171

British Journa l of Social Psychology (2002), 41, 171188

2002 The British Psychological Society
www.bps.org.uk

Henri Tajfels Cognitive aspects of prejudice

and the psychology of bigotry

Michael Billig*
Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough University, UK

This paper pays tribute to Tajfels classic article Cognitive aspects of prejudice and
re-examines its central arguments. Tajfels paper is important for outlining a social
cognitive approach to the study of prejudice and also for refuting of what Tajfel called
the blood-and-guts approach. Taking Tajfels proposition that social psychology is not
value-free, the current paper examines the moral and political view of Cognitive
aspects and also the gaps in its approach to the study of prejudice. It is suggested that
this cognitive approach has difficulty in accounting for extreme bigotry, at least
without recourse to the motivational themes that the approach seeks to exclude. In
particular, there would be limitations in applying this approach in order to understand
the Holocaust. Indeed, Tajfel did not attempt to do so, for reasons that are discussed.
Tajfels Social Identity Theory (SIT) has similar limitations. The paper also examines
Tajfels use of the term depersonalization, which he described as a milder form of
dehumanizatio n of out-groups. Later social identity theorists have tended to use
depersonalization differently, shifting their attentio n to in-groups. Their perspective
moves away from understandin g the topic of prejudice in the way that can be found in
Tajfels Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Finally, the present paper suggests how
extrem e prejudice might be studied without returnin g to the motivational blood-and-
guts approach that Tajfel so cogently criticized.

It will soon be 20 ye ars since the de ath of He nri Tajfel. His influe nce throughout social
psychology p ersists, e spe cially in work on soc ial identity (Robinson, 1996). As Brow n
and Capozza (2000) have show n, inte rest in Social Ide ntity Theory (SIT) continue s to
grow, w ith an inc reasing number of studies being published yearly. As with any major
figure in the social scie nce s, Tajfe ls writings rep ay care ful study and reinterpre tation.
This article ex amine s the rhe toric and argume nt of He nri Tajfels classic article
Cognitive aspec ts of prejudic e, which was first published in the Journal of Biosocial
Sciences in 1 969 and which has bee n rep rinte d a numbe r of time s since . The article
feature d as a ke y c hapter in Tajfe ls book Human groups and social categories (Tajfe l,
1981).
There are a numbe r of re asons for re-e x amining Cognitive aspec ts of pre judice .
Most notably, the article re mains one of the most brilliant piec es of writing in the
history of social psyc hology. Writte n be fore soc ial psychologys cognitive turn in the

*Requests for reprints should be addresse d to Michael Billig, Department of Social Sciences, Loughboroug h University,
Loughboroug h LE11 3TU, UK (e-mail: m.g.billig@lboro.ac.uk).
172 Michael Billig

1980s, Cognitive aspec ts of prejudic e outlined the principle s of c ognitive social

psychology without spec ifically using the term social c ognition. Eise r (1996) has
argued that c urre nt asse ssments of Tajfels legac y tend to conc entrate on Social Ide n-
tity The ory at the e x pe nse of his e arlie r w ork in soc ial judgment. Tajfel produc ed
Cognitive aspec ts at a ke y point in his inte lle ctual developme nt. It was w ritten as a
c ulmination of his work in social judgme nt, but be fore he deve lop ed Soc ial Identity
The ory. The artic le w as publishe d just as Tajfe l w as embarking on the minimal
intergroup e x periments that w ere to lay the basis for his later intergroup theorizing
(Tajfel, 1970; Tajfe l Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). As suc h, Cognitive aspe cts
c ombine s the the mes of soc ial judgment with those of intergroup c onflic t, as Tajfel
argued that the principles of c ognition can illuminate the p sychological nature of
prejudic e.
Ove r and above paying tribute to Tajfels enduring inte llectual legacy, there is
another reason for returning to Cognitive aspe cts of pre judice . This is to unde rstand
the nature of prejudice . It is not suggested that Cognitive aspe cts holds all the keys,
nor even that we should follow rigidly the message that Tajfe l was advocating there .
Far from it, the strategy is to e x amine c ritically the omissions in the artic le . This is not
to downgrade the importance of Cognitive aspe cts. In the social sc ienc es, works of
the highest intellec tual quality alw ays rep ay c ritic al re-e x amination, for even the ir
limitatio ns and omissions can be re ve aling. This is what sep arate s the first-rate from the
mere ly compe tent.
The omissions in Cognitive aspe cts, it will be sugge ste d, enable us to understand
the contex t of Tajfels theorizing, espec ially in relation to his bac kground. They are
also the oretically re ve aling, inasmuch as they point towards the limitation s of the
c ognitive ap proac h for understanding ex tre me prejudic e. In this respec t, the present
tribute to Cognitive aspe cts is also an argument. To argue, howe ve r, is not ne ce ssarily
to rejec t, but to de ve lop. As Tajfel (1981) e mphasize d, no soc ial psychology is value -
fre e, for all social psychology reflec ts the c ultural c limate in which it is produced. That
w as w hy he argue d that it was vital to have multiple pe rsp ective s in social psychology
(Tajfel, 1981, p. 6). The political climate of today is diffe re nt from that of the late 196 0s
and early 1 970s, when Tajfe l w as de ve loping his ide as. So must social p sychology
reflec t the se changed times. Todays soc ial p sychology c annot be a mere re pe tition of
that w hic h was formulated a ge neration ago. Tajfel may have argue d that motivational
the mes should be put to one side, but, by c onsidering one of the finest pie ce s of
w riting, it will be sugge ste d that suc h the me s c annot, and should not, be e x cluded
e ntirely if one wishe s to understand ex treme pre judice .

Image of humanity
The opening paragraphs of Cognitive aspe cts illustrate Tajfels inte lle ctual style . He
does not start w ith a c are ful review of pre vious ex pe rime ntal studie s on prejudice and
soc ial judgment. That sort of review can be found in his contribution to The handbook
of social psychology, whic h w as p ublishe d in the same year (Tajfel, 1969b) but which
Tajfel did not include in Human groups and social categories. Tajfel not only re ad
w ide ly in othe r discip lines such as history, anthropology and political sc ienc e, but also
use d this re ading in his social psyc hology (se e, for instance , his comme nt in the
interview w ith Cohe n (1 977, p. 30 6) about his reading). The Marx ist philosophe r and
c ric ke t write r C. L. R. Jame s adapte d a saying from Rudyard Kipling in the pre fac e to
 Cognitive aspects of prejudice 173

his book Beyond a boundary: What do the y know of cric ke t w ho only cricket
know? (Jame s, 1964, p. 11). A further adap tation would fit Tajfe ls own acade mic
prac tice , as we ll as his inte lle ctual position: What do they know of soc ial psychology
who only soc ial psychology know ?
Cognitive aspe cts begins with soc ial anthropology and an assertion of the c om-
monality of humans. Tajfe l writes that the vie ws of e arly social anthropologists suc h as
Rivers, who be lie ve d in the c ultural and p sychological defe ctiveness of non-Europe ans,
are now rejec ted. Tajfel illustrated this w ith a long quotation from Le vi-Strausss
The savage mind. In the quotation, Le vi-Strauss was arguing that so-c alled primitive
c ultures have deve lop ed a sophistic ated practical scie ntific knowledge. All forms of
agriculture , the making of p ots, the use of poisons in w arfare or ritual, and so on,
depe nd upon an e mpiric al attitude and a de sire for know le dge . Tajfel then commented
that: an image of Man e merges from the se considerations (1981, p . 128; quotations
are take n from the ve rsion of Cognitive asp ec ts included in Human groups; here , and
in subse que nt quotations, no atte mpt will be made to alte r Tajfels use of masculine
nouns and pronouns to denote humanity in gene ral). The image depic ts humans as
be ing essentially rational be ings, w ho se ek, above all, to unde rstand their world. The
same image, Tajfe l comments, is to be found in the work of Frede rick Bartle tt, who
stresse d the human e ffort afte r me aning.
As Tajfel re alized, such images of humans c annot be prove d by e x perimentation.
Evidence c an be brought from e x perimental psyc hology, and from history, soc ial anthro-
pology and so on to support the image , but ultimately, the image ste ms from a wider
politic al and moral perspec tive. Because social psyc hology and othe r soc ial scie nce s are
not value -free , such an image will conve y moral and p olitic al value s. In this w ay, Tajfel at
the start of Cognitive asp ec ts w as dec laring a political and moral position, just as
Le vi-Strauss was doing w he n he app lie d the rational image , not to modern Europe ans,
but to the very c ultures that Europe ans had for ce nturies dismisse d as irrational.
Typic ally, an academic argument is dire cted towards a rival position. The refore, to
understand the meaning of an ac ademic position, not only must one de termine the
sp ec ific case that is be ing advocate d, but one must also know w hat positions are being
argued against (Billig, 1 987a). Tajfe ls assertion of a common rational humanity was an
argument against a c ounter-position. As he noted, when obse rve rs try to e x plain
human soc ial activity, e spec ially warfare, they disc ard the rational image of humanity,
adopting instead a blood-and-guts model for soc ial phe nomena (Tajfel, 1981,
p. 128). During the 1960s, the blood-and-guts model of c onflic t was prominent in both
popular and acade mic writing: it had bee n blesse d and spe eded on its w ay by a
numbe r of books, some of which have quic kly bec ome best-se lle rs (p. 12 9). Tajfe l
had in mind populist versions of Freudian and ethologic al theories that postulate d an
instinc t for aggression. Fore most amongst the blood-and-guts w rite rs was the Nobe l
prize-w inning ethologist, Konrad Lorenz, who was to publish his ide as in a numbe r of
be st-selling books (e .g. Lorenz, 197 4, 1976). Lore nz direc tly e x trapolated from his
animal studie s to human beings, in w ays that antic ipate some of the cruder versions of
todays evolutionary psychology. Lore nz c laime d that humans, in common w ith a
numbe r of animal spe cie s, had e volved an aggressive instinc t but without the biologi-
c ally base d inhibitory me chanisms to be found in othe r spec ies. Lorenz propose d that
human c onflict should be ex plained in terms of this innate aggre ssive instinct, and,
thus, he w as proposing a biologic al sourc e of irrationality at the core of human nature .
In this regard, Lorenzs blood-and-guts model was the very antithesis of the rational
model to be found in Bartle tt and Le vi-Strauss.
174 Michael Billig

Against the blood-and-guts model

Tajfel rec ognized that the re we re compe lling intellec tual and political re asons for
c ombating the blood-and-guts model. In Cognitive aspe cts, Tajfel produc ed two sets
of argument against the blood-and-guts mode l. First, the re was the wax ing-and-w aning
argume nt, whic h pow erfully yet simp ly unde rmined the the oretic al adequacy of an
instinc tivist e x planation of human warfare. Tajfe l c once de d that all me n can and do
display hostility towards groups other than their ow n (1981, p . 130). Howe ver, the y
do not do this all the time , for there is also no doubt, how eve r, that under othe r
c onditions this hostility eithe r does not appe ar or c an be modified (p. 130). In short,
the positing of an invariant and unc hangeable instinc t c annot ex plain the w ax ing and
w aning of social c onflic t (nor of individual aggre ssivene ss). To e x plain why w ars occ ur
at one time and not anothe r, one must go be yond the hypothe sis of an aggressive
instinc t and look at soc ial and historic al conditions. This involves e x amining the be lie fs
and ideologie s that groups hold about eac h other. Thus, the study of c onflic t must
e mbrace the study of group attitudes, and, in conse que nc e, the re should be a social
psychological dimension.
Tajfe l also had a moral/p olitic al argument against the blood-and-guts pe rspe ctive. To
offe r an acc ount of soc ial c onflic t in terms of an unc hanging instinc t is, at best, to
sugge st that nothing can be done to alleviate p rejudic e. At worst, it is to justify
prejudic e and c hauvinism as an innate part of the human c ondition. As Tajfe l w ell
kne w, this w as a ce ntral part of Nazi ideology, w hic h postulate d that the re is an innate
desire to favour one s own race. Acc ording to this ideology, liberalism and a belie f in
the universality of human rationality we re alien to the nature of humans. At the time
of writing Cognitive aspec ts, Tajfe l w as unaw are that Lore nzs early pape rs, w hich
w ere published during the Nazi era, w ere lac ed with Nazi terminology, even to the
e x te nt of praising the racial p olic y of the Nazi regime (see , for instanc e, Lorenz, 1940,
1943). The ex posure of Lorenzs early work was to c ome shortly after the public ation
of Cognitive aspec ts (see Eise nberg, 1972; se e also Billig, 1978; Nisbe tt, 1976).
Eve n without the spe cific e vidence linking Lorenzs instictivism with Nazi ide ology,
Tajfel w as aware of the de eply reactionary implic ations of the blood-and-guts
approach. In this light, his use of Le vi-Strauss to begin his analysis of prejudice was no
acc ident. It was better to begin with the assumption of a unive rsal, human rationality,
as Le vi-Strauss was doingand, inde ed, as Chomsky w as doing at that time than to
utter profound-sounding banalitie s about the irrationality of human nature .

Cognition and prejudice

The ne x t step in Tajfe ls argument was a bold one : to show that the see ming irrational-
ities in human soc ial c onduct ow ed the ir origin to this e ssential rationality. Again, the
argume nt is simple and all the more pow erful for its simplic ity. Tajfel starte d from
the assumption that prejudic e c onstituted a serious social p roble m. Inde ed, as he
rec ounted in Human group and social categories, the essay that won him a sc holar-
ship to enter university as a mature stude nt afte r the war was entitled Pre judice
(Tajfel, 1981, p. 2). In Cognitive aspec ts, Tajfel w rote that prejudice lite rally me ans
p rejudgment, and most c ommonly, the te rm is used to refe r to the prejudgme nt of
other group s. Technic ally, it is possible to pre judge in favour of othe r groups. How-
e ve r, Tajfe ls c once rn, whic h is re fle cted in the c ommon use of pre judic e to denote a
serious social problem, was the p rejudic e against other group s. As he wrote, the
 Cognitive aspects of prejudice 175

purpose of Cognitive aspe cts w as to prese nt an outline of the c ognitive e tiology of

pre judice , mainly with re gard to its unfavourable aspec ts (Tajfel, 1981, p. 131,
e mphasis in original) .
In pre judice d thinking, judgme nts are made about the members of other groups
re gardle ss of the ir individual charac te ristics: members of the out-group are judged
ne gative ly, or unfavourably stereotype d, simply bec ause they be long to the out-group.
Tajfe l relate d this type of ste reotyping to ordinary sense-making. In order to under-
stand the worldboth the p hysic al and the soc ial world humans nee d to make
c ognitive short cuts. There is too much sensory informatio n available at any one point
to deal w ith eve ry detail. Unless this informatio n is c ognitive ly organizedunle ss it is
c ategorize d there c an be no meaning. There fore , humans nee d to organize the social
world into cate gories. How ever, w he n we do this, we are liable to distort the world,
e ven as w e make it meaningful. As Tajfel had shown in his line -estimatio n studies,
imposing a cate gorization on a continuum of stimuli create s a te nde nc y towards two
sorts of ex aggeration: the re is the te ndenc y to overestimate the ex tent to which
instance s of the same cate gory resemble each other and a tende nc y to overe stimate the
diffe rence s betwe en instanc es of different cate gorie s (Tajfe l & Wilke s, 1963). Tajfe l
argued that the effects of c ategorization on the judgment of physical stimuli re sembled
the ex agge rations of social stereotype s. Thus, the tende ncy to pre judge members
of out-groups was, at root, simila r to the more gene ral te ndency to e x aggerate the
diffe rence s betwe en c ategorie s and to minimize diffe renc es within c ategories.
The notion of c ategorization w as one of three ke y c once pts that Tajfe l used in
Cognitive aspec ts to outline the cognitive dynamics of p rejudic e. The other two
c oncep ts w ere assimilation and cohe rence . In line w ith Tajfels attempt to construct
a ge nuinely social approach to prejudic e, he stre sse d the importance of assimilatio n.
Individuals do not cre ate their own c ategorie s but assimilate the c ategorie s that
are culturally available , the reby acc epting c ulturally de termine d patte rns of
pre judgme nt and ste re otyping.
Individuals use the se social cate gorie s to make sense of, and there by bring
c ohere nc e to, the ir understanding of the w orld. The searc h for c ohere nc e provides a
c lue about how individuals c ope with unde rstanding the constantly c hanging social
world. Individuals will atte mpt to use c ategorie s in w ays that preserve the ir se lf-image
or integrity. Acc ording to Tajfe l, this nee d to pre se rve the inte grity or the se lf-image
is the only motivational assumption that we nee d to make in order to understand
the direc tion that the search for cohe rence will take (1981, p. 137). A similar
motivational assumption was to appe ar in Social Identity Theory, which assume d a
ne ed for a positive social ide ntity (i.e . Tajfe l & Turner, 1979).
Cognitive aspec ts provide s a brilliant re buttal of an instinctual theory of pre judice .
Tajfe l take s an aspe ct of human behaviour that appe ars to be inhe rently irrational
but argue s that this irrationality should be unde rstood in terms of a psychological
pe rspe ctive that is base d on the assumption of human rationality. The re is, in c onse -
quenc e, no ne ed to posit an underlying motivational force . Yet, as c an be se en,
motivational pre mise s are not entirely e x clude d. The cognitive approach includes the
motivation to unde rstand, as w ell as the motive for pre se rving the se lf-image. As such,
the c ognitive approac h is not entire ly cognitive.
There are a number of criticisms that c an be made of the c ognitive ap proac h to
pre judice . Rec ently, critics have suggeste d that c ognitive soc ial psyc hology is mistaken
in taking a pe rce ptual, rather than disc ursive, view of c ategorization (Billig, 1985,
1987a; Potter & Wethe rell, 1987; Wethe rell, 1996). Acc ording to this argume nt, the
176 Michael Billig

c ategorie s of prejudic e are e sse ntially language c ategories. Spe ake rs can use language
flex ibly and, thus, are not restric te d mere ly to minimizin g within-c ategory diffe rence s
or be tw een-cate gory similaritie s (Edw ards, 1991). Indee d, w ith language, we can both
c ategorize in our judgments as we ll as p articularize , not to mention talk c ritic ally about
our c ategorie s (Billig, 1987a). All this makes the use of c ategorie s in language ve ry
diffe re nt from the use of pe rc eptual c ategorization. More over, this duality of particular-
ization and cate gorization c an be found in the language of those who are p rejudic ed
and, more ge ne rally, in the talk of those who hold strong vie ws (Billig, 1985, 1991).
The present purpose is not to p ursue this discursive critique of the c ognitive
approach. Inste ad, the tactic is to apply Tajfe ls the oretic al critique against the blood-
and-guts approach to his own approach. In the wax ing-and-waning argume nt, Tajfel
w as ex posing what the blood-and-guts app roac h c annot ex p lain. The fact that the
argume nt could e x pose the limitation s of the blood-and-guts approach does not mean
that the c ognitive approach has no analogous limitations . In fac t, it is safe to assume
that any theory in social psyc hology must be incomp le te , just as any image of the
pe rson that underlie s a theoretical pe rsp ec tive must also be an oversimplification. The
intention is to p robe the absenc es, in orde r to c larify which asp ects of pre judice
the cognitive approach best addre sse s and whic h aspe cts it tends to ignore.

Holocaust and explanation

The re is a paradox in the limitatio n of Tajfe ls approach to pre judice . He did not apply
e ither his c ognitive approach, or his Social Identity The ory, to e x plain the one histori-
c al e vent that brought him to social psyc hology the Holocaust. In the opening pages
of Human groups and social categories, Tajfe l describes in all too brie f terms his
passage towards social psychology. Unlike the majority of the people whom he had
grow n up w ith, Tajfel survive d the massac re of Europe an Je ws. For the re st of his life ,
he was to reflec t on what had happened. As has be en me ntioned, Tajfels e ssay
Pre judice e nabled him to enter unive rsity as a mature student, and he w as to bec ome
a professional academic almost in a fit of absent-minde dness (Tajfe l, 19 81, p. 1; see
also his ac count in the inte rvie w in Cohe n, 1 977). Although Tajfel may have be gun his
rese arch caree r by addre ssing tec hnical que stions of pe rce ptual judgment, he was soon
using this re se arc h as a basis for understanding the nature of pre judice . Academic
rese arch for its own sake was insufficie nt for Tajfe l. He would te ll his students that
be hind his work lay one que stion: how is ge nocide p ossible?
Yet, apart from occ asional comme nts, Tajfel rarely in his w ritte n work applie d his
pow erful the orie s of pre judice to the one e vent that pre occ upied him (for a more
detaile d disc ussion of this omission, se e Billig, 1996). In part, this reflec ts a more
ge neral phenome non. There was little writte n or spoke n about the Holoc aust for a
ge neration afte r the Sec ond World War. Survivors at that time would rare ly risk
telling the ir storie s to a w orld that se emingly had more important things to do than
listen. In addition there are spec ific reasons against offering academic e x planations,
e spe cially p sychological ex p lanations, of the Holocaust.
If w e c laim to have ex plaine d an e vent, we are claiming to have under-
stood it. More over, the e x planation by providing understanding by giving a set of
adequate cause ssee ms to wrap up that event. Furthe r de taile d thought be comes
unnec essary; afte r all, we know and understand what happe ned. Any ex planation of
the Holocaust w ould be c laiming too much. More than any othe r e ve nt in history, the
Holocaust should not be ex plaine d aw ay; it demands furthe r thought. A p sychological
 Cognitive aspects of prejudice 177

e x planation runs a furthe r risk: tout comprendre cest tout pardonner. If an ac count
e x plains the motives and thought proc esses of the perpetrators in psychological te rms,
suc h an acc ount may pre sent the pe rpe trators in an unde rstandable light that wittingly
or unwittingly invites e mpathy (see Billig, 1996; Mandel, 1998). Primo Levi e x pre ssed
this better than anyone in If this is a man (Levi, 1987). He argue d that one should not
understand w hat happe ned in the Holocaust be cause to unde rstand is almost to justify.
Unde rstanding w ould mean putting one self in the p lac e of, and thus identifying with,
the p erpe trators. Better not to understand, argue d Levi, than risk such identific ation.
In addition to such gene ral c onsiderations, there are spec ific feature s of Tajfels
c ognitive app roac h that would make it unsuitable, at least on its own, as an e x pla-
nation of the Holoc aust. In Cognitive aspe cts, Tajfel w as describing unive rsal
proc esses. Cate gorization, assimilation and cohe re nce we re not assume d to be
c ulturally spe cific, as if the y only occ ur in c ertain socio-historic c onte x ts and not
others. The y we re inte nded to rep resent feature s of all human thinking. Similarly,
Tajfe l w as proposing that it was human nature to w ish to understand the human world
and that the simplifications of cate gorization were ne ce ssary to do so. The se conce pts
c an be app lie d to all forms of inte rgroup prejudic e. How ever, if the y are ap plied to the
Holocaust as if offering an e x planation, the e x treme spec ificity of that e vent would be
lost.
It would be neithe r app ropriate, nor informativ e, to say that the Germans systemati-
c ally murdere d the Je ws in the Sec ond World War, bec ause they w ere see king to
understand the world and to p rotec t their self-inte grity. Of course , such proce sse s may
have playe d the ir part, but c onstitute only a small part in a w ide r pic ture (Mande l,
1998, 200 1). We c an say indee d we must saythat the German murder of the Je ws
should be unde rstood in terms of what the Nazis thought about Jew s. But this is very
diffe rent from offe ring an e x planation in te rms of c ognitive proce sse s suc h as the
se arch for understanding and the p rotec tion of se lf-integrity. The re is nothing intrinsic
about these proc esses, nor about the unive rsal proce sses of c ategorization, assimilatio n
and cohe rence , that would acc ount for the historical spe cificity of Nazi ide ology.
It is significant that Tajfe l presented his cognitive approach as offering an under-
standing (not an e x planation) of pre judice . One implic ation of the approac h is that
pre judice , at least in its literal se nse of prejudgment, is ine vitable: we must use c at-
e gorie s in our thinking, and c ategorization predisp oses us to prejudgme nt. Thus the
ine vitability of prejudice , and indee d of stereotyping, is implied (see Billig, 1985,
1987a, for criticisms of this assumption).
Even if it is c oncede d that prejudic e is ine vitable and that human thinking about
soc ial group s involves some or other form of ste re otyping, this does not me an that all
pre judice s and all stere otyping are equivalent. Inde ed, the te rm prejudic e may be too
anodyne to c over all forms of intergroup ste reotyping. Ste reotyp es, e ve n if they are
broadly ne gative , c an be distinguished in te rms of the ir inte nsity and ide ological
importance . For instanc e, the current British stereotype of German tourists, who rush
to the beach to sec ure the best sunbathing spots, c an be distinguishe d from the Nazi
stere otype of Je ws as vermin, responsible for all German misfortunes. As Tajfel noted
in Cognitive asp ec ts, partic ular cate gorizations are embedde d (or assimilated) into
wide r ide ologic al patte rns of be lief.
The te rm prejudice is not a neutral te rm, but it conveys a critique of the belie fs
labelled as p rejudic ed (see Billig, 1991). De spite this moral and politic al evaluation,
not all prejudic es, just like all ste reotyp es, nee d to be conside red as equivalent. Within
the ge neral cate gory of illegitimate belie fs, pre judice is not the stronge st te rm in the
178 Michael Billig

le x icon. The re is, for instance, bigotry. In ex treme ideological conte x ts, pre judice
c an be c onsidere d a c omparatively mild te rm and, indee d, inapprop riate be cause of
this c omparative mildne ss. To say that Hitle r and other leading Nazis we re prejudic ed
against Je ws w ould se em to be an understate me nt. Their anti-se mitis m crie s out for a
stronge r te rm. Thus, one ne eds to inte nsity the le x icon in orde r to begin to c apture the
sort of be lie fs that lay at the core of the sort of Nazi ide ology. A term that describe s a
phenomenon, that is suppose dly unive rsal to all belief systems, w ill not do for a be lief
syste m that is spec ifically ge noc idal, or eliminationist, to quote Goldhage n (1998).
Tajfel, with his fine sense of understanding and approp riatene ss, w ould not have
neede d to be told this. In this light it is not surp rising that he did not turn his
the oretic al c onstruc ts to the ve ry issue that led him to the study of prejudic e.

Prejudice and bigotry

Tajfels argument against the blood-and-guts approac h can be turned around and
applied against his own approach. Just as the blood-and-guts position c ould not
acc ount for the wax ing and waning of w arfare , so we c an say that the re c an be a
w ax ing and waning of prejudic e. Some time s there is soc ially shared bigotry; some time s
the re is not; sometimes an ideology of toleranc e might be widespre ad. A c ognitive
approach that links prejudic e to cate gorization (and also to assimilatio n and c ohe r-
e nc e) c annot of itself acc ount for this w ax ing and waning: some additional e le me nt is
c alle d for.
This, of c ourse, doe s not ne ce ssarily imp ly a return to the blood-and-guts mode l that
Tajfel criticized so powe rfully. Just to say that the cognitive model ne eds an added
e leme nt is not to say that the additional fac tor must be an assume d innate instinc t for
aggre ssion. It might be suggested that the additional ele ments are not p sychologic al
factors but are historic al and c ultural e le me nts, which, acc ording to Tajfe ls acc ount,
w ould need to be assimilated by the individual. If this w ere the c ase, the distinguishing
features be tw ee n different inte nsities of pre judice would not be psyc hologic al. It
w ould be implausible , howe ve r, to asse rt that the differe nce be twe en p rejudic e, as a
c ognitive inte rpretation of the social world, and bigotry, as an intense group hatred,
must only be cultural and historical. There surely could be some soc io-p sychological
distinctions betwe en the two typ es of phe nome na.
The differe nce be twe en pre judice and bigotry, or hatred, can be c onsidere d furthe r.
Where as the notion of prejudic e se ems to invite a c ognitive inte rpre tation, since its
lite ral sense re fe rs to pre judgme nt, bigotry se ems to include the very p sychological
c omponents that the c ognitive approach sought to e x clude, or at least to p ut to one
side . The se are emotional or motivational fac tors, adding an intensity and wilfulne ss to
mere categoric al e x agge rations. To talk of Nazi anti-semitism without suc h fac tors to
presume it to be me rely a cate gory mistake would se em odd.
Ke nne th Burke (1963), in his book A grammar of motives, discusses the limitatio ns
of giving simple (nothing but) e x planations of human be haviour. The e x c luded
e leme nts have a habit of worming their way back. Burke spec ifically mentioned
instinc tivist ex planations of w arfare . Whe n applie d to actual c ases, suc h e x planations
start rec ognizing situational fac tors, in order to ac count for why the w ar occ urred
at one point and not anothe r (Burke, 1962, p. 34). Similarly, the cognitive ex pla-
nation cannot ac count for w hy prejudic e might become bigotry without discussing
motivational issue s. One might predict that the more it avoids doing so, the more these
issues will sne ak into the ac count by, as it w ere, the bac k door.
 Cognitive aspects of prejudice 179

This can be se en in Cognitive aspec ts of pre judice . At one point, Tajfe l writes if
a man is pre judice d, he has an emotional investme nt in pre serving differe ntiations
be twe en his own group and others (p. 134). He re Tajfe l is using the description
prejudic ed in a different way than he used pre judice when de scribing the c ognitive
implic ations of cate gorization. To be prejudic ed in this state ment is to do more than
use a social c ategory in a way that ove restimate s the differenc es be twe en in-group and
out-group members. The se nte nce significantly suggests that pre judice c an be a c on-
dition of a p ersons be ing (to be prejudic ed, he writes), not something that is a
by-product of inevitable cognitive p rocessing. In this c ase, the c ondition of being
inc lude s an ex tra dime nsion, namely an emotional investment.
Tajfel has little to say about what this emotional investme nt might be and how it
might operate. There was a good the oretical reason why Tajfel w ould have avoided
drawing out this theme . To talk of emotional motivations might seem to be leading
back to individual dynamic s. Significantly, in the state ment just quoted, Tajfel refe rs to
an individual be ing pre judice d, and not a group. Reducing soc ial e ve nts to individual
motives w as some thing he c onsistently sought to avoid. The problem of bigotry w as
not to be resolved by the psyc hologic al analysisor psyc hoanalysis of individual
bigots.
Howe ver, the reductionism, that Tajfe l opp osed, is not a nec essary conse quenc e of
c onside ring motivational factors. Rec ently, w ithin social constructionist psychology,
there is an aw arene ss that emotions must be c onsidered as socially constitute d
(Edwards, 1997; Harre & Gillett, 1994). This position stresses that e motions do not
e x ist as w ordle ss imp ulses, lying be ne ath soc ial life , but are constitute d w ithin social,
disc ursive interac tion. This is e ve n true of unc onsc ious emotions (Billig, 1999). Thus,
hatred nee d not be se en as an individual condition, loc ated within the body of the
individual. There can be ide ologies of hatre d that produc e hate-talk (e.g. Whilloc k &
Slayde n, 19 95). The hatred is not se parate from the discourse . To hate is not me rely, or
principally, to feel something at a bodily or visc eral levelbut to belie ve and to utter
partic ular sorts of things about othe rs (Billig, 2001 ). Without that, there c an be no
hatred. To put it crude ly, w e do not ne ed to know the hidde n, inne r psychological
me chanisms of the Nazis, in orde r to know that the y hate d Jew s. The ir actions and
their w ords w ere not a sign of their hatred, as if the hatred really w as e lsew he re ; those
actions and w ords we re, in the most literal se nse , pure hatred.

Gap in Social Identity Theory

Although Cognitive aspec ts containe d feature s that w ere to be de ve lope d in the later
Social Ide ntity The ory, the re are also differe nce s. Most notably, soc ial ide ntity the ory is
not a theory of pre judice . It c ertainly is not a the ory of murde rous bigotry. It is, at root,
a the ory of group free dom. It te lls of the w ay that oppre sse d groups c an find w ays to
c halle nge groups that have the pow er to asc ribe identities and stere otypes. The most
original parts of the theory de sc ribe how groups c an re-c reate stereotype s that are
applied to them: they can find ne w dime nsions of c omparison, alte r the valuation of
e x isting traits, collec tive ly oppose p ow erful out-groups, e tc . Significantly, the e x am-
ple s that Tajfel tended to use, in order to illustrate the se proce sse s, w ere the blac k
powe r movement in the USA and the w omens moveme nt. Both w ere dire ctly over-
turning ascribed stere otypes and re -creating the ir social ide ntities.
Tajfel belonged to the gene ration of East Europe an Je ws for whom attachment to the
Jewish state , espec ially after the war, w as de ep ly he ld. Afte r what that ge neration had
180 Michael Billig

w itne sse d, a world without a Je wish state c ould ne ver be fully trusted. Ne vertheless,
w ith the e x ce ption of a few passing refe renc es (e.g. Tajfel, 19 81, p. 186), Tajfel did not
use Zionism as an illustratio n of Social Ide ntity Theory in the way that he use d black
pow er and the w omens moveme nt. Zionism had be en engage d in the very ac tivity
described by Soc ial Identity The ory; it was ex p lic itly ove rturning centurie s of stereo-
typing, which had de picted Je ws as passive, unheroic , politically uncre ative and so on.
In private conversation, esp ecially with Je ws, Tajfel would be open in his support for
the e x iste nc e of Israe l (while distancing himself from the partic ular actions of Israeli
gove rnments). However, in the 1960s and 1970s, the re we re still inhibitions, at le ast in
British unive rsity c ircle s, against ex pressing Jew ish issue s too ope nly. In ways that
Soc ial Ide ntity Theory itse lf could de sc ribe, there w ere pressures not to be too Je wish
too visibly (se e Billig (2000) for an acc ount of how such p ressures affec ted the cultural
sphe re of p opular music at that time ). In the late 1960s, espec ially during the student
pow er e vents, Zionism was not politically ac ce ptable within leftist, liberal circles of
the soc ial scie nce s (significantly, Tajfel disc usse d anti-semitism of both the left and the
right in his interview with David Cohen to a muc h gre ater ex te nt than in his writings of
the time see Cohen, 1977, p. 310). On the far le ft, anti-Zionism was c ommonly
e x pre sse d (Billig, 1987b).
The c onseque nce is that Tajfels w ritings show a gap at the c ore of his political
thinking. His c ognitive approach did not direc tly addre ss the e x tre me of bigotry that
c onstituted Nazism. Nor did he apply Soc ial Identity Theory to Jew ish (or Palestinian)
identity in the Middle East. Soc ial Ide ntity Theory, howe ver, c ould not have be en easily
use d as the c entral e leme nt in a social p sychologic al inte rpre tation of Nazism. A social
identity theorist, w ho wished to apply the the ory, might say that Nazism arose bec ause
the Ge rmans created dime nsions of comparisons with the Jews, in orde r to p roduc e a
positive German self-identity. There might be a grain of truth in such an acc ount.
Inde ed, it would not be difficult to p oint towards such e le me nts in the deve lop ment of
Nazi ideology and e ve n in the thinking of Hitle r (Mandel, 2001). But to leave the matte r
the re would conve rt the grain of truth into a wider untruth. This untruth w ould be a
gross oversimplific ation, w hic h failed to probe the e sse ntial c haracteristic s of Nazism.
After all, Nazism was not me re ly a searc h for positive German se lf-ide ntity. Much more
w as at stake.
There would also be a politic al untruth in applying a the ory of liberation to the most
reactionary political move me nt imaginable . It w ould sugge st equivalenc es, w hich
should not be made , suc h as a p sychologic al e quivale nce be twe en the developme nt of
in-group identity in Nazism and that of the wome ns movement or the black struggle
for e quality. Any e mpiric ally grounded similarities would be trivial as compare d with
the differe nc es. The more that the soc ial psychological theory drew attention to such
similarities, the more inappropriate w ould be its application. This very inappropriate -
ness shows the truth of Tajfels assertion that social p sychological the ories are not, and
should not be, value-fre e.

Depersonalization and dehumanization

In Social Identity The ory, there is a furthe r absence , paralle ling the c ognitive
approachs failure to distinguish be tw ee n pre judice and bigotry. In his writings about
soc ial identity, Tajfel introduce d the notion of de personalizationa conc ept that was
to fe ature signific antly in Turners Se lf-Categorization Theory (se e, for instanc e, Turne r,
 Cognitive aspects of prejudice 181

Hogg, Oake s, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). A p arallel can be draw n be twe en Tajfels
c omments about de personalization and his treatme nt of cate gorization in Cognitive
aspe cts.
Tajfel sugge ste d that the use of categorie s was ne ce ssary for human thinking, but
that this entaile d prejudgme nt and, thus, prejudic e. How ever, an ex tra emotional
investme nt was re quired to turn such inevitable cognitive pre judice into the state of
be ing prejudice d. De pe rsonalization was similar to cate gorization in being a c ommon
aspe ct of inte rgroup phe nomena. Tajfel wrote that de personalizatio n occ urre d in the
delibe rately artificial situation of the minimal intergroup e x periments as well as in
actual situations of w arfare : The common denomination of all these ex amp le s from
the c ontrived absurdities of the ex p eriments to the tragic realities of the Waris the
depe rsonalizatio n of the members of the outgroup (1981, p. 241).
Significantly, Tajfe l, in his c omme nts about dep ersonalization, also use d a stronger
te rm, namely dehumanization. De pe rsonalization might be the common denomi-
nator in the minimal intergroup ex pe rime nts and in actual warfare, but the re is a
c rucial differe nc e be twe en the tw o situations. In ac tual w arfare , out-group members
are ofte n not me rely dep ersonalize d but c ommonly dehumanized. Thus, Tajfel wrote
that depe rsonalizatio n of out-group membe rs may be just a be ginning, and the nex t
stage is often the ir dehumanization (1981, p. 241). Depe rsonalization , thus, is a
milder form of the w ay that in-group me mbe rs c an tre at out-group s: Our social history
is full of familiar and horrifying ex amp le s of dehumanization of outgroups and e ve n
more so of milde r forms of their depe rsonalization (1981, pp. 52 53). As suc h, there
is a c ontinuum stre tc hing betwe en de personalization and dehumanization (Tajfe l,
1981, p. 241). One might suggest a ratio: dep ersonalizatio n is to dehumanization as
c ognitive prejudic e is to bigotry.
Just as the c ognitive app roac h doe s not stipulate the fac tors that lead from pre judice
to bigotry (or from p rejudic es as c ognitive prejudgme nt to prejudic e as an ide ology of
hatred), so Tajfel in his soc ial ide ntity theory did not elaborate on the possible contin-
uum betw ee n de personalization and dehumanization. For any social psychological
theory of social c onflic t, let alone a the ory of ge nocide, suc h a continuum w ould be
vital: it would de marcate the ordinary from the abnormal, or the mild from the
strong. As Tajfe l stre sse d, ideologic al factors, or soc ial myths, will be c rucial on this
c ontinuum, for crue lty and massacre are made le gitimate if the victims are see n as
be ing in some way inhuman (Tajfel, 1984, p. 698 ). Me re ly to be c ategorize d as
a member of an out-group is not suffic ient to be c onsidere d as be ing non-human,
although, conversely, it c an be said that an ide ology of dehumanization must re st on
the distinctions of soc ial c ategorization.

Later work on social identity

It might be thought that late r work on Soc ial Identity The ory w ould have discussed the
c ontinuum be twe en dep ersonalizatio n and de humanization. This is e spe cially so since
muc h of this late r w ork has involved giving the conc ept of depe rsonalizatio n a
more promine nt role and has addressed itself to making the original theory more
pre cise. How ever, the re has bee n a cruc ial c hange in the use of dep ersonalizatio n in
muc h of this later w ork. This c hange not only leads aw ay from the problem of
distinguishing the mild from the e x tre me , but also leads away from some of the
intergroup c onsiderations that unde rlay Tajfels the orizing.
182 Michael Billig

The c onc ep t of de pe rsonalization is much more promine nt in Turners Self-

Cate gorization Theory than it is in e ithe r Tajfels Cognitive aspec ts of pre judice or his
soc ial ide ntity the ory. Turner has linked dep ersonalizatio n to the proc ess of self-
c ategorization. He writes that the factors that enhance the salie nce of in-group
out-group cate gorizations enhance the perc eived ide ntity be twe en the self and
fellow in-group me mbe rs; as suc h, the se fac tors depersonalize individual self-
perception (Turner et al., 19 87, p. 50, emphasis in original). In c onse que nce ,
the depe rsonalizatio n of se lf-pe rc eption is the basic proce ss unde rlying group
phenomena (p. 50).
De pe rsonalization, being the basic p rocess of group proce sse s, is linke d to a range of
group phe nomena. In-group c ohesion, in-group co-operation, social stere otyping and
so on are said to be consequenc es of de pe rsonalization . Turner writes that sub-
the ories of, for ex ample, group cohe sion, social co-operation and influenc es nee d to
be deve lop ed consiste nt w ith ex isting e mpiric al ge neralization s but also produc tive
of distinctive , testable p redictions and clearly derived from the depersonalization
process (Turne r et al., 1987, p. 56, emphasis adde d). The importanc e of the notion of
dep ersonalizatio n can also be se en in other rec ent theorie s de rive d from Social Identity
The ory, suc h as Postmes, Spe ars, and Lea (19 99), whose SIDE model (the Social
Ide ntity Model of De individuation effec ts) reinterprets deindividuation in terms of
dep ersonalization.
It is not the prese nt inte ntion to offer a c ritique of the se re ce nt approaches to
intergroup re lations. Clearly that is we ll be yond the scope of the prese nt analysis.
Rather the intention is muc h more limited. It is to point out how the term
de personalization, in moving to the theore tical c entre of later deve lop ments, has
be en alte red in two cruc ial resp ects.
(a) From out-group to in-group. In the quotations given above , it is c lear that Tajfel,
in discussing depe rsonalization , w as writing about the de personalizatio n of out-group
membe rs not the de personalization of the se lf or fellow in-group membe rs. By c on-
trast, the linkage of depe rsonalizatio n to the se lf and to the in-group is c entral to
Se lf-Cate gorization Theory. As Hogg (1996 ) w rite s, self-c ategorization depe rsonalize s
self-perce ption in terms of the evaluatively positive ingroup prototype (p. 72).
(b) From negative to positive. The shift from out-group to the se lf (and, thus, to the
in-group) involves a shift in value. In the quotations from Tajfe l, de personalization, like
prejudic e, is clearly see n as a proble m. It is the start of a proc ess that can le ad to
dehumanization and mass slaughter. In se lf-c ategorization the ory, the emphasis is ve ry
diffe re nt. Write rs take care to stre ss the positive aspe cts of de personalization. Turne r
w rite s that dep ersonalizatio n should not be se en as a loss of individual identity, rathe r
than as a gain in ide ntity (Turne r et al., 1987, p . 51, e mphasis in original). As Turne r
(1984) stre sse d, depe rsonalizatio n in this analysis should not be conside re d a loss (as
in the c once pt of de-individuation) but a c hange, and pe rhaps even a gain, in identity,
as the individual assumes the charac teristic s of a c ulturally c onstruc te d ide ntity
(pp . 535536 ).
The terminology of loss and gain is significant, in c onstruing de personalization as
something that can p ositive ly benefit the individual by providing a social identity.
Depe rsonalizatio n is not assume d to be a soc ial problem. Thus it is to be distinguished
from terms suc h as dehumanization and deindividuation that have typic ally
appe ared in social psyc hologic al theorizing as social problems (see , most notably,
Zimbardo, 1969). Thus, Hogg (1996) w rite s:
 Cognitive aspects of prejudice 183

Nothing ne gative is implied by the term de personalization. It contains none of

the implications of dehumanization or deindividuation, but simply refers to a
contex tual change in the level of identity, not to a loss of identity (p. 69, e mphasis
in original).
In such c omme nts the double shift in the treatme nt of de personalization is ap parent.
The foc us has be en transforme d from prejudice against out-groups to the positive
be nefit to the in-group member. The possible continuum betw ee n de pe rsonalization
and de humanization is not given theore tical sp ac e. In fac t, the linkage is theore tic ally
denie d, for depe rsonalization is said to c arry no imp lic ation of de humanization
Tajfe ls ide a that dep ersonalizatio n might on occ asions be the first step to de humaniz-
ation is omitted in this shift of theoretical attention.
The double shift also appe ars as Turner (1999) appe ars to dismiss pre judice and
stere otyping as fundamental problems. Turner writes that de personalization is the
basic proce ss that produce s group be haviour and adds psychological group for-
mation is an adaptive proc ess (p. 14 ). This p erspec tive , he c laims, provide s a new
way of thinking about prejudic e and ste re otyping. In this new way of thinking, p reju-
dice ce ases to be a p roble m as suc h, at least in the way that it is traditionally
c onceived. The negative connotation of ste reotyp e is re je cte d. Stere otype s are not to
be se en as invalid or inac curate . Stere otypic ac ce ntuation re fle cts the rational se lec -
tivity of perc eption in which it is more appropriate to se e people in some c ontex ts at
the leve l of social c ategory identity than at the le ve l of personal ide ntity (p. 26). Thus
stere otyping does not imp overish, but e nric he s soc ial perc ep tion (p . 27). Inde ed,
part of se lf-c ategorization rese arch is devote d to e x ploring the e x te nt to w hic h stere o-
typ ing might be ve ridical (p. 28; se e Stangor, 1995, for criticism of rese arch that
atte mpts to se e stereotype s as acc urate or veridical).
The p roble matic of Cognitive aspe cts has shifted. Tajfel in that artic le starte d from
the assumption that pre judice and stereotyping were social problems. He w as c on-
c erned to trac e the ir origins to rational fac tors. In doing this, he was not arguing that
pre judice and ste reotyping w ere the mse lves rational, but that irrational consequenc es
did not nee d to be e x plained in te rms of irrational motivations. In Turne rs Self-
Categorization Theory, pre judice does not ap pear as a proble m in its ow n right. Nor
doe s the c ontinuum be twe en dep ersonalizatio n and de humanization feature . If fol-
lowed rigidly, this perspe ctive would make an analysis of the Holoc aust even more
inappropriate. One w ould not wish to imagine e x tre me bigotry as an e nric hing social
pe rce ption, nor to se e the Nazi stere otype s of Jews being describe d as rational, ap pro-
priate or adaptive bec ause the y are soc ially rather than individually base d. Eve n the
idea of e x ploring whether or not such ste reotyp ing might be veridic al is distasteful.
Whate ve r the me rits of the Self-Cate gorization Theory and this is not to deny that the
approach might not have conside rable forc e in some c onte x ts it is addre sse d to a
diffe rent se t of p roble ms.

Towards a study of bigotry

The re is not spac e here to do anything more than make suggestions about rec asting the
soc ial p sychological study of bigotry. Suc h rec asting can take, as its starting point, the
theore tic al inte rstice s of Cognitive aspe cts. Se veral fac tors w ould nee d to be taken
into ac count to de velop the continuum betwee n prejudic e and bigotry or be tw een
depe rsonalizatio n and de humanization. Some pre liminary p oints can be made about
suc h a deve lopment.
184 Michael Billig

(i) Bigotry as ideological. In line w ith Tajfe ls argument in Cognitive aspe cts, it c an
be reaffirmed that the study of bigotry should not be reduce d to the pe rsonal dynamic s
of individual bigots. Bigotry typically is more than an individual emotional inve stment.
It is a fe ature of group re lations. In this re gard, the ideologic al basis of bigotry ne eds to
be re cognized, as inde ed Tajfe l acknowledged w ith his conc ept of assimilation .

(ii) Discursive basis of ideology. The disc ursive position in social psychology
stre sse s the ke y role of language in the social w orld (i.e. Billig, 1987a; Edwards, 1997;
Potte r & Wethe rell, 1987). Ideologie s are above all discursive , instantiated within
disc ursive actions (Billig, 1991). Thus, the cate gories of ideology, together with shared
stereotyping and c ommonplac e soc ial e x planations, are frame d in language . If this
is ac ce pte d, it is no longer nec essary to unde rstand c ategorization in te rms of mode ls
that are de rive d from pe rc eptual proc esses, as is commonly found in most c ognitive
soc ial psychology, inc luding Tajfels Cognitive asp ec ts. Instead, c ategorization and
stereotyping c an be investigated w ithin discursive interac tion.

(iii) Emotional aspects of ideology. The ide ology of bigotry cannot be se en merely
as a c ognitive appraisal of social reality. The limitations of a pure ly c ognitive approac h
to inte rgroup relations have be en re cognize d by mainstream social psyc hologists. For
instanc e, Stephan and Stephan (1985) emphasize the importanc e of inte rgroup
anx ie ty, but this primarily refers to individual contact across groups rather than the
ideology of hatre d (see also Maas & Sc haller, 1991). Bre we r (1999) argue s for e x amin-
ing hatred. How ever, she offers no charac te rization of hatre d in he r argument that
in-group pre fere nc e provides a platform for outgroup hate (p. 434). She states that
the re is a fine line be twe en the absenc e of trust and the prese nc e of active distrust
(p. 435) but doe s not indicate the nature of that dividing line. What is re quired is not
mere ly the addition of e motional variable s to the prevailing c ognitive pe rspe ctive but
a theore tical re assessme nt of the ap parent distinc tion betwe en c ognition and e motion.
If ideologies are said to encompass emotions, this does not me an that emotions should
be se en as free -floating psychological impulse s, lying be hind ideologie s or soc ial c at-
e gories. The y e x ist within socially shared ex planations, blamings, ac countings and so
on. The emotion within an ide ology of hatred is not some thing e x tra that is adde d to a
c ognitive inte rpretation; it is part of that interpre tation. Whe n Tajfe l w as writing,
it was c ustomary for psyc hologists to assume a rigid split be twe en cognition and
e motion, or betwe en rational and irrational aspe cts of human functioning. The soc ial
c onstructionist position, which has be en develop ed subse que ntly, atte mpts to bridge
this gap. Thus, social c onstructionists have stressed the soc ial and disc ursive constitu-
tion of e motions (Billig, 1999; Edwards, 199 7; Harre & Gille tt, 1994). In c onse que nce ,
to say that bigotry involve s e motions does not imply that the re must be an emotional
force behind the bigotry. The emotions will be c ontained within the hate -talk that
c omprise s the bigotry.

(iv) Reconceptualizing depersonalization and dehumanization in discursive

terms. Following Tajfe l, one can assert that the notions of depe rsonalizatio n and
dehumanization are vital to an unde rstanding of bigotry. Depe rsonalizatio n should not
be restric te d to the depe rsonalizatio n of the se lf, nor should it be se en as a c ognitive
proc ess that somehow lie s behind language. Instead, the foc us should be on the ways
that partic ular w ays of spe aking might de pe rsonalize the othe r. To probe this furthe r,
one w ould want to ex amine the language of stere otyping as use d in ac tual social
interac tion. De humanization will be an ex treme form of de pe rsonalization, as the
 Cognitive aspects of prejudice 185

other is de picte d as some how le ss than human. Dehumanization may, for instance ,
occ ur in e thnic jokes, and it w ill ce rtainly be found in the ex tre mes of hate-talk (Billig,
2001). The ideology of bigotry, in w hich the discourse of de humanization will occ ur,
might be pre sumed to be an emotion-lade n disc ourse.
(v) Repressed and unrepressed emotions. Tajfel, in c ommon w ith most c ognitive
soc ial psychologists, was re solutely anti-Fre udian. He did not wish the study of ideol-
ogy to be reduce d to individual or inte rpe rsonal dynamic s. Howe ver, a discursive
approach offers the possibility of re constituting Freudian the ory around the notion of
re pre ssion in a way that avoids individual reductionism (Billig, 1997, 1999). This
pe rspe ctive assume s that language is both e x pre ssive and repre ssive: in order to speak
appropriate ly, spe akers must learn to rep ress routine ly the desire to spe ak inappropri-
ate ly. In any social conte x t, the re will be norms and routines that permit c ertain
disc ursive actions and that forbid others. What is socially forbidden c an bec ome an
obje ct of de sire and pleasure. If there are taboos on the ex pression of bigotry in
c ontemporary socie ty, outward pre judice may take the form of a forbidden pleasure .
Bigotry, the n, bec omes a temp tation.
(vi) Pleasure in bigotry. This w ould le ad to the disturbing possibility that the re is
ple asure in bigotry. As Sartre re cognize d in his Portrait of the anti-Semite (1948), the
bigot might enjoy the act of hatre d, e spe cially if this inc lude s the pleasure of doing
some thing that is forbidden. De humanizing the other can be e njoyable as the bigot is
fre ed from the constraints of respec t, toleranc e and re asonable ness. Thus one should
not e x pe ct e x treme racist propaganda to be devoid of humour and moc kery (Billig,
2001). The c omplex relations betwee n language and ple asure in ex tre me rac ist
humour involve, as Sartre realized, moc king the restraints of logic and re ason. This
would lead to a further p aradox in the study of pre judice . The Cognitive aspe cts de alt
with the paradox of social irrationality stemming from rational motive s. The re is also
the possibility that the e x treme s of hatred bring pleasure to the hate r. We re it not so,
bigotry would not re main such a dange rous te mptation that constantly nee ds to be
watc he d.
These notions are ske tched out in orde r to stress a simple point. A turn tow ards the
study of bigotry and the emotions c ontained with hate -discourse does not mean a
re turn to the sort of blood-and-guts psyc hology that Tajfel ex plic itly re je cted. When
Tajfe l w as writing, the c hoice seemed to be betwee n conce ntrating on either c ognitive
or instinctual dynamics, as if the tw o belonge d to entire ly se parated psychological
re alms. Faced w ith that choic e, Tajfel understandably, and w ith good re ason, chose the
c ognitive aspe cts. Today, suc h a stark choic e is unnec essary. The ac ade mic, cultural
and political c limate has c hanged. In many sphe re s, there has be en a blurring of
boundarie s that w ere previously thought to be impermeable. Philosop hic ally, the firm
divisions be tw een truth and falsity or be tw ee n rationality and irrationality no longer
se em to fit the c urrent mood: whereas once ac ademics sought absolute truths and
c omplete rationality, the p rovisionally reasonable seems to suffice nowadays. Such
shifts have bee n both ex p lore d by and revealed within the writings of thinkers suc h as
Ric hard Rorty, Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman. Within social psychology,
soc ial construc tionism is a product of this c hanged mood. More ge nerally the re
might be a theore tic al gain if the pre viously ac ce pte d divisions betw ee n e motion and
c ognition, or betw ee n rationality and irrationality, no longe r have to be acc epted at
least in the old manner. The challenge is to e x plore the interconne ctions, e spec ially in
re lation to the continuing problems of prejudic e and bigotry.
186 Michael Billig

The political c ontex t of today should not be forgotten. The c urrent age is not one
of confident political ide ologic al truth. Ne ve rtheless, bigotry remains a major soc ial
issue in Europe w ith fascist partie s ap pealing to anti-fore igner sentime nts, and the
re-e merge nc e of e x treme , often violent, nationalist politic s. Fasc ism in We ste rn Europe
refuses to wane to the point of disappearanc e, and the re is a marked w ax ing in the
East. These force s are not the products of individual motivations, nor do the y re pre sent
mere systems of soc ial c ategorization. The y re present powe rful and dange rous
mix ture s. So long as this ideologic al mix ture continue s to thre aten, the nee d to attend
to the social psyc hologic al dynamics of bigotry p ersists.

Acknowledgements
The author is grate ful to Charle s Antaki, David Mandel and Margaret Wethe rell for the ir he lpful
c omments on an earlier draft. Parts of the argume nt of this pape r w ere presente d at the spe cial
Tajfel symposium organize d by the History and Philosophy Se ction of the British Psychological
Socie ty, at its annual c onfe rence , held in York, 2000.

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Received 3 July 2000; revised version received 24 November 2000