ART 7: LIGHT FELONIES
Ormoc City finding her guilty of parricideshe allegedly killed her
Light felony
Infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto
menor or fine not exceeding P200, or both, is provided
Produce light insignificant moral and material injuries that public
conscience is satisfied with providing a light penalty for their
consummation
Punishable only when they have been consummated
Exceptions: if committed against persons or property, punishable even
if attempted or frustrated
o Why? Such commission presupposes moral depravity
ART 8: CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL TO COMMIT FELONY
Gen rule: mere conspiracy or proposal to commit a felony is not
punishable since they are only preparatory
ART 9: CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES ACCORDING TO
GRAVITY
Grave felonies
Less grave felonies
Light felonies
ART 10: OFFENSES NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS
Gen rule: if special law, must not apply RPC
But Suppletory Application of RPC
o Depends on the court whether to apply it or not
ART 11: JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
Justifying circumstance:
o Act of person is in accordance with the law
Transforms criminal act to a lawful act
Nature of a justifying circumstance If the facts were as he
believed them to be, the act would have been lawful (People
v Ah Chong)
Crime is erased, offense is not an offense
o Such person is deemed not to have transgressed the law
o Free from both criminal and civil liability
o Basis: lack of criminal intent
One must admit the act being charged bc he cant deny the
act and then claim in his defense
And then claim in his defense that he committed the act but
only did so under justifying circumstance
Self defense
o 3 elements:
Unlawful aggression
Reasonable necessity of means employed
Lack of sufficient provocation
PEOPLE V BOHOLST-CABALLERO
November 25, 1974
G.R. No. L-23249
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Cunigunda Boholst-Caballero
PONENTE: Munoz-Palma, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Self-defense
FACTS:
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
Cunigunda Boholst Caballero seeks reversal of the judgment of the CFI of
husband, Francisco Caballero, using a hunting knife.
Jan 2, 1958:
o Francisco drank tuba with 2 other companions, went home at
midnight
o Saw Cunigunda otw home, C called F and when F approached, C
suddenly stabbed F with knife (marked by prosecution as Exhibit C)
o F called for help, companions brought him to St. Jude Hospital
o Dr Cesar Samson, hospital owner found a puncture wound on left
lumbar region (left lower back), 1 inch externally (Exhibit B)
o 1st aid given, insufficient facilities, inadequate treatment,
suggested patient be transferred to Cebu City
o Cunigunda surrendered to police dept of Ormoc, informed desk
sergeant that she stabbed her husband
o While in hospital Patrolman Covero interrogated Francisco, latter
pointed to his wife as assailant, written down on paper, Francisco
placed thumbmark on paper (in presence of brother and another
policeman)
o Jan 4, 1958: Otw to Cebu, Francisco died
Cudigundas testimony:
o married in 1956 (when both were 20) and had a daughter
o had frequent quarrels due to the husband's gambling and drinking
and there were times when he maltreated and abused his wife.
o After more than a year, Francisco abandoned his family.
o In 1958, Cunigunda went caroling with her friends and when she
was on her way home she met her husband who suddenly held her
by the collar and accused her of going out for prostitution.
F: Where have you been prostituting? You are a son of a bitch.
C: What is your business. Anyway, you have already left us. You
have nothing to do with us.
F: What do you mean by saying I have nothing to do with you. I will
kill you all, I will kill you all.
o Then he held her by the hair, slapped her until her nose bled then
pushed her towards the ground. She fell to the ground, he knelt on
her and proceeded to choke her.
o Cunigunda, having earlier felt a knife tucked in Francisco's belt line
while holding unto his waist so she wouldn't fall to the ground,
grabbed the hunting knife and thrust it into her husband's left
side, near the belt line just above the thigh.
o He died 2 days after the incident due to the stab wound.
o Then she ran home and threw the knife away. The next day, she
surrendered herself to the police along with the torn dress that she
wore the night before.
o Pat. Cabral then accompanied her to look for the weapon but
because they could not find it the policeman advised her to get any
knife, and she gave a knife to the desk sergeant which is the knife
now marked as Exhibit C for the prosecution
ISSUE: WON Cunigunda, in stabbing her husband, acted in legitimate self-
defense
RULING: Yes, she did. Acquitted.
The RTC held that Boholsts evidence was not clear and convincing:
o Testimony improbable as brought out by her demonstration during
the trial
o No wound or injury on her body treated by the physician
o That the knife used was a Moro knife and not exhibit C is incredible
o Contradictory statements
o Has motive: husbands abandonment
The court departs from the general rule that appellate court will not
disturb the findings of the trial court on facts testified by the witnesses
The trial court judge overlooked an important piece of evidence that
could confirm the narration of the appellant: location of the wound
inflicted on the victim.
 Burden off proof of self-defense rests on the accused. In this case, the
location and nature of the stab wound confirms that the said victim, the
husband, was the aggressor.
o As she was flat on her back and her husband choking her, she had
no other recourse but to pull out the knife inserted at the left side
of her husbands belt and stabbed him hitting the left back portion
just below the waist, as also described by the attending physician
as the left lumbar region.
o The fact that the blow landed in the vicinity from where the knife
was drawn is a strong indication of the truth of her testimony, for
as she lay on the ground with her husband bent over her it was
quite natural for her right hand to get hold of the knife tucked in
the left side of the mans belt and thrust it at that section of the
body nearest to her hand at the moment. (consistent with medical
report)
This particular location of the wound negates the credibility of the
prosecution witness that is if it was true, then the wound should have
been directed towards the front of the body of the victim rather than at
his back.
The Court finds the location of the wound as a valuable circumstance
which confirms the plea of self-defense.
Appellant also lacks motive. She declared that she still loved her husband
and for several months prior to the incident, she appeared resigned to
her fate.
She also surrendered herself immediately the morning after.
The court also believed that the knife must be a blade of six inches as
stated by Boholst for it to penetrate through the left lumbar region to
the victims large intestine and cause the discharge of fecal matter.
Three requisites of legitimate self-defense are present
o Unlawful aggression. The husband resorting to pushing her to the
ground then choking her just because she was out caroling at night
constitutes unlawful aggression, there was imminent danger of
injury.
Aggression was unjustified
o Reasonable necessity of means employed. While being choked,
Cunigunda had no other recourse but to take hold of the knife and
plunge it into husband's side in order to protect herself.
Reasonable necessity does not depend upon the harm done but
on the IMMINENT DANGER of such injury.
Discrepancy in size and/or physical character bet accused and
aggressor is a means used by Court to justify the use of
weapons
Hes so much stronger and already choking the life out of her
o Lack of sufficient provocation. Provocation is sufficient when
proportionate to the aggression. In this case, there was no
sufficient provocation on the part of the accused (Cunigunda) to
warrant the attack of her husband. All that she did to provoke an
imaginary commission of a wrong in the mind of her husband was
to be out caroling at night.
Boholst acted in the legitimate defense of her person. Judgment of
conviction set aside. Acquitted.
PEOPLE V ALCONGA
April 30, 1947
G.R. No. L-162
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Dioscoro Alconga and Adolfo Bracamonte,
defendants; DIOSCORO ALCONGA, appellant
PONENTE: Hilado, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Self-defense
FACTS:
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
May 27 1943, deceased Silverio Barion, the banker of the card game, was
playing black jack against Maria De Raposo.
o De Raposo and Alconga were partners in the game, they had a
common fund. Alconga was seated behind Barion and he gave signs
to De Raposo.
o Barion, who was suffering losses in the game, found this out and he
expressed his anger at Alconga. The two almost fought outright this
was stopped by the maintainer of the games.
May 29, the two met again when Alconga was doing his job as a home
guard.
o While the said accused was seated on a bench in the guardhouse,
Barion came along and said Coroy, this is your breakfast followed
by a swing of his pingahan, a bamboo stick.
o Alconga avoided the blow by falling to the ground under the bench
with the intention to crawl out of the guardhouse.
o A second blow was given by Barion but failed to hit the accused,
hitting the bench instead.
o Alconga managed to go out of the guardhouse by crawling on his
abdomen. While Barion was about to deliver the 3rd blow, Alconga
fired at him with his revolver, causing him to stagger and hit the
ground.
o The deceased stood up, drew forth his dagger and directed a blow
to the accused who was able to parry the attack using his bolo.
o A hand to handfight ensued. The deceased, looking already beaten
and having sustained several wounds ran away.
He was followed by the accused and was overtaken after 200 meters.
o A second fight took place and the deceased received a mortal bolo
blow, the one which slashed the cranium.
o The deceased fell face downward besides many other blows
delivered.
o Alconga surrendered.
ISSUE: Whether or not self-defense can be used as a defense by Alconga
RULING: No. Self-defense cannot be sustained. Alconga is guilty of homicide
The deceased ran and fled w/o having to inflicted so much a scratch to
Alconga, but after, upon the other hand, having been wounded with one
revolver shot and several bolo slashes the right of Alconga to inflict injury
upon him has ceased absolutely/ Alconga had no right to pursue, no right
to kill or injure.
o US v Vitug: when the deceased ran and fled without having inflicted
so much as a scratch upon appellant, but after, upon the other
hand, having been wounded with one revolver shot and several
bolo slashes, as aforesaid, the right of appellant to inflict injury
upon him, ceased absolutely appellant "had no right to pursue,
no right to kill or injure" said deceased for the reason that "a
fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees."
o the requisites of self-defense had ceased to exist, principal and
indispensable among these being the unlawful aggression of the
opponent
He could have only attacked if there was reason to believe that he is still
not safe.
o There was no more reason for him to further chase Barion.
o The second fight will be treated differently and independently.
Under the first fight, self-defense would have been valid, but that
is not the case in the second fight.
o In the second fight, there was illegal aggression on the part of
Alconga and as a result, he is found guilty of Homicide with no
mitigating circumstance (MC) of Provocation
To fall under a mitigating circumstance, provocation must
immediately precede the act and must also be sufficient (Art
13, RPC)
In this case, it can no way be said that whatever remained of
the effects of the deceased's aggression, by way of
provocation after the latter was already in fight, was
proportionate to his killing his already defeated adversary
o United States vs. Rivera: one defending himself or his property
from a felony violently or by surprise threatened by another is not
obliged to retreat but may pursue his adversary until he has
secured himself from danger.
 In the case at bar, it is apparent that it is Alconga who is the
superior fighter and his safety was already secured after the
first fight ended.
Note Provocation in order to be an MC must be sufficient and immediately
preceding the act. It should be proportionate to the act committed and
adequate to stir one to its commission
US V MACK
October 3, 1907
G.R. No. L-3515.
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: The United States
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Anderson Mack
PONENTE: Carson, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Self-defense
FACTS:
defendant Anderson Mack was charged with the crime of asesinato
(assassination) and convicted of the crime of homicidio (homicide).
From this judgment of conviction he appealed to this court.
o Crime was done in self-defense and accused sought exemption
May 4, 1906, the accused, a negro soldier, shot and killed a municipal
policeman named Estanislao Indic.
o The evidence of record is extremely conflicting and contradictory,
but giving the accused the benefit of the doubt as to the veracity
and credibility of the witnesses, the following relation of the
incidents, as they occurred must be held to be in accordance with
the weight of the evidence.
Just before the shooting, Mack was sitting on a bench a few feet back
from the street, in an open space some 3 or 4 feet width, between the
tienda or content of a woman named Olimpia, and another building.
The deceased Estanislao, with another policemen, directed Olimpia to
close her tienda, and, later, ordered Mack and another soldier who was
standing nearby to go to their quarters.
The accused did not obey this order, and its probable that there was
some convo between the soldiers, the policemen, and the woman which
angered Estanislao
o But weight of the evidence clearly maintains the contention of
Mack that he didnt do anything to provoke/offend the deceased,
other than maybe his failure to obey the order to go to his quarters.
The deceased, who was standing some 10 or 12 feet from the accused,
cursing and abusing him for his failure to obey the order, wrought
himself into a passion dragged himself free from his companion, who was
restraining and taking him away, and started toward the accused,
drawing his bolo and brandishing it in a threatening manner.
The accused got up, drew his revolver
o The deceased approached within a distance of from 3 to 6 feet
o The accused fired 3 shots
one in the left breast of the deceased, just above the nipple
one in the back of his head.
Some testimony showed that when the shooting took place, the
deceased was under the influence of alcohol, and that he bore
resentment against the accused bc of a quarrel about a woman
o but these contentions are not satisfactorily sustained by the
evidence, nor it is necessary info in deciding the case
TC: accused established an incomplete defense = reduction of penalty
but not exemption from punishment
ISSUE: WON the accused acted in self-defense
RULING:
Elements of Self Defense (Art 8, Sec 4, Penal Code)
1) illegal aggression
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
2) Lack of sufficient provocation
3) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it"
(aggression)
To show entitlement to complete acquittal in this case, the accused must
establish to the satisfaction of the court a reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel the attack.
Court affirms that from the evidence of record that there was an unprovoked,
illegal aggression on the part of the deceased, as held by the trial court, after
a careful analysis of the testimony; and further that there was reasonable
necessity for the use of the means employed by the accused to defend himself
from this unlawful aggression.
The trial court held that in shooting and killing the deceased, the defendant
adopted a mode of defense which was not "reasonable necessary," because it
was of opinion that
1) it was possible by taking to flight he might have escaped injury
2) he might have parried the blow aimed at him or wrested the bolo from his
assailant without the necessity for the use of his revolver;
3) against his assailant, the accused might have successfully defended himself
against the attack by directing his aim at the arm or hand with which the bolo
was held, or at the legs or feet of his assailant.
We do not think that under all the circumstances in this case it was the duty
of the defendant to take refuge in flight. Without attempting to lay down a
rule covering all the cases wherein it is the duty of one who is unlawfully
assailed to give ground" instead of resisting the attack, it is sufficient to hold,
that under such circumstances that assailed person need not attempt to
retreat where there is no reasonable ground to believe that by so doing he can
safely avoid the threatened attack; not is he required to continue his retreat
when there is no reason able ground to believe that he can do so with safety.
The defendant was sitting on a beach in a narrow alleyway when the deceased
started to advance upon him from a distance of from 9 to 12 feet, brandishing
a formidable looking bolo.
We do not think that under the circumstances the defendant had
reasonable grounds to believe that he could safely make his escape by
flight.
To do so it was necessary that the defendant, in the second or two
required by his assailant to advance the couple of space which would
bring him within striking distance, should recognize his danger, resolve
upon flight rather than resistance, rise from his seat, look backward only
to discover that there were obstacles with made it impracticable to
escape to the rear, step forward a few feet toward his approaching
assailant, turn to the right or to the left. on reaching the street, thus
exposing his unprotected body to this assailants attack, and finally
distance his pursuer in flight.
If the deceased was in fact endeavoring to reach the defendant and to
strike him with his bolo, it is very doubtful whether there was time to
avoid the blow by instant flight; certainly the accused had reasonable
grounds to believe that he could not hope to make his escape with safety;
and even though it were true that "he might have found time" to dodge
the deceased" and make his escape by flight, yet it is too much to ask of
one who is in imminent peril of felonious and murderous attack that
without reasonable grounds to believe can safely do so, he should "give
ground" rather than use any other more certain means to defend himself
which he may have at hand.
Court also disagrees with the opinion of the trial court that there was no
reasonable necessity for the use of the revolver because the deceased was a
smaller man than the accused and perhaps under the influence of liquor, or
because on examination, after the occurrence, it is discovered that the bolo in
the hands of the deceased was "almost blunt through rust and dullness."
Mere physical superiority in no protection to an unarmed man, as against an
assailant armed with a large bolo, and if it be true that the deceased was under
the influence of liquor when he made that attack, his intoxication probably
rendered him the more dangerous unless he was so drunk as to be physically
helpless, which is not suggested in the evidence. Nor does the fact that after
the occurrence the blade of the bolo was found to be "almost blunt through
rust and dullness," and that it is "more than doubtful whether if applied with
ordinary force against any portion of the accuseds body covered by clothing
it would penetrate the latter," justify the conclusion that there who no
reasonable necessity for the defendants use of the only weapon at land to
resist the onslaught of his adversary. Lying on the desk in the trial court, in the
broad light of day, that bolo was, in the language of the trial court a
"formidable looking weapon, with a blade fourteen and a half inches in
length;" the accused, in apparent imminent danger of his life, court not
reasonably be excepted to take the chance that mere ordinary force would be
used in striking, or that the blow would be given upon some protected part of
his body, or that the cutting edge of the blade was not keen enough to give
him his death blow.
The findings of facts occurring in the cases cited in the opinion of the trial judge
are not applicable in this case. On a plea of self-defense the question as to the
"reasonable necessity" for the use of the means employed is one of fact to be
determined in accordance with the particular facts proven in each case.
A murderous attack with a formidable-looking boo is a very different from an
assault with a small chisel or a piece of bamboo, and the fact that this court
has held that the taking of life was not reasonably necessary in defending
oneself against assault in the latter cases does not sustain a ruling that taking
the life of ones assailant in the former case may not become reasonably
necessary in the defense of ones person, as we think it was in the case at bar.
Finally, if it be admitted that it was reasonably necessary to make use of the
revolver, it would be unreasonable to hold that in the shades of night the
defendant, with his adversary advancing upon him and within a few feet of
striking distance, should be held responsible for a failure to take deliberate
and careful aim at the arm or hand that held the bolo or at the legs or the
effect of his assailant. The reasonable and natural thing for him to do under
the circumstances was to fire at the body of his opponent, and thus make sure
of his own life.
It is suggested that since the first shot inflicted a fatal wound there was no
necessity for the firing of the two succeeding shows in order to prevent or
repel the attack. The record discloses that there were shots fired in rapid
succession. Not every wound which proves fatal is sufficient to stop an
enemys attack, and the accused and his assailant were so close at hand that
until the assailant fell to the ground it can be said that the accused was out of
danger. Even a wounded man with a drawn bolo in his hand might prove to be
no mean antagonist at close quarters.
Judgment reversed. Appellant acquitted.
PEOPLE V SUMICAD
March 18, 1932
G.R. No. L-35524
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Julian Sumicad
PONENTE: Street, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Self-defense
FACTS:
Appeal to reverse a judgment of the CFI of Misamis Occidental, finding
appellant, Julian Sumicad, guilty of homicide
Feb 23, 1931, the accused was engaged in labor of hauling logs for the
church construction in barrio.
At about 5:30pm, when the laborers taking a break, Segundo Cubol
happened to pass the place where the accused was sitting.
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
Before this, the accused had rendered 5 and a half days service to Cubol.
As Cubol passed, Sumicad said to him, "Pay me for the five-and-a-half
days work for which you owe me." Cubol replied, "What debt!", followed
by an insulting expression.
Then he struck the Sumicad with his fist. The accused arose from the log
upon which he was sitting and moved backward, trying to escape, but
Cubol pursued him and continued punching him.
Sumicad found himself cornered by a pile of logs, the wings of which
extended out on either side, effectually preventing any further retreat.
As Cubol pressed upon him, the accused drew his bolo and delivered a
blow on Cubol's right shoulder.
Upon this Cubol lunged at the accused with the evident intention of
wresting the bolo from the accused. To prevent this, the Sumicad struck
2 other blows with the bolo, inflicting two deep cuts on Cubol's forehead
above the left eye.
o One of these blows broke through the cranium.
o The other made a cut extending from the left eyebrow to the nose
and upper lip.
Upon finding a seat on a log nearby, witness, Francisco Villegas, who
came up in a moment after learning something about the matter, asked
Cubol whether he had struck the accused blows with his fist. Cubol
replied that he had.
Villegas turned to the accused, who was standing a short distance away,
and told him to put up his bolo and go to the poblacion.
Acting upon this suggestion the accused immediately surrendered
himself to the authorities.
Cubol lived only an hour or so, and died from the effect of the wounds
received. In one of the pockets of the deceased a knife was found, and
the accused testified that, when he struck the deceased with his bolo,
the latter was attempting to draw a knife from his pocket.
Sumicad: 25 years of age, height: 51, weight: 105 lbs.
Cubol: taller, larger and stronger man
o hot-tempered and that he had the reputation of being a trouble
maker
o quarrelsome and in the habit of making frequent trouble by
fighting in the places where he happened to be present with others
o local courts:
convicted and jailed for assault and battery in 2 diff cases
convicted of inflicting minor physical injuries, imprisoned for
1 month and 1 day
convicted of theft, imprisoned for 1 month and 1 day
o It is a safe inference from this proof - and there is nothing to the
contrary, - that the deceased was with good reason considered by
his neighbors to be a dangerous man.
ISSUE: Whether there was reasonable necessity for the means employed by
him to prevent or repel the aggression to which he was subjected
RULING: Yes. All the elements necessary to constitute justifiable self-defense
were present in this case and the accused should have been acquitted.
Two of the elements of self-defense were clearly present:
1) deceased was the aggressor
2) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
As for reasonable necessity for means employed:
The aggression was begun by the deceased, the accused retreated until he was
cornered in the angle of a pile of logs. His further retreat was this effectually
cut off both in the rear and at the sides.
Decisive turning point: In response to the blows which the deceased delivered
with his fists, the accused first delivered a cut on the left shoulder of the
deceased;
Sanitary officer that examined deceaseds body said that this wound
alone could not have resulted in death
 Upon receiving that cut the deceased should have been admonished that
further aggression on his part would be met by determined resistance
and that any further advance would be at grave peril to himself.
Instead of acting upon this warning, the deceased pressed forward in the
attempt to possess himself of the bolo, the only means of defense then
at the command of the accused.
Under these circumstances, accused is justified in keeping the weapon in his
hands and, as an ultimate resort, in using it as a means for his own defense;
for it would probably have been an act of suicide to permit that weapon to
pass into the hands of his assailant.
In judging a question of this kind, the reputation of the deceased for violence
is pertinent, for it tends to show that when the fatal blows were struck the
accused had reasonable grounds for believing that he was in grave peril to life
or limb.
General rule: A man is not, as a rule, justified in taking the life of one who
assaults him with his fist only, without the use of a dangerous weapon. The
person assaulted must, in such case, either resist with the arms that nature
gave him or with other means of defense at his disposal, short of taking life.
But that rule contemplates the situation where the contestants are in the
open and the person assaulted has the option to run away.
This has no binding force in the case where the person assaulted has
retreated to the wall, as the saying is, and uses in a defensive way the
only weapon at his disposal.
One is not required, when hard pressed, to draw fine distinctions as to
the extent of the injury which a reckless and infuriated assailant might
probably inflict upon him (Browell vs. People)
And it was not incumbent on the accused in this case, when assailed by
a bully of known violent disposition, who was larger and stronger than
himself.
Under said circumstances, he had the right to resist the aggression with
the bolo, and if he unfortunately inflicted a fatal blow, it must be
considered to have been given in justifiable self-defense.
Upon this point it may be recalled that the deceased, when asked about
the circumstances of the homicide, admitted that he himself was the
aggressor; and it is noteworthy that he used no word placing blame upon
the accused.
PEOPLE V GENOSA
January 15, 2004
G.R. No. 135981
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Maviric Genosa
PONENTE: Panganiban, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Self-defense Battered wife syndrome
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived
happily but apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always
quarrel and sometimes their quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that
every time her husband came home drunk, he would provoke her and
sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she consulted medical
doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant and
the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However,
appellant was able to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed
the victim with the use of a gun. The information for parricide against
appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of the victim was by
beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self-defense and
defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT
OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow:
(1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re-examination of the cause of his
death;
(2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and
psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband;
and finally,
(3) the inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for
purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of
the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.
The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the
appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert
psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman syndrome
plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman
syndrome, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the
trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the
records.
ISSUES:
1. WON appellant can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as
constituting self-defense.
2. WON treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.
RULING:
1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is
afflicted with the battered woman syndrome.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly subjected
to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce
her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship
with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may
find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second
time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-
called cycle of violence, which has three phases:
(1) the tension-building phase;
(2) the acute battering incident; and
(3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising
from the battered woman syndrome.
First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to
have characterized at least two battering episodes between the
appellant and her intimate partner.
Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of
the batterer must have produced in the battered persons mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest
belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.
Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed
probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual -- grave harm to
the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter.
Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self-
defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these
elements were duly established.
The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the cycle of violence
supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No
doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that
in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a
similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to
the third phase of the cycle.
In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself
establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence
must still be considered in the context of self-defense. Settled in our
jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self-defense must face
a real threat on ones life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.
Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self-
defense must concur:
(1) Unlawful aggression;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It
presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger
thereof -- on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however,
according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time
interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him.
She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape
to their childrens bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack
and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed
had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual
threat on her life or safety.
The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation
were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these
two circumstances -- psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation
-- did not arise from the same set of facts.
The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the
battery inflicted by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated
beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which
was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without
depriving her of consciousness of her acts.
As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so
powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been
held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result
of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper
acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.
To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur:
(1) there is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of
mind; and
(2) this act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover her
normal equanimity.
2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be
proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule
that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot
be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be
said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the
assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault
adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen
for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from
any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.
The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally
produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal
night in the hands of her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight
(8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the
aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and
impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide.
However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and
without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been detained
for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of
the Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon
due determination that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for
some other lawful cause.
NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise
known as Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was
enacted. Sec. 26 of said law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found
by the courts to be suffering from battered women syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the absence of any of the elements
for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.xxx"
ART 11: DEFENSE OF HONOR
PEOPLE V LUAGUE AND ALCANSARE
November 7, 1935
GR No. 43588
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Wenceslao Alcansare and Natividad Luague
PONENTE: Recto, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Defense of Honor
FACTS:
Spouses Wenceslao Alcansare and Natividad Luague were charged with
homicide, in the CFI of Occidental Negros
Appeal for reversal and acquittal of sentence
Feb 18 1935, morning: wife Natividad was in the house with 3 children
Husband Wenceslao gone to grind corn several km away.
Paulino Disuadido came and began to make love to her.
Natividad cannot dissuade him, she started for kitchen knife, Paulino
followed her
Natividad insisted she cant give what he wanted, Paulino drew and
opened a knife and threatening her with death.
o Also began embracing her and touching her boobs
In preparing to lie with her, Paulino leaves the knife on the floor
Natividad took advantage of situation, picked up knife and stabbed him
in the abdomen.
Paulino ran away by jumping through the window
Natividad immediately went to the poblacion to surrender self to
authorities and report the incident
Theory of the prosecution: the accused husband and his wife had
conspired to kill Paulino
o Husband Wenceslao, thinking that Paulino importuned his wife
with unchaste advances, out of jealousy, decided to get rid of him.
o His chance to bring about his plan came when, in the morning of
the crime, Paulino happened to pass in front of the house of the
spouses with his friend Olimpio Libosada.
o The accused wife invited Paulino to drop in, which the latter and
his, friend did. The spouses met them at the threshold. The accused
wife asked Paulino whether he had a knife and Paulino said yes. She
asked him to lend it to her because she wanted to cut her nails,
Paulino gave knife.
o While wife was cutting her nails, she asked Paulino where he came
from and the latter answered, turning his head around, that he
came from the house of one Inting, then the accused wife slashed
him in the abdomen.
 o Paulino tried to return the blow but the accused husband picked
up a stone and struck him in the forehead. Wounded in the
abdomen and in the forehead, Paulino fled therefrom
ISSUE: WON Natividad is exempted from criminal liability
RULING:
Yes. Natividad was unaided by her husband, and circumstances
abovementioned constitutes the exempting circumstance mentioned in
Art 11 (1) of RPC.
o The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an aggression sufficient
to put her in a state of self-defense inasmuch as a womans honor
cannot be esteemed as a right as precious, if not more, than her
very existence;
because virginity or chastity, once defiled, cannot be restored
o and it is evident that a woman who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay
kills the offender, should be afforded exemption from criminal
liability.
such killing cannot be considered a crime from the moment it
became the only means left for her to protect her honor from
so great an outrage.
Regarding prosections theory:
o Were it true that the accused husband, prompted by jealousy,
designed to do away with Paulino, it would have been because he
observed that his wife somehow returned Paulino's attentions, for
otherwise he would not have indulged in tragic thoughts.
o It is incomprehensible why the wife would take upon herself, and
the husband would charge her with, the execution of the plan.
o The observation is no less true if the spouses plotted in common
for it would have been patently disgraceful and cowardly of the
husband to thrust its execution upon the wife at the hazard of her
life, and liberty to shield his own, in the event of prosecution
Also, nothing of record compelling the supposition that the
husband had such plans.
o Under the theory of the prosecution, whether the accused husband
doubted his wife's fidelity or was sure of it, the natural thing in
either case would be for him, unaided by his wife, to avenge the
affront or punish the offender (Paulino).
In the case at bar, we must assume that, if the motive
attributed to him by the prosecution were true, the accused
would have acted, as would the great majority of men in
identical circumstances.
o If conspiracy really existed, the spouses would have been fully
prepared to carry it into execution
bc rational beings differ from those who are not in that when
they embark on anything, they make the means equal to its
realization.
However, these accused, on the occasion, had neither a rusty
bolo nor an outworn club to cope with Paulino.
The weapon with which Paulino was first wounded was his
own knife which, according to the prosecution, the accused
wife had to borrow from him on the pretext that she wanted
to cut her nails, and later a stone which the accused husband
casually picked up from the ground.
Accused Natividad Luague in wounding Paulino Disuasido to death, acted
in legitimate selfdefense, and that the other accused Wenceslao
Alcansare had no participation in said act.
o Judgment reversed
o ACQUITTED both accused
PEOPLE V DELA CRUZ
March 30, 1935
G.R. No. L-41674
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Remedios Dela Cruz
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
PONENTE: Vickers, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Defense of Honor
FACTS:
Remedios Dela Cruz was charged with homicide, in the CFI of Nueva Ecija
Appeal for reversal and acquittal of sentence
Night of Feb 18, 1934
o Francisco Ramos and wife Brigida, his sister Baltazara Ramos, and
woman named Consuelo called at the house of Remedios and
asked her to cgo with them to wake at house of Maria Inguit
o 9pm: after wake, they started home
o 5 minutes later was followed by Francisco Rivera, who was playing
cards where wake was held
o Rivera and Bautista overtook Remedios and her friends
They were in a single file: Baltazara in front, Remedios
hindmost
Remedios was 2 brazas (arms-length) from person ahead of
her
o Francisco Ramos heard someone cry out Aruy, dios mio.
o He went back and found that Francisco Rivera had been stabbed
under the right breast.
Rivera was taken to the hospital, where he died the next
afternoon.
Francisco Ramoss testimony:
o it took him about two minutes to go back to the place where
Francisco Rivera was
o He found Enrique Bautista with the wounded man, and the
defendant had started back towards the house of mourning.
o He overtook her. She had a knife in her hand.
o When they reached the house of Maria Inguit, Remedios de la Cruz
stuck the knife into a table and said that she stabbed Francisco
Rivera because he embraced her.
Enrique Bautistas testimony:
o According to him, defendant waited on the right side of the path
near some guava trees and stabbed Francisco Rivera with a knife in
her right hand when he arrived in front of her;
o that the injured man cried "Aruy, Dios mio", while the defendant
turned around and returned to the house of Maria Inguit, saying
"Icao ay malaon na" (hacia tiempo ya).
o Also said that the defendant stabbed the deceased before either
of them had said anything; that the distance between him and the
deceased was about one foot; that he did not see any of the
companions of the defendant after they reached the path and had
to walk one behind the other.
Remedioss testimony:
o In a narrow part of a trail that was dark, after going to a wake, a
man suddenly threw his arms around her from behind, caught hold
of her breasts and kissed her, and seized her in her private parts;
o she tried to free herself, but he held her and tried to throw her
down;
o when she felt weak and could do nothing more against the strength
of the man, she got a knife from her pocket, opened it, and stabbed
him in defense of her honor.
o Man did not say anything, she asked but he did not answer. She
cried for help but no one answered.
o She scarcely recognized the face because of darkness. She desisted
as soon as he released her. (Illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her
name, 18 years old)
o Also said that she was engaged in selling fruit, and that the fanknife
in question was in a pocket of the overcoat she was wearing that
day; that she went off with her friends without having an
opportunity of changing her clothes
ISSUE: WON Remedios de la Cruz is exempted from criminal liability.
RULING:
Testimony of Enrique Bautista not sustainable, bc Francisco Ramos, one
of the witnesses for the prosecution, testified that it was a dark night,
and Bautista himself said that he could scarcely see anyone in the
darkness (aka he did not see any of the companions of the defendant)
Evidence shows that the deceased had been making love to the
defendant, and also to another girl named Felicisima Sincaban;
o finding of the trial judge that Francisco Rivera and the defendant
were engaged, that she was madly in love with him and was
extremely jealous of Felicisima Sincaban = not sustained by the
evidence of record
The appellant stabbed the deceased only once, although she retained
possession of the knife, and undoubtedly could have inflicted other
wounds on him if she wanted to
o In other words she desisted as soon as he released her.
An officer of the Constabulary went to see the injured man about 11pm
that night in the hospital, but Rivera never told him anything about the
circumstances under which he had been stabbed.
The appellant is an illiterate barrio girl, unable to write her name, and
scarcely eighteen years old. That her story is a fabrication is unlikely.
o Note that almost immediately after the incident in question took
place, the appellant said she stabbed Francisco Rivera because he
EMBRACED her.
o It is not improbable that she was reluctant to relate in the presence
of all the people in the house of Maria Inguit the details of what
had occurred.
Court is convinced from a study of the record that the deceased did in
fact grab hold of the defendant, and whether he intended to rape her or
not, taking into consideration that it was a dark night and that the
deceased grabbed her from behind without warning and without making
himself known and refused to say who he was, and in the struggle that
followed touched her private parts, and the fact that she was unable to
free herself by means of her strength alone, defendant was justified in
making use of the pocket-knife
Whether she did in fact cried for help, as claimed by her, or failed to do
so because of the suddenness with which the deceased grabbed her and
the fright that which it naturally caused, taking into consideration the
circumstances of the case, she is exempt from criminal liability in the
defense of her honor.
Defendant ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE V JAURIGUE
February 21, 1946
C.A. No. 384
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue
PONENTE: Carson, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Defense of Honor
FACTS:
Nicolas Jaurigue and daughter Avelina Jaurigue were charged with
homicide, in the CFI of Tayabas for murder
o Nicolas acquitted, Avelina found guilty
Appeal for reversal and acquittal of sentence
Prior to the stabbing of the deceased, Amado Capina, he has been
courting Avelina in vain
About a month before the stabbing, Amado snatched Avelinas
handkerchief bearing her nickname Aveling while it was being washed
by her cousin, Josefa Tapay.
Sep 13, 1942:
o while Avelina was feeding a dog under her house, Amado
approached her and told her he loved her, which she flatly refused,
o then he suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her breasts,
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
o Avelina, resolute and quick-tempered, slapped Amado, gave him
fist blows and kicked him.
o She kept the matter to herself, until the following morning when
she told her mom about it
o Since then, she armed herself with a long fan knife, whenever she
went out, for self-protection
Midnight, Sep 15, 1942:
o Amado climbed up the house of Avelina, and entered the room
where she was sleeping.
o He felt her forehead, evidently with the intention of abusing her
o She screamed for help, awakening her parents. They went to her.
o Amado came out from under a bed in Avelina's room where he was
hiding and kissed the hand of Nicolas Jaurigue, her father, asking
for forgiveness;
o when Avelina's mother made an attempt to beat Amado, her
husband prevented her from doing so, stating that Amado probably
did not realize what he was doing.
o Nicolas Jaurigue sent for the barrio lieutenant, Casimiro Lozada,
and for Amado's parents, the following morning.
o Amados parents went to the house of Jaurigue and apologized for
the misconduct of their son; and as Nicolas Jaurigue was then angry,
he told them to end the conversation, as he might not be able to
control himself.
Sep 20, 1942:
o Morning: Avelina received info that Amado was falsely boasting in
the neighborhood of having taken liberties with her person (maybe
that they had a thing?) and that she had even asked him to elope
with her and that if he doesnt marry her, she would take poison;
and that Avelina again received information of Amado's bragging
at about 5pm of that same day.
o Abt 8pm: Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of the 7th day
Adventist Church, which he was the treasurer, in their barrio, to
attend religious services, and sat on the front bench facing the altar
with the other officials of the organization and the barrio lieutenant,
Casimiro Lozada. Inside the chapel it was quite bright as there were
electric lights.
o Arriving shortly after her dad, Avelina went to church to attend
services and sat on the bench next to the last one nearest the door
o Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon
seeing Avelina, he went to the bench where Avelina was sitting and
sat by her right side
o Without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence,
placed his hand on the upper part of her right thigh.
o On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado
Capina, Avelina, conscious of her personal dignity and honor,
pulled out with her right hand the fan knife, which she had in a
pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's
offending hand.
o Amado seized Avelina's right hand, but she quickly grabbed the
knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the
left side of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches
deep, which was necessarily mortal. Nicolas Jaurigue, who was
seated on one of the front benches, saw Amado bleeding and
staggering towards the altar, and upon seeing his daughter still
holding the bloody knife, he went to her and asked: "Why did you
do that," Avelina said: "Father, I could not endure anymore."
o Amado Capina died from the wound a few minutes later.
o Avelina surrendered herself to Barrio lieutenant Casimiro Lozada,
who was also in the chapel, saying: "Kayo na po ang bahala sa
aquin,"
Meaning: "I hope you will take care of me," or more correctly,
"I place myself at your disposal."
o Fearing that Amado's relatives might retaliate, barrio lieutenant
Lozada advised Nicolas Jaurigue to go home immediately, to close
their doors and windows and not to admit anybody into the house,
unless accompanied by him.
 o Father and daughter went home and locked themselves up,
following instructions of the barrio lieutenant, and waited for the
arrival of the municipal authorities;
o when 3 policemen arrived in their house, at about 10pm that night,
and questioned them about the incident, defendant and appellant
immediately surrendered the knife, and informed said policemen
briefly of what had actually happened in the chapel and of the
previous acts and conduct of the deceased, and went with said
policemen to the headquarters, where her written statements
were taken, which were presented as a part of the evidence for the
prosecution.
ISSUE:
WON appellant Jaurigue acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and that
she should be completely absolved of all criminal responsibility
RULING:
No. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. The attempt to rape a woman
constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate
defense inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a right as
precious, if not more than her very existence; and it is evident that a woman
who, thus imperiled, wounds, nay kills the offender, should be afforded
exemption from criminal liability, since such killing cannot be considered a
crime from the moment it became the only means left for her to protect her
honor from so great an outrage (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., p. 301; People
vs. Luague and Alcansare, 62 Phil., 504).
As long as there is actual danger of being raped, a woman is justified in killing
her aggressor in the defense of her honor (US v Apego).
In the instant case, if defendant and appellant had killed Amado Capina,
when the latter climbed up her house late at night on September 15,
1942, and surreptitiously entered her bedroom, undoubtedly for the
purpose of raping her, as indicated by his previous acts and conduct,
instead of merely shouting for help, she could have been perfectly
justified in killing him, as shown by the authorities cited above.
When the deceased sat by the side of the appellant on the same bench, near
the door of the barrio chapel and placed his hand on the upper portion of her
right thigh without her consent, the said chapel was lighted with electric lights,
and there were already several people inside the chapel, including her own
father and the barrio lieutenant and other dignitaries of the organization; and
under the circumstances, there was and there could be no possibility of her
being raped.
And when she gave Amado Capina a thrust at his neck, inflicting upon him a
mortal wound and causing his death a few moments later, the means
employed by her in the defense of her honor was evidently excessive; and
under the facts and circumstances of the case, she cannot be legally declared
completely exempt from criminal liability.
Mitigating circumstances:
That she and her dad surrendered themselves to authorities, and
admitting having stabbed the deceased immediately after the incident
That she had acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her few moments before, and upon such provocation
as to produce passion and obfuscation, or temporary loss of reason and
self-control
No intent to kill but merely to punish his offending hand with her knife
o Shown by fact that she only inflicted one wound
No aggravating circumstances
claim of the prosecution that the offense was committed with the
aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a place dedicated
to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained;
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
o no evidence to show that the defendant and appellant had murder
in her heart when she entered the chapel
o Avelina is not a criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the
greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman, typical of
our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope
in a world where so many others have hopelessly lost the faith of
their elders and now drifting away they know not where.
Judgment: Homicide with 3 mitigating circumstances, and no aggravating
circumstances arresto mayor to prision correccional
ART 11: DEFENSE OF PROPERTY
PEOPLE V APOLINAR
July 19, 1938
G.R. No. 1744
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Anastacio Apolinar
PONENTE: Hontiveros, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Defense of Property
FACTS:
Midnight of Dec 22, 1936
Defendant Anastacio Apolinar (Atong) was the occupant of a parcel of
land owned by Joaquin Gonzales in Papallasen, La Paz, Umingan,
Pangasinan
Armed with a shotgun, Atong was looking over said land when he
observed that there was a man carrying a bundle on his shoulder.
Believing that he was a thief (of palay), the defendant called his attention
but he ignored him.
Defendant fired in the air and then at the person.
Victim, Domingo Petras, was able to get back to his house and
consequently narrated to Angel Natividad, the barrio chief, that he had
been wounded in the back by a shotgun.
Victim showed the 2 wounds - one in each side of the spinal column -
which wounds were circular in form and a little bigger than a quarter of
an inch, according to the medical report of Dr. Mananquil
Petras died of the wounds he sustained.
The defendant surrendered to the authorities immediately after the
incident and gave a sworn statement (Exhibit F) before the Justice of
Peace of Umingan on December 23, 1936.
ISSUE: WON the killing of Petras was justified by defense of property
HELD: No.
That Petras was carrying a sack of palay in his arms coming from the land
tilled by the defendant, is not sufficient for the defendant to be justified
in shooting the deceased
The right to property is not of such importance as right to life, and
defense of property can be invoked as a justifying circumstance only
when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one entrusted with
said property
In his testimony, aggression was basis of Apolinars defense
o But earlier in the case, the defendant said nothing abt any
aggression committed or attempted by Petras toward the barrio
chief (Mendones)
Accd to the defendant and his witness, the aggression against Mendones
was done by Petras with a bolo.
o But no bolo was ever presented before the Court, which would
have supported if the deceased was indeed armed that night
US V BUMANGLAG
 December 23, 1909
G.R. No. 5318
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: The United States
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Rafael Bumanglag
PONENTE: Makasiar, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Defense of Property
FACTS:
Night of Jan 2, 1909 - Rafael Bumanglag, an inhabitant of pueblo of San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, missed 4 baares or 40 bundles of palay which were
kept in his granary in Payas, barrio No. 16 of the said pueblo.
He proceeded to search for them on the following morning and found
them in an in closed eld planted with sugar cane, at a distance of about
100 meters from his granary. For the purpose of ascertaining who had
done it, he left the palay there. That night, accompanied by Gregorio
Bundoc, Antonio Ribao, and Saturnino Tumamao, he waited near the
said eld for the person who might return to get the palay.
A man, who turned out to be Guillermo Ribis, appeared and approached
the palay and attempted to carry it away with him, but at that instant,
Bumanglag, Bundoc and Ribao assaulted the presumed thief with sticks
and cutting and stabbing weapons. Ribis fell down and died instantly.
Bumanglag et al presumed Ribis was responsible for several robberies
and thefts that had occurred in the place.
Provincial scal led a complaint charging Bumanglag, Bundoc and Ribao
with the crime of homicide. The trial judge sentenced the 3 caused to the
penalty of 14 yrs 8 months 1 day of reclusion temporal, with accessories,
and payment of P1,000 indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
Only Gregorio Bundoc appealed from the said sentence. He said he
assaulted and killed the deceased, with the help of his co-defendants, in
order to defend himself from an attack made by deceased with a bolo.
ISSUE / HELD / RATIO
1.WON Bundoc should be acquitted based on plea of self denes
NO. Unless the accused was rst unlawfully attacked, it is not proper to
admit the plea of self-defense and exempt him from criminal
responsibility. It is necessary, in order that such defense shall be effective,
that the same shall be proven as well as the crime charged.
In this case, defendants declared that they only used sticks against Ribis
but examination of health ofcer Felipe Barba of the latters body
showed that serious wounds had been inicted with cutting and stabbing
weapons.
Also, the bolo worn by the deceased was still in its sheath and hanging
from his waist when he fell and died. So, it cant be concluded that the
deceased even intended to assault his murderers with his bolo either
before he was attacked by them or during the ght.
Bundoc is guilty of the crime of homicide as co-principal by direct
participation.
2. WON defense of property (palay) should extinguish the crime committed by
respondents
NO. It is only a mitigating circumstance which will lower the penalty.
Mitigating circumstance No. 7 of Art 9 of Penal Code should be taken into
account because the defendant acted with loss of reason and self-control
on seeing that Ribis was taking material possession of the palay seized
and hidden by him the previous night thus prejudicing the respondents
who laboured to provide themselves and their families with subsistence.
The special circumstance established by Art 11, PC should be also
considered in favor of the accused, in view of the erroneous and quite
general belief that it is legal to punish, even to excess the thief who, in
defiance of law and justice, while refusing to work, devotes himself to
depriving his neighbors of the fruits of their arduous labors
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
PEOPLE V NARVAEZ
April 20, 1983
L-33466-67
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Mamerto Narvaez
PONENTE: Makasiar, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Defense of Property
FACTS:
Mamerto Narvaez convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David
Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia.
On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia when the 2 were
constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his
house and rice mill.
The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction
and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them
to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over.
Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead."
Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun.
He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the
deceased's gun was placed.
Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family)
was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers
of Cotabato over certain pieces of property.
At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment
(settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled).
At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher
(though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble.
On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he
allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house
from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter.
Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property.
CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty.
Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs, and to pay for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not CFI erred in convicting defendant-appellant despite the fact
that he acted in defense of his person.
No. The courts concurred that the fencing and chiseling of the walls of the
house of the defendant was indeed a form of aggression on the part of the
victim. However, this aggression was not done on the person of the victim but
rather on his rights to property. On the first issue, the courts did not err.
However, in consideration of the violation of property rights, the courts
referred to Art 30 of the Civil Code recognizing the right of owners to close and
fence their land. Although is not in dispute, the victim was not in the position
to subscribe to the article because his ownership of the land being awarded
by the government was still pending, therefore putting ownership into
question. It is accepted that the victim was the original aggressor.
2. WON the court erred in convicting defendant-appellant although he acted
in defense of his rights.
Yes. However, the argument of the justifying circumstance of self-defense is
applicable only if the 3 requirements are fulfilled. Art. 11(1) RPC enumerates
these requisites:
Unlawful aggression. In the case at bar, there was unlawful aggression
towards appellant's property rights. Fleischer had given Narvaez 6 months and
he should have left him in peace before time was up, instead of chiseling
Narvaez's house and putting up fence. Art. 536 of the Civil Code also provides
that possession may not be acquired through force or intimidation; while
Art.539 provides that every possessor has the right to be respected in his
possession.
Reasonable necessity of means employed to prevent or repel attack. In the
case, killing was disproportionate to the attack.
Lack of sufficient provocation on part of person defending himself. Here,
there was no provocation at all since he was asleep.
Since not all requisites present, defendant is credited with the special
mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense, pursuant to Art. 13(6) RPC.
These mitigating circumstances are: voluntary surrender and passion and
obfuscation (read p. 405 explanation). Crime is homicide (2 counts) not
murder because treachery is not applicable on account of provocation by the
deceased. Also, assault was not deliberately chosen with view to kill since
slayer acted instantaneously. There was also no direct evidence of planning or
preparation to kill. Art.249 RPC: Penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
However, due to mitigating circumstances and incomplete defense, it can be
lowered three degrees (Art. 64) to arresto mayor.
3. WON he should be liable for subsidiary imprisonment since he is unable to
pay the civil indemnity due to the offended party.
No. He is not liable to be subsidiarily imprisoned for nonpayment of civil
indemnity. RA 5465 made the provisions of Art. 39 applicable to fines only and
not to reparation of damage caused, indemnification of consequential
damages and costs of proceedings. Although it was enacted only after its
conviction, considering that RA 5465 is favorable to the accused who is not a
habitual delinquent, it may be given retroactive effect pursuant to Art. 22 of
the RPC Judgment: Defendant guilty of homicide but w/mitigating
circumstances and extenuating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.
Penalty is 4 months arresto mayor and to indemnify each group of heirs 4,000
w/o subsidiary imprisonment and w/o award for moral damages.
Appellant has already been detained 14 years so his immediate release is
ordered.
Gutierrez, dissenting. Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled
with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was
not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since
he has served more than that, he should be released.
ART 11: DEFENSE OF REPUTATION
PEOPLE VS. CHUA HIONG
FACTS:
Cesario Gocheco, nephew of Federico Chua Hiong (accused-appellant),
published an article in the Manila Chronicle on February 11, 1952 entitled
Doubtful Citizenship questioning the latters citizenship. Aside from that,
Gocheco also filed various charges against the appellant with different
government agencies. To answer this, on February 21, 1952, Chua Hiong
published an article in the Manila Chronicle accusing Cesario Gocheco of
persecution mania and sending the appellant a threatening letter under the
pseudonym Benito Solipco. Chua Hiong also alleged that Gocheco was trying
to damage his reputation to retaliate. In an earlier case, Gocheco and his
family lost 2/3 of the inheritance left by his father. Chua Hiong was behind the
prevailing parties, helping them with the expenses of the case.
Thus, for the article, Chua Hiong was charged with and found guilty of the
crime of libel.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant was justified by virtue of defense of
reputation when he published article in the Manila Chronicle dated the
February 21, 1952 containing libelous material
HELD:
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
1. Held: In a physical assault, retaliation becomes unlawful after the attack
has ceased, because there would be no harm to repel. But that is not the case
when it is aimed at a persons good name. Once the aspersion is cast, its sting
clings and the one defamed may avail himself of all necessary means to shake
it off. He may hit back with another libel, which, if adequate, will be justified.
(emphasis supplied)
Note: However, it is justified as self-defense only when it is clearly intended to
explain or deny what was previously said of the one making the libelous
statement. (People vs. Pelayo)
Appellant acquitted with costs de-officio.
PEOPLE VS. PELAYO
FACTS:
On Nov.15, 1956 Pelayo told Atty. Clapano in his office and within hearing
distance of three other people that upon his investigation about the existence
of gambling in the community, a Chinese operator named Lim Peng told him
that then Gov. Alejandro Almendras (now Senator) used to receive from him
P500 protection money. The following day, Pelayo delivered a privileged
speech in city council session wherein he did not directly mention but
insinuated through his interpellations that the governor was receiving
tongs. Pelayo admits having the said conversation with Clapano.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the conversation was said in confidence and covered by the rule on
privileged communication
(2) WON the crime charged which is serious slander should only be intriguing
against honor
(3) WON words were uttered in Self Defense to what the governor had said
about him previously
HELD:
(1) NO this contention of confidence is inconsistent with contention of self-
defense, there were others who heard the remarks he made to Clapano thus
could not have given the communication in confidence.
(2) NO - it cannot be Intriguing against honor because the source of the
information can be pin-pointed= Lim Peng. When the source can be
determined and the information was passed for the purpose of causing
dishonor, the act is slander
(3) NO even if on a previous occasion the governor made derogatory remarks
against Pelayo, the retaliation with scurrilous words cannot be self-defense. It
will only exist of the defendant did not go beyond explaining what was
previously said of him for the purpose of repairing the effect of the damage
caused to him. There is no justification for him to hit back of make the same
imputation of accusation because this is not an act of defense but an
aggression itself
ART 11: DEFENSE OF RELATIVE
US V ESMEDIA
October 21, 1910
G.R. No. 5749
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: The United States
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: PONCIANO ESMEDIA and MENA ESMEDIA,
defendants and appellants
PONENTE: Trent, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Defense of Relative
When alleged attacker is 80-years old, defense of relative doubtful
FACTS:
Esmedia and Abando family lived very near to each other and owned adjoining
rice lands. Ciriaco Abando instructed his son Santiago to go to the rice field to
let out the water so that they could plant rice in the said field. Gregorio
Esmedia appeared on the scene and started a quarrel with Santiago. Gregorio
drew a dagger and stabbed Santiago in the back. Santiago fell to the ground
but arouse immediately and attacked Gregorio with his bolo. The two accused
namely Ponciano and Mena arrived on the scene about the time the fight
between the Santiago and Gregorio was terminating, and seeing their father
lying in the mud and water, fatally wounded and dying and believing Santiago
inflict the wounds to their father, in defense immediately killed Santiago.
Ciriaco was near the scene at this time, the two accused attack him and as a
direct result of the blows inflicted by them he fell to the ground dying
immediately.
ISSUE: WON the two accused can be criminally responsible for the death of
Ciriaco and Santiago Abando
HELD:
Potenciano and Mena Esmedia are exempted from criminal responsibility for
causing the death of Santiago Abando because of the mitigating circumstance
of loss of reason and self-control. Any person who, in depending his father
against an unlawful attack, while he still honestly believes him to be in a great
danger, causes the death of the attacking party, is exempt from criminal
responsibility.
But the two accused is guilty of homicide with aggravating circumstance for
the death of Ciriaco Abando. Considering the age of Ciriaco, 80 years of age
and arrives upon the scene of an altercation after it has terminated, and is
thereupon attacked and killed, the aggravating circumstance must be
considered in fixing the penalty because of the disregard and lack of respect
for age.
ART 11: AVOIDANCE OF A GREATER EVIL
PEOPLE V NORMA HERNANDEZ
October 5, 1959
G.R. No. 10413
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Maria Norma Hernandez
PONENTE: Gutierrez David, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Avoidance of Greater Evil
FACTS:
Vivencio Lascano, 19 y/o, started courting appellant, Maria Norma
Hernandez and after months of courtship, appellant finally accepted
Vivencio. On the same date, she asked him to bring his parents over her
home so that they could talk about their marriage.
When Vivencio and his parents went to her house, they brought chickens
and goats and they agreed to buy a wedding dress, 2 vestidas, shoes, P20
for the sponsors and to repair the uncles roof.
While the celebration was going on, appellant was nowhere to be found.
Vivencio and his parents waited but she never showed up thus causing
them great shame and humiliation.
Norma Hernandez averred that Vivencio was really courting her but that
she wasnt really in love with him. Her parents tried to persuade her to
accept the proposal and that she only accepted it out of obedience to
her parents and the uncles insistence.
Before Vivencios parents came to their home, she already counselled
them not to bring the chickens and that they should not regret whatever
may happen later.
Appellant said she felt torture because she wasnt honestly in love with
Vivencio and so she decided to leave home as last recourse to prevent
the marriage.
Appellants parents also corroborated her testimony.
RTC convicted her of serious slander by deed because she purposely and
deliberately fled to prevent celebration of marriage. Thus, she appealed.
ISSUE: WON the defendant is guilty of slander
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
HELD:
Malice, one of the essential requisites of slander hasnt been proven.
There is no malice in the act of the appellant changing her mind. She was
merely exercising her right not to give her consent the marriage after
mature consideration.
Furthermore, there were no strained relations existing between the
complainant & appellant before the incident. There always existed good
relations between them for they were neighbors so it cannot be
sustained that appellant was motivated by spite or ill-will in deliberately
frustrating the marriage.
Appellant has the privilege to reconsider her previous commitment to
marry and it would be utterly inconsistent to convict her for slander by
deed simply because she desisted in continuing with the marriage. If she
would be liable then that would be tantamount to compelling her to go
into a marriage without her free consent.
Appellant had the right to avoid to herself the evil of going through a
loveless marriage. (Art. 11 par.4, RPC)
Court reversed the RTC judgment and acquitted the appellant.
REGINA VS. DUDLEY
December 9, 1884
FACTS:
Two Defendants together with one Brooks and the deceased, Richard
Parker (between 17-18 y/o) was cast away in a storm on high seas,
1600mi from Cape of Good Hope on July 5, 1884. All were able-bodied
English seamen of an English yacht.
They had no food and no fresh water except for 2 1lb. tins of turnips
which they ate for 3days and stock up rain water.
On 4th day, they caught a turtle & ate it up to the 12th day. For the next
8 days they ate nothing.
On 20th day, petitioners spoke to Brooks about sacrificing one in order
to save the others. Brooks disagreed. Parker, deceased was not
consulted. A proposal to cast lots was raised but was never carried out
because brook disagreed (July24). They talked about their families
implying and suggesting that boy was in a better position to be killed than
all of them because he has no family of his own. Dudley proposed that if
no vessel appears the next day (July 25) the boy should be killed.
July 25, still no vessel and defendants helping each other while
distracting Brooks, sought to kill the boy. Deceased was at the moment,
lying at the bottom of the boat quite helplessly and extremely weakened
by famine that he is unable to put up any resistance. Dudley, after telling
him what is about to come, struck a knife in his throat killing him.
The three fed on his body and blood for the next four days. On the fourth
day they were rescued.
ISSUE: WON killing of deceased is justifiable.
HELD/RATIO:
NO. Extreme necessity of hunger does not justify killing of the boy.
Self-defense along justifies the taking of life of another. It is a general
assumption that one ought rather to die himself than to kill an innocent.
No jurisprudence supports any of the defendants contentions (That they
would have died of hunger within the four days before they were
rescued of they did not feed on the body of the deceased, or that the
boy, being of weaker health was most probable to die first under the
circumstances)
Lord Baron commenting on maxim of Necessity carrieth a privilege in
itself highlights 3 kind of necessity:
(1) necessity of conservation of life,
(2) necessity of obedience, and
(3) necessity of act of God or of a stranger. The first kind being of closest
resemblance to the case it hand cannot be applied. The temptation to
 the act was not what the law has ever called a necessity. A man has no
right to declare temptation to be an excuse.
There is no absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve ones life. It
cannot be compared to mans duty of a necessity to conservation of life
in times of war as in the latter, it a duty imposed by the Sovereign on a
soldier to defend his country. There is no such excuse of necessity in the
deliberate killing of this unoffending & unresisting boy. The crime is
undeniably, willful murder.
Though law and morality are not the same, and many things immoral are
not necessarily illegal, the absolute divorce of law from morality (as will
be the result if the temptation to murder in this case is upheld by law),
will have fatal consequences.
Decision: Modified. No legal justification of Homicide but willful Murder.
TY V PEOPLE
September 27, 2004
G.R. No. 149275
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: Vicky C. Ty
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: People of the Philippines
PONENTE: Tinga, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Avoidance of Greater Evil
FACTS:
Ty's mother and sister was confined at the Manila Doctors Hospital. The total
hospital bills amounted to P1 million. After signing a contract of responsibility
with the hospital, Ty issued 7 checks to cover the said expenses, all of which
were dishonored for being drawn against a closed account. Manila Doctors
Hospital sued Ty for violation of BP 22. In her defense, Ty alleged that she
issued the checks because of an "uncontrollable fear of a greater injury". She
averred that her mother threatened to commit suicide due to the inhumane
treatment she allegedly suffered while confined in the hospital. Ty was found
guilty by the trial court of 7 counts of violation of BP 22. Ty appealed wherein
she reiterated her defense that she issued the checks under the impulse of an
uncontrollable fear of a greater injury or in avoidance of a greater evil or injury.
ISSUE: Is the defense of uncontrollable fear or avoidance of a greater evil or
injury tenable to warrant Ty's exemption from criminal liability?
HELD:
Avoidance of a greater evil or injury
The law prescribes the presence of three requisites to exempt the actor
from liability under this paragraph:
(1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually exists;
(2) that the injury feared be greater than the one done to avoid it;
(3) that there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing
it.
In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated. If the evil sought to be avoided is merely expected or
anticipated or may happen in the future, this defense is not applicable.
Ty could have taken advantage of an available option to avoid
committing a crime. By her own admission, she had the choice to give
jewelry or other forms of security instead of postdated checks to secure
her obligation.
Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to be availing, the greater
injury feared should not have been brought about by the negligence or
imprudence, more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case, the
issuance of the bounced checks was brought about by Tys own failure to
pay her mothers hospital bills. (Ty vs. People, G.R. No. 149275.
September 27, 2004)
Uncontrollable fear
For this exempting circumstance to be invoked successfully, the
following requisites must concur:
(1) existence of an uncontrollable fear;
(2) the fear must be real and imminent; and
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
(3) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that committed.
It must appear that the threat that caused the uncontrollable fear is of
such gravity and imminence that the ordinary man would have
succumbed to it. It should be based on a real, imminent or reasonable
fear for ones life or limb. A mere threat of a future injury is not enough.
It should not be speculative, fanciful, or remote. A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show therefore that the compulsion was such
that it reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but
against his will as well. It must be of such character as to leave no
opportunity to the accused for escape.
In this case, far from it, the fear, if any, harbored by Ty was not real and
imminent. Ty claims that she was compelled to issue the checks a
condition the hospital allegedly demanded of her before her mother
could be discharged for fear that her mothers health might deteriorate
further due to the inhumane treatment of the hospital or worse, her
mother might commit suicide. This is speculative fear; it is not the
uncontrollable fear contemplated by law.
To begin with, there was no showing that the mothers illness was so life-
threatening such that her continued stay in the hospital suffering all its
alleged unethical treatment would induce a well-grounded
apprehension of her death. Secondly, it is not the laws intent to say that
any fear exempts one from criminal liability much less petitioners flimsy
fear that her mother might commit suicide. In other words, the fear she
invokes was not impending or insuperable as to deprive her of all volition
and to make her a mere instrument without will, moved exclusively by
the hospitals threats or demands.
Ty has also failed to convince the Court that she was left with no choice
but to commit a crime. She did not take advantage of the many
opportunities available to her to avoid committing one. By her very own
words, she admitted that the collateral or security the hospital required
prior to the discharge of her mother may be in the form of postdated
checks or jewelry. And if indeed she was coerced to open an account with
the bank and issue the checks, she had all the opportunity to leave the
scene to avoid involvement.
ART 11: FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
PEOPLE V DELIMA
December 22, 1922
G.R. No. L-18660,
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Felipe Delima
PONENTE: Romualdez, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Fulfillment of Duty
FACTS:
Lorenzo Napilon escaped from the jail.
Some days afterwards, policeman Felipe Delima found him in the house
of Jorge Alegria, armed with a pointed piece of bamboo in the shape of
a lance, and demanded his surrender.
Napilon answered with a stroke of his lance.
Delima dodged, it, and to impose his authority fired his revolver, but
the bullet did not hit him.
Napilon ran away, without parting with his weapon.
Delima went after him and fired again his revolver, this time hitting and
killing him.
Delima was tried and convicted for homicide and sentenced to
reclusion temporal and the accessory penalties.
ISSUE: WON Delima should be acquitted for a killing committed in fulfillment
of his duty
HELD:
The killing was done in the performance of a duty. The deceased was under
the obligation to surrender, and had no right, after evading service of his
sentence, to commit assault and disobedience with a weapon in the hand,
which compelled the policeman to resort to such an extreme means, which,
although it proved to be fatal, was justified by the circumstances.
PEOPLE VS. BELBES
FACTS:
Accused together with Pat. Jose Pabon were assigned to maintain peace
and order at the prom of Pili Brgy. High School.
At 9:00 pm, two students approached them and their teacher saying
someone was making trouble.
Accused and Pat. Pabon who were armed with an armalite and .38
caliber respectively, responded forthwith.
Meanwhile, Fernando Bataller and two of his company. Bataller was
drunk and was vomiting and holding on to the bamboo wall of the
schools temporary building when the bamboos broke.
At this instance, the accused and Pat. Pabon appeared and without
warning Accused fired his gun.
Bataller fell and the two patrolmen fled.
Accussed version of the facts:
o Upon responding and arriving at the scene: Bataller was a little
tipsy but not vomiting. They introduced themselves as policemen
but Bataller didnt mind them.
o Bataller then stabbed Pabon with a knife which accused said he
knew because he saw the glint of the blade and he was only 1 meter
away from Pat. Pabon. The latter unfortunately was not hit.
o After two more thrusts were made towards him, Pabon retreated
but accused was stabbed in his lower left shoulder.
o The accused firearm was slung over his shoulder. As Bataller made
another thrust, Accused gave a shot, which after doing so, Bataller
suddenly grabbed the firearm.
o Batallers two other companions had also ganged up on him.
o They struggled with each other and the gun went off. It was semi-
automatic, so one squeeze at the trigger would fire a shot.
o After the armalite went off, Bataller fell. He took the knife and that
was the time people started to gather.
o They went to the police station and turned over the knife.
o Pat. Pabons testimony corroborated with the accused except the
part when accused fired a warning shot and the
deceased companions ganging up on accused.
o Accused pleaded not guilty invoking self-defense in the
performance of his official duty
ISSUE: Was the trial court correct in holding accused-appellant guilty of
murder?
Held: No. It was modified to HOMICIDE.
RATIO:
To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing
evidence that (1) he is not the unlawful aggressor, (2) there was lack of
sufficient provocation on his part, and (3) he employed reasonable
means to prevent or repel the aggression.
It is incumbent upon an accused who has admitted to inflict fatal injuries
to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence in order to avoid criminal liability.
o Appellant offers no material evidence to sufficiently support his
claim of self-defense on the face of mortal danger while on police
duty
o the knife used by the deceased was not even subjected to
fingerprinting
o The accused wound was only examined after 21 hours making self-
infliction a possibility
o If it was true that accused and Bataller grappled face to face, then
the victim should not have been hit sideways
o TIME FACTOR! It took only about 6 seconds from the time the
accused left his seat until the gunshots were heard
There are two requisites to invoke self-defense in the fulfillment of a
duty:
(1) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right
LAW 109 | CONANAN
ART 11: Justifying Circumstances
(2) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence
of the due performance of such right or office
o The first requisite is present for it was admittedly a performance of
his duty. However the second one is lacking for the killing need not
be a necessary consequence on the performance of his duty. He
exceeded his duty which is only to maintain peace and order when
he fired his armalite without warning. Thus, it would account only
as an INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE.
ON MURDER: Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. For it to be a qualifying
circumstance, 2 conditions must concur:
(1) the employment of means, method or manner of execution which
would ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory
acts on the part of the victim, no opportunity being given the latter to
defend himself or to retaliate
(2) the means, method or manner of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the offender
o None of the two conditions were committed. Likewise, suddenness
of an attack does not necessarily imply treachery. Thus, ruling our
murder.
o Homicide resulting from reckless imprudence is not recognized
either.
Decision: Accused-appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide
mitigated by the incomplete justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty.
ART 11: LAWFUL ORDER OF SUPERIOR
PEOPLE V BERONILLA
February 28, 1955
G.R. No. L-4445
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEE: People of the Philippines
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS: Manuel Beronilla, Filipino Velasco, Policarpo
Paculdo, Jacinto Adriatico
PONENTE: Romualdez, J.
TOPIC: Criminal Law Art 11, RPC Lawful Order of Superior
FACTS:
Manuel Beronilla, Policarpio Paculdo, Filipino Velasco and Jacinto
Adriatico file an appeal from the judgement of the Abra CFI, which
convicted them of murder for the execution of Arsenio Borjal, the
elected mayor of La, Paz, Abra (at the outbreak of war), which was found
to be aiding the enemy.
Borjal moved to Bangued because of death threats was succeeded by
Military Mayor Manuel Beronilla, who was appointed by Lt. Col. Arbold,
regimental commander of the 15th Infantry of the Phil. Army, operating
as guerilla unit in Abra.
Simultaneously upon his appointment, Beronilla received a
memorandum which authorized him to appoint a jury of 12 bolo men to
try persons accused of treason, espionage and aiding or abetting the
enemy.
Upon the return of Borjal and his family to Abra, to escape bombing in
Bangued, he was placed under custody and tried and sentenced to death
by the jury based on various complaints made by the residents. Beronilla
reported this to Col. Arnold who replied, saying I can only compliment
you for your impartial but independent way of handling the whole case.
Two years thereafter, Beronilla, along with the executioner, digger and
jury, were indicted for the murder of Borjal. Soon after, President
Manuel Roxas issued Executive Proclamation 8, which granted amnesty
to persons who committed acts in furtherance of the resistance to the
enemy against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy.
The rest of defendants applied and were granted amnesty, but Beronilla
and others were convicted on the grounds that the crime was made on
purely personal motives and that the crime was committed after the
expiration of time limit for amnesty proclamation.
ISSUE: WON the defendant-appellants actions are covered by justifying
circumstances for obedience to lawful order of superior

HELD:
Yes. The accused acted upon orders of their superior officers, which as
military subordinates, they could not question and obeyed in good faith
without the being aware of its illegality.
The evidence is sufficient to sustain the claim of the defense that arrest,
prosecution and trial of Borjal was done in pursuant to express orders of
superiors. Additionally, it could not be established that Beronilla
received the radiogram from Colonel Volckmann, overall area
commander, which called attention to the illegality of Borjals conviction
and sentence. Had Beronilla known the violation, he would not have
dared to report it to Arnold. The conduct of the accused also does not
show malice on their part because of the conduct of the trial, defense
through counsel given to Borjal, suspension of trial based on doubts of
illegality and death sentence review sent to the superior officers.
Criminal intent then could not be established. The maxim here is actus
non facit reum, nisi mens rea (Crime is not committed if the mind of the
person performing the act complained of to be innocent).
Additionally, the lower court should not have denied their claim to the
benefits of the Guerilla Amnesty Proclamation No. 8 inspite of
contradictory dates of liberation of La Paz, Abra. Even if the dates were
contradictory, the court should have found for the Beronila, et al because
if there are any reasonable doubt as to whether a given case falls within
the (amnesty) proclamation should be resolved in favor of the accused.
Judgement reversed, appellants acquitted.

LAW 109 | CONANAN

ART 11: Justifying Circumstances