HIGHLAND TOWERS

On December 11, 1993 at 1.30pm, after a period of 10

days of incessant rain, Block 1
of Highland Towers Condominium
collapsed resulting in the loss of
48 lives and the loss of use of the
remaining two Tower Blocks that
are still unoccupied. The local
authority (MPAJ, 1994) set up a
Technical Committee of Enquiries
and the findings are as follows:
●T h e H i g h l a n d T o w e r s
Condominium was sited mainly on
fill ground over granitic formation.
The maximum depth from the
ground surface to bedrock is
about 19m. Granitic rocks found
in and around the areas were
not highly soluble minerals to
adversely affect the stability of
the foundations.
● Soils overlying the granitic
bedrock were very loose to loose
silty sand and highly permeable.
● The foundation for all the three
Tower Blocks were supported on
rail piles designed to take only
vertical loads.
●S u r f a c e d r a i n a g e s y s t e m
provided was not in accordance to
approved plan. Situations worsen
when earthwork activities changed
the drainage pattern on the hillslope
behind the Condominium
Blocks and available drainage
systems were not maintained.
● Clearing of trees on upper
catchments resulted in increased
runoff that flowed down the
terraced hill-slope immediately
behind the towers
●R e t r o g r e s s i v e s l i d e s
progressively moved uphill starting
from loss of toe mass at the back
of the Condominium Block 1 (see
Fig. 5).
Fig.3 Landslide at Quarter 1276 Fig.4 Landslide at Quarter 1280
THE INGENIEUR 11
cover feature
● The fallen debris accumulated
behindthebackterraceof
Condominium Tower Block 1
caused the landslip to occur
beneaththeentirerailpile
foundation that brought down
the Tower Block 1 Condominium
within minutes of the landslide
occurrences. (This mode of failure
has been precluded by the High
Court hearings. Yee (2008) has
analytically shown that this mode
of failure is inadmissible).
It must be pointed out that
the MPAJ 1994 report was
accepted by the High Court only
on the factual data contained in
the report. The findings in the
report were excluded as during
the course of the High Court
hearings, certain findings, based
on evidence, were arrived at.
The rotational retrogressive slope
failure was accepted as the cause
of the collapse of the Block 1 of
the Highland Towers and water
from up-slope development and its
drainage system and maintenance
were the major factors contributing
to the slope failure.
The Resident Association took
the case to the High Court (Steve
Phoa Chen Loon & Ors v Highland
Properties Sdn Bhd & Ors,
2000) and the High Court found
that the landslide that brought
down Block 1 of the Highland
Towers Condominium was due
to a rotational retrogressive slide
emanating from a high retaining
wall behind the second tier of
the three-tiered car parks. Water
was found to be the principal
factor that caused this high wall
to fail.
Lessons learned from the
decision of the High Court in
August 2000 are as follows:
The Engineer was liable in
negligence for (i) not having
taken into account the hill or
slope behind the Towers, (ii) not
having designed and constructed
a foundation to accommodate
the lateral loads of a landslide or
alternatively to have ensured that
the adjacent hill-slope was stable,
(iii) for not having implemented
that approved drainage scheme,
(iv) for colluding with the
First (Developer) and Second
(Architectural Draughtsman)
Defendants to obtain CF without
fulfilling the conditions imposed
by the Fourth Defendant (Local
Authorities) and also in nuisance
as he was an unreasonable user
of land. An appeal was filed
by the Defendants and the
Appeal Court in December 2002
maintained the fact findings of
the High Court. The case went
further to the Federal Court and
in the judgment of February
2006; economic loss claim of
the residents was rejected.
This case has several important
implications for developers,
building professionals, local
authorities, absentee landlords
and developers of neighbouring
properties in Malaysia. As the
Court battle went on, the two
other towers that were declared
unsafe for occupation were left
vacant and unattended even till
today, some 15 years after the
incident.
In general, water has been the
principal cause of many slope
failures as can be seen in Table
2. The design should have taken
into account suitable surface and
subsurface drainage of slopes.
The use of tipped-fill materials
on slope and embankment
should never have been allowed
under any circumstances but this
practice remains unabated.
Rainfall Records
Since water and poor drainage
h av e b e e n f o u n d t o b e t h e
principal factors of the causes
of collapse of the slope and one
of the towers, it is important
then to look at the cumulative
rainfall three months before the
collapse of the slope and the
tower. Fig. 6 shows the rainfall
d i s t r i b u t i o n f r om S e p t emb e r-
December 1993. On the same
figure, the cumulative rainfall
wa s a l s o p l o t t e d . I t c a n b e
seen that the cumulative rainfall
on the day of the tragic event
was about 900mm. The annual
rainfall for 1993 was 2,604mm.
Thus the cumulative rainfall from
September to December 11, 1993
accounted for 35% of the annual
Fig. 5 Retrogressive Slope Failure
12 THE INGENIEUR
cover feature
rainfall. The intensity of rainfall
wa s s e ve r e i n t h e mo n t h o f
December prior to the day when
the slope and the Block 1 Tower
c o l l a p s e d . The s e e p a g e f l ow
would have played a part in the
collapse of the slope since water
emerging from the rubble wall at
the slope toe can cause loss of
support as the material collapsed
locally leading to the rotational
retrogressive slope failure.