Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents.

Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners.

City Fiscal Diaz for respondents.

MALCOLM, J.:

The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met
with in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no
great difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular
government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall
the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in
the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might
prove profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The
Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice,
ordered the segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a
number of years in the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the
women were kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during
this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for
sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the
use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard
of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders
from the chief of police, Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban,
descended upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them
aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to
collect their belongings, and apparently were under the impression that they were being
taken to a police station for an investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined
for a life in Mindanao. They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and
had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary
guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and
a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers
sailed for Davao during the night of October 25.

The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in
the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been
expelled from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious
charges growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the
disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others
assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different
capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found
means to return to Manila.

To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting
in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of
the women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions
concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set
forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally
restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief
of police of the city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable
before the full court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann,
admitted certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ
should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action
should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao
and Sulu, because the respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or
control, and because their jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of
Manila. According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were
destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In
open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these
women had been sent out of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an
order of November 4, that directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of
Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an hacenderoof Davao, to bring before the court the persons
therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.

Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own
expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of
the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd,
1918, none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to
Manila through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear
before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated
the stand taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the
Mayor of the city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and
telegrams that had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau
then in Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with
their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered
alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women
had never been under his control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and
because they had married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered
alleging that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it was
impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10,
1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the respondents had not complied with
the original order to the satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and
therefore directed that those of the women not in Manila be brought before the court by
respondents Lukban, Hohmann, Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women
should, in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or
the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate
some other legal motives that made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the
question of whether the respondents were in contempt of court would later be decided and
the reasons for the order announced in the final decision.

Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of
certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before
the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents
technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their
own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys
for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored
to account for all of the persons involved in thehabeas corpus. In substance, it was stated
that the respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing
from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao
who, on notice that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced
the right through sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other
means, and that despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel
for petitioners and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally
asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police
force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt
of court. The city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to
respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.

In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.

One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women
were isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any
opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board
steamers for transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the
women left voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that
the presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these
officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed,
this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.

With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what
law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these
persons from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the
statutes and we find

Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing
from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of
justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any
citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland.
New York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of
Refuge of women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the
health authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in
the Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain
for any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of
Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these
women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but
Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to
change their domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law
specifically punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or
regulation, compels any person to change his residence.

In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important
as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional
system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered
so elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often
been said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary
prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a
municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of
police could, at their mere behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the
liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand
other municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to
themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can
exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And if a
prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to another
within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of any citizen.

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be
taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn
him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we
will not deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225,
Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The
courts are the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of
the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man
who by accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit
to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the
authority which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said
Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be
compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the
enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where
freedom prevails, as being the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118
U.S., 356, 370.) All this explains the motive in issuing the writ ofhabeas corpus, and makes
clear why we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts
should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established in the
Philippine Islands.

What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the
citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.

The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup
money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it
was never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before
us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:

Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general

character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more
than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the
judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and
twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.

Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a

general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change
his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less
than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and
fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)

We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and
press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in
this action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can
be proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge
Cooley in a case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the
law if to an application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a
sufficient answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued
indefinitely until the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of
criminal procedure." (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from
unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any
further rights of the parties are left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal
purpose is to set the individual at liberty.

Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in
parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that
the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only
extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.

The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives
and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made
it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper
for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even
makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that
within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners
had standing in court.

The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First
Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule
of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a
hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any
judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure,
sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable
before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme
Court and is dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown
that the Court of First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means
by which to advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the
petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in
Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it
was shown that the women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was
shown that if the writ was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and
decided immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the
application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the
writ.

The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ
was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no
restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and
the chief of police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable
position. On closer examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the
first principles of the writ of habeas corpus.

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if
such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The
forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going
when and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until
the aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly
waived his right.

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon
to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under
no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We
believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that
he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is
addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ
is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under
no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same
officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The
respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of
her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the
courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The
great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal
any analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in
nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ ofhabeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person
within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in
the State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of
the Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief
justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court
was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ
should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-
writers, with whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the
opinion of Justice Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English
decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view,
only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the
present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . .

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and
a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its
establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on
the petition of right that "Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no
sovereign," and after the extension of its benefits and securities by the petition of
right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion
of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of
the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, as I can
not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as
to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of
king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute.
Statutes were not passed to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights
which existed. . . .

The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ
is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It
does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves
it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves
him by compelling the oppressor to release his constraint. The whole force of the writ
is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to
for the purposes of compulsion are fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode
of affording relief, and if any other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to
those which are usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the
relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court
he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not
increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as greater
distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15
Mich., 416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts.
(Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep.,
1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)

The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been
taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's
Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant
to produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce
the child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ
had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and
that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal,
the court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:

A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That
writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in
chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ,
together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a command to bring
the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be
shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could be shown that by reason of
his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child before the issuing of the
writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that might be an
answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child,
and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without
lawful excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of
contempt to some anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at
some time prior to the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what
was done before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a
contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience
to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to the
same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], 233; The
Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)

A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed
to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored
persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that
he had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they
were removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas
corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence
tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would
apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient,
and that Davis was bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and
refusing to produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until
he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court
afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one
of the negroes had run away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two
negroes on the last day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622,
Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas,
2nd ed., p. 170.)

We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not,
whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales,
and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December
2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample
time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor
of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of
Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to
Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The
half-hearted effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before
the court on the day named.

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ;
or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those
persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented
affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.
(Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in
whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they
did not present writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few
stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in
Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the
return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty,
could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of
Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at
the second hearing by the respondents.

The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail
until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far
from sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to
indicate with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in
Gossage's case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said:
"We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must
take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child
back; that he must do much more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in
America, and even if necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man
could do in the matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute
impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible
effort to produce the women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this
time to take drastic action was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze
the spectacle of a clash between executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired
to give the respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their
wrong.

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards
were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women,
and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-
charges in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of
the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude
that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced
somewhat by our sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is
now being perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular
individual is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas
corpus proceedings.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.

The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto
Diaz, Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not
on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in
order to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and
does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent
to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to
produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to
do so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156;
In re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the
first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority.
Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their
chiefs, and while, under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is
nevertheless a powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have
been drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to
fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any
disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of
attorney for the petitioners, which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted.
When all is said and done, as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily
responsible for the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same,
who made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the
negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the city government,
had it within his power to facilitate the return of the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo
Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was
commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued
by the court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would
reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some
members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that
since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has
purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this
merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of
respondent Lukban to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass
the administration of justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only
as extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being
unduly oppressive such an amount is P100.

In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary.
The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be
in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos
(P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record theReplica al
Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed
against respondents. So ordered.

In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the
hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of
laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.

Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.

Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of
the habeas corpusproceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.

There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige
a great number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.

We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of
public houses of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this
reason, when more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a
steamer and transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said houses of
prostitution has been tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city,
in proceeding in the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal provision which
constitutes an exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the
residents of the city of Manila.

We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying
with the order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of taking them
to the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention
to suppress the segregated district or the community formed by those women in Gardenia
Street, could have obliged the said women to return to their former residences in this city or
in the provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said
official is obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to
the places in which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia
Street.

As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not
find any apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the
mayor of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in
bringing the said women who were free at Davao and presenting them before this court
within the time fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the said women were living
together in a given place. It was not because they were really detained, but because on the
first days there were no houses in which they could live with a relative independent from one
another, and as a proof that they were free a number of them returned to Manila and the
others succeeded in living separate from their companions who continued living together.

To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and
whether he has acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community of
prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only
the rights and interests of the said women and especially of the patrons who have been
directing and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of
the suburbs of this city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous people of
Manila where relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the
inhabitants thereof being more than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with
indifference and without repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate
women dedicated to prostitution.

If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social
morality are to be taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and
permissible to establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened
population, for, although there were no positive laws prohibiting the existence of such houses
within a district of Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its
inhabitants are sufficient to warrant the public administration, acting correctly, in exercising
the inevitable duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution
ostensibly open to the public, and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a
house is inhabited by its true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the
constitutional law guaranteeing his liberty, his individual rights, and his right to property.

A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease
cannot invoke in his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual
rights, should the administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or
concentration in a certain island or distant point in order to free from contagious the great
majority of the inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The
same reasons exist or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to
prostitution, and such reasons become stronger because the first persons named have
contracted their diseases without their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the
unfortunate prostitutes voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously
accepted all its consequences, knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of
all classes, notwithstanding the cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt,
gives way to the spread or multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal
disease, which, although it constitutes a secret disease among men and women, is still
prejudicial to the human species in the same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera,
tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and other contagious diseases which produce great
mortality and very serious prejudice to poor humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which
can give her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will
of another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a
house of prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is
undeniable that she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and
individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join
the society of decent women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the
latter, nor is it possible for her to live within the community or society with the same liberty
and rights enjoyed by every citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she
should therefore be comprised within that class which is always subject to the police and
sanitary regulations conducive to the maintenance of public decency and morality and to the
conservation of public health, and for this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate
women dedicated to prostitution evade the just orders and resolutions adopted by the
administrative authorities.

It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but
those who have been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a governmental
measure, which being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to
consider with due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in general and
particularly the duties and responsibilities weighing upon the authorities which administer
and govern it; they have forgotten that many of those who criticize and censure the mayor
are fathers of families and are in duty bound to take care of their children.

For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the
abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen
but by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health
and social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing himself of the
services of the police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting the immense
majority of the population from the social evils and diseases which the houses of prostitution
situated in Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for
years a true center for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom.
Hence, in ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and
the change of the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the
constitutional laws which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino,
inasmuch as the women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the
exercise of which they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free practice of their
shameful profession.

In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the
administrative authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes,
considering them prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such
measures more humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma, have
been adopted, but such procedures have always had in view the ultimate object of the
Government for the sake of the community, that is, putting an end to the living together in a
certain place of women dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the
problematical hope that they adopt another manner of living which is better and more useful
to themselves and to society.

In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo
Lukban is obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present found in
Davao, and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia
Street, Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should expressly make
known to the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must be
made under oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within the shortest time
possible for its due compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.

ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:

I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in
these proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt
committed, according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
and the consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.

In the said decision, it is said:

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco
Sales, and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court
on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents
were thus given ample time, practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as
the record disclosed, the mayor of the city of Manila waited until the 21st of
November before sending a telegram to the provincial governor of Davao. According
to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief,
there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but who should not
be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort
naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on
the day named.

In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the
respondents, for the purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have, (1)
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by
affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not safely be brought
before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the same decision, the said
respondents ". . . did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was
granted; did not show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that waived
the right to be present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to
show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been
repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a
considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is
demonstrated by the fact that during this time they were easily to be found in the municipality
of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced
at the second hearing by the respondents."

The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order
was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of
contempt of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for
the non production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority
decision cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D.,
283) and added "that the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women
was made by the respondents."

When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case
discussed, my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for
contempt. Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued on December
10, 1918, requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on January 13, 1919, the
women who were not in Manila, unless they could show that it was impossible to comply with
the said order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With respect to this second order,
the same decision has the following to say:

In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to
Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in
rounding up the women, and a steamer with free transportation to Manila was
provided. While charges and countercharges in such a bitterly contested case are to
be expected, and while a critical reading of the record might reveal a failure of literal
fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is a substantial
compliance with it.

I do not agree to this conclusion.

The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date
of the issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month before
taking the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st
of November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial governor o f
Davao and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in that
none of the women appeared before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was
not complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that
seven of the said women having returned to Manila at their own expense before the said
second day of December and being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was
known to Chief of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney for
the respondents, were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the latter
show any effort to present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this
particular by the undersigned.

The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the
respondents, on January 13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before this
court, presented technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to the
city at their own expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents themselves
brought to Manila, alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in
bringing them from Davao with their consent; that in Davao they found eighty-one (81)
women who, when asked if they desired to return to Manila with free transportation,
renounced such a right, as is shown in the affidavits presented by the respondents to this
effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59) women have already returned to Manila, but
notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it was not possible to locate the whereabouts
of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of the one hundred and eighty-one (181)
women who, as has been previously said, have been illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and
Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao against their will, only eight (8) have
been brought to Manila and presented before this court by the respondents in compliance
with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have returned to Manila through other means
not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom were brought by the attorney for the
petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said attorney paid out of his own pocket
the transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding to these numbers the other seven
(7) women who returned to this city at their own expense before January 13 we have a total
of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand, the falsity of the allegation by the
respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2, 1918, giving as one of the
reasons for their inability to present any of the said women that the latter were content with
their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on the other hand, that the
respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban, who acted as chief and
principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by this court, could bring
before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well as before January
13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the seventy-four (74)
women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty (60) of them, as is
said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count upon the aid of
the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had transportation facilities for the
purpose. But the said respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women before this
court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the majority
opinion, justify the conclusion that the said respondent has substantially complied with the
second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not complied with
the mandate of this court in its first and second orders; that neither of the said orders has
been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, who is,
according to the majority decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which
conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent with respect to the second order
confirms the contempt committed by non-compliance with the first order and constitutes a
new contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because of the production of
only eight (8) of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally
detained by virtue of his order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the
twenty-six (26) women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that,
notwithstanding the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus,
presented by the petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be
granted their liberty, the respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he
made any effort to comply with the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the said
two orders; has despised the authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to
justice; and lastly, he has created and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the
saidhabeas corpus proceeding, thus preventing, because of his notorious disobedience, the
resolution of the said proceeding with the promptness which the nature of the same required.

Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity
of the court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case
Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)

It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes
contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol.
6, p. 502.)

It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to

obstruct or attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or
prevents the service of process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any
means, the result is the same as though he had obstructed by some direct means.
(Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)

While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of
enforcing respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized
communities for establishing justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is
apparent nevertheless that the power to enforce decorum in the courts and
obedience to their orders and just measures is so essentially a part of the life of the
courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their usefulness or efficiency as existing
without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for the courts as
ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not,
however, so much to excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to remove
 an unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice. (Ruling
Case Law, vol. 6, p. 487.)

The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised
from the earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted
of scandalizing the sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts. In
the American states the power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive
department and the ministers of state are concerned, and in some degree so far as
the legislative department is concerned, is obsolete, but it has been almost
universally preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The power which the
courts have of vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every court of
justice, whether of record or not; and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper
case for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same
immemorial usage as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case
Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)

The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss
of the prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss might
have been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the respondent
Justo Lukban; the damages which might have been suffered by some of the women illegally
detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be
presented before the court and of the further fact that some of them were obliged to come to
this city at their own expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the
petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said women; and the
delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition interposed by the said
petitioners and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and
duly obeyed and complied with, are circumstances which should be taken into account in
imposing upon the respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt
committed by him, a penalty which, according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
should consist of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or
both such fine and imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken
into consideration the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public
authority, the mayor of the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the city, and
consequently, the person obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and
respect for the laws and the valid and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as
for the orders emanating from the courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said
courts in order that justice may be administered with promptness and rectitude.

I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be
imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the
costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the
records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order that, after a
study of the same and deduction from the testimony which he may deem necessary, and the
proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of
Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and
punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal
detention of the women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila
and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by reason of the
same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby
the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine
Islands there should exist a government of laws and not a government of men and that this
decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to
protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2662 March 26, 1949

SHIGENORI KURODA, petitioner,

vs.
Major General RAFAEL JALANDONI, Brigadier General CALIXTO DUQUE, Colonel
MARGARITO TORALBA, Colonel IRENEO BUENCONSEJO, Colonel PEDRO
TABUENA, Major FEDERICO ARANAS, MELVILLE S. HUSSEY and ROBERT
PORT, respondents.

Pedro Serran, Jose G. Lukban, and Liberato B. Cinco for petitioner.

Fred Ruiz Castro Federico Arenas Mariano Yengco, Jr., Ricardo A. Arcilla and S. Melville
Hussey for respondents.

MORAN, C.J.:

Shigenori Kuroda, formerly a Lieutenant-General of the Japanese Imperial Army and

Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in The Philippines during a period
covering 19433 and 19444 who is now charged before a military Commission convened by
the Chief of Staff of the Armed forces of the Philippines with having unlawfully disregarded
and failed "to discharge his duties as such command, permitting them to commit brutal
atrocities and other high crimes against noncombatant civilians and prisoners of the Imperial
Japanese Forces in violation of the laws and customs of war" comes before this Court
seeking to establish the illegality of Executive Order No. 68 of the President of the
Philippines: to enjoin and prohibit respondents Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port from
participating in the prosecution of petitioner's case before the Military Commission and to
permanently prohibit respondents from proceeding with the case of petitioners.

In support of his case petitioner tenders the following principal arguments.

First. "That Executive Order No. 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the
provision of our constitutional law but also our local laws to say nothing of the fact (that) the
Philippines is not a signatory nor an adherent to the Hague Convention on Rules and
Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore petitioners is charged of 'crimes' not based
on law, national and international." Hence petitioner argues "That in view off the fact that
this commission has been empanelled by virtue of an unconstitutional law an illegal order
this commission is without jurisdiction to try herein petitioner."

Second. That the participation in the prosecution of the case against petitioner before the
Commission in behalf of the United State of America of attorneys Melville Hussey and Robert
Port who are not attorneys authorized by the Supreme Court to practice law in the
Philippines is a diminution of our personality as an independent state and their appointment
as prosecutor are a violation of our Constitution for the reason that they are not qualified to
practice law in the Philippines.
Third. That Attorneys Hussey and Port have no personality as prosecution the United
State not being a party in interest in the case.

Executive Order No. 68, establishing a National War Crimes Office prescribing rule and
regulation governing the trial of accused war criminals, was issued by the President of the
Philippines on the 29th days of July, 1947 This Court holds that this order is valid and
constitutional. Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of
international jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or
civilian who have been guilty of planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the
commission of crimes and offenses consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the
laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held accountable therefor.
Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the President
of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.

The promulgation of said executive order is an exercise by the President of his power as
Commander in chief of all our armed forces as upheld by this Court in the case of
Yamashita vs. Styer (L-129, 42 Off. Gaz., 664) 1 when we said

War is not ended simply because hostilities have ceased. After cessation of armed
hostilities incident of war may remain pending which should be disposed of as in time
of war. An importance incident to a conduct of war is the adoption of measure by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemies but to seize and subject
to disciplinary measure those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our
military effort have violated the law of war. (Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S., 1; 63 Sup. Ct.,
2.) Indeed the power to create a military commission for the trial and punishment of
war criminals is an aspect of waging war. And in the language of a writer a military
commission has jurisdiction so long as a technical state of war continues. This
includes the period of an armistice or military occupation up to the effective of a
treaty of peace and may extend beyond by treaty agreement. (Cowles Trial of
War Criminals by Military Tribunals, America Bar Association Journal June, 1944.)

Consequently, the President as Commander in Chief is fully empowered to consummate this

unfinished aspect of war namely the trial and punishment of war criminal through the
issuance and enforcement of Executive Order No. 68.

Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try petitioner for
acts committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because
the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be
denied that the rules and regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and
are wholly based on the generally accepted principals of international law. In facts these
rules and principles were accepted by the two belligerent nation the United State and Japan
who were signatories to the two Convention, Such rule and principles therefore form part of
the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the conventions
embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as
continued inn treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

Furthermore when the crimes charged against petitioner were allegedly committed the
Philippines was under the sovereignty of United States and thus we were equally bound
together with the United States and with Japan to the right and obligation contained in the
treaties between the belligerent countries. These rights and obligation were not erased by
our assumption of full sovereignty. If at all our emergency as a free state entitles us to
enforce the right on our own of trying and punishing those who committed crimes against
crimes against our people. In this connection it is well to remember what we have said in the
case of Laurel vs. Misa (76 Phil., 372):

. . . The change of our form government from Commonwealth to Republic does not
affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason committed during
then Commonwealth because it is an offense against the same sovereign people. . . .

By the same token war crimes committed against our people and our government while we
were a Commonwealth are triable and punishable by our present Republic.

Petitioner challenges the participation of two American attorneys namely Melville S. Hussey
and Robert Port in the prosecution of his case on the ground that said attorney's are not
qualified to practice law in Philippines in accordance with our Rules of court and the
appointment of said attorneys as prosecutors is violative of our national sovereignty.

In the first place respondent Military Commission is a special military tribunal governed by a
special law and not by the Rules of court which govern ordinary civil court. It has already
been shown that Executive Order No. 68 which provides for the organization of such military
commission is a valid and constitutional law. There is nothing in said executive order which
requires that counsel appearing before said commission must be attorneys qualified to
practice law in the Philippines in accordance with the Rules of Court. In facts it is common in
military tribunals that counsel for the parties are usually military personnel who are neither
attorneys nor even possessed of legal training.

Secondly the appointment of the two American attorneys is not violative of our nation
sovereignty. It is only fair and proper that United States, which has submitted the vindication
of crimes against her government and her people to a tribunal of our nation should be
allowed representation in the trial of those very crimes. If there has been any relinquishment
of sovereignty it has not been by our government but by the United State Government which
has yielded to us the trial and punishment of her enemies. The least that we could do in the
spirit of comity is to allow them representation in said trials.

Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case petitioner challenges the
personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the
United State and its people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes
with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It can be considered a
privilege for our Republic that a leader nation should submit the vindication of the honor of its
citizens and its government to a military tribunal of our country.

The Military Commission having been convened by virtue of a valid law with jurisdiction over
the crimes charged which fall under the provisions of Executive Order No. 68, and having
said petitioner in its custody, this Court will not interfere with the due process of such Military
commission.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.

Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:

A military commission was empanelled on December 1, 1948 to try Lt. Gen. Shigenori
Kuroda for Violation of the laws and customs of land warfare.

Melville S. Hussey and Robert Port, American citizens and not authorized by the Supreme
Court to practice law were appointed prosecutor representing the American CIC in the trial of
the case.

The commission was empanelled under the authority of Executive Order No. 68 of the
President of the Philippines the validity of which is challenged by petitioner on constitutional
grounds. Petitioner has also challenged the personality of Attorneys Hussey and Port to
appear as prosecutors before the commission.

The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the name of the people
of the Philippines as accusers.

We will consideration briefly the challenge against the appearance of Attorneys Hussey and
Port. It appearing that they are aliens and have not been authorized by the Supreme Court to
practice law there could not be any question that said person cannot appear as prosecutors
in petitioner case as with such appearance they would be practicing law against the law.

Said violation vanishes however into insignificance at the side of the momentous question
involved in the challenge against the validity of Executive Order No. 68. Said order is
challenged on several constitutional ground. To get a clear idea of the question raised it is
necessary to read the whole context of said order which is reproduced as follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 68.

ESTABLISHING A NATIONAL WAR CRIMES OFFICE AND PRESCRIBING

RULES AND REGULATION GOVERNING THE TRIAL OF ACCUSED WAR
CRIMINAL.

I, Manuel Roxas president of the Philippines by virtue of the power vested in me by

the Constitution and laws of the Philippines do hereby establish a National War
Crimes Office charged with the responsibility of accomplishing the speedy trial of all
Japanese accused of war crimes committed in the Philippines and prescribe the
rules and regulation such trial.

The National War crimes office is established within the office of the Judge Advocate
General of the Army of the Philippines and shall function under the direction
supervision and control of the Judge Advocate General. It shall proceed to collect
from all available sources evidence of war crimes committed in the Philippines from
the commencement of hostilities by Japan in December 1941, maintain a record
thereof and bring about the prompt trial maintain a record thereof and bring about the
prompt trial of the accused.

The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with the Legal Section
General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied power and shall
exchange with the said Office information and evidence of war crimes.

The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person accused as war
criminals:

ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS

(a) General. person accused as war criminal shall be tried by military commission
to be convened by or under the authority of the Philippines.

II. JURISDICTION

(a) Over Person. Thee military commission appointed hereunder shall have
jurisdiction over all persons charged with war crimes who are in the custody of the
convening authority at the time of the trial.

(b) Over Offenses. The military commission established hereunder shall have
jurisdiction over all offenses including but not limited to the following:

(1) The planning preparation initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in

violation of international treaties agreement or assurance or participation in a
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing.

(2) Violation of the laws or customs of war. Such violation shall include but not be
limited to murder ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor or for other purpose of
civilian population of or in occupied territory; murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of
war or internees or person on the seas or elsewhere; improper treatment of hostage;
plunder of public or private property wanton destruction of cities towns or village; or
devastation not justified by military necessity.

(3) Murder extermination enslavement deportation and other inhuman acts

committed against civilian population before or during the war or persecution on
political racial or religion ground in executive of or in connection with any crime
defined herein whether or not in violation of the local laws.

III. MEMBERSHIP OF COMMISSIONS

(a) Appointment. The members of each military commission shall be appointed by

the President of the Philippines or under authority delegated by him. Alternates may
be appointed by the convening authority. Such shall attend all session of the
commission, and in case of illness or other incapacity of any principal member, an
alternate shall take the place of that member. Any vacancy among the members or
alternates, occurring after a trial has begun, may be filled by the convening authority
but the substance of all proceeding had evidence taken in that case shall be made
known to the said new member or alternate. This facts shall be announced by the
president of the commission in open court.

(b) Number of Members. Each commission shall consist of not less than three (3)
members.

(c) Qualifications. The convening authority shall appoint to the commission

persons whom he determines to be competent to perform the duties involved and not
disqualified by personal interest or prejudice, provided that no person shall be
appointed to hear a case in which he personally investigated or wherein his presence
as a witness is required. One specially qualified member whose ruling is final in so
far as concerns the commission on an objection to the admissibility of evidence
offered during the trial.

(d) Voting. Except as to the admissibility of evidence all rulings and finding of the
Commission shall be by majority vote except that conviction and sentence shall be
by the affirmative vote of not less than conviction and sentence shall be by the
affirmative vote of not less than two-thirds (2\3) of the member present.

(e) Presiding Member. In the event that the convening authority does not name
one of the member as the presiding member, the senior officer among the member of
the Commission present shall preside.

IV. PROSECUTORS

(a) Appointment. The convening authority shall designate one or more person to
conduct the prosecution before each commission.

(b) Duties. The duties of the prosecutor are:

(1) To prepare and present charges and specifications for reference to a

commission.

(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before the commission
of all cases referred for trial.

V. POWER AND PROCEDURE OF COMMISSION

(a) Conduct of the Trial. A Commission shall:

(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the issues raised by
the charges, excluding irrelevant issues or evidence and preventing any unnecessary
delay or interference.

(2) Deal summarily with any contumacy or contempt, imposing any appropriate
punishment therefor.

(3) Hold public session when otherwise decided by the commission.

(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine, or as may be
directed by the convening authority.
(b) Rights of the Accused. The accused shall be entitled:

(1) To have in advance of the trial a copy of the charges and specifications clearly
worded so as to apprise the accused of each offense charged.

(2) To be represented, prior to and during trial, by counsel appointed by the

convening authority or counsel of his own choice, or to conduct his own defense.

(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present relevant evidence at the
trial in support of his defense, and cross-examine each adverse witness who
personally appears before the commission.

(4) To have the substance of the charges and specifications, the proceedings and
any documentary evidence translated, when he is unable otherwise to understand
them.

(c) Witnesses. The Commission shall have power:

(1) To summon witnesses and require their attendance and testimony; to administer
oaths or affirmations to witnesses and other persons and to question witnesses.

(2) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material.

(3) To delegate the Prosecutors appointed by the convening authority the powers
and duties set forth in (1) and (2) above.

(4) To have evidence taken by a special commissioner appointed by the commission.

(d) Evidence.

(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall be of assistance
in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in the commission's opinion would
have probative value in the mind of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply
the rules of evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to
achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without limiting in any way the
scope of the foregoing general rules, the following evidence may be admitted:

(a) Any document, irrespective of its classification, which appears to the commission
to have been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the
armed forces of any Government without proof of the signature or of the issuance of
the document.

(b) Any report which appears to the commission to have been signed or issued by
the International Red Cross or a member of any medical service personnel, or by any
investigator or intelligence officer, or by any other person whom commission
considers as possessing knowledge of the matters contained in the report.

(c) Affidavits, depositions or other signed statements.

(d) Any diary, letter to other document, including sworn statements, appearing to the
commission to contain information relating to the charge.
(e) A copy of any document or other secondary evidence of the contents, if the
original is not immediately available.

(2) The commission shall take judicial notice of facts of common knowledge, official
government documents of any nation, and the proceedings, records and findings of
military or other agencies of any of the United Nation.

(3) A commission may require the prosecution and the defense to make a preliminary
offer of proof whereupon the commission may rule in advance on the admissibility of
such evidence.

(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from responsibility nor
be considered in mitigation of punishment. Further action pursuant to an order of the
accused's superior, or of his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the commission determines that justice so
requires.

(5) All purposed confessions or statements of the accused shall bee admissible in
evidence without any showing that they were voluntarily made. If it is shown that
such confession or statement was procured by mean which the commission believe
to have been of such a character that may have caused the accused to make a false
statement the commission may strike out or disregard any such portion thereof as
was so procured.

(e) Trial Procedure. The proceedings of each trial shall be conducted substantially
as follows unless modified by the commission to suit the particular circumstances:

(1) Each charge and specification shall be read or its substance stated in open court.

(2) The presiding member shall ask each accused whether he pleads "Guilty" or "Not
guilty."

(3) The prosecution shall make its opening statement."(4) The presiding member
may at this or any other time require the prosecutor to state what evidence he
proposes to submit to the commission and the commission thereupon may rule upon
the admissibility of such evidence.

(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be heard or
presented. At the close of the case for the prosecution, the commission may, on
motion of the defense for a finding of not guilty, consider and rule whether he
evidence before the commission may defer action on any such motion and permit or
require the prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further available
evidence.

(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to presenting its case. The
presiding member may, at this any other time require the defense to state what
evidence it proposes to submit to the commission where upon the commission may
rule upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be heard or presented.
Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may introduce such evidence in rebuttal as
the commission may rule as being admissible.

(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the commission.

(8) The commission thereafter shall consider the case in closed session and unless
otherwise directed by the convening authority, announce in open court its judgment
and sentence if any. The commission may state the reason on which judgment is
based.

( f ) Record of Proceedings. Each commission shall make a separate record of its

proceeding in the trial of each case brought before it. The record shall be prepared
by the prosecutor under the direction of the commission and submitted to the
defense counsel. The commission shall be responsible for its accuracy. Such record,
certified by the presiding member of the commission or his successor, shall be
delivered to the convening authority as soon as possible after the trial.

(g) Sentence. The commission may sentence an accused, upon conviction to

death by hanging or shooting, imprisonment for life or for any less term, fine or such
other punishment as the commission shall determine to be proper.

(h) Approval of Sentence. No. sentence of a military commission shall be carried

into effect until approved by the chief off Staff: Provided, That no sentence of death
or life imprisonment shall be carried into execution until confirmed by the President of
the Philippines. For the purpose of his review the Chief of Staff shall create a Board
of Review to be composed of not more than three officers none of whom shall be on
duty with or assigned to the Judge Advocate General's Office. The Chief of Staff shall
have authority to approve, mitigate remit in whole or in part, commute, suspend,
reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed, or (without prejudice to the
accused) remand the case for rehearing before a new military commission; but he
shall not have authority to increase the severity of the sentence. Except as herein
otherwise provided the judgment and sentence of a commission shall final and not
subject to review by any other tribunal.

VI. RULE-MAKING POWER

Supplementary Rule and Forms. Each commission shall adopt rules and forms to
govern its procedure, not inconsistent with the provision of this Order, or such rules
and forms as may be prescribed by the convening authority]or by the President of the
Philippines.

VII. The amount of amount of seven hundred thousand pesos is hereby set aside out
of the appropriations for the Army of the Philippines for use by the National War
Crimes Office in the accomplishment of its mission as hereinabove set forth, and
shall be expended in accordance with the recommendation of the Judge Advocate
General as approved by the President. The buildings, fixtures, installations, messing,
and billeting equipment and other property herefore used by then Legal Section,
Manila Branch, of the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied
Power, which will be turned over by the United States Army to the Philippines
Government through the Foreign Liquidation Commission and the Surplus Property
 Commission are hereby specification reserved for use off the National War Crimes
Office.

Executive Order No. 64, dated August 16, 1945, is hereby repealed.

Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and forty-seven, and of the Independence of the Philippines, the second.

MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines

By the President:

EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office

EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION

Executive Order No. 68 is a veritable piece of Legislative measure, without the benefit of
congressional enactment.

The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other no less important
question, is whether or not the President of the Philippines may exercise the legislative
power expressly vested in Congress by the Constitution. .

The Constitution provides:

The Legislative powers shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.)

While there is no express provision in the fundamental law prohibiting the exercise of
legislative power by agencies other than Congress, a reading of the whole context of the
Constitution would dispel any doubt as to the constitutional intent that the legislative power is
to be exercised exclusively by Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President of
the President of the Philippines, to the specific provision which allow the president of the
Philippines to suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus and to place any part of the
Philippines under martial law, and to the rule-making power expressly vested by the
Constitution in the Supreme Court.

There cannot be any question that the member of the Constitutional Convention were
believers in the tripartite system of government as originally enunciated by Aristotle, further
elaborated by Montequieu and accepted and practiced by modern democracies, especially
the United State of America, whose Constitution, after which ours has been patterned, has
allocated the three power of government legislative, executive, judicial to distinct and
separate department of government.

Because the power vested by our Constitution to the several department of the government
are in the nature of grants, not recognition of pre-existing power, no department of
government may exercise any power or authority not expressly granted by the Constitution
or by law by virtue express authority of the Constitution.
Executive Order No. 68 establishes a National War Crimes Office and the power to establish
government office is essentially legislative.

The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried by military
commissions. Whether such a provision is substantive or adjective, it is clearly legislative in
nature. It confers upon military commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war
crimes. The power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person accused of
any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in Congress. .

It provides rules of procedure for the conduct of trial of trial. This provision on procedural
subject constitutes a usurpation of the rule-making power vested by Constitution in the
Supreme Court.

It authorized military commission to adopt additional rule of procedure. If the President of the
Philippines cannot exercise the rule -making power vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court, he cannot, with more reason, delegate that power to military commission.

It appropriates the sum of P7000,000 for the expenses of the National War Crimes office
established by the said Executive Order No. 68. This constitutes another usurpation of
legislative power as the power to vote appropriations belongs to Congress.

Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it the President of the
Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the Constitution in Congress and in the
Supreme Court.

Challenged to show the constitutional or legal authority under which the President issued
Executive Order No. 68, respondent could not give any definite answer. They attempted,
however, to suggest that the President of the Philippines issued Executive Order No. 68
under the emergency power granted to him by Commonwealth Act No. 600, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 620, and Commonwealth Act No. 671, both of which are transcribed
below:

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 600.

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF EMERGENCY AND AUTHORIZING

THE PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATION TO
SAFEGUARD THE INTEGRITY OF THE PHILIPPINES AND TO INSURE
THE TRANQUILITY OF ITS INHABITANTS.

Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines:

SECTION 1. The existence of war in many parts of the world has created a national
emergency which makes it necessary to invest the President of the Philippines with
extraordinary power in order to safeguard the integrity of the Philippines and to
insure the tranquility of its inhabitants, by suppressing espionage, lawlessness, and
all subversive to the people adequate shelter and clothing and sufficient food supply,
and by providing means for the speedy evacuation of the civilian population the
establishment of an air protective service and the organization of volunteer guard
units, and to adopt such other measures as he may deem necessary for the interest
of the public. To carry out this policy the President is authorized to promulgate rules
and regulations which shall have the force and effect off law until the date of
adjournment of the next regulation which shall have the force and effect of law until
the date of adjournment of the next regular session of the First Congress of the
Philippines, unless sooner amended or repealed by the Congress of Philippines.
Such rules and regulation may embrace the following objects: (1) to suppress
espionage and other subversive activities; (2) to require all able-bodied citizens (a)
when not engaged in any lawful occupation, to engage in farming or other productive
activities or (b) to perform such services as may bee necessary in the public interest;
(3) to take over farm lands in order to prevent or shortage of crops and hunger and
destitution; (4) to take over industrial establishment in order to insure adequate
production, controlling wages and profits therein; (5) to prohibit lockouts and strikes
whenever necessary to prevent the unwarranted suspension of work in productive
enterprises or in the interest of national security; (6) to regulate the normal hours of
work for wage-earning and salaried employees in industrial or business undertakings
of all kinds; (7) to insure an even distribution of labor among the productive
enterprises; (8) to commandership and other means of transportation in order to
maintain, as much as possible, adequate and continued transportation facilities; (9)
to requisition and take over any public service or enterprise for use or operation by
the Government;(10) to regulate rents and the prices of articles or commodities of
prime necessity, both imported and locally produced or manufactured; and (11) to
prevent, locally or generally, scarcity, monopolization, hoarding injurious
speculations, and private control affecting the supply, distribution and movement of
foods, clothing, fuel, fertilizer, chemical, building, material, implements, machinery,
and equipment required in agriculture and industry, with power to requisition these
commodities subject to the payment of just compensation. (As amended by Com. Act
No. 620.)

SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out its objective, the
President may designate any officer, without additional compensation, or any
department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National Government.

SEC. 3. Any person, firm, or corporation found guilty of the violation of any provision
of this Act or of this Act or any of the rules or regulations promulgated by the
President under the authority of section one of this Act shall be punished by
imprisonment of not more than ten years or by a fine of not more than ten thousand
pesos, or by both. If such violation is committed by a firm or corporation, the
manager, managing director, or person charge with the management of the business
of such firm, or corporation shall be criminally responsible therefor.

SEC. 4. The President shall report to the national Assembly within the first ten days
from the date of the opening of its next regular session whatever action has been
taken by him under the authority herein granted.

SEC. 5. To carry out the purposed of this Act, the President is authorized to spend
such amounts as may be necessary from the sum appropriated under section five
Commonwealth Act Numbered four hundred and ninety-eight.

SEC. 6. If any province of this Act shall be declared by any court of competent
jurisdiction to be unconstitutional and void, such declaration shall not invalidate the
remainder of this Act.
 SEC. 7. This Act shall take upon its approval.

Approved, August 19, 1940.

COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 671

AN ACT DECLARING A STATE OF TOTAL EMERGENCY AS A RESULT

OF WAR INVOLVING THE PHILIPPINES AND AUTHORIZING THE
PRESIDENT TO PROMULGATE RULE AND REGULATIONS TO MEET
SUCH EMERGENCY.

Be it enacted the National Assembly of the Philippines;

SECTION 1. The existed of war between the United State and other countries of
Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines, makes it necessary to invest the
President with extraordinary powers in order to meet the resulting emergency.

SEC. 2. Pursuant to the provision of Article VI, section 16, of the Constitution, the
President is hereby authorized, during the existence of the emergency, to promulgate
such rules and regulation as he may deem necessary to carry out the national policy
declared in section 1 hereof. Accordingly, he is, among other things, empowered (a)
to transfer the seat of the Government or any of its subdivisions, branches,
department, offices, agencies or instrumentalities; (b) to reorganize the Government
of the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the
heads of the Executive Department; (c) to create new subdivision, branches,
departments, offices, agency or instrumentalities of government and to abolish any of
those already existing; (d) to continue in force laws and appropriation which would
lapse or otherwise became inoperative, and to modify or suspend the operation or
application of those of an administrative character; (e) to imposed new taxes or to
increase, reduce, suspend, or abolish those in existence; (f) to raise funds through
the issuance of bonds or otherwise, and to authorize the expensive of the proceeds
thereof; (g) to authorize the National, provincial, city or municipal governments to
incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may approve; (h) to declare the suspension
of the collection of credits or the payment of debts; and (i) to exercise such other
power as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilities and to maintain and enforce its authority.

SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules and regulation
promulgated by him under the power herein granted.

SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules and regulations.
promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect until the Congress of the
Philippines shall otherwise provide.

Approved December 16, 1941.

The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was issued on July 29,
1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of the Philippines form the Japanese forces
or, at the latest, when the surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
When both Acts were enacted by the Second National Assembly, we happened to have
taken direct part in their consideration and passage, not only as one of the members of said
legislative body as chairman of the Committee on Third Reading population Known as the
"Little Senate." We are, therefore in a position to state that said measures were enacted by
the second national Assembly for the purpose of facing the emergency of impending war and
of the Pacific War that finally broke out with the attack of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.
We approved said extraordinary measures, by which under the exceptional circumstances
then prevailing legislative power were delegated to the President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the following provisions of the Constitution:

In time of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe to
promulgate rules and regulations to carry out declared national policy. (Article VI,
section 26.)

It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the delegation beyond the
emergency created by the war as to extend it farther would be violative of the express
provision of the Constitution. We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.;
but if there could still be any the same should be resolved in favor of the presumption that
the National Assembly did not intend to violate the fundamental law.

The absurdity of the contention that the emergency Acts continued in effect even after the
surrender of Japan can not be gainsaid. Only a few months after liberation and even before
the surrender of Japan, or since the middle of 1945, the Congress started to function
normally. In the hypothesis that the contention can prevail, then, since 1945, that is, four
years ago, even after the Commonwealth was already replaced by the Republic of the
Philippines with the proclamation of our Independence, two district, separate and
independence legislative organs, Congress and the President of the Philippines would
have been and would continue enacting laws, the former to enact laws of every nature
including those of emergency character, and the latter to enact laws, in the form of executive
orders, under the so-called emergency powers. The situation would be pregnant with
dangers to peace and order to the rights and liberties of the people and to Philippines
democracy.

Should there be any disagreement between Congress and the President of the Philippines, a
possibility that no one can dispute the President of the Philippines may take advantage of he
long recess of Congress (two-thirds of every year ) to repeal and overrule legislative
enactments of Congress, and may set up a veritable system of dictatorship, absolutely
repugnant to the letter and spirit of the Constitution.

Executive Order No. 68 is equally offensive to the Constitution because it violates the
fundamental guarantees of the due process and equal protection of the law. It is especially
so, because it permit the admission of many kinds evidence by which no innocent person
can afford to get acquittal and by which it is impossible to determine whether an accused is
guilty or not beyond all reasonable doubt.

The rules of evidence adopted in Executive Order No. 68 are a reproduction of the regulation
governing the trial of twelve criminal, issued by General Douglas Mac Arthur, Commander in
Chief of the United State Armed Forces in Western Pacific, for the purpose of trying among
other, General Yamashita and Homma. What we said in our concurring and dissenting
opinion to the decision promulgated on December 19, 1945, in the Yamashita case, L-129,
and in our concurring and dissenting opinion to the resolution of January 23, 1946 in
disposing the Homma case, L-244, are perfectly applicable to the offensive rules of evidence
in Executive Order No. 68. Said rules of evidence are repugnant to conscience as under
them no justice can expected.

For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and Homma cases, we
vote to declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void and to grant petition.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979

LEOVILLO C. AGUSTIN, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROMEO F. EDU, in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner; HON.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, in his capacity as Minister of National Defense; HON.
ALFREDO L. JUINIO, in his capacity as Minister Of Public Works, Transportation and
Communications; and HON: BALTAZAR AQUINO, in his capacity as Minister of Public
Highways, respondents.

Leovillo C. Agustin Law Office for petitioner.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Ruben E. Agpalo and
Solicitor Amado D. Aquino for respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

The validity of a letter of Instruction 1 providing for an early seaming device for motor vehicles is
assailed in this prohibition proceeding as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and, insofar as the rules and regulations for its implementation are concerned, for
transgressing the fundamental principle of non- delegation of legislative power. The Letter of
Instruction is stigmatized by petitioner who is possessed of the requisite standing, as being
arbitrary and oppressive. A temporary restraining order as issued and respondents Romeo F.
Edu, Land Transportation Commissioner Juan Ponce Enrile, Minister of National Defense; Alfredo
L. Juinio, Minister of Public Works, Transportation and Communications; and Baltazar Aquino,
Minister of Public Highways; were to answer. That they did in a pleading submitted by Solicitor
General Estelito P. Mendoza. 2 Impressed with a highly persuasive quality, it makes devoid clear
that the imputation of a constitutional infirmity is devoid of justification The Letter of Instruction on
is a valid police power measure. Nor could the implementing rules and regulations issued by
respondent Edu be considered as amounting to an exercise of legislative power. Accordingly, the
petition must be dismissed.

The facts are undisputed. The assailed Letter of Instruction No. 229 of President Marcos,
issued on December 2, 1974, reads in full: "[Whereas], statistics show that one of the major
causes of fatal or serious accidents in land transportation is the presence of disabled, stalled
or parked motor vehicles along streets or highways without any appropriate early warning
device to signal approaching motorists of their presence; [Whereas], the hazards posed by
such obstructions to traffic have been recognized by international bodies concerned with
traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United
Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said Vienna Convention which was ratified by
the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207, recommended the enactment of local
legislation for the installation of road safety signs and devices; [Now, therefore, I, Ferdinand
E. Marcos], President of the Philippines, in the interest of safety on all streets and highways,
including expressways or limited access roads, do hereby direct: 1. That all owners, users or
drivers of motor vehicles shall have at all times in their motor vehicles at least one (1) pair of
early warning device consisting of triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates in red and yellow
colors at least 15 cms. at the base and 40 cms. at the sides. 2. Whenever any motor vehicle
is stalled or disabled or is parked for thirty (30) minutes or more on any street or highway,
including expressways or limited access roads, the owner, user or driver thereof shall cause
the warning device mentioned herein to be installed at least four meters away to the front
and rear of the motor vehicle staged, disabled or parked. 3. The Land Transportation
Commissioner shall cause Reflectorized Triangular Early Warning Devices, as herein
described, to be prepared and issued to registered owners of motor vehicles, except
motorcycles and trailers, charging for each piece not more than 15 % of the acquisition cost.
He shall also promulgate such rules and regulations as are appropriate to effectively
implement this order. 4. All hereby concerned shall closely coordinate and take such
measures as are necessary or appropriate to carry into effect then instruction. 3 Thereafter,
on November 15, 1976, it was amended by Letter of Instruction No. 479 in this wise. "Paragraph
3 of Letter of Instruction No. 229 is hereby amended to read as follows: 3. The Land
transportation Commissioner shall require every motor vehicle owner to procure from any and
present at the registration of his vehicle, one pair of a reflectorized early warning device, as d bed
of any brand or make chosen by mid motor vehicle . The Land Transportation Commissioner shall
also promulgate such rule and regulations as are appropriate to effectively implement this
order.'" 4 There was issued accordingly, by respondent Edu, the implementing rules and
regulations on December 10, 1976. 5 They were not enforced as President Marcos on January
25, 1977, ordered a six-month period of suspension insofar as the installation of early warning
device as a pre-registration requirement for motor vehicle was concerned. 6 Then on June 30,
1978, another Letter of Instruction 7 the lifting of such suspension and directed the immediate
implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229 as amended. 8 It was not until August 29, 1978
that respondent Edu issued Memorandum Circular No. 32, worded thus: "In pursuance of Letter
of Instruction No. 716, dated June 30, 1978, the implementation of Letter of Instruction No. 229,
as amended by Letter of Instructions No. 479, requiring the use of Early Warning Devices (EWD)
on motor vehicle, the following rules and regulations are hereby issued: 1. LTC Administrative
Order No. 1, dated December 10, 1976; shall now be implemented provided that the device may
come from whatever source and that it shall have substantially complied with the EWD
specifications contained in Section 2 of said administrative order; 2. In order to insure that every
motor vehicle , except motorcycles, is equipped with the device, a pair of serially numbered
stickers, to be issued free of charge by this Commission, shall be attached to each EWD. The
EWD. serial number shall be indicated on the registration certificate and official receipt of
payment of current registration fees of the motor vehicle concerned. All Orders, Circulars, and
Memoranda in conflict herewith are hereby superseded, This Order shall take effect
immediately. 9 It was for immediate implementation by respondent Alfredo L. Juinio, as Minister of
Public Works, transportation, and Communications. 10

Petitioner, after setting forth that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035,
already properly equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore
and aft, which could very well serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies
mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229, as amended, as well as the implementing rules
and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by the land transportation
Commission," 11 alleged that said Letter of Instruction No. 229, as amended, "clearly violates the
provisions and delegation of police power, [sic] * * *: " For him they are "oppressive,
unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of our
compassionate New Society." 12 He contended that they are "infected with arbitrariness because
it is harsh, cruel and unconscionable to the motoring public;" 13 are "one-sided, onerous and
patently illegal and immoral because [they] will make manufacturers and dealers instant
millionaires at the expense of car owners who are compelled to buy a set of the so-called early
warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." 14 are unlawful and unconstitutional and
contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being] compulsory and confiscatory
on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical alternative road safety device,
or a better substitute to the specified set of EWD's." 15 He therefore prayed for a judgment both
the assailed Letters of Instructions and Memorandum Circular void and unconstitutional and for a
restraining order in the meanwhile.

A resolution to this effect was handed down by this Court on October 19, 1978: "L-49112
(Leovillo C. Agustin v. Hon. Romeo F. Edu, etc., et al.) Considering the allegations
contained, the issues raised and the arguments adduced in the petition for prohibition with
writ of p prohibitory and/or mandatory injunction, the Court Resolved to (require) the
respondents to file an answer thereto within ton (10) days from notice and not to move to
dismiss the petition. The Court further Resolved to [issue] a [temporary restraining order]
effective as of this date and continuing until otherwise ordered by this Court. 16

Two motions for extension were filed by the Office of the Solicitor General and granted. Then
on November 15, 1978, he Answer for respondents was submitted. After admitting the
factual allegations and stating that they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle car," they "specifically deny the
allegations and stating they lacked knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
petitioner owning a Volkswagen Beetle Car, 17 they specifically deny the allegations in
paragraphs X and XI (including its subparagraphs 1, 2, 3, 4) of Petition to the effect that Letter of
Instruction No. 229 as amended by Letters of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716 as well as Land
transportation Commission Administrative Order No. 1 and its Memorandum Circular No. 32
violates the constitutional provisions on due process of law, equal protection of law and undue
delegation of police power, and that the same are likewise oppressive, arbitrary, confiscatory,
one-sided, onerous, immoral unreasonable and illegal the truth being that said allegations are
without legal and factual basis and for the reasons alleged in the Special and Affirmative
Defenses of this Answer." 18 Unlike petitioner who contented himself with a rhetorical recital of his
litany of grievances and merely invoked the sacramental phrases of constitutional litigation, the
Answer, in demonstrating that the assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of the police
power and implementing rules and regulations of respondent Edu not susceptible to the charge
that there was unlawful delegation of legislative power, there was in the portion captioned Special
and Affirmative Defenses, a citation of what respondents believed to be the authoritative
decisions of this Tribunal calling for application. They are Calalang v. Williams, 19 Morfe v.
Mutuc, 20 and Edu v. Ericta. 21 Reference was likewise made to the 1968 Vienna Conventions of
the United Nations on road traffic, road signs, and signals, of which the Philippines was a
signatory and which was duly ratified. 22 Solicitor General Mendoza took pains to refute in detail,
in language calm and dispassionate, the vigorous, at times intemperate, accusation of petitioner
that the assailed Letter of Instruction and the implementing rules and regulations cannot survive
the test of rigorous scrutiny. To repeat, its highly-persuasive quality cannot be denied.

This Court thus considered the petition submitted for decision, the issues being clearly
joined. As noted at the outset, it is far from meritorious and must be dismissed.

1. The Letter of Instruction in question was issued in the exercise of the police power. That is
conceded by petitioner and is the main reliance of respondents. It is the submission of the
former, however, that while embraced in such a category, it has offended against the due
process and equal protection safeguards of the Constitution, although the latter point was
mentioned only in passing. The broad and expansive scope of the police power which was
originally Identified by Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847
decision as "nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty" 23 was stressed in the aforementioned case of Edu v. Erictathus: "Justice Laurel, in
the first leading decision after the Constitution came into force, Calalang v. Williams, Identified
police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus 'be subjected
to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to we the general comfort, health and prosperity of
the state.' Shortly after independence in 1948, Primicias v. Fugoso reiterated the doctrine, such a
competence being referred to as 'the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people. The concept
was set forth in negative terms by Justice Malcolm in a pre-Commonwealth decision as 'that
inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the
comfort, safety and welfare of society. In that sense it could be hardly distinguishable as noted by
this Court in Morfe v. Mutuc with the totality of legislative power. It is in the above sense the
greatest and most powerful at. tribute of government. It is, to quote Justice Malcolm anew, 'the
most essential, insistent, and at least table powers, I extending as Justice Holmes aptly pointed
out 'to all the great public needs.' Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times,
even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides enough room for an efficient and
flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits. In the
language of Justice Cardozo: 'Needs that were narrow or parochial in the past may be interwoven
in the present with the well-being of the nation. What is critical or urgent changes with the time.'
The police power is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted
in the conception that men in organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to
safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of
citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures calculated to
communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 24

2. It was thus a heavy burden to be shouldered by petitioner, compounded by the fact that
the particular police power measure challenged was clearly intended to promote public
safety. It would be a rare occurrence indeed for this Court to invalidate a legislative or
executive act of that character. None has been called to our attention, an indication of its
being non-existent. The latest decision in point, Edu v. Ericta, sustained the validity of the
Reflector Law, 25 an enactment conceived with the same end in view. Calalang v. Williams found
nothing objectionable in a statute, the purpose of which was: "To promote safe transit upon, and.
avoid obstruction on roads and streets designated as national roads * * *. 26 As a matter of fact,
the first law sought to be nullified after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the National
Defense Act, 27 with petitioner failing in his quest, was likewise prompted by the imperative
demands of public safety.

3. The futility of petitioner's effort to nullify both the Letter of Instruction and the implementing
rules and regulations becomes even more apparent considering his failure to lay the
necessary factual foundation to rebut the presumption of validity. So it was held in Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. 28 The rationale
was clearly set forth in an excerpt from a decision of Justice Branders of the American Supreme
Court, quoted in the opinion: "The statute here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the
scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground that the specific method
of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law.
As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character,
the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record in overthrowing the statute. 29

4. Nor did the Solicitor General as he very well could, rely solely on such rebutted
presumption of validity. As was pointed out in his Answer "The President certainly had in his
possession the necessary statistical information and data at the time he issued said letter of
instructions, and such factual foundation cannot be defeated by petitioner's naked assertion
that early warning devices 'are not too vital to the prevention of nighttime vehicular accidents'
because allegedly only 390 or 1.5 per cent of the supposed 26,000 motor vehicle accidents
that in 1976 involved rear-end collisions (p. 12 of petition). Petitioner's statistics is not backed
up by demonstrable data on record. As aptly stated by this Honorable Court: Further: "It
admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face, which
is not the case here"' * * *. But even as g the verity of petitioner's statistics, is that not reason
enough to require the installation of early warning devices to prevent another 390 rear-end
collisions that could mean the death of 390 or more Filipinos and the deaths that could
likewise result from head-on or frontal collisions with stalled vehicles?" 30 It is quite manifest
then that the issuance of such Letter of Instruction is encased in the armor of prior, careful study
by the Executive Department. To set it aside for alleged repugnancy to the due process clause is
to give sanction to conjectural claims that exceeded even the broadest permissible limits of a
pleader's well known penchant for exaggeration.

5. The rather wild and fantastic nature of the charge of oppressiveness of this Letter of
Instruction was exposed in the Answer of the Solicitor General thus: "Such early warning
device requirement is not an expensive redundancy, nor oppressive, for car owners whose
cars are already equipped with 1) blinking lights in the fore and aft of said motor vehicles,' 2)
"battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles," 3) "built-in reflectorized tapes on front
and rear bumpers of motor vehicles," or 4) "well-lighted two (2) petroleum lamps (the Kinke) *
* * because: Being universal among the signatory countries to the said 1968 Vienna
Conventions, and visible even under adverse conditions at a distance of at least 400 meters,
any motorist from this country or from any part of the world, who sees a reflectorized
rectangular early seaming device installed on the roads, highways or expressways, will
conclude, without thinking, that somewhere along the travelled portion of that road, highway,
or expressway, there is a motor vehicle which is stationary, stalled or disabled which
obstructs or endangers passing traffic. On the other hand, a motorist who sees any of the
aforementioned other built in warning devices or the petroleum lamps will not immediately
get adequate advance warning because he will still think what that blinking light is all about.
Is it an emergency vehicle? Is it a law enforcement car? Is it an ambulance? Such confusion
or uncertainty in the mind of the motorist will thus increase, rather than decrease, the danger
of collision. 31

6. Nor did the other extravagant assertions of constitutional deficiency go unrefuted in the
Answer of the Solicitor General "There is nothing in the questioned Letter of Instruction No.
229, as amended, or in Administrative Order No. 1, which requires or compels motor vehicle
owners to purchase the early warning device prescribed thereby. All that is required is for
motor vehicle owners concerned like petitioner, to equip their motor vehicles with a pair of
this early warning device in question, procuring or obtaining the same from whatever source.
In fact, with a little of industry and practical ingenuity, motor vehicle owners can even
personally make or produce this early warning device so long as the same substantially
conforms with the specifications laid down in said letter of instruction and administrative
order. Accordingly the early warning device requirement can neither be oppressive, onerous,
immoral, nor confiscatory, much less does it make manufacturers and dealers of said
devices 'instant millionaires at the expense of car owners' as petitioner so sweepingly
concludes * * *. Petitioner's fear that with the early warning device requirement 'a more
subtle racket may be committed by those called upon to enforce it * * * is an unfounded
speculation. Besides, that unscrupulous officials may try to enforce said requirement in an
unreasonable manner or to an unreasonable degree, does not render the same illegal or
immoral where, as in the instant case, the challenged Letter of Instruction No. 229 and
implementing order disclose none of the constitutional defects alleged against it. 32

7 It does appear clearly that petitioner's objection to this Letter of Instruction is not premised
on lack of power, the justification for a finding of unconstitutionality, but on the pessimistic,
not to say negative, view he entertains as to its wisdom. That approach, it put it at its mildest,
is distinguished, if that is the appropriate word, by its unorthodoxy. It bears repeating "that
this Court, in the language of Justice Laurel, 'does not pass upon questions of wisdom
justice or expediency of legislation.' As expressed by Justice Tuason: 'It is not the province of
the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.' There can be no possible
objection then to the observation of Justice Montemayor. 'As long as laws do not violate any
Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary. For they, according to Justice Labrador, 'are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and * * * never inquire into the wisdom of the law.' It is thus settled,
to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only
congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis
for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of separation of powers
has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each department and confined its
jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion not allowable under the
Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as there ought to be, the last
offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms and prescriptions. The attack
on the validity of the challenged provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if
valid and cogent on is wisdom cannot be sustained. 33

8. The alleged infringement of the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative

power is equally without any support well-settled legal doctrines. Had petitioner taken the
trouble to acquaint himself with authoritative pronouncements from this Tribunal, he would
not have the temerity to make such an assertion. An exempt from the aforecited decision
of Edu v. Ericta sheds light on the matter: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there
must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hard to repel A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances
under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative
purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated
may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations.
The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be
implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law
clearly, the legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained as in Calalang
v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads.' This is to adhere to the recognition given
expression by Justice Laurel in a decision announced not too long after the Constitution
came into force and effect that the principle of non-delegation "has been made to adapt itself
to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits,
of the principle of "subordinate legislation" not only in the United States and England but in
practically all modern governments.' He continued: 'Accordingly, with the growing complexity
of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward
the delegation of greater powers by the legislature and toward the approval of the practice by
the courts.' Consistency with the conceptual approach requires the reminder that what is
delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completeness of the statute when it
leaves the hands of Congress being assumed." 34

9. The conclusion reached by this Court that this petition must be dismissed is reinforced by
this consideration. The petition itself quoted these two whereas clauses of the assailed Letter
of Instruction: "[Whereas], the hazards posed by such obstructions to traffic have been
recognized by international bodies concerned with traffic safety, the 1968 Vienna Convention
on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organization (U.N.); [Whereas], the said
Vionna Convention, which was ratified by the Philippine Government under P.D. No. 207,
recommended the enactment of local legislation for the installation of road safety signs and
devices; * * * " 35 It cannot be disputed then that this Declaration of Principle found in the
Constitution possesses relevance: "The Philippines * * * adopts the generally accepted principles
of international law as part of the law of the land * * *." 36 The 1968 Vienna Convention on Road
Signs and Signals is impressed with such a character. It is not for this country to repudiate a
commitment to which it had pledged its word. The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the
way of such an attitude, which is, moreover, at war with the principle of international morality.

10. That is about all that needs be said. The rather court reference to equal protection did not
even elicit any attempt on the Part of Petitioner to substantiate in a manner clear, positive,
and categorical why such a casual observation should be taken seriously. In no case is there
a more appropriate occasion for insistence on what was referred to as "the general rule"
in Santiago v. Far Eastern Broadcasting Co., 37 namely, "that the constitutionality of a law wig
not be considered unless the point is specially pleaded, insisted upon, and adequately
argued." 38 "Equal protection" is not a talismanic formula at the mere invocation of which a party
to a lawsuit can rightfully expect that success will crown his efforts. The law is anything but that.

WHEREFORE, this petition is dismissed. The restraining order is lifted. This decision is
immediately executory. No costs.

Castro, C.J., Barredo, Antonio, Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, concur.

Makasiar, J, reserves the right to file a separate opinion.

Aquino J., took no part.

Concepcion J., is on leave.

Castro, C.J., certifies that Justice Concepcion concurs in their decision.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the
Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum
Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is
oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter
alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-
in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of
said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D.
specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has
been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents
that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the
purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout
the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's
assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country
requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a
consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S
"stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in
their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main
cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest
and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the
reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits
and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be
imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the
petitioner for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and
unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out
of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

# Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

I dissent from the majority's peremptory dismissal of the petition and lifting of the restraining
order issued on October 19, 1978 against the blanket enforcement of the requirement that all
motor vehicles be equipped with the so-called early warning device, without even hearing the
parties in oral argument as generally required by the Court in original cases of far-reaching
consequence such as the case at bar.

Lack of time presents my filing an extended dissent. I only wish to state that the petition
advances grave and serious grounds of assailing "the rules and regulations issued by the
Land Transportation Commission under Administrative Order No. 1 and Memorandum
Circular No. 32 [which] do not reflect the real intent, noble objectives and spirit of Letter of
Instructions No. 229, as amended by Letter of Instructions Nos. 479 and 716, because it is
oppressive, unreasonable, arbitrary, confiscatory, nay unconstitutional and contrary to the
precepts of our compassionate New Society," because of the following considerations, inter
alia:

1. It is oppressive, arbitrary and discriminatory to require owners of motor vehicles with built-
in and more effective and efficient E.W.D.'S such as "a) blinking lights in the fore and aft of
said motor vehicles, 1)) battery-powered blinking lights inside motor vehicles, c) built-in
reflectorized tapes on front and rear bumpers of motor vehicles....... to purchase the E.W.D.
specified in the challenged administrative order, whose effectivity and utility have yet to be
demonstrated.

2. The public necessity for the challenged order has yet to be shown. No valid refutation has
been made of petitioner's assertion that the "E.W.D.'s are not too vital to the prevention of
nighttime vehicular accidents. Statistics shows that of the 26,000 motor vehicle accidents
that occurred in 1976, only 390 or 1.5 per cent involved rear-end collisions," as to require the
purchase and installation of the questioned E.W.D. for almost 900,000 vehicles throughout
the country;

3. The big financial burden to be imposed on all motorists is staggering, and petitioner's
assertion that "as of 1975, there were at least 865,037 motor vehicles all over the country
requiring E.W.D.'S and at the minimum price of 1156.00 per set, this would mean a
consumer outlay of P 48,451,872.00, or close to P 50 million for the questioned E.W.D.'S
"stands unchallenged;

4. No real effort has been made to show that there can be practical and less burdensome
alternative road safety devices for stalled vehicles than the prescribed E.W.D., such as the
common petroleum lamps "kinke" which can be placed just as effectively in front of stalled
vehicles on the highways; and

5. There is no imperative need for imposing such a bet requirement on all vehicles. The
respondents have not shown that they have availed of the powers and prerogatives vested in
their offices such as ridding the country of dilapidated trucks and vehicles which are the main
cause of the deplorable -highway accidents due to stoned vehicles, establishing an honest
and foolproof system of examination and licensing of motor vehicle drivers so as to ban the
reckless and irresponsible and a sustained education campaign to instill safe driving habits
and attitudes that can be carried out for much less than the P 50 million burden that would be
imposed by the challenged order.

I do feel that a greater "degree of receptivity and sympathy" could be extended to the
petitioner for his civic mindedness in having filed the present petition g as capricious and
unreasonable the "all pervading police power" of the State instead of throwing the case out
of court and leaving the wrong impression that the exercise of police power insofar as it may
affect the life, liberty and property of any person is no longer subject to judicial inquiry.

#Footnotes

1 Letter of Instruction No. 229 (1974) as amended by Letter of Instruction No.

479 (1976).

2 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor Ruben E. Agpalo and Solicitor

Amado D. Aquino.

3 Petition, par. III.

4 Ibid, par. IV.

5 Ibid, par. V.

6 Ibid, par. VIII.

7 No. 716.

8 Petition, par. VII.

9 Ibid, par. VIII.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid, par. IX.

12 Ibid, par. X.

13 Ibid, par. XI.

14 Ibid, par. X.

15 Ibid, par. XI.

16 Resolution of the Court dated October 19, 1978.

17 Answer, pars. 1-6.

18 Ibid, par. 8.

19 70 Phil. 726 (1940). The opinion was penned by Justice Laurel.

20 L-20387, January 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424. The writer of this opinion is the
ponente.

21 L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481. The writer of this opinion was
likewise the ponente.
22 Answer, par. 18 (a) and (b).

23 License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583.

24 35 SCRA 481, 487-488. There is no need to repeat where Calalang and

Morfe are reported. Primicias v. Fugoso is reported in 80 Phil. 71; Rubi v.
Provincial Board, where the first quotation from Justice Malcolm came, in 39
Phil. 660, 708 (1919); and Smith Bell and Co. v. Natividad, his other decision
cited, in 40 Phil. 136 (1919); Helvering v. Davis, with Justice Cardozo writing
the opinion, in 301 US 619 (1937).

25 Republic Act No. 5715 (1969).

26 Commonwealth Act No. 548 (1940).

27 Cf. People v. Lagman 66 Phil. 13 (1938). Even earlier in United States v.

Pompeya, 31 Phil. 245 (1915), this Court, by virtue of the police power, held
valid a provision of the then Municipal Code requiring " able-bodied" males in
the vicinity between ages to perform patrol duty not ex one day each week.

28 L-24693, July 31, 1967, 20 SCRA 849.

29 Ibid. 867. The excerpt came from O'Gorman and Young v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co., 282 US 251, 328 (1931).

30 Answer, par. 18 (a). The excerpt came from Samson v. Mayor of Bacolod
City, L-28745; October 23, 1974; 60 SCRA 267; 270.

31 Ibid, par. 18 (c).

32 Ibid, par. 18 (d) and (e),

33 Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424, 450-451. The citation from Justice Laurel
may be traced to Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 160 (1936);
from Justice Laurel to People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535, 548 (1947); from
Justice Montemayor to Quintos v. Lacson, 97 Phil. 290, 293 (1955); and from
Justice Labrador to Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155, 1166 (1957). Chief
Justice Concepcion's reiteration of the doctrine, paraphrased in the quoted
opinion, was made by him in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, L-28196,
November 9, 1967, 21 SCRA 774. Cf. Province of Pangasinan v. Secretary
of Public Works, 27861, October 3l,1969, 30 SCRA 134.

34 SCRA 481, 497-498. The following cases were also cited. People v.
Exconde, 101 Phil. 1125 (1957), and People v. Jolliffe, 105 Phil. 677 (1959).

35 Petition, par. III.

36 Article 11, Section 3 of the Constitution reads in full "The Philippines

renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and
adheres to the Policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and
amity with all nations.

37 73 Phil. 408 (1941).

38 Ibid, 412.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City
Treasurer of Manila,respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City
Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of
a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate
national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and
urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed to
free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and
the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts
and circumstances justify the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition
in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to
continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception
therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for the
forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on
nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade,
commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens
actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6)
a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration
with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among
other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and
principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now
engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months
for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this
action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not
expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has
only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed;
(4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is
not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power.

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but
petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before
proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well
to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the
determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the
due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of
the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must be
clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought
forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive
with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under
a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has
become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as
we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the
State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the
due process clause and the equal protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power.

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following
provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III,
Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom
in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their
application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The, equal protection clause.

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause.

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review.

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or
of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the
other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have
nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative.
They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to
override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would
be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further
and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes
more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself,
which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or
citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation.

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that
they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families
begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an infinite
number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop
into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is
enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have
multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential
as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily
life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of
capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to
members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the
community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and
the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices
needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew
them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so
much a part of day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's trait.

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly
but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big
centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of
community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their
agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities
the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit,
and the patience and forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-
bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not,
and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless
and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance.

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about
the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy.
Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance,
but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware,
textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And
were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the
Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one
breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged
that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage,
it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail
business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of
fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive
competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black
and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien
domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears
and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act
(1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control
by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
 Assets Gross Sales
Year and Retailers No.- Per cent Per
Pesos Pesos
Nationality Establishments Distribution Distrib
1941:
Filipino .......... 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924
Chinese ........... 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239
Others ............ 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239
1947:
Filipino .......... 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333
Chinese ........... 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134
Others ........... 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168
1948: (Census)
Filipino .......... 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667
Chinese .......... 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227
Others .......... 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402
1949:
Filipino .......... 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901
Chinese .......... 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875
Others .......... 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364
1951:
Filipino ......... 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052
Chinese .......... 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384
Others .......... 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item
Year and Retailer's Gross Sales
Assets
Nationality (Pesos)
(Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 9,691

Others ............................................... 24,415 8,281

 1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 24,398

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 24,152

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 33,207

Others ............................................... 24,824 22,033

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and

Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census
and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on
Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily
small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have
the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap
through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of
the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The
same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail
trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises.
As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer
is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention.

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is
the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have
been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other
things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and
the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the
University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general
preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under
their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the
nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of
the country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political
independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private
capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national
economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced,
timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of
the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the
struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did
in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an
organized movement for the protection of the nation not only against the possibilities
of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the
economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from
alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino
Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National
Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears,
alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not
only to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to
be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail.

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly
endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough
organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on
such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles
to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would
or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of
the complete subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely
unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by
the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or
because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would
do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new
one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or its
consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the
article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise
correspondingly suppressed.

We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of
alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens.
It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in
the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public
that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable
practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or
other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating
artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have
hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so
much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation
to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have
violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the
legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate
and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations
among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand;
that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or
yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are
believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of
the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and
contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public
officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the
Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the
Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly
admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in
the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of
population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing
goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate
the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population.
They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times
of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject
to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security.

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the
disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the
expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been
saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the
public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police
power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme
welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. The next question that now poses
solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the
mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain
and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily
stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his
Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and
exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved
country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien
retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes
his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general
distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help
the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being
merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very
important function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out
above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of
the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of
which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the
exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid
reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be
doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate
distinction can be found between one and the other.

b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction.

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which
are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into
nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's classification.
To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds
that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated
alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded,
it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it
can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the
Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among
persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative
power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional
limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the
authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic
Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal
protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take
from the state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the
exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A
classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it
results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in
question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the
existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4.
One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification.

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has
already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the
United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity
of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein
limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by
citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was
held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the
encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign
interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions
are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not
violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of
Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice
Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example,
acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this
instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the
object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal
footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves
to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in
favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United
States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the
license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her
enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished
from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as
frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification

otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of
nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly
speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for
reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing

of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or
has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the
following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are
supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and
the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309
(Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging
in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a
deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien cannot be
sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the
relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid.
In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme
Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance
of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear
in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis
of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and
that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the
legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs.
Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of
Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as
having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of
police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also
sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs.
Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to
have different interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions
of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room,
dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State
Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens
as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the
exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or
even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L.
ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power
over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of
the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination.
It further added that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of
Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have
been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82
Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of
foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because
the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary
deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained.

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States
hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification.
But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable
or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was
no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed.
1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making
unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any
other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven
out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese
would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be
advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision,
therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of
the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for
carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance
conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to
persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was
arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the administration
and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State
vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and
peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation
to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said,
aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers
with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been
shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We
can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive
home the reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are
without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own
people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different
psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to
suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and
whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and
formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same
inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United
States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further
enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be
affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason
for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens
as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .

VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive.

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that
the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means
selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be
attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may
reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare
such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed
are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied,
and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia
vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering

the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine
the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether
the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are
unreasonable, and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon
the persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and
must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the
police power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of
the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised
has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to
the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered.

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men;
that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to
prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect
assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by
petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and
unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to
their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also
found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, thru the
illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic
control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control
and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied
the bill, which later was enacted into law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons
who are not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our
economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the
ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our
free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are
not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national
security, will be at the mercy of other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive

persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this
bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life
and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence

is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are
subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race
or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and
domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people
can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative

action.

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from
economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the
Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation
that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the
precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a
resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the
legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment
introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law
which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail
trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66
and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony
of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the
exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article
XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy
laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the
same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in
the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant
to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals
with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the
demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through
adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to
national economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable.

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how
reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right
and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest
of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of
aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In
the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege
should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade.
Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of
legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not
inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative
judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of
its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold
views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably
in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a
violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the
provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments
raised against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general welfare;
that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase
because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that
adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there
would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against
the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do
not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which
shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise
the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation
(I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title
and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term
"regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of
"nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature
may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7;
quoted in page 41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating
liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an actprohibiting the sale of such
liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters
being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State,
48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of
restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be
regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there
is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating
 police power in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of
which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in
p. 42 of Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that
the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the Act in question
adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore,
the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling
within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term
"regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under
which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other
provisions found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study
of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators
have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a
great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign
against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law
invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation
thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans
Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human
Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of
achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United
Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that
members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of
April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260),
and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston
vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and
by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for
the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege;
that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly
evident as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary and
that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power
and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the
provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and
has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually
been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered
by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should
have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for
them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the
scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and
equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law
should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an
the Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the
rule does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the Act offends against
a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative
of the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution
does not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations,
the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who
are not and have not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to
persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to
associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and have
heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail business there
was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed and believed in good
faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to continue in
business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their
license; and corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly
owned by the citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten years
from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the
existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The
prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date
of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event
comes first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such
corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by
subsequent legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations
and partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after
ten years from the date of the approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their
existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the
retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his
executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their property without due process of
law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of the term of the existence of the association and partnership, whichever event
comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien, his executor
or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law, because the
effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price
obtainable at such forced sale of the business would be inadequate to reimburse and
compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and the alien heirs
of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock of
merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill
that the association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of effort,
patience and perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no
person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law2 and that no person shall
be denied the equal protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as applied to
associations or partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they
were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the
approval of the Act and before the end of the term of the existence of the associations and
partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners and within six months after the
death of their predecessor-in-interest.

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the
ownership of private agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain
constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise
and prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands.4

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels
associations and partnership referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten
years from the date of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term of their
existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as
it compels the aliens engaged in the retail business in his lifetime his executor or
administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of law
and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.

Footnotes
1 Section 76, Act No. 1459..

2 Section 1 (1), Article III, of the Constitution..

3 Ibid.

4 Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-21897 October 22, 1963

RAMON A. GONZALES, petitioner,

vs.
RUFINO G. HECHANOVA, as Executive Secretary, MACARIO PERALTA, JR., as
Secretary of Defense, PEDRO GIMENEZ, as Auditor General, CORNELIO
BALMACEDA, as Secretary of Commerce and Industry, and SALVADOR MARINO,
Secretary of Justice, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales in his own behalf as petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General and Estanislao Fernandez for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an original action for prohibition with preliminary injunction.

It is not disputed that on September 22, 1963, respondent Executive Secretary authorized
the importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased from private sources, and
created a rice procurement committee composed of the other respondents herein1 for the
implementation of said proposed importation. Thereupon, or September 25, 1963, herein
petitioner, Ramon A. Gonzales a rice planter, and president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association, whose members are, likewise, engaged in the production of rice and
corn filed the petition herein, averring that, in making or attempting to make said
importation of foreign rice, the aforementioned respondents "are acting without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction", because Republic Act No. 3452 which allegedly repeals or amends
Republic Act No. 220 explicitly prohibits the importation of rice and corn "the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency;" that petitioner has no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that a preliminary injunction
is necessary for the preservation of the rights of the parties during the pendency this case
and to prevent the judgment therein from coming ineffectual. Petitioner prayed, therefore,
that said petition be given due course; that a writ of preliminary injunction be forthwith issued
restraining respondent their agents or representatives from implementing the decision of the
Executive Secretary to import the aforementioned foreign rice; and that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered making said injunction permanent.

Forthwith, respondents were required to file their answer to the petition which they did, and
petitioner's pray for a writ of preliminary injunction was set for hearing at which both parties
appeared and argued orally. Moreover, a memorandum was filed, shortly thereafter, by the
respondents. Considering, later on, that the resolution said incident may require some
pronouncements that would be more appropriate in a decision on the merits of the case, the
same was set for hearing on the merits thereafter. The parties, however, waived the right to
argue orally, although counsel for respondents filed their memoranda.

I. Sufficiency of petitioner's interest.

Respondents maintain that the status of petitioner as a rice planter does not give him
sufficient interest to file the petition herein and secure the relief therein prayed for. We find
no merit in this pretense. Apart from prohibiting the importation of rice and corn "by the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency". Republic Act No. 3452 declares,
in Section 1 thereof, that "the policy of the Government" is to "engage in the purchase of
these basic foods directly from those tenants, farmers, growers, producers and
landowners in the Philippines who wish to dispose of their products at a price that will afford
them a fair and just return for their labor and capital investment. ... ." Pursuant to this
provision, petitioner, as a planter with a rice land of substantial proportion,2 is entitled to a
chance to sell to the Government the rice it now seeks to buy abroad. Moreover, since the
purchase of said commodity will have to be effected with public funds mainly raised by
taxation, and as a rice producer and landowner petitioner must necessarily be a taxpayer, it
follows that he has sufficient personality and interest to seek judicial assistance with a view
to restraining what he believes to be an attempt to unlawfully disburse said funds.

II. Exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Respondents assail petitioner's right to the reliefs prayed for because he "has not exhausted
all administrative remedies available to him before coming to court". We have already held,
however, that the principle requiring the previous exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not applicable where the question in dispute is purely a legal one",3 or where the
controverted act is "patently illegal" or was performed without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction,4 or where the respondent is a department secretary, whose acts as an alter-ego
of the President bear the implied or assumed approval of the latter,5 unless actually
disapproved by him,6 or where there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention.7 The case at bar fails under each one of the foregoing exceptions to the general
rule. Respondents' contention is, therefore, untenable.

III. Merits of petitioner's cause of action.

Respondents question the sufficiency of petitioner's cause of action upon the theory that the
proposed importation in question is not governed by Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, but
was authorized by the President as Commander-in-Chief "for military stock pile purposes" in
the exercise of his alleged authority under Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1;8 that in
cases of necessity, the President "or his subordinates may take such preventive measure for
the restoration of good order and maintenance of peace"; and that, as Commander-in-Chief
of our armed forces, "the President ... is duty-bound to prepare for the challenge of threats of
war or emergency withoutwaiting for any special authority".

Regardless of whether Republic Act No. 3452 repeals Republic Act No. 2207, as contended
by petitioner herein - on which our view need not be expressed we are unanimously of the
opinion - assuming that said Republic Act No. 2207 is still in force that the two Acts are
applicable to the proposed importation in question because the language of said laws is such
as to include within the purview thereof all importations of rice and corn into the Philippines".
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 2207, "it shall be unlawful for any person, association,
corporation orgovernment agency to import rice and corn into any point in the Philippines",
although, by way of exception, it adds, that "the President of the Philippines may authorize
the importation of these commodities through any government agency that he may
designate", is the conditions prescribed in Section 2 of said Act are present. Similarly,
Republic Act No. 3452 explicitly enjoins "the Rice and Corn Administration or any
government agency" from importing rice and corn.
Respondents allege, however, that said provisions of Republic Act Nos. 2207 and 3452,
prohibiting the importation of rice and corn by any "government agency", do not apply to
importations "made by the Government itself", because the latter is not a "government
agency". This theory is devoid of merit. The Department of National Defense and the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, as well as respondents herein, and each and every officer and
employee of our Government, our government agencies and/or agents. The applicability of
said laws even to importations by the Government as such, becomes more apparent when
we consider that:

1. The importation permitted in Republic Act No. 2207 is to be authorized by the "President
of the Philippines" and, hence, by or on behalf of the Government of the Philippines;

2. Immediately after enjoining the Rice and Corn administration and any other government
agency from importing rice and corn, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 3452 adds "that the
importation of rice and corn is left to private parties upon payment of the corresponding
taxes", thus indicating that only "private parties" may import rice under its provisions; and

3. Aside from prescribing a fine not exceeding P10,000.00 and imprisonment of not more
than five (5) years for those who shall violate any provision of Republic Act No. 3452 or any
rule and regulation promulgated pursuant thereto, Section 15 of said Act provides that "if the
offender is a public official and/or employees", he shall be subject to the additional penalty
specified therein. A public official is an officer of the Government itself, as distinguished from
officers or employees of instrumentalities of the Government. Hence, the duly authorized
acts of the former are those of the Government, unlike those of a government instrumentality
which may have a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of the Government,
as such. The provisions of Republic Act No. 2207 are, in this respect, even more explicit.
Section 3 thereof provides a similar additional penalty for any "officer or employee of the
Government" who "violates, abets or tolerates the violation of any provision" of said Act.
Hence, the intent to apply the same to transactions made by the very government is patent.

Indeed, the restrictions imposed in said Republic Acts are merely additional to those
prescribed in Commonwealth Act No. 138, entitled "An Act to give native products and
domestic entities the preference in the purchase of articlesfor the Government." Pursuant to
Section 1 thereof:

The Purchase and Equipment Division of the Government of the Philippines and
other officers and employees of the municipal and provincial governments and the
Government of the Philippines and of chartered cities, boards,
commissions, bureaus, departments, offices, agencies, branches, and bodies of any
description, including government-owned companies, authorized to requisition,
purchase, or contract or make disbursements for articles, materials, and supplies for
public use, public buildings, or public works shall give preference to materials ...
produced ... in the Philippines or in the United States, and to domestic entities,
subject to the conditions hereinbelow specified. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under this provision, in all purchases by the Government, including those made by and/or for
the armed forces,preference shall be given to materials produced in the Philippines. The
importation involved in the case at bar violates this general policy of our Government, aside
from the provisions of Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452.

The attempt to justify the proposed importation by invoking reasons of national security
predicated upon the "worsening situation in Laos and Vietnam", and "the recent tension
created by the Malaysia problem" - and the alleged powers of the President as Commander-
in-Chief of all armed forces in the Philippines, under Section 2 of the National Defense Act
(Commonwealth Act No. 1), overlooks the fact that the protection of local planters of rice and
corn in a manner that would foster and accelerate self-sufficiency in the local production of
said commodities constitutes a factor that is vital to our ability to meet possible national
emergency. Even if the intent in importing goods in anticipation of such emergency were to
bolster up that ability, the latter would, instead, be impaired if the importation were so made
as to discourage our farmers from engaging in the production of rice.

Besides, the stockpiling of rice and corn for purpose of national security and/or national
emergency is within the purview of Republic Act No. 3452. Section 3 thereof expressly
authorizes the Rice and Corn Administration "to accumulate stocks as a national reserve in
such quantities as it may deem proper and necessary to meet any contingencies". Moreover,
it ordains that "the buffer stocks held as a national reserve ... be deposited by the
administration throughout the country under the proper dispersal plans ... and may be
released only upon the occurrence of calamities or emergencies ...". (Emphasis applied.)

Again, the provisions of Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, upon which respondents rely
so much, are not self-executory. They merely outline the general objectives of said
legislation. The means for the attainment of those objectives are subject to congressional
legislation. Thus, the conditions under which the services of citizens, as indicated in said
Section 2, may be availed of, are provided for in Sections 3, 4 and 51 to 88 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 1. Similarly, Section 5 thereof specifies the manner in which
resources necessary for our national defense may be secured by the Government of the
Philippines, but only "during a national mobilization",9 which does not exist. Inferentially,
therefore, in the absence of a national mobilization, said resources shall be produced in such
manner as Congress may by other laws provide from time to time. Insofar as rice and corn
are concerned, Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452, and Commonwealth Act No. 138 are
such laws.

Respondents cite Corwin in support of their pretense, but in vain. An examination of the work
cited10 shows that Corwin referred to the powers of the President during "war time"11 or when
he has placed the country or a part thereof under "martial law".12 Since neither condition
obtains in the case at bar, said work merely proves that respondents' theory, if accepted,
would, in effect, place the Philippines under martial law, without a declaration of the
Executive to that effect. What is worse, it would keep us perpetually under martial law.

It has been suggested that even if the proposed importation violated Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452, it should, nevertheless, be permitted because "it redounds to the benefit of
the people". Salus populi est suprema lex, it is said.

If there were a local shortage of rice, the argument might have some value. But the
respondents, as officials of this Government, have expressly affirmed again and again that
there is no rice shortage. And the importation is avowedly for stockpile of the Army not the
civilian population.

But let us follow the respondents' trend of thought. It has a more serious implication that
appears on the surface. It implies that if an executive officer believes that compliance with a
certain statute will not benefit the people, he is at liberty to disregard it. That idea must be
rejected - we still live under a rule of law.
And then, "the people" are either producers or consumers. Now as respondents explicitly
admit Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452 were approved by the Legislature for the benefit
of producers and consumers, i.e., the people, it must follow that the welfare of the people lies
precisely in the compliance with said Acts.

It is not for respondent executive officers now to set their own opinions against that of the
Legislature, and adopt means or ways to set those Acts at naught. Anyway, those laws
permit importation but under certain conditions, which have not been, and should be
complied with.

IV. The contracts with Vietnam and Burma

It is lastly contended that the Government of the Philippines has already entered into two (2)
contracts for the Purchase of rice, one with the Republic of Vietnam, and another with the
Government of Burma; that these contracts constitute valid executive agreements under
international law; that such agreements became binding effective upon the signing thereof by
representatives the parties thereto; that in case of conflict between Republic Acts Nos. 2207
and 3452 on the one hand, and aforementioned contracts, on the other, the latter should
prevail, because, if a treaty and a statute are inconsistent with each other, the conflict must
be resolved under the American jurisprudence in favor of the one which is latest in
point of time; that petitioner herein assails the validity of acts of the Executive relative to
foreign relations in the conduct of which the Supreme Court cannot interfere; and the
aforementioned contracts have already been consummated, the Government of the
Philippines having already paid the price of the rice involved therein through irrevocable
letters of credit in favor of the sell of the said commodity. We find no merit in this pretense.

The Court is not satisfied that the status of said tracts as alleged executive agreements has
been sufficiently established. The parties to said contracts do not pear to have regarded the
same as executive agreements. But, even assuming that said contracts may properly
considered as executive agreements, the same are unlawful, as well as null and void, from a
constitutional viewpoint, said agreements being inconsistent with the provisions of Republic
Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. Although the President may, under the American constitutional
system enter into executive agreements without previous legislative authority, he may not, by
executive agreement, enter into a transaction which is prohibited by statutes enacted prior
thereto. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to enforce laws enacted
by Congress. The former may not interfere in the performance of the legislative powers of
the latter, except in the exercise of his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments
that have acquired the status of law, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said laws.

The American theory to the effect that, in the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute,
the one which is latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar, for
respondents not only admit, but, also insist that the contracts adverted to are not treaties.
Said theory may be justified upon the ground that treaties to which the United States is
signatory require the advice and consent of its Senate, and, hence, of a branch of the
legislative department. No such justification can be given as regards executive agreements
not authorized by previous legislation, without completely upsetting the principle of
separation of powers and the system of checks and balances which are fundamental in our
constitutional set up and that of the United States.

As regards the question whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our

courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the Philippines has clearly settled it in the
affirmative, by providing, in Section 2 of Article VIII thereof, that the Supreme Court may not
be deprived "of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on
appeal, certiorari, or writ of error as the law or the rules of court may provide, final judgments
and decrees of inferior courts in (1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation is in question". In other words,
our Constitution authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.

The alleged consummation of the aforementioned contracts with Vietnam and Burma
does not render this case academic, Republic Act No. 2207 enjoins our Government not
from entering into contracts for the purchase of rice, but from importing rice, except under the
conditions Prescribed in said Act. Upon the other hand, Republic Act No. 3452 has two (2)
main features, namely: (a) it requires the Government to purchase rice and corn directly from
our local planters, growers or landowners; and (b) it prohibits importations of rice by the
Government, and leaves such importations to private parties. The pivotal issue in this case is
whether the proposed importation which has not been consummated as yet is legally
feasible.

Lastly, a judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our
Government to default in the performance of such obligations as it may have contracted with
the sellers of the rice in question, because, aside from the fact that said obligations may be
complied with without importing the commodity into the Philippines, the proposed importation
may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the aforementioned laws.

V. The writ of preliminary injunction.

The members of the Court have divergent opinions on the question whether or not
respondents herein should be enjoined from implementing the aforementioned proposed
importation. However, the majority favors the negative view, for which reason the injunction
prayed for cannot be granted.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that respondent Executive Secretary

had and has no power to authorize the importation in question; that he exceeded his
jurisdiction in granting said authority; said importation is not sanctioned by law and is
contrary to its provisions; and that, for lack of the requisite majority, the injunction prayed for
must be and is, accordingly denied. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, CJ, Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur in the result.

Separate Opinions

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:

Under Republic Act No. 2207, which took effect on May 15, 1959, it is unlawful for any
person, association, corporation or government agency to import rice and corn into any point
in the Philippines. The exception is if there is an existing or imminent shortage of such
commodity of much gravity as to constitute national emergency in which case an importation
may be authorized by the President when so certified by the National Economic Council.
However, on June 14, 1962, Republic Act 3452 was enacted providing that the importation of
rice and corn can onlybe made by private parties thereby prohibiting from doing so the Rice
and Corn Administration or any other government agency. Republic Act 3452 does not
expressly repeal Republic Act 2207, but only repeals or modified those parts thereof that are
inconsistent with its provisions. The question that now arises is: Has the enactment of
Republic Act 3452 the effect of prohibiting completely the government from importing rice
and corn into the Philippines?

My answer is in the negative. Since this Act does not in any manner provide for the
importation of rice and corn in case of national emergency, the provision of the former law on
that matter should stand, for that is not inconsistent with any provision embodied in Republic
Act 3452. The Rice and Corn Administration, or any other government agency, may
therefore still import rice and corn into the Philippines as provided in Republic Act 2207 if
there is a declared national emergency.

The next question that arises is: Can the government authorize the importation of rice and
corn regardless of Republic Act 2207 if that is authorized by the President as Commander-in-
Chief of the Philippine Army as a military precautionary measure for military stockpile?

Respondents answer this question in the affirmative. They advance the argument that it is
the President's duty to see to it that the Armed Forces of the Philippines are geared to the
defenses of the country as well as to the fulfillment of our international commitments in
Southeast Asia in the event the peace and security of the area are in danger. The stockpiling
of rice, they aver, is an essential requirement of defense preparation in view of the limited
local supply and the probable disruption of trade and commerce with outside countries in the
event of armed hostilities, and this military precautionary measure is necessary because of
the unsettled conditions in the Southeast Asia bordering on actual threats of armed conflicts
as evaluated by the Intelligence Service of the Military Department of our Government. This
advocacy, they contend, finds support in the national defense policy embodied in Section 2
of our National Defense Act (Commonwealth Act No. 1), which provides:

(a) The preservation of the State is the obligation of every citizen. The security of the
Philippines and the freedom, independence and perpetual neutrality of the Philippine
Republic shall be guaranteed by the employment of all citizens, without distinction of
sex or age, and all resources.

(b) The employment of the nation's citizens and resources for national defense shall
be effected by a national mobilization.

(c) The national mobilization shall include the execution of all measures necessary to
pass from a peace to a war footing.

(d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the Philippines as
the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces, shall be responsible that mobilization
measures are prepared at all times.(Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, I find in that declaration of policy that the security of the Philippines and its freedom
constitutes the core of the preservation of our State which is the basic duty of every citizen
and that to secure which it is enjoined that the President employ all the resources at his
command. But over and above all that power and duty, fundamental as they may seem,
there is the injunction that the civil authority shall always be supreme. This injunction can
only mean that while all precautions should be taken to insure the security and preservation
of the State and to this effect the employment of all resources may be resorted to, the action
must always be taken within the framework of the civil authority. Military authority should be
harmonized and coordinated with civil authority, the only exception being when the law
clearly ordains otherwise. Neither Republic Act 2207, nor Republic Act 3452, contains any
exception in favor of military action concerning importation of rice and corn. An exception
must be strictly construed.

A distinction is made between the government and government agency in an attempt to take
the former out of the operation of Republic Act 2207. I disagree. The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines under the Revised Administrative Code refers to that entity
through which the functions of government are exercised, including the various arms through
which political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or other form
of local government, whereas a government instrumentality refers to corporations owned or
controlled by the government to promote certain aspects of the economic life of our people.
A government agency, therefore, must necessarily refer to the government itself of the
Republic, as distinguished from any government instrumentality which has a personality
distinct and separate from it (Section 2).

The important point to determine, however, is whether we should enjoin respondents from
carrying out the importation of the rice which according to the record has been authorized to
be imported on government to government level, it appearing that the arrangement to this
effect has already been concluded, the only thing lacking being its implementation. This is
evident from the manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General wherein it appears that the
contract for the purchase of 47,000 tons of rice from had been sign on October 5, 1963, and
for the purchase of 20,000 tons from Burma on October 8, 1963, by the authorized
representatives of both our government and the governments of Vietnam and Burma,
respectively. If it is true that, our government has already made a formal commitment with
the selling countries there arises the question as to whether the act can still be impeded at
this stage of the negotiations. Though on this score there is a divergence of opinion, it is
gratifying to note that the majority has expressed itself against it. This is a plausible attitude
for, had the writ been issued, our government would have been placed in a predicament
where, as a necessary consequence, it would have to repudiate a duly formalized agreement
to its great embarrassment and loss of face. This was avoided by the judicial statesmanship
evinced by the Court.

BARRERA, J., concurring:

Because of possible complications that might be aggravated by misrepresentation of the true

nature and scope of the case before this Court, it is well to restate as clearly as possible, the
real and only issue presented by the respondents representing the government.

From the answer filed by the Solicitor General, in behalf of respondents, we quote:

The importation of the rice in question by the Armed Forces of the Philippines is
for military stockpilingauthorized by the President pursuant to his inherent power as
commander-in-chief and as a military precautionary measure in view the worsening
situation in Laos and Vietnam and, it may added, the recent, tension created by the
Malaysia problem (Answer, p. 2; emphasis supplied.)
During the oral argument, Senator Fernandez, appealing in behalf of the respondents,
likewise reiterated the imported rice was for military stockpiling, and which he admitted that
some of it went to the Rice and Corn Administration, he emphasized again and again that
rice was not intended for the RCA for distribution to people, as there was no shortage of rice
for that purpose but it was only exchanged for palay because this could better preserved.

From the memorandum filed thereafter by the Solicits General, again the claim was made:

We respectfully reiterate the arguments in our answer dated October 4, 1963 that the
importation of rice sought be enjoined in this petition is in the exercise of the authority
vested in the President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces, as a measure of military preparedness demanded by a real and actual threat
of emergency in the South East Asian countries. (p. 1, Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

It (the stressing of the unsettled conditions in Southeast Asia) is merely our

intention to show the necessity for the stockpiling of rice for army purposes, which is
the very reason for the importation.

xxx xxx xxx

As it is, the importation in question is being made by the Republic of the Philippines
for its own use, and the rice is not supposed to be poured into the open market as to
affect the price to be paid by the public. (p. 4, Emphasis supplied.)

xxx xxx xxx

What we do contend is that the law, for want of express and clear provision to that
effect, does not include in its prohibition importation by the Government of rice for its
own use and not for the consuming public, regardless of whether there is or there is
no emergency. (p. 5, Emphasis supplied.)

From the above, it not only appears but is evident that the respondents were not concerned
with the present rice situation confronting the consuming public, but were solely and
exclusively after the stockpiling of rice for the futureuse of the army. The issue, therefore, in
which the Government was interested is not whether rice is imported to give the people a
bigger or greater supply to maintain the price at P.80 per ganta for, to quote again their
contention: "the rice is not supposed to be poured into the open market to affect the price to
be paid by the public, as it is not for the consuming public, regardless of whether there is or
there is no emergency", but whether rice can legally be imported by the Armed Forces of
the Philippines avowedly for its future use, notwithstanding the prohibitory provisions of
Republic Acts Nos. 2207 and 3452. The majority opinion ably sets forth the reasons why this
Court can not accept the contention of the respondents that this importation is beyond and
outside the operation of these statutes. I can only emphasize that I see in the theory
advanced by the Solicitor General a dangerous trend that because the policies enunciated
in the cited laws are for the protection of the producers and the consumers, the army is
removed from their application. To adopt this theory is to proclaim the existence in the
Philippines of three economic groups or classes: the producers, the consumers, and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines. What is more portentous is the effect to equate the army
with the Government itself.
Then again, the importation of this rice for military stockpiling is sought to be justified by the
alleged threat of emergency in the Southeast Asian countries. But the existence of this
supposed threat was unilaterally determined by the Department of National Defense alone.
We recall that there exists a body called the National Security Council in which are
represented the Executive as well as the Legislative department. In it sit not only members of
the party in power but of the opposition as well. To our knowledge, this is the highest
consultative body which deliberates precisely in times of emergency threatening to affect the
security of the state. The democratic composition of this council is to guarantee that its
deliberations would be non-partisan and only the best interests of the nation will be
considered. Being a deliberative body, it insures against precipitate action. This is as it
should be. Otherwise, in these days of ever present cold war, any change or development in
the political climate in any region of the world is apt to be taken as an excuse for the military
to conjure up a crisis or emergency and thereupon attempt to override our laws and legal
processes, and imperceptibly institute some kind of martial law on the pretext of
precautionary mobilization measure avowedly in the interest of the security of the state. One
need not, be too imaginative to perceive a hint of this in the present case.

The Supreme Court, in arriving at the conclusion unanimously reached, is fully aware of the
difficult and delicate task it had to discharge. Its position is liable to be exploited by some for
their own purposes by claiming and making it appear that the Court is unmindful of the plight
of our people during these days of hardship; that it preferred to give substance to the
"niceties of the law than heed the needs of the people. Our answer is that the Court was left
no alternative. It had, in compliance with its duty, to decide the case upon the facts
presented to it. The respondents, representing the administration, steadfastly maintained and
insisted that there is no rice shortage; that the imported rice is not for the consuming public
and is not supposed to be placed in the open market to affect the price to be paid by the
public; that it is solely for stockpiling of the army for future use as a measure of mobilization
in the face of what the Department of National Defense unilaterally deemed a threatened
armed conflict in Southeast Asia. Confronted with these facts upon, which the Government
has built and rested its case, we have searched in vain for legal authority or cogent reasons
to justify this importation made admittedly contrary to the provisions of Republic Acts Nos.
2207 and 3452. I say admittedly, because respondents never as much as pretended that the
importation fulfills the conditions specified in these laws, but limited themselves to the
contention, which is their sole defense that this importation does not fall within the scope of
said laws. In our view, however, the laws are clear. The laws are comprehensive and their
application does not admit of any exception. The laws are adequate. Compliance therewith is
not difficult, much less impossible. The avowed emergency, if at all, is not urgently
immediate.

In this connection, it is pertinent to bear in mind that the Supreme Court has a duty to
perform under the Constitution. It has to decide, when called upon to do so in an appropriate
proceeding, all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance,
executive order or regulation is in question. We can not elude this duty. To do so would be
culpable dereliction on our part. While we sympathize with the public that might be adversely
affected as a result of this decision yet our sympathy does not authorize us to sanction an
act contrary to applicable laws. The fault lies with those who stubbornly contended and
represented before this Court that there is no rice shortage, that the imported rice is not
intended for the consuming public, but for stockpiling of the army. And, if as now claimed
before the public, contrary to the Government's stand in this case, that there is need for
imported rice to stave off hunger, our legislature has provided for such a situation. As already
stated, the laws are adequate. The importation of rice under the conditions set forth in the
laws may be authorized not only where there is an existing shortage, but also when the
shortage is imminent. In other words, lawful remedy to solve the situation is available, if only
those who have the duty to execute the laws perform their duty. If there is really need for the
importation of rice, who adopt some dubious means which necessitates resort to doubtful
exercise of the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army? Why not comply
with the mandate of the law? Ours is supposed to be a regime under the rule of law.
Adoption as a government policy of the theory of the end justifies the means brushing aside
constitutional and legal restraints, must be rejected, lest we end up with the end of freedom.

For these reasons, I concur in the decision of the Court.

Separate Opinions

Footnotes

1The Secretary of National Defense, the Auditor General, the Secretary of

Commerce and Industry, and the Secretary Justice.

2 275 hectares.

3Tapales vs. The President and the Board of Regents of the U.P., L-17523, March
30, 1963.

4Mangubat vs. Osmea, L-12837, April 30, 1959; Baguio vs. Hon. Jose Rodriguez,
L-11078, May 27, 1959; Pascual Provincial Board, L-11959, October 31, 1959.

5Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. vs. Secretary of Public Works, L-15982, May
31, 1963.

6In the present case, respondents allege in their answer that "the importation ... in
question ... is authorized by the President.

7Alzate vs. Aldaba, L-14407, February 29, 1960; Demaisip vs. Court of Appeals, L-
13000, September 25, 1959.

8 Which provides that the national defense policy of the Philippines shall be follows:

(a) The preservation of the state is the obligation of every citizen. The
security of the Philippines and the freedom, independence and perpetual
neutrality of the Philippine Republic shall be guaranteed by the employment
of all citizens, without distinction of sex or age, and all resources.

(b) The employment of the nation's citizens and resources for national
defense shall be effected by a national mobilization.

(c) The national mobilization shall include the execution of all measures
necessary to pass from a peace to a war footing.
 (d) The civil authority shall always be supreme. The President of the
Philippines as the Commander-in-Chief of all military forces, shall be
responsible that mobilization measures are prepared at all times.

xxx xxx xxx

9 In line with the provisions of paragraphs b), c), e), and f) of section 2 of said Act.

10 The Constitution and What It Means Today, pp. 95-96.

11 The Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief is primarily that of military

command in wartime, and as such includes, as against the persons and property
of enemies of the United States encountered within the theater of military operations,
all the powers allowed a military commander in such cases by the Law of Nations.
President Lincoln's famous Proclamation of Emancipation rested upon this ground. It
was effective within the theater of military operations while the war lasted, but no
longer. (p. 93, Emphasis supplied.)

12From an early date the Commander-in-Chief power came to be merged with the
President's duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. So, while in using
military force against unlawful combinations too strong to be dealt with through the
ordinary processes of law the President acts by authorization of statute, his powers
are still those of Commander-in-Chief. ...

Under "preventive martial law", so-called because it authorizes "preventive" arrests

and detentions, the military acts as an adjunct of the civil authorities but not
necessarily subject to their orders. It may be established whenever the executive
organ, State or national, deems it to be necessary for the restoration of good order.
The concept, being of judicial origin, is of course for judicial application, and
ultimately for application by the Supreme Court, in enforcement of the due process
clauses. (See, also, Section III of this Article, and Article IV, Section IV.) (Pp. 95-96,
Emphasis supplied.)
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45892 July 13, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TRANQUILINO LAGMAN, defendant-appellant.

-----------------------------

G.R. No. L-45893 July 13, 1938

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PRIMITIVO DE SOSA, defendant-appellant.

Severino P. Izon for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.

AVANCEA, J.:

In these two cases (G.R. Nos. L-45892 and 45893), the appellants Tranquilino and Primitivo
de Sosa are charged with a violation of section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 1, known as
the National Defense Law. It is alleged that these two appellants, being Filipinos and having
reached the age of twenty years in 1936, willfully and unlawfully refused to register in the
military service between the 1st and 7th of April of said year, notwithstanding the fact that
they had been required to do so. The evidence shows that these two appellants were duly
notified by the corresponding authorities to appear before the Acceptance Board in order to
register for military service in accordance with law, and that the said appellants, in spite of
these notices, had not registered up to the date of the filing of the information.

The appellants do not deny these facts, but they allege in defense that they have not
registered in the military service because Primitivo de Sosa is fatherless and has a mother
and a brother eight years old to support, and Tranquilino Lagman also has a father to
support, has no military learnings, and does not wish to kill or be killed.

Each of these appellants was sentenced by the Court of First Instance to one month and one
day of imprisonment, with the costs.

In this instance, the validity of the National Defense Law, under which the accused were
sentenced, is impugned on the ground that it is unconstitutional. Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution of the Philippines provides as follows:

SEC. 2. The defense of the state is a prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment
of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.
The National Defense Law, in so far as it establishes compulsory military service, does not
go against this constitutional provision but is, on the contrary, in faithful compliance
therewith. The duty of the Government to defend the State cannot be performed except
through an army. To leave the organization of an army to the will of the citizens would be to
make this duty of the Government excusable should there be no sufficient men who
volunteer to enlist therein.
1vvphl.nt

In the United States the courts have held in a series of decisions that the compulsory military
service adopted by reason of the civil war and the world war does not violate the
Constitution, because the power to establish it is derived from that granted to Congress to
declare war and to organize and maintain an army. This is so because the right of the
Government to require compulsory military service is a consequence of its duty to defend the
State and is reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and property of the citizen. In
the case of Jacobson vs. Massachusetts (197 U.S., 11; 25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 385), it was said
that, without violating the Constitution, a person may be compelled by force, if need be,
against his will, against his pecuniary interests, and even against his religious or political
convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of
being shot down in its defense. In the case of United States vs. Olson (253 Fed., 233), it was
also said that this is not deprivation of property without due process of law, because, in its
just sense, there is no right of property to an office or employment.

The circumstance that these decisions refer to laws enacted by reason on the actual
existence of war does not make our case any different, inasmuch as, in the last analysis,
what justifies compulsory military service is the defense of the State, whether actual or
whether in preparation to make it more effective, in case of need. The circumstance that the
appellants have dependent families to support does not excuse them from their duty to
present themselves before the Acceptance Board because, if such circumstance exists, they
can ask for determent in complying with their duty and, at all events, they can obtain the
proper pecuniary allowance to attend to these family responsibilities (secs. 65 and 69 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1).

The appealed judgment rendered in these two cases is affirmed, with the costs to the
appellants. So ordered.

Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937

GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,

vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.

Vicente Sotto for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.

LAUREL, J.:

The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent
Church, seeks the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent
Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress.

In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order
the issues of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the
Thirty-third international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church.
The petitioner, in the fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente
Sotto, Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the
Philippines. In spite of the protest of the petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly
announced having sent to the United States the designs of the postage stamps for printing
as follows:

"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps
are blue, green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The
denominations are for 2, 6, 16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually
issued and sold though the greater part thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale
of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the petitioner herein.

The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in
the instant case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions.
While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control
the performance of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance
and enforcement are regulated by statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior
tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether excercising functions judicial or
ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation,
board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.) The terms "judicial"
and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the
present case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a
fortiorari "without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the
jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to
keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent them from encroaching
upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer or
person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently, "the writ is
granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the use
of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of
actions." (Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)

The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third
International Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative
of the provisions of section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines,
which provides as follows:

No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or

indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
secretarian, institution, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces or
to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.

The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church
and state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in
our country, it is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has
taught us that the union of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise
when the estate will use the church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance
of their recognized this principle of separation of church and state in the early stages of our
constitutional development; it was inserted in the Treaty of Paris between the United States
and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in President McKinley's Instructions of the
Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the autonomy Act of
August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the Philippines as the supreme
expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this country we enjoy
both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest to the
lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to
recognize and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent
limitations and recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our
Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious toleration.

Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound

reverence for religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its
influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of
their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order to establish a government
that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested
reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of
religion in human society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general
concessions are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our
Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious
purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4,
Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c]. Adm. Code). Sectarian aid
is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium 9
sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in
the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week,
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral
results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes
against religious worship are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state
(see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).

In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage
stamps in question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This
Act is as follows:

No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS

AND MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR
TREASURY NOT OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES
AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in

Legislature assembled and by the authority of the same:

SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident
thereto.

SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount
herein appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous
to the Government.

SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the
Treasury.

SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.

Approved, February 21, 1933.

It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto,
and authorizes the Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, to dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as
often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government". The printing and issuance of
the postage stamps in question appears to have been approved by authority of the President
of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936, made part of the respondent's
memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the Government of the Philippines
would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the revenue to be derived
from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states that there still
remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.

Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts
is the discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would
be "advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the
Government" does not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the
appropriation, use or application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of
a particular sect or church. In the present case, however, the issuance of the postage
stamps in question by the Director of Posts and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications was not inspired by any sectarian denomination. The stamps were not
issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from
the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears from the latter of the
Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's complaint, that
the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines and
attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an
event considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people" (Letter of the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President
of the Philippines, June 9, 1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the
stamps as actually designed and printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church
chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of the City of
Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb.
3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, the capital
of the Philippines, as theseat of that congress. It is obvious that while the issuance and sale
of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not
the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should
not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious
in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere
incidental results not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct.
Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed., 168.)

We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain
inviolate the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by
indirection a constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious
intolerance and prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political
development nothing is done by the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief
that the Government is taking sides or favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But,
upon very serious reflection, examination of Act No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending
circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there has been no constitutional
infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with the approval of
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage stamps
with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if
we were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling
the postage stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight.
Between the exercise of a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap
exists which is yet to be filled to justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as
coming within a constitutional inhibition.

The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005]

DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA, NICANOR

GALANIDA, RENERIO CANTA, JERRY CANTA,
CORDENCIO CONSIGNA, SUSANO ALCALA, LEONARDO
DIZON, SALVADOR GELSANO and BENITO
LAUGO,petitioners, vs. BISHOP PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ,
REV. FR. RUSTOM FLORANO and DELFIN
BORDAS,respondents.

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

This is an appeal under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45480 which reversed and set aside
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32 in Civil Case
No. 4907 and ordered said case dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine
Independent Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio
de la Cruz and Rustom Florano were the bishop and parish priest, respectively,
of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led by Dominador Taruc,
clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la Cruz
denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Floranos
wife belonged to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity
between the two factions with Fr. Florano being identified with his wifes political
camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this too flimsy a reason for transferring
Fr. Florano to another parish.
Meanwhile, hostility among the members of the PIC in Socorro, Surigao del
Norte worsened when petitioner Taruc tried to organize an open mass to be
celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro.
When Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade
him from pushing through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the
clergy of the diocese of Surigao and his credentials as a parish priest were in
doubt. The Bishop also appealed to petitioner Taruc to refrain from committing
acts inimical and prejudicial to the best interests of the PIC. He likewise advised
petitioners to air their complaints before the higher authorities of PIC if they
believed they had valid grievances against him, the parish priest, the laws and
canons of the PIC.
 Bishop de la Cruz, however, failed to stop Taruc from carrying out his plans.
On June 19, 1993, at around 3:00 p.m., Taruc and his sympathizers proceeded
to hold the open mass with Fr. Ambong as the celebrant.
On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared petitioners
expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church for reasons
of:

(1) disobedience to duly constituted authority in the Church;

(2) inciting dissension, resulting in division in the Parish of Our Mother of

Perpetual Help, Iglesia Filipina Independiente, Socorro, Surigao del
Norte when they celebrated an open Mass at the Plaza on June 19,
1996; and

(3) for threatening to forcibly occupy the Parish Church causing anxiety and
fear among the general membership. [1]

Petitioners appealed to the Obispo Maximo and sought reconsideration of

the above decision. In his letter to Bishop de la Cruz, the Obispo Maximo opined
that Fr. Florano should step down voluntarily to avert the hostility and enmity
among the members of the PIC parish in Socorro but stated that:

I do not intervene in your diocesan decision in asking Fr. Florano to vacate

Socorro parish.[2]

In the meantime, Bishop de la Cruz was reassigned to the diocese of

Odmoczan and was replaced by Bishop Rhee M. Timbang. Like his predecessor,
Bishop Timbang did not find a valid reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another
parish. He issued a circular denying petitioners persistent clamor for the
transfer/re-assignment of Fr. Florano. Petitioners were informed of such denial
but they continued to celebrate mass and hold other religious activities through
Fr. Ambong who had been restrained from performing any priestly functions in
the PIC parish of Socorro, Surigao del Norte.
Because of the order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a
complaint for damages with preliminary injunction against Bishop de la Cruz
before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32. They impleaded Fr.
Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the
Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They
contended that their expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus
violating their right to due process of law.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the case before the lower court on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction but it was denied. Their motion for reconsideration
was likewise denied so they elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
 The appellate court reversed and set aside the decision of the court a
quo and ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to its being refiled
before the proper forum. It held:

We find it unnecessary to deal on the validity of the

excommunication/expulsion of the private respondents (Taruc, et al.), said acts
being purely ecclesiastical matters which this Court considers to be outside the
province of the civil courts.

Civil Courts will not interfere in the internal affairs of a religious organization
except for the protection of civil or property rights. Those rights may be the
subject of litigation in a civil court, and the courts have jurisdiction to
determine controverted claims to the title, use, or possession of church
property. (Ibid., p.466)

Obviously, there was no violation of a civil right in the present case.

Ergo, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that the instant case does not
involve a violation and/or protection of a civil or property rights in order for the
court a quo to acquire jurisdiction in the instant case. [3]

Petitioners appealed from the above decision but their petition was denied.
Their motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, hence, this appeal.
The only issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the courts have
jurisdiction to hear a case involving the expulsion/excommunication of members
of a religious institution.
We rule that the courts do not.
Section 5, Article III or the Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution specifically
provides that:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion or

prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.

In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the State to be separate and
distinct from each other. Give to Ceasar what is Ceasars and to God what is
Gods. We have, however, observed as early as 1928 that:

upon the examination of the decisions it will be readily apparent that cases
involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always received the
profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent
interest, but because of the far reaching effects of the decisions in human
society. [However,] courts have learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing
with such matters, it having been found that, in a form of government where the
complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted upon, the
civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an
ecclesiastical nature. (italics ours)
[4]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of

members of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the
discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization. It is not for the courts to exercise control over church
authorities in the performance of their discretionary and official functions. Rather,
it is for the members of religious institutions/organizations to conform to just
church regulations. In the words of Justice Samuel F. Miller[5]:

all who unite themselves to an ecclesiastical body do so with an implied

consent to submit to the Church government and they are bound to submit to it.

In the leading case of Fonacier v. Court of Appeals,[6] we enunciated the

doctrine that in disputes involving religious institutions or organizations, there is
one area which the Court should not touch: doctrinal and disciplinary
differences.[7] Thus,

The amendments of the constitution, restatement of articles of religion and

abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do with
faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of
a church and having reference to the power of excluding from the church
those allegedly unworthy of membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts. (emphasis ours)

We would, however, like to comment on petitioners claim that they were not
heard before they were expelled from their church. The records show that Bishop
de la Cruz pleaded with petitioners several times not to commit acts inimical to
the best interests of PIC. They were also warned of the consequences of their
actions, among them their expulsion/excommunication from PIC. Yet, these
pleas and warnings fell on deaf ears and petitioners went ahead with their plans
to defy their Bishop and foment hostility and disunity among the members of PIC
in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. They should now take full responsibility for the
chaos and dissension they caused.
WHEREFORE, the petition is herby DENIED for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
 Panganiban, (Chairman), and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on leave.
Garcia, J., no part.

[1]
Rollo, p. 73.
[2]
Rollo, p. 129.
[3]
Penned by Associate Justice Bennie A. Adefuin-de la Cruz and concurred in by Associate
Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and Renato C.
Dacudao, Rollo, p. 82.
[4]
Gonzales v. R. Archbishop, 51 Phil. 420, 434 (1928).
[5]
In Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 723; 20 Law ed., 666, quoted in Gonzales v. R.
Archbishop, supra.
[6]
96 Phil. 417 (1955).
[7]
Bernas, J., The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, A Commentary, 1996 ed.,
p. 322.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 47800. December 2, 1940.]

MAXIMO CALALANG, Petitioner, v. A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL., Respondents.

Maximo Calalang in his own behalf.

Solicitor General Ozaeta and Assistant Solicitor General Amparo for respondents Williams,
Fragante and Bayan

City Fiscal Mabanag for the other respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION

OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND SECRETARY OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. The
provisions of section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the
Director of Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now
complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative
policy laid down by the National Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and
avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated as national roads by acts of the National
Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily
to any or all classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all,
therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the
facts and circumstances upon which the application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate
rules and regulations on the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national
road should be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be
directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other
government official to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists
for executing the law. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the
law.

2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY. Commonwealth

Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of
the state. Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated,
aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and
convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom
of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and, personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is
conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which
resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. Social justice is "neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism,
nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by
the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be
approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by
 the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements
of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations
of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all
governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,
therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to
all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the fundamental and
paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of
bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number."

DECISION

LAUREL, J.:

Maximo Calalang, in his capacity as a private citizen and as a taxpayer of Manila, brought before
this court this petition for a writ of prohibition against the respondents, A. D. Williams, as Chairman
of the National Traffic Commission; Vicente Fragante, as Director of Public Works; Sergio Bayan, as
Acting Secretary of Public Works and Communications; Eulogio Rodriguez, as Mayor of the City of
Manila; and Juan Dominguez, as Acting Chief of Police of Manila.

It is alleged in the petition that the National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940,
resolved to recommend to the Director of Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along Rosario Street
extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmarias Street, from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m. and
from 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.; and along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at
Antipolo Street to Echague Street, from 7 a.m. to 11 p.m., from a period of one year from the date
of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Chairman of the National Traffic
Commission, on July 18, 1940 recommended to the Director of Public Works the adoption of the
measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned, in pursuance of the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director of Public Works, with the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and
control the use of and traffic on national roads; that on August 2, 1940, the Director of Public
Works, in his first indorsement to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
recommended to the latter the approval of the recommendation made by the Chairman of the
National Traffic Commission as aforesaid, with the modification that the closing of Rizal Avenue to
traffic to animal-drawn vehicles be limited to the portion thereof extending from the railroad
crossing at Antipolo Street to Azcarraga Street; that on August 10, 1940, the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, in his second indorsement addressed to the Director of Public Works,
approved the recommendation of the latter that Rosario Street and Rizal Avenue be closed to traffic
of animal-drawn vehicles, between the points and during the hours as above indicated, for a period
of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic; that the Mayor of Manila
and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and
regulations thus adopted; that as a consequence of such enforcement, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above-mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.

It is contended by the petitioner that Commonwealth Act No. 548 by which the Director of Public
Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, is authorized to
promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national
roads and streets is unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power.
This contention is untenable. As was observed by this court in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro
(39 Phil, 660, 700), "The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided
by Judge Ranney, and since followed in a multitude of cases, namely: The true distinction therefore
is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under
and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.
(Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. v. Commrs. Clinton County, 1 Ohio St., 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief
Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard (10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an
executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments or
subordinate officials thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on
questions of fact. (U.S. v. Kinkead, 248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give
prominence to the necessity of the case."cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 548 reads as follows: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

"SECTION 1. To promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and streets designated
as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the President of the
Philippines, the Director of Public Works, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to regulate and control the
use of and traffic on such roads and streets. Such rules and regulations, with the approval of the
President, may contain provisions controlling or regulating the construction of buildings or other
structures within a reasonable distance from along the national roads. Such roads may be
temporarily closed to any or all classes of traffic by the Director of Public Works and his duly
authorized representatives whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes such
action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest, or for a specified period, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

The above provisions of law do not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works and
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and regulations now complained of is not to determine
what public policy demands but merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National
Assembly in said Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive orders of the
President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all classes of traffic "whenever
the condition of the road or the traffic makes such action necessary or advisable in the public
convenience and interest." The delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what
the law shall be, but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on the use of
national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should be closed to traffic, in
view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the requirements of public convenience
and interest, is an administrative function which cannot be directly discharged by the National
Assembly. It must depend on the discretion of some other government official to whom is confided
the duty of determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot be
said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law. As was said in Lockes Appeal (72
Pa. 491): "To assert that a law is less than a law, because it is made to depend on a future event or
act, is to rob the Legislature of the power to act wisely for the public welfare whenever a law is
passed relating to a state of affairs not yet developed, or to things future and impossible to fully
know." The proper distinction the court said was this: "The Legislature cannot delegate its power to
make the law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things
upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action depend. To deny this would be to
stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must
depend which cannot be known to the law-making power, and, must, therefore, be a subject of
inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation." (Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694; 36
L. Ed. 294.)

In the case of People v. Rosenthal and Osmea, G.R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12,
1939, and in Pangasinan Transportation v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No. 47065,
promulgated June 26, 1940, this Court had occasion to observe that the principle of separation of
powers has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the
adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United
States and England but in practically all modern governments. Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the theory of separation of
governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the delegation of greater
powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in administrative and executive
officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation of certain rules and
regulations calculated to promote public interest.

The petitioner further contends that the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 548 constitute an unlawful interference with
legitimate business or trade and abridge the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion.
Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National Assembly in the exercise of the paramount
police power of the state.

Said Act, by virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience
of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National Assembly was prompted by
considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of
traffic. which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom
of the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property may
be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort, health,
and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our
Government the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a
misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will
fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant
equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all. The moment greater authority is
conferred upon the government, logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which
resides in the people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.

The scope of police power keeps expanding as civilization advances. As was said in the case of
Dobbins v. Los Angeles (195 U.S. 223, 238; 49 L. ed. 169), "the right to exercise the police power
is a continuing one, and a business lawful today may in the future, because of the changed
situation, the growth of population or other causes, become a menace to the public health and
welfare, and be required to yield to the public good." And in People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440), it was
observed that "advancing civilization is bringing within the police power of the state today things
which were not thought of as being within such power yesterday. The development of civilization,
the rapidly increasing population, the growth of public opinion, with an increasing desire on the part
of the masses and of the government to look after and care for the interests of the individuals of the
state, have brought within the police power many questions for regulation which formerly were not
so considered."cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

The petitioner finally avers that the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the
constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people. The promotion of social justice, however, is to be achieved not
through a mistaken sympathy towards any given group. Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social
and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people,
the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the
competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the
adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers
underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principle of salus populi est
suprema lex.

Social justice, therefore, must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good to the greatest number." cralaw virt ua1aw li bra ry

In view of the foregoing, the writ of prohibition prayed for is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Diaz. and Horrilleno. JJ. concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-43800 July 29, 1977

LEONILA LAUREL ALMEDA and VENANCIO ALMEDA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EULOGIO GONZALES, respondents.

Dizon & Vitug and Cornell S. Valdez for petitioners.

Dennis B. Recon Juanito Hernandez and Oseas A. Martin for private respondent,

MARTIN, J.:

This is an agrarian case. Three questions of consequential effects are raised: first is there a
tenant's right of redemption in sugar and coconut lands; second, is prior tender or judicial
consignation of the redemption price a condition precedent for the valid exercise of the right
of redemption; and third, does the Court of Agrarian Relations have jurisdiction over
complaints for redemption of sugar and coconut lands.

Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is an agricultural share tenant of Glicerio, Sinfroso, Susana,

Maria, Sebastian, Rufina, Bienvenido, Besmark and Cesar, all surnamed Angeles, on their
46,529-square land situated in Tanauan, Batangas, and devoted to sugar cane and
coconuts. On September 30, 1968, the landowners sold the property to petitioners-spouses
Leonila Laurel Almeda and Venancio Almeda without notifying respondent-tenant in writing
of the sale. The document of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Tanauan,
Batangas on March 27, 1969. Respondent-tenant thus seeks the redemption of the land in a
complaint filed on March 27, 1971, pursuant to the provisions of Sections 11 and 12 of the
Code of Agrarian Reforms, with the Court of Agrarian Relations at Lipa City.

Answering the complaint, petitioners-spouses state, among other things, that long before the
execution of the deed of sale, Glicerio Angeles and his nephew Cesar Angeles first offered
the sale of the land to respondent Gonzales, but the latter said that he had no money; that
respondent-tenant, instead, went personally to the house of petitioners-spouses and
implored them to buy the land for fear that if someone else would buy the land, he may not
be taken in as tenant; that respondent-tenant is a mere dummy of someone deeply
interested in buying the land, that respondent-tenant made to tender of payment or any valid
consignation in court at the time he filed the complaint for redemption.

At the hearing of May 29, 1973 the parties waived their right to present evidence and,
instead, agreed to file simultaneous memoranda upon which the decision of the court would
be based.

On October 10, 1973, the Agrarian Court rendered judgment authorizing, the respondent-
tenant, Eulogio Gonzales, to redeem the tenanted land for P24,000.00, the said amount to
be deposited by him with the Clerk of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
decision.

Petitioners-spouses excepted to the ruling of the Agrarian Court and appealed the case to
the Court of Appeals. On January 30, 1976, the Appellate Court, however, affirmed the
decision of the Agrarian Court. Denied of their motions for reconsideration, petitioners-
spouses instituted the present petition for review.

We find the appeal to be impressed with merits.

1. Prior to the enactment of the Agricultural Land Reform Code RA 3844), no right of
preference in the sale of the land under cultivation was enjoyed by the tenant-farmer. The
absence of this right freely opened the way to the landlords to ease out their tenants from the
land by ostensible conveyance of said land to another tenant who, in turn, sues for the
ejectment of the first tenant on ground of personal cultivation. While many of these sales
were simulated, the tenant is oftenly evicted from the land because of the formal transfer of
ownership in the land.1 On August 8, 1963, the Agricultural Land Reform Code was passed,
impressed with the policy of the State, among other things, "(t)o establish owner-cultivatorship
and the economic family-size farm as the basis of Philippine agriculture; to achieve a dignified
existence of the small farmers free from pernicious institutional restraints and practices; to make
the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible citizens, and a source of
genuine strength in our democratic society."2 More importantly, a new right was given to the
tenants-farmers: the right of pre-emption and redemption. It bolsters their security of tenure and
further encourages them to become owner-cultivators.3 Thus, Section II provides: "In case the
agricultural lessor decides to sell the landholding, the agricultural lessee shall have the
preferential right to buy the same under reasonable terms and conditions. ... The right of pre-
emption under this Section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in
writing, which shall be served by the owner on all lessees affected and the Department of
Agrarian Reform.. If the agricultural lessee agrees with the terms and conditions of the sale, he
must give notice in writing to the agricultural lessor of his intention to exercise his right of pre-
emption within the balance of one hundred eighty days' period still available to him, but in any
case not less than thirty days. He must either tender payment of, or present a certificate of the
land bank that t shall make payment pursuant to section eighty of this Code on the price of the
landholding to the agricultural lessor. If the latter refuses to accept such tender or presentment,
he may consign it with the court." As protection of this right, Section 12 was inserted: "In case the
landholding is sold to a third person without the knowledge of the agricultural lessee, the latter
shall have the right to redeem the same at a reasonable price and consideration. ... The right of
redemption under this section may be exercised within one hundred eighty days from notice in
writing which shall be served by the vendee on all lessees affected and the Department of
Agrarian Reform upon the registration of the sale, and shall have priority over any other right of
legal redemption. The redemption price shall be the reasonable price of the land at the time of the
sale. 4 In the precedential case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 5 this right was held applicable to
both leasehold tenants and share tenants.

Presently, We are faced with an intricate question: is this right of redemption available to
tenants in sugar and coconut lands? We answer yes. Among those exempted from the
automatic conversion to agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of the Agricultural Land
Reform Code in 1963 or even after its amendments (Code of Agrarian Reforms) are sugar
lands. Section 4 thereof states: Agricultural share tenancy throughout the country, as herein
defined, is hereby declared contrary to public policy and shall be automatically converted to
agricultural leasehold upon the effectivity of this section. ... Provided, That in order not to
jeopardize international commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing
allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation by the President upon
recommendation of' the department head that adequate provisions, such as the organization
of cooperatives marketing agreement, or similar other workable arrangements, have been
made to insure efficient management on all matters requiring synchronization of the
agricultural with the processing phases of such crops ..." Sugar is, of course, one crop
covered by marketing allotments. In other words this section recognizes sharetenancy in
sugar lands until after a special proclamation is made, which proclamation shall have the
same effect of an executive proclamation of the operation of the Department of Agrarian
Reform in any region or locality; the share tenants in the lands affected will become
agricultural lessees at the beginning of the agricultural year next succeeding the year in
which the proclamation is made. 6 But, there is nothing readable or even discernible in the
lawdenying to tenants in sugar lands the right of pre-emption and redemption under the Code.
The exemption is purely limited to the tenancy system; it does not exclude the other rights
conferred by the Code, such as the right of pre-emption and redemption. In the same manner,
coconut lands are exempted from the Code only with respect to the consideration and tenancy
system prevailing, implying that in other matters the right of pre-emption and redemption which
does not refer to the consideration of the tenancy the provisions of the Code apply. Thus,
Section 35 states: "Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of
fishponds, saltbeds and lands principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, durian, and
other similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of this Code, the consideration as well
as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered
Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended."

It is to be noted that under the new Constitution, property ownership is impressed with social
function. Property use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well.
The State, in the promotion of social justice, may "regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property ... ownership
and profits." 7 One governmental policy of recent date project emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil and the transfer to them of the ownership of the land they till. This is
Presidential Decree No. 27 of October 21, 1972, ordaining that all tenant farmers "of private
agricultural lands devoted to rice and corn under a system of sharecrop or lease tenancy whether
classified as landed estates or not shall be deemed "owner of a portion constituting a family-size
farm of five (5) hectares if not irrigated and three (3) hectares if irrigated." 8

2. Nevertheless, while the Code secures to the tenant-farmer this right of redemption, in
particular, the exercise thereof must be in accordance with law in order to be valid. "The
timely exercise of the right of legal redemption," said the Court in Basbas v.
Entena.9 "requires either tender of the price or valid consignation thereof." The statutory periods
within which the right must be exercised "would be rendered meaningless and of easy evasion
unless the redemptioner is required to make an actual tender in good faith of what he believed to
be reasonable price of the land sought to be redeemed." "The existence of the right of redemption
operates to depress the market value of the land until the period expires, and to render that
period indefinite by permitting the tenant to file a suit for redemption, with either party unable to
foresee when final judgment will terminate the action, would render nugatory the period of two
years (180 days under the new law) fixed by the statute for making the redemption and virtually
paralyze any efforts of the landowner to realize the value of his land. No buyer can be expected
to acquire it without any certainty as to the amount for which least his investment in case of
redemption. In the meantime, the landowner's needs and obligations cannot be met. It is doubtful
if any such result was intended by the statute, absent clear wording to that effect." 10 Bona fide
redemption necessarily imports a seasonable and valid tender of the entire repurchase price. The
right of a redemptioner to pay a "reasonable price" does not excuse him from the duty to make
proper tender of the price that can be honestly deemed reasonable under the circumstances,
without prejudice to final arbitration by the courts. "It is not difficult to discern why the redemption
price should either be fully offered in legal tender or else validly consigned in court. Only by such
means can the buyer become certain that the offer to redeem is one made seriously and in good
faith. A buyer cannot be expected to entertain an offer of redemption without attendant evidence
that the redemptioner can, and is willing to accomplish the repurchase immediately. A different
rule would leave the buyer open to harassment by speculators or crackpots as well as to
unnecessary prolongation of the redemption period, contrary to the policy of the law. While
consignation of the tendered price is not always necessary because legal redemption is not made
to discharge a pre-existing debt (Asturias Sugar Central v. Cane Molasses Co., 60 Phil. 253), a
valid tender is indispensable, for the reasons already stated. Of course, consignation of the price
would remove all controversy as to the redemptioner's ability to pay at the proper time." 11

In the case before Us, neither prior tender nor judicial consignation of the redemption price
accompanied the filing of the redemption suit. In fact, the Agrarian court had yet to order,
when it rendered its decision on October 10, 1973 (complaint was filed on March 27, 1971),
respondent-tenant to deposit the amount of M,000.00 as redemption price with the Clerk of
Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the decision. The absence of such tender or
consignation leaves Us, therefore, with no alternative but to declare that respondent-tenant
had failed to exercise his right of redemption in accordance with law.

3. Reliance cannot be placed upon the case of Hidalgo v. Hidalgo 12 as excuse for the failure
to make the requisite tender or consignation in court, because the Court did not rule therein that
prior tender or judicial consignation of the redemption price is not required for the valid exercise of
the right of redemption. In that case, the spouse Igmidio Hidalgo and Martina Resales were
the share tenants of Policarpio Hidalgo on his 22, 876-square meter agricultural land in Lumil,
San Jose, Batangas, while the spouses Hilario Aguila and Adela Hidalgo were his tenants on a
square meter land. Policarpio Hidalgo sold these lands without notifying his tenants: and so, the
tenants filed petitions before the Court of Agrarian Relations seeking the redemption of the lands
under Section 12 of the Code. The Agrarian Court dismiss the petitioners for the reason that the
right of redemption is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share tenants. On review, the
Court ruled that while the Agrarian Court "correctly focused on the sole issue of law" whether
the right of redemption granted 12 of Republic Act No. 3844 is applicable to share tenants it
(Agrarian Court) "arrived at its erroneous conclusion that the right of redemption granted by
Section 12 of the Land Reform Code is available to leasehold tenants only but not to share
tenants." The Court said that '(t)he Code intended ... to afford the farmers
who transitionally continued to be share tenants after its enactment but who inexorably would be
agricultural lessees by virtue of the Code's proclaimed abolition of tenancy, the same priority and
preferential right as those other share tenants, who upon the enactment of the Code or soon
thereafter were earlier converted by fortuitous circumstance into agricultural lessees, to acquire
the lands under their cultivation in the event of their voluntary sale by the owner or of their
acquisition, by expropriation or otherwise, by the Land Authority." But, the Court did not rule that
tender of payment or consignation of the redemption price in court is not a requisite in the valid
exercise of the right of redemption. In fact, it said that "(i)n the absence of any provision in the
Code as to the manner of and amounts payable on redemption, the pertinent provisions of the
Civil Code apply in a suppletory character" which, of course, imposes tender of payment or
judicial consignation of the repurchase price as condition for valid redemption. Besides, it is
noteworthy that in that case petitioners-tenants' possession of funds and compliance the
requirements of redemption werenot questioned, the case having been submitted and decided on
the sole legal issue of the right of redemption being available to them as share tenants.

4. As a consequence, the Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over suits for
redemption, like the present case, of sugar and coconut lands. Section 154 of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, states: "The Court of Agrarian Relations shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over (1) all cases or actions involvingmatters,
controversies, disputes, or money claims arising from agrarian relations ..." Since this case
involves a matter, controversy or dispute "arising from agrarian relations" whether
respondent-tenant on sugar and coconut lands has the right of redemption it is definite
that the Agrarian Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the same. 13 The Court of Agrarian
Relations came into being for the enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relations
between capital and labor on all agricultural lands under any system of cultivation with original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide and settle all
questions, matters, controversies, or disputes involving or arising from such relationship. 14

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set
aside. Respondent Eulogio Gonzales is hereby held not to have validly exercised his right of
redemption over his tenanted agricultural land. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Muoz-Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., reserved his vote.

Footnotes

1 Montemayor, Labor, Agrarian and Social Legislation, Vol. 3, 1961 ed., at

246.

2 See. 2, Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended.

3 Op. Cit.

4 Agricultural Land Reform Code, as amended, now known as "Code of

Agrairan Reforms."

5 L-2532-28, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105.

6 See Montemayor, Labor Agrarian and Social Legislation, Vol. 3, 1967 ed.,
at 230.

7 Art. 11, Se 6, 1973 Constitution; Alfanta v. Noe, I,32362, September 19,

1973, 53 SCRA 84.

8 Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, L-37653, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 724.

9 L-26255, June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 669-672.

10 Idem.

11 Conejero v. Court of Appeals, L-21812, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 775.

12 L-25327-28, May 29, 1970, 33 SCRA 105.

13 Lacson v. Pineda, L-28523, July 16, 1971, 40 SCRA 30; Ferrer v.

Villamor, L-33293, Sept. 30, 1974, 60 SCRA 106.

14 Salandanan v.Tizon, L-30290, February 24, 1975, 62 SCRA 388.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47178 May 16, 1980

ESTRELLA B. ONDOY, petitioner,

vs.
VIRGILIO IGNACIO, Proprietor M/B LADY ESTRELLITA and/or IMPERIAL FISHING
ENTERPRISES and/or THE SECRETARY OF LABOR and/or THE COMPENSATION
APPEALS AND REVIEW STAFF, Department of Labor, respondents.

Fernardo R. Moreno for petitioner.

Feliciano Tumale for private respondents.

E. V. Espanol for public respondent.

FERNANDO, C.J.: t.hq w

The undisputed facts argue strongly for the granting of the claim for compensation filed by
petitioner, the mother of one Jose Ondoy, who was drowned while in the employ of private
respondent, Virgilio Ignacio. Whatever be the cause for the failure to do so, it is admitted that
there was no controversion. Such omission, fatal in character, was sought to be minimized
by the filing of a motion to dismissed based on the alleged absence of an employment
relationship. What cannot be ignored, however, is that subsequently, in the hearing of such
claim private respondent submitted affidavits executed by the chief engineer and oiler of the
fishing vessel that the deceased a fisherman, was in that ship, undeniably a member of the
working force, but after being invited by friends to a drinking spree, left the vessel, and
thereafter was found dead. The referee summarily ignored the affidavit of the chief-mate of
respondent employer to the effect "that sometime in October, 1968, while Jose Ondoy, my
co-worker, was in the actual performance of his work with said fishing enterprises, he was
drowned and died on October 22, 1968. That the deceased died in line of Duty." 1 The
hearing officer or referee dismissed the claim for lack of merit. 2 A motion for reconsideration was
duly filed, but in an order dated August 29, 1977, the then Secretary of Labor, now Minister Blas
F. Ople, denied such motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. 3 Hence this petition for review.

1. In La Mallorca v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 4 this Court explicitly held that the
failure to controvert "is fatal to any defense that petitioner could interpose. So we have held in a
host of decisions in compliance with the clear and express language of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. Any Assertion to the contrary is doomed to futility. 5 The opinion noted thirty
decisions starting from Bachrach Motor Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission 6 to Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission. 7 Thereafter, in Regal Auto Works, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, 8 such a doctrine was reaffirmed. It was further noted that nine more decisions had
been rendered by this Court starting from Republic v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission 9 to Abong v. Workmen's Compensation Commission. 10 By the time respondent
secretary of Labor denied the motion for reconsideration, a host of decisions that speaks to the
same effect had been promulgated. 11 It clearly, appears, therefore, that the failure of the referee
to grant the award ought to have been remedied and the motion for reconsideration granted.

2. The deceased in this case met his death because of drowning. In Camotes Shipping
Corporation v. Otadoy, 12there was not even any direct testimony that the deceased was
drowned while in the performance of his duty. All that could be alleged was that he "was lost at
sea while in the employ of petitioner. 13 Nonetheless, the award for compensation was sustained.
Likewise, the ruling in Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Villanueva 14 was cited with approval. Thus: "The fact
that the employee was found missing while on board the petitioner's vessel MV 'Caltex Mindanao'
became known to the captain of the vessel on 10 October 1956 but it was only on 6 November
1956 when the petitioner transmitted to the respondent Compensation WCC For in No. 3 stating
that the employee was 'Lost at sea and presumed dead as of October 10, 1956,' and that it was
controverting the respondent's claim. 15 In the present case, there is evidence of the fact of death
due to drowning. That was not controverted. Under the circumstances, the failure to grant the
claim finds no justification in law.

3. It bears repeating that there is evidence, direct and categorical, to the effect that the
deceased was drowned while "in the actual performance of his work" with the shipping
enterprise of private respondent. Even without such evidence, the petitioner could have
relied on the presumption of compensability under the Act once it is shown that the death or
disability arose in the course of employment, with the burden of overthrowing it being cast on
the person or entity resisting the claim. Time and time again this Court has stressed such
statutory provision. It suffices to mention cases decided from January to April of this
year. 16 An appraisal of the counter-affidavits submitted by two employees of private respondent
and thereafter beholden to him to the effect that the deceased left the vessel for a drinking spree
certainly cannot meet the standard required to negate the force of the presumption of
compensability.

4. Nor is an affirmance of the finding of the referee adverse to the claim warranted because
of the doctrine that the findings of facts of an administrative agency must be accorded due
weight and consideration. An excerpt from the recent case of Uy v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission 17 finds pertinence: "The claim merits scant consideration for this
Court is authorized to inquire into the facts when the conclusions are not supported by substantial
or credible evidence. 18

5. This Court, in recognizing the right of petitioner to the award, merely adheres to the
interpretation uninterruptedly followed by this Court resolving all doubts in favor of the
claimant. So it has been since the first leading case ofFrancisco v. Conching 19 decided a
year after the 1935 Constitution took effect. What was said in Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission 20 is not amiss: "There is need, it seems, even at this late
date, for [private respondent] and other employers to be reminded of the high estate accorded the
Workmen's Compensation Act in the constitutional scheme of social justice and protection to
labor. 21 Further: "No other judicial attitude may be expected in the face of a clearly expressed
legislative determination which antedated the constitutionally avowed concern for social justice
and protection to labor. It is easily understandable why the judiciary frowns on resort to doctrines,
which even if deceptively plausible, would result in frustrating such a national policy. 22 Lastly, to
quote from the opinion therein rendered: "To be more specific, the principle of social justice is in
this sphere strengthened and vitalized. A realistic view is that expressed in Agustin v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission: 'As between a laborer, usually poor and unlettered, and the
employer, who has resources to secure able legal advice, the law has reason to demand from the
latter stricter compliance. Social justice in these cases is not equality but protection.' 23
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted and petitioner Estrelita B. Ondoy is awarded
the sum of, P6,000.00 as compensation for the death of her son, Jose Ondoy; P300.00 for
burial expenses; and P600.00 as attorney's fees. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against private respondent Virgilio Ignacio.

Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur. 1w ph1.t

Barredo, J., is on leave.

Footnotes t.hqw

1 Annex C-1.

2 Petition, par. 8.

3 Ibid, par. 11.

4 L-29315, November 28,1969,30 SCRA 613.

5 Ibid, 619-620.

6 99 Phil. 238 (1956).

7 L-25274, July 29, 1969, 28 SCRA 877.

8 L-29455, September 30, 1975, 67 SCRA 207.

9 L-26763, December 26, 1969,30 SCRA 811.

10 L-32347. December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 379.

11 Cf. Security Services v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-40739,

Jan. 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 269; Dinaro v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-42457, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 292; Talip v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-42574, May 31, 1976, 71 SCRA 218;
Reynaldo v. Republic, L-43108, June 30,1976, 71 SCRA 650; Laude v.
Moderna, L-43009, Aug. 31, 1976, 72 SCRA 569; Vda. de Lauron, v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43344; Sept. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA
84; Pros v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43348, Sept. 29, 1976,
73 SCRA 92; Camarillo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42831,
Oct. 21, 1976, 73 SCRA 497; Vallo vs. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-41816, Oct. 29, 1976, 73 SCRA 623; Dometita v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-43612, Nov. 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 217; Arzadon
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42404, Dec. 8, 1976, 74 SCRA
238; Delgado Brothers v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-42753,
Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 343; People v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-42828, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 350; Bihag v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-43162, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA 357; Gomez
v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43617, Feb. 28, 1977, 75 SCRA
395; Baterna v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43932, Feb. 28,
1977, 75 SCRA 409; Buenaventura v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-42835, April 22, 1977, 76 SCRA 485, Romero v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, L-42617, June 30, 1977, 77 SCRA 482;
Evangelista v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-43572, June 30,
1977, 77 SCRA 497.

12 L-27699, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 456.

13 Ibid, 456.

14 112 Phil. 897 (1961).

15 Ibid, 905-906.

16 Cf. Guzman v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-

38911, Jan. 28, 1980; Pajarillo v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-
42927, Jan. 28, 1980; Villones v. Employees Compensation Commission, L-
44301, Feb. 14, 1980; Cabriera v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, L-
43363, Feb. 21, 1980; Del Rosario v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-44114, Feb. 21, 1980; Macatol v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, L-43127, Feb. .28, 1980; Barga v. Employees Compensation
Commission, G. R. No. L-49227, April 25, 1980; Reyes v. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-46579, April 28, 1980; Guillen v.
Workmen's Compensation Commission, G. R. No. L-46692, April 28, 1980;
Cenabre v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-46802, April
28, 1980; Avendano v. Employees Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-
48593, April 30, 1980.

17 L-43389, April 28, 1980.

18 Ibid, 15. The opinion of Justice Makasiar cited the following cases:
International Factory v. Vda. de Doria and WCC, 109 Phil. 553 (1960); Abong
v. WCC, L-32347-53, Dec. 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 379; Mulingtapang v. WCC &
Marcelo Steel Corporation, L-42483, Dec. 21, 1977, 80 SCRA 610; Yutuc v.
Republic of the Philippines, L-43270, Dec. 29, 1978, 87 SCRA 436.

19 63 Phil. 354.

20 L-25665, May 22,1969, 28, SCRA 285.

21 Ibid, 296.

22 Ibid, 297-298.

23 Ibid, 298. Agustin v. Workmen's Compensation Commission is reported in

120 Phil. 846 (1964). The ponente is Justice J.B.L. Reyes. It must be
stressed that the present Constitution has expanded and made more specific
the principles of social justice and protection to labor.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47088 July 10, 1981

CONSOLACION DUQUE SALONGA, assisted by her husband WENCESLAO

SALONGA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JULITA B. FARRALES, and THE SHERIFF OF OLONGAPO CITY, defendants-appellees.

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 from the decision of the Court
of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial District, Branch III, Olongapo
City, in Civil Case No. 1144-0, entitled "Consolacion Duque Salonga, assisted by her husband,
Wenceslao Salonga, Plaintiff, versus Julita B. Farrales, and The Sheriff of Olongapo City,
Defendants," the dispositive part of which reads:

FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing

plaintiff's complaint, as well as defendants' counterclaim.

Costs against plaintiff.

SO ORDERED. 2

The records disclose that on January 2, 1973; the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga
assisted by her husband, filed a complaint against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of
Olongapo City with the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Third Judicial
District, Branch III, Olongapo City, seeking the following relief:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief:

a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land

containing an area of 156 Square Meters, more or less, where the house of
strong materials of plaintiff exists.

b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful

possession or occupation of the land by plaintiff, until a final decision is
rendered in this case.

c) Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay costs; and

d) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity.

Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, December 28, 1972. 3

that on January 9, 1973, plaintiff-appellant, Salonga filed an urgent petition for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction which was duly amended on January 16, 1973, 4 with the
following prayer:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff assisted by counsel most respectfully prays the Hon.

Court the following relief:

a) That a restraining order be issued pending resolution of the instant petition

for issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction enjoining defendants,
particularly the Sheriff of Olongapo City to restrain from enforcing the Writ of
Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in Civil Case 650
for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City;

b) That after due hearing of the present amended petition, a Writ of

Preliminary Injunction conditioned upon a reasonable bond be issued
enjoining the defendants, particularly, the Sheriff of Olongapo City, to restrain
from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued in connection with the judgment
rendered in Civil Case No. 650 for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo
City, in order to maintain the status of the parties; in order to prevent the
infliction of irreparable injury to plaintiff; and in order that whatever judgment
may be rendered in this case, may not become moot, academic, illusory and
ineffectual, and

c) Granting plaintiff such other relief conformable to law, justice and equity;

that on January 22, 1973, the court a quo issued an order temporarily restraining the carrying
out of the writ of execution issued pursuant to the judgment rendered by the City Court of
Olongapo City in Civil Case No. 650, a suit for ejectment filed by defendant-appellee
Farrales against five defendants, among whom the herein appellant, Consolacion Duque
Salonga; 5 that on January 23, 1973, defendant-appellee Farrales filed a motion to deny the
motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for being vague and her answer with
counterclaim to the complaint; 6 that an opposition to the amended petition for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction was also filed by the defendant-appellee Farrales on January 25,
1973; 7 that in an order dated January 20, 1973, the court a quo denied the petition for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction and lifted the restraining order issued on January 22,
1973; 8 that plaintiff-appellant moved for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for
issuance of a preliminary injunction on January 5, 1973; 9 which was also denied by the court a
quo on February 21, 1973; 10 that after the trial on the merits of Civil Case No. 1144-0, the trial
court rendered the judgment under review, dismissing plaintiff's complaint; 11 that on August 13,
1973, the plaintiff, Consolacion Duque Salonga, appealed from the said decision to the Court of
Appeals; 12 that on February 25, 1974, the plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga, filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction in aid of
appeal; 13 that in a resolution dated March 6, 1974, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion
on the ground that "the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for being intended to restrain the
enforcement of the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 650 for Ejectment, which is not
involved in this appeal, and there being no justification for the issuance of the writ ... " 14 that on
January 13, 1975, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that the appeal has become moot and academic because "the house of the
plaintiffs-appellants, subject matter of this appeal was demolished on October 21, 1974, Annex
"A", Sheriff's return and the land where this house was built was delivered to her and she is now
the one in possession ... ; 15 that the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to comment on the said
motion to dismiss when required by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated January 16,
1975, 16the Court of Appeals resolved to submit the motion for decision in a resolution dated April
17, 1975; 17 and that, likewise, the plaintiffs-appellants having failed to show cause why the case
should not be submitted for decision without the benefit of appellant's reply brief when required to
do so in a Court of Appeals resolution dated May 14, 1975, 18 the Court of Appeals resolved on
July 8, 1975 to submit the case for decision without the benefit of appellants' reply brief. 19

In a resolution promulgated on September 15, 1977 the Court of Appeals certified the case
to the Supreme Court because the issue raised in the appeal is purely legal. 20

The plaintiffs-appellants assign the following errors:

I THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING

APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN DENYING SAID APPELLANTS'
RELIEF TO PURCHASE FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLEE JULITA
FARRALES THE PIECE OF LAND IN QUESTION.

II THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT APPLYING TO THE

SUIT AT BAR, SECTION 6, UNDER ARTICLE 11 OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTION, WHICH CONTROLS, DELIMITS AND REGULATES
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND PRIVATE GAINS. 21

The main legal question involved in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in
dismissing the complaint for specific performance or the ground that there exists no legally
enforceable compromise agreement upon which the defendant-appellee Farrales can be
compelled to sell the piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque
Salonga.

The facts, as found by the trial court, are:

At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated on the following facts -

(1) THAT the personal circumstances of the parties as alleged in the

complaint are admitted:

(2) THAT defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land
situated in Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, Identity of which is not disputed, formerly
acquired by her from one Leoncio Dytuco who, in turn, acquired the same
from the Corpuz Family of which only 361 square meters, more or less, not
actually belong to said defendant after portions thereof had been sold to
Marciala Zarsadias, Catalino Pascual and Rosanna Quiocson*; (*Per Deed of
Absolute Sale, Exhibit B, the vendee is actually Dionisio Quiocson);

3) THAT even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales (if the land
aforesaid, plaintiff was already in possession as lessee of some 156 square
meters thereof, on which she had erected a house, paying rentals thereon
first to the original owners and later to defendant Farrales.

(4) THAT, sometime prior to November, 1968, defendant Farrales filed an

ejectment case for non-payment of rentals against plaintiff and her husband-
jointly with other lessees of other portions of the land, to wit, Jorge Carvajal,
Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias, and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina
Quiocson - Civil Case No. 650 of the Olongapo City Court, Branch 1, in
which, on November 20, 1968, and reiterated on February 4, 1970, a
decision was rendered in favor of defendant Farrales and ordering the therein
 defendants, including plaintiff herein and her husband, to vacate the portion
occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney's fees and costs;

(5) THAT the decision aforesaid was elevated on appeal to the Court of First
Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City, Civil Case No. 581-0 thereof, and,
in a Decision dated November 11, 1971 of Branch III thereof, the same was
affirmed with modification only as to the amount of rentals arrears to be paid;

(6) THAT the affirmatory decision of the Court of First Instance aforesaid is
now final and executory the records of the case had been remanded to the
Court for execution, and the corresponding writ of execution had been issued
partially satisfied, as far as plaintiff herein is concerned, by the payment of all
rentals in arrears although the removal of said plaintiff's house from the land
still remains to be carried out by defendant Sheriff: and

(7) THAT, even before the rendition of the affirmatory decision of the Court of
First Instance, by common consent amongst themselves defendant sold to
Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias and the spouses Cesar and Rosalina
Quiocson the areas respectly occupied by them; while, with respect to Jorge
Carvajal, in a suit thereafter filed between him and defendant Farrales, a
compromise. agreement was entered into whereunder said defendant
undertook to pay for Carvajal's house on her land, so that the decision
aforesaid is now being executed, as far as ejectment is concerned, only
against plaintiff herein. (Pre-Trial Order, May 17, 1973, pp. 2-5) 22

The lower court explained its conclusion thus:

... From the very allegations of the complaint, it is clearly admitted -

5. That plaintiff herein, in view of the sale to three tenants defendants of the
portions of land occupied by each of said three tenant-defendants, by
defendant Julita B. Farrales, also offered to purchase from said defendant
the area of One Hundred Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters, more or less, where
plaintiff's house of strong materials exists, but, defendant Julita B. Farrales,
despite the fact that said plaintiff's order to purchase was just, fair and
reasonable persistently refused such offer, and instead insisted to execute
the judgment rendered in the ejectment case, before the City Court of
Olongapo City, thru the herein defendant Sheriff of Olongapo City, with the
sole and only purpose of causing damage and prejudice to the plaintiff
(Complaint, p. 3 emphasis supplied).

Being a judicial admission, the foregoing binds plaintiff who cannot

subsequently take a position contradictory thereto or inconsistent therewith
(Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court; McDaniel vs. Apacible, 44 Phil. 248
Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil., 227). Hence, if plaintiff's offer to purchase
was, as aforesaid persistently refused by defendant, it is obvious that no
meeting of the and, took place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or
of sale, was ever perfected between them. This is only firmed up even more
by plaintiff's admission on the witness stand that no agreement respecting
the purchase and sale of the disputed land was finalized because, while
defendant Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cash, plaintiff did not have
any money for that purpose and neither were negotiations ever had
 respecting any possible arrangement for payment in installments. On all fours
to the case at bar, therefore, is Velasco et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al,
G.R. No. L-31018, June 29, 1973, which was a case for specific performance
to compel the therein respondent Magdalena Estate, Inc. to sell a parcel of
land to petitioner per an alleged contract of sale in which the Supreme Court
ruled:

It is not difficult to glean from the aforequoted averments that

the petitioners themselves admit that they and the respondent
still had to meet and agree on how and when the down
payment and the installment payments were to be paid. Such
being the situation, it cannot, therefore be said that a definite
and firm sales agreement between the parties had been
perfected over the lot in question. Indeed this Court has
already ruled before that a definite agreement on the manner
of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in
the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of sale.

Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of perfection (Articles
1315 and 1475, Civil Code of the Philippines; Pacific Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. vs. Central Bank, G.R. No. L-21881, March 1, 1968; Atkins, Kroll and
Co., Inc. vs. B. Cua Hian Teck G.R. No. L-9817, January 31, 1958), and
there is here no perfected contract at all, it goes without saying that plaintiff
has absolutely nothing to enforce against defendant Farrales, and the fact
that defendant Farrales previously sold portions of the land to other lessees
similarly situated as plaintiff herein, does not change the situation because,
as to said other lessees, a perfected contract existed - which is not the case
with plaintiff. 23

The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in question was
ever perfected between the defendant-appellee as vendor and the plaintiffs-appellants as
vendees. 24

It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and
where it is wanting, the contract is non-existent. The essence of consent is the conformity of
the parties on the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the
other. The contract to sell is a bilateral contract. Where there is merely an offer by one party,
without the acceptance of the other, there is no consent. 25

It appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did
not accept, but rejected the offer of plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in
question. There being no consent there is. therefore, no contract to sell to speak of.

Likewise, it must be borne in mind that the alleged compromise agreement to sell the land in
question is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, 26 and thus, renders all the more
ineffective the action for specific performance in the court a quo.

Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are
neither builders in good faith nor in bad faith. Their rights are governed not by Article 448 but
by Art. 1678 of the New Civil Code. 27 As lessees, they may remove the improvements should
28
the lessor refuse to reimburse them, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land.
Anent the appellants' claim that since the appellee sold to the three (3) other defendants in
the ejectment suit the three (3) portions of the land in question occupied by them, it follows
that "she must also sell that portion of the land where appellants' residential house was
found to appellants" is unmeritorious. The trial court correctly ruled that the fact that
defendant-appellee sold portions of the land to the other lessees similarly situated as
plaintiffs-appellants Salonga does not change the situation because as to said other lessees,
a perfected contract of sale existed which, as previously shown was not the case with the
plaintiff. 29

As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at
bar, it must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of
property owners who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The
social justice consecrated in our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a
person and give them to another who is not entitled thereto. Evidently, the plea for social
justice cannot nullify the law on obligations and contracts, and is, therefore, beyond the
power of the Court to grant.

There is no showing that the trial court committed any reversible error.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the judgment appealed from
is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Guerrero and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 53-57. Resolution penned by Justice Pacifica de Castro and

concurred in by Justices Jose G. Bautista and Nestor B.Alampay.

2 Record on Appeal, pp. 73-87; Rollo, p. 15.

3 Record on Appeal, p. 5; Rollo, p. 15.

4 Idem, pp. 7-23.

5 Idem, p. 27.

6 Idem, pp. 28-33.

7 Idem, p. 33.

8 Idem,pp. 38-40.

9 Idem, pp. 41-52.

10 Idem, pp. 61-65.

11 Idem, pp. 73-87.

12 Idem, pp- 87-91.

13 Rollo, p. 29.

14 Rollo, p. 32.

15 Idem, p.44.

16 Idem, p.48.

17 Idem, p.49.

18 Idem p.50.

19 Idem, p. 51.

20 Rollo, pp. 53-57.

21 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellants, p. 6; Rollo, p. 40.

22 CFI Decision, Record on Appeal, pp. 74-77, Rollo, p. 15,

21 Idem pp. 80-83.

24 Arts. 1319, 1475, New Civil Code.

25 Gamboa v. Gonzales, 17 Phil. 381.

26 Art. 1403, par. (2) Subpar. (e).

27 Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which
are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended, without altering the
form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon the termination of
the lease shall pay the lessee one- half of the value of the improvements at
that time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more impairment upon
the property leased than is necessary.

With regard to ornamental expenses, the lessee shall not be entitled to any
reimbursement, but he may remove the ornamental objects, provided no
damage is cause to the principal thing, and the lessor does not choose to
retain them by paying their value at the time the lease is extinguished.

28 Southwestern University v. Salvador, 90 SCRA 318, 329-330.

29 CFI Decision, Record on Appeal, p. 83; Rollo, p. 15.

 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

THE SECRETARY OF G.R. No. 180906

NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED Present:
FORCES OF
THEPHILIPPINES, PUNO, C.J.,
Petitioners, QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
- versus - TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO, Promulgated:
Respondents. October 7, 2008
x- - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

While victims of enforced disappearances are separated from the rest of the
world behind secret walls, they are not separated from the constitutional
protection of their basic rights. The constitution is an overarching sky that
covers all in its protection. The case at bar involves the rights to life, liberty
and security in the first petition for a writ of amparo filed before this Court.
This is an appeal via Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court in relation to Section 19[1] of the Rule on the Writ ofAmparo, seeking
to reverse and set aside on both questions of fact and law, the Decision
promulgated by the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. AMPARO No. 00001,
entitled Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo, petitioners, versus The
Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines, respondents.

This case was originally a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and

Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)[2] filed before this Court by herein
respondents (therein petitioners) on August 23, 2007 to stop herein
petitioners (therein respondents) and/or their officers and agents from
depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. Therein
petitioners also sought ancillary remedies, Protective Custody Orders,
Appointment of Commissioner, Inspection and Access Orders, and all other
legal and equitable reliefs under Article VIII, Section 5(5)[3] of the 1987
Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6 of the Rules of Court. In our
Resolution dated August 24, 2007, we (1) ordered the Secretary of the
Department of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP, their
agents, representatives, or persons acting in their stead, including but not
limited to the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) to submit
their Comment; and (2) enjoined them from causing the arrest of therein
petitioners, or otherwise restricting, curtailing, abridging, or depriving them
of their right to life, liberty, and other basic rights as guaranteed under
Article III, Section 1[4] of the 1987 Constitution.[5]

While the August 23, 2007 Petition was pending, the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. Forthwith, therein petitioners
filed a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion to Treat Existing Petition
as Amparo Petition, to Admit Supporting Affidavits, and to Grant Interim
and Final Amparo Reliefs. They prayed that: (1) the petition be considered a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo under Sec. 26[6] of the Amparo Rule; (2) the
Court issue the writ commanding therein respondents to make a verified
return within the period provided by law and containing the specific matter
required by law; (3) they be granted the interim reliefs allowed by
the Amparo Rule and all other reliefs prayed for in the petition but not
covered by the Amparo Rule; (4) the Court, after hearing, render judgment
as required in Sec. 18[7] of the Amparo Rule; and (5) all other just and
equitable reliefs.[8]

On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007
Petition as a petition under the Amparo Rule and further resolved,viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents
requiring them to file with the CA (Court of Appeals) a verified written
return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We
REMAND the petition to the CA and designate the Division of Associate
Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition
on November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance
with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.[9]
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
favor of therein petitioners (herein respondents), the dispositive portion of
which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
AMPARO is GRANTED.

The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP

CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:

1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from
notice of this decision all official and unofficial reports of the
investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those
already on file herein;

2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of

M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas within five days
from notice of this decision.

3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and

charts, reports of any treatment given or recommended and medicines
prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and
(sic) personnel (military and civilian) who attended to them from
February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice
of this decision.

The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and
oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff or his duly authorized deputy, the
 latters authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn
compliance with this directive.

SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts
as alleged by herein respondents:

Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before
February 14, 2006, several uniformed and armed soldiers and members of
the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in
San Idelfonso, Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were
not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of the soldiers when
he passed by the barangayhall.[11]

On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na

Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past noon, several armed soldiers
wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and
roused him. They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo,
replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed soldier slapped him on
both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed,
brought to the rear of his house, and forced to the ground face down. He was
kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then forcibly
brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers
stopped her and told her to stay.[12]

Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers
Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz, andPula de la
Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and
residing in Manuzon, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers
Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While
he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house
two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo Lingasa, with some
soldiers and armed men.[13]

The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was
blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he saw the faces of the soldiers who
took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The
one who drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he
estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of the team who
entered his house and abducted him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-
haired and a bit old. Another one of his abductors was George who was tall,
thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.[14]

The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van
and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of them were beaten up. On the road,
he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother
Reynaldos. The van stopped several times until they finally arrived at a
house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different room. With
the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers
continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo on the head and other parts of his
body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo
was brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to be
beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked him if he was a member of
the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the
butt of their guns. He was questioned where his comrades were, how many
soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had helped. Each
time he answered none, they hit him.[15]

In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the

soldiers who beat him up would salute them, call them sir, and treat them
with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials,
but he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put
on. He noticed that the uniform of the high officials was different from those
of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white
pants, tie, and leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog
and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas corpus case filed
in connection with the respondents abduction.[16] While these officials
interrogated him, Raymond was not manhandled. But once they had left, the
soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also
manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night,
usually with left-over and rotten food.[17]

On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while

Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They doused him with urine and
hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice
with a .45 pistol, punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his
body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure the torture and
could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the
same ordeal in another room. Before their torturers left, they warned
Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.[18]

The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the

guards to get drunk, then made noise with the chains put on him to see if
they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he
managed to free his hand from the chains and jumped through the
window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and stopped near a
fishpond where he used stones to break his chains.After walking through a
forested area, he came near a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked
to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and the
road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay.[19] He reached
the highway, but some soldiers spotted him, forcing him to run away. The
soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another
place near the entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed
repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled. They poured
gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying
that she wanted to see Raymond before he was killed.The soldiers ceased the
torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was
detained.[20]

For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their
wounds were treated. When the wounds were almost healed, the torture
resumed, particularly when respondents guards got drunk.[21]

Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained
in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed all the time in that small room
measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating,
removing his bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen
people[22] had been detained in that bartolina, including his brother
Reynaldo and himself.[23]

For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained
in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house with two rooms and a
kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the
firing range, helipad and mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their
house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as the
DTU.[24]

At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their

body and eyes, took their urine samples and marked them.When asked how
they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their
stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day,
two ladies in white arrived. They also examined respondents and gave them
medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought
with them the results of respondents urine test and advised them to drink
plenty of water and take their medicine. The two ladies returned a few more
times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the master of the DTU,
Master Del Rosario alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the
DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named Efren who
said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.[25]

One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along
with Efren and several other armed men wearing fatigue suits, went to a
detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained
for one or two weeks in a big two-storey house.Hilario and Efren stayed
with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by Hilarios men.[26]

From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel,
Bulacan on board the Revo. They were detained in a big unfinished house
inside the compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they arrived
in Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them.They were brought out of the house
to a basketball court in the center of the compound and made to sit. Gen.
Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away
from respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to
which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked Raymond if he knew
him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be
scared if he were made to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he
would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an evil
man.[27]
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba
natatakot sa akin?

Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din

Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na

mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng sasabihin ko sabihin mo sa
magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa
Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo. Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa
bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na
sumuko na sa gobyerno.[28]
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they
could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in the morning, Hilario, Efren and the
formers men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their
parents house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in
the Revo because he still could not walk. In the presence of Hilario and other
soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As
they were afraid, Raymonds parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds
parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies, they would never
see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to
Sapang.[29]

When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about

to leave. He was talking with the four masters who were there: Arman,
Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse.[30] When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he
called for him. He was in a big white vehicle.Raymond stood outside the
vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be healthy
and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine
was expensive at Php35.00 each, and would make them strong. He also said
that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned
that they would not be given another chance.[31] During his testimony,
Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.[32]

One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by
Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named Alive, was green and yellow. Raymond
and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take
one capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the
medicine. The Alive made them sleep each time they took it, and they felt
heavy upon waking up.[33]

After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond
at Sapang. Arman instructed Raymond that while in Sapang, he should
introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon,
assigned in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who
abducted him from his house, and got acquainted with other military men
and civilians.[34]

After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought

to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion. He was fetched by three
unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond
was then blindfolded. After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was
removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.[35]

The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean
outside the barracks. It was then he learned that he was in a detachment of
the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He
was also ordered to clean inside the barracks.In one of the rooms therein, he
met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him that she was a student of
the University of thePhilippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She
confided that she had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was
crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During the day, her
chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.[36]

After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from
his arrival, two other captives, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino,
arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name
they later came to know as Donald Caigas, called master or commander by
his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo were put in
the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and
Reynaldo was beaten up. In the daytime, their chains were removed, but
were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their
families would all be killed.[37]
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the
detainees that they should be thankful they were still alive and should
continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8,
2006, respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend
the hearing. However, their parents had already left for Manila. Respondents
were brought back to CampTecson. They stayed in that camp from
September 2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to
continue using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a military
trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose
names and descriptions he stated in his affidavit.[38]

On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and

Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion in
Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp
until May 8, 2007. Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While
there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy beat him up
and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered
enormous torture in the camp. They were all made to clean, cook, and help
in raising livestock.[39]

Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and
some other soldiers brought him and Manuel with them to take and kill all
sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-
bayanan, Bataan where he witnessed the killing of an old man
doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who was
a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his
house.[40] Another time, in another Operation Lubog, Raymond was brought
to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived,
only the old man of the house who was sick was there. They spared him and
killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes.[41]

From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were

transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the sea. Caigas and some of his
men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the
house. Like in Limay, the five detainees were made to do errands and
chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.[42]
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond,
Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring food to detainees brought to the
camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the
camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita
ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at nilagyan ng silenser.Sabi ni
Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang
nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag
na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at itoy
sinunog. Masansang ang amoy.

Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga

unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa loob ng
kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga
bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.

Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang

Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at labis na
binugbog.Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo
ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita kong pinatay nila iyong isang
Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.

Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba

ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala ang mga bangkay sa labas ng
bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at
napakamasangsang ang amoy.

May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko

sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan. Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at
hindi ko na sila nakita.

xxx xxx xxx

Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel

dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan. Nakapiring si Manuel, wala
siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na
galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni
Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban
si Manuel.

Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o

4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami

kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni Donald huwag na raw
 naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na
yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay
at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami
kinakadena.[43]
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to
Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for Donald (Caigas).Caigas told
respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care
of the food of their family. They were also told that they could farm a small
plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no longer put in
chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and
Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent themselves as cousins from Rizal,
Laguna.[44]

Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from
where they stayed. They helped farm adjoining lands for which they were
paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had
saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a
cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text messages with a girl who lived
nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use
it. They earned some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.

There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were
housed in one of them while their guards lived in the other three. Caigas
entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents house
did not have electricity. They used a lamp.There was no television, but they
had a radio. In the evening of August 13, 2007, Nonong and his cohorts had
a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of
the radio. When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and
Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving behind their sleeping
guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were
thus freed from captivity.[45]

Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds

affidavit insofar as they related to matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo
added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he
saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He
also named the soldiers he got acquainted with in the 18 months he was
detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay,
Reynaldo was severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of
the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber pistol, Reynaldo was
hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the
pain.

At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in
Sapang, Reynaldo was separated from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by
Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a
mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name Rodel and to represent
himself as a military trainee from Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario
brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market
in San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while
Hilario was buying.He was also brought to Tondo, Manila where Hilario
delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a
black and red vehicle. Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but
allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of their
trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo
saw the sign board, Welcome to Camp Tecson.[46]

Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents

Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino specialized in forensic
medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an
organization handling cases of human rights violations, particularly cases
where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct
medical examinations on the respondents after their escape.He first asked
them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the physical examination. His
findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with
their account of physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was
conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents escape, and the
results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of
the scars. He testified that he followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting
the examination.[47]

Petitioners dispute respondents account of their alleged abduction and

torture. In compliance with the October 25, 2007 Resolution of the Court,
they filed a Return of the Writ of Amparo admitting the abduction but
denying any involvement therein, viz:
13. Petitioners Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were not at any time
arrested, forcibly abducted, detained, held incommunicado, disappeared or
under the custody by the military. This is a settled issue laid to rest in
the habeas corpus case filed in their behalf by petitioners parents before
the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 94431 against M/Sgt. Rizal
Hilario aka Rollie Castillo, as head of the 24th Infantry Battalion; Maj.
Gen. Jovito Palparan, as Commander of the 7th Infantry Division in
Luzon; Lt. Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, in his capacity as the Commanding
General of the Philippine Army, and members of the Citizens Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), namely: Michael dela Cruz, Puti
dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy
Mendoza. The respondents therein submitted a return of the writ On July
4, 2006, the Court of Appeals dropped as party respondents Lt. Gen.
Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., then Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, and on September 19, 2006, Maj. (sic) Jovito S. Palparan, then
Commanding General, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, stationed at
Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija, upon a finding that no
evidence was introduced to establish their personal involvement in the
taking of the Manalo brothers. In a Decision dated June 27, 2007, it
exonerated M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka Rollie Castillo for lack of evidence
establishing his involvement in any capacity in the disappearance of the
Manalo brothers, although it held that the remaining respondents were
illegally detaining the Manalo brothers and ordered them to release the
latter.[48]

Attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of therein

respondent (herein petitioner) Secretary of National Defense, which attested
that he assumed office only on August 8, 2007 and was thus unaware of the
Manalo brothers alleged abduction. He also claimed that:
7. The Secretary of National Defense does not engage in actual military
directional operations, neither does he undertake command directions
of the AFP units in the field, nor in any way micromanage the AFP
operations. The principal responsibility of the Secretary of National
Defense is focused in providing strategic policy direction to the
Department (bureaus and agencies) including the Armed Forces of
thePhilippines;

8. In connection with the Writ of Amparo issued by the Honorable

Supreme Court in this case, I have directed the Chief of Staff, AFP to
institute immediate action in compliance with Section 9(d) of
the Amparo Rule and to submit report of such compliance Likewise, in
 a Memorandum Directive also dated October 31, 2007, I have issued a
policy directive addressed to the Chief of Staff, AFP that the AFP
should adopt the following rules of action in the event the Writ
of Amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the
AFP:

(1) to verify the identity of the aggrieved party;

(2) to recover and preserve evidence related to the death or

disappearance of the person identified in the petition which may
aid in the prosecution of the person or persons responsible;

(3) to identify witnesses and obtain statements from them concerning

the death or disappearance;

(4) to determine the cause, manner, location and time of death or

disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have
brought about the death or disappearance;

(5) to identify and apprehend the person or persons involved in the

death or disappearance; and

(6) to bring the suspected offenders before a competent court.[49]

Therein respondent AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own

affidavit, attached to the Return of the Writ, attesting that he received the
above directive of therein respondent Secretary of National Defense and that
acting on this directive, he did the following:
3.1. As currently designated Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), I have caused to be issued directive to the units of the
AFP for the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance and the recent reappearance of the petitioners.

3.2. I have caused the immediate investigation and submission of the result
thereof to Higher headquarters and/or direct the immediate conduct of the
investigation on the matter by the concerned unit/s, dispatching Radio
Message on November 05, 2007, addressed to the Commanding General,
Philippine Army (Info: COMNOLCOM, CG, 71D PA and CO 24 IB
PA). A Copy of the Radio Message is attached as ANNEX 3 of this
Affidavit.

3.3. We undertake to provide result of the investigations conducted or to

be conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the
alleged disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ of Amparo
has been sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher
headquarters.
 3.4. A parallel investigation has been directed to the same units relative to
another Petition for the Writ of Amparo (G.R. No. 179994) filed at the
instance of relatives of a certain Cadapan and Empeo pending before the
Supreme Court.

3.5. On the part of the Armed Forces, this respondent will exert earnest
efforts to establish the surrounding circumstances of the disappearances of
the petitioners and to bring those responsible, including any military
personnel if shown to have participated or had complicity in the
commission of the complained acts, to the bar of justice, when warranted
by the findings and the competent evidence that may be gathered in the
process.[50]
Also attached to the Return of the Writ was the affidavit of Lt. Col.
Felipe Anontado, INF (GSC) PA, earlier filed in G.R. No. 179994,
another amparo case in this Court, involving Cadapan, Empeo and Merino,
which averred among others, viz:
10) Upon reading the allegations in the Petition implicating the
24th Infantry Batallion detachment as detention area, I immediately went
to the 24th IB detachment in Limay, Bataan and found no untoward
incidents in the area nor any detainees by the name of Sherlyn Cadapan,
Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino being held captive;

11) There was neither any reports of any death of Manuel Merino in the
24th IB in Limay, Bataan;

12) After going to the 24th IB in Limay, Bataan, we made further inquiries
with the Philippine National Police, Limay, Bataan regarding the alleged
detentions or deaths and were informed that none was reported to their
good office;

13) I also directed Company Commander 1st Lt. Romeo Publico to inquire
into the alleged beachhouse in Iba, Zambales also alleged to be a detention
place where Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo and Manuel Merino were
detained. As per the inquiry, however, no such beachhouse was used as a
detention place found to have been used by armed men to detain Cadapan,
Empeo and Merino.[51]

It was explained in the Return of the Writ that for lack of sufficient time, the
affidavits of Maj. Gen Jovito S. Palparan (Ret.), M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario aka
Rollie Castillo, and other persons implicated by therein petitioners could not
be secured in time for the submission of the Return and would be
subsequently submitted.[52]
Herein petitioners presented a lone witness in the summary hearings, Lt.
Col. Ruben U. Jimenez, Provost Marshall, 7th Infantry Division, Philippine
Army, based in Fort Magsaysay, Palayan City, Nueva Ecija. The territorial
jurisdiction of this Division covers Nueva Ecija, Aurora, Bataan, Bulacan,
Pampanga, Tarlac and a portion of Pangasinan.[53] The 24th Infantry
Battalion is part of the 7thInfantry Division.[54]

On May 26, 2006, Lt. Col. Jimenez was directed by the Commanding
General of the 7th Infantry Division, Maj. Gen. Jovito Palaran,[55]through his
Assistant Chief of Staff,[56] to investigate the alleged abduction of the
respondents by CAFGU auxiliaries under his unit, namely: CAA Michael de
la Cruz; CAA Roman de la Cruz, aka Puti; CAA Maximo de la Cruz, aka
Pula; CAA Randy Mendoza; ex-CAA Marcelo de la Cruz aka Madning; and
a civilian named Rudy Mendoza. He was directed to determine: (1) the
veracity of the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo by the alleged
elements of the CAFGU auxiliaries; and (2) the administrative liability of
said auxiliaries, if any.[57] Jimenez testified that this particular investigation
was initiated not by a complaint as was the usual procedure, but because the
Commanding General saw news about the abduction of the Manalo brothers
on the television, and he was concerned about what was happening within
his territorial jurisdiction.[58]

Jimenez summoned all six implicated persons for the purpose of having
them execute sworn statements and conducting an investigation on May 29,
2006.[59] The investigation started at 8:00 in the morning and finished
at 10:00 in the evening.[60] The investigating officer, Technical Sgt. Eduardo
Lingad, took the individual sworn statements of all six persons on that
day. There were no other sworn statements taken, not even of the Manalo
family, nor were there other witnesses summoned and investigated[61] as
according to Jimenez, the directive to him was only to investigate the six
persons.[62]

Jimenez was beside Lingad when the latter took the statements. [63] The six
persons were not known to Jimenez as it was in fact his first time to meet
them.[64] During the entire time that he was beside Lingad, a subordinate of
his in the Office of the Provost Marshall, Jimenez did not propound a single
question to the six persons.[65]
Jimenez testified that all six statements were taken on May 29, 2006, but
Marcelo Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza had to come back the next day to sign
their statements as the printing of their statements was interrupted by a
power failure. Jimenez testified that the two signed on May 30, 2006, but the
jurats of their statements indicated that they were signed on May 29,
2006.[66] When the Sworn Statements were turned over to Jimenez, he
personally wrote his investigation report. He began writing it in the
afternoon of May 30, 2006 and finished it on June 1, 2006.[67] He then gave
his report to the Office of the Chief of Personnel.[68]

As petitioners largely rely on Jimenezs Investigation Report dated June 1,

2006 for their evidence, the report is herein substantially quoted:

III. BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

4. This pertains to the abduction of RAYMOND MANALO and
REYNALDO MANALO who were forcibly taken from their respective
homes in Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on 14 February
2006 by unidentified armed men and thereafter were forcibly
disappeared.After the said incident, relatives of the victims filed a case for
Abduction in the civil court against the herein suspects: Michael dela
Cruz, Madning dela Cruz, Puti Dela Cruz, Pula Dela Cruz, Randy
Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza as alleged members of the Citizen Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).

a) Sworn statement of CAA Maximo F. dela Cruz, aka Pula dated 29 May
2006 in (Exhibit B) states that he was at Sitio Mozon, Brgy. Bohol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan doing the concrete building of a church
located nearby his residence, together with some neighbor thereat. He
claims that on 15 February 2006, he was being informed by Brgy.
Kagawad Pablo Umayan about the abduction of the brothers Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo. As to the allegation that he was one of the suspects, he
claims that they only implicated him because he was a CAFGU and that
they claimed that those who abducted the Manalo brothers are members of
the Military and CAFGU. Subject vehemently denied any participation or
involvement on the abduction of said victims.

b) Sworn statement of CAA Roman dela Cruz y Faustino Aka Puti dtd 29
May 2006 in (Exhibit C) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy.
Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a CAA member based
at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo being his neighbors are active
members/sympathizers of the CPP/NPA and he also knows their elder
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE of being an NPA Leader operating in
their province. That at the time of the alleged abduction of the two (2)
brothers and for accusing him to be one of the suspects, he claims that on
February 14, 2006, he was one of those working at the concrete chapel
being constructed nearby his residence. He claims further that he just came
only to know about the incident on other day (15 Feb 06) when he was
being informed by Kagawad Pablo Kunanan. That subject CAA
vehemently denied any participation about the incident and claimed that
they only implicated him because he is a member of the CAFGU.

c) Sworn Statement of CAA Randy Mendoza y Lingas dated 29 May

2006 in (Exhibit O) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Buhol na Mangga,
San Ildefonso, Bulacan and a member of CAFGU based at Biak na Bato
Detachment. That being a neighbor, he was very much aware about the
background of the two (2) brothers Raymond and Reynaldo as active
supporters of the CPP NPA in their Brgy. and he also knew their elder
brother KUMANDER BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was at Brgy. Magmarate,
San Miguel, Bulacan in the house of his aunt and he learned only about
the incident when he arrived home in their place. He claims further that
the only reason why they implicated him was due to the fact that his
mother has filed a criminal charge against their brother Rolando Manalo
@ KA BESTRE who is an NPA Commander who killed his father and for
that reason they implicated him in support of their brother.Subject CAA
vehemently denied any involvement on the abduction of said Manalo
brothers.

d) Sworn Statement of Rudy Mendoza y Lingasa dated May 29, 2006 in

(Exhibit E) states that he is a resident of Brgy. Marungko, Angat,
Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to
him being his barriomate when he was still unmarried and he knew them
since childhood. Being one of the accused, he claims that on 14 February
2006, he was at his residence in Brgy. Marungko, Angat, Bulacan. He
claims that he was being informed only about the incident lately and he
was not aware of any reason why the two (2) brothers were being
abducted by alleged members of the military and CAFGU. The only
reason he knows why they implicated him was because there are those
people who are angry with their family particularly victims of summary
execution (killing) done by their brother @ KA Bestre Rolando Manalo
who is an NPA leader. He claims further that it was their brother @ KA
BESTRE who killed his father and he was living witness to that
incident. Subject civilian vehemently denied any involvement on the
abduction of the Manalo brothers.

e) Sworn statement of Ex-CAA Marcelo dala Cruz dated 29 May 2006 in

(Exhibit F) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a farmer and a former CAA based
at Biak na Bato, San Miguel, Bulacan. He claims that Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo are familiar to him being their barrio mate. He claims
further that they are active supporters of CPP/NPA and that their brother
Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE is an NPA leader. Being one of the
accused, he claims that on 14 February 2006, he was in his residence at
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. That he
vehemently denied any participation of the alleged abduction of the two
(2) brothers and learned only about the incident when rumors reached him
by his barrio mates. He claims that his implication is merely fabricated
because of his relationship to Roman and Maximo who are his brothers.

f) Sworn statement of Michael dela Cruz y Faustino dated 29 May 2006 in

(Exhibit G) states that he is a resident of Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na
Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, the Chief of Brgy. Tanod and a CAFGU
member based at Biak na Bato Detachment, San Miguel, Bulacan. He
claims that he knew very well the brothers Raymond and Reynaldo
Manalo in their barangay for having been the Tanod Chief for twenty (20)
years. He alleged further that they are active supporters or sympathizers of
the CPP/NPA and whose elder brother Rolando Manalo @ KA BESTRE
is an NPA leader operating within the area. Being one of the accused, he
claims that on 14 Feb 2006 he was helping in the construction of their
concrete chapel in their place and he learned only about the incident which
is the abduction of Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo when one of the Brgy.
Kagawad in the person of Pablo Cunanan informed him about the
matter. He claims further that he is truly innocent of the allegation against
him as being one of the abductors and he considers everything fabricated
in order to destroy his name that remains loyal to his service to the
government as a CAA member.

IV. DISCUSSION

5. Based on the foregoing statements of respondents in this particular case,

the proof of linking them to the alleged abduction and disappearance of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo that transpired on 14 February 2006 at
Sitio Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan, is
unsubstantiated. Their alleged involvement theretofore to that incident is
considered doubtful, hence, no basis to indict them as charged in this
investigation.

Though there are previous grudges between each families (sic) in the past
to quote: the killing of the father of Randy and Rudy Mendoza by @ KA
BESTRE TN: Rolando Manalo, this will not suffice to establish a fact that
they were the ones who did the abduction as a form of revenge.As it was
also stated in the testimony of other accused claiming that the Manalos are
active sympathizers/supporters of the CPP/NPA, this would not also mean,
however, that in the first place, they were in connivance with the
abductors. Being their neighbors and as members of CAFGUs, they ought
to be vigilant in protecting their village from any intervention by the leftist
 group, hence inside their village, they were fully aware of the activities of
Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo in so far as their connection with the
CPP/NPA is concerned.

V. CONCLUSION

6. Premises considered surrounding this case shows that the alleged

charges of abduction committed by the above named respondents has not
been established in this investigation. Hence, it lacks merit to indict them
for any administrative punishment and/or criminal liability. It is therefore
concluded that they are innocent of the charge.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

7. That CAAs Michael F. dela Cruz, Maximo F. Dela Cruz, Roman dela
Cruz, Randy Mendoza, and two (2) civilians Maximo F. Dela Cruz and
Rudy L. Mendoza be exonerated from the case.

8. Upon approval, this case can be dropped and closed.[69]

In this appeal under Rule 45, petitioners question the appellate courts
assessment of the foregoing evidence and assail the December 26, 2007
Decision on the following grounds, viz:
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY

ERRED IN BELIEVING AND GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
TO THE INCREDIBLE, UNCORROBORATED, CONTRADICTED,
AND OBVIOUSLY SCRIPTED, REHEARSED AND SELF-SERVING
AFFIDAVIT/TESTIMONY OF HEREIN RESPONDENT RAYMOND
MANALO.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY

ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN PETITIONERS)
TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND UNOFFICIAL REPORTS
OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH
THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN FILE WITH THE
COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF
OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka ROLLIE
CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE
PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL
REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY
 TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO
INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND
CIVILIAN) WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14,
2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.[70]

The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ
of Amparo (Amparo Rule). Let us hearken to its beginning.

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the

recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored
by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summitwas envisioned to provide a
broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances,[71]hence representatives from all sides of the
political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice
system[72]participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the
prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.[73] It was an
exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules
to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of
the martial law regime.[74] As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the
intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its
coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of
law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.[75] On the other
hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics:
an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or
organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate
or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law.[76]
The writ of amparo originated in Mexico. Amparo literally means protection
in Spanish.[77] In 1837, de Tocquevilles Democracy in America became
available in Mexico and stirred great interest. Its description of the practice
of judicial review in the U.S. appealed to many Mexican jurists.[78] One of
them, Manuel Crescencio Rejn, drafted a constitutional provision for his
native state, Yucatan,[79]which granted judges the power to protect all
persons in the enjoyment of their constitutional and legal rights. This idea
was incorporated into the national constitution in 1847, viz:
The federal courts shall protect any inhabitant of the Republic in the
exercise and preservation of those rights granted to him by this
Constitution and by laws enacted pursuant hereto, against attacks by the
Legislative and Executive powers of the federal or state governments,
limiting themselves to granting protection in the specific case in litigation,
making no general declaration concerning the statute or regulation that
motivated the violation.[80]
Since then, the protection has been an important part of Mexican
constitutionalism.[81] If, after hearing, the judge determines that a
constitutional right of the petitioner is being violated, he orders the official,
or the officials superiors, to cease the violation and to take the necessary
measures to restore the petitioner to the full enjoyment of the right in
question. Amparo thus combines the principles of judicial review derived
from the U.S. with the limitations on judicial power characteristic of the
civil law tradition which prevails inMexico. It enables courts to enforce the
constitution by protecting individual rights in particular cases, but prevents
them from using this power to make law for the entire nation.[82]

The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere,

gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of
each country.[83] It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal
Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos self-attributed task of conveying to
the worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity,
her own painful history conceived.[84] What began as a protection against
acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights
later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the protection of
personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2)amparo contra
leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes; (3) amparo
casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a
judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the judicial review of
administrative actions; and (5)amparo agrario for the protection of peasants
rights derived from the agrarian reform process.[85]

In Latin American countries, except Cuba, the writ of amparo has been
constitutionally adopted to protect against human rights abuses especially
committed in countries under military juntas. In general, these countries
adopted an all-encompassing writ to protect the whole gamut of
constitutional rights, including socio-economic rights.[86] Other countries
like Colombia, Chile, Germany and Spain, however, have chosen to limit the
protection of the writ of amparo only to some constitutional guarantees or
fundamental rights.[87]

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide
for the writ of amparo, several of the above amparoprotections are
guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the judicial
power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar general
protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra leyes, amparo
casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the
remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of the 1987
Constitution.[88] The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition
of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case of Marbury v.
Madison.[89]

While constitutional rights can be protected under the Grave Abuse Clause
through remedies of injunction or prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and a petition for habeas corpus under Rule 102,[90] these remedies
may not be adequate to address the pestering problem of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances. However, with the swiftness required to
resolve a petition for a writ ofamparo through summary proceedings and the
availability of appropriate interim and permanent reliefs under
the Amparo Rule, this hybrid writ of the common law and civil law
traditions - borne out of the Latin American and Philippine experience of
human rights abuses - offers a better remedy to extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances and threats thereof. The remedy provides rapid
judicial relief as it partakes of a summary proceeding that requires only
substantial evidence to make the appropriate reliefs available to the
petitioner; it is not an action to determine criminal guilt requiring proof
beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance
of evidence, or administrative responsibility requiring substantial evidence
that will require full and exhaustive proceedings.[91]

The writ of amparo serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing
the problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. It is
preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of
these offenses; it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment
of perpetrators as it will inevitably yield leads to subsequent investigation
and action. In the long run, the goal of both the preventive and curative roles
is to deter the further commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances.

In the case at bar, respondents initially filed an action for Prohibition,

Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order[92] to stop petitioners and/or
their officers and agents from depriving the respondents of their right to
liberty and other basic rights on August 23, 2007,[93] prior to the
promulgation of the Amparo Rule. They also sought ancillary remedies
including Protective Custody Orders, Appointment of Commissioner,
Inspection and Access Orders and other legal and equitable remedies under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 135, Section 6
of the Rules of Court. When the Amparo Rule came into effect on October
24, 2007, they moved to have their petition treated as an amparo petition as
it would be more effective and suitable to the circumstances of the Manalo
brothers enforced disappearance. The Court granted their motion.

With this backdrop, we now come to the arguments of the

petitioner. Petitioners first argument in disputing the Decision of the Court
of Appeals states, viz:
The Court of Appeals seriously and grievously erred in believing and
giving full faith and credit to the incredible uncorroborated, contradicted,
and obviously scripted, rehearsed and self-serving affidavit/testimony of
herein respondent Raymond Manalo.[94]
 In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and
refine the ore of petitioners cause of action, to determine whether the
evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the

following causes of action, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available
to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or

threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof
required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties
shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and
such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege
shall be denied. (emphases supplied)

Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[95]

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the
Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in Sito
Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14,
2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13,
2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were
narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents
harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his
different senses and etched in his memory. A few examples are the
following: Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban
si Manuel.[96] (N)ilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng
sasakyan. Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel.[97] May
naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga
bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.[98] Tumigil ako sa may
palaisdaan kung saan ginamit ko ang bato para tanggalin ang mga
kadena.[99] Tinanong ko sa isang kapit-bahay kung paano ako makakakuha
ng cell phone; sabi ko gusto kong i-text ang isang babae na nakatira sa
malapit na lugar.[100]

We affirm the factual findings of the appellate court, largely based on

respondent Raymond Manalos affidavit and testimony, viz:
the abduction was perpetrated by armed men who were sufficiently
identified by the petitioners (herein respondents) to be military personnel
and CAFGU auxiliaries. Raymond recalled that the six armed men who
barged into his house through the rear door were military men based on
their attire of fatigue pants and army boots, and the CAFGU auxiliaries,
namely: Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la Cruz and Pula
de la Cruz, all members of the CAFGU and residents of Muzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan, and the brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza,
also CAFGU members, served as lookouts during the abduction. Raymond
was sure that three of the six military men were Ganata, who headed the
abducting team, Hilario, who drove the van, and George. Subsequent
incidents of their long captivity, as narrated by the petitioners, validated
their assertion of the participation of the elements of the 7th Infantry
Division, Philippine Army, and their CAFGU auxiliaries.

We are convinced, too, that the reason for the abduction was the suspicion
that the petitioners were either members or sympathizers of the NPA,
considering that the abductors were looking for Ka Bestre, who turned out
to be Rolando, the brother of petitioners.

The efforts exerted by the Military Command to look into the abduction
were, at best, merely superficial. The investigation of the Provost Marshall
of the 7th Infantry Division focused on the one-sided version of the CAFGU
auxiliaries involved. This one-sidedness might be due to the fact that the
Provost Marshall could delve only into the participation of military
personnel, but even then the Provost Marshall should have refrained from
outrightly exculpating the CAFGU auxiliaries he perfunctorily investigated

Gen. Palparans participation in the abduction was also established. At the

very least, he was aware of the petitioners captivity at the hands of men in
uniform assigned to his command. In fact, he or any other officer tendered
no controversion to the firm claim of Raymond that he (Gen. Palparan) met
them in person in a safehouse in Bulacan and told them what he wanted
them and their parents to do or not to be doing. Gen. Palparans direct and
personal role in the abduction might not have been shown but his
knowledge of the dire situation of the petitioners during their long captivity
at the hands of military personnel under his command bespoke of his
indubitable command policy that unavoidably encouraged and not merely
tolerated the abduction of civilians without due process of law and without
probable cause.

In the habeas proceedings, the Court, through the Former Special Sixth
Division (Justices Buzon, chairman; Santiago-Lagman, Sr., member; and
Romilla-Lontok, Jr., member/ponente.) found no clear and convincing
evidence to establish that M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario had anything to do with the
abduction or the detention. Hilarios involvement could not, indeed, be then
established after Evangeline Francisco, who allegedly saw Hilario drive the
van in which the petitioners were boarded and ferried following the
abduction, did not testify. (See the decision of the habeas proceedings
at rollo, p. 52)

However, in this case, Raymond attested that Hilario drove the white L-300
van in which the petitioners were brought away from their houses
onFebruary 14, 2006. Raymond also attested that Hilario participated in
subsequent incidents during the captivity of the petitioners, one of which
was when Hilario fetched them from Fort Magsaysay on board a Revo and
conveyed them to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan where
they were detained for at least a week in a house of strong materials
(Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) and then Hilario (along with Efren) brought them
to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo, to an unfinished house
inside the compound of Kapitan where they were kept for more or less
three months. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 205) It was there where the petitioners
came face to face with Gen. Palparan. Hilario and Efren also brought the
petitioners one early morning to the house of the petitioners parents, where
only Raymond was presented to the parents to relay the message from Gen.
Palparan not to join anymore rallies. On that occasion, Hilario warned the
parents that they would not again see their sons should they join any rallies
to denounce human rights violations. (Exhibit D, rollo, pp. 205-
206) Hilario was also among four Master Sergeants (the others being
Arman, Ganata and Cabalse) with whom Gen. Palparan conversed on the
occasion when Gen. Palparan required Raymond to take the medicines for
his health. (Exhibit D, rollo, p. 206) There were other occasions when the
petitioners saw that Hilario had a direct hand in their torture.

It is clear, therefore, that the participation of Hilario in the abduction and

forced disappearance of the petitioners was established. The participation
of other military personnel like Arman, Ganata, Cabalse and Caigas, among
others, was similarly established.
 xxx xxx xxx

As to the CAFGU auxiliaries, the habeas Court found them personally

involved in the abduction. We also do, for, indeed, the evidence of their
participation is overwhelming.[101]
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos
statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces
of evidence.[102] Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the
affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo.The testimony and medical reports
prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left
by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents,[103] also corroborate
respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in
detention. Respondent Raymond Manalos familiarity with the facilities in
Fort Magsaysay such as the DTU, as shown in his testimony and confirmed
by Lt. Col. Jimenez to be the Division Training Unit,[104] firms up
respondents story that they were detained for some time in said military
facility.

In Ortiz v. Guatemala,[105] a case decided by the Inter-American

Commission on Human Rights, the Commission considered similar
evidence, among others, in finding that complainant Sister Diana Ortiz was
abducted and tortured by agents of the Guatemalan government. In this case,
Sister Ortiz was kidnapped and tortured in early November 1989. The
Commissions findings of fact were mostly based on the consistent and
credible statements, written and oral, made by Sister Ortiz regarding her
ordeal.[106] These statements were supported by her recognition of portions
of the route they took when she was being driven out of the military
installation where she was detained.[107] She was also examined by a medical
doctor whose findings showed that the 111 circular second degree burns on
her back and abrasions on her cheek coincided with her account of cigarette
burning and torture she suffered while in detention.[108]

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture

perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of
the information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims
themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility
and candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can
be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the
torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they
were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the
hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no
surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the

writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of both
respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have
escaped from captivity and surfaced.But while respondents admit that they
are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are
not free in every sense of the word[109] as their movements continue to be
restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits
and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at large and have not
been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a position to threaten
respondents rights to life, liberty and security.[110] (emphasis supplied)
Respondents claim that they are under threat of being once again
abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation
of their right to security of person.[111]

Elaborating on the right to security, in general, respondents point

out that this right is often associated with liberty; it is also seen as an
expansion of rights based on the prohibition against torture and cruel and
unusual punishment. Conceding that there is no right to security expressly
mentioned in Article III of the 1987 Constitution, they submit that their
rights to be kept free from torture and from incommunicado detention and
solitary detention places[112] fall under the general coverage of the right to
security of person under the writ of Amparo. They submit that the Court
ought to give an expansive recognition of the right to security of person in
view of the State Policy under Article II of the 1987 Constitution which
enunciates that, The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights. Finally, to justify a liberal
interpretation of the right to security of person, respondents cite the teaching
in Moncupa v. Enrile[113] that the right to liberty may be made more
meaningful only if there is no undue restraint by the State on the exercise of
that liberty[114] such as a requirement to report under unreasonable
restrictions that amounted to a deprivation of liberty[115] or being put under
monitoring and surveillance.[116]

In sum, respondents assert that their cause of action consists in the threat to
their right to life and liberty, and a violation of their right to security.

Let us put this right to security under the lens to determine if it has
indeed been violated as respondents assert. The right to security or
the right to security of person finds a textual hook in Article III, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution which provides, viz:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge
At the core of this guarantee is the immunity of ones person,
including the extensions of his/her person houses, papers, and effects against
government intrusion. Section 2 not only limits the states power over a
persons home and possessions, but more importantly, protects the privacy
and sanctity of the person himself.[117] The purpose of this provision was
enunciated by the Court inPeople v. CFI of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon
City, viz: [118]
The purpose of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches
and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in personand
property and unlawful invasion of the security of the home by officers of
the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction and to give remedy
against such usurpation when attempted. (Adams v. New York,
192 U.S. 858; Alvero v. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637 [1946]). The right to privacy is
an essential condition to the dignity and happiness and to the peace and
security of every individual, whether it be of home or of persons and
correspondence. (Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines,
Vol. 2, 139 [1962]). The constitutional inviolability of this great
fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures must be
deemed absolute as nothing is closer to a mans soul than the serenity of
his privacy and the assurance of his personal security. Any interference
allowable can only be for the best causes and reasons.[119] (emphases
supplied)
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1[120] guarantees
essentially the right to be alive[121] - upon which the enjoyment of all other
rights is preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the
secure quality of this life, viz: The life to which each person has a right is
not a life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably
violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that
the government he established and consented to, will protect the security of
his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property pervades
the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of mans existence.[122] In a
broad sense, the right to security of person emanates in a persons legal and
uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his
reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of life
while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of
those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to the
nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual.[123]

A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various

permutations of the exercise of this right.

First, the right to security of person is freedom from fear. In its whereas
clauses, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(UDHR) enunciates
that a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and
belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest
aspiration of the common people. (emphasis supplied) Some scholars
postulate that freedom from fear is not only an aspirational principle, but
essentially an individual international human right.[124] It is the right to
security of person as the word security itself means freedom from
fear.[125] Article 3 of the UDHR provides, viz:
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.[126] (emphasis
supplied)
In furtherance of this right declared in the UDHR, Article 9(1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights(ICCPR) also
provides for the right to security of person, viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure
as are established by law. (emphasis supplied)
The Philippines is a signatory to both the UDHR and the ICCPR.
 In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is
the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is
the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from
being baseless to well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear
can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of
their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the
stimulus. Thus, in theamparo context, it is more correct to say that the right
to security is actually the freedom from threat. Viewed in this light, the
threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of
the Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in
the earlier part of the provision.[127]

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and

psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987
Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be searched
or invaded without a search warrant.[128]Physical injuries inflicted in the
context of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more
than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment,
physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical
injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an
affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.[129]

Physical torture, force, and violence are a severe invasion of bodily

integrity. When employed to vitiate the free will such as to force the victim
to admit, reveal or fabricate incriminating information, it constitutes an
invasion of both bodily and psychological integrity as the dignity of the
human person includes the exercise of free will. Article III, Section 12 of the
1987 Constitution more specifically proscribes bodily and psychological
invasion, viz:
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat or intimidation, or any other means
which vitiate the free will shall be used against him (any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense). Secret detention places,
solitary, incommunicado or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.
Parenthetically, under this provision, threat and intimidation that vitiate the
free will - although not involving invasion of bodily integrity - nevertheless
constitute a violation of the right to security in the sense of freedom from
threat as afore-discussed.

Article III, Section 12 guarantees freedom from dehumanizing abuses

of persons under investigation for the commission of an offense. Victims of
enforced disappearances who are not even under such investigation should all
the more be protected from these degradations.

An overture to an interpretation of the right to security of person as a

right against torture was made by the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) in the recent case of Popov v. Russia.[130] In this case, the claimant,
who was lawfully detained, alleged that the state authorities had physically
abused him in prison, thereby violating his right to security of
person. Article 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
provides, viz: Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No
one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by law ... (emphases
supplied) Article 3, on the other hand, provides that (n)o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Although the application failed on the facts as the alleged ill-
treatment was found baseless, the ECHR relied heavily on the concept of
security in holding, viz:
...the applicant did not bring his allegations to the attention of
domestic authorities at the time when they could reasonably have been
expected to take measures in order to ensure his security and to
investigate the circumstances in question.

xxx xxx xxx

... the authorities failed to ensure his security in custody or to comply

with the procedural obligation under Art.3 to conduct an effective
investigation into his allegations.[131] (emphasis supplied)
The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
has also made a statement that the protection of the bodily integrity of
women may also be related to the right to security and liberty, viz:
gender-based violence which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women
of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law
or under specific human rights conventions is discrimination within the
meaning of article 1 of the Convention (on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women). These rights and freedoms include . . . the
right to liberty and security of person.[132]
Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection
of ones rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo,
this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under
Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of
person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this
third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect
for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987
Constitution.[133] As the government is the chief guarantor of order and
security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford
protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection
includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government
apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced
disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families, and bringing
offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights
stressed the importance of investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez
Case,[134] viz:
(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and
not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation
must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal
duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends upon the
initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof, without
an effective search for the truth by the government.[135]

This third sense of the right to security of person as a guarantee of

government protection has been interpreted by the United Nations Human
Rights Committee[136] in not a few cases involving Article 9[137] of the
ICCPR. While the right to security of person appears in conjunction with the
right to liberty under Article 9, the Committee has ruled that the right to
security of person can exist independently of the right to liberty. In other
words, there need not necessarily be a deprivation of liberty for the right to
security of person to be invoked. In Delgado Paez v. Colombia,[138] a case
involving death threats to a religion teacher at a secondary school
inLeticia, Colombia, whose social views differed from those of the
Apostolic Prefect of Leticia, the Committee held, viz:
The first sentence of article 9 does not stand as a separate
paragraph. Its location as a part of paragraph one could lead to the view
that the right to security arises only in the context of arrest and detention.
The travaux prparatoires indicate that the discussions of the first sentence
did indeed focus on matters dealt with in the other provisions of article
9. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in article 3, refers to
the right to life, the right to liberty and the right to security of the
person. These elements have been dealt with in separate clauses in the
Covenant. Although in the Covenant the only reference to the right of
security of person is to be found in article 9, there is no evidence that
it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to
situations of formal deprivation of liberty. At the same time, States
parties have undertaken to guarantee the rights enshrined in the
Covenant. It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can
ignore known threats to the life of persons under their jurisdiction,
just because that he or she is not arrested or otherwise detained.
States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and
appropriate measures to protect them. An interpretation of article 9
which would allow a State party to ignore threats to the personal
security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render
totally ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant.[139] (emphasis
supplied)
The Paez ruling was reiterated in Bwalya v.
Zambia,[140] which involved a political activist and prisoner of conscience
who continued to be intimidated, harassed, and restricted in his movements
following his release from detention. In a catena of cases, the ruling of the
Committee was of a similar import: Bahamonde v. Equatorial
Guinea,[141] involving discrimination, intimidation and persecution of
opponents of the ruling party in that state; Tshishimbi v.
Zaire,[142] involving the abduction of the complainants husband who was a
supporter of democratic reform in Zaire; Dias v. Angola,[143] involving
the murder of the complainants partner and the harassment he (complainant)
suffered because of his investigation of the murder; and Chongwe v.
Zambia,[144] involving an assassination attempt on the chairman of an
opposition alliance.

Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has interpreted the
right to security not only as prohibiting the State from arbitrarily depriving
liberty, but imposing a positive duty on the State to afford protection of the
right to liberty.[145] The ECHR interpreted the right to security of person
under Article 5(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights in the
leading case on disappearance of persons, Kurt v. Turkey.[146] In this case,
the claimants son had been arrested by state authorities and had not been
seen since. The familys requests for information and investigation regarding
his whereabouts proved futile. The claimant suggested that this was a
violation of her sons right to security of person. The ECHR ruled, viz:
... any deprivation of liberty must not only have been effected in
conformity with the substantive and procedural rules of national law but
must equally be in keeping with the very purpose of Article 5, namely to
protect the individual from arbitrariness... Having assumed control over
that individual it is incumbent on the authorities to account for his or her
whereabouts. For this reason, Article 5 must be seen as requiring the
authorities to take effective measures to safeguard against the risk of
disappearance and to conduct a prompt effective investigation into an
arguable claim that a person has been taken into custody and has not
been seen since.[147] (emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing concept of the right to security of person to
the case at bar, we now determine whether there is a continuing violation of
respondents right to security.

First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to

respondents life, liberty and security.

While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped,
their families, including them, would be killed. In Raymonds narration, he
was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he
attempted to escape from FortMagsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who
wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.

This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to
be killed has come to pass. It should be stressed that they are now free from
captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or
voluntarily freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the
end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when respondents were detained
in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them that they
were still deciding whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond
Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o
4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya kami nakakadena ay dahil
pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.[148]

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye

while they were in detention. With their escape, this continuing threat to
their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated
specific officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture,
but also in those of other persons known to have disappeared such as
Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.

Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under

concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their
life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced
to limit their movements or activities.[149] Precisely because respondents are
being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction, they cannot be
expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face
intimidation or written threats to their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless,
the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will
again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute
threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a
writ of amparo.

Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the

government. Apart from the failure of military elements to provide
protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction,
detention, and torture, they also miserably failed in conducting an effective
investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and
investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez,
Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited,
superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the Sworn Statements of the
six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the
investigation for the first time. He was present at the investigation when his
subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did not
propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or
their credibility. He did not call for other witnesses to test the alibis given by
the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the
respondents.

In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a

Memorandum Directive dated October 31, 2007, he issued a policy directive
addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of
action in the event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against
any members of the AFP, which should essentially include verification of
the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant
evidence; identification of witnesses and securing statements from them;
determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons
involved in the death or disappearance; and bringing of the suspected
offenders before a competent court.[150] Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also
submitted his own affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of
respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on this directive,
he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for
the purpose of establishing the circumstances of the alleged disappearance
and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide
results of the investigations to respondents.[151] To this day, however, almost
a year after the policy directive was issued by petitioner Secretary of
National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished
the results of the investigation which they now seek through the instant
petition for a writ of amparo.

Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the

conclusion that there is a violation of respondents right to security as a
guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents
threat is violated by the apparent threat
person. Their right to security as a
government is likewise violated by
protection on the part of the military.
right to security as freedom from
to their life, liberty and security of
guarantee of protection by the
the ineffective investigation and

Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which

petitioners question.

First, that petitioners furnish respondents all official and unofficial reports
of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those
already in file with the court.

Second, that petitioners confirm in writing the present places of official

assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas.

Third, that petitioners cause to be produced to the Court of Appeals

all medical reports, records and charts, and reports of any treatment
given or recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the Manalo
brothers, to include a list of medical personnel (military and civilian)
who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007.

With respect to the first and second reliefs, petitioners argue that the
production order sought by respondents partakes of the characteristics of a
search warrant. Thus, they claim that the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant must be complied with prior to the grant of the production
order, namely: (1) the application must be under oath or affirmation; (2) the
search warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized; (3) there exists probable cause with one specific offense;
and (4) the probable cause must be personally determined by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce.[152] In the case at bar, however, petitioners point out that
other than the bare, self-serving and vague allegations made by respondent
Raymond Manalo in his unverified declaration and affidavit, the documents
respondents seek to be produced are only mentioned generally by name,
with no other supporting details. They also argue that the relevancy of the
documents to be produced must be apparent, but this is not true in the
present case as the involvement of petitioners in the abduction has not been
shown.

Petitioners arguments do not hold water. The production order under

the Amparo Rule should not be confused with a search warrant for law
enforcement under Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This
Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable
intrusion of the government, not a protection of the government from the
demand of the people such as respondents.

Instead, the amparo production order may be likened to the production of

documents or things under Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provides in relevant part, viz:
Section 1. Motion for production or inspection order.

Upon motion of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in
which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving
party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or
contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which
are in his possession, custody or control

In Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. v. Judge Natividad,[153] the

respondent judge, under authority of Rule 27, issued a subpoena duces
tecum for the production and inspection of among others, the books and
papers of Material Distributors (Phil.) Inc. The company questioned the
issuance of the subpoena on the ground that it violated the search and seizure
clause. The Court struck down the argument and held that
the subpoena pertained to a civil procedure that cannot be identified or
confused with unreasonable searches prohibited by the Constitution

Moreover, in his affidavit, petitioner AFP Chief of Staff himself

undertook to provide results of the investigations conducted or to be
conducted by the concerned unit relative to the circumstances of the alleged
disappearance of the persons in whose favor the Writ ofAmparo has been
sought for as soon as the same has been furnished Higher headquarters.
With respect to the second and third reliefs, petitioners assert that the
disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt. Hilario aka Rollie
Castillo and Donald Caigas, as well as the submission of a list of medical
personnel, is irrelevant, improper, immaterial, and unnecessary in the
resolution of the petition for a writ of amparo. They add that it will
unnecessarily compromise and jeopardize the exercise of official functions
and duties of military officers and even unwittingly and unnecessarily
expose them to threat of personal injury or even death.

On the contrary, the disclosure of the present places of assignment of M/Sgt.

Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas, whom respondents both
directly implicated as perpetrators behind their abduction and detention, is
relevant in ensuring the safety of respondents by avoiding their areas of
territorial jurisdiction. Such disclosure would also help ensure that these
military officers can be served with notices and court processes in relation to
any investigation and action for violation of the respondents rights. The list
of medical personnel is also relevant in securing information to create the
medical history of respondents and make appropriate medical interventions,
when applicable and necessary.

In blatant violation of our hard-won guarantees to life, liberty and security,

these rights are snuffed out from victims of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances. The writ of amparo is a tool that gives voice to preys of
silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 26, 2007 is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
 Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Sec. 19 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for appeal, viz:
Sec. 19. Appeal Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the
adverse judgment.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus cases.
[2]
G.R. No. 179095 filed on August 23, 2007.
[3]
1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. VIII, 5(5) provides for the rule-making power of the Supreme Court, viz:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
[4]
1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 1 provides in relevant part, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, libertywithout due process of law
[5]
CA rollo, pp. 26-27.
[6]
Section 26 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides, viz:
Sec. 26. Applicability to Pending Cases. This Rule shall govern cases involving
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof pending in the trial and
appellate courts.
[7]
Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides, viz:
Sec. 18. Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the
time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by
substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs as may
be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.
[8]
CA rollo, pp. 86-87.
[9]
Id. at 1-6.
[10]
Id. at 82-83.
[11]
Exhibit D (Sinumpaang Salaysay para sa Hukuman ni Raymond Manalo), CA rollo, pp. 200-201; TSN,
November 13, 2007, p. 47.
[12]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, pp. 200-201.
[13]
Id. at 201-202.
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id. at 202.
[16]
A Petition for Habeas Corpus was filed on May 12, 2006 in the Court of Appeals by the relatives of
herein respondents. (CA-G.R. SP. No. 94431). The petition alleged that military personnel and CAFGU
auxiliaries forcibly took petitioners from their homes in Bulacan on February 14, 2006.
Impleaded as respondents were Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon, then the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army; Maj. Gen. Jovito Palparan, then the Commanding Officer, 7 thInfantry Division, stationed
in Luzon; M/Sgt. Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo; and civilians Michael dela Cruz, Madning dela Cruz,
Puti dela Cruz, Pula dela Cruz, Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, all CAFGU members.
Respondents denied any involvement in the petitioners abduction and disappearance.
After hearing, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on June 27, 2007, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court holds that respondents Madning de la
Cruz, Puti de la Cruz, Pula de la Cruz, Rudy Mendoza and CAFGU members Michael de
la Cruz and Randy Mendoza are illegally detaining Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, and
are hereby ordered to RELEASE said victims Raymond Manalo and Reynaldo Manalo
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof; otherwise, they will be held in contempt of
court. This is without prejudice to any penalty that may be imposed should they be found
later by any other court of justice to be criminally, administratively, or civilly liable for
any other act/s against the persons of aforenamed victims. (CArollo, pp. 60-61)
On July 18, 2007, the relatives of the petitioners appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. (G.R. No.
178614). Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration in the Court of Appeals.
On August 13, 2007, the petitioners escaped from captivity. Consequently, they filed motions to withdraw
the petition for habeas corpus in the CA and this Court as it had become moot and academic. (CA rollo, p.
101; rollo, pp. 54-55)
[17]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, pp. 200-201.
[18]
Id. at 203.
[19]
TSN, November 13, 2007, p. 29.
[20]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, p. 203.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Daniel Mendiola; Oscar Leuterio; mag-asawang Teresa at Vergel; isang nagngangalang Mang Ipo at
Ferdinand mula sa Nueva Ecija; isang taga-Bicol na ikinulong doon ng isa o dalawang araw lamang (siyay
inilabas at hindi ko na nakitang muli); isang taga-Visayas (na ikinulong doon ng isa o dalawang araw; siyay
inilabas at hindi ko na siya nakita); mga nagngangalang Abel, Jojo at isa pa mula sa Nueva Ecija (na
tumagal doon ng isang araw at isang gabi, pagkatapos ay inilabas din); isang nagngangalang Bernard mula
sa Hagonoy, Bulacan; ang apelyido ni Bernard ay tila Majas ngunit hindi ako sigurado sa apelyido
niya. Nang dinala doon si Bernard, inilabas sina Mang Ipo at Ferdinand; dalawang lalaking may edad na,
taga-Pinaud at dinukot sa poultry (tumagal lang sila ng mga isang araw at tapos inilabas at hindi ko na
nakita uli). (CA rollo, pp. 203-204)
[23]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, pp. 203-204.
[24]
Id. at 204.
[25]
Id. at 204-205.
[26]
Id. at 205.
[27]
Id.; TSN, November 13, 2007, pp. 36-38.
[28]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, p. 205.
[29]
Id.
[30]
Id.
[31]
Id. at 206.
[32]
TSN, November 13, 2007, p. 44; Exhibit F shows eights pictures of highest ranking officers of the AFP
and PNP in their uniforms; Exhibit F-1 is the picture of Gen. Palparan identified by respondent
Raymond Manalo, CA rollo, p. 214.
[33]
Exhibit D, CA rollo, p. 206.
[34]
Id. at 207.
[35]
Id.
[36]
Id. at 207-208.
[37]
Id. at 208.
[38]
Id.
[39]
Id. at 209.
[40]
Id.
[41]
Id.
[42]
Id.
[43]
Id. at 210-211.
[44]
Id. at 211.
[45]
Id.
[46]
Exhibit C (Sinumpaang Salaysay ni Reynaldo Manalo para sa Hukuman), CA rollo, pp. 196-197.
[47]
TSN, November 13, 2007, pp. 85-90; Exhibit G is the background of the case of Raymond and
Reynaldo Manalo, CA rollo, p. 216; Exhibits G-1 to G-2 are the report proper for Reynaldo Manalo
containing a narration of his ordeal and complaints, and Dr. Molinos physical findings, analysis and
recommendations, CA rollo, pp. 217-218; Exhibit G-3 are the pictures taken of Reynaldo Manalos scars,
CA rollo, p. 219; Exhibits G-4 to G-5 are the report proper for Raymond Manalo with similar contents as
Reynaldos report, CA rollo, pp. 220-221; Exhibits G-6 to G-7 are the pictures of Raymond Manalos
scars, CA rollo, pp. 222-223.
[48]
CA rollo, pp. 112-113; rollo, pp. 94-95.
[49]
CA rollo, pp. 122 and 171; rollo, pp. 28-29.
[50]
CA rollo, pp. 124-125; 177-178; rollo, pp. 29-31.
[51]
CA rollo, pp. 191-192; rollo, 106-107.
[52]
Id. at 107.
[53]
TSN, November 14, 2007, p. 25.
[54]
Id. at 84.
[55]
Id. at 36.
[56]
Id. at 40.
[57]
Id. at 41.
[58]
Id. at 92.
[59]
Id. at 46.
[60]
Id. at 44.
[61]
Id. at 46.
[62]
Id. at 80.
[63]
Id. at 28.
[64]
Id. at 50.
[65]
Id. at 55-56.
[66]
Id. at 57-61.
[67]
Id. at 61-63.
[68]
Id. at 63.
[69]
Exhibit 3-C, CA rollo, pp. 238-240.
[70]
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[71]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: The Rationale for the Writ of Amparo, p. 43.
[72]
Id.
[73]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 47.
[74]
Id. Article VIII, 5(5) of the 1987 Constitution provides for this rule-making power, viz:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights
[75]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 48. This is the manner the term is used in United Nations
instruments.
[76]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 48. This is the definition used in the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearances.
[77]
Barker, R., Constitutionalism in the Americas: A Bicentennial Perspective,
49 University of Pittsburgh Law Review (Spring, 1988) 891, 906.
[78]
Id., citing Zamudio, F., A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 California Western
International Law Journal (1979) 306, 309.
[79]
At the time it adopted Rejns amparo, Yucatan had separated itself from Mexico. After a few months, the
secession ended and the state resumed its place in the union. (Barker, R., supra at 906.)
[80]
Acta de Reformas, art. 25 (1847) (amending Constitution of 1824).
[81]
Acta de Reformas, art. 25 (1847) (amending Constitution of 1824); CONST. of 1857, arts. 101, 102
(Mex.); CONST. art. 107 (Mex.).
[82]
Barker, R., supra at 906-907. See also Provost, R. Emergency Judicial Relief for Human Rights
Violations in Canada and Argentina, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review(Spring/Summer,
1992) 693, 701-702.
[83]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 45. See Article 107 of the Constitution of Mexico; Article
28(15) of the Constitution of Ecuador; Article 77 of the Constitution of Paraguay; Article 43 of the
Constitution of Argentina; Article 49 of the Constitution of Venezuela; Article 48 (3) of the Constitution
of Costa Rica; and Article 19 of the Constitution of Bolivia.
[84]
Provost, R., supra at 698, citing Ramirez, F., The International Expansion of the Mexican Amparo, 1
Inter-American Law Review (1959) 163, 166.
[85]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 45; see also Zagaris, B., The Amparo Process in Mexico,
6 Mexico Law Journal (Spring 1998) 61, 66 and Provost, R., supra at 708-709.
[86]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 45.
[87]
Brewer-Carias, A., The Latin American Amparo Proceeding and the Writ of Amparo in the Philippines,
Second Distinguished Lecture, Series of 2007, Supreme Court, Philippine JudicialAcademy in
coordination with the Philippine Association of Law Schools, March 7, 2008.
[88]
See 1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 13 & 15; Art. VII, 18; Art. VIII, 5(1).
[89]
5 U.S. 137 (1803). See Gormley, K. Judicial Review in the Americas: Comments on the United
States and Mexico, 45 Duquesne Law Review (Spring, 2007) 393.
[90]
Rule on the Writ of Amparo: Annotation, p. 47.
[91]
Deliberations of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, August 10, 2007; August 24,
2007; August 31, 2007; and September 20, 2008.
[92]
G.R. No. 179095.
[93]
CA rollo, p. 3.
[94]
Rollo, p. 35.
[95]
Ferancullo v. Ferancullo, Jr., A.C. No. 7214, November 30, 2006, 509 SCRA 1.
[96]
CA rollo, p. 210.
[97]
Id.
[98]
Id.
[99]
Id. at 203.
[100]
Id. at 211.
[101]
Rollo, pp. 74-76.
[102]
Id. at 40.
[103]
CA rollo, pp. 219, 222-224.
[104]
TSN, November 14, 2007, p. 66.
[105]
Case 10.526, Report No. 31/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R.,OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 332 (1997).
[106]
Id. at par. 49.
[107]
Id.
[108]
Id. at par. 50.
[109]
Rollo, p. 182.
[110]
Id.
[111]
Id. at 183.
[112]
Respondents cite 1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 12(2) which provides, viz:

(2) No torture, force, violence threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him (any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense). Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
[113]
225 Phil. 191 (1986).
[114]
Rollo, pp. 182-183.
[115]
Id. at 183.
[116]
Id.
[117]
Bernas, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A
COMMENTARY (2003) 162.
[118]
No. L-41686, November 17, 1980, 101 SCRA 86.
[119]
Id. at 100-101.
[120]
1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 1 provides, viz:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
[121]
But see Bernas, supra at 110. The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of
the right to be alive or to the security of ones limb against physical harm.
[122]
Separate Opinion of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504
(2003).
[123]
Sandifer, D. and L. Scheman, THE FOUNDATION OF FREEDOM (1966), pp. 44-45.
[124]
Schmidt, C., An International Human Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 15 William and Mary Bill of
Rights Journal (February, 2007) 983, 1004.
[125]
Id., citing Websters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary 780 (1971).
[126]
The U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance also provides for
the right to security under Article 2, viz:
2. Any act of enforced disappearance places the persons subjected thereto outside
the protection of the law and inflicts severe suffering on them and their families. It
constitutes a violation of the rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right
to recognition as a person before the law, the right to liberty and security of the
person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. It also violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life.
(emphasis supplied)
Various international human rights conventions and declarations affirm the right to security of person,
including the American Convention on Human Rights; European Convention on Human Rights;
African Charter; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of
Violence Against Women; American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, African Womens
Protocol, and the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women.
[127]
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides, viz:
Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violationby an
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or
entity. (emphasis supplied)
[128]
People v. Aruta, 351 Phil. 868 (1998).
[129]
Book Two, Title Eight, Crimes against Persons, of the Revised Penal Code consists of two chapters:
Chapter One Destruction of Life, and Chapter Two Physical Injuries.
[130]
(App. No.26853/04), ECtHR Judgment of July 13, 2006.
[131]
Id. at pars.196-197.
[132]
General Recommendation No. 19 on Violence against Women of the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women. Adoption of the Report, U.N. Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, 11th Sess., Agenda Item 7, at para. 8, U.N. Doc.
CEDAW/C/1992/L.1/Add.15 (1992); see also Lai, S. and Ralph, R., Female Sexual Autonomy and
Human Rights, 8 Harvard Human Rights Journal (Spring, 1995) 201, 207-208.
[133]
1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. II, 11, provides, viz:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.
[134]
I/A Court H.R. Velsquez Rodrguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, Series C No. 4.
[135]
Id. at par. 177.
[136]
Created under Article 28 of the ICCPR as the treaty-based body charged with the authoritative
interpretation of the ICCPR. See Russell-Brown, S., Out of the Crooked Timber of Humanity: The
Conflict Between South Africas Truth and Reconciliation Commission and International Human Rights
Norms Regarding Effective Remedies, 26 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review (Winter
2003) 227.
[137]
The ICCPR provides in Article 9(1), viz:
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. (emphasis
supplied)
[138]
Communication No. 195/1985, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990).
[139]
Id. at , par. 5.5.
[140]
Communication No. 314/1988, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 (1993).
[141]
Communication No. 468/1991, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 (1993).
[142]
Communication No. 542/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/53/D/542/1993 (1996).
[143]
Communication No. 711/1996, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/68/D/711/1996 (2000).
[144]
Communication No. 821/1998, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/821/1998 (2000).
[145]
Powell, R., The Right to Security of Person in European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence,
6 European Human Rights Law Review (2007) 649, 652-653.
[146]
Kurt v. Turkey (1999) 27 E.H.R.R. 373.
[147]
Id. at pars. 122 and 123.
[148]
CA rollo, p. 210.
[149]
Rollo, p. 182
[150]
Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[151]
Rollo, pp. 29-31. The directives issued by the petitioners are in line with Article 13 of the 1992 U.N.
Declaration on Enforced Disappearances which states that, any person having knowledge or legitimate
interest who alleges that a person has been subjected to enforced disappearance has the right to complain
to a competent and independent state authority and to have that complaint promptly, thoroughly and
impartially investigated by the authority.
[152]
Rollo, pp. 44-45.
[153]
84 Phil. 127 (1949).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47841 March 21, 1978

FRANCISCO VIRTOUSO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
MUNICIPAL JUDGE OF MARIVELES, BATAAN, and CHIEF OF POLICE OF
MARIVELES, BATAAN,respondents.

RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:

Petitioner Francisco Virtouso, Jr., who filed an application for the writ of habeas corpus on
February 23, 1978, premised his plea for liberty primarily on the ground that the pre
examination which led to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless
formality as respondent Municipal Judge of Mariveles, Bataan, 1 failed to meet the strict
standard required by the Constitution to ascertain whether there was a probable cause. 2 He
likewise alleged that aside from the constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in
the preliminary examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive. 3 It was in the amount of
Pl6,000.00, the alleged robbery of a TV set being imputed to petitioner. As prayed for, the Court
issued a writ of habeas corpus, returnable to it on Wednesday, March 15, 1978. Respondent
Judge, in his return filed on March 8, 1978, justified the issuance of the warrant of arrest, alleging
that there was no impropriety in the way the preliminary examination was conducted. As to the
excessive character of the bail, he asserted that while it was fixed in accordance with the Revised
Bail Bond Guide issued by the Executive Judge of Bataan in 1977, he nevertheless reduced the
amount to P 8,000.00.

Petitioner's counsel and respondent Municipal Judge orally argued the matter on March 15,
1978. In the course of intensive questioning by the members of this Court, especially
Justices Barredo, Aquino and Santos, it was ascertained that petitioner is a seventeen-year
old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. 4 a
youthful offender being defined therein as "one who is over nine years but under eighteen years
of age at the time of the commission of the offense." 5 As such, he could be provisionally released
on recognizance in the discretion of a court. 6 According accordingly, after the hearing, the Court
issued the following resolution: "Acting on the verbal petition of counsel for petitioner Francisco
Virtouso, Jr., the Court Resolved pursuant to section 191 of Presidential Decree No. 603,
petitioner being a 17-year old minor, to [order] the release of the petitioner on the recognizance of
his parents Francisco Virtouso, Sr. and Manuela Virtouso and his counsel, Atty. Guillermo B.
Bandonil, who, in open court, agreed to act in such capacity, without prejudice to further
proceedings in a pending case against petitioner being taken in accordance with law." 7 This
Court should, whenever appropriate, give vitality and force to the Youth and Welfare Code, which
is an implementation of this specific constitutional mandate: "The State recognizes the vital role of
the youth in nation-building and shall promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being." 8

Thus was the petition resolved, without the need of passing upon the issue of whether or not
the procedure by respondent Judge in ascertaining the existence of probable cause was
constitutionally deficient. Nonetheless, it must ever be kept in mind by occupants of the
bench that they should always be on the alert lest by sloth or indifference or due to the
economic or social standing of the alleged offended party, as was intimated in this petition,
the rights of an accused, instead of being honored, are disregarded. There is much more
importance attached to the immunities of an individual during a period of martial law, which in
itself is a creature of the Constitution as a mode of coping with grave emergency situations. It
is equally pertinent to state that there should be fealty to the constitutional ban against
excessive bail being required. There is relevance to this excerpt from De la Camara v.
Enage: 9

Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory
by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is
understandable why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. It would have been more forthright if no mention of
such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight
of that that United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against
excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, 'the sole
permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's presence at
trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose is 'excessive' under the Eighth Amendment. 10

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted in accordance with the terms of the Resolution of this
Court of March 15, 1978 as set forth above.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 The Chief of Police of Mariveles, Bataan was named as the other

respondent.

2 According to Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution: "The right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other
responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produced,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized."

3 According to Article IV, Section 18 of the Constitution: "All persons, except

those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties. Excessive bail shall not
be required."

4 Presidential Decree 603 (1974).

5 The Child and Youth Welfare Code, Article 189, as amended by

Presidential Decree No. 1179 (1977).
6 Ibid, Article 191.

7 Resolution of March 15,1978.

8 Article II, Section 5 of the Constitution.

9 L-32951-2, September 17, 1971, 41 SCRA 1.

10 Ibid, 8.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors,
and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE
SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO,
AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by
their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA.
CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by their parents GEORGE
and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his parents
ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her
parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO,
minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and
MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE
and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and
HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA,
minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA.
and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents
ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed
CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA,
CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and
represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH,
STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by
their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO, ANNA,
DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL
NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.

Oposa Law Office for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-
generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala,
was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was
instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic
of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves
and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:

. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting

in his behalf to

(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or

approving new timber license agreements.

and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to
maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the
basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance
of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise
known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water
table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may
be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion
and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil
eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately
the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of
cultural communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the
siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life
leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought
as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds
which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural
plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and
shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the
purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power,
and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led
to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be
submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention
to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION

7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million
hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.

9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's
land area.

10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-
growth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the
Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and
uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted
timber license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the
aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.

A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto
attached as Annex "A".

12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the
end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and

irreparable damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff
minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated
in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.

14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest
the remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to
plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never
see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.

This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the

natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors
and succeeding generations.

15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as
the parens patriae.

16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's
office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to
cancel all logging permits in the country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as

Annex "B".

17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an
act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be
left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had
been abundantly blessed with.

19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly

contrary to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy
which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;

(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;

(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to

a life of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned

TLA's is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to
 a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth"
and "make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article
XII of the Constitution);

b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV,id.);

d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16,
Article II, id.)

21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the
natural law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than
the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life
support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss
the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the
latter in this case. 8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on
Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order
(E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational
genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and
self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging
than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not
contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.

On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint
a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state
in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a
bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can
neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and
general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since
the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all
of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.

This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations
can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development
and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to
say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the
full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors' assertion of
their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot
help but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs
have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with
sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress
(Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is
replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified
data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against
the herein defendant.

Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being
impressed with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not
be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred
principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we

stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment
of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified
data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly
incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:

Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of
nature.

This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:

Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.

While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-
preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by
the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the
day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but
also for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions

against all forms of pollution air, water and noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic)

environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of
not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be
provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
 Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the
conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President
Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary
government agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use
of the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in
order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present
and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:

Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State

to ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of
the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the
population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources,
not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including
social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of
the Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the
judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of
the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas
and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and
utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that
takes into account social and environmental cost implications relative to the
utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural

Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.
 (2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out
the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution,
specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and
future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and
P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a
continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under
which man and nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation
17
as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." The latter statute, on
the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that
no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.

A cause of action is defined as:

. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of

the other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation
of said legal right. 18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth
thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is:
admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the
judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to
dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a
correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants
or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law
itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs
prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is
concerned, there is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-
vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to
the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and
legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article
VIII of the Constitution states that:

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial
power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The
second part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to
wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the
Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of
the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The
catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of
the judiciary.

In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the
issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .

The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment
of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
 The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we
stretch our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment
of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms
and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and
welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber
license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may
amend, modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses
or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause
of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the

utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly
withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case.

A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be

unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not
create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs.
Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).

We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26

. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal

instruments by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly
be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right
to the particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may
be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive
when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and
 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,
G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-
impairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of
advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health
and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare.
In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of
contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The
general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But
neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government
cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally
fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the
common interest.

In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to
renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.

WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason,
JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this
case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last
few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly
the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of
course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the
necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries'
right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the
field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the
part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character,
I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and
healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and
smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management
policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to
an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment
Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The
Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific
legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II
(15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed
to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of
law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of
the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or

applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy

ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad
ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,"
the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real
and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.

My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must
be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to
the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one
or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I
suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific
legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set
out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.

# Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this
case which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last
few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly
the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of
course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity.
I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus
standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit.
Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this
"class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the
necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries'
right of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the public
administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the
field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found
under any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the
part of the governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character,
I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and
healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic
appears to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and
smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and
raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and
whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements
pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1,
Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977
all appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").

P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management
policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to
an extremely wide range of topics:

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;

(c) land use management;

(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii) wild life;

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;

(v) energy development;

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment
Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The
Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.

As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right

comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to
be hinted at here.

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific
legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II
(15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed
to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of
law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of
the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at
least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or

applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the
expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of
the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. . . .

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy

ecology" and "the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad
ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,"
the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted
ocean of social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of
environmental protection and management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where no
specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real
and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose
concession agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must
be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to
the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one
or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this,
petitioners implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I
suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners
should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific
legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative agency. They may also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or
remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set
out in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 164; 186.

2 Id., 62-65, exclusive of annexes.

3 Under Section 12, Rule 3, Revised Rules of Court.

4 Rollo, 67.

5 Id., 74.

6 Rollo, 70-73.

7 Annex "B" of Petitions; Id., 43-44.

8 Paragraph 7, Petition, 6; Rollo, 20.

9 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, unabridged, 1986, 1508.

10 Title XIV (Environment and Natural Resources), Book IV of the

Administrative Code of 1987, E.O. No. 292.

11 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 43-44.

12 Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 4, 913.

13 For instance, the Preamble and Article XII on the National Economy and
Patrimony.

14 The Reorganization Act of the Department of Environment and Natural

Resources.
15 E.O. No. 292.

16 Section 1.

17 Section 2.

18 Ma-ao Sugar Central Co. vs. Barrios, 79 Phil. 666 [1947]; Community
Investment and Finance Corp. vs. Garcia, 88 Phil. 215 [1951]; Remitere vs.
Vda. de Yulo, 16 SCRA 251 [1966]; Caseas vs. Rosales, 19 SCRA 462
[1967]; Virata vs. Sandiganbayan, 202 SCRA 680 [1991]; Madrona vs. Rosal,
204 SCRA 1 [1991].

19 Section 1(q), Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court.

20 Adamos vs. J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. 25 SCRA 529 [1968]; Virata vs.
Sandiganbayn, supra; Madrona vs. Rosal, supra.

21 39 SCRA 473, 479 [1971].

22 1991 ed., 226-227.

23 180 SCRA 496, 501-502 [1989]. See also, Coseteng vs. Mitra, 187 SCRA
377 [1990]; Gonzales vs. Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 [1990]; Llamas vs.
Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 [1991]; Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
203 SCRA 767 [1991].

24 Rollo, 44.

25 125 SCRA 302, 325 [1983].

26 190 SCRA 673, 684 [1990].

27 Article III, 1987 Constitution.

28 110 Phil. 198, 203 [1960]; footnotes omitted.

29 291 U.S. 502, 523, 78 L. ed. 940, 947-949.

30 22 SCRA 135, 146-147 [1968].

31 Ongsiako vs. Gamboa, 86 Phil. 50 [1950]; Abe vs. Foster Wheeler

Corp. supra.; Phil. American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, supra.;
Alalayan vs. NPC, 24 SCRA 172[1968]; Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope
Workers' Union, 59 SCRA 54 [1974]; Kabiling vs. National Housing Authority,
156 SCRA 623 [1987].
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 110120 March 16, 1994

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL JN. SERAPIO, Presiding Judge RTC, Branch
127, Caloocan City, HON. MACARIO A. ASISTIO, JR., City Mayor of Caloocan and/or
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF CALOOCAN,respondents.

Alberto N. Hidalgo and Ma. Teresa T. Oledan for petitioner.

The City Legal Officer & Chief, Law Department for Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. and the
City Government of Caloocan.

ROMERO, J.:

The clash between the responsibility of the City Government of Caloocan to dispose off the
350 tons of garbage it collects daily and the growing concern and sensitivity to a pollution-
free environment of the residents of Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City where
these tons of garbage are dumped everyday is the hub of this controversy elevated by the
protagonists to the Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) for adjudication.

The instant case stemmed from an earlier petition filed with this Court by Laguna Lake
Development Authority (LLDA for short) docketed as G.R.
No. 107542 against the City Government of Caloocan, et al. In the Resolution of November
10, 1992, this Court referred G.R. No. 107542 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
disposition. Docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP
No. 29449, the Court of Appeals, in a decision 1 promulgated on January 29, 1993 ruled that
the LLDA has no power and authority to issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of
garbage in Barangay Camarin, Tala Estate, Caloocan City. The LLDA now seeks, in this petition,
a review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts, as disclosed in the records, are undisputed.

On March 8, 1991, the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of Lourdes Parish,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed a letter-complaint 2 with the Laguna Lake Development
Authority seeking to stop the operation of the 8.6-hectare open garbage dumpsite in Tala Estate,
Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City due to its harmful effects on the health of the residents and the
possibility of pollution of the water content of the surrounding area.

On November 15, 1991, the LLDA conducted an on-site investigation, monitoring and test
sampling of the leachate 3that seeps from said dumpsite to the nearby creek which is a tributary
of the Marilao River. The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an
Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB)
of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree
No. 1586, 4 and clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850, 5 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. 6

After a public hearing conducted on December 4, 1991, the LLDA, acting on the complaint of
Task Force Camarin Dumpsite, found that the water collected from the leachate and the
receiving streams could considerably affect the quality, in turn, of the receiving waters since
it indicates the presence of bacteria, other than coliform, which may have contaminated the
sample during collection or handling. 7 On December 5, 1991, the LLDA issued a Cease and
Desist Order 8 ordering the City Government of Caloocan, Metropolitan Manila Authority, their
contractors, and other entities, to completely halt, stop and desist from dumping any form or kind
of garbage and other waste matter at the Camarin dumpsite.

The dumping operation was forthwith stopped by the City Government of Caloocan.
However, sometime in August 1992 the dumping operation was resumed after a meeting
held in July 1992 among the City Government of Caloocan, the representatives of Task
Force Camarin Dumpsite and LLDA at the Office of Environmental Management Bureau
Director Rodrigo U. Fuentes failed to settle the problem.

After an investigation by its team of legal and technical personnel on August 14, 1992, the
LLDA issued another order reiterating the December 5, 1991, order and issued an Alias
Cease and Desist Order enjoining the City Government of Caloocan from continuing its
dumping operations at the Camarin area.

On September 25, 1992, the LLDA, with the assistance of the Philippine National Police,
enforced its Alias Cease and Desist Order by prohibiting the entry of all garbage dump trucks
into the Tala Estate, Camarin area being utilized as a dumpsite.

Pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration earlier filed on September 17, 1992 with
the LLDA, the City Government of Caloocan filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an action for the declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order with prayer for the
issuance of writ of injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15598. In its complaint, the City
Government of Caloocan sought to be declared as the sole authority empowered to promote
the health and safety and enhance the right of the people in Caloocan City to a balanced
ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. 9

On September 25, 1992, the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the LLDA from enforcing its cease and desist
order. Subsequently, the case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 126 of
Caloocan which, at the time, was presided over by Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 127, the pairing judge of the recently-retired presiding judge.

The LLDA, for its part, filed on October 2, 1992 a motion to dismiss on the ground, among
others, that under Republic Act No. 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 984,
otherwise known as the Pollution Control Law, the cease and desist order issued by it which
is the subject matter of the complaint is reviewable both upon the law and the facts of the
case by the Court of Appeals and not by the Regional Trial Court. 10
On October 12, 1992 Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio issued an order consolidating Civil Case No.
C-15598 with Civil Case No. C-15580, an earlier case filed by the Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite entitled "Fr. John Moran, et al. vs. Hon. Macario Asistio." The LLDA, however,
maintained during the trial that the foregoing cases, being independent of each other, should
have been treated separately.

On October 16, 1992, Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, after hearing the motion to dismiss, issued
in the consolidated cases an order 11 denying LLDA's motion to dismiss and granting the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the LLDA, its agent and all persons acting for
and on its behalf, from enforcing or implementing its cease and desist order which prevents
plaintiff City of Caloocan from dumping garbage at the Camarin dumpsite during the pendency of
this case and/or until further orders of the court.

On November 5, 1992, the LLDA filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for restraining order with the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 107542, seeking
to nullify the aforesaid order dated October 16, 1992 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127 of Caloocan City denying its motion to dismiss.

The Court, acting on the petition, issued a Resolution 12 on November 10, 1992 referring the
case to the Court of Appeals for proper disposition and at the same time, without giving due
course to the petition, required the respondents to comment on the petition and file the same with
the Court of Appeals within ten (10) days from notice. In the meantime, the Court issued a
temporary restraining order, effective immediately and continuing until further orders from it,
ordering the respondents: (1) Judge Manuel Jn. Serapio, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 127, Caloocan City to cease and desist from exercising jurisdiction over the case for
declaration of nullity of the cease and desist order issued by the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA); and (2) City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to
cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City.

Respondents City Government of Caloocan and Mayor Macario A. Asistio, Jr. filed on
November 12, 1992 a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash/recall the temporary
restraining order and an urgent motion for reconsideration alleging that ". . . in view of the
calamitous situation that would arise if the respondent city government fails to collect 350
tons of garbage daily for lack of dumpsite (i)t is therefore, imperative that the issue be
resolved with dispatch or with sufficient leeway to allow the respondents to find alternative
solutions to this garbage problem."

On November 17, 1992, the Court issued a Resolution 13 directing the Court of Appeals to
immediately set the case for hearing for the purpose of determining whether or not the temporary
restraining order issued by the Court should be lifted and what conditions, if any, may be required
if it is to be so lifted or whether the restraining order should be maintained or converted into a
preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals set the case for hearing on November 27, 1992, at 10:00 in the
morning at the Hearing Room, 3rd Floor, New Building, Court of Appeals. 14 After the oral
argument, a conference was set on December 8, 1992 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning where the
Mayor of Caloocan City, the General Manager of LLDA, the Secretary of DENR or his duly
authorized representative and the Secretary of DILG or his duly authorized representative were
required to appear.

It was agreed at the conference that the LLDA had until December 15, 1992 to finish its
study and review of respondent's technical plan with respect to the dumping of its garbage
and in the event of a rejection of respondent's technical plan or a failure of settlement, the
parties will submit within 10 days from notice their respective memoranda on the merits of
the case, after which the petition shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 15Notwithstanding
such efforts, the parties failed to settle the dispute.

On April 30, 1993, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision holding that: (1) the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction on appeal to try, hear and decide the action for
annulment of LLDA's cease and desist order, including the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction in relation thereto, since appeal therefrom is
within the exclusive and appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9, par.
(3), of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129; and (2) the Laguna Lake Development Authority has no
power and authority to issue a cease and desist order under its enabling law, Republic Act
No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order
No. 927, series of 1983.

The Court of Appeals thus dismissed Civil Case No. 15598 and the preliminary injunction
issued in the said case was set aside; the cease and desist order of LLDA was likewise set
aside and the temporary restraining order enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the
City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its garbage at the Tala
Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City was lifted, subject, however, to the condition that
any future dumping of garbage in said area, shall be in conformity with the procedure and
protective works contained in the proposal attached to the records of this case and found on
pages 152-160 of the Rollo, which was thereby adopted by reference and made an integral
part of the decision, until the corresponding restraining and/or injunctive relief is granted by
the proper Court upon LLDA's institution of the necessary legal proceedings.

Hence, the Laguna Lake Development Authority filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari, now docketed as G.R. No. 110120, with prayer that the temporary restraining
order lifted by the Court of Appeals be re-issued until after final determination by this Court of
the issue on the proper interpretation of the powers and authority of the LLDA under its
enabling law.

On July, 19, 1993, the Court issued a temporary restraining order 16 enjoining the City Mayor
of Caloocan and/or the City Government of Caloocan to cease and desist from dumping its
garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, effective as of this date and
containing until otherwise ordered by the Court.

It is significant to note that while both parties in this case agree on the need to protect the
environment and to maintain the ecological balance of the surrounding areas of the Camarin
open dumpsite, the question as to which agency can lawfully exercise jurisdiction over the
matter remains highly open to question.

The City Government of Caloocan claims that it is within its power, as a local government
unit, pursuant to the general welfare provision of the Local Government Code, 17 to determine
the effects of the operation of the dumpsite on the ecological balance and to see that such
balance is maintained. On the basis of said contention, it questioned, from the inception of the
dispute before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, the power and authority of the LLDA to
issue a cease and desist order enjoining the dumping of garbage in the Barangay Camarin over
which the City Government of Caloocan has territorial jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeals sustained the position of the City of Caloocan on the theory that
Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 984, otherwise known as the Pollution Control law,
authorizing the defunct National Pollution Control Commission to issue an ex-parte cease
and desist order was not incorporated in Presidential Decree No. 813 nor in Executive Order
No. 927, series of
1983. The Court of Appeals ruled that under Section 4, par. (d), of Republic Act No. 4850, as
amended, the LLDA is instead required "to institute the necessary legal proceeding against
any person who shall commence to implement or continue implementation of any project,
plan or program within the Laguna de Bay region without previous clearance from the
Authority."

The LLDA now assails, in this partition for review, the abovementioned ruling of the Court of
Appeals, contending that, as an administrative agency which was granted regulatory and
adjudicatory powers and functions by Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws,
Presidential Decree No. 813 and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, it is invested with
the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order pursuant to Section 4 par. (c), (d),
(e), (f) and (g) of Executive Order No. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus:

Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions. The authority shall have the
following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the provisions of this
Executive Order and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper
notice and hearing.

(d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution

specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must
be accomplished.

(e) Issue, renew, or deny permits, under such conditions as it may determine
to be reasonable, for the prevention and abatement of pollution, for the
discharge of sewage, industrial waste, or for the installation or operation of
sewage works and industrial disposal system or parts thereof.

(f) After due notice and hearing, the Authority may also revoke, suspend or
modify any permit issued under this Order whenever the same is necessary
to prevent or abate pollution.

(g) Deputize in writing or request assistance of appropriate government

agencies or instrumentalities for the purpose of enforcing this Executive
Order and its implementing rules and regulations and the orders and
decisions of the Authority.

The LLDA claims that the appellate court deliberately suppressed and totally disregarded the
above provisions of Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983, which granted administrative
quasi-judicial functions to LLDA on pollution abatement cases.

In light of the relevant environmental protection laws cited which are applicable in this case,
and the corresponding overlapping jurisdiction of government agencies implementing these
laws, the resolution of the issue of whether or not the LLDA has the authority and power to
issue an order which, in its nature and effect was injunctive, necessarily requires a
determination of the threshold question: Does the Laguna Lake Development Authority,
under its Charter and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint
against the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by
the City Government of Caloocan which is allegedly endangering the health, safety, and
welfare of the residents therein and the sanitation and quality of the water in the area brought
about by exposure to pollution caused by such open garbage dumpsite?

The matter of determining whether there is such pollution of the environment that requires
control, if not prohibition, of the operation of a business establishment is essentially
addressed to the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR which, by virtue of
Section 16 of Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987, 18 has assumed the powers and
functions of the defunct National Pollution Control Commission created under Republic Act No.
3931. Under said Executive Order, a Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) under the Office of the
DENR Secretary now assumes the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control
Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases. 19

As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution
Adjudication Board (PAB), except in cases where the special law provides for another forum.
It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is
specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws to carry out and
make effective the declared national policy 20 of promoting and accelerating the development
and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and
Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan 21 with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of
human life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances,
deterioration and pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by
virtue of its special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the
Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of
wastes from the surrounding areas. In carrying out the aforementioned declared policy, the LLDA
is mandated, among others, to pass upon and approve or disapprove all plans, programs, and
projects proposed by local government offices/agencies within the region, public corporations,
and private persons or enterprises where such plans, programs and/or projects are related to
those of the LLDA for the development of the region. 22

In the instant case, when the complainant Task Force Camarin Dumpsite of Our Lady of
Lourdes Parish, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City, filed its letter-complaint before the LLDA,
the latter's jurisdiction under its charter was validly invoked by complainant on the basis of its
allegation that the open dumpsite project of the City Government of Caloocan in Barangay
Camarin was undertaken without a clearance from the LLDA, as required under Section 4,
par. (d), of Republic Act. No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927. While there is also an allegation that the said project was without an Environmental
Compliance Certificate from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR,
the primary jurisdiction of the LLDA over this case was recognized by the Environmental
Management Bureau of the DENR when the latter acted as intermediary at the meeting
among the representatives of the City Government of Caloocan, Task Force Camarin
Dumpsite and LLDA sometime in July 1992 to discuss the possibility of
re-opening the open dumpsite.

Having thus resolved the threshold question, the inquiry then narrows down to the following
issue: Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order
under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory laws, on the basis of the facts presented in
this case, enjoining the dumping of garbage in Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan
City.

The irresistible answer is in the affirmative.

The cease and desist order issued by the LLDA requiring the City Government of Caloocan
to stop dumping its garbage in the Camarin open dumpsite found by the LLDA to have been
done in violation of Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, and other relevant environment
laws, 23 cannot be stamped as an unauthorized exercise by the LLDA of injunctive powers. By its
express terms, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and Executive Order No.
927, series of 1983, authorizes the LLDA to "make, alter or modify order requiring the
discontinuance or pollution." 24 (Emphasis supplied) Section 4, par. (d) explicitly authorizes the
LLDA to make whatever order may be necessary in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

To be sure, the LLDA was not expressly conferred the power "to issue and ex-parte cease
and desist order" in a language, as suggested by the City Government of Caloocan, similar
to the express grant to the defunct National Pollution Control Commission under Section 7 of
P.D. No. 984 which, admittedly was not reproduced in P.D. No. 813 and E.O. No. 927, series
of 1983. However, it would be a mistake to draw therefrom the conclusion that there is a
denial of the power to issue the order in question when the power "to make, alter or modify
orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution" is expressly and clearly bestowed upon the
LLDA by Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

Assuming arguendo that the authority to issue a "cease and desist order" were not expressly
conferred by law, there is jurisprudence enough to the effect that the rule granting such
authority need not necessarily be express. 25 While it is a fundamental rule that an
administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law, it is likewise a
settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the
exercise of its express powers. 26 In the exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its
charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake
region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied.
Otherwise, it may well be reduced to a "toothless" paper agency.

In this connection, it must be noted that in Pollution Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals,
et al., 27 the Court ruled that the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has the power to issue an ex-
parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding
the allowable standards set by the anti-pollution laws of the country. Theponente, Associate
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, declared:

Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in
situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous
discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland
waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation
over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full
course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar
has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution
control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated
in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety,
health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power.
It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. . . .

The immediate response to the demands of "the necessities of protecting vital public
interests" gives vitality to the statement on ecology embodied in the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies or the 1987 Constitution. Article II, Section 16 which provides:
 The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.

As a constitutionally guaranteed right of every person, it carries the correlative duty of non-
impairment. This is but in consonance with the declared policy of the state "to protect and
promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them." 28 It is
to be borne in mind that the Philippines is party to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the Alma Conference Declaration of 1978 which recognize health as a fundamental human
right. 29

The issuance, therefore, of the cease and desist order by the LLDA, as a practical matter of
procedure under the circumstances of the case, is a proper exercise of its power and
authority under its charter and its amendatory laws. Had the cease and desist order issued
by the LLDA been complied with by the City Government of Caloocan as it did in the first
instance, no further legal steps would have been necessary.

The charter of LLDA, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended, instead of conferring upon the
LLDA the means of directly enforcing such orders, has provided under its Section 4 (d) the
power to institute "necessary legal proceeding against any person who shall commence to
implement or continue implementation of any project, plan or program within the Laguna de
Bay region without previous clearance from the LLDA."

Clearly, said provision was designed to invest the LLDA with sufficiently broad powers in the
regulation of all projects initiated in the Laguna Lake region, whether by the government or
the private sector, insofar as the implementation of these projects is concerned. It was meant
to deal with cases which might possibly arise where decisions or orders issued pursuant to
the exercise of such broad powers may not be obeyed, resulting in the thwarting of its
laudabe objective. To meet such contingencies, then the writs of mandamus and injunction
which are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue, may be sought from the proper courts.

Insofar as the implementation of relevant anti-pollution laws in the Laguna Lake region and
its surrounding provinces, cities and towns are concerned, the Court will not dwell further on
the related issues raised which are more appropriately addressed to an administrative
agency with the special knowledge and expertise of the LLDA.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order issued by the
Court on July 19, 1993 enjoining the City Mayor of Caloocan and/or the City Government of
Caloocan from dumping their garbage at the Tala Estate, Barangay Camarin, Caloocan City
is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Melo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Jorge S. Imperial, J., ponente, Vicente V. Mendoza and Quirino D. Abad

Santos, Jr., JJ., concurring.
2 Annex "C", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 47-51.

3 Webster's Third International Dictionary (1986) defines "leachate" as the

liquid that has percolated through soil or other medium.

4 Establishing An Environmental Impact Statement System, Including Other

Environmental Management Related Measures And For Other Purposes
(June 11, 1978).

5 An Act Creating The Laguna Lake Development Authority, Prescribing Its

Powers, Functions and Duties, Providing Funds Therefor, And For Other
Purposes
(July 18, 1966).

6 Annex "D", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 52-54.

7 Ibid.

8 Annex "G", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 58-63.

9 Annex "M", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 77-81.

10 Annex "O", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 83-90.

11 Annex "A", Petition, G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 29-37.

12 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 93-95.

13 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 98-99.

14 Ibid, p. 97.

15 G.R. No. 107542, Rollo, pp. 129-130.

16 G.R. No. 110120, Rollo, p. 70.

17 Section 16, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as "The Local
Government Code of 1991."

18 Providing For The Reorganization Of The Department Of Environment,

Energy And Natural Resources, Renaming It As The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, And For Other Purposes (June 10,
1987).

19 Section 19, Executive Order No. 192, series of 1987.

20 Section 1, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813 and
Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.
21 Section 41, par. (4), Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

22 Section 4, par. (d), Republic Act No. 4850, as amended by P.D. No. 813
and Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983. (Emphasis supplied)

23 Sections 45 and 48, Presidential Decree No. 1152, otherwise known as

Philippine Environment Code which requires that solid waste disposal shall
be by sanitary landfill, incineration, composting and other methods as may be
approved by competent government authority and, that the sites shall
conform with existing zoning, land use standards, and pollution control
regulations, respectively; Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1586.

24 Section 4, par. (d), Executive Order No. 927, series of 1983.

25 Motor Transit Co. v. Railroad Com., 189 CAL 573, 209 P 586.

26 Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 90482, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA
266; Guerzon v. Court of Appeals, et al. G.R. No. 77707, August 8, 1988,
164 SCRA 182.

27 G.R. No. 93891, March 11, 1991, 195 SCRA 112.

28 Art. II, Section 15, 1987 Constitution.

29 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Proceedings and Debates, Vol.

III,
p. 119.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111088. June 13, 1997]

C & M TIMBER CORPORATION (CMTC), petitioner, vs. HON.

ANGEL C. ALCALA, Secretary of the Department of
Environment & Natural Resources, HON. ANTONIO T.
CARPIO, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and HON.
RENATO C. CORONA, Assistant Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari by which C & M Timber Corporation seeks the
nullification of the order dated February 26, 1993 and the resolution dated June
7, 1993 of the Office of the President, declaring as of no force and effect Timber
License Agreement (TLA) No. 106 issued to petitioner on June 30, 1972. TLA
No. 106, with the expiry date June 30, 1997, covers 67,680 hectares of forest
land in the municipalities of Dipaculao and Dinalongan in the Province of Aurora
and the Municipality of Maddela in Quirino province.[1]
It appears that in a letter dated July 20, 1984[2] to President Marcos, Filipinas
Loggers Development Corporation (FLDC), through its president and general
manager, requested a timber concession over the same area covered by
petitioners TLA No. 106, alleging that the same had been cancelled pursuant to a
presidential directive banning all forms of logging in the area. The request was
granted in a note dated August 14, 1984 by President Marcos who wrote, as was
his wont, on the margin of the letter of FLDC: Approved.[3]
Accordingly, on September 21, 1984, the Ministry of Natural Resources, as it
was then called, issued TLA No. 360, with the expiry date September 30,
1994, to FLDC, covering the area subject of TLA No. 106. In 1985, FLDC began
logging operations.
On June 26, 1986, then Minister of Natural Resources Ernesto M. Maceda
suspended TLA No. 360 for FLDCs gross violation of the terms and conditions
thereof, especially the reforestation and selective logging activities and in
consonance with the national policy on forest conservation. [4] On July 26, 1986,
Minister Maceda issued another order cancelling the license of FLDC on the
ground that in spite of the suspension order dated June 26, 1986, said
concessionaire has continued logging operations in violation of forestry rules and
regulations.[5]
 Learning of the cancellation of FLDCs TLA, petitioner, through its officer-in-
charge, wrote Minister Maceda a letter dated October 10, 1986, requesting
revalidation of its TLA No. 106.[6] As FLDC sought a reconsideration of the order
cancelling its TLA, petitioner wrote another letter dated February 13,
1987,[7] alleging that because of the log ban imposed by the previous
administration it had to stop its logging operations, but that when the ban was
lifted on September 21, 1984, its concession area was awarded to FLDC as a
result of [FLDCs] covetous maneuvers and unlawful machinations. (Petitioner
was later to say that those behind FLDC, among them being the former
Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna Barba,were very influential because of their very
strong connections with the previous Marcos regime.)[8] Petitioner prayed that it
be allowed to resume logging operations.
In his order dated May 2, 1988,[9] Secretary Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., of the
DENR, declared petitioners TLA No. 106 as of no more force and effect and
consequently denied the petition for its restoration, even as he denied FLDCs
motion for reconsideration of the cancellation of TLA No. 360. Secretary
Factoran, Jr. ruled that petitioners petition was barred by reason of laches,
because petitioner did not file its opposition to the issuance of a TLA to FLDC
until February 13, 1987, after FLDC had been logging under its license for almost
two years. On the other hand, FLDCs motion for reconsideration was denied,
since the findings on which the cancellation order had been based, notably gross
violation of the terms and conditions of its license, such as reforestation and
selective logging activities appear to be firmly grounded.
Both petitioner CMTC and FLDC appealed to the Office of the President.
Petitioner denied that it was guilty of laches. It alleged that it had sent a letter to
the then Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario dated September 24,
1984 protesting the grant of a TLA to FLDC over the area covered by its
(petitioners) TLA and, for this reason, requesting nullification of FLDCs TLA.
In a decision dated March 21, 1991,[10] the Office of the President, through
then Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos, affirmed the DENRs order of May 2,
1988. Like the DENR it found petitioner guilty of laches, the alleged filing by
petitioner of a protest on September 24, 1984 not having been duly proven. The
decision of the Office of the President stated:[11]

As disclosed by the records, this Office, in a letter of June 1, 1989, had

requested the DENR to issue a certification as to the authenticity/veracity
of CMTCs aforesaid Annex A to enable it to resolve this case judiciously
and expeditiously. Said letter-request pertinently reads:

x x x C & M Timber Corporation has attached to its Supplemental Petition For

Review, dated June 1, 1988, a xerox copy of (Annex A) of its letter to the
Minister of Natural Resources Rodolfo del Rosario, dated September 24, 1984,
prepared by its counsel, Atty. Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting against the
award of the contested area to Filipinas Loggers Development Corporation and
requesting that it be annulled and voided.

Considering that the aforementioned Annex A constitutes a vital defense to C

& M Timber Corporation and could be a pivotal factor in the resolution by this
Office of the instant appeal, may we request your good office for a certification
as to the authenticity/veracity of said document (Annex A) to enable us to
resolve the case judiciously and expeditiously.

In reply thereto, the DENR, thru Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Romulo
D. San Juan, in a letter of July 7, 1989, informed this Office, thus:

xxx

Despite diligent efforts exerted to locate the alleged aforementioned Annex A,

no such document could be found or is on file in this Office.

This Office, therefore, regrets that it can not issue the desired certification as to
the authenticity/veracity of the document.

On September 10, 1990, this Office requested an updated comment of the

DENR on (a) the duplicate original copy of Annex A; (b) a xerox copy of Page
164, entry No. 2233, of the MNRs logbook tending to show that the original
copy of Annex A was received by the MNR; and (c) a xerox copy of Page 201
of the logbook of the BFD indicating that the original copy of Annex A was
received by BFD from the MNR.

On October 26, 1990, DENR Assistant Secretary San Juan endorsed to this
Office the updated comment of Director of Forest Management Bureau (FMB)
in a 2nd endorsement of October 25, 1990, which pertinently reads as follows:

Please be informed that this Office is not the addressee and repository of the
letter dated September 24, 1984 of Atty. Norberto Quisumbing. This Office was
just directed by then Minister Rodolfo del Rosario to act on the purported letter
of Atty. Quisumbing and as directed, we prepared a memorandum to the
President which was duly complied with as shown by the entries in the
logbook. Annex A, which is the main document of the letter-appeal of C & M
Timber Corporation is presumed appended to the records when it was acted
upon by the BFD (now FMB) and forwarded to the Secretary (then
Minister). Therefore this Office is not in a position to certify as to the
authenticity of Annex A.
Clearly therefore, CMTCs reliance on its Annex A is misplaced, the
authenticity thereof not having been duly proven or established. Significantly,
we note that in all the pleadings filed by CMTC in the office a quo, and during
the hearing conducted, nothing is mentioned therein about its letter of
September 24, 1984 (Annex A). Jurisprudence teaches that issues neither
averred in the pleadings nor raised during the trial below cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal (City of Manila vs. Ebay, 1 SCRA 1086, 1089); that
issues of fact not adequately brought to the attention of the trial court need not
be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal (Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 145 SCRA 592, 595); and
that parties, may not, on appeal, adopt a position inconsistent with what they
sustained below (People v. Archilla, 1 SCRA 698, 700-701)

The Office of the President also declined to set aside the DENRs order of
July 31, 1986, cancelling FLDCs TLA No. 360, after finding the same to be fully
substantiated.
Petitioner and FLDC moved for reconsideration. In its order dated January
25, 1993,[12] the Office of the President, through Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Antonio T. Carpio, denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. It held that even
assuming that CMTC did file regularly its letter-protest of September 24, 1984
with MNR on September 25, 1984, CMTC failed to protect its rights for more than
two (2) years until it opposed reinstatement of FLDCs TLA on February 13,
1987. Within that two (2) year period, FLDC logged the area without any
opposition from CMTC. In the same order, the Office of the President, however,
directed the reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360, in view of the favorable report
of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 23, 1987. Later, the
Presidents office reconsidered its action after the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources Angel C. Alcala, on February 15, 1993, expressed concern
that reinstatement of FLDCs TLA No. 360 might negate efforts to enhance the
conservation and protection of our forest resources. In a new order dated
February 26, 1993,[13] the Office of the President reinstated its March 21, 1991
decision.
Petitioner again moved for a reconsideration of the decision dated March 21,
1991 and for its license to be revived/restored. Petitioners motion was, however,
denied by the Office of the President on June 7, 1993 [14] in a resolution signed by
Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato C. Corona. The
Presidents office ruled:

The above Order of February 26, 1993 was predicated, as stated therein, on
a new policy consideration on forest conservation and protection,
unmistakably implied from the Presidents handwritten
instruction. Accordingly, this Order shall be taken not only as an
affirmation of the March 21, 1991 decision, but also as
 a FINAL disposition of the case and ALL matters incident thereto, like
CMTCs motion for reconsideration, dated April 16, 1991.

Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that laches cannot be imputed to it

because it did not incur delay in asserting its rights and even if there was delay,
the delay did not work to the prejudice of other parties, particularly FLDC,
because the cancellation of the FLDCs TLA was attributable only to its own
actions. Petitioner also denies that its license had been suspended by reason of
mediocre performance in reforestation by order of then Minister of Natural
Resources Teodoro O. Pea. It says that it did not receive any order to this
effect. Finally,petitioner claims that the denial of its petition, because of a new
policy consideration on forest conservation and protection, unmistakably implied
from the Presidents handwritten instruction, as stated in the resolution of June 7,
1993 of the Office of the President, would deny it the due process of
law. Petitioner points out that there is no total log ban in the country; that
Congress has yet to make a pronouncement on the issue; that any notice to this
effect must be stated in good form, not implied; and that in any case, any new
policy consideration should be prospective in application and cannot affect
petitioners vested rights in its TLA No. 106.
We find the petition to be without merit.
First. As already stated, the DENR order of May 2, 1988, declaring
petitioners TLA No. 106 as no longer of any force and effect, was based on its
finding that although TLA No. 106s date of expiry was June 30, 1997 it had been
suspended on June 3, 1983 because of CMTCs mediocre performance in
reforestation and petitioners laches in failing to protest the subsequent award of
the same area to FLDC. There is considerable dispute whether there was really
an order dated June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA because of mediocre
performance in reforestation, just as there is a dispute whether there indeed was
a letter written on September 24, 1984 on behalf of petitioner protesting the
award of the concession covered by its TLA No. 106 to FLDC, so as to show that
petitioner did not sleep on its rights.
The alleged order of June 3, 1983 cannot be produced. The Office of the
Solicitor General was given until May 14, 1997 to secure a copy of the order but
on May 7, 1997 the OSG manifested that the order in question could not be
found in the records of this case in which the order might be. [15] Earlier, petitioner
requested a copy of the order but the DENR, through Regional Executive
Director Antonio G. Principe, said that based from our records there is no file
copy of said alleged order.[16]
On the other hand, the alleged letter of September 24, 1984 written by Atty.
Norberto J. Quisumbing, protesting the award of the concession in question to
FLDC cannot be found in the records of the DENR either. The Assistant
Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DENR certified that Despite diligent efforts
exerted to locate the alleged [letter], no such document could be found or is on
file in this Office.[17] In a later certification, however, Ofelia Castro Biron of the
DENR, claimed that she was a receiving clerk at the Records and Documents
Section of the Ministry of Natural Resources and that on September 25, 1984
she received the letter of Atty. Quisumbing and placed on all copies thereof the
stamp of the MNR. She stated that the copy in the possession of petitioner was a
faithful copy of the letter in question.[18]
The difficulty of ascertaining the existence of the two documents is indeed a
reflection on the sorry state of record keeping in an important office of the
executive department. Yet these two documents are vital to the presentation of
the evidence of both parties in this case. Fortunately, there are extant certain
records from which it is possible to determine whether these documents even
existed.
With respect to the alleged order of June 3, 1983 suspending petitioners TLA
No. 106 for mediocre performance in reforestation, the Court will presume that
there is such an order in accordance with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions inasmuch as such order is cited both in the order
dated May 2, 1988 of the DENR, declaring as of no force and effect TLA No. 106,
and in the decision dated March 21, 1991 of the Office of the President affirming
the order of the DENR. It is improbable that so responsible officials as the
Secretary of the DENR and the Executive Secretary would cite an order that did
not exist.
On the other hand, with respect to the letter dated September 24, 1984, there
are circumstances indicating that it existed. In addition to the aforesaid
certification of Ofelia Castro Biron that she was the person who received the
letter for the DENR, the logbook of the Ministry of Natural Resources contains
entries indicating that the letter was received by the Bureau of Forest
Development from the MNR.[19] DENR Assistant Secretary Romulo San Juan
likewise informed the Office of the President that the Bureau of Forest
Management prepared a memorandum on the aforesaid letter of September 24,
1984,[20] thereby implying that there was such a letter.
On the premise that there was an order dated June 3, 1983, we find that after
suspending petitioners TLA for mediocre performance in reforestation under this
order, the DENR cancelled the TLA, this time because of a Presidential directive
imposing a log ban. The records of G.R. No. 76538, entitled Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
Co. v. Deputy Executive Secretary, the decision in which is reported in 190
SCRA 673 (1990), contain a copy of the memorandum of then Director Edmundo
V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development to the Regional Director of
Region 2, in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, informing the latter that pursuant to the
instruction of the President and the memorandum dated August 18, 1983 of then
Minister Teodoro Q. Pea, the log ban previously declared included the
concessions of the companies enumerated in Cortes memorandum, in
consequence of which the concessions in question were deemed cancelled. The
memorandum of Director Cortes stated:

MEMORANDUM ORDER
TO : The Regional Director
Region 2, Tuguegarao, Cagayan

FROM : The Director

DATE : 24 August 1983

SUBJECT : Stopping of all logging operations

in Nueva Vizcaya and Quirino

REMARKS :

Following Presidential Instructions and Memorandum Order of Minister

Teodoro Q. Pea dated 18 August 1983, and in connection with my previous
radio message, please be informed that the coverage of the logging ban in
Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya provinces include the following concessions which
are deemed cancelled as of the date of the previous notice:

- Felipe Ysmael Co., Inc.

- Industries Dev. Corp.
- Luzon Loggers, Inc.
- C & M Timber Corporation
- Buzon Industrial Dev. Corporation
- Dominion Forest Resources Corp.
- FCA Timber Development Corp.
- Kasibu Logging Corp.
- RCC Timber Company
- Benjamin Cuaresma

You are hereby reminded to insure full compliance with this order to stop
logging operations by all licensees above mentioned and submit a report on the
pullout of equipment and inventory of logs within five days upon receipt
hereof.

ACTION
DESIRED : For your immediate implementation.

EDMUNDO V. CORTES

(Emphasis added)

It thus appears that petitioners license had been cancelled way back in 1983,
a year before its concession was awarded to FLDC. It is noteworthy that
petitioner admits that at the time of the award to FLDC in 1984 petitioner was no
longer operating its concession because of a log ban although it claims that the
suspension of operations was only temporary. As a result of the log ban, the TLA
of petitioner, along with those of other loggers in the region, were cancelled and
petitioner and others were ordered to stop operations. Petitioner also admits that
it received a telegram sent on August 24, 1983 by Director Cortes of the BFD,
directing it to stop all logging operations to conserve our remaining forests. [21] It is
then not true, as Atty. Quisumbing stated in protesting the award of the
concession to FLDC, that the logging ban did not cancel [petitioners] timber
license agreement.
Now petitioner did not protest the cancellation of its TLA. Consequently, even
if consideration is given to the fact that a year later, on September 24, 1984, its
counsel protested the grant of the concession to another party (FLDC), this
failure of petitioner to contest first the suspension of its license on June 3, 1983
and later its cancellation on August 24, 1983 must be deemed fatal to its present
action.
Second. Except for the letter of its counsel to the Minister of Natural
Resources, which it reiterated in its letter to the President of the Philippines,
petitioner took no legal steps to protect its interest. After receiving no favorable
response to its two letters, petitioner could have brought the necessary action in
court for the restoration of its license. It did not. Instead it waited until FLDCs
concession was cancelled in 1986 by asking for the revalidation of its
(petitioners) on TLA No. 106.
Petitioners excuse before the DENR is that it did not pursue its protest
because its president, Ricardo C. Silverio, had been told by President Marcos
that the area in question had been awarded to the Presidents sister, Mrs. Fortuna
Barba, and petitioner was afraid to go against the wishes of the former
President.[22] This is a poor excuse for petitioners inaction. In Felipe Ysmael, Jr. &
Co., Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary,[23] a similar excuse was given that
Ysmael & Cos license had been cancelled and its concession awarded to entities
controlled or owned by relatives or cronies of then President Marcos. For this
reason, after the EDSA Revolution, Ysmael & Co. sought in 1986 the
reinstatement of its timber license agreement and the revocation of those issued
to the alleged presidential cronies. As its request was denied by the Office of the
President, Ysmael & Co. filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. On the basis
of the facts stated, this Court denied the petition: (1) because the August 25,
1983 order of the Bureau of Forest Development, cancelling petitioners timber
license agreement had become final and executory. Although petitioner sent a
letter dated September 19, 1983 to President Marcos seeking reconsideration of
the 1983 order of cancellation of the BFD, the grounds stated there were different
from those later relied upon by petitioner for seeking its reinstatement;
(2)because the fact that petitioner failed to seasonably take judicial recourse to
have the earlier administrative actions [cancelling its license and granting another
one covering the same concession to respondent] reviewed by the court through
a petition for certiorari is prejudicial to its cause. Such special civil action
of certiorari should have been filed within a reasonable time. And since none was
filed within such period, petitioners action was barred by laches; and (3) because
executive evaluation of timber licenses and their consequent cancellation in the
process of formulating policies with regard to the utilization of timber lands is a
prerogative of the executive department and in the absence of evidence showing
grave abuse of discretion courts will not interfere with the exercise of that
discretion.
This case is governed by the decision in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. v.
Deputy Executive Secretary.
Third. It is finally contended that any policy consideration on forest
conservation and protection justifying the decision of the executive department
not to reinstate petitioners license must be formally enunciated and cannot
merely be implied from the Presidents instruction to his subordinates and that, at
all events, the new policy cannot be applied to existing licenses such as
petitioners.
The Presidents order reconsidering the resolution of the Presidential Legal
Adviser (insofar as it reinstated the license of FLDC) was prompted by concerns
expressed by the then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources that said
reinstatement [of FLDCs license] may negate our efforts to enhance conservation
and protection of our forest resources. There was really no new policy but, as
noted in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc., a mere reiteration of a policy of
conservation and protection. The policy is contained in Art. II, 16 of the
Constitution which commands the State to protect and promote the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature. There is therefore no merit in petitioners contention that no
new policy can be applied to existing licenses.
As to petitioners contention that the cancellation of its license constitutes an
impairment of the obligation of its contract, suffice it for us to quote what we held
in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co. Inc. v. Deputy Executive Secretary:[24]

A cursory reading of the assailed orders issued by public respondent Minister

Maceda of the MNR, which were affirmed by the Office of the President, will
disclose public policy considerations which effectively forestall judicial
interference in the case at bar.

Public respondents herein, upon whose shoulders rests the task of

implementing the policy to develop and conserve the countrys natural
resources, have indicated an ongoing department evaluation of all timber
license agreements entered into, and permits or licenses issued, under the
previous dispensation. . . .

The ongoing administrative reassessment is apparently in response to the

renewed and growing global concern over the despoliation of forest lands and
the utter disregard of their crucial role in sustaining a balanced ecological
system. The legitimacy of such concern can hardly be disputed, most especially
in this country. . . .

Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious
problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will
stand clear. . . . More so where, as in the present case, the interests of a private
logging company are pitted against that of the public at large on the pressing
public policy issue of forest conservation. . . . Timber licenses, permits and
license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State regulates
the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a
permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the forest
products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
[See Sections 3(33) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Petition, Annex A; Rollo, pp. 45-64.
[2]
Id., Annex B; Id., pp. 65-66.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 72.
[5]
Id., Annex G; Id., p. 73.
[6]
Id., Annex F; Id., p. 71.
[7]
Id., Annex H; Id., pp. 74-75.
[8]
Id., Annexes H and J; Id., pp. 74, 78.
[9]
Id., Annex V; Id., pp. 226-253.
[10]
Id., Annex HH; Id., pp. 297-306.
[11]
Id., pp. 300-302.
[12]
Petition, Annex JJ; Id., pp. 316-329.
[13]
Id., Annex LL; Id., pp. 331-332.
[14]
Id., Annex NN; Id., pp. 338-339.
[15]
Manifestation and Motion dated May 2, 1997, Temporary Rollo.
[16]
Petitioners Memorandum, Annex A; Rollo, p. 460.
[17]
Petition, Annex AA; Id., p. 274.
[18]
Id., Annex II-1; Id., p. 315.
[19]
Id., pp. 280-284.
[20]
Id., p. 274.
[21]
Petitioners Compliance and Manifestation dated March 24, 1997, Annex H; Id., p. 579.
[22]
Id., p. 257.
[23]
190 SCRA 673 (1990).
[24]
Id ., at 682-684.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,

vs.
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY,
LUZON PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL
CORPORATION, respondents.

Abraham C. La Vina for petitioner.

Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for Luzon Petrochemical Corporation.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments
(BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of the
proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of feedstock for that
plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).

This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman Enrique T.
Garcia v. the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court issued a decision,
ordering the BOI as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments

is ordered: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the
Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access
to its records on the original and amended applications for registration, as a
petrochemical manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical
Corporation, excluding, however, privileged papers containing its trade
secrets and other business and financial information, and (3) to set for
hearing the petitioner's opposition to the amended application in order that he
may present at such hearing all the evidence in his possession in support of
his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC petrochemical plant to
Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period of ten (10) days
from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served by personal
service to the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in advance.
The hearings may be held from day to day for a period of ten (10) days
without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary
injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451)
However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that we rule on
the import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign investor's claim of right of final
choice of plant site, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987, this Court on October 24, 1989, made the observation that P.D.
Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that the Limay site should be the only petrochemical
zone in the country, nor prohibit the establishment of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the
country, that the establishment of a petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D.
No. 949 and P.D. No. 1803.

Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial inducements and
other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may change it simply because it
has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely ruled that the petitioner appears to have
lost interest in the case by his failure to appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after
receipt of the decision, so he may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment. On
this ground, the motion for partial reconsideration was denied.

A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking that we
resolve the basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has the right of final choice of
plant site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing was because the decision
was not yet final and executory; and that the petitioner had not therefor waived the right to a
hearing before the BOI.

In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:

Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under
the 1987 Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a
'right of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to
processing and approval or disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II,
Omnibus Investments Code). By submitting its application and amended
application to the BOI for approval, the investor recognizes the sovereign
prerogative of our Government, through the BOI, to approve or disapprove
the same after determining whether its proposed project will be feasible,
desirable and beneficial to our country. By asking that his opposition to the
LPC's amended application be heard by the BOI, the petitioner likewise
acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last word or the "final
choice" on the matter.

Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by
the BOI may not be 'final', for supervening circumstances and changes in the
conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of
plant site in order that the project will not fail. After all, our country will benefit
only when a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)

Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.

A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and

this ponente voted to grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the hearing set by the
BOI was premature as the decision of the Court was not yet final and executory; that as
contended by the petitioner the Court must first rule on whether or not the investor has the
right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling is in the affirmative, the hearing would be a
useless exercise; that in the October 19, 1989 resolution, the Court while upholding validity
of the transfer of the plant site did not rule on the issue of who has the final choice; that they
agree with the observation of the majority that "the investor has no final choice either under
the 1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus Investments Code and that it is the BOI who decides
for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be granted to give him the
chance to show the justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to give a second hard look at
the matter.

Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of January
17, 1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final choice under the 1987
Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code.

Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain located in
Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial Zone under the
administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine National Oil Company
(PNOC).

The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation, located
at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.

Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical

Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic producer of
petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. One of the terms and
conditions for registration of the project was the use of "naphtha cracker" and "naphtha" as
feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The petrochemical plant was to be a joint
venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by
BOI.

BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like: (1)
exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds of liquidation
investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate obtaining at the time of
repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on investments. As additional incentive, the
House of Representatives approved a bill introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad
valoremtax on naphtha if and when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant.
(G.R. No. 88637, September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-442)

However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the major
investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a letter dated
January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original registration certification
of its project by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. The reason adduced
for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable labor situation, and the presence in
Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell
Corporation.

The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino
expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a conference with the
Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces.

Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to
Batangas, BPC filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the amendments. Its
application is as follows: "(l) increasing the investment amount from US $220 million to US
$320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha cracker, polythylene plant
and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or
liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4) transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas.
(Annex B to Petition; Rollo, p. 25)

Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner addressed to
Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed amendment with its
attachments which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989, BOI approved the revision of
the registration of BPC's petrochemical project. (Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to
6, Decision in G.R. No. 88637; supra.)

BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways and Means
of the Senate asserted that:

The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the
site of the petrochemical complex, as this would provide a better distribution
of industries around the Metro Manila area. ... In advocating the choice of
Bataan as the project site for the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however,
made it clear, and I would like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its
view that the BOI or the government for that matter could only recomend as
to where the project should be located. The BOI recognizes and respect the
principle that the final chouce is still with the proponent who would in the final
analysis provide the funding or risk capital for the project. (Petition, P. 13;
Annex D to the petition)

This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in the
present petition.

Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:

SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should remain in
Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock originally of naphtha
only should be changed to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas as the approved
amended application of the BPC, now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And
in the light of the categorical admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final
choice of the site and the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave
abuse of discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest
notwithstanding.

We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and determine
the paramount issue. We grant the petition.

First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC agreed.
That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan. There is available
576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan
under P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy expensive real estate for the site unlike in the
proposed transfer to Batangas. The site is the result of careful study long before any
covetous interests intruded into the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and
allows for expansion. The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace
and order situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site to
Batangas. Certainly, these were taken into account when the firm named
itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence proves the contrary.

Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan produces
60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock for the plant in
Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On the other hand, the country
is short of LPG and there is need to import the same for use of the plant in Batangas. The
local production thereof by Shell can hardly supply the needs of the consumers for cooking
purposes. Scarce dollars will be diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in
order to feed the furnaces of the transferred petrochemical plant.

Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by the
approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from exemption
from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the petrochemical industry. The
policy determination by both Congress and the President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign
investor should disregard or contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from
naphtha to LPG.

Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the State to
"regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in
accordance with its national goals and priorities." The development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19,
Article II of the Constitution.

In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of the
national economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of economic nationalism"
is the set goal of government.

Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the capital for the
project from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called "petroscam scandal", the
capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC does not have to buy the land for the
project and its feedstock shall be limited to naphtha which is certainly more economical,
more readily available than LPG, and does not have to be imported.

Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the venture to
the great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a participation in the
management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge multinational corporation.

In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan, practically
nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-absolute discretion given
by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but to transfer it from their own first
choice for reasons which remain murky to say the least.

And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.

Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:

 xxx xxx xxx

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on

sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that
make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are
competitive in both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall
protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade
practices.

xxx xxx xxx

Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is infused with
the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources, the State's full control
over the development and utilization of our scarce resources, agreements with foreigners
being based on real contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country
and the regulation of foreign investments in accordance with national goals and priorities are
too explicit not to be noticed and understood.

A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not be treated

like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an assembler of cars or
manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning may be accorded fuller faith and
credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to the national interest. In other ASEAN
countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the government superintends the industry by
controlling the upstream or cracker facility.

In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented favors,
among them:

(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave
an eligible relending credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a
debt to swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of US
$80 million which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million.

(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign
sources but from loans, initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan, to be given by
both government banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or in
common parlance, a case of 'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.'

(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer
status.'

(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the
Asian Development Bank portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's
massive loan request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee).

but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make a company
abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of unscrupulous machinations and
a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests of the Filipino people.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in
approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and authorizing
the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG for the main reason that
the final say is in the investor all other circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No
cogent advantage to the government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation
of the independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the
Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.

One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he would not
mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient to foreign dictation.
In this case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary investor whom the BOI
allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board of
Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the Luzon
Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193, Series of 1989,
(Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The original certificate of
registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with Bataan as the plant site and
naphtha as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered maintained.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., Paras, JJ., took no part.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting Opinion:

This is the petitioner's second petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for a
temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against the respondents Board of
Investments (BOI), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), the Luzon Petrochemical
Corporation (LPC), formerly Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell
Corporation (SHELL) on the transfer of the LPC petrochemical plant site from Bataan to
Batangas. The first case was docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 88637 and was decided on
September 7, 1989. Consistent with my opinion in the first case, I vote once more to deny
the petition.

The petitioner filed this second petition supposedly "upon the authority and strength" of this
Court's statement in its Resolution of January 9, 1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the foreign
investor (LPC) does not have a right of final choice of plant site because its choice is subject
to approval or disapproval by the BOI (p. 3, Rollo). Ergo, the BOI has the "final choice."
Petitioner contends that since the BOI had earlier approved Bataan as the plant site of the
LPG petrochemical complex, and of "naphtha only" as the feedstock, that approval was
"final" and may not be changed. Hence, the BOI allegedly abused its discretion: (1) in
approving the transfer of the LPC's plant site from Bataan to Batangas (in spite of the BOI's
initial preference for Bataan) "upon the false and unlawful thesis that the foreign investor has
the right of final choice by plant site" (p. 13, Rollo), and (2) in allowing the LPC to shift
feedstock from naphtha only, to naphtha and/or LPG, despite the disadvantages of using
LPG. Petitioner prays the Court to annul the BOI's action and prohibit LPC from transferring
its plant site to Batangas and shifting feedstock to naphtha and/ or LPG (p. 22, Rollo).

The petition is not well-taken. There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code prohibiting
the amendment of the investor's application for registration of its project, such as, in this
case, its plant site, the feedstock to be used, and the capitalization of the project.

Neither does the law prohibit the BOI from approving the amended application.

Since the investor may amend its application and the BOI may approve or disapprove the
amendments, when may the BOI be deemed to have made a "final choice" regarding those
aspects of the project which have been changed?

Only the BOI or the Chief Executive is competent to answer that question, for the matter of
choosing an appropriate site for the investor's project is a political and economic decision
which, under our system of separation of powers, only the executive branch, as implementor
of policy formulated by the legislature (in this case, the policy of encouraging and inviting
foreign investments into our country), is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to
determine what is, or should be, the BOI's "final choice" of plant site and feedstock, for, as
we said in our decision in G.R. No. 88637:

This Court ... does not possess the necessary technology and scientific
expertise to detail e whether the transfer of the proposed BPC (now LPC)
petrochemical complex from Bataan to Batangas and the change of fuel from
'naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG' will be best for the project and for our
country. This Court is not about to delve into the economics and politics of
this case. It is concerned simply with the alleged violation of due process and
the alleged extra limitation of power and discretion on the part of the public
respondents in approving the transfer of the project to Batangas without
giving due notice and an opportunity to be heard to the vocal opponents of
that move." (pp. 445-446, Rollo of G.R. No. 88637.)

Although we did say in our decision in G.R. No. 88637 that the BOI, not the foreign investor,
has the right of "final choice" of plant site for the LPC project, the Court would be
overstepping the bounds of its jurisdiction were it to usurp the prerogative of the BOI to make
that choice or change it.

The petitioner's contention that the BOI abused its discretion in approving the transfer of the
LPC plant site to Batangas because the BOI, in effect, yielded to the investor's choice, is not
well taken. The record shows that the BOI approved the transfer because "the BOI
recognizes the justification given by the proponent of the project (p. 30, Rollo). The fact that
the petitioner disagrees with the BOI's decision does not make it wrong. The petitioner's
recourse against the BOI's action is by an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 1987
Investments Code), not to this Court.
This Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, may review and annul executive as well as
legislative actions when they clash with the Constitution or with existing laws, or when any
branch or instrumentality of the Government has acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution) but the Court
may not do more than that. It may not make the decisions that the executive should have
made nor pass the laws that the legislature should have passed. Not even the much
publicized "petroscam" involving the financial arrangements (not the issue in this case) for
the LPC project would justify the intervention of this court in a matter that pertains to the
exclusive domain of the executive department. The court does not have a panacea for all the
ills that afflict our country nor a solution for every problem that besets it.

Did the BOI gravely abuse its discretion in approving the LPC's amended application for
registration of its petrochemical project to warrant the intervention of this Court? Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Prov. of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Alafriz vs.
Nable, 70 Phil. 278).

In light of the LPC's justifications for the transfer of its project site and the shift from one kind
of feedstock to two, we are not prepared to hold that the BOI's decision to approve the
changes was the product of a capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment on its part,
despite the seemingly impressive arguments of the petitioner showing the advantages of
establishing the petrochemical plant in Bataan and of using naphtha only as feedstock. We
are not prepared to substitute the judgment of the BOI on this matter with one crafted by this
Court.

With regard to the scandalously liberal financial accommodations that local banks have
allegedly agreed to grant to the LPC (the so-called "petroscam") to enable it to raise a major
part of its capital requirements from local sources (hence, a betrayal of the people's
expectation that foreign investors will bring in foreign exchange to finance their projects in
this country) it is significant that the petitioner has not led an outcry for the disapproval and
cancellation of the project on this score. Apparently, the petitioner is not seriously disturbed
by the moral implications of the "scam" provided the petrochemical plant is set up in Bataan.

The decision of the BOI to allow the transfer of the LPC petrochemical project to Batangas
and shift feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG, may appear to the petitioner to
be extremely unwise and inadvisable, but the Court may not, for that reason annul the BOI's
action or prohibit it from acting on a matter that lies within its particular sphere of
competence, for the Court is not a judge of the wisdom and soundness of the actions of the
two other co-equal branches of the Government, but only of their legality and
constitutionality.

WHEREFORE, I vote to deny the petition for certiorari and prohibition for lack of merit.

Melencio-Herrera, Narvasa and Regalado, JJ., concur.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Consistent with my dissent in G.R. No. 88637, the first petition, I concur in the dissent herein
of Mme. Justice Aquino and merely wish to add that in its Decision, the majority has actually
imposed its own views on matters falling within the competence of a policy-making body of
the Government. It decided upon the wisdom of the transfer of the site of the proposed
project (pp. 8-9); the reasonableness of the feedstock to be used (pp. 8-9); the undesirability
of the capitalization aspect of the project (p. 10), and injected its own concept of the national
interest as regards the establishment of a basic industry of strategic importance to the
country (p. 13).

It is true that the judicial power embodied in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the
duty of Courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. By no means, however, does it vest in the Courts the
power to enter the realm of policy considerations under the guise of the commission of grave
abuse of discretion.

But this is exactly what the majority Decision has resulted in. It has made a sweeping policy
determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into what might be termed a
"government by the Judiciary," something never intended by the framers of the Constitution
when they provided for separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of
government and excluded the Judiciary from policy-making.