Towards a re-dating of Pompeys conquest of Jerusalem

D. Cameron

The conventional date for Pompeys conquest of Jerusalem has long been the Day of
Atonement, the 10th day of the Jewish month of Tishri (September/October), in the year 63 BC.
This date is the clearest and most obvious interpretation of the explicit dating information
supplied by the first-century AD Jewish historian, Flavius Josephus. Concerning Pompeys
victory, Josephus reports that the city was taken on the third month, on the day of the Fast, upon
the 179th Olympiad, when Caius Antonius and Marcus Tullius Cicero were consuls (Antiquities
14.66).

Although Josephus provides such detailed information concerning the timing of

Pompeys victory, the accuracy and meaning of much of this information has continued to be the
subject of considerable debate. The accuracy of the 179th Olympiad, generally seen as running
from the summer of 64 BC to the summer of 60 BC, has never really been in question. All the
evidence points to a victory within this time frame. The consular date has also gone essentially
unchallenged, although there have been varied opinions concerning how the consular year of
Antonius and Cicero would have lined up with the calendar year reckoned according to both our
modern Gregorian calendar and the Julian calendar which predated it; this issue will be
considered below. The day of the Fast has been the most controversial piece of information
supplied by Josephus. It is generally recognized that what Josephus meant by that phrase was
the Day of Atonement.1 What has been frequently challenged, however, has been the accuracy
of Josephus statement. The reason for this challenge lies primarily in the fact that, in addition to
the explicit dating information supplied by Josephus, we also have access to a considerable body
of information concerning Pompeys activities during this period. This information comes to us
from a number of Roman sources as well as from Josephus himself. The chronology is
complicated and the sources not always consistent or clear. Consequently, dates and fasts
ranging anywhere from January through October, 63 BC have been proposed, with the assumed
meaning of the third month being largely dictated by the interpretation of the day of the
Fast.2

What these varied dates demonstrate is that scholars have long been willing to question
the validity of at least some of the explicit information Josephus reports, namely the day and the
month. What will be proposed here, however, is that Pompeys conquest of the Jewish capital

1
Emil Schrer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ, (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), vol. 1, p.
239, n. 23.
2
January 2 (10th of Tebeth) R. Clover, The Sabbath and Jubilee Cycle, (Garden Grove, CA: Qadesh La Yahweh
Press, 2002), p. 253; March 5 (13th of Adar), Bieke Mahieu, Between Rome and Jerusalem, (Leuven: Peeters, 2012),
p. 103; July 25 (9th of Tammuz), Solomon Zeitlin, Megillat Taanit as a Source for Jewish Chronology and History
in the Hellenistic and Roman Periods, (Philadelphia, 1922), p. 27; a day of public fasting in August, Abraham
Schalit, Knig Herodes: Der Mann und sein Werk, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969), pp. 679, 767; a Sabbath during the
summer, various authors; The Day of Atonement (10 th of Tishri), Emil Schrer, The History of the Jewish People in
the Age of Jesus Christ, (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), vol. 1, p. 239, n. 23; A.M. Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign
Policy in the East 168 BC to AD 1, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1983) p. 216, n. 74 (in 63 BC this
would have been October 23 according to Richard A. Parker and Waldo H. Dubberstien, Babylonian Chronology:
620 BC AD 75, (Providence: Brown University Press, 1956), p. 44, but a month earlier, on September 23,
according to Avraham A. Akiva, Calendar for 6000 Years, ed. David Zakai (Hebrew; Jerusalem: Mossad Harav
Kook, 1976) p. 311.

1
took place not in 63 BC at all, but in the fall of 64 BC. In other words, it will be argued that the
only piece of explicit dating information that may need to be questioned is Josephus statement
about the consular year in which Pompeys victory occurred.

Evidence from Josephus

As indicated, Josephus himself provides some of the additional information that needs to
be considered in establishing a date for Pompeys victory. Later in Antiquities (14.448), in
recounting the details of Herods siege of Jerusalem (usually dated to 37 BC)3, Josephus
indicates that this victory took place 27 years to the day after Jerusalem fell to Pompey. The
difficulty here is that between the two conventional dates, 63 BC and 37 BC, there is a span of
only 26 years. This discrepancy has sometimes been addressed by suggesting that Josephus was
counting inclusively, meaning that he counted both the year of Pompeys victory and the year of
Herods victory as full years.4 However, there is little evidence that Josephus counted years in
this way, especially in this part of his history.5 Others, rightly questioning the assumption of
inclusive counting, have suggested that Josephus simply miscalculated and should have written
26 years rather than 27.6 If Josephus figure of 27 years is correct, however, this forces us to one
of two conclusions: either the end of Pompeys siege must be dated to 64 BC by modern
reckoning or the end of Herods must be considered to be 36 BC.

In support of a true 27-year span, one can, from the data Josephus provides, produce an
internally consistent timeline for the reigns of the later Hasmonean and Herodian rulers of
Judaea. This data is drawn from both the chronological references provided by Josephus within
his accounts of these reigns and also from the record of high priestly reigns he incorporates into
Antiquities 20. In reporting regnal years for this period, the data suggest that Josephus employed
a pre-dating system (sometimes referred to as non-accession year dating) similar to that reflected
in later rabbinic writings.7 In this system, the calendar year in which a ruler first came to power

3
This event is dated in similar fashion by Josephus: during the consulship at Rome of Marcus Agrippa and Caninus
Gallus, in the 185th Olympiad, in the third month, on the day of the Fast (Antiquities 14.487). Some alternative
dates have also been suggested for Herods victory, including dates in 36 BC (see W.E. Filmer, The Chronology of
the Reign of Herod the Great, in The Journal of Theological Studies (1966), pp. 283-298.
4
For example, Thomas Lewin, Fasti Sacri: Or a Key to the Chronology of the New Testament, (London: Longmans,
Green & Co., 1865), n. 524.
5
See Andrew E. Steinmann, From Abraham to Paul, (St. Louis: Concordia, 2011), p. 223: there is no evidence for
this [inclusive way of reckoning the partial years] and every other reign in this period, including those of the
Jewish high priests, is reckoned non-inclusively by Josephus; Ormond Edwards, Herodian Chronology, in
Palestine Exploration Quarterly; vol. 114 (1982) p. 35, where it is pointed out that the 1973 edition of Schrer
rejects the view that inclusive reckoning is involved in the Hasmonean era; W.E. Filmer, The Chronology of the
Reign of Herod the Great, in The Journal of Theological Studies (1966), pp. 291-294; cf. Harold W. Hoehner, The
Date of the Death of Herod the Great, in Jerry Vardaman, Edwin M. Yamauchi (eds.), Chronos, Kairos, Christos,
(Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1989), p. 105 for an attempt to maintain that Josephus used inclusive reckoning for
Herods reign but not for the Hasmoneans.
6
Schrer (2014), vol. 1, p. 286, n. 11.
7
The first of Nisan is the new year for kings and for festivals The rabbis taught: A king who ascends the throne
on the 29th of Adar must be considered to have reigned one year as soon as the first of Nisan comes, but if he
ascends the throne on the first of Nisan he is not considered to have reigned one year until the first of Nisan of the
following year The rabbis taught: If a king dies in Adar, and his successor ascends the throne in Adar,
(documents may be dated either) the (last) year of the (dead) king or the (first) year of the new king. If a king dies
in Nisan, and his successor ascends the throne in Nisan, the same is the case. But if a king dies in Adar, and his

2
was considered to be his first regnal year. The year of a rulers death or removal was therefore
reckoned as the first year of the succeeding ruler; the reign of the deceased or deposed ruler was
deemed to have ended at the end of the previous year. This had the effect of rounding off the
length of each reign to a number of full years, thereby allowing the sum of the length of multiple
reigns to remain accurate over long periods of time.8 The only variation to this in the rabbinic
system was when a ruler died very close to the new year, either just before or just after; then it
was permissible to reckon the year as a part of either the deceased or the new rulers reign. The
data from Josephus, as well as the later rabbinic tradition, also indicate that the regnal year began
with the Jewish month of Nisan (which corresponds to March/April in our calendar).

The table presented in Appendix A presents the data related to the rulers who most
immediately preceded and followed Pompeys siege. This information suggests that, by
Josephus reckoning, Aristobulus II was removed from office by Pompey and replaced by his
brother Hyrcanus II in the year beginning with the Jewish month of Nisan (March/April), 64 BC
and ending with the month of Adar (February/March), 63 BC much too early for the
conventional date for Pompeys victory, but also for nearly all of the other dates in 63 BC which
have been suggested. In addition, the length of the reigns indicated by Josephus for Hyrcanus II
and Antigonus II (the son of Aristobulus), which span the era between the two victories at
Jerusalem, add up to slightly more than 27 years (or 27 exactly when Antigonus reign is
appropriately rounded down to give the year of his removal to Herod). This further demonstrates
that Josephus was thinking in terms of 27 complete years between the conclusions of the two
sieges.

It must be acknowledged that there is some variation in the length of a few of the reigns
of the Hasmonean and Herodian periods as Josephus presents them: the reign of Hyrcanus I is
given variously as 33 years in War 1.68, 31 years in Antiquities 13.299, and as 30 years in
Antiquities 20.240; the reign of Aristobulus II is given as 3 years and 6 months in Antiquities
14.97 and as 2 (or 3) years and 3 months in Antiquities 20.243; the reign of Hyrcanus II, after he
was restored by Pompey, is given as 40 years in Antiquities 15.180 and as 24 years in Antiquities
20.245; the reign of Herods son, Archelaus, is given as 9 years in War 2.111-113 and as 10
years in Antiquities 17.242-347. In resolving the question of when Pompey captured the Jewish
capital, it is the length of Hyrcanus IIs reign which is of greatest concern. As noted by Ralph
Marcus, though. the suggestion of a 40 year reign for Hyrcanus following Pompeys victory is
clearly in error.9 In his comprehensive treatment of the Jewish high priesthood, James C.

successor does not ascend the throne until Nisan, then the year ending with Adar should be referred to the as the
year of the dead king, and from Nisan it should be referred to as that of his successor. Is this not self evident? The
case here mentioned refers to an instance where the new king was a son of the deceased, and , while ascending the
throne in Nisan, had been elected in the month of Adar, and being the kings son, it might be assumed that he was
king immediately after his election, and thus the following first of Nisan would inaugurate the second year of his
reign. He comes to teach us that such is not the case. (Tractate Rosh Hashana, chapter 1).
8
W.E. Filmer (1966, p. 290) argues that a non-accession year system results in the length of a reign appearing to be
one year longer than it really was, as both the year in which a ruler comes to power and the year in which that ruler
dies or is removed appear as a part of his reign. This would certainly be true when considering material emerging
from the rulers reign itself (such as documents or coins) since, not knowing it would be his last, a ruler would
understandably consider his final year to be a part of his reign. However, Josephus and others, writing from the
perspective of historians, would be able to freely assign the transitional year to the successor, giving this system the
benefits which Filmer assigns to an accession year (or post-dating) system.
9
Marcus (LCL) Antiquities 15.180, n. a.

3
VanderKam also dismisses the reference to forty years.10 It is simply not possible to see
Hyrcanus IIs rule or even his life, for that matter extending from Pompeys involvement into
the mid-twenties BC.

One of the other hints we have from Josephus that Pompeys victory occurred prior to the
fall of 63 BC comes from the fact that the town of Gadara, which had previously been conquered
by the Hasmonean ruler Alexander Jannaeus, was granted its independence and ordered to be
rebuilt by Pompey following the completion of his siege of Jerusalem (War 1.155; Antiquities
14.75).11 In gratitude, the people of Gadara adopted a new era for the city. The first year of this
era, as evidenced by both coins and inscriptions from Gadara, began with the equivalent of the
Jewish month of Tishri (September/October) in the fall of 64 BC.12 An era beginning in 64 BC
is also in evidence for the towns of Hippos and Scythopolis, both well inside what was until that
time the Hasmonean kingdom.13 Plutarch, in his biography of Pompey, places Pompeys creation
of a new foundation for some cities in the area following his account of the Roman generals
involvement in Judaea (Pompey 39), lending support to the order of events we find in Josephus.
Here, therefore, we have evidence from Josephus himself which supports an earlier date for
Pompeys victory, including the possibility of one in Tishri, 64 BC.

Evidence from Contemporary Sources

Some of the most important information concerning the timeline of events is to be found
in documents nearly contemporary with Pompeys victory, especially the works of Cicero, one of
the Roman consuls for 63 BC. We know from Ciceros speeches On the agrarian law, made in
January of that consular year, that some word of Pompeys successes had already found its way
back to Rome (1.2.6). However its also clear that, as far as Cicero knew, the war was still going
on at that time. The proposed law would have put on the auction block the royal lands of
Mithridates, which were in Paphlagonia, and in Pontus, and in Cappadocia. To this proposition,
Cicero responded Is it so indeed? When no law has been passed to that effect, when the words
of our commander-in-chief have not been heard, when the war is not yet over, when king
Mithridates, having lost his army, having been driven from his kingdom, is even now planning
something against us (2.19.52) Ciceros speeches at this time also indicate an awareness that
Syria had already come into Romes possession (2.29.80)14, confirming what we find in other
sources that Pompey had moved into Syria and laid claim to that territory during the preceding
consular year, namely 64 BC. It must be remembered, however, that Ciceros speeches merely
reflect the current state of knowledge in the capital, which was necessarily some weeks and, in
the winter, potentially even months behind the actual progress of events in the East. These
speeches therefore cannot be used to prove that Mithridates, Pompeys chief foe in the war, was

10
James C VanderKam, From Joshua to Caiaphas: High Priests after the Exile, (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress
Press, 2004), p. 374.
11
On the date of Gadaras conquest see Meron M. Piotrkowski, When did Alexander Yannai capture which
Gadara?, Jewish Studies Quarterly, Volume 18 (2011), pp. 266-276.
12
Schrer, (2014) v. 2, p. 134; Yiannis E. Meimaris, Chronological Systems in Roman and Byzantine Palestine and
Arabia: the evidence of the dated Greek inscriptions, (Athens: The National Hellenic Research Foundation, 1992),
pp. 79-81.
13
Schrer, (2014) v. 2, p. 132, 144.
14
Syria is here paralleled with the province of Asia as a source of revenue and as part of the public property to be
disposed of under the proposed law.

4
necessarily still alive in January of the consular year 63 BC, only that word of his death had not
yet reached Rome.

We also know, from Ciceros In Catilinam 2.11, delivered on November 9, 63 BC, that
by that time the war was known to be over and Mithridates was known to be dead: For there is
no nation for us to fear, no king who can make war on the Roman people. All foreign affairs are
tranquilized, both by land and sea, by the valour of one man. Domestic war alone remains. The
same thing is evident in Ciceros defence of Murena, also delivered late in that year.15 The
question to be asked is therefore When between January and November did word of Pompeys
final victory reach Rome? Though we lack any clear documentation concerning the arrival of
this news from the East, we are not left without resources in trying to provide a more precise
answer to our question.

First, 63 BC was also the year in which the conspiracy of Catiline resulted in the outbreak
of civil war in Italy. Information about the conspiracy of Catiline comes primarily from the
writings of Cicero and from an account of the Bellum Catilinae written by Sallust (86-35 BC).
Though seemingly anticipated by Cicero some months earlier, Catilines plots first become
public in October of that consular year. On October 21, the senate armed the consuls with the
senatus consultum ultimum to defend the state from harm (Sallust 29). Word of armed
insurrection then reached the senate in the first days of November (Sallust 30). On November 9,
Cicero addressed the senate openly about the domestic war that Rome now faced (In Catilinam
2.11).

Now, in his work De Divinatione (1.47), Cicero, placing the words in his brothers
mouth, indicates that a few months before the start of this domestic conflict, an augury (the
augurium salutis) had predicted just such a civil war. Though the reference to a few months is
far from precise, it suggests that the augury would have taken place sometime during the month
of July, roughly 3-4 months before the senate granted emergency powers to the consuls and
received word that an armed force was mustering north of the city at the town of Faesulae.16
During this period of the Roman republic, consular elections for the following year were
typically held in July (Cicero, Ad Atticus 1.1, Ad Familiares 8.4; cf. Sallust 17). Cicero

15
Nadav Sharon (The Conquests of Jerusalem by Pompey and Herod, Jewish Studies Quarterly, vol. 21 (2014) no.
3, p. 203, n. 28) suggests this defence was made between November 8 and December 3.
16
According to Tacitus (Annals 12.23), by the time the augurium was reinstituted in the first century AD by
Augustus, it had been neglected for 75 years. This seems to be a clear reference to its observance in 63 BC.
Although it seems that the augurium was intended to be observed annually, there is only one other documented
occurrence of the augurium in the century preceding Ciceros consular year, that of 160 BC (Plutarch, Aemelius
Paullus 39). Some have suggested that the augury was supposed to be performed on August 5, the day of sacrifice
to Salus, the goddess of safety and welfare, though the observance of the augurium may have predated her
deification ("Salus". Encyclopdia Britannica. Encyclopdia Britannica Online. Encyclopdia Britannica Inc.,
2015. Web. 09 Dec. 2015 <http://www.britannica.com/topic/Salus>). Jrg Rpke (Domi militiae: Die religise
Konstruktion des Krieges in Rom, (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1990), p. 143) suggests that the augury was observed in the
fall, but David Wardle (ed., Clarindon Ancient History Series: On divination, Book 1, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), p. 361) acknowledges that this simply does not fit Ciceros text and suggests that perhaps Cicero
requested an early celebration on hearing of the end of Pompeys campaign, implying a summer date for the
augury and consequently that word of victory had reached the capital by that time. The information supplied by Dio
Cassius suggests a fixed date would be unlikely given the military predilections of Rome. Given the scarcity of data
concerning any annual timing for the augury, it seems best to let Cicero speak for himself.

5
apparently postponed the election in 63 BC because of his misgivings concerning Catiline
(Plutarch, Cicero 14.5), but its likely that this delay was only a matter of a few days and that the
election still took place during the appointed month.17 It is therefore possible that the augury
was performed as a part of or during the lead-up to these elections.18

This general timeframe for the augury is supported by another section of Ciceros De
Divinatione (1.11), which speaks of several portents, seemingly in sequential order, which
occurred during that consular year: first, Ciceros participation in the Feast of the Latins just after
he took office in January19, then an eclipse of the moon20, followed by two undated portents, and
lastly a tremor in the fruit-laden body of the earth suggesting late spring before the grain
harvests began in June. Although the augury itself is not specifically mentioned, the next
reference in this list is to dreadful predictions and gloomy forecasts, which certainly sound
like the results of an augury.

It is noteworthy that this augury is also mentioned by Dio Cassius, who indicates that it
was being held for the first time after a very long interval. Of particular importance are the
conditions Dio outlines for this augury to take place. The augurium salutis, he says, was
observed on that day of each year on which no army was going out to war, or was preparing
itself against any foes, or was fighting a battle (37.24.1-25.2). When the augury had last taken
place is not known, but Dios statement suggests that it definitely could not have been performed
while Romes long conflict with Mithridates was raging. In fact, the required conditions indicate
that the augury could only have been performed if word of the cessation of hostilities in the East
had already reached Rome. This requires that news of Pompeys victory had reached the capital
by July at the very latest. In connection with the augury, Dio also mentions that The Romans
had a respite from war for the remainder of the year (37.24.1). Its difficult to see how this
would have been a meaningful statement if the conclusion to Pompeys campaign did not occur
until the fall, or even later that summer, since word of his victory could then hardly have reached
the capital before hints of the trouble with Catiline began to be evident; such a limited respite
would hardly have been worth writing about. Dio, therefore, supports what we find in Cicero a
final declaration of Pompeys victory arriving in Rome between late January at the earliest and
July at the latest.

That Pompeys campaigning in the East was known to be over by the time of the consular
elections in 63 BC is also suggested by Plutarch, who mentions rumours of Pompeys impending
return with his army during the lead-up to the elections (Cicero 14.1). While Pompeys return to
Italy would not actually take place until sometime either in late 62 or 61 BC21, its hard to see

17
J.T. Ramsay, Sallusts Bellum Catilinae, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) p. 18.
18
Karl Lowenstein, (The Governance of Rome, Springer Science & Business Media (2012), p. 122) indicates that
the entire election schedule consumed three to four weeks.
19
See Livy, The History of Rome, 21.63, 22.1, 25.12.
20
A lunar eclipse visible from Rome occurred on May 3, 63 BC by modern reckoning; a partial eclipse was also
visible on Nov. 7, 64 BC.
21
The precise date is not known. Plutarch (Cato 29.1) places Pompey in Asia early in the consular year for 62 BC.
Cicero (Ad. Fam. 5.7) similarly locates Pompey in Asia in April, 62 BC (see also Dio 37.43.1). What is uncertain is
whether Asia in these sources refers to the province or the continent; it is clearly used for the latter by Plutarch in
Pompey 45.5 and by Velleius Peterculus (2.40.4) and perhaps by Appian (Roman History 12.91). According to
Appian (12.116), Pompey distributed money to his army at the end of the winter (63/62 BC?). Pompey then

6
how these rumours would have been given any credence at all in July, 63 BC if word of his final
success had not already reached Rome.

Something else we see by 63 BC is the return to Rome of a number of Pompeys

principle lieutenants. These included both Quintus Caecilius Metellus Celer and Quintus
Caecilius Metellus Nepos Iunior. Metellus Celer had been placed in command of one of the
three divisions of Pompeys army during the winter of 66/65 BC22 but was in Rome to be elected
praetor for 63 BC, meaning his return must have occurred by the first half of 64 BC. Metellus
Nepos was elected tribune for 62 BC (Plutarch, Cato 26.2), and therefore may be assumed to
have been present in Rome for the elections in July, 63.23 Upon taking office in December,
Metellus Nepos would propose that Pompey and his forces be recalled in order to restore order in
the capital (Plutarch Cato 26.2; Dio 37.43.1). This proposal was not adopted by the senate, but
confirms that major efforts in the East were known to be over by the end of 63 BC.

Cicero also indicates that, when news of final victory did reach the capital, it came by
way of correspondence from Pompey himself (De Provinciis Consularibus 27); this
correspondence caused the senate to declare an extended supplication, knowing that all wars
both by sea and land were happily terminated. The announcement of this supplication also
demonstrates that word of victory in the East arrived in Rome prior to any hint of the impending
civil war became public. As well, the expansive all wars makes it hard to believe that Pompey
could still have been involved in a lengthy siege outside Jerusalem, and potentially anticipating
an expedition to Nabataea, when this correspondence was sent.

From Cicero, we also find the suggestion that Pompey had refused to consider the war to
be over until he had personal confirmation that Mithridates was dead: Therefore, Pompeius
himself, having taken possession of [Mithridates] kingdom, having driven the enemy away from
all his coasts, and from all his usual places of resort still thought that so much depended on his
single life, that though, by his victory, he had got possession of everything which he had
possessed, or had approached, or even had hoped for, still he did not think the war entirely over
till he drove him from life also (Pro Murena 16). The same attitude seems to have been present
in the senate itself: And do you, O Cato, think lightly of this man as an enemy, when so many
generals warred against him for so many years, with so long a series of battles? when, though
driven out and expelled from his kingdom, his life was still thought of such importance, that it
was not till the news arrived of his death, that we thought the war over? (emphasis added) (Pro
Murena 16). Given that Pompeys predecessor, Lucullus, had plainly declared victory over

marched to Ephesus, embarked for Italy, and hastened to Rome. Other sources, however, indicate a more
leisurely journey with Pompey spending time in Mytilene, Rhodes and Athens (Plutarch, Pompey 42; cf. Dio
37.20.1) on his way back to Italy. Information concerning the consular elections for 61 BC (held in July, 62 BC)
indicates that Pompey may have been approaching Italy at that time (Dio 37.44.3; Plutarch, Pompey 44, Cato 30.1).
From a letter of Cicero (Ad Atticus 1.12), it is clear that Pompey had not entered Rome as of January 1, 61 BC, but
references to his divorce in the same letter suggest he may have been in Italy at that time (cf. Plutarch, Pompey 42).
It is likely that Pompey reached Italy in mid-62 BC but was not permitted to enter Rome until his triumph was held
(Plutarch, Pompey 44), which Pliny (Natural History 7.27, 37.6) dates to September 28/29, 61 BC. Dio (37.49.1)
implies that Pompey entered Italy just before the consular elections for 60 BC (i.e. July, 61 BC) but the reference is
not clear enough to dictate a date.
22
Dio 36.53.5; 36.54.2
23
Karl Lowenstein (The Governance of Rome, Springer Science & Business Media (2012), p. 122) indicates that
July, as the date for the election of the tribunes, had been traditional since 449

7
Mithridates prematurely (Dio 36.46.1), Pompey wisely refused to make the same mistake. It
seems entirely likely, therefore, that no announcement of final victory was sent to the senate until
Pompey had arrived in Pontus, where the body of Mithridates had been kept unburied and
awaiting Pompeys inspection (Plutarch Pompey 41; Appian 12.113; Dio 37.14.1).

A Proposed Timeline

If Pompeys dispatch from Pontus announcing final victory reached Rome in time for
rumours of his return to be circulating prior to the consular elections in 63 BC, and early enough
for arrangements to be made for the observance of the augurium salutis in July, it must have
been sent no later than early May a voyage from Pontus to Rome by sea typically taking 8-10
weeks.24 This, in turn, would require that Pompey had arrived in Pontus no later than mid-to-late
April.

Unfortunately, it cant be known with certainty how long Pompey may have been in
Pontus before the dispatch was sent. On the one hand, news of such importance would seem to
have required almost immediate communication with the capital. On the other hand, it appears
that some amount of time had to have passed following Pompeys arrival before he would have
been ready to publicly declare the war to be over. For instance, while he was making
arrangements for Mithridates to be buried (Plutarch Pompey 42; Appian 12.113; Dio 37.14.1),
Pompey was also receiving the surrender of those of Mithridates garrisons which had
determined to only relinquish their charge to Pompey personally (Dio 37.20.1, cf. 37.14.1). The
surrender of these garrisons would have been a necessary precursor to any declaration of
triumph. It would have taken some time for word of Pompeys arrival in Pontus to circulate
among these hold-out garrisons, and additional time would have been required for delegations
from these garrisons to reach the Roman general; 2-3 weeks would not be excessive given the
distances involved. In addition, as Jakob Munk Htje has pointed out, The elimination of
Mithridates terminated Pompeius legal grounds of the Lex Manilia for campaigning in the
East.25 Sending word of victory to Rome may therefore have been to invite a measure of
interference from the capital in the settling of the republics new eastern territories (as had been
proposed in the agrarian laws earlier that year); such interference does not seem to be something
Pompey would have welcomed, and it may therefore have seemed prudent to Pompey to delay
any announcement of the wars conclusion until some of his plans for the new provinces had
been set in motion. Regardless of our uncertainty about how long Pompey may have waited to
send his letter, if we assume Pompey was in Pontus no later than mid-April, this necessarily
forces his victory at Jerusalem back even earlier.

We do not know what route Pompey used to reached Pontus from Judaea. Plutarch
merely indicates that his route took him through the intervening provinces (Pompey 41), though
this seems to imply that he went by land rather than sea. Josephus states that he went by way of
Cilicia, but Josephus also has him going from Cilicia straight back to Rome (War 1.157-158) so
the value of his information must be considered highly suspect in this instance. Several routes

24
Lionel Casson, Speed under sail of ancient ships, Transactions of the American Philological Association, Vol.
82 (1951) pp. 136-148.
25
Jakob Munk Htje (ed.), Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom (Aarhus, Denmarl: Aarhus University Press,
2009) , p. 121.

8
for the journey from Judaea to Pontus are possible. One would certainly be north through Syria
into Cilicia and thence via the Cilician Gates into the uplands of the Anatolian plateau and north
to Pontus; such a journey would have required roughly 8 weeks if Pompey was accompanied by
a significant body of troops,26 though a smaller force might have been able to make the journey
somewhat faster. However, this would not have been the most direct route. Other routes would
have taken Pompey north from Syria through Commagene in order to approach Pontus from the
south or south-east. That Pompey may have proceeded in this way is actually suggested by the
mention of Commagene on his route south to Syria (Appian, Roman History 12.106); Appians
reference in the same section to a crossing of the Taurus Mountains need not imply that Pompey
crossed them by way of their most famous pass (the Cilician Gates) as this range extends
eastwards all the way to the upper reaches of the Euphrates and the Tigris, precisely where these
other routes would have taken him. Several passes through the mountains existed in
Commagene and were in regular use prior to the Roman conquest.27 Allowing for roughly 8
weeks for Pompey to reach Pontus from Judaea places Pompeys departure from Jerusalem no
later than mid-February of that consular year. This, in turn, eliminates nearly all of the dates in
that year which have been proposed for Pompeys victory, and forces us to locate the end of the
siege either in the winter of 63/64 BC or, as is being proposed here, in the fall of 64 BC.

Additional support for a fall victory, over against the various spring and summer dates,
actually comes from Schrer. In examining the various accounts of Pompeys dealings with
Judaea, Schrer concluded: even if it is not proved that the event [Pompeys conquest of
Jerusalem] took place on the Day of Atonement, it must nevertheless be maintained that it
occurred in the late autumn. For the long sequence of events between Pompeys start in the
spring, and the conquest of the city, cannot have happened within the space of a few
months.28 Schrer, of course, is referring to the fall of 63 BC, based largely on the consular
date and narrative of Josephus. His argument for a fall victory, however, would also hold for 64
BC; the sequence of events described by Josephus, beginning with Pompeys meeting with the
Hasmonean brothers, Hyrcanus and Aristobulus, sometime in the spring in Damascus and
leading up to and through a siege of three months at Jerusalem necessarily brings us to the fall of
the year.

It should also be mentioned here that the case for Pompeys siege having ended on (or
even about) the Day of Atonement has been significantly buttressed by the recent work of Nadav

26
Louis E. Lord (The date of Julius Caesars departure from Alexandria in The Journal of Roman Studies
Vol. 28, Part 1 (1938), pp. 19-40) presents a detailed analysis of the distances and times involved in a journey from
Tarsus in Cilicia to Zela in Pontus, 665 km over 28 days of travel. Pompeys journey from Jericho to Amisus would
have been almost twice as long.
27
William Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, (London: John Murray, 1890) indicates that three
passes, leading across the eastern part of Taurus into Kommagene, can be traced in the ancient records, one from
Kokussos to Germanicea, a second from Arabissos to Germanicea, which is far more frequently mentioned and
evidently much more important, and a third leading directly south from Melitene to Samosata (p. 276). The pass at
Arabissos he identifies as the main pass over Taurus (p. 55) and suggests it may have been in use by the Hittites
(p. 35), in other words as early as the 2nd millennium BC. Shai Har-El, Struggle for Domination in the Middle East:
the Ottoman-Mamluk War 1485-91, (Leiden: Brill, 1995), p. 36, also points to this pass at Arabissus as part of the
ancient trade route leading to Aleppo in Syria. Though the weather is colder at Arabissos (Afsin) than at the Cilician
Gates (Gulek), precipitation during the months of October to December is less than half as great and daytime highs
remain above freezing even during December and January.
28
Schrer (2014), v. 1, p. 239, n. 23.

9
Sharon. Sharon challenges the view that Josephus reference to the day of the fast arose
because of a mistaken reading of a non-Jewish source, presumably Strabo. As Sharon
acknowledges, one does find in some non-Jewish sources the mistaken perception that the
Sabbath was a fast day29, and Strabo is clearly identified by Josephus as the source for some of
the information regarding Pompeys activities in Syria and Judaea. However, Sharon contends
that the fact that Josephus kept the wording of Strabo and did not change it to Sabbath
indicates that he indeed understood the phrase as referring to Yom Kippur [the Day of
Atonement], in accordance with his own terminology elsewhere.30 Analyzing Strabos
surviving account of the siege (Geography 16.2.40), Sharon concludes that the very description
of Pompey as watching for or awaiting the day of the fast gives the impression of a specific,
unique day, not one that comes around every seven days.31 Sharons grammatical analysis of
Strabos statement supports this conclusion.32 Sharon also argues that an assault on Yom Kippur
provides the best explanation for the seemingly slight resistance encountered by the Roman
assault, as a greater degree of self-defence would have been expected if the temple precinct
merely fell on a weekly Sabbath.33 Taken together, Sharons arguments maintain as a strong
possibility an end to Pompeys siege on the Day of Atonement, and suggest that this was not
only Josephus understanding, but Strabos as well. Sharons case is supported by the earlier
conclusions of A.N. Sherwin-White: Josephus as a learned Jew cannot have mistaken the Day
of Atonement for a Sabbath, and he would hardly depend on a written tradition of pagan authors
for the date of this fearful event34

The Issue of Calendars

Another factor that now needs to be considered is that the timeline presented thus far is
based largely on dates coming from the near-contemporary works of Cicero and Sallust. These
dates emerge from the pre-Julian calendar of the late republic. In 46 BC, Julius Caesar did away
with this calendar and replaced it with the Julian calendar. In doing so, Caesar brought to an end
the years of confusion which had resulted from the Roman calendar getting weeks ahead of the
seasons of the solar year. Caesar corrected for this by putting off the end of that particular
calendar year by 90 days (over an ordinary Roman year of 355 days) in order to let the sun
catch up. Several reconstructions of the pre-Julian calendar have been attempted over the
years, with varying results35. Most, however, suggest that dates for 63 BC according to the pre-
Julian calendar corresponded with Julian dates which would have been several weeks earlier.36

29
Sharon (2014) , p. 195.
30
Sharon (2014), p. 200.
31
Sharon (2014), p. 207, n. 42.
32
Sharon (2014), p. 207-208.
33
Sharon (2014), p. 196.
34
A.N. Sherwin-White (1983), p. 216, n. 74.
35
Recent efforts include A.W Lintott, Nundinae and the Chronology of the Late Roman Republic, in The Classical
Quarterly, v. 18/1 (May 1968), pp. 189-194; P. BrindAmour, Le calendrier romain: rechereches chronologiques
(Ottawa: ditions de lUniversit dOttawa, 1983); G. Radke, Fasti Romani (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1990); Chris
Bennett, Zeitschrift fr Papyrologie und Epigraphik, Bd. 147, (2004), pp. 169-174.
36
Bennett (p. 174) suggest 21 days earlier; Lintott (p. 190) suggests approximately 28 days earlier; Radke (Augustus
und das Gttliche, in Anrike und Universalgeschishte (Mnster: Aschendorff, 1972), pp. 258-263, suggests more
than 80 days.

10
 Even with the smallest modification suggested by these reconstructions, our entire
timeline needs to be backed up by three to four weeks. The dating of the exposure of Catilines
conspiracy and the report that troops were mustering to the north of Rome would then fall in the
beginning of October. This in turn would place the date of the augury sometime in June. The
sending of Pompeys dispatch would consequently need to be dated to, at the latest, early April.
In turn, this would require Pompeys departure from Judaea to have occurred no later than the
end of January, but quite possibly weeks earlier, placing it sometime in the latter part of 64 BC.
This further restricts the possible dates for Pompeys capture of the Jewish capital to two of those
suggested: either the 10th of Tebeth (January 2, 63 BC) or the 10th of Tishri (October 4) during
the fall of 64 BC37.

If the dispatch was indeed sent no later than the early spring of 63 BC, it may well be that
Pompey actually chose to wait for the opening of the sea lanes before he sent word of
Mithridates demise to Rome. The safe sailing season on the Mediterranean traditionally
began in March and was finished by October or November.38 Apuleius, for instance, indicates
that, in some locations, the opening of the sailing season was celebrated on the 5th of March with
the Navigium Isidis (Metamorphoses 11.8.17).39 Other sources offer February 8, March 10 and
even April 1 as the dates for the seasonal inauguration.40 For the Jews, there is some suggestion
that the season actually ended with the Day of the Atonement: Since much time had been lost
and sailing was now dangerous, because even the Fast had already gone by, Paul advised them,
saying, Sirs, I can see that the voyage will be with much danger and much heavy loss, not only
of the cargo and the ship, but also of our lives (Acts of the Apostles 27:9-10). Though some
sailing certainly did take place on the Mediterranean during the winter months, especially in
times of great need, if Pompeys arrival in Pontus occurred in the late fall or early winter of 64
BC, it may well have seemed imprudent if not foolhardy to Pompey to send his dispatch
immediately, especially if he wished to retain a free-hand in settling affairs in the East. While
the message could also have been sent by land, this would have required a journey of roughly
2,500 km between Amisus and Rome, including a winter crossing of the Adriatic. With Pompey
arriving in Pontus in the late fall or early winter, however, this still would not have placed his
message in Rome any earlier than sometime in February, 63 BC (equivalent to March in the pre-
Julian calendar), a timeline not incompatible with what we know from Cicero and Sallust). The
suggestion being made here, then, is that Pompeys announcement of victory arrived in Rome
either in the late winter of 63 BC (if sent by land) or by late spring (if sent by sea).

It has occasionally been suggested that, depending on the magnitude of the discrepancies
in the calendars, Pompeys victory at Jerusalem in the fall of 64 BC may actually have occurred
very close to the beginning of the new consular year, which Radke would place in the first half

37
Parker and Dubberstien (1956), p. 44.
38
James Beresford, The Ancient Sailing Season, (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 9.
39
See Mladen Tomorad, Egyptian Cults of Isis and Serapis in Roman Fleets, in A. Amenta, M.M. Luiselli, M.N.
Sordi (eds.), L'acqua nell'antico Egitto: vita, rigenerazione, incantesimo, medicamento - Proceedings of the First
International Conference for Young Egyptologists (Chianciano Terme, 15-18 October 2003), (Rome: LErma di
Bretschneider, 2005), pp. 241-253.
40
Bieke Mahieu (2012), p. 79, n. 141-143.

11
of October, 64 BC by modern reckoning.41 In this case, the two sieges would then indeed have
been separated by 27 full years according to the Jewish calendar, but only 26 years by the
confused reckoning of the Romans. Though appealing, such a degree of discrepancy between
the calendars seems unlikely given the rough consensus of the other reconstructions, which place
the discrepancy at about a month.

The Accuracy of Josephus Dating

As weve already seen, there is good evidence for a fall 64 BC victory even if the
discrepancy of calendars did not place Pompeys victory within the bounds of Ciceros consular
year. In Antiquities, we find Josephus imposing consular and Olympiad dates on a narrative
which had already been set down in his earlier work, War, the major source of which is likely to
have been Nicholaus of Damascus. By the time Josephus wrote Antiquities some twenty years
later, however, he seems to have become concerned with drawing on other, recognizably non-
Jewish sources, such as Strabo and Livy. Its also in Antiquities that Josephus began to apply
these Olympiad and consular dates to his narrative. In doing so, however, it is clear that he was
not entirely successful.

There are thirteen Olympiad dates in Josephus writings: 1 in War, 10 in Antiquities and 2
more in his later work Against Apion: (War 1.415; Antiquities 12.248, 12.321 (two dates),
13.236, 14.4, 14.66, 14.389, 14.487, 15.109, 16.136; Against Apion 1.184, 2.17). The Olympiad
references in Apion are, in fact, citations of Castor of Rhodes and Apion himself, and therefore
cannot be used as evidence of Josephus own reckoning system.42 That leaves the ones in War
and Antiquities. Of these, 8 would seem to accurately locate the event identified43, leaving three:
Antiquities 12.321, 13.236, 14.389. Of these, one (Antiquities 14.389) is almost universally
recognized as being wrong; here Josephus has applied an Olympiad date to events which actually
took place some months afterwards, the Olympiad having concluded in the summer and the
events described having taken place the following fall and winter. The other two references
(Antiquities 12.321, 13.236) are both associated with events related to the Seleucid Era. The
Seleucid Era itself seems to have been reckoned in three different ways depending on who was
doing the reckoning: as starting in Nisan, 312 BC; in Tishri, 312 BC; or in Nisan, 311 BC.44
This means that if Josephus (or his source) made no distinction between the various reckonings
of Seleucid dates, a mistake of a year could easily have occurred. What we find, however, is that
in one of these references, Josephus Olympiad date is more than a year too late (Antiquities
13.236). Here again we simply have to assume an error on the part of Josephus or his source.

The application of consular dates requires even more precision than applying the much
broader Olympiad dates. In all his works, Josephus attaches consular dates to only four events.
All of these appear in Antiquities 14 (14.4, 14.66, 14.389, 14.487). Antiquities 14 covers the
years during which significant Roman influence began to be felt in the affairs of Judaea, and this
41
This is also argument put forward by Henry Brown, Ordo Sacerdotum: a treatise on the chronology of the Holy
Scriptures, (London: John W. Parker, 1844) following Joseph Justus Scalinger, De emendatione temporum (1583)
who placed January 1, 63 BC of the pre-Julian calendar on either October 13 or 23, 64 BC.
42
Bieke Mahieu (2012), p. 53.
43
There are, however, some questions about Antiquities 14.4. See below and Appendix A.
44
See Lester L. Grabbe, Maccabean Chronology: 167-164 or 168-165 BCE, in The Journal of Biblical Literature,
vol. 110, no. 1 (1991), pp. 59-74; John R. Bartlett, 1 Maccabees, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press (1998), p. 36.

12
may be why Josephus chose to include consular dates for this period; alternately, Romes
involvement may have meant that Josephus was able to draw on Roman sources which would
have included consular dates for some of the events he described. The first (14.4) concerns the
year in which Hyrcanus II began his high-priesthood. Unless Josephus actually meant the year
Hyrcanus was appointed either co-regent with or heir-apparent to his mother, this reference is in
error: Hyrcanus took up the office of high priest upon the death of his father in 76/75 BC, seven
years prior to the date Josephus supplies. The next date (14.66) is the one associated with
Pompeys victory and, as weve seen, its accuracy is somewhat in question. The third (14.389)
covers Herods appointment as king in Rome; significant arguments can be made that the
consular date supplied here, as with the Olympiad date, is too early.45 The final instance
(14.487) is the date of Herods victory at Jerusalem, which most, but not all, accept as accurate.

Joseph Sievers has presented a structural comparison of these four passages46; in this, he
notes that The indication of the particular event is followed by the Olympiad dating, followed
by the consular dating, every time in about the same form. In the fourth example [related to
Herods siege], consular dating precedes indication of the Olympiad. These are the only four
times Josephus uses the verb w47 These chronological indications, especially in the last
two cases, appear as insertions in a text that otherwise follows the War very closely. He goes
on to say that with respect to these four references it appears Josephus here used an independent
chronological source.48

It has been pointed out that Olympiads and consular dates are found only in accounts
which go back to Nicholaus and Strabo49 and therefore one or the other of these may be the
source. However, as Jane Bellemore points out, The extant works of Nicolaus and Strabo
unfortunately show little, if any evidence of international dating.50 Bellemore herself
suggests Livy as a possible source for Josephus consular dates.51 Schrer agrees that there are
problems with some of these chronological synchronisms, and suggests that they may have been
derived from a chronological handbook, possibly that of Castor..52 Regardless of where these

45
W.E. Filmer, The Chronology of the Reign of Herod the Great, in The Journal of Theological Studies, NS 17
(1966) pp. 283-298. Some of the strongest arguments for placing Herods appointment in Rome in the next consular
year come from trying to align the chronology of Herods movements with that of Ventidius, who was appointed in
the spring of 39 BC to drive the Parthians out of Asia Minor and Syria and who, according to Josephus himself, had
already been in Jerusalem prior to Herods return to Judaea from Rome. It seems, therefore, that Josephus has
significantly condensed Herods time in Rome, as well as possibly dating it too early; Herods return to Judaea can
hardly have been before the autumn of 39 BC. See James E. Seaver, Publius Ventidius. Neglected Roman Military
Hero, in The Classical Journal, Vol. 47, No. 7 (Apr., 1952), pp. 275-280+300.
46
Joseph Sievers, A Synopsis of Portions of War, Antiquities, and 1-2 Maccabees: Problems and Results, seminar
paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature 2000, Nashville, p. 8.
47
w, meaning to be consul, Henry George Liddell; Robert Scott [1940], A Greek-English Lexicon;
Machine readable text (Trustees of Tufts University, Oxford)
48
Joseph Sievers (2000), p. 9.
49
http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/8905-josephus-flavius. The reference to Strabo here is not to his
geographical work, of which copies do exist, but to his History.
50
Jane Bellemore, Josephus, Pompey and the Jews, in Historia: Zeitschrift fr Alte Geschichte, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1st
Qtr., 1999), p. 116, n. 79.
51
Bellemore (1999), p. 113; cf. Antiquities 14.68.
52
Schrer, (2014) v. 1, p. 200-201, n. 1.

13
dates came from, though, their accuracy (or inaccuracy) has been the source of a great deal of the
contention regarding the timeline for events covered by this part of Antiquities.

What all of this means is that, with regard to Olympiad and consular dates, Josephus was
making use of dating systems in Antiquities which seem to have been borrowed somewhat
uncritically, and which, when applied to his established narrative, give evidence of having been
applied imperfectly.53 Indeed, since others have been willing to consider Josephus to have been
mistaken in his calculations (27 or 26 years), in his reference to the Fast, and certainly in respect
to some of his Olympiad dates, there seems to be little reason to assume that his consular
references are somehow beyond question. Whether the consular year of Antonius and Cicero
actually began prior to Pompeys victory or not can therefore not be considered a decisive factor
in arguing for a victory in the fall of 64 BC. However, neither should it be the decisive factor in
claiming a date in 63 BC.

A Journey in Late 64 BC?

Some might argue against the timeline being presented here based on a different factor
altogether: the difficulty of a late fall journey between Judaea and Pontus.54 Such a march
cannot be ruled out however, especially given the importance of confirming that Romes most
tenacious enemy had finally been removed, and of making sure that no one stepped into the
power vacuum created by his demise. If it was attempted, the passage of the Cilician Gates
might well have been challenging due to the early arrival of snow in those parts. However, as
indicated above, it is by no means certain that Pompey made use of the Cilician Gates to cross
the Taurus mountains. As suggested, Pompey may well have passed northwards through
Commagene. We also know that the army of Alexander the Great was able to operate in central
Asia Minor during the winter of 334/333 BC, and it seems that Pompeys army itself may have
been active in Pontus during the winter of 65/64 BC (Dio 37.7.5). Pompeys lieutenant,
Afranius, admittedly with difficulty due to a lack of provisions, journeyed across northern Syria
that same winter (Dio 37.5.5) having been dispatched, most likely, from Lesser Armenia that
fall. It may also be that another lieutenant, Scaurus, brought his troops from Armenia to Syria
during the winter of 66/65 BC (War 1.127). All of this provides ample indication that travel in
the region during the months of October and November would have been entirely possible if the
need presented itself.

Considering our Other Sources

Its evident from the data presented thus far that a departure for Pontus from Judaea in the
fall of 64 BC, following a conquest of Jerusalem earlier that season fits much of what Josephus
tells us, as well as what we know about what was going on in Rome at the time. Josephus

53
Bellemore ((1999), p. 113, n. 65) points to issues Josephus may have had in reconciling his Greek and Latin
dates.
54
As cited by Sharon ((2014) no. 3., p. 204), David Magie (Roman Rule in Asia Minor (2 vols.; Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1950) 2.1229) rejects Yom Kippur as the date of the fall of Jerusalem, due to the fact that Pompey
must have reached Amisus in Asia Minor before winter began, since he needed to cross the Taurus before snow
blocked the Cilician Gates pass. Therefore, it is claimed, he had to leave Judea before Yom Kippur. In 64 BC, the
Day of Atonement likely fell on October 4, two and a half weeks earlier than the date assumed by Magie for 63 BC,
making a fall journey to Amisus far more plausible.

14
statement that 27 years separated the conclusions of the two sieges, his timeline for the reigns of
Jerusalems Hasmonean rulers, the Pompeian era of Gadara, the witness of Cicero and Sallust,
even Schrers timeline for the year of the siege all point in this direction. Even more, this data
narrows the window in time for Pompeys victory significantly; taken together they eliminate
nearly all of the suggested dates in 63 BC.

However, given that it has so long been insisted that Pompeys victory over the Jewish
capital took place in 63 BC, it has to be asked whether a victory in the fall of 64 BC can be
reconciled with the data we have from other sources concerning the events both before and after
the siege. This means taking a careful look at the dating evidence in the various accounts of
Pompeys campaign.

The general timeline for Pompeys campaign against Mithridates is reasonably clear from
the spring of 66 BC until the fall of 65 BC. During 66 BC, Pompey pursued Mithridates across
Pontus, brought Tigranes to terms in Armenia, and continued his pursuit of the Pontic monarch
toward Colchis. In 65 BC, Mithridates retreated toward the Crimean Bosporus, while Pompey
engaged the Albanians and the Iberians and commanded a naval blockade of Mithridates
remaining territory. It is only as Pompey began to make his way back west from the vicinity of
the Caspian Sea that significant questions start to arise. As A.N. Sherwin-White puts it, The
activities of Pompeius after his Caucasian campaign (against the Albanians) in 65 through to his
withdrawal from Syria are left remarkably obscure by the sources. This, in itself, ought to
make us cautious about accepting any timeline too readily. Sherwin-White goes on to say that
the only phase of activity that is at all adequately documented is the intervention of Pompeius in
Judaea, for which the narrative histories of Josephus fill in the story55 As weve seen and
will continue to see, the need to rely so heavily on Josephus is precisely what has created some
of the issues we face in establishing an accurate date for Pompeys victory.

It seems clear that Pompeys westward trek from the Caucasus began during the mid- to
late summer of 65 BC, but its unclear precisely when and how far Pompey and his troops may
have marched. He certainly returned as far as Lesser Armenia; there Pompey received
delegations from the kings of the Elymaeans and Medes (Plutarch 36) as well as from Phraates of
Parthia (Dio 37.5.2; cf. Plutarch 33). It also seems to have been from there that Pompey
dispatched his lieutenant, Afranius, to drive the Parthians out of Gordyene (Dio 37.5.4-5;
Plutarch 36; cf. Appian 12.105), a territory over which Phraates had been quarrelling with
Tigranes. Afranius may also have been sent with instructions to meet Pompey in Syria the
following spring. As mentioned above, after driving the Parthians back, Afranius made his way
west that winter (65/64 BC), through northern Mesopotamia and Syria (Dio 37.5.5). From this
point on, though, the various chroniclers weave something of a tangled tale, and it may be best if,
for the most part, we consider them separately.

Dio Cassius

Of the major chroniclers to be considered, Dio is the latest; his works date to the first part
of the 3rd century AD, more than 250 years after Pompeys campaign. However, Dio also

55
Sherwin-White (1983), p. 206.

15
provides one of the most detailed accounts, and offers us the most chronological landmarks
through his frequent references to the Roman consuls of the day.

Following his mention of Afranius, Dio describes Pompeys refusal to acknowledge

Phraates customary title King of kings, and Phraates protest at this treatment (Dio 37.6.1-3).
Staying with Phraates for the moment, Dio proceeds to recount how, the following spring, during
the consular year of Lucius Caesar and Gaius Figulus (64 BC), Phraates launched another
campaign against Tigranes. By this time, Tigranes had become an ally of Rome; he therefore
invoked the assistance of Pompey, who by then had arrived in Syria (Dio 37.6.4-7.4; Plutarch
39). In response to Tigranes plea, Pompey sent arbitrators but no military aid.

The next material in Dio takes us back in time as Dio returns to events related to Pompey.
It includes Pompeys stay during the winter of 65/64 BC in Aspis (37.7.5), the location of which
is sadly unknown.56 However, Dio indicates that Pompey, while he was there, won over the
districts that were still resisting (37.7.5). While Dio does not specify what districts these were,
this comment does suggest as indicated above that Pompeys forces remained active that
winter, rather than being shut up tight in winter quarters. Dio also says that, during this time,
Pompey took Mithridates fort at Symphorion (which Plutarch identifies as Caenum). While the
location of Aspis may not be known, the location of Caenum is reasonably certain. Strabo
(Geography 12.3.31) says Here, also, is Kainon [Caenum] Chorion, as it is called, a rock that is
sheer and fortified by nature, being less than two hundred stadia distant from Cabeira [near
modern Niksar, Turkey]. It has on its summit a spring that sends forth much water, and at its
foot a river and a deep ravine. The height of the rock above the neck is immense, so that it is
impregnable; and it is enclosed by remarkable walls, except the part where they have been pulled
down by the Romans Here it was that the most precious of the treasures of Mithridates were
kept, which are now stored in the Capitolium, where they were dedicated by Pompey.57 This
location clearly places Pompey in Pontus proper during that winter, and perhaps even in the late
fall of 65 BC. As well see when we consider the narrative of Plutarch, Pompey then seems to
have travelled from Caenum to Amisus (less than 200 km from Cabeira),58 and its there that
Plutarch locates the second and more provocative fall exchange between Pompey and Pharnaces
which triggers the Parthian campaign of the following spring.

The next section (37.7a), coming from one of Dios epitomators and filling a gap in the
preserved text, describes Pompeys return west from Armenia, his arbitration of disputes among
kings and potentates, and his creation of Syria as a Roman province, providing a summary of
56
It has variously been located anywhere from Lesser Armenia (John Leach, Pompey, (London: Croom Helm,
1978), p. 88; Schalit, Herodes, Studia Judaica 4 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), pp. 7-8, n. 26-27) to Syria (Ralph
Marcus, Josephus: Antiquities, (Cambridge: Loeb, 1963) 14.37, n. d.).
57
Deniz Burcu Erciyas, Wealth, Aristocracy and Royal Propaganda Under the Hellenistic Kingdom of the
Mithridatids in the Central Black Sea Region of Turkey, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 44, cites De Jerphanion (Mlanges,
1912), p. 135, who associated Caenum Chorion with the fortifications at Mahalakales, 24 km NNW of Niksar.
58
The location of Symphorion/Caenum in the Lycus placed it very close to the major east-west road through Pontus
as described by J.A.R. Munro: Thus from the headwaters of the Lycus to those of the Amnias, throughout the entire
length of the land, nature has marked out an easy line of communication. This was the grand trunk road of the
Kingdom of Pontus. One might almost say that Pontus consists of two roads, this great trunk road and the
commercial highway from Amisus to Zela. Along them moves the main history of the country (Roads in Pontus,
Royal and Roman, in Journal of Hellenistic Studies, vol. 21, p.54). From Symphorion/Caenum, travel to Amisus
would have been entirely possible along these major roadways.

16
Pompeys actions in the years 65 and 64 BC. This section has been placed where there is clearly
material missing from the end of 37.7.5 and from the beginning of 37.8.1. When Dios own text
resumes, it backtracks, switching to a discussion of the events in Rome for the consular years of
65 BC and 64 BC (as indicated by 37.9.3 and 37.10.1). If the dispute between Aristobulus and
Hyrcanus is part of what Dios epitomator had in mind by this reference to arbitrating between
kings and potentates, the placement of this section provides another hint that Pompeys
involvement in Judaea occurred in 64 BC.

However, its in his account of the year 64 BC that Dios narrative becomes horribly
muddied and if, as seems likely, the gap between 37.7.5 and 37.8.1 contained material associated
with this year, a significant part has unfortunately been lost. The next chronological reference
Dio provides is for the consular year of Marcus Cicero and Gaius Antonius, namely 63 BC. Dio
states that, in that year, Catiline undertook to set up a new government, adding that this
happened after Mithridates had destroyed himself (37.10.4). With this reference to Catiline,
Dio has jumped well forward into the year. The reference to Mithridates death, however, is
without a date. From Dio, all we know is that it preceded the plots of Catiline.

Backtracking, Dio then describes how, with Pompey in Syria, Mithridates had concocted
a plan to invade Italy (37.11.1). Appian mentions this plan twice in the context of 65 BC
(Appian 12.101-102), and Plutarchs narrative (38) suggests that, by the end of 65 BC,
Mithridates was firmly in control of the Crimean Bosporus and in command of his newly-
mustered army. This jumping forward and back by Dio suggests that this section is a prime
example of what Earnest Cary describes in his introduction to Dios work: For it frequently
happens that in his desire to trace the causes or results of a given series of events [Dio] is led to
exceed the limits of a single year by a considerable margin; occasionally also this same motive is
responsible for an inversion of the actual order of events. As a result, Cary says, it would
often be extremely difficult or impossible to extract a consistent chronology from his data. 59 It
is entirely possible that Dio was writing out of a personal uncertainty concerning the actual flow
of events between Pompeys move into Syria and the events involving Catiline. For our
purposes, however, all that Dio is able to state clearly in 37.10 is that, before the conspiracy of
Catiline became the focus of Roman attention, Mithridates was already known to be dead.
Precisely when this happened Dio does not indicate; but in picking up the story of Mithridates,
Dio clearly takes us back into the events of 65 BC.

With reference to Mithridates, the narratives of Dio (37.3.3) and Plutarch (34) both
suggest that Pompeys pursuit of the Pontic king was effectively broken off by the winter of
66/65 BC. The next spring, Mithridates was able to leave his winter quarters at Dioscurias in
Colchis, and make his way to the Crimean Bosporus. Once there, Mithridates would have had
roughly nine months to assemble fresh forces in anticipation of a spring campaign in 64 BC.
Something else Dio tells us is that, as Mithridates was preparing for action, there was a
devastating earthquake (Dio 37.11.4). Orosius, writing in the early 5th century AD, places this
earthquake during the rites of Ceres, which were celebrated in the springtime (Orosius 6.5).
Orosius source for this information is unknown, but the time of year fits.60 When Mithridates
put his scheme into action, however, he soon began to face one setback after another: first, a

59
Earnest Cary, Dio Cassius: Roman History, (Cambridge: Loeb, 1914) p. xv.
60
Orosius, though, likely on the basis of Josephus, places this in the spring of 63 BC.

17
mutiny by some of his soldiers and the garrisons of several fortresses (Dio 37.11.4; Appian
12.108), then the kidnapping of several of his children who were subsequently sent to Pompey
(Dio 37.11.4; Appian 12.108), plots and armed attack by members of his family (Dio 37.12.1-4;
Appian 12.110), an unsuccessful attempt to take his own life by poison (Dio 37.13.1-2; Appian
12.111), and ultimately either being put to death by his son, Pharnaces (Dio 37.13.3), or having
to persuade one of his own soldiers to kill him (Appian 12.111). There is no clear indication in
Dios narrative of how long all of this took to unfold.61

According to Dio, most of Mithridates remaining territory was then subdued, seemingly
by Pharnaces62 and by the legates of Pompey who were still operating in Pontus and Lesser
Armenia. Outside of Bosporus, however, a few of Mithridates garrisons deemed it wise to only
surrender directly to Pompey, who was clearly elsewhere (37.14.3). Pompeys return to Pontus
and his taking control of these forts is not recounted by Dio until 37.20.1, following Pompeys
actions in Syria, Nabataea, and Judaea.

After his description of Mithridates death, Dio begins his next section by saying When,
then, the regions in that quarter had been subdued [seemingly the territories once controlled by
Mithridates], and Phraates [of Parthia] remained quiet, while Syria and Phoenicia had become
tranquil, Pompey decided to turn his attention towards Aretas, king of the Nabateans, who had
dared to lift his hand against Roman troops in Syria (37.15.1). Dios narrative therefore implies
that Pompeys move against Nabataea followed the death of Mithridates and that, in part, it
was word of his enemys death that gave Pompey the confidence to move south. However, the
fact that Mithridates was still alive and well and formulating his plans as Pompey moved south
from Syria is clearly indicated by two much earlier chroniclers. Plutarch (Pompey 41) states that
Pompeys move against Nabataea was seen as being an evasion of his responsibility to pursue
Mithridates who was busily rekindling the flames of war, and Josephus tells how word of
Mithridates death reached Pompey while he was in Judaea (War 1.138; Antiquities 14.53).
Dios order of events here is therefore clearly confused, and any attempt to use him in building a
clear picture of the events of 64 and 63 BC requires significant caution.

Another implication of Dios narrative, and likely an accurate one this time, is that
Pompeys move against Nabataea did not commence until after Pompey had dispatched his
mediators to settle affairs between Phraates and Tigranes (Dio 37.6.4-7.4). Whether this
particular order of events is accurate, however, is uncertain (cf. Plutarch, Pompey 39).

Another indication of the confusion of Dios narrative is found in his description of the
Nabataean campaign itself. He describes it as follows: Pompey accordingly marched against
[Aretas] and his neighbours, and, overcoming them without effort, left them in charge of a

61
M.B. Dagut (The Habbakuk Scroll and Pompeys Capture of Jerusalem, in Biblica 32 (1951), p. 544) contends
that Mithridates died before the end of March, 63 BC. However, as Nadav Sharon (The Conquests of Jerusalem by
Pompey and Herod, Jewish Studies Quarterly, vol. 21 (2014) no. 3., p. 203) points out, this is based, first, on a
mistaken reading of Dio by which Dagut has inferred that Mithridates died just as Cicero and Antonius were taking
office (and Dagut seems to date the beginning of the consular year to March), and, secondly, on the assumed
accuracy of Josephus claim that Pompey learned of Mithridates death before the siege at Jerusalem had
commenced, a fact which the sources are far from agreement on To this, it should be added that Dagut assumes
the siege occurred in 63 BC.
62
See Strabo, Geography 12.3.14.

18
garrison (37.15.2). This account is again contradicted by both Plutarch and Josephus who
indicate that Pompey had left the region for Pontus before the Nabataean capital could be
invested. The garrison Dio mentions would have been the legions Pompey left under the
command of his lieutenant, Scaurus, who remained in Syria as the first governor of the new
province (Appian, Syrian War 51), and Dios comment about the lack of effort required finds its
basis in the fact that the Nabataean king, Aretas, paid Scaurus to withdraw without ravaging the
country (War 1.159; Antiquities 14.81). Aretas was later included in the list of conquered kings
at Pompeys official triumph (Diodorus Sicululus 40.4.1; Appian 12.117), but this is clearly an
instance of the superior taking credit for the actions of his subordinates.

Its only after describing the events in Nabataea, most of which occurred after Pompeys
withdrawal from Syria, that Dio describes Pompeys involvement with Aristobulus and Hyrcanus
in Syria Palaestina. Its clear, therefore, that in piecing together a proper chronology of
Pompeys activities during 64 and 63 BC, Dios assistance will be questionable at best. His
placement of the Judaean siege is clearly mistaken, or the result of editorial considerations.63
When read carefully, however, Dio says nothing that prevents us from placing all of Pompeys
activity in Syria and Judaea within the year 64 BC.

Plutarch

Plutarch, writing early in the 2nd century AD, stood a century closer to the events in
question than Dio Cassius. He is also noted for having considered a variety of sources in
compiling his narrative. As B.X. de Wet puts it, Plutarch is not only well aware of historical
traditions to be found in the written accounts of his own time, but he is also familiar with authors
who were the contemporaries or near contemporaries of the events which he describes.64 In
writing his account of Pompeys life, these included both Pompeys personal historian,
Theophanes, as well as Posidonius, who also wrote a history of Pompeys achievements (works
which sadly no longer exist). Again to quote de Wet, Plutarch in his Life of Pompey has not
omitted any event of great significance. Very often Plutarch is the only available source of
information for a minor incident or detail.65 Plutarchs account therefore has much to commend
it, yet it lacks the frequent chronological markers which Dio provides.

As indicated, Plutarch (Pompey 36-38) also recounts the capture of Mithridates fortress
at Caenum and says that, from there, Pompey made his way to Amisus (modern Samsun, on the
southern coast of the Black Sea). There, Pompey received twelve eastern kings and began
issuing edicts and handing out rewards. According to Plutarch, it was also there that Pompeys
provocative exchange with Phraates, the Parthian king, took place. This exchange Dio places in
the fall of 65 BC, and since this exchange seems to have been one of the factors leading up to

63
One possible reason for Dios placement of the Jerusalem siege is that he uses it to introduce an extended
description of Jewish practices, in particular the Sabbath. (see Fergus Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio, (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1964) p. 178). This lengthy excursus fills sections 17-19 of book 37 and is followed by the simple
statement Pompey, when he had accomplished what has been related, proceeded again to Pontus and after taking
over the forts returned to Asia and thence to Greece and Italy. It seems entirely likely that the placement of this
excursus (and therefore its introduction through the narration of the siege) was placed at the end of Dios account of
Pompeys campaigns so as not to inordinately disrupt the flow of the whole.
64
B.X. de Wet, Aspects of Plutarchs Portrayal of Pompey, in Acta Classica, 1981, p. 119.
65
De Wet (1981), p. 119-120.

19
Phraates campaign in the spring of 64 BC, that chronological placement seems accurate.
Plutarchs narrative, then, suggests that Pompeys travels in the fall of 65 BC took him all the
way back to heart of Mithridates territory.66 Plutarch (38) also suggests, as indicated above, that
by this time Mithridates was firmly in control of the Crimean Bosporus and in command of his
new army.

According to Plutarch, it was during Pompeys time in Pontus that he conceived a

passionate longing to make Syria a Roman province (38). Pompey had nominally taken control
of Syria in 66 BC as part of the terms he had come to with Tigranes (Dio 36.53.2; Plutarch 33).
Subsequently, he had also sent forces under various lieutenants to occupy some of that territory
(War 1.127-128; Dio 37.5.2). During those years, Philip II and then Antiochus XIII had
nominally occupied the throne of the Seleucid kingdom in Antioch, but the presence of Roman
forces in the region clearly indicates Pompeys intention that Syria would ultimately belong to
Rome. The reference in Plutarch, therefore, seems to have more to do with Pompeys desire to
set foot in Syria personally, thereby adding to his image as world conqueror the same
motivation which Plutarch indicates lay behind his desire to march all the way south to the Red
Sea.

Plutarch does not specify any winter quarters for Pompey for 65/64 BC but moves right
into a description of how, in Pontus, Pompey gathered his forces and set out for Syria.
Unfortunately, were not told when this journey started, or what route Pompey took. We are told
that, on the way, he came across the unburied bodies of the Roman troops whod perished in the
battle of Zela in 67 BC (39). Among other things, this piece of information helps to establish the
first part of Pompeys route south, and certainly suggests Amisus, less than 200 kilometres to the
north of Zela, as the likely starting point.67

As stated above, Pompeys way into Syria had been paved for him by Afranius, who had
subdued the Arab tribes living in the Amanus region on Syrias north-western border during his
march west from Mesopotamia during the winter of 65/64 BC (39). These Arabs had been a
plague on the region for some years, as indicated by Dio (36.17.3). In this section, Plutarch
groups together Pompeys arrival in Syria and his entire involvement in Judaea. This is certainly
suggestive of an earlier date for Jerusalems fall than is usually considered. The spring conflict
between the Parthians and Armenians follows, though this may simply be a consequence of the
fact that its offered as an example of the judicial work Pompey would do while in Syria; no
chronological implication can confidently be inferred. However, Phraates had been nursing his
desire for payback since the previous fall. Its not hard to imagine Tigranes dispatching a
request for assistance as soon as he knew that the Parthians were on the march. Travel for
Pompey and his forces from Pontus to Syria, for messengers and arbitrators may well have
required most of the spring of 64 BC, but its entirely possible that Pompeys delegates could
have been in place in Gordyene by early June. In the meantime, the exchanges between Pompey

66
This is the view adopted by Peter Greenhalgh, Pompey: the Roman Alexander, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson,
1980), p. 133: After following the [Lycus] river to the sea Pompey established his headquarters for the rest of the
winter at the great maritime city of Amisus.
67
Zela lay just west of what Ramsay (p. 27) calls the great trade route from Central Asia by Komana Pontica to
Amisos. It was likely accessed as a side trip from Comana Pontica (Lord, p. 32); from Comana, Pompey would
have access to Sebastea (Megalopolis) and a choice of routes further south.

20
and those contending for the rule of Judaea could have taken place. All of this would have
prepared the way for Pompey to consider his expedition into Nabataea.

Plutarch (41) describes Pompeys move against Nabataea, first, by indicating that the
king of the Arabians had written to Pompey to tell of his decision that he was theirs to
command in everything. This letter of submission likely came as part of the arrival of delegates
from across the region mentioned by Josephus (Antiquities 14.34). Pompey wanted to make sure
that Aretas really meant what he said, so he advanced toward Petra. Plutarch fails to indicate
that the siege of Jerusalem interrupted these plans. As indicated above, though, Plutarch clearly
places Pompeys move against Nabataea prior to Pompeys receiving any word concerning the
death of Mithridates. He also indicates that Pompey received that word near Petra, suggesting
that the news arrived while he was on his way, seemingly after the fall of Jerusalem (41). This is
contrary to what were told by Josephus, who places the arrival of the message prior to the siege
of Jewish capital (War 1.138).

Plutarch also indicates that it was Pharnaces, Mithridates son, who wrote to explain the
situation to Pompey and the Romans, so the message evidently came from Bosporus. This
news would have taken roughly 2 weeks to come by sea from Bosporus to the Levantine coast,
and several days more to reach Pompey inland.68 If Jerusalem fell in early October, 64 BC as is
being proposed, this would suggest that Mithridates likely died in the later summer or early fall
of that year.69 Plutarch writes that Pompey left Arabia immediately upon receiving the news
and, passing through the intervening provinces, made his way directly to Pontus. This has the
ring of authenticity to it and may suggest that Josephus was mistaken in his report that Pompey
waited three months before departing.70

As with Dio, it can therefore be said of Plutarch that nothing he relates, up to and
including Pompeys departure from Syria, would necessarily carry us beyond the bounds of 64
BC. If Pompeys conversations with the Jewish leaders took place in the spring (or even, via
their delegates, during the late winter as potentially suggested by Dio 37.7a) and the siege of
Jerusalem interrupted the intended Nabataean expedition of that summer, Pompeys victory at
Jerusalem may comfortably be placed in the fall of 64 BC.

Appian

Appian wrote in the mid-2nd century AD, just after Plutarch. In evaluating the work of
the three major Greek and Roman chroniclers to be considered, J.G.C. Anderson offers the
following observation: Of the narratives, Plutarchs agrees in most essentials with that of Dio
Appian disagrees in several points, but he is a careless writer and it is clear that where he

68
Lionel Casson (1951), p. 136-148.
69
Adrienne Mayor (The Poison King: The Life and Legend of Mithridates, Romes Deadliest Enemy, (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2010), pp. 41718, n. 1) suggests late spring or early summer. The basis for this
conclusion, however, is not expressed. Much would seem to depend on whether Plutarch or Josephus is followed
for the timing for the news.
70
Mahieu (2012), p. 113-115 favours Plutarchs order of events and suggests that Josephus simply knew that word
of Mithridates death reached Pompey near Jericho. Josephus then mistakenly placed the arrival of the news during
Pompeys journey from Damascus to Jerusalem rather than on his later journey from Jerusalem toward Petra.

21
differs from the others he is not to be trusted.71 Some caution is therefore warranted as we
consider any new or contradictory information which Appian may supply.

We pick up Appians account of Pompeys actions with a battle in the east against the
Albanians and Iberians (Roman History 12.103), two nations which both Dio (37.1.1-37.4.4) and
Plutarch (34) have Pompey engaging separately in the summer of 65 BC. Appian, contrary to
both Dio and Plutarch, places Pompeys invasion of Armenia, and Tigranes surrender, on
Pompeys return from that quarter (12.104). This is a highly unlikely scenario from a military
standpoint; Pompey would never have left such a powerful enemy to his rear while he marched
into the lands further east, especially given the vulnerability of his supply lines once hed left the
reach of his fleet.

Appian then reports some of the actions which Pompey took in settling affairs in
Armenia, Sophene and Gordyene (12.105) which two territories, he says, are now called Lesser
Armenia. This is Appians misplaced description of the settlement reached between Pompey and
Tigranes in 66 BC. A further difficulty with Appian is that Gordyene does not ever seem to have
been considered part of Lesser Armenia, which lay between Pontus and Armenia. Gordyene
itself lay between Armenia and Parthia. Appian then indicates that Pompey now thought that
the whole war was at an end and describes his founding of the city of Nicopolis in Lesser
Armenia. Appian goes on to describe how Pompey now gave back the kingdom of Cappadoica
to Ariobarzanes and added to it Sophene and Gordyene to it. This also poses a problem. In
Plutarch (38) were told how, while in Amisus, Pompey began issuing edicts and handing out
rewards. This makes it possible that Cappadocia may have been turned over to Ariobarzanes at
this time. However, Appian is clearly mistaken with regards to Gordyene on two counts. First,
given its location, it would never have been made a part of Cappadocia; Dio and Plutarch both
indicate that it became part of Armenia, a far more likely arrangement. Second, Gordyene was
the territory that would be contested by Tigranes and Phraates in 64 BC so reference to it being
granted to anyone other Tigranes at this point is clearly a mistake. Appian is also in error here
about when Cappadocia itself became a province of Rome; he places it during the reign of
Augustus but, in fact, this did not take place until the reign of Tiberius. We should therefore be
extremely cautious about drawing any firm chronological conclusions from this section of
Appians narrative, especially about when Pompey began making arrangements for the future
governance of the East.

Appian goes on to provide a much fuller description of Pompeys arrangements in

12.114-115, following the conclusion of all his campaigns. While not all of these arrangements
must necessarily be seen as following Pompeys time in Syria and his return to Pontus, it seems
more likely that the work of rebuilding and reorganizing would take place once it was clear that
the war was truly at an end.

Appians next section deals with Pompeys journey southwards to Syria (12.106).
Appian relates that Pompey passed over the Taurus mountains, made war against Antiochus, the
king of Commagene, and against Darius the Mede. Its hard to know precisely what to make of
this reference to Darius. Plutarch (36) has indicated that the relationship with the Median

71
J.G.C. Anderson, Pompeys Campaign Against Mithridates, in The Journal for the Promotion of Roman Studies,
vol. 12 (1922), p. 99-100.

22
monarch had been a friendly one the preceding fall. As well, Darius territory lay far to the east
of Pompeys likely line of advance in early 64 BC. John Leach suggests that the exchange of
letters the previous fall had established a truce that was hailed as a victory for Rome to such an
extent that the imperial historian, Velleius, visualized an invasion of Media.72 This invasion
Velleius groups with Pompeys conquest of the Albanians and the Iberians, which took place at
the far eastern end of his trek in the summer of 65 BC (Velleius, Roman History, 2.40.1). Its
possible that Appian is basing his report on Velleius; its also possible that whats being referred
to is some interaction between the Medes and Pompeys lieutenant Gabinius who had marched as
far east as the Tigris in 65 BC. Either way, its hard to understand why Appian would locate
Pompeys interaction with the Mede at this point.

The exact nature of Pompeys encounter with Antiochus is also uncertain. Appian
indicates that Pompey made war against Antiochus, the king of Commagene, until the latter
entered into friendly relations with him. Appian, though, seems to have significantly
misrepresented things at this point. Antiochus had already shown himself to be ready to aid the
armies of Rome during Lucullus campaign in 69 BC (Dio 36.2.5), and both Strabo (Geography
16.2.3) and Appian (12.114) report that, at the conclusion to his own campaign, Pompey would
actually expand Antiochus territory by granting him the city of Seleucia. This grant was hugely
significant. A treaty between Rome and the Parthians had established the Euphrates as the
boundary between the two powers. The available crossings of the river were therefore of great
strategic importance. The capital of Commagene, Samosata, sat at one of the available crossings.
Seleucia guarded another. The fact that Pompey would entrust Antiochus with two such
strategically significant cities displays a tremendous degree of trust. Significantly, Antiochus is
not listed among the conquered or subjected monarchs in Diodorus Siculus transcription of
Pompeys testament to his achievements in Asia (40.4). While he does appear in the list of
conquered kings reported by Appian (12.117), and Plutarch (45) indicates that hostages given to
Pompey by Antiochus appeared in Pompeys triumph procession, it seems likely that in 64 BC,
as Pompey passed through Antiochus territory, rather than engaging him in battle, the king of
Commagene simply acknowledged Pompeys power and Romes authority, setting the stage for
the relationship that would follow. The nature of that relationship is further indicated by the fact
that in 59 BC, the very year in which Pompeys acta concerning the east would finally be ratified
by the senate, Antiochus would be granted the toga praetexta and official recognition as an allied
king (Cicero, Ad Quint Frat. 2.10.2).

Appians account of events once Pompey entered Syria is also unusual. He first mentions
that Pompey made war against the Nabataean Arabs and against the Jews, capturing their
holiest city, Jerusalem (12.106). Only then does he recount how Pompey brought Syria and the
adjacent territories under Roman rule. He also seems to place all of this activity during the
renewed hostilities between Tigranes and Phraates and before Pompeys dispatching of his
arbitrators (Appian 12.106). Perhaps following Plutarch in this, Appian also seems to suggest
that Pompeys engagement at Jerusalem took place soon after his arrival in Syria. A slightly
different arrangement is presented earlier in Appians work (11.50); here, Jewish resistance is
described following a statement of how Syria was claimed without fighting.

72
John Leach (1978), p. 85.

23
 In the next section (12.107), Appian describes how Mithridates arrived in Bosporus, and
mentions as well Pompeys capture of the Symphorion/Caenum. These events, as weve seen,
occurred the previous year, in 65 BC. Appian also describes an embassy from Mithridates to
Pompey while the latter was in Syria, bringing us to 64 BC. Appian also states that, at the same
time, Mithridates was raising his new army. The first task of this army was to capture the town
of Phanagoria (12.108). This action prompted a wide-spread rebellion among the castles that
had been lately occupied by Mithridates. The next few sections (12.109-112) describe the
deterioration of Mithridates position and end with his death and a summary of his life. No
definite time reference is given, but there is no reason these events should not be placed during
the spring and summer of 64 BC.

Appian does not describe Pompeys return to Pontus, nor how or where he heard about
Mithridates death. He writes about how the body was sent from Bosporus to Pontus and how
Pompey made arrangements for the burial, and how Mithridates son, Pharnaces, became a friend
of Rome. This is followed by a summary of Pompeys victories, his arrangements for the
governance of the East (12.114), and some of the cities he founded or restored (12.115). No
dates are attached, again raising the question of when the administrative work of organizing
Romes new territories was actually done. The next reference is to the fact that, at the end of
winter (year unspecified), Pompey gave rewards to his army, marched to Ephesus and embarked
for Italy where he eventually held his triumph (12.116). This would seem to be the winter of
63/62 BC.

Josephus

Josephus supplements the other accounts of Pompeys actions in Syria by first describing
the earlier arrival in Damascus of the Roman general Scaurus, who had been sent by Pompey
from Armenia where Pompey was, at that time, engaged with Tigranes (War 1.127; Antiquities
14.29-33). If this statement is accurate, it would place Scaurus departure from Armenia
sometime in 66 BC, since by the end of that year Pompey had concluded his treaty with Tigranes
(Dio 36.53.2; Plutarch 33). Scaurus arrived in Damascus only to find that it had already been
taken by Metellus and Lollius.73 Taking command of the region himself (War 1.127), Scaurus
then marched south at the request of Aristobulus to lift the siege of Jerusalem currently being
carried out by Aretas of Nabataea, Antipater (the father of Herod the Great), and the forces loyal
to Hyrcanus II (War 1.126; Antiquities 14.19-21). This siege Josephus places at Passover and,
according to most, this was the spring of 65 BC.74 With the siege lifted, Scaurus retired north to
Damascus, but hostilities soon broke out afresh between the brothers at Papyron (War 1.130;
Antiquities 14.33).

73
Metellus Nepos was the legate who had been put in charge of the Phoenician coast during the war against the
pirates in 67 BC (Appian 12.95). This may imply that his occupation of Damascus was a part of, or quickly
followed, his securing of the coastal area that year. Damascus arguably lay within the territory in which Pompey
and his forces had authority to operate, up to 50 miles from the coast. Some would place Metellus activity in
Damascus in 66 BC (see M. Sartre, Rome et les Nabatens la fin de la Rpublique, in Revue des etudes anciennes
81 (1979), p. 42), others as late as early 65 BC.
74
Ralph P. Marcus, Antiquities 14.29, n. f; see also Schrer, Vol. 1, p. 236, n. 7; John Leach, Pompey the Great,
(London: Croom Helm, 1978) p. 91; Bieke Mahieu (2012), p. 101; Glen Warren Bowersock, Roman Arabia,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 31

24
 Josephus then goes on to say that When Pompey not long afterward came to Damascus,
petitions were sent by the warring brothers directly to Pompey himself, including a gift from
Aritstobulus (Antiquities 14.34-36). The phrase not long afterwards is far from precise, but
seems to imply that this must have happened very soon after Pompeys arrival in Syria in the
spring of 64 BC, meaning a year or so after the involvement of Scaurus.

Its this particular section of Josephus which, next to the consular date, has been most to
blame for the misdating of Pompeys victory. Immediately after his account of Pompeys arrival
in Damascus, Josephus goes on to describe how, soon afterwards, envoys came to Pompey:
Antipater of behalf of Hyrcanus and Nicodemus on behalf of Aristobulus. No location for this
meeting is provided; neither does this incident appear in War. Josephus adds that, in response to
this apparent second round of appeals, Pompey told the disputants to come to him in person in
the spring. He then brought his forces out of their winter quarters, marching southwards by way
of Apamea (on the Orontes River in northern Syria), Heliopolis (Baalbek, Lebanon) and the
region of Chalcis towards Damascus (Antiquities 14.37-40).

Recognizing that Josephus seems to have Pompey arriving in Damascus twice, Ralph
Marcus (Antiquities 14.34 n. d.) suggests that Josephus material here is out of order, with
14.37ff (the summons to meet in Damascus) belonging to the autumn of 64 BC and the material
in 14.34-36 (the ambassadors and the gift) belonging to the spring of 63 BC. This dating is
clearly reflective of the assumption that Pompeys victory at Jerusalem took place in the summer
or fall of 63 BC.

However, it now appears far more likely that this is a duplication of a single series of
events caused by Josephus use of two distinct sources, both of which spoke of Pompeys arrival
in Syria. As Adolf Bchler pointed out over a century ago, in Antiquities 14.34-36 Josephus
produces a fragment from Strabo, in which it is related that Pompey received in Damascus a
costly present from a Jewish embassy, without bearing in mind that he related Pompeys arrival
at Damascus in a subsequent passage and that order of relation was quite incongruous. The
subsequent narrative, however, runs on without interruption; it is therefore clear that Strabos
fragment did not occur in Nicholas, his principal authority, but that Josephus had found it
somewhere else, and inserted it in a place by no means suitable for it.75 This was also the
opinion of Richard Laqueur in the first part of the twentieth century: the citation from Strabo,
which is already formally bracketed by doublets ( =
) is to be omitted; the basic conception therefore reads: When Pompey
came to Damascus and Coelesyria, // ,
(34a, 37b). Hence it follows that Josephus himself saw [a
work of] Strabo or one that was reworked, extracted an excerpt [from it] and incorporated this
into his [own] work.76 More recently, we see the same suggestion being made by Alessandro
Galimberti: Josephus provides an account of Pompeys arrival in Damascus twice in the span
of a few paragraphs: in Ant. 14.34 (soon afterwards, Pompey arrived in Damascus) and in Ant.
14.38 and 40: after ordering that the rival parties should appear before him, in early spring

75
Adolf Bchler, The Sources of Josephus for the History of Syria, The Jewish Quarterly Review, Vol. 9, No. 2
(January, 1897), p. 341.
76
Richard Laqueur, The Jewish Historian Flavius Josephus: a biographical investigation based on new critical
sources, trans. by Caroline Disler, ed. Steve Mason, (Toronto, York University, 2005), p. 128

25
Pompey moved with his army from the winter quarters to Damascus . . . and once he crossed the
mountains that separate Coele-Syria from the rest of Syria, he arrived in Damascus. From this
we could infer that the Roman general went to Damascus twice Instead, Pompey only went to
Damascus once: in my opinion the duplicate can only be explained by the fact that in Ant.
14.3440 Josephus first uses Strabo (14.3436) and then Nicolaus (14.3740).77 While
Galimberti places the single arrival in Damascus in the spring of 63 BC, the basic argument still
holds: Josephus appears to relate two arrivals by Pompey in Damascus because he uses the
reports of two sources, Strabo and Nicholaus, which differed in their details and which he
blended in an awkward and ultimately misleading way. As Etienne Nodet has recently pointed
out, this is by no means an uncommon occurrence in the works of Josephus, where his strange
statements and inconsistencies can [often] be explained by his attempt to preserve all the data
available to him.78 This is also consistent with the findings of Daniel Schwartz, whose work in
the area of source criticism in recent years has highlighted the susceptibility of Josephus to
mistaken duplications and to reporting contemporaneous events from different sources as if they
happened at different times.79 It may be that this duplication ultimately mislead Josephus
himself, resulting in his adding a winter, and therefore a year, to his order of events. Pompeys
arrival in Damascus, however, should be seen as a singular event which took place during the
spring of 64 BC following an earlier meeting with emissaries in the north of Syria which took
place immediately upon his arrival from Pontus.

Even with the need for a double arrival in Damascus removed, however, there are still
questions which need to be answered concerning the troops Pompey is said to have brought out
of their winter quarters. Can this reference be associated with the winter of 65/64 BC and, if so,
how? If Pompey came to Damascus sometime in the spring of 64 BC, the most likely scenario
would be, as indicated, that the envoys met Pompey almost immediately upon his arrival in
Syria. Pompey would have instructed them to have the brothers come to Damascus. If this was
the case, the troops to be brought out of winter quarters cannot have been those whod
accompanied Pompey from Pontus to Syria; those troops had already been on the move for some
weeks. However, these were not the only Roman forces in Syria; in fact, a considerable body of
troops was already in place under the command of Pompeys various legates: Metellus, Scaurrus,
Afranius and Gabinius. These included both Roman legions and Syrian auxiliaries (Antiquities
14.48). Its entirely likely, therefore, that these were the troops Pompey brought from their
winter quarters on his way south, adding them to whatever forces hed brought from Pontus, as
he prepared for his march to the Red Sea (Plutarch 38).

The proper order of events would therefore be as follows: the contending brothers sent
their ambassadors to Pompey; this most likely followed soon after Pompeys arrival in Syria in
the spring of 64 BC. Pompey sent the Jewish ambassadors back with instructions to have their

77
Alessandro Galimberti, Josephus and Strabo: the reason for a choice, in Zuleika Rodgers (ed.), Making History:
Joesphus and Historical Method, (Leiden: Brill, 2006), p. 164.
78
Etienne Nodet, Josephus and Discrepant Sources, in Jack Pastor, Pnina Stern, and Menahem Mor (eds.), Flavius
Josephus: Interpretation and History, (Leiden: Brill, 2011), p. 259.
79
John H. Roads, Josephus Misdated the Census of Quirinius, in The journal of The Evangelical Theological
Society, vol. 54, no. 1 (March, 2011), p. 67; see D.E. Schwartz, Agrippa I: the Last King of Judaea, (Tbingen:
J.C.B. Mohr, 1990), pp. 11-14, also Pontius Pilates Appointment to Office and the Chronology of Josephus
Antiquities, Books 18-20, and Pontius Pilates Suspension, both in Studies in the Jewish Background of Christianity,
(Tbingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1992), pp. 197-198 and 202-217.

26
principals meet him in Damascus. Pompey then made his way south through Lebanon, bringing
with him the forces of his legates which had been quartered in northern Syria, with some of them
dealing with the various robber dens they found along the way. As recounted in War,
Hyrcanus accompanied Antipater to Damascus, though it was Antipater who took the lead in
presenting their case to Pompey. They came, however, without presents. Aristobulus,
however, took a different approach. Based on his experience with Scaurus, Aristobulus believed
that Pompey might be open to a bribe; from Strabo, we know what that bribe was. Its unclear
from Josephus whether Aristobulus appeared in person or relied entirely on his ambassador,
Nicodemus. A deputation of Jewish leaders also appeared arguing against an appointment of
anyone as king, but seemingly supporting Hyrcanus claim to the high priesthood (cf. Diodorus
Siculus 40.2). Pompey, though, refused to render a decision until he came to Judaea on his way
towards Nabataea. Aristobulus then chose to withdraw, precipitating the invasion by Pompey.

Josephus then provides us with the details concerning how the siege began, was carried
out, and was concluded after three months. Here again Josephus narrative reflects a blending of
the narrative of War with new material, presumably from Strabo.80 Following the capture of the
temple area, were told by Josephus that Pompey quickly restored Hyrcanus to the high
priesthood and executed those most responsible for the war (War 1.153-154). He also made
Judaea a tributary state to Rome and withdrew from its rule a number of cities in the interior and
on the coast (War 1.156) and annexed all to the province of Syria (War 1.157). If Pompeys
victory fell on or near the Day of Atonement, October 4, 64 BC, then his departure from Judaea
would have taken place sometime later that month. Depending on how soon he left and the
speed with which he was able to travel, Pompey would have been in Pontus by the end of
November or early December.

Josephus then tells us about how Scaurus took up the campaign against the Nabataeans:
Meanwhile Scaurus had invaded Arabia (War 1.159). The meanwhile seems to indicate that
this happened as, or shortly after, Pompey was travelling north. In both War (1.157) and
Antiquities (14.79-81), Josephus indicates that Pompey left Scaurus in charge of Syria with two
legions, and given that Hyrcanus seems to have been able to exercise some authority in providing
aid to Scaurus during his campaign against Aretas III, a post-siege timeframe is required. The
timing of Scaurus action against Aretas must also be dictated by the fact that Obodas II became
the king of Nabataea sometime in either 63 or 62 BC. Bieke Mahieu argues for 63 BC on the
basis of the Nabataeans apparent use of an accession year system for reckoning their kings
reigns.81 If this is indeed the case, Scaurus will have marched either in the fall of 64 BC, as
Pompey made his way north, or else not long afterward, presumably in the spring of 63 BC.

Final Considerations

80
Sharon ((2014) no. 3, p. 199), points out the presence of two sources here, one of which (presumably Strabo)
clearly lacked precise knowledge of the particulars of the siege since the reference is to the taking of the city
(Antiquities 14.66) rather than simply to the temple area; the city itself had already been handed over to Pompey
(War 1.143; Antiquities 14.5859). Sharon goes on to point out that Consequently, it is significant that in his
Geography Strabo writes that Pompey in particular took Jerusalem itself by force (16.2.40), and in reading his
entire description one can hardly ascertain that the siege was only of the Temple.
81
Mahieu (2012) p. 110; see also p. 37-38 for a proposed chronology of the Nabataean kings.

27
 What did Pompey actually do during 64 BC? That is a question that historians have
struggled to answer or else carefully avoided. The dominant thinking has had him spending the
year in largely judicial matters (see Plutarch 39), resolving various disputes (though apparently
not the one in Judaea) and doing the work of transforming Syria into a Roman province. What
did this work entail? There was very little to be done militarily in Syria. As mentioned, some of
Pompeys legates had already been there for over a year and, in the case of Metellus, his arrival
may have preceded Pompeys by as much as two years. Appian (11. 50) says that the Romans,
without fighting, came into possession of Cilicia and both inland Syria and Coele-Syria,
Phoenicia and Palestine, and all the other countries bearing the Syrian name Josephus is the
only source who makes reference to any military action outside of the intended campaign into
Nabataea (and its interruption to deal with Jerusalem), and this limited action in Lebanon does
not seem to have occupied Pompey for long. In fact, as suggested by M.B. Dagut, it may even
have been accomplished by detachments of Pompeys army, without hindering the progress of
the main body.82 According to Plutarch, Pompey was still primarily focused on building his
reputation; Pompeys great ambition as he left Amisus was to march through Syria and Arabia to
the Red Sea. Yet he did not do this. If Plutarchs statement is reliable, it seems clear that
something significant must have held Pompey up and ultimately prevented him from seeing that
ambition through to completion. One finds it hard to imagine Pompey putting off this ambition
for a full year simply in order to do administrative work, especially with Mithridates still active
in the north. What prevented him was, in fact, the siege at Jerusalem which, for the conquering
Romans, proved to be surprisingly and annoyingly long!

Yes, some administrative issues would certainly have been dealt with during that year;
the slow progress of siege warfare would have allowed for this. In addition, Pompey had several
notable lieutenants in Syria, including Marcus Pupius Piso (War 1.143; Antiquities 14.59) who
would become consul in 61 BC, Afranius who would become consul in 60 BC, Gabinius
(Antiquities 14.55-56) who would become consul in 58 BC and proconsul of Syria in 57 BC, and
Scaurus who would be left behind as governor. These may well have been left in charge of the
siege much of the time, or else delegated to bring Roman order to other portions of the province.

Yet the extent of the administrative work accomplished in Syria is another factor which
suggests that Pompeys activities there were rather more limited in duration than is usually
assumed. Arthur Keaveney puts it this way: It is generally agreed that matters were better
ordered in the north (Asia Minor) than they were in the south (Syria). There, things appear to
have been more hastily carried out and the inner ring of defences was less stable.83 By contrast,
Pompeys efforts in Asia Minor seem to have stood the test of time: his arrangements for
Bithynia were not altered until the third century AD.84 And while we have evidence of the lex
Pompeia which provided the provincial charter for Bithynia-Pontus and the government of its
cities, there does not seem to be any evidence of a comparable charter for Syria. Eva Matthews
Sanford, in writing about the career of Aulus Gabinius, expresses a similar assessment: During
his three years as proconsul [of Syria], however, he was to devote much of his time to the
problems that were left unsettled by Pompeys preliminary reorganization of Syria and

82
Dagut (1951), p. 544.
83
Arthur Keaveney, Reorganization of the East by Pompeius, in Encyclopaedia of the Hellenic World, Asia Minor,
URL: <http://www.ehw.gr/l.aspx?id=7227>, retrieved November 6, 2014.
84
Keaveney (retrieved November 6, 2014)

28
Palestine.85 Clearly Pompeys administrative efforts in Syria were significantly less effective
than what he was able to accomplish elsewhere.

It should also be recognized that the enduring character of Pompeys work in Asia Minor
is clearly the result of more work than Pompey was able to do during the winter of 65/64 BC. In
his final arrangements for the East, after making grants of land to various allies (Appian 12.114),
Pompey joined what remained of Pontus to the former kingdom of Bithynia to create a single
province (Strabo 12.3.1). He divided the region into eleven cities (Gr. politeiai), forming a
chain from Eupatoria-Magnopolis in the east to Pompeiopolis in the west, with each
administering a large rural territory.86 On the coast, these were based on the old Greek colonies;
in the interior, however, these cities either needed to be built (Pompeiopolis, Megalopolis,
Nikopolis) or rebuilt (Neapolis, Magnopolis, Zela, and Diospolis). These new politeiai were
intended to supplant Mithridates own administrative system which had been centered on a large
number of strongholds (Gr. phrouriai); these Pompey caused to be destroyed.87 In addition to
the significant work involved in reorganizing and rebuilding, construction and demolition, what
can be determined of Pompeys charter for the province also reveals considerable thought and
effort. A.J. Marshall refers to it as a great charter which remained for centuries the basis of
administration of a vast area88; he further indicates how this charter set a lower age-limit for
entry into the magistracies and senates of the cities of the province, regulated the expulsion of
senators and their recruitment from ex-magistrates, and controlled the granting of local
citizenship.89 This regulation of citizenship, according to Marshall, served to help stabilize the
population of Pompeys newly created politeiai, some of which were built upon ruins and others
on the site of mere villages, and therefore required these constitutional measures to help them
retain their residents.90 The degree of forethought displayed by this charter suggests the
investment of considerable time in stabilizing Romes new territory in Asia Minor. As Robin
Seager puts it in his biography of Pompey, The most elaborate aspect of Pompeius settlement
of the east was his organization of Pontus. Here he displayed all his administrative skill But
in general Pompeius arrangements [in Syria] bear the marks of incompleteness, in sharp contrast
with the meticulous nature of his work in the North.91 Why the difference?

The conventional date for Pompeys victory requires that Pompey was present in Syria
for roughly a year and a half: from the spring of 64 BC until the fall of 63 BC. What is being
proposed here is that, in Syria, Pompey was forced to leave Scaurus behind as the one who
would largely be in charge of bringing Roman organization to bear on the new province while
Pompey himself hastened away in response to word of the death of Mithridates, which he
received in the fall of 64 BC. His return to Pontus, however, allowed Pompey essentially a full

85
Eva Matthews Sanford, The Career of Aulus Gabinius, Transaction and Proceedings of the American Philological
Association, vol. 70 (1939), p. 73.
86
Tnes Bekker-Nielsen, 350 years of research on Neoklaudiopolis (Vezirkpr), Orbis Terrarum, vol. 11 (2011-
2013), p. 4.
87
Jakob Munk Hjte, The Administration of the Pontic Kingdom, in Mithridates VI and the Pontic Kingdom, Black
Sea Studies 9 (rhus, 2009) p. 95.
88
A.J. Marshall, Pompey's Organization of Bithynia-Pontus: Two Neglected Texts in The Journal of Roman Studies,
Vol. 58, Parts 1 and 2 (1968), p. 103.
89
A.J. Marshall (1968), p. 104.
90
A.J. Marshall (1968), p. 108.
91
Robin Seager, Pompey, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), p.60-61.

29
year (63 BC)92 to implement the extensive administrative changes and city building we have
evidence for in the north.

In determining the date of Pompeys victory then, what is clear is that the various dates
suggested over the years have largely been dictated by the information provided by Josephus.
Yet, as many have recognized, its difficult if not impossible to see how all this data can be
accurate. Each piece must be weighed against the rest, as well as against the information
supplied by the various Roman chroniclers. Once it is recognized that there is no need for a
double arrival in Damascus with an intervening winter, it becomes apparent that all of the
narrative and circumstantial evidence points to a victory in the fall of 64 BC. What remains is
the explicit dating evidence we began with: the city was taken on the third month, on the day of
the Fast, upon the 179th Olympiad, when Caius Antonius and Marcus Tullius Cicero were
consuls (Antiquities 14.66). What is now clear, however, is that its not the Fast but the
consular date which is the one potentially disparate piece of data. It seems wisest to follow
where the majority of the data lead. A span of 27 years between the sieges, a record of reigns
which supports this number and points to a change in rule prior to Nisan (March/April) 63 BC,
an era for Gadara and other cities which predates a victory in the fall of 63 BC, contemporary
evidence which precludes a victory any later than the earliest months of 63 BC, as well as the
narrative data supplied by the various ancient chroniclers all point to the likelihood of
Jerusalems fall to Pompey as having occurred in the fall of 64 BC.

92
As indicated above Plutarch (Cato 29.1) has Pompey in the province of Asia by early in the consular year for 62
BC (which would have commenced sometime in the early winter of 63 BC); from there Pompey appears to have
travelled to Mytiliene, Rhodes and Athens on his way back to Italy (Plutarch, Pompey 42; Dio 37.20.1) for his
triumph in 61 BC.

30
 Appendix A (Chart of Hasmonean Rulers)
Ruler First Regnal Reference Last Regnal Reference Length of Reference
Year (BC) Year (BC) Reign
Simon 143/142 1 Maccabees 136/135i 1 Maccabees 8 Ant. 13.228;
13.41-42; 16.14-16; 20.239-240
War 1.53 War 1.53
Hyrcanus I 135/134ii War 1.56; 105/104 33/31/30iii War 1.68;
Ant. 13.236 Ant. 13.299;
20.240
Aristobulus I 104/103 104/103 1 War 1.83;
Ant. 13.317;
20.241
Alexander 103/102 77/76 27 War 1.106;
Jannaeus Ant. 13.404;
20.242
Alexandra 76/75 68/67 9 War 1.119;
Salome Ant. 13.430;
(as ruler) 20.242
Hyrcanus II 76/75 War 1.109 68/67 same 9 Ant. 13.408;
(as high priest) 20.242

Hyrcanus II 70/69iv Ant. 14.4v; cf.

(coregent) War 1.120
Aristobulus II 67/66 65/64 3+6 monthsvi; Ant. 14.97;
2(3) +3 20.244
monthsvii
Hyrcanus II 64/63 41/40 24 Ant. 20.245
(restored by
Pompey)
Antigonus 40/39 War 1.248viii 38/37 3+3 monthsix Ant. 20.246
Herod the 37/36 Ant. 14.487- 4/3 34 War 1.665;
Great 490 Ant. 17.191

i
According to 1 Maccabees 16.14, Simon was murdered during Shebat (January/February), the 11th month of the
Jewish year. This was in the 8th year after he became high priest (compare the references in 1 Maccabees).
Josephus appears to have counted that partial 8th year as part of Simons reign, rather than as part of the reign of his
successor, Hyrcanus I. This is an anomaly in an otherwise consistent system, and may reflect the proximity of
Simons death to the end of the year. Josephus clearly identifies the year 135/134 BC as the first year of Hyrcanus
Is rule (Antiquities 13.236).
ii
Josephus locates the first year of Hyrcanus Is rule in the 162 nd Olympiad (132-128 BC), which is clearly an error.
iii
The reason for the variation here is unclear. A 31 year reign fits the rest of the data. A 30 year reign would move
the resumption of rule by Hyrcanus II even earlier. Feldman (LCL) seems to simply emend Antiquities 20.240 to
read 31 years; Whiston does not. The reference to 33 years appears in the Greek manuscripts of War; the Latin
translation has 31 years, making it consistent with Antiquities.
iv
Perhaps not coincidentally, this was also the year in which Tigranes of Armenia was besieging Ptolemais, just
outside of Jewish territory (Plutarch, Lucculus 21.1).
v
Indicates the beginning of his high priesthood in the 3 rd year of 177th Olympiad (70/69 BC) during the consular
year of Quintus Hortensius and Quintus Metellus (69 BC), which does not fit with other known data. He assumed
the high priesthood when Alexandra began to rule since, as a woman, she was ineligible to be high priest (cf. Ant.
13.408; 20.242). War 1.120 indicates that Alexandra entrusted the kingdom to Hyrcanus II in her lifetime. It
seems likely, therefore, that due to external threats and possibly Alexandras failing health a clear succession needed
to be established and Hyrcanus was made co-regent or heir-apparent at this time. See Schrer, (2014) v. 1, p. 200-
201, n. 1 on the difficulties with this Olympic and consular synchronization.
vi
When Josephus includes a reference to months (cf. entry for Antigonus as well) he seems to be indicating the
actual length of the reign. These extra months, however, would fall within the first years of those who removed

31
these two rulers from power. It seems that the three years, six months for Aristobulus II should be reckoned from
Nisan 1, 67 BC to the end of the siege in Tishri, 64 BC.
vii
This second reference (literally, in the third year of his reign and after as many months) is rendered variously as
two years and three months (Feldman, LCL), or as three years and three months (Whiston, cf. Marcus Antiquities
14.5, n. c). If the latter, it may either be from Nisan 1, 67 BC to Aristobulus IIs arrest before the siege began or else
from a date in the summer of 67 BC (when he began to rule, see Antiquities 15.180) to the end of the siege in Tishri,
64 BC; if the shorter, it is either an error or would involve shifting the entire Hasmonean chronology up to that point
later one year to fill the gap.
viii
Now two years afterward refers to the Battle of Philippi in October, 42 BC.
ix
It seems the three years, three months should be reckoned from the summer of 40 BC when the Parthians gave the
rule to Antigonus until the end of the siege in Tishri, 37 BC.

Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Duncan Cameron
University of Toronto, Toronto School of Theology, Alumnus
https://utoronto.academia.edu/DuncanCameron

Abstract:
It has long been argued, on the basis of dating evidence provided by Josephus, that the Roman General
Pompey captured Jerusalem sometime in 63 BC. This paper argues that a conquest in the fall of 64 BC is
much better supported by the available evidence, including that provided by Josephus.
https://www.academia.edu/13503274/Towards_a_Redating_of_Pompeys_Conquest_of_Jerusalem

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Duncan Cameron

- |
University of Toronto, Toronto School of Theology, Alumnus
University of Toronto, Toronto School of Theology, Alumnus |
Historical Jesus
+11
Duncan is a pastor of the Presbyterian Church in Canada. He graduated from Knox College at the University
of Toronto in 1990 and has been involved in congregational ministry ever since. He has a keen interest in
archaeology, Inter-testamental and New Testament history, and biblical chronology.
Address: Scarborough, Ontario, Canada

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