Criminal Full Cases 2

People v.
Ambal
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HONORATO AMBAL, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
Honorato Ambal appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camiguin convicting
him of parricide, sentencing him toreclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay an indemnity of twelve
thousand pesos to the heirs of his deceased wife, Felicula Vicente-Ambal (Criminal Case No. 155-
C).
In the morning of January 20, 1977, the barangay captain found under some flowering plants near
the house of Honorato Ambal located in Barrio Balbagon, Mambajao, Camiguin, Felicula Vicente-
Ambal, 48, mortally wounded. She asked for drinking water and medical assistance.
She sustained seven incised wounds in different parts of her body. She was placed in an improvised
hammock and brought to the hospital where she died forty minutes after arrival thereat (Exh. B and
G).
On that same morning, Honorato Ambal, husband of Felicula, after entrusting his child to a neighbor,
went to the house of the barangay captain and informed the latter's spouse that he (Honorato) had
killed his wife Feling. After making that oral confession, Ambal took a pedicab, went to the municipal
hall and surrendered to a policeman, also confessing to the latter that he had liquidated his wife.
The policeman confiscated Ambal's long bolo, the tip of which was broken (Exh. F). Ambal was
bespattered with blood. His shirt was torn. He appeared to be weak.
The killing was the climax of a fifteen-year-old marriage featured by quarrels and bickerings which
were exacerbated by the fact that the wife sometimes did not stay in the conjugal abode and chose
to spend the night in the poblacion of Mambajao. The couple had eight children.
The immediate provocation for the assault was a quarrel induced by Felicula's failure to buy
medicine for Ambal who was afflicted with influenza. The two engaged in a heated alteration.
Felicula told her husband that it would be better if he were dead ("Mas maayo ka pang mamatay").
That remark infuriated Ambal and impelled him to attack his wife (Exh. 1).
On January 27, 1977, a police lieutenant charged Ambal with parricide in the municipal court. After a
preliminary examination, the case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where on March 4,
1977 the fiscal filed against Ambal an information for parricide. At the arraignment, Ambal, assisted
by counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty.
After the prosecution had presented its evidence, accused's counsel de oficio manifested that the
defense of Ambal was insanity.
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The trial court in its order of September 15, 1977 directed the municipal health officer, Doctor
Maximino R. Balbas, Jr., a 1960 medical graduate who had undergone a six-month training in
psychiatry in the National Mental Hospital, to examine Ambal and to submit within one month a
report on the latter's mental condition (p. 65, Record).
Doctor Balbas in his report dated November 3, 1977 found that Ambal was a "passive-aggressive,
emotionally unstable, explosive or inadequate personality" (Exh. 1).
Doctor Balbas testified that during the period form February 1 (twelve days after the killing) to
November 3, 1977, when he placed Ambal under observation, the latter did not show any mental
defect and was normal (44-46 tsn November 3,1977).
Asked directly whether Ambal suffered from a mental disease or defect, Doctor Balbas replied:
"Before the commission of the crime, he was normal. After the commission of the crime, normal, but
during the commission of the crime, that is what we call "Psychosis" due to short frustration
tolerance" (45 tsn).
Doctor Cresogono Llacuna,a 1937 medical graduate who undertook a two-month observation of
mental cases and who in the course of his long practice had treated around one hundred cases of
mental disorders, attended to Ambal in 1975. He found that Ambal suffered from a psychoneurosis, a
disturbance of the functional nervous system which is not insanity (65 November 15, 1977). The
doctor concluded that Ambal was not insane. Ambal was normal but nervous (68 He had no mental
disorder.
Ambal, 49, who reached Grade four, testified on November 16, 1977 or about ten months after the
incident. He said that at the time of the killing he did not know what he was doing because he was
allegedly not in full possession of his normal mental faculties. He pretended not to know that he was
charged with the capital offense of having killed his wife.
But he admitted that he knew that his wife was dead because he was informed of her death. During
his confinement in jail he mopped the floor and cooked food for his fellow prisoners. Sometimes, he
worked in the town plaza or was sent unescorted to buy food in the market.
He said that his wife quarrelled with him. She was irritable. he admitted that he rode on a tricycle
when he surrendered on the day of the killing. He remembered that a week before the incident he
got wet while plowing. He feel asleep without changing his clothes. At midnight, when he woke up,
he had chills. That was the commencement, his last illness.
The trial court concluded from Ambal's behavior immediately after the incident that he was not
insane and that he acted like a normal human being. We agree with the court's conclusion.
Courts should be careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness
or mere depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. (People vs. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87, 94.)
Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability an imbecile or an insane person
unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. *
According to the dictionary imbecile is a person marked by mental deficiency while an insane person
is one who has an unsound mind or suffers from a mental disorder. "imbecil vale tanto como escaso
de razon y es loco el que ha perdido el juico." An insane person may have lucid intervals but "el
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embecil no puede tener, no tiene estos intervalos de Corazon, pues en el no hay una alteracion,
sino una carencia del juico mismo" (1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., p. 92.)
Insanity has been defined as "a manifestation in language or conduct of disease or defect of the
brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered condition of the mentality, functional or
organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or disordered function of the sensory or of the
intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered volition" (Sec. 1039, Revised Administrative Code).
The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of proof to the contrary (Art.
800, Civil Code re Testamentary Succession; U.S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil. 305, 308). The law always
presumes all acts to be voluntary. It is improper to presume that acts were executed unconsciously
(People vs. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288, 292; People vs. Tagasa, 68 Phil. 147, 153; U.S. vs. Guevara, 27
Phil. 547; People vs. Fausto, 113 Phil. 841).
When there is no proof that the defendant was not of sound mind at the time he performed the
criminal act charged to him, or that he performed it at the time of madness or of mental
derangement, or that he was generally considered to be insane his habitual condition being, on
the contrary, healthy the legal presumption is that he acted in his ordinary state of mind and the
burden is upon the defendant to overcome this presumption (U.S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil. 218.)
Without positive proof that the defendant had lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior
to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition (U.S.
vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil. 62).
A defendant in a criminal case, who interposes the defense of mental incapacity, has the burden of
establishing that fact, meaning that he was insane at the very moment when the crime was
committed (People vs. Bascos, 44 Phil. 204.)
What should be the criterion for insanity or imbecility? We have adopted the rule, based on Spanish
jurisprudence, that in order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of
article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and
freedom of the will at the time of committing the crime (People vs. Formigonez, 87 Phil. 658, 660)
In order that insanity may be taken as an exempting circumstance, there must be complete
deprivation of intelligence in the commission of the act or that the accused acted without the least
discernment. Mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability. (People vs.
Cruz, 109 Phil. 288,292; People vs. Renegado, L-27031, May 31,1974,57 SCRA 275, 286.)
A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy and who tried to vindicate his honor by taking violent
measures to the extent of killing his wife (whom he suspected of infidelity) can hardly be regarded as
an imbecile (Formigones case).
Where the accused had a passionate nature, with a tendency to having violent fits when angry, his
acts of breaking glasses and smashing dishes are indications of an explosive temper and not
insanity, especially considering that he did not turn violent when a policeman intercepted him after
he had killed his wife. (Cruz case.)
There is a vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into such
a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. Persons who get into
a quarrel or fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An extremely angry man, often, if not
always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that he is insane.
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The popular meaning of the word I "crazy" is not synonymous with the legal terms "insane", "non
compos mentis," "unsound mind","idiot", or "lunatic" (U.S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88, 91.)
The heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred, or revenge is not insanity.
(People vs. Foy, 138 N.Y. 664, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 92.)
One who, in possession of a sound and, commits a criminal act under the impulse of passion or
revenge, which may temporarily dethrone reason and for the moment control the will, cannot
nevertheless be shielded from the consequences of the act by the plea of insanity. Insanity will only
excuse the commission of a criminal act, when it is made affirmatively to appear that the person
committing it was insane, and that the offense was the direct consequence of his insanity (State vs.
Strickly, 41 Iowa 232, cited in Vaquilar case, on p. 94.)
The defense of insanity was rejected in a case where the accused killed by strangulation a sixteen-
year-old girl, who got leaves from his banana plants, and sliced the flesh of her legs, thighs and
shoulders, cooked the flesh and ate it like a cannibal. (People vs. Balondo, L-27401, October 31,
1969, 30 SCRA 155). Being weak-minded does not necessarily mean that the accused is insane
(People vs. Martin, 120 Phil. 14, 20-21).
Justice Cardozo in his article, "What Medicine Can Do For The Law", traces briefly the origin of the
rule regarding insanity as a defense. He says:In the early stages of our law, way back in medieval
times, insanity was never a defense for crime. The insane killer, like the man who killed in self-
defense, might seek a pardon from the king, and would often get one. He had no defense at law.
Gradually insanity was allowed, but only within narrow limits This was what was become known as
the wild-beast stage of the defense. Then the limits of the defense were expanded, but still slowly
and narrowly. The killer was excused if the disease of the mind was such that he was incapable of
appreciating the difference between right and wrong. At first this meant, not the right and wrong of
particular case, but right and wrong generally or in the abstract, the difference, as it was sometimes
said, between good and evil. Later, the rule was modified in favor of the prisoner so that capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong generally would not charge with responsibility if there was no
capacity to understand the difference in relation to the particular act, the subject of the crime.
The rule governing the subject was crystallized in England in 1843 by the answer made by the
House of Lords to questions submitted by judges in the famous case of McNaghten, who was tried
for the murder of one Drummond, the secretary of Sir Robert Peel.
In the M'Naghten case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, Clark and Finelly 200, the following rule was laid down: "To
establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing
the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as
not, to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong."
In the M'Naghten case, it appears that Daniel M'Naghten shot Edward Drummond on January 20,
1843. Drummond died as a consequence of the gunshot wound on April 25, 1843. Drummond was
the private secretary of Sir Robert Peel, prime minister M'Naghten shot Drummond, thinking he was
Sir Robert. M'Naghten labored under the the insane delusion that he was being hounded by his
enemies and that the prime minister was one of them. Medical evidence tended to prove that
M'Naghten was affected by morbid delusions which carried him beyond the power of his own control,
leaving him unable to distinguish right and wrong, and that he was incapable of controlling his
conduct in connection with the delusion. The jury found him not guilty by reason of insanity.
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As stated in another case, the "test of the responsibility for criminal acts, when insanity is asserted,
is the capacity of the accused to distinguish between right and wrong at the time and with respect to
the act which is the subject of the inquiry. (Coleman's case,1 N.Y. Cr. Rep. 1.)
Another test is the so-called "irresistible impulse" test which means that "assuming defendant's
knowledge of the nature and quality of his act and his knowledge that the act is wrong, if, by reason
of disease of the mind, defendant has been deprived of or lost the power of his will which would
enable him to prevent himself from doing the act, then he cannot be found guilty." The commission of
the crime is excused even if the accused knew what he was doing was wrong provided that as a
result of mental disease he lacked the power to resist the impulse to commit the act. (State v. White,
270 Pac. 2d. 727, 730; Leslie Kast, 31 North Dakota Law Review, pp. 170, 173.)
The latest rule on the point is that "the so-called right wrong test, supplemented by the irresistible
impulse test, does not alone supply adequate criteria for determining criminal responsibility of a
person alleged mental incapacity." "An accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act is the
product of a mental disease or a mental defect. A mental disease relieving an accused of criminal
responsibility for his unlawful act is a condition considered capable of improvement or deterioration;
a mental defect having such effect on criminal responsibility is a condition not considered capable of
improvement or deterioration, and either congenital, or the result of injury or of a physical or mental
disease." (Syllabi, Durham v. U.S., 214 F. 2nd. 862, 874, 45 A.L.R. 2d. 1430 [1954].)
As stated in 22 C.J.S. 203, "the general test of criminal responsibility may be stated to be the
capacity to understand the nature and consequences of the act charged and the ability to distinguish
between right and wrong as to such act, and in a majority of jurisdictions this is the exclusive test."
And, as noted in 21 Am Jur 2d. 118, the rule in the M'Naghten case exists along with the "irresistible
impulse" test or some other formula permitting a defendant to be exculpated on the ground that,
although he knew the act was wrong, he was unable to refrain from committing it.
Since the broadest test suggested, which is the Durham or "Product" rule, also permits inability to
distinguish between right and wrong to be considered, even though it refuses to limit the inquiry to
that topic, it would appear that insanity which meets this test is a defense in all Anglo-American
jurisdictions and that the only controversy is over whether there are some cases in which the right-
and-wrong test is not met, but in which a defense on grounds of insanity should nevertheless be
recognized. (21 Am Jur 2d 118.)
In the instant case, the alleged insanity of Ambal was not substantiated by any sufficient evidence.
The presumption of sanity was not overthrown. He was not completely bereft of reason or
discernment and freedom of will when he mortally wounded his wife. He was not suffering from any
mental disease or defect.
The fact that immediately after the incident he thought of surrendering to the law-enforcing
authorities is incontestable proof that he knew that what he had done was wrong and that he was
going to be punished for it.
Ambal is guilty of parricide with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to the authorities.
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code punishes parricide with reclusion perpetuato death. The
lesser penalty should be imposed because of the presence of one mitigating circumstance and the
absence of aggravating circumstances (Art. 63[3], Revised Penal Code).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.SO ORDERED
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G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castaeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of
kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information;
or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974),
as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery
punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom
allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the
purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount
as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a
judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with extortion
committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in
the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE
AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a highway and, in
accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma.
Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate
damages. 3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them
under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in
applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential
decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is
necessarily included in the offense charged. 4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of
facts in the People's brief 5 which adopted the established findings of the court a quo, documenting
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the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are without
any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two
accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika
Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal
driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao purportedly on account of local
election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to
Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his
place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz
of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta
Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver (Id.,
pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma.
Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get
money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her
go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that
but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car
went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed. Enrique's
gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA
and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked
Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in
denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a
pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car
again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the
other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag
down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on
the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's
P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13) 6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except
that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North Diversion and freely allowed
complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that
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his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while
running across the highway. 7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando,
Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and
divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried
to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his
ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been
advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission
of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the information. We
likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime
for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts partake of the nature
of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying circumstances
thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in
arriving at a correct appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine
the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was committed in the furtherance
of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious
movement in which case rebellion and murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where
injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his
official duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of
the previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be direct
assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to
or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant, other than the extortion of
money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as
already stated, candidly laid the blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own
testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her
"Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the
victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for this crime to exist, there
must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where
such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and
consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of
the victims by the accused, even for an appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate
purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they
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committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute
kidnapping or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her
personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic) being handed to
you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto.
Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will take her to her
house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given
you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or
some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the police. So when we reached
Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom,
considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in
municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a
captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed
that when complainant readily gave the cash and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she
gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in
the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the
occasion of a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we
hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we, however, reject
the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and
punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the information
that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused admitted that the
robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted
that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the
time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable under
P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the
highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua. 18
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The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section
5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code,
particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate
an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532
on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any
definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification
of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles
306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof which
treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with
brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and
which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are
synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion
thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands, also known as
highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter
reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were
organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to
cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a
treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of
the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed persons for the purpose
indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not be
necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually
committed robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is
proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated
by art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily
organized for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three
armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text
of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis
supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only
a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532
for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is
presumed to have adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is
buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when
and the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
191
highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing
acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation
andstunting the economic and social progress of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among
the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts
of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all
obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by
the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered
"among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and
would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or
brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on
the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised
Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein
when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if committed.
Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band
of robbers; and the presumption in the Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed
firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of
brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not
only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the concept of
brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under
its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery
committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree just because it was
committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and
intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any
unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary
rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the
letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who
considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the
fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for
the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if
192
not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to
a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the
trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities
and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at
the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No.
532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972? 27 And,
if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are
incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by
the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the explicit
prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present
case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was casually operating on a
highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of terms.
Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have
amply demonstrated, the single act of robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case
does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article
293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have
indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought
and community of purpose. In the determination of their respective liabilities, the aggravating
circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of
confidence shall be further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor
of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the
penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of
simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom, since the former
offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are
charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to
gain, of personal property through intimidation of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has
been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an
information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by
the offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which,
as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom
from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed
as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued
that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any
of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is
rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno
of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal
Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2)
193
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and
jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

vs.
ROSALINO DUNGO, accused-appellant.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:p
This is an automatic review of the Decision * of the Regional Trial Court of the Third Judicial Region,
Branch 54, Macabebe, Pampanga, convicting the accused of the crime of murder.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
On March 24, 1987, the prosecuting attorney of the Province of Pampanga filed an information
charging Rosalino Dungo, the defendant-appellant herein, with the felony of murder, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 16th day of March, 1987 in the Municipality of Apalit, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
ROSALINO DUNGO, armed with a knife, with deliberate intent to kill, by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab Mrs. Belen Macalino Sigua with a knife hitting her in the chest, stomach, throat and other parts
of the body thereby inflicting upon her fatal wounds which directly caused the death of said Belen
Macalino Sigua.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, evident premeditation and the
generic aggravating circumstance of disrespect towards her sex, the crime was committed inside the
field office of the Department of Agrarian Reform where public authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties, taking advantage of superior strength and cruelty. (Record, p. 2)
On arraignment, accused-appellant Rosalino Dungo pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Trial on
the merits thereafter ensued.
The prosecution, through several witnesses, has established that on March 16, 1987 between the
hours of 2:00 and 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a male person, identified as the accused, went to the
place where Mrs. Sigua was holding office at the Department of Agrarian Reform, Apalit, Pampanga.
After a brief talk, the accused drew a knife from the envelope he was carrying and stabbed Mrs.
Sigua several times. Accomplishing the morbid act, he went down the staircase and out of the DAR's
office with blood stained clothes, carrying along a bloodied bladed weapon. (TSN, pp. 4-19, 33-46,
April 13, 1987; TSN, pp. 5-21, 28-38, April 20, 1987).
The autopsy report (Exh. "A") submitted by Dra. Melinda dela Cruz Cabugawan reveals that the
victim sustained fourteen (14) wounds, five (5) of which were fatal.
194
Rodolfo Sigua, the husband of the deceased, testified that, sometime in the latter part of February,
1987, the accused Rosalino Dungo inquired from him concerning the actuations of his wife (the
victim) in requiring so many documents from the accused. Rodolfo Sigua explained to the accused
the procedure in the Department of Agrarian Reform but the latter just said "never mind, I could do it
my own way." Rodolfo Sigua further testified that his wife's annual salary is P17,000.00, and he
spent the amount of P75,000.00 for the funeral and related expenses due to the untimely death of
his wife. (TSN, pp. 4-21, April 22, 1987).
The accused, in defense of himself, tried to show that he was insane at the time of the commission
of the offense.
The defense first presented the testimony of Andrea Dungo, the wife of the accused. According to
her, her husband had been engaged in farming up to 1982 when he went to Lebanon for six (6)
months. Later, in December 1983, her husband again left for Saudi Arabia and worked as welder.
Her husband did not finish his two-year contract because he got sick. Upon his arrival, he underwent
medical treatment. He was confined for one week at the Macabali Clinic. Thereafter he had his
monthly check-up. Because of his sickness, he was not able to resume his farming. The couple,
instead, operated a small store which her husband used to tend. Two weeks prior to March 16, 1987,
she noticed her husband to be in deep thought always; maltreating their children when he was not
used to it before; demanding another payment from his customers even if the latter had paid;
chasing any child when their children quarrelled with other children. There were also times when her
husband would inform her that his feet and head were on fire when in truth they were not. On the
fateful day of March 16, 1987, at around noon time, her husband complained to her of stomach
ache; however, they did not bother to buy medicine as he was immediately relieved of the pain
therein. Thereafter, he went back to the store. When Andrea followed him to the store, he was no
longer there. She got worried as he was not in his proper mind. She looked for him. She returned
home only when she was informed that her husband had arrived. While on her way home, she heard
from people the words "mesaksak" and "menaksak" (translated as "stabbing" and "has stabbed").
She saw her husband in her parents-in-law's house with people milling around, including the
barangay officials. She instinctively asked her husband why he did such act, but he replied, "that is
the only cure for my ailment. I have a cancer in my heart." Her husband further said that if he would
not be able to kill the victim in a number of days, he would die, and that he chose to live longer even
in jail. The testimony on the statements of her husband was corroborated by their neighbor Thelma
Santos who heard their conversation. (See TSN, pp. 12-16, July 10, 1987). Turning to the barangay
official, her husband exclaimed, "here is my wallet, you surrender me." However, the barangay
official did not bother to get the wallet from him. That same day the accused went to Manila. (TSN,
pp. 6-39, June 10, 1981)
Dra. Sylvia Santiago and Dr. Nicanor Echavez of the National Center for Mental Health testified that
the accused was confined in the mental hospital, as per order of the trial court dated August 17,
1987, on August 25, 1987. Based on the reports of their staff, they concluded that Rosalino Dungo
was psychotic or insane long before, during and after the commission of the alleged crime and that
his insanity was classified under organic mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or
stroke. (TSN, pp. 4-33, June 17, 1988; TSN, pp. 5-27, August 2, 1988).
Rosalino Dungo testified that he once worked in Saudi Arabia as welder. However, he was not able
to finish his two-year contract when he got sick. He had undergone medical treatment at Macabali
Clinic. However, he claimed that he was not aware of the stabbing incident nor of the death of Mrs.
Belen Sigua. He only came to know that he was accused of the death of Mrs. Sigua when he was
already in jail. (TSN, pp. 5-14, July 15, 1988)
195
Rebuttal witnesses were presented by the prosecution. Dr. Vicente Balatbat testified that the
accused was his patient. He treated the accused for ailments secondary to a stroke. While Dr.
Ricardo Lim testified that the accused suffered from oclusive disease of the brain resulting in the left
side weakness. Both attending physicians concluded that Rosalino Dungo was somehow
rehabilitated after a series of medical treatment in their clinic. Dr. Leonardo Bascara further testified
that the accused is functioning at a low level of intelligence. (TSN, pp. 620, September 1, 1988; TSN,
pp. 4-29, November 7, 1988).
On January 20, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of
murder, the Court hereby renders judgment sentencing the accused as follows:
1. To suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the accessories of the law;
2. To indemnify the family of the victim in the amount of P75,000.00 as actual damage, P20,000.00
as exemplary damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)
The trial court was convinced that the accused was sane during the perpetration of the criminal act.
The act of concealing a fatal weapon indicates a conscious adoption of a pattern to kill the victim. He
was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila which indicates that he embarked on a flight in order
to evade arrest. This to the mind of the trial court is another indication that the accused was sane
when he committed the crime.
It is an exercise in futility to inquire into the killing itself as this is already admitted by the defendant-
appellant. The only pivotal issue before us is whether or not the accused was insane during the
commission of the crime changed.
One who suffers from insanity at the time of the commission of the offense charged cannot in a legal
sense entertain a criminal intent and cannot be held criminally responsible for his acts. His unlawful
act is the product of a mental disease or a mental defect. In order that insanity may relieve a person
from criminal responsibility, it is necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act, that is, that the accused be deprived of cognition; that he acts without the least
discernment; that there be complete absence or deprivation of the freedom of the will. (People v.
Puno, 105 SCRA 151)
It is difficult to distinguish sanity from insanity. There is no definite defined border between sanity and
insanity. Under foreign jurisdiction, there are three major criteria in determining the existence of
insanity, namely: delusion test, irresistible impulse test, and the right and wrong test. Insane delusion
is manifested by a false belief for which there is no reasonable basis and which would be incredible
under the given circumstances to the same person if he is of compos mentis. Under the delusion
test, an insane person believes in a state of things, the existence of which no rational person would
believe. A person acts under an irresistible impulse when, by reason of duress or mental disease, he
has lost the power to choose between right and wrong, to avoid the act in question, his free agency
being at the time destroyed. Under the right and wrong test, a person is insane when he suffers from
such perverted condition of the mental and moral faculties as to render him incapable of
distinguishing between right and wrong. (See 44 C.J.S. 2)
So far, under our jurisdiction, there has been no case that lays down a definite test or criterion for
insanity. However, We can apply as test or criterion the definition of insanity under Section 1039 of
196
the Revised Administrative Code, which states that insanity is "a manifestation in language or
conduct, of disease or defect of the brain, or a more or less permanently diseased or disordered
condition of the mentality, functional or organic, and characterized by perversion, inhibition, or by
disordered function of the sensory or of the intellective faculties, or by impaired or disordered
volition." Insanity as defined above is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental
faculties which is manifested in language or conduct. An insane person has no full and clear
understanding of the nature and consequence of his act.
Thus, insanity may be shown by surrounding circumstances fairly throwing light on the subject, such
as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and appearance, his acts and
conduct inconsistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts and beliefs, and his
improvident bargains.
Evidence of insanity must have reference to the mental condition of the person whose sanity is in
issue, at the very time of doing the act which is the subject of inquiry. However, it is permissible to
receive evidence of his mental condition for a reasonable period both before and after the time of the
act in question. Direct testimony is not required nor the specific acts of derangement essential to
establish insanity as a defense. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward acts:
thereby we read the thoughts, motives and emotions of a person; and through which we determine
whether his acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind. (People v. Bonoan, 64 Phil. 87)
In the case at bar, defense's expert witnesses, who are doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, concluded that the accused was suffering from psychosis or insanity classified under organic
mental disorder secondary to cerebro-vascular accident or stroke before, during and after the
commission of the crime charged. (Exhibit L, p. 4). Accordingly, the mental illness of the accused
was characterized by perceptual disturbances manifested through impairment of judgment and
impulse control, impairment of memory and disorientation, and hearing of strange voices. The
accused allegedly suffered from psychosis which was organic. The defect of the brain, therefore, is
permanent.
Dr. Echavez, defense's expert witness, admitted that the insanity of the accused was permanent and
did not have a period for normal thinking. To quote
Q Is there such a lucid intervals?
A In this case, considering the nature of the organic mental disorder, the lucid intervals unfortunately
are not present, sir.
(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)
However, Dr. Echavez disclosed that the manifestation or the symptoms of psychosis may be treated
with medication. (TSN, p. 26, August 2, 1988). Thus, although the defect of the brain is permanent,
the manifestation of insanity is curable.
Dr. Echavez further testified that the accused was suffering from psychosis since January of 1987,
thus:
Q In your assessment of the patient, did you determine the length of time the patient has been
mentally ill?
A From his history, the patient started (sic) or had a stroke abroad. If I may be allowed to scan my
record, the record reveals that the patient had a stroke in Riyadh about seven (7) months before his
197
contract expired and he was brought home. Sometime in January of 1987, the first manifestation is
noted on the behavioral changes. He was noted to be in deep thought, pre-occupied self,
complaining of severe headache, deferment of sleep and loss of appetite; and that was about
January of 1987, Sir. (TSN, pp. 21-22, August 2, 1988)
The defense reposed their arguments on the findings of the doctors of the National Center for Mental
Health, specifically on Dr. Echavez's assessment that the accused has been insane since January of
1987 or three (3) months before the commission of the crime charged. The doctors arrived at this
conclusion based on the testimonies of the accused's wife and relatives, and after a series of
medical and psychological examinations on the accused when he was confined therein. However,
We are still in quandary as to whether the accused was really insane or not during the commission of
the offense.
The prosecution aptly rebutted the defense proposition, that the accused, though he may be insane,
has no lucid intervals. It is an undisputed fact that a month or few weeks prior to the commission of
the crime charged the accused confronted the husband of the victim concerning the actuations of the
latter. He complained against the various requirements being asked by the DAR office, particularly
against the victim. We quote hereunder the testimony of Atty. Rodolfo C. Sigua:
Q In the latter part of February 1987 do you remember having met the accused Rosalino Dungo?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where?
A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.
Q Could you tell us what transpired in the latter part of February 1987, when you met the accused at
your residence?
A Accused went to our residence. When I asked him what he wanted, accused told me that he
wanted to know from my wife why she was asking so many documents: why she was requiring him
to be interviewed and file the necessary documents at the Office of the DAR. Furthermore, he
wanted to know why my wife did not want to transfer the Certificate of Land Transfer of the
landholding of his deceased father in his name.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the accused informed you in the latter part of February 1987 that your wife the late Belen
Macalino Sigua was making hard for him the transfer of the right of his father, what did you tell him?
A I asked the accused, "Have you talked or met my wife? Why are you asking this question of me?"
Q What was his answer?
A Accused told me that he never talked nor met my wife but sent somebody to her office to make a
request for the transfer of the landholding in the name of his deceased father in his name.
Q When you informed him about the procedure of the DAR, what was the comment of the accused?
A The accused then said, "I now ascertained that she is making things difficult for the transfer of the
landholding in the name of my father and my name."
198
(TSN, pp. 5-7, April 22, 1987)
If We are to believe the contention of the defense, the accused was supposed to be mentally ill
during this confrontation. However, it is not usual for an insane person to confront a specified person
who may have wronged him. Be it noted that the accused was supposed to be suffering from
impairment of the memory, We infer from this confrontation that the accused was aware of his acts.
This event proves that the accused was not insane or if insane, his insanity admitted of lucid
intervals.
The testimony of defense witness Dr. Nicanor Echavez is to the effect that the appellant could have
been aware of the nature of his act at the time he committed it. To quote:
Q Could you consider a person who is undergoing trial, not necessarily the accused, when asked by
the Court the whereabouts of his lawyer he answered that his lawyer is not yet in Court and that he
is waiting for his counsel to appear and because his counsel did not appear, he asked for the
postponement of the hearing of the case and to reset the same to another date. With those facts, do
you consider him insane?
A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.
Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q How about if you applied this to the accused, what will be your conclusion?
A Having examined a particular patient, in this particular case, I made a laboratory examination, in
short all the assessment necessary to test the behavior of the patient, like for example praying for
postponement and fleeing from the scene of the crime is one situation to consider if the patient is
really insane or not. If I may elaborate to explain the situation of the accused, the nature of the
illness, the violent behavior, then he appears normal he can reason out and at the next moment he
burst out into violence regardless motivated or unmotivated. This is one of the difficulties we have
encountered in this case. When we deliberated because when we prepared this case we have really
deliberation with all the members of the medical staff so those are the things we considered. Like for
example he shouted out "Napatay ko si Mrs. Sigua!" at that particular moment he was aware of what
he did, he knows the criminal case.
COURT
Q With that statement of yours that he was aware when he shouted that he killed the victim in this
case, Mrs. Sigua, do we get it that he shouted those words because he was aware when he did the
act?
A The fact that he shouted, Your Honor, awareness is there. (TSN, pp. 37-41, August 2, 1983;
emphasis supplied)
Insanity in law exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence. The statement of one of
the expert witnesses presented by the defense, Dr. Echavez, that the accused knew the nature of
what he had done makes it highly doubtful that accused was insane when he committed the act
charged. As stated by the trial court:
199
The Court is convinced that the accused at the time that he perpetrated the act was sane. The
evidence shows that the accused, at the time he perpetrated the act was carrying an envelope
where the fatal weapon was hidden. This is an evidence that the accused consciously adopted a
pattern to kill the victim. The suddenness of the attack classified the killing as treacherous and
therefore murder. After the accused ran away from the scene of the incident after he stabbed the
victim several times, he was apprehended and arrested in Metro Manila, an indication that he took
flight in order to evade arrest. This to the mind of the Court is another indicia that he was conscious
and knew the consequences of his acts in stabbing the victim (Rollo, p. 63)
There is no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation of the evidence presented.
(People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646). The trial court had the privilege of examining the deportment
and demeanor of the witnesses and therefore, it can discern if such witnesses were telling the truth
or not.
Generally, in criminal cases, every doubt is resolved in favor of the accused. However, in the
defense of insanity, doubt as to the fact of insanity should be resolved in fervor of sanity. The burden
of proving the affirmative allegation of insanity rests on the defense. Thus:
In considering the plea of insanity as a defense in a prosecution for crime, the starting premise is
that the law presumes all persons to be of sound mind. (Art. 800, Civil Code: U.S. v. Martinez, 34
Phil. 305) Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and that it is improper to
presume that acts were done unconsciously (People v. Cruz, 109 Phil. 288). . . . Whoever, therefore,
invokes insanity as a defense has the burden of proving its existence. (U.S. v. Zamora, 52 Phil. 218)
(People v. Aldemita, 145 SCRA 451)
The quantum of evidence required to overthrow the presumption of sanity is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Insanity is a defense in a confession and avoidance and as such must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Insanity must be clearly and satisfactorily proved in order to acquit an
accused on the ground of insanity. Appellant has not successfully discharged the burden of
overcoming the presumption that he committed the crime as charged freely, knowingly, and
intelligently.
Lastly, the State should guard against sane murderer escaping punishment through a general plea
of insanity. (People v. Bonoan, supra) PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned decision is hereby
AFFIRMED without costs.
SO ORDERED.
200
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.
Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
AVANCEA, C.J.:
Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores, municipality of
Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the said barrio and visitors
were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao. Early that
afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room
bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen.
Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which
he wounded himself. Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as
a result of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
An information for parricide was filed against Potenciano Taneo, and upon conviction he was
sentenced by the trial court to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties, to indemnity the heirs
of the deceased in the sum of P500 and to pay the costs. From this sentence, the defendant
appealed.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the defendant had a
quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin Abadilla, who invited him to come
down to fight, and when he was about to go down, he was stopped by his wife and his mother. On
the day of the commission of the crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early
in the afternoon he had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was
then when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that Collantes
was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of which he got up; and as it
seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come down, he armed himself with a bolo and
left the room. At the door, he met his wife who seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he
fancied seeing his wife really wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed
to multiply around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
The evidence shows that the defendant not only did not have any trouble with his wife, but that he
loved her dearly. Neither did he have any dispute with Tanner and Malinao, or have any motive for
assaulting them.
Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with which he is charged,
were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.
In arriving at this conclusion, we are taking into consideration the fact that the apparent lack of a
motive for committing a criminal act does not necessarily mean that there are none, but that simply
201
they are not known to us, for we cannot probe into depths of one's conscience where they may be
found, hidden away and inaccessible to our observation. We are also conscious of the fact that an
extreme moral perversion may lead a man commit a crime without a real motive but just for the sake
of committing it. But under the special circumstances of the case, in which the victim was the
defendant's own wife whom he dearly loved, and taking into consideration the fact that the defendant
tried to attack also his father, in whose house and under whose protection he lived, besides
attacking Tanner and Malinao, his guests, whom he himself invited as may be inferred from the
evidence presented, we find not only a lack of motives for the defendant to voluntarily commit the
acts complained of, but also motives for not committing said acts.
Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor stated that
considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a dream, under the
influence of an hallucination and not in his right mind.
We have thus far regarded the case upon the supposition that the wound of the deceased was direct
result of the defendant's act performed in order to inflict it. Nevertheless we may say further that the
evidence does not clearly show this to have been the case, but that it may have been caused
accidentally. Nobody saw how the wound was inflicted. The defendant did not testify that he
wounded his wife. He only seemed to have heard her say that she was wounded. What the evidence
shows is that the deceased, who was in the sala, intercepted the defendant at the door of the room
as he was coming out. The defendant did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was
defending himself from his enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in
desperation, he stabbed himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the courts finds that
the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is charged, and it is ordered that
he be confined in the Government insane asylum, whence he shall not be released until the director
thereof finds that his liberty would no longer constitute a menace, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
202
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126283. May 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN ESTEPANO, RODNEY

ESTEPANO and RENE ESTEPANO, accused-appellants.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ENRIQUE BALINAS was stabbed and hacked to death for which Dominador, Rodrigo, Ruben,
Rodney, Dante and Rene, all surnamed Estepano, were charged with murder. Rodrigo died during
the trial and before judgment could be rendered. Dante was never apprehended hence, as against
him, the case was archived. After trial, Dominador was acquitted on reasonable doubt. Only Ruben,
Rodney and Rene were found guilty. Accordingly, the three (3) were sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of Enrique Balinas in the amount of P100,000.00
for moral damages and P9,500.00 for actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.[1]
The case for the prosecution is woven mainly on the testimony of Florencio Tayco. He narrated that
on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the evening, he was on his way home in Barangay IV,
Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, with Lopito Gaudia and Enrique Balinas. Enroute, they met
Dominador Estepano at the BM Trucking compound. At this juncture, according to Florencio, Lopito
started to talk to Dominador while he and Enrique stood nearby. Suddenly, Rodrigo appeared and
without any provocation stabbed Enrique in the stomach with a guinunting.[2] Ruben who was armed
with a cane cutter and Rodney, Dante and Rene, each armed with a bolo, followed suit in hacking
Enrique. While this was happening, Dominador told his companions, You better kill him![3]
Lopito Gaudia confirmed that on 16 April 1991, at around ten oclock in the evening, while he was
walking home with Enrique Balinas and Florencio Tayco, they saw Dominador Estepano at the BM
Trucking compound near the house of Junior Vasquez. While he was talking to Dominador he saw
two (2) persons, both naked from the waist up, pass by. He recognized one of them to be Rodrigo
Estepano.Soon after, he heard a couple of splashing sounds and a ring, which made him turn
around. As he did, he saw Rodrigo withdrawing his bolo from the neck of Enrique. He also saw
another person, who was armed with a cane cutter, standing near the fallen
Enrique. He asked Dominador why Rodrigo hacked Enrique and Dominador replied that that was the
result of intense hatred. He then hurriedly left for home.On the way he met some military men and
told them about the incident. The military men assured him that they would report the matter to the
police authorities.[4]
Dominador Estepano gave his own version of the incident. According to him, on 16 April 1991, at
around ten oclock in the evening, he was at home with his wife and son Roberto. They were about to
eat supper when he heard Enrique Balinas call out for his son Rodrigo to come down. He peeped
through the window and saw Rodrigo hacking Enrique. When Enrique fell to the ground Rodrigo
hastily fled.There was no other person in the vicinity. He then went down his house where the victim
was and saw the latters firearm. He picked it up and when Chief of Police Balquin arrived, he turned
over the firearm to him.[5]
203
Robert Hautea[6] and Luz Cuepas,[7] both residents of Barangay IV, corroborated the testimony of
Dominador.
Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked alibi. Ruben claimed that on 16 April 1991, at around
ten oclock in the evening, he was at the provincial hospital in Bacolod City attending to his wife who
earlier underwent a caesarian operation.[8] Rene and Rodney, sons of Rodrigo, claimed that they
were at home sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only thirteen (13) years of
age then, testified that he came to know about the incident that same night when his mother
awakened him to inform him about it.[9] Rodney, on the other hand, was awakened by shouts that
his father killed Enrique Balinas.[10]
The crux of this appeal of Ruben, Rodney and Rene is that the trial court erred: (a) in giving
credence to the testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco; (b) in finding the existence of
conspiracy in the commission of the crime charged; and, (c) in finding them guilty of murder.[11]
On the first assigned error, accused-appellants argue that the trial court accorded too much
credence to the testimony of Florencio Tayco notwithstanding that some substantial points of his
testimony were not corroborated by Lopito Gaudia who was also present at the crime
scene. Florencio maintained that aside from Rodrigo, the other Estepanos, Dante, Rodney, Ruben
and Rene, also attacked Enrique.Lopito, on the other hand, asserted that he saw Rodrigo with only
one companion at the time of the incident.[12]
The assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by
the trial court because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are the most significant factors in
evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting
testimonies. Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected
to determine, with reasonable discretion, who of the witnesses to disbelieve or whose testimonies to
accept.Verily, findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate
court unless some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended or misinterpreted,[13] which is not true in the present case.
The clear and convincing testimony of Florencio Tayco positively points to accused-appellants as the
killers of Enrique Balinas. Florencio testified that he was only two arms length away from the
victim[14] as well as from the assailants.[15] Thus, it was unlikely that he could not have recognized
the latter considering that he was a resident of the place and thus familiar more or less with the
faces of its townsfolk. He was positive in identifying Rodrigo as the person who first stabbed Enrique
in the stomach with a bolo,[16] followed by Ruben, Dante, Rodney and Rene, each hacking the
victim one after the other while the victim was already lying down.[17] He was also positive in
identifying the respective weapons used by the malefactors.[18] As there was no indication that
Florencio was moved by any improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his
testimony must be given full faith and credence.[19]
Florencios account, in a way, was bolstered by the testimony of Dr. Quintin Napoles, the physician
who made a post mortem examination on the body of the victim. His findings revealed:
Multiple hack wounds left face and neck with fracture of cervical vertebrae; stab wound left anterior
chest and right posterior lumbar region, non-penetrating. Dead on arrival.[20]
On the basis of his medical findings, Dr. Napoles opined that there could have been more than one
kind of weapon used in killing the victim - one sharp pointed and another sharp bladed.[21]
204
It is undisputed that both Florencio Tayco and Lopito Gaudia were present at the crime scene when
the incident happened. However, as clearly shown by their testimonies, it was only Florencio who
saw the entire incident. What Lopito witnessed was only that which transpired when he turned
around upon hearing some noise. Naturally, their impressions on the incident would vary. In other
words, the alleged conflicting testimonies between the two eyewitnesses as claimed by accused-
appellants are more imagined than real.[22]
With respect to the defense of alibi, we agree with the trial court that it must fall. Well entrenched is
the rule that alibi and denial are inherently weak and have always been viewed with disfavor by the
courts due to the facility with which they can be concocted. They warrant the least credibility or none
at all and cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness.
[23]
Appellant Ruben Estepano would impress us that in the evening of 16 April 1991 he was at the
provincial hospital attending to his wife who had a caesarean operation, and never left the hospital
until the following day. However, he did not introduce evidence that his wife was actually admitted in
the hospital and that she was discharged therefrom only on 17 April 1991 to prove that he was not at
the scene of the crime when the incident happened.[24] The other appellants, Rodney and Rene, on
their part, testified that they were asleep when the incident happened. These testimonies are not
sufficient to outweigh their positive identification by one of the prosecution witnesses.
For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for accused-appellants to prove that they were somewhere else
when the crime was committed. They must likewise demonstrate that they were so far away that
they could not have been present at the place of the commission of the offense or its immediate
vicinity at the time of its commission.[25] They were not able to prove that it was physically
impossible for them to be at the locus criminis considering the proximity of the places where they
alleged to be and the place where the victim was murdered. For alibi to be believed, credible and
tangible proof of physical impossibility for the accused to be at the scene of the crime is
indispensable.[26]
On the second issue, accused-appellants contend that there was no solid ground to establish
conspiracy among them because their identities as authors of the crime were not proved by clear
and convincing evidence, and that their participation in the crime was not sufficiently established in
the light of conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.[27]
We do not agree. The factual findings of the trial court, through the credible testimony of prosecution
witness Florencio Tayco, clearly established their identities as the assailants as well as the
participation of each of them, not to mention the weapons used for the attack. Conspiracy may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was committed,[28] and the concerted
acts of the accused to obtain a common criminal objective signify conspiracy.[29] In the case at bar,
the overt acts of accused-appellants in taking turns in hacking Enrique Balinas clearly and
adequately established conspiracy. It can be inferred therefrom that they acted in unison in the
pursuit of their common criminal design which was to kill the victim Enrique Balinas.[30]
The trial court was correct in finding accused-appellants Ruben Estepano and Rodney Estepano
guilty of murder as the killing was attended by treachery. The evidence shows that they suddenly
and unexpectedly attacked the victim while the latter was waiting for Lopito Gaudia who was talking
to Dominador Estepano. There was treachery because the following requisites concurred: (a) the
culprits employed means, methods or forms of execution which tended directly and specially to
insure their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, which
205
meant that no opportunity was given the latter to do so; and, (b) that such means, method or manner
of execution was deliberately or consciously chosen.[31] The penalty of reclusion perpetua was
correctly imposed on them in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances.[32]
With respect to accused-appellant Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen (13)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense. Under Art. 12, par. (3), of The Revised
Penal Code, a person over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) is exempt from criminal
liability unless it is shown that he acted with discernment. The minor referred to here is presumed to
have acted without discernment. Thus, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that such minor
acted otherwise.[33]
A scrutiny of the records shows that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant Rene
Estepano acted with discernment. The testimony of prosecution witness Florencio Tayco only
attempted to establish, as it did, Renes presence at the crime scene and his supposed participation
in the killing of Enrique Balinas. Thus -
Q: Aside from Ruben Estepano alias Texas and Dante Estepano who helped in attacking Enrique
Balinas, were there other persons involved or helped aside from these two?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many more (who) helped?
A: Rodney Estepano and Rene Estepano.
xxxx
Q: What is (sic) the weapon used by Texas (Ruben)?
A: Cane cutter (espading).
xxxx
Q: How about Rene?
A: Bolo.[34]
Clearly, the prosecution did not endeavor to establish Renes mental capacity to fully appreciate the
consequences of his unlawful act. Moreover, its cross-examination of Rene did not in any way
attempt to show his discernment. He was merely asked about what he knew of the incident that
transpired on 16 April 1991 and whether he participated therein.[35] Accordingly, even if he was
indeed a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from criminal liability as the prosecution failed to
rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his age.[36] The cross-examination
of Rene could have provided the prosecution a good occasion to extract from him positive indicators
of his capacity to discern. But, in this regard, the government miserably squandered the
opportunity to incriminate him.
The damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim must be
modified. The P100,000.00 granted by the trial court for moral damages must
be REDUCED to P50,000.00 considering that the purpose for such award is not to enrich the heirs
but to compensate them for the injuries to their feelings. Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence,
an additional award of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Enrique Balinas must also be given.
[37]
206
Finally, the heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased,
and the absence of documentary evidence to support a claim therefor does not prevent recovery of
such damages.[38] The testimony of Marietta Balinas, the victims wife, on the earning capacity of
her husband is enough to establish the basis for the award. The formula for determining the life
expectancy of Enrique Balinas applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality is as follows: 2/3
multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased).[39] Since Enrique was 34 years of age at the time
of his death,[40]then his life expectancy was 30.66 years.
At the time of his death, Enrique was earning P2,000.00 a month as househelper of a certain Dr.
Sancho[41] so that his annual income was P24,000.00. From this amount, 50% should be deducted
as reasonable and necessary living expenses to arrive at his net earnings. Prescinding from the
foregoing, we deduce that his net earning capacity was P367,920.00 computed as follows:
net earning life gross reasonable
capacity (x) = expectancy x annual less & necessary
income living expenses
x = 2 (80 - 34) x [24,000.00 12,000.00]
= 30.66 x 12,000.00
= P367,920.00
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO

and RODNEY ESTEPANO are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are
accordingly sentenced each to reclusion perpetua. They are ordered to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of their victim Enrique Balinas y Gran the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity for
death,P50,000.00 as moral damages, P9,500.00 as actual damages and P367,920.00 for loss of
earning capacity.
Accused-appellant RENE ESTEPANO is ACQUITTED in the absence of proof that he acted with
discernment; consequently, his immediate RELEASE from confinement is ORDERED unless he is
detained for some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to implement this
Decision and to report to this Court immediately the action taken hereon within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
207
LLAVE VS PEOPLE
NIEL F. LLAVE, G.R. No. 166040
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C. J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. *
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 26, 2006
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26962 affirming, with modification, the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 02-1779 convicting Petitioner Neil F. Llave of rape.
On September 27, 2002, an Information charging petitioner (then only 12 years old) with rape was
filed with the RTC of Pasay City. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September 2002, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NEIL LLAVE Y
FLORES, aka NIEL F. LLAVE, a minor over nine (9) years of age and under fifteen (15) but acting
with discernment, by means of force threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant, DEBBIELYN SANTOS y QUITALES, a minor,
seven (7) years of age, against her will and consent. Contrary to law.[3]
The Case for the Prosecution
The spouses Domingo and Marilou Santos were residents of Pasay City.[4] One of their children,
Debbielyn, was born on December 8, 1994.[5] In 2002, she was a Grade II student at the Villamor Air
Base Elementary School in Pasay City[6] and attended classes from 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.[7]
Domingo eked out a living as a jeepney driver, while Marilou sold quail eggs at a nearby church.
[8] Adjacent to their house was that of Teofisto Bucud, a barbecue vendor who would usually start
selling at 6:30 p.m.[9] Next to Teofistos residence was a vacant house.[10]
208
Debbielyn testified that on September 24, 2002, she arrived home at past 6:00 p.m. She changed
her clothes and proceeded to her mothers store. Marilou asked her daughter to bring home the
container with the unsold quail eggs.[11] Debbielyn did as told and went on her way. As she neared
the vacant house, she saw petitioner, who suddenly pulled her behind a pile of hollow blocks which
was in front of the vacant house. There was a little light from the lamp post.[12] She resisted to no
avail.[13] Petitioner ordered her to lie down on the cement. Petrified, she complied. He removed her
shorts and underwear then removed his own. He got on top of her.[14] She felt his penis being
inserted into her vagina. He kissed her.[15] She felt pain and cried.[16] She was sure there were
passersby on the street near the vacant house at the time.
It was then that Teofisto came out of their house and heard the girls cries. He rushed to the place
and saw petitioner on top of Debbielyn, naked from the waist down. Teofisto shouted at petitioner,
and the latter fled from the scene. Teofisto told Debbielyn to inform her parents about what
happened.[17] She told her father about the incident.[18] Her parents later reported what happened
to the police authorities.[19] Debbielyn told the police that petitioner was a bad boy because he was
a rapist.[20]
Teofisto testified that at about 6:25 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he went out of their house to get
his barbecue grill. He heard someone moaning from within the adjacent vacant house.[21] He
rushed to the place and saw petitioner, naked from waist down, on top of Debbielyn, making
pumping motions on her anus.[22] The girl was crying. He shouted at petitioner, Hoy, bakit ginawa
mo yan?[23] Petitioner hurriedly put his shorts on and fled.[24] Neighbors who had heard Teofisto
shouting arrived.[25] Later, Teofisto gave a written statement to the police investigator regarding the
incident.[26]
Domingo Santos testified that at about 6:30 p.m. that day, he was inside their house. His daughter,
Kimberly Rose, suddenly told him that Debbielyn had been raped near the vacant house by
petitioner.[27] He rushed to the place and found her daughter crying. When he asked her what
happened, she replied that she had been abused. He brought Debbielyn to their house and then left.
[28] He then looked for petitioner and found him at his grandmothers house. A barangay
tanod brought petitioner to the barangay hall.[29]On September 25, 2002, he brought her daughter
to the Philippine General Hospital Child Protection Unit at Taft Avenue, Manila where she was
examined by Dr. Mariella S. Castillo.
Dr. Castillo declared on the witness stand that she was a physician at the Child Protection Unit of the
Philippine General Hospital. On September 25, 2002, she interviewed the victim who told
her Masakit ang pepe ko, Ni-rape ako.[30] Dr. Castillo also conducted a genital examination on the
child, and found no injury on the hymen and perineum, but found scanty yellowish discharge
between the labia minora.[31] There was also a fresh abrasion of the perineal skin at 1
oclock position near the anal opening.[32] She declared that the findings support the theory that
blunt force or penetrating trauma (such as an erect penis, finger, or any other foreign body[33]) was
applied to the perineal area[34] not more than six or seven days before.[35] The abrasion could have
been caused on September 24, 2002. She found no spermatozoa in the vaginal area or injury at the
external genitalia;[36] neither did she find any other injury or abrasion on the other parts of the
victims body.[37] She concluded that her findings were consistent with the victims claim that she was
sexually abused by petitioner.
Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez, for his part, testified that on September 24, 2002, Marilou
Santos arrived at the barangay hall and reported that her daughter had been raped by petitioner who
was then in his aunts house at Cadena de Amor Street. Barangay Captain Greg Florante ordered
209
him and Barangay Tanod Efren Gonzales to proceed to Cadena de Amor Street and take the boy
into custody, and they did as they were told.[38]
The Case for the Accused
Petitioner, through counsel, presented Dr. Castillo as witness. She declared that the abrasions in the
perineal area could have been caused while the offender was on top of the victim.[39] She explained
that the distance between the anus and the genital area is between 2.5 to 3 centimeters.[40] The
abrasion was located at of an inch from the anal orifice.
Petitioner testified and declared that he was a freshman at the Pasay City South High School.
[41] He had been one of the three outstanding students in grade school and received awards such
as Best in Mathematics.[42] He also finished a computer course and received a Certificate of
Completion from the Philippine Air Force Management Information Center.[43] He denied having
raped the private complainant. He declared that at 6:30 p.m. on September 24, 2002, he was
outside of their house to buy rice in thecarinderia[44] and he saw her on his way back.[45] He also
met his father, who asked him what he had done to their neighbor. He was also told that the victims
father was so angry that the latter wanted to kill him.[46] He did not ask his father for the name of the
angry neighbor. He was also told to pass by Cadena de Amor Street in going to his aunts
house. Petitioner also declared that his mother prodded him to go to his aunts house.[47] Later,
Domingo and Barangay Tanod Jorge Dominguez arrived at his aunts house and brought him to
the barangay hall. He did not know of any reason why Debbielyn and her parents would charge him
with rape.[48]
Petitioner also declared that he played cards with Debbielyn.[49] While confined at the Pasay City
Youth Home during trial, he had a crush on Issa, a young female inmate.Using a piece of broken
glass (bubog) about half-an-inch long, he inscribed her name on his right thigh, left leg and left arm.
[50]
Nida Llave testified and identified her sons Certificate of Live Birth, in which it appears that he was
born on March 6, 1990.[51] She declared that at about 6:30 p.m. onSeptember 24, 2000, Marilou
Santos and Marilyn Bucud arrived in their house looking for her son. According to Marilyn, her son
had raped the private complainant. She went to their house to look for her son and came across
Domingo Santos who threatened to kill her son. She and her husband proceeded to the house of his
sister Josefina at Cadena de Amor Street where petitioner had hidden for a while.[52]
At the conclusion of the trial, the court rendered judgment convicting Neil of the crime charged. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
FROM ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the xxx
Niel Llave y Flores beyond reasonable doubt when he forcibly pulled the complainant towards the
vacant lot, laid on top of her and had carnal knowledge with the [complainant] against her will and
consent who is only seven (7) years old (sic). Moreover, he being a minor, he cannot be meted with
the Death penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the CICL [Child in Conflict with the Law] Niel Llave y Flores guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, and crediting him with the special mitigating circumstance of minority, this
Court hereby sentences him to prision mayor minimum, Six (6) years and One (1) day to Eight (8)
years, and pay civil indemnity of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php50,000.00).[53] The trial court declared
that based on the evidence of the prosecution that petitioner pushed the victim towards the vacant
210
house and sexually abused her, petitioner acted with discernment. It also considered petitioners
declaration that he had been a consistent honor student.[54]
Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA, where he averred the following in his Brief as appellant
therein: THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MATERIAL
INCONSISTENCIES OF THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS WITH THAT OF THE
MEDICAL REPORT ON THE FACTUAL ALLEGATION OF BLEEDING.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS TEOFISTO BUCUD WHO HAS REASON TO FABRICATE A SCENARIO
AGAINST ACCUSED-APPELLANT BECAUSE HE HAS PERSONAL VENDETTA AGAINST THE
LATTERS FAMILY/RELATIVES.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE THEORY OF THE PROSECUTION OF RAPE
BY HAVING CARNAL KNOWLEDGE, BEING CONTRARY TO THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE.[55]
The CA rendered judgment affirming the decision with modification as to the penalty meted on him.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-
appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional medium as the minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as
the maximum. Additionally, the accused-appellant is ordered to pay the complaining witness the
amount of P50,000 by way of moral damages and P20,000 by way of exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[56]
Petitioner filed a Motion for the Reconsideration,[57]contending that the prosecution failed to adduce
proof that he acted with discernment; hence, he should be acquitted. The appellate court denied the
motion in a Resolution[58] dated November 12, 2004 on the following finding:
As regards the issue of whether the accused-appellant acted with discernment, his conduct during
and after the crime betrays the theory that as a minor, the accused-appellant does not have the
mental faculty to grasp the propriety and consequences of the act he made. As correctly pointed out
by the prosecution, the fact that forthrightly upon discovery, the accused-appellant fled the scene
and hid in his grandmothers house intimates that he knew that he did something that merits
punishment.
Contrary to the urgings of the defense, the fact that the accused-appellant is a recipient of several
academic awards and is an honor student further reinforces the finding that he [is] possessed [of]
intelligence well beyond his years and is thus poised to distinguish, better at least than other minors
his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible.[59]
Petitioner now raises the following issues and arguments in the instant petition before this Court:
ISSUES
WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER, WHO WAS A MINOR ABOVE 9 YEARS BUT BELOW 15
YEARS OF AGE AT THE TIME OF THE CRIME, ACTED WITH DISCERNMENT.
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
211
ARGUMENTS
THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS

WITH THE MEDICAL REPORT BELIE THE FINDING OF RAPE.
PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.
PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.
THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.
THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.
PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[60]
The issues raised by the petitioner in this case may be summarized as follows: (1) whether he was
deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation; (2) whether he had carnal knowledge of the
private complainant, and if in the affirmative, whether he acted with discernment in perpetrating the
crime; (3) whether the penalty imposed by the appellate court is correct; and (4) whether he is liable
to pay moral damages to the private complainant.
On the first issue, petitioner avers that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation
before the Information against him was filed.
On the second issue, petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he had carnal knowledge of Debbielyn. He insists that her testimony is inconsistent on material
points. He points out that she claimed to have felt pain in her vagina when petitioner inserted his
penis to the point that she cried; this, however, is negated by Dr. Castillos report stating that there
was no evidence of injury on the victims external genitalia. Petitioner maintains that as against the
victims testimony and that of Dr. Castillos report, the latter should prevail.
According to petitioner, mere touching of the female organ will not suffice as factual basis of
conviction for consummated rape. Moreover, the victims testimony lacks credibility in view of her
admission that, while she was being allegedly ravished by him, there were passersby along the
street. Besides, petitioner avers, an abrasion may be caused by an invasion of the body through the
protective covering of the skin. Petitioner insists that the prosecution failed to prove the cause of the
abrasion.
Petitioner also claims that the victim was tutored or coached by her parents on her testimony before
the trial court. Dr. Castillo testified that when she interviewed Debbielyn, the latter admitted to her
that she did not understand the meaning of the word rape and its Filipino translation, hinalay, and
that the genital examination of the girl was at the insistence of the latters parents.
Petitioner avers that Teofisto Bucuds testimony has no probative weight because and had an ill-
motive to testify against him. Petitioner stated, on cross-examination, that his uncle, Boy, had the
house rented by Teofisto demolished. Petitioner avers that the witness persuaded the victims
parents to complain against him, as gleaned from the testimony of Police Investigator Milagros
Carroso.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) avers that petitioner was subjected to an
inquest investigation under Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
212
gleaned from the Certification of the City Prosecutor incorporated in the Information. It avers that the
absence of external injuries does not negate rape; neither is it necessary that lacerations be found
on the hymen of a victim. Rape is consummated if there is some degree of penetration within the
vaginal surface. Corroborative evidence is not necessary to prove rape. As long as the testimony of
the victim is credible, such testimony will suffice for conviction of consummated rape. When the
victim testified that she was raped, she was, in effect, saying all that is necessary to prove that rape
was consummated. Petitioners evidence to prove ill-motive on the part of Teofisto Bucud in testifying
against him is at best flimsy. Moreover, it is incredible that the victim and her parents would charge
petitioner with rape solely on Teofistos proddings.
The OSG insists that the petitioner acted with discernment before, during, and after the rape based
on the undisputed facts. The submission of the OSG follows:
Petitioner argues that since he was only 12 years old at the time of the alleged rape incident, he is
presumed to have acted without discernment under paragraph 3 of Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code. Under said provision, the prosecution has the burden of proving that he acted with
discernment. In the instant case, petitioner insists that there was no evidence presented by the
prosecution to show that he acted with discernment. Hence, he should be exempt from criminal
liability.
Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.
Discernment, as used in Article 12(3) of the Revised Penal Code is defined as follows: the
discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor under
fifteen (15) years of age but over nine (9), who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong (People v. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580
[1939]). For a minor above nine but below fifteen years of age, he must discern the rightness or
wrongness of the effects of his act (Guevarra v. Almodova, G.R. No. 75256, January 26, 1989).
Professor Ambrocio Padilla, in his annotation of Criminal Law (p. 375, 1998 Ed.), writes that
discernment is more than the mere understanding between right and wrong. Rather, it means the
mental capacity of a minor between 9 and 15 years of age to fully appreciate the consequences of
his unlawful act (People v. Navarro, [CA] [51 O.G. 4062]). Hence, in judging whether a minor
accused acted with discernment, his mental capacity to understand the difference between right and
wrong, which may be known and should be determined by considering all the circumstances
disclosed by the record of the case, his appearance, his attitude and his behavior and conduct, not
only before and during the commission of the act, but also after and even during the trial should be
taken into consideration (People v. Doquena, supra).
In the instant case, petitioners actuations during and after the rape incident, as well as his behavior
during the trial showed that he acted with discernment.
The fact appears undisputed that immediately after being discovered by the prosecutions witness,
Teofisto Bucud, petitioner immediately stood up and ran away. Shortly thereafter, when his parents
became aware of the charges against him and that private complainants father was looking for him,
petitioner went into hiding. It was not until the Barangay Tanod came to arrest him in his
grandmothers house that petitioner came out in the open to face the charges against him. His flight
as well as his act of going into hiding clearly conveys the idea that he was fully aware of the moral
depravity of his act and that he knew he committed something wrong. Otherwise, if he was indeed
innocent or if he was not least aware of the moral consequences of his acts, he would have
213
immediately confronted private complainant and her parents and denied having sexually abused
their daughter.
During the trial, petitioner submitted documentary evidence to show that he was a consistent honor
student and has, in fact, garnered several academic awards. This allegation further bolstered that he
acted with discernment, with full knowledge and intelligence. The fact that petitioner was a recipient
of several academic awards and was an honor student further reinforces the finding that he was
possessed of intelligence well beyond his years and thus was able to distinguish, better than other
minors of his age could, which conduct is right and which is morally reprehensible. Hence, although
appellant was still a minor of twelve years of age, he possessed intelligence far beyond his age. It
cannot then be denied that he had the mental capacity to understand the difference between right
and wrong. This is important in cases where the accused is minor. It is worthy to note that the basic
reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent on the part of the accused.
In expounding on intelligence as the second element of dolus, the Supreme Court has stated: The
second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality of
human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because the infant has no
intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability (Guevarra v. Aldomovar, 169 SCRA 476
[1989], at page 482).
The foregoing circumstances, from the time the incident up to the time the petitioner was being held
for trial, sufficiently satisfied the trial court that petitioner acted with discernment before, during and
after the rape incident. For a boy wanting in discernment would simply be gripped with fear or keep
mum. In this case, petitioner was fully aware of the nature and illegality of his wrongful act. He
should not, therefore, be exempted from criminal liability. The prosecution has sufficiently proved that
petitioner acted with discernment.[61]
In reply, petitioner asserts that the only abrasion found by Dr. Castillo was on the peri-anal skin and
not in the labia of the hymen. He further insists that there can be no consummated rape absent a
slight penetration on the female organ. It was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the
accused acted with discernment but failed. The mere fact that he was an honor student is not
enough evidence to prove that he acted with discernment.
The petition is not meritorious.
On the first issue, petitioners contention that he was deprived of his right to a regular preliminary
investigation is barren of factual and legal basis. The record shows that petitioner was lawfully
arrested without a warrant. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully arrested without
a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or
information may be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest has
been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer directly with the
proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person.
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary
investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver,
214
he may apply for bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its
inception.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary investigation, the
accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of its filing, ask for a preliminary
investigation with the same right to adduce evidence in his defense as provided for in this Rule.
As gleaned from the Certification[62] of the City Prosecutor which was incorporated in the
Information, petitioner did not execute any waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code before the Information was filed. He was arraigned with the assistance of counsel
on October 10, 2002, and thereafter filed a petition for bail.[63]Petitioners failure to file a motion for a
preliminary investigation within five days from finding out that an Information had been filed against
him effectively operates as a waiver of his right to such preliminary investigation.[64]
On the second issue, a careful review of the records shows that the prosecution adduced evidence
to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner had carnal knowledge of the private complainant
as charged in the Information. In People v. Morata[65] the Court ruled that penetration, no matter
how slight, or the mere introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudendum, constitutes
carnal knowledge. Hence, even if the penetration is only slight, the fact that the private complainant
felt pains, points to the conclusion that the rape was consummated.[66]
From the victims testimony, it can be logically concluded that petitioners penis touched the middle
part of her vagina and penetrated the labia of the pudendum. She may not have had knowledge of
the extent of the penetration; however, her straightforward testimony shows that the rape passed the
stage of consummation.[67] She testified that petitioner dragged her behind a pile of hollow blocks
near the vacant house and ordered her to lie down. He then removed her shorts and panty and
spread her legs. He then mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: From what time up to what time?
A: From 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.
Q: September 24, 2002 and going over the calendar, it was Tuesday. Did you go to school
from 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.?
A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.
Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?
A: I went home.
Q: And by whom you are referring to your house at 1-C Carnation St., R. Higgins,
Maricaban, Pasay City?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what did you do after you went home?
A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.
Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?
215
A: It is near our house, walking distance.
Q: What is your mother selling in that store?
A: She sells quail eggs.
Q: And were you able to immediately go to the store of your mother where she was selling quail
eggs?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was past 6:00 p.m. already?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when you went to the store where your mother is selling quail eggs past 6:00
p.m.?
A: My mother asked me to bring home something.
Q: What were these things you were asked by your mother to bring home?
A: The things she used in selling.
Q: And did you obey what your mother told you to bring home something?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And what happened to you in going to your house?
A: Totoy pulled me.
Q: Pulled you where?
A: Totoy pulled me towards an uninhabited house.
Q: What happened after Totoy pulled you in an uninhabited house?
A: He told me to lie down on the cement.
Q: What happened after he laid you down on the cement?
A: He removed my shorts and panty. He also removed his shorts.
Q: After Totoy removed your shorts and panty and he also removed his shorts, what happened next?
A: He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: What did you feel when Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina?
A: It was painful.
Q: Aside from inserting his penis inside your vagina, what else did you do to you?
A: He kissed me on my lips.
216
Q: After Totoy inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed you on your lips, what did you do?
A: I cried.
Q: What happened when you were crying when he inserted his penis inside your vagina and kissed
you on your lips. What happened next?
A: Somebody heard me crying.
Q: Who heard you crying?
A: Kuya Teofe, Sir.
Q: What happened after you cried and when somebody heard you crying?
A: Totoy ran away.
Q: After Totoy ran away, what happened next?
A: When Totoy ran away, I was left and Kuya Teofe told me to tell the matter to my parents.
Q: Did you tell your parents what Totoy did to you?
A: Yes, Sir.[68]
On cross-examination, the victim was steadfast in her declarations:
ATTY. BALIAD:
Q: Again, in what particular position were you placed by Totoy when he inserted his penis inside your
vagina?
A: I was lying down.
Q: Aside from lying down, how was your body positioned at that time?
A: He placed on top of me.
Q: After he placed on top of you, what else did he do to you, if any?
A: He started to kiss me and then he inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q: Did you feel his penis coming in into your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Are you sure that his penis was inserted inside your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.[69]
When questioned on cross-examination whether she could distinguish a vagina from an anus, the
victim declared that she could and proceeded to demonstrate. She reiterated that the penis of
petitioner penetrated her vagina, thus, consummating the crime charged:
Atty. Baliad:
217
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or Totoy inserted
his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Where is your pepe?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated only in your
vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part of
your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.[70]
While it is true that Dr. Castillo did not find any abrasion or laceration in the private complainants
genitalia, such fact does not negate the latters testimony the petitioner had carnal knowledge of her.
The absence of abrasions and lacerations does not disprove sexual abuses, especially when the
victim is a young girl as in this case.[71] According to Dr. Castillo, the hymen is elastic and is
capable of stretching and reverting to its original form.[72] The doctor testified that her report is
compatible with the victims testimony that she was sexually assaulted by petitioner:
Atty. Baliad:
Q: Do you recall having stated during the last hearing that the accused, Neil Llave or Totoy inserted
his penis in your vagina, do you recall that?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And likewise, you testified that you feel (sic) that the penis of Neil entered your vagina?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Could you distinguish vagina from your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
218
Q: Where is your pepe?
A: (Witness pointing to her vagina.)
Q: Where is your anus?
A: (Witness pointing at her back, at the anus.)
Q: In your statement, am I correct to say that Neil, the accused in this case penetrated only in your
vagina and not in your anus?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: So that, your anus was not even touched by the accused neither by his penis touched any part of
your anus?
A: He did not insert anything on my anus, Sir.
xxxx
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: Based on your testimony doctor, and the medico genital examination propounded on the report
that the victim here, Debbielyn Santos is complaining that around 6:00 in the evening of September
24, 2002, she was sexually abused and that on the following day, September 25, you interviewed
her and stated to you that her genitalia was hurting and in binocular (sic) masakit ang pepe ko, ni-
rape ako, would your findings as contained in this Exh. B and C be compatible with the allegation if
the minor victim that she was sexually abused on September 24. 2002 at around 6:00 p.m.?
Atty. Baliad:
Objection, Your Honor. The one who narrated the incident is the mother.
Court:
What is your objection?
Atty. Baliad:
The objection, Your Honor, is the question propounded is that it was the minor who made the
complaint regarding the allegation.
Fiscal Barrera:
The answer were provided..
Court:
The doctor is being asked whether or not her findings is compatible with the complaint of the
minor. Overruled. Answer.
Witness:
A It is compatible with the allegation of the minor.
219
Fiscal Barrera:
Confronting you again with your two (2) medico-genital documents, the Provincial and Final Report
mark[ed] in evidence as Exhs. B and C, at the lower portion of these two exhibits there appears to
be a signature above the typewritten word, Mariella Castillo, M.D., whose signature is that doctor?
A Both are my signatures, Sir.[73]
Dr. Castillo even testified that the abrasion near the private complainants anal orifice could have
been caused by petitioner while consummating the crime charged:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: With your answer, would it be possible doctor that in the process of the male person inserting his
erect penis inside the vagina, in the process, would it be possible that this abrasion could have been
caused while in the process of inserting the penis into the vagina touch the portion of the anus where
you find the abrasion?
A: It is possible, Sir.
Q: Now, are you aware, in the course of your examination, that the alleged perpetrator is a 12-year-
old minor?
A: I only fount it out, Sir, when I testified.
Q: Do you still recall your answer that a 12-year-old boy could cause an erection of his penis?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: To enlight[en] us doctor, we, not being a physician, at what age could a male person can have
erection?
A: Even infants have an erection.[74]
Petitioners contention that the private complainant was coached by her parents into testifying is
barren of merit. It bears stressing that the private complainant testified in a straightforward and
spontaneous manner and remained steadfast despite rigorous and intensive cross-examination by
the indefatigable counsel of the petitioner. She spontaneously pointed to and identified the petitioner
as the perpetrator.
It is inconceivable that the private complainant, then only a seven- year old Grade II pupil, could
have woven an intricate story of defloration unless her plaint was true.[75]The Presiding Judge of the
trial court observed and monitored the private complainant at close range as she testified and found
her testimony credible. Case law is that the calibration by the trial court of the evidence on record
and its assessment of the credibility of witnesses, as well as its findings of facts and the conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded conclusive effect by this Court unless facts and
circumstances of substance were overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted, which, if considered
would merit a nullification or reversal of the decision. We have held that when the offended party is
young and immature, from the age of thirteen to sixteen, courts are inclined to give credence to their
account of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter to which they testified is not true.[76]
220
Neither do we lend credence to petitioners claim that the charge against him is but a fabrication and
concoction of the private complainants parents. Indeed, petitioner admitted in no uncertain terms
that the spouses had no ill-motive against him. Thus, Neil testified as follows:
Fiscal Barrera:
Q: As you testified earlier that you have played post cards with Debbielyn Santos alias Lyn-lyn and
you have no quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyn. Do you know of any reason why Lyn-lyn
complaint (sic) against you for sexual abuse?
A: I dont know of any reason, Sir.
Q: You also testified that you do not have any quarrel or misunderstanding with Lyn-lyns parents,
spouses Domingo Santos, Jr. and Marilou Santos, do you think of any reason as to why they would
file a complaint against you for molesting their 7-year-old daughter?
A: I do not know of any reason why they filed a complaint against me, Sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
That would be all, Your Honor.[77]
There is no evidence that the parents of the offended party coached their daughter before she
testified. No mother or father would stoop so low as to subject their daughter to the tribulations and
the embarrassment of a public trial knowing that such a traumatic experience would damage their
daughters psyche and mar her life if the charge is not true.[78] On the other hand, when the parents
learned that their daughter had been assaulted by petitioner, Domingo tried to locate the offender
and when he failed, he and his wife reported the matter to the barangay authorities. This manifested
their ardent desire to have petitioner indicted and punished for his delictual acts.
That petitioner ravished the victim not far from the street where residents passed by does not negate
the act of rape committed by petitioner. Rape is not a respecter of time and place. The crime may be
committed by the roadside and even in occupied premises.[79] The presence of people nearby does
not deter rapists from committing the odious act.[80] In this case, petitioner was so daring that he
ravished the private complainant near the house of Teofisto even as commuters passed by,
impervious to the fact that a crime was being committed in their midst.
Case law has it that in view of the intrinsic nature of rape, the only evidence that can be offered to
prove the guilt of the offender is the testimony of the offended party. Even absent a medical
certificate, her testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of conviction if such testimony is
credible. Corroborative testimony is not essential to warrant a conviction of the perpetrator.[81] Thus,
even without the testimony of Teofisto Bucud, the testimonies of the offended party and Dr. Castillo
constitute evidence beyond reasonable doubt warranting the conviction of petitioner.
Teofistos testimony cannot be discredited by petitioner simply because his uncle caused the
demolition of the house where Teofisto and his family were residing. It bears stressing that Teofisto
gave a sworn statement to the police investigator on the very day that the petitioner raped Debbielyn
and narrated how he witnessed the crime being committed by the petitioner.[82] In the absence of
proof of improper motive, the presumption is that Teofisto had no ill-motive to so testify, hence, his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[83]
221
The trial court correctly ruled that the petitioner acted with discernment when he had carnal
knowledge of the offended party; hence, the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the trial courts ruling.
Article 12, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person over nine years of age
and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability, unless he acted with discernment. The basic
reason behind the exempting circumstance is complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action of
the offender which is an essential element of a felony either by dolus or by culpa. Intelligence is the
power necessary to determine the morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.
[84] On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to understand the difference between
right and wrong. The prosecution is burdened to prove that the accused acted with discernment by
evidence of physical appearance, attitude or deportment not only before and during the commission
of the act, but also after and during the trial.[85] The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate
that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstance includes the
gruesome nature of the crime and the minors cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion, dragged the resisting victim behind the
pile of hollow blocks near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not be able to discover
his dastardly acts. When he was discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the petitioner
hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid
in his grandmothers house to avoid being arrested by policemen and remained thereat
until barangay tanods arrived and took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an outstanding grade school student and even
received awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his academic subjects. He
represented his class in a quiz bee contest.[86] At his the age of 12, he finished a computer course.
In People v. Doquea,[87] the Court held that the accused-appellant therein acted with discernment
in raping the victim under the following facts: Taking into account the fact that when the accused
Valentin Doquea committed the crime in question, he was a 7th grade pupil in the intermediate
school of the municipality of Sual, Pangasinan, and as such pupil, he was one of the brightest in said
school and was a captain of a company of the cadet corps thereof, and during the time he was
studying therein he always obtain excellent marks, this court is convinced that the accused, in
committing the crime, acted with discernment and was conscious of the nature and consequences of
his act, and so also has this court observed at the time said accused was testifying in his behalf
during the trial of this case.[88]
The CA ordered petitioner to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages. There is no factual basis for the award of exemplary damages. Under Article 2231, of the
New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded if the crime was committed with one or more
aggravating circumstances. In this case, no aggravating circumstance was alleged in the Information
and proved by the People; hence, the award must be deleted.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 26962 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the award of
exemplary damages is DELETED. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129792. December 21, 1999]
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA

PANELO, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents.
222
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek the
reversal of the 17 June 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 and the
resolution[2]denying their motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision set aside the 15 January
1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 60 in Civil Case No. 7119 and
ordered petitioners to pay damages and attorneys fees to private respondents Conrado and Criselda
(CRISELDA) Aguilar.
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department Store, Makati
City.Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager,
operations manager, and supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents
of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH).
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the 2nd floor of Syvels
Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing her credit card slip at the payment and
verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind
her. She then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned by the bulk of the
stores gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was crying and screaming for help. Although
shocked, CRISELDA was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and
retrieving ZHIENETH from the floor.[3]
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next
day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic
slate. The injuries she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) days after
the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was six years old.[4]
The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. The provisional medical
certificate[5] issued by ZHIENETHs attending doctor described the extent of her injuries:
Diagnoses:
1. Shock, severe, sec. to intra-abdominal injuries due to blunt injury
2. Hemorrhage, massive, intraperitoneal sec. to laceration, (L) lobe liver
3. Rupture, stomach, anterior & posterior walls
4. Complete transection, 4th position, duodenum
5. Hematoma, extensive, retroperitoneal
6. Contusion, lungs, severe
CRITICAL
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement
of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses[6] which they had
incurred. Petitioners refused to pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for
damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they sought the payment of P157,522.86 for
223
actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorneys fees and an unspecified
amount for loss of income and exemplary damages.
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent
death of ZHIENETH. They claimed that CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence
over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with glassware and
appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed the counter,
triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of
sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its
construction.
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it observed the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees. The other
petitioners likewise raised due care and diligence in the performance of their duties and countered
that the complaint was malicious for which they suffered besmirched reputation and mental
anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an award of moral and exemplary damages
and attorneys fees in their favor.
In its decision[7] the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the
preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the
counter on ZHIENETH was her act of clinging to it. It believed petitioners witnesses who testified that
ZHIENETH clung to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell with the structure falling on
top of her, pinning her stomach. In contrast, none of private respondents witnesses testified on how
the counter fell. The trial court also held that CRISELDAs negligence contributed to ZHIENETHs
accident.
In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the counter was situated at the
end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure hence, it could not be considered as an
attractive nuisance.[8] The counter was higher than ZHIENETH. It has been in existence for fifteen
years. Its structure was safe and well-balanced. ZHIENETH, therefore, had no business climbing on
and clinging to it.
Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as errors of the trial court its findings that:(1)
the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was ZHIENETHs misbehavior; (2) CRISELDA was
negligent in her care of ZHIENETH; (3) petitioners were not negligent in the maintenance of the
counter; and (4) petitioners were not liable for the death of ZHIENETH.
Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to the conclusive
presumption that a child below nine (9) years is incapable of contributory negligence. And even if
ZHIENETH, at six (6) years old, was already capable of contributory negligence, still it was
physically impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. She had a small frame (four
feet high and seventy pounds) and the counter was much higher and heavier than she was. Also,
the testimony of one of the stores former employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied
ZHIENETH when she was brought to the emergency room of the Makati Medical Center belied
petitioners theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter. Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was
asked by the doctor what she did, ZHIENETH replied, [N]othing, I did not come near the counter and
the counter just fell on me.[9] Accordingly, Gonzales testimony on ZHIENETHs spontaneous
declaration should not only be considered as part of res gestae but also accorded credit.
Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was reasonable for her to have let go
of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that she was signing the credit card slip.
224
Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the proximate cause of ZHIENETHs death,
was petitioners negligence in failing to institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed.
On the other hand, petitioners argued that private respondents raised purely factual issues which
could no longer be disturbed. They explained that ZHIENETHs death while unfortunate and tragic,
was an accident for which neither CRISELDA nor even ZHIENETH could entirely be held faultless
and blameless. Further, petitioners adverted to the trial courts rejection of Gonzales testimony as
unworthy of credence.
As to private respondents claim that the counter should have been nailed to the ground, petitioners
justified that it was not necessary. The counter had been in existence for several years without any
prior accident and was deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. Truth to tell, they
acted without fault or negligence for they had exercised due diligence on the matter. In fact, the
criminal case[10] for homicide through simple negligence filed by private respondents against the
individual petitioners was dismissed; a verdict of acquittal was rendered in their favor.
The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed
judgment. It found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous
counter. The counter was shaped like an inverted L[11] with a top wider than the base. It was top
heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow
base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the
overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former employees
of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the management the danger the
counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern. The Court of Appeals faulted the
petitioners for this omission, and concluded that the incident that befell ZHIENETH could have been
avoided had petitioners repaired the defective counter. It was inconsequential that the counter had
been in use for some time without a prior incident.
The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7) years old at the time of
the incident, was absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child
under nine (9) years could not be held liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old
ZHIENETH could not be made to account for a mere mischief or reckless act. It also absolved
CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing
ZHIENETH to walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.
The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the witnesses of petitioners. It found them
biased and prejudiced. It instead gave credit to the testimony of disinterested witness Gonzales. The
Court of Appeals then awarded P99,420.86 as actual damages, the amount representing the
hospitalization expenses incurred by private respondents as evidenced by the hospital's statement of
account.[12] It denied an award for funeral expenses for lack of proof to substantiate the
same.Instead, a compensatory damage of P50,000 was awarded for the death of ZHIENETH.
We quote the dispositive portion of the assailed decision,[13] thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of the lower court is SET ASIDE and another one
is entered against [petitioners], ordering them to pay jointly and severally unto [private respondents]
the following:
1. P50,000.00 by way of compensatory damages for the death of Zhieneth Aguilar, with legal interest
(6% p.a.) from 27 April 1984;
225
2. P99,420.86 as reimbursement for hospitalization expenses incurred; with legal interest (6% p.a.)
from 27 April 1984;
3. P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages;
4. P20,000.00 in the concept of attorneys fees; and
5. Costs.
Private respondents sought a reconsideration of the decision but the same was denied in the Court
of Appeals resolution[14] of 16 July 1997.
Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals decision and the reinstatement of the
judgment of the trial court. Petitioners primarily argue that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding
the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court. They stress that since the action was based on
tort, any finding of negligence on the part of the private respondents would necessarily negate their
claim for damages, where said negligence was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. The
injury in the instant case was the death of ZHIENETH. The proximate cause was ZHIENETHs act of
clinging to the counter. This act in turn caused the counter to fall on her. This and CRISELDAs
contributory negligence, through her failure to provide the proper care and attention to her child while
inside the store, nullified private respondents claim for damages. It is also for these reasons that
parents are made accountable for the damage or injury inflicted on others by their minor
children.Under these circumstances, petitioners could not be held responsible for the accident that
befell ZHIENETH.
Petitioners also assail the credibility of Gonzales who was already separated from Syvels at the time
he testified; hence, his testimony might have been tarnished by ill-feelings against them.
For their part, private respondents principally reiterated their arguments that neither ZHIENETH nor
CRISELDA was negligent at any time while inside the store; the findings and conclusions of the
Court of Appeals are substantiated by the evidence on record; the testimony of Gonzales, who heard
ZHIENETH comment on the incident while she was in the hospitals emergency room should receive
credence; and finally, ZHIENETHs part of the res gestae declaration that she did nothing to cause
the heavy structure to fall on her should be considered as the correct version of the gruesome
events.
We deny the petition.
The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH was accidental or
attributable to negligence; and (2) in case of a finding of negligence, whether the same was
attributable to private respondents for maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and
ZHIENETH for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises.
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the

defendant.[15] It is a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an event happening without any
human agency, or if happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under the
circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens.[16]
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by
those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing
of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.[17] Negligence is the failure to
226
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of care, precaution and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.[18]
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident
occurs when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any
person and which could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence.
[19]
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the landmark case of Picart v.
Smith,[20] thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence.[21]
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that ZHIENETHs death could
only be attributed to negligence.
We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene of the incident and
accompanied CRISELDA and ZHIENETH to the hospital:
Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice anything while the child was being
treated?
A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And when the doctor asked the child
what did you do, the child said nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell on
me.
Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN)
You want the words in Tagalog to be translated?
ATTY. BELTRAN
Yes, your Honor.
COURT
Granted. Intercalate wala po, hindi po ako lumapit doon. Basta bumagsak.[22]
This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETHs statement formed (and should be admitted as)
part of the res gestae under Section 42, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and statements made to a
physician are generally considered declarations and admissions.[23] All that is required for their
admissibility as part of the res gestae is that they be made or uttered under the influence of a
startling event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood as witnessed by
the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances thus described, it is unthinkable for
ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she
trusted with her life.We therefore accord credence to Gonzales testimony on the
227
matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death. Sadly, petitioners did,
through their negligence or omission to secure or make stable the counters base.
Gonzales earlier testimony on petitioners insistence to keep and maintain the structurally unstable
gift-wrapping counter proved their negligence, thus:
Q When you assumed the position as gift wrapper at the second floor, will you please describe the
gift wrapping counter, were you able to examine?
A Because every morning before I start working I used to clean that counter and since it is not nailed
and it was only standing on the floor, it was shaky.
xxx
Q Will you please describe the counter at 5:00 oclock [sic] in the afternoon on [sic] May 9 1983?
A At that hour on May 9, 1983, that counter was standing beside the verification counter. And since
the top of it was heavy and considering that it was not nailed, it can collapse at anytime, since the
top is heavy.
xxx
Q And what did you do?
A I informed Mr. Maat about that counter which is [sic] shaky and since Mr. Maat is fond of putting
display decorations on tables, he even told me that I would put some decorations. But since I told
him that it not [sic] nailed and it is shaky he told me better inform also the company about it. And
since the company did not do anything about the counter, so I also did not do anything about the
counter.[24] [Emphasis supplied]
Ramon Guevarra, another former employee, corroborated the testimony of Gonzales, thus:
Q Will you please described [sic] to the honorable Court the counter where you were assigned in
January 1983?
xxx
A That counter assigned to me was when my supervisor ordered me to carry that counter to another
place.I told him that the counter needs nailing and it has to be nailed because it might cause injury or
accident to another since it was shaky.
Q When that gift wrapping counter was transferred at the second floor on February 12, 1983, will you
please describe that to the honorable Court?
A I told her that the counter wrapper [sic] is really in good [sic] condition; it was shaky. I told her that
we had to nail it.
Q When you said she, to whom are you referring to [sic]?
A I am referring to Ms. Panelo, sir.
Q And what was the answer of Ms. Panelo when you told her that the counter was shaky?
228
A She told me Why do you have to teach me. You are only my subordinate and you are to teach
me? And she even got angry at me when I told her that.
xxx
Q From February 12, 1983 up to May 9, 1983, what if any, did Ms. Panelo or any employee of the
management do to that (sic)
xxx
Witness:
None, sir. They never nailed the counter. They only nailed the counter after the accident happened.
[25] [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were personally informed of the
danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet, neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the
situation nor ensure the safety of the stores employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary
prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation petitioners miserably failed to
discharge the due diligence required of a good father of a family.
On the issue of the credibility of Gonzales and Guevarra, petitioners failed to establish that the
formers testimonies were biased and tainted with partiality. Therefore, the allegation that Gonzales
and Guevarras testimonies were blemished by ill feelings against petitioners since they (Gonzales
and Guevarra) were already separated from the company at the time their testimonies were offered
in court was but mere speculation and deserved scant consideration.
It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the appellate courts will not as
a general rule disturb the findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to determine the
same. The trial court has the distinct advantage of actually hearing the testimony of and observing
the deportment of the witnesses.[26] However, the rule admits of exceptions such as when its
evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it overlooked or failed to appreciate some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case.[27] In the instant
case, petitioners failed to bring their claim within the exception.
Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors
children below nine (9) years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. In his book,
[28] former Judge Cezar S. Sangco stated:
In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like
exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of
age, unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a
quasi-delict and required discernment as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under
nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the
presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the case of a child over nine but
under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, is that a child under
nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of contributory negligence as a matter
of law. [Emphasis supplied]
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that she climbed over the
counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept petitioners theory that the counter was stable
229
and sturdy. For if that was the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to
collapse. The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of Appeals and a
scrutiny of the evidence[29]on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it was not durable after all. Shaped like
an inverted L, the counter was heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the
customer waiting area and its base was not secured.[30]
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Initially, ZHIENETH held on to
CRISELDAs waist, later to the latters hand.[31] CRISELDA momentarily released the childs hand
from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was reasonable and
usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the
counter, she was just a foot away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four
meters away from CRISELDA.[32] The time and distance were both significant.ZHIENETH was near
her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the
doctor who treated her at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 75256 January 26, 1989
JOHN PHILIP GUEVARRA, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE IGNACIO ALMODOVAR, respondent.
Teresita Dy-Liacco and Roberto Madrid for petitioner.
230
PARAS, J.:
Presented before Us is a special civil action for certiorari against the Honorable Judge Ignacio
Almodovar of the City Court of Legaspi, Branch 1, Legaspi City, raising beautiful questions of law
which We are tasked to resolve. Considering the issues and arguments raised by petitioner, We
impleaded the People of the Philippines as party respondents herein in a resolution dated 17
September 1986 (p. 41, Rollo).
The relevant facts gathered from the records are as follows:
Petitioner John Philip Guevarra, then 11 years old, was playing with his best friend Teodoro Almine,
Jr. and three other children in their backyard in the morning of 29 October 1984. They were target-
shooting a bottle cap (tansan) placed around fifteen (15) to twenty (20) meters away with an air rifle
borrowed from a neighbor. In the course of their game, Teodoro was hit by a pellet on his left collar
bone which caused his unfortunate death.
After conduct a preliminary investigation, the examining Fiscal exculpated petitioner due to his age
and because the unfortunate occurrence appeared to be an accident. The victim's parents appealed
to the Ministry of Justice, which ordered the Fiscal to file a case against petitioner for Homicide
through reckless Imprudence. The information dated 9 October 1985 was consequently filed, which
narrated in part:
. . . the above-named accused, who is over 9 years but below 15 years of age and acting with
discernment, did then and there, without taking the necessary precautions to prevent and/or avoid
accident or injuries to persons, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate and cause to be fired, in a
reckless and imprudent manner, an air rifle with .22 caliber bore with rifling, oxygen and bolt
operated thereby hitting as a result of said carelessness and imprudence one TEODORICO PABLO
ALMINE at the left side of the body with its pellet, causing injuries which directly caused his untimely
death; . . . (p. 8, Rollo)
On 25 October 1985, petitioner moved to quash the said information on the following grounds:
THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE OFFENSE.
THAT THE INFORMATION CONTAINS AVERMENTS WHICH IF TRUE WOULD CONSTITUTE A

LEGAL EXCUSE OR JUSTIFICATION.
THAT THIS HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
AND THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT. (p. 9, Rollo)
This motion, in an Order dated 4 April 1986, was denied with respect to the first and third grounds
relied upon. However, the resolution of the second ground was deferred until evidence shall have
been presented during trial.
On 26 July 1986, this present petition for certiorari was filed, raising two (2) issues, to wit:
WHETHER AN ELEVEN (11) YEAR OLD BOY COULD BE CHARGED WITH THE CRIME OF
HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE, AND
WHETHER THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT IT DID NOT PASS THRU THE BARANGAY LUPON. (Petition, p. 3, Rollo)
231
Going through the written arguments of the parties, the surfacing of a corollary controversy with
respect to the first issue raised is evident, that is, whether the term "discernment", as used in Article
12(3) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is synonymous with "intent." It is the position of the
petitioner that "discernment" connotes 'intent' (p. 96, Rollo), invoking the unreported case of People
vs. Nieto, G.R. No. 11965, 30 April 1958. In that case We held that the allegation of "with intent to kill
. . ." amply meets the requirement that discernment should be alleged when the accused is a minor
between 9 and 15 years old. Petitioner completes his syllogism in saying that:
If discernment is the equivalent of 'with intent', then the allegation in the information that the accused
acted with discernment and willfully unlawfully, and feloniously, operate or cause to be fired in a
reckless and imprudent manner an air rifle .22 caliber' is an inherent contradiction tantamount to
failure of the information to allege a cause of action or constitute a legal excuse or exception.
(Memorandum for Petitioner, p. 97, Rollo)
If petitioner's argument is correct, then no minor between the ages of 9 and 15 may be convicted of
a quasi-offense under Article 265 of the RPC.
On the contrary, the Solicitor General insists that discernment and intent are two different concepts.
We agree with the Solicitor General's view; the two terms should not be confused.
The word "intent" has been defined as
(a) design; a determination to do a certain things; an aim; the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent;. . .; the design resolve, or determination with which a
person acts.' (46 CJS Intent p. 1103.)
It is this intent which comprises the third element of dolo as a means of committing a felony, freedom
and intelligence being the other two. On the other hand, We have defined the term discernment, as
used in Article 12(3) of the RPC, in the old case of People vs. Doquena, 68 Phil. 580(1939), in this
wise:
The discernment that constitutes an exception to the exemption from criminal liability of a minor
under fifteen years of age but over nine, who commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
capacity to understand the difference between right and wrong . . . (Emphasis supplied) p. 583
From the foregoing, it is clear that the terms "intent" and "discernment" convey two distinct thoughts.
While both are products of the mental processes within a person, the former refers to the desired of
one's act while the latter relates to the moral significance that person ascribes to the said act. Hence
a person may not intend to shoot another but may be aware of the consequences of his negligent
act which may cause injury to the same person in negligently handling an air rifle. It is not connect,
therefore, to argue, as petitioner does, that since a minor above nine years of age but below fifteen
acted with discernment, then he intended such act to be done. He may negligently shoot his friend,
thus did not intend to shoot him, and at the same time recognize the undesirable result of his
negligence.
In further outlining the distinction between the words "intent" and "discernment," it is worthy to note
the basic reason behind the enactment of the exempting circumstances embodied in Article 12 of the
RPC; the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or on the absence of
negligence on the part of the accused.1 In expounding on intelligence as the second element
of dolus, Albert 2 has stated:
232
The second element of dolus is intelligence; without this power, necessary to determine the morality
of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act, no crime can exist, and because ... the
infant 3(has) no intelligence, the law exempts (him) from criminal liability. (Emphasis supplied)
lt is for this reason, therefore, why minors nine years of age and below are not capable of performing
a criminal act. On the other hand, minors above nine years of appeal but below fifteen are not
absolutely exempt. However, they are presumed to be without criminal capacity, but which
presumption may be rebutted if it could be proven that they were "capable of appreciating the nature
and criminality of the act, that is, that (they) acted with discernment. " 4 The preceding discussion
shows that "intelligence" as an element of dolo actually embraces the concept of discernment as
used in Article 12 of the RPC and as defined in the aforecited case of People vs. Doquena,supra. It
could not therefore be argued that discernment is equivalent or connotes 'intent' for they refer to two
different concepts. Intelligence, which includes discernment, is a distinct element of dolo as a means
of committing an offense.
In evaluating felonies committed by means of culpa, three (3) elements are indispensable, namely,
intelligence, freedom of action, and negligence. Obviously, intent is wanting in such felonies.
However, intelligence remains as an essential element, hence, it is necessary that a minor above
nine but below fifteen years of age be possessed with intelligence in committing a negligent act
which results in a quasi-offense. For him to be criminally liable, he must discern the rightness or
wrongness of the effects of his negligent act. Indeed, a minor over nine years of age but below
fifteen may be held liable for a quasi-offense under Article 365 of the RPC. A reading of the said
Article would reveal such fact as it starts off with the phrase "Any person. . ." without any distinction
or exception made. Ubi lex non distinquit nec nos distinguere debemos.
In his last attempt to justify his position equating the words "intent" and "discernment" used under the
law, he cites the case of People vs. Nieto, supra. However, petitioner failed to present the qualifying
sentence preceding the ruling he now invokes, which reads:
That requirement should be deemed amply met with the allegation in the information that
she. . ."with the intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, criminally and feloniously push one Lolita
Padilla . . ." into a deep place of the Pearanda River and as a consequence thereof Lolita Padilla
got drowned and died right then and there.' This allegation clearly conveys the Idea that she knew
what would be the consequence of her unlawful act of pushing her victim into deep water and that
she knew it to be wrong. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above, it is clear that We did not mean to equate the words "intent" and "discernment."
What We meant was that the combined effect of the words used in the information is to express a
knowledge, on the part of the accused Nieto, of the wrongness or rightness of her act. Hence,
petitioner may not validly contend that since the information now in question alleged "discernment", it
in effect alleged "intent." The former may never embrace the Idea of the latter; the former expresses
the thought of passivity while the latter signifies activity.
Coming now to the second issue of jurisdiction, it is contended by the petitioner that the case against
him should have first been brought before the Lupong Tagapayapa pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 1508, Section 2(3). He submits that, considering his entitlement to a two-degree privileged
mitigating circumstance due to his minority, P.D. 1508 applies to his case because the penalty
imposable is reduced to not higher than arresto menor from an original arresto mayor maximum
to prision correccional medium as prescribed in Article 365 of the RPC. This is not correct. The
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the penalty imposable under the law for
233
the offense and not the penalty ultimately imposed (People vs. Caldito, 72 Phil. 263; People vs.
Purisima, 69 SCRA 314; Dioquino vs. Cruz and People vs. Savellano, 116 SCRA 451). The same
principle applies in construing Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, which states:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Offense punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 day , or a fine exceeding P 200.00; ...
(emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the above provision, a member of the committee that drafted P.D. 1508 has said:
The law says 'punishable,' not 'punished.' One should therefore consider the penalty provided for by
law or ordinance as distinguished from the penalty actually imposed in particular cases after
considering the attendant circumstances affecting criminal liability. 5
The foregoing finds support in our jurisprudence as above cited. We therefore rule that, in construing
Section 2(3) of P.D. 1508, the penalty which the law defining the offense attaches to the latter should
be considered. Hence, any circumstance which may affect criminal liability must not be considered.
The petitioner, in his arguments, asserts that since P.D. 1508 has not been complied with, the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the case. This erroneous perception has been corrected long before.
As intimated in the case ofRoyales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470, and categorically stated in Ebol vs.
Amin, 135 SCRA 438, P.D. 1508 is not jurisdictional.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and
the Temporary Restraining Order effective 17 September 1986 is LIFTED. Let this case be
REMANDED to the lower court for trial on the merits. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
234
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding herein accused-appellant Richard
O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape3 committed against
AAA,4 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However,
the CA modified the penalties imposed by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing the
award of civil indemnity to P75,000.00, and awarding P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside
from the P50,000.00 for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year old girl.
After almost four (4) years, AAAs father filed a complaint5 for acts of lasciviousness against herein
accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the evidence, the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to rape.6 The Information7 dated September 5,
2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doa Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province of Albay,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with [AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against
her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her father; and
Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The defense presented the
accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the crimes imputed to him and
Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision9 finding the accused-appellant guilty of
the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by the
accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellants Brief11 on July 15, 2004, while the People, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellees Brief12 on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,13 modifying the pertinent provisions of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTC to this
Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in "Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court," the case was transferred, for appropriate action and disposition, to the CA where it was
docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the trial court. We
quote the fallo of the CA decision:
235
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y Olivera, is
ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount of (1) P75,000.00
as civil indemnity; (2)P50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant to A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death Penalty
Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously submit their
respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental Brief16 on April 7, 2006.
Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was deemed to have waived
the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF [AAA],
[her cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI

INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD
SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other playmates], was
playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling Crisologos
house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAAs cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAAs] shorts and underwear. He also removed his
trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back. Then, he lay on top of her
and inserted his penis into [AAAs] private organ. Appellant made an up-and-down movement
("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her private part and said "aray." She also felt an
intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAAs cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed appellants
dastardly act. Horrified, [AAAs cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of [AAAs] mother, her aunt
Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAAs] mother answered that they (referring to {AAA
and her cousin} were still very young to be talking about such matters.
236
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her clothes.
Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAAs cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where she found
[AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAAs cousin] approached [AAA] and asked her what
appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin] did not ask her any further
question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared that her
mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating sensation in her
private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAAs cousin] came to their house and told
[AAAs] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-and-down movement on top of [AAA].
[AAAs mother], however did not say anything. At that time, [AAAs] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that: (1) it was
the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on [AAA]; (2) Dr.
Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the result of [AAA]s
examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural health officer of Guinobatan,
Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings in said medico-legal certificate issued
to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]s medical findings are as follows: "negative for introital vulvar laceration nor
scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with
resistance; (6) the finding "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in laymans
language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of
the hymen which means that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as
strenuous exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doa Tomasa, Guinobatan, Albay
denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAAs] parents, because sometimes they go to their house
looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself. His father retired as a
fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa,
Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings
and attend seminars in Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in
1992 they transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag while
his mother is from barangay Doa Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer in
Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to his 1-hectare
coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15) years old in 1992 when
they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was out of school. But from 1994 to
1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High School. His daily routine was at about 4:00 oclock
in the afternoon after school before proceeding home he would usually play basketball at the
basketball court near the church in Doa Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When
her mother suffered a stroke in 1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard
denied molesting other girls ... and was most surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He
knows Saling Crisologo and the latters place which is more than half kilometer to their house.
Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on May 7,
2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No. 4087 was filed
against him with the docile cooperation of [AAAs] parents who are related to Salvacion, concocted
and instigated [AAAs] rape charge against him to make the case for Murder against him stronger
and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May 10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2)
237
months later while he already in detention, the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed
against him in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from
his sister, Marivic, on a Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in
jail. He naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such thing and
recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine to prove he did not rape
her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAAs] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA mothers]
father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the lending of money by his
father to the AAAs family as the motive for the latter to file the rape case against him but the
instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan, Albay, testified
on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay against Richard Sarcia for
Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal of said rape case but the accused
through counsel failed to formally offer the marked exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution was not
able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the testimonies of AAA and
her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was confused as to the date and time of
the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-year delay in filing the criminal case, and the
only reason why they filed the said case was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same
accused in a murder case filed by said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae
Christine Camu on May 7, 2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier
helped AAAs father in filing the said case for rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the
prosecution failed to prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally,
accused-appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and
interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar which
means that there was no showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAAs and her
cousins testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA at the time of the
incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-appellant invited her to the
back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified that when she saw accused-appellant
doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA, the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to
AAAs testimony that when accused-appellant was inside her and started the up-and-down motion,
she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin returned to AAA after telling the latters mother what accused-
appellant had done to AAA, she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her
clothes, she invited the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that other children were
playing at the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them who were
playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to minor details
and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their testimonies where there is
consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the positive identification of the accused. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their
testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for
there is no person with perfect faculties or senses.19 The alleged inconsistencies in this case are
too inconsequential to overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two
238
prosecution witnesses were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA.
Their positive, candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-
appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened, AAA was only
five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely 9 and 11 years old,
respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies
of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their inexperience with court proceedings, and
that even the most candid of witnesses commit mistakes and make confused and inconsistent
statements. This is especially true of young witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the
atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there is more reason to accord them ample space for
inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAAs inability to recall the exact date when the incident in 1996
was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an indication of false
testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are inconsequential and immaterial
and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the
gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place of commission
in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already held that where the time
or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may
be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed
at the precise time or place alleged, or if the proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial
fact set out in the complaint, provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact
committed prior to the date of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute
of limitations and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when the victim
was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact of carnal
knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as near to the actual date
when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In previous cases, we ruled that
allegations that rapes were committed "before and until October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year
1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime in November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or
subsequent thereto" and "on or about and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient
compliance with Section 11, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAAs declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was
explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996 mentioned
by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense cross-examination she
was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any month and date in the year 1996 as
in fact neither the information nor [AAAs] sworn statement mention the month and date but only the
year.24
Likewise, witnesses credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against accused-
appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellants claim that the only reason why this
case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused-
239
appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae
Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victims delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of the charge
nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence for fear of her
aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been sexually abused. In
People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the
victims father as understandable and not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old
daughter. Thus, in the absence of other circumstances that show that the charge was a mere
concoction and impelled by some ill motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to
defeat the charge. Here, the failure of AAAs parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently
justified by the complainants father in the latters testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your wife told you that
something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that during that time we
had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited. When we were able to save enough
amounts, we filed the case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no proof that
he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA. Where the girl is
below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether "carnal knowledge" took
place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary, since none of these is an element of
statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of absence of free consent when the rape victim is
below the age of twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as follows:
"negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman language, that there was
no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently ruled that the presence of lacerations
in the victims sexual organ is not necessary to prove the crime of rape and its absence does not
negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape.28 What is
important is that AAAs testimony meets the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the
accused.
Accused-appellants defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have ruled
that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of appellant
by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and consistent positive identification, absent
any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the
appellants defense of denial and alibi.29 The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant
that he was accused of raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this
Court. On this score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAAs family file the instant case against the accused, but
the Court believes [AAAs] parents finally decided to file the rape case because after they have come
240
to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what previously [AAA and her cousin]
told her mother and which the latter had continually ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that the
testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is improbable for a
girl of complainants age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her family had she not
been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse. At any rate, a girl of tender years,
innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly impute a crime so serious as rape to any
man if it were not true.30 Parents would not sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at
that, and subject her to the rigors and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by
an honest desire to have their daughters transgressor punished accordingly.31 Hence, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we discuss now
the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659,32 was the governing
law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under the said law, the
penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below seven years of age. In this
case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time the rape was committed, was alleged
in the information and proven during trial by the presentation of her birth certificate, which showed
her date of birth as January 16, 1991, the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot agree
with the CAs conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When accused appellant testified on March
14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age.
As found by the trial court, the rape incident could have taken place "in any month and date in the
year 1996." Since the prosecution was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was
committed, it is not certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of
age in 1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in several
cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone declaration of the
accused regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years, the
penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.
However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with.35 Thus, the
proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil Code, in
case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that "in crimes, the
damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the award of damages should be reduced in
view of the presence here of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the
time of the commission of the offense.
241
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is in order.
Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which is included in the
civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. Indemnification for consequential damages shall

include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family or by a third
person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of P50,000.00 to the offended party as
being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v. Gementiza
that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for the offended party, in
the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside from other proven actual
damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. It is not to be
considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based on different jural foundations and
assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated and the
legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes that, on like
considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the same direction. Hence,
starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by the present amended law, the
indemnity for the victim shall be in the increased amount of not less than P75,000.00. This is not only
a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over
time, but also an expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. In
San Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award
designed tocompensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory

damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong (25 C.J.S.
815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and compensatory
damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by her family, and moral
damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority of the offender at the time of the
commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity and extent of injury caused to the victim
and her family, particularly considering the circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-
appelant could have been eighteen at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the
benefit of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his
actual age and the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority,
which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no justifiable ground to
242
depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the case of qualified rape,
considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil indemnity and moral damages. This was
the same stance this Court took in People v. Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which
did not reduce the award of damages. At that time, the damages amounted toP75,000.00 for civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 for moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused
was lowered by one degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome40 and
People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its
heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis for
increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally in
accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending qualifying
circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil indemnity for the victim
shall P75,000.00 Also, in rape cases, moral damages are awarded without the need proof other
than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to
such an award. However, the trial courts award ofP50,000.00 as moral damages should also be
increased to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty
provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently,
the civil indemnity for the victim is still P75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence,
correctly awarded the following amounts; P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime
is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00.00 as moral
damages because the victim is assumed to have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an
award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A.
No. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination in
People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on
the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the
commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a
reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time
but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the
crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of
whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that exemplary or
corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
243
damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter of right. The requirements of an
award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in addition to
compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of
compensatory damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by
bad faith or done in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the
compensatory damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased when
qualified rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of P75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages should be
maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary damages be likewise
increased to the amount ofP30,000.00 based on the latest jurisprudence on the award of damages
on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded P75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award
of P50,000.00 as moral damages is increased toP75,000.0044 and that of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages is likewise increased to P30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the outcome of
his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision were promulgated on January
17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation of the sentence of conviction of accused-
appellant handed down by the RTC was not suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that
time, in accordance with Article 192 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth
Welfare Code46 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the
Law.47 Accused-appellant is now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the
Albay Provincial Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on
October 13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. Persons who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who were below the
age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for which they were
convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act.
xxx
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have been
convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below
the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With more reason, the Act should
apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under review. Hence, it is
necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344 shall apply to accused-appellant, who was
below 18 years old at the time of the commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she is found guilty of the
offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of
age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense charged, the court
shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense committed.
However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
244
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court
shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court on Juvenile in
Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the
child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC.48 The said P.D. and
Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended sentence would not apply to a child
in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has been convicted of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is
guided by the basic principle of statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish.49 Since R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been
convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court
should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in
conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of sentence of
a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate deliberations50 on Senate Bill No.
1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is
quoted below:
If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or may have
committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the child could be
recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by the Local Council
for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration
to go through a judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should
still be a primordial or primary consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the
childs restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1
Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be
applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the
time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of
sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:
Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. If the court finds that the objective of
the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if
the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the condition of his/her disposition
or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for
execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under suspended
sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to
order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or
until the child reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)
To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38 and 40
to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-appellant shall be
245
entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children as follows:
Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve
his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and
other training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the
BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the appropriate
disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.52
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed on accused-
appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim
the amount of P75,000.00 andP30,000.00 as moral damages and exemplary damages, respectively.
The award of civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be
REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE vs MANTALABA
246
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO,* J.
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA,
Accused-Appellant. July 20, 2011
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision [1] dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment [2]dated September 14,
2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal
Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) 9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:

The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen (17) years old
at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust
team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon and two (2) poseur-buyers
who were provided with two (2) pieces of P100 marked bills to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked money,
proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two
poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said to be in the act of selling
shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other. Afterwards, the
appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked
money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the
transaction has been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed
the appellant as he was leaving the place.
247
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangayofficials
Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet of
shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces of P100 bill,
thrown by the appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers
made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet of shabu
which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they marked as RMP
2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money and a fifty peso (P50)
bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory
examination of the two (2) sachets containing a crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the
person of the appellant as well as the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The
request was brought by PO1 Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor,
Forensic Chemical Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately
conducted the examination. The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested positive
for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the crystalline substance
contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and RMP-2-10-01-03, were
positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against
appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250

That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao,
Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu which is a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). [3]

That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao,
Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously possess zero point six one three one (0.6131) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous
drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165). [4]
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
248
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment [5] dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a
dangerous drug, as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
No. 9165. As provided for in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the
penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan is hereby sentenced
to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y
Udtojan GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a
dangerous drug, weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of the
commission of the offense, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is
accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8)
years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a fine of Three Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.[6]
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan
City dated September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen
Udtojan Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of
Section 5 and Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the
crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-
buyer. He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established. Finally, he
asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of proof is on the
prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took
place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-bust
operation was successfully conducted, thus:
249
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did you
conduct your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian assets
that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And after we
evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will operate this
accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We prepared a
request for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of shabu
there should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked
moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-buyer
and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal
because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the case,
of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of giving the
shabu and the marked moneys to the suspect and considering also that that
was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer immediately
proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already given by the
suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?] Was
he alone or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the suspect,
we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the barangay officials
to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-bust
operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces of
100 peso bills as marked moneys.[8]
250
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of
the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller,
the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.
[9]
From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements
have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject
dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The
testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the testimony of Police
Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer, who confirmed that the plastic containing
white crystalline substance was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner
was in possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the
sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated
specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the
accused, as well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet
flourescent powder. x x x[10]
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this Court
stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. [11] It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of
trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. [12] In People v. Roa,
[13]
this Court had the opportunity to expound on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation,
ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement
before police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that
Section 86[14] of Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation,
PNP and the Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all
drug-related matters," the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's
participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-
bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113[15] of the
Rules of the Court, which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending
violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the PDEA. [16] A buy-bust operation is
not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes[17] is
quite instructive:
251
In People v. Ganguso,[18] it has been held that prior
surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the
arresting officers were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting
that there was no surveillance conducted before the buy-bust
operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,[19] that there is no rigid
or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a
trait of good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of
the essence and dispense with the need for prior surveillance. [20]
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great
respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the witnesses as they
testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court. When the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this
Court.[21]
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that the
appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal possession of
dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the consummation of the
buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search the person of the appellant. In
the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of 0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or
object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. [22]
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated from
him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing enough to merit
reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they
recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched
they also found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the
prosecution that no money was taken from you because you have none at that time,
is it not?
A: None sir, only the P250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This P250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your
possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not P200 of the P250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you
were arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
252
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your hands
tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for the
presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.[23]
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this Court with
disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in prosecutions
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the defenses of denial and frame-up
must be proved with strong and convincing evidence. [24]
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the chain of
custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police officers Pajo and Simon were
present in the buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered

Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is
justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. [25]Its non-
compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible.[26] What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. [27] In this particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and
Simon were members of the buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B.
Dacillo who signed the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the
253
integrity of the items confiscated.All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been
observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the consummation
of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing white
[crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?

A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
[constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?

A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of
the barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of
the barangayofficials. Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did
you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)

A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces
ofP100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him, where
were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?

A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2
pieces of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the
search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked
moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of
Inventory.[28]
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the confiscated item
which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking [29] of the seized drugs or other
related items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after
seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized
contraband are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens
will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate
254
the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.
[30]
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to discuss the
effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was seventeen (17) years old
when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense was committed, but was no longer
a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its decision
on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor.The RTC did not
suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare
Code[31] and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law, [32] the
laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of judgment, because the imposable
penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his
sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil
liability which may have resulted from the offense committed. However, instead of
pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict
with the law under suspended sentence, without need of
application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of

the child, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in
the Supreme Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. -
Persons who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time
of the commission of the offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia[33] that while Section 38 of RA 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is
already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section
255
40 of the same law limits the said suspension of sentence until the child reaches the maximum age
of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that
the objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the
law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child
in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the
suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches
the maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer avail of the
provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence, because such is
already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have happened if the CA, when
this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of the appellant. The records show that
the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of 19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became
effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and the case having been elevated to the CA, the
latter should have suspended the sentence of the appellant because he was already entitled to the
provisions of Section 38 of the same law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors
regardless of the penalty imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603. [34]
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51 of

RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: [35]
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other

Training Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may
be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165,
the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 98 [36] of the same law. A
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to death; however, in
Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life
imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this
means that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of
penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court
in People v. Simon,[37] thus:
256
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the
penalty for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating
circumstances under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A
review of such doctrines as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason
therefor was because the special laws involved provided their own specific penalties
for the offenses punished thereunder, and which penalties were not taken from or
with reference to those in the Revised Penal Code. Since the penalties then
provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for the minimum, medium or
maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to consider the aforestated
modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine the period of the
penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the
Code on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary
application to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of
or contemplated in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The
suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility
of, or a prohibition in the special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and
ostensibly punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from
the Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its
duration, correlation and legal effects under the system of penalties native to said
Code. When, as in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional, in its
technical sense under the Code, it would consequently be both illogical and absurd
to posit otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently

determine the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the
Code as applied to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of
the crime and the nature of the participation of the accused. However, under
paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there are two or more ordinary mitigating
circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the penalty shall be reduced by
one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstances, as
provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or two degrees,
or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not apply in
toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which
could not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in
some manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof,
the courts shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed
for the crime consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the
penalty next lower in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow
the former in the scale in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the
complex penalty in this case consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent,
that is, prision correccional, prision mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree
lower would be arresto menor, destierroand arresto mayor. There could, however,
be no further reduction by still one or two degrees, which must each likewise consist
of three penalties, since only the penalties of fine and public censure remain in the
scale.
257
The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated
to determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty
by degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable
penalty beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three
component penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be
considered as an independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should
in any event be prision correccionalin order not to depreciate the seriousness of
drug offenses. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such
interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather
than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which
impasse should now be the concern of and is accordingly addressed to Congress. [38]
Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority [39] can now be appreciated in fixing
the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules
stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which
is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been
appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum
penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other
mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance. [40] The ISLAW is applicable in the present
case because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the
presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.Therefore, a penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the proper imposable penalty.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding
appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II of RA 9165 is herebyAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be
imposed on appellant's conviction of violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1352. March 29, 1905. ]
THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. APOLONIO CABALLEROS, ET

AL., Defendants-Appellants.
Hipolito Magsalin, for Appellants.
258
Solicitor-General Araneta, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. COERCION. Held upon the evidence that the defendant Baculi was exempt from responsibility
under article 8, paragraph 9 of the Penal Code.
2. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION. Extrajudicial confessions not made voluntarily can not be

received in evidence. (Act No. 619, sec. 4.)
3. FAILURE TO REPORT A CRIME. Failure to report to the authorities the commission of a crime
is not an offense punished by the Penal Code.
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
The defendants have been sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Cebu to the penalty of seven
years of presidio mayor as accessories after the fact in the crime of assassination or murder
perpetrated on the persons of the American school-teachers Louis A. Thomas, Clyde O. France,
John E. Wells, and Ernest Eger, because, without having taken part in the said crime as principals or
as accomplices, they took part in the burial of the corpses of the victim in order to conceal the crime.
The evidence does not justify, in our opinion, this sentence. As regards Roberto Baculi, although he
confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, it appears that he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. And not only does the defendant affirm
this, but he is corroborated by the only eyewitness to the crime, Teodoro Sabate, who, by the way, is
a witness for the prosecution. This witness says he was present when the Americans were killed;
that Roberto Baculi was not a member of the group who killed the Americans, but that he was in a
banana plantation on his property gathering some bananas; that when he heard the shots he began
to run; that he was, however, seen by Damaso and Isidoro, the leaders of the band; that the latter
called to him and striking him the butts of their guns they forced him to bury the corpses.
The Penal Code exempts from liability any person who performs the act by reason of irresistible
force (par. 9, art. 8). Baculi acted, doubtless, under such circumstances when he executed the acts
which are charged against him.
As regards the other defendant, Apolonio Caballeros, there is no proof that he took any part in any
way in the execution of the crime with which he has been charged; there is conclusive proof to the
contrary, since Baculi, as well as on of the witnesses for the prosecution, Teodoro Sabate, expressly
declare that he, Caballeros, did not take any part in the burial of the aforesaid corpses, nor was he
even in the place of occurrence when the burial took place. The confession of his supposed liability
and guilt, made before an official of the division of information of the Constabulary, Enrique
Calderon, as the latter states when testifying as a witness, can not be considered as legal proof,
because the same witness says that Roberto Baculi was the only one of the defendants who made a
confession to him voluntarily. It appears besides, from the statements of another witness for the
prosecution, Meliton Covarrubias, that the confession of Apolonio Caballeros was made through the
promise made to him and to the other defendants that nothing would be done to them. Confessions
which do not appear to have been made freely and voluntarily, without force, intimidation, or promise
of pardon, can not be accepted as proof on a trial. (Sec. 4 Act No. 619 of the Philippine
Commission.)
The fact of the defendants not reporting to the authorities the perpetration of the crime, which seems
to be one of the motives for the conviction and which the court below takes into consideration in his
259
judgment, is not punished by the Penal Code and therefore that can not render the defendants
criminally liable according to law.
By virtue, then, of the above considerations, and with a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we
acquit the defendants, appellants, with the costs de oficio in both instances. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 1481 February 17, 1904
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,

vs.
LIBERATO EXALTACION, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
260
Alberto Barretto for appellants.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
March 26, 1903, the provincial fiscal of Bulacan presented to the court of that province an
information charging Liberato Exaltacion and Buenaventura Tanchinco with the crime of rebellion, in
that they, subsequently to the 4th day of November, 1901, willfully and illegally bound themselves to
take part in a rebellion against the Government of the United States in these Islands, swearing
allegiance to the Katipunan Society, the purpose of which was to overthrow the said Government by
force of arms, this against the statute in the case made and provided.
In the course of the trial Don Pablo Tecson, the provincial governor of Bulacan, testified under oath
that the two defendants were arrested in the month of March, 1903, the police some days before
having captured a number of documents in the encampment of one Contreras, as so-called general
of bandits, situated at a place called Langca, of the town of Meycauayan, among which documents
appeared the papers now on pages 2 and 3 of the record, signed by the said Exaltacion and
Tanchinco, who recognized the said documents when they were exhibited to them; that the said
defendants stated to the witness that they had signed the said documents under compulsion; that
the purpose of the Katipunan Society was to obtain the independence of the Philippines; that this
statement was made in the house of the parish priest of Meycauayan in the presence of Exequiel
Casas and Fernando Nieto. The latter, upon their examination as witnesses, testified to the same
facts, stating that the defendants told Governor Tecson that they had signed the said documents
under fear of death at the hands of the thieves by whom they had been captured. The witness
Casas, the municipal president of Meycauayan, testified that he held office as such in place of the
former president, Don Tomas Testa, who was kidnapped in the month of October, 1902.
The said documents, the first of which was dated July 4 and the second July 17, 1902, were written
in Tagalog, and contain an oath taken in the name of God, and a covenant on the part of the
subscribers to carry out the superior orders of the Katipunan, and never disobey them until their
death in the defense of the mother country. The two accused, under oath, testified to having signed
the said documents and alleged that they did so under compulsion and force while they were held as
captives by the thieves; that the defendant Tanchinco was captured in the fields one day when he
was going to work on his farm by three armed men, unknown to him, who asked him if he was an
agent or friend of President Testa, and upon his replying in the negative they compelled him in view
of his denial to sign a document, now on page 3 of the record.
The defendant Tanchinco cited Lazaro Yusay to testify to the fact that he was captured at a place
called Kaibiga in the township of Novaliches, and that on the day following his release, having been
unable to pay the $300 which was demanded of him, he reported to the president, Tomas Testa. The
defendant Liberato Exaltacion under oath testified that he was captured near Meycauayan by five
persons, unknown, dressed as policemen and armed with guns or revolvers; that these men bound
him and took him into the forest and there compelled him by threats of death to sign the documents
now on page 2 of the record; that thereupon they allowed him to go upon promise to return. This
defendant testified that Antero Villano and Tomas Rivera saw him while on the road in the hands of
the thieves. Both the accused testified that as soon as they were released they presented
themselves to the president, Don Tomas Testa, in the presence of witnesses, and subsequently went
to Bonifacio Morales, a lieutenant of volunteers, and reported to him the fact that they had been
captured.
The witnesses Morales, Lazaro Yusay, Antero Villano, Dalmacio Ferrer, and Hipolito de Leon of
whom the last two were present when Tanchinco appeared before Senor Testa, the president of
Meycauayan, and reported to him what had happened to him all testified to the same fact and
corroborated the statements of the accused with respect to their capture and their subsequent report
to President Testa and to the witness Morales.
261
The evidence for the prosecution, and especially the two documents above referred to, signed by the
accused, is not sufficient to prove the guilt of the latter or to justify the imposition upon them of the
penalty inflicted by the judgment of the court below.
The facts, established by the evidence, that the defendants were kidnapped by brigands who
belonged to the Contreras band, and that they signed the said documents under compulsion and
while in captivity, relieve them from all criminal liability from the crime of rebellion of which they are
charged. The conduct of the defendants in presenting themselves first to the local president of
Meycauayan and subsequently to Lieut. Bonifacio Morales, of the Bulacan Government Volunteers,
as soon as they were released by the bandits is corroborative of their testimony, and is the best
demonstration of their innocence. This conclusion is not overcome by the trifling discrepancy
between the testimony of the witness Yusay and that of the defendant Tanchinco nor the fact the
Exaltacion was unable to determine the date when he was captured or that on which he appeared
before President Testa.
The guilt of the defendants of the crime defined and punished by Act No. 292 not having been
established at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt, we are of the opinion that the judgment below
must be reversed and the defendants acquitted with the costs de oficio. The judge below will be
informed of this decision and a copy of the judgment entered herein will be furnished him for his
information and guidance. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150647. September 29, 2004]
ROWENO POMOY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
262
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Well-established is the principle that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on the highest court of the land. However, when facts are
misinterpreted and the innocence of the accused depends on a proper appreciation of the factual
conclusions, the Supreme Court may conduct a review thereof. In the present case, a careful
reexamination convinces this Court that an accident caused the victims death. At the very least, the
testimonies of the credible witnesses create a reasonable doubt on appellants guilt. Hence, the
Court must uphold the constitutional presumption of innocence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 28, 2001 Decision[2] and the October 30, 2001 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CAGR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995 judgment [4] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC)[5] of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No. 36921, finding Roweno
Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, MODIFIED as to penalty in the sense that the [Petitioner]
ROWENO POMOY is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years, four (4)
months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, the decision appealed
from is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.[6]
The challenged CA Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged in an Information worded thus:
That on or about the 4th day of January 1990, in the Municipality of Sara, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with his .45 service pistol, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and without any
justifiable cause or motive, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot one TOMAS BALBOA with the service pistol he was then provided, inflicting upon the latter
gunshot wounds on the vital parts of his body, which directly caused the death of said victim
thereafter.[7]
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presented respondents version of the facts as follows:
Tomas Balboa was a master teacher of the Concepcion College of Science and Fisheries
in Concepcion,Iloilo.
On January 4, 1990, about 7:30 in the morning, some policemen arrived at

the Concepcion College to arrest Balboa, allegedly in connection with a robbery which took place in
the municipality in December 1989. With the arrest effected, Balboa and the policemen passed by
the Concepcion Elementary Schoolwhere his wife, Jessica, was in a get-together party with other
School Administrators. When his wife asked him, Why will you be arrested? [H]e answered [Even I]
do not know why I am arrested. That is why I am even going there in order to find out the reason for
my arrest.
263
Balboa was taken to the Headquarters of the already defunct 321 st Philippine Constabulary
Company atCamp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo. He was detained in the jail thereat, along with Edgar
Samudio, another suspect in the robbery case.
Later that day, about a little past 2 oclock in the afternoon, petitioner, who is a police sergeant, went
near the door of the jail where Balboa was detained and directed the latter to come out, purportedly
for tactical interrogation at the investigation room, as he told Balboa: Lets go to the investigation
room. The investigation room is at the main building of the compound where the jail is located. The
jail guard on duty, Nicostrado Estepar, opened the jail door and walked towards the investigation
room.
At that time, petitioner had a gun, a .45 caliber pistol, tucked in a holster which was hanging by the
side of his belt. The gun was fully embedded in its holster, with only the handle of the gun protruding
from the holster.
When petitioner and Balboa reached the main building and were near the investigation room, two (2)
gunshots were heard. When the source of the shots was verified, petitioner was seen still holding a .
45 caliber pistol, facing Balboa, who was lying in a pool of blood, about two (2) feet away. When the
Commanding Officer of the Headquarters arrived, he disarmed petitioner and directed that Balboa
be brought to the hospital. Dr. Palma (first name not provided) happened to be at the crime scene as
he was visiting his brother in the Philippine Constabulary. When Dr. Palma examined Balboa, he (Dr.
Palma) said that it was unnecessary to bring Balboa to the hospital for he was dead.
Upon the request of Mrs. Jessica Balboa, the wife of the deceased, Dr. Ricardo Jabonete, the
medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, Region VI, Iloilo City, conducted an
autopsy on the remains of Tomas Balboa. The following were his findings:
Pallor, integumens and nailbeds.
Wound, gunshot: (1) ENTRANCE, downwards and medially, edges, modified by sutures, surrounded
by abrasion collar, 0.6 cm. In its chest, left side, 10.0 cms. from anterior midline, 121.0 cms. From
left heel, directed medially backwards from left to right, penetrating chest wall thru 5 th intercostals
space into thoracic cavity, perforating thru and thru, upper lobe, left lung, lacerating left ventricular
wall causing punched out fracture, 8th thoracic vertebra and make an EXIT, stallate in shape, 1.0 x
0.8 cm. Edges, modified by sutures, back, right side, 8.0 cms. From posterior midline, 117.0
cms. From right heel (2) ENTRANCE, ovaloid, oriented medially downwards, edges sutured, 0.7 cm.
on its widest portion, at infero-medial border, hypochondriac region, left side, 4.0 cms. From anterior
midline, 105.0 cms. From left heel, directed backwards, laterally wall into penetrating abdominal
cavity, perforating thru and thru, stomach, head of the pancreas and mesentery, make an exit, ovalid,
1.0 x 0.8 cm., oriented medially upwards, edges, sutured, back, left side, level of 9 th intercostal
space, 4.5 cms. From posterior midline, 110.0 cms. From left heel. x x x.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Hemorrhage, massive secondary to gunshot wounds on chest and abdomen.
REMARKS: Body previously embalmed and autopsied.
Dr. Jaboneta testified that the two (2) wounds he found on x x x Balboas body were gunshot
wounds. The entrance of [W]ound No. 1 was to the left side of the chest about the left nipple and
exited to the right side of the back. Its trajectory was backwards then downwards from left to
right. As to the possible position of the assailant, Dr. Jaboneta opined that the nozzle of the gun was
probably in front of the victim and was more to the left side, and the gun must have been a little bit
higher than the entrance wound. Wound No. 2 was located immediately below the arch of the ribs,
left side. Its direction was backwards and laterally upwards. Dr. Jaboneta estimated that when it was
inflicted, the assailant must have pointed the guns nozzle to the right side front of the victim. The
264
distance between the entrance points of wounds No. 1 and No. 2 was found to be about 16.0
centimeters.[8]
Version of the Defense
The Petition adopted the narration of facts in the assailed CA Decision, which in turn culled
them from the trial court. The RTC summarized the testimonies of Defense Witnesses Erna Basa,
the lone eyewitness to the incident; Eden Legaspi; Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.; and petitioner himself, as
follows:
Erna Basa:
x x x [O]n January 4, 1990, she was working in their office in the camp up to the afternoon; at about
past 2 oclock that afternoon while working on the backlogs, she heard some noise and exchange of
words which were not clear, but it seemed there was growing trouble; she opened the door to verify
and saw Roweno Pomoy and Tomas Balboa grappling for the possession of the gun; she was inside
the room and one meter away from the door; Pomoy and Balboa while grappling were two to three
meters away from the door; the grappling happened so fast and the gun of Pomoy was suddenly
pulled out from its holster and then there was explosion; she was not certain who pulled the gun. x x
x.
Eden Legaspi:
x x x [A]s early as 1:30 oclock in the afternoon of January 4, 1990 she was inside the investigation
room of the PC at Camp Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo; at about 2 oclock that same afternoon while there
inside, she heard a commotion outside and she remained seated on the bench; when the commotion
started they were seated on the bench and after the commotion that woman soldier (referring to
Erna Basa) stood up and opened the door and she saw two persons grappling for the possession of
a gun and immediately two successive shots rang out; she did not leave the place where she was
seated but she just stood up; after the shots, one of the two men fall down x x x.
Accused-petitioner Roweno Pomoy:
He is 30 years old and a PNP member of the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force Company then attached
to the defunct 321 st PC Company; he was one of the investigators of their outfit; about 2 oclock or
past that time of January 4, 1990 he got Tomas Balboa from their stockade for tactical interrogation;
as he was already holding the door knob of their investigation room and about to open and enter it,
all of a sudden he saw Tomas Balboa approach him and take hold or grab the handle of his gun;
Tomas Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case who was apprehended by the police of Concepcion
and then turned over to them (PC) and placed in their stockade; he asked the sergeant of the guard
to let Balboa out of the stockade for interrogation; from the stockade with Balboa walking with him,
he had his .45 caliber pistol placed in his holster attached to his belt on his waist; then as he was
holding the doorknob with his right hand to open the door, the victim, who was two meters away from
him, suddenly approached him and grabbed his gun, but all of a sudden he held the handle of his
gun with his left hand; he released his right hand from the doorknob and, with that right hand, he
held the handle of his gun; Tomas Balboa was not able to take actual hold of the gun because of his
efforts in preventing him (Balboa) from holding the handle of his gun; he used his left hand to parry
the move of Balboa; after he held the handle of his gun with his right hand, in a matter of seconds,
he felt somebody was holding his right hand; he and Balboa grappled and in two or three seconds
the gun was drawn from its holster as both of them held the gun; more grappling followed and five
seconds after the gun was taken from its holster it fired, the victim was to his right side when the
attempt to grab his gun began and was still to his right when the gun was drawn from its holster until
it fired, as they were still grappling or wrestling; his gun was already loaded in its chamber and
265
cocked when he left his house, and it was locked when it fired; during the grappling he used his left
hand to prevent Balboa from holding his gun, while the victim used his right hand in trying to reach
the gun; after the gun fired, they were separated from each other and Balboa fell; he is taller than
Balboa though the latter was bigger in build; he cannot say nor determine who of them was stronger;
after Balboa fell, Sgt. Alag shouted saying stop that and he saw Sgt. Alag approaching; sometime
after, Capt. Rolando Maclang, their commanding officer, came, got his gun, and said that the case
be investigated as to what really happened. He said that when his gun was put in its holster only its
handle protrudes or comes out from it.
Upon cross-examination, he said that Balboa was a suspect in a robbery case that happened during
the first week of December, 1989; he was the one who filed that case in the town of San Dionisio
and that case involves other persons who were also detained; before January 4, 1990 he had also
the chance to invite and interrogate Balboa but who denied any robbery case; x x x [I]t was after he
took his lunch that day when Capt. Maclang called him to conduct the interrogation; when he took
Balboa from the stockade he did not tell him that he (Balboa) was to be investigated in the
investigation room which was housed in the main building which is fifty meters, more or less, from
the stockade, likewise houses the administrative office, the office of the commanding officer, officer
of the operations division and that of the signal division; his gun was in its holster when the victim
tried to grab it (gun); from the time he sensed that the victim tried to grab his gun, he locked the
victim; the hand of the victim was on top of his hand and he felt the victim was attempting to get his
gun; that the entire handle of his gun was exposed when placed inside its holster; he cannot tell
whether the victim, while struggling with him, was able to hold any portion of his gun from the tip of
its barrel to the point where its hammer is located; during the incident his gun was fully loaded and
cocked; Sgt. Alag did not approach, but just viewed them and probably reported the incident to their
commanding officer; he was not able to talk to Sgt. Alag as he (Pomoy) was not in his right sense;
when his commanding officer came some five to ten minutes later and took away his gun he did not
tell him anything.
Dr. Salvador Mallo Jr.
He is the Rural Health Physician of Sara who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Tomas
Balboa that afternoon of January 4, 1990; in his autopsy findings respecting which he made an
autopsy report he said he found two entrance wounds on the victim, the first on the left chest with
trajectory medially downward, while the second one is on the left side of the stomach with trajectory
somewhat going upward; at the same time of his examination he saw this victim to be wearing a
light-colored T-shirt and a jacket; other than the T-shirt worn by the victim, he did not see or find any
powder burns and marks and that those dotted marks in the T-shirt were believed by him to be
powder burns as they look like one; he also found a deformed slug in the pocket of the jacket of the
victim.[9]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA anchored its Decision on the following factual findings: 1) the victim was not successful
in his attempts to grab the gun, since petitioner had been in control of the weapon when the shots
were fired; 2) the gun had been locked prior to the alleged grabbing incident and immediately before
it went off; it was petitioner who released the safety lock before he deliberately fired the fatal shots;
and 3) the location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not support the assertion of
petitioner that there had been a grappling for the gun.
To the appellate court, all the foregoing facts discredited the claim of petitioner that the death of
Balboa resulted from an accident. Citing People v. Reyes,[10] the CA maintained that a revolver is not
prone to accidental firing if it were simply handed over to the deceased as appellant claims because
of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already first cocked and pressure was exerted on the
trigger in the process of allegedly handing it over. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure
266
had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver. Either way, the shooting of the deceased must
have been intentional because pressure on the trigger was necessary to make the gun fire. [11]
Moreover, the appellate court obviously concurred with this observation of the OSG:
[Petitioners] theory of accident would have been easier to believe had the victim been shot only
once. In this case, however, [petitioner] shot the victim not only once but twice, thereby establishing
[petitioners] determined effort to kill the victim. By any stretch of the imagination, even assuming
without admitting that the first shot was accidental, then it should not have been followed by another
shot on another vital part of the body. The fact that [petitioner] shot the victim two (2) times and was
hit on two different and distant parts of the body, inflicted from two different locations or angles,
means that there was an intent to cause the victims death, contrary to [petitioners] pretensions of the
alleged accidental firing. It is an oft-repeated principle that the location, number and gravity of the
wounds inflicted on the victim have a more revealing tale of what actually happened during the
incident. x x x.[12]
Furthermore, the CA debunked the alternative plea of self-defense. It held that petitioner had
miserably failed to prove the attendance of unlawful aggression, an indispensable element of this
justifying circumstance.
While substantially affirming the factual findings of the RTC, the CA disagreed with the
conclusion of the trial court that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position had
attended the commission of the crime. Accordingly, the penalty imposed by the RTC was modified by
the appellate court in this manner:
x x x [F]or public position to be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, the public official must
use his influence, prestige and ascendancy which his office gives him in realizing his purpose. If the
accused could have perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of
public position. (People vs. Joyno, 304 SCRA 655, 670). In the instant case, there is no showing that
the [petitioner] had a premeditated plan to kill the victim when the former fetched the latter from the
stockade, thus, it cannot be concluded that the public position of the [petitioner] facilitated the
commission of the crime. Therefore, the trial courts finding that the said aggravating circumstance
that [petitioner] took advantage of his public position to commit the crime cannot be
sustained. Hence, there being no aggravating and no mitigating circumstance proved, the maximum
of the penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, a penalty imposable for
the crime of homicide. x x x.[13]
Hence, this Petition.[14]
Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I. The Court of Appeals committed serious and reversible error in affirming petitioners
conviction despite the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence to convict the
petitioner, in contrast to petitioners overwhelming evidence to support his
theory/defense of accident.
II. The Court of Appeals committed grave and reversible error in affirming the conviction of
the petitioner on a manifestly mistaken inference that when the gun fired, the petitioner
was in full control of the handle of the gun, because what the testimonies of
disinterested witnesses and the petitioner reveal was that the gun fired while petitioner
and Balboa were both holding the gun in forceful efforts to wrest the gun from each
other.
267
III. The Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming the solicitor generals observation that
the fact that petitioner shot the victim twice establishes petitioners determined effort to
kill the victim.
IV. The appellate court committed serious misapprehension of the evidence presented
when it ruled that the trajectory of the wounds was front-to-back belying the allegation of
petitioner that he and the victim were side-by-side each other when the grappling
ensued.
V. The Court of Appeals failed to discern the real import of petitioners reaction to the
incident when it stated that the dumbfounded reaction of petitioner after the incident
strongly argues against his claim of accidental shooting.
VI. The appellate court committed grave error when it disregarded motive or lack of it in
determining the existence of voluntariness and intent on the part of petitioner to shoot at
the victim when the same was put in serious doubt by the evidence presented.
VII. The Court of Appeals was mistaken in ruling that the defense of accident and self-
defense are inconsistent.
VIII. The Court of Appeals obviously erred in the imposition of the penalties and damages.
[15]
In sum, the foregoing issues can be narrowed down to two: First, whether the shooting of Tomas
Balboa was the result of an accident; and second, whether petitioner was able to prove self-defense.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.

First Issue:
Accidental Shooting
Timeless is the legal adage that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, are conclusive. [16] Both courts possess time-honored expertise in the field of fact
finding. But where some facts are misinterpreted or some details overlooked, the Supreme Court
may overturn the erroneous conclusions drawn by the courts a quo. Where, as in this case, the facts
in dispute are crucial to the question of innocence or guilt of the accused, a careful factual
reexamination is imperative.
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code:
Article 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
xxxxxxxxx
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident
without fault or intent of causing it.
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to the victim was not due
to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to circumstances that could not have been foreseen or
controlled.[17] Thus, in determining whether an accident attended the incident, courts must take into
account the dual standards of lack of intent to kill and absence of fault or negligence. This
determination inevitably brings to the fore the main question in the present case: was petitioner in
control of the .45 caliber pistol at the very moment the shots were fired?
268
Petitioner Not in Control
of the Gun When It Fired
The records show that, other than petitioner himself, it was Erna Basa who witnessed the
incident firsthand. Her account, narrated during cross-examination, detailed the events
of that fateful afternoon of January 4, 1990 as follows:
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. You said that while you were inside the investigation room you heard a commotion. That
commotion which you heard, did you hear any shouting as part of that commotion
which you heard?
A. Moderately there was shouting and their dialogue was not clear. It could not be
understood.
Q. Did you hear any voices as part of that commotion?
A. No, sir.
Q. From the time you entered the investigation room you did not hear any voice while you
were inside the investigation room as part of that commotion?
A. There was no loud voice and their conversation could not be clarified. They were talking
somewhat like murmuring or in a low voice but there was a sort of trouble in their talks.
COURT:
Q. Was there a sort of an exchange of words in their conversation?
A. Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you opened the door, you saw Sgt. Pomoy and Mr. Balboa the deceased in this
case?Am I correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when you saw Sgt. Pomoy was he holding a gun?
A. Not yet, the gun was still here. (Witness illustrating by pointing to her side) and I saw
both of them grappling for that gun.
Q. Where was the gun at that time?
A. The gun was in its holster. (Witness illustrating by pointing to [her] side.)
Q. When you demonstrated you were according to you saw the hands holding the gun. It
was Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. I saw two hands on the handle of the gun in its holster, the hand of Sir Balboa and
Sgt. Pomoy.
COURT:
Q. At that precise moment the gun was still in its holster?
A. When I took a look the gun was still in its holster with both hands grappling for the
possession of the gun.
Q. How many hands did you see?
A. Two.
Q. One hand of Sgt. Pomoy and one hand is that of the victim?
269
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY TEODOSIO:
Q. Which hand of Sgt. Pomoy did you see holding the gun?
A. Right hand of Sgt. Pomoy.
Q. And when you see that right hand of Sgt. Pomoy, was it holding the gun?
A. The right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was here on the gun and Sir Balboas hand was also
there. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. Which part of the gun was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding?
A. The handle.
Q. And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A. At first they were not directly facing each other.
Q. So later, they were facing each other?
A. They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as
they were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.
COURT:
Q. What was the position of the victim when the shots were fired?
A. When I saw them they were already facing each other.
Q. What was the distance?
A. Very close to each other.
Q. How close?
A. Very near each other.
Q. Could it be a distance of within one (1) foot?
A. Not exactly. They were close to each other in such a manner that their bodies would
touch each other.
Q. So the distance is less than one (1) foot when the gun fired?
A. One (1) foot or less when the explosions were heard.
Q. And they were directly facing each other?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT:
Proceed.
Q. Were you able to see how the gun was taken out from its holster?
A. While they were grappling for the possession of the gun, gradually the gun was
released from its holster and then there was an explosion.
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
270
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
Q. Did you see when the gun fired when they were grappling for its possession?
A. Yes sir, I actually saw the explosion. It came from that very gun.
Q. Did you see the gun fired when it fired for two times?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to
because the gun was turning.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Could you tell the court who was holding the gun when the gun fired?
A. When the gun exploded, the gun was already in the possession of Sgt. Pomoy. He was
the one holding the gun.
Q. After the gun went off, you saw the gun was already in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How soon after the gun went off when you saw the gun in the hand of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. After Balboa had fallen and after they had separated themselves with each other, it was
then that I saw Sgt. Pomoy holding the gun.
COURT:
Proceed.
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. When the gun was taken out from its holster, Sgt. Pomoy was the one holding the
handle of the gun? Am I correct?
A. Both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. So when the gun was still in its holster, two of them were holding the gun?
A. Yes sir, they were actually holding the gun, Sgt. Pomoy and Sir Balboa.
Q. It was the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun as you
testified?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Which hand of Balboa was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. At the time Balboa was holding the handle of the gun with his left hand, was he in front
of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. They had a sort of having their sides towards each other. Pomoys right and Balboas left
sides [were] towards each other. They were side by side at a closer distance towards
each other.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. It was actually Sgt. Pomoy who was holding the handle of the gun during that time?
271
A. When I looked out it was when they were grappling for the possession of the gun
and the right hand of Sgt. Pomoy was holding the handle of the gun.
Q. When you saw them did you see what position of the handle of the gun was being held
by Tomas Balboa? The rear portion of the handle of the gun or the portion near the
trigger?
A. When I looked at them it was the hand of Sgt. Pomoy holding the handle of the
gun with his right hand with the hand of Sir Balboa over the hand of Pomoy, the
same hand holding the gun.
Q. It was in that position when the gun was removed from its holster?
A. When the gun pulled out from its holster, I was not able to notice clearly anymore
whose hand was holding the gun when I saw both their hands were holding the
gun.
Q. When you said this in [the] vernacular, Daw duha na sila nagakapot, what you really
mean?
A. Both of them were holding the gun.
Q. But Sgt. Pomoy still holding the handle of the gun?
A. Still both of them were holding the handle of the gun.
Q. With the hand of Balboa still on the top of the hand of Sgt. Pomoy as what you have
previously said when the gun was in the holster of Sgt. Pomoy?
A. When the gun was pulled from its holster, I saw that Sgt. Pomoys right hand was
still on the handle of the gun with the left hand of Sir Balboa over his right hand
of Sgt. Pomoy, like this (witness illustrating by showing his right hand with her left
hand over her right hand as if holding something. The thumb of the left hand is
somewhat over the index finger of the right hand.)
COURT:
Which hand of the victim was used by him when the gun was already pulled out form its
holster and while the accused was holding the handle of the gun?
A. Left hand.
Q. So, he was still using the same left hand in holding a portion of the handle of the gun up
to the time when the gun was pulled out from its holster?
A. Yes sir, the same left hand and that of Pomoy his right hand because the left hand of
Pomoy was used by him in parrying the right hand of Sir Balboa which is about to grab
the handle of the gun.
COURT:
Q. So in the process of grappling he was using his left hand in pushing the victim away
from him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about the right hand of the victim, what was he doing with his right hand?
A. The victim was trying to reach the gun with his right hand and Pomoy was using
his left hand to protect the victim from reaching the gun with his right hand.
COURT:
Proceed.
272
ATTY. TEODOSIO:
Q. Did you say a while ago that Mr. Balboa was able to hold the barrel of the gun of
Sgt. Pomoy?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was at the time before the shots were fired?
A. Yes, he was able to hold the tip of the barrel of the gun using his right hand.
COURT:
Q. That was before the gun fired?
A. Yes, sir.[18]
The foregoing account demonstrates that petitioner did not have control of the gun during the
scuffle. The deceased persistently attempted to wrest the weapon from him, while he resolutely tried
to thwart those attempts. That the hands of both petitioner and the victim were all over the weapon
was categorically asserted by the eyewitness. In the course of grappling for the gun, both hands of
petitioner were fully engaged -- his right hand was trying to maintain possession of the weapon,
while his left was warding off the victim. It would be difficult to imagine how, under such
circumstances, petitioner would coolly and effectively be able to release the safety lock of the gun
and deliberately aim and fire it at the victim.
It would therefore appear that there was no firm factual basis for the following declaration of the
appellate court: [Petitioner] admitted that his right hand was holding the handle of the gun while the
left hand of the victim was over his right hand when the gun was fired. This declaration would safely
lead us to the conclusion that when the gun went off herein [petitioner] was in full control of the gun.
[19]
Release of the Guns Safety Lock and

Firing of the Gun Both Accidental
Petitioner testified that the .45 caliber service pistol was equipped with a safety lock that, unless
released, would prevent the firing of the gun. Despite this safety feature, however, the evidence
showed that the weapon fired and hit the victim -- not just once, but twice. To the appellate court, this
fact could only mean that petitioner had deliberately unlocked the gun and shot at the victim. This
conclusion appears to be non sequitur.
It is undisputed that both petitioner and the victim grappled for possession of the gun. This
frenzied grappling for the weapon -- though brief, having been finished in a matter of seconds -- was
fierce and vicious. The eyewitness account amply illustrated the logical conclusion that could not be
dismissed: that in the course of the scuffle, the safety lock could have been accidentally released
and the shots accidentally fired.
That there was not just one but two shots fired does not necessarily and conclusively negate the
claim that the shooting was accidental, as the same circumstance can easily be attributed to the
mechanism of the .45 caliber service gun. Petitioner, in his technical description of the weapon in
question, explained how the disputed second shot may have been brought about:
x x x Petitioner also testified on cross-examination that a caliber .45 semi-automatic pistol, when
fired, immediately slides backward throwing away the empty shell and returns immediately carrying
again a live bullet in its chamber. Thus, the gun can, as it did, fire in succession. Verily, the location
of, and distance between the wounds and the trajectories of the bullets jibe perfectly with the claim
of the petitioner: the trajectory of the first shot going downward from left to right thus pushing
Balboas upper body, tilting it to the left while Balboa was still clutching petitioners hand over the gun;
the second shot hitting him in the stomach with the bullet going upward of Balboas body as he was
falling down and releasing his hold on petitioners hand x x x.[20]
273
Thus, the appellate courts reliance on People v. Reyes[21] was misplaced. In that case, the Court
disbelieved the accused who described how his gun had exploded while he was simply handing it
over to the victim. Here, no similar claim is being made; petitioner has consistently maintained that
the gun accidentally fired in the course of his struggle with the victim. More significantly, the present
case involves a semi-automatic pistol, the mechanism of which is very different from that of a
revolver, the gun used in Reyes.[22] Unlike a revolver, a semi-automatic pistol, as sufficiently
described by petitioner, is prone to accidental firing when possession thereof becomes the object of
a struggle.
Alleged Grappling Not Negated
by Frontal Location of Wounds
On the basis of the findings of Dr. Jaboneta showing that the wounds of the deceased were all
frontal, the appellate court rejected petitioners claim that a grappling for the weapon ever occurred. It
held that if there was indeed a grappling between the two, and that they had been side [by] side x x x
each other, the wounds thus inflicted could not have had a front-to-back trajectory which would lead
to an inference that the victim was shot frontally, as observed by Dr. Jaboneta. [23]
Ordinarily, the location of gunshot wounds is indicative of the positions of the parties at the
precise moment when the gun was fired. Their positions would in turn be relevant to a determination
of the existence of variables such as treachery, aggression and so on.
In the factual context of the present case, however, the location of the wounds becomes
inconsequential. Where, as in this case, both the victim and the accused were grappling for
possession of a gun, the direction of its nozzle may continuously change in the process, such that
the trajectory of the bullet when the weapon fires becomes unpredictable and erratic. In this case,
the eyewitness account of that aspect of the tragic scuffle shows that the parties positions were
unsteady, and that the nozzle of the gun was neither definitely aimed nor pointed at any particular
target. We quote the eyewitness testimony as follows:
Q. And when the gun fired the gun was on Tomas Balboa?
A. I could not see towards whom the nozzle of the gun was when it fired
because they were grappling for the possession of the gun.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. Did you see the barrel of the gun when the gun fired?
A. I could not really conclude towards whom the barrel of the gun was pointed to
because the gun was turning.[24]
xxxxxxxxx
Q And was he facing Tomas Balboa when he was holding the gun with his right hand?
A At first, they were not directly facing each other.
Q So later, they were facing each other?
A They were not directly facing each other. Their position did not remain steady as they
were grappling for the possession of the gun force against force.[25]
In his Petition, this explanation is given by petitioner:
x x x. The Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Balboa was shot frontally. First, because the
position of the gun does not necessarily indicate the position of the person or persons holding the
gun when it fired. This is especially true when two persons were grappling for the possession
of the gun when it fired, as what exactly transpired in this case. x x x.
274
[The] testimony clearly demonstrates that the petitioner was on the left side of the victim during the
grappling when the gun fired. The second wound was thus inflicted this wise: when the first shot hit
Balboa, his upper body was pushed downward owing to the knocking power of the caliber .45
pistol. But he did not let go of his grip of the hand of petitioner and the gun, Balboa pulling the gun
down as he was going down. When the gun went off the second time hitting Balboa, the trajectory of
the bullet in Balboas body was going upward because his upper body was pushed downward
twisting to the left. It was then that Balboa let go of his grip. On cross-examination, petitioner
testified, what I noticed was that after successive shots we separated from each other. This
sequence of events is logical because the protagonists were grappling over the gun and
were moving very fast. x x x. [26]
Presence of All the

Elements of Accident
The elements of accident are as follows: 1) the accused was at the time performing a lawful act
with due care; 2) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and 3) on the part of the
accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. [27] From the facts, it is clear that all these
elements were present. At the time of the incident, petitioner was a member -- specifically, one of the
investigators -- of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latters cell for a routine interrogation.
Again, it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to
defend his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As
an enforcer of the law, petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by
anyone, especially by a detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to
facilitate escape and to kill or maim persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself.
Petitioner cannot be faulted for negligence. He exercised all the necessary precautions to
prevent his service weapon from causing accidental harm to others. As he so assiduously
maintained, he had kept his service gun locked when he left his house; he kept it inside its holster at
all times, especially within the premises of his working area.
At no instance during his testimony did the accused admit to any intent to cause injury to the
deceased, much less kill him. Furthermore, Nicostrato Estepar, the guard in charge of the detention
of Balboa, did not testify to any behavior on the part of petitioner that would indicate the intent to
harm the victim while being fetched from the detention cell.
The participation of petitioner, if any, in the victims death was limited only to acts committed in
the course of the lawful performance of his duties as an enforcer of the law. The removal of the gun
from its holster, the release of the safety lock, and the firing of the two successive shots -- all of
which led to the death of the victim -- were sufficiently demonstrated to have been consequences of
circumstances beyond the control of petitioner. At the very least, these factual circumstances create
serious doubt on the latters culpability.
Petitioners Subsequent Conduct
Not Conclusive of Guilt
To both the trial and the appellate courts, the conduct of petitioner immediately after the incident
was indicative of remorse. Allegedly, his guilt was evident from the fact that he was dumbfounded,
according to the CA; was mum, pale and trembling, according to the trial court.These behavioral
reactions supposedly point to his guilt. Not necessarily so. His behavior was understandable. After
all, a minute earlier he had been calmly escorting a person from the detention cell to the
investigating room; and, in the next breath, he was looking at his companions bloodied body. His
reaction was to be expected of one in a state of shock at events that had transpired so swiftly and
ended so regrettably.
Second Issue:
275
Self-Defense
Petitioner advanced self-defense as an alternative. Granting arguendo that he intentionally shot

Balboa, he claims he did so to protect his life and limb from real and immediate danger.
Self-defense is inconsistent with the exempting circumstance of accident, in which there is no
intent to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarily contemplates a premeditated intent to kill in
order to defend oneself from imminent danger. [28] Apparently, the fatal shots in the instant case did
not occur out of any conscious or premeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim for the
purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather, they appeared to be the spontaneous and
accidental result of both parties attempts to possess the firearm.
Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidental firing of the service gun of petitioner
-- an exempting circumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code -- a further
discussion of whether the assailed acts of the latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision REVERSED. Petitioner
is ACQUITTED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125299. January 22, 1999]
276
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO, and
VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," accused-appellants.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On December 7, 1995, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y Bolado and Violeta Gaddao y

Catama @ "Neneth" were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[1] The information reads:
"That on or about the 5th day of December, 1995 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping and aiding one another and without having been authorized by law, did, then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven
(11) plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing 7,641.08 grams in violation of the
above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows: In November 1995, members
of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom),
received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug
activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust
operation. As arranged by one of the CI's, a meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun" was
scheduled on December 5, 1995 at E. Jacinto Street in Mandaluyong City.
On December 5, 1995, at 6:00 in the morning, the CI went to the PNP Headquarters at EDSA,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prepare for the buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team
Alpha composed of P/Insp. Nolasco Cortes as team leader and PO3 Celso Manlangit, SPO1
Edmund Badua and four (4) other policemen as members. P/Insp. Cortes designated PO3 Manlangit
as the poseur-buyer and SPO1 Badua as his back-up, and the rest of the team as perimeter security.
Superintendent Pedro Alcantara, Chief of the North Metropolitan District PNP Narcom, gave the
team P2,000.00 to cover operational expenses. From this sum, PO3 Manlangit set aside P1,600.00--
a one thousand peso bill and six (6) one hundred peso bills [3]-- as money for the buy-bust operation.
The market price of one kilo of marijuana was then P1,600.00. PO3 Manlangit marked the bills with
his initials and listed their serial numbers in the police blotter. [4] The team rode in two cars and
headed for the target area.
At 7:20 of the same morning, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as
interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills
worth P1,600.00. "Jun" instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him at the corner of Shaw Boulevard
and Jacinto Street while he got the marijuana from his associate. [5] An hour later, "Jun" appeared at
the agreed place where PO3 Manlangit, the CI and the rest of the team were waiting. "Jun" took out
from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3 Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith
arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the
marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named "Neneth."[6] "Jun" led the police team to "Neneth's" house nearby at Daang Bakal.
The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. "Jun" identified the
woman as his associate.[7] SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit
looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the
dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something
wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana earlier
"sold" to him by "Jun." His suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house and took
hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what
appeared to be dried marijuana leaves.
277
Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth."[8]The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took "Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box,
its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters. It was
only then that the police learned that "Jun" is Florencio Doria y Bolado while "Neneth" is Violeta
Gaddao y Catama. The one (1) brick of dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten
(10) bricks recovered from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. [9] The
bricks, eleven (11) in all, were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops of various weights totalling
7,641.08 grams.[10]
The prosecution story was denied by accused-appellants Florencio Doria and Violeta
Gaddao.Florencio Doria, a 33-year old carpenter, testified that on December 5, 1995, at 7:00 in the
morning, he was at the gate of his house reading a tabloid newspaper. Two men appeared and
asked him if he knew a certain "Totoy." There were many "Totoys" in their area and as the men
questioning him were strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any "Totoy." The men took
accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their community. When
accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car outside and ordered him to point
out the house of "Totoy." For five (5) minutes, accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he
gave in and took them to "Totoy's" house.
Doria knocked on the door of "Totoy's" house but no one answered. One of the men, later
identified as PO3 Manlangit, pushed open the door and he and his companions entered and looked
around the house for about three minutes. Accused-appellant Doria was left standing at the door.
The policemen came out of the house and they saw Violeta Gaddao carrying water from the well. He
asked Violeta where "Totoy" was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibitzers
were, by that time, surrounding them. When Violeta entered her house, three men were already
inside. Accused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the men say that they found
a carton box. Turning towards them, Doria saw a box on top of the table. The box was open and had
something inside. PO3 Manlangit ordered him and Violeta to go outside the house and board the
car. They were brought to police headquarters where they were investigated.
Accused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Violeta Gaddao, is the wife of his
acquaintance, Totoy Gaddao. He said that he and Totoy Gaddao sometimes drank together at the
neighborhood store. This closeness, however, did not extend to Violeta, Totoy's wife. [11]
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao, a 35-year old rice vendor, claimed that on December 5,
1995, she was at her house at Daang Bakal, Mandaluyong City where she lived with her husband
and five (5) children, namely, Arvy, aged 10, Arjay, aged 8, the twins Raymond and Raynan, aged 5,
and Jason, aged 3. That day, accused-appellant woke up at 5:30 in the morning and bought pan de
sal for her children's breakfast. Her husband, Totoy, a housepainter, had left for Pangasinan five
days earlier. She woke her children and bathed them. Her eldest son, Arvy, left for school at 6:45
A.M. Ten minutes later, she carried her youngest son, Jayson, and accompanied Arjay to
school. She left the twins at home leaving the door open. After seeing Arjay off, she and Jayson
remained standing in front of the school soaking in the sun for about thirty minutes. Then they
headed for home. Along the way, they passed the artesian well to fetch water. She was pumping
water when a man clad in short pants and denim jacket suddenly appeared and grabbed her left
wrist. The man pulled her and took her to her house. She found out later that the man was PO3
Manlangit.
Inside her house were her co-accused Doria and three (3) other persons. They asked her about
a box on top of the table. This was the first time she saw the box. The box was closed and tied with a
piece of green straw. The men opened the box and showed her its contents. She said she did not
know anything about the box and its contents.
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao confirmed that her co-accused Florencio Doria was a friend
of her husband, and that her husband never returned to their house after he left for Pangasinan. She
denied the charge against her and Doria and the allegation that marked bills were found in her
person.[12]
278
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City convicted the accused-appellants.
The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both
accused-appellants to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the guilt of accused, FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA
GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" having been established beyond reasonable doubt, they are both
CONVICTED of the present charge against them.
According to the amendatory provisions of Sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 7659 which cover violations
of Sec. 4 of Republic Act No. 6425 and which was exhaustively discussed in People v. Simon, 234
SCRA 555, the penalty imposable in this case is reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos. Taking into consideration, however, the provisions
of Sec. 23, also of Republic Act No. 7659 which explicitly state that:
'The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any person who belongs to
an organized/syndicated crime group.
An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating,

confederating or mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.'
the Court is hereby constrained to sentence (hereby sentences) said FLORENCIO DORIA y
BOLADO @ "Jun" and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "Neneth" to DEATH and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) each without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs.
The confiscated marijuana bricks (7,641.08 grams) shall be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs
Board, NBI for destruction in accordance with law.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused DORIA from the Mandaluyong City
Jail to the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City and also for accused GADDAO for her transfer to the
Correctional Institute for Women, Mandaluyong City.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory
review.
SO ORDERED."[13]
Before this Court, accused-appellant Doria assigns two errors, thus:

"I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE
WITNESSES FOR THE PROSECUTION WHEN THEIR TESTIMONIES WERE SHOT WITH
DISCREPANCIES, INCONSISTENCIES AND THAT THE CORPUS DELICTI OF THE MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY TAKEN FROM APPELLANT WAS NOT POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE POSEUR-
BUYER.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE MARIJUANA

FRUITINGS FOUND INSIDE THE CARTON BOX AS THESE WERE OBTAINED THROUGH A
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND DOES NOT COME WITHIN THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE." [14]
279
Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao contends:
"I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY DESPITE THE INCREDIBILITY
OF THE POLICE VERSION OF THE MANNER THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST AS CONDUCTED.
II
THE PNP OFFICERS' VERSIONS AS TO WHERE THE BUY-BUST MONEY CAME FROM ARE
INCONSISTENT WITH ONE ANOTHER AND ALSO REEKS WITH INCREDIBILITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT GUILTY AND SENTENCING HER TO
DEATH DESPITE THE MANIFESTLY IRRECONCILABLE INCONSISTENCIES IN THE VERSIONS
OF THE POLICE AS TO HOW AND BY WHOM THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST MONEY WAS
RECOVERED FROM HER, WHICH IN CONSEQUENCE RESULTS IN THE EVIDENCE, OF
RETRIEVAL FROM HER OF THE SAME, NEBULOUS, AT BEST, NIL, AT WORST.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH
LEADING TO THE SEIZURE OF THE MARIJUANA ALLEGEDLY FOUND INSIDE THE HOUSE OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANT."[15]
The assigned errors involve two principal issues: (1) the validity of the buy-bust operation in the
apprehension of accused-appellant Doria; and (2) the validity of the warrantless arrest of accused-
appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of
evidence obtained therefrom.
Accused-appellants were caught by the police in a buy-bust operation. A buy-bust operation is a
form of entrapment employed by peace officers as an effective way of apprehending a criminal in the
act of the commission of an offense. [16] Entrapment has received judicial sanction when undertaken
with due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards. [17]
Entrapment was unknown in common law. It is a judicially created twentieth-century American
doctrine that evolved from the increasing use of informers and undercover agents in the detection of
crimes, particularly liquor and narcotics offenses. [18] Entrapment sprouted from the doctrine of
estoppel and the public interest in the formulation and application of decent standards in the
enforcement of criminal law. [19] It also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the
powers of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they might otherwise
resist.[20]
In the American jurisdiction, the term "entrapment" has a generally negative meaning because it
is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not contemplated by him, for the mere
purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution against him. [21] The classic definition of entrapment is
that articulated by Justice Roberts in Sorrells v. United States,[22] the first Supreme Court decision to
acknowledge the concept: "Entrapment is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer,
and his procurement of its commission by one who would not have perpetrated it except for the
trickery, persuasion or fraud of the officer." [23] It consists of two (2) elements: (a) acts of persuasion,
trickery, or fraud carried out by law enforcement officers or the agents to induce a defendant to
commit a crime; and (b) the origin of the criminal design in the minds of the government officials
rather than that of the innocent defendant, such that the crime is the product of the creative activity
of the law enforcement officer.[24]
280
It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the
personsviolating or about to violate the law. Not every deception is forbidden. The type of
entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the "seduction" of an
otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. [25] Where the criminal intent originates in the mind
of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in
order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. [26] Where, however, the
criminal intent originates in the mind of the accused and the criminal offense is completed, the fact
that a person acting as a decoy for the state, or public officials furnished the accused an opportunity
for commission of the offense, or that the accused is aided in the commission of the crime in order to
secure the evidence necessary to prosecute him, there is no entrapment and the accused must be
convicted.[27] The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal.
Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense [28] that can be raised by an accused and partakes
of the nature of a confession and avoidance. [29] It is a positive defense. Initially, an accused has the
burden of providing sufficient evidence that the government induced him to commit the offense.
Once established, the burden shifts to the government to show otherwise. [30] When entrapment is
raised as a defense, American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or
"origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells v. United States[31] to determine whether entrapment
actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense
charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. [32] All
relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his
eagerness in committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind
before the crime.[33] The predisposition test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the
offense rather than the officer's misconduct [34] and reflects an attempt to draw a line between a "trap
for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." [35] If the accused was found to have
been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense
will fail even if a police agent used an unduly persuasive inducement. [36] Some states, however, have
adopted the "objective" test.[37] This test was first authoritatively laid down in the case ofGrossman v.
State[38] rendered by the Supreme Court of Alaska. Several other states have subsequently adopted
the test by judicial pronouncement or legislation. Here, the court considers the nature of the police
activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. [39] The inquiry is focused on the inducements
used by government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit
the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct. [40] The test of entrapment is
whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a normally law-abiding
person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; [41] for purposes of this test, it
is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is
presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. [42] Official conduct that merely offers such an
opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as badgering, cajoling or importuning, [43] or
appeals to sentiments such as pity, sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not.
[44]
Proponents of this test believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not
because his conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been
established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the crime "cannot be
countenanced." To some extent, this reflects the notion that the courts should not become tainted by
condoning law enforcement improprieties.[45] Hence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the
interaction between the accused and law enforcement officer and the accused's response to the
officer's inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its
commission are considered in judging what the effect of the officer's conduct would be on a normal
person.[46]
Both the "subjective" and "objective" approaches have been criticized and objected to. It is
claimed that the "subjective" test creates an "anything goes" rule, i.e., if the court determines that an
accused was predisposed to commit the crime charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other
unsavory practices will be deemed impermissible. [47] Delving into the accused's character and
predisposition obscures the more important task of judging police behavior and prejudices the
accused more generally. It ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes and general
disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular crime unless confronted with
inordinate inducements.[48] On the other extreme, the purely "objective" test eliminates entirely the
281
need for considering a particular accused's predisposition. His predisposition, at least if known by
the police, may have an important bearing upon the question of whether the conduct of the police
and their agents was proper. [49] The undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous and chronic
offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal syndicate at the time of his arrest
is relegated to irrelevancy.[50]
Objections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to entrapment. Some states in the
United States now combine both the "subjective" and "objective" tests. [51] In Cruz v. State,[52] the
Florida Supreme Court declared that the permissibility of police conduct must first be determined. If
this objective test is satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to
commit the crime.[53] InBaca v. State,[54] the New Mexico Supreme Court modified the state's
entrapment analysis by holding that "a criminal defendant may successfully assert a defense of
entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime for which he is charged, or,
that the police exceeded the standards of proper investigation. [55] The hybrid approaches combine
and apply the "objective" and "subjective" tests alternatively or concurrently.
As early as 1910, this Court has examined the conduct of law enforcers while apprehending the
accused caught in flagrante delicto. In United States v. Phelps,[56] we acquitted the accused from the
offense of smoking opium after finding that the government employee, a BIR personnel, actually
induced him to commit the crime in order to prosecute him. Smith, the BIR agent, testified that
Phelps' apprehension came after he overheard Phelps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium
on some occasions. Smith's testimony was disregarded. We accorded significance to the fact that it
was Smith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an opium den where
both of them could smoke this drug.[57] The conduct of the BIR agent was condemned as "most
reprehensible."[58] In People v. Abella,[59] we acquitted the accused of the crime of selling explosives
after examining the testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a
merchant. The police officer offered "a tempting price, xxx a very high one" causing the accused to
sell the explosives. We found that there was inducement, "direct, persistent and effective" by the
police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no evidence sufficient to convict the
accused.[60] In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng,[61] we convicted the accused after finding that
there was no inducement on the part of the law enforcement officer. We stated that the Customs
secret serviceman smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from Hongkong to Cebu after the
accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. We ruled that the apprehending
officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely entrapped him by pretending to have
an understanding with the Collector of Customs of Cebu to better assure the seizure of the
prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. [62]
It was also in the same case of People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng [63] we first laid down the
distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or inducement. Quoting 16 Corpus Juris,[64] we
held:
"ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. -- While it has been said that the practice of entrapping
persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while
instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes
been held to prevent the act from being criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no
defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his
way, or that the criminal act was done at the 'decoy solicitation' of persons seeking to expose the
criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a kind habitually
committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception by
the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him, free from the influence
or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as a supposed confederate of
a thief is no defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was
formed independently of such agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate
notifies the owner or the public authorities, and, being authorised by them to do so, assists the thief
in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it is no
282
defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made by a 'spotter,'
detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary." [65]
The distinction above-quoted was reiterated in two (2) decisions of the Court of Appeals. In People v.
Galicia,[66] the appellate court declared that "there is a wide difference between entrapment and
instigation." The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the
offense and himself becomes a co-principal. In entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the
peace officer for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his
criminal plan.[67] InPeople v. Tan Tiong,[68] the Court of Appeals further declared that "entrapment is
no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker." [69]
The pronouncement of the Court of Appeals in People v. Galicia was affirmed by this Court
in People v. Tiu Ua.[70] Entrapment, we further held, is not contrary to public policy. It is instigation
that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal. [71]
It can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the American jurisdiction is similar to
instigation or inducement in Philippine jurisprudence. Entrapment in the Philippines is not a defense
available to the accused. It is instigation that is a defense and is considered an absolutory cause.
[72]
To determine whether there is entrapment or instigation, our courts have mainly examined the
conduct of the apprehending officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The
"objective" test first applied inUnited States v. Phelps has been followed in a series of similar cases.
[73]
Nevertheless, adopting the "objective" approach has not precluded us from likewise applying the
"subjective" test. In People v. Boholst,[74] we applied both tests by examining the conduct of the
police officers in a buy-bust operation and admitting evidence of the accused's membership with the
notorious and dreaded Sigue-Sigue Sputnik Gang. We also considered accused's previous
convictions of other crimes[75] and held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded
gang strengthened the state's evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the accused did
not sell or smoke marijuana and did not have any criminal record was likewise admitted in People v.
Yutuc[76] thereby sustaining his defense that led to his acquittal.
The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very material in anti-
narcotics operations. In recent years, it has become common practice for law enforcement officers
and agents to engage in buy-bust operations and other entrapment procedures in apprehending
drug offenders. Anti-narcotics laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes. [77] They are rules
of convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society, and their
violation gives rise to crimes mala prohibita.[78] They are not the traditional type of criminal law such
as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with crimes mala in se or those inherently
wrongful and immoral.[79] Laws defining crimes mala prohibita condemn behavior directed, not
against particular individuals, but against public order. [80] Violation is deemed a wrong against society
as a whole and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. [81] These
offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and subterfuges to avoid
detection. It is rare for any member of the public, no matter how furiously he condemns acts mala
prohibita, to be willing to assist in the enforcement of the law. It is necessary, therefore, that
government in detecting and punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of
aggrieved individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police must be
present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover capacity or through
informants, spies or stool pigeons.[82]
Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the confidential
informant system breeds abominable abuse. Frequently, a person who accepts payment from the
police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers also accept payment from these persons
who deceive the police. The informant himself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty
criminal. For whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated with
the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order is not an inspiring
one.[83] Equally odious is the bitter reality of dealing with unscrupulous, corrupt and exploitative law
enforcers. Like the informant, unscrupulous law enforcers' motivations are legion-- harassment,
extortion, vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their superiors. This
283
Court has taken judicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of cases [84] where we observed that it is
a common modus operandi of corrupt law enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons,
particularly unsuspecting provincial hicks.[85] The use of shady underworld characters as informants,
the relative ease with which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and
ignorant persons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have compelled
this Court to be extra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. [86] Criminal activity is such that stealth and
strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer, become as objectionable
police methods as the coerced confession and the unlawful search. As well put by the Supreme
Court of California in People v. Barraza,[87]
"[E]ntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. Along with illegal search and seizures, wiretapping,
false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type of lawless enforcement. They all spring
from common motivations. Each is a substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. Each is
condoned by the sinister sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the 'criminal
classes,' justifies the employment of illegal means." [88]
It is thus imperative that the presumption, juris tantum, of regularity in the performance of official duty
by law enforcement agents raised by the Solicitor General be applied with studied restraint. This
presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-
protected rights of the individual. [89] It is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple
from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. [90] Courts should not allow
themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and injustice lest an innocent person be made to
suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. [91]
We therefore stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of
the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial
contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the
sale.[92]The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the
offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug,
whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to
insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not
disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must
also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to
commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
inducement.
In the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant who initially
contacted accused-appellant Doria. At the pre-arranged meeting, the informant was accompanied by
PO3 Manlangit who posed as the buyer of marijuana. PO3 Manlangit handed the marked money to
accused-appellant Doria as advance payment for one (1) kilo of marijuana. Accused-appellant Doria
was apprehended when he later returned and handed the brick of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit.
PO3 Manlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categorical manner and his
credibility was not crumpled on cross-examination by defense counsel. Moreover, PO3 Manlangit's
testimony was corroborated on its material points by SPO1 Badua, his back-up security. The non-
presentation of the confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Informants are usually not
presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to
the police.[93] It is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling prohibited
drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, [94] or there
are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant,
[95]
or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,
[96]
the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the
apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies. [97] There is no need to present the informant in court
where the sale was actually witnessed and adequately proved by prosecution witnesses. [98]
284
The inconsistencies in PO3 Manlangit's and SPO1 Badua's testimonies and the other police
officers' testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and weight of the prosecution
evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust operation is not a critical fact in the case at
bar. It is enough that the prosecution proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in
consideration of which he sold and delivered the marijuana.
Contrary to accused-appellant Doria's claim, the one kilo of marijuana "sold" by him to PO3
Manlangit was actually identified by PO3 Manlangit himself before the trial court. After appellants'
apprehension, the Narcom agents placed this one (1) brick of marijuana recovered from appellant
Doria inside the carton box lumping it together with the ten (10) bricks inside. This is why the carton
box contained eleven (11) bricks of marijuana when brought before the trial court. The one (1) brick
recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten (10) bricks, however, were identified and marked
in court. Thus:
"ATTY. ARIAS, Counsel for Florencio Doria:
Mr. Police Officer, when you identified that box,. Tell the court, how were you able to identify
that box?
A This is the box that I brought to the crime laboratory which contained the eleven pieces
of marijuana brick we confiscated from the suspect, sir.
Q Please open it and show those eleven bricks.
PROSECUTOR Witness bringing out from the said box...
ATTY. VALDEZ, Counsel for Violeta Gaddao:
Your Honor, I must protest the line of questioning considering the fact that we are now
dealing with eleven items when the question posed to the witness was what was handed to
him by Jun?
COURT So be it.
ATTY. ARIAS May we make it of record that the witness is pulling out item after item from the box
showed to him and brought in front of him.
COURT Noted.
Q Now tell the court, how did you know that those are the eleven bricks?
x x x.
A I have markings on these eleven bricks, sir.
Q Point to the court, where are those markings?
A Here, sir, my signature, my initials with the date, sir.
PROSECUTOR Witness showed a white wrapper and pointing to CLM and the signature.
Q Whose signature is that?
ATTY VALDEZ Your Honor, may we just limit the inquiry to the basic question of the fiscal as to
what was handed to him by the accused Jun, your Honor?
PROSECUTOR Your Honor, there is already a ruling by this Honorable Court, your Honor,
despite reconsideration.
COURT Let the prosecution do its own thing and leave the appreciation of what it has done to the
court.
ATTY. VALDEZ We submit, your Honor.
A This brick is the one that was handed to me by the suspect Jun, sir.
285
COURT Why do you know that that is the thing? Are you sure that is not "tikoy?"
A Yes, your Honor.
Q What makes you so sure?
A I am sure that this is the one, your Honor. This is the Exhibit "A" which I marked before I
brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
Q What are you sure of?
A I am sure that this is the brick that was given to me by one alias Jun, sir.
Q What makes you so sure?
A Because I marked it with my own initials before giving it to the investigator and before
we brought it to the PCCL, your Honor.
x x x.
PROSECUTOR May we request that a tag be placed on this white plastic bag and this be
marked as Exhibit "D?"
COURT Mark it as Exhibit "D."
Q To stress, who made the entries of this date, Exhibit "A" then the other letters and figures on
this plastic?
A This one, the signature, I made the signature, the date and the time and this Exhibit "A."
Q How about this one?
A I don't know who made this marking, sir.
PROSECUTOR May it be of record that this was just entered this morning.
Q I am asking you about this "itim" and not the "asul."
A This CLM, the date and the time and the Exhibit "A," I was the one who made these markings,
sir.
PROSECUTOR May we place on record that the one that was enclosed...
ATTY. ARIAS Your Honor, there are also entries included in that enclosure where it appears D-
394-95, also Exhibit "A," etc. etc., that was not pointed to by the witness. I want to make it of
record that there are other entries included in the enclosure.
COURT Noted. The court saw it.
Q Now, and this alleged brick of marijuana with a piece of paper, with a newspaper
wrapping with a piece of paper inside which reads: "D-394-95, Exhibit A, 970 grams
SSL" be marked as our Exhibit "D-2?"
COURT Tag it. Mark it.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you
by whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto St., sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
x x x.
286
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun
the money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the
house of Neneth, sir.
x x x."[99]
The first brick identified by P03 Manlangit was the brick of marijuana "given to [him] by suspect Jun"
at the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Streets. This brick, including the newspaper and white plastic
wrapping were marked as Exhibits "D," "D-1," and "D-2" and described as weighing nine hundred
seventy (970) grams.[100]
We also reject appellant's submission that the fact that PO3 Manlangit and his team waited for
almost one hour for appellant Doria to give them the one kilo of marijuana after he "paid" P1,600.00
strains credulity. Appellant cannot capitalize on the circumstance that the money and the marijuana
in the case at bar did not change hands under the usual "kaliwaan" system. There is no rule of law
which requires that in "buy-bust" operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked
money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher. [101] Again, the decisive fact
is that the poseur-buyer received the marijuana from the accused-appellant. [102]
We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, to wit:
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
x x x."[103]
Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Appellant Doria was
caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as
a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even
without a warrant.[104]
The warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the
seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills are different matters.
Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence
obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. [105] The rule is,
however, not absolute. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: [106] (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest;[107] (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; [108] (3) search in violation of customs laws; [109] (4)
seizure of evidence in plain view; [110] (5) when the accused himself waives his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[111]
The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested without a warrant of arrest and the
search and seizure of the box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made without a
search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the warrants were not necessary because the arrest was
made in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful arrest.
287
To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao must fall under any of the three (3)
instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
aforequoted. The direct testimony of PO3 Manlangit, the arresting officer, however shows otherwise:
"ATTY VALDEZ, Counsel for appellant Gaddao:
We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that question.
Q This particular exhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was given to you by
whom?
A It was given to me by suspect Jun, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At the corner of Boulevard and Jacinto Street, sir.
Q How about the other items that you were able to recover?
ATTY. VALDEZ: We submit at this juncture, your Honor, that there will be no basis for that
question.
COURT There is. Answer.
A These other marijuana bricks, because during our follow-up, because according to Jun the
money which I gave him was in the hands of Neneth and so we proceeded to the
house of Neneth, sir.
Q Whereat?
A At Daang Bakal near the crime scene at Shaw Boulevard, sir.
Q And what happened upon arrival thereat?
A We saw alias Neneth inside the house and we asked him to give us the buy-bust money,
sir.
Q You mentioned "him?"
A Her, sir. We asked her to give us the money, the marked money which Jun gave her, sir.
Q And what happened?
A At this instance, it was SPO1 Badua who can testify regarding this buy-bust money, sir.
x x x."[112]
SPO1 Badua testified on cross-examination that:
Q What was your intention in going to the house of Aling Neneth?
A To arrest her, sir.
Q But the fact is, Mr. Witness, when you reached the house of Aling Neneth, Aling Neneth
was there?
A Yes, sir.
Q As far as you can see, she was just inside her house?
A I saw her outside, sir.
Q She was fetching water as a matter of fact?
A She was `sa bandang poso.'
Q Carrying a baby?
288
A No, sir.
Q At that particular time when you reached the house of Aling Neneth and saw her outside
the house, she was not committing any crime, she was just outside the house?
A No, sir.
Q She was not about to commit any crime because she was just outside the house doing
her daily chores.Am I correct?
A I just saw her outside, sir.
Q And at that point in time you already wanted to arrest her. That is correct, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, if any memory of your testimony is correct, according to you SPO1 Manlangit approached
her?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q You did not approach her because PO3 Manlangit approached her?
A Yes, sir.
Q During all the time that this confrontation, arrest or whatever by SPO3 Manlangit was taking
place, you were just in the side lines?
A I was just watching, sir.
Q So you were just an on-looker to what Manlangit was doing, because precisely according to
you your role in this buy-bust operation was as a back-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who got the alleged marijuana from inside the house of Mrs. Neneth?
A PO3 Manlangit, sir.
Q Manlangit got the marijuana?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the money from Aling Neneth?
A I don't know, sir.
Q You did not even know who got the money from Aling Neneth?
PROSECUTOR:
There is no basis for this question, your Honor. Money, there's no testimony on that.
ATTY. VALDEZ:
I was asking him precisely.
PROSECUTOR:
No basis.
COURT:
Sustained.
Q Alright. I will ask you a question and I expect an honest answer. According to the records, the
amount ofP1,600.00 was recovered from the person of Aling Neneth. That's right?
289
A Yes, sir, the buy-bust money.
Q What you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you were not the one
who retrieved the money from Aling Neneth, it was Manlangit maybe?
A I saw it, sir.
Q It was Manlangit who got the money from Aling Neneth?
A The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of Aling Neneth, sir.
Q It was taken from the house of Aling Neneth, not from the person of Aling Neneth. Is that what
you are trying to tell the Court?
A No, sir.
ATTY. VALDEZ: I am through with this witness, your Honor."[113]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give
ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to
the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." [114] In fact, she was going about her daily chores when
the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule
113."Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be
based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion."[115] The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves
to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [116] A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.[117]
Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made
by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria
named his co-accused in response to his (PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the
marked money was.[118] Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the
drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing
drugs. Appellant Doria may have left the money in her house, [119] with or without her knowledge, with
or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. If there is no showing that the
person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the
person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. [120]
Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search
of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be
deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial court
correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. [121] The
"plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can
view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. [122] The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an
initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. [123] In the
course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused.[124] The object must be open to eye and hand [125]and its discovery inadvertent.[126]
290
It is clear that an object is in plain view if the object itself is plainly exposed to sight. The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view and therefore cannot be seized without a
warrant. However, if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized.[127] In other words, if the package is such that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed in plain view.
[128]
It must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that they observe may be evidence
of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. [129]
PO3 Manlangit, the Narcom agent who found the box, testified on cross-examination as follows:
"ATTY. VALDEZ:
So here we are. When you and Badua arrived, Aling Neneth was inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q Badua demanded from Aling Neneth the buy-bust money?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular instance, you saw the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q This carton, according to you was under a table?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q I noticed that this carton has a cover?
A Yes, sir.
Q I ask you were the flaps of the cover raised or closed?
A It was open, sir. Not like that.
COURT
Go down there. Show to the court.
INTERPRETER
Witness went down the witness stand and approached a carton box.
A Like this, sir.
PROSECUTOR
Can we describe it?
ATTY. VALDEZ
Yes.
PROSECUTOR
One flap is inside and the other flap is standing and with the contents visible.
COURT
Noted.
Q At this juncture, you went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
291
Q And got hold of this carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you mention anything to Aling Neneth?
A I asked her, what's this...
Q No, no. no. did you mention anything to Aling Neneth before getting the carton?
A I think it was Badua who accosted Aling Neneth regarding the buy-bust money and he asked
"Sa iyo galing ang marijuanang ito, nasaan ang buy-bust money namin?" sir.
Q Making reference to the marijuana that was given by alias Jun?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you proceeded to take hold of this carton, Aling Neneth was not yet frisked, is it not [sic]?
A I just don't know if she was frisked already by Badua, sir.
Q Who got hold of this?
A I was the one, sir.
Q You were the one who got this?
A Yes, sir.
Q At that particular point in time, you did not know if the alleged buy-bust money was already
retrieved by Badua?
A Yes, sir.
Q You went inside the house?
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not have any search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q In fact, there was nothing yet as far as you were concerned to validate the fact that Mrs. Gadao
was in possession of the buy-bust money because according to you, you did not know
whether Badua already retrieved the buy-bust money from her?
A Yes, sir.
Q How far was this from the door?
A Two and a half meters from the door, sir. It was in plain view.
Q Under the table according to you?
A Yes, sir, dining table.
Q Somewhere here?
A It's far, sir.
PROSECUTOR
May we request the witness to place it, where he saw it?
A Here, sir.
Q What you see is a carton?
A Yes, sir, with plastic.
292
Q Marked "Snow Time Ice Pop?"
A Yes, sir.
Q With a piece of plastic visible on top of the carton?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is all that you saw?
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR
For the record, your Honor...
Q You were only able to verify according to you...
PROSECUTOR
Panero, wait. Because I am objecting to the words a piece of plastic. By reading it...
ATTY. VALDEZ
That's a piece of plastic.
PROSECUTOR
By reading it, it will connote... this is not a piece of plastic.
ATTY. VALDEZ
What is that? What can you say, Fiscal? I'm asking you?
PROSECUTOR
With due respect, what I am saying is, let's place the size of the plastic. A piece of plastic
may be big or a small one, for record purposes.
COURT
Leave that to the court.
PROSECUTOR
Leave that to the court.
Q The only reason according to you, you were able to... Look at this, no even Superman... I
withdraw that. Not even a man with very kin [sic] eyes can tell the contents here. And
according to the Court, it could be "tikoy," is it not [sic]?
A Yes, sir.
Q Siopao?
A Yes, sir.
Q Canned goods?
A Yes, sir.
Q It could be ice cream because it says Snow Pop, Ice Pop?
A I presumed it was also marijuana because it may ...
Q I am not asking you what your presumptions are. I'm asking you what it could possibly
be.
A It's the same plastic, sir.
293
ATTY. VALDEZ
I'm not even asking you that question so why are you voluntarily saying the information. Let
the prosecutor do that for you.
COURT
Continue. Next question.
x x x."[130]
PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant Gaddao's house because they were led there
by appellant Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no information on appellant Gaddao
until appellant Doria named her and led them to her. [131] Standing by the door of appellant Gaddao's
house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the
dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box was partially open and revealed something
wrapped in plastic.
In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was sure that the contents of the box were
marijuana because he himself checked and marked the said contents. [132] On cross-examination,
however, he admitted that he merely presumed the contents to be marijuana because it had the
same plastic wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the records reveals that the
plastic wrapper was not colorless and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a
viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box was individually wrapped in old
newspaper and placed inside plastic bags-- white, pink or blue in color. [133] PO3 Manlangit
himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of the box could be items other than
marijuana. He did not know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask appellant
Gaddao about its contents. [134] It was not immediately apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the
content of the box was marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its seizure without the
requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution. [135] It was fruit of the
poisonous tree and should have been excluded and never considered by the trial court. [136]
The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of marijuana [137] was found in the house of
accused-appellant Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged.
[138]
Apropos is our ruling in People v. Aminnudin,[139] viz:
"The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends
the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our
people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be
more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual
in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the
authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual
in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, 'I
think it a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an
ignoble part.' It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially
if the law violated is the Constitution itself."[140]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Section
13 of Republic Act No. 7659 punishes the "sale, administration, delivery, distribution and
transportation of a prohibited drug" with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from P500,000.00 toP10 million, to wit:
"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.-- The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell,
294
administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited
drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
x x x."
In every prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, what is material is the submission of proof
that the sale took place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof and the presentation of the
drug, i.e., the corpus delicti, as evidence in court.[141] The prosecution has clearly established the fact
that in consideration of P1,600.00 which he received, accused-appellant Doria sold and delivered
nine hundred seventy (970) grams of marijuana to PO3 Manlangit, the poseur-buyer. The
prosecution, however, has failed to prove that accused-appellant Gaddao conspired with accused-
appellant Doria in the sale of said drug. There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
lower penalty of reclusion perpetuamust be imposed.[142]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig City acting as
a Special Court in Criminal Case No. 3307-D is reversed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetuaand to pay a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
2. Accused-appellant Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-30801 March 27, 1974

vs.
DOMINGO URAL, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and
Solicitor Vicente P. Evangelista for plaintiff-appellee.
Vicente Cerilles and Emeliano Deleverio for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
295
This is an appeal of defendant Domingo Ural from the decision of Judge Vicente G. Ericta of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola in the sum of twelve thousand
pesos and to pay the costs (Criminal Case No. 3280).
The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, a twenty-six year old
former detention prisoner in Buug, Zamboanga del Sur. He had been accused of murder and then
set at liberty on June 9, 1966 after posting bail. He went to Barrio Camongo, Dumalinao where his
father resided. On July 31, 1966, he intended to go to his residence at Barrio Upper Lamari, Buug
but night overtook him in the town. He decided to sleep in the Buug municipal building where there
would be more security.
Upon arrival in the municipal building at around eight o'clock, he witnessed an extraordinary
occurrence. He saw Policeman Ural (with whom he was already acquainted) inside the jail. Ural was
boxing the detention prisoner, Felix Napola. As a consequence of the fistic blows, Napola collapsed
on the floor. Ural, the tormentor, stepped on his prostrate body.
Ural went out of the cell. After a short interval, he returned with a bottle. He poured its contents on
Napola's recumbent body. Then, he ignited it with a match and left the cell. Napola screamed in
agony. He shouted for help. Nobody came to succor him.
Much perturbed by the barbarity which he had just seen, Alberto left the municipal building. Before
his departure, Ural cautioned him: "You better keep quiet of what I have done" (sic). Alberto did not
sleep anymore that night. From the municipal building, he went to the crossing, where the cargo
trucks passed. He hitchhiked in a truck hauling iron ore and went home.
Doctor Luzonia R. Bakil, the municipal health officer, certified that the thirty-year old victim, whom
she treated twice, sustained second-degree burns on the arms, neck, left side of the face and one-
half of the body including the back (Exh. A). She testified that his dermis and epidermis were burned.
If the burns were not properly treated, death would unsue from toxemia and tetanus infection.
"Without any medical intervention", the burns would cause death", she said. She explained that,
because there was water in the burnt area, secondary infection would set in, or there would be
complications.
Napola died on August 25, 1966. The sanitary inspector issued a certificate of death indicating "burn"
as the cause of death (Exh. B).
The trial court fittingly deplored the half-hearted manner in which the prosecution (represented by
Fiscal Roque and the private prosecutor, Delfin Agbu) handled the case. It bewailed the
prosecution's failure to present as witnesses Juanito de la Serna and Ernesto Ogoc, the detention
prisoners who saw the burning of Napola. They had executed a joint affidavit which was one of the
bases of the information for murder. 1
It noted that Rufina Paler, the victim's widow, who was present in court, was a vital witness who
should have been presented as a witness to prove the victim's dying declaration or his statements
which were part of the res gestae. 2
In this appeal appellant's three assignment of error may be condensed into the issue of credibility or
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
His story is that at around nine o'clock in the evening of July 31, 1966 he was in the municipal jail on
guard duty. He heard a scream for help from Napola. He entered the cell and found Napola's shirt in
flames. With the assistance of Ernesto Ogoc and Anecio Siton, Ural removed Napola's shirt. Ural did
296
not summon a doctor because, according to Napola, the burns were not serious. Besides, he (Ural)
was alone in the municipal building.
Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, whom the trial court branded "as a complete liar",
testified that she heard Napola's scream for help. She saw that Napola's shirt was burning but she
did not know how it happened to be burned. She said that Ural and Siton removed the shirt of
Napola and put out the fire.
Teofilo Matugas, a policeman, declared that he was relieved as guard by Ural at eight-thirty in the
evening of July 31st. Matugas denied that Alberio was in the municipal building at eight o'clock.
The trial court held that Ural's denials cannot prevail over the positive testimony of Alberio. It
observed that Ural's alleged act of removing Napola's burning shirt was at most an indication that he
was "belatedly alarmed by the consequence of his evil act" but would not mean that he was not the
incendiary.
Appellant Ural (he was thirty-four years old in March, 1969), in assailing the credibility of Alberio,
pointed out that he was not listed as a prosecution witness and that he was convicted of murder.
Those circumstances would not preclude Alberio from being a credible witness. It should be noted
that the accused was a policeman. Ordinarily, a crime should be investigated by the police. In this
case, there was no police investigation. The crime was investigated by a special counsel of the
fiscal's office. That might explain why it was not immediately discovered that Alberio was an
eyewitness of the atrocity perpetrated by Ural.
The testimonies of Felicisima Escareal, Ogoc's common-law wife, and Policeman Matugas are
compatible with the prosecution's theory that Ural burned Napola's shirt. Ultimately, the factual issue
is: who should be given credence, Alberio or Ural? As already stated, the trial court which had the
advantage of seeing their demeanor and behavior on the witness stand, chose to believe Alberio.
This Court, after a searching scrutiny of the whole record, does not find any justification for
disbelieving Alberio.
This case is covered by article 4 of the Revised Penal code which provides that "criminal liability
shall be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended". The presumption is "that a person intends the ordinary
consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rationale of the rule in article 4 is found in the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused)."Conforme a dicha doctrina no alteran la relacion de causalidad las condiciones
preexistentes (como las condiciones patologicasdel lesionado, la predisposicion del ofendido, la
constitucion fisica del herido, etc.); ni las condiciones sobrevenidas (como el tetanos, la pulmonia, o
la gangrena sobrevenidos a consequencia de la herida)" (1 Cuello Calon, Codigo Penal, 12th Ed.,
1968, p. 335-336).
The similar rule in American jurisprudence is that "if the act of the accused was the cause of the
cause of death, no more is required" (40 C.J.S. 854). So, where during a quarrel, the accused struck
the victim with a lighted lamp, which broke and fell to the floor, causing the oil to ignite and set fire to
the rug, and, in the course of the scuffle, which ensued on the floor, the victim's clothes caught fire,
resulting in burns from which he died, there was a sufficient causal relation between the death and
the acts of the accused to warrant a conviction of homicide (Williams vs. U.S., 20 Fed. 2nd 269, 40
C.J.S. 854, note 90).
297
There is a rule that "an individual who unlawfully inflicts wounds upon another person, which result in
the death of the latter, is guilty of the crime of homicide, and the fact that the injured person did not
receive proper medical attendance does not affect the criminal responsibility" (U.S. vs. Escalona, 12
Phil. 54). In the Escalona case, the victim was wounded on the wrist. It would not have caused death
had it been properly treated. The victim died sixty days after the infliction of the wound. It was held
that lack of medical care could not be attributed to the wounded man. The person who inflicted the
wound was responsible for the result thereof.
The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Par. 3, Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. Masin, 64 Phil. 757; U.S. vs. Burns, 41 Phil. 418, 432, 440). 3
The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Par. 1, Art. 14,
Revised Penal Code). He could not have maltreated Napola if he was not a policeman on guard
duty. Because of his position, he had access to the cell where Napola was confined. The prisoner
was under his custody. "The policeman, who taking advantage of his public position maltreats a
private citizen, merits no judicial leniency. The methods sanctioned by medieval practice are surely
not appropriate for an enlightened democratic civilization. While the law protects the police officer in
the proper discharge of his duties, it must at the same time just as effectively protect the individual
from the abuse of the police." U.S. vs. Pabalan, 37 Phil. 352).
But the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance "that the offender had no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that committed" (Par. 3, Art. 13, Revised Penal Code). It is manifest
from the proven facts that appellant Ural had no intent to kill Napola. His design was only to maltreat
him may be because in his drunken condition he was making a nuisance of himself inside the
detention cell. When Ural realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed Napola
to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of
his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the
medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts. 64[4] and 248, Revised Penal Code).
Finding no error in the trial court's judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
So ordered.
[G.R. No. 135701. May 9, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
298
The accused, ELBERT CALLET y SABANAL was charged with Murder before the Regional Trial
Court of Negros Oriental, Dumaguete City, Branch 30. The crime was allegedly committed as
follows:[1]
That on or about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of September 15, 1996, at Barangay Tambulan,
Tayasan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ALFREDO SENADOR with the use of a knife
with which the said accused was then armed and provided, thereby inflicting upon said victim the
following injury, to wit:
A stab wound measuring two (2) cm. in length, 0.3 cm. in width and eleven (11) cm. in deepness
located at the left side of the trunk, about two (2) cm. above the left clavicular bone. The wound was
directed downward and slightly to the right.
which injury or wound caused the death of said ALFREDO SENADOR shortly thereafter.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

[2]
When arraigned on June 11, 1997, the accused pled not guilty.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Dr. Rogelio Kho, Lecpoy Senador, Eduardo
Perater, Manuel Gabonales and Francisca Senador. For the defense, the accused, Elbert Callet,
PO3 Roy Balasabas, Barangay Captain Dominador Calijan and Nilo Callet testified.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that on September 15, 1996, at 5:00 p.m., the victim,
Alfredo Senador, his 12-year old son, Lecpoy Senador, and Eduardo Perater were at the flea market
of barangayTambulan, Tayasan, Negros Oriental. There were many people in the vicinity. Some
were playing cara y cruz while others were playing volleyball.
Alfredo, Lecpoy and Eduardo were beside each other as they watched a cara y
cruz game. Alfredo sat close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot. Lecpoy and
Eduardo sat on a piece of wood and on a stone, respectively.
Out of nowhere, the accused, Elbert Callet, appeared behind Alfredo and stabbed the latter on
the left shoulder near the base of the neck with a 9-inch hunting knife. Instinctively, Alfredo stood up
and managed to walk a few meters. When he fell on the ground, Lecpoy and Eduardo rushed to help
him but to no avail. Alfredo died shortly thereafter.
Manuel Gabonales was also at the flea market at that time. At 5:00 p.m., he saw people running
away from the place where there was a cara y cruz game. Next, he saw Alfredo and the
accused. Alfredo was soaked in blood while the accused was running towards the basketball
court. He asked Alfredo what happened to him. Alfredo replied that the accused stabbed him. The
accused was then standing at the basketball court. Manuel helped Lecpoy and Eduardo carry
Alfredo under a mango tree. He thought of bringing Alfredo to the hospital when he saw blood oozing
from his mouth. After a moment, Alfredo died.
Dr. Rogelio Kho, Municipal Health Officer at Tayasan, autopsied the body of Alfredo on
September 16, 1996. The doctor found a stab wound on the left shoulder of Alfredo, near the base of
the neck. He opined that the victim died due to severe hemorrhage and irreversible shock due to
stab wound.[3]
The defense gave a different account of the stabbing incident.
Allegedly, at 3:00 p.m., the accused, Elbert Callet, played volleyball near the flea market. After
two (2) games, he stopped playing. It was past 4:00 p.m. He stayed at the flea market and watched
as others played volleyball. While watching the game, he was hit on the left side of the body by
Alfredos elbow. He asked Alfredo why he hit him. Alfredo retorted, Are you angry? Next, Alfredo
grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it. He pleaded with Alfredo to let go of his arm, but Alfredo
299
warned that he would be his third victim if he would get angry with him. As Alfredo was pulling out a
hunting knife from his waist, he (the accused) managed to stab him first. Thereafter, he ran towards
the municipal hall to surrender.
Dominador Calijan, the Barangay Captain of Tayasan, happened to be at the basketball court
near the scene of the crime. He encountered Alfredo along the road after the stabbing
incident. Alfredo had a stab wound on the lower nape. Calijan asked Alfredo who stabbed him and
the latter gave the name of the accused. He directed his barangay tanods to arrest the accused.
Barangay tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus Dagodog were able to catch up with the accused three
(3) kilometers away from the scene of the crime. He was still holding the hunting knife and refused to
surrender it for fear that the relatives of Alfredo would retaliate. The barangay tanods escorted him to
the municipal hall. Along the way, they asked him why he stabbed Alfredo. The accused replied that
he could not help it and that everything happened too fast. Upon reaching the municipal hall, the
accused surrendered the hunting knife. He was turned over to PO3 Roy Balasbas for investigation.
After the trial, the accused was found guilty of murder. The fallo of the trial courts
decision[4] states:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused ELBERT CALLET Y SABANAL guilty beyond a scintilla of doubt
for the crime of MURDER penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, taking into
account the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstance,
the accused is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA with all the accessory penalties
provided under Article 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
Accused is ordered to pay the legal heirs of Alfredo Senador the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for his death.
Costs against the accused.
Hence, the appeal. The accused contends that:[5]
1. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED KILLED THE VICTIM WITH TREACHERY;
2. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-
DEFENSE;
3. THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER

THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE THAT THE ACCUSED DID NOT INTEND TO COMMIT SO
GRAVE A WRONG.
We affirm. The conviction of the accused is clearly supported by the evidence.

Two (2) eyewitnesses positively identified the accused, Elbert Callet, as the one who fatally
stabbed the victim, Alfredo Senador. Eyewitness Lecpoy Senador testified as follows:[6]
(PROS. HERMOSA):
Q: About that time 5:00 clock in the afternoon on September 15, 1996, where were you and your
companions situated or stationed since you said you were particularly at the flea market?
xxxxxxxxx
A: We were in Tambulan.
Q: In what particular place were you at the flea market?
300
A: In the place where there was a cara y cruz.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What were you and your father as well as Eduardo Perater doing at that moment at 5:00
oclock on September 15 at the place where there was a game of cara y cruz?
A: We were looking at the cara y cruz.
Q: While you were looking at the cara y cruz game, do you recall if there was an unusual incident
that happened?
A: Yes, there was.
Q: What was this unusual incident that happened?
A: My father was stabbed.
Q: Who stabbed your father?
A: Elbert Callet.
Q: Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago?
A: Yes.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Where was Elbert Callet in relation to your father when he stabbed your father?
A: At the back of my father.
Q: What was the position of your father when he was stabbed by the accused?
A: He was sitting.
Q: Where was your father hit if you know?
A: Left shoulder.
Q: What happened after Elbert Callet stabbed your father?
A: My father walked.
Q: Towards what place?
A: Towards the area where there was a volleyball game.
Q: And what eventually happened to him?
A: He fell down.
Q: And then, what happened after he fell down?
A: We carried him to a place where there was a mango tree.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What happened or what transpired after you brought your father towards the mango tree?
A: My father died.
Q: After stabbing your father, what did Elbert Callet do if he did anything?
A: He ran away.
Q: What did he use in stabbing your father?
A: Hunting knife.
301
(emphases ours)
Another eyewitness, Eduardo Perater, testified as follows: [7]
(PROS. HERMOSA):
Q: All right, at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of that day, can you recall if there was an
unusual incident that happened?
A: Yes, there was.
Q: What was that unusual incident?
A: There was a stabbing incident.
Q: Who was stabbed?
A: Alfredo Senador.
Q: Who stabbed Alfredo Senador?
A: Elbert Callet.
Q: The same Elbert Callet whom you just identified a while ago in the courtroom?
A: Yes.
Q: What was the position of Alfredo Senador when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?
A: He was sitting down.
Q: Will you please demonstrate to us the manner how Alfredo Senador was sitting down at the
time when he was stabbed by the accused in this case?
A: (Witness in squatting position, he was sitting with his buttock on his right foot).
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Where was Elbert Callet situated when he stabbed Alfredo Senador?
A: At the back of Alfredo Senador.
Q: Was there any argument between Alfredo Senador and Elbert Callet before Alfredo
Senador was stabbed?
A: There was none.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: How many times did Elbert Callet stab Alfredo Senador?
A: Only one (1).
Q: Was Alfredo hit when he was stabbed by Elbert Callet?
A: Yes.
Q: In what part of the body of Alfredo Senador was hit?
A: In the left shoulder.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What happened after Alfredo Senador was hit by the stabbing of Elbert Callet?
A: He stood up.
Q: What did Elbert Callet use in stabbing Alfredo Senador?
302
A: A hunting knife.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: What about Elbert Callet, what did he do after stabbing Alfredo Senador?
A: He ran away.
Q: What did he do with his knife which he used in stabbing Alfredo senador?
A: He carried it with him.
(emphases ours)
We give full faith and credit to the testimonies of Lecpoy and Eduardo. Their testimonies were
vivid with details. They were clear and consistent with each other.
The accused laments that Lecpoy Senador is a biased witness, being a son of the victim. We
are not convinced.
The fact that Lecpoy is a son of the victim would not necessarily make him untrustworthy. This
Court has ruled that (b)lood relationship between a witness and the victim does not by itself impair
the credibility of witnesses. On the contrary, relationship may strengthen credibility, for it is unnatural
for an aggrieved relative to falsely accuse someone other than the real culprit. The earnest desire to
seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon his conscience and prudence
and blame one who is innocent of the crime. [8] Significantly, there is no showing that this young
eyewitness has any ill motive to testify falsely against the accused.
To be sure, even without the testimony of Lecpoy, the testimonies of Eduardo Perater and
Manuel Gabonales would suffice to convict the accused. They are disinterested witnesses.[9] Their
identification of the accused as the assailant is beyond question.
Still assailing the credibility of the eyewitnesses, the accused points out that in the joint
affidavit[10] f Lecpoy and Eduardo, it was stated that the victim was standing with his back facing
Elbert Callet.However, they contradicted their affidavit when they testified at the trial that the victim
was sitting, with his buttocks resting on his right foot.
The cited inconsistency will not exculpate the accused. We quote with approval the following
observations of the trial court:[11]
In the instant case, the direct and candid testimonies of eyewitnesses Lecpoy Senador and
Eduardo Perater clearly showed that the killing of Alfredo Senador was attended by
treachery. Alfredo Senador was sitting with his buttocks on his right foot watching the game of
cara y cruz when Elbert Callet who was at the back of the victim stabbed him using a nine (9)
inch hunting knife hitting him near the base of his neck. The victim was not in a position to
defend himself from the accused who deliberately and consciously positioned himself at the
back of the unsuspecting victim to ensure the accomplishment of his evil desire without risk to
himself. The location of the stab wound at the left side of the trunk about two (2) centimeters
from the base of the neck and four (4) centimeters above the left clavicular bone with a
deepness of eleven (11) centimeters directed downward and slightly to the right also suggests
that the accused deliberately and consciously selected that part of the human body to ensure
the instantaneous death of the victim. Although the counsel of the accused tried to discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses by pointing that in their joint affidavit dated 20
September 1996 Lecpoy Senador and Eduardo Perater stated that Alfredo Senador was
standing when he was stabbed, the said discrepancy could not in any way affect the
categorical, candid, consistent and straightforward declaration of the said eyewitnesses
made in open court that Alfredo Senador was sitting when he was stabbed by the
accused. Discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at
the witness stand do no necessarily discredit the witnesses (People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA
19). This is because it is a matter of judicial experience that an affidavit being taken ex
parte is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate (People vs. Castillo, 261 SCRA
303
493). Moreover, as noted by this Court the word standing was superimposed after the
original typewritten word was erased using a snopic (sic) or white substance. (emphases ours)
In addition, we note that Lecpoy and Eduardo did not countersign the superimposition in the subject
affidavit. In the absence of clear proof that they confirmed the change, they should not be bound by
it.
The accused invokes self-defense for his acquittal. In self-defense, the burden of proof rests
upon the accused. Thus, he must present clear and convincing evidence that the following elements
are present, to wit: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
[12]
The accused failed to discharge this task.
The accused alleged that he and the victim had hunting knives during their encounter. After the
victims elbow hit the left side of his body, the victim grabbed his left arm and tried to twist it with his
right arm. A verbal exchange ensued between them and then the victim, using the left arm tried to
unsheathe the knife that was tucked at his left side. However, the victim was not able to pull out the
knife because it got entangled with his shirt tucked in his pants. In defense, the accused allegedly
pulled out his own knife that was tucked in the right side of his waist using his left arm and stabbed
the victim on the left shoulder. He then retreated and left as the victim was still trying to approach
him.[13]
The version of the accused does not inspire belief. The incident happened in plain view of many
witnesses at the flea market. He even claimed he was with a certain Guale and one Sonny Boy at
that time.[14] Yet, nobody corroborated his story. Indeed, his narration on how the victim attacked him
is improbable. In the witness chair, he admitted that the victim was bigger than him and that his left
hand was restrained by the victim. [15] It is thus incredible how he could pull out his knife from his right
side, with the use of his left hand, [16] raise that knife high enough to hit the shoulder of the victim and
inflict an 11-cm. deep wound upon him. It is more probable that the victim was sitting down when the
accused attacked him from behind as the prosecution witnesses testified. Equally incredulous is the
claim that after being injured, the victim still tried to approach and attack him, hence, he had to
retreat. The accuseds uncorroborated plea of self-defense cannot be entertained, especially when it
is, in itself, extremely doubtful. [17]
The Information charged that evident premeditation and treachery attended the commission of
the crime. The evidence failed to prove evident premeditation. Evident premeditation requires proof
of: (1) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act manifestly indicating
that he has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the decision and the
execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. [18] The records show that
the prosecution did not adduce any evidence to prove these elements.
Treachery or alevosia exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make.[19]
The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of the victim to murder. The
stabbing was from behind, done in a sudden and unexpected manner while the victim was sitting
close to the ground, with his buttocks resting on his right foot, and while his attention was focused on
the on-goingcara y cruz game.[20] Clearly, the victim was not able to defend himself from the mode of
attack.
The trial court also correctly credited the accused with voluntary surrender to mitigate his
liability.Voluntary surrender requires that the offender had not been actually arrested; that he
surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and that the surrender was
voluntary.
The records reveal that the accused ran toward the municipal building after the stabbing
incident. On his way to the municipal building, he admitted to Barangay Tanods Nilo Callet and Jesus
304
Dagodog that he stabbed the victim. Although he did not immediately turn over his weapon to them
for fear of retaliation from the victims relatives, he did so as soon as they reached the municipal
building. Undoubtedly, the conduct he displayed was spontaneous as it shows his interest to give
himself up unconditionally to the authorities, thus saving the State the trouble and expenses
necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[21]
The accused also claims that his liability should be mitigated by the fact that he had no intention
to commit so grave a wrong. We are not persuaded.
The lack of intent to commit a wrong so grave is an internal state. It is weighed based on the
weapon used, the part of the body injured, the injury inflicted and the manner it is inflicted. The fact
that the accused used a 9-inch hunting knife in attacking the victim from behind, without giving him
an opportunity to defend himself, clearly shows that he intended to do what he actually did, and he
must be held responsible therefor, without the benefit of this mitigating circumstance. [22]
As the killing was attended by treachery, the accused is liable for the crime of murder. The
prescribed penalty therefor is reclusion perpetua to death.[23] In view of the presence of the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, the trial court correctly meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua against the accused.
The civil indemnity awarded in favor of the legal heirs of the victim, Alfredo Senador, in the
amount of P50,000.00 is in accord with the Courts current policy.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from, finding the accused, ELBERT CALLET, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Murder in Criminal Case No. 12995, and sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua and to pay the legal heirs of the victim, ALFREDO SENADOR, the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125053. March 25, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER CAA LEONOR, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
305
In the decision[1] of 22 March 1996 in Criminal Case No. 95-212, the Regional Trial Court of
Paraaque, Branch 274, found accused-appellant Christopher Caa Leonor guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and to
pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as death indemnity; P44,318 as actual damages; P2 million as
moral damages; and P50,000 as attorneys fees.
CHRISTOPHER was charged in an information [2] whose accusatory portion reads as follows:
That on or about the 15 th day of May 1995, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and
against the will of complainant Ma. Teresa Tarlengco and by means of force, violence and
intimidation employed upon the person of said complainant did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously divest her cash money worth P900.00 and Titus wrist watch valued at an
undetermined amount, belonging to said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter, in the aforementioned amount; that on the occasion of the said Robbery, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, without justifiable reason, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and stab said Ma. Teresa Tarlengco, thereby inflicting upon the latter
serious stab wounds which caused her death.
At his arraignment on 14 June 1995, CHRISTOPHER entered a plea of not guilty. [3]
It is undisputed that on 15 May 1995 at the Hermanos Building in General Santos Avenue,
Bicutan Extension, Paraaque City, at around 11:30 a.m., CHRISTOPHER stabbed dentist Dr. Maria
Teresa Tarlengco, which wound ultimately led to her death. That much is admitted by
CHRISTOPHER. The prosecution and the defense differ, however, in the circumstances surrounding
the incident.
The prosecution had as witnesses Reynaldo Baquilod, SPO1 Luis F. Galeno, PO3 Mateo
Interia, Dr. Ravell Ronald Baluyot, Dr. Edgardo de Guzman, Dr. Paul Pepa, Beverly Vidanes, Dr.
John Enrique Franco, Fernando Tarlengco, Geraldine Tarlengco, Joseph Sumalbar, and Asst. Public
Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray. The defense presented CHRISTOPHER, Leopoldo Leonor
Leonidas, Dr. Alfredo Besa, Renato Leonor and Alexander Pagubasan.
The Office of the Solicitor General partly summarized the evidence for the prosecution as
follows:
In the morning of May 15, 1995, Dr. Maria Teresa Tarlengco, a dentist by profession, was at her clinic
at the third floor of the Hermanos Building, Bicutan, Paraaque, Metro Manila, when a man entered
and inquired about the cost of tooth extraction. After Dr. Tarlengco quoted her professional fee, the
man, who was later on identified as Christopher Leonor, said that he would come back and then left
in a hurry.Minutes later, Leonor came back[,] and Dr. Tarlengco told him to take a seat and wait. Dr.
Tarlengco was preparing her dental instruments when Leonor barged in and demanded money. Dr.
Tarlengco told Leonor that her money [was] on the table. On hearing this, Leonor stabbed Dr.
Tarlengco, grabbed her watch and ran away. Dr. Tarlengco struggled out of the clinic and saw the
man running out of the building, Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help.
Reynaldo Baquilod, building security guard, heard Dr. Tarlengco shouting, Tulungan ninyo ako,
sinaksak ako ng taong iyon. Baquilod noticed that Dr. Tarlengco was referring to the man running out
of the building, coming from upstairs. Baquilod chased Leonor up to Daang Hari Street where he
was joined by traffic policeman Luis Galeno who was alerted by people running after a person with
bloodied shirt. When Galeno and Baquilod caught up with Leonor, Baquilod grabbed Leonors hand
and took therefrom a Titus wristwatch and P900 cash. When queried, Leonor readily answered, Sir,
hindi ko naman gusto po ito.Ginawa ko lang ito dahil kailangan ng pamilya ko. Leonor was brought
to the Paraaque Police Block Station, PO3 Interia who was instructed to investigate proceeded to Dr.
Tarlengcos clinic, where they saw, among other[ ] [things], a bloodied balisong (fan knife) at the
ground floor of the Hermanos building.Baquilod turned over the watch and money he took from
306
Leonor to Interia. Thereafter, Galeno and Interia returned to the police station where they were
interrogated.
Dr. Tarlengco was brought to the South Super Highway Medical Center where she underwent an
emergency operation for a stab wound on her chest. After the operation, Dr. Tarlengcos father, with
the doctors permission, was allowed to talk to his daughter inside the operating room. Although Dr.
Tarlengco was gasping for breath, she spoke to her father, viz:
Q: So were you able to talk with your daughter while in the Operating Room? What did she say, if
any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: She said that this man pretended to be a patient.
Q: And what else did she say?
A: He asked her how much would it cost to pull a tooth and then she said, Dad, when I quoted my
price, he said that he would come back and left in a hurry.
Q: What else did she say, if any, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: After a minute, he came back, I told him to wait, to sit down first at my Waiting Area because I
[had] to still prepare the instruments needed.
Q: Then, what happened after that?
A: She said, while I was busy preparing my instrument, Dad, this man barged in. He demanded
for my money. I told him it [was] on my table. And after telling that, Dad, he stabbed me and
then he grabbed my watch and he [ran] away and she said, I struggled Dad, to come out of
the clinic and when I was on the porch, I saw this man coming [sic] out of the building. I
shouted for help, I said Saklolo, saklolo, sinaksak ako ng taong iyan. Hulihin ninyo.
Q: Then what else did she say after she narrated to you that incident, Mr. Tarlengco?
A: After that, in tears, she said that Dad, I dont know, why inspite of getting my money this man
stabbed me and I was numbed at that point of time, I [could not] talk anymore, I [could not]
tell anything to her anymore, I just combed her hair with my fingers.
Thereafter, Dr. Tarlengco was brought to a private room where she subsequently died.
Dr. Ronaldo Baluyot, the NBI Medico-legal Officer who conducted the post-mortem examination of
the deceased, testified that Tarlengcos stab wound on the chest could have been caused by single
bladed fan knife.
Geraldine Tarlengco, who stayed with her sister Dr. Tarlengco while reviewing for the BAR
Examination, owned a Titus watch similar to that of her sister. Both watches were given to them by
another sister Cecille. On the morning of May 15, 1995, Geraldine saw Dr. Tarlengco strap the watch
on her wrist.Geraldine, likewise, saw her sister, Dr. Tarlengco, place in her wallet one 500-peso bill
and four 100-peso bills, after showing the same to Geraldine, who earlier was teasing her sister, Dr.
Tarlengco, that the reason why she did not buy the dress she wanted to buy at Cinderellas was
because she had no money. If only to prove her sister Geraldine wrong, Dr. Tarlengco showed her
money which she took from her wallet.[4]
Additionally, Dr. John Enrique Franco, a friend of the victim, testified that he got to talk with Dr.
Tarlengco at the hospital. He asked Dr. Tarlengco what happened, and she answered that a man
posing as a patient held her up and stabbed her. [5]
Joseph B. Sumalbar, Dr. Tarlengcos fiance, testified that when he learned about his fiancees
killing, he immediately went to the crime scene and, thereafter, to the Block 7 police station where he
confronted the suspected killer, Christopher. Sumalbar recalled his conversation with the latter, thus:
307
Q: And what happened after that, when you proceeded to the cell of this suspect?
A: I found this man who was half naked from the waist up. I found this man without any shirt on
and he was sitting at the corner and he was trying to avoid me and I asked him, Bakit mo
ginawa iyon? Sabi niya, hindi ko po naman gusto. Kailangan ko lamang ang pera.
Q: When you confronted the accused at Block 7, what else did he say, if any?
A: While I was shouting at him, Hinold-up mo na, sinaksak mo pa. Bakit mo ginawa iyon? Hindi
ko po naman gusto iyon, mahuhuli na po ako, sabi niya. Mahuhuli na po ako kaya ginawa ko
iyon.
Q: Then what else did he say when you confronted him, if any?
A: And he told me that he needed the money. [6]
SPO3 Mateo Interia testified that on 16 May 1995, he took the statement of Dr. Tarlengcos
father and executed a Referral[7] to the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal for CHRISTOPHERs
inquest. Interia reported in the referral that CHRISTOPHER was being held for robbery with
homicide but forgot to state the property stolen from Dr. Tarlengco. After Mr. Tarlengco reminded
Interia of the stolen items, the latter intercalated into the referral a reference to P900 and a Titus
wristwatch forming part of the evidence against CHRISTOPHER.[8]
Fernando Tarlengco, father of the victim, described the impact of her daughters death, viz.:
Q: In connection with the death of your daughter, Mr. Tarlengco, did your family incur any
expenses?
A: Not just expenses but more on the agony, the tribulations we are having up to this time. You
know, up to this time, we kept on weeping. My father, the grandfather of my daughter, was
shocked and in anguish, he also succumbed to death in less than two months, because of
what this evil person [had] done to us. My work was affected. My wifes work is
affected. There are times when we are at home, we dont know what to do anymore. We are
in total misery. I dont know why this was done to us by the devil deeds of this person has
done to us [sic].[9]
In relation to Dr. Tarlengcos death, her family spent P8,718 for hospital expenses; about P2,500
to P3,500 charged by Funeraria Malaya where she was brought; P22,500 for her casket; P8,250
paid to Manila Memorial, Inc.; P5,000 for the masses held for Dr. Tarlengco; and about P10,000 for
the food served to the guests at Dr. Tarlengcos wake. [10]
CHRISTOPHER, on the other hand, testified that on 15 May 1995, at about 6:00 a.m., he left his
town Calauag, Quezon, and boarded a Jam Transit bus bound for Manila, with P800 and a fan knife
in his pocket. He was to fetch his family for the town fiesta to be held on 25 May 1995. His head and
two of his molar teeth were then aching. He alighted at Alabang and took a bus bound for Bicutan
Extension.[11]
Upon reaching Bicutan Extension, he looked for a dentist to have his aching teeth pulled. He
found Dr. Tarlengcos dental clinic at the third floor of a certain building in General Santos Avenue. He
asked Dr. Tarlengco how much an extraction cost, and was told that the fee was P150 per
tooth. CHRISTOPHER negotiated a charge of P100 per tooth, but Dr. Tarlengco rejected the
offer. CHRISTOPHER then proceeded to look for another dentist, but before he could make his way
out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco stopped him and agreed to charge P100 per
extraction. CHRISTOPHER was made to sit on the dental chair as Dr.Tarlengco prepared the
instruments for the extraction. Just as she was about to inject anesthesia, she remarked that she
changed her mind and would charge P150 per tooth pulled.CHRISTOPHER pushed away Dr.
Tarlengcos hand, which angered her. She castigated and cursed CHRISTOPHER for asking for an
extraction without being able to pay for it.[12]
As CHRISTOPHER was making his way out of the clinic, Dr. Tarlengco cursed and pushed him,
at which moment he blacked out. [13] He then sensed that the dentist was in pain, and he saw blood
308
spurting.He realized that he had stabbed the dentist. In shock, CHRISTOPHER stepped back, lost
the grip on his fan knife, and ran out of the clinic and out of the building. When he looked back at the
clinic, he saw Dr. Tarlengco shouting for help. A security guard, with his shotgun aimed at
CHRISTOPHER, ran after the latter.[14]
CHRISTOPHER ran to where there were many people. Then he came across Police Officer
Galeno, who grabbed him by the hand an asked what happened. He replied, Sir, nakadisgrasya ako.
[15]
Galeno warded off the pursuing security guard who insisted on apprehending
CHRISTOPHER. Galeno brought CHRISTOPHER to Block 7, Paraaque Police Station, and later, to
the Police Headquarters along the Coastal Road in Paraaque. Four policemen, including PO3
Interia, took turns in mauling and kicking him, and one policeman even took money from his
wallet. Also, his clothes were confiscated. [16]
During the investigation, CHRISTOPHER admitted that he had stabbed Dr. Tarlengco, but
denied that he had taken P900 and a Titus wristwatch from the victim. He was surprised when later,
he was informed by Assistant Public Prosecutor Elizabeth Yu Guray that he would be charged with
Robbery with homicide, not homicide only.[17]
Leopoldo Leonor Leonidas, CHRISTOPHERs uncle, revealed that at about noon of 15 May
1995, while he was at home, he received a telephone call from CHRISTOPHER saying that he had
stabbed someone. When he asked CHRISTOPHER why he stabbed someone the latter
answered, Aburido ako,Kuya Ding, aburido ako (I am troubled, Kuya Ding, I am troubled). [18]
Renato Leonor, CHRISTOPHERs father, testified that he went to see his son at his detention
cell but could hardly recognize him because he was bloodied. He remembered that CHRISTOPHER
complained of toothache before he left for Manila.[19]
Dr. Alfredo Besa, a dentist, examined CHRISTOPHER three hours before the former took the
stand.Unassisted by any dental aid or nurse, he determined that two of CHRISTOPHERs teeth were
due for extraction[20] and, at the condition they were in, were probably aching as early as a year
before. Citing his experience, Dr. Besa claimed that people complaining of tootache are usually
irritable, although he admitted that none of his patients complaining from a tootache has ever killed a
person or even brought a fan knife to his clinic. In fact, he never heard of any patient with a
toothache who killed a dentist. He recalled one instance when a patient boxed him after he
unintentionally hurt the patient while pulling a tooth.
These were the evidence before the trial court which merited CHRISTOPHERs
conviction.CHRISTOPHER urges us to modify the judgment by (1) convicting him of the crime of
homicide, and not of robbery with homicide, and (2) appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstances of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, sufficient provocation,
passion and obfuscation, voluntary surrender, and voluntary confession.
CHRISTOPHER claims that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are fraught with
inconsistencies and contradictions, and are therefore obvious concoctions and manufactured
evidence. He points out that Baquilod failed to mention in his sworn statement, given to the police
immediately after the incident, that he retrieved a Titus wristwatch and P900 worth of peso bills from
CHRISTOPHER.Baquilod likewise testified that Dr. Tarlengco shouted for help because she was
stabbed; she made no mention of having been robbed. Then, too, SPO1 Galeno stated in his sworn
statement that Dr. Tarlengco was only stabbed.
CHRISTOPHER contends further that the testimonies of Baquilod, Galeno, Interia, Sumalbar,
and Yu Guray that he admitted to them on separate occasions his commission of the offense
charged are inadmissible because the admission was not in writing, was not made with the
assistance of a counsel, and was not preceded by a warning as to the consequences of the
admission. In any event, their testimonies are hearsay evidence. Additionally, he stresses the
possible bias of Yu Guray considering that she caused the filing against him of the information for
robbery with homicide.
In the Appellees Brief, the Solicitor General refutes CHRISTOPHERs claims, asserting that the
robbery was duly and satisfactorily established by the dying declaration of Dr. Tarlengco to her
309
father, corroborated by the testimonies of Baquilod and Galeno. That Dr. Tarlengco failed to exclaim
that she was robbed when she shouted for help from her clinics balcony is of no moment, since she
later told Dr. Franco and her father of the complete events that transpired. Galenos failure to mention
in his sworn statement that money and a wristwatch were retrieved from CHRISTOPHER does not
negate his claim to that effect, because he later stated that fact in his testimony. The settled rule is
that testimonies in open court are superior to affidavits taken ex parte. That Interia inserted the
stolen items in the Police Referral does not diminish the truth of the allegation of robbery, since it
appears that the intercalation was intended to make the Referral accurate.
The core issues raised involve the credibility of witnesses. One of the highly revered dicta in our
jurisdiction is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the
credibility of opposing witnesses unless there appears in the record some facts or circumstances of
weight and influence that have been overlooked which, if considered, will affect the result of the
case. The reason therefor is founded on practical and empirical considerations. The trial judge is in a
better position to decide questions of credibility, since he has personally heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying. [21] Nevertheless, in view of the gravity of the
charge and the penalty imposed, we spared no effort to meticulously review the evidence to
determine whether CHRISTOPHER had indeed committed the offense charged and the
prosecutions evidence proved it beyond reasonable doubt.
CHRISTOPHER admitted that he stabbed Dr. Tarlengco. The burden of evidence, therefore,
shifted to him; he had to prove a justifying [22] or exempting[23]circumstance to avoid criminal
liability. He miserably failed to do so.
The remaining factual issue is whether CHRISTOPHER killed Dr. Tarlengco by reason or on the
occasion of a robbery[24] with the use of violence against or intimidation of a person. One could be
convicted of robbery with homicide only if the robbery itself was proved as conclusively as any other
essential element of the crime. The taking with intent to gain of personal property belonging to
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things,
constitutes robbery.[25]
Geraldine Tarlengco and Joseph Sumalbar identified the items recovered from CHRISTOPHER
as belonging to Dr. Tarlengco. These testimonies indicate that CHRISTOPHER stole personal
property belonging to Dr. Tarlengco, consistent with the disputable presumption that a person found
in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the
whole act.[26] While CHRISTOPHER denied that Dr. Tarlengcos watch and money were recovered
from him, the independent and corroborative testimonies of police officer Galeno and guard Baquilod
prove otherwise. The trial court found the testimonies of these two witnesses more credible, and we
see no reason to depart from its conclusion. CHRISTOPHER also pointed out that the intercalation
of stolen items in Interias referral report to the Prosecutor indicated the fabrication of robbery
charges against him. But the intercalation was sufficiently explained as an honest mistake, especially
considering that Interia had specified in the report, in an entry appearing before the intercalation, that
the charge against CHRISTOPHER was robbery with homicide.
It is undisputable then that CHRISTOPHER took Dr. Tarlengcos belongings. The unexplained
possession of stolen articles gives rise to a presumption of theft unless it is proved that the owner of
the articles was deprived of her possessions by violence or intimidation, in which case, the
presumption becomes one of robbery. [27] The prosecution proved in this case that there was violence
and intimidation in the taking of Dr. Tarlengcos property.
Most crucial for the prosecution is the testimony of Mr. Fernando Tarlengco, the victims father,
because he stated the most incriminating piece of evidence the dying declaration of Dr.
Tarlengco. While, generally, a witness can testify only to those facts which are derived from his own
perception,[28] a recognized exception thereto is the reportage in open court of the declaration of a
dying person made under the consciousness of an impending death where that persons death is the
subject of inquiry in the case.[29] To be admissible, a dying declaration must (1) refer to the cause and
circumstances surrounding the declarants death; (2) be made under the consciousness of an
impending death; (3) be made freely and voluntarily without coercion or suggestion of improper
310
influence; (4) be offered in a criminal case in which the death of the declarant is the subject of
inquiry; and (5) the declarant must have been competent to testify as a witness had he been called
upon to testify.
Dr. Tarlengcos dying declaration complied with the above requisites. She talked about the
incident which led to her condition. The declaration was a first-hand account of the incident, bereft of
opinion or conjecture. The account was made in a criminal case where her death was part of the
subject of inquiry.And, most important, she was convinced that she was about to die; thus:
Atty. Revilla:
Q Could you tell this Court what was her condition when you saw her inside the operating room?
Witness Tarlengco:
A I asked her how she was and she said, Dad, I have a feeling I can no longer endure this.
Atty. Revilla:
Q So, what else happened in the operating room while you were talking to her, Mr. Tarlengco?
A I told her to fight for her life. I asked her to open her eyes, keep herself awake, and in my desire
to help her awake, I asked her what happened.
Atty. Revilla:
Q Then what else happened while you were in the operating room, after that, Mr. Tarlengco?
Witness Tarlengco:
A On that condition, she was really very very cold and gasping and complaining of pain and
gasping for breath.[30]
Dr. Tarlengco narrated to her father that a man who pretended to be her patient demanded
money from her. After she surrendered her money to him, the latter stabbed her and took her watch
as she lay injured.
The dying declaration thus established not only that a robbery was committed, there being
violence and intimidation against Dr. Tarlengco, but that homicide was perpetrated on the occasion
of said robbery.
Lastly, we find no mitigating circumstance in this case. CHRISTOPHER claims that he did not
intend to commit so grave a wrong as the act committed; that there was sufficient provocation by the
offended party immediately preceding the offense; that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to
have produced in him passion and obfuscation; that he voluntarily surrendered to a person in
authority; and that he voluntarily confessed having committed homicide.
Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong does not mitigate in homicide cases where the
accused used a deadly weapon in inflicting mortal wounds on vital organs of the victim, [31] as in this
case.
The provocation sufficient to mitigate an offense must be proportionate to the gravity of the
retaliatory act.[32] The events which led to the stabbing were described by CHRISTOPHER as
follows:
Q Mr. Leonor, you said, while she was about to inject anaesthesia, you said Dra. Tarlengco
changed the price from P100.00 to P150.00. Then you parried her hand. Is that correct?
A Opo. Tinabig ko po. [Yes, sir. I pushed it aside.]
Q What hand of Dra. Tarlengco did you parry?
A The one handling the rounded instrument. Right hand, Sir.
Q When you parried her right hand, you were already sitting at the dental chair? Right?
311
A Opo.
Q After you parried the hand of Dra. Tarlengco, she cursed you, right?
A No, sir. I just said why did you change the price? and I stood up. That was the time she cursed
me.
Q When she cursed you, did Dra. Tarlengco hit you with an instrument?
A No, Sir. She just got mad.
Q Did she slap you on your face?
A No Sir. She just pushed me.
Q And she did not box you anywhere in any portion of your body?
A No, Sir.
Q And she likewise did not kick you in any part of your body?
A She just told me bad words.[33]
CHRISTOPHER is thus claiming that a push and bad words justify retaliation with a knife. Such
claim is undeserving of belief and does not entitle CHRISTOPHER to the benefit of the mitigating
circumstance prior provocation by the offended party.
CHRISTOPHER could not have been provoked by passion or obfuscation as, according to him,
he momentarily blacked out and instantly found his fan knife embedded in Dr. Tarlengcos chest. To
be blinded by passion and obfuscation is to lose self-control, [34] not consciousness. Moreover, courts
cannot appreciate passion and obfuscation unless there is a clear showing that there were causes
naturally tending to produce such powerful excitement as to deprive the accused of reason and self-
control.[35] As we discussed earlier, the events leading to the stabbing precluded any natural
tendency to produce a powerful excitement in CHRISTOPHER.
CHRISTOPHER did not voluntarily surrender either to a person in authority or to any other
person.While he was being pursued by Security Guard Baquilod, he intentionally went to where
there were many people, presumably to confuse Baquilod. Fortunately, Police Officer Galeno was
able to grab him by the hand and prevented him from further eluding justice. There is nothing in the
record which can lead us to conclude that he surrendered to anyone.
Neither was there voluntary confession in the instant case. The mitigating circumstance
contemplated by law is a plea of guilty made spontaneously and unconditionally in open court before
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. [36] CHRISTOPHER made no such plea.
What remains to be resolved is the penalty to be imposed. The penalty for robbery with
homicide isreclusion perpetua to death.[37] There being no evidence of aggravating or mitigating
circumstance against or in favor of CHRISTOPHER, the lower of the two indivisible penalties shall
be imposed,[38]without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. [39] We likewise believe that the
awards in favor of Dr. Tarlengcos family of moral damages of P2 million and attorneys fees
of P500,000 are excessive. We reduce them to P50,000 and P25,000, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the decision of Branch 274 of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque in Criminal
Case No. 95-212 is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant CHRISTOPHER CAA
LEONOR is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of robbery with homicide,
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the victim,
Dr. Teresa Tarlengco, P50,000 as indemnity for death; P44,318 as actual damages; P50,000 as
moral damages; andP25,000 as attorneys fees, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
SO ORDERED.
312
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 132325-26. July 26, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMEO ESPINA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran, Branch 47, in
Criminal Case Nos. 8194 and 8155 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder qualified by
Illegal Possession of Firearms under P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294; and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of
P50,000.00 and the costs.
The information for the crime of murder alleged:
313
That on or about the 30th day of September, 1992, in the municipality of Tubigon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused without
justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of superior strength, the accused being then armed with
a short firearm and without giving opportunity to the victim to defend himself, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Romeo Bulicatin, with the use of
said firearm, hitting the latter on the vital part of his body resulting to his death; to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the deceased.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the
aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken advantage of by the
accused to facilitate the commission of the crime.[2]
For Illegal Possession of Firearms, the information stated:
That on or about the 30th day of September, 1992, in the municipality of Tubigon, province of Bohol,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent
to possess firearm and ammunition did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally keep, carry
and have in his possession, custody and control a short firearm and ammunition without first
obtaining the necessary permit or license to possess the said firearm and ammunition from
competent authority, which firearm and ammunition were carried by the accused outside of his
residence and used by him in committing the crime of Murder of which one Romeo Bulicatin was the
victim; to the damage and prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines. Acts committed contrary to
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866.[3]
Upon arraignment on June 27, 1994, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges;
[4]
thereafter trial followed.
The facts as adduced by the prosecution are synthesized in the Peoples Brief, thus -
In the afternoon of September 30, 1992, the members of an association locally known as the ripa-
ripa went to the house of Eufronia Pagas located at sitio Batic, Tan-awan, Tubigon, Bohol for their
scheduled contribution to a fund intended for a wedding celebration. (p. 3, August 23, 1996, TSN; p.
3, January 21, 1997, TSN) Among those present thereat were Romeo Bulicatin, Rogelio Espina,
Samson Abuloc who were having a drinking spree and playing chikika, a card game. (p. 4, May 9,
1995, TSN).
When accused-appellant arrived, Romeo asked three (3) bottles of kulafu wine from him and he
acceded by buying three (3) bottles of kulafu wine from the store of Eufronia Pagas. Later on, at
around 4:00 of that afternoon, Romeo again demanded another bottle of kulafu wine from accused-
appellant but this time, the latter refused to give in to the demand. (p. 4, January 21, 1997, TSN)
Romeo then proceeded to where accused-appellant was playing cards and without any warning,
urinated on the latter and clipped him under his (Romeo) arms. (p. 4, August 23, 1996, TSN)
Accused-appellant got angry. He however did not engage Romeo in any altercation but instead
turned away and went home. (p. 5, May 9, 1995, TSN)
Later on in the evening, at about 9:00 p.m., while Romeo, Rogelio and Samson were still having a
drinking spree at the store of Eufronia Pagas, they heard accused-appellant calling Romeo from
outside, saying, Borgs, get out because I have something to say. The trio came down from the
house. Rogelio went down first, followed by Samson and Romeo (pp. 5-6, ibid.) When Rogelio
reached the ground, accused-appellant told him to drop down while Samson also dropped himself to
the ground when he saw accused-appellant about to draw his firearm. At that juncture, Romeo was
still at the stairway and when he turned his back towards accused-appellant, the latter shot him,
hitting him at the back. Romeo ran away but he was chased by accused-appellant who fired two (2)
more shots at him. (p. 5, March 19, 1996, TSN; p. 7, May 9, 1995)
314
Samson ran away from the scene of the incident and upon reaching the house of Poloy Concha, he
saw Romeo outside the house asking for help. Samson asked some of residents to help him bring
Romeo to barangay Cawayanan. (pp. 14-15, March 19, 1996, TSN) They loaded Romeo in a rattan
cradle and upon reaching the said barangay at about 3:00 oclock of the following morning, they
transferred him to the vehicle owned by a certain Emiliano Fucanan. From the said barangay,
Romeo was taken to the house of Mayor Placing Mascarinas in Poblacion, Tubigon, Bohol where he
was transferred to the ambulance which took him to the Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital in
Tagbilaran City. On the way to the hospital, Felix Celmar asked Romeo what happened to him and
the latter answered that he was shot by accused-appellant. (pp. 4-8, July 29, 1996, TSN) Romeo
was brought to the emergency room and underwent operation. He however died at about 5:00 p.m.
of October 2, 1992, due to septic shock irreversible, generalized peritonitis, gunshot wound,
perforating ileum. (pp. 7 & 11, June 18, 1996, TSN)[5]
The defense presented four witnesses, namely: Rogelio Espina, Dr. Harold B. Gallego,
Maximiano Dormal and accused-appellant himself.
The testimonies of accused-appellant and Maximiano Dormal may be summarized as follows:
At around 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of September 30, 1992, accused-appellant was in the
house of Eufronia Pagas to represent his father in a meeting to prepare for a wedding
celebration. Among those present in the said gathering were accused-appellants brother, Rogelio
Espina, and the deceased, Romeo Bulicatin who were having a drinking spree. When accused-
appellant arrived thereat, Bulicatin asked him to buy 3 bottles of kulafu wine to which he acceded. At
around 4:00 oclock of the same afternoon, Bulicatin again demanded another bottle of kulafu wine
from accused-appellant. The latter, however, refused to obey, prompting Bulicatin to urinate on
accused-appellant. This infuriated accused-appellant, but instead of assaulting Bulicatin, he turned
his back and walked away because he knew that Bulicatin always carried a knife. When accused-
appellant was about 12 meters away from the house of Eufronia Pagas, Bulicatin pursued
him. Accused-appellant tried to evade Bulicatin but the latter caught up with him and stabbed him on
his side. Consequently, accused-appellant sustained a deep punctured wound but was fortunately
able to escape until he passed out.[6]
At around 6:00 oclock p.m. of the same day, Maximiano Dormal who was then on his way
home, saw accused-appellant wounded and lying on the ground. Recognizing the latter, Dormal
immediately informed and accompanied accused-appellants parents who lost no time in bringing him
to the hospital.[7]
On the other hand, defense witness Rogelio Espina (Rogelio), declared that in the afternoon of
September 30, 1992, he was in the house of Eufronia Pagas, having a drinking spree with Romeo
Bulicatin and Samson Abuloc, while his brother, herein accused-appellant, was playing cards. At
around 3:00 oclock p.m., he saw Bulicatin approach accused-appellant and forthwith urinated on
him. Thereafter, Bulicatin grabbed accused-appellant under his arms but the latter was able to
extricate himself from the hold of Bulicatin and ran away. Rogelio wanted to follow accused-appellant
but was prevailed upon by Bulicatin to stay. They then continued their drinking spree until 9:00
oclock p.m. When they were about to go home, Rogelio heard somebody calling Bulicatin, saying -
Get out, Borgs, as I have something to tell you. According to Rogelio, he is certain that the voice was
not that of accused-appellant. When they decided to go home, he was the first one to go downstairs,
followed by Samson Abuloc, and then by Bulicatin. Upon reaching the ground, Rogelio heard a
gunshot and immediately scampered away without looking back to see who was shot. He claimed
that it was only two days after the incident that he came to know who the victim of the shooting
incident was. He added that from the house of Eufronia Pagas, he directly went home where he was
told by his mother that accused-appellant was stabbed and was brought to the hospital.
On August 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, the Court finds the accused, Romeo Espina, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, for the crime of Murder defined and penalized by Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended
315
by Republic Act No. 8294 and sentences him to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment
of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law, there being a
mitigating circumstance of vindication for a grave offense committed on the accused; to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased, Romeo Bulicatin, in the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos;
and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, this appeal on the following grounds:

I
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED OR MISINTERPRETED THE

SIGNIFICANCE OF SOME FACTS OR CIRCUMSTANCES OF WEIGHT AND INFLUENCE
APPEARING IN THE RECORD IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES
CHARGED.
II
THAT THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING
ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED. [9]
In particular, accused-appellant points to the following facts and circumstances that had been
allegedly overlooked by the trial court, to wit -
1) The resolutions of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tubigon, Bohol in Criminal Case Nos.
1245 and 1246 to the effect that there was no sufficient evidence that accused-appellant had
committed the crimes charged;
2) The non-presentation of Eufronia Pagas (the owner of the house where the victim and his
companions had a drinking spree), despite being listed in the information as one of the witnesses for
the prosecution.
3) The testimony of prosecution eyewitness Samson Abuloc, that he does not know Felix Celmar
who claimed to be one of the persons asked by the former to help him bring the victim to the
hospital.
4) The incredibility of the testimony of Samson Abuloc as regards his having identified accused-
appellant through his voice and the type of firearm used by the latter in shooting the victim as well as
his having seen the victim being hit at the back by the first gunshot fired at him by accused-
appellant;
5) The fact that at about 6:00 oclock in the evening of September 30, 1992, accused-appellant was
found by one Maximiano Dormal lying wounded and groaning near a pathway leading to the latters
house; and
6) The length of time that elapsed before Felix Celmar revealed that the victim told him that accused-
appellant was the one who shot him.[10]
Accused-appellant makes capital of the November 23, 1992 Resolutions [11] of the 2nd Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Tagbuin-Clarin Bohol, which found the evidence against accused-appellant to
be insufficient after conducting the preliminary investigation. We note, however, that said resolutions
were reversed and superseded by the February 2, 1993 Omnibus Resolution [12] of the Second
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, who, after conducting a re-investigation of the instant case, found
316
probable cause to hold accused-appellant for trial and accordingly filed the corresponding
informations against accused-appellant.
Moreover, the basis of the investigating judge in declaring insufficiency of evidence does not
appear to be substantial. Pertinent portion of said resolution reads:
Upon the foregoing facts, the court finds and is satisfied that the offense complained of has been
committed, but there is insufficiency of evidence that the herein accused Romeo Espina committed
the crime for the simple reason that according to the declaration of Eufronia Pagas who is an
unbiased witness as compared to the declaration of Samson Abuloc who was a close barcada of the
victim, the herein accused Romeo Espina was not in her house where the drinking spree was held
from 6:00 to 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 30, 1992. [13]
Clearly, the fact that Eufronia did not see accused-appellant in her house between 6:00 9:00
oclock in the evening of September 30, 1992, does not in any way contradict or refute the claim of
the prosecution that accused-appellant left the house of Eufronia at around 4:00 in the afternoon
after being urinated on by the victim and thereafter returned at about 9:00 p.m. and shot the victim
outside the house of Eufronia.
Then too, the non-presentation of Eufronia Pagas as a prosecution witness is not damaging to
the case of the prosecution. In Eufronias affidavit, she declared that after Rogelio Espina, Samson
Abuloc and the deceased went out of her house, she heard three gunshots but bothered not to go
outside because of fear.[14] Evidently, Eufronia Pagas is not an eyewitness and her testimony would
not do much for the prosecution. At any rate, it is the prosecutions prerogative to determine who
should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity. [15] Hence, its
choice of witnesses can not be successfully challenged by accused-appellant.
Whether or not prosecution witness Samson Abuloc knew Felix Celmar who claimed to be one
of the persons asked by the former to help him bring the victim to the hospital, is of no
consequence. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, it is possible that Felix Celmar, a
resident of another barangay, is not known by name to Abuloc, especially so since their meeting on
that fateful day was only casual.
Neither do we find improbable the testimony of Samson Abuloc that he recognized the voice of
accused-appellant. Being a friend and a second cousin of accused-appellant, he is expected to be
familiar with his voice. So also, we find no reason to doubt the testimony of Abuloc that he was able
to identify the pistol used by accused-appellant as well as witnessed the stabbing of the victim at the
back. Not only was Abuloc only three to four meters away from accused-appellant, [16] the prosecution
was likewise able to establish that the moonlight illuminating the locus criminis afforded the witness a
clear view of the shooting incident. [17] The Court has previously held that the light from the stars or
the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give ample illumination to enable a person to
identify or recognize another. [18]Under the circumstances, therefore, Abuloc could not have failed to
recognize accused-appellant who is not only his barkada but a second cousin as well.
Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, the trial court did not overlook his contention that he
could not have committed the offenses charged because at around 4:00 oclock p.m. of September
30, 1992, he was unconscious due to a stab wound. In fact, the trial court treated the same as a
defense of denial and alibi. Indeed, these defenses cannot prevail over the categorical and positive
identification of accused-appellant by prosecution witness Abuloc who was not shown to have any ill
motive to testify falsely against him.[19]
Moreover, it is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity to
observe the witnesses first hand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.[20] In the case at bar, the trial court did not err in giving credence to the version of the
prosecution. The facts and circumstances alleged to have been overlooked by the trial court are not
material to the case and will not affect the disposition thereof.
317
The alleged dying declaration of the victim should not have been admitted as an ante
mortemstatement, considering that the prosecution failed to show that the subject declaration was
made under the consciousness of an impending death. Prosecution witness Celmar testified that on
the way to the hospital, the victim told him that it was accused-appellant who shot him. Though the
victim eventually died two days after he was shot, there is nothing in the records that would show
that the victim was under the impression that he was going to die. However, the declaration of the
deceased pointing to accused-appellant as the culprit is admissible as part of res gestae. Having
been made shortly after a startling occurrence and under the influence thereof, the victim evidently
had no opportunity to contrive. [21]Furthermore, the delay of Felix Celmar in revealing the declaration
of accused-appellant does not make Celmars testimony unworthy of belief. Delay in revealing the
identity of the perpetrator of a crime does not necessarily impair the credibility of a witness,
especially where such witness gives a sufficient explanation. In the case at bar, such delay was
amply explained by the witness. Celmar testified that it took him four months to reveal what he knew
because he thought he would not be utilized as witness for the prosecution. Moreover, after the
incident, he had to leave for his work in Albay.
In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court appreciated the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, pursuant to P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No.
8294. Considering the penalty provided for in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. No. 7659, the trial court imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, in view
of the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty then, accused-appellant was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The third paragraph, Section 1, of R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997), amending
P.D. No. 1866, provides that If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be used as an aggravating circumstance. This
amendment, however, cannot be applied in the present case. It bears stressing that when the
offenses at bar were perpetrated on September 30, 1992, the unlicensed firearm used in taking the
life of another was not yet a special aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide. Not being
favorable to the accused, the amendatory provision cannot be applied to accused-appellant, lest it
acquires the character of an ex post facto law.[22]
Likewise, the trial court erred in treating alevosia merely as a generic aggravating circumstance,
moreso in offsetting the same by the generic mitigating circumstance of having committed the crime
in immediate vindication of a grave offense. The treachery employed by accused-appellant in
shooting the victim is actually a circumstance that qualified the killing to murder. Such being the
case, treachery cannot be offset by a mitigating circumstance.
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of having acted in immediate
vindication of a grave offense. As the evidence on record show, accused-appellant was urinated on
by the victim in front of the guests. The act of the victim, which undoubtedly insulted and humiliated
accused-appellant, came within the purview of a grave offense under Article 13, paragraph 5, of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be appreciated in favor of accused-
appellant.
As to the imposable penalty, the applicable provision is Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
before its amendment by R.A. No. 7659 on December 31, 1993, the crime having been committed
on September 30, 1992. Thereunder, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death.With one generic mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance to offset
it, the penalty should be imposed in its minimum period, i.e., reclusion temporal maximum. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day ofreclusion temporal, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran, Branch 47, in Criminal
Case Nos. 8194 and 8195 finding the accused-appellant Romeo Espina guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is
hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
318
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum; and to pay the heirs of Romeo Bulicatin the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45100 October 26, 1936

vs.
EPIFANIO DIOKNO and ROMAN DIOKNO, defendants-appellants.
Ramon Diokno and Gabriel N. Trinidad for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno appeal to this court from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the accused Epifanio Diokno and
Roman Diokno guilty of the crime of murder, beyond a reasonable doubt, and sentences
each of them to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs of the suit. It is so ordered.
In support of their appeal, the appellants assign the following alleged errors as committed by the
court a quo in its judgment in question, to wit:
319
1. The lower court erred in accepting Exhibit E as evidence.
2. The lower court erred in admitting Exhibit K as evidence.
3. The lower court erred in not acquitting the appellant Roman.
4. The lower court erred in sentencing the appellant Epifanio to reclusion perpetua.
The following facts have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt during the trial:
The deceased Yu Hiong was a vendor of sundry goods in Lucena, Tayabas. At about 7 o'clock in the
morning of January 4, 1935, Salome Diokno, to whom Yu Hiong was engaged for about a year,
invited the latter to go with her. Yu Hiong accepted the invitation but he told Salome that her father
was angry with him. Salome answered him: "No matter, I will be responsible." At about 6 o'clock in
the afternoon of said day, Yu Hiong and Salome Diokno took an automobile and went to the house of
Vicente Verina, Salome's cousin, in Pagbilao. As they found nobody in the house, they went on their
way up to San Pablo, Laguna. On January 5th or 6th of said year, Roman Diokno telegraphed his
father Epifanio Diokno, who was in Manila, informing him that Salome had eloped with the Chinese
Yu Hiong. On the morning of January 7, 1935, Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno went to San
Pablo, Laguna, in search of the elopers. Having been informed that the latter were stopping at the
house of Antonio Layco, they went there. Upon arriving near the house, they saw Yu Hiong coming
down the stairs. When Yu Hiong saw them, he ran upstairs and they pursued him. As the Chinese
found the door of the house locked, he shouted that it be opened for him. At that moment, he was
overtaken by the accused who carried knives locally known asbalisong, of different sizes. Yu Hiong
fell on his knees and implored pardon. In that situation Roman Diokno stabbed him with the knife in
the back and later in the left side. Epifanio Diokno also stabbed him once. Yu Hiong fell on the
landing of the stairs in the balcony, and there he was again stabbed repeatedly. Then Roman Diokno
said: "Enough, father." Yu Hiong lost consciousness. Juan Alcantara, who lived on the same street,
Hermanos Belen, in front of Antonio Layco's house, saw the accused pursue Yu Hiong and fired
shots for the police to come. Upon hearing the shots, municipal policeman Francisco Curabo
appeared and found Yu Hiong pale and lying on the landing of the stairs. He then asked who had
wounded the Chinese and the accused Epifanio Diokno answered that it was he. The policeman
took the knife (Exhibit C) which Epifanio Diokno carried in his right hand and brought him to police
headquarters. Roman Diokno had left before the policeman arrived and he was not located until after
three days. The municipal president of San Pablo, Laguna, also went to the scene of the crime,
found the Chinese almost unconscious and questioned him, putting down his answers in Exhibit E.
The Chinese was brought to the provincial hospital of San Pablo where he was examined by Drs.
David Evangelista and Manuel Quisumbing, who found that he had five incised wounds in different
parts of the body, one of them at the back and about three and a half inches long, piercing the pleura
and penetrating the lower lobe of the right lung about an inch, which wound was necessarily mortal
and which caused the death of the victim. On January 8, 1935, while the said Chinese was in a
serious condition in the hospital, he made a statement telling how he was attacked by the accused
(Exhibit K).
The accused, testifying as witnesses in their own behalf, stated that they had not gone to San Pablo
together on the day in question; that when Roman Diokno arrived, his father Epifanio Diokno was
coming down the stairs of Antonio Layco's house with a knife in his hand; that Epifanio Diokno told
his son Roman to go home and tell their relatives what had happened; that when Epifanio Diokno
overtook Yu Hiong on the landing of the stairs of Antonio Layco's house, he asked Yu Hiong whether
he was willing to marry his daughter; that the Chinese answered him in the negative and at the same
time tried to take something from his pocket; that as Epifanio knew that Yu Hiong carried a revolver,
he feared the Chinese might harm him; he became obfuscated, drew his knife and knew not what
happened afterwards.
320
The first question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in
admitting as evidence Exhibit E, consisting in the investigation conducted by the municipal president
of San Pablo in the same place where Yu Hiong had fallen a few minutes before, at about 1.30 p. m.
on January 7, 1935, and wherein Yu Hiong, answering the questions asked by said municipal
president, stated that it was Ramon Diokno and Epifanio Diokno who had wounded him.
It is argued by the defense that said document Exhibit E should not be admitted on the ground that
some words had been altered and because it has not been proven that declarant had a sense of
impending death.
It does not appear that said document was altered after it had been signed, but on the contrary,
municipal president Jacinto Peaflor, upon being cross-examined by the defense, declared that he
neither erased any word nor put another in its place after said document had been finished.
The fact that Yu Hiong failed to state that he had given up all hope of life, in answering the municipal
president's questions, does not make his declaration inadmissible. It is enough if, from the
circumstances of the case, it can be inferred with certainty that such must have been his state of
mind (People vs. Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil., 182). In the present case, Yu Hiong was semiconscious as
a result of the wounds received by him and, consequently, he could not have the hope to live when
he made his declaration immediately after he was mortally wounded. But even if the document
Exhibit E were not admissible as an ante mortem declaration, it is admissible as a part of theres
gest because it was made under circumstances so proximate to the incident that it may be
considered as a part thereof. (People vs. Portento and Portento, 48 Phil., 971; People vs. Palamos,
49 Phil., 601.)
The first assignment of alleged error is, therefore, untenable.
With respect to the second assignment of alleged error consisting in that the court a quo erred in
admitting Exhibit K as an ante mortem declaration of Yu Hiong, because it does not appear that
when the declarant made it he was aware of impending death and that he did not die until three days
after making it, all that has been said relative to Exhibit E, which is the subject matter of the first
assignment of alleged error, may be repeated in connection with said Exhibit K, in the sense that it is
admissible as an ante mortem declaration. Furthermore, when the deceased made the declaration
Exhibit K, he complained of great difficulty in breathing and of being very ill. The fact that he did not
die until three days later neither implies that he had no sense of impending death when he made his
declaration because he did not improve thereafter but became worse until he died; nor detracts from
its character of an ante mortem declaration because what gives the declaration such character is the
declarant's conviction, upon making it, that he is not going to live (U. S. vs. Mallari, 29 Phil., 14).
The third assignment of alleged error consists in the failure of the court a quo to acquit the appellant,
Roman Diokno.
The testimony of the eyewitnesses Juan Alcantara and Antonio Layco corroborated by the different
dimensions of the wounds which, according to Dr. Manuel Quisumbing, were caused by two
instruments of different sizes, and the ante mortem declarations (Exhibits E and K) of the deceased,
leave no room for doubt that Roman Diokno cooperated with his father and stabbed the deceased
Yu Hiong with a knife in different parts of the body. Furthermore, the deceased stated in his ante
mortem declaration (Exhibit K) that it was Roman Diokno who inflicted the necessarily mortal wound
in his back, which caused his death.
We find the fourth assignment of alleged error well founded. The circumstance of abuse of superior
strength, qualifying the crime of murder, which the trial court found to have been proven, has not
been established beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of United States vs. Devela (3 Phil., 625),
this court said that "the mere fact that the number of the assailants is superior to that of those
attacked by them is not sufficient to constitute the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority."
321
In this case we have the photographs of the body of the deceased (Exhibits D and D-1) showing that
he had a strong constitution: but there is no evidence of the physical constitution of the accused
Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno. Therefore, we cannot determine whether or not said accused
were physically stronger than the deceased and whether or not they abused such superiority.
Neither does this court find the existence of the other circumstance qualifying murder, that is, evident
premeditation, proven beyond a reasonable doubt because, even assuming that both the accused
went to San Pablo, Laguna, each carrying the knife used by him in attacking Yu Hiong, it being
customary for the people of said province to carry it, it cannot be inferred with certainty from the
mere fact that they carried knives that their intention in going to San Pablo was to look for the
deceased in order to kill him. In order that premeditation may be considered either as an aggravating
circumstance or as a qualifying circumstance, it must be evident, that is, the intention to kill must be
manifest and it must have been planned in the mind of the offender and carefully meditated. It is not
enough that it arose at the moment of the aggression.
Therefore, there having been neither abuse of superior strength nor evident premeditation, the crime
committed by the accused is simple homicide.lwphi1.nt
The presence of the fifth mitigating circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, that is,
immediate vindication of a grave offense to said accused, may be taken into consideration in favor of
the two accused, because although the elopement took place on January 4, 1935, and the
aggression on the 7th of said month and year, the offense did not cease while Salome's
whereabouts remained unknown and her marriage to the deceased unlegalized. Therefore, there
was no interruption from the time the offense was committed to the vindication thereof. Our opinion
on this point is based on the fact that the herein accused belong to a family of old customs to whom
the elopement of a daughter with a man constitutes a grave offense to their honor and causes
disturbance of the peace and tranquility of the home and at the same time spreads uneasiness and
anxiety in the minds of the members thereof.
The presence of the sixth mitigating circumstance of said article 13, consisting in having acted upon
an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or ofuscation, may also be taken into
consideration in favor of the accused. The fact that the accused saw the deceased run upstairs
when he became aware of their presence, as if he refused to deal with them after having gravely
offended them, was certainly a stimulus strong enough to produce in their mind a fit of passion which
blinded them and led them to commit the crime with which they are charged, as held by the
Supreme Court of Spain in similar cases in its decisions of February 3, 1888, July 9, 1898, February
8, 1908, May 25, 1910, July 3, 1909, and in other more recent ones.
The seventh circumstance of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, consisting in having surrendered
himself immediately to the agents of persons in authority, should also be taken into consideration in
favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno.
In view of the foregoing considerations, this court concludes that the accused are guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide defined and punished in article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty prescribed therein being reclusion temporal in its full extent. Three mitigating
circumstances must be taken into consideration in favor of the accused Epifanio Diokno and two in
favor of the accused Roman Diokno, with no aggravating circumstance, thus authorizing the
imposition of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law (reclusion temporal in its full extent),
or prision mayor in its full extent, in the period that this court deems applicable, which is the medium
period in this case, in accordance with the provisions of article 64, rule 5, that is eight years and one
day of prision mayor.
Both accused should be granted the benefits of the indeterminate sentence provided in Act No.
4103, as amended by Act No. 4225, which prescribes a penalty the minimum of which shall be taken
from that next lower to prision mayor, or prision correccional of from six months and one day to six
322
years. Taking into account the circumstances of the case, the indeterminate penalty to which each of
said accused must be sentenced is fixed at from two years and one day of prision correccional to
eight years and one day of prision mayor, crediting each with one-half of the time during which they
have undergone preventive imprisonment (art. 29, Revised Penal Code).
Wherefore, this court declares the accused Epifanio Diokno and Roman Diokno guilty of the crime of
homicide and sentences each of them to an indeterminate penalty from two years and one day
of prision correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor, crediting them with one-half of
the time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, and to indemnify the heirs of
the deceased in the sum of P1,000, with the costs of both instances. So ordered.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12883 November 26, 1917
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CLEMENTE AMPAR, defendant-appellant.
Filemon A. Cosio for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
A fiesta was in progress in the barrio of Magbaboy, municipality of San Carlos, Province of
Occidental Negros. Roast pig was being served. The accused Clemente Ampar, a man of three
score and ten, proceeded to the kitchen and asked Modesto Patobo for some of the delicacy.
Patobo's answer was; "There is no more. Come here and I will make roast pig of you." The effect of
this on the accused as explained by him in his confession was, "Why was he doing like that, I am not
a child." With this as the provocation, a little later while the said Modesto Patobo was squatting
down, the accused came up behind him and struck him on the head with an ax, causing death the
following day.
As the case turns entirely on the credibility of witnesses, we should of course not interfere with the
findings of the trial court. In ascertaining the penalty, the court, naturally, took into consideration the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The court, however, gave the accused the benefit of a mitigating
circumstance which on cursory examination would not appear to be justified. This mitigating
323
circumstance was that the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the
one committing the felony.
The authorities give us little assistance in arriving at a conclusion as to whether this circumstance
was rightly applied. That there was immediate vindication of whatever one may term the remarks of
Patobo to the accused is admitted. Whether these remarks can properly be classed as "a grave
offense" is more uncertain. The Supreme court of Spain has held the words "gato que araaba a
todo el mundo," "landrones," and "era tonto, como toda su familia" as not sufficient to justify a finding
of this mitigating circumstance. (Decisions of January 4, 1876; May 17, 1877; May 13, 1886.) But the
same court has held the words "tan landron eres tu como tu padre" to be a grave offense. (Decision
of October 22, 1894.) We consider that these authorities hardly put the facts of the present case in
the proper light. The offense which the defendant was endeavoring to vindicate would to the average
person be considered as a mere trifle. But to this defendant, an old man, it evidently was a serious
matter to be made the butt of a joke in the presence of so many guests. Hence, it is believed that the
lower court very properly gave defendant the benefit of a mitigating circumstance, and correctly
sentenced him to the minimum degree of the penalty provided for the crime of murder. lawph!1.net
Judgment of the trial court sentencing the defendant and appellant to seventeen years four months
and one day of cadena temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased, Modesto Patobo, in the amount of one thousand pesos, and to pay the costs
is affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 96444 June 23, 1992

vs.
LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO, accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision * of the Regional Trial Court, NCJR, Branch VIII, Manila dated
October 25, 1990 in Criminal Case No. 85-40579 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Leandro
Pajares y Florentino" convicting herein appellant Pajares of the crime of Murder.
Herein appellant was charged with the aforementioned crime in an Information which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely sought to
insure and better accomplish his criminal design, in the City of Manila. Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with five (5) others whose
true names, real Identities, and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation, and treachery, attack, assault. and use personal violence
upon one DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN, by then and there mauling him and
hitting him with a baseball bat at the back of the head, a vital part of the body,
thereby inflicting upon the said DIOSDADO VIOJAN Y SABAYAN a club wound on
the head which was the direct and immediate cause of his death.
324
Contrary to law. (Original Records of Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p. 1)
He was likewise charged with the crime of Frustrated Homicide in an Information which reads as
follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1985, at night time, purposely sought to
insure and better accomplish his criminal design, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, conspiring and confederating together with five (5) others whose
true names, real identities, and present whereabouts are still unknown, and helping
one another, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and use personal violence upon one RENATO PEREZ Y RUIDERA,
by mauling and hitting him with a baseball bat at the back, a vital part of the body,
thereby inflicting upon him a club wound at the back which is necessarily mortal and
fatal, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime
of homicide, as a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, because of the timely and able
medical attendance rendered upon the said RENATO PEREZ RUIDERA which
prevented his death.
Contrary to law (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 1)
Appellant Pajares pleaded not guilty to both charges (Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-
40579, p. 5; Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40580, p. 8). Upon the petition of herein
appellant that the two (2) cases be consolidated, a joint trial ensued.
The prosecution presented Renato R. Perez, Cpl. Benigno Dong, Salud Manguba, Pat. Conrado
Bustillos, Dr. Norman Torres, Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Rosita Viojan and Arlene Viojan as witnesses
while only appellant Leandro Pajares took the witness stand for the defense.
Renato R. Perez, a resident of 1386-K Burgos St., Paco, Manila, is the same Renato Perez who is
the victim in Criminal Case No. 85-40580 for Frustrated Homicide. He testified that at about 11:30
p.m. on October 11, 1985, he and the deceased Diosdado Viojan were on their way to a store
located at Gomez St., Paco, Manila to buy something. They were walking abreast with each other,
the deceased was at his right side and was a bit ahead of him, when appellant Pajares suddenly
appeared from behind and hit Viojan with a baseball bat at the back of his head. The latter ran a
short distance and fell down near the store of one Alex Blas. When Perez tried to help Viojan. he,
too, was attacked by Pajares with the baseball bat hitting him at the back below the left shoulder. He
then grappled with the appellant for the possession of the baseball bat but the latter's companions,
namely: Rudy Dokling, Popoy, Inggo and Lauro Duado mauled him until he lost consciousness. He
was brought to the Philippine General Hospital by Eugene Panibit and Joselito Perez where he was
treated for the injuries he sustained (TSN, Hearing of January 7, 1986, pp. 4-23). He identified in
court the baseball bat used by Pajares (TSN, Hearing of September 16, 1986, p. 36).
On cross examination, he averred that he has known appellant Pajares for less than a year and that
although they both live in Zone 89, he and the deceased belonged to a group which is an adversary
of the group of the accused (Ibid., pp. 39-41).
Cpl. Benigno Dong, of the Zamora Police Department Station No. 6, WPD, testified that he was on
duty on October 12, 1985 when one Napoleon Gabawa sought their assistance regarding a killing
incident that happened in Gomez Street, Paco, Manila. They went to the house of appellant Leandro
Pajares at 1453 Gomez St., Paco, Manila and invited the latter and his brother to the station for
questioning regarding the aforementioned incident. Pajares verbally admitted his participation in the
incident (TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p. 26). The incident was registered in the Police Blotter
Entry (Exhibits "A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33)
325
On cross examination, he admitted that he placed appellant Pajares under arrest after he verbally
admitted that he was responsible for the death of Diosdado Viojan, but the booking sheet and arrest
report has not been accomplished yet (TSN, Hearing of March 11, 1986, p 27).
Salud Manguba, Forensic Chemist of the National, Bureau of Investigation, testified that she
examined a baseball bat for the presence of blood upon the written request of Pat. Conrado Bustillos
(Exhibit "C-1", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p. 69). In connection with the study
she made, she submitted Biology Report No. B-85-1342 (Exhibit "C". Original Records of Criminal
Case No. 85-40579, p. 68) that shows the absence of blood on the baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of
June 23, 1986, pp. 30-32).
Pat. Conrado G. Bustillos, testified that relative to a telephone call he received from the Philippine
General Hospital on October 12 1985 he went to the morgue of the said hospital to investigate a
dead on arrival case of one Diosdado Viojan. A close examination of the body of the latter showed
that he suffered a fracture at the back of the skull. Thereafter, he proceeded to the scene of the
crime to make an ocular inspection where he was informed that there was another victim by the
name Renato Perez. Pat. Bustillos further testified that Renato Perez was investigated at the
Homicide Section and that the latter executed a sworn statement (Exhibit "F" Original Records of
Criminal Case No, 85-40579, p 208) in relation to the incident. In the same manner, Roberto
Pajares. brother of herein appellant was also investigated and who also executed a sworn statement
(Exhibit "G",Ibid., p. 219) The alleged murder weapon, a baseball bat, was turned over to him by Cpl.
Ben Macalindog (TSN, November 18, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Norman Torres, a resident physician at the Philippine General Hospital, testified that on October
12, 1985, a certain Diosdado Viojan was brought to the emergency room of the Philippine General
Hospital for head injury, left occipital region. The victim was in critical condition necessitating
immediate surgery. He did not personally attend the operation but learned that the victim died while
undergoing the surgery. Witness further averred that the injury could have been caused by a blunt
instrument like a baseball bat (TSN, Hearing of December 2, 1986, p. 46).
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan, Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that he
conducted an autopsy on the body of Diosdado Viojan and in connection therewith submitted
Autopsy Report No. N-85-2161 (Exhibit "L", Original Records on Criminal Case No. 85-40579, p.
224) indicating that the cause of death was "Hemorrhage, meningeal, severe, traumatic". He further
testified that a single forceful blow against the head using a blunt instrument like a baseball bat could
have caused the injury (TSN, Hearing of June 15, 1987, pp. 58-60).
Rosita S. Viojan, mother of the deceased Diosdado Viojan, testified that when her son died, she
hired the services of Tree Amigos Funeral Parlor for P12,000.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt No.
10511 (Exhibits "P" and "Q", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579, pp. 228-229) (TSN,
Hearing of February 23. 1988, p. 66).
Arlene Viojan, widow of Diosdado Viojan. testified that prior to the incident her husband was working
with PEMCO earning about P500.00 a week. At the time of the incident, she was three (3) months
on the family way. She gave birth to a baby girl and it was her parents-in-law who paid for the
expenses during her delivery. At the moment, she is living with her parents (TSN, Hearing of April 4,
1988, p. 67).
Appellant Leandro Pajares y Florentino denied the allegations of the prosecution. He asserts that he
knew the deceased Diosdado Viojan by the name Dado, having met him once at the store, and
Renato Perez by the name Balat. At the time of the incident, he was inside the store of Alex Blas
with about eight (8) other People watching television. Hence, he did not see who hit Diosdado Viojan
and Renato Perez. After the commotion, upon the advise of Alex Blas, he went home and slept. At
about 3:30 in the morning of October 12, 1985, he was arrested inside their house. Without asking
326
any question, he went with the arresting officers to the police station (TSN, Hearing of August 1,
1988, pp. 72-76).
At the police detachment, he was coerced to admit his participation in the crime since a gun was
poked at him. He identified his signature at the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report (Exhibit "J",
Original Records of Criminal Case No 85-40579, p. 222) but alleged that he signed the same without
being allowed to read the contents thereof without the assistance of counsel and while being held at
the collar at the back of his shirt. He likewise averred that during investigation the investigating
policemen molested him like "pinipitik-pitik" his ears with rubber band or chopping his neck with
karate chops (Ibid., pp. .77-78). He, however, admitted that even after several days he did not
complain about what were done to him (Ibid., p. 128).
On cross examination, he testified that his house is about five (5) houses away from the store of Alex
Blas, the scene of the crime (TSN, Hearing of August 22, 1983, pp. 90-91). He likewise denied any
knowledge about any quarrel between his brother, Roberto Pajares and the deceased Diosdado
Viojan (TSN, Hearing of September 19, 1988, p. 108).
As aforementioned, the trial court rendered a decision on October 25, 1990, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered

finding herein accused LEANDRO PAJARES y FLORENTINO of 1433-B, Gomez St.,
Paco, Manila, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the charges against him, as
follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40579:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as
defined and penalized by Art. 248, par, 1, Rev. Penal Code, and there being no
modifying circumstance to consider, hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment
of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the accessory penalties of the law; to pay Arlene
Viojan and her child the sum of: P30,000,00; P12,000.00 as funeral expenses;
P15,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as litigation expenses and attorney's
fees; and finally the costs of the suit.
CRIM. CASE NO. 85-40580:
The Court finds accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Slight
Physical Injuries as defined in par. 1, Art. 266 and penalized by Art. 27, both of the
Rev. Penal Code, hereby sentencing him to an imprisonment of ONE (1) MONTH;
and to pay the cost of suit.
Done in Manila, this 25th day of October, 1990.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 38)
Hence this appeal.
Appellant Pajares asserts that the trial court gravely erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion
perpetua upon him. He avers that such a penalty is tantamount to a cruel, degrading or inhuman
punishment which is prohibited by the Constitution. Appellant points out that hours before the
clubbing incident, Roberto Pajares, appellant's younger brother, was mauled by the group of
Diosdado Viojan as cited by the lower court referring to the entry in the Police Blotter and the sworn
statement of Roberto Pajares. The mauling of the latter is a big insult and truly offending to the
327
appellant and his family. Hence, the clubbing of Diosdado Viojan by herein appellant was a
vindication of the grave offense committed against his family. a mitigating circumstance under
paragraph 5 of Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Considering further that the appellant was just
nineteen (19) years old at the time he committed the offense the penalty imposed by the court a
quo should have been seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day (Brief for the
Appellant, Rollo, pp. 52-58).
The appeal is devoid of merit.
In convicting herein appellant of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery, the trial court relied
heavily on the testimony of prosecution witness Renato Perez which it found to be credible.
According to the lower court, the latter "gave his account on what was done to them by the accused
and his companions in a simple, candid, straightforward manner" (RTC Decision. Rollo, p. 36).
It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimony of witnesses by the trial court is
received on appeal with the highest respect because it is the trial court that has the opportunity to
observe them on the stand and detect if they are telling the truth or lying in their teeth (People v.
Santito, Jr., G.R. No. 91628, August 22, 1991 [201 SCRA 87]). The appellate court can only read in
cold print the testimony of the witnesses which commonly is translated from the local dialect into
English. In the process of converting into written form the statement of living human beings, not only
fine nuances but a world of meaning apparent to the judge present, watching and listening, may
escape the reader of the written translated words (People v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 99258, September 13,
1991 [201 SCRA 616]).
Appellant's sole defense is alibi. According to him, he was inside the store of Alex Blas, watching
television, when the incident occurred, Alex Blas even advised him to go home so as not to be
involved in the incident. However, the latter was not presented to corroborate appellant's testimony.
Alibi is the weakest defense an accused can concoct. In order to prosper, it must be so convincing
as to preclude any doubt that the accused could have been physically present at the place of the
crime or its vicinity at the time of the commission (People v. Lacao, Sr., G.R. No. 94320, September
4. 1991 (201 SCRA 317]). In the case at bar, appellant was within the vicinity of the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.
Furthermore, appellant was Positively identified by Renato Perez as the perpetrator of the crime. In
the face of the clear and positive testimony of the prosecution witness regarding the participation of
the accused in the crime, the accused's alibi dwindles into nothingness. The Positive identification of
the accused by the witness as the perpetrator of the crime cannot be overcome by the mere denial
of the accused. Such positive identification of the accused that he killed the victim establishes the
guilt of the accused beyond moral certainty (People v Arroyo,supra).
The trial court correctly ruled that the crime was attended by treachery. There is treachery, the law
says, when the offender adopts means, methods or forms in the execution of the felony which
ensure its commission without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make (People v. Cuyo, G.R. No. 76211, April 30, 1991 [196 SCRA 447]). As found by the trial
court, appellant Pajares hit Diosdado Viojan with a baseball bat from behind without any warning
thereby precluding any possible retaliation from the victim.
Having established the guilt of herein appellant. the next question is whether or not the mitigating
circumstance of immediate vindication of a grave offense can be appreciated in his favor. While it
may be true that appellant's brother Roberto Pajares was mauled by the companions of the
deceased at about 11:30 a.m. of October 11, 1985 as show in the entry in the Police Blotter (Exhibits
"A" to "A-3", Original Records of Criminal Case No. 85-40579. pp. 30-33) and by appellant's brother
himself (Exhibits "G", "Q" and "A" Nos. 7-9, Ibid., p. 219), it must be emphasized that there is a lapse
of about ten (10) hours between said incident and the killing of Diosdado Viojan. Such interval of
time was more than sufficient to enable appellant to recover his serenity (People v. Benito, G.R. No.
328
L-32042, December 17, 1976 [74 SCRA 271]). Hence, the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in his favor.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification that the
indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy of this Court on the matter.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131839. January 30, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARANDE COLINA ADLAWAN @

RANDIE, accused-appellant.
DECISION
This is an appeal from the June 23, 1997 Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. DU-3463, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder
and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
and to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P18,850.00 as
actual damages and the costs.
The Information against accused-appellant reads:
That on or about the 15th day of November, 1992, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and
shot Nequito Ortizano with a revolver, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound at his vital
portion which caused his death soon thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment on March 31, 1997, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. [3] Thereafter, trial
ensued.
329
The prosecutions account of the antecedent facts are as follows: At dawn of November 15,
1992, the deceased, together with prosecution witnesses Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco, and
a certain Oliver Bonayan, were inside a fenced disco area in Sitio Oril, Mandaue City. At 2:00 a.m.,
Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco were alerted by a commotion outside. When they rushed out,
they saw the deceased raising his hands in front of accused-appellant, who was then in the
company of Barangay Tanod Jerry Diaz and Jet Bonita. Likewise present was accused-appellant's
father, Barangay Tanod Crispulo Adlawan, who was lying on the ground unconscious. Prosecution
witnesses Benjamin Basubas and Quirino Cinco stood approximately one meter away from the
deceased. All of a sudden, accused-appellant drew a gun from his waist, pointed it at the deceased,
saying, this is the one.[4] He immediately fired the gun, hitting the deceased on the chest. The latter
staggered toward the direction of Benjamin Basubas. He was able to hold on to a deaf-mute
bystander, but fell on a shallow canal and landed on his belly with his head resting on the bank of the
canal. Accused-appellant followed the deceased, turned the latters head and delivered a fatal shot
hitting him above the right ear. Thereafter, accused-appellant surrendered the gun to a group of
Barangay Tanod.[5]
The Necropsy Report shows the postmortem findings and the cause of death of the victim, thus:
II. Pertinent Findings:
1. Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 0.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., located at the left parietal region 4 cm. above the
right ear. The entrance wound has an inverted periphery. The bullet slug went thru the brain tissues
and pierced thru the right parietal bone, where the slug was embedded and extracted at the scalp of
the right parietal region.
2. Gunshot Wound, Entrance, 0.5 cm., located at the left supraclavicular at the medial part, with
inverted periphery and contusion, collar. The bullet slug went downward and backwards hitting the
upper lobes of the left and right lungs and exited thru the inferior border of the right scapula. The exit
wound measures 1 cm. x 1 cm. with irregular everted edges.
Gunshot Wounds Number 1 and 2 resulted to a massive hemorrhage of the brain, the left and right
lungs.
III. Cause of Death:
SHOCK, IRREVERSIBLE. Secondary to Massive Hemorrhage due to Multiple Gun Shot Wounds. [6]
On the other hand, the defense averred that at around 2:00 in the morning of November 15,
1992, while accused-appellant was inside a fenced disco area in Sitio Oril, Mandaue City, he heard
somebody shouting and when he turned to the source of the disturbance, he saw his father, lying on
the ground unconscious and with a bloodied face. Accused-appellant dashed to his father whom he
thought was already dead. As he tried to lift him, he saw the deceased about 2 1/2 arms length
away, holding a gun and told him, Do you want to follow your father? [7]Thereafter, accused-appellant
lunged at the deceased, twisted his hand, forcing the muzzle of the gun to be pointed at the
deceaseds chest. Suddenly, the gun went off, causing the deceased to fall in a canal. Accused-
appellant was able to get hold of the gun and again fired at the deceased. Thereafter, he fled and hid
in Manila[8] until January 23, 1997, when he finally decided to surrender to Mayor Alfredo M. Ouano
and P/Supt. Rolando Borres.[9]
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the herein accused ARANDE COLINA ADLAWAN @ RANDIE guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, the said accused is hereby sentenced to undergo the
indeterminate penalty by imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum, with
330
the accessories of the law, to indemnify the legal heirs of Nequito Ortizano the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos by reason of his death, P18,850.00 as actual damages, and to pay
the costs.
The accused, being a detention prisoner, shall be credited in the service of his sentence full time
during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Hence, the instant appeal. Accused-appellant contends that:

I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT THE ATTENDANCE OF TREACHERY AND EVIDENT PREMEDITATION,
AND THE RECORDS WILL SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ONLY OFFERED TO
PLEAD GUILTY TO THE LESSER OFFENSE OF HOMICIDE.
II.
ANENT HERETO, THE COURT A QUO ERRED TO APPRECIATE (sic) THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT'S WILLINGNESS TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY TO THE LESSER OFFENSE OF
HOMICIDE AS A MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
III.
FURTHER TO THIS, ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS INDEED GUILTY, THE

COURT A QUO FAILED TO LIKEWISE APPRECIATE THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF RELATIVE WHICH WAS
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED.
IV.
IN APPRECIATING THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ACCORDING

GREATER WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION
WITNESSES DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME LACK CREDIBILITY AND CANNOT SUSTAIN
A CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
V.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING ACTUAL DAMAGES OF P18,850.00 TO THE HEIRS
OF THE VICTIM NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAME WERE NEVER DULY PROVEN.[11]
The appeal has no merit.

The task of assessing the conflicting versions of the defense and the prosecution is a matter
best determined by the trial court who had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the witnesses
demeanor and deportment on the witness stand, and therefore could better discern if such witnesses
were telling the truth or not. Hence, unless the trial judge plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, his assessment on
credibility of witnesses must be respected.[12]
After a careful and thorough review of the testimony of prosecution witnesses Benjamin
Basubas and Quirino Cinco, we are convinced that the trial court did not err in giving credence to
331
their declarations which were given in a direct, positive and straightforward manner. Moreover, the
defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses had improper motive to give a false narration
of the circumstances surrounding the death of the deceased.
Likewise, the trial court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, depriving the victim of any real chance to
defend himself, thereby ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. [13] At the time
accused-appellant fired the first shot, the deceased was unarmed and had his hands raised. The
deceased was therefore in no position to put up any defense such as would present a risk to
accused-appellant. Moreover, the second shot fired by accused-appellant clearly foreclosed any
doubt as to the attendance of treachery. When he turned the head of the deceased before he fired
the second shot, accused-appellant was manifestly determined to have a better shot at the head of
the deceased who was already lying helpless on the ground.
The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense cannot be appreciated in
favor of accused-appellant. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete. [14] From the version of the prosecution, which the Court finds
credible, the deceased did not commit any unlawful aggression towards accused-appellant. On the
contrary, it was accused-appellant who was the aggressor when he shot the deceased who was
unarmed and raising his hands.
In the same vein, the circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is unavailing. It is settled
that a person making a defense has no more right to attack an aggressor when the unlawful
aggression has ceased.[15] In the instant case, accused-appellant was not justified in attacking the
deceased as the latter had his hands raised and was no longer poised to attack accused-appellant's
father at the time he was shot.
Furthermore, the acts of the deceased immediately prior to the shooting did not constitute
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression requires an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or
imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. It must be such as to
put in real peril the life of the person defending himself and not a mere imagined threat. [16]In his direct
testimony, accused-appellant did not categorically declare that the deceased was aiming the gun at
him, or about to shoot him. Right after he allegedly heard the deceaseds remark, Do you want to
follow your father, he immediately lunged at him, twisted the gun toward his chest and fired. Clearly,
therefore, there was no real peril to the life of accused-appellant. InPeople v. Escoto,[17] we held that
the mere apprehension that the supposed aggressor would shoot the person invoking self-defense is
not justified. Failing to discharge the burden of proving unlawful aggression, accused-appellant's
claim of incomplete self-defense cannot prosper.
The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
in favor of accused-appellant. To be considered a mitigating circumstance, voluntary surrender must
be spontaneous. The conduct of the accused, and not his intention alone, after the commission of
the offense, determines the spontaneity of the surrender. In People v. Mabuyo,[18] we held that the
surrender is not spontaneous where it took the accused almost nine months from the issuance of the
warrant of arrest against him before he presented himself to the police authorities. With more reason
then that we should not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the case at
bar since it took accused-appellant more than three years from the issuance of the warrant of arrest
on September 23, 1993 before he finally decided to surrender on January 23, 1997.
Nevertheless, the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation should be appreciated to
mitigate accused-appellant's criminal liability. The requisites of this mitigating circumstance are: (1)
that there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said
act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. [19]
In the case at bar, accused-appellant thought his father whose face was bloodied and lying
unconscious on the ground was dead. Surely, such a scenario is sufficient to trigger an
uncontrollable burst of legitimate passion. His act, therefore, of shooting the deceased, right after
332
learning that the latter was the one who harmed his father, satisfies the requisite of the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
The penalty for Murder at the time of the commission of the offense is Reclusion Temporal in its
maximum period to Death. There being one mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, and
no aggravating circumstance to offset it, the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum
period, i.e., Reclusion Temporal maximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
sentence shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period and the minimum shall be taken from
the next lower penalty, which is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Hence,
accused-appellant should be meted the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
As to accused-appellant's civil liability, we agree with the accused-appellant that the award of
P18,850.00 as actual damages to the heirs of the deceased lacks basis. In lieu of actual damages,
the heirs of the deceased are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of
P10,000.00. Temperate damages are awarded where pecuniary loss is proved but not the amount
thereof.[20]
Moral Damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should likewise be awarded for the emotional
suffering of the deceased's heirs.[21]
The wife of the deceased testified that her husband, a 29-year old driver and spray man at the
time of his death, was earning P100.00 daily. [22] Using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality,
[23]
the loss of his earning capacity should be computed as follows:
Net = Life expectancy x Gross Annual Income (GAI) - Living expenses

Earning [2/3 (80-age at death)] (daily wage) x 261 (No. of (50% of GAI)
Capacity working days in a yr.)]
= 2/3 [(80-29)] x [(P100.00 x 261)] - 50%
= 2/3 (51) x P26,100.00 - 13,050.00
= 34 (P13,050.00)
= P443,700.00
Hence accused-appellant should be ordered to pay the amount of P443,700.00 for the loss of
earning capacity of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue
City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case No. DU-3463, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of Murder,
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay in
addition to the P50,000.00 death indemnity and the costs, the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages; P10,000.00 as temperate damages and the amount of P443,700.00 for the loss of earning
capacity of the deceased.
SO ORDERED.
333
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4971 September 23, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,

vs.
AUGUSTUS HICKS, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.

Jose Robles Lahesa for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
For about five years, from September, 1902, to November, 1907, Augustus Hicks, an Afro-American,
and Agustina Sola, a Christian Moro woman, illicitly lived together in the municipality of Parang,
Cotabato, Moro Province, until trouble arising between them in the last-mentioned month of 1907,
Agustina quitted Hick's house, and, separation from him, went to live with her brother-in-law, Luis
Corrales. A few days later she contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace Current,
a corporal in the Army who then went to live in the said house.
On the 21st of December following, at about 7:30 p. m., Augustus Hicks together with a soldier
named Lloyd Nickens called at said house, and from the sala called out to his old mistress who was
in her room with Corporal Current, and after conversing with her in the Moro dialect for a few
minutes, asked the corporal to come out of said room; in response thereto the corporal appeared at
the door of the room, and after a short conversation, Current approached Hicks and they shook
hands, when Hicks asked him the following question: "Did I not tell you to leave this woman alone?,"
to which Current replied: "That is all right, she told me that she did not want to live with you any
longer, but if she wishes, she may quit me, and you can live with her." The accused then replied:
"God damn, I have made up my mind;" and as Corporal Current saw that Hicks, when, he said this,
was drawing a revolver from his trousers' pocket, he caught him by the hand, but the latter,
snatching his hand roughly away, said: "Don't do that," whereupon Current jumped into the room,
hiding himself behind the partition, just as Hicks drew his revolver and fired at Agustina Sola who
was close by in the sala of the house. The bullet struck her in the left side of the breast; she fell to
the ground, and died in a little more than an hour later.
334
Upon hearing the shot Edward Robinson, who was also in the house, went to render assistance and
wrested the weapon from the hand of the accused. The latter immediately fled from the house and
gave himself up to the chief of police of the town, H. L. Martin, asking him to lock him up in jail; and,
when a few minutes later a policeman came running in and reported that Hicks had fired a shot at
Agustina, the said chief of police caused Hicks to be arrested. The latter, when once in jail, threw
eight revolver cartridges out of the window; these were picked up by a policeman who reported the
occurrence and delivered the cartridges to his chief.
In view of the foregoing the provincial fiscal on the 8th of February, 1908, filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance of said province charging Augustus Hicks with the crime of murder.
Proceedings were instituted, the trial court, after hearing the evidence adduced, entered judgment
on the 10th of September of the same year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of death, to be
executed according to the law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for review.
The above-stated facts, which have been fully proven in the present case, constitute the crime of
murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, in that the woman Agustina Sola met
a violent death, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia), she being suddenly and
roughly attacked and unexpectedly fired upon with a 45-caliber revolver, at close, if not point blank
range, while the injured woman was unarmed and unprepared, and at a time when she was listening
to a conversation, in which she was concerned, between her aggressor and third person, and after
usual and customary words had passed between her and her aggressor. From all of the foregoing it
is logically inferred that means, manners, and forms were employed in attack that directly and
specially insured the consummation of the crime without such risk to the author thereof as might
have been offered by the victim who, owing to the suddenness of the attack, was doubtless unable
to flee from the place where she was standing, or even escape or divert the weapon.
The accused, Augustus Hicks, pleaded not guilty, but notwithstanding his exculpatory allegations
which were certainly not borne out at the trial, the evidence in the case is absolutely at variance
therewith and conclusively establishes, beyond peradventure of doubt, his culpability as the sole fully
convicted author of the violent and treacherous death of his former mistress, Agustina Sola.
It is alleged by the accused that when he withdrew his hand from that of Current, who had seized
him, he fell backward but managed to support himself on his two hands, and when he got up again
the said corporal threatened him with a revolver thrust into his face; whereupon he also drew his
revolver, just as Edward Robinson caught him from behind, when his revolver went off, the bullet
striking the deceased.
This allegation appears to be at variance with the testimony of the witnesses Wallace Current,
Edward Robinson, Luis Corrales, and Lloyd Nickens in their respective declaration, especially with
that of the second and third, who witnessed the actual firing of the shot by the aggressor at the
deceased, as shown by the fact that Robinson immediately approached the accused in order to take
his weapon away from him which he succeeded in doing after a brief struggle, whereupon the
aggressor ran out of the house. Thus, the shot that struck the deceased in the breast and caused
her death was not due to an accident but to a willful and premeditated act on the part of the
aggressor with intent to deprive the victim of her life.
In addition to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, as above referred to, the presence of other
aggravating circumstances, such as premeditation, and the fact that the crime was committed in the
dwelling of the deceased should be taken into consideration. The last-mentioned circumstances
appears proven from the testimony of several witnesses who were examined at the trial of the case.
Inasmuch as in the present case the crime has already been qualified as committed with treachery,
the circumstance of premeditation should only be considered as a merely generic one.
Premeditation is, however, manifest and evident by reason of the open acts executed by the
335
accused. According to the testimony of Charles Gatchery and Eugenio R. Whited, Hicks asked leave
from the former to be absent from the canteen where he was working on the morning of the day
when the affray occurred, alleging that his mind was unsettled and that he feared getting into trouble.
It is also shown by the fact that Whited, who was in Hicks' house about noon upon the latter's
invitation, and while both where drinking gin, and while the revolver, the instrument of the crime, was
lying on the table on which were also several loaded cartridges, heard the accused repeatedly say,
referring to the deceased, that her time had come, adding that he would rather see her dead than in
the arms of another man, and when the accused went to bed apparently very much worried, and
refusing to answer when called, the witness left him. On the day after the crime the police found on a
table in the cuprit's house several loaded cartridges, a bottle of oil and a piece of cloth used
undoubtedly for cleaning the revolver.
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after due
reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order to
accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already provided
with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides those already in
his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and conversed with his victim, in
what appeared to be a proper manner, disguising his intention and claiming her by his apparent
repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design, behaving
himself properly as he had planed to do beforehand.
As against the two foregoing aggravating circumstances no mitigating circumstances is present, not
even that mentioned in paragraph 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code, to wit loss of reason and self-
control produced by jealousy as alleged by the defense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate
the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate feelings,
not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions.
From the foregoing considerations, and as the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the
law, it is our opinion that the same should be affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it with costs, provided,
however, that the death penalty shall be executed according to the law in force, and that in the event
of a pardon being granted, the culprit shall suffer the accessory penalties of article 53 of the Penal
Code unless the same be expressly remitted in the pardon. So ordered.
336
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7094 March 29, 1912

vs.
HILARIO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
F.C. Fisher for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Harvey for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
The guilt of the defendant and appellant of the crime of homicide of which he was convicted in the
court below is conclusively established by the evidenced of record.
The trial court was of opinion that its commission was not marked by either aggravating or
extenuating circumstances, and sentenced the convict to fourteen years eight months and one day
of reclusion temporal, the medium degree of the penalty prescribed by the code. Burt we are of
opinion that the extenuating circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9 should have been taken
into consideration, and that the prescribed penalty should have been imposed in its minimum
degree. Subsection 7 of article 9 is as follows:
The following are extenuating circumstances:
xxx xxx xxx
That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion
and obfuscation.
The evidence clearly discloses that the convict, in the heat of passion, killed the deceased, who had
theretofore been his querida (concubine or lover) upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal
communication with a mutual acquaintance. We think that under the circumstances the convict was
entitled to have this fact taken into consideration in extenuation of his offense under the provisions of
the above-cited article.
337
This was the view taken by the Court of Spain upon a similar state of facts as set forth in its
sentence of July 4, 1892, which is summarized by Viada (p. 69, in question 19, art. 9 of vol. 6) as
follows:
Shall he who kills a woman with whom he is living in concubinage for having caught her in
her underclothes with another party and afterwards shoots himself, inflicting a serious
wound, be responsible for that crime with the extenuating circumstance of having acted with
violent passion and obfuscation? The Audiencia of Santiago de Cuba did not so hold and its
judgment was reversed by the supreme court for the improper disregard of article 9, number
8, of the Penal Code for Cuba and Puerto Rico: "The facts held to be true by the trial court,
and which were the immediate cause of the crime by producing in the accused strong
emotion which impelled him to the criminal act and even to attempt his own life, were a
sufficient impulse in the natural and ordinary course to produce the violent passion and
obfuscation which the law regards as a special reason for extenuation, and as the judgment
did not take into consideration the 8th circumstance of article 9 of the code,
the Audiencia rendering it seems to have violated this legal provision."
It is true that in the case of U.S. vs. Hicks (14 Phil. Rep.., 217), we held that the "causes which
mitigate the criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such as originate from legitimate
feelings, not those which arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoral passions," and declined to give
the benefit of the provisions of this article to the convict in that case on the ground that the alleged
causes for his loss of self-control did not "originate from legitimate feelings." But in that case we
found as facts that:
All the foregoing circumstances conclusively prove that the accused, deliberately and after
due reflection had resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man, and in order
to accomplish his perverse intention with safety, notwithstanding the fact that he was already
provided with a clean and well-prepared weapon and carried other loaded cartridges besides
those already in his revolver, he entered the house, greeting everyone courteously and
conversed with his victim, in what appeared to be in a proper manner, disguising his intention
and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully
accomplish his criminal design, behaving himself properly as he had planned to do
beforehand.
In the former case the cause alleged "passion and obfuscation" of the aggressor was the convict's
vexation, disappointment and deliberate anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue
to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do; his reason for killing her being
merely that he had elected to leave him and with his full knowledge to go and live with another man.
In the present case however, the impulse upon which defendant acted and which naturally
"produced passion and obfuscation" was not that the woman declined to have illicit relations with
him, but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the
arms of another. As said by the supreme court of Spain in the above-cited decision, this was a
"sufficient impulse" in the ordinary and natural course of things to produce the passion and
obfuscation which the law declares to be one of the extenuating circumstances to be taken into
consideration by the court.
Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating
circumstance set out in subsection 7 of article 9, and by the reduction of the penalty of fourteen
years eight months and one day ofreclusion temporal to twelve years and one day of reclusion
temporal, the judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be and are
hereby affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Trent, JJ., concur.
338
G.R. No. L-32243 April 15, 1988

vs.
EUGENIO CRISOSTOMO, accused-appellant.
Jose Ma. Abola for accused- appellant.
GANCAYCO, J.:
On Christmas day, December 25, 1967, between 6:00 and 7:00 o' clock in the evening at Sto.
Rosario, Hagonoy, Bulacan, while Eugenio Crisostomo was passing near the house of Romeo
Geronimo, he met the latter and invited him to have a drink in the place of a friend. Romeo declined
the offer. Suddenly Eugenio rushed towards Romeo who was then standing near a store facing the
street with his back towards Eugenio and shot him with a .22 caliber revolver at a distance of one (1)
meter. The bullet entered about two (2) inches below the axilla (armpit) and came out on the right
side of the chest about one (1) inch to the sternum. Romeo fell to the ground mortally wounded while
Eugenio ran away. By-standers who were near the place such as Delfin Lopez, Ernesto Trillana
Apolonio Santos and Manuel Tamayo and others who were all friends of both the victim and
assailant came to the aid of the fallen victim and brought him to the Reyes Hospital at the Poblacion
of Hagonoy where the doctor pronounced the victim dead upon arrival. Thus, they brought the
victim's body to his home.
An information for murder was filed by the provincial fiscal in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Bulacan against Eugenio Crisostomo charging him of the crime of murder as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December, 1967, in the municipality of Hagonoy,
province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused Eugenio Crisostomo, armed with a firearm and with intent to kill one
Romeo Felipe Geronimo, did then and there unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and shoot the said Romeo Felipe
Geronimo with the firearms he was then provided, hitting the latter on the chest,
causing serious physical injuries thereon, which directly caused the death of the said
Romeo Felipe Geronimo.
339
After the arraignment wherein accused entered a plea of not guilty and again during the trial, the
accused signified his intention to withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of murder and to
substitute it with a plea of guilty to a lesser charge of homicide and prayed that he be allowed to
prove the mitigating circumstances. The same plea was made by the accused after the prosecution
had rested its case but the fiscal did not agree. Thus the court denied the petition.
A decision was rendered on March 28, 1969 convicting the accused of the offense charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds the accused

EUGENIO CRISOSTOMO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER,
punished under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, without any modifying
circumstance and hereby sentences him to Reclusion Perpetua, with the accessories
of the law: to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of TWELVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00); and to pay the costs.
Not satisfied therewith the accused now interposed this appeal alleging that the trial court committed
the following assigned errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT HAS

ADMITTED HAVING KILLED ROMEO GERONIMO, INSTEAD OF LIMITING ITS
FINDING TO THE TRUE EXTENT OF HIS ADMISSION.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE IS EVIDENCE BEYOND

REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT-APPELLANT KILLED ROMEO
GERONIMO, INSTEAD OF FINDING THAT NO EVIDENCE HAD BEEN
PRESENTED AS TO THE ACTUAL CAUSE OF DEATH, THERE HAVING BEEN NO
AUTOPSY PERFORMED ON THE BODY OF ROMEO GERONIMO.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT HAD

ACTED WITH TREACHERY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT DEFENDANT- APPELLANT

IS ENTITLED TO THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF DRUNKENNESS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT

THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING DEFENDANT-

APPELLANT'S OFFER TO PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF HOMICIDE (THE
TRUE CRIME COMMITTED IF ONE HAD IN FACT BEEN COMMITTED AS A
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
340
VII
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CREDITING DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

WITH THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF PRESENCE OF TWO
ORDINARY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF ANY
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE.
Under the first assigned error appellant claims that the trial court erred in finding that he admitted
having killed the victim.
Testifying in his defense the appellant claims that at the time of the incident when he saw the victim
he played a joke on him by drawing his gun from his waist and pointing the same to the victim but
the gun suddenly went off, its bullet hitting the victim. Taken by surprise he fled.
No doubt from the said version of the appellant he effectively admitted having shot the victim Romeo
Geronimo. In fact he fled from the scene of the crime upon realizing the gravity of what he had
committed. It is clear that it was that single shot that felled the victim which was the immediate cause
of his death.
Indeed, during the trial and as late as after the prosecution had rested its case, the appellant offered
to withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute it with a plea of guilty of the lessor offense of
homicide but the prosecution refused to agree with his proposal.
Under the second assigned error the appellant claims that as no autopsy was performed on the body
of the victim the prosecution has not established the actual cause of death of the victim. He
contends that the death certificate of the victim (Exhibit A) to which he offered no objection is
admissible only to establish the fact of death not the cause of the death of the victim. He further
avers that the testimony of Dr. Juan Santos who examined the body of the victim but did not perform
an autopsy shows that he did not qualify as an expert witness; and even if he were an expert witness
there was no basis for him to render an opinion as to the cause of death of the victim. Further,
appellant alleges that Dr. Santos mentioned two (2) wounds of different sizes but otherwise with
exactly identical characteristics from which the possibility may be deduced that the victim may have
been shot twice, the second time by a person other than the appellant.
These arguments are devoid of merit.
Dr. Santos, who was then the municipal health officer of Hagonoy, Bulacan, categorically testified
that the cause of death of the deceased was a through and through gunshot wound which was
caused by a bullet. 1 Although he may not be an expert witness, as a physician and health officer he
is certainly qualified to give an opinion as to the cause of death of the victim. He externally examined
the body of the deceased on the same night of the incident, and found no other sign of external
violence except the shot wound. 2 Under such circumstances, one need not be an expert to render
an opinion that the said gunshot wound was the cause of death of the victim.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Dr. Santos pointed out the difference between the two (2)
wounds on the body of the victim in that the left axilla wound was only 2.5 milimeters, while the right
chest wound was 8 milimeters in diameter; that the former was round while the latter was oval; and
that the former was deep while the latter was shallower He denied that the wounds were of identical
appearance. 3 Dr. Santos emphasized that the left axilla wound is the point of entry of the bullet while
the right chest wound is its point of exit and that the said wounds were caused by one bullet. The
trajectory of the bullet was from the left axilla to the right chest. 4 The speculation of the appellant
that the victim may have been shot twice is thus totally without basis.
341
The death certificate and the notes issued by Dr. Santos after his external examination of the body of
the victim establish the cause of death of the deceased contrary to the contention of the
appellant. 5 In this jurisdiction such death certificate and notes issued by said municipal health officer
in the regular performance of his duty are prima facieevidence of the cause of death of the victim. 6
Moreover, the said death certificate is not only confirmed by the testimony of Dr. Santos and by two
(2) eyewitnesses Manuel Tamayo and Delfin Lopez who stated that they saw the appellant rush at
the victim and suddenly shoot him; that the victim fell down after he was hit; and that they brought
him to the hospital but the doctor pronounced him dead on arrival. These two witnesses are mutual
friends of both the deceased and the appellant so that their testimonies are free from any suspicion
of bias or prejudice.
The appellant assails the findings of the court a quo that he acted with treachery in the commission
of the offense as a third assigned error. He contends that while it may be true that he suddenly
attacked the victim, it does not appear that he had consciously adopted the mode of attack intended
to facilitate the perpetuation of the offense without risk to himself. In fact appellant claims that he was
drunk and as such he could not have reflected on the special means of the execution of the act.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, method or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 7
The suddenness of the attack does not, of itself, suffice to support the findings of alevosia. 8 There
must be evidence that the mode of attack was consciously adopted by the appellant to make it
impossible or hard for the person attacked to defend himself or retaliate. 9
In the present case, the appellant admitted that he had a previous altercation with the victim wherein
he was hit by the deceased with a bottle because of certain differences they had in a billiard hall
although he claimed to have resumed friendly relations with the victim thereafter. 10 Nevertheless, at
the time of the incident, the appellant went through the motion of inviting the victim to join him in a
drinking spree which the victim declined and then suddenly, without any ceremony, he shot the victim
while his (the victim's) back was turned. The appellant used a gun, a lethal weapon to insure his
design to kill the victim. He fired at him at a short distance aiming at a vital spot of his body. The
victim was unarmed. From the environmental circumstances of the case, alevosia has been fully
established. 11
Under the fourth assigned error appellant alleges that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
drunkenness. He asserts that he had been drinking from one o'clock in the afternoon on that
Christmas day and that he had been drunk five (5) times in his entire life so that it is not habitual.
Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be taken into
consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise
when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The allegation of the appellant that he was drunk when he committed the offense is self-serving and
uncorroborated. Besides, appellant admitted that at that time he was only dizzy, 12 and that he was
on the way to another drinking spree. Obviously he had not drunk enough. He remembers the details
of the shooting, the time it started and ended, how much wine he imbibed and the persons who were
with him. He realized the gravity of the offense he committed so he fled and hid from the authorities.
He sought sanctuary in the chapel of Sto. Rosario, boarded a tricycle going to the poblacion and
took a La Mallorca bus to Manila. All these are acts of a man whose mental capacity has not been
impaired.
342
As the fifth assigned error appellant argues that he should be credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender stating that although he hid himself from the authorities for ten
(10) days, he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities thereafter upon the advice of his parents.
The requisites of voluntary surrender are: (a) that the offender had not actually been arrested; (b)
that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c) that the
surrender was voluntary.13
The testimony of the appellant is not disputed by the prosecution that while in hiding, upon the
advise of his parents, he voluntarily surrendered on January 4, 1968, so he was detained in the
municipal jail of Hagonoy. 14The Court agrees that the appellant is entitled to this mitigating
circumstance.
However, he cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense of the charge of homicide as invoked under the sixth assigned error. The requisites of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty are: (1) that the offender spontaneously confessed
his guilt; (2) that the confession of guilt was made in open court, that is, before the competent court
that is to try the case; and (3) that the confession of guilt was made prior to the presentation of
evidence for the prosecution. 15
In the present case the appellant offered to enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
only after some evidence of the prosecution had been presented. He reiterated his offer after the
prosecution rested its case. This is certainly not mitigating. 16
In the light of the foregoing discussion, the seventh assigned error where the appellant claims that
he should be entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance is consequently without merit.
The offense committed is the crime of murder as the killing was qualified by treachery. 17 Considering
that the commission of the offense is attended by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant is hereby imposed the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment of Ten (10) Years and One (1) Day of prision mayor as minimum to Seventeen (17)
Years, Four (4) Months, and One (1) Day of reclusion temporalas maximum. The indemnity for the
death of the victim is increased to P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and indemnity, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED in all other respects, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
343
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 130654. July 28, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EDUARDO BASIN JAVIER,accused-

appellant.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision [1] dated April 15, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court
of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32,[2] in Criminal Case No. A-3155, convicting accused-appellant Eduardo
Javier of the crime of parricide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P21,730.00 as actual
expenses.
The Information filed before the trial court which charged accused-appellant with the crime of
parricide reads as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of June 1996, in the Municipality of Santo Tomas, Province of La
Union, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
with the intent to and being then armed with a bolo, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and use of personal violence, by hacking with the said weapon one
FLORENTINA JAVIER Y LACESTE, his legitimate spouse, and as a result of which his said wife
suffered fatal injuries which directly caused her death immediately thereafter, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
Contrary to law."[3]
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.
The prosecution evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Consolacion Javier Panit and Alma
Javier, daughters of the victim and accused-appellant, and SPO1 Rotelio Pacho are detailed as
follows:
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the victim Florentina Laceste Javier were legally married
on December 18, 1954.[4] In their forty-one years of marriage, they begotten children. Accused-
344
appellant and Florentina lived at Tubod, Sto. Tomas, La Union with one of their daughters, Alma
Javier.[5]
On June 15, 1996 between two o'clock and three oclock in the morning, Consolacion Javier
Panit, who lives near her parent's house about ten to fifteen meters away, heard her mother,
Florentina shouting "Arayatan dac ta papatayen nac ni Tatangyo" (Your father is going to kill
me). After she heard her mother scream for help, Consolacion rushed out of her house and met her
sister, Alma who, weeping, told her that their parents were quarrelling. Alma, at the time of the
incident was living in her parents' house.Consolacion and Alma then proceeded to their brother
Manuel's house, which is located about seventy to eighty meters away from their parents'
house. The three then proceeded to their parents' house. Manuel, who entered first, found the
lifeless body of his mother and his father, accused-appellant, wounded in the abdomen. Manuel then
ordered Consolacion to get a tricycle to bring their father to the hospital. At this point, Manuel
informed her sisters that their mother was dead and that their father confessed to him that he killed
his wife and thereafter allegedly stabbed himself. Florentina was found dead in their bedroom,
drenched in her own blood.[6]
Accused-appellant was brought to the hospital by Consolacion's husband, Fernando, and her
son, Jefferson, while Manuel went out to get help.[7]
SPO1 Rotelio Pacho, assigned as desk investigator at the Sto. Tomas Police Station in La
Union, testified in the investigation he conducted with SPO4 Manuel Zarate and SPO1 Agaton
Laroza regarding the incident of June 15, 1996. He stated that he received a call for assistance from
the barangay captain of Tugod, Sto. Tomas because accused-appellant allegedly killed his wife. The
police authorities then proceeded to accused-appellant's house in Brgy. Tugod, Sto. Tomas, where
they saw Florentina lying in the bedroom floor covered with blood. Upon interviewing the victim's
children, Pacho testified that Manuel told him that his father confessed to killing his wife. Manuel
then surrendered to him the bolo covered with blood which was found in the bedroom. The bolo was
allegedly used by accused-appellant in assaulting his wife. [8] The medical findings indicated that the
victim suffered from multiple injuries and her neck was almost cut off from her body. [9]
Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier, in his testimony, admitted killing his wife in their bedroom
with the use of a sharp bolo. He identified the bolo as the same one presented by the prosecution as
Exhibit "A" and which he used in wounding himself. Accused-appellant told the court that he killed
his wife because he could not sleep for almost a month. He claimed that when the killing took place,
his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he was doing. [10] He claims that he was insane
at the time of the incident.
The trial court rejected accused-appellant's defense of insanity and on April 15, 1997 rendered a
decision finding him guilty of parricide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration, the accused, Eduardo Javier y Basin is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of death; to pay the heirs of the victims the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages for the death of the victim and P21,730.00 as actual expenses; and
to pay the cost of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED."[11]
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty,
considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances of illness of the offender and passion and
obfuscation.[12] While accused-appellant does not question the decision of the trial court in rejecting
his defense of insanity, he argues that he should be meted a lower penalty because at the time of
the incident, he was suffering from loss of sleep for a prolonged period of time, which would have
caused him to commit the crime.
He further contends that his suspicion that his wife was having an illicit relationship with another
man, aggravated by his illness, goaded him to commit the crime.
345
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that accused-appellant cannot
claim the mitigating circumstance of illness in the absence of a medical finding to support his
claim. Accused-appellant cannot likewise be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation in the absence of sufficient evidence.
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Accused-appellant, during trial, admitted killing his wife, but interposed as defense the
exempting circumstance of insanity. However, the trial court rejected this defense of insanity for
failure of the defense to prove that accused-appellant was indeed insane at the time of the
incident. The defense never presented any medical record of the accused-appellant, nor was a
psychiatrist ever presented to validate the defense of insanity. Equally important, the defense, during
trial, never alleged the above-claimed mitigating circumstances of illness and passion and
obfuscation, thus weakening the case of accused-appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleged that prior to the incident, he had been suffering from
insomnia for around a month, thus leading him to commit an act beyond his control, the killing of his
wife, Florentina. The defense went on to cite medical literature on the effects of total and partial
sleep loss to support his contentions.[13]
For the mitigating circumstance of illness of the offender to be appreciated, the law requires the
presence of the following requisites: (1) illness must diminish the exercise of the will-power of the
offender; and (2) such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. [14]
Since accused-appellant has already admitted to the killing, it is incumbent upon him to prove
the claimed mitigating circumstance of illness. In this case, however, aside from the testimony of the
accused that his mind went blank when he killed his wife due to loss of sleep, no medical finding was
presented regarding his mental condition at the time of killing. This Court can hardly rely on the bare
allegations of accused-appellant, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures. No clear and
convincing evidence was shown that accused-appellant was suffering an illness which diminished
his exercise of will-power at the time of the killing.
On the other hand, it is clear that accused-appellant was aware of the acts he committed. First,
he remembered killing his wife in their bedroom with the use of a bolo, where he mangled her neck
twice; he remembered trying to commit suicide, by wounding himself with the same bolo he used in
killing his wife; and he remembered being brought to the hospital. Since he remembered the vital
circumstances surrounding the ghastly incident, from the time of the killing up to the time he was
brought to the hospital, it shows that he was in full control of his mental faculties. This negates his
claim that he was suffering from an illness that diminished the exercise of his will-power. On the
basis of the foregoing, we cannot appreciate the mitigating circumstance alleged by accused-
appellant.
Neither can we appreciate the circumstance of passion and obfuscation to mitigate his criminal
liability.
In order to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the following
elements should concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such
condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the
commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover
his moral equanimity.[15] The foregoing elements were not proved to be present in instant case. In
fact, during accused-appellant's testimony, he even stated that he was not jealous of his wife.
As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General:
"In the case of appellant, there is lack of proof of the cause which produced the alleged passion and
obfuscation. Appellant, in his testimony, did not account how he killed his wife nor did he explain the
cause why he was prompted to kill his wife. Verily, there exists no justifiable basis for applying to him
this mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation as the cause which produced it has not been
established."[16]
346
All told, the allegations propounded by accused-appellant that his suspicions regarding his wife,
aggravated by his illness made it possible for him to kill his own wife, is but a mere afterthought to
whittle down his criminal liability.
Additionally, it is a settled rule that factual findings of the trial courts will generally not be
disturbed by the appellate court because it is in the best position to properly evaluate testimonial
evidence considering that it observes the demeanor, conduct and attitude of witnesses during the
trial. In the case at bar, the trial court was able to observe the behaviour of accused-appellant and it
stated that his recollection of the details surrounding the killing is so impeccable that only a person in
his right mind can make it.
Thus, the trial court was correct in convicting accused-appellant of the crime of parricide under
Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, Section 5) which
provides that:
"Any person who shall kill his father, mother or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."
The crime of parricide, not being a capital crime per se as it is not punishable by mandatory
death penalty but by the flexible penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, two indivisible penalties, the
application of the lesser or the greater penalty depends on the presence of mitigating and
aggravating circumstances.[17]
In this case, the information for parricide against accused-appellant did not allege any
aggravating circumstance. Nor did the evidence show that the prosecution was able to prove any
aggravating circumstance.[18] Likewise, no mitigating circumstance is appreciated by this Court in
favor of the accused-appellant. Thus, in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance
for the accused-appellant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.
As regards the monetary liability, the Court takes the amount of P50,000.00 imposed by the trial
court as one of civil indemnity instead of as moral damages.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 32, in
Criminal Case No. A-3155 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
Eduardo Javier y Basin should suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
347
[G.R. No. 128618. November 16, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FELICISIMO NARVASA, JIMMY ORANIA

and MATEO NARVASA, accused, FELICISIMO NARVASA and JIMMY
ORANIA appellants.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
What crime or crimes are committed when a killing is perpetrated with the use of unlicensed
firearms? In the absence of the firearms themselves, may illegal possession of firearms be proven
by parol evidence?
The Case
Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania seek the reversal of the October 11, 1996
Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case Nos. 2629-A, 2648-
A and 2646-A, finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearms in its
aggravated form and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Emiliano A. Rabina filed three Informations [2] against the
appellants and their co-accused, Mateo Narvasa. In Criminal Case No. 2648-A, the Amended
Information filed on November 10, 1993 charged Felicisimo Narvasa (in conspiracy with the other
accused) with aggravated illegal possession of firearm allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about February 6, 1992 at Sitio Bugtong, Barangay Patar, [M]unicipality of Agno,
[P]rovince of Pangasinan, New [sic] Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody an M-14 Rifle without first securing the necessary
license or permit from the lawful authorities and which firearm in conspiracy with Jimmy Orania and
Mateo Narvasa was used in the killing of one SPO3 Primo Camba, victim in Crim. Case No. 2629-A.
348
In Criminal Case No. 2646-A, Jimmy Orania (in conspiracy with the other accused) was charged
with aggravated illegal possession of firearm in the Amended Information which reads:
That on or about February 6, 1992 at Sitio Bugtong, Barangay Patar, [M]unicipality of Agno,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody a .30 U.S. Carbine without first securing the necessary
license /and/or permit from the lawful authorities and which firearm in conspiracy with Mateo
Narvasa and Felicisimo Narvasa was used in the killing of SPO3 Primo Camba, victim in Crim. Case
No. 2629-A.
In Criminal Case No. 2629-A, Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania and Mateo Narvasa were
charged with homicide allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about February 6, 1992, at Sitio Bugtong, [B]arangay Patar, [M]unicipality of Agno,
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, armed with high powered guns, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously shoot SPO3 PRIMO CAMBA which caused his instantaneous death as a consequence,
to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were arrested, but Mateo Narvasa remained at
large. When arraigned, the two appellants, assisted by their counsel, [3] pleaded not guilty.[4] Trial
proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing premises and the evidence presented, this Court
finds both accused Felicisimo Narvasa in Criminal Case No. 2648-A and Jimmy Orania in Criminal
Case No.2646-A [g]uilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of [i]llegal [p]ossession of [f]irearms in
its aggravated form in these cases and therefore, both accused are sentenced to death penalty but
for reasons that the law at that time of the commission of the crime prohibits death sentence penalty,
these two accused therefore shall each suffer the sentence of single, indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua and are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 as death indemnity and moral damages of P100,000.00 each, plus cost.
In Criminal Case No. 2629-A for [h]omicide, this Court has considered this case as [a] necessary
component of the crimes of [i]llegal [p]ossession in their aggravated form, as the same is merely an
element of the principal offense of [i]llegal [p]ossession of [f]irearms in [its] aggravated form, which is
the graver offense.
With respect to accused Mateo Narvasa, since he has not been arrested and never brought to the
jurisdiction of this Court, this case in the meantime, is ordered archived insofar as said accused
Mateo Narvasa is concerned.
Let an Alias Warrant of Arrest issue as against accused Mateo Narvasa.
The [b]ailbond posted by accused Felicisimo Narvasa is hereby ordered cancelled.
Appellants counsel then filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals. [5] In an Order[6] dated
October 24, 1996, the trial court deemed the appeal filed by Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania
perfected, and effected the transmittal of the case records to the Court of Appeals. Realizing the
mistake, the Court of Appeals subsequently forwarded the records to this Court. [7]
349
The Facts
Evidence for the Prosecution
In his Brief, the solicitor general[8] presented the following narration of facts:
On February 6, 1992, after lunch time[,] Villamor Laderas and Ernesto Nagal, councilmen of
Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan, acting on a report that there were missing carabaos, pigs and
goats, repaired to the far-flung Sitio Bugtong of the town of Bani and to Sitio Patar of the adjoining
town of Agno in Pangasinan, which they reached at around 5:30 that afternoon. Then Laderas and
Nagal patrolled the area. Along their way, the two chanced upon the gang of appellants[.] [T]hey
were five and three of them were armed. Jimmy Orania was holding a caliber .30 U.S. carbine,
Mateo Narvasa was armed with [an] M-16 and Felicisimo Narvasa was carrying an M-14.
The two are familiar with those kind[s] of guns as they have seen similar ones carried by policemen.
They said, a carbine is shorter than [an] M-14 and [an] M-16 is longer than [an] M-14 (Tsn., April 21,
1994, pp. 1-35, December 13, 1995, pp. 1-12).
Laderas and Nagal simply stared at the five and then they proceeded to their way home. Unluckily
for the goons, the two councilmen met the two policemen[,] SPO3 Primo Camba and PO2 Simeon
Navora who were on patrol and they reported what they saw (Ibid).
The two policemen were also responding to a report about the missing animals and they suggested
that all of them should track down the armed goons (Ibid).
After walking some distance, the four responding men saw the house of appellant Felicisimo
Narvasa on a hilly portion around 100 meters away from their path. They decided to investigate at
the house but before they could negotiate the distance, they were met by a volley of gunfire. The
four[,] who were ten meters apart[,] dove and sought cover (Tsn., April, 1994, p. 11). When the firing
took a halt, Laderas had the courage to raise his head and [view] xxx the source of the gunfire.
Laderas saw Felicisimo Narvasa in a squatting position aiming at the two policemen and Jimmy
Orania was seated near him guiding him at his target. Mateo Narvasa was also aiming his gun.
There was an exchange of gunfire as the policemen were able to take proper positions.
Unfortunately, SPO3 Camba was hit. Navora summoned Laderas and Nagal to get closer to give aid
to Camba. Laderas and Nagal carried Camba as they retreated and, Navora followed moving
backwards as he kept firing at their enemies (Ibid, tsn., July 20, 1994, pp. 1-8; tsn., August 15, 1994,
pp. 2-30).
In the process of the retreat, Camba [bled] profusely and he died even before he could be brought
out from the scene of the crime.
The body of Camba was left at the scene of the crime while his companions escaped and called for
help. Several policemen arrived. Pieces of evidence like empty shells of M-16, M-14 and caliber .30
U.S. carbine bullets were gathered and some policemen were tasked to track down the goons (Exhs.
C, C-1 to C-4; tsn., August 16, 1994, pp. 6-10).
Shortly thereafter, Felicisimo Narvasa, Glicerio Narvasa, Rederio Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were
apprehended. Mateo Narvasa was not found. The four were investigated and paraffin tested.
Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania were found positive of gunpowder burns (Tsn., August 16,
1994, pp. 11-15).[9]
Evidence for the Defense
350
Appellants deny the charges against them. Felicisimo Narvasa even claims that his son Arnel
was shot by Ernesto Nagal, Villamor Laderas and PO2 Simeon Navora. In their Brief,[10] they state:
Felicisimo Narvasa testified that he was sleeping at his house on the afternoon of February 6, 1992
when Glicerio Narvasa woke him up and informed him that his son Arnel was shot. He went
downstairs and saw his co-accused Jimmy Orania embracing his son. He asked his son who shot
him and the latter told his father that it was the group of Councilman Laderas who shot him. He
instructed Orania and his wife to bring his son to the hospital but the latter died at the hospital. He
further averred that before he slept, Jimmy Orania, Glicerio Narvasa and Rederio Narvasa were in
his house drinking two bottles of gin after helping him [fix] the fence in his house. Accused-appellant
Narvasa when asked to explain the charge against him denied committing the same. On March 17,
1992 he gave his affidavit naming Ernesto Nagal, Villamor Laderas and Simeon Navora as the
assailants of his son. (TSN, August 8, 1999, pp. 3-17)
Jimmy Orania testified that on February 6, 1992, he was in the house of his co-accused Felicisimo
Narvasa because he was invited to work on the fence of Felicisimo. After finishing their work,
Jimmy[,] together with Glicerio and Rederio Narvasa[,] drunk two bottles of gin. At about 5:00 oclock
in the afternoon he instructed Arnel Narvasa to get their carabaos grazing around 100 meters north
of the house of Felicisimo, when he heard a gunshot coming from that direction. Arnel shouted for
help, so he proceeded to the place where Arnel was shot and carried him to the house of Felicisimo.
The latter was awakened by Glicerio and when he asked his son who shot him, Arnel answered that
it was the group of Laderas.
Jimmy Orania further averred that he knew nothing and denied participation in the killing of Primo
Camba. That on the day after February 6, 1992, they were picked up by the police. (TSN, August 20,
1996, pp. 3-13).[11]
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and held that mere denial could
not overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-powered firearms to
shoot at the prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death of SPO3 Primo Camba. Further
supporting said testimonies were the results of the paraffin test conducted on appellants and the
recovery of various cartridges and shells matching the firearms purportedly used in the
crime. Though these unlicensed firearms were not presented as evidence, the trial court,
citing People v. Ferrera,[12] ruled that appellants may still be convicted of illegal possession of
firearms.
Finally, the trial court found that appellants acted in conspiracy in the killing of Primo
Camba.However, on the basis of People v. Barros,[13] it held that the homicide was merely an
element of the illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form; thus, homicide in the present
case was taken into account not as a separate crime but as an aggravating circumstance which
increased the penalty for the illegal possession of firearms.
Hence, this appeal.[14]
Assignment of Errors
In assailing the trial courts Decision, appellants interpose the following errors:
351
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE
TO THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR THE
PROSECUTION.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS

DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE TO
WARRANT CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF AGGRAVATED ILLEGAL POSSESSION
OF FIREARM.[15]
In the main, the resolution of this case revolves around the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence and the characterization of the crime
committed.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is not meritorious. In light of Republic Act 8294, [16] however, appellants should be
convicted only of homicide, with the special aggravating circumstance of the use of illegally
possessed firearms.
First Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses
Appellants question the credibility of Witnesses Laderas and Nagal because of an alleged
inconsistency in their testimonies. Laderas testified that there was an exchange of fire between
appellants and PO2 Simeon Navora, while Nagal declared that only the appellants fired. Appellants
point out that conflicting testimonies on a material and relevant point casts doubt [on] the
truthfulness or veracity[17] of such testimonies.
Appellants contention is untenable. The circumstances of the instant case explain the seeming
inconsistency in the testimonies of the two witnesses. At the time, they were under fire and in fear of
losing their lives. Moreover, they did not take cover in the same place that Navora did.
Nonetheless, their uncertainty on whether Navora had fired back is immaterial to the crime
charged and too insignificant to impair their credibility. In any event, the Court has ruled that a
witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of minute details. [18]
Second Issue: Sufficiency of the Evidence
Appellants cite People v. Lualhati,[19] wherein this Court ruled that in crimes involving illegal
possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the
existence of the subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess the same. Appellants contend that the
existence of the firearms was not sufficiently proven because the prosecution had not presented the
firearms as evidence. It is necessary, they argue, that said firearms allegedly possessed by the
accused-appellants and allegedly used in the killing of Policeman Primo Camba be presented in
evidence as those firearms constitute the corpus delicti of the crime with which they are sentenced.
[20]
352
Appellants argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated that the
existence of the firearm must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be presented
as evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela,[21] the Court held that the existence of the firearm can be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said firearm. In the said case,
Appellant Orehuela was convicted of qualified illegal possession of a firearm despite the fact that the
firearm used was not presented as evidence. The existence of the weapon was deemed amply
established by the testimony of an eyewitness that Orehuela was in possession of it and had used it
to kill the victim, viz.:
We consider that the certification was adequate to show that the firearm used by Modesto Orehuela
in killing Teoberto Canizares was a firearm which Orehuela was not licensed to possess and to carry
outside his residence on the night that Teoberto Canizares was shot to death. That that firearm was
a .38 caliber pistol was shown by the testimony and report of NBI Ballistician Bonifacio Ayag. When
the above circumstances are taken together with the testimony of the eyewitness that Modesto
Orehuela was in fact in possession of a firearm and used the same to kill Teoberto Canizares,
we believe that accused Orehuela was properly found guilty of aggravated or qualified illegal
possession of firearm and ammunition.
In the present case, the testimonies of several witnesses indubitably demonstrate the existence
of the firearms. Villamor Laderas stated that when he went to Barangay Quinaoayanan, Bani,
Pangasinan to investigate a report regarding missing carabaos, pigs and goats, he saw the
appellants carrying long firearms. We quote hereunder the relevant portion of his testimony:
Q And when you saw the two accused together with the three others, what have you noticed in
their persons?
A They were holding long firearms, sir.
Q Who of the five persons did you see was holding long firearms?
A Jimmy Orania was holding a carbine; Mateo Narvasa was holding an M-16.
Q About Felicisimo Narvasa, what was he holding?
A Felicisimo Narvasa was holding [an] M-14.[22]
Ernesto Nagal likewise stated that he saw appellants carrying long firearms, as his testimony
indicates:
Q What did you notice in the persons of the five persons you met?
A They were carrying arms, sir.
Q What kind of firearm were the five persons, or some of them, carrying?
A Jimmy Orania is carrying a caliber .30.
Q How about Mateo Narvasa?
A Mateo Narvasa is carrying [an] M-16.
Q How about Felicisimo Narvasa?
A A long firearm was carried by Felicisimo Narvasa, sir, but I dont know the caliber. [23]
That herein appellants were the ones who had shot at the prosecution witnesses was confirmed
by Laderas, who testified as follows:
Q How did you know that the gunfire came from the west?
A Because we were facing west.
Q And while the gunfire was going on, did you know who fired those gunshots?
353
A We know sir, because we can see them.
Q Whom did you see?
A Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania and Mateo Narvasa, sir. [24]
In addition, Primo Camba was hit by a bullet, and empty shells of M-16, M-14 and .30 caliber
carbine bullets were later on recovered in the vicinity of the place where the shooting occurred.
The above facts, duly proven and taken together, sufficiently establish the existence of the
subject firearms and the fact that appellants possessed and used said firearms in firing at Villamor
Laderas, Ernesto Nagal, and Simeon Navora, as well as Primo Camba who succumbed to the
gunshot wound he had sustained.
The present case can be distinguished from People v. Navarro[25] wherein the Court held that
illegal possession of firearm could not be deemed an aggravating circumstance because the
existence of the said firearm was not proven. In said case, a witness testified that he saw appellant
shoot the victim with a short firearm. No firearm, however, was presented as evidence, although a
gun was recovered from the accused when he was arrested. Moreover, no proof was adduced to
show that the firearm allegedly seen by the witness was the same one recovered by the
authorities from the accused. Thus, the Court held:
In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5, 1991, the appellant had in his
possession an unlicensed firearm which he used in killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was
allegedly recovered on January 5, 1994, when appellant was arrested. However, said firearm was
not presented in court or offered as evidence against the appellant. Although Rabago testified that
he saw the appellant with a short firearm when the latter shot Rabadon on January 5, 1991 no other
proof was presented to show that such gun,allegedly used on January 5, 1991, was the same one
recovered on January 5, 1994. The prosecution was not able to establish sufficiently the existence of
the subject firearm x x x.
In other words, the evidence on the existence of the firearm was beset with doubt and
conflict. Such uncertainty is not found in the present case, for the testimonies of several
witnesses indubitably established that the subject firearms were in the possession of the appellants.
As to proof that appellants had no license or permit to possess the firearms in question, we
have held in People v. Villanueva[26] that the second element of illegal possession of firearms can be
proven by the testimony or the certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives
Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the firearm in question. The Court ruled:
As we have previously held, the testimony of, or a certification from the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused-appellant was not a licensee of the said firearm would have
sufficed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession.
The prosecution submitted a certification showing that Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and
Jimmy Orania were not licensed firearm holders, [27] a fact that was attested to by SPO4 Roberto
Manuel, a member of the PNP stationed at the provincial headquarters of the Pangasinan Provincial
Command as Assistant Firearms and Explosives NCPO, who testified thus:
Q And did you bring with you the Master List of the firearm licensed holders in Pangasinan?
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you please produce it?
A (Witness showing a folder, which is the Master List of firearm licensed holders in Pangasinan.)
Q And with the aid of that voluminous list of firearm holders in Pangasinan, will you please tell his
Honor if Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania appear therein as licensed firearm holders?
354
A Their names do not appear, as manifested by our [Master List as licensed] holders of any
caliber, sir.[28]
Appellants did not present any evidence and neither did they even claim -- that they were in fact
licensed firearm holders.
Appellants Responsible
for Policemans Death
Laderas, Nagal and Navora testified that as their group, which included Primo Camba,
approached Felicisimo Narvasas house, they were suddenly fired upon. Camba was hit and it was
from that bullet wound that he died. That appellants were responsible for his death is clear from
Navoras testimony:
Q And on your way following them what happened?
A When we were about 100 meters North of the House of Ising Narvasa we were met [by] a
heavy volume of gunfire.
Q Now, if you were met according to you with heavy volume of gunfire, what did you xxx and your
companion [do]?
A We dive[d] to the ground for safety, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q Upon diving to the ground, what happened to Primo Camba?
A Primo Camba was hit, sir[.]
Q How did you come to know that Primo Camba was hit by the first exchange of gunfire?
A Just after we dived to the ground, xxx Primo Camba told me that he was hit.
Q And when Primo Camba told you that he was hit, what did you do?
A I signalled the two (2) councilmen to get near me.
xxxxxxxxx
''Q After giving instruction to the two (2) councilmen, what did you do?
A They carr[ied] him while we were retreating.
Q Carried the body of Primo Camba, to what place?
A We retreated [to the] East direction, until we reach the yard of [a] certain Prudencio.
xxxxxxxxx
Q And when you reach[ed] the premises of Prudencio, what was the condition of Primo Camba?
A He [was] no longer breathing, sir.[29]
Laderas was able to identify their attackers as Felicisimo Narvasa, Jimmy Orania and Mateo
Narvasa.As these three directed and fired their guns at Laderas, Nagal, Navora and Camba, there
was unity in action and purpose, and thus, conspiracy was present. Although it was not ascertained
who among them actually shot Camba, all of them are liable for his death. In conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all.
Third Issue:
355
The Crime
The totality of the evidence shows that appellants possessed unlicensed firearms, which they
used in killing Primo Camba. In its Decision, the trial court convicted appellants of [i]llegal
[p]ossession of [f]irearms in its aggravated form and considered homicide merely an element of the
principal offense of[i]llegal [p]ossession of [f]irearms in its aggravated form. Applying People v.
Barros[30] to the proven facts, the trial court imposed upon appellants the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. However, a new law has in the meanwhile been enacted.
Republic Act No. 8294,[31] which imposes a lighter penalty for the crime, provides:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. -- The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen Thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition; Provided, That no other crime was committed.
The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty Thousand pesos (P30,000)
shall be imposed if the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores
bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9 millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, .45 and also lesser
calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357 and caliber .22 center-fire magnum
and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or three; Provided,
however, That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In People v. Molina,[32] this Court en banc explained that RA 8294 considers the use of an
unlicensed firearm only an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, viz.:
Under our ruling in People vs. Quijada, violation of PD 1866 is an offense distinct from murder;
appellants should perforce be culpable for two separate offenses, as ruled by the trial court.
Fortunately for appellants, however, RA 8294 has now amended the said decree and considers the
use of an unlicensed firearm simply as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, and not
as a separate offense.
Under RA 8294, appellants can be held liable only for homicide [33] and penalized with reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, [34] RA 8294 should be given retroactive
effect.
Civil Liability
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, appellants are liable to pay, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Primo Camba the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as indemnity ex delicto for his
death.
However, the award of two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000) representing moral damages
should be deleted since no evidence of anxiety, moral shock, wounded feelings or similar injury was
presented during the trial.
356
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. For the death of Primo Camba,
Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania are found GUILTY of HOMICIDE with the special
aggravating circumstance of using unlicensed firearms. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
they are each sentenced to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal, as maximum; and ordered to pay the heirs of Primo Camba P50,000 as death
indemnity.However, the award of moral damages is hereby DELETED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 140937. February 28, 2001]
EXUPERANCIO CANTA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision, dated August 31, 1999, and resolution,
dated November 22, 1999, of the Court of Appeals, [1] which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 25, Maasin, Southern Leyte, [2] finding petitioner Exuperancio Canta guilty of
violation of P.D. No. 533, otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974, and sentencing
him to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years, five (5)
months, and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
The information against petitioner alleged:
That on or about March 14, 1986, in the municipality of Malitbog, province of Southern Leyte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent
to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take, steal and carry away one (1)
black female cow belonging to Narciso Gabriel valued at Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00) without
the knowledge and consent of the aforesaid owner, to his damage and prejudice in the amount
aforestated.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
The prosecution established the following facts:

Narciso Gabriel acquired from his half-sister Erlinda Monter a cow, subject of the case, upon its
birth on March 10, 1984. The cow remained under the care of Erlinda Monter for
sometime. Subsequently, Narciso gave the care and custody of the animal, first, to Generoso
Cabonce, from October 24, 1984 to March 17, 1985; then to Maria Tura, from May 17, 1985 to
March 2, 1986; and lastly, to Gardenio Agapay, from March 3, 1986 until March 14, 1986 when it was
lost.[4] It appears that at 5 oclock in the afternoon of March 13, 1986, Agapay took the cow to graze in
357
the mountain of Pilipogan in Barangay Candatag, about 40 meters from his hut. However, when he
came back for it at past 9 oclock in the morning of March 14, 1986, Agapay found the cow gone. He
found hoof prints which led to the house ofFilomeno Vallejos. He was told that petitioner Exuperancio
Canta had taken the animal.[5]
Upon instructions of the owner, Gardenio and Maria Tura went to recover the animal from
petitioners wife, but they were informed that petitioner had delivered the cow to his father, Florentino
Canta, who was at that time barangay captain of Laca, Padre Burgos, Southern Leyte. Accordingly,
the two went to Florentinos house. On their way, they met petitioner who told them that if Narciso
was the owner, he should claim the cow himself. Nevertheless, petitioner accompanied the two to his
fathers house, where Maria recognized the cow. As petitioners father was not in the house, petitioner
told Gardenio and Maria he would call them the next day so that they could talk the matter over with
his father.
However, petitioner never called them. Hence, Narciso Gabriel reported the matter to the police
of Malitbog, Southern Leyte. [6] As a result, Narciso and petitioner Exuperancio were called to an
investigation. Petitioner admitted taking the cow but claimed that it was his and that it was lost on
December 3, 1985. He presented two certificates of ownership, one dated March 17, 1986 and
another dated February 27, 1985, to support his claim (Exh. B).[7]
Narciso presented a certificate of ownership issued on March 9, 1986, signed by the municipal
treasurer, in which the cow was described as two years old and female. On the reverse side of the
certificate is the drawing of a cow with cowlicks in the middle of the forehead, between the ears, on
the right and left back, and at the base of the forelegs and hindlegs (Exhs. C, C-1 to 4). [8] All four
caretakers of the cow identified the cow as the same one they had taken care of, based on the
location of its cowlicks, its sex, and its color. Gardenio described the cow as black in color, with a
small portion of its abdomen containing a brownish cowlick, a cowlick in the middle of the forehead,
another at the back portion between the two ears, and four cowlicks located near the base of its
forelegs and the hindlegs.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed he acquired the animal under an agreement which he had
with Pat. Diosdado Villanueva, that petitioner take care of a female cow of Pat. Villanueva in
consideration for which petitioner would get a calf if the cow produced two offsprings. Petitioner
claimed that the cow in question was his share and that it was born on December 5, 1984. This cow,
however, was lost on December 2, 1985. Petitioner said he reported the loss to the police
of Macrohon, Padre Burgos, and Malitbog, on December 3, 1985 (Exh. A and Exh. 1). [10]
Petitioner said that on March 14, 1986, his uncle Meno told him that he had seen the cow at
Pilipogan, under the care of Gardenio Agapay. He, therefore, went to Pilipogan with the mother cow
on March 14, 1986 to see whether the cow would suckle the mother cow. As the cow did, petitioner
took it with him and brought it, together with the mother cow, to his father Florentino Canta. [11] Maria
Tura tried to get the cow, but Florentino refused to give it to her and instead told her to call Narciso
so that they could determine the ownership of the cow. [12] As Narciso did not come the following day,
although Maria did, Florentino said he told his son to take the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre
Burgos. Petitioner did as he was told. Three days later, Florentino and Exuperancio were called to
the police station for investigation.[13]
Petitioner presented a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle dated February 27, 1985 [14] and
a statement executed by Franklin Telen, janitor at the treasurers office of the municipality of Padre
Burgos,to the effect that he issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the name of
petitioner Exuperancio Canta on February 27, 1985 (Exh. 5). [15] The statement was executed at the
preliminary investigation of the complaint filed by petitioner against Narciso. [16]
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership was, however, denied by the municipal treasurer, who
stated that petitioner Exuperancio Canta had no Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle in the
municipality of Padre Burgos (Exhs. E, E-1 and 2). [17] On the other hand, Telen testified that he
issued the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle to petitioner on March 24, 1986 but, at the
instance of petitioner, he (Telen) antedated it to February 27, 1985. [18]
358
On January 24, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding petitioner guilty of the offense
charged. In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
From the affidavits and testimonies of the complainant and his witnesses, it is indubitable that it was
accused Exuperancio Canta who actually took the cow away without the knowledge and consent of
either the owner/raiser/caretaker Gardenio Agapay.
That the taking of the cow by the accused was done with strategy and stealth considering that it was
made at the time when Gardenio Agapay was at his shelter-hut forty (40) meters away tethered to a
coconut tree but separated by a hill.
The accused in his defense tried to justify his taking away of the cow by claiming ownership. He,
however, failed to prove such ownership. Accused alleged that on February 27, 1985 he was issued
a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) for his cow by Franklin Telen, a janitor at the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Padre Burgos, a neighboring town. On rebuttal Franklin Telen
denied in Court the testimony of the accused and even categorically declared that it was only on
March 24, 1986 that the accused brought the cow to the Municipal Hall of Padre Burgos, when he
issued a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle for the cow, and not on February 27, 1985. Franklin
Telen testified thus:
Q. According to the defense, this Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle was issued by
you on February 27, 1985. Is that correct?
A. Based on the request of Exuperancio, I antedated this.
(TSN, June 3, 1992, p. 7)
The testimony of Franklin Telen was confirmed in open court by no less than the Municipal Treasurer
of Padre Burgos, Mr. Feliciano Salva. (TSN, September 29, 1992, pp. 5-8).
If accused Exuperancio Canta were the owner of the cow in question, why would he lie on its
registration?And why would he have to ask Mr. Franklin Telen to antedate its registry? It is clear that
accused secured a Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle (Exh. 2-A) by feigning and manipulation
(Exhs. A & B) only after the act complained of in the instant case was committed on March 14,
1986. His claim of ownership upon which he justifies his taking away of the cow has no leg to stand
on. Upon the other hand, the complainant has shown all the regular and necessary proofs of
ownership of the cow in question.[19]
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision and denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this petition. It is contended that the prosecution failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt his criminal intent in taking the disputed cow.
First. Petitioner claims good faith and honest belief in taking the cow. He cites the following
circumstances to prove his claim:
1. He brought the mother cow to Pilipogan to see if the cow in question would suckle to the
mother cow, thus proving his ownership of it;
2. He compared the cowlicks of the subject cow to that indicated in the Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle issued on February 27, 1985 in his name, and found that
they tally;
3. He immediately turned over the cow to the barangay captain, after taking it, and later to
the police authorities, after a dispute arose as to its ownership; and
4. He filed a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel for violation of P. D. No. 533.
359
These contentions are without merit.
P.D. No. 533, 2(c) defines cattle-rustling as
. . . the taking away by any means, methods or scheme, without the consent of the owner/raiser, of
any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or gain, or whether committed with or
without violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon things.
The crime is committed if the following elements concur: (1) a large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs
to another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking is done by any
means, methods or scheme; (5) the taking is with or without intent to gain; and (6) the taking is
accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against person or force upon things. [20]
These requisites are present in this case. First, there is no question that the cow belongs to
Narciso Gabriel. Petitioners only defense is that in taking the animal he acted in good faith and in the
honest belief that it was the cow which he had lost. Second, petitioner, without the consent of the
owner, took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio Agapay, despite the fact that he
knew all along that the latter was holding the animal for the owner, Narciso. Third, petitioner falsified
his Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle by asking Telen to antedate it prior to the taking to make
it appear that he owned the cow in question. Fourth, petitioner adopted means, methods, or
schemes to deprive Narciso of his possession of his cow, thus manifesting his intent to gain. Fifth, no
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things attended the commission of the crime.
Indeed, the evidence shows that the Certificate of Ownership of Large Cattle which petitioner
presented to prove his ownership was falsified. Franklin Telen, the janitor in the municipal treasurers
office, admitted that he issued the certificate to petitioner 10 days after Narcisos cow had been
stolen.Although Telen has previously executed a sworn statement claiming that he issued the
certificate on February 27, 1985, he later admitted that he antedated it at the instance of petitioner
Exuperancio Canta, his friend, who assured him that the cow was his. [21]
Telens testimony was corroborated by the certification of the municipal treasurer of Padre
Burgos that no registration in the name of petitioner was recorded in the municipal records. Thus,
petitioners claim that the cowlicks found on the cow tally with that indicated on the Certificate of
Ownership of Large Cattle has no value, as this same certificate was issued after the cow had been
taken by petitioner from Gardenio Agapay. Obviously, he had every opportunity to make sure that the
drawings on the certificate would tally with that existing on the cow in question.
The fact that petitioner took the cow to the barangay captain and later to the police authorities
does not prove his good faith. He had already committed the crime, and the barangay captain to
whom he delivered the cow after taking it from its owner is his own father. While the records show
that he filed on April 30, 1986 a criminal complaint against Narciso Gabriel, the complaint was
dismissed after it was shown that it was filed as a countercharge to a complaint earlier filed on April
16, 1986 against him by Narciso Gabriel.
Petitioner says that he brought a mother cow to see if the cow in question would suckle to the
mother cow. But cows frequently attempt to suckle to alien cows. [22] Hence, the fact that the cow
suckled to the mother cow brought by petitioner is not conclusive proof that it was the offspring of the
mother cow.
Second. Petitioner contends that even assuming that his Certificate of Ownership is not in order,
it does not necessarily follow that he did not believe in good faith that the cow was his. If it turned out
later that he was mistaken, he argues that he committed only a mistake of fact but he is not
criminally liable.
Petitioners Certificate of Ownership is not only not in order. It is fraudulent, having been
antedated to make it appear it had been issued to him before he allegedly took the cow in
question. That he obtained such fraudulent certificate and made use of it negates his claim of good
faith and honest mistake. That he took the cow despite the fact that he knew it was in the custody of
360
its caretaker cannot save him from the consequences of his act. [23] As the Solicitor General states in
his Comment:
If petitioner had been responsible and careful he would have first verified the identity and/or
ownership of the cow from either Narciso Gabriel or Gardenio Agapay, who is petitioners cousin
(TSN, 9/12/91, p. 26).Petitioner, however, did not do so despite the opportunity and instead rushed
to take the cow. Thus, even if petitioner had committed a mistake of fact he is not exempted from
criminal liability due to his negligence.[24]
In any event, petitioner was not justified in taking the cow without the knowledge and permission
of its owner. If he thought it was the cow he had allegedly lost, he should have resorted to the court
for the settlement of his claim. Art. 433 of the Civil Code provides that The true owner must resort to
judicial process for the recovery of the property. What petitioner did in this case was to take the law
in his own hands.[25] He surreptitiously took the cow from the custody of the caretaker, Gardenio
Agapay, which act belies his claim of good faith.
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the evidence fully supports the finding of both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty as charged. There is therefore no
reason to disturb their findings.
However, the decision of the Court of Appeals should be modified in two respects.
First, accused-appellant should be given the benefit of the mitigating circumstance analogous to
voluntary surrender. The circumstance of voluntary surrender has the following elements: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrenders to a person in authority or to the
latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary. [26] In the present case, petitioner Exuperancio Canta
had not actually been arrested. In fact, no complaint had yet been filed against him when he
surrendered the cow to the authorities. It has been repeatedly held that for surrender to be voluntary,
there must be an intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities, showing an intention to
save the authorities the trouble and expense that his search and capture would require. [27] In
petitioners case, he voluntarily took the cow to the municipal hall of Padre Burgos to place it
unconditionally in the custody of the authorities and thus saved them the trouble of having to recover
the cow from him. This circumstance can be considered analogous to voluntary surrender and
should be considered in favor of petitioner.
Second, the trial court correctly found petitioner guilty of violation of 2(c) of P. D. No. 533,
otherwise known as the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. However, it erred in imposing the penalty
of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 12 years, 5 months and 11 days of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. The trial court apparently considered P. D. No. 533 as a special law
and applied 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which provides that if the offense is punished by
any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less
than the minimum term prescribed by the same. However, as held in People v. Macatanda,[28] P. D.
No. 533 is not a special law. The penalty for its violation is in terms of the classification and duration
of penalties prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, thus indicating that the intent of the lawmaker
was to amend the Revised Penal Code with respect to the offense of theft of large cattle. In fact, 10
of the law provides:
The provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, pertinent provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, all laws,
decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations which are inconsistent with this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
There being one mitigating circumstance and no aggravating circumstance in the commission of
the crime, the penalty to be imposed in this case should be fixed in its minimum period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, in relation to Art. 64 of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next
361
lower in degree, i. e., prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and the maximum of
which isprision mayor in its maximum period.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the modification that
petitioner Exuperancio Canta is hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison term of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional maximum, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor maximum, as maximum.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981

vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the
Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary. Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P12,000.00, to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00
as exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.
The information alleges:
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana
together with PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and
Patrolman Felix Mojica of Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang
market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
While they were eating, they saw, through the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the
restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt.
Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant,
approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself as a PC officer, whether the gun
that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question of Lt. Masana appellant
362
moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel immediately
grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana told
the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the
appellant occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt.
Masana's three companions Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two
were already seated, Lt. Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled
out a piece of coupon bond paper from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and
after signing it, he asked appellant to countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead,
he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him. Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter
that they would talk the matter over in the municipal building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana
was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-bladed dagger and with it he stabbed
Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death several hours thereafter (pp.
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica who were all seated at a
separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and
Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt. Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who
happened to be taking his lunch in the same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near
the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the
dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused
to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22,
1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt. Masana brought the latter to the
V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours later as a result of the stab wounds
inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario, Medico-Legal
Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt. Masana
and made the following findings, which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-
89, rec.), and which reads as follows:
Postmortem findings.
General:
Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity
over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe tips are
pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen, measuring 21 cm.
long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches applied. There are
surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the
anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches
applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each, respectively.
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline,
128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and slightly upwards,
passing superficially between muscles and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline,
121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards, downwards and to
the left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline,
96 cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards and to the
left, perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric vessels, grazing
363
the liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of the lower lobe of the
right lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
(5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by
0.5 cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index finger,
measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of
the stomach.
There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic

hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the stomach,
gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts:
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a
restaurant near the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come
from Mandaluyong, Rizal where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant,
the accused saw three persons to his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later
learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking beer alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting
for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached him and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil
and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit. After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt.
Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The accused accepted the invitation so the two
moved over to the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to the accused who, however,
refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told the accused
not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he had not
reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his
identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID
card, Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist
League of the Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted
that it was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to
put it back in his pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad
and, in an angry tone of voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the
accused refused to surrender his ID to Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist
and hit the accused on the head with its handle two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed from his
head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the accused for the third time, the latter parried
the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and stabbed the officer two or three times and
then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp. 74,75,79, Ibid).
364
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to
surrender to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang,
Cavite. The Chief of Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he
was hit by Lt. Masana on the head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of
Police asked somebody to accompany the accused to the municipal building. Arriving there, one
Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just
across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9, t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971).
After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the Indang policeman to the
municipal, building where he was detained for two days before he was picked up by the Philippine
Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-91,
t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and
convincing evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17;
People vs. Solaa, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80
Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533; 536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover,
to prove justification, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57; People vs. Talaboc, 30
SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaa, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66; People vs.
Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7
2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim,
the accused must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of
the court the fact of legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who
committed unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he
refused to surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was his
and he also spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot
perceive how this refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent
of initiating the aggression by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that
the accused was no longer armed after the latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him.
Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased, ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in
an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active resistance, and finds no other way to
comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender. Furthermore, the records reveal
an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed when the incident happened, he
being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason to be
resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea that his
gun be returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms. Accordingly,
We are constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased,
who initiated the aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his
death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third blow.
This claim is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the
scar produced by the injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID thus
365
Court
Q Where is that scar?
(Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony in his
medical findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It
also shows that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were facing
each other. If that was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the accused,
holding the gun with his right hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head and and on
his right ear lobe WE find that this particular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who first
hit him twice with the handle of his gun before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is
definitely belied not only by the location of the scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa
aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each other, and it appearing that they were both
right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given by one, if not parried by the other, would
perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of the recipient of the blow. WE,
therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the natural course of
human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the
victim parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his
head on the edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal
building from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims
that he told the Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his (Masana's)
gun. On his return from the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was detained in
the municipal building of Indang, Cavite for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC
Headquarters. During all this time, he did not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or
other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the
lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he claimed self-defense during the
preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec.
10, 1971). If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have so informed the
Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly asked
him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police
Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused
made before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an
exculpatory statement made so long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim
does not deserve credence since the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the
straightforward testimony of prosecution witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard
serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased witnesses, whose testimony as peace
366
officers, in the absence of any showing as to any motive that would impel them to distort the truth,
must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr.
Ochoa, confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the incident
between the appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the
knife from appellant, whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.
II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with assault
upon an agent of authority?
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established by
the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a
chance to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal
wounds on the chest and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack with a
deadly weapon on an unarmed and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the latter to
flee or defend himself before the fatal blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's
brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil.
475); People vs. Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following testimony
of Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
COURT
Q What is the truth?
A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt. Guillermo
Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's head) bumped on
the edge of a table; that is why he sustained an injury and blood
oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis
supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
ATTY. MUOZ
Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a
table and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally

bumped his head on the table.
Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana
367
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the

extent that he bumped his head on the table?
A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana
already stabbed?
A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet stabbed.
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the
prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face to
face when the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the victim was
able to ward off the same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off the
attack was so strong that the accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him
which necessitated medical treatment. In short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the
moment. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery
(People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the record failed to show that the accused
made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime, making it at the
same time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil.
546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the accused
employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to himself. On the
contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking distance of his three companions, two
of whom were police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation between the accused and the
victim about the confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the moment
when the victim was about to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed
the victim in the chest. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his
victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence
does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be
presumed, but must be proved as conclusively as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil.
670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or
treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make [Art. 14, par. 16,
Revised Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in
civilian clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the
complex crime of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason
that the information does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of
the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that
appellant did attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his
official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to
justify a conviction of the complex crime, which necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense. Like a qualifying circumstance, such
knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information; otherwise, in the absence
of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although proven, would
only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack on the
victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating,
368
being "in contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal
Code), or as an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his
rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV, Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to
offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority
(People vs. Villaseor 35 SCRA 460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et
al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly
alleged in the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority does not render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from
which it can be implied that the accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority.
Thus, the information for Direct Assault upon a person in authority reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of
Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school bonding of Lian,
duly qualified and appointed as such and while in the performance of her official
duties or on the occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, embraced
and kissed. and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester
Gonzales. That the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of
having committed it inside the school building and during school classes.
Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:
Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public
uprising, ... shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in
authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or
on occasion of such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code).
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools,
colleges and universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in applying the
provisions of article 148." This special classification is obviously intended to give
teachers protection, dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official
duties. The lower court, however, dismissed the information on the ground that there
is no express allegation in the information that the accused had knowledge that the
person attacked was a person in authority. This is clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused
knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of
her duties. He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by
specific provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not
expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law
and not of fact, ignorance thereof could not excuse non- compliance on his part
(Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil
369
or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or remedial
(Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil. 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the
information for Direct Assault reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of
Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and
Jose Astjada each of whom was armed with a piece of wood, except Paulo Coraide
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said
pieces of wood one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio Languyin of said
municipality, duly elected and qualified as such while said councilman was engaged
in the actual performance of his duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the

information that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that
such fact was known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in this
case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari but
the refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following considerations:
The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t is
patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is want of
factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been based.'
It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information was
deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct assault
that the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held by the
person attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in
authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act
No. 1978) [See U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11,
Padilla's Revised Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it is
sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of authority,
held by the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then engaged in the
performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to allege further that
the accused also knew that such position was that of a person in authority, since 'this
is a matter of law' thus:
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that

the accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom and
engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore knew that
she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific provision of
law. It matters not that such knowledge on `his part is not expressly
alleged, complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter
of law and not of fact, ignorance whereof could not excuse non-
370
compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code). This article applies to
all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs.
Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs.
Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual findings
as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the fiscal's proper course is not
the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against respondents-
accused, as herein indicated.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a valid

information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated (emphasis
supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the
instant case; because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the latter
and does not allege facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the
person assaulted is a person, or an agent of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that
the victim, PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member
of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social
position or standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of
the English Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or
station (75 CJS 458); or to the order or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy
in relation to others (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George
Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order
to fix his relative position in reference to other officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and
sometimes of command or by which to determine his pay and emoluments as in the case of army
staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a grade or official standing,
relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade, including its grade,
status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, p.
100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89,
105-106, July 30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil
Service Commission by a clerk therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975),
the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs. Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez,
107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor (People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil.
298), the murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret service division (People vs.
Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First Instance by a
justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by his
subordinate a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of an
army general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally
considered of high station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be
respected. Therefore, whenever there is a difference in social condition between the offender and
the offended party, this aggravating circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. The Revised
Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
371
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-
smuggling unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent
of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either
circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a
person in authority. But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently,
either aggravating circumstance should be considered in the imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the
aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged
with and convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said
Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder for
the death of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen.
Mariano Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with homicide
for the killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-
35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City
Police Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang
was present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from
behind, wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang.
And appellant admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims
that he went to the municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not allegedly in the
restaurant during the incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs.
Siojo (61 Phil. 307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public
authority refers to a person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not
a public authority but merely an agent of aperson in authority; there is need of re-examining such a
ruling since it is not justified by the employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2
of Article 14 instead of the term person in authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152
of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the
aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should comprehend only persons in
authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in authority" in the aforesaid
paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase in Articles 148 and
1452. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public authority, which may
however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
372
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is
a person in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person
in authority under CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People,
90 Phil 228). So is the town municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well
as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya,
CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs. Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for he
is vested with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to
prosecute and to apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the
aforementioned officials who cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors
although specifically mentioned as persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads
and supervises the entire police force in the municipality as well as exercises his authority over the
entire territory of the municipality, which is patently greater than and includes the school premises or
the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or
barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should therefore
be condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty prescribed for
homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE

AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF
THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO
RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT
RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER
RESPECTS.
373
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990

vs.
RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City,
convicting him of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007
and of murder in Criminal Case No. 4012 and imposing upon him the penalty of death in both cases.
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1, paragraph (2), of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of Tagbilaran
accused, while acting under the influence of drugs and without any license or permit
from the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have ill his possession, custody and control an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH &
WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 359323 with Five (5)
spent shells and Five (5) live ammunitions and without any justifiable cause and with
intent to kill, used the said firearm and ammunitions to shoot one Francis Ernest
Escano III hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or
injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS Head & Chest (through and

through);
Head Entrance 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-Temporal Area; Port

1.3 x 0.3 cm.; Right Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external meatus;
374
Chest Entrance 0.3 x 1 cm. Right Infrascapular Area at the level
of the 7th Intercostal Rib (Back); Exist 0.3 cm. dia; above the right
nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2 of the

Presidential Decree No. 1866. 1
On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed against appellant reading
as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran,
accused, without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation
treachery, while acting under the influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately
augmenting the suffering of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shot one Francis Ernest Escano with the use of an
unlicensed SMITH & WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number
359323 hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or injuries,
to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS Head and Chest (Through &

Through);
Head Entrance 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-temporal Area; Port l.3

x 0.3 cm., Right Cheek, 3.5 cm., above the right external meatus;
Chest Entrance 0.3 x 1 cm. right Infrascapular Area at the level

of the 7th Inter-Costal Rib (back); exit 0.3 cm. dia; above the right
nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H.
Escano, in the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
in relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and acting under the influence of
dangerous drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases were consolidated
upon motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the trial court rendered a
decision 3 convicting appellant under both informations. The dispositive portion of the decision read
as follows:
375
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with
Murder under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
hereby sentences said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
Further, decision is also rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012 finding the same
accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and
P.D. 1866. Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
(treachery used to qualify the crime to murder) and the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult to a person in authority and there being
no mitigating circumstance to offset them, and sentences the said Renato Tac-an y
Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused is likewise ordered to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano in the amount of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay actual compensatory damages in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN PESOS
(P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge Francisco Escano, Jr., the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the
sum of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental anguish
and suffering each experienced because of the death of Francis Ernest. All such
amount shall earn legal interest from the time this decision shall become final and
executory until fully satisfied. The accused shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his intention to appeal to this
Court, although the same was subject to automatic review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of the case instead of
according full faith and credence to the defendant's version.
II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was justified in shooting the
deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the defendant acted in
incomplete self-defense in shooting the deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the defendant
inasmuch as said decree was enforceable only during the existence of the Martial
Law Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy
for having been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for
murder in an information which alleges that the accused used an unlicensed firearm
in killing the deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:
376
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the deceased
Francis Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year of high school of
the Divine Word College in Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but
also members of the same gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house where Francis and
his parents lived, on one or two occasions. On those occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato
had a handgun with him. Francis was then advised by his mother to distance himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis turned sour.
Sometime in September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other, on which occasion
Francis bodily lifted Arnold Romelde from the ground. Arnold was friend and companion to Renato.
The quarrel resulted in Renato and Francis being brought to the high school principal's office. The
strained relationship between the two (2) erstwhile friends was aggravated in late November 1984
when Francis teamed that Renato, together with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for
him, apparently with the intention of beating him up. Further deterioration of their relationship
occurred sometime in the first week of December 1984, when graffiti appeared on the wall of the
third year high school classroom and on the armrest of a chair in that classroom, deprecating the
Bronx gang and describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed the graffiti to
Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of the high
school building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook prepared for their
Mathematics class on his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma, to raise a
question. Upon returning to his chair, he found Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato was
angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the chair on which Francis was seated. Francis,
however, explained that he had not intentionally sat down on Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would
have ensued but some classmates and two (2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas,
intervened and prevented them from assaulting each other. After the two (2) had quieted down and
apparently shaken hands at the instance of Mrs. Baluma, the latter resumed her English III class.
Francis sat on the last row to the extreme right of the teacher while Renato was seated on the same
last row at the extreme left of the teacher. While the English III class was still going on, Renato
slipped out of the classroom and went home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom
approximately fifteen (15) minutes later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started in
Room 15 when Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with both hands raised,
holding a revolver, shouted "Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated behind and to the light
of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired at Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the armrest
of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up and with several of their classmates rushed forward
towards the teacher's platform to seek protection from their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this
time hitting the blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the other students rushed back towards
the rear of the room. Renato walked towards the center of the classroom and fired a third time at
Francis, hitting the concrete wall of the classroom. Francis and a number of his classmates rushed
towards the door, the only door to and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s platform
nearest the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door.
This time, Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor. Ruel
was pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr. Pablo
Baluma, apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis, approached Renato
and asked him to help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the room. Renato thereupon re-
entered Room 15, closed the door behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?"
Standing over Francis sprawled face down on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of
Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis' back below the right shoulder, and exited
on his front chest just above the right nipple. 8
377
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room 15. Renato
proceeded to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he found some teachers and
students and ordered them to lock the door and close the windows, in effect holding them as
hostages. He also reloaded his gun with five (5) bullets. After some time, a team of Philippine
Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo arrived and surrounded the faculty room. With a
hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called upon Renato to surrender himself Renato did not
respond to this call. Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo and volunteered to persuade his
brother to give up. Renato's father who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded with Renato to
surrender himself Renato then turned over his gun to his brother through an opening in the
balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's brother, went to the door of
the faculty room, entered and placed Renato under arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue Francis
but could not open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the students entered the
room by climbing up the second floor on the outside and through the window and opened the door
from the inside. The teachers and students brought Francis down to the ground floor from whence
the PC soldiers rushed him to the Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before
reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City. The officer
deposited the revolver recovered from Renato which was an Airweight Smith and Wesson .38 caliber
revolver, with Serial No. 359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets removed from the said revolver,
and the five (5) empty cartridges which Renato had turned over to him. Ballistic examination
conducted by Supervising Ballistician, Artemio Panganiban, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu,
showed that the empty cartridge cases had been fired from the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the prosecution's version of the facts
instead of the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took into account, inter alia, the
positive and direct testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the events which took
place inside her English III classroom immediately before the shooting;
2. Ruel Ungab a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and Francis, who had
fallen on the floor with Francis when the latter was finally hit by Renato;
3. Damaso Pasilbas the Mathematics teacher who was holding his class when
Renato had burst into Room 15 and started firing at Francis; and
4. Napoleon Jumauan another sixteen (16) year old, classmate of Renato and
Francis who was inside the classroom when Renato had started firing at Francis and
who was only about a foot away from the head of Francis when Renato, having re-
entered Room 15, had fired at Francis as the latter was sprawled on the floor of the
classroom.
After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the trial
court that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the circumstances and in the manner
described by these witnesses.
1. The claim of self-defense.
Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete self-defense, when he
shot Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the following requisites existed:
378
a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the

aggression; and
12
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused.
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of Mrs. Baluma's English
III class, Francis had approached him:
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel)
Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a conversation with

Francis?
(Renato)
A: While the class was going on, Mrs. Baluma was writing on the
blackboard.
Q: Then what happened?
A: While our teacher was writing on the blackboard Francis suddenly

got near me.
Q: And what happened when Francis approached you?
A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a (sic) guts to fight
against me.'
Q: And what else did he say?
A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm because I will go home to get
a gun.'
Q: Was that all that he told you?
A: He further said, 'You go home get your firearm, if you won't go

home and get a gun, I will go to your place and kill you including your
parents, brothers and sisters.'
Q: And after that where did Francis go?
13
A: Before the bell rang he went ahead.
(Emphasis supplied)
We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except Renato's own testimony,
that Francis had uttered the above statements attributed to him by Renato. Although there had been
about twenty-five (25) other students, and the teacher, in the classroom at the time, no corroborating
testimony was offered by the defense. In the second place, assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis
had indeed made those statements, such utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression
which is the first and most fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly uttered in a high
379
school classroom by an obviously unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably inspire
the "well grounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of
death or bodily harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or
materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist in oral threats or a merely
threatening stance or posture. 15Further as pointed out by the Solicitor General, Francis was
obviously without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room 15
demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him repeatedly, without the slightest
regard for the safety of his other classmates and of the teacher. There being no unlawful aggression,
there simply could not be self-defense whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly
no need to refer to the other requirements of lawful self-defense.
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an unlicensed
firearm, a Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5) spent bullets and five (5) live
ones and with having used such firearm and ammunition to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escano III,
in violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866.
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:
Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of

Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of
firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty
of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the reason for its [P.D. No.
1866] issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866 was enforceable only during the
existence of martial law, and that when martial law was "lifted in 1979," the reason for the "existence"
of P.D. No. 1866 faded away, with the result that the "original law on firearms, that is, Section 2692 of
the [Revised] Administrative Code, together with its pre-martial law amendments, came into effect
again thereby replacing P.D. No. 1866." 17
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which suggests that it
was intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law imposed upon the country by
former President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain any provision that so prescribes its
lapsing into non-enforceability upon the termination of the state or period of martial law. On the
contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its own terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all prior
laws and decrees penalizing illegal possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and
explosives in order "to harmonize their provisions as well as to update and revise certain provisions
and prior statutes "in order to more effectively deter violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions
and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus without basis in fact.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with illegal possession
of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated by the use of such unlicensed
firearm to commit a homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of punishment
for the second time when he was charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an
380
unlicensed [firearm]," in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of
B.P. Blg. 179.
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or
later prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another
and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double
jeopardy. In the case at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case
No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute,
while the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the
Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite
different one from the other, such that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is
not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second jeopardy.
We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that said firearm and
ammunition had been used to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escao III. We note also that the
amended information in Criminal Case No. 4012 after charging appellant with the unlawful killing of
Francis Ernest Escao III, stated that the killing had been done with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two (2) informations did not have the effect of
charging appellant with having committed the same offense more than once.
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the trial court
did take into account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the killing of Francis had
been done "with the use of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so hold, the trial court
committed error. There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that
the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second
offense of homicide or murder to death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The
essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of the instrument used in destroying
human life or committing some other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. 19
In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or
disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable
penalty for unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm where such firearm
was used to destroy human life. Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed with the
use of the unlicensed firearm is not an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised
Penal Code, it may still be taken into account to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua,
under the 1987 Constitution) because of the explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted earlier, the
unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition is an offense punished under a special
law and not under the Revised Penal Code.
4. The claim that there was no treachery.
Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any shot was fired, Renato
had shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement was a warning
to Francis and that the first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were merely warning shots.
Moreover, building upon his own testimony about the alleged threat that Francis had uttered before
he (Renato) left his English III class to go home and get a gun, appellant argues that Francis must
have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient time to prepare for the coming of the
appellant. 20 Appellant's contention, while ingenious, must be rejected. The trial court made a finding
of treachery taking explicit account of the following factors:
381
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department Tagbilaran City, is
situated in the second floor of the building. It is a corner room and it has only one (1)
door which is the only means of entry and exit;
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair inside his
classroom and was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab
and while their teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The
deceased was not aware of any impending assault neither did he have any means to
defend himself;
3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver in shooting to
death the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escao;
4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused consciously conceived
that mode of attack;
5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give him a chance to
defend himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor while he
was already sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired at him again
and the deceased was hit on the chest;
6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was absolutely not
aware of any coming attack. 21
The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room 15 had no
means of escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second floor of the
building. Renato in effect blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on the teacher's platform
closest to the door and fired as Francis and Ruel sought to dash through the door. Renato's question
"where is Francis?" cannot reasonably be regarded as an effort to warn Francis for he shot at
Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three
(3) shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only be ascribed to the indifferent
markmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and the other students were scurrying from one
part of the room to the other in an effort to evade the shots fired by Renato. The cumulative effect of
the circumstances underscored by the trial court was that the attack upon Francis had been carried
out in a manner which disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against Renato. Finally,
the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15
and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood, manifested Renato's
conscious choice of means of execution which directly and especially ensured the death of his victim
without risk to himself. 22 We are compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was here
present and that, therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escao III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the same as a
generic aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant that the requisites of evident
premeditation had not been sufficiently shown. In order that evident premeditation may be taken into
account, there must be proof of (a) the time when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime;
(b) an action manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination to commit the
crime; and (c) of the passage of a sufficient interval of time between the determination of the
offender to commit the crime and the actual execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. 23 The defense pointed out that barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed
from the time Renato left his English III class and the time he returned with a gun. While there was
testimony to the fact that before that fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and resentment had
welled up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing when Renato
382
had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis. Accordingly, we must discard
evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as follows: SEC. 17.
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a crime is committed by an offender
who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state shall be considered as a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime and the application of the penalty provided for
in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the influence of a
dangerous drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a "special aggravating
circumstance". No medical evidence had been submitted by the prosecution to show that Renato
had smoked marijuana before gunning down Francis. Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after
December 14, 1984 before Renato was medically examined for possible traces of marijuana; the
results of the examination were negative. Defense witness Dr. Rogelio Ascona testified that in order
to have a medically valid basis for determining the presence of marijuana in the human system, the
patient must be examined within twenty-four (24) hours from the time he is supposed to have
smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the Divine Word
College, High School Department, who testified that he found Renato and one Jaime Racho inside
the men's room of the High School Department sucking smoke from a hand-rolled thing that look like
a cigarette, that he had asked Renato what that was and that Renato had
replied damo (marijuana). 25 While the testimony of Orlando Balaba was corroborated by two (2)
other prosecution witnesses, we believe that Orlando Balaba's testimony was incompetent to show
that what Renato and Jaime Racho were smoking inside the men's room was indeed marijuana. It
was pointed out by apellant that Orlando Balaba had never smoked nor smelled marijuana.
In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain detailed factors as
circumstantial evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba. These circumstances were:
The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the circumstance of the manner of the
attack, the circumstance of holding hostage some teachers and students inside the faculty room, the
circumstance of terrifying an entire school, the circumstance that sitting on a scrapbook is too
insignificant as to arouse passion strong enough to motivate a killing, are circumstantial evidences
that gave the court no room for doubt that prosecution witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper
and Allan de la Serna truthfully told the court that they saw the accused smoking marijuana inside
the comfort room at 1:45 in the afternoon of December 14, 1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of passionate anger on the
part of Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato had smoked marijuana
before entering his English III class. In the absence of competent medical or other direct evidence of
ingestion of a dangerous drug, courts may be wary and critical of indirect evidence, considering the
severe consequences for the accused of a finding that he had acted while under the influence of a
prohibited drug. The Court considers that the evidence presented on this point was simply
inadequate to support the ruling of the trial court that Renato had shot and killed Francis while under
the influence of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.
Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should have
considered that mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did not, and we consider that it
correctly refused to do so. Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by handing over the
weapon through the balustrade of the faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his brother,
who was not in any case a person in authority nor an agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly,
Renato did not surrender himself he was arrested by Capt. Lazo. The fact that he did not resist
383
arrest, did not constitute voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed that Renato had surrendered
himself, such surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in
the faculty room, in effect holding some teachers and students as hostages. The faculty room was
surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no escape open to him. He was not
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
authorities.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or with insult
to the public authorities: Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private
school is considered a person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in
mathematics, was already checking the attendance did not deter the accused from pursuing his evil
act, The accused ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet satisfied with the crime and
terror he had done to Francis and the entire school, the accused entered the faculty room and held
hostage the teachers and students who were inside that room. To the court, this act of the accused
was an insult to his teachers and to the school, an act of callus disregard of other's feelings and
safety and completely reprehensible. 30
We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance.
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential
Decree No. 299, provides as follows:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. Who shall be deemed as such.
In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly
vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government
corporation, board, or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a
barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is

charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property,
such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader and any person who comes to
the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority.
In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities,
and lawyers in the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance, shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended by P.D. No. 299, September 19,
1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 873, June 12, 1985).
Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a
public or recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or
professor is so deemed only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person
in authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such
person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not
identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the application of which any person "directly
vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority." Because a penal statute is not to be
given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary meaning of the ordinary
words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe that a teacher or
professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority" within the
meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision the trial court
applied in the case at bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED in the
following manner and to the following extent only:
384
1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident

premeditation and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities
shall be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the
use of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be DELETED and not taken into account.
There being no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the
appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in accordance with the
provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the decision of the trial court is
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant. SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-40367-69 August 22, 1985

vs.
PACITO STO. TOMAS, accused-appellant.
CUEVAS, J.:
At about ten o'clock in the evening of May 23, 1967, tragedy struck at the residence of the
GRULLAS situated in the municipality of Donsol, Sorsogon. After the smoke of gun fire had cleared,
two (2) persons were found dead inside the house of the Grullas bathed in their own blood, namely:
SALVACION GRULLA, wife of the herein accused-appellant who lay prostrate on the floor at the
sala; and appellant's mother-in-law CONSOLACION BELMONTE VDA. DE GRULLA who appeared
seated motionless on a chair with her body reclining on a table. The third victim NATIVIDAD
GRULLA, younger sister of Salvacion, nearly escaped death but likewise suffered gunshot wounds
necessitating hospitalization for almost a month.
As an aftermath of the aforesaid shooting incident, three Criminal Cases were filed before the then
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon-Branch III, against appellant PACITO STO. TOMAS. One for
PARRICIDE under Criminal Case No. 22, for the death of Salvacion Grulla; another one for
MURDER under Criminal Case No. 23, for the death of appellant's mother-in-law Consolacion
Belmonte Vda. de Grulla; and the third one for FRUSTRATED MURDER under Criminal Case No.
29, for the near fatal shooting of Natividad Grulla, appellant's sister-in-law.
After trial, following a plea of NOT GUILTY entered upon arraignment, accused was convicted and
thereafter sentenced as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 22: to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Salvacion Grulla in the amount of P15,000.00;
plus P10,000.00 by way of moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 23: to suffer an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years as
the minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal; and to indemnify the heirs
of deceased Consolacion Vda. de Grulla in the amount of P15,000.00; and to pay
P10,000.00 as moral damages plus P5,000.00 as punitive damages.
385
3. In Criminal Case No. 29: to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years
of prison mayor, as the minimum of twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as the
maximum; and to indemnify Natividad Grulla, in the amount of P700.00 as actual
damages; P10,000.00 as moral damages; and P5,000 as punitive damages; plus
From the aforesaid judgment, accused ventilated an appeal to this Court, seeking the
reversal of his aforesaid conviction on the ground that the trial court allegedly erred
IN HOLDING THAT SALVACION GRULLA IS THE WIFE OF THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANT;
II
IN FINDING THAT NATIVIDAD GRULLA WITNESSED THE SHOOTING OF

SALVACION GRULLA AND CONSOLACION VDA. DE GRULLA;
III
IN FINDING THAT TREACHERY ACCOMPANIED THE SHOOTING OF NATIVIDAD

GRULLA;
IV
IN FINDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF

SUPERIOR STRENGTH ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE;
IN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF

DWELLING IN THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES;
VI
IN FINDING THAT NATIVIDAD GRULLA SUFFERED PERMANENT DEFORMITY

FROM THE INJURY WHICH COULD HAVE CAUSED HER DEATH;
VII
IN AWARDING DAMAGES DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A CLEAR AND

CONVINCING PROOF IN SUPPORT THEREOF; and
VIII
IN CONVICTING APPELLANT ON THE BASIS OF PURELY CIRCUMSTANTIAL

EVIDENCE.
The prosecution's version of the incident in question as summarized by the Solicitor General runs
thus
On May 23, 1967 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Natividad Grulla, then a 19
year old girl, was engrossed in reading the Illustrated Classics in her bedroom at the
Grulla residence in Dansol, Sorsogon (pp. 19, 21, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969). Also then at
386
home, were her nephews, Fidel, Pacito, Jr., and Roberto, her sisters, Blesilda and
Salvacion, her mother Consolacion Grulla, a niece, Alma and their maid Avelina
Bordeos (p, 34, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968). A brother, Sixto, was out of the house at that time,
while two other brothers Samuel and Alfredo, were asleep in the house of Natividad's
grandmother located at the back of their residence (p. 38, tsn, Ibid). Between 10:00
o'clock and 11:00 o'clock that same evening, Salvacion Grulla's husband, Pacito Sto.
Tomas arrived by car and knocked at the front door of the Grulla residence and upon
hearing the knocking, Natividad proceeded to the front door to open it but Pacito had
walked towards the back door and knocked upon it. (p. 4, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968).
Pacito's wife, Salvacion, proceeded to meet him in the kitchen. Once inside, Pacito
asked his wife to go with him, together with their children, and rushed the maid to get
their things packed for Legaspi City. Natividad saw the couple talking in the sala. (p.
5, tsn, Ibid.).
Awakened by Pacito and Salvacion's conversation, Consolacion Grulla, Salvacion

and Natividad's mother, came out of her bedroom and joined the spouses in the sala.
There, Pacito asked his mother-in-law's permission to bring his wife and children to
Legaspi City. Speaking in the dialect, Consolacion Grulla replied, "Pacito, my
daughter cannot go with you to Legaspi because she does not want to live with you.
She can no longer endure the sufferings she is undergoing because of your
jealousy." Pacito, however, retorted, "May, I cannot talk over this thing with you any
longer and I would like Vacion to go with me to Legaspi." (p. 5, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968)
After which, he turned to his wife and asked her whether she was going with him, but
she answered that she could not do so because their youngest child Blesilda, then
only seven months old, was with fever (p. 36, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968; p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27,
1968).
Later, while Natividad was already in her room she heard a series of gunshots that
caused her to stopped reading, and she went out her room to see Pacito firing at her
sister (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968; pp. 6, 34 and 35, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969). After the series
of gunshot by Pacito, Natividad then saw her mother seated, motionless, on a chair
about three meters from Pacito, her body reclining on a table, while her sister lay
prostrate on the floor (pp. 29, 31-33, tsn. Dec. 5, 1968; p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968).
Then, in response to Natividad's call of "Manay", Mrs. Sto. Tomas raised her head
slightly but was apparently too weak to rise (p. 27, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968; p. 6, tsn, Dec.
27, 1968). Natividad pleaded with Pacito to spare Salvacion's life telling him that the
latter would go with him to Legaspi. But her pleas merited no more than an
expression of "Hmmm" from Pacito who began to reload his revolver (p. 6, tsn, Dec.
27, 1968).
At this juncture, Natividad suddenly remembered that her sister had told her,
sometime in the past, that Pacito had threatened to kill all the members of the Grulla
family (p. 6, tsn, Dec. 27, 1968). Scared by this recollection, Natividad thought of
escaping, and forthwith returned to her bedroom, her back now towards the accused,
her hands raised in a gesture of surrender. As she entered her room she heard
gunshots again, and she turned around to find out at whom the accused was firing,
but as she did so, she felt her left arm go numb (p. 34, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968, p. 7, tsn,
Dec. 27, 1968; p. 47, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969). She saw her left arm bleed and tried to
support it with her right hand, but Pacito shot her once more, this time hitting her right
forearm (p. 35, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968). Frightened' to death, she ran through the front
door, shouting for help at the top of her voice (p. 35, tsn, Dec. 5, 1968; p. 7, tsn, Dec.
27, 1968; p. 42, tsn, Feb. 25, 1969). Upon reaching a doromon tree some ten meters
away from her house, she met Reynaldo Masanque and Hospicio Pasibi, who were
on their way to find out the cause of the successive gunshots that they had heard
while conserving in the park near the municipal building.
387
Natividad thereupon requested Reynaldo Masanque to go to her mother and sister,
telling him that they had been shot and so Masanque complied, and ran towards
Natividad's house (pp. 5, 16-20, tsn, March 31, 1970). Upon reaching the door of the
Grulla residence, Masanque saw Pacito Sto. Tomas inside, his right hand holding a
gun and his back towards the door. Masanque likewise saw Salvacion lying on the
floor and Consolacion leaning against a table (pp. 6-7, tsn, Ibid). Afraid that he might
be shot if he were seen by Pacito, Masanque left immediately, and he overtook
Natividad Grulla near the house of Mr. Barios, her arms being held by Hospicio
Pasibi (pp. 10, 11, tsn, Ibid). Upon reaching the corner of Calle Tres Marias, they met
Sixto Grulla, a brother of Natividad, who had also been alarmed by the shots he
heard. Sixto went with them to the municipal building, and on the way, Natividad
unfolded to him the tragic incident (p. 11, tsn, March 31, 1970; p. 16, tsn, April 1,
1970). 1
On the other hand, appellant's version of the incident tends to show that it was his wife Salvacion
Grulla who accidentally shot his mother-in-law, the deceased Consolacion Belmonte Vda. de Grulla.
Summing up his evidence, it appears that he went to Donsol, Sorsogon on the fatal day in question
in order to fetch his wife Salvacion Grulla and their children for purposes of bringing them to Legaspi
City since he will have to be confined in a hospital on the following day upon orders of his doctor.
Upon reaching his wife's place, he knocked at the back door near the kitchen. Salvacion opened the
door. Right then and there, appellant told her to get ready for Legaspi City with their children.
Salvacion refused to leave for Legaspi City and ignored appellant's plea. Appellant then entered the
room occupied by his mother-in-law, Consolacion, to get the suitcase containing his children's
clothes. Consolacion was awakened and learning of appellant's purpose in going to their place, she
angrily cursed the latter. Appellant then reiterated and explained to his mother-in-law, (Consolacion)
his purpose in fetching his wife and children. A verbal altercation thereafter ensued between them
during which time, accused-appellant branded his mother-in-law as " kunsintidora.
Angered by the harsh and discourteous words of the appellant, Consolacion grabbed both hands of
the latter from behind and while struggling to free himself from his mother- in-law, Salvacion grabbed
appellant's Magnum 357 revolver from the latter's shoulder holster, and when Salvacion saw
accused kicking her mother, she fired the gun hitting the appellant at the lower mandible dislocating
his mandible and shattering completely his pharynx. The force of the gun fire rifted the appellant,
forcing him to fall by his side on the floor bleeding and gasping for breath. Salvacion fell on her
knees beside the fallen body of accused-appellant and in a moment of self-recrimination uttered out
of fear. "I pulled the trigger of the gun when I saw you kicked my mother. I did not do it purposely,
Cito" referring to the appellant. Accused-appellant then succeeded in reaching for the gun held by
his wife Salvacion. Salvacion warded him off and called her mother for help. Salvacion, Consolacion
and appellant then began grappling for the gun. In the process, the gun went off hitting Consolacion
who was thrown backward into a chair. Still, accused-appellant and Salvacion continued to grapple
for the possession of the gun until both of them fell on the floor with Salvacion falling on top of the
appellant. As they continued grappling near a table, the gun again exploded. Finally, Salvacion
slowly relaxed her hold on the gun and said "I am hit, Cito", and thereafter fell on the floor. Later,
accused-appellant heard a noise coming from the room of Natividad Grulla, sister of Salvacion.
Afraid that someone was trying to gain entrance into the bedroom, accused-appellant instinctively
reloaded his gun and fired in the general direction of the bedroom where the noise came from. The
noise stopped and suddenly Natividad crying, came out of the bedroom across the sala. 2
As will be noted, appellant denies any liability for the death of Salvacion (his deceased wife),
Consolacion (his mother-in-law), and the near fatal shooting of Natividad (his sister-in-law), claiming
that the death of the two (2) aforementioned victims was purely accidental, the firing of his gun that
hit them being brought about by Salvacion's grappling with him for the possession thereof. Disputing
this claim, however, and totally demolishing the veracity of said assertion, are the injuries sustained
by the deceased as shown by the post mortem examination conducted upon their cadavers.
388
Salvacion Grulla suffered four (4) gunshot wounds: one on the posterior aspect of her neck; another
one on the chest; a third one on the left abdominal region; and a fourth one on the right forearm. 3
Mrs. Consolacion Grulla on the other hand, likewise sustained four (4) gunshot wounds:one on the
left face just below the cheekbone; a second one on the left side of the neck; a third one on the left
cheek at the level of the second rib; and a fourth one at the back left side of her body. These multiple
gunshot wounds sustained by the two (2) aforementioned victims conclusively negate the theory
espoused by the appellant-that the shooting was merely accidental. On the contrary, they were mute
but vivid testimonials of the manner by which they were inflicted-indicating that both Salvacion and
Consolacion were deliberately fired upon by the appellant thereby sustaining those various gunshot
wounds resulting in their death.
The same holds true with regards to Natividad. That she was intentionally fired upon by the appellant
is clearly established by her clear and straightforward testimony which do not appear to have been
dented despite rigorous and rigid cross-examination. Natividad testified that the exchange of words
between appellant and his wife Salvacion at their sala awakened her. Coming out of her bedroom,
Natividad joined the spouses (appellant and Salvacion) and her mother Consolacion in the sala. The
incident was preceded by appellant's plea upon Consolacion to allow Salvacion to go with him to
Legaspi City since he was going to enter the hospital the following day. Consolacion told appellant
that her daughter Salvacion is no longer willing to go and live with him because of the untold
miseries and sufferings she has undergone at his hands brought about by appellant's jealousy.
Turning upon his wife (Salvacion) appellant also got a negative answer. Besides, ,Salvacion told
appellant that their daughter Blesilda was suffering from high fever at the time.
As the heated exchange of words went on between appellant ,on the one hand and Consolacion and
Salvacion at the other, and while Natividad was returning to her bedroom, a series of gunshots rent
the air. She then turned around and saw appellant firing at Salvacion. As she stepped back into their
sala, she saw accused holding his revolver. 4 She also saw her mother Consolacion about three
meters away from the appellant already reclining on a table totally motionless. Natividad called her
but there was no answer. Consolacion was already dead.
Natividad continued pleading to the appellant to spare the life of his sister Salvacion telling him that
the latter will now go with him to Legaspi City. Natividad's plea, however, fell on deaf ears.
Frightened that appellant may now vent his ire on her and already panicky at the time, she rushed
back to her bedroom with her hands raised in gesture of surrender. As she was entering her room
she again heard gunshots. She turned around to see whom the accused was firing at only to find out
that she was already hit at her left arm which was profusely bleeding at that time. She tried to
support it with her right arm, but the accused again fired at her this time hitting her at her right
forearm. She lost no time running out of the house passing by their front door to escape from the
appellant, simultaneously shouting for help.
Examined and treated by Dr. Adan R. Eva of the Albay Provincial Hospital on that same night, she
was found to have suffered 5 gunshot wounds at the posterior lateral side, middle third left forearm;
another gunshot wound with lacerated edges on the posterior surface of her left elbow; a third
gunshot wound with lacerated edges on distal 1/5 posterior surface left arm; and a compound
fracture of the left forearm.
Testifying on the said injuries, Dr. Eva stated that the injury of the left forearm which penetrated
through and through, causing a compound fracture comminuted with bone fragments which
necessitated an operation could have caused the death of the patient were it not for the timely
surgery because complications could have arisen and tetanus would have set in.
That appellant's gun which had finally been determined to be a Magnum 357 revolver was fired
intentionally appeared further corroborated by the empty shells found at the sala of the Grullas'
residence. Chief of Police Salvatierra responding to the report of the shooting incident, found ten
389
(10) empty shells on the floor of the sala of Mrs. Grulla's house. Inspecting the Magnum revolver of
the appellant, he found inside its chamber one empty shell and another live bullet. Considering that
the revolver's chamber could accommodate only six (6) bullets at a time and as admitted by the
appellant himself, the gun was reloaded after being emptied. If the first shot was accidental, why was
there a necessity to reload the said gun? Would that not be inviting more trouble that could lead to
more disastrous consequences? If his version is true, he should have thrown that gun away to
prevent a repetition of it being fired by accident. But that is not what he did. His reloading of that gun
destroys and unravel the falsity of his concoction. To subscribe with appellant's claim of accidental
shooting will be gullibility at its highest.
The trial court found Natividad Grulla to be a very credible witness. Her testimony appeared positive,
categorical and unequivocal despite rigid and thorough cross-examination. She has never waivered
much less vacillated at any time throughout the entire course of her testimony.
As aptly observed by the trial court
A careful analysis of Natividad's testimony gives out the revealing fact that she saw
something else, and this was the horrible spectacle of her helpless sister being fired
at pointblank by the accused, Natividad stuck to this statement, making no mention
whatsoever, however, that she saw the accused doing the same to an equal beloved
if not a far dearer individual in the person of her mother whom, she saw at the same
moment seated motionless. This unembelished testimony of Natividad, who could
have so easily pointed an accusing finger at the accused as having been likewise
seen by her firing at her mother, exudes nothing less than the untarnished truth of
what she actually saw and spoke of. If her purpose in declaring forthright that she
actually saw accused Pacito Sto. Tomas firing at Salvacion was none other than to
falsely implicate him, how easily could she have done the same insofar as the
incident concerned her mother!
We can do no less in according her the same credence since the record is bereft of any
circumstance of note that will negate His HONOR's findings and conclusions. 6
In view thereof, We find no merit in appellant's assignment of error nos. II, III, VI and VIII.
In Criminal Case No. 22, accused-appellant was charged with and convicted of PARRICIDE, the
victim being his wife Salvacion Grulla. Appellant, however, contends that even assuming he could be
made liable for the death of Salvacion, yet his conviction for parricide is erroneous, his marriage to
the latter being null and void since he is previously married to a certain Prima Patanao wayback in
1943. In support of his aforesaid claim, he presented Prima Patanao who testified on this alleged
marriage. He also introduced a xerox copy of his alleged marriage certificate 7 with Patanao. Upon
objection, however, by the prosecution, the trial court rejected said xerox copy since admission
thereof violates the best evidence rule.
We agree with His Honor's ruling, the same being welltaken. Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court provides:
Sec. 2. Original writing must be produce exceptions.There can be no evidence of a

writing the contents of which is the subject of inquiry, other than the original writing
itself, except in the following cases:
a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court;
c) When the original is in the possession of the party against whom the evidence is
offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
390
c) When the original is a record or other document in the custody of a public officer;
d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record a certified copy of
which is made evidence by law;
e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which

cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole.
None of the aforesaid circumstances appeared proven by the defense evidence that will sufficiently
warrant admission of the xerox copy in question. The uncorroborated testimony of Patanao hardly
sufficed to overthrow the legality of appellant's marriage to the deceased Salvacion Grulla.
Anent appellant's submission that the trial court erred in considering dwelling as an aggravating
circumstance, we find the same bereft of any legal support. There is no dispute that the place where
the crimes herein involved were committed is the house of Consolacion Grulla. It is there where she
lives with her daughter, Natividad Grulla (the other victim) and where Salvacion Grulla was
temporarily staying in order to escape from the brutalities of the appellant brought about by the
latter's jealousy. The fact that Salvacion's stay in the said place may be considered as a temporary
sojourn adds no validity to appellant's stance on this point. As we earlier held in People vs.
Galapia, 8 the aggravating circumstance of dwelling is present when the appellant killed his wife in
the house occupied by her other than the conjugal home. Similarly, dwelling is aggravating where
the offended party was raped in a boarding house rented by her. 9
Appellant also questions the trial court's findings that Natividad Grulla suffered permanent
deformity 10 by reason of the injuries sustained by her. Furthermore, he also asserts that no
treachery attended the shooting of Natividad. A review of the evidence on record, however, clearly
indicates that Natividad was fired upon by the appellant while she was entering her bedroom with
her back turned against the appellant. lt was while she was running away with her arms raised in
surrender that accused fired at her. Treachery therefore clearly attended the attack made upon
her. 11
With respect to the questioned deformity, it was indubitably shown that she is now permanently
mained. Her left arm became shorter than her right arm as a result of the gunshot wound sustained
by her. All hope of her left arm being restored to its normal length had been totally foreclosed. In
short, her present condition is beyond medical repair. By reason thereof, she is now exposed to
public ridicule aside from having spent some P700.00 for her hospitalization. She also lost the
chance of a lifetime to better her future in the form of a scholarship grant by the Insular Life
Assurance Corporation amounting to P10,000.00. The two (2) bullets pumped into her body from the
gun of the accused deprived her of a better tomorrow and total loss of the monetary value of said
scholarship grant to which she is rightfully entitled to.
Aside from parricide, accused-appellant was likewise found guilty of MURDER for the death of her
mother-in-law Consolacion Vda. de Grulla. The Information in this case 12 alleged evident
premeditation as the qualifying circumstance. We, however, found no evidence on record proving the
existence of said circumstance. Consolacion was fired upon while arguing with the appellant, the
latter having probably blacked-outed when he thereafter squeezed the trigger of his gun aimed at
Consolacion. There is likewise no evidence on record showing the manner by which he was attacked
and/or fired upon by the appellant. Hence, appellant may be liable only for Homicide.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
391
A. In Criminal Case No. 22: Accused-appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua; and to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Salvacion Grulla in the amount of P30,000.00 plus P10,000.00
moral damages; and costs.
B. In Criminal Case No. 23: To an indeterminate penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 17 years and 4 months ofreclusion temporal as the maximum; and to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Consolacion Vda. de Grulla the amount of P30,000.00 plus P10,000.00 moral
damages and costs.
C. In Criminal Case No. 29.
To 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion
temporal as the maximum; to indemnify Natividad Grulla in the following amounts: P700.00 covering
actual damages; P20,000.00 by way of moral damages plus P10,000.00 representing value for the
loss of the scholarship grant and costs. SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19491 August 30, 1968

vs.
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, ET AL., defendants,
APOLONIO APDUHAN, JR. alias JUNIOR, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Alberto M. Meer for defendant-appellant.
CASTRO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the judgment rendered on August 30, 1961 by the Court of First
Instance of Bohol (Judge Hipolito Alo presiding) convicting Apolonio Apduhan, Jr. of robbery with
homicide and sentencing him to death and "to idemnify the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in
the amount of P6,000.00, to indemnify the heirs of the other deceased Norberto Aton in the same
amount of P6,000.00 ..."
On August 2, 1961 the accused Apduhan, then represented by Atty. David Ocangas, together with
his co-accused Rodulfo Huiso and Felipe Quimson, both represented by Atty. David Tirol, pleaded
not guilty to a second amended information which recites:.
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses Apolonio Apduhan, Jr., alias Junior, Rodulfo
Huiso and Felipe Quimson of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of May, 1961, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, in the
Municipality of Mabini, Province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused and five (5)
other persons whose true names are not yet known (they are presently known only with their
aliases of Bernabe Miano, Rudy, Angel-Angi, Romeo and Tony) and who are still at large
(they will be charged in separate information or informations as soon as they are arrested
and preliminary proceedings in Crim. Case No. 176 completed before the Justice of the
Peace Court), all of them armed with different unlicensed firearms, daggers, and other
deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, by means of violence, the dwelling
house of the spouses Honorato Miano and Antonia Miano, which was also the dwelling
house of their children, the spouses Geronimo Miano and Herminigilda de Miano; and, once
392
inside the said dwelling house, the above-named accused with their five (5) other
companions, did attack, hack and shoot Geronimo Miano and another person by the name of
Norberto Aton, who happened to be also in the said dwelling house, thereby inflicting upon
the said two (2) persons physical injuries which caused their death; and thereafter the same
accused and their five (5) other companions, did take and carry way from said dwelling
house cash money amounting to Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00), Philippine
Currency, belonging to Honorato Miano and Geronimo Miano, to the damage and prejudice
of the said Honorato Miano and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Miano in the sum of
Three Hundred Twenty-two Pesos (P322.00) with respect to the amount robbed, and also to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of deceased Geronimo Miano and Norberto Aton by
reason of the death of these two persons.
Act committed contrary to the provisions of Art. 294, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code with
the special aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed by a band with the use of
unlicensed firearms (Art. 296, Rev. Penal Code), and other aggravating circumstances, as
follows:
1. That the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended parties without any
provocation from the latter;
2. That nighttime was purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the crime; and.
3. That advantage was taken of superior strength, accused and their companions, who were
fully armed, being numerically superior to the offended parties who were unarmed and
defenseless.
When the case was called for trial on August 9, 1961, Atty. Tirol informed the court a quo that he was
appearing also for Apduhan, but only as counsel de oficio. In view of this manifestation, the trial court
appointed Atty. Tirol as counsel de oficio for the said accused. Forthwith, Atty. Tirol manifested that
Apduhan would change his former plea of not guilty to a plea of guilty. The record discloses that after
the trial, judge had repeatedly apprised Apduhan of the severity of the offense for which he was
indicted and the strong possibility that the capital penalty might be imposed upon him despite a plea
of guilty, Apduhan persisted in his intention to plead guilty with the request, however, that the death
penalty be not imposed. Then after hearing the arguments of Provincial Fiscal Jesus N. Borromeo
and Atty. Tirol on the effect of articles 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code on the case at bar, the
trial judge advised the herein accused anew that he could be sentenced to death notwithstanding his
projected plea of guilty, but the latter reiterated his desire to confess his guilt on the specific condition
that he be sentenced to life imprisonment. Eventually, however, Apduhan desisted from pleading
guilty and let his previous plea stand on record after further warnings that he faced the grave danger
of being sentenced to death in view of the circumstances of his case. But the aforesaid desistance
was merely momentary as it did not end the accused's equivocation on the matter of his plea. After a
five-minute recess requested by Atty. Tirol in order to confer with the accused, the former informed
the court a quo that his client would insist on entering a plea of guilty. The following appears on
record:
Atty. D. TIROL:
Your Honor, please, I had a conference with the accused and I apprised him with the
situation of the case and after hearing our apprisal he manifested that he will insist on his
entering a plea of guilty, Your Honor. I made it clear to him that we are not forcing him to
enter the plea of guilty.
COURT (To accused Apolonio Apduhan, Jr.)
Q. Is it true that you are withdrawing your plea of not guilty?
393
A. I will just enter the plea of guilty.
Q. Have you been forced to enter the plea of guilty by your lawyer?.
A. No, Sir.
Q. And why do you said "I will JUST enter the plea of not guilty"?
A. I have proposed to enter the plea of guilty even before.
Q. Now the Court warns you again. Are you conscious of the fact that notwithstanding your
plea of guilty the Court may impose upon you the penalty of death?
A. I will just enter the plea of guilty, at the discretion of the Court.
Q. Even with all those dangers mentioned by the Court to you? .
A. Yes, Sir. (t.s.n. pp. 23-25).
Subsequently the prosecuting fiscal and the counsel de oficio resumed their oral arguments
regarding the effect on the instant case of articles 295 and 296, particularly the use of unlicensed
firearm as a special aggravating circumstance under the latter article. Also discuss were the
existence and effect of the alleged mitigating and aggravating circumstances. All of these points will
be later analyzed.
When the lower court subsequently reviewed the proceedings, it found that the accused's plea of
guilty was ambiguous. Hence, on August 30, 1961, the case was reopened with respect to Apduhan,
and on said date the latter entered a categorical plea of guilty, as evidenced by the record:
COURT (To Accused Apduhan, Jr.):
The Court reopened this case because after a review of the proceedings it found that your plea was
not definite. In answer to a question of the Court you simply said "I will just enter the plea of guilty".
The Court wants to know whether you enter the plea of guilty of the crime charged in the second
amended information.
ACCUSED APDUHAN:.
I enter the plea of guilty.
COURT (To same accused Apduhan):
Q. Therefore, you admit that you have committed the crime charged in the second
information?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. Is it necessary for you that the second amended information be read again?
A. No more; it is not necessary.
Q. Do you want that the second amended information be read to you again?
394
A. No more, Your Honor. (t.s.n. pp. 50-51).
On the same day, the court a quo rendered its decision, the pertinent dispositive portion of which
reads:.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court renders judgment finding accused Apolonio Apduhan,
Jr., alias Junior guilty of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, punished by Article 294
of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 296 of the game Code, as amended, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of death.
Considering that Apduhan had voluntarily confessed his guilt in open court, then the only aspect of
the case properly subject to review is the correctness of the penalty imposed by the court a quo. In
this respect, the appreciation of the use of unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating circumstance
(art. 296) in fixing the appropriate penalty for robbery with homicide (Art, 294 [1]) committed by a
band with the use of unlicensed firearms, and the interplay and counter-balancing of the attendant
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, would determine the severity of the penalty imposable.
The disposition of the question at hand necessitates a discussion of the interrelation among articles
294, 295 and 296 of the Revised Penal Code. For this purpose the said articles are hereunder
quoted:
ART. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. Any
person guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the

robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed.
2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when
the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by
reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in
subdivision 1 of article 263 shall have been inflicted.
3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery,

any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the
next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.
4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its
medium period, if the violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the
robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the commission
of the crime, or when in the course of the execution, the offender shall have inflicted
upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries
covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said article 263.
5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period in other cases. (As amended by Rep. Act 18.).
ART 295. Robbery with physical injuries, committed in an uninhabited place and by a band,
or with the use of firearm on a street, road or alley. If the offenses mentioned in
subdivisions three, four, and five of the next preceding article shall have been committed in
an uninhabited place or by a band, or by attacking a moving train, street car, motor vehicle or
airship, or by entering the passengers' compartments in a train or, in any manner, taking the
passengers thereof by surprise in the respective conveyances, or on a street, road highway,
or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of a firearm, the offender shall be
395
punished by the maximum period of the proper penalties. (As amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 12
and 373.) (Emphasis supplied) .
ART. 296. Definition of a band and penalty incurred by the members thereof. When more
than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of a robbery, it shall be deemed to
have been committed by a band. When any of the arms used in the commission of the
offense be an unlicensed firearm the penalty to be imposed upon all the malefactors shall be
the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by law,without prejudice to the criminal
liability for illegal possession of such unlicensed firearm.
Any member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band, shall be
punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band, unless it be shown that
he attempted to prevent the same. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 12). (Emphasis supplied).
The afore-quoted art. 294 enumerates five classes of robbery with violence against or
intimidation of persons and prescribes the corresponding penalties. The case at bar falls
under art. 294(1) which defines robbery with homicide and fixes the penalty from reclusion
perpetua to death.
Article 295 provides, inter alia, that when the offenses described in subdivisions 3, 4 and 5 of art.
294 are committed by a band, the proper penalties must be imposed in the maximum periods. The
circumstance of band is therefore qualifying only in robbery punished by subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of
art. 294. Consequently, art. 295 is inapplicable to robbery with homicide, rape, intentional mutilation,
and lesiones graves resulting in insanity, imbecility, impotency or blindness. If the foregoing classes
of robbery which are described in art. 294(1) and (2) are perpetrated by a band, they would not be
punishable under art. 295, but then cuadrilla would be a generic aggravating under Art. 14 of the
Code.1 Hence, with the present wording of art. 295 2 there is no crime as "robbery with homicide in
band." If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be
denominated as "robbery with homicide" under art. 294(1), but the element of band, as stated above,
would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
Article 296, as quoted above, defines "band", creates the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm, and provides the criminal liability incurred by the members of the band. The
ascertainment of the definite function and range of applicability of this article in relation to articles
294 and 295 is essential in the disposition of the case at bar.
In imposing the death penalty, the trial court appears to have accorded validity to the Provincial
Fiscal's contention that in robbery with homicide committed by a band, the use of unlicensed firearm
must be appreciated as a special aggravating circumstance pursuant to art. 296. Thus convinced,
the trial judge stressed in his decision that "under the express mandate of the law, we cannot escape
the arduous task of imposing the death penalty." Subscribing to the said position, the Solicitor
General adds that the "penalty for robbery under the circumstances mentioned in Articles 294,
paragraph 1, and 296 of the Code is the maximum of reclusion perpetua to death, or the supreme
penalty of death. This is mandatory." .
On the other hand, Atty. Alberto M. Meer, the accused's counsel de oficio in the present review,
contends that the use of unlicensed firearm, if ever appreciated in the case at bar, must be
considered a generic aggravating factor which "may be off-set by the existence of mitigating
circumstances so that the penalty to be imposed should be the penalty of reclusion perpetua." .
Both the foregoing contentions are untenable.
After a perceptive analysis of the provisions of art. 296, we reach the considered opinion that the
said article is exclusively linked and singularly applicable to the immediately antecedent provision of
art. 295 on robbery in band, as the latter article, in turn, is explicitly limited in scope to subdivisions 3,
396
4, and 5 of art. 294. Consequently, although the use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating
circumstance under art. 296, as amended by Rep. Act 12, 3 it cannot be appreciated as such in
relation to robbery with homicide, described and penalized under paragraph 1 of art. 294.
As previously stated, art. 295 provides that if any of the classes of robbery described in subdivisions
3, 4, and 5 of art. 294 is committed by a band, the offender shall be punished by the maximum
period of the proper penalty. Correspondingly, the immediately following provisions of art. 296 define
the term "band", prescribe the collective liability of the members of the band, and state that "when
any of the arms used in the commission of the offense be in unlicensed firearm, the penalty to be
imposed upon all the malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty provided by
law." Viewed from the contextual relation of articles 295 and 296, the word "offense" mentioned in
the above-quoted portion of the latter article logically means the crime of robbery committed by a
band, as the phrase "all the malefactors" indubitably refers to the members of the band and the
phrase "the corresponding penalty provided by law" relates to the offenses of robbery described in
the last three subdivisions of art. 294 which are all encompassed within the ambit of art. 295.
Evidently, therefore, art. 296 in its entirety is designed to amplify and modify the provision on robbery
in band which is nowhere to be found but in art. 295 in relation to subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of art. 294.
Verily, in order that the aforesaid special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm may
be appreciated to justify the imposition of the maximum period of the proper penalty it is a condition
sine qua non that the offense charged be robbery committed by a band within the contemplation of
art. 295. To reiterate, since art. 295, does not apply to subdivision 1 and 2 of art. 294, then the
special aggravating factor in question, which is solely applicable to robbery in band under art. 295,
cannot be considered in fixing the penalty imposable for robbery with homicide under art. 294(1),
even if the said crime was committed by a band with the use of unlicensed firearms.
The legislative intent of making art. 296 corollary to art. 295 with respect to robbery in band was
unmistakably articulated by Congressman Albano in his sponsorship speech on H. B. No. 124
(subsequently enacted as Rep. Act No. 12, amending, among others, articles 295 and 296 of the
Revised Penal Code). Said Congressman Albano: "Article 296 as a corollary of Article 295 would
change the definition heretofore known of the term "band" under the law. The purpose of this
amendment is to inject therein the element of aggravation, when any member of the band carries an
unlicensed firearm . ." 4.
The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, however, was initially applicable
to all the subdivisions of art. 294 since the said Rep. Act No. 12 also amended art. 295 to include
within its scope all the classes of robbery described in art. 294. With the then enlarged coverage of
art. 295, art. 296, being corollary to the former, was perforce made applicable to robbery with
homicide (art. 294[1]). Thus, in People vs. Bersamin, 5 this Court, in passing, opined: "The use of
unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstanceapplicable only in cases of robbery in band
(Art. 296, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3, Republic Act No. 12)." .
In the said case, this Court declared in effect that in robo con homicidio the use of unlicensed firearm
is not a special aggravating circumstance when the said offense is not committed by a band.
Inferentially, had the robbery with homicide in Bersamin been perpetrated by a band, the use of
unlicensed firearm would have been appreciated. This implied pronouncement would have been
justified under art. 296 in relation to art. 295, as amended by Rep. Act 12. But the aforesaid
inference lost all legal moorings in 1949 with the enactment of Rep. Act 373 which excluded
subdivisions 1 and 2 of art. 294 from the coverage of art. 295. Since art. 296, as repeatedly
emphasized above, is corollary to art. 295, the diminution of the latter's scope correspondingly
reduced the former's extent of applicability. In other words, the passage of the foregoing amendment
did not only jettison the first two subdivisions of art. 294 from the periphery of art. 295 but also
removed the said subdivisions (which pertain, inter alia, to the offense of robbery with homicide) from
the effective range of art. 296.
397
Notwithstanding that the special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm cannot be
appreciated in the instant case, we are constrained, in the final analysis, to observe that the
imposition of the death penalty on the accused Apduhan would appear to be a logical legal
consequence, because as against the attendant mitigating circumstances the aggravating
circumstances numerically and qualitatively preponderate.
After Apduhan had pleaded guilty, the defense counsel offered for consideration three mitigating
circumstances, namely, plea of guilty, intoxication, and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong.
Subsequently, however, the defense withdrew the last mentioned mitigating circumstance after the
prosecution had withdrawn the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The
following manifestations appear on record: .
"FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"In fairness to the accused, because the crime charged is robbery in band (the case at bar is
actually robbery with homicide), it is natural that in robbery in band there is already abuse of
superior strength, so we will just withdraw that superior strength.
"COURT (To Atty. D. Tirol): .
"What do you say now? .
"ATTY. D. TIROL: .
"Such being the case, we will not insist on presenting evidence in support of our contention
that the accused did not intend to commit so grave a wrong.
"COURT: .
"Moreover by the mere use of firearm the accused cannot claim that he did not intend to
commit so grave a wrong as that committed. So now you withdraw your petition that you be
allowed to present evidence to that effect? .
"ATTY. D. TIROL: .
"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 47-48).
Thus, only two alleged mitigating circumstances remain for consideration.
Anent the plea of guilty, we believe that under art. 13 (7) its appreciation in the case at bar is
beyond controversion.
However, apropos the alternative circumstance of intoxication, we find no evidence on record

to support the defense's claim that it should be considered as a mitigating factor. This
absence of proof can be attributed to the defense's erroneous belief that it was not anymore
its burden to establish the state of intoxication of the accused when he committed the
offense charged since anyway the prosecution had already admitted the attendance of the
said mitigating circumstance on the ground that the State did not have strong evidence to
overthrow the accused's claim of non-habituality to drinking. The record discloses the
following pertinent discussion: .
"COURT (To Fiscal Borromeo):.
398
"Do you agree, Mr. Fiscal, that the non-habitual intoxication of the accused be also taken into
account in his favor as a mitigating circumstance? "FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"We have no evidence exactly to know at this time that the accused was intoxicated, but his
affidavit states that before the commission of the crime they took young coconuts and there
is no mention about the taking of any liquor, so that, as it is now, we are constrained to
object.
"COURT (To the Fiscal): .
"But do you have evidence to counteract that allegation? .
"FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"We do not have any evidence to counteract that.
"But do you not admit the attendance of that circumstance? .
"FISCAL BORROMEO: With that manifestation we submit because actually we do not have
evidence to counteract that he was a habitual drinker. "COURT (To the Fiscal): .
"But do you prefer to admit that mitigating circumstance or you need that evidence be
presented to that effect? "FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"Inasmuch as we do not have strong evidence to contradict that circumstance in fairness to

the accused, we would rather submit.
"The attendance of the mitigating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication? .
"FISCAL BORROMEO: .
"Yes, Your Honor." (t.s.n. pp. 7-9) (Emphasis supplied) .
From the above proceedings in the trial court, it would appear that what the prosecution actually
intended to admit was the non-habituality of the accused to drinking liquor, not as a matter of fact,
but due to the State's inability to disprove the same. The prosecution apparently did not concede the
actual intoxication of the accused. We are of the firm conviction that, under the environmental
circumstances, the defense was not relieved of its burden to prove the accused's actual state of
intoxication. Otherwise, to appreciate the attendance of a mitigating factor on the mere allegation of
the accused, coupled with the dubious acquiescence of the prosecution, would open wide the
avenue for unscrupulous and deceitful collusion between defense and prosecution in order to unduly
and unjustly minimize the penalty imposable upon the accused.
The last paragraph of art. 15 of the Code provides:.
"The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when
the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit said felony but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional it
shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. (Emphasis supplied).
399
Under the foregoing provision, intoxication is mitigating when it is not habitual or intentional, that is,
not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. However, to be mitigating the accused's state of
intoxication must be proved. 6 Once intoxication is established by satisfactory evidence, 7 then in
the absence of proof to the contrary" it is presumed to be non-habitual or unintentional. 8 .
In People vs. Noble 9 the defendant testified that before the murder he took a bottle of wine and
drank little by little until he got drunk. The policeman who arrested the accused testified that the latter
smelled wine and vomited. The Court held that the evidence presented was not satisfactory to
warrant a mitigation of the penalty. Intoxication was likewise not competently proved in a case 10
where the only evidence was that the defendant had a gallon of tuba with him at the time he
committed the crime.
In the case at bar the accused merely alleged that when he committed the offense charged he was
intoxicated although he was "not used to be drunk," 11This self-serving statement stands
uncorroborated. Obviously, it is devoid of any probative value.
To recapitulate, the accused has in his favor only one mitigating circumstance: plea of guilty. As
aforementioned, the defense withdrew its claim of "lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong" and
failed to substantiate its contention that intoxication should be considered mitigating.
While an unqualified plea of guilty is mitigating, it at the same time constitutes an admission of all the
material facts alleged in the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein recited. 12
The four aggravating circumstances are (1) band; (2) dwelling; (3) nighttime; and (4) abuse of
superior strength. The circumstance of abuse of superiority was, however, withdrawn by the
prosecution on the ground that since the offense of robbery with homicide was committed by a band,
the element of cuadrilla necessarily absorbs the circumstance of abuse of superior strength. We
believe that said withdrawal was ill-advised since the circumstances of band and abuse of superiority
are separate and distinct legal concepts. The element of band is appreciated when the offense is
committed by more than three armed malefactors regardless of the comparative strength of the
victim or victims. Hence, the indispensable components of cuadrilla are (1) at least four malefactors
and (2) all of the four malefactors are armed. On the other hand, the gravamen of abuse of
superiority is the taking advantage by the culprits of their collective strength to overpower their
relatively weaker victim or victims. Hence, in the latter aggravating factor, what is taken into account
is not the number of aggressors nor the fact that they are armed, but their relative physical might vis-
a-vis the offended party.
Granting, however, that the said withdrawal was valid, there still remain three aggravating
circumstances which render inutile the solitary extenuating circumstance of plea of guilty. The
prosecution does not need to prove the said three circumstances (all alleged in the second amended
information) since the accused by his plea of guilty, has supplied the requisite proof. 13 Hence, we
will not belabor our discussion of the attendance aggravating circumstances.
The settled rule is that dwelling is aggravating in robbery with violence or intimidation of persons, 14
like the offense at bar. The rationale behind this pronouncement is that this class of robbery could be
committed without the necessity of transgressing the sanctity of the home. Morada is inherent only in
crimes which could be committed in no other place than in the house of another, such as trespass
and robbery in an inhabited house. 15 This Court in People vs. Pinca, 16 citing People vs. Valdez,
17 ruled that the "circumstances (of dwelling and scaling) were certainly not inherent in the crime
committed, because, the crime being robbery with violence or intimidation against persons
(specifically, robbery with homicide) the authors thereof could have committed it without the
necessity of violating or scaling the domicile of their victim." Cuello Calon opines that the
commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows greater perversity in the accused and produces
greater alarm. 18.
400
Nocturnity is aggravating when it is purposely and deliberately sought by the accused to facilitate the
commission of the crime 19 or to prevent their being recognized or to insure unmolested escape. 20
Nocturnidad must concur with the intent and design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic
impunity afforded by the darkness of night. 21 In the case at bar, the affidavit (exh. I-1) of the
accused Apduhan shows that he and his co-malefactors took advantage of the nighttime in the
perpetration of the offense as they waited until it was dark before they came out of their hiding place
to consummate their criminal designs.
In his decision, the trial judge recommends to, the President of the Republic the commutation of the
death sentence which he imposed on the accused to life imprisonment. The Solicitor General
supports this recommendation for executive clemency.
We find no compelling reason to justify such recommendation. Contrary to the trial judge's
observation, the accused's plea of guilty was far from "spontaneous" and "insistent". It will be
recalled that his initial plea was one of not guilty. Later, he changed his plea but with the persistent
condition that he be sentenced to life imprisonment, not death. It was only after much equivocation
that he finally decided to "just" plead guilty. Because his plea was still ambiguous, the court a quo
had to reopen the case to ascertain its real nature. Conceding, however, that his plea was
"spontaneous" and "insistent," such manifestation of sincere repentance cannot serve to obliterate
the attendant aggravating circumstances which patently reveal the accused's criminal perversity.
It appears from a cursory reading of the decision under review that the trial judge also anchored his
recommendation on the ground that there is "the possibility that the firearm was used in order to
counteract the resistance of the deceased." This is no justification at all for executive clemency.
Firstly, the above observation is a mere conjecture - in the language of the presiding judge, a
"possibility." Secondly, even granting that the said observation relates to the actual happening, to
employ a firearm in subduing the lawful resistance of innocent persons is a criminal act by any
standard.
Even as we purge the decision under review of its errors, we must hasten to commend the trial
judge, the Hon. Hipolito Alo, for his earnest and patient efforts to forestall the entry of an improvident
plea of guilty by the accused Apduhan, notwithstanding that the latter was already represented by a
counsel de oficio and hence presumed to have been advised properly. Judge Alo made sure that the
accused clearly and fully understood the seriousness of the offense charged and the severity of the
penalty attached to it. When the accused proposed to confess his guilt, Judge Alo repeatedly warned
him that the death penalty might be imposed despite his plea of guilty. As aforementioned, when it
appeared that Apduhan's plea of guilty was ambiguous, Judge Alo reopened the case to determine
with definitiveness the nature of his plea.
The virtue of Judge Alo's efforts in ascertaining whether Apduhan pleaded guilty with full knowledge
of the significance and consequences of his act, recommends itself to all trial judges who must
refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while justice demands a speedy
administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that when an accused
pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.
As a final commentary on the criminal conduct of the accused herein, it must be emphasized that the
instant review was delayed for several years because he escaped from the New Bilibid Prisons on
June 17, 1963, less than six months after he was committed to the said penitentiary. He was
recommitted on July 10, 1964 with a new mittimus from the Court of First Instance of Leyte for
robbery in band in criminal case 10099, for which he was sentenced to serve a prison term of from 8
years and 1 day to 12 years and 1 day commencing on October 31, 1963. 22 His recommitment was
reported to this Court only on July 5, 1966.
401
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, for failure to secure the required number of votes, the
penalty of death cannot be legally imposed. The penalty next lower in degree - reclusion perpetua -
should consequently be imposed on the accused.
ACCORDINGLY, with the modification that the death sentence imposed upon Apolonio Apduhan, Jr.
by the court a quo is reduced to reclusion perpetua, the judgment a quo is affirmed in all other
respects, without pronouncement as to costs.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30449 October 31, 1979

vs.
ANTONIO GARCIA Y CABARSE alias "TONY MANOK" and REYNALDO ARVISO V
REBELLEZA alias "RENE BISUGO," defendants-appellants.
Wenceslao B. Trinidad for appellants.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and Solicitor Adolfo
J. Diaz for appellee.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of April 17, 1969 by the Circuit Criminal Court at Pasig, Rizal,
which found the accused guilty of murder and sentenced them to the death penalty.
The legal verdict hinges on the testimony of the lone eyewitness for the prosecution, Mrs. Corazon
Dioquino Paterno, sister of the deceased, Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. She testified that at the time of the
incident, she resided at Ventanilla Street, Pasay City. She lived at Pasay City for about five months
before moving to another dwelling at Timog Avenue, Quezon City. While residing at Pasay City, she
conceived a child and during this period, it was not unusual for her, accompanied by her husband, to
step out of the house in the wee hours of the morning. They set out on these irregular walks about
five times.
During her residence at Pasay City, her brother Apolonio visited her family for about twenty times.
Sometimes her brother would stay instead at their parents' house at Muntinlupa, Rizal. He usually
spent his weekends in his residence at Bo. Balubad, Porac, Pampanga. Apolonio and her husband
were very close to each other; whenever Apolonio paid them a visit, he usually slept in the house
and sought their help on various problems.
402
Before the incident which gave rise to this case, Corazon's husband informed her that he saw
Apolonio engaged in a drinking spree with his gang in front of an establishment known as Bill's Place
at M. de la Cruz Street. Pasay City. In her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police executed on
November 3, 1968, Corazon surmised that her husband must have been painting the town red ("nag
good time") in that same place. Upon learning this information from her husband, Corazon obtained
permission to leave the house at 3:00 a.m. so she could fetch her brother. At that time, she had not
been aware that Apolonio was in Pasay City; she had been of the belief that he was with his family in
Pampanga. She went to fetch him because she wanted him to escape the untoward influence of his
gang. In explaining the rationale for her noctural mission, she employed in her sworn statement the
following language: "Dahil itong si Junior ay meron na kaming nabalitaan na naaakay ng barkada
niya sa paggawa ng hindi mabuti."
On her way, as she rounded the corner of P.C. Santos Street, Corazon saw her brother fleeing a
group of about seven persons, including the two accused, Antonio Garcia and Reynaldo Arviso. She
recognized the two accused because they were former gangmates of her brother; in fact, she knew
them before the incident by their aliases of "Tony Manok" and "Rene Bisugo, " respectively.
Corazon saw that the chase was led by the two accused, with Antonio carrying a long sharp
instrument. Later, in the course of giving her sworn statement before the Pasay City Police on ,
November 3, 1968, Corazon positively Identified Antonio and Reynaldo, who were then at the office
of the General Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, Pasay City Police Department. She
also stated that if she saw the other members of the group again, perhaps she could likewise Identify
them. At the trial, Corazon likewise pointed out the two accused. During the incident, she exerted
efforts to Identify the other group members, taking care to conceal herself as she did so. She heard
a gunshot which caused her to seek cover.
When she ventured to look from where she was hiding, about 20 meters away, she saw the group
catch up with her brother and maltreat him. Some beat him with pieces of wood, others boxed him.
Immediately afterwards, the group scampered away in different directions. Antonio was left behind.
He was sitting astride the prostrate figure of Apolonio, stabbing the latter in the back with his long
knife. Corazon was not able to observe where Antonio later fled, for she could hardly bear to witness
the scene.
When Corazon mustered the courage to approach her brother, she saw that he was bathed in a pool
of his own blood. The incident threw her in a state of nervous confusion, and she resolved to report
the incident to her younger sister, who lived at Lakandula Street, Pasay City. Her sister in turn
decided to break the news to their father at Muntinlupa.
Subsequently, Corazon learned that the police authorities were searching for her brother's
gangmates for having killed him. She also learned that the suspects were in hiding. On the same
day October 19, 1968 accompanied by her family, she went at 2:00 p.m. to the Police
Department to inquire about her brother's corpse. They were directed to the Funeraria Popular,
where an autopsy was held. Sometime later, on November 1, 1968, she transferred residence to
Quezon City.
Dr. Mariano Cueva, Jr. testified that he conducted a post-mortem examination on the cadaver of the
decedent Apolonio, and that he prepared the corresponding Necropsy Report. Dr. Cueva found that
the deceased suffered 22 stab wounds in the different portions of his hips; in the front portion of the
chest and neck; in the back portion of the torso; and in the right hand. He testified that the wounds
sustained by the deceased brought about a massive hemorrhage which caused death. He also
testified that it is possible that the instrument marked as Exhibit "B" could have been used in
inflicting the multiple stab wounds sustained by the deceased, except the stab wounds on the neck.
Both the accused took refuge in the defense of alibi. Antonio Garcia claimed that at that time of the
incident starting with the chase and ending with the victim's death in the morning of October
403
19, 1968, he was at a place called Pacita's Canteen which adjoins Bill's Place at M, de la Cruz
Street. Reynaldo Arviso claimed that in the evening of the preceding night (October 18, 1968) he
went on a drinking spree with his friends at Pacita's Canteen. He went home at 10:30 p.m. and slept
up to 7:00 a.m. of October 19, 1968. From 7:00 a.m. of that day, he performed his duties as a bus
conductor by calling for passengers near Pacita's Canteen.
The trial court pinpointed the issue as revolving around the Identity of the persons who participated
in the killing of the deceased. it banked on the testimony of the witness, Corazon Dioquino, who
positively Identified the accused as participants in the attack. Noting that "the defense did not even
attempt to present any evil motive on the part of the witness," the court concluded that "the two
accused took part in the perpetuation of the crime charged." It gave short shrift to the defense of alibi
presented by the two accused, noting that, by their own admission, the two accused were residents
of the vicinity of the crime.
In respect of the circumstances attending the crime it said:
But considering the aggravating circumstances of nighttime; superior strength; and

treachery, which three aggravating circumstances had been sufficiently established
by the prosecution, the same cannot be offset by said voluntary surrender to a
person in authority of his agent, plus the uncontested fact that deceased, Apolonio
Dioquino, Jr. suffered no less than 22 stab wounds, convincing evidence of the
apparent criminal perversity of the accused, the court, therefore, has no alternative
but to impose the supreme penalty.
And rendered judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused, Antonio Garcia v
Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the
crime of Murder under Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged under
Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and
considering the aggravating circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime,
each one of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
The two accused are further ordered to indemnify, the heirs of the deceased,
Apolonio Dioquino, Jr. in the amount of TWELVE 'THOUSAND (P12,000,00) PESOS,
jointly and severally and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
In their Brief, the accused contended that the lower court erred: in not considering nighttime and
superior strength as absorbed in treachery: in finding nighttime as an aggravating circumstance
despite absolute absence of evidence that nighttime was purposely sought to insure the execution of
the crime; in finding superior strength as an aggravating circumstance despite absence of evidence
to sustain such a finding; in finding treachery as an aggravating circumstance despite absence of
evidence to that effect; in not stating the qualifying circumstance of the alleged crime; in holding that
the accused Reynaldo Arviso stabbed and hit the victim when there is no evidence as to the
participation of the said accused Arviso in the execution of the alleged crime; and in failing to
consider the material inconsistencies, prejudice and other circumstances in the uncorroborated
testimony of the only eyewitness, rendering said testimony not worthy of belief.
The assignment of errors by the accused is anchored on their attempt to discredit the lone
eyewitness for the prosecution, a function which, if successfully undertaken, would totally obliterate
the nexus between the accused and the crime. The defense vigorously maintained that the
testimony of the only eyewitness is a fabrication, and that she was in fact absent from the scene
which she described in both her sworn statement and in her testimony at the trial.
404
The defense asserted that Corazon Dioquino's testimony was riddled by material inconsistencies.
The defense sought to capitalize on the discrepancy of a sketch made by Corazon and the sketch
made by Pasay City Electrical Engineer Jaime Arriola. Corazon's sketch shows Juan Sumulong
Elementary School to be right in front of P.C. Santos Street; while Arriola's sketch shows that the
school is about 135 meters from the corner of the street. The defense contended that the
discrepancy was a deliberate falsehood on the part of the witness,
Corazon testified that she was near the corner of P.C. Santos Street when she saw her brother
under chase in front of the school, and that she met the group in front of the school in a matter of five
seconds, more or less. The defense assailed her testimony on this point as incredible on the ground
that the distance between the point where she saw her brother being chased, up to the point where
she met them, is 135 meters, and no human being can cover that distance in five seconds.
Moreover, Corazon testified that she was 20 meters away from the place where the accused caught
up with her brother. Again, the defense criticized her testimony in this respect by pointing out that the
true distance is 175 meters.
The defense insisted that Corazon's sketch of the locale of the crime (Exhibit "1") constitutes "the
high point of falsity of her testimony." The defense sought to substantiate this claim by arguing that
from her sketch, it appears that she never crossed paths with her brother or his pursuers. The
witness testified that she saw her brother at the point which is four to five meters from the corner of
P.C. Santos Street. Yet she also testified that she saw the incident from 20 meters. The witness
claimed she hid after hearing the shot at a point which is 170 meters from the scene of the crime.
The defense argued that she could not have covered the distance in such a short time, and that this
belies her claim that she was only 20 meters from the scene of the crime. The defense pointed out
that Arriola's sketch (Exhibit "2") shows that the school is 135 meters from the scene of the crime,
and the point where the witness claimed she viewed the crime is 170 meters from the scene of the
crime thus giving the lie to her claim that she was 20 meters away.
The alleged inconsistencies in Corazon's testimony which the defense makes much of are not
irreconcilable with the physical facts, At the outset, it should not be overlooked that Corazon was
testifying as an eyewitness to the traumatic incident by which her brother met a violent death at the
hands of a mob. Naturally, Corazon can not be expected to deliver a testimony which passes
microscopic scrutiny and scrupulous armchair analysis of the facts, conducted under circumstances
far removed from the turbulence and emotional color of the event as it actually transpired. Al
contrario, if Corazon's testimony were meticulously accurate with respect to distance covered and
the time taken to negotiate it, an impartial observer would wonder whether such exactitude were not
the product of previous rehearsal, if not of fabrication. In times of stress, the human mind is
frequently overpowered by the ebb and flow of emotions in turmoil; and it is only judicious to take
into consideration the natural manifestations of human conduct, when the physical senses are
subdued by the psychological state of the individual.
Corazon was a resident of Pasay City for only about five months. She testified that she is not familiar
with the streets along M. de la Cruz Street. Moreover, Corazon did not categorically testify that she
covered the distance of 135 meters in five seconds. Mole accurately, she testified that she walked for
a period of from five to ten seconds, more or less. Put in this way, the period was sufficient to allow
her to negotiate the distance. Moreover, Corazon did not stay rooted to one spot while the incident
was taking place, but surreptitiously edged her way up to Magtibay Street, which is closer to the
place of the killing.
The defense also claims that the delay which Corazon allowed to transpire, before reporting the
crime to the authorities and giving her sworn statement (on November 3, 1968), is indicative of
fabrication. The killing took place before dawn of October 19, 1968, In the afternoon of the same day,
Corazon and her family went to the Police Department to inquire about the remains of her brother.
Corazon already knew that the police were taking steps to round up the killers. She incurred no fault
in waiting until the culprits were arrested before confronting them and giving her statement. It would
405
have been the better part of legal procedure if she had given her statement earlier; but since she
was only a 22-year old housekeeper at that tune, she can not be held to a higher standard of
discretion.
The defense further contends that the failure to present Corazon's husband in court indicates that
Corazon was not actually at the scene of the crime at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It the defense felt
that the husband had a contribution to make in the cause of truth, there was nothing which
prevented them from compelling his process by summons. This they failed to do; and their omission
should not be taken to reflect adversely on the prosecution, who evidently believed that the
husband's testimony was unnecessary,
Finally, the defense claims that it was unnatural for Corazon, after viewing her brother's body, to
proceed to her sister's house one kilometer away, instead of returning to her own house, which was
just a block or so away. It is not unnatural for a witness to a gruesome event, to choose to confer
with a person bound to her by ties of consanguinity, even if such a conference necessitates that she
traverse a longer distance. The exercise of judgment, on the spot, should not be gauged by reason
applied in hindsight with a metrical yard stick.
The next major burden which the defense undertook to assume was to contend that the accused
Reynaldo Arviso is innocent because there is no evidence as to his participation in the execution of
the crime. It is claimed that there is absolute absence of evidence to show that Reynaldo was a
direct participant and that the only evidence against him is that he was seen pursuing the victim.
However, the finding of Reynaldo's guilt stems, not from his direct participation in the criminal
execution, but from his participation in the conspiracy to kill the deceased. His participation in the
conspiracy is supported by Corazon's testimony that he and Antonio were the leaders of the pack
following closely at the heels of the victim.
It is well established that conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when
such acts point to a joint purpose and design. A concerted assault upon the victim by the defendants
may indicate conspiracy. (PP v. Monroy & Idica, L-11177, Oct. 30, 1958, 104 Phil. 759). Conspiracy
exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendants had the same criminal purpose
and were united in its execution. (PP v. Datu Dima Binahasing, L-4837, April 28, 1956, 98 Phil. 902).
Those who are members of the band of malefactors by which a murder is committed and are present
at the time and place of the commission of the crime, thus contributing by their presence to augment
the power of the band and to aid in the successful realization of the crime, are guilty as principals
even if they took no part in the material act of killing the deceased. (US v. Abelinde, No. 945, Dec.
10, 1902, 1 Phil. 568; People v. Carunungan, L-13283, Sept. 30, 1960, 109 Phil. 534). To establish
conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to commit a crime. It is
sufficient that the malefactors have acted in concert, pursuant to the same objective. (PP vs. San
Luis, L-2365, May 29, 1950, 86 Phil. 485).
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence of acts charged, but may and generally must
be proven by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the
purpose to be accomplished. If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part. so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy maybe inferred though no actual meeting among them
to concert is proven (PP v. Colman L-6652-54, Feb. 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 6). A conspiracy may be
entered into after the commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime. (PP v.
Barredo, L-2728, Dec. 29, 1950, 87 Phil. 800). Conspiracy implies concert of design and not
participation in every detail of execution (PP v. Carbonel, L-24177, March 15, 1926, 48 Phil. 868; PP
v. Danan, L-1766, March 31, 1949, 83 Phil. 252).
When a group of seven men, more or less, give chase to a single unarmed individual running for his
life, and they overtake him and inflict wounds on his body by means of shooting, stabbing, and
406
hitting with pieces of wood, there is conspiracy to kill; and it does not detract from their status as
conspirators that there is no evidence of previous agreement, it being sufficient that their wills have
concurred and they labored to achieve the same end.
The defense submits that the failure of the lower court to specify the qualifying circumstance in the
crime of murder is violative of the Constitution and the Rules of Court. We find no such infirmity.
Since the principle concerned is "readily understood from the facts, the conclusion and the penalty
posed., an express specification of the statute or exposition of the law is not necessary." (People vs.
Silo, L-7916, May 25, 1956, 99 Phil. 216). In the absence of a specification by the trial court, the
defense surmised that the qualifying circumstance in this case is evident premeditation: but the
defense argued that evident premeditation was not shown. We agree. Under normal conditions,
conspiracy generally presupposes premeditation. But in the case of implied conspiracy, evident
premeditation may not be appreciated, in the absence of proof as to how and when the plan to kill
the victim was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried out, so that it can not be
determined if the accused had "sufficient time between its inception and its fulfillment
dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences." There should be a showing that the
accused had the opportunity for reflection and persisted in executing his criminal design. (PP v.
Custodia, L-7442, October 24,1955, 97 Phil. 698; PP v. Mendoza and Sinu-ag, L-4146 and L-4147,
March 28, 1952, 91 Phil. 58; PP v. Yturiaga, L-2816, May 31, 1950, 86 Phil. 534; PP v. Lozada, No.
46998, Nov. 16, 1940, 70 Phil. 525; PP v. Upao Moro, L-6771, May 28, 1957, Phil. 101 Phil. 1226;
PP v. Sakam, No. 41566, Dec. 7, 1934, 61 Phil. 27: PP v. Peralta, L-19069, Oct. 29, 1968, 25 SCRA
759; PP v. Pareja, L-21937, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693).
Even in the absence of evident premeditation, the crime of murder in this case might still be qualified
by treachery, which is alleged in the information. But the defense argued that treachery was not
present. We are so convinced. It is an elementary axiom that treachery can in no way be presumed
but must be fully proven. (US v. Asilo, No. 1957, Jan. 30, 1905, 4 Phil, 175; US v. Arciga, No. 1129,
April 6, 1903, 2 Phil. 110; PP v. Durante, No. 31101, Aug. 23, 1929, 53 Phil. 363; PP v. Pelago, L-
24884, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1027), Where the manner of the attack was not proven, the
defendant should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the crime should be considered homicide
only. (Carpio, 83 Phil. 509; Amansec, So Phil, 424).
In People vs. Metran (L-4205, July 27, 1951, 89 Phil. 543). the aggravating circumstances of aid of
armed men, abuse of superiority, and nocturnity, were considered as constituting treachery, which
qualified the crime as murder, since there was no direct evidence as to the manner of the attack.
However, in this case we believe that the correct qualifying circumstance is not treachery, but abuse
of superiority. Here we are confronted with a helpless victim killed by assailants superior to him in
arms and in numbers. But the attack was not sudden nor unexpected, and the element of surprise
was lacking. The victim could have made a defense; hence, the assault involved some risk to the
assailants. There being no showing when the intent to kill was formed, it can not be said that
treachery has been proven. We believe the correct rule is found in People vs. Proceso Bustos (No.
17763, July 23, 1923, 45 Phil. 9), where alevosia was not appreciated because it was deemed
included in abuse of superiority.
We find that abuse of superiority attended the offense, following a long line of cases which made this
finding on parallel facts Our jurisprudence is exemplified by the holding that where four persons
attacked an unarmed victim but there was no proof as to how the attack commenced and treachery
was not proven, the fact that there were four assailants would constitute abuse of superiority.
(People vs. Lasada, No. 6742, Jan. 26, 1912, 21 Phil. 287; US v. Banagale, No. 7870, Jan. 10,
1913, 24 Phil. 69). However, the information does not allege the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superiority; hence, this circumstance can only be Created as generic aggravating. (People v. Acusar,
L-1798, Dee. 29, 1948, 82 Phil. 490; People v. Beje, L-8245, July 19, 1956, 99 Phil. 1052; People v.
Bautista, L-23303, May 20, 1969, 28 SCRA 184).
407
The offense took place at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. It may therefore be said that it was committed
at night, which covers the period from sunset to sunrise, according to the New Civil Code, Article 13.
Is this basis for finding that nocturnity is aggravating? The Revised Penal Code, Article 14, provides
that it is an aggravating circumstance when the crime is committed in the nighttime, whenever
nocturnity may facilitate the commission of the offense. There are two tests for nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance: the objective test, under which nocturnity is aggravating because it
facilitates the commission of the offense; and the subjective test, under which nocturnity is
aggravating because it was purposely sought by the offender. These two tests should be applied in
the alternative.
In this case, the subjective test is not passed because there is no showing that the accused
purposely sought the cover of night time. Next, we proceed and apply the objective test, to
determine whether nocturnity facilitated the killing of the victim. A group of men were engaged in a
drinking spree, in the course of which one of them fled, chased by seven others. The criminal assault
on the victim at 3:00 a.m. was invited by nocturnal cover, which handicapped the view of
eyewitnesses and encouraged impunity by persuading the malefactors that it would be difficult to
determine their Identity because of the darkness and the relative scarcity of people in the streets.
There circumstances combine to pass the objective test, and e find that nocturnity is aggravating
because it facilitated the commission of the offense. Nocturnity enticed those with the lust to kill to
follow their impulses with the false courage born out of the belief that they could not be readily
Identified.
The information alleges that the crime of murder was attended by the two qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation. Neither of these qualifying circumstances was proved;
hence, the killing can not be qualified into murder, and constitutes instead the crime of homicide,
which is punished by reclusion temporal. It is not controverted that the accused voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities; they are therefore entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. This lone mitigating circumstance offset by the two generic aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superiority and nocturnity, produces the result that in the crime of homicide, one
aggravating circumstance remains.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby modified in that the two accused, Antonio
Garcia y Cabarse and Reynaldo Arviso y Rebelleza, are sentenced to undergo an indeterminate
imprisonment of 10 years as minimum to 18 years as maximum, but in all other respects affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
408
EN BANC
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,

vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.

Ramon Diokno for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard,
was seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly
received a wound on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a
clerk in the said store, who was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of
the wounded man, ran to his assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the
aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the
street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in front of the door of a store and was about to
enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe wound in the left shoulder, on account
of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the rancheria of Dupit and had entered the
town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the meantime escaped by running away
from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard, were taken to the hospital,
where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the wound inflicted on the
Spaniard Juan Igual.
In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging
Manalinde with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge, in view
of the evidence adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said year, sentencing the
accused to the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to
pay the costs. The case has been submitted to this court for review.
409
From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of
murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was committed on the person of the
Chinaman Choa, in that the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep
cut on the left shoulder at the moment when he had just put down the load that he was carrying and
was about to start for the door of the store in front of which he stopped for the purpose of entering
therein. As a result of the tremendous wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and unexpected blow,
he was unable, not only to defend himself, apart from the fact that he was unarmed, but even to flee
from the danger, and falling to the ground, died in an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the
means and form employed in the attack the violent death of the said Chinaman was consummated
with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five qualifying circumstances enumerated in the
aforesaid article as calling for the greatest punishment.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime
herein mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had
come from his home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him
to go juramentado in Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain
grievances to avenge against a lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he,
Manalinde, was successful in the matter, he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in
case he was captured he was to say that he performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang,
Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he
provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in banana leaves, and, traveling for a day and a
night from his home, upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a Spaniard who was seated in
front of a store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who was close by, just
as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter a store
near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel
with the assaulted persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted
author of the crime in question has been unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he
acted by order of Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him, because it
was not a matter of proper obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said
datto and on that account killed only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own
volition he would have killed many more, because it is the barbarous and savage custom of
a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason whatever, can not under any
consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of civilized nations; such exhibitions of
ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people who up to the present time
have been practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities in this country can
never allow them to go unpunished, and as has happened a number of times in towns
where juramentados are in the habit of appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every
crime so committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of
article 10 of the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of reward and
premeditation are present, which in the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has
already been qualified as committed with the treachery, because the accused confessed that he
voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto Mupuck to gojuramentado and kill some one in the
town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped punishment he would be rewarded with a
pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the accused undoubtedly acted of his own volition and
with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on some of his fellow-beings, depriving
them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was about to commit a most serious
deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted authorities could by no means
permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the accused
knew perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.
410
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order
and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and
thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders
received from the said datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a
weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole
purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had
never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might warrant his
perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool considered the
killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration of the circumstance
of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the crime, the perversity of
the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the victim was not
predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having been deprived of
his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as the
firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received
the order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed
upon offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being
inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not
necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was
made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the other. In
the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise
of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to
carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being immaterial whether Datto
Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the inducement and voluntarily
executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United States
vs. Caranto et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was
rendered, as may be seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different from
the case where a criminal who has made up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other
than the object of his criminal intent. On going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did
kill the first two persons he encountered, and the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not
alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the crime, for the reason that to cause the violent
death of a human being without any reasonable motive is always punishable with a more or less
grave penalty according to the nature of the concurrent circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize
the effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be
affirmed with costs provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in
accordance with the provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being
granted he shall likewise be sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the
Penal Code. So ordered.
411
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136892. April 11, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. SUEENE DISCALSOTA y JUGAR,appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Without any proven qualifying circumstance, a killing constitutes homicide which is punishable
byreclusion temporal, not death. Where the attack was made openly and the victim had ample
opportunity to escape, treachery cannot be appreciated.
The Case
For automatic review by this Court is the Decision [1] dated September 28, 1998, issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City (Branch 53), finding Sueene Discalsota y Jugar guilty of
murder beyond reasonable doubt. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Sueene Discalsota, alias Ronnie de la Pea, GUILTY of
the crime of Murder, punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
7659, of Herbert Suarnaba. Applying Art. 63, of the Revised Penal Code, paragraph 2, No. 1, on the
application of indivisible penalties, which provides that whenever there is present only one
aggravating penalty, the greater penalty shall applied, and there is no mitigating circumstance. The
Court hereby imposes upon the accused Sueene Discalsota the penalty of DEATH.
412
The accused is further ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P50,000.00, as civil
indemnity;P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as actual expenses for the wake and
funeral, and costs.[2]
The Information[3] against appellant reads as follows:
That on or about the 24th day of January, 1996, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, without any justifiable cause or motive,
being then armed with a bladed weapon, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack and stab with
said weapon one HERBERT SUARNABA Y CATALAN, thereby inflicting upon the person of the latter
the following wounds:
I.W. 4 cm, left posterior lumbar area, level of L2 L4 penetrating Retroperiton[e]al Cavity completely
transacting left kidney, inferior pole, penetrating abdominal cavity completely transacting pancreas,
body, perforating posterior surface of Stomach, pundus with massive gastric spillage.
Cause of Death: Hypovolemic Shock 2
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
When arraigned on July 9, 1997, appellant, with the assistance of counsel, [4] pleaded not guilty.
[5]
In due course, the former was tried by the RTC which found him guilty of murder.
The Facts
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this
wise:[6]
At about 1:00 P.M. of January 24, 1996, the victim, Herbert Suarnaba, 16 years old, along with his
neighborhood friends, Jenny Aplaza (17 years old), Pedro Ramos (17 years old) and Rowell Lavega
(17 years old) left 6th Street, Bacolod City and went to Plaza Mart, a shopping mall, where they
loitered for about an hour or two. They decided to visit their friend, Novieboy del Rosario, who used
to be their neighbor at Purok Pag-asa but who ha[d] since transferred to Libertad Baybay. They took
[a] jeepney and arrived there at around 3:00 P.M. They proceeded to the inner portion of the
barangay, passing by several houses [o]n a footwalk to the house of Novieboy del Rosario. They
were welcomed by the latter and [they] then listened to music on the tape recorder. When Novieboys
mother arrived, she offered them chorizo (sausage) which she brought with her from Kalibo.
While peacefully enjoying themselves, they were suddenly startled by shouts coming from a group of
men outside the house. Looking out, they saw about nine (9) men with their leader shouting: Gua
kamo dira, kay pamatyon ta kamo! Nga-a nagsulod-sulod kamo diri sa amon teritoryo? Gua kamo
dira kay pamatyon ta kamo! (You there, get out and we will kill you!) The four (4) teen-agers were
terrified since they did not know the men who were threatening them. Nor did they know of any
grudge or misunderstanding between their group and the men outside. They then called Mrs. Del
Rosario (Novieboys mother) who advised them not to go out of the house and called for the
police. However, after waiting for some time, no police assistance came. Mrs. Del Rosario then went
out and returned with four (4) barangay tanods. The tanods entered the house and talked to the
teen-agers and assured them that no harm would come to them and that there would be a police
Bac[k]-up waiting for them at the road. The group was then escorted out of the house by the tanods
and were accompanied by two (2) of them and Mrs. Del Rosario towards the footpath leading to the
413
main road. It was already dusk by that time. The men threatening them were still outside when they
went out of the house and they followed the group. When the group reached the main road, no
police Bac[k]-up was in sight but Mrs. Del Rosario remained with them.
There was a single trisikad (pedicab) outside and the four (4) boarded it. Since the pedicab could
only accommodate two (2) persons inside, Rowell Lavega stood on the rail at the back of the
pedicab while the victim sat in front.
The pedicab had not left when Rowell saw a man running towards them from the footwalk. He was
about 50 meters away when Rowell first saw him. The four jumped out of the pedicab when Mrs. Del
Rosario and the people there shouted at them to run. Despite efforts by the barangay tanods to stop
him, the man rushed headlong towards Rowell and the victim. He was about to strike at Rowell when
Mrs. Del Rosario pushed Rowell to run. When Mrs. Del Rosario fell down as if to faint, the victim
helped her stand up. Mrs. Del Rosario then told the victim to run and he ran around the pedicab
more than a foot long. While the victim was running away trying to escape, the man holding the knife
caught up with him and thrust his knife at the fleeing victim who was hit at the back. The victim fell
and crawled, while gasping for breath, and he managed to enter a house pleading for help.
Rowell saw what happened to his friend and wanted to help him but could not because the attacker
was still there. After seeing the victim fall down, bloodied, his attacker ran towards the interior of the
barangay. Meanwhile, Pedro, Jenny and Rowell ran as fast [as] they could because the companions
of the attacker also came rushing out of the footwalk and were charging at them with drawn
knives. They escaped being hurt when they sought refuge in the house of a friend at the opposite
side of the basketball court. Mrs. Del Rosario fainted upon seeing the attack on the victim.
Pedro and Rowell recognized the attacker as the one who earlier shouted at them while they were
still inside the house of Mrs. Del Rosario. They stayed for about an hour inside the house of their
friend where they sought refuge and there they learned that the man who chased them and struck
the victim was known by the nickname, Yawa and is also known as Ronnie de la Pea although his
real name is Sueene Discalsota. Much later, when the police finally came and investigated them,
Pedro was shown pictures of the suspects and he picked out the picture of accused-appellant.
Louie Gregorio, a reluctant witness who testified only on pain of arrest for contempt of court,
declared that he was a live-in partner of Nieves del Rosario; that while resting at the house of Nieves
del Rosario around 4:00 P.M. of January 24, 1996, he confirmed that the victim and three (3) others
were at the house and that no untoward incident happened while they were inside the
house. Several minutes after the boys were escorted out of the house by four (4) barangay tanods,
he learned that a stabbing incident happened outside and when he went out to investigate, he saw
accused-appellant running towards the house of his girlfriend. He was only about five (5) armslength
from accused-appellant who was carrying a bloodied long knife which he did not even bother to
conceal. He heard accused-appellant shouting, Naigo ko gid! (I got him). He also confirmed that
Ronnie de la Pea is the same accused-appellant Sueene Discalsota.
The victim was rushed to the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital. He was still alive
when the police and his mother arrived. However, he was already breathing heavily, in a critical
condition, and could no longer respond. A few minutes later, he was pronounced dead by the doctor.
Dr. Hildegard B. Madalag conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim and submitted a Report of
his findings (Exhibit D). He confirmed his findings in open court and further testified that upon
examination, he found the kidney of the victim completely transacted or totally cut. The knifes entry
point was at the back, a direct and straight thrust which went through three (3) vital organs pancreas,
stomach and the kidney, causing massive gastric spillage. He gave the cause of death in the
Certificate of Death (Exhibit E) as Hypo-volemic shock.
414
Despite lack of cooperation from the residents of the area where the incident happened, the police
authorities were able to arrest accused-appellant on the identification of Pedro Ramos and Rowell
Lavega.[7]
On the other hand, the Public Attorneys Office narrated appellants version of the incident as
follows:[8]
SUEENE DISCALSOTA, denied that he was [the] one who stabbed and killed Herbert Suarnaba. He
testified that in the afternoon of January 24, 1996, he was in their house at Purok Kingfisher,
Libertad Baybay, Bacolod City, from 3:00 to 5:00 P.M. He was tending their store where he acted as
cashier. His companion thereat were older sister Aileen and younger sister Yvette. He never left their
store even after 5:00 P.M. When his mother Lilia Discalsota arrived from the Central Market she took
over the chores in the store. He only learned that there was a stabbing incident on the following day
(January 25, 1996).
He learned that he was charged [with] Murder on April 7, 1997, when he was arrested by policemen
in the house of his wife, Christina at Purok Tulihaw, Brgy. 16, Bacolod City. He was surprised when
the policemen presented a warrant for his arrest. The policemen told him that he was involved in a
murder case in Libertad, Baybay, Bacolod City in January 1996. He did not want to go with the
policemen, but it was a certain Tiyo Erwin who prevailed upon him to go with the arresting
officers. He was then brought to Bac[k]-up I and later to headquarters. He was subsequently
detained at the Lock-up.
He further testified that he [did] not know Louie Gregorio, one of the witnesses for the
prosecution. He [did] not know whether Louie Gregorio [was] the common law husband of Nieves del
Rosario but he met her only at the City jail, when she visited her common-law husband Marcial
Flores, in January 1998.Marcial Flores [was] his neighbor at Libertad, Baybay.
Discalsota also denied leaving Libertad, Baybay, Bacolod City after the incident. He was there on
January 25, 1996, and he was even able to leave their house that day. He continued staying in their
house x x x until April 1996. Eventually their house was demolished in 1997 and his family
transferred to Tangub. He nevertheless, remained in the area and stayed with his wife at her house
in Purok Tulinaw, which was just about 30 meters away from the house of Nieves del Rosario.
He denied membership [in] any fraternity, much less U-2. He declared that Yawa, x x x Ming, Michael
Bartolo, Da-dan, were not his neighbors, but admitted they were residents of the place. These
persons are members of Red-O fraternity. He denied knowing Ulysses Tonggoy. He admitted
knowing x x x Alfonso one of the CVOs mentioned by prosecutions [witness] Alfonso de la Cruz. He
mentioned that he [was] not Yawa but one Stephen.
EVETTE DISCALSOTA corroborated the testimony of Suenne Discalsota. She testified that she was
tending their store the whole day of January 24, 1996. Her companions thereat were her brother,
Sueene[;] and sister, Aileen. Their store opened at 7:00 A.M. and closed on that particular day, at
9:00 P.M. her brother Sueene never left the store from 7:00 A.M. to 9:00 P.M. Sueene was then
acting as the cashier of their store.
She also testified that she did not know that her brother Sueene was charged in court. When her
brother was arrested she went to the police station and inquired why Sueene was detained and she
was told he had a case. She then told the police that on the day the alleged stabbing was committed
Sueene was not able to leave the house the whole day.[9]
415
The RTC ruled that appellant had positively been identified by the prosecution witnesses as the
culprit responsible for the death of Herbert Suarnaba. It gave no credence to the denial and alibi
proffered by appellant. It also appreciated evident premeditation and treachery as qualifying and
aggravating circumstances, respectively, and thus sentenced him to death.
Hence, this automatic review before us.[10]
In his Brief, appellant faults the trial court with the following alleged errors:
I
The trial court gravely erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder as charged in the information despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the
qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
II
The trial court erred in imposing the death penalty upon the accused-appellant. [11]
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Preliminary Matter
Appellant no longer questions the finding of the RTC that he stabbed and killed Herbert
Suarnaba.However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case to review. Thus, we shall still
pass upon the matter.
The prosecution witnesses were one in identifying appellant as the person who had wielded a
knife and stabbed the victim. Appellant had nothing to offer in his defense but an alibi corroborated
by his two sisters. A careful scrutiny of the records shows no reason to disbelieve the prosecution
witnesses and to overturn the court a quos finding that they were credible.
Basic is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance. [12]
Also, the RTC was correct in disregarding the alibi of appellant. As it aptly ruled, his defense of
alibi crumbles in the face of the positive identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses as
being present in the scene of the crime.[13]
First Issue:
Evident Premeditation and Treachery
416
Appellant contends that evident premeditation should not have been appreciated by the trial
court as a qualifying circumstance.
It is settled that qualifying circumstances cannot be presumed, but must be established by clear
and convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. [14]
[F]or evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as the evidence of the
crime itself of the following elements thereof, viz: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to his determination,
and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow himself to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.[15]
In this case, the first two elements of evident premeditation are present. As found by the RTC,
the time appellant determined to commit the crime was when he started shouting at the victim and
the latters companions: You, there, get out and we will kill you! By staying outside the house and
following the victims companions when they came out, he manifestly indicated that he clung to his
determination.
As for the third element, the prosecution evidence shows that appellant started shouting outside
Mrs. del Rosarios house at 3:30 p.m. [16] When the victims group left the house, it was not yet dark;
[17]
it was only past four oclock in the afternoon. [18] The police received information on the stabbing
incident at 4:30[19] p.m. on the same day. It took less than an hour from the time appellant evinced a
desire to commit the crime, as manifested by his shouts outside the house, up to the time he
stabbed the victim. The span of less than one hour could not have afforded the former full
opportunity for meditation and reflection on the consequences of the crime he committed.
The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool
thought and reflection on the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time
sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[20]
To justify the inference of deliberate premeditation, there must be a period sufficient in a judicial
sense to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and to allow the conscience of the actor
to overcome the resolution of his will if he desires to hearken to its warning. [21]
Where no sufficient lapse of time is appreciable from the determination to commit the crime until
its execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. [22] Hence, the lower court erred in holding
that evident premeditation qualified the killing to murder.
No Treachery
Appellant also argues that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing
means, methods, or forms of attack that tend directly and specially to insure the execution of the
crime without risk arising from the defense that the offended party might make. [23]
For treachery to exist, two essential elements must concur: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the
said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. [24] Treachery cannot be presumed;
it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself. [25]
In the present case, the victim had the opportunity to escape or to defend himself. Before he
and his group left the house of Mrs. del Rosario, they had already been forewarned of violent
aggression from appellant, whose words and stance while outside the house made its imminence
clear. The mode of attack adopted by appellant was not without risk to himself; neither was it
sudden. When he began his menacing approach, he was visible to the victim and the latters
companions. Appellant was out in the open and thus at risk from any defense which the group might
make. The presence of such risk and the existence of ample opportunity for the victim to escape or
defend himself negated treachery.
417
Second Issue:
Proper Penalty
In his Brief, appellant further claims to have been a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime.This matter was, however, not raised during the trial. Furthermore, in his direct examination
held on June 11, 1998, he stated for the record that he was a 20-year-old married man. Hence, we
cannot agree to appreciate minority as a privileged mitigating circumstance.
Absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant may be convicted of homicide only. Considering
further the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty
of reclusion temporal should be in the medium period [26] and encompassed by the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
Damages
We affirm the RTCs award of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P30,000.00 as moral
damages.However, the grant of actual damages should be reduced to P10,890, since this is the only
amount duly supported by a statement of account and receipts. To justify an award of actual
damages, it is necessary to prove with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent
proof and on the best evidence obtainable by the injured party, the actual amount of loss. [27]
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide and
isSENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor medium as minimum to 17
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. The grant of civil indemnity and
moral damages is AFFIRMED, but that of actual damages is reduced to P10,890. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
418
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14476 November 6, 1919

vs.
JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant-appellant.
Filemon Sotto for appellant.

Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This cause has been brought to the Supreme Court upon an appeal prosecuted by Jose I. Baluyot
from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, convicting him of the crime
of murder, committed August 3, 1918, upon the person of Conrado Lerma, governor of said province,
and sentencing him to undergo the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the
sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs.
At the general election which was held on June 6, 1916, Conrado Lerma was elected governor of the
Province of Bataan. One of his competitors upon this occasion was the accused, Jose I. Baluyot,
who came out third in the race. As a result of this contest a feeling of personal rancor was developed
in the mind of Baluyot against his successful competitor, and during the two years which followed the
accused became fully imbued with the idea that Governor Lerma was persecuting him.
In the year 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the
offense ofestafa in connection with a loan of money which had been negotiated at the Philippine
National Bank. This proceeding had been tried and in the early days of August, 1918, was pending
decision by the judge who tried the case.
Upon the organization of the National Guard, Baluyot had been commissioned as captain in that
body, and owing possibly to the pendency of the accusation for estafa and its damaging effects upon
his reputation, he had been asked to resign from the position of captain in the National Guard; and
although he had not resigned when the act which gave occasion to this prosecution occurred, he
had apparently been temporarily relieved from duty with that organization pending investigation.
The misfortunes above mentioned, as well as others of a minor character, were attributed by Baluyot
to the machinations of Governor Lerma, all of which served to foment and increase his feeling of
enmity towards the latter.
419
On August 2, 1918, the defendant left the city of Manila and went to the town of Orion, in the
Province of Bataan, taking with him a revolver. Early on the following day, August 3, he shipped to
Manila from Orion a piano belonging to his wife, and at 8 a.m., went to Balanga, the capital of the
Province, arriving at the recorder's office in the provincial building at about 9 o'clock a.m., where he
inquired for Governor Lerma.
He was told that the governor had not arrived, but was expected later. The accused accordingly
determined to wait in the recorder's office, which served as a sort of anteroom to the office of the
governor. At about 11 o'clock a. m. the governor arrived. He and the accused greeted each other in a
friendly manner by shaking hands; and the governor, upon being informed that Baluyot had called to
confer with him, invited Baluyot into his office. Baluyot hesitated, having noted the presence of
another caller, and asked if the latter did not have a prior right to an interview. The governor said that
Baluyot should enter first, which the latter accordingly did. The governor and the accused remained
alone in the former's office for 3 or 4 minutes, whereupon it occurred to Governor Lerma that the
interview might be more extended than he had expected, and he accordingly requested that Baluyot
should withdraw long enough for the governor to confer with one Antonino Aranjuez, the other caller
to whom reference has already been made. Baluyot accordingly withdrew into the recorder's office
and told Aranjuez that the governor wanted to see or talk to him. Aranjuez then went in and had a
conference with the governor for a few minutes about the appointment of the former as chief of
police for the municipality of Limay. When Aranjuez came out Baluyot said that it was now his turn
and again entered the governor's office.
The evidence shows that at the time Baluyot reentered the governor's office the latter was sitting
behind his desk in an ordinary office chair. Baluyot approached the desk and upon reaching a
position directly in front of the governor spoke certain words which were heard, though not distinctly,
by persons in the recorder's office, Antonino Aranjuez merely heard the accused call out "governor,"
while Gregorio de Guzman understood Baluyot to be asking the governor for his revolver. The
accused himself testified that his reference to the revolver was intended to admonish the governor to
prepare for a mortal combat and he says that the words spoken were these:
BALUYOT. It appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre.
GOVERNOR LERMA. No sir; mine is 32.
BALUYOT. So is mine. Be prepared because one of us must die.
The accused gives a color to this conversation which seems to us somewhat unnatural, and his
statement as to what occurred, especially with reference to the length of time that elapsed after he
entered the governor's office until the first shot was fired, is wholly lacking in verisimilitude . What
really occurred, as the lower court found, and as the testimony of the witnesses in the recorder's
office shows, is that the first shot was fired within a few seconds after Baluyot reentered the
governor's office and that the interval which elapsed was scarcely more than sufficient to allow
Baluyot to reach the governor's desk. The inference is conclusive that, immediately upon asking the
governor about his revolver, and discovering that he was unarmed, Baluyot drew his own revolver
and fired.
In the testimony given by Baluyot himself a circumstance is mentioned which appears to us

important in this connection. He says that while he was sitting in the recorder's office, awaiting the
arrival of Governor Lerma, Paulo Venegas, a guard attached to the provincial jail, came up and after
speaking in a low voice with the recorder, entered the office of the governor and presently emerged,
bringing a revolver and some cartridges. Baluyot noticed that the revolver was discharged and
remarked to the person having it in hand that an unloaded revolver is less useful even than a cane.
The guard replied that he was not the person charged with loading it, but was going to take it out to
be cleaned, whereupon he disappeared carrying the revolver with him. This act of carrying away of
the revolver from Governor Lerma's office was especially notice by Baluyot and naturally from this he
420
must have supposed that the revolver seen by him was a weapon commonly kept in the governor's
office. The still further inference was obvious to Baluyot that the governor upon arrival would be
unarmed in his office, unless he should possibly bring a revolver upon his person.
This circumstance shows that the words which Baluyot directed to Governor Lerma immediately
before the fatal attack were intended to discover whether Governor Lerma was in fact unarmed.
Upon discovering that Governor Lerma did not have his revolver at hand, the accused at once drew
his own weapon and fired. Baluyot therefore knew Governor Lerma to be unarmed and practically
defenseless, and it is plain that the attack was not begun until the assailant was fully assured upon
this point.
The bullet first fired by Baluyot entered in the frontal region of the right shoulder blade of Governor
Lerma and inflicted a wound of minor importance, passing through the aforesaid part of the body and
penetrating the back of the chair in which the governor was sitting. Passing on from the chair, the
ball entered the wall of the office building, but was so far spent that it did not penetrate deeply.
Instead it merely made a circular hole in the wall of moderate depth and rebounded, falling on the
floor. The line of direction followed by the ball indicates that the accused directed the shot in
somewhat downward direction and that Governor Lerma was in all probability reclining backwards in
the chair at the instant the shot struck him.
The governor immediately arose. His free action was impeded by the table in front, and by the walls
of the office behind and on either side, since his table was in a corner of his office. His exit was
further obstructed by a small book stand on his immediate right. His only convenient direction of
escape was, therefore, in the direction to his left by way of the space between the left corner of his
desk and the wall nearby. This direction the governor accordingly took, directing himself towards a
passageway in the wall a few feet from his desk leading into a corridor. When the governor had
cleared the desk so as to leave a free space between himself and his assailant, the distance which
separated them was only a few feet. Baluyot meanwhile turned somewhat to his right and advanced
slightly in the direction taken by Governor Lerma.
The latter desiring to make good his escape, started to run in the direction aforesaid, and Baluyot,
raising his revolver, again fired. The ball struck Governor Lerma in the region of the right shoulder
blade and passed through the body an inch or two from the wound made by the first shot . The firing
of the second shot was seen by Antonino Aranjuez, whose attention had been attracted by the noise
of the first shot. Being then seated at a desk in the recorder's office near the door leading into the
governor's office, this witness immediately arose upon hearing the first shot, and having arrived at a
point in the governor's office where stood a screen, occluding direct vision from the door to the
governor's desk, he placed himself at the side of the screen and was thus able to see the scene then
being transacted. It was at this instant that Baluyot, with his arm extended, fired the second shot at
his fleeing victim. The governor at this moment had his right hand raised to his already wounded
shoulder and was running in a direction away from his assailant rather than towards him.
Immediately upon seeing this shot fired, Aranjuez, instead of intervening to save the governor, as
would have been becoming, turned and fled to obtain succor.
Bonifacio Mencias, the sanitary official, who examined the wounds of Governor Lerma, says that
both of the first two wounds were made by bullets which entered from the front. This is obviously true
as to the first, but as to the second there seems to be room for doubt. The inspection made by the
doctor may have been superficial, and his opinion may have been partly a matter of mere inference
from his information as to the general features of the tragedy. At any rate he does not state any
particulars from which it could clearly be discovered that the second shot entered from the front. The
witness Aranjuez makes it clear that as the matter presented itself to his eye, the governor was
fleeing with his right side, rather than his front, exposed to Baluyot. This witness says that the
governor's face was turned in the direction of his flight, though he thinks the governor could have
seen what Baluyot was doing. In this view the second shot should apparently have entered from
behind.
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The point we consider of little importance, inasmuch as it is obvious that Baluyot was the aggressor
throughout and that the second shot was fired at an unarmed man whose only purpose was to effect
an escape to a place of safety. Whether at the instant this shot was fired Governor Lerma may have
had his body turned so as momentarily to confront his assailant, moving away sidewise, can have no
bearing upon the qualification and character of the crime. The testimony of Baluyot to the effect that
as soon as Governor Lerma emerged from behind the table the two engaged in a hand to hand
struggle is preposterous in the extreme.
After the second shot was fired, Governor Lerma continued his flight along the corridor and, instead
of attempting to pass out to the right into the recorder's office, which would have exposed him to the
danger of another shot while passing through the open space, he took refuge in a closet at the end
of the corridor. Once within, he shut the door and placed himself in a position to obstruct the
entrance of his pursuer, who vainly attempted to open the door.
The governor then began to call aloud for help, and Baluyot, judging the position of the governor's
head from the direction of the sound thus emitted, fired his revolver in the direction indicated. The
bullet passed through the panel of the door and struck Governor Lerma in the forward part of the
head near and above the right temple. It passed downwards and came out through the left eye,
loosening the eyeball in its socket. This wound was necessarily fatal, though not instantly so; and the
governor evidently lost consciousness at once. Baluyot, feeling the movement of the body within the
closet, opened the door without resistance. As he did so the body of Governor Lerma shot forward
out of the closet, as if in an attitude to embrace the slayer, who drew backwards, and the body fell
prone on the floor. In this position it remained and was found prostrate a few minutes later by person
who came upon the scene. Death ensued in about two or three hours, without recovery of
consciousness.
Baluyot, immediately after the tragedy, stepped over to a window of the room overlooking the public
square and calling to a squad of Constabulary, who were directing themselves to the provincial
building, indicated that they should come up. At the same time he threw his revolver to the ground,
with three empty shells and others that had not been discharged. Upon the arrival of the
Constabulary he surrendered without resistance.
The offense committed in this case exhibits features markedly similar to those which characterized
the crime which was the subject of prosecution in United States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530); and the
offense here committed was properly qualified by the trial judge as murder, in which was present the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia. The presence of this element is easily and in our opinion
irrefutably indicated in the conditions and manner both of the original attack and of the final act by
which the offense was consummated.
With reference to the manner in which the attack was begun, the proof shows that access was
gained by Baluyot, to the governor's office upon the pretext that he desired a friendly interview; and
although the strained relations existing between the two, owing to their political antagonisms, was
appreciated by both, there was nothing in the situation to warn the governor of impending trouble.
The fact Baluyot had already been called into the office upon the governor's first arrival and had
withdrawn for a few moments to permit another person to have an interview was also calculated to
put the governor off his guard at the moment Baluyot reentered the office. Being seated in a reclining
chair, and hemmed in by obstacles which prevented him from reaching his assailant, it is plain that
the unarmed governor could make no effectual defense against a person armed with such a deadly
weapon as a revolver. It is obvious also that the means and methods thus deliberately selected by
the assailant were intended to insure the execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party could make.
We need not detain ourselves to analyze the conditions which existed when the second shot was
fired, and we pass on to the third, with the single observation that the entire assault from the
beginning must be considered continuous and that the second shot was fired while the victim was
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endeavoring to flee to a place of safety. The presence of alevosia in the firing of the third shot seems
to be too patent to permit of controversy. The victim in his effort to escape had been driven to take
refuge in the closet, and with the door shut, it was impossible for him to see what his assailant was
doing or to make any defense whatever against the shot directed through the panel of the door. It
was as if the victim had been bound or blindfolded, or had been treacherously attacked from behind
in a path obscured by the darkness of night.
Even supposing that alevosia had not been present in the beginning of the assault, it would be
necessary to find this element present from the manner in which the crime was consummated. In
United States vs. Elicanal (35 Phil.Rep., 209) Justice Moreland said:
This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the
death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present
if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself.
While the writer of this opinion formerly held the view that, where there is no treachery in the
attack which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will
qualify the crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was
struck, the deceased was unarmed and defenseless, nevertheless, the court having held so
frequently the contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established.
There was present in the offense in question the generic aggravating circumstance that said offense
was committed in a place where public authority was engaged in the discharge of duty. (Subsec. 19,
art. 10, Penal Code.) There is no discernible difference at this point between the present case and
that of United States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530, 533), in which this aggravating circumstance was
declared to be present.
The trial court also found that the crime in question was characterized by the further aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. Certain items of proof which tend strongly to show the
presence of this element may be briefly mentioned. It was testified by one Pedro Magajes, a friend of
the accused, that on July 14, 1918, Baluyot in the course of a conversation with Magajes exhibited
ill-feeling against Lerma and said that Lerma would pay for the misfortunes that were befalling him
(Baluyot). Domingo Lintag, compadre of the accused, testified that on the Friday in the month of
August, prior to the commission of the crime in question, he saw the defendant in Orion; that when
he and the defendant shook hands the latter squeezed his hand tightly and said, "Parece ser que
esta es la ultima vez que vamos a dar la mano" [may be that this will be the last time we will shake
hands]. This remark is especially noteworthy, since it shows that the accused contemplated some
occurrence which would have grave consequences to him. On the morning of August 3, the day on
which the crime was committed, the accused asked more than one person if they thought he was in
Bilibid, intimating that a false rumor to this effect had been maliciously circulated by his arch-enemy,
Governor Lerma. This shows clearly that the mind of the accused was fixed upon Lerma as the
supposed author of his wrongs.
No very satisfactory explanation is given by the accused as to the reason for his trip to Orion and
especially to Balanga; and the conclusion is irresistible that he was carried to the latter place by a
thirst for vengeance . Furthermore, the conduct of the accused in the next day or two succeeding the
commission of the crime was that of a person stimulated by a feeling of gratification over the
successful accomplishment of a fixed purpose, not the conduct of one effected by grief over the fatal
results of a sudden and unexpected altercation. At no time did he exhibit any sign of regret for the
act committed. The conclusion reasonably to be drawn from the evidence as a whole is that the
accused, for several days prior to the perpetration of this murder, had determined to seek an
interview or encounter with Governor Lerma regardless of consequences. It is impossible to say at
what moment the determination to take life became a fixed resolution. The design to kill was
probably entertained when the accused went in the early morning of August 3 to the governor's
office, and the putting of this resolution into effect was at once determined upon when the accused
found that the governor was unarmed. In order to constitute the element of known premeditation in
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the crime of murder it is not necessary that the slayer should have prefigured in his mind all of the
details of the crime or determined upon the exact moment when he should carry his purpose into
effect. It is enough that the determination to take life should have been formed for a period
sufficiently long to allow the actor time to reflect coolly upon the character and the consequences of
the act, the accomplishment of the crime being left to some suitable opportunity such as chance or
design may present.
It is thus manifest that the conclusion of the trial court that the offense was characterized by known
premeditation is by no means without support in the evidence. Nevertheless, as an express ruling on
this point is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, was concede to the accused the benefit of
the possible doubt, and we accordingly refrain from making any express findings as to the presence
of said element.
It is contended in behalf of the accused that the crime in question was qualified by two extenuating
circumstances, namely, first, that it was committed under "an impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion and obfuscation" (art. 9, subsec. 7, Penal Code), and, secondly, that "the
offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed." (Art. 9, subsec. 3, Penal
Code). This contention rests upon certain statements found in the testimony of the accused and
which, in our opinion, are discredited by other evidence. Baluyot states that he began his first
interview with Governor Lerma on August 3 by saying that he wished Diputado [delegate] Reyes of
Bataan could have been present as there were certain things which he wanted to say in the
presence of them both. Baluyot then stated that there was no doubt that Governor Lerma had won in
the political contest and that it was also undeniable that in all his own misfortunes the governor had
played an important and direct part. The governor, according to Baluyot, thereupon replied: "viene
usted con la misma queja, Sr. Baluyot, pero no somos enemigos? Si fueramos amigos, menos mal;
y usted en nuestro lugar hubiera hecho lo mismo como usted ha hecho con mi compadre Velez que
acaba de ser separado de la Guardia Nacional." [You come with the same complaint, Mr. Baluyot,
but, are we not enemies? If we were friends, not quite so bad. If you were in our place you would
have done the same as you have done with my friend (compadre) Velez who has just been
discharged from the National Guard.] Baluyot says that in reply to this he protested that he had
nothing to do with the separation of Captain Velez from the National Guard. At his juncture the
governor suggested that the interview was going to be somewhat lengthy and requested that Baluyot
should yield his turn for a few minutes until the governor could have a short interview with
Aranjuez. Thereupon the interview was interrupted in the manner already stated, Baluyot
withdrawing for a few moments into the recorder's office.
Baluyot says that, when he was readmitted into the presence of the governor, he seated himself in
the same chair in front of the governor's desk where he had been seated before, and the
conversation was resumed. This conversation according to Baluyot was of the following tenor:
GOVERNOR LERMA. Where do you say you are going to, Mr. Baluyot?
BALUYOT. I am thinking of going to Cebu and residing therefor some time with my brother-
in-law.
THE GOVERNOR. But you will not be able to do so very soon, perhaps until after several
months.
BALUYOT. That is not true. On my return to Manila, I'll prepare for my trip and go to Cebu.
THE GOVERNOR. I believe you will not be able to carry that out, because Judge
Concepcion will detain you.
BALUYOT. Why?
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THE GOVERNOR. Well, Judge Concepcion has sentenced you for estafa to four months,
and I don't know how many days; truly that is a good idea, to change location, a location so
full of people as Cebu where nobody knows you perhaps you may be able to cheat better.
Baluyot says that, upon being informed by Governor Lerma that Judge Concepcion had rendered
judgment against him in the estafa case condemning him to prison, he lost his head, as he was in
high hopes of being acquitted in that prosecution. He accordingly, at the close of the foregoing words
imputed to Governor Lerma, rose from his chair and used the words which we have quoted in a
former part of this opinion with reference to the calibre of Governor Lerma's revolver, at the same
time unbuttoning his coat and producing his own weapon.
Even supposing that the conversation between the accused and Governor Lerma was exactly as
stated by Baluyot, the language used by Governor Lerma was not such as could have produced
passion and obfuscation in Baluyot sufficient to constitute the mitigating circumstance defined in
subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal Code. It is to be noted, however, that no such conversation as
that above transcribed could possibly have taken place in the interval between the reentrance of
Baluyot into the governor's office and the time when the words addressed to the governor about the
revolver were heard in the recorder's office. From the testimony given by the witnesses Pedro
Gonzales, Antonino Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman, we consider it to be irrefutably established
that the first shot was fired within nine or ten seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office
and that the interval which elapsed was scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach the
governor's desk.
The mind of an unbiased person must also be impressed with the inverisimilitude of imputing to
Governor Lerma knowledge of a judgment rendered by a court in the City of Manila against Baluyot
of which Baluyot was ignorant, for under section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sentence in
such a proceeding as that then pending against this accused must be pronounced in the presence of
the condemned person, and if Baluyot had in fact been convicted he himself would have been
among the first to learn of it. It is highly improbable that governor Lerma would have been guilty of
conduct so unbecoming as to have engaged in bantering a political enemy over a matter so delicate,
when judgment had not in fact been pronounced. Our conclusion is that Baluyot's account of the
words which passed between him and Governor Lerma immediately prior to the firing of the first shot
must be rejected as false.
The contention that the accused had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed
rests upon the statement of Baluyot that the third shot was accidentally discharged from his revolver
while he was attempting to push open the door of the closet in which the Governor had taken refuge.
This pretension is hardly deserving of serious notice, as it is refuted not only by the circumstantial
evidence bearing upon this phase of the tragedy but also by an admission made by Baluyot on
August 5 in conversation with Eusebio Reyes, reporter of a Manila newspaper. In this conversation
Baluyot stated that he pursued the deceased to the door of the closet and, having observed from the
cries emitted by Governor Lerma that the latter was seated behind the door, he (Baluyot) discharged
his pistol in the direction where he divined the governor to be. We have no doubt as to the truth of
this admission, and it is a complete refutation of the suggestion that the discharge of the revolver
was accidental.
What we have thus far said suffices to demonstrate that in slaying Governor Lerma, the accused
was guilty of murder with at least one aggravating circumstance and that the penalty for murder was
properly imposed in its maximum degree. It is, however, further insisted in the brief of the Attorney-
General that in reality two crimes were committed by the accused in the same act, namely, murder
and assault upon a person in authority. Under this conception of the case also the penalty for murder
should be imposed in its maximum degree under article 89 of the Penal Code.
We agree with the Attorney-General upon the proposition that the same act in fact resulted in this
case in the perpetration of two crimes. That the homicide is to be characterized as murder we have
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already determined; and it is undeniable that, an attack was in the same act made upon a person in
authority while exercising the duties of his office, as charged in the complaint, since the deceased
was, as a provincial governor, an authority within the meaning of article 249 of the Penal Code.
These considerations in our opinion supply an additional irrefutable basis for the imposition of the
death penalty by the trial judge though his decision did not discuss this aspect of the case.
What has been said is sufficient to dispose of so much of the appeal as is concerned with the
commission of the offense and its legal qualification under the law. Other questions, however, are
raised relative to the conditions under which the case was called to trial and the manner in which the
prosecution was conducted in the Court of First Instance. In this connection various errors of law are
imputed, in a separate assignments, to the action of the Hon. Carlos Imperial, who acted as judge in
the court below.
In the first specification of error the appellant alleges that "he was not given ample opportunity to
defend himself," because the court denied his attorney's last request for a continuance. Upon this
ground the appellant seeks to secure from this court, if not a reversal of the judgment, at least an
order for a new trial. The assignment of error is in our opinion without merit. It appears in evidence
that on August 3, 1918, the provincial fiscal filed an information in the court of the justice of the
peace charging the accused with the crime of murder. On the 5th, he appeared and waived the right
to be defended by an attorney and requested that the "expediente" be sent to the Court of First
Instance as soon as possible. On the 9th, an information was filed in the Court of First Instance,
whereupon Manuel Banzon, a regularly admitted member of the bar, was appointed by the court as
attorney de officio for the defendant upon the latter's request, and he was duly arraigned, entering a
plea of not guilty. On that date the attorneys for the Government asked that the trial be set for the
12th, but the counsel for the accused requested that it be set for the 15th, which petition was
granted . After the case was called for hearing on the 15th, the court received a telegram from
Vicente Sotto, then a member of the bar in Manila, stating that he had been employed by the family
of the accused and asking that the hearing be postponed until the following Monday. The attorneys
for the Government objected to this request but the court, nevertheless, postponed the hearing until
the following day, and Sotto was immediately notified by telegram of that order. Sotto at once
departed for Balanga and was present in court when the case was called for trial the next
morning. Banzon was authorized by the court to retire from the case only with the defendant's
consent and after Sotto had made his appearance and taken charge of the case.
From the foregoing statement it is seen that the accused was at all times represented before the
court by a competent attorney, and no fact is adduced which would enable us to say that he was in
any wise embarrassed in the making of his defense by the action of the court in setting the case for
trial on August the sixteenth and proceeding with it on that day. It cannot be permitted that a trial
court should be put in error for refusing a continuance when there is nothing whatever to show that
the accused was in fact prejudiced by the action taken. Where a continuance is sought on the
ground of want of preparation, an affidavit should ordinarily be filed showing in what respect the
applicant is not ready and that he has made reasonable exertions to prepare for trial without
success, or some good reasons for not making such exertions. (13 Cor. Jur., 183.) Nothing of the
kind was done in this case; and when Sotto actually appeared in court and assumed the duties of
attorney for the accused, no application for a continuance of any sort was really made. On the
contrary the attorney was content merely to cause a note to be made in the record to the effect that
he respectfully protested against the telegram which the court had sent to him the day before
notifying that the cause was set for trial on the 16th. No statement whatever was made showing why
further delay was necessary. The action taken by the court was in our opinion in no wise prejudicial
and was therefore not erroneous.
In United States vs. Lao Chueco (37 Phil. Rep., 53), it was held that "when an accused is obliged to
come to trial without having the opportunity to cite his witnesses it cannot be said that he is given the
opportunity to be tried completely, fully and impartially as the law prescribes, and a new trial will be
ordered." But in that case the accused was deprived of the opportunity to subpoena his witnesses,
426
whereas in the case at bar neither the accused nor his attorney informed the court that there was
any witness that they wanted to be cited. It does not appear even now that there was any essential
witness whom he could have presented had not the case been tried on August 16th. When the
accused was arraigned on August 9 the court told him that, if he had any witness that he wanted the
court to subpoena, he should so inform the court as soon as possible in order that the trial of the
case might not be delayed.
The second assignment of error raises a question which is addressed to the personal qualification of
his Honor, Carlos A. Imperial, to preside at the hearing of this case. The exception to the trial judge
was based on the fact that the latter had attended the funeral obsequies of Governor Lerma, which
had been characterized by marked manifestations of public grief and sympathy. This fact was relied
upon as showing that Judge Imperial was biased and could not be relied on to try the accused with
rectitude, justice, and impartiality. The judge, however, did not accede to this suggestion and
proceeded with the trial as already stated. There is in our opinion no merit in the assignment. No
prejudice on the part of the judge is in fact shown, and the record by no means bears out the
assumption that the judge was in fact in any wise biased.
Furthermore, the objection raised is not based upon any of the grounds of disqualification stated in
section 8 of Act No. 190. This section expressly enumerates without ambiguity the cases in which a
judge or justice of the peace is disqualified from acting as such, and the express enumeration of
these cases excludes others. Such is the tenor of the decisions of this court in the cases of Perfecto
vs. Contreras (28 Phil. Rep., 538), and Joaquin vs. Barretto (25 Phil. Rep., 281). In the case last
cited it was held that extreme delicacy was no ground for disqualifying a judge from trying a case.
The decisions just cited are civil cases but in the absence of express provision in the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the analogy is of value.
In the third assignment it is imputed as error that the court at the hearing denied a motion of the
attorney of the accused to withdraw the plea of not guilty previously entered by him in order to permit
a demurrer to be filed to the information. The attorney did not disclose to the court the ground on
which he proposed to base his demurrer, and as the information appears to be sufficient, it is evident
that this motion was merely dilatory, and the court committed no error in refusing to accede thereto.
The action of the trial court in passing upon an application of this character is largely discretionary
and is not subject to review except where the judicial discretion appears to have been abused.
The fourth specification is addressed to the supposed error of the court in refusing to compel the
provincial fiscal to produce in court at the request of the attorney for the accused certain written
statements which had been made by the witnesses Pedro Gonzales, Gregorio de Guzman, and
Antonio Aranjuez in a preliminary inquiry conducted by the fiscal preparatory to this prosecution. It
appears that after the witnesses above mentioned had been examined in court for the prosecution,
they were turned over to the attorney for the accused and were by him fully cross-examined . Later,
when the giving of testimony for the prosecution had been concluded, the defense proceeded to
introduce sundry witnesses who were examined in due course. After four had thus testified, and
immediately before the accused was placed upon the stand in his own behalf, his attorney made the
request that the declarations or statements above referred to should be produced. The attorney for
the prosecution objected on the ground that one party cannot be compelled to produced evidence in
favor of the other. The court was of the opinion that the written declarations the production of which
was sought were of a privileged nature and accordingly overruled the motion. We are of the opinion
that the court was not in error in refusing to compel the production of the documents in question.
They were not original or independent evidence of such a character as to give the accused an
unqualified right to compel their production, and no proper basis was laid in the cross-examination of
the witnesses who had made those statements to justify their production with a view to the
impeachment of the declarants. The request was of course based upon the supposition or
expectation that if the statements of the witnesses before the fiscal were produced, they might be
found to contain something different from what was contained in their testimony given in court.
427
We know of no rule of practice which sustains the contention of the appellant. The statements in
question were not the sworn declarations of witnesses taken in conformity with the requirements of
section 13 of General Orders, No 58, and which are commonly attached to the "expediente"
transmitted by the committing magistrate to the Court of First Instance. In the case at bar the
preliminary examination before the committing magistrate was waived by the accused, and the
declarations of the witnesses for the prosecution were therefore not taken before the magistrate. The
declarations referred to were, on the contrary, taken in an investigation conducted by the fiscal under
the authority of section 1687 of the Administrative Code. This section authorizes the fiscal, if he
deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or misdemeanor for the
purpose of instituting or carrying on a criminal prosecution. It is expressly declared that this section
shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as a justice of the peace in any
preliminary investigation. The proceeding here contemplated is of an administrative character, and
the information thereby acquired is intended for the use of the fiscal in the conduct of the
prosecution. Such declarations therefore pertain to the official file in the office of the public
prosecutor and are not subject to production at the mere request of the attorney for the accused
where no ground therefor had been laid.
In order that we may not be misunderstood, as well as for the purpose of clarifying the practice in
such matters, a few words may here by properly said in respect to the proper mode of proceeding in
a case where a party wishes to get before the court contradictory statements made by a witness who
is testifying for the adversary party. For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that
a certain witness, say Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal
materially different from that given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the
attorney when cross-examining said witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him
if he did not make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement
different from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the making of such contradictory
statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to
explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness denies making any such
contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness did make such
statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary
evidence of the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness
upon the point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts
"laying a predicate" for the introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted
that unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are
not admissible to impeach a witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the
discretion of the court.
We wish to add that in a case of this kind, if the accused had, by affidavit or otherwise, made it
appear to the satisfaction of the court that the witnesses named had made statements in their
declarations before the fiscal materially at variance with their statements in court and that the
production of said declarations was necessary or even desirable, in the interests of justice, the court
would have had ample power to order their production. No such showing, or intimation, was made in
this case; and the attorney who made the motion was merely angling at random to discover
something that might prove to be favorable to his client. To put a court in error for refusing to
entertain such a motion would encourage frivolous delays and tend to embarrass the speedy and
proper administration of justice.
The last assignment directed to supposed error of law in the action of the trial court is to the effect
that the judge made his decision without hearing the assessors who acted at the trial. In this
connection it appears that at the request of the accused two assessors were appointed in
accordance with the provisions of sections 153-161 of Act No. 190, which provisions were extended
to criminal causes by Act No. 2369 of the Philippine Legislature. The record does not show that the
assessors in the case before us were in fact consulted by the judge, and the decision of the court
makes no mention of them. We are of the opinion that the irregularity, if such it be, is immaterial. The
functions of the assessor are purely advisory, and the responsibility for the decision rests exclusively
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with the judge. The statute does not require that the opinions of the assessors shall be recorded
except where two or more assessors are of the opinion that the court's findings of fact are wrong . In
the silence of the record it is to be presumed not only that the functions of the assessors were
properly performed but that they agreed with the findings of the court. This presumption is borne out
in the case before us by the circumstance that after the records of the case had been sent up to this
court, the clerk of court of Bataan forwarded as part of said records certifications signed by the
assessors who had sat in the case, stating that they had read the decision rendered by the court and
that they concurred in the findings of fact made therein. It is not necessary that the record should
affirmatively show that the judge consulted the assessors before making his decision as in the
absence of a showing to the contrary it is to be presumed that he did so.
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that, in the view sustained by the majority of the
members of this court, no material error was committed by the trial judge either in the mode of
conducting the trial or in the qualification of the crime and fixing the penalty attendant
thereupon. However, as one of the Justices of this court is not in accord with the majority with regard
to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty imposed must, in conformity with
the requirements of Act No. 2726 of the Philippine Legislature, be reduced from death to cadena
perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed in article 54 of the Penal Code. As thus modified
the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Avancea, JJ., concur.
Malcolm, J., was not present at the argument, and did not take part in the disposition of the case.
Moir, J., voted with the majority of the court for the affirmance of the judgment, but on account of his
absence at the time of the promulgation of this opinion his name does not appear signed thereto.
(Sgd.) C. S. Arellano.
Separate Opinions
ARAULLO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the foregoing opinion of the Justices in regard to the classification of the crime
committed by the accused Jose I. Baluyot and the penalty which ought to be imposed upon him.
After a careful study of the case, in my opinion the death of Governor Conrado Lerma of the
Province of Bataan caused by Baluyot in the morning of August 3, 1918, cannot be qualified
by alevosia (treachery), and consequently the crime committed by said accused is that of
homicide. Wherefore, the penalty corresponding to said crime should have been imposed.
There is treachery (alevosia) when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make.
(Art. 10, par. 2, of the Penal Code.)
It is a doctrine upheld repeatedly by the courts that the circumstances which qualify the homicide,
converting same into murder, ought to be proven by the prosecution like the homicide itself, to wit,
beyond a reasonable doubt, before the same may be qualified as murder and the corresponding
penalty imposed; that in order that the crime of murder may be considered established, it is requisite
that there appear proved in a manner evident and undisputable one of the circumstances
enumerated in article 403 of the Penal Code; that mere presumptions and hypothetical deductions
do not suffice for their appraisal and justification. It has also been held repeatedly that before
treachery can be considered as a qualifying circumstance of the crime of homicide, it is requisite that
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there appear as clearly proven that regarding it no doubt whatever presents itself, arising from
suppositions founded on facts which may have been the subject matter of the evidence at the trial.
It was proven: First, that the accused Jose I. Baluyot, between 10 and 11 a.m. of August 3, 1918,
finding himself in the room or office of the provincial governor of Bataan, Conrado Lerma, alone with
the latter, with a revolver which he was carrying fired, first, two shots at short intervals at said
governor the first shot while the governor was seated in front of his writing desk, the second while
he, having stood up, was in the act of betaking himself to a little passage-way leading to a corridor
adjoining the office, and afterwards a third, the said Lerma then being behind the door of a closet,
wherein he took refuge, fleeing from his pursuer who aimed said third shot through said
door; second, that the projectile of the first shot entered the frontal region of Lerma's right shoulder
blade, that is to say (as Dr. Mencias, who examined him five minutes after the incident has stated),
the region below the upper right clavicle, passing through the said part of the body, the back of the
chair in which Lerma was sitting and lodging itself in the wall of the room behind the chair; third, that
the projectile of the second shot also entered the same part of Lerma's body but about one or two
inches from the first, passed through the body and, like the first, came out of the shoulder blade on
the same side said wounds not being necessarily mortal except in case of complications;
and fourth, that the projectile of the third shot penetrated the panel of the door behind which the
decease had taken refuge, struck him in the right temporal region, coming out of the left eye and
destroying same, this would being necessarily mortal and serious for the cerebrum was penetrated,
the result being that the wounded Lerma, without being able to say a word and without recovering
consciousness, died at 2:35 p.m. of the same day, or approximately three hours after having been
wounded.
Governor Lerma and the accused Baluyot being alone in the governor's office when Baluyot, making
use of the revolver which he was carrying, began the attack; and nobody having witnessed what
occurred between them before the one began the attack upon the other or during the same; and the
one attacked having died without being able to say a word, on account of the gravity of the wound
caused by the last shot; it is undeniable that no one, with the exception of the accused himself, has
been in a position to relate what took place then between him and the deceased.
It is said in the majority decision that the accused, in the morning of the third day of August
aforesaid, was awaiting Governor Lerma in the recorder's office, a sort of anteroom to the governor's
office; that on the governor's arrival about 11 o'clock a.m. after an exchange of friendly greeting and
handshaking the accused was invited first by the governor into said office, in preference to another
caller called Aranjuez who was also waiting; that the accused entered and, the two remained alone
in said office for 3 or 4 minutes, but as it appeared to the governor that the interview would be
longer, he requested the accused to go out a minute in order to confer with said Antonio
Aranjuez. The accused did so, Aranjuez entered the governor's office and had a few minutes
conference. As soon as this was over, the accused reentered the governor's office and that was
when the aforementioned three shots fired successively by the accused, were heard.
Referring to what took place then between him and Governor Lerma, the accused said that he came
that morning from Orion to Balanga where he had been during the first hours of the same morning
occupied in shipping his wife's piano to Manila, his purpose being to have an interview with the
Representative of said province, Reyes, and Governor Lerma, to talk over certain things with them
and to bid them good-bye before leaving for Cebu as he intended to do, but as Representative
Reyes was not in town then, his interview was only with the governor; that the first time he met the
governor in his office telling him the object of his visit, Lerma said: "I can almost guess what you
want to say to me;" that he answered: "So much the better. That will save me time. There is not the
least doubt but that you have defeated me, just as it is also almost undeniable that in all of my
misfortunes as these documents I have in my hands prove, you have had very important and direct
participation;" that the governor then replied: "You come with the same complaint, Mr. Baluyot, but,
are we not enemies? If we were friends, not quite so bad. If you were in our place you would have
done the same, as you have done with my friend (compadre) Velez who has just been discharged
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from the National Guard;" that after having denied that he had any thing to do with Captain Velez's
discharge the governor asked him if his interview would be long and if he would be willing to grant
Aranjuez, who was waiting in the recorder's office, his turn with whom he (governor) would have a
short interview that in compliance with the governor's suggestion he withdrew to the recorder's office
and, Aranjuez's interview with the governor being over, he reentered said office and resumed the
previous conversation in the following words:
GOVERNOR LERMA. Where do you say you are going, Mr. Baluyot?
BALUYOT. I am thinking of going to Cebu and residing there for some time with my brother-
in-law.
GOVERNOR. But you will not be able to do so very soon, perhaps not until after several
months.
BALUYOT. That's not true. On my return to Manila I'll prepare for my trip and go to Cebu.
GOVERNOR. I believe you will not be able to carry that out, because Judge Concepcion will
detain you.
BALUYOT. Why?
GOVERNOR. Well, Judge Concepcion has sentenced you for estafa to four months, and I
don't know how many days;" that when he heard this he lost his head, as he was in high
hopes of winning the case or of being acquitted in the prosecution; that the governor
continued saying to him; "Truly that is a good idea, to change residence in a place so full of
people as Cebu, where nobody knows you, perhaps you may be able to cheat (estafar)
better; that then he got up from his seat and addressed the governor in these words: "It
appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre;" that the governor
answered: "No, sir; mine is 32;" that to this he replied: "So is mine. Be prepared because one
of us must die," that upon saying this he opened his coat and drew his revolver; that then the
governor raised his right hand putting it right on the shelf where there was a sword (cris), but
on seeing the revolver out of its case he cried out: "Oh! Mother! guard!;" that he (the
accused) fired the first shot; that the governor having fallen towards the East, he again pulled
the trigger of the revolver, but having missed his shot while he was fixing the trigger, the
governor got up grabbing him in order to reach his right hand with which he was fixing the
trigger, and after this struggle he (governor) fled starting to run towards the corridor; that he
then approached the door of the closet, wherein the governor had taken refuge, with the
trigger raised, and when he tried to push said door the revolver went off, the accused not
knowing whether it was the third or fourth shot; that after this shot the door was half-opened;
that on pushing it, the governor got up in an attitude to embrace him, and he then believed
that the governor was trying to struggle with him, but the governor took one step backward
and fell prostrated completely on the floor; that he was immediately arrested afterwards by
the constabulary to whom he voluntarily surrendered; and that before this he threw from the
window his revolver with the cartridges remaining in order that the constabulary soldiers in
front of said widow should take charge of them.
While the foregoing facts were taking place in the governor's office manner stated by the accused, in
the adjoining recorder's office were the recorder himself (Pedro Gonzalez), Antonio Aranjuez who
had a few moments before left the governor's office, and Gregorio de Guzman, the provincial
assessor, who were produced at the hearing as witnesses for the prosecution.
Pedro Gonzalez testified that, while seated in his office chair, that is in front of the table marked No.
9 in the prosecution's plan, Exhibit B, and shortly after the accused entered the governor's office
after Antonino Aranjuez's interview had come to an end, he heard one pistol shot, that the time from
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the moment the accused entered the aforesaid office until he (the witness) heard said first shot was
enough for the accused to go from the witness' office to the governor's desk or about two seconds,
calculating the distance between his desk and the governor's to be only some ten steps; that having
left his office, going towards the engineer's office in order to ask for help and being in front of said
office, he heard a second shot; that the time which elapsed between the first and second shots was
about 20 or 30 seconds, the distance between his office and that of the engineer being about 15 or
20 meters; that having immediately gone to the auditor's office, in the lower story of the building, he
heard the third shot, more than a minute after the second.
The second witness, Antonio Aranjuez, testified that after he had been some two minutes only in the
governor's office, talking with the governor, who said he would be appointed chief of police of the
municipality of Limay, he left the governor in his chair, went to the adjoining office of the recorder and
there, to a question of the accused, replied that his interview with the governor was now over; that
then the accused entered the governor's office; and he (witness) was not yet seated in a chair in the
recorder's office, in the place marked with the letter Y in the said Exhibit B, and was in the act of
picking up a penholder, when he heard the accused Baluyot say "governor" and immediately
afterwards a shot; that on hearing said shot, he ran towards the door opening into the governor's
office, reached the side of a screen next to said door, and from there saw the accused fire a second
shot with his revolver at the governor; that he then began to run first towards the warden's office, in
the lower part of the building, in order to ask for help and afterwards towards the Constabulary
barracks; that just as he was about to go out of the front door of said provincial building, he heard
the third shot fired from the same place as the two other shots; that the time from the moment the
accused entered the governor's office until he heard the first shot was 9 or 10 seconds; that from the
first to the second shot was 5 or 6 seconds; and that from the second to the third shot was 3 or 4
minutes, more or less.
The third witness, Gregorio de Guzman, the provincial assessor, testified in turn that when the
accused Baluyot entered the governor's office, he was very near the recorder's desk and
approximately one meter from the door which was between the governor's office and that of the
recorder; that at the moment he was saying good-bye and leaving the recorder's desk to go to his
own office, he heard the accused Baluyot asking the governor for his revolver saying: "I would like to
see your revolver," that as he was taking hold of the door to go out of the recorder's office, he could
not understand the other words of the accused, who was then talking in a natural tone without any
indication of a quarrel; that he heard the aforementioned words on going out towards the corridor,
and for this reason he could not say whether or not the governor answered; that Baluyot spoke those
words as soon as he (Baluyot) was in front of the governor because Baluyot entered the governor's
office while the witness was in the recorder's office; that the distance between the recorder's desk
and that of the governor was some 9 meters, more or less; that after leaving and while in front of the
engineer's office, he heard a pistol shot coming from the place where he had been; that the time
from the moment he heard Baluyot's words addressed to the governor until he heard said shot was,
according to his opinion 9 or 11 seconds; that the distance between the recorder's office and that of
the engineer was 10 to 11 meters, more or less, and he was then walking naturally; that upon
returning to the recorder's office because he had heard the shot coming from that place and
supposed it was an accidental one, he could not enter said office for, when he was about to enter he
heard a second shot, and he saw coming out, Antonino Aranjuez, who said that Baluyot had fired at
the governor; that the time from the first to the second shot was about 5 or 6 seconds; that after
hearing the second shot and seeing Aranjuez he went to the provincial guard room, called the
guards from the steps of the building, and then to the warden to tell him what was going on upstairs;
that after loading his revolver and after asking the warden if he would go to help the governor, and
while he was on the stairway, he heard another shot; that finding nobody there, and having entered
the auditor's office, which was open, and in which were the provincial assessor and an employee of
the treasurer's office, he heard another pistol shot fired from the governor's office; and that the time
from the second to the third shot was about 2 or 3 minutes.
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And, finally, said three witnesses for the prosecution declared that they had not noted nor heard any
dispute, altercation, quarrel by words or blows between Governor Lerma and the accused from the
time the latter entered the governor's office and before the first shot was heard.
Now then, if, according to the recorder, Pedro Gonzalez, only some two seconds elapsed from the
moment the accused entered the governor's office until he reached the governor's desk and fired the
first shot, said witness made it clearly understood that the accused had no time enough to hold with
the governor the dialogue related by said accused in his testimony, but suddenly, unexpectedly and
instantaneously fired his first revolver shot at the governor as soon as he was near him. But it is not
explained nor is it comprehensible, unless said witness has not told the whole truth, why the second
witness, Antonino Aranjuez (who was going to take a seat at a table in the very end of the same
recorder's office which, according to plan Exhibit B, is 5 meters and 96 centimeters long and away
from the recorder's table approximately this same distance, as is shown in said plan) heard the
accused, after having entered the governor's office, say "governor" before hearing the first shot, and
affirmed also that the time that passed from the moment the accused entered the governor's office
until he heard said first shot was 9 to 10 seconds. Neither does one understand how the recorder,
Gonzales, heard the first shot fired by the accused two seconds after the latter entered the
governor's office and as soon as he had reached the governor's desk, without making mention of
having heard the accused say some word to the governor, when the third witness Gregorio de
Guzman, the provincial assessor, (who was precisely at the side of the recorder and next to the door
separating the office of the latter and that of the governor; i. e., in the same place where the recorder
was) heard the accused say, upon entering the governor's office, "Governor, I would like to see your
revolver." But, it is far more incomprehensible that when the aforementioned witness Guzman heard
the accused utter the aforesaid words he was taking leave of the recorder, as he testified, and
leaving the table of the former bound for his own table (that belonging to the provincial assessor) but
that he heard the first shot only when he was in front of the door of the engineer's office which was
about 10 or 11 meters from the recorder's office and only after 9 or 11 seconds after having heard
Baluyot ask the governor for his revolver; i. e., the witness being already outside of the recorder's
office and having walked a distance of about 10 or 11 meters from this office to the engineer's a
distance much greater than that intervening between the door of the recorder's office and where the
governor's table was, as may be seen in the plan Exhibit B.
It is evident that the three witnesses having referred to the same act, having been placed under
similar condition so as to have been advised of what the accused may have said to the governor
before firing the first shot, and having heard the first shot, no one of them ought to have failed to
have perceived that which the others heard from the accused when the latter talked to the governor.
If the object of the prosecution in presenting these witnesses was to prove that Governor Lerma was
unsuspectedly and suddenly assaulted by the accused immediately on having placed himself in front
of the former, firing at him the first shot which caused a wound in his right shoulder blade, and
immediately thereafter the second shot which struck exactly the same part of his body, one or two
inches from the first, and to prove also that between the accused and the governor no words were
exchanged nor did the said dialogue ever take place, it is evident that said object has not been
obtained. The discrepancy and contradiction in the testimony of the two witnesses, Antonino
Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman, on the one hand, and that of the other witness, Pedro Gonzalez,
on the other hand, is so evident that one is unable to infer from their respective testimony what took
place between Governor Lerma and the accused while the two were alone in the office of the former,
before the accused assaulted the governor, and at the time the first shot was fired followed
immediately by the second is a positive and proven fact.
However, in the foregoing decision the majority say that, from the testimony given by the
aforementioned three witnesses, they consider irrefutably established that the first shot was fired
within 9 or 10 seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office, and that the interval which
intervened was scarcely more then sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach the governor's desk.
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I do not believe that the evidence warrants such a conclusion. Aside from the fact that for the
reasons already set forth absolute credit cannot be conceded said three witnesses in all that each
has stated regarding the particulars already mentioned, it is indisputable that, if it be accepted as an
established fact that the first shot was fired within 9 or 10 seconds, it cannot be accepted at the
same time as certain that the interval which intervened after the accused reentered the governor's
office or, better said, went to this office from the recorder's was hardly more than sufficient to allow
the accused to reach the governor's desk, for the simple reason that what is deduced from the
testimony of Antonino Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman regarding the first point is an evident
contradiction of what the recorder, Gonzalez, said regarding the second or last point. The recorder
said that the distance between his desk and that of the governor was only some 10 paces and that
the time intervening from the moment the accused entered the governor's office until he (the
witness) heard the first shot was some two seconds or the time sufficient, according to said witness,
to reach the governor's desk from that office. But according to the affirmations of Aranjuez the first
shot was fired within the 9 or 10 seconds after the accused had reentered the governor's office, and
according to De Guzman from 9 to 11 seconds elapsed after Baluyot was heard saying to the
governor that he would like to see his (the governor's) revolver (words that Baluyot uttered upon
arriving in front of the governor) until the first shot was heard, said witness being then in front of the
engineer's office.Wherefore it cannot be affirmed that what the recorder Gonzalez told about the
particulars in question is not true, because, as anybody, watch in hand, can prove it, the distance of
10 steps between two points cannot be covered walking at natural pace and not hurriedly, in 2
seconds only; but from 8 to 9 seconds. Regarding the other two witnesses, one cannot deny that the
basis for their computation of the time intervening from one moment to another was only reliable in a
small degree and easily fallible when before-hand (i.e., from the first moment) there had been no
intention to determine it, and even so, any calculation is not able always to come out exact. These
two witnesses could have just as well said that the time intervening from the moment stated by each
respectively in this affirmation until they heard the first shot was from 20, 30, 50, seconds or one
minute more, without anybody contradicting them and without their giving any reason justificative of
said computation, as they have said that it was from 9 to 10 or 11 seconds. It is to be noted also that
said Aranjuez and De Guzman have come to agree in their computations regarding the first shot, the
first saying it was from 9 to 10 seconds the second from 9 to 11; and also regarding the time which
transpired from the first shot to the second, the two saying it was some 5 to 6 seconds
coincidence which is rather strange as far as it reveals complete identity in the computation made by
the two, and rather unnatural and unexpected, especially if there is taking into consideration the
circumstances in which are unrolled the events to which said computation refers. And so much the
more strange as the other witness, Gonzalez, has not coincided with the other witnesses in the
computation which concerns the first shot as much as the second, for according to said witness
between the first and the second shot passed not 5 or 6 seconds, but 20 or 30 seconds.
Therefore, in my judgment, the aforementioned conclusion cannot be reached by means of the

testimony of the witnesses who were in the secretary's office, i.e., of the three witnesses above
named; nor can it be conclusively deduced from same, as is also stated in the same decision, that,
immediately upon asking the governor about his revolver, and discovering that he was defenseless,
Baluyot drew his own revolver and fired.
However, in order to arrive at said conclusion, the majority has had under consideration various facts
and circumstances which are related in the same decision indicative of the purpose then conceived,
according to the majority, by the accused to kill treacherously Governor Lerma.
In fact it is said in the majority decision that the governor, upon being informed that Baluyot had gone
there to have an interview with him, invited Baluyot to pass into his office; but Baluyot hesitated,
having noted the presence of another caller, and asked if the latter did not have a prior right to an
interview with the governor.
What follows from the evidence regarding this particular is that: First, according to the recorder,
Pedro Gonzalez, who was then in his office, when Governor Lerma arrived and saw Baluyot he
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greeted the latter and invited him to pass into his office and that Baluyot went in; second, according
to Antonino Aranjuez, when the governor arrived in the recorder's office, he greeted everybody,
saying "good morning," that they, in turn, greeted him, that Baluyot shook hands with the governor
who then invited Baluyot to enter his office saying: "Come here, friend, pass in," and then Baluyot
asked: "Which of us two, Mr. Aranjuez or myself, is the one who ought to enter first?" and the
governor answered: "You ought to enter first," and in fact, the governor and Baluyot entered into the
former's office; and third, according to the same accused, Baluyot, in that morning he was in the
recorder's office where he found an employee typewriting; that the recorder Gonzalez and Aranjuez
arrived after he did; that when the governor arrived all greeted each other as usual; that the governor
having invited him, saying: "Come in," he (the accused), before entering the governor's office, asked
the recorder who of those waiting for the governor had the prior right to enter, that the recorder said:
"He who had arrived first ought to enter first," then he (the accused) entered the governor's office;
the accused added furthermore, in his testimony (rec., 236) that the provincial assessor, Gregorio de
Guzman, having entered the recorder's office while Aranjuez was in the governor's office, he (the
accused) said to the recorder the following: "Mr. Gonzalez, I give you notice that the next turn is
mine and not Mr. Gregorio de Guzman, who has just come," and De Guzman answered: "Yes, I give
my turn to you," and that after Antonino Aranjuez had come out of the same he (the accused) then
entered the governor's office.
As it appears from the foregoing facts, the accused did not hesitate to enter into the governor's office
because he had noted the presence of another caller. The truth is that, upon having been invited by
the governor into his office, the accused went in but before entering, he showed himself disposed to
enter after Aranjuez if his turn was not prior, having first asked the recorder whose turn it was of
those who were waiting for the governor. Certainly, it cannot be said from this that the accused
should have shown hesitation then because he should want to be alone with the governor in his
office, as it seems to be given to infer in the majority decision. And it is so much the more certain that
the accused did not hesitate to enter the governor's office inasmuch as when Gregorio de Guzman
was also in the office, he reminded the recorder, that he had prior right to enter the governor's office
than De Guzman, who had only recently arrived.
In my judgment, the conclusion in the majority decision that "The fact that Baluyot had already been
called into the office upon the governor's first arrival and had withdrawn for a few moments to permit
another person to have an interview was also calculated to put the governor off his guard at the
moment Baluyot reentered the office" must also be rectified. From the evidence, it does not appear
that the initiative or the idea of withdrawing from Governor Lerma's office at that moment had come
from Baluyot but, on the contrary, it was the governor himself, as the majority decision says
verbatim, who "requested Baluyot to withdraw long enough for the governor to confer with Antonino
Aranjuez, the other caller to whom reference has been made," in view of its having occurred to the
governor that the interview which he was then having with the accused might be more extended than
he had expected. Moreover, in his testimony (rec. 215) relative to this incident, the accused said
that, in his first interview with the governor after having protested that he had nothing to do with
Captain Velez' separation from the National Guard, the governor asked him: "Is our interview going
to be very long Mr. Baluyot? Do you wish to give your turn to Mr. Aranjuez who has a short
interview?" and he answered he had no objection to this; that in view of the governor's suggestion,
he went out of the office to say to Aranjuez almost at the same time that the governor was calling
him; and that he passed into the recorder's office.
Baluyot did not then of his own free will withdraw from the governor's office in order that in the
meanwhile Antonino Aranjuez should enter in said office and have a short interview with the
governor. Nor can it be inferred that the governor was off his guard the moment the accused
reentered his office from the fact that said accused had withdrawn from the same office for a few
moment. The inference is exactly the contrary because, the governor knowing the accused was
waiting in the recorder's office so that Aranjuez should finish his interview, he must have been aware
that the accused was going to return in his office as soon as Aranjuez should go out. In a word, the
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governor must have been waiting for Baluyot in his office, immediately after Aranjuez departed
therefrom.
In the same decision it is said that in the testimony given by Baluyot, mention is made of a
circumstance seemingly to the majority of importance regarding Governor Lerma' defenselessness
when Baluyot, after asking him for his revolver, drew his own and fired. According to the decision,
Baluyot said, "That while he was sitting in the recorder's office, awaiting the arrival of Governor
Lerma, Paulo Venegas, a guard attached to the provincial jail, came up and after speaking in a low
voice with the recorder, entered the governor's office and presently emerged bringing a revolver and
some cartridges. Baluyot noticed that the revolver was discharged and remarked to the person
having it in hand that an unloaded revolver is less useful even than a cane. The guard replied that he
was not the person charged with loading it, but was going to take it out be cleaned, whereupon he
disappeared carrying the revolver with him." And the majority infer that, naturally, from the foregoing
fact Baluyot must have supposed that the revolver seen by him was a weapon commonly kept in the
governor's office and that the latter upon arrival would be unarmed in his office, unless he should
possibly bring a revolver upon his person, and they concluded that this circumstance showed that
the word directed to Governor Lerma immediately before the fatal attack against him were intended
to discover whether Governor Lerma was in fact unarmed, and that, upon discovering that Governor
Lerma did not have his weapon at hand, the accused at one drew his own weapon and fired, and
that Baluyot therefore knew Governor Lerma to be unarmed and practically defenseless, and it is
plain that attack was not begun until the assailant was fully assured upon this point.
In fact, it appears in evidence, from the testimony of the accused, that after narrating the
conversation which took place between him, the recorder, and the other people in the office of the
latter and what he saw and observed at that moment while he was in said office and before
Governor Lerma's arrival, he said that Paulo Venegas, the warden of the provincial jail, entered the
aforesaid office where they were, and after whispering some words to the recorder, the latter went
into the governor's office returning therefrom with a revolver and some cartridges which he delivered
to said warden; that as the latter stayed for a while near them, pulling the trigger of the revolver
which was discharged, he remarked to the warden that an unloaded revolver is less useful even than
a cane, and the warden replied that he was going to take out said weapon to be cleaned. But in his
testimony as witness for the prosecution, and before the accused had testified in these terms in his
own behalf, (for he testified when the defense offered their evidence) the recorder Gonzalez himself
said (rec., 83) that in that morning the warden of the jail took from him a revolver, before the accused
first met or interviewed the governor; and that the accused was present when he delivered the
revolver to the warden; and (in answer to a question propounded upon him by the court) that said
revolver belonged to the warden because when the latter and the governor returned from Manila, it
was left in his care.
If follows, therefore, that, if the accused saw or believed to have seen the recorder taking the
revolver from the governor's office before delivering it to the warden, the truth was that the recorder
had in his care the revolver which did not belong to the governor but to the warden, who took it with
him upon leaving the recorder's office to have it cleaned, as the warden himself has testified. From
the fact that the warden, upon leaving the recorder's office, took with him said revolver, which he had
received from the former (as said warden testified that it was given to him) even if the accused must
have supposed that said revolver was a weapon commonly kept in the governor's office, it cannot be
said that same accused might have also supposed that the governor upon arrival would be unarmed
in his office; because, as the same decision says the governor could have possibly brought a
revolver upon his person, and Baluyot could have very well believed this since he was also carrying
his. Moreover, what must be inferred from the very fact that the accused had mentioned in his
testimony this circumstance (that he had seen a revolver given by the recorder to the warden which,
according to the accused himself, the recorder took from the governor's office) without having been
questioned upon this fact but which he spontaneously gave when he referred, among other things, to
the conversation which took place between him and the people in the recorder's office and to the
things he saw therein while waiting for the governor, appears to be that the accused did not take
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advantage nor tried to take advantage of what he had seen; i.e., that the revolver, which the warden
took out with him was not in the governor's office at the time he attacked the latter; because, if it had
been so, he would not have made mention of said revolver in his testimony, nor that the recorder
took it from the governor's office and gave it to the warden, as he was not examined upon this point
when he was testifying. Said statement was spontaneously and voluntarily made by him, and it is
natural and even common sense that if he wanted to take advantage of what he had seen and he
was sure that said revolver was no longer in the governor's office, he would not have asked the
governor any more of his revolver (as the witness Gregorio de Guzman has said) before firing his
own revolver at him. This shows that he had not been aware of that fact, otherwise he would have
hidden and denied it in his testimony even if he been examined about it, instead of referring to it
spontaneously and voluntarily as he did.
In narrating the facts which took place between the governor and the accused while they were alone
in the office of the former when said accused fired his revolver at said governor, already mentioned,
the majority decision says that the second shot should apparently have entered from behind the
victim. And although same decision goes on to say that this point is of little importance, inasmuch as
it is obvious that Baluyot was the aggressor throughout and that the second shot was fired at an
unarmed man whose only purpose was to effect an escape to a place of safety, the consideration of
such a circumstance has undoubtedly influenced the mind of the majority (as the other
circumstances mentioned in said decision) in determining that the means and methods employed by
the accused in attacking and killing Governor Lerma were treacherous. It is beyond all doubt that
Governor Lerma was sitting in the chair which was in front of his desk (marked with the number 2 in
the plan Exhibit B) somewhat reclining backwards in said chair, and that when the accused fired the
first shot he was in front of the governor who must have also immediately stood up from his seat,
directing himself towards the corridor which was on the left side of the seat or chair where he was
sitting. The first shot struck the superclavicular region or the frontal region of the right shoulder blade
of the victim, passing through the aforesaid part of the body (as the majority decision says), and
penetrating the back of the chair in which the governor was sitting.
According to Antonino Aranjuez, who upon hearing the first shot, entered the governor's office,
placing himself at the side of a screen which was before the door of said office, (marked with the
letter "m" in the plan Exhibit B) from said place he saw the accused fire the second shot with his
revolver at the governor who was at this moment fleeing towards the corridor, and was at the point
marked with the letter "n" in said plan, with his right hand raised to his right shoulder, the accused
being then at the point marked with the letter "" in same plan, and the governor's face was turned in
the direction of his flight, towards the corridor or the southeastern part of the building, just by and
towards the right side of the accused who was in front of the governor, and he (Aranjuez) thought
that the governor could have seen what Baluyot was doing. The majority decision says, regarding
this particular, that the witness Aranjuez makes it clear that as the matter presented itself to his eye,
the governor was fleeing with his right side, rather than his front, exposed to Baluyot.
Dr. Bonifacio Mencias, the sanitary official of Bataan, who examined the governor's wounds five
minutes after they were inflicted and while the victim was yet living, says, in the medical certificate
which he gave on that same day, August 3, that he found in Governor Lerma's body the following
wound: "Two wounds inflicted with a firearm in the region of the upper-right clavicle coming out of the
region of the right shoulder-blade a wound coming out (?) in the region of the right temple. The first
two wounds are not mortal, but the third was mortal, it having penetrated the cerebrum." At the
hearing same Doctor Mencias, testifying for the prosecution, said that Conrado Lerma had three
perforating wounds and were located: one in the head entering the right temple and coming out of
the left side, and the other in the right shoulder coming out of the shoulder-blade of the same side. In
this same testimony he went on to say that Governor Lerma's two wounds in the right shoulder had
entered from in front and had come out from the region of the shoulder-blade (rec., 19); that in his
judgment the shots which the governor received in his right shoulder were fired in front of him (rec.,
27); that one of said wounds must have been received by the governor while he was sitting; that one
of said wounds was one and one-half inches from the other (rec., 28). In explaining why there was
437
but one hole at the back of the chair (c) of the plan Exhibit B, where the governor was sitting in spite
of the fact that near the governor's right shoulder there were two wounds with four holes (two exit
wounds and two entrance wounds), the same Doctor Mencias said that he believed that one of the
wounds in the right shoulder must have been inflicted upon the governor when he arose from his
chair. And when he was asked by the court "You testified that those two wounds in the right shoulder
could have been inflicted from the governor's front, what do you mean in using the word front?" he
answered: "I mean to say that he received the wounds while he was in front of the assailant" (rec.,
29).
From an examination of the plan Exhibit B, it appears that if the accused was at the point marked
with the letter () and Governor Lerma was going towards the corridor being at the point marked with
the letter (n) when the former fired the second shot at the latter, (as it has been said Aranjuez had
seen it) the projectile of the second shot could not have entered in the region of the upper-right
clavicle or the region in front of the right shoulder-blade and coming out of the region of the
shoulder-blade (scapula) or the victim's back of the same side, but just the reverse, for according to
the position in which the governor was at that moment (facing the corridor towards which he was
going, as it was stated by Aranjuez), a straight line drawn from the point (), where the accused was,
(according to Aranjuez himself) to the point (n) where the governor was (according to same witness),
must terminate, not in front or in the front part of the victim, but precisely in the right side of his back
or the back part, and therefore the bullet of the first shot must have entered here and must have
come out of the region of the upper-right clavicle or the front part of the body of said victim.
Moreover, each of the holes where the projectiles entered, according to an express testimony of
Doctor Mencias, was in the region of the upper-right clavicle or the region in front of the right
shoulder-blade, near the right shoulder, in front of the victim; and each one of the holes where said
projectiles passed out was in the rear part of same shoulder or the region of the right shoulder-blade,
with the circumstance, furthermore, that between the two wounds in said region of the upper-right
clavicle, or the region in front of the right shoulder-blade, there was a distance of one or two inches
(according to the majority decision, when it mentioned the wound produced by the second shot).
These are very evident proofs that the first two shots were fired by the accused when Governor
Lerma was in front of him.
However, the majority decision says that the inspection made by this doctor may have been
superficial, and his opinion may have been partly a matter of mere inference from his information as
to the general features of the tragedy, and that at any rate he does not state any particular from
which it could clearly be discovered that the second shot entered the front. I do not believe that more
details are necessary, nor that there are clearer details than those given by Doctor Mencias in this
inspection (rec., 2) and in his statements found can be seen in the cited pages of his testimony. It is
also evident that the inspection of the doctor aforesaid has not been superficial; nor is there any
reason to believe that it has been so; nor is there any evidence to support such a supposition; and it
cannot be supposed that his opinion may have been partly a matter of mere inference from his
information as to the general features of the tragedy, because, as has already been said, said
opinion has been the result of a material inspection of the victim's body and the wounds themselves
conducted by said doctor; i.e., what his eyes have seen. This inference or supposition could have
better been applied to Aranjuez' testimony because same was in open contradiction with the reality
and referred to an instance when said person was not in possession of a serene spirit sufficient to
understand that which his eyes saw. In fine, the following is the testimony of Aranjuez in answer to
the questions of the Court respecting the particular in point, as it appears in the stenographic notes
(rec., 126):
COURT. But, at the moment the second shot was fired, what part of the body of the accused
was facing towards Governor Lerma and what part of the body of the latter was facing
towards the accused?
WITNESS. I saw Governor Lerma running towards the corridor in this position. (The witness
arises from his seat, looks towards the southeastern part of the building or the court room
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and continues saying) When the accused fired the second shot at the governor he was
looking at him, so that the accused was facing the governor.
COURT. What the court wants to say and wants to know is: when the accused fired the
second shot at the governor, in what position was the latter in relation with the former was
he in front, sideways or at the back?
WITNESS. He was almost sideways and he was on Captain Baluyot's right side which was
facing the governor.
So Antonino Aranjuez first said that when the accused fired the second shot, he was facing and
looking at the governor, but afterwards, when the court asked him the second question in a very
clear and precise term, as it appears, he answered what has already been said, namely that the
governor was almost sideways and over the right side of the accused which was facing the governor.
These contradictory answers give the measure of credit which such a witness for the prosecution
deserves. And it is very clear that from his testimony it cannot be inferred that the second shot must
have manifestly entered from the governor's back, as it is stated in the majority decision, but that it
must have entered in accordance with the result of the examination conducted by Doctor Mencias
and what the latter had clearly and explicity testified to at the hearing, namely, that the second shot
entered from the front of the victim about one or two inches from the wound inflicted by the first.
Expressing himself why he wanted to have an interview in the morning of the aforementioned day,
August 3, with Representative Reyes and Governor Lerma, the accused said that he wanted to take
leave with them and to tell them that he has given up the fight between them and to pray them that, if
possible, they should leave him in peace and stop persecuting him when he shall have settled in
Cebu. According to the accused when the first met Governor Lerma that morning, the first question
he asked the latter was whether Representative Reyes was in Bataan, to which the governor
answered that he did not think so; that he wanted to avail himself of the presence of Representative
Reyes in order to take leave from them at the same time; that the governor asked him why he
intended to leave and he answered that he was planning to have a trip but that above all he wanted
to tell them some words, and then the governor said that which has already been mentioned before,
"I can almost guess what you want to say to me," and the dialogue continued between the two until
at the request of the governor, who thought that the conference between them would continue longer
than what he has expected, he (the accused) retired back to the recorder's office in order that
Antonino Aranjuez could confer with the governor, and to resume the conversation between them
after Aranjuez should have finished.
The wife of the accused as well as the accused himself must have knowledge of the projects of the
latter touching upon what was convenient for the common interest and for the particular interest of
each of them. In No. 152 of the daily newspaper, La Vanguardia, date August 7th, 1918, which was
presented at the hearing as Exhibit 2 for the defense, one of the reporters of said paper, Eusebio
Reyes (the same man, who having been in jail at Balanga at the first hours of August 5, published in
Nos. 150 and 151 of said paper, corresponding to Monday, the 5th, and Tuesday, the 6th, of the
aforementioned month, which have been presented as evidence for the defense, a report of the
different details of the crime of which Governor Lerma was the victim) amplifying said report,
mentioned the conversation he had with the wife of the accused Baluyot in the house where she was
living in this capital concerning the incident and, among other things, according to said report, said
wife told him, as it appears on the 4th page of said paper, the following:
His trip (Baluyot's) to Bataan would have been the last at present until after a long time, for
we had been planning to reside in Cebu with my brother.
When Baluyot's wife expressed herself in these terms to the reporter Reyes, she has not seen her
husband after the lamentable incident happened and the accused has been arrested and imprisoned
in the provincial jail at Bataan, for according to her own statement to the reporter aforementioned
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she had only known what happened between her husband and Governor Lerma thru the report
published before in the same newspaper La Vanguardiaand she wanted (while she was talking with
the reporter) to be at the side of her husband so that she could give him a bed, food, and whatever
he needed to the end and that the lonesome hours of his imprisonment might not be very bitter to
him, especially when she heard that her husband's hands and feet were chained as if he were a
common felon and that he was not allowed to talk to anybody. This is an evident proof of the truth of
the statement of the accused regarding his proposed trip to Cebu, which impelled his desire to have
an interview with Representative Reyes and Governor Lerma in the morning of August 3, because
when the wife of the accused made that statement to the reporter Reyes, she has not yet been in
communication with the accused, nor has she talked with him. And if the report (given in Nos. 150
and 151 of the newspaper La Vanguardia by the reporter Eusebio Reyes, as a result of his interview
with the accused in the jail at Balanga and with the recorder Gonzalez and others who were
afterwards called as witness for the prosecution) has been presented by the latter in evidence, it is
not reasonable nor just to disregard what appears in the statement made by the wife of said accused
to the same reporter, Reyes (and which appears in No. 152 of the aforesaid paper, presented as
evidence for the defense), concerning their proposed trip to Cebu a fact which, on the other hand,
has not been contradicted at the hearing.
It cannot, therefore, be affirmed, as the majority decision does, that no very satisfactory explanation
has been given by the accused as to the reason for his trip to Orion and especially to Balanga that
morning. And even supposing it as true that the accused must have been entertaining a thirst for
vengeance and resentment towards the governor for the motives mentioned in the majority decision,
and for which the accused has given a sufficient idea when he referred to the dialogue which took
place between him and the governor at the time he first entered the office of the latter, nevertheless
from said motives it cannot be inferred that the conclusion is irresistible that he was carried to
Balanga by a thirst for vengeance or that he was determined to kill the governor, (as is stated in the
majority decision), when he went into said office in that morning.
In order to arrive at such a conclusion the majority have also taken into consideration the fact that on
July 14, 1918, being, says the majority decision, fully imbued with the idea that Governor Lerma was
persecuting him and attributing to the machinations of said governor his prosecution for the crime
of estafa in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila and his having been requested to resign
from the position of captain in the National Guard, the accused in the course of a conversation with
one Pedro Magajes, a friend of his, had said to the latter that Governor Lerma would pay for the
misfortunes that were befalling him (Baluyot); and that also, on a Friday in the month of August, prior
to the commission of the crime, the accused met his compadre called Domingo Lintag, and upon
shaking hands he (the accused) squeezed his hand tightly and said: "May be this is the last time that
we would shake hands."
Upon testifying, Pedro Magajes in fact said that, when he met the accused on the aforementioned
day, July 14, in the railroad car which was bound from Manila to Guagua with the object of
afterwards going to Balanga, he asked the accused what had become of the charge of the National
Bank against him for the crime of estafa, and the accused told him that it was going on well and that
he admired the conduct of Lerma, Sr., (or of the governor's father), and that he detested the conduct
of Lerma, Jr., (or of said governor); that the governor did not know that he (the accused) was still
worth something in Bataan, and that some day said governor would pay for the things that have be
fallen upon him. Moreover, when the fiscal examined said witness he answered the following:
Q. Who is still worth something in Bataan? A. Sr. Baluyot.
Q. And who will pay some day? A. According to my belief, it is Mr. Conrado Lerma.
Q. And why would Mr. Conrado Lerma Pay? A. I thought it was a political question and
that the accused would work against Governor Lerma, because said accused said,
"Governor Lerma does not know how much I am still worth in Bataan and for the things that
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he is doing against me he will pay some day; and afterwards I changed the conversation
because Mr. Baluyot was somewhat grieved.
That's all. (Rec., p. 169.)
In his testimony, Domingo Lintag also said that on a Friday, the 2nd of said month of August, he met
the accused in Orion, and that when they shook hands the accused said, "May be this is the last
time that we would shake hands," squeezing his hand tightly. Moreover, after the witness had been
cross-examined by counsel for the defense in order to impugne his credibility, said counsel asked
that it be made a part of the record that said witness, upon leaving the witness stand, had
approached him on passing by his side, and had said in a loud voice these words, "In fact I don't
know anything." The judge immediately replied that he had not heard the witness say these words,
and denied counsel's petition, adding, however, that the witness could be recalled and asked new
question if counsel for the defense so desired. When Domingo Lintag was recalled, he answered in
the following terms the cross-questions asked then by same counsel and the new questions of the
Fiscal:
ADDITIONAL CROSS-QUESTIONS BY ATTORNEY SOTTO.
Q. I'll talk to you slowly so that you may understand well. Tell us whether it is true or not that
when you went down from the witness stand upon passing by my side you told me in a loud
voice "Wala po akong talagang nalalaman," which in English is, "In fact I don't know any
thing." A. Yes, Sir.
That's all.
NEW QUESTIONS BY FISCAL TUASON.
Q. What do you mean by that? A. That I don't know all the questions propounded to me.
Q. To what questions do you refer? A. That I don't know anything more than what I have
said.
That's all. (Rec., p. 182).
From the foregoing, the accused, in his conversation with Pedro Magajes on the occasion referred to
by the latter with his testimony, did not utter any threat of death nor of any personal injury upon
Governor Lerma, but that, when he said that some day Governor Lerma would have to pay for the
things that have been befallen upon him, he meant, as said witness understood it, that there were
political questions between him (the accused) and said governor and that he (the accused) would
work against the latter because he was still worth something in Bataan. Certainly, what the accused
then said in connection with the governor can not be given other interpretation or different meaning
than that given by the witness aforementioned. Concerning the other witness, Domingo Lintag, he
has been very explicit and definite upon answering the additional cross-question of the counsel for
the accused and the new questions of the fiscal propounded on him at the end of his testimony and
inserted above. First, he answered in the affirmative to the question whether or not it is true that
when he went down from the witness stand he told said counsel upon passing by his side in tagalog,
"In fact I don't know anything." And afterwards when the fiscal tried to make clear said answer, he
said that he did not know all the questions propounded on him, that it is almost unnecessary to deal
with, nor to give any importance of, what he himself has testified to, to the effect that the accused
told him that perhaps (referring to the date when he met the accused in Orion) it was the last time
that they would shake hands. From the testimony of this witness, nothing in reality can be inferred
which may be useful for the object of the prosecution and for the object he has been presented,
because the fiscal himself did not secure from said witness an answer other than that he did not
441
know anything more than what he had said, in spite of the effort on his (fiscal's) part to neutralize the
effect of the answer given to the last cross-question of the counsel for the accused and to the last-
mentioned question of the fiscal, wherein said witness showed ignorance of everything.
But even admitting that in fact the accused, squeezing tightly his hand, said to the aforesaid
Domingo Lintag, on the occasion mentioned by the latter, that perhaps that was the last time that
they would shake hands, and that, according to the majority, it showed that the accused
contemplated some occurrence which would have grave consequences to him, nevertheless it is
clear that it can also be interpreted with greater reason in the sense that having proposed to go to
Cebu and because in the same morning he was going to take leave from Governor Lerma and
Representative Reyes, the accused was also taking leave with his compadre, Domingo Lintag. In
conclusion, from what has been stated by said witness nothing definite and conclusive can be
inferred for the purpose of considering as proven that in that morning the accused had conceived the
idea of killing Governor Lerma when he went into the latter's office. There is not a single evidence to
show that the accused (as the majority decision says), for several days prior to the petration of this
murder, had determined to seek an interview or encounter with Governor Lerma regardless of
consequences. This conclusion has no other basis than mere inferences from the testimonies before
mentioned and from the fact, also mentioned in the majority decision, that the accused asked more
than one person with whom he had met that morning and several days before if they thought he was
in Bilibid intimating also that such a rumor had been circulated by Governor Lerma. May be the mind
of the accused, as the majority say, was fixed upon Governor Lerma as the supposed author of his
wrongs. But the fact is that before August 3 the accused had not told anybody that he wanted or had
decided to have an interview with the governor, and only on said day did he communicate such idea
to the people who were in the recorder's office that morning. If several days before he had intended
to meet the governor, the accused did not show any exterior sign of that intention, much less was he
determined to seek that interview regardless of consequences. On the contrary, according to the
recorder, while he (the accused) was waiting for Governor Lerma in the recorder's office, he was in
good humor, and according to same recorder and Antonino Aranjuez, who were also in said office
while the accused was with them, he continued to be in good humor before his first interview with the
governor as well as after it, when he retired to allow Aranjuez to enter and have a short interview
with said governor and before he reentered said office. Upon the governor's arrival in the recorder's
office that morning he and the accused greeted each other in a friendly manner by shaking hands.
No one noted any change nor alteration in the face or attitude of the accused then; and during two
hours, approximately, that he was in the recorder's office, from his arrival until he reentered
Governor Lerma's office, the accused showed no impatience either because he wanted to stay with
the governor in his office or because he wanted to have with the latter the interview he desired; for
as has been said before, he agreed to yield his turn for a moment to Antonino Aranjuez at the
request of the governor himself.
In fine, is nothing in the record to show or to print out that the accused (even admitting his mind was
fixed upon the governor as the supposed author of his wrongs, as it is stated in the majority
decision) was intending at those moments to executed any aggressive act against said governor.
After dealing with the assertions and conclusions which has already been mentioned, the majority
decision says that the conclusion of the trial court that the offense was characterized by known
premeditation is by no means without support in the evidence. However, same decision states that,
as an express ruling on this point is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, the Justices
subscribing said decision concede to the accused the benefit of the possible doubt, and accordingly
they refrain from making any express finding as to the presence of said element. Supported by the
evidence in the case, it can be affirmed in this dissenting opinion, for the reasons already mentioned,
that the offense is not characterized by known premeditation and, to the writer's regret, the absence
of an express finding as to the presence of said element in the crime and the majority's concession
to the accused of the benefit of the possible doubt as to the presence of said element, in spite of the
assertions and conclusions assigned in said decision relative to this particular, constitutes another
reason for not considering that in the commission of the crime there has been present the qualifying
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circumstance of alevosia (treachery). And the reason is obvious. If the accused has been
entertaining a rooted rancor and resentment in his mind against Governor Lerma, and for several
days prior to the perpetration of this murder, has been determined according to the majority to seek
an interview or encounter with him regardless of consequences, upon his interview in the morning of
August 3 when he then killed said governor, the natural and logical thing was or should be that he
would have employed means, methods, or forms that were intended to insure the execution of said
object without any risk to himself arising from the defense which Governor Lerma could make in that
interview. If the preconceived, deliberate, and premeditated design for the perpetration of this
murder at said interview is not considered as proven, or, at least, if the benefit of a possible doubt as
to the presence of said design is conceded to the accused, necessarily it has to be recognized that it
is also doubtful that the accused had intended to insure by any means the execution of his criminal
design without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party could make. In
the estimation of the existence of the aggravating circumstances of known premeditation
and alevosia (treachery) in the instant case, there is such a relation in the facts adduced in evidence
at the hearing for the determination whether or not said circumstances were present in the
commission of the crime imputed upon the accused, and it is so clearly gathered from all that has
been said and argued in the majority decision upon dealing with said facts, that it is difficulty, if not
impossible, to conceive that the accused had acted treacherously in killing Governor Lerma, without
having premeditated, deliberated and reflected upon said act before its execution. If there was then
no known premeditation, there could not be alevosia. This does not mean that in all cases where the
first of said circumstances is not present in the commission of the crime, the second should not or
cannot be considered as present; but it is undeniable that there are cases where, the former not
being present, the latter cannot be considered as present. Such has been recognized by this court in
its decision in the case of United States vs. Balagtas and Jaime (19 Phil. Rep., 164), holding the
following:
MURDER; ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF "ALEVOSIA". When the record contains no

evidence showing that the accused had, prior to the moment of the killing, resolved to
commit the crime, or any proof that the death of the victim was the result of meditation,
calculation or reflection, the alleged qualifying circumstance of alevosia can not be
considered.
This holding is exactly applicable to the instant case.
The first meeting between the governor and the accused having been suspended, not by the latter's
will but by the request of the former to whom it occurred that the interview between them might be
more extended than he had expected, it is natural that, upon seeing each other again in the office
they would have resumed the conversation which was interrupted moments before. Therefore, it is
probable that the governor might have begun asking Baluyot where he said he would go, and that
the dialogue mentioned by the accused in his testimony might have taken place between them, a
dialogue which, as it can be tested with a watch on hand, could not have lasted one minute or more.
On the contrary, it is improbable that when the accused reentered the governor's office and as soon
as he reached the governor's desk (coming from the recorder's office, covering in two seconds the
distance of 10 paces of between said offices, as the recorder Gonzalez has said) and without saying
any word to said governor, he fired the first shot at him, a fact which has been contradicted by
Antonino Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman, who were then with said Gonzalez in his office and
heard Baluyot call out to the governor before the first
shot one of them heard Baluyot call out "governor", and other "governor", may I see your
revolver?". The testimony of these two witnesses, especially that of the last, is another reason for
believing with some foundation that the governor and the accused then talked of something, or, what
is amount to the same thing, that there might have been between them a short dialogue, and that in
view or as a consequence of it, that sad and unfortunate event took place. That Aranjuez, De
Guzman and Gonzalez, who were in the latter's office had not heard said dialogue, or had not heard
what the governor and the accused were talking about, is no proof that same had not taken place,
because as it can be seen on the plan Exhibit B, from the door of the recorder's office to the place
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where Governor Lerma and the accused were, there was a distance of 8 meters and 30 centimeters,
or all the length of the governor's office; from the place where Antonino Aranjuez was, or that marked
with the letter Y in the plan, to the place where Governor Lerma and the accused were, there was
distance equal to the length of the governor's office 8 meters and 30 centimeters plus the length of
the recorder's office, 5 meters and 96 centimeters, according to same plan, which to be sure, has
been traced by the provincial assessor himself, Gregorio de Guzman, making a total of 14 meters
and 26 centimeters. And that, according to this same witness, when he heard the accused call out to
the governor "May I see your revolver?" he was taking leave with the recorder and was leaving the
latter's desk bound for his office, and as he was going toward the door to leave the office, he did not
understand the other words of the accused, who was then speaking in a natural voice, which
showed no sign of alteration, adding that he heard those words when he was going out towards the
corridor and for this reason he could not tell whether the governor answered the accused or not.
With all these it should be added that (from what has been said by the recorder in his testimony, rec.,
p. 86) when he heard the first shot, the door between his office and that of the governor "was almost
closed, because one-half of it was closed," a circumstance which should be taken into consideration
in determining whether or not those who were at that moment in the recorder's office (the recorder,
Aranjuez, and De Guzman) were in such a condition as to have been able to hear what the governor
and the accused were talking about. The one who was in a better condition for said purpose was
precisely the recorder Gonzalez, because he was sitting by the desk in his office near the door of the
governor's office, and from there he did not move until he heard, as he said, the first shot.
Nevertheless, unlike Aranjuez and De Guzman, who said that they have heard the accused utter the
words already mentioned, Gonzalez did not make any mention about this, stating, on the contrary,
that only two seconds elapsed from the moment that the accused reached the governor's desk
coming from his office until he heard the first shot. So that, according to said witness, there was no
sufficient time whereby there could have been an exchange of words between the governor and the
accused. Necessarily, the recorder, Gonzalez, has not told the truth. His other two friends have
contradicted him and there are sufficient reasons to believe that the former in turn, being able to tell
the truth, have not said all that they knew, or that, because of the distance of the place where they
were from that where the governor and the accused were talking, and because one-half of the door
of the governor's office was closed, they could not hear other words than what, according to them,
was uttered by the accused. In any way it cannot be denied that when the accused, being near
Governor Lerma, called out "governor" as Antonino Aranjuez heard it, and called out "governor, may
I see your revolver," according to De Guzman, the governor and said accused must have been
talking about something related to what they have been talking about moments before, or at the first
interview. The word "governor," spoken by the accused in a high and dry tone, may mean, or could
have been, an exclamation of the accused, as well as a call of the attention upon the governor to tell
him something. It appears that the words "governor, may I see your revolver," which De Guzman
heard, must not have been spoken by the accused immediately after he has approached the
governor's desk and prior to an exchange of words between them before, because the conversation
which they must have then was a continuation of the former one which have been interrupted after
the accused had protested that he had nothing to do with the separation of Captain Velez from the
National Guard, which was attributed to him by the governor. Those words could have also been
spoken by the accused as a result or by reason of what he and the governor continued to talk about,
namely, the governor's intervention upon the misfortunes of the accused as alleged by him and
something connected thereto. For it is inconceivable why the accused would have been willing to
see the governor's revolver, unless it is because he (the accused) wanted to challenge the governor,
believing that the latter has offended him. According to the accused, when he rose from his chair as
soon as he was offended by the governor, who said that he could cheat better in Cebu, he told the
governor; "May be your revolver and mine have the same calibre." These words are, in some
respects, similar to those which the witness De Guzman understood or heard spoken by the
accused expressing his desire to see the governor's revolver. But, in any manner, what is certain
and positive is that the accused, before firing the first shot at the governor, gave the latter a hint that
he intended to do something which might have caused him (governor) some personal harm, and the
governor must have also understood it in this manner, for he knew that they, the two, were enemies,
as he himself had said to the accused moments before and that he had before him one whom he
considered his enemy and with whom he had also behaved as an enemy. Therefore, the situation in
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which they were found at that moment was very clear to the governor as well as to the accused. If
the accused was entertaining as ill feeling towards Conrado Lerma because the latter had been one
of his competitors for governorship at the 1916 general elections and because he was then defeated
by said Lerma, as well as because he thought that said Lerma was instigator of the criminal
proceedings for estafa against him, Lerma in turn would not forget that the accused was one of his
competitors in said election and, having been defeated by him, was a person dissatisfied to him in
the province under his control, and as such could have some day planned to discredit or to cause
him some damage. As a matter of fact he (Lerma) was attributing to the accused the separation of
his compadre Velez from the National Guard, for which reason he believed, as he made it appear to
the accused, that everything he could have done against the latter was justifiable. Two enemies
were face to face on that occasion, although socially they treated each other as friends one, the
vanquished, the humiliated Baluyot, and the other, the victor, Governor Lerma, the chief of the
province, exercising authority in the place where they were and to whom, like Representative Reyes,
the accused had come to implore that, if possible, they should leave him in peace and should not
persecute him which is certainly probable and to bid them farewell for he was going to Cebu.
From those circumstances, it is perfectly conceivable that a gesture, a look, any action whatever of
Governor Lerma which the accused would have considered depreciatory and humiliating to him,
would have been sufficient to provoke the anger of said accused and to impel him to attack the
former, because it should not be overlooked that the accused in his testimony (rec., 225) has said
the following: "When I warned him to prepared, he was sitting speaking in that manner of his and
laughing at me." There is nothing strange in that the accused, considering himself offended and
humiliated by Governor Lerma upon seeing the attitude of the latter, his manner of speaking and that
he was being laughed at, would endeavor to avenge on that same moment an offense which was
being committed upon him. When the accused, upon entering for the first time Governor Lerma's
office, told the latter that he was going to take leave from him and Representative Reyes for he was
going to Cebu and to implore them that, if possible, they should leave him in peace and should not
persecute him in said province, Governor Lerma has expressed himself in the sense that, they being
enemies, he (Lerma) was justified in his conduct towards him, thereby showing that the accused
could not hope for the peace and tranquility which he was desiring. This expression shows that the
governor was not accepting the request of the accused with benevolence, but that, on the contrary,
he was refusing to make peace with the accused. And what has been said by the accused on this
particular is verosimil.No one has contradicted it at the hearing, there being, instead, sufficient
grounds for believing that it was true, because it was the cause of the interruption of the first
interview between the governor and the accused at the request of the former, to be resumed
afterwards, as in fact it was resumed, and it was a beginning of what must have taken place
between at the second interview.
The terms used by Governor Lerma in his conversation with the accused, even admitting that it was
not true that he said to the latter that he could cheat better in Cebu, may be considered not of such a
character as to justify that the accused has acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion and obfuscation. But it is indisputable that they might have been such as to
provoke the accused to execute an offensive act or an act of personal aggression against the
governor. The two were on that occasion, commonly speaking, playing with fire (jugando con fuego),
and a spark coming from any one of them was sufficient to cause a conflagration. Of this
conflagaration not only the accused must be blamed. His testimony, given at the hearing under oath
when testifying as a witness, has as much value as that of any witness, and same must be taken
into consideration in connection with the other evidence adduced at said hearing. The only persons
who have testified to what took place between the accused and the governor at the time when the
two were alone in the office of the latter, are the recorder Gonzalez, Antonino Aranjuez, and the
provincial assessor, Gregorio de Guzman. We are already acquainted with their testimonies limited,
as has been seen, to the time, according to them, that elapsed between the moment the accused
entered into the governor's office and that when they heard the first shot testimonies in which two
of them said that they have heard the accused call out to the governor and in which Aranjuez said
that he has seen them (accused and governor) when he peeped into the governor's office after the
first shot.
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In reality, the testimonies of the said three individuals have not been useful in any manner whatever,
as has been already shown, to prove that before the first shot was fired by the accused the
conversation mentioned by the latter did not take place between him and the governor. All that said
witnesses testified to, concerning this particular, has been based only upon a computation, as has
already been said, made by each of them of the time intervening between one moment and another,
a computation which is inconceivable to serve as a basis for establishing the conclusion that the
accused unexpectedly, suddenly, and instantaneously attacked Governor Lerma as soon as he
approached him in his office, asked for his revolver and saw that he was defenseless, firing at him
the first shot, i.e., that the accused made the attack treacherously.
The majority decision says that the offense committed in this case exhibits features markedly similar
to those which characterized the crime which was the subject of prosecution in United States vs. Gil
(13 Phil. Rep., 530) and, in the following lines, that the offense here committed was properly
qualified by the trial judge as murder, in which was present the qualifying circumstances of alevosia.
With this statement said decision has made it understood that what has been said and held by this
High Court in that case is applicable to the present case on account of their similarity. The similarity
between these two cases lies in that in one and the other victim had been a provincial governor and
the crime had been committed in a provincial building or in the place where said provincial
authorities were exercising their functions. But in the case, U. S. vs. Gil, the latter, or the accused,
alleged in his defense that, without the least provocation on his part, Governor Lopez, whom he
asked for the favor of a license for the revolver he was carrying with him, answered him in an
insulting manner, upbraiding him for his temerity in seeking a favor of a man who he had denounced
to higher authority and that the governor having reached for the revolver, a struggle between them
ensued during which the shots that wounded the governor were fired. Not having immediately died
as a consequence of said wounds but after 24 days, Governor Lopez had the opportunity to
contradict and did flatly contradict the accused, denying that he provoked and insulted the latter. This
statement was made by the governor when about to breathe his last. And this dying declaration of
the wounded man was taken into account by this High Court, in connection with the other evidence
adduced in the case, in order not to give credit to whatever the accused had to say for his
exoneration of all that happened between him and the governor when they were alone in the office
of the latter and when said governor was attacked by said accused, Gil. In the decision of this High
Court in the aforementioned case, the following is said:
If the account of what occurred in the office of the deceased governor on the morning of the
27th of December, 1907, as told by the accused when testifying in his own behalf, be
accepted as true, this testimony, taken together with the other evidence of record not in
conflict therewith, would leave no room for doubt of his guilt of the crime of unlawfully taking
in life of Benito Lopez, deceased the commission of the crime being marked with certain
extenuating circumstances, but unmarked either by "treachery" (alevosia) or "deliberate
premeditation" ( premeditacion conocida) as charged in the information; and as the slayer
was alone with his victim when the fatal shots were fired no eyewitness could be called to the
stand to contradict the testimony of the accused as to what occurred in the office from the
time he entered until the explosion of the pistol shots attracted the attention of the other
occupants of the building. In our opinion, however, the ante-mortem statement of the
deceased, taken together with the other evidence of record, conclusively establishes not only
the falsity in all its essential details of the account of the tragedy given by the accused, but
also the fact that the crime was committed with treachery (alevosia) and deliberate
premeditation ( premeditacion conocida). (Page 533.)
Now then, in the instant case Governor Lerma died approximately three hours after he has been
wounded by the third shot fired by the accused, without having been able to regain consciousness
before his death nor to articulate any word; i.e., he (the governor) did not contradict the accused
Baluyot nor did he contradict the latter's account of what occurred between them in that morning
during the short period of time that they were alone together in the office of said governor. There
being then in this case no ante-mortem statement of the deceased Governor Lerma, which may be
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taken together with the other evidence of record, and if the testimony of the accused in his own
behalf, taken together with said evidence, be accepted (if in the present case we apply, as it should
be, the ruling mentioned by this High Court in the case in U. S. vs. Gil), accepting at the same time,
as we should, the account of what occurred in the office of Governor Lerma in the morning of the 3d
of August, 1918, as told by the accused Baluyot, the guilt of the latter, as author of the crime of
unlawfully taking the life of Conrado Lerma, deceased, leaves no room for doubt, but unmarked
either by treachery (alevosia) or premeditation (premeditacion) as charged in the
information. Therefore, beside the fact that there is no complete similarity between the case of
U.S. vs. Gil and the present case, and applying in this case the doctrine laid down by this court
concerning the question of evidence in that case, it cannot be accepted as proved that the accused
Baluyot acted treacherously and with deliberate premeditation in taking away Governor Lerma's life.
However, the accused Baluyot has been charged with some admissions alleged to have been made
to the reporter of La Vanguardia, Eusebio Reyes, when the latter had an interview with the former in
the provincial jail of Bataan in the morning of August 5th (an information which was published in the
corresponding issues of said newspaper, marked Exhibits D and E of the prosecution) and to the
lieutenant of the Constabulary, the commanding officer of Bataan Province, Angel Labayan, in the
afternoon of the same day, August 3d, in order to prove that said accused attacked Governor Lerma
knowing the latter to be disarmed and defenseless. The reporter, Reyes, affirmed that he has
published in said newspaper, La Vanguardia, the information or news appearing in said two issues,
after he had a conversation with the accused in the morning of the 5th of August; and that, among
other things (as it can be seen in the issue of the 6th of August), the accused told him the following:
"I asked Conrado about his revolver, but it is not true that he was reading when I fired at him,
no. And that cannot be true because I told him: "Governor, defend yourself as you may. I come to kill
you." And I fired the first shot, then the second, one after the other." Lieutenant Labayan, in turn,
testified that in a conversation he had with the accused in the provincial jail, in the afternoon of
August 3d, the latter related to him all that occurred, and, among other things, that after the accused
told the governor "You are taking advantage of all the opportunities to render me completely
useless," to which the governor answered, "Were you, yourself, in our place, you would take
advantage of all the opportunities to render an enemy useless," the accused, upon hearing this
phrase, got mad and asked the governor: "What calibre has your revolver?" to which the governor
answered that he did not bring his revolver, and then the accused, who was in an attitude of drawing
out his revolver, said to the governor, "I will kill you now;" that the governor cried out calling the
guard and for the scream (so says) the accused fired his revolver at the governor.
Without entering now upon the consideration (inasmuch as the majority does not say anything about
it in their decision) of the question whether the information published in the press about an event
subject of a suit or a prosecution before the courts of justice may be utilized as an evidence at the
hearing, (which is what in reality has been done by the prosecution in presenting the reporter Reyes
and in examining him about the information aforesaid) and admitting the testimony of said reporter
as that made by any other witness, what in reality is inferred therefrom is that Governor Lerma was
not reading when the accused, fired at him at the first shot and that the accused, before firing said
shot, warned the governor to defend himself as much as he could, because he was going to kill him.
From Lieutenant Labayan's testimony, it appears that the accused asked the governor about the
calibre of his revolver and that the governor having answered that he did not bring his revolver, the
accused, who was in an attitude of drawing out his revolver, told the governor that he would kill him
and, when the governor cried out calling for the guard, fired his revolver. Above all it is rather strange
that to the reporter Reyes, who was his friend (as they treated such other with familiarity) and who
was interested in giving in the newspaper, La Vanguardia, the most complete information possible
about that sad event, the accused would not tell that when he asked governor Lerma about his
revolver he answered that he was not bringing it (as Reyes did not mention this particular in his
testimony), while to Lieutenant Labayan, who did not know the accused prior to August 3d, (for he
happened to know him only on that day and when he had with him a conversation in the afternoon of
same day in the provincial jail of Bataan, conversation referred to by him in his testimony) the
accused would have made a revelation which is so compromising against him as that he knew
before he fired the first shot at the governor that the latter was not bringing with him his revolver. It
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should also be taken into consideration that when the reporter Reyes had an interview with the
accused in the morning of August 5th, there were present then. according to him, the Lieutenant of
the Constabulary, Pedro Navarro, the provincial warden and one constabulary soldier; and that when
said Lieutenant Navarro was called to testify for the prosecution, he was not produced, as well as
the other two individuals who witnessed the aforesaid conversation between the accused and the
aforementioned reporter, and who could have testified to what they have then heard. In referring to
that incident the accused said, as it will be remembered, that he told the governor, "It appears to me
that your revolver and mine have the same calibre," and the Governor answered, "No Sir, mine is
32," and that to this he replied, "It is the same and prepare yourself because one of us will have to
die." The accused did not say that the governor answered him then that he was not bringing with him
his revolver. And it appears more proper that when the accused asked the governor about the calibre
of his revolver, as Lieutenant Labayan has said referring to the accused himself, the governor should
have answered what the calibre of his revolver was, namely, that it was 32 calibre, for the question of
the accused referred to this. The answer that the governor was not bringing with him his revolver
would have been more appropriate to the question which, according to the reporter Reyes, referring
to the accused, the latter asked to the governor, because it was referring only to the governor's
revolver. In spite of this fact, the reporter Reyes did not say that the accused had stated to him that
the governor had given any answer to said question nor that the governor had said that he was not
bringing his revolver. Lieutenant Labayan is then the only witness who testified (referring himself to
the conversation between him and the accused in the provincial jail in the afternoon of the 3rd of
August), that the governor told the accused that he was not then bringing his revolver. By this
testimony, said witness made it understood that the accused, before firing the first shot at the
governor, knew that at that moment the latter was without said weapon with which to defend himself.
However, taken together with that of the other witnesses who testified to said particular, his
testimony is not sufficient to prove, beyond any doubt, that Governor Lerma answered the accused
that he was not then bringing with him his revolver. But, taking due consideration to the testimony of
the reporter Reyes as well as that of Lieutenant Labayan and that of the provincial assessor,
Gregorio de Guzman, in connection with what the accused testified to about the revolver, it is
indisputable that what in reality can be inferred and considered proven therefrom is that having
asked the governor about his revolver and having then told him his desire to know the calibre of his
revolver, the accused warned said governor, before firing the first shot, to prepare and defend
himself as much as he could because one of them will have to die. In a word, before receiving the
first shot fired at him by the accused, Governor Lerma was able to look for his defense, had the
opportunity to make good his defense from the danger that was threatening him because the
accused himself had warned him.
But, moreover, according to the testimony of the accused (rec., 219), while Governor Lerma was
talking with him during the second interview, the former had his left hand on the table and with it he
was playing a brass knuckle (llave inglesa). This brass knuckle was seen on the governor's table by
Lieutenant Navarro of the Constabulary (who was then in charge of said force in the absence of the
provincial commander), when, immediately after the accused was arrested and imprisoned (whom
he found between the door of the office of the recorder and that of the governor), he returned
upstairs in order to learn something of the incident and to see what happened to the governor. Said
brass knuckle was kept by Lieutenant Navarro and presented at the hearing when he testified to the
particular aforesaid, and marked as Exhibit 1 of the defense. Although the recorder, Pedro Gonzalez,
did not give a satisfactory explanation of the existence of said brass knuckle on the governor's table,
having said, moreover, that he had never seen the governor use it, and it is said in the Attorney-
General's brief that said weapon might have been placed on the governor's table by the accused
himself as part of his plan for defense, the fact is that there is no proof about this allegation of the
Attorney-General and that the brass knuckle was on the governor's table when Lieutenant Navarro
(who arrested the accused bringing him to the prison and whose veracity there is no reason to
doubt) immediately returned to the governor's office in order to see the latter and to learn what
happened then (rec., 193-194).
It also appears from the evidence that when the tragedy occurred there was a long "cris" (dagger) on
the top of the bookcase which was on the right side of the governor's table and of the chair in which
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the latter was sitting, a bookcase marked with the No. 3 in the plan Exhibit B. Lieutenant Navarro of
the Constabulary so testified as well as the recorder Gonzalez, who said, moreover, (rec., 252) that
said "cris" (which was presented by the defense at the hearing as Exhibit 4) belonged to Governor
Lerma; that he (the witness) knew it and recognized it very well because it was placed on the
governor's bookcase at the time he told possession of his office. The accused said in his testimony
(rec., 219) that upon seeing him unbottoning his coat and taking out his revolver after he told the
governor (as has been mentioned already) to prepare because one of them will have to die, said
governor raised up his right hand placing it on the bookcase where the "cris" was, but that when he
saw that the case of his (the accused) revolver was opened, he cried out "ina ko po" (my mother)
"guardia" (guard) and then he (the accused) fired the first shot. Upon being asked whether in that
morning, when he saw the "cris" on top of the governor's bookcase, said "cris" was within the reach
of the latter, Lieutenant Navarro, in turn, answered, "I believe that the court has been there and can
tell by sitting in the chair whether it was within his reach or not," an answer with which the witness
tried to show that he had no interest in expressing his own opinion about the question propounded
upon him. Moreover, upon being asked again . . . "But as you found the "cris" in that morning, same
was within the governor's, reach, if the governor were sitting in his chair," Navarro answered, "It
seems so." And, finally, upon being asked "If Governor Lerma were in his chair where he used to sit,
could he reach the "cris"? the recorder Gonzalez answered, "Sitting, he could not reach it, but
standing, he could," adding, furthermore, that he did not know Governor Lerma's object in having
said "cris" in his office on top of his bookcase, but that he knew that he had it there at the time he
took possession of his office and that he never saw the governor use said weapon; and that, lastly,
the governor had a revolver which he (the witness) had seen, but he did not know where this
weapon was on that date, or when the incident took place, and that he (governor) seldom used it,
bringing it with him only when making some inspection in some municipalities.
Now then, it being not proven, beyond all doubt that there is present in the commission of the crime
in question the aggravating circumstance of known premeditation, for concerning this the majority
themselves concede to the accused the benefit of a doubt and they have refrained from making any
holding about it; it being not also proven beyond all doubt that the accused had made up his mind to
kill Governor Lerma when he went into the office of the latter in the morning in question; on the other
hand, it being proven, without the shadow of a doubt, (for such is the result of the testimony not only
of the accused but also of the reporter Reyes, a witness for the prosecution) that before firing the
first shot with his revolver followed immediately by the second shot, the accused warned the
governor to be prepared to defend himself as much as he could because he (the accused) was
going to kill him; and, finally the governor having means and opportunity to defend himself in any
manner or to resist the attack (for on the bookcase by his side there was a "cris", which can not be
considered as an object for mere ostentation on that bookcase, because if it was so, it should have
been placed in the panoply in said office), and having been able to take said weapon, even if he
were stooping a little or standing by his seat, and for which he had also enough time inasmuch as
the accused unbottoned his coat, took out his revolver from his belt and from the case where it was
before firing the first shot, it is evident that it cannot be affirmed that the accused employed means,
methods or forms in the execution of the crime which had tended directly to insure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party could have made. On the
contrary, all of the acts executed by the accused (before firing the first two shots with his revolver at
the governor while the latter was in front of him, taken together with the strained relation between
them mentioned in the majority decision, or their enmity, and with their conversation in the first as
well as in the second interview) are incompatible with the lawful existence of the circumstance
of alevosia (treachery).
But even admitting that Governor Lerma was defenseless and that he did not suspect that he was
going to be attacked by the accused in the manner that he was attacked, nevertheless it cannot be
said that the crime was committed with alevosia as a qualifying circumstance, because, beside the
fact that said circumstance is of a subjective character, or that it is exclusively related to the accused
and not to the condition of the offended party, there having been, in the first as well as in the second
interview between the governor and the accused, an exchange of words which showed that there
was an ill feeling between the two such that would have given rise to a personal attack by anyone of
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them against the other, it is not impossible that the one who is attacked would have to defend
himself by some means. The supreme court of Spain has held so in its decision of January 19, 1907
(Vol. 78, Criminal Jurisprudence), in a case which an individual fired a shot gun at two other
individuals who were defenseless and who had no means to suspect that they would have been
attacked by the assailant in the manner they were attacked, thereby killing them stantaneously. The
court based its decision in that (1) alevosiabeing a circumstance of a subjective character, in order to
consider its existence, it must be shown whether or not the accused employed means, methods, or
forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly and specially to insure its execution without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make; and that (2) admitting
that the deceased was defenseless and that they did not suspect that they would have been
attacked by the accused in the manner they were attacked, this fact is not sufficient to show that the
act was committed with alevosia which qualifies the crime as murder, inasmuch as the personal acts
of the accused constituting the treacherous means employed are not specified, as well as it appears
from the verdict that the shots were preceded by words and gestures indicative of the initial stage of
a quarrel and exclusory, unless there appears facts to the contrary, of the impossibility that at any
stage of the attack the offended party could have defended themselves, much more in dealing with
an attack which, although not foreseen, was committed by a man who, on appearing at the place of
the incident to recriminate upon the deceased, was carrying a shotgun with which he afterwards fired
at them.
Moreover, in its double aspect as aggravating and qualifying circumstance in the crime against
person, alevosiarequires for its juridicial integration that, even if same arises at the moments of the
execution of the crime, the election of the means tending to insure the accomplishment of the act
without risk to the assailant arising from the possible defense of the offended party, be the product of
the sound mind of the guilty person; for it is only when, says the Supreme Court of Spain in a
decision of July 6, 1910 (Vol. 85, supra), by an act exclusive of the aggressor, the offended party is
deprived of all the natural means of defense, that the special aggravating circumstance,
aforementioned, exists.
The foregoing doctrine was applied by the Supreme Court aforementioned, in the decision (supra) of
a case in which the accused, suddenly, unexpectedly and from behind, struck an individual with a
club in the head from which he died, without risk to his person and knowledge on the part of the
victim, who had challenged the accused before the attack. The supreme court held that this fact (that
the offended party had challenged the accused before the attack) altered and destroyed the element
of alevosia and showed, strictly interpreting the verdict, that from the provocation and challenge of
the one, the attack of the other followed without interruption, and that the external form of said attack
only meant an accident peculiar to their reciprocal impetuosity at the moment.
In the instant case it is not proven that, when he went to see the governor in that morning, the
accused Baluyot carried with him the revolver expressly and precisely to make use of said weapon
against the former, in the same way that it is not proven that he then had deliberately and reflexively
premeditated and resolved to kill the governor. On the other hand from the testimony of the accused
himself, who was an officer of the National Guard, it appears that he was accustomed to carrying
with him said revolver whenever he used to leave the house to go from one place to another. Nor did
the accused try to avoid all personal risks arising from the defense which the governor could have
made. But, on the contrary, with the warning he made to the latter to be prepared, to defend himself
as much as he could because he was going to kill him, he (the accused) ran the risk that the
governor might have suddenly made use for his defense of the "cris" which he had by his side
although, as has been already said, he could dispose of a short time. And it is not doubtful that on
that occasion the governor was not deprived by an act exclusive of the accused, of all the natural
means for a defense. It is true that between the governor and the accused there was no quarrel,
altercation, or dispute but there was an exchange of words of such meaning and sense as could
have provoked, as has been already said, the anger of said accused. And certainly it is not
necessary that said words should have been spoken in a loud voice or in an angry tone in order that
same could have produced said effect, for it is well known that words gently spoken without
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alteration can produce, according to the circumstances, same effect as if spoken in a loud voice and
in an aggressive tone. It is undeniable that all of the foregoing circumstances exclude the idea that
the accused treacherously fired at the first two shots at the governor, and (as in the case decided by
the supreme court of Spain in the decision aforementioned), the external form of the attack was only
an accident peculiar to the reciprocal impetuosity of the governor and the accused at the moment. If
Governor Lerma was strongly frightened (as it is natural) when he saw the revolver in the hands of
the accused and heard the warning or the challenge of this and had no sufficient will power to
remain cool before the danger that was threatening him nor sufficient strength to defend himself from
the attack of which he was going to be the object (to repel, or to resist it, making use of the means of
defense which he had in hand or of the "cris", which was on the top of the bookcase by his side, or
of a chair or of any other furniture which was near him, whereby the accused, by means of the first
two shots, caused him two wounds before the same governor could take refuge in the closet towards
which he suddenly fled, pursued by the accused) it cannot be inferred therefrom that the latter acted
treacherously in making said attack; for, as has already been said, alevosia (treachery) is a
circumstance of a subjective character and in order to determine its existence in a case, the
condition of the person attacked and what this would have done or left to have done should not be
taken into consideration, but the acts of the accused himself.
There having been, then, no alevosia when the accused attacked the governor by firing the first two
shots, we now pass on to the third.
This shot was fired by the accused when Governor Lerma fleeing through the corridor after the
second shot; took refuge in the closet which, as has been said, was at the end of said corridor. Once
in the close, the governor shut the door and placed himself, as the majority decision says, in a
position to obstruct the entrance of his pursuer, who vainly attempted to open the door. In the same
decision it is further said that the accused, judging the position of the governor's head from the
direction of the sound emitted when same began to call aloud for help, fired his revolver in the
direction indicated, the bullet passing through the panel of the door, struck the governor in the
forward part of his head near and above the right temple. The wound was necessarily fatal and
caused the governor's death two or three hours after.
From the evidence it appears: (1) according to the reporter Reyes (rec., 39), that, referring to him
what happened in connection with the third shot, the accused told him that he (the accused) pursued
the governor because he though that the first two shots missed him, that the governor was able to
reach the door of the closet and to sit behind it and, once within, called aloud, and from the sound
thus emitted, he (the accused) was able to judge where the governor was and he then fired and
observed a movement at the door, that he opened it and as he did so the body of the governor shot
towards him as if in an attitude to embrace him, and he ran away from the body and it fell; (2)
according to Lieutenant Labayan (rec., 152) that in an interview had between them in the afternoon
of the same day of August 3d, the accused told him that the governor fled through the corridor and
was able to enter in it and close the door of the closet, that then there was a struggle between the
two in order to open the door and as the governor was calling aloud for a guard, he (the accused)
knew from the governor's voice that the latter was sitting and, judging from said voice, he fired again,
and after this shot the door was opened and the governor fell towards the window of the corridor.
Perhaps, it has been inferred from these two testimonies that before discharging the third shot, the
accused had judged the position of the governor's head, as stated in the majority decision. But, in
reality, what the accused meant by said testimonies was that he knew the governor's position behind
the door. Whatever, it may be, it is evident that when the accused fired the third shot, his object was
to inflict a wound upon and consequently kill the governor. It is also true, as same decisions says,
that the victim in his effort to escape had been driven to take refuge in the closet, and with the door
closed it was impossible for him to see what his assailant was doing, or to make any defense
whatever against the shot directed through the panel of the door. But, in spite of all these and of the
fact that, according to the majority opinion, the presence of alevosia in firing the third shot seems to
be too patent of controversy that it requires no discussion whatever, in my judgment, dissenting from
451
such a respectable opinion, the presence of said qualifying circumstance should not be taken into
account in the acts aforesaid.
And the reason is very clear. The accused did not take advantage of the fact that the governor was
behind the door of the closet and he was in front of it, or outside of said door; nor did he select this
situation in order to prevent said governor from defending himself, so that without risk to his person
arising from said defense, he might insure the execution of his criminal object. On the contrary, said
situation was an obstacle against the realization of the object of the accused; was a means by
employed by the governor, under the desperate and sorrowful condition in which he was found, for
his defense against the attack of which he was the object; was a difficulty encountered by the
accused from continuing his attack upon the governor and making sure his aim at him with his
revolver. The accused, after all, did not avail himself of these means or situation (that the door of the
closet being closed) in order to make his victim a better and more accurate target, as is shown by
the fact that only by judging the governor's position behind the door was he able to hit him with the
third shot. And it is hereby convenient to rectify what appears in the decision of the lower court,
namely, that one of the admissions made by the accused to the reporter Reyes and Lieutenant
Labayan (at the interview they had in the jail with him relative to the third shot) was that when the
accused knew the governor's position from the sound emitted when the latter called for help, he fired
the third shot, placing the muzzle of his revolver against the door and at the place where he thought
the governor's head was. This is absolutely inaccurate. Neither Lieutenant Labayan nor reporter
Reyes has said this. And it is not strange that (such an admission being found in the judgment of the
trial court, which was reproduced by the Attorney-General in his brief, copying the whole of the
respective paragraph of the judgment appealed from) the Attorney-General has invoked in his brief,
as applicable in the instant case, the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of December 10,1884,
cited in I Viada's commentaries 260, in order to maintain that the qualifying circumstance
of alevosia was present when the third shot was fired. As it appears in the decision of the Supreme
Court of Spain aforementioned, the case decided therein was: that a fight took place between the
accused and the inmates of a house; that after the accused had been ejected from said house and
its door closed by those within, said accused fired his pistol, which he was carrying, through the
crevice of the door; and that one of the persons inside the house was thereby killed. If in the present
case (as has been inaccurately asserted in the judgment appealed from, referring to what has been
testified by the reporter Reyes, an assertion accepted by the Attorney-General in his brief) Baluyot
had placed the muzzle of his revolver against the door behind which was Governor Lerma and at the
place or spot where he thought the governor's head was, or had, upon firing the third shot,
previously placed said revolver against the wall of the door (as is also inaccurately mentioned in said
judgment referring to Lieutenant Labayan), then the holding of the Supreme Court of Spain in its
decision aforementioned would be in some way applicable, although not closely; for in the case
aforementioned the agent or aggressor fired his revolver through the crevice of the door, i.e., could
easily aim at same of the persons behind the door, one of whom he wounded. But in the present
case the accused Baluyot fired the third shot at the spot where the head of the deceased must have
been merely according to his judgment of the victim's position, or his being seated, and of the sound
emitted by him when he called out for help. As a consequence of said shot, he inflicted the mortal
wound he had intended. Therefore, the difference between this case and the other one is very clear.
Moreover, it must be also taken into consideration that the third shot was fired by the accused after
the first two shots as a mere continuation of his attack upon the governor, and when he, being
already excited and in the heat of anger, could not, naturally be in a position to stop to aim his
revolver with the necessary accuracy at exactly the head of the deceased much more less
because from the testimony of the accused himself, the governor was calling out for Venegas,
Aranjuez and a guard.
It is true, according to the majority decision, that the victim in his effort to escape had been driven to
take refuge in the closet, and with the door closed it was impossible for him to see what his
aggressor was doing, or to make any defense whatever against the shot directed through the panel
of the door the case being the same, according to the majority, as if the victim had been bound or
blindfolded, or had been treacherously attacked from behind in a path obscured by the darkness of
the night. It is indisputable that Governor Lerma was completely defenseless while taking refuge in
452
the closet even if the door could have very well served to him, in any manner, as a means of
defense(and he must have so understood when he pushed or held it from within to prevent the
accused from entering said closet) But in order to determine whether the means employed by the
accused when he fired the third shot were treacherous or not, the condition and situation in which
the victim was found must be taken alone. Great consideration must also be had of the acts
executed by the accused as constituting his unlawful aggression, because the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia is subjective in character, as has been repeatedly said, or is specially
connected with the aggressor. And it is evident that if Governor Lerma could be compared to a
person bound and in defenseless conditions aforementioned, for the reason that the door being
closed he could not see what his aggressor was doing, or make any defense whatever against the
shot directed through the panel of the door, it was not due to any act of the accused because the
latter was not the one who closed the door, or prevented it to be opened. On the contrary, it was the
accused who tried to open it by pushing it persistently in order to continue his assault upon the
unfortunate governor. And if Baluyot fired the third shot through the door, it is also indisputable that
he did not take advantage of the door being closed, nor did he choose to fire said shot while it was
thus closed in order to insure himself against any defense of resistance which could be made by the
person attacked, or to insure the consummation of the criminal act he was executing, for the same
reason that from his own actions he preferred to have the door opened before firing the third shot at
his victim
However, supposing, but not admitting as true, that the third shot, which caused Governor Lerma's
death, was fired by the accused under such circumstances as would justify the holding that the
procedure then employed by said accused was treacherous, it cannot also be considered that the
commission of the crime was attended by the qualifying circumstance of alevosia which raises it to
the degree of murder. It is a fact recognized in the majority decision that the entire assault upon
Governor Lerma from the beginning must be considered continuous, i.e., there was no break of
continuity in each of the three shots fired by the accused at the governor. So that said three shots
constituted, in reality, one single attack or one single act. Since it cannot be considered as duly
proven, beyond reasonable doubt or in any manner whatever (as it is not in the judgment of the
undersigned, as has already been said), that the accused acted treacherously when he fired the first
two shots at the governor (which caused the two wounds in the region of the right supra-clavicle) or
when he commenced to execute the criminal act there is no legal terminology whereby the qualifying
circumstance of alevosia can be considered present after the assault has been commenced;
because alevosia must necessarily embrace the entire assault constituting the crime. Such has been
the holding of the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of September 9, 1901,(Vol.
67,Jurisprudencia Criminal), in a case in which the accused fired two gun shots at his victim, who
thereby received four wounds, and when said victim was already lying on the ground the accused
again delivered several blows with the butt of his gun on the victim's head, thereby inflicting upon the
latter several other wounds of which he died shortly afterwards. It appears from the verdict that the
first two shots were not fired by the assailant from behind his victim in order to insure in that manner
the execution of the crime without any risk to himself arising from the defense which the deceased
could have made, but that, in delivering the several blows with the butt of his gun in the head of the
deceased while lying on the ground, the assailant employed means, methods or forms especially
and directly tending to insure the victim's death without any risk to his person arising from any
defense the deceased could have made; i.e., the assailant did not employ treacherous means at the
beginning of the assault but only towards its end when he killed the victim. In reversing the decision
of the Audiencia Provincial de Geronaqualifying the crime as murder and condemning the accused
to death penalty, the Supreme Court aforementioned held the following:
That treachery necessarily embraces the entire assault constituting the crime, so that
treachery cannot be considered present when it was not present at the beginning of the
unlawful assault, notwithstanding that said assault was consummated on account of the
victim's inability to repel it; that, therefore, the Jury having found out that there was no
treachery when the accused fired the two shots at the victim, and that, when the latter fell on
the ground as a consequence of said shots, said accused delivered several blows with the
453
butt of his gun in his head, treachery cannot be considered present, as the victim was killed
with the butt of the gun when he was already lying helpless on the ground.
The case decided in the foregoing decision, as it appears, is identical to the instant case, and the
fundamental reason adduced therein by the Supreme Court aforementioned, consists in that, the
assault being considered as indivisible and only one criminal act punishable by law, even if it was
executed at different and successive stages, it cannot be considered that in the execution of said act
there are present separate and distinct circumstances in connection with each of the facts
embracing said act which constitute but one crime
However, the majority decision maintains, by citing the decision of this court in the case of
U.S. vs. Elicanal (35 Phil. Rep. 29), that even supposing that treachery (alevosia) had not been
presented at the beginning of the assault, it would be necessary to find this element present from the
manner and surrounding circumstances under which the crime was consummated. The foregoing
decision of the court contains this syllabus:
It is the doctrine of this court that where the person killed was in a helpless and defenseless
condition at the time the fatal blow was given, the homicide was committed
with alevosia notwithstanding that in the attack, which was continuous, and which finally
resulted in the death there was no alevosia.
The facts in the foregoing case were:.
That while the sailboat Catalua under the command of her captain Juan Nomo, was on her trip
along the coast of Iloilo, the chief mate of said sailboat named Guillermo Guiloresa told Eduardo
Elicanal, the accused, and one of the members of the crew, that he was going to kill the captain
because he was very angry with him and asked him to assist him. But Elicanal paid no attention to
this proposal because he thought that it was a joke; that the following day while the crew were
engaged in their daily occupation, the same chief mate (Guillermo), finding the captain in his cabin,
assaulted him attempting to seize and hold his hands and at the same time calling the crew to come
forward and help him. The crew, with the exception of the accused, hastened to the spot where
Guillermo was engaged in a hand to hand fight with the captain. At the request of Guillermo the crew
seized the captain and tied him with rope. After he had been rendered helpless, Guillermo struck the
deceased captain in the back of his neck with an iron bar, and then delivering the weapon to the
accused, ordered him to come forward and assist in disposing of his victim. The accused thereupon
seized the bar and, while the captain was still struggling for his life, struck him the fatal blow in the
head, which caused his death.
After a thorough consideration of the qualifying circumstances that should be taken into account in
the commission of the crime among which is that of alevosia, which the court took into consideration
in qualifying the offense as murder and in sentencing the accused Elicanal to death penalty, in order
to hold that in the case then at bar the qualifying circumstance of alevosia was present, the writer of
the majority opinion, Justice Moreland, said:
This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the
death of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present
if, at the time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself.
While the writer of this opinion hold the view that, where there is not treachery in the attack
which results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the
crime as murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was struck, the
deceased was unarmed and defenseless, but, the court having held so frequently the
contrary, the writer accepts the doctrine so well established.
In acknowledging in the foregoing decision that the doctrine established in the case,
U.S. vs. Balagtas and Jaime (19 Phil. Rep., 174 invoked by counsel for the defense to maintain that
454
the qualifying circumstance of alevosiacould not be taken into account in the commission of the
crime inasmuch as it was not present at the beginning of the assault upon the captain of the vessel)
was quite different from, if not directly opposed to that already stated as therefore, the uniform
holding of this court in former cases, the writer of said decision, Justice Moreland, again said that,
inasmuch as the majority of the court being of the opinion that it was not the intention of the court in
the case U.S. vs. Balagtas and Jaime to reverse the previous decision of this court and to set down
a new doctrine, he accepted that view particularly in the face of the almost unbroken line of
decisions on the subject now to be referred to. Then in the following lines Justice Moreland cited
various cases decided by this court holding, as has been already stated, a uniform doctrine quite
different from, if not opposed to, that established in the Balagtas and Jaime case aforementioned.
The first of said cases was that of U.S. vs. De Leon (1 Phil. Rep., 163) wherein "it appeared," says
same decision, "that the accused entered the house of the deceased, drew their bolos and
compelled him to follow him. On arriving at a place called Bulutong, the deceased was bound and in
that condition murdered. It was held that the fact that the deceased was bound at the time he was
killed although there was no treachery at the beginning of the assault resulting in his death, the
qualifying circumstance was present. The court said:.
From the evidence there appears the qualifying circumstance of treachery. To show this it is
only necessary to mention the fact that the deceased was bound.
"The head note to that case says:
"The fact that the deceased was bound while killed constitute the qualificative
circumstance ofalevosia and raises the crime to the degree of
murder, . . ."
The various cases, fifteen in number, mentioned by Justice Moreland in the aforesaid decision,
beside that of U.S.vs. De Leon, aforementioned, are cited in same decision (35 Phil. Rep., 218),
followed by, "For these reasons we are of the opinion that the crime was committed with treachery
and that it was properly denominated murder instead of homicide."
Now then, as it appeared in the De Leon case, the accused began the attack by entering the house
of the deceased, drawing their bolos and compelling him to follow them, and, on arriving at a certain
place, the deceased was bound and in that condition murdered. Upon an examination of the fifteen
cases cited in the same decision, it appears that the facts, leading to the prosecution of the
respective accused and the classification of the crime as murder because of the presence of the
qualifying circumstance of alevosia, were identical to those in the De Leon case, or, what amounts to
the same thing, were, with some alterations, that after the offended parties had been kidnapped from
their respective homes or sequestered and carried to another place and there bound by their
aggressors, they were put to death while absolutely defenseless. The facts in one of the cases cited
in the aforementioned decision, that of U.S. vs. Nalua and Cadayum (23 Phil. Rep., 1), were: two
persons suddenly and unexpectedly leaped upon a third, and while one of them holds the victim's
hands the other stabs him to death.
What was then mainly taken into account by this court in holding, in the case U.S. vs. Elicanal, that
in the commission of the crime there is present the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, was that the
captain of the sailboat Catalua was tied with rope when the accused, by order of the chief mate,
took the iron bar and with it struck a blow in the head of the deceased resulting in his death. The
special circumstance that, when the deceased captain was killed by Elicanal, he was tied with rope
and was consequently helpless and defenseless is what, comparing aid case with that of De Leon
and the other cases cited therein, was taken into consideration by this Court in the aforementioned
decision in holding that treachery was present when Elicanal killed the captain even though there
was no treachery at the beginning of the struggle. Such was duly and thoroughly shown by the
arguments in the same decision holding clearly that where the person killed is bound hand and foot
when the aggressor killed him, the crime was committed with alevosia, even though the acts of the
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aggressor prior to the killing were not treacherous, or that in such a case any other consideration
related to the former acts of the offender must be excluded and the act of said offender in killing the
deceased must be considered treacherous. If in holding what it did in the Elicanal case the purpose
of this court had been otherwise, useless would have been all that has been said by Justice
Moreland in the decision of said case, citing as the ground for his concurrence with the majority
(notwithstanding his holding a different opinion and the doctrine established in the Balagtas and
Jaime case) the cases already mentioned (the De Leon case and the other 15 cases cited in same
decision) and finally accepting the view of the majority in the sense that it was not the intention of the
court in the Balagtas and Jaime case to reverse the previous decisions of this court and to set down
a new doctrine in view of the uniform holding of this court upon the subject in question; i.e., those
holdings in the aforementioned case of De Leon and the other fifteen.
The case at bar, as it clearly appears, has no analogy or similarity whatever with the cases cited
above nor with the Elicanal case. In all these cases the acts complained of were that the victims had
been tied by their respective murderers before they were killed. In the Elicanal case there was at the
beginning of the attack a hand to hand fight in the course of which the chief mate Guillermo with an
iron bar dealt a blow in the back of the neck of the deceased captain while the latter was tied with
the rope, before another blow was delivered by the accused Elicanal at the request of said
Guillermo. Treachery was, therefore, present when Guillermo dealt the first blow and before Elicanal
delivered the fatal one on captain Nomo, deceased. In the De Leon case and the other fifteen cases
cited in the decision against Elicanal, the purpose, the principal object, of the offenders being to put
to death the victims by them sequestered or kidnapped from their homes, their acts of tying said
victims were simply preliminaries or preparatory to the principal act committed by them at the time
the offended parties were already bound and rendered completely defenseless. Treachery, therefore,
cannot be present in the said preliminary acts, it being present only when the accused executed their
principal object, or their intended purpose at the time they sequestered the offended parties. On the
hand, the case at bar (which is rather unnecessary to repeat) was that the accused Baluyot began
attacking Governor Lerma by firing two pistol shots while said governor was in front of him thereby
causing him two wounds; and that the deceased having taken refuge into the close next to the
corridor adjoining his office, the accused continued his attempt by firing another pistol shot which
caused the death of the victim.lawphil.net
It is therefore, evident that the case at bar has no application to the doctrine established in the
Elicanal case and in those cases cited in the body of same case by the writer, Justice Moreland and
invoked in the opinion of the majority in order to hold that, even supposing that at the beginning of
the assault upon Governor Lerma treachery was not present, it would be necessary to consider its
presence in view of the form by which the crime was committed. On the contrary, the present case
has an exact application to the doctrine established by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision of
September 9, 1901, already mentioned above, and expressive of the fact that "treachery must
necessarily be present thruout the assault constituting the crime," because the present case is
identical to that decided by said Supreme Court in the aforementioned decision where the foregoing
doctrine was established. The case at bar has also an exact application to the doctrine established
in the Balagtas and Jaime case (supra), to wit:.
In order that alevosia may be considered as a qualifying circumstance to raise the

classification of the crime, or as an aggravating circumstance to augment the penalty, it must
be shown that the treacherous acts were present and preceded the commencement of the
attack which cause the injury complained of. After the commencement of such an attack, and
before its termination, an accused may have employed means or methods which are of a
treacherous character, and yet such means and methods would not constitute the
circumstance of alevosia. One continuous attack cannot be broken up into two or more parts
and made to constitute separate, distinct, and independent attacks so that treachery may be
injected therein and considered as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance. (19 Phil. Rep.,
164.)
456
The foregoing doctrine must be considered subsisting, and it is, in my own judgment, subsisting
notwithstanding what has been said by this court in the cases already cited; to wit, U.S. vs. De Leon,
U.S. vs. Elicanal, and the fifteen cases mentioned in the last one.
For the foregoing reasons and with the due respect to the opinion of the majority of this court, I
hereby dissent from same and am of the opinion that the crime committed by the accused, according
to the evidence adduced at the hearing and their merits, is not murder but homicide, defined and
punished under article 404 of the Penal Code; and that the fact that it was committed at the place
where the deceased Conrado Lerma, Governor of Bataan, was exercising the proper functions of his
office as such governor, a generic circumstance modifying the criminal responsibility incurred by the
accused in the sense of aggravating same without the presence of any extenuating circumstance to
compensate it, the accused must be sentenced to suffer the medium of the maximum degree of the
corresponding penalty, i.e., 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal with the
accessories of article 59 of the same Code; but that if it be considered, as it was understood by the
majority in their decision, that same criminal act executed by the accused in fact resulted in the
perpetration of two crimes, one of them being the assault upon persons in authority defined in article
249 No. 2 of said Code, the accused must therefore be sentenced to suffer the penalty
corresponding to the more serious crime, i.e., that of homicide in its maximum degree, as provided
for in article 89, or 20 years of reclusion temporal and the same accessories of article 59.
G.R. No. 140756. April 4, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JUAN GONZALES ESCOTE, JR. @ Jun
Mantika of Sta. Lucia, Angat, Bulacan and VICTOR ACUYAN y OCHOVILLOS @ Vic
Arroyo of Sto. Nio, Poblacion, Bustos, Bulacan, accused-appellants.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a

generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim of homicide is killed treacherously.The
Supreme Court of Spain so ruled. So does the Court rule in this case, as it had done for decades.
Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision [1] of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court
of Bulacan in Criminal Case No. 443-M-97 convicting accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr.
and Victor Acuyan of the complex crime of robbery with homicide, meting on each of them the
supreme penalty of death, and ordering them to pay the heirs of the victim, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.,
the total amount of P300,000.00 by way of actual and moral damages and to pay to Five Star Bus,
Inc., the amount of P6,000.00 by way of actual damages.
The Facts
The antecedent facts as established by the prosecution are as follows:
457
On September 28, 1996 at past midnight, Rodolfo Cacatian, the regular driver of Five Star
Passenger Bus bearing Plate No. ABS-793, drove the bus from its terminal at Pasay City to its
destination in Bolinao, Pangasinan. Also on board was Romulo Digap, the regular conductor of the
bus, as well as some passengers. At Camachile, Balintawak, six passengers boarded the bus,
including Victor Acuyan and Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. who were wearing maong pants, rubber
shoes, hats and jackets.[2] Juan seated himself on the third seat near the aisle, in the middle row of
the passengers seats, while Victor stood by the door in the mid-portion of the bus beside
Romulo. Another passenger, SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., a resident of Angeles City, was seated at the
rear portion of the bus on his way home to Angeles City. Tucked on his waist was his service gun
bearing Serial Number 769806. Every now and then, Rodolfo looked at the side view mirror as well
as the rear view and center mirrors installed atop the drivers seat to monitor any incoming and
overtaking vehicles and to observe the passengers of the bus.
The lights of the bus were on even as some of the passengers slept. When the bus was
travelling along the highway in Plaridel, Bulacan, Juan and Victor suddenly stood up, whipped out
their handguns and announced a holdup. Petrified, Rodolfo glanced at the center mirror towards the
passengers seat and saw Juan and Victor armed with handguns. Juan fired his gun upward to
awaken and scare off the passengers. Victor followed suit and fired his gun upward.Juan and Victor
then accosted the passengers and divested them of their money and valuables.Juan divested
Romulo of the fares he had collected from the passengers. The felons then went to the place Manio,
Jr. was seated and demanded that he show them his identification card and wallet. Manio, Jr.
brought out his identification card bearing No. 00898. [3] Juan and Victor took the identification card of
the police officer as well as his service gun and told him: Pasensya ka na Pare, papatayin ka namin,
baril mo rin and papatay sa iyo. The police officer pleaded for mercy: Pare maawa ka sa akin. May
pamilya ako. However, Victor and Juan ignored the plea of the police officer and shot him on the
mouth, right ear, chest and right side of his body. Manio, Jr. sustained six entrance wounds. He fell to
the floor of the bus. Victor and Juan then moved towards the driver Rodolfo, seated themselves
beside him and ordered the latter to maintain the speed of the bus. Rodolfo heard one of the felons
saying: Ganyan lang ang pumatay ng tao.Parang pumapatay ng manok. The other said: Ayos na
naman tayo pare. Malaki-laki ito. Victor and Juan further told Rodolfo that after they (Victor and
Juan) shall have alighted from the bus, he (Rodolfo) should continue driving the bus and not report
the incident along the way. The robbers assured Rodolfo that if the latter will follow their instructions,
he will not be harmed.Victor and Juan ordered Rodolfo to stop the bus along the overpass in Mexico,
Pampanga where they alighted from the bus. The robbery was over in 25 minutes.
When the bus reached Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga, Rodolfo and Romulo forthwith reported the
incident to the police authorities. The cadaver of SPO1 Manio, Jr. was brought to the funeral parlor
where Dr. Alejandro D. Tolentino, the Municipal Health Officer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, performed
an autopsy on the cadaver of the police officer. The doctor prepared and signed an autopsy report
detailing the wounds sustained by the police officer and the cause of his death:
Body still flaccid (not in rigor mortis) bathed with his own blood. There were 6 entrance wounds and
6 exit wounds. All the entrance were located on his right side. An entrance (0.5 cm x 0.5 cm.)
located infront of the right ear exited at the left side just below the ear lobe. Another entrance
through the mouth exited at the back of the head fracturing the occiput with an opening of (1.5 cm x
2 cm). Blood CSF and brain tissues came out. Another fatal bullet entered at the upper right cornea
of the sternum, entered the chest cavity pierced the heart and left lung and exited at the left axillary
line. Severe hemorrhage in the chest cavity came from the heart and left lung. The other 3 bullets
entered the right side and exited on the same side. One entrance at the top of the right shoulder
exited at the medial side of the right arm. The other entered above the right breast and exited at the
right lateral abdominal wall travelling below muscles and subcutaneous tissues without entering the
cavities. Lastly another bullet entered above the right iliac crest travelled superficially and exited
above the right inguinal line.
Cause of Death:
458
Shock, massive internal and external hemorrhage, complete brain destruction and injury to the heart
and left lung caused by multiple gunshot wounds. [4]
Rodolfo and Romulo proceeded to the police station of Plaridel, Bulacan where they reported
the robbery and gave their respective sworn statements. [5] SPO1 Manio, Jr. was survived by his wife
Rosario Manio and their four young children. Rosario spent P20,000.00 for the coffin
and P10,000.00 for the burial lot of the slain police officer. [6] Manio, Jr. was 38 years old when he
died and had a gross salary of P8,085.00 a month.[7]
Barely a month thereafter, or on October 25, 1996, at about midnight, SPO3 Romeo Meneses,
the team leader of Alert Team No. 1 of Tarlac Police Station, and PO3 Florante S. Ferrer were at the
police checkpoint along the national highway in Tarlac, Tarlac. At the time, the Bambang-Concepcion
bridge was closed to traffic and the police officers were tasked to divert traffic to the Sta. Rosa
road. Momentarily, a white colored taxi cab without any plate number on its front fender came to
view. Meneses stopped the cab and asked the driver, who turned out to be the accused Juan
Gonzales Escote, Jr., for his identification card. Juan told Meneses that he was a policeman and
handed over to Meneses the identification card of SPO1 Manio, Jr. and the money which Juan and
Victor took from Manio, Jr. during the heist on September 28, 1996. [8]Meneses became suspicious
when he noted that the identification card had already expired on March 16, 1995. He asked Juan if
the latter had a new pay slip. Juan could not produce any. He finally confessed to Meneses that he
was not a policeman. Meneses brought Juan to the police station. When police officers frisked Juan
for any deadly weapon, they found five live bullets of a 9 millimeter firearm in his pocket. The police
officers confiscated the ammunition. In the course of the investigation, Juan admitted to the police
investigators that he and Victor, alias Victor Arroyo, staged the robbery on board Five Star Bus and
are responsible for the death of SPO1 Manio, Jr. in Plaridel, Bulacan. Meneses and Ferrer executed
their joint affiavit of arrest of Juan.[9] Juan was subsequently turned over to the Plaridel Police Station
where Romulo identified him through the latters picture as one of those who robbed the passengers
of the Five Star Bus with Plate No. ABS-793 and killed SPO1 Manio, Jr. on September 28, 1996. In
the course of their investigation, the Plaridel Police Station Investigators learned that Victor was a
native of Laoang, Northern Samar. [10] On April 4, 1997, an Information charging Juan Gonzales
Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan with robbery with homicide was filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan. The Information reads:
That on or about the 28th day of September 1996, in the municipality of Plaridel, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with firearms, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of force, violence
and intimidation, take, rob and carry away with one (1) necklace and cash in [the] undetermine[d]
amount of one SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the said
undetermine[d] amount; that simultaneously or on the occassion (sic) of said robbery, said accused
by means of violence and intimidation and in furtherance of their conspiracy attack, assault and
shoot with the service firearm of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., thereby inflicting serious physical
injuries which resulted (sic) the death of the said SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr.
Contrary to law.[11]
On the strength of a warrant of arrest, the police officers arrested Victor in Laoang, Northern
Samar and had him incarcerated in the Bulacan Provincial Jail. Assisted by Atty. Ramiro Osorio, their
counsel de parte, Juan and Victor were duly arraigned and entered their plea of not guilty to the
charge. Trial thereafter ensued. After the prosecution had rested its case on August 26, 1998, Juan
escaped from the provincial jail. [12] The trial court issued a bench warrant on September 22, 1998 for
the arrest of said accused-appellant.[13] In the meantime, Victor adduced his evidence.
Victor denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that in 1996, he
worked as a tire man in the vulcanizing shop located in Banga I, Plaridel, Bulacan owned by Tony
Boy Negro. On one occasion, Ilarde Victorino, a customer of Tony Boy Negro, ordered Victor to sell a
459
tire. Victor sold the tire but did not turn over the proceeds of the sale to Ilarde.The latter hated Victor
for his misdeed. The shop was later demolished and after two months of employment, Victor
returned to Barangay Muwal-Buwal, Laoang, Northern Samar. On September 26, 1996, at 9:30 p.m.,
Victor was at the town fiesta in Laoang. Victor and his friends, Joseph Iringco and Rickey Lorcio
were having a drinking spree in the house of Barangay Captain Ike Baluya. At 11:30 p.m., the three
left the house of the barangay captain and attended the public dance at the town auditorium. Victor
and his friends left the auditorium at 5:30 a.m. of September 27, 1996. Victor likewise testified that
he never met Juan until his arrest and detention at the Bulacan Provincial Jail. One of the inmates in
said provincial jail was Ilarde Victorino. Victor learned that Ilarde implicated him for the robbery of the
Five Star Bus and the killing of SPO1 Manio, Jr. to hit back at him for his failure to turn over to Ilarde
the proceeds of the sale of the latters tire.
On January 14, 1999, Juan was rearrested in Daet, Camarines Norte. [14] However, he no longer
adduced any evidence in his behalf.
The Verdict of the Trial Court
On March 11, 1999, the trial court rendered its Decision judgment finding Juan and Victor guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, meted on each of them the penalty of death and
ordered them to pay P300,000.00 as actual and moral damages to the heirs of the victim and to pay
the Five Star Bus Company the amount of P6,000.00 as actual damages. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused, Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor Acuyan GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Homicide as penalized under Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended and hereby sentences both to suffer the supreme penalty of Death and to
indemnify the heirs of the late SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr., the amount of P300,000.00 as actual and
moral damages and to pay the Five Star Bus P6,000.00 as actual damage.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Juan and Victor assail the Decision of the trial court and contend that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RODOLFO CACATIAN AND ROMULO DIGAP,
DRIVER AND CONDUCTOR OF THE FIVE STAR BUS, RESPECTIVELY, WERE ABLE TO
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE TWO (2) MEN WHO HELD-UP THEIR BUS AND KILLED ONE
PASSENGER THEREOF AT AROUND 3:00 OCLOCK IN THE EARLY MORNING OF SEPTEMBER
28, 1996.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE TWO (2) ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE. [16]
The Courts Verdict
460
Anent the first assignment of error, Juan and Victor contend that the trial court committed a
reversible error in relying on the testimony of Rodolfo, the bus conductor, for convicting them of the
crime charged. They aver that although their counsel was able to initially cross-examine Rodolfo, the
former failed to continue with and terminate his cross-examination of the said witness through no
fault of his as the witness failed to appear in subsequent proceedings. They assert that even if the
testimonies of Rodolfo and Romulo were to be considered, the two witnesses were so petrified
during the robbery that they were not able to look at the felons and hence could not positively
identify accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. They argue that the police investigators
never conducted a police line-up for the identification of the authors of the crime.
The contentions of Juan and Victor are not meritorious. There is no factual and legal basis for
their claim that they were illegally deprived of their constitutional and statutory right to fully cross-
examine Rodolfo. The Court agrees that the right to cross-examine is a constitutional right anchored
on due process.[17] It is a statutory right found in Section 1(f), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides that the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him at the trial. However, the right has always been understood as requiring not
necessarily an actual cross-examination but merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-
examine if desired.[18] What is proscribed by statutory norm and jurisprudential precept is the
absence of the opportunity to cross-examine. [19] The right is a personal one and may be waived
expressly or impliedly. There is an implied waiver when the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons
attributable to himself alone. [20] If by his actuations, the accused lost his opportunity to cross-examine
wholly or in part the witnesses against him, his right to cross-examine is impliedly waived. [21] The
testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record.[22]
In this case, the original records show that after several resettings, the initial trial for the
presentation by the prosecution of its evidence-in-chief was set on November 18, 1997 and
December 5, 1997, both at 9:00 a.m. [23] Rodolfo testified on direct examination on November 18,
1997. The counsel of Juan and Victor forthwith commenced his cross-examination of the witness but
because of the manifestation of said counsel that he cannot finish his cross-examination, the court
ordered the continuation thereof to December 5, 1997. [24] On December 5, 1997, Rodolfo did not
appear before the court for the continuation of his cross-examination but Rosemarie Manio, the
widow of the victim did. The prosecution presented her as witness. Her testimony was
terminated. The court ordered the continuation of the trial for the cross-examination of Rodolfo on
January 20, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. [25] During the trial on January 20, 1998, Rodolfo was present but
accused-appellants counsel was absent. The court issued an order declaring that for failure of said
counsel to appear before the court for his cross-examination of Rodolfo, Victor and Juan waived
their right to continue with the cross-examination of said witness. [26] During the trial set for February
3, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor appeared but did not move for a reconsideration of the
courts order dated January 20, 1998 and for the recall of Rodolfo Cacatian for further cross-
examination. It behooved counsel for Juan and Victor to file said motion and pray that the trial court
order the recall of Rodolfo on the witness stand. Juan and Victor cannot just fold their arms and
supinely wait for the prosecution or for the trial court to initiate the recall of said witness. Indeed, the
Court held in Fulgado vs. Court of Appeals, et al:
xxx
The task of recalling a witness for cross examination is, in law, imposed on the party who wishes to
exercise said right. This is so because the right, being personal and waivable, the intention to utilize
it must be expressed. Silence or failure to assert it on time amounts to a renunciation thereof. Thus,
it should be the counsel for the opposing party who should move to cross-examine plaintiffs
witnesses. It is absurd for the plaintiff himself to ask the court to schedule the cross-examination of
his own witnesses because it is not his obligation to ensure that his deponents are cross-
examined. Having presented his witnesses, the burden shifts to his opponent who must now make
the appropriate move. Indeed, the rule of placing the burden of the case on plaintiffs shoulders can
be construed to extremes as what happened in the instant proceedings. [27]
461
The trial was reset to March 31, April 17 and 24, 1998, all at 8:30 a.m. because of the non-
availability of the other witnesses of the prosecution. [28] On March 31, 1998, the prosecution
presented Dr. Alejandro Tolentino, PO2 Rene de la Cruz and Romulo Digap. During the trial on April
17, 1998, the counsel of Juan and Victor failed to appear. The trial was reset to June 3, 19 and 26,
1998.[29] The trial scheduled on June 3, 1998 was cancelled due to the absence of the counsel of
Juan and Victor. The court issued an order appointing Atty. Roberto Ramirez as counsel for accused-
appellants.[30]
During the trial on August 26, 1998, Atty. Ramirez appeared in behalf of Juan and Victor.The
prosecution rested its case after the presentation of SPO2 Romeo Meneses and formally offered its
documentary evidence. The next trial was set on September 23, 1998 at 8:30 a.m. [31]On November
11, 1998, Juan and Victor commenced the presentation of their evidence with the testimony of Victor.
[32]
They rested their case on January 27, 1999 without any evidence adduced by Juan.
Juan and Victor did not even file any motion to reopen the case before the trial court rendered
its decision to allow them to cross-examine Rodolfo. They remained mute after judgment was
rendered against them by the trial court. Neither did they file any petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals for the nullification of the Order of the trial court dated January 20, 1998 declaring that
they had waived their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It was only on appeal to this Court that Juan
and Victor averred for the first time that they were deprived of their right to cross-examine Rodolfo. It
is now too late in the day for Juan and Victor to do so. The doctrine of estoppel states that if one
maintains silence when in conscience he ought to speak, equity will debar him from speaking when
in conscience he ought to remain silent. He who remains silent when he ought to speak cannot be
heard to speak when he should be silent. [33]
The contention of accused-appellants Juan and Victor that Rodolfo and Romulo failed to identify
them as the perpetrators of the crime charged is disbelieved by the trial court, thus:
As can be gathered from the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution, on September 28,
1996, the accused boarded at around 3:00 a.m. a Five Star Bus driven by Rodolfo Cacatian, bound
to Pangasinan, in Camachile, Balintawak, Quezon City. Twenty (20) minutes or so later, when the
bus reached the vicinity of Nabuag, Plaridel, Bulacan, along the North Espressway, the accused with
guns in hand suddenly stood up and announced a hold-up. Simultaneously with the announcement
of a hold-up, Escote fired his gun upwards. Acuyan, meanwhile, took the gun of a man seated at the
back. Both then went on to take the money and valuables of the passengers, including the bus
conductors collections in the amount of P6,000.00. Thereafter, the duo approached the man at the
back telling him in the vernacular Pasensiya ka na pare, papatayin ka namin. Baril mo rin ang
papatay sa iyo. They pointed their guns at him and fired several shots oblivious of the plea for mercy
of their victim. After the shooting, the latter collapsed on the floor. The two (2) then went back at the
front portion of the bus behind the drivers seat and were overheard by the bus driver, Cacatian,
talking how easy it was to kill a man. The robbery and the killing were over in 25 minutes. Upon
reaching the Mexico overpass of the Expressway in Pampanga, the two (2) got off the bus. The
driver drove the bus to the Mabalacat Police Station and reported the incident. During the
investigation conducted by the police, it was found out that the slain passenger was a policeman,
SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. of the Caloocan City Police Department.
The above version came from Rodolfo Cacatian and Romulo Digap, bus driver and conductor,
respectively, of the ill-fated Five Star Bus.[34]
The Court agrees with the trial court. It may be true that Romulo was frightened when Juan and
Victor suddenly announced a holdup and fired their guns upward, but it does not follow that he and
Rodolfo failed to have a good look at Juan and Victor during the entire time the robbery was taking
place. The Court has held in a catena of cases that it is the most natural reaction of victims of
violence to strive to see the appearance of the perpetrators of the crime and to observe the manner
in which the crime was committed. [35] Rodolfo and Romulo had a good look at both Juan and Victor
before, during and after they staged the robbery and before they alighted from the bus. The
evidence on record shows that when Juan and Victor boarded the bus and while the said vehicle
462
was on its way to its destination, Romulo stationed himself by the door of the bus located in the mid-
section of the vehicle. The lights inside the bus were on. Juan seated himself in the middle row of
the passengers seat near the center aisle while Victor stood near the door of the bus about a meter
or so from Romulo. [36] Romulo, Juan and Victor were near each other. Moreover, Juan divested
Romulo of his collection of the fares from the passengers. [37] Romulo thus had a face-to-face
encounter with Juan. After shooting SPO1 Manio, Jr. at the rear portion of the bus, Juan and Victor
passed by where Romulo was standing and gave their instructions to him. Considering all the facts
and circumstances, there is no iota of doubt that Romulo saw and recognized Juan and Victor
before, during and after the heist.[38]Rodolfo looked many times on the rear, side and center view
mirrors to observe the center and rear portions of the bus before and during the robbery. Rodolfo
thus saw Juan and Victor stage the robbery and kill SPO1 Manio, Jr. with impunity:
xxx
Q So, the announcement of hold-up was ahead of the firing of the gun?
A Yes, sir.
Q And before the actual firing of the gun it was even still said bad words before saying the
hold-up?
A After they fired the gun they uttered bad words, sir.
Q Mr. Witness before the announcement of the hold-up you do not have any idea that you
will encounter that nature which took place, is that correct?
A None, sir.
Q Within the two (2) year[s] period that you are plying the route of Manila to Bolinao that
was your first experience of hold-up?
A Yes, sir.
Q And the speed of above 70 kilometers per hour your total attention is focus in front of the
road, correct, Mr. witness?
A Once in a while the driver look at the side mirror and the rear view mirror, sir.
Q Before the announcement there was no reason for you to look at any at the rear mirror,
correct, Mr. witness?
Court:
Every now and then they usually look at the side mirror and on the rear, that was his
statement.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q I am asking him if there was no reason for him....
Fiscal:
Before the announcement of hold-up, there was no mention.
Court:
Every now and then.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q When you said every now and then, how often is it, Mr. witness?
463
A I cannot tell how often but I used to look at the mirror once in a while, sir.
Q How many mirror do you have, Mr. witness?
A Four (4), sir.
Q Where are these located?
A Two (2) on the side mirror, center mirror and rear view mirror, sir.
Q The two side mirror protruding outside the bus?
A Yes, sir, they are in the side of the bus, sir.
Q One of them is located on the left and the other on the right, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q You only look at the side mirror when you are going to over take, Mr. witness?
A No, sir.
Q Where is this center mirror located, Mr. witness?
A In the center, sir.
Q What is the purpose of that?
A So that I can see the passengers if they are already settled so that I can start the engine,
sir.
Q What about the remaining mirror?
A Rear view mirror, sir.
Q What is the purpose and where is it located?
A The rear view is located just above my head just to check the passengers, sir.
Q So that the center mirror and the rear view mirror has the same purpose?
A They are different, sir.
Q How do you differentiate of (sic) one from the other?
A The center mirror is used to check the center aisle while the rear mirror is for the whole
view of the passengers, sir.
Q If you are going to look at any of your side mirrors, you will never see any passengers,
correct, Mr. witness?
A None, sir.
Q If you will look at your center mirror you will only see the aisle and you will never see any
portion of the body of your passengers?
A Yes, sir.
Q Seated passengers?
A It is only focus (sic) on the middle aisle sir.
Q If you look at your rear mirror, you will only see the top portion of the head of your
passengers, correct?
A Only the portion of their head because they have different hight (sic), sir.
464
Q You will never see any head of your passengers if they were seated from the rear mirror
portion, correct, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Before the announcement of hold-up, all of your passengers were actually sleeping?
A Some of my passengers were sleeping, some were not, sir.
Q But you will agree Mr. witness that when you said every now and then you are using your
mirror? It is only a glance, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And by mere glancing, Mr. witness you were not able to identify any person on the basis
of any of your mirror, correct?
A If only a glance but when I look at him I can recognize him, sir.
Q You agree a while ago by every now and then it is by glancing, as a driver, Mr. witness by
your side mirror?
A Not all glancing, there are times when you want to recognize a person you look at him
intently, sir.
Q The purposes of your mirror inside your Bus is mainly of the safety of your passengers
on board, Mr. witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And as a driver, Mr. witness, you do not used (sic) your mirror to identify the person
particularly when you are crossing (sic) at a speed of 70 kilometers per hour?
A I do that, sir.
Q How long Mr. witness can you focus your eyes on any of these mirror before getting back
your eyes into the main road?
A Seconds only, sir.
Q When you said seconds, for how long the most Mr. witness that you can do to fix your
eyes on any of your mirrors and the return back of (sic) your eyes into the main road?
A Two seconds, sir.
Q At that time Mr. witness, that you were travelling at about 70 kilometers you were
glancing every now and then on any of your mirrors at about two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And when you heard the announcement of hold-up your natural reaction is to look either
at the center mirror or rear mirror for two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were instructed Mr. witness to even accelerate your speed upon the
announcement of hold-up?
A No sir, they just told me to continue my driving, sir.
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular alalay ka lang, steady ka lang.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
465
Q Steady at what speed?
A 70 to 80, sir.
Q What is the minimum speed, Mr. witness for Buses along North Expressway?
A 60 kilometers, sir.
Q Are you sure of that 60 kilometers, minimum? Are you sure of that?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is what you know within the two (2) years that you are driving? Along the North
Expressway?
A Yes, sir.
Q And while you were at the precise moment, Mr. witness, you were being instructed to
continue driving, you were not looking to anybody except focus yours eyes in front of
the road?
Fiscal:
May I request the vernacular. Nakikiramdam ako.
Atty. Osorio:
(to the witness)
Q Thats what you are doing?
A During the time they were gathering the money from my passengers, that is the time
when I look at them, sir.
Q For two seconds, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Which of the four (4) mirrors that you are looking at within two seconds, Mr. witness you
said you are nakikiramdam?
A The rear view mirror, sir.
Q The Bus that you were driving is not an air con bus?
A Ordinary bus, sir.
Q And at what time your passengers, most of your passengers were already sleep (sic),
Mr. witness?
A Most of my passengers, sir. Some of my passengers were still sleep (sic), sir.
Q And the lights inside the Bus are off, correct Mr. witness?
A The lights were on, sir.
Q While the passengers were sleep (sic) the light was still on, Mr. witness, at the time of
the trip.?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, Mr. witness when the hold-up was announced and then when you look for two
seconds in the rear mirror you were not able to see any one, you were only sensing
what is happening inside your bus?
A I saw something, sir.
466
Q You saw something in front of your Bus? You can only see inside when you are going to
look at the mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q That is the only thing that you see every now and then, you said you were looking at the
mirror?
A Yes, sir.
Q How many times, Mr. witness did you look Mr. witness at the rear mirror during the entire
occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up?
A There were many times, sir.
Q The most that you can remember, please inform the Honorable Court? During the
occurance (sic) of the alleged hold-up, Mr. witness?
A I cannot estimate, sir.
Q How long did the alleged hold-up took place?
A More or less 25 minutes, sir.[39]
When Rodolfo gave his sworn statement to the police investigators in Plaridel, Bulacan after the
robbery, he described the felons. When asked by the police investigators if he could identify the
robbers if he see them again, Rodolfo declared that he would be able to identify them:
8. T: Natatandaan mo ba kung ano ang itsura ng dalawang lalaki na nanghold-up sa
minamaneho mong bus?
S: Halos magkasing taas, 54 o 55 katam-taman ang pangangatawan, parehong
nakapantalon ng maong naka-suot ng jacket na maong, parehong naka rubber shoes
at pareho ring naka sumbrero.
9. T: Kung sakali bang makikita mo pa ang mga ito ay makikilala mo pa sila?
S: Makikilala ko po sila.[40]
When asked to identify the robbers during the trial, Rodolfo spontaneously pointed to and
identified Juan and Victor:
QFiscal:
(to the witness)
xxx
Q Those two man (sic) who stated that it was a hold-up inside the bus and who fired the
gun are they inside the Court room (sic) today?
A Yes, maam.
Q Point to us?
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing red T-shirt and when asked his name answered
Victor Acuyan and the man wearing green T-shirt and when asked his name answered
Juan Gonzales.[41]
For his part, Romulo likewise spontaneously pointed to and identified Juan and Victor as the
culprits when asked by the prosecutor to identify the robbers from among those in the courtroom:
xxx
467
Q You said that you were robbed inside the bus, how does (sic) the robbing took place?
A They announced a hold up maam, afterwards, they confiscated the money of the
passengers including my collections.
Q You said they who announced the hold up, whose (sic) these they you are referring to?
A Those two (2), maam.
Interpreter:
Witness pointing to the two accused.
Public Pros.:
May we request that the accused be identified, Your Honor.
Court:
(to both accused)
What are your names?
A Juan Escote, Your Honor. Victor Acuyan, Your Honor.
Public Pros.:
May we know from the accused if his name is Juan Escote Gonzales because he just
said Juan Escote. In the Information, it is one Juan Gonzales, Jr., so, we can change,
Your Honor.[42]
Moreover, when he was accosted by SPO3 Romeo Meneses on October 25, 1997 in Tarlac,
Tarlac, Juan was in possession of the identification card [43] of the slain police officer. Juan failed to
explain to the trial court how and under what circumstances he came into possession of said
identification card. Juan must necessarily be considered the author of the robbery and the killing of
SPO1 Manio, Jr. In People v. Mantung,[44] we held:
xxx [T]he recovery of part of the loot from Mantung or the time of his arrest gave rise to a legal
presumption of his guilt. As this Court has held, [I]n the absence of an explanation of how one has
come into possession of stolen effects belonging to a person wounded and treacherously killed, he
must necessarily be considered the author of the aggression and death of the said person and of the
robbery committed on him.
While police investigators did not place Juan and Victor in a police line-up for proper
identification by Rodolfo and Romulo, it cannot thereby be concluded that absent such line-up, their
identification by Romulo and Rodolfo as the authors of the robbery with homicide was
unreliable. There is no law or police regulation requiring a police line-up for proper identification in
every case. Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper and reliable identification
as long as such identification was not suggested or instigated to the witness by the police. [45] In this
case, there is no evidence that the police officers had supplied or even suggested to Rodolfo and
Romulo the identities of Juan and Victor as the perpetrators of the robbery and the killing of SPO1
Manio, Jr.
The Felony Committed by Juan and Victor
The Court finds that the trial court committed no error in convicting Juan and Victor of robbery
with homicide. Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
7659, reads:
468
Art. 294. - Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. - Penalties. - Any person guilty
of robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
To warrant the conviction of Juan and Victor for the said charge, the prosecution was burdened
to prove the confluence of the following essential elements:
xxx (a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b)
the property thus taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandiand (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is
therein used in a generic sense, was committed. xxx[46]
The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life. [47] In robbery with homicide, so long as
the intention of the felons was to rob, the killing may occur before, during or after the
robbery.In People v. Barut,[48] the Court held that:
In the controlling Spanish version of article 294, it is provided that there is robbery with homicide
cuando con motivo o con ocasin del robo resultare homicidio. Basta que entre aquel este exista una
relacin meramente ocasional. No se requiere que el homicidio se cometa como medio de ejecucin
del robo, ni que el culpable tenga intencin de matar, el delito existe segn constanta jurisprudencia,
aun cuando no concurra animo homicida. Incluso si la muerte sobreviniere por mero accidente,
siempre que el homicidio se produzca con motivo con ocasin del robo, siendo indiferente que la
muerte sea anterior, coetnea o posterior a ste (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 14 th Ed. P.
872).
Even if the victim of robbery is other than the victim of the homicide committed on the occasion
of or by reason of the robbery, nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide. All the crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and
integrated into a single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. This was the ruling of the
Supreme Court of Spain on September 9, 1886, et sequitur cited by this Court in People v.
Mangulabnan, et al.[49]
We see, therefore, that in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery (Decision of the
Supreme Court of Spain of November 26, 1892, and January 7, 1878, quoted in 2 Hidalgos Penal
Code, p. 267 and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of the accessory character of
the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held that it is immaterial that the death would
supervene by mere accident (Decision of September 9, 1886; October 22, 1907; April 30, 1910 and
July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery,
inasmuch as it is only theresult obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances,
causes, modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into
consideration (Decision of January 12, 1889 see Cuello Calons Codigo Penal, p. 501-502).
Case law has it that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of
the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals
of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they
endeavored to prevent the homicide.[50]
In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Juan and Victor conspired
and confabulated together in robbing the passengers of the Five Star Bus of their money and
valuables and Romulo of his collections of the fares of the passengers and in killing SPO1 Manio, Jr.
with impunity on the occasion of the robbery. Hence, both Juan and Victor are guilty as principals by
469
direct participation of the felony of robbery with homicide under paragraph 1, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
The Proper Penalty
The trial court imposed the supreme penalty of death on Juan and Victor for robbery with
homicide, defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, punishable withreclusion
perpetua. Under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the felons should be meted the
supreme penalty of death when the crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance attendant
in the commission of the crime absent any mitigating circumstance. The trial court did not specify in
the decretal portion of its decision the aggravating circumstances attendant in the commission of the
crime mandating the imposition of the death penalty. However, it is evident from the findings of facts
contained in the body of the decision of the trial court that it imposed the death penalty on Juan and
Victor on its finding that they shot SPO1 Manio, Jr. treacherously on the occasion of or by reason of
the robbery:
xxx
The two (2) accused are incomparable in their ruthlessness and base regard for human life. After
stripping the passengers of their money and valuables, including the firearm of the victim, they came
to decide to execute the latter seemingly because he was a police officer. They lost no time
pouncing him at the rear section of the bus, aimed their firearms at him and, in a derisive and
humiliating tone, told him, before pulling the trigger, that they were rather sorry but they are going to
kill him with his own gun; and thereafter, they simultaneously fired point blank at the hapless
policeman who was practically on his knees begging for his life. Afterwhich, they calmly positioned
themselves at the front boasting for all to hear, that killing a man is like killing a chicken (Parang
pumapatay ng manok). Escote, in particular, is a class by himself in callousness. xxx.[51]
The Court agrees with the trial court that treachery was attendant in the commission of the
crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of
the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. [52]The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission
without risk of himself. Treachery may also be appreciated even if the victim was warned of the
danger to his life where he was defenseless and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of
the coup de grace.[53] In the case at bar, the victim suffered six wounds, one on the mouth, another
on the right ear, one on the shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of
the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were armed with handguns. They
first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then shot him even as he pleaded for dear life. When the victim
was shot, he was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his death. The victim was
on his way to rejoin his family after a hard days work. Instead, he was mercilessly shot to death,
leaving his family in grief for his untimely demise. The killing is a grim example of the utter
inhumanity of man to his fellowmen.
The issues that now come to fore are (1) whether or not treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide; and if in the affirmative, (b) whether treachery may be
appreciated against Juan and Victor. On the first issue, we rule in the affirmative. This Court has
ruled over the years[54] that treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in the felony of robbery
with homicide, a special complex crime (un delito especial complejo) and at the same time a single
and indivisible offense (uno solo indivisible).[55] However, this Court in two cases has held that
robbery with homicide is a crime against property and hence treachery which is appreciated only to
crimes against persons should not be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. [56] It held
in another case that treachery is not appreciated in robbery with rape precisely because robbery with
470
rape is a crime against property. [57] These rulings of the Court find support in case law that in robbery
with homicide or robbery with rape, homicide or rape are merely incidents of the robbery, with
robbery being the main purpose and object of the criminal. [58] Indeed, in People vs. Cando,[59] two
distinguished members of this Court advocated a review of the doctrine that treachery is a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide.They opined that treachery is applicable only to
crimes against persons. After all, in People vs. Bariquit,[60] this Court in a per curiam decision
promulgated in year 2000 declared that treachery is applicable only to crimes against
persons. However, this Court held in People vs. Cando that treachery is a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide, citing its prior rulings that in robbery with homicide, treachery
is a generic aggravating circumstance when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery. This Court
opted not to apply its ruling earlier that year inPeople vs. Bariquit.
Legal Luminaries in criminal law and eminent commentators of the Revised Penal Code are not
in full accord either. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino (Retired) says that treachery is appreciated only
in crimes against persons as defined in Title 10, Book Two of the Code. [61]Chief Justice Luis B.
Reyes (Retired) also is of the opinion that treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons.
[62]
However, Justice Florenz D. Regalado (Retired) is of a different view. [63] He says that treachery
cannot be considered in robbery but can be appreciated insofar as the killing is concerned, citing the
decisions of this Court in People vs. Balagtas [64] for the purpose of determining the penalty to be
meted on the felon when the victim of homicide is killed with treachery.
It must be recalled that by Royal Order of December 17, 1886 the 1850 Penal Code in force in
Spain, as amended by the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 was applied in the Philippines. The
Penal Code of 1887 in the Philippines was amended by Act 3815, now known as the Revised Penal
Code, which was enacted and published in Spanish. In construing the Old Penal Code and the
Revised Penal Code, this Court had accorded respect and persuasive, if not conclusive effect to the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing the 1850 Penal Code of Spain,
as amended by Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870. [65]
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code reads:
ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. The following are aggravating circumstances:
xxx
16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make.
The law was taken from Chapter IV, Article 10, paragraph 2 of the 1860 Penal Code and
theCodigo Penal Reformado de 1870 of Spain which reads:
Art. 10 ...2. Ejecutar el hecho con alevosia. Hay alevosia cuando el culpable comete cualquiera de
los delitos contra las personas empleando medios, modos o for mas en la ejecucion que
tiendan directa y especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para su persona, que proceda de la
defensa que pudiera hacer el ofendido. xxx
Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code is a reproduction of the 1850 Penal Code of
Spain and the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870 with a slight difference. In the latter law, the
words las personas (the persons) are used, whereas in Article 14, paragraph 6, of the Revised Penal
Code, the words the person are used.
Going by the letter of the law, treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons as
enumerated in Title Eight, Chapters One and Two, Book II of the Revised Penal Code. However, the
Supreme Court of Spain has consistently applied treachery to robbery with homicide, classified as a
crime against property. Citing decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, Cuello Calon, a noted
471
commentator of the Spanish Penal Code says that despite the strict and express reference of the
penal code to treachery being applicable to persons, treachery also applies to other crimes such as
robbery with homicide:[66]
Aun cuando el Codigo solo se refiere a los delitos contra las personas, cabe estimarla en los que no
perteneciendo a este titulo se determinan por muerte o lesiones, como, en el robo con homicidio, y
en el homicidio del Jefe del Estado que es un delito contra la seguridad interior del Estado, y no
obstante la referencia estricta del texto legal a los delitos contra las personas no es la alevosia
aplicable a la mayoria de ellos, no lo es en el homicidio, pues como su concurrencia lo cualifica lo
transforma en delito distinto, en asesinato, ni en el homicidio consentido (art. 409), ni en la ria
tumultuaria (art. 408) ni en el infanticidio (art. 410). xxx. [67]
Viada also says that treachery is appreciated in crimes against persons (delitos contra
personas) and also in robbery with homicide (robo con homicidio).[68]
Contra las personas. - Luego la circunstancia de alevosia solo puede apreciarse en los delitos
provistos desde el art. 417 al 447, y en algun otro, como el de robo con homicidio, atentario, a la vez
que contra la propriedad, contra la persona.
Thus, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery with homicide although said
crime is classified as a crime against property and a single and indivisible crime. Treachery is not a
qualifying circumstance because as ruled by the Supreme Court of Spain in its decision dated
September 11, 1878, the word homicide is used in its broadest and most generic sense. [69]
Article 62, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in diminishing or increasing the
penalty for a crime, aggravating circumstances shall be taken into account. However, aggravating
circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are
included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing a penalty therefor shall not be taken into
account for the purpose of increasing the penalty. [70] Under paragraph 2 of the law, the same rule
shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree that
it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or

which are included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be
taken into account for the purpose of increasing the penalty.
xxx
2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to
such a degree that it must be of necessity accompany the commission thereof.
Treachery is not an element of robbery with homicide. Neither does it constitute a crime
specially punishable by law nor is it included by the law in defining the crime of robbery with
homicide and prescribing the penalty therefor. Treachery is likewise not inherent in the crime of
robbery with homicide. Hence, treachery should be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance in robbery with homicide for the imposition of the proper penalty for the crime.
In its Sentencia dated March 14, 1877, the Supreme Court of Spain declared that treachery is a
generic aggravating circumstance not only in crimes against persons but also in robbery with
homicide. The high court of Spain applied Article 79 of the Spanish Penal Code (Article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code) and ruled that since treachery is not a constitutive element of the crime of
robbery with homicide nor is it inherent in said crime, without which it cannot be committed,
treachery is an aggravating circumstance to said crime. The high court of Spain was not impervious
of the fact that robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property.Indeed, it specifically
declared that the classification of robbery with homicide as a crime against property is irrelevant and
472
inconsequential in the application of treachery. It further declared that it would be futile to argue that
in crimes against property such as robbery with homicide, treachery would have no application. This
is so, the high tribunal ruled, because when robbery is coupled with crimes committed against
persons, the crime is not only an assault (ataca) on the property of the victims but also of the victims
themselves (ofende):
xxx que la circunstancia agravante de alevosia ni es constitutiva del delito complejo de robo y
homicidio, ni de tal modo inherente que sin ella no pueda cometerse, sin que quepa arguir que en
los delitos contra la propiedad no debe aquella tener aplicacion, porque cuando estos son
complejos de los que se cometen contra las personas, no solo se ataca a la propiedad, sino que se
ofende a estas. xxx[71]
In fine, in the application of treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance to robbery

with homicide, the law looks at the constituent crime of homicide which is a crime against
persons and not at the constituent crime of robbery which is a crime against
property. Treachery is applied to the constituent crime of homicide and not to the constituent
crime of robbery of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
The crime of robbery with homicide does not lose its classification as a crime against
property or as a special complex and single and indivisible crime simply because treachery
is appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Treachery merely increases the
penalty for the crime conformably with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code absent any
generic mitigating circumstance.
In its Sentencia, dated July 9, 1877, the high tribunal of Spain also ruled that when the victim of
robbery is killed with treachery, the said circumstance should be appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide:
xxx que si aparece probado que el procesado y su co-reo convinieron en matar a un conocido suyo,
compaero de viaje, para lo cual desviaron cautelosamente los carros que guiaban, en uno de los
cuales iba el interfecto, dirigiendolos por otro camino que conducia a un aljibon, y al llegar a este,
valiendose de engao para hacer bajar a dicho interfecto, se lanzaron de improviso sobre el,
tirandolo en tierra, robandole el dinero, la manta y los talegos que llevaba, y atandole al pie una
piedra de mucho peso, le arrojaron con ella a dicho aljibon, dados estos hechos, no cabe duda que
constituyen el delito complejo del art. 516, num. I, con la circunstancia agravante de alevosia,
puesto que los medios, forma y modos empleados en la ejecucion del crimen tendieron directa y
especialmente a asegurarla sin riesgo para sus autores, procedente de la defensa del ofendido. [72]
In sum then, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide when the
victim of homicide is killed by treachery.
On the second issue, we also rule in the affirmative. Article 62, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code which was taken from Article 80 of the Codigo Penal Reformado de 1870,[73]provides
that circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to
accomplish it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had
knowledge of them at the time of the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.The
circumstances attending the commission of a crime either relate to the persons participating in the
crime or into its manner of execution or to the means employed. The latter has a direct bearing upon
the criminal liability of all the accused who have knowledge thereof at the time of the commission of
the crime or of their cooperation thereon. [74] Accordingly, the Spanish Supreme Court held in
its Sentencia dated December 17, 1875 that where two or more persons perpetrate the crime of
robbery with homicide, the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery shall be appreciated
against all of the felons who had knowledge of the manner of the killing of victims of homicide, with
the ratiocination that:
473
xxx si por la Ley basta haberse ejecutado un homicidio simple con motivo ocasin del robo para la
imposicion de la pena del art. 516, num. I, no puede sere ni aun discutible que, concurriendo la
agravante de alevosia, se aumente la criminalidad de los delincuentes; siendo aplicable a todos los
autores del hecho indivisible, porque no es circunstancia que afecte a la personalidad del
delincuente, de las que habla el art. 80 del Codigo penal en su primera parte, sino que consiste en
la ejecusion material del hecho y en los medios empleados para llevarle a cabo, cuando de ellos
tuvieron conocimiento todos los participantes en el mismo por el concierto previo y con las
condiciones establecidad en la segunda parte del citado articulo. [75]
Be that as it may, treachery cannot be appreciated against Juan and Victor in the case at bar
because the same was not alleged in the Information as mandated by Section 8, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedures which reads:
Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall
be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Although at the time the crime was committed, generic aggravating circumstance need not be
alleged in the Information, however, the general rule had been applied retroactively because if it is
more favorable to the accused.[76] Even if treachery is proven but it is not alleged in the information,
treachery cannot aggravate the penalty for the crime.
There being no modifying circumstances in the commission of the felony of robbery with
homicide, Juan and Victor should each be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua conformably with
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liability of Juan and Victor
The trial court awarded the total amount of P300,000.00 to the heirs of SPO1 Manio, Jr. The
court did not specify whether the said amounts included civil indemnity for the death of the victim,
moral damages and the lost earnings of the victim as a police officer of the PNP. The Court shall
thus modify the awards granted by the trial court.
Since the penalty imposed on Juan and Victor is reclusion perpetua, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The heirs are also entitled to moral damages
in the amount of P50,000.00, Rosemarie Manio having testified on the factual basis thereof.
[77]
Considering that treachery aggravated the crime, the heirs are also entitled to exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00. This Court held in People vs. Catubig[78] that the retroactive
application of Section 8, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should not impair the
right of the heirs to exemplary damages which had already accrued when the crime was committed
prior to the effectivity of the said rule. Juan and Victor are also jointly and severally liable to the said
heirs in the total amount of P30,000.00 as actual damages, the prosecution having adduced
evidence receipts for said amounts. The heirs are not entitled to expenses allegedly incurred by
them during the wake as such expenses are not supported by receipts. [79] However, in lieu thereof,
the heirs are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P20,000.00.[80] The service firearm of
the victim was turned over to the Evidence Custodian of the Caloocan City Police Station per order
of the trial court on October 22, 1997. [81] The prosecution failed to adduce documentary evidence to
prove the claim of Five Star Bus, Inc. in the amount of P6,000.00. Hence, the award should be
deleted. However, in lieu of actual damages, the bus company is entitled to temperate damages in
the amount of P3,000.00.[82]
The heirs are likewise entitled to damages for the lost earnings of the victim. The evidence on
record shows that SPO1 Manio, Jr. was born on August 25, 1958. He was killed on September 28,
474
1996 at the age of 38. He had a gross monthly salary as a member of the Philippine National Police
of P8,065.00 or a gross annual salary of P96,780.00. Hence, the heirs are entitled to the amount
of P1,354,920.00 by way of lost earnings of the victim computed, thus:
Age of the victim = 38 years old
Life expectancy = 2/3 x (80 age of the victim at the time of death)
= 2/3 x (80-38)
= 2/3 x 42
= 28 years
Gross Annual Income = gross monthly income x 12 months
= P8,065.00 x 12
= P96,780.00
Living Expenses = 50% of Gross Annual Income
= P96,780.00 x 0.5
= P48,390.00
Lost Earning Capacity = Life expectancy x [Gross Annual Income-
Living expenses]
= 28 x [P96,780.00 P48,390.00]
= 28 x P48,390.00
= P1,354,920.00
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants Juan Gonzales Escote, Jr. and Victor
Acuyan are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of robbery with homicide
defined in Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying
circumstances in the commission of the felony, hereby metes on each of them the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Said accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
severally the heirs of the victim SPO1 Jose C. Manio, Jr. the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P1,349,920.00 for lost earnings, P30,000.00 as actual
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of P6,000.00 to the Five Star Bus, Inc.
is deleted. However, the said corporation is awarded the amount of P3,000.00 as temperate
damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
475
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126281. June 10, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SERGIO A. CARATAO,appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Sergio A. Caratao appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Libertad, Butuan City,
Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 5143, dated December 22, 1995, finding him guilty of murder, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings of facts and law, with the attendan[ce] of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery, the court finds the accused Sergio A. Caratao guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Art. 248, Revised Penal Code. Republic Act No. 7659
defining heinous crimes was not yet passed and effective at the time of the commission of the crime.
Accused Sergio A. Caratao is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all
the accessory penalties provided for in Art. 41, Revised Penal Code. Further, the knife used in the
commission of the crime is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the government.
Furthermore, he is ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Edgardo Tado Bulawin, the
following:
(1) P50,000.00 for the death of Edgardo Tado Bulawin;
(2) P22,050.00 as actual damages ; and
(3) P20,000.00 as moral damages.
476
And also to pay the costs.[1]
On July 21, 1992, appellant was charged under an amended information, thus:
That on or about the 27 th day of April, 1992, at, more or less, 4:20 oclock in the evening, at Nalco
Commissary Compound, Hill Top Village, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-name[d] accused, armed with a bladed weapon, with
intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery and with cruelty, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab Edgardo Bulawin, thus inflicting upon him
stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Article 248, of the Revised Penal Code). [2]
Upon his arraignment on August 11, 1992, appellant, assisted by his counsel, entered a plea of
not guilty.[3] Trial thereafter ensued and the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
The prosecution relies on the eyewitness accounts of Martin Sugala, Eugenio Agudera and
Roberto Mangmang. The widow of the deceased, Moreta Bulawin, testified to prove civil damages.
Their testimonies are summarized below.
Martin Sugala, a rice dispatching checker employed with Nasipit Agusan Lumber Company
(NALCO) at Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, testified that at around 4:00 p.m., appellant and his wife
entered the commissary canteen of NALCO. Appellants wife approached Sugala and told him that
her husband was angry. Sugala asked appellant about this. Appellant replied, saying that he was not
given additional rice vale by the victim Edgardo Tado Bulawin, NALCOs rice vale issuer. After
checking that there was extra rice available, Sugala assured appellant that he would give him an
additional 25 kilos.
Shortly thereafter, Sugala saw the victim walk out of the canteen. Sensing that appellant was
about to rush to the victim, the witness restrained him and said, Do not do anything harsh because
we are all brothers here, anyway I am giving you [an] additional 25 kilos of rice. He placed his arm
around appellant and accompanied him to the issuing area for the additional rice. Upon reaching the
issuing area, he first checked the rice being issued to two employees. After this, he noticed that
appellant was no longer near him. Through the canteens screened windows, he next saw appellant
standing one meter behind the victim, who was then already astride his motorbike. About 5 meters
from Sugalas position, the victims motorbike was facing towards the exit gate, with its engine already
running.[4] At that moment, he saw appellant attack the victim from behind:
Q. What did you observe next?
A. When I saw that Sergio Caratao was already about 1 meter away from the back of
Edgardo Bulawin, I shouted to him saying Bay, your rice is ready. At that moment, I
saw that the left hand of Caratao was on the shoulder of Bulawin and his right hand
was on the side of Bulawin. I thought he only boxed the latter.
Q. Aside from thrusting his hand at the side of Bulawin, what else if any did you see
Caratao do with his hand?
A. When the right hand was on the side of Bulawin, it was retracted very fast and I saw that
that hand was holding a knife, and [that he] immediately made another thrust towards
here. (witness pointing to his nose)
ATTY. GONZALES: With the permission of the Court, may we request the witness to re-
enact what [he] actually saw, and we request the jail guard to act as the victim.
COURT: Okay.
INTERPRETER: (Jail guard Meode being requested to act as Edgardo Bulawin and the
witness as accused Sergio Caratao.)
477
(Edgardo Bulawin made an initial stance as if riding on a motorcycle with both hands on the
handle bars of the motorcycle.)
ATTY GONZALES:
Q. Where was Caratao when you first saw him, how far was he?
A. This distance, [S]ir. (witness demonstrating a distance of about 1 meter from the back of
Bulawin)
Q. Then re-enact what you saw.
A. After I shouted Bay, your rice is ready, I saw Sergio Caratao, in a simultaneous action,
place his left hand on the left shoulder of Bulawin and the right hand of Caratao on the
right side of Bulawin. When Sergio Caratao withdrew his right hand from the right side
of Bulawin, I saw that the right hand has a knife in it, and a second thrusting motion
was made towards the face of Bulawin. After that, Bulawin got off from his motorcycle
and ran towards the cemented road. Sergio Caratao remained standing on the place
of the incident still holding that knife, and after that, Caratao and his wife went home. [5]
Sugala also recalled seeing many people at the scene of the incident, such as some NALCO
employees, security guards, and outsiders who buy rice from the canteen called the blackmarketers.
[6]
Roberto Mangmang, canteen dispatcher of NALCO, corroborated Sugalas testimony. He

testified that in the afternoon of April 27, 1992, while walking from the canteen towards the gate, he
saw the victim in a squatting position, tinkering with his motorbike. [7] Shortly thereafter, on his way
back to the canteen, at around 4:20 p.m., he saw appellant behind the victim who was already
astride his motorbike facing the gate, with his hands on its handle bars. From a distance of one and
a half meter, he witnessed appellant put his left hand on the victims left shoulder and thrust his right
hand on the victims right side. Immediately thereafter, appellant made another thrust at the victims
face. At that point, Mangmang saw that appellant was holding a dagger, and he later heard
somebody shout, Do, run! The victim then ran out through the gate towards the hospital, while
appellant ran home. Mangmang followed the victim and saw his intestines bulging and coming out.
He then brought the victim to the nearby hospital aboard a tricycle. [8] He testified having seen many
employees in the area at the time of the incident, whom he could not identify. [9]
Eugenio Agudera, the security guard of NALCO, testified that on April 27, 1992, he likewise saw
the stabbing incident four meters away from the guardhouse by the gate of the canteen. At around
4:15 p.m., he witnessed appellant sneak from behind the victim who was astride his motorcycle, and
stab the victims right side with a knife. Immediately thereafter, appellantdelivered a second
blow, with a slashing motion across the victims mouth. Upon seeing this, he shouted, Run, Do!,
directed at the victim. The victim then ran out towards the highway through the gate, while clutching
his stomach as it bled profusely. [10] Agudera also confirmed the presence of those who witnessed the
incident such as Clemente Felias, Roberto Mangmang, Dino Macabugto, Martin Sugala and the
blackmarketers.[11]
Moreta Bulawin, wife of the victim, testified that she saw her husband in St. Christopher Hospital
around 4:30 p.m. with stab wounds on his right stomach and upper lip, and a cut across his right
cheek.[12] Shortly thereafter, the victim was transferred to Butuan Doctors Hospital, where he expired.
She presented her husbands death certificate to prove his age at the time of death, [13] and his latest
income tax return to prove his annual gross income of P37,432.[14] She testified that she spent more
than P30,000 for hospital and funeral expenses, some of which were supported with receipts. [15]
The defense presented four witnesses, namely, appellant, Nancy Sotis, Delia Peramide, and
SPO4 Bienvenido Capablanca.
Taking the witness stand, appellant Sergio Caratao admitted stabbing the victim, but interposed
self-defense to exculpate himself. He testified that on April 27, 1992, at around 4:00 p.m., he was
with his wife at the NALCO Commissary Canteen, where the victim was then on duty as
478
rice vale issuer. He requested the victim for his rice vale. The victim told him to wait. Appellant hence
waited nearby for around ten minutes, while the victim issued rice to others. Appellant thereafter kept
begging the victim for his turn, telling him Do, give me my rice because I have nothing to eat for
supper, but the victim made no reply. Despite repeated pleas, he was not given any rice. Upon
seeing the victim leave the issuing area, he kept silent and walked away. He went to his wife and told
her that he was unable to get rice. His wife then left.
Shortly thereafter, appellant also left to go home. On his way out, he saw the victim getting his
motorbike. He approached the victim, who at that point was already mounted on his motorcycle,
holding the handle bars, with the engine already running. As appellant stood one meter away from
the victim, along the right side of the motorcycle, he asked, Do, how about my rice? The victim
answered, That is no longer my problem. Why are you forcing me? Appellant persisted with his
pleas, and the victim angrily answered back, Are you forcing me? Immediately thereafter, the victim
punched appellants face with his right fist and said, You are always like that, you are forcing me.
Appellant was thrown backward, and the victim moved his motorbike forward, hitting appellants left
thigh near the groin. Appellant then held the victims right hand, and when the victim tried to break
free, he twisted it. Thereafter, with a knife on his right hand, he stabbed the right portion of the
victims belly. In retaliation, the victim punched appellant with his left fist, hitting appellants
mouth. The victim thereafter ran, while appellant remained standing for about ten minutes. He later
followed the victim to the gate, and saw the victim from afar boarding a tricycle alone. Appellant went
home to get his tricycle and immediately drove to the municipal hall, where he voluntarily
surrendered.[16]
In his testimony, appellant denied seeing any guard at the guardhouse at the time of the
incident. He saw Mangmang only, inside the canteen, [17] and denied hearing anyone shout Run,Do!
[18]
On his way out of the gate after the stabbing, he noticed only one person in the compound, a
woman sitting under the jackfruit tree at the corner by the gate, whom he does not know. He recalled
seeing other people outside the gate of the canteen, whom he could not identify. [19] On cross-
examination, however, he confirmed the presence of Agudera outside the said gate. [20]
Nancy Sotis, a blackmarketer who frequented the NALCO canteen, testified that she was
seated under a jackfruit tree by the gate of the canteen the whole day of April 27, 1992. [21] At about
4:00 p.m., from a distance of four meters, she saw the victim astride his motorcycle, with its engine
already running. Appellant then approached the victim and stood in front of the latter, a little obliquely
to the right. She saw appellant utter something to the victim, which she did not hear because of the
sound of the engine. She looked away, and when she glanced back at their direction, she saw the
victim punch appellant in the face with his right hand. Appellant thenthrust something near the
victims abdomen. Upon seeing appellant pull out a knife from the victims abdomen, she shouted to
the people outside the fence of the canteen. When she looked back, he saw the victim raise his right
fist towards appellants face. Appellant then stabbed the victims face with his knife. The victim
thereafter alighted from his motorcycle and walked towards the gate, holding his bleeding abdomen.
The people outside the fence were about to meet and assist him, but they later turned back when
they saw appellant following the victim.[22]
Sotis testified that there was nobody near the victim and appellant at the time of the incident.
[23]
She denied seeing Mangmang,[24] but confirmed that Sugala was then inside the canteen. [25]She
admitted having seen in the morning a security guard at the guardhouse, by the name of Felias, but
was uncertain as to his presence from noontime onwards. [26] She denied seeing any guard at the
gatepost at the time of the incident, [27] but admitted seeing Agudera approach the victim when the
latter was about to go out of the gate.[28]
Delia Peramide, a blackmarketer like Sotis, testified to rebut the statement of prosecution
eyewitness Mangmang, who declared that he brought the victim to the hospital aboard a tricycle.
She narrated that in the afternoon of April 27, 1992, while she was in line for consultation inside St.
Christopher Hospital, she heard someone shout, Doctor, there is an emergency. She ran to look
outside, and saw a tricycle parked outside the hospital, about 20 to 25 meters away from where she
stood. She saw the driver, and a bloodied person curled up on the passengers seat, whom she later
recognized as Tado Bulawin. [29] She declared that when she saw the victim in the tricycle,
479
Mangmang was not with him. She saw Mangmang in the hospital only after 15 minutes, when he
was on his way to the emergency room to visit the victim. [30]
SPO4 Bienvenido Capablanca, chief of the operations division at Nasipit PNP Station, testified
that at about 4:30 p.m. of April 27, 1992, appellant, looking cool and composed, arrived at the station
and told him, Sir, I voluntarily surrender myself because I have killed somebody. Appellant identified
the victim as a certain Tado, and also surrendered his knife. [31]
For its rebuttal evidence, the prosecution recalled Roberto Mangmang and presented a new
witness, Clemente Felias.
Roberto Mangmang, the prosecution eyewitness who testified earlier, added that the victim
never boxed appellant, nor did he try to run over the latter with his motorcycle prior to the stabbing,
contrary to appellants claim.[32]
Clemente Felias, the NALCO security guard whose shift was previous to that of
prosecutioneyewitness Agudera, testified that throughout his tour of duty from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.,
he never saw defense eyewitness Sotis within the compound. He also testified that he, too,
witnessed the incident, and declared that it was not true that the victim punched appellant before the
stabbing. [33]
The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions version of the incident. It found that the
victims indifference to appellants repeated pleas for rice must have angered appellant to the point of
attacking the victim upon seeing the latter about to leave without heeding his request. It rejected the
plea of self-defense for appellants failure to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. It
upheld the presence of treachery, but ruled out the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and cruelty, for lack of evidence.
Hence, this appeal.
In his brief, appellant submits the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE KILLING
OF THE DECEASED WAS ATTENDED BY [THE] JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE
OF SELF-DEFENSE.
II. THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED
COMMITTED MURDER BY TREACHERY.
III. THE LOWER COURT ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.[34]
In his first and third assignment of errors, appellant assails the trial court for giving credence to
the prosecutions evidence and disregarding his claim of self-defense.
The settled rule is that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to
escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and
convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.
[35]
This is known as a shift in the burden of the evidence, and as a result thereof the person claiming
self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the
prosecutions.[36] Furthermore, on appeal, appellant must show that the court below committed
reversible error in appreciating the evidence. [37]
To prove self-defense, the accused must show with clear and convincing evidence: (1) that the
victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of
the person claiming self-defense; (2) that there was reasonable necessity in the means employed to
prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person claiming self-defense or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person
claiming self-defense was not the proximate and immediate cause of the victims aggression. [38]
480
At the heart of the claim for self-defense is the presence of an unlawful aggression committed
against appellant. Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this
justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated, even if the other elements are present.
[39]
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb
of the person claiming self-defense.[40] The admission of appellant in his testimony that he stabbed
the victim makes it incumbent upon him convincingly to prove that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadly force. [41] In the case at bar, appellant tried
to prove that the unlawful aggression emanated from the victim, who punched him in the face and hit
him in the thigh with his motorbike, without provocation on his part. This the trial court found
unconvincing, thus:
Under the situation where Tado Bulawin was in a riding position on his motorcycle, holding its handle
bars, ready to start the engine, the court finds it incredible for him to be the unlawful aggressor.
Instead, Sergio Carataos being made to wait and make repeated requests or pleas for his vale of
rice must have moved him to be the unlawful aggressor thereby inflicting stab wounds on the victim
Tado Bulawin. For the circumstance of self-defense to be appreciated, it must be shown that the
compulsion is of such character that the accused is left with no opportunity to escape or self-defense
[sic] in equal combat (People v. Fronda, 222 SCRA 71). And this is not the set-up in the case at bar.
The prosecution version merits belief and credence beyond reasonable doubt. [42]
We agree with the foregoing finding of the trial court. Appellants account of the circumstances of
the attack does not inspire belief.
First, according to appellants testimony, after an exchange of words, the victim punched him in
the face, and thereafter hit his left thigh with his motorcycle. Appellant held the victims hand, twisted
it and stabbed the latter in the abdomen. The victim then punched appellant in the mouth with his left
fist. After this, the victim ran away. Noticeably, in this narration, nowhere did appellant mention that
he stabbed the victim for the second time in the face. This is in conflict with the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, and even of the defense witness Sotis, who all narrated that appellant
stabbed the victim in the mouth. Appellants account, moreover, does not jibe with the physical
evidence showing the victims injuries below the nose and across the cheek. [43]
Second, on cross-examination, appellant missed the part where the victim allegedly hit his left
thigh with the motorcycle, testifying that after the first punch, he immediately stabbed the victim.
[44]
Interestingly, defense witness Sotis also made no mention of this important portion, [45]rendering it
highly dubious.
Third, we agree with the trial courts observation that the circumstances of the victims alleged
assault on appellant is not credible, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, his contention that Tado Bulawin while still in that riding position boxed him and that Tado
Bulawin let run his motorcycle pushing forward hitting accused on his thigh also do not inspire belief
because accused Sergio Caratao was positioned at the right side of the motorcycle, not in front, and
if at all Tado Bulawin boxed him in that riding position, the motorcycle could have probably fallen
down. But [there was] no proof that it did fall. [46]
xxx xxx xxx
We further observe that in their relative positions, appellant had more freedom of action than the
victim who was riding his motorcycle. Moreover, it is hardly believable that the victim in that position
would have the strength to punch appellant in the face with his left fist, after being stabbed in his
right abdomen. All the eyewitness accounts showed that, after being stabbed, the victim left his
motorcycle and walked away while clutching his bleeding abdomen with both hands. [47]
481
Fourth, we note that as between appellant and the victim, appellant had more hatred to harbor
arising from the fact that the victim refused to give him his rice vale. He thus had more motive to do
harm than the victim. On the witness stand, he reasoned that he stabbed the victim, not to repel the
victims attack, nor out of fear for his life, but specifically because he lost his temper. [48]
Fifth, we note that appellants plea of self-defense is rendered doubtful by the fact that he
invoked it for the first time only upon taking the witness stand for his defense. When he surrendered
at the police station, he only reported that he had killed a certain Tado, but never raised self-defense
to exculpate himself. Records also show that appellant waived his right to a preliminary investigation
and submission of counter-affidavits. [49] We have ruled that an appellants failure to inform the police
upon his surrender that he acted in self-defense is fatal to his defense. [50] A righteous individual will
not cower in fear but rather unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest opportunity if he were
morally justified in so doing. A belated plea suggests that it is false and only an afterthought made as
a last-ditch effort to avoid the consequences of the crime. [51]
Appellant tried to obtain corroboration from Sotis and Peramide to prop up his defense and to
assail the prosecutions testimonies. The account of Sotis, however, was put to question by the
rebuttal testimony of Felias, whom Sotis admitted to having seen on the day of the incident. Felias in
his testimony denied seeing her under the jackfruit tree near the guardhouse, or anywhere within the
compound on that day. Peramides testimony, on the other hand, failed to cast doubt on the
testimony of prosecution witness Mangmang, as it was established that when she saw the tricycle
where Mangmang claimed to have ridden going to the hospital, it was already parked. It therefore
does not render false Mangmangs claim that he brought the victim to the hospital, as he could
already have alighted from the vehicle by the time Peramide saw it.
Moreover, appellant has not shown that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive against
him, which would have moved them falsely to implicate him. On the contrary, he admitted on cross-
examination that prosecution witness Sugala is his friend. [52] Prosecution witness Mangmang further
testified that appellant was his neighbor in their younger days, and that appellants brother is his
friend.[53] It is worth reiterating that where there is no evidence that the principal witnesses of the
prosecution were actuated by ill motives, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. [54]
All told, no matter how appellant tried to cast doubt on the veracity of the testimonies of the
prosecution, we find the prosecution witnesses to be more credible than those of the defense. There
may have been inconsistencies in the narration of the prosecution witnesses on minor details, but
these do not affect the weight of their testimonies, as these cannot be expected to be uniform to the
last details.[55] In fact, a perfectly dovetailing narration by different witnesses could mean that their
testimonies were prefabricated and rehearsed. [56] What is primordial is that the mass of testimony
jibes on material points.[57]
Furthermore, even assuming that appellant succeeded in weakening the prosecutions evidence,
such will not suffice to exculpate him. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence, and not on
the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission of responsibility for the killing. [58]
Finally, the question whether or not appellant acted in self-defense is essentially a question of
fact.[59] The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution worthy of belief. As to who between
the prosecution and the defense witnesses are to be believed, the trial courts assessment enjoys a
great amount of respect for the reason that the trial court has the advantage of observing the
demeanor of the witnesses as they testify, unless found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded. [60] In the
present case, appellant failed to point out any arbitrariness on the part of the trial court.
Thus, we find that the court a quo was correct in upholding the testimonies of the prosecution.
The unlawful aggression was convincingly established to have emanated from appellant, and not
from the victim. Appellant having failed to discharge the burden of establishing his defense, his
conviction necessarily follows on the basis of his admission of the killing. [61]
This brings us to appellants second assignment of error on the finding of treachery.
482
Treachery is present when two conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and
forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and
consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his person. [62] In the case at bar, the first
element was established by the fact that appellant suddenly attacked from behind the unsuspecting
and unarmed victim who was then astride his motorcycle. However, we find the prosecutions
evidence insufficient to sustain the finding of the presence of the second element, namely, that
appellant deliberately adopted the mode of attack.
Repeatedly upheld has been the rule that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes
committed at the spur of the moment, or those that were preceded by heated altercations are
generally not attended by treachery, for lack of opportunity of the accused deliberately to employ a
treacherous mode of attack. [63] In the present case, it appears from the evidence that appellants
grudge against the victim was brought about only moments before the attack, when the latter
ignored his repeated pleas for rice. As observed by the trial court, the sight of the victim leaving the
compound without heeding appellants request must have worsened his anger. [64] In his testimony,
appellant admitted that at that moment, he forgot himself. [65] Further, he explained that it was then
customary for him to bring a knife for his own safety, in defense against lawless elements in their
area at the time.[66] It was thus only by chance and not by plan that he attacked the victim the way he
did. The stabbing was evidently a result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from
what appellant perceived to be an unjust act of the victim, rather than from a deliberated action.
[67]
Hence, as the killing was done at the spur of the moment, treachery cannot be appreciated. [68]
Furthermore, we find the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender present in the case at
bar. To benefit an accused, the following requisites of this circumstance must be proven, namely: (1)
the offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary. [69] In the present case, based on SPO4 Capablancas
testimony, appellants surrender at the station immediately after the incident was spontaneous,
showing his intent to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. He expressly acknowledged
having killed the victim, surrendered his knife, and allowed himself to be detained in prison.
In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is Homicide, not
Murder.[70] The penalty therefor, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion
temporal. Considering the attendant mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty
should be imposed in its minimum period, pursuant to Article 64 (2) of the aforesaid Code. [71]Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants sentence will consist of a minimum that is anywhere
within the full range of prision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere withinreclusion temporal in
its minimum period. We hereby fix it to be from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Coming now to the matter of damages, we affirm the award of actual damages in the amount
of P22,050, as these are duly substantiated by receipts and appear to have been genuinely incurred
in connection with the death, wake and burial of the victim. The award of civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000 is likewise sustained, pursuant to controlling case law. [72]However, we increase
the award of moral damages to a more reasonable amount of P30,000, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.[73]
Finally, we rule that the heirs of the victim are also entitled to indemnification for the loss of the
latters earning capacity. In a recent case, we explained how to arrive at the amount of this indemnity,
thus:
The following factors should be considered in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings:
(1) the number of years for which the victim would have otherwise lived; and (2) the rate of loss
sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is computed using the formula adopted in
the American Combined Experience Table of Mortality: 2/3 x (80 age at death). The rate of loss is
arrived at by multiplying life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings
less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily pegged at fifty percent of the gross earnings. [74]
483
Evidence on record reveals that the victim died at the age of 41, [75] and that he was earning an
annual gross income of P37,432 from his employment with NALCO.[76] The widows testimony
regarding the victims income from his sideline cannot be considered for lack of the necessary
unbiased proof.[77] Thus, applying the above-cited formula, appellant should pay the victims heirs
P486,616 as shown by the following computation:
2/3 [80-41(age at the time of death)] = 26 (life expectancy)

26 x [P37,432 x 50% (annual net income)]= P 486, 616[78]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Appellant Sergio A. Caratao is found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of an
indeterminate sentence of from eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum to thirteen (13) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the
amounts of P50,000 as death indemnity, P30,000 as moral damages, P22,050 as actual damages
and P486,616 as indemnity for the victims loss of earning capacity. The decision under review is
AFFIRMED in all other respects. Cost de oficio.
G.R. No. 134362. February 27, 2002]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMELITO SITCHON y

TAYAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
For beating to death the two-year old son of his common-law wife, accused-appellant Emelito
Sitchon y Tayag was convicted of murder and sentenced to death by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila. His case is now before this Court on automatic review.
Appellant was charged in an information stating: That on or about June 12, 1996, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal violence
upon one MARK ANTHONY FERNANDEZ y TABORA a minor, 2 years old, by then and there
mauling and clubbing him on the different parts of his body with the use of a steel hammer and a
wooden stick, approximately 18 inches long, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the above charge. [2] However, before testifying in his own defense
on June 4, 1998, appellant admitted that he killed the victim and changed his plea to guilty. [3]
Five witnesses testified for the prosecution, namely, Lilia Garcia, a neighbor; the victim's eight-year
old brother Roberto; the investigating officer, PO3 Paul Dennis Javier; Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-
legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); and Felicisima Francisco, a forensic
chemist of the same agency.
Appellant lived in the second floor of a three-square meter house located at 2001 Batangas Street,
Tondo, Manila. His neighbor of two months, Lilia Garcia, resided in the first floor of the same house.
At about 10:00 in the morning of June 12, 1996, Lilia was in front of the house attending to her
children when she heard the sound of a boy crying. Curious, Lilia went up the stairway, her children
484
in tow. The open door of the upper floor allowed Lilia to witness appellant beating two-year old Mark
Anthony Fernandez. From a distance of less than three arms length, Lilia saw appellant hit various
parts of the boys body with a piece of wood, about 14 inches in length and 2 inches in
diameter. Appellant also banged the head of the boy against the wooden wall.
The beating went on for about one hour. Lilia then saw appellant carry the boy down the house
to bring him to the hospital. The two-year old was already black and no longer moving. [4]
Eight-year old Roberto Fernandez is the elder brother of the victim, also known as
Macky.According to Roberto, Macky had scattered his feces all over the house. Appellant, whom
Roberto called Kuya Chito, thus beat Macky with a belt, a hammer and a 2x2 piece of wood.Roberto
could not do anything to help his brother because he was afraid Kuya Chito might also beat him
up. When Kuya Chito brought Macky to the hospital, his little brother, who could barely talk, was not
crying anymore.[5]
Roberto identified the two pieces of wood [6] that appellant allegedly used in beating the
victim. He also identified the T-shirt[7] that Macky wore when he died.
A certain Alice Valerio from the Galang Medical Hospital informed PO3 Paul Dennis Javierthat a
boy had been admitted there. When PO3 Javier went to the hospital, he found the boy already
dead. He observed that the child had wounds on the left middle finger, the right index finger and both
feet. The child also had lacerations in the upper lip and contusions all over his head and body.
PO3 Javier proceeded to appellants house at No. 2001, Batangas Ext., Tondo, Manila.Human
feces and fresh blood splattered on the floor. PO3 Javier recovered from the house the broken
wooden sticks, the steel hammer, [8] which were allegedly used to beat up the boy, as well as a
bloodstained white T-shirt.
PO3 Javier then went to the house of appellants sister in Del Fierro St., Tondo, who informed
him of matters relative to appellants identification. Thereafter, the police conducted a search
operation in Cavite where appellants mother lived but they did not find him there. Later that
afternoon, PO3 Javier learned that appellant had surrendered to Station 3 of their district.
The following day, a staff member of the television program Magandang Gabi Bayan turned
over to PO3 Javier a brown belt which appellant allegedly also used in beating the victim.Roberto
Fernandez, the victims brother, had given the belt to the staff member. [9]
Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the postmortem examination of
the victims body on June 12, 1996 at 4:40 p.m. He found that the boy had suffered many injuries,
including three wounds at the head and the anterior chest, which could have been inflicted with the
use of blunt objects such as a piece of wood or a fist. The child could have been dead three to four
hours, or not more than eight hours, prior to the postmortem examination. Dr. Lagonera concluded
that the victim died of bilateral pneumonia secondary to multiple blunt traversal injuries or
complication of the lungs due to said injuries. [10] The autopsy report of Dr. Lagonera shows that Mark
Anthony Fernandez sustained the following injuries:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Multiple old scars, forehead.

2. Healing lacerated wound, left forehead.
3. Healed lacerated wound, above the left eyebrow, measuring 1.2x0.2 cm.
4. Healed linear abrasions, left cheek.
5. Lacerated wound, extending up to the mucous membrane of the upper lip, measuring 2
x0.3 cm.
6. Contussion (sic), left temporo-parietal region, measuring 6x5 cms.
485
7. Healing lacerated wound, left zygomatic region, measuring 0.5x0.3 cm.
8. Contussion (sic), left jaw, measuring 1.5x1 cm.
9. Contussion (sic), right anterior thorax, measuring 17x12 cms.
10. Contussion (sic), right anterior forearm.
11. Lacerated wound, tip of the forefinger, right.
12. Old scar, upper 3rd , right anterior thigh.
13. Contussion (sic), right lower leg, above and below the knee measuring 9x5 cms.
14. Contussion (sic), left lower leg, above and below the knee, measuring 13x6 cms.
15. Hematoma, big toe, under the nail bed, right.
16. Contusso-abrasion, dorsum of the left foot, measuring 6x2 cms.
17. Contussion (sic), left posterior thorax, measuring 17x6 cms.
18. Contussion (sic), right postero-lateral thorax, extending up to the right lumbar region,
measuring 13x6 cms.
19. Contussion (sic), right posterior forearm, measuring 24x8 cms.
20. Contussion (sic), left posterior forearm, measuring 22x7 cms.
21. Healing abrasion, right buttocks, measuring 2x0.5 cm.
22. Plucked finger nail, left middle finger, with hematoma of the nail bed.
23. Posterior hand, both swollen.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Presence of left sub-aponeurotic hematoma, temporo-parietal region and over the mid-
occipital region.
2. Hematoma over the sternum and pectoralis muscles.
3. Both lungs showed patcy and confluent consolidations.
4. Small amount of rice porridge was recovered from the stomach. [11]
Felicisima M. Francisco, NBI forensic chemist, conducted an examination to determine the
presence and grouping of human blood found on the steel hammer, the wooden sticks, and the T-
shirt that were sent to his office by P/Sr. Inspector Pedro Ramos Angulo, Jr. of the Western Police
District in Manila.[12] She prepared Report No. B-96-941 stating that Specimen No. 1 or the steel
hammer, was positive for human blood but insufficient for blood group. Specimen Nos. 2 (the broken
wooden sticks) and 3 (the white T-shirt) were also positive for human blood showing reactions of
Group A.[13]
Only appellant, 40, a sidewalk vendor, testified for the defense. As stated earlier, appellant
admitted killing the two-year old victim, the son of his live-in partner. He and the boys mother had
lived together for two years before the incident, starting when the boy was about a year old.He
claimed he enjoyed a harmonious relationship with his partner and that he killed the boy
onlybecause he was under the influence of shabu, marijuana and Valium 10 at that time. Appellant
professed that he began using drugs in 1974 and that he had also taken drugs two weeks before the
incident.
On June 12, 1996, appellant came upon Macky playing with his feces, scattering them all over
the pillow, the bed sheets and the curtains. Appellant scolded the boy, Putang-ina ka Macky! Bakit
mo ikinalat ng ganyan ang tae mo? Halika, dadalhin kita sa baba para hugasan! Appellant got hold of
486
Macky but the boy struggled to free himself from appellants grasp.Appellant, still reeling from the
Valium 10 he had just taken, became so angry that he picked up a broom with a wooden handle, and
hit the boy. Appellant did not realize that he had hit Macky hard until he saw the boy sprawled on the
floor, breathing with difficulty. He dressed Macky and brought him to the Galang Medical Center at
the corner of Abad Santos Avenue and Tayabas Street, Manila. He prayed to God that nothing
serious would happen to the boy.
A lady doctor immediately attended to Macky. Appellant pleaded to the lady doctor to do all she
can to save the child; otherwise, he would be in serious trouble. After examining the child, the doctor
told appellant that she could not do anything more Macky was dead. The same day, appellant
surrendered to the police. He was brought to the Homicide Section at 3:00 p.m.
Explaining his change of plea, appellant clarified that the killing of the boy was "accidental." He
reiterated that he was under the influence of drugs, which he had taken one after the other.He was a
drug dependent and, in fact, had been confined at the Tagaytay Rehabilitation Center.He said he
was conscious when the incident happened but he simply did not realize that he had hit the child
hard with the brooms wooden handle. He denied having hit the boy with a hammer or having banged
his head against the wall. He hoped the trial court would be lenient with him because of his voluntary
surrender. He prayed that the court would not impose upon him the death penalty.[14]
Nevertheless, on July 3, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads: WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Emelito Sitchon y Tayag, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the death penalty and to pay the
costs. The accused is further ordered to pay the mother of the victim Christina Tabora, moral and
nominal damages in the respective sums of P100,000.00 and P50,000.00, plus death compensation
in the sum of P50,000.00, with interest thereon at the legal rate from this date until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The Court entertains little doubt that appellant is guilty of the killing of Mark Anthony
Fernandez. Appellants guilt was adequately established by the testimonies of Lilia Garcia and
Roberto Fernandez, who both saw appellant beat Macky. These testimonies were further
corroborated by those of PO3 Paul Dennis Javier, Dr. Manuel Lagonera and Felicisima Francisco, as
well as the various pieces of object evidence. Indeed, appellant in open court admitted beating the
poor child, which beating resulted in the latters death.
That appellant purportedly did not intend to kill the toddler would not exculpate him from
liability. Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended. The rationale of the rule is found in the doctrine that el que es causa de la causa es
causa del mal causado (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused). [16]
Thus, where the accused violently kicked the sleeping victim in vital parts of the latters body, the
accused is liable for the supervening death as a consequence of the injuries. [17] Assuming, therefore,
that appellant merely intended to inflict physical injuries upon the boy, he is nevertheless liable for
the death of the victim caused by such injuries.
The killing in this case was attended by treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. [18] It is beyond dispute that the killing of minor
children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a defense, is
treacherous.[19]
Evident premeditation is absent. For the court to appreciate evident premeditation, the
prosecution must prove: (a) the time the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act
manifestly indicating that he clung to his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between the
487
decision and the execution to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequence of his act. [20] The
prosecution failed to establish any of these requisites.
The trial court incorrectly appreciated cruelty against the accused. The test in appreciating
cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically
augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission,
or inhumanlyincreased the victims suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse. [21] The
nature of cruelty lies in the fact that the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly
and gradually, causing him moral and physical pain which is unnecessary for the consummation of
the criminal act which he intended to commit. [22] The sheer number of wounds, however, is not a test
for determining whether cruelty attended the commission of a crime. [23]
The prosecution did not show that appellant enjoyed inflicting injuries upon the victim. The
inordinate force employed by appellant appears to have been caused not by any sadistic bend but
rather by the drugs that diminished his capacity.
The trial court also considered intoxication as an aggravating circumstance. The Solicitor
General defends this ruling, contending that appellants habitual drug addiction is an alternative
circumstance analogous to habitual intoxication under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code:
Intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the
offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent
to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
The Court does not agree. Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code provides a list of mitigating
circumstances, which work to reduce the accuseds penalty. Article 13(10) allows courts to consider
any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those mentioned therein.Neither Article
14 of the same Code on aggravating circumstances [24] nor Article 15 on alternative circumstances,
[25]
however, contain a provision similar to Article 13(10). Accordingly, the Court cannot consider
appellants drug addiction as an aggravating circumstance. Criminal statutes are to be strictly
construed and no person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them. [26]
Appellant maintains that his plea of guilt mitigates his criminal liability. On this matter, this Court
said in People v. Ramos:[27] To effectively alleviate the criminal liability of an accused, a plea of guilt
must be made at the first opportunity, indicating repentance on the part of the accused. In
determining the timeliness of a plea of guilty, nothing could be more explicit than the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code requiring that the offender voluntarily confess his guilt before the court prior
to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution. It is well-settled that a plea of guilty made
after arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea
considered as a mitigating circumstance.
As appellant changed his plea only after the prosecution had rested its case and just when he was
just about to testify, said mitigating circumstance is unavailing. The trial court credited appellant with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, these
elements must be established: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) he surrendered
himself to a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority; and (3) his surrender was
voluntary.[28] It is sufficient that the surrender be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly
indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges
his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be
incurred in searching for and capturing him.[29]
Appellant has failed to adequately prove voluntary surrender. While he claimed that he
surrendered to the police on the same day that the victim was killed, he did not detail the
circumstances like the time and place of such surrender. Neither did appellant state to whom he
surrendered. He did not indicate if the person was a person in authority or an agent of the latter.PO3
Javiers testimony that he learned of appellants alleged surrender is hearsay and does not serve to
corroborate appellants claim.
488
The Court, however, discerns no intention on the part of appellant to commit so grave a wrong
against his victim. Appellants intention was merely to maltreat the victim, not to kill him.When
appellant realized the horrible consequences of his felonious act, he immediately brought the victim
to the hospital.[30] Sadly, his efforts were for naught.
In view of the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, the killing of the victim is
qualified to murder, punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code byreclusion perpetua to
death. The murder was attended by the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong and there is no aggravating circumstance. Hence, the lesser penalty of reclusion
perpetua must be imposed upon appellant.[31]
Appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00 without proof of damages. [32] Moral damages
that are recoverable for the mental anguish or emotional distress suffered by the heirs of the victim
cannot be awarded here as the prosecution did not present any evidence to justify its award. [33]
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Emelito Sitchon y Tayag is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, as defined and punished by Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of Mark Anthony
Fernandez civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 138306-07 December 21, 2001

vs.
SPO1 EDUARDO ANCHETA Y RODIGOL, accused-appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court Caloocan City finding SPO1 accused-
appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol guilty of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and of
Frustrated Murder in Crim. Case No. 44940.1 SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol 2 was originally
charged with Homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939 andFrustrated Homicide in Crim. Case No. C-
44940. However, upon motion of private complainant, a reinvestigation was conducted and the
Informations were amended to charge the accused with Murder in Crim. Case No. C-
44939and Frustrated Murder in Crim Case No. C-44940.
In the amended Information for Murder, it was alleged that the accused "with deliberate intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot one Julian Ancheta y Rodigol on the left temple, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious
physical injuries, which injuries caused the victim's death." 3 On the other hand, in the
amended Information for Frustrated Murder it was alleged that the accused "with deliberate intent to
kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously shoot with a gun one Jonathan Aromin y Cardinez on the right cheek, thus performing all
the acts of execution which would constitute the crime of Murder as a consequence but which
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the herein accused,
that is, due to timely, able and efficient medical attendance rendered to the victim." 4
During trial, the main witness for the prosecution, Jonathan Aromin, testified that on the night of 2
September 1993 he and his neighbor Julian Ancheta went to the house of the accused who lived just
across them.5 Julian told Jonathan to knock on the door first but when no one answered Julian did
the knocking himself.6 When the accused opened the door, Jonathan immediately noticed that SPO1
Ancheta was armed with a gun. Intimidated, Jonathan began to move away. 7 As he left the house of
the accused, Jonathan suddenly heard two (2) shots which prompted him to hide behind the nearest
wall. But when he looked back the accused SPO1 Ancheta was already aiming his revolver directly
at his face and without hesitation shot him at close range. 8 Stunned by the gunshot wound, Jonathan
momentarily blacked out but soon regained consciousness when his neighbor, Leonila Lopez, came
489
to his aid and rushed him to the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center. 9 At the hospital, the slug that
pierced his right cheek was removed from his left shoulder and was subsequently released on 7
September 1993.10
Leonila Lopez narrated that her house was right across the house of the accused, separated only by
a narrow alley.11 At around 8:00 o'clock in the evening of 2 September 1993 while she was preparing
dinner, she was startled by the sound of two (2) gunshots coming from the house of the accused.
She immediately told her children to go inside and as she was about to close her windows she saw
Jonathan Aromin running towards her house, followed by the accused. She then saw the accused
shoot Jonathan Aromin on the right cheek. After the accused left, she helped the hapless victim and
brought him to the hospital. 12 She was approximately a meter away when she witnessed the
shooting.13
Virginia Ancheta, wife of Julian Ancheta, testified that she and her deceased husband had two (2)
children and that she incurred P54,200.00 as funeral expenses for his burial. 14
Dr. Roberto Garcia, a Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, testified that he autopsied the body of Julian
Ancheta on 3 September 1993. Julian sustained three (3) gunshot wounds. One (1) bullet pierced
the back of his left forearm and exited in front thereof, another entered the rear left portion of the
neck and exited through the right rear portion thereof, while the fatal bullet pierced the front portion
of the left ear without an exit wound. 15 However, although Dr. Garcia concluded that three (3) bullets
hit the deceased, he did not discount the possibility that the three (3) wounds could have been
caused by only two (2) bullets as the left arm, being a movable part of the body, might have been in
the way when the bullet exited through the neck of the victim. 16
Police Officer 3 Feliciano Almojuela of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, PNP Station,
Caloocan City, claimed that in the early morning of 3 September 1993 he received a report of a
shooting incident at Block 36, Phase 3-F-1 Dagat-dagatan, Caloocan City. 17 Upon reaching the crime
scene he was informed that the slain victim was S/Sgt. Julian Ancheta of the Philippine Air Force and
the suspect was the deceased's brother SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta. When he learned that another
victim was confined at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center he went there and found Jonathan
Aromin in critical condition. Thinking that the victim might not survive he immediately interviewed him
and took an "ante-mortem" statement. 18 In the afternoon of the same day, the accused voluntarily
surrendered himself as well as his service firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. 19 At around
11:00 p.m., PO3 Almojuela brought the accused to the hospital where the latter was positively
identified by Jonathan Aromin as the assailant.20
Dr. Abraham Gonzales, the resident physician at the Jose Reyes Memorial Medical Center, testified
that he was on duty on 2 September 1993 when Jonathan Aromin was admitted. Upon examination
he observed that the victim sustained a gunshot wound on the right portion of his jaw and no exit
wound was visible.21 During treatment, the lead slug was recovered from the left side of the neck or
from the "trapicious muscle."22 He added that were it not for the timely medical intervention Jonathan
Aromin would have died.23
In his defense, the accused claimed that on the night of 2 September 1993 he was sleeping at home
with his wife and son when he was awakened by the sound of someone banging on his door. 24 After
a brief silence he heard him say: "Pare buksan mo ito." Sensing danger, the accused took his gun
from under his pillow and ordered the person to identify himself. But the stranger just kept on
banging the door and insisted that it be opened. 25 When he finally opened the door, he saw his
brother Julian Ancheta and his neighbor Jonathan Aromin. Upon seeing them, he inquired as to why
his brother addressed him as "pare" but instead of answering, Julian Ancheta angrily asked him why
he was holding a gun.26 To appease his brother, the accused lowered his pistol and explained that
the gun was only for protection as he had no idea who was banging his door in the middle of the
night. He then invited them into the house, but when he turned around his brother suddenly grabbed
his hand from behind to disarm him. 27 As they grappled, the gun accidentally fired twice and the next
490
thing he saw was his brother sprawled on the ground and Jonathan Aromin was nowhere to be
found. He never knew what actually happened to Jonathan Aromin as his back was turned against
him when the gun went off.28
Confused by the startling events, the accused just took his family to the house of his wife's cousin.
His wife then convinced him to spend the night with them and postpone his surrender until the next
day.29 At around 6:00 o'clock p.m. 30 of 3 September 1993 he surrendered at the PNP Station in
Caloocan City. After being taken into custody, PO3 Almojuela brought him to the Jose Reyes
Memorial Hospital where Jonathan Aromin identified him as the perpetrator. 31
On 26 March 1999 the trial court, giving credence to the prosecution witnesses, found the accused
guilty of both charges.32 In Crim. Case No. C-44939, the accused was found guilty of Murder and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as
death indemnity, P54,200.00 as actual and compensatory damages and the costs. In Crim. Case
No. C-44940 the accused was found guilty of Frustrated Murder and was sentenced to ten (10)
years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum. He was also ordered to pay Jonathan Aromin P30,000.00 as moral damages
and the costs.33
Accused-appellant, in his brief, raises two (2) points: First, his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt as the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish that
he intended to kill Julian Ancheta and Jonathan Aromin. Second, the court a quo gravely erred in
convicting him of murder and frustrated murder since there was no proof that the killing was
attended by evident premeditation or treachery. 34
The defense of accused-appellant is that the death of Julian Ancheta and the injury of Jonathan
Aromin were caused by the accidental gunshots which occurred when he and the deceased
grappled for the gun. Thus, absent any intent to kill the victims, he could not be convicted of
homicide or murder.
However, the evidence presented proves otherwise. The autopsy of Julian Ancheta reveals that he
sustained three (3) bullet wounds: one (1) in the rear of the left forearm, another on the left rear
portion of his neck and the most fatal one, on the front portion of his left temple.
On the other hand, Jonathan Aromin sustained a gunshot wound on his right cheek which would
have caused his death had it not been for the timely medical attention. Based on the number of
bullet wounds and the location of the injuries sustained by the victims it is quite impossible to believe
that such wounds were caused by two (2) accidental gunshots which ensued while the accused and
the deceased wrestled for the gun. On the contrary, the location of the injuries proves that accused-
appellant intentionally shot his own brother to death and thereafter shot the eyewitness at point
blank to permanently silence him.
Further, Jonathan Aromin categorically and positively identified accused-appellant as the person who
pursued and shot him at close range. This Court has no reason to doubt his testimony for even
accused-appellant admitted that he and the witness were in good terms prior to the
incident.35 Neither does this Court have any ground to question the veracity of Leonila Lopez's
testimony that she saw accused-appellant shoot Jonathan Aromin as there was no proved ill motive
on her part. Thus, where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why
prosecution witnesses should testify falsely against the accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous
crime, such testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit. 36 Besides, it has been an established rule
that unless the trial judge overlooked certain facts of substance and value, which if considered might
affect the result of the case, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by
the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. 37 We find no reason to deviate from this well-
entrenched principle.
491
But although we affirm the factual findings of the trial court on the presence of "intent to kill," we
believe that the killing of Julian Ancheta and the shooting of Jonathan Aromin were not qualified by
treachery.
While it was established that accused-appellant intentionally shot his brother Julian, the witnesses
never saw how the killing started. Treachery cannot be considered where the witnesses did not see
the commencement of the assault and the importance of such testimonies cannot be
overemphasized considering that treachery cannot be presumed nor established from mere
suppositions.38 And where no particulars are shown as to the manner by which the aggression was
commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, treachery
can in no way be established. 39 Hence, without the existence of treachery accused-appellant can
only be convicted of homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44939.
Neither was treachery established in the shooting of Jonathan Aromin. Two (2) conditions must
concur for treachery to exist, namely: (a) the employment of means of execution that gave the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and, (b) the means or method of
execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 40 Both these circumstances must be proved as
indubitably as the crime itself.41
In the case at bar, however, there is no sufficient proof to establish with certainty that accused-
appellant deliberately and consciously adopted the means of executing the crime against Jonathan
Aromin. Furthermore, the victim was already aware of the danger as he saw accused-appellant
carrying a gun and heard two (2) gunshots prompting him to run and hide behind a wall. 42 Thus,
there could be no treachery since prior to the attack the victim was forewarned of the danger to his
life and even managed to flee, albeit unsuccessfully. 43 Consequently, accused-appellant can only be
convicted of frustrated homicide in Crim. Case No. C-44940.
It must be noted that the testimonies of the witnesses show that accused-appellant surrendered
himself on 3 September 1993 at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. For voluntary surrender to be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance the following requisites must concur: (a) the offender had
not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and, (c) the
surrender was voluntary.44 All these requisites were present in this case as PO3 Feliciano Almojuela
confirmed that on 3 September 1993, the day after the incident, accused-appellant voluntarily gave
himself up and his service firearm at the PNP Station in Caloocan City. 45 Thus, the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in his favor.
Article 249 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal.
There being one mitigating circumstance, namely, voluntary surrender, the imposable penalty
is reclusion temporal in its minimum period the range of which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
shall be taken from the minimum of the imposable penalty while the minimum shall be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayorthe range of which is six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years.
Article 50 of The Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty next lower in degree than that
prescribed by law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principal in a frustrated
felony. Thus, in Crim. Case No. C-44940, there also being one (1) mitigating circumstance, the
maximum term of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken from prision mayor in its minimum
period, the range of which is from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the minimum
term shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision correccional, in any of its
periods, the range of which is six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court appealed from convicting accused-appellant SPO1
Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol of Murder in Crim. Case No. C-44939 and Frustrated Murder in Crim.
Case No. C-44940, is MODIFIED.
492
In G.R. No. 138306 (Crim. Case No C-44939), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol
is found guilty of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years eight
(8) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum as minimum to twelve (12) years six (6)
months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal minimum as maximum. He is also ordered to pay
the heirs of Julian Ancheta P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P54,200.00 as actual and compensatory
damages, plus the costs.
In G.R. No. 138307 (Crim. Case No. C-44940), accused-appellant SPO1 Eduardo Ancheta y Rodigol
is found guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of two
(2) years two (2) months and twenty (20) days of prision correccional minimum as minimum to six (6)
years four (4) months and ten (10) days of prision mayor minimum as maximum. He is also ordered
to pay Jonathan Aromin P30,000.00 as moral damages plus the costs.SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ALFANTA y ALO, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting [1] accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y Alo
of rape with two aggravating circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of
death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply read:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon the person of one
NITA FERNANDEZ y JOSEFA against her will and consent. [2]
When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its decision under
review, thus:
The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the afternoon, he performed a
physical examination and medico genital examination on one Nita Fernandez for alleged rape. Upon
physical examination he found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or on the mandibular area left
portion; and, upon examination of the hymen, he found that the labia majora and minora gaping,
similar to the appearance of a woman who had just given birth; or a normal appearance as a result
of several sexual intercourses that had been performed. He submitted a report on his findings
(Exhibit A).
493
The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information who testified that
on August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in the residence of a friend at
AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio, Makati city, a man whom she had not seen before suddenly entered the
house where she was sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his hand on her mouth, and told
her that if she will not obey him, he will kill her. She resisted, but could not do anything. Thereafter,
she was forced to climb a fence. Because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she followed. After
climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go to a vacant house. She followed, as
instructed. While at the vacant house, she was told to undress, she did because of fear, as the man
was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed her. Then she was told to lie down
and told to separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her vagina. After inserting the mans
penis to her vagina, she was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his
penis into her anus. After inserting the mans penis into her anus, she was told to turn around face
up. All these acts of the man hurt her. After turning around face up, the man inserted his fingers in
and out into her private part. After the man had finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private
part, she was told to go near him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he was going to take a
rest and at the same time telling her not to tell what happened to others saying that lahat ng nirape
ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong. All the time the man was inserting his penis
and fingers into her private part and into her anus, she was shouting: tulungan po ninyo ako,' but
nobody responded. Noticing that the man was already sleeping, she suddenly got the knife at waist
of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife broke. She suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack
the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the bolo and ran to the signal
office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the persons she met that
she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they went to the place
where she was raped. They found the man lying down still alive. The man was brought to the
hospital. The man turned out to be accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an
affidavit (Exh. C), narrating what happened to her to the police; and was brought to the NBI Medico-
Legal Officer for examination.
On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she worked as
housemaid, she went to her friends house named Patrick because she brought mongo and because
she and Patricks wife Inday, are friends, arriving in the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the evening of
August 26, 1995. She was not able to go back to her place of work at Valle Verde, Pasig because it
was already late at night and was told to sleep at Patricks house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she
saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from her two (2) other persons slept in the
house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and her son in a room. The door
of the house was closed, but was not locked. In entering the house were she slept, one has to reach
the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but nobody heard her because they were sleeping and
at the same time the accused placed his hand on her mouth. She was really afraid because she was
boxed on her chest and accused was holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the
garage, which was not lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because of fear. Accused also
undressed himself. While accused was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is not her
sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart.
The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit, Makati Police Station
who testified that she came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D, because Nita Fernandez was
brought to Sub-Station A. The bolo, which was brought by Nita Fernandez to the Military Signal
Village, was in turn given to the Central Police Desk wherein she is the Investigator. After the bolo
was handed to her by the soldiers of the Signal Village, she conducted an investigation. Based on
her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez that when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00
midnight on August 26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a man standing beside her. Nita was punched on
the left portion of the face and ordered her to go outside, instructed to climb over a fence on the
other side of the house. After climbing the fence, Nita Fernandez was told to undress, was boxed on
her breast and was told to lie down in a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua, where suspect
raped Nita Fernandez. On their way to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked
accused why he rape Nita Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth
because they were sweethearts.
494
Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at AFOVAI Village,
Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house of General Renato Icarma together with many
other laborers, somebody told him that his wife was waiting for him in the house of Captain
Pascua. At 10:00 oclock that evening, he went to the house of Captain Pascua; and upon reaching
the house, he knocked, and called Patrick Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda
Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon, opened the door. After opening the door, Nita
Fernandez, his live-in partner for almost a year came out, in an angry mood, because she has been
waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was late. He explained that he did not expect her to
come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he will call her by phone or write her before
she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that they talk outside as she was ashamed with the
neighbor, and they will disturb the child who was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to
sleep. He and Nita went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived
in the vacant house, it was closed, so they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what Nita
Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed that, he was surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he
knows of no reason why Nita Fernandez will hack him. He believes that Nita Fernandez concocted
the story of rape because of fear that he will file a case against Nita Fernandez for hacking him.
On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of General Romeo
Icarma (the house where he and 15 other workers were constructing a fence), since 1990. His
livelihood was, as a Mason, since 1993. In February 1995, the daughter of Nita Fernandez named,
Lucia who is married to Lito introduced him to Nita. He and Nita became sweethearts in February
1995. They have not live together because Nita was working at Valle Verde. They only meet during
Nitas day off. He has been at Nitas place of work, but he used to call then at her telephone numbers
which are 6326062 and 6356060.They used to see each other at Gen. Icarmas place where he
lived. On August 26, 1995, when the incident in questioned happened, Lucia and Lito were no longer
residing at Gen. Icarmas place because they were told to leave in April 1993. On August 26, 1995,
while in the squatters area, just 100 meters away from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking
for him. Because Nita does not know the workers in Gen. Icarmas house, Nita left and went to the
house of Captain Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters area,
Melchor Rudy Abella told him that Nita was looking for him. He went to the house of Captain
Pascua. At Captain Pascuas place, he met Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were
Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a cousin and a small child who were all awake, except the
child. Although Ablon was very much willing to accommodate him in Ablons house, he brought Nita
to the house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains, there is a roof to protect them and ashamed
to stay at Ablons house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in Ablons place, saying that instead of
sleeping at Ablons place, she prefers to go back at Valle Verde. He did not allow Nita to go back at
Valle Verde because it was already late at night and if anything happens to her, her daughter who
knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring Nita to Gen. Icarmas house
because it is crowded and the Colonels house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascuas house. They
went to the Colonels house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying banig,
pillow and blanket, and did not notice that Nita was carrying a knife. Nobody live in the Colonels
house and was closed. They slept in the terrace of the house on a cement flooring. While he was
sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen knife.When hacked, he just said aray. The bolo was not
used in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left and went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen
knife. When the Military Police arrived, he was no longer at the Colonels house because he went to
another house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked the assistance of Ablon. Ablon was
the one who called for the Military Police. He did not leave the colonels house. He just stayed in the
premises. Despite his wounds, he was able to sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the morning. When
asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that it was because he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand and
pushing her on her chest when Nita insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he
did not file a complaint against Nita for hacking him. [3]
In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment, thus:
495
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of
death, and indemnify complainant Nita Fernandez the sum of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit.
[4]
Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and the imposition
of the death penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends that -
I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE.
II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY. [5]
The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases that have
been previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances before it, of two people, each
testifying on the same incident but making a clearly discordant testimony. Since only the participants
could directly testify on the sexual congress, here conceded to have taken place, extreme care is
observed in evaluating the respective declarations of the complainant and the accused. The
doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great respect over the assessment of the trial court on the
credibility of the witnesses and, in the usual words of similar import employed by the Court, it would
be best not to disturb the findings of the court which has heard the evidence except only when a
material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into
account can alter the outcome of the case. [6] Regrettably for accused-appellant, no such exceptive
instances of possible oversight are perceived or evident in this case.
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the trial court and by
this Court as well, of what had transpired during the late hour of the night in question.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August 26, 1995 at
around 12:00 oclock midnight?
A At Fort Bonifacio.
Q What city or municipality?
A I do not know but it must be here sir.
Q Meaning Makati City?
A Yes sir.
Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness?
A I was sleeping in my friends residence.
Court:
Q What is the address of that friends residence at Fort Bonifacio?
A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.
Q Why were you there at that time?
A Because I always go there and my sons residence is beside the house of my friend sir.
Court: Proceed fiscal:
Pros. Manola:
496
Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in AFOVAI Fort
Bonifacio Makati City do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?
A There was sir.
Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?
A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there was a man
who entered the house where I was sleeping.
Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.
Q What else happened after that?
A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he said if I will
not obey him he will be going to kill me sir.
Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?
A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.
Q Did you climb over the fence?
A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
Q Were you able to go over the fence?
A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.
Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the fence?
A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?
A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and I took off my
clothes he embraced me and kissed me sir.
Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?
A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.
Q Did you obey him?
A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.
Court:
Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the accused for you
to undress?
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to that vacant
house and to undress why did you follow this instruction?
A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.
Q Why do you say that he might kill you?
A He like to rape me sir.
Court:
497
Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?
A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.
Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he inserted his penis to my
vagina sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened next Mrs.
Witness?
A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to my private
parts going it and out sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person according to
you lie down after he put his fingers inside your private part?
A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him.
Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him?
A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person?
A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does not want me
to tell it to anybody because he have raped many.
Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would you be able
to recognize him?
A Yes sir I could recognize him.
Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he is inside?
Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and when asked his
name answered as Rolando Alfanta.
Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of Rolando Alfanta
uttered the words lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong
what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take a rest.
Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab him in the
chest sir.
498
Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.
Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal where the
soldiers were.
Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.
Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according to you you
have killed a person what happened next?
A We went to the person who raped me sir.
Q And did you see him there?
A Yes sir.
Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly raped?
A The soldiers sir.
Q Did you find this person who raped you?
A Yes sir.
Q What was he doing?
A He was lying down sir.
Q What happened after that?
A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.
Q Who brought him to the hospital?
A The ambulance of the soldier.
Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in connection with what
you have just narrated or told or testified to this afternoon?
A I could remember.
Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?
A Yes sir.
Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutors office consisting of
two pages kindly go over it and tell us if you recognize this statement?
A Yes sir I could recognize this.
Q Is that your statement
A Yes sir.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if you see this
bolo again would you be able to recognize it again?
499
A Yes sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this bolo is presented
by the policeman who is in custody of this bolo.
Court:
Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of the accused
did you bring it also?
A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.
Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
A Yes sir.
Q How did you ask for help?
A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir.
Q The question to you was how did you ask for help?
A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako.
Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help?
A None sir.
Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your private part?
A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir.
Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A He forced that to insert it.
Q Forced it to where?
A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?
A Yes sir I feel it sir.
Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?
A I do not know him.
Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?
A I saw him around 7:00 oclock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of the house of
my friends where I was sleeping.
Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?
A Only me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him with the knife
how many times have you stabbed him with the knife?
A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.
Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of the bolo you
hacked him how many times have you hacked him?
500
A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he might kill me.
Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.
Court: Cross-examination.
Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.
Court: Proceed.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your friend at
AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio?
A One of their children so there were three and I was one.
Q Were you sleeping in one room?
A I was sleeping in the sala sir.
Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that house?
A It was closed but it was not locked.
xxx xxx xxx.
Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when you could
already at the house of your employer?
A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir.
Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo to your friend?
A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
Q By the way what time did you go there?
A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.
Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
A 6:30 sir.
Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isnt?
A Yes sir.
Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that place isnt?
A Three rides sir.
Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were sleeping at
the time the place where you were sleeping or the place of the room where the owner of the
house were sleeping?
A First it is the sala where he passed.
Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked placed in
that door like a wood?
A They did not lock the door because they are in confident.
Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time?
A Patrick sir.
Q And how are you related to Patrick?
501
A His wife is my friend sir.
Q What is the name of his wife?
A Inday sir.
Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of your friend
Inday did you not shout when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?
A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same time he placed
his hands on my mouth sir.
Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times were you
boxed by the accused on the chest?
A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him.
Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest?
A Yes sir.
Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on her mouth.
Q Was it strong?
A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked.
Note: Witness holding on his left chin.
Q How about on the chest?
Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
A It was not too strong sir.
Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?
A Yes sir.
Q Where?
A I fell on the ground down.
Q Where were you boxed by the accused?
A Outside sir of the house.
Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is that correct?
A Yes sir.
Q And you followed him?
A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because I was afraid
because he was holding a bolo sir.
Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?
A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing himself.
Q Was it lighted the place?
A None sir.
Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?
A Near sir.
Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?
502
A Yes sir.
Q How big?
Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.
Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.
Court: Answer
A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.
Atty. Manalo:
Q And then you lie down?
A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.
Q Was he still holding the bolo?
A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.
Q How did you see him?
A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I cried and he was
holding the bolo.
Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.
A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
A He was molesting me sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to you?
A 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?
A I saw him that he was passing.
Q Where were you at the time?
A I was seating by the window sir.[7]
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward categorical, and relatively
free from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to sufficiently persuade the Court to
conclude that the trial court has erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the
complainant.Neither is evidence adduced to show that the complainant has had any ulterior motive
to prevaricate and enmesh accused-appellant in a fabricated charge. The Court repeats the familiar
doctrine that when a woman claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show such a fact so long as her testimony can meet the test of credibility, [8] for it is said that no
woman in her right mind will cry rape, allow examination of her private parts, or subject herself and
her family to the humiliation concomitant to the prosecution of the case, unless the story were true. [9]
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant had been
lived-in partner for almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at the
porch of the house of a certain Air Force officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal knowledge of
the victim that evening. In his appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to negate any possible or likely
use of violence or intimidation, considering that: (a) in the house where the victim was sleeping on
the night of 26 August 1995, there were at least three persons (the caretaker of the house Patrick
Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couples son) who could have responded to any shout for
503
help from the victim; (b) the door of the house was purposely left unlocked in order to enable
accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c) when the victim was made to climb a fence
followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.
The sweetheart theory of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out strategy,
often resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No documentary
evidence of any sort, like a letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to
confirm a romantic liaison between accused-appellant and the complainant. The latter testified:
Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?
A No sir.
Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?
A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?
Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned because
your sweetheart was then womanizing?
Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Really?
A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir.[10]
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved for petty
reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz:
This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez were
sweethearts, for such a claim defies rationality, let alone common sense, because if they were
sweethearts, she will not hack him. Not only that, the manner on which she stabbed and hacked him,
first with a knife, then with a bolo, shows a complete anger to vindicate the outrage on her. If they
were sweethearts, she would not have acted in the manner she did in stabbing and hacking him. At
least, if they have some relationship, she would not show anger the way she did. [11]
Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August 1995 in the
house where victim was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It was already close to
midnight when the incident occurred, and the other occupants of the house were by then apparently
all sound asleep. The evidence is to the effect that accused-appellant immediately after getting into
the house hit her on the jaw, put his hand on her mouth and threatened to kill her if she dared refuse
to yield to his demands.Understandably, the victim was shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed
into submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the
victim at the time of the commission of the offense and not by any kind of hard and fast rule. It would
be unreasonable to expect the victim to act with equanimity of disposition and to have the courage
and intelligence to disregard the threat made by accused-appellant. [12]
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant wanted accused-
appellant to have a chance to see her during the late evening indeed should deserve scant
consideration.The so-called love angle was properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of concrete
evidence to establish any such relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered her to climb a
fence, it should be enough to state she did not appear to have had any real opportunity to flee from
504
the clutches of the intruder who was, in fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence and while inside
the abandoned and enclosed house, she could not have done any much better since she was all the
time within striking distance of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at dawn.
[13]
The law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise. [14] By and of itself, nighttime would not be
an aggravating circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken
advantage of by him, or it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offenders immunity
from capture.[15]As an ordinary aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it
is duly proved although not alleged in the information. [16] The Court entertains no doubt that appellant
has specially taken advantage of the cover of darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime
without being recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted his victim, brought her to an abandoned
and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured of the stillness of a sleeping
world.[17] The Court has long held that this aggravating circumstance can be considered when an
accused takes advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity from his illegal
act.[18]
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into her
vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her
anus.Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The
Solicitor General correctly invoked the case of People vs. Saylan,[19] where this Court said:
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary
position, i.e. male superior, female inferior, but also the same position as dogs do i.e., entry from
behind. The appellant claims there was no ignominy because The studies of many experts in the
matter have shown that this position is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by
couples in the act of copulation. (Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by
consenting partners but not otherwise. [20]
Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating
circumstance any means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the
natural effects of the act. The circumstance, it is said,[21] "pertains to the moral order [and] adds
disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.[22]
In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with a bolo to
realize his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be considered as a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape [23] for not having been correspondingly alleged in the
information as to make the offense fall under the jurisprudentially referred qualified rape punishable
by reclusion perpetuato death. In People vs. Garcia,[24] the Court declared:
505
One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments thereto by providing for
qualified forms of rape carrying the death penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape the
victim becomes insane, or, under the same circumstances, a homicide is committed. The homicide
in the last two instances in effect created a special complex crime of rape with homicide. The first
two attendant circumstances are considered as equivalent to qualifying circumstances since
they increase the penalties by degrees, and not merely as aggravating circumstances which
affect only the period of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The original
provisions of Article 335 and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.
xxx xxx xxx.
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as
aggravating circumstances, (People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934]; People vs. Jovellano, et al.,
L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156; People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January 17, 1994,
229 SCRA 289; People vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No. 107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.)
since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People vs.
Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 73464, August 1988, 164 SCRA
215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against
him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be convicted
of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the
offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned.[25]
Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if
there were aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the appropriate
penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the
commission of the deed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by hereby
lowering the penalty therein imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for
moral damages is likewise ordered to be paid by accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta to the victim
Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu granted by the
trial court.
SO ORDERED.
506
[G.R. No. 134802. October 26, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RENATO Z. DIZON,accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us on automatic review is the Decision [1] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219, in Crim. Case No. Q-97-71910, finding Renato Dizon y Zuela guilty of Robbery with
Rape, attended by two aggravating circumstances, imposing upon him the penalty of Death and
ordering him to pay complainant Arlie Rosalin P9,500.00 for actual damages, P200,000.00 as moral
damages and to pay the costs.
Culled principally from the testimony of private complainant, the facts of the case are as follows:
On July 7, 1997, around 9:30 p.m., private complainant Arlie Rosalin, then a 21-year old
engineering student from Dinalupihan, Bataan, alighted from a bus as it stopped by a small bridge
along EDSA just before Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. [2] Seconds later, she heard someone call
out Miss! and when she turned her head around, she found appellant behind her. [3] Appellant
suddenly seized her, pointing a fan knife to the side of her neck, and announced a holdup. He then
told her to face the railing of the bridge and asked for her wallet and jewelry. Terrified, private
complainant complied. Still not content, though, appellant got her backpack, warning her that should
he find another wallet inside, he would kill her and throw her over the bridge as he had done to his
other victims.[4]
After appellant stripped her of her valuables, appellant instructed private complainant to walk
with him along EDSA and pretend that they were a couple. [5] They crossed Roosevelt Avenue,
passed the Munoz market, then headed for Project 7. Private complainant could not ask for anyones
help because, all the while, appellant had his arm around her and a knife pressed to her side.
[6]
Appellant further frightened her by telling her that he had already killed many people. [7] Scared as
she was, however, private complainant would furtively look at appellants face whenever they passed
a lighted place, vowing to herself that should she ever be able to escape, she would remember him
and have him arrested.[8]
After walking for some time, they finally reached a dark and empty basketball court. [9] There,
appellant ordered private complainant to remove her pants and underwear. Private complainant
could not do anything but follow appellants orders since he was holding her at knifepoint. Besides,
even if she screamed, nobody would hear her.[10]
507
Appellant kissed private complainant on the lips, neck, and breasts, which he also mashed.
[11]
He likewise bit her nipple at least three times, as well as the right side of her back and vagina.
[12]
Unable to control his lustful urges any longer, he forced her to bend forward over the hood of a
taxi and, in this position, forcefully penetrated her vagina with his organ. [13]
After satisfying himself in this fashion, appellant ordered private complainant to hold and
massage his penis which, he boastfully informed the latter, carried bolitas.[14] He then forced her to
put his foul-smelling penis into her mouth, which sickened her to the pit of her stomach. [15]
Still not done with her, appellant forced private complainant to lie on the ground. [16] Private
complainant could not fight off any of appellants demands, because whenever she tried to resist,
and whenever she failed to answer any of his questions, he would bang her head on the hood of the
taxi, slam her head on the wall, or slap her hard in the face. [17]
After appellant pushed private complainant to the ground, he went down on her and proceeded
to ravish her all over again.[18]
Though admittedly spent by now, appellant still refused to let go of private complainant. Instead,
he made her sit astride over him, and to make sure she would not be able to escape, held her tightly
by the hair with both hands.[19] When private complainant balked at inserting his organ inside of hers,
appellant removed one hand from her hair and groped in the dark. [20] Sensing that he was reaching
for his knife and would finally kill her, private complainant struggled with all her might and broke free
from appellants hold. She scampered to her feet, grabbed her pants, and ran as fast as she could
away from appellant.[21]
Soon, private complainant found a store that was about to close. She barged in, informing the
people that she had been raped, and pleaded for their help. However, the owner of the store did not
want to get involved. Instead, he reminded her to wear her pants, then referred her to the barangay.
[22]
When a barangay officer arrived, he accompanied her back to the basketball court, where they
were able to recover her shoes, underwear, and appellants black cap. [23] Since appellant was no
longer around, private complainant just gave a description of him: he was dark, 53 to 54 in height,
and with a body covered with tattoos from the waist down. [24] Private complainant was then brought
to the police station where her statement was taken. [25]
About three days later, the barangay informed private complainant that they already had a
suspect who matched appellants description. Accompanied by policemen, among others, she went
to the vicinity of the Munoz market, where appellant was reportedly working as a tricycle dispatcher.
[26]
After some anxious moments of searching in the crowd, private complainant finally caught sight of
appellant and pointed him out to her companions. [27] One of the police officers accosted appellant
and asked him if he knew private complainant. [28] Upon seeing her, appellant pulled out the same fan
knife he had earlier used on her. [29] He was not quick enough, however, because the police officers
were able to disarm him.Appellant was then handcuffed and brought to the police station. [30]
In an Information[31] dated July 14, 1997, Assistant City Prosecutor Mercedes D. Penamora
charged appellant as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of July, 1997 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
with intent to gain, by means of force and violence against and/or intimidation upon person did, then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob the person of one ARLIE ROSALIN Y NICDAO In
the following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned while said complainant was
walking along the sidewalk of EDSA, Munoz, this city after alighting from a passenger bus, said
accused suddenly appeared and embraced complainant and at knife point announced a hold-up and
then and there rob, took and carted away the following items, to wit:
One necklace w/pendant - P 300.00

Two (2) gold rings 5,000.00
One bag pack containing
508
Assorted clothes 2,000.00
One(1) paper bag (bench)
Containing stuff toys 200.00
Perfume 1,000.00
Cash 1,000.00
all in the total amount of p9,500.00, Philippine Currency, all belonging to said ARLIE ROSALIN y
NICDAO, to her damage and prejudice and on the occasion of the robbery, accused with lewd
designs and with force and intimidation and with use of a knife undressed said complainant and put
himself on top of her and have carnal knowledge with said ARLIE ROSALIN y NICDAO against her
will and without her consent, to the damage and prejudice of the said ARLIE ROSALIN Y NICDAO.
Contrary to law.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on August 7, 1997, with the assistance of
Atty. Donato A. Mallabo.[32] Trial proceeded in due course. The prosecution presented as witnesses
the victim herself, Arlie Rosalin; SPOI Cristopher Hael, a police officer assigned at the Baler Police
Station who testified on the circumstances leading to the arrest of the accused; PO1 Emelito de La
Cruz, the police investigator; and Dr. Emmanuel Reyes, the PNP medico-legal officer who conducted
the examination on Arlie Rosalin.
The appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. Appellants testimony was not corroborated
by any other witness. His testimony consisted mainly of denials of his involvement in the crime being
imputed against him. He averred that as a tricycle dispatcher, he used to work from 7:00 oclock to
11:00 oclock in the morning and from 2:00 oclock to 5:00 oclock in the afternoon; that on the evening
of July 7, 1997, he was just at home resting; that he was at work when he was arrested and when he
was brought to the police station, he was beaten up; that he told the police that he had nothing to do
with what happened to the complainant and that he saw her for the first time only when he was
arrested; that he did not know of any reason why she singled him out and filed a case against him;
and that when he was brought to the fiscal, he again denied the charges against him.
On July 13, 1998, the trial court promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery with rape under paragraph one, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, attended by two aggravating circumstances, the
Court hereby sentences him (1) to suffer the penalty of Death; (2) to indemnify complainant Arlie
Rosalin in the amount of P9,500.00 as actual damages; (3) to pay her P200,000.00 as moral
damages; and (4) to pay the costs.
Let the records of the case be transmitted to the Supreme Court for automatic review.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant impugns the decision of the trial court on the following grounds:
1. The lower court erred in convicting the accused when in truth and in fact he was not
positively identified by the victim.
2. The lower court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstances of cruelty and
uninhabited place against the accused.
3. The lower court erred in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of robbery with rape in violation of Art. 294, Par. 1 (should be par. 2) of the Revised
Penal Code.
We affirm the trial courts decision.
509
Being interrelated, appellants first and third assigned errors, which boil down to a question of
credibility of the private complainant, will be discussed jointly.
In assailing the credibility of the private complainant, appellant puts the following in issue:
First, appellant states that he has only two hands; hence, it was impossible for him to remove
his pants, restrain private complainant, and hold a fan knife all at the same time.
Second, appellant points out an alleged inconsistency between private complainants account of
rape and her alleged refusal to escape her rapist despite opportunity to do so.
Third, appellant argues that he was not positively identified by private complainant because
somebody had to tell her where he was when she and the police went out to look for him at the
market place in Munoz.
We find appellants arguments to be untenable.
On the first point, it is not impossible for appellant to undress while holding his victim and a fan
knife at the same time. On direct examination, the private complainant testified thus:
Q When he raped you did he remove his pants?
A Yes, maam he removed his pants.
Q When he removed his pants, did you run?
A No, Maam because he was holding me and the knife was pointed at me,
Q When he was holding you and the gun (sic) was pointing (sic) at you how did he remove his
pants?
A Like this, maam . . .
COURT INTERPRETER
Witness holding the right wrist of the Interpreter using the left hand. The witness demonstrating
that the accused was using his right hand holding the knife while unbuttoning his pants and
every time she would resist the accused would point the knife at her. [33]
Countless cases of rape have been committed in a similar fashion. We quote the pertinent portions
of two such cases:
xxx When she saw her father naked, she got scared and did not move. Because of her refusal, her
father poked a three-cantos knife at her neck and he undressed her by pulling down her skirt and her
panty until they were removed from her body. Her father then told her to sit up and when she did, he
pulled her t-shirt off her head. She cried and her father threatened to kill her if her cries will be heard
by others.[34]
xxx The accused awakened Mergena upon arriving from a drinking session with his brothers,
pointed a knife at her and ordered her to stand up. When she refused to obey, he pulled her up. He
removed his short pants, then with a knife still pointed at her, removed her skirt and made her lie
down. He removed her panty and his underwear, separated her thighs and inserted his penis into
her vagina while fondling her breast. This entire time his left hand was holding the knife. [35]
On the second point, that private complainant could have escaped her captor with facility is
something easier said than done. Private complainant was a terrified captive, held fast at the wrist by
appellant while the latter, using his other hand, unbuttoned his pants, stopping only to brandish his
fan knife at private complainant whenever she showed the least sign of resistance. Overcome with
fear, it is understandable why she was not able to escape at that moment.
On the third point, contrary to appellants assertion, private complainant was able to identify
appellant as her assailant. While somebody did point out to private complainant and her companions
510
that they had already passed the person they were looking for, this was understandable because the
place where they were searching was crowded. The failure to see is not the same as failure to
recognize which is what is crucial in identification. Nobody prodded her to point to appellant. Nobody
told her that he was the malefactor. What is important is that it was private complainant herself who
had provided appellants description and who, without assistance, eventually picked him out from the
crowd as the person who robbed and raped her.
Appellant finds it unbelievable that private complainant was able to recognize him when she did
not even touch his penis and test it for the presence of bolitas during his identification at the Muoz
market. Private complainant did not have to do that. She was able to recognize appellant because of
his mole on the cheek and his body smeared with tattoos, and more importantly, because she
repeatedly gazed at appellants face every time they passed a well-lit place on their way to the
basketball court.[36] She was also able to take a good hard look at appellants face and body while
she was forced to sit on top of him during an unwanted sexual act at the basketball court. [37]
On cross-examination, private complainant testified thus:
Q So much so that because his hands were placed around your neck and the knife was pressed
in your body, practically, you were closing your eyes, you just believed whatever he tells (sic)
you?
A Everytime we would pass by a lighted area, even if I was scared, I would look at him, sir.
Q But as much as possible, because you were scared and you were already angry, you would not
like to see the face of that stranger, right?
A No, sir, because I was really trying to memorize the face. [38]
xxx
Q Why were you interested in the face of that stranger?
A So that in case I would be able to escape, I would have him arrested. [39]
And on re-direct examination, private complainant testified:
Q Are you very sure that it was the accused now in this case who actually sexually abused you?
A Yes, maam I am sure.
Q Why are you so sure?
A Because I could see his face everytime I passed by a lighted area, maam (witness crying). [40]
This only shows that private complainant had ample opportunity to behold the appellant so that she
was able to positively identify the appellant as the one who robbed her and sexually abused her.
In the light of this positive and direct evidence of appellants culpability, the trial court correctly
discarded his defense of denial and alibi. It is an elementary rule that alibi cannot prevail over the
clear and positive identification of the appellant as the very person who committed the crime.
Moreover, in order to justify an acquittal based on this defense, the accused must establish by clear
and convincing evidence that (a) he was in another place at the time of the commission of the
offense; and, (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.[41] This, appellant miserably failed to do. It was not physically impossible for appellant to
have been at the crime scene in Project 7, Quezon City, considering that he claimed to have been a
mere tricycle ride away in his house in San Jose del Monte, Quezon City around the time of the
commission of the crime.
Considering all the foregoing, the trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to the
testimony of private complainant. This, especially since appellant has not even imputed any ill motive
on the part of private complainant to testify falsely against him. Where there is no evidence to show
any improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness to testify falsely against the accused or to
511
falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence.[42]
The matter of assigning values to the declarations of witnesses is best and most competently
performed by the trial court who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while testifying, and to assess their credibility using various indicia available but not
reflected in the records. Hence, the court a quos appraisal on the matter is entitled to the highest
respect, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a clear showing that it overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would affect
the result of the case. There is no compelling reason in the present case to depart from this rule. [43]
On the second assigned error, the trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating
circumstances of cruelty and uninhabited place against appellant.
Indeed, the term cruelty often conjures bloody and gory images which are conspicuously absent
in this case. However, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, the appreciation of cruelty, as an
aggravating circumstance, is relative. It depends upon the crime committed. As long as the wrong
done in the commission of the offense is deliberately augmented and that such wrong is not
essential for the accomplishment of the ultimate purpose of the offender, the same could be
considered as aggravating. The nature of the wrong or the number thereof is immaterial. [44]
The trial courts pronouncement finds support in a long line of jurisprudence. As held in People
vs. Basao,[45] People vs. Lacao,[46] People vs. llaoa,[47] People vs. Alban,[48] and other cases, the
test of cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing
another wrong not necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victims suffering, or
outraged, or scoffed at his person or corpse. Where the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction,
inflicted on the victim unnecessary physical and moral pain, with the intention of deliberately and
inhumanly intensifying or aggravating the sufferings of the victim, cruelty is present.
Tested against the foregoing yardstick, the element of cruelty undoubtedly attended the
commission of the crime in this case. As recounted by private complainant, appellant not only raped
her, but subjected her to various dehumanizing indignities, such as making her fondle and put his
foul-smelling penis in her mouth, forcing her to admire his bolitas, and demanding that she assume
embarrassing and indelicate positions. Furthermore, he viciously slammed her head against the
hood of the taxi, banged her head against the wall, and slapped her hard in the face whenever she
failed to answer any of his questions. All these wrongs were no longer necessary insofar as
appellants purpose of raping private complainant was concerned. By subjecting her to these
unwarranted physical and moral abuses on top of raping her, appellant deliberately and inhumanly
augmented her pain and sufferings, thus, committing cruelty.
Finally, appellant claims that the generic aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place cannot
be appreciated against him since the basketball court where he supposedly brought his victim
cannot be considered an uninhabited place. Appellant cites private complainants testimony that the
basketball court was near a highway and surrounded by houses.
We are not convinced.
Whether or not a place may be considered uninhabited, is determined not by the distance of the
nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of commission, there was
reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. [49] In People vs. Desalisa,[50] the crime was
considered as having been committed in an uninhabited place because the killing was done during
nighttime, and many fruit trees and shrubs obstructed the view of neighbors and passersby.
Similarly, in the case of People vs. Damaso, et al.,[51] the court, notwithstanding the close proximity
of the sugarcane field where the victims were killed to the national highway and some houses, still
considered the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place because the killing was done during
nighttime and the sugarcane in the field was tall enough to obstruct the view of neighbors and
passersby. The situation is no different in the case at bar. Appellant precisely sought the solitude of
the basketball court to ensure that private complainant would not be able to call for, and receive, any
help. Aside from being cloaked by the darkness of the night, the basketball court was a relatively
512
isolated place, shielded from the public view by the high walls of the surrounding houses. [52] Private
complainant could have screamed at the top of her lungs and nobody still would have heard
her. Without a doubt, therefore, the trial court properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of
uninhabited place against appellant.
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659 provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by
rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In the case at bar, two (2) aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the robbery
with rape, thus the trial court correctly imposed on the appellant the penalty of death.
The trial court also ordered appellant to pay the victim P200,000.00 as moral damages.
Ordinarily, the victims of rape are awarded a minimum of P50,000.00 as moral damages. However,
the factual circumstances of the case at bar calls for a stiffer penalty. After robbing and raping the
victim, appellant subjected the victim to physical harm like biting her nipples and vagina; banging her
head on the hood of the taxi and on the wall; and subjecting her to indignities like holding and
massaging his penis and worst of all, forcing her to put his foul-smelling penis into her mouth. The
trial court was correct in ordering the appellant to pay his victim the amount P200,000.00 as moral
damages for all of these repulsive acts andP9,500.00 as actual damages for the money and
valuables taken from her. We also hold that the victim is entitled to P50,000.00 for civil indemnity, as
it is mandatory upon a conviction of rape. Such indemnity is distinct from moral damages and based
on different jural foundations.[53] Furthermore, under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[54] Hence, We find an award of exemplary damages in the amount ofP25,000.00
proper.
Four Justices of the Court maintain their position that R. A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty. Nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law
is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 219 in Crim. Case No. Q-71910 finding appellant Renato Dizon y Zuela guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape under paragraph one, Art. 294 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, attended by two (2) aggravating circumstances, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death, to pay victim Arlie Rosalin P200,000.00 as moral
damages; and P9,500.00 as actual damages, with the MODIFICATION that he shall further pay the
victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let certified copies thereof, as well as the records of this
case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for possible exercise of executive
clemency.
SO ORDERED.
513
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16177 May 24, 1967

vs.
PANCHO PELAGIO Y ALFONSO, ET AL., defendants.
PANCHO PELAGIO Y ALFONSO, OSCAR CAYMO Y REYES and JOSE GUICO Y
PAPAS, defendants-appellants.
Jose Bonto and Jose Sarte for defendants-appellants.

Antonio Barredo for plaintiff-appellee A. B. Zamora.
Manuel V. Pineda for other plaintiff-appellee.
PER CURIAM:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pasay City in Criminal Case No.
3380, People v. Pancho Pelagio, et al., condemning the appellants, Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo
and Jose Guico, to death for the crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized in Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code.
The amended information under which the above judgment was rendered originally recited six
defendants, namely, the three aforenamed appellants, and Arcadio Balmeo, Evelyn Villanueva and
Arcadio Manalang alias Ding Manalang. Subsequently, however, Arcadio Balmeo and Evelyn
Villanueva were discharged from the said information when they agreed to turn state witnesses.
Armando Manalang, on the other hand, died while the case was pending trial. Thus, the trial
proceeded only with respect to the herein appellants: Pancho Pelagio, Oscar Caymo and Jose
Guico.
The records disclose that Jose Guico, an ex-convict, and Evelyn Villanueva lived in common law
relationship at No. 289-A (Int.) Leveriza St., Pasay City, from about January 1955 to March of the
same year. Among their friends were Pancho Pelagio, also an ex-convict, and Armando Manalang.
At around three o'clock in the afternoon of March 23, 1955, while Manalang was at the above
residence, Pancho Pelagio came to see the spouses Guico and Villanueva. Pelagio's wife had just
delivered a child and he wanted to borrow money for the hospital expenses.
It is not determinable from the records if Pancho Pelagio was then accommodated in his request for
a loan. The records disclose, however, that Armando Manalang, taking advantage of the said visit,
informed Pancho Pelagio of a robbery he, Manalang was planning with some other friends who later
were revealed by Manalang to be Jose Guico, Oscar Caymo and Arcadio Balmeo. Pelagio and
514
Manalang decided to talk the matter over and, in fact, did discuss the subject once more later that
afternoon in the presence of Jose Guico and Evelyn Villanueva, when Caymo and Balmeo arrived in
the same house. The following day, March 24, 1955, the above persons, namely, Evelyn Villanueva,
Pancho Pelagio, Armando Manalang, Oscar Caymo and Arcadio Balmeo, met again at Guico's
residence and there finalized and agreed on the plan to rob the house of Guico's former landlady, a
certain Aling Nena, at No. 327 G. Villanueva St., Pasay City. At this meeting, Jose Guico was absent.
But the full and exact nature of Jose Guico's participation in the first meeting is unclear because
there is evidence to the effect that while the robbery was then being discussed, Guico was in the
bathroom taking his shower. (t.s.n. pp. 6, 12-13, Hearing of August 23, 1955). It is established,
though, that after Manalang had sketched the intended victim's house and its surrounding, Guico
explained the location of the said house in relation to the surrounding streets and, the points thereof
through which entrance and exit should be effected.
When the meeting broke up at about sick o'clock that evening, March 24, 1955, Pancho Pelagio,
Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang and Arcadio Balmeo set out for the execution of their plan. They
all walked together towards Aling Nena's residence although before reaching the place, Caymo
ordered Manalang to hail and hold a taxi which the latter did. Then, too, only Balmeo and Caymo
actually entered the victim's premises because, as was earlier agreed upon, Pancho Pelagio acted
as the lookout for the two and he simply posted himself by the gate of the said house.
Caymo and Balmeo gained entrance to the house through its back kitchen door which they found to
be open. Once inside, Caymo drew his gun and sought out its occupants. Only an old woman, Mrs.
Severina de Gloria, however, was in at the time. Caymo then pointed the gun at the old lady and
intimidated her into producing all the money and jewelry she could. All in all, the pair got about P437
in cash, three pieces of jewelry worth about P205.00 and a watch worth about P300.00. After they
had taken the above items, Caymo ordered Mrs. de Gloria to lie face downward, covered her with a
blanket, and cautioned her against moving or otherwise sounding out an alarm. The two then went
down the house and out into the street. At the gate, however, they failed to find Pancho Pelagio.
From G. Villanueva Street where the victim's house was located, Caymo and Balmeo walked till they
got to the corner of F. Fernando street where they found Armando Manalang waiting for them in a
taxi. Caymo and Balmeo then rode on it.
As the taxi was about to leave, however, a jeep from the opposite direction blocked its way and as
the two vehicles were thus stopped, a man alighted from the jeep and started to walk towards the
taxi. When the stranger was very near the taxi already, Manalang instructed Caymo to shoot at the
man as the latter was a police officer. Whereupon, Caymo leveled several shots at the latter, about
six in all; and the man, who was later identified as Patrolman Francisco Trinidad of the Pasay Police
Department, fell dead.
From the scene of the shooting, Manalang, Caymo and Balmeo went direct to a house in Buendia
Street owned by Manalang's sister where they changed clothes and hid the death weapon and the
money and jewelry they had robbed. Shortly thereafter, Caymo and Balmeo proceeded to a house in
Blumentritt where they met Pancho Pelagio whom they called to account for his absence at the gate
during the robbery. The latter explained that he had to scamper away before Caymo and Balmeo
had gone down because he, Pelagio, saw someone slip out of the house apparently to summon the
police.
The records do not disclose just how and when the herein appellants and their companions were
apprehended by the police. It appears, however, that on March 25, 1955, or the day following the
incident, Oscar Caymo was taken to the National Bureau of Investigation and subjected to paraffin
test and found positive for nitrate burns in both hands, the next day, he executed his extrajudicial
confession (Exh. I) relating to his participation in the crime and implicating Pancho Pelagio, Armando
Manalang had Arcadio Balmeo in it.
515
On March 26, 1955, appellant, Jose Guico also executed an extra-judicial confession (Exh. I) owning
his participation in the formation of the conspiracy as earlier recited in this decision. He named as
co-conspirators Pancho Pelagio and Armando Manalang.
The last to be apprehended was Armando Manalang. On April 8, 1955, he extra-judicially confessed
(Exh. G) to the above offense and implicated as his companions in it Jose Guico, Oscar Caymo,
Arcadio Balmeo and Evelyn Villanueva.
In the trial court, the herein appellant's common defense was alibi. Pancho Pelagio claimed that at
the time of the incident he was playing mahjong at the house of one Angelina Dadivas in Lakandola
Street, Tondo, Manila. Oscar Caymo, on the other hand, claimed that he was then at home at No.
2316 Oroquieta Street, Manila. Finally, Jose Guico maintained that during the incident he was at the
residence of one Jose Obligacion where he stayed until about 11:00 in the evening. Consistently
with their alibi, the appellants charged that the extrajudicial confession given by them were secured
by the police through threat and maltreatment.
In the appeal before us now, only Oscar Caymo sticks to the defense of alibi. Appellant Pancho
Pelagio now admits he participated in the crime in the manner recited above but submits that, under
the circumstances, he should only be convicted for simple robbery and not for robbery with
homicide. Appellant Jose Guico, on the other hand, argues in this appeal that even under the facts
found by the trial court regarding his participation, he cannot justly be convicted for the crime
charged. The Office of the Solicitor General, for its part, urges the affirmance of the decision under
review with respect to Pancho Pelagio and Oscar Caymo but recommends the acquittal of Jose
Guico on reasonable doubt.
After a careful and thorough review of the evidence, this Court believes that the decision appealed
from should be modified to the end that Oscar Caymo's conviction should stand, Pancho Pelagio's
guilt be reduced to simple robbery, and Jose Guico, as recommended by the Solicitor General, be
acquitted on reasonable doubt.
Appellant Oscar Caymo's insistence on his alibi is absolutely futile. The evidence against its
credibility is both forceful and overwhelming.
To begin with, Oscar Caymo was positively identified by Mrs. Severina de Gloria as one of those
who broke into her house on the night of the incident and robbed her at gunpoint. He was likewise
positively identified during the trial by Francisco Juni, the driver of the get-away taxi, as the
gunwielder in the fatal shooting of Pat. Trinidad. Additionally, state witnesses Evelyn Villanueva and
Arcadio Balmeo testified at the stand that he was among those who hatched and agreed on the
robbery at the house of Jose Guico previous to the execution of the same. And then, too, he was
found positive for nitrate burns in both his hands by the National Bureau of Investigation the very day
following the incident. Against this finding, he has offered neither denial nor any reasonable
explanation. Even if this Court disregards his extrajudicial confession, therefore, though we do not
here now find the same inadmissible the acceptance of Caymo's alibi would still be completely
anomalous and irrational. No jurisprudence in criminal cases is more settled than the rule that alibi is
the weakest of all defenses and that the same should be rejected when the identity of the accused
has been sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime. (People v. Ruiz, G.R.
No. L-11063, August 22, 1958; People v. Asmawil, G.R. No. L-18761, March 31, 1965; People vs.
Lumayag, G.R. No. L-19142, March 31, 1965). When nothing supports it except the testimonies of
relatives and friends and the defendant's own urging of the same, the said defense weighs and is
worth nothing. (People v. Baaga, et al., G.R. No. L-14905, January 28, 1961) Besides, the rule is to
the effect that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that he was also somewhere when the
crime was committed but the defendant must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at such time. (People v. Limpo, et al., G.R. No. L-
13058, January 28, 1961) Caymo's alibi does not meet this standard. Consequently, this Court would
only do wrong and carry justice to set aside his conviction.
516
This Court, however, concurs with appellant Pancho Pelagio's submission that, by the trial court's
own factual determination, his criminal liability cannot be extended beyond simple robbery. We hold
Pancho Pelagio guiltless or innocent of Pat. Trinidad's death.
Even the decision under appeal recites that when Arcadio Balmeo and Oscar Caymo hurried out of
the victim's house after the robbery, Pancho Pelagio had evidently fled from his lookout post
because the pair, Balmeo and Caymo, failed to locate him at the gate where he was supposed to
have stationed himself. To be sure, the said decision itself renders the account that it was only
Balmeo and Caymo who walked together from the said house to the corner of Villanueva and F.
Fernando Streets where then they saw Armando Manalang waiting for them in a taxi and that it was
only when these three had taken to the said taxi, and the cab was about to leave, that the shooting
of Pat. Trinidad happened. When the homicide was committed, therefore, Pancho Pelagio could not
have had the least intervention or participation as might justify penalizing him likewise for the said
killing. So far as the records disclose, the conspirators were agreed only on the commission of
robbery; there is no evidence that homicide besides was determined by them when they plotted the
crime. All these warrant the exclusion of Pancho Pelagio from any responsibility for the said killing.
(People vs. Basisten, et al., 47 Phil. 493) Considering that those who actually participated in the
robbery were only three, Pancho Pelagio included, and only one of them was armed, the same
evidently was not "in band." (Art. 296, Revise Penal Code) This being the case, then it would indeed
be irregular or questionable to hold Pancho Pelagio similarly responsible as Caymo and Balmeo for
the killing of Pat. Trinidad. Under the code, it is only when the robbery is in band that all those
present in the commission of the robbery may be punished, for any of the assaults which its
members might commit. Thus, inPeople v. Pascual, G.R. No. L-4801, June 30, 1953 (unreported),
we held that where three persons committed robbery and two of them committed rape upstairs on its
occasion, while the third guarded the owner of the house downstairs, only the two who committed
the assault should be punished for robbery with rape while the third was liable for robbery only.
Finally, we find the Solicitor General's recommendation for the acquittal of appellant Jose Guico well
founded. While it seems proven that the said appellant did participate in the first of two meetings in
the discussion of the plan to commit the robbery in question by answering Armando Manalang's
inquiries relating to the intended house and its surrounding streets and the means of entrance
thereto and the channels of exit therefrom, the evidence is as much that, thereafter, his involvement
with the conspiracy ceased. It should be recalled that the conferences on the robbery were held on
March 23, and 24, 1955. At the first meeting, the participants were Jose Guico, Pancho Pelagio,
Oscar Caymo, Armando Manalang, Arcadio Balmeo and Evelyn Villanueva. At the meeting of the
24th the same group, save for appellant Jose Guico, conferred and finalized the plan and, in fact,
proceeded to execute the same almost immediately after the conference adjourned. There is ample
and positive evidence on record that appellant Jose Guico was absent not only from the second
meeting but likewise from the robbery itself. To be sure, not even the decision under appeal
determined otherwise. Consequently, even if Guico's participation in the first meeting sufficiently
involved him with the conspiracy, such participation and involvement, however, would be inadequate
to render him criminally liable as a conspirator. Conspiracy alone, without the execution of its
purpose, is not a crime punishable by law, except in special instances (Article 8, Revised Penal
Code) which, however, do not include robbery.
Besides, appellant Jose Guico's absence from the second conference as well as from the robbery
itself strongly points to his evident change of mind regarding his commitment the previous day to be
in on the robbery. Under the circumstances and under a policy of liberal consideration for timely
retreat or repentance, he may be deemed to have desisted voluntarily from the conspiracy before
the contemplated crime could actually be carried out and therefore, free from penal accountability.
(People v. Timbol, et al., G.R. Nos. 47473-47474, August 4, 1944 [unreported]) As Viada expounds
on the rule, "when the action of the felony starts and the accused, because of fear or remorse
desists from its continuance, there is no attempt. . . . If the author of the attempt, after having
commenced to execute the felony by external acts, he stops by a free and spontaneous feeling on
the brink of the abyss, he is saved. It is a call to repentance, to the conscience, a grace, a pardon
517
which the law grants to voluntary repentance." (Cited and translated in Padilla Criminal Law, p. 120,
1964 Ed.)
In summary then, this Court finds appellant Oscar Caymo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with the homicide attended by the aggravating circumstances, all recited in the
information and proven at the trial, of nocturnity and use of a motor vehicle without the compensating
mitigating circumstances. On the other hand, appellant Pancho Pelagio is hereby determined to be
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5 of the Revised
Penal Code, attended by the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and recidivism, having been at
the time of the trial, as recited in the information and proven at the trial, previously convicted for
robbery. There is no mitigating circumstance appreciable in his favor. For both appellants, therefore,
the penalties prescribed by law should be imposed in their maximum period, although appellant
Pancho Pelagio is still qualified to avail of the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the
reasons given above, appellant Jose Guico should be, as he is hereby acquitted.
Wherefore this Court affirms the decision under appeal insofar as it imposes the death penalty on
appellant Oscar Caymo, but modifies the conviction of appellant Pancho Pelagio from robbery with
homicide to simple robbery under Article 294, paragraph 5, R.P.C., with the aforementioned
aggravating circumstances. Accordingly and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the said
appellant is hereby sentenced to a prison term of from four years and two months of prision
correccional to eight years and one day of prision mayor. The abovenamed appellants, moreover,
are hereby ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally the offended parties named in the decision
under appeal the sums therein stated. The indemnity for the death of Pat. Francisco Trinidad,
payable to his heirs, should be raised from P3,000.000 to P6,000.00 and charged alone against
appellant Oscar Caymo. Finally, the conviction of appellant Jose Guico is hereby set aside and let
judgment be entered acquitting him for the reasons given above. Costs against the appellants.
518
G.R. No. 99840 August 14, 1995

vs.
RODOLFO FEDERICO Y MEDIONA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The accused-appellant was charged with murder in Criminal Case No. 90-82576-SCC of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 49, under an information the accusatory portion of
which reads as follows:
That on or about March 17, 1990, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together with others whose true names, real identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon one Pastor Neil Escala y de Guzman by then and there stabbing him several times on
the different parts of his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon the said Pastor Neil Escala y de
Guzman mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter. Contrary
to law. 1
He was also charged with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 90-82577 for stabbing on the
same occasion Rogelio Fernando. These two cases were not, however, consolidated despite a
motion for that purpose. 2
After trial on the merits of the first case, the trial court, in a decision promulgated on 7 December
1990, 3 found the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to pay the heirs of the victim P16,980.00 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as indemnity for moral damages.
The trial court considered treachery as the qualifying circumstance in view of the "suddenness" of
the attack, leaving the victim "completely unaware of the intentions and actuations of Francisco
Mediona because, at the time, [the victim, Pastor Escala] was conversing with Rogelio Fernandez
and was thus unable to defend himself and prevent the attack on him by Francisco
Mediona." 4
The evidence for the prosecution as developed by the testimonies of its witnesses is summarized in
the Brief for the Appellee as follows:Sometime in February 1990, Rogelio Fernando, a tricycle driver
and Francisco Mediona, a Metro Aide, had an altercation resulting in one chasing the other (TSN,
May 28, 1990, pp. 15-16, 22). However, before the incident could worsen, Rogelio Fernando and
Francisco Mediona settled their differences before the Barangay Chairman of their place in Tondo,
519
Manila, in the presence of the mother of Rogelio Fernando and a Barangay Tanod and sealed it by
shaking hands (Ibid., pp. 15, 22-23). Rogelio Fernando believed then that was the end of his
differences with Francisco Mediona (Ibid.). He was wrong.
On March 17, 1990, between 8:00 and 8:30 p.m., Rogelio Fernando, Pastor Escala, one
Artemon and a certain Jun, all of whom were tricycle drivers, were in front of the bakery
owned by Benedicto Escala, the father of Pastor Escala, located at No. 212 Magsaysay
Street, corner Liwayway Street, Don Bosco, Tondo, Manila, conversing about tricycle
sidecars, while Marcelo Gallardo was seated as he used to in front of his house located eight
(8) meters away from Escala's bakery across the street, passing the time (tsn, May 28, 1990,
pp. 5-7, 21-22, 24, 26-27, 30-33, 35-36, 38-41, 44). The place was illuminated by a lighted
electric post about seven (7) to eight (8) meters from the bakery (Ibid., pp. 26-27, 35-36).
Although passenger jeepneys and other vehicles plied Magsaysay Street, however, there
were no vehicles passing at the time (Ibid., p. 38).
At that precise moment Marcelo Gallardo saw appellant Rodolfo Federico and the latter's
cousins Francisco Mediona and Ruben Mediona emerge from an alley across the street
going towards the direction of the bakery; then change their direction and go to a house
nearby (Ibid., pp. 35, 40-43). Not long after, appellant and his two cousins reappeared at
Magsaysay Street and proceeded towards the bakery (Ibid.). Francisco Mediona was holding
with his right hand a bladed knife similar to that used by butchers (Ibid., pp. 32, 44-45). At a
distance of about six (6) to seven (7) meters from the lighted electric post, the trio
momentarily stopped. Then Francisco Mediona, still armed with a knife, proceeded towards
the bakery where Rogelio Fernando, Pastor Escala, Artemon and Jun were still conversing;
while Ruben Mediona and appellant Rodolfo Federico, who both stayed behind, pulled out
from their pockets slings with darts and aimed the same towards the bakery, where Rogelio
Fernando's group was (Ibid., pp. 31, 35-36, 45, 48, 50). Francisco Mediona bought bread
from the bakery (Ibid., pp. 7, 17). After buying bread, Francisco Mediona suddenly and
without any warning stabbed Rogelio Fernando on the left side of the body, who was caught
by surprise and was hit between the armpit and left breast, and at the same time uttered
"malas mo, pare" (Ibid., pp. 7-8, 16-17, 32). Rogelio Fernando felt pains in his body and
instinctively fled from the scene before Francisco Mediona could finish him off (Ibid., p. 18).
He ran towards Magsaysay Street, but his path was blocked by Ruben Mediona and
appellant, who aimed their slings and darts at him (Ibid., p. 8-11). So he turned towards
Herbosa Street, Tondo, Manila, to avoid being hit by the darts of appellant and Ruben
Mediona (Ibid., p. 11). There, he met some friends who brought him to the Tondo Medical
Center for medical treatment (Ibid., pp. 11-12).
Meanwhile, immediately after he stabbed Rogelio Fernando, Francisco Mediona instantly

turned to Pastor Escala, held him by the hair, and stabbed him with his bladed knife ( Ibid.,
pp. 33-34, 51). Pastor Escala fell down on his back to the pavement and again Francisco
Mediona stabbed him (Ibid.). Marcelo Gallardo saw Francisco Mediona stabbing Pastor
Escala four (4) times on different parts of the body (Ibid.). After stabbing Pastor Escala,
Francisco Mediona defiantly hurled a challenge on anyone in the vicinity to a fight but
nobody took up his challenge (Ibid.). Thereupon, Francisco Mediona fled with the appellant
and Ruben Mediona (Ibid.).
Pastor Escala was rushed to the Mary Johnston Hospital where he was pronounced dead on
arrival by Dr. G. Uy, the hospital's surgeon-on-duty. 5
The autopsy conducted on Pastor Escala's body revealed that it bore six stab wounds which caused
his death. 6
The accused-appellant denied any participation in the commission of the crime and interposed alibi
to strengthen such denial. According to him, at 6:00 p.m. of 17 March 1990, he was in the house of
520
his cousin Elsa Mediona along Magsaysay Street, Tondo, Manila, which is about twenty arms-length
from the bakery. Shortly before 9:00 p.m. that evening, he noticed a commotion outside Elsa's house
and heard someone shouting, "May saksakan, may saksakan." When he went out of the house, he
heard people, say that Francisco Mediona stabbed somebody. He then returned to the house of
Elsa, but shortly thereafter, two policemen arrived, handcuffed him, and pushed him outside the
house. He told them that he had not done anything wrong, and when he asked why they arrested
him, they just told him to give his explanation at the police headquarters. At the police headquarters,
Patrolman Richard Lumbad tried to force him to admit that he killed Pastor Escala, but he refused to
do so.
Although the accused-appellant was not the one who stabbed the victim in this case, the trial court
convicted him as a principal on the basis of conspiracy established by the following facts, to wit: (a)
the accused-appellant and his cousins Francisco Mediona and Ruben Mediona emerged together
and at the same time from an alley nearby and went toward the bakery while the victim and his
companions were conversing in front of the bakery; (b) instead of proceeding directly to the bakery,
they first veered toward another direction and went to the house nearby (presumably Elsa Mediona's
house); (c) they reappeared after a while near the bakery where Francisco pretended to buy bread,
while the accused-appellant and Ruben, armed with slings and darts which they pointed at the
bakery, positioned themselves strategically along Magsaysay Street; (d) when Francisco was
receiving the bread, he suddenly stabbed Rogelio Fernando on the left side of his body, and after the
latter managed to escape, Francisco turned to Pastor Escala and stabbed him several times while
the accused-appellant and Ruben continued to aim their slings and darts at the bakery; (e) after
stabbing Escala, Francisco challenged every one in the area to a fight and since nobody dared to
accept the challenge, he left the scene together with the accused-appellant and Ruben Mediona.
The trial court concluded that by their acts, the accused-appellant and his cousins Francisco and
Ruben showed a common objective, that of killing Rogelio Fernando and Pastor Escala, and each of
them performed separate parts aimed at and to attain the same objective. Such acts were concerted
and cooperative in point of time and sequence, indicating concurrence of sentiments, sympathy and
determination.
In this appeal, the accused-appellant wants us to acquit him because the trial court:
ERRED IN CONVICTING [HIM] BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. . . AS PRINCIPAL OF

THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE FACT THAT HE HAD NOT CONSPIRED OR
COOPERATED WITH THE ASSAILANT IN STABBING THE VICTIM TO DEATH.
He does not, therefore, question the findings of the trial court that the crime committed for the killing
of Escala is murder. The only issue presented to us is whether there was conspiracy between the
accused-appellant and his cousin Francisco Mediona, the person who actually stabbed Escala. If
there was, the accused-appellant admits that he would be equally liable with Francisco; otherwise,
the latter alone should suffer the consequences for the criminal act.
Our own scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence for the prosecution fail to convince us
with moral certainty that the accused-appellant had conspired with his cousins Francisco Mediona
and Ruben Mediona to kill Pastor Escala.
The basis for the trial court's conviction of the accused-appellant was the existence of a conspiracy
between him, Ruben Mediona, and Francisco Mediona to kill both Rogelio Fernando and the victim
in this case, Pastor Escala. What the trial court overlooked, though is that the conspiracy which the
records and the evidence of this case show and which the prosecution successfully established is to
kill Fernando only and not Escala also.
It is very obvious that the accused-appellant and his cousins intended to harm Fernando because of
the bad blood that existed between the latter and Francisco Mediona due to a misunderstanding that
521
occurred a month before the incident which Francisco could not forget despite the amicable
settlement mediated by the barangay captain. The actions of the accused-appellant in arming
himself with a sling and darts which he aimed towards the bakery where Fernando and the others
were and in blocking the path of Fernando when the latter tried to run away from Francisco establish
his concurrence in the criminal purpose of Francisco, the actual assailant of Fernando. But with
respect to the stabbing of the victim herein, Pastor Escala, we find very tenuous and insufficient the
evidence of conspiracy. Conspiracy, just like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 7 And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts
done pursuant to the conspiracy; for other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-
conspirators or which are not the necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the
actual perpetrators are liable. 8 In such a case, the dictum that the act of one is the act of all does not
hold true anymore.
No reason, motive, or intent on the part of Francisco was shown or proved why he would stab
Escala. And there is no convincing evidence that the killing of Escala was part of the conspiracy to
kill Rogelio Fernando. Neither is there any indication that the accused-appellant was aware that
Francisco would attack Escala. Francisco stabbed Escala only after he had stabbed Rogelio
Fernando and the latter ran away. Why Francisco decided to also stab Escala is beyond our ken. We
could only surmise that Escala made a move which Francisco perceived as an act of aggression
against him because after repeatedly stabbing Escala, Francisco even challenged those around him
to a fight. 9 We cannot and should not assume that the accused-appellant had any inkling of what
Francisco was going to do at the time the latter turned against Escala. Because the conspiracy was
to kill Fernando only and the accused-appellant did not conspire with Francisco in the killing of
Escala, he cannot be held liable as a co-conspirator for the said killing.
In the absence of a conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the
commission of the crime, or community of criminal design the criminal responsibility arising from acts
directed against one and the same person is individual and not collective; each of the participants is
liable only for the acts committed by him. 10 The accused-appellant, by his actions while Francisco
was stabbing Escala, is liable for the latter's death, not as a co-principal however, but as an
accomplice under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code. It was established that at the time Francisco
attacked and stabbed Escala, the accused-appellant and Ruben Mediona remained standing in the
same place where they were when Francisco stabbed Fernando and still had their slings and darts
pointed at the people near the bakery. It is obvious then that at that particular instance, the accused-
appellant became aware of the intent of Francisco to kill Escala. Moreover, he cooperated in the
execution of Francisco's purpose and concurred therewith by pointing his sling and darts, either to
give moral support to Francisco or to deter the people from attacking him in retaliation for the
stabbing of Escala. Such cooperation, however, was not indispensable to the accomplishment of the
evil deed as to make him a co-principal.
Under Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon an accomplice in a
consummated crime is that next lower in degree to the one prescribed by law for the consummated
felony. The penalty prescribed by Article 248 at the time of the commission of the crime herein
was reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. 11 The penalty next lower in degree would
be prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum penalty which may be imposed upon the accused-appellant would be within the
range of the penalty next lower in degree to that of prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporalmedium which is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium, and its maximum
would be within the range ofprision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal medium. In view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, such maximum period shall be the medium
period of the prescribed, penalty. 12 Accordingly, the accused-appellant shall be sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty ranging from eight (8) years of prision mayoras minimum to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
522
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal
Case No. 90-82576-SCC is AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications on the extent of the accused-
appellant's criminal liability and the imposable penalty, and as modified, accused-appellant
RODOLFO FEDERICO Y MEDIONA is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
only as accomplice and his penalty is hereby reduced fromreclusion perpetua to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four
(4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Costs against the accused-appellant.SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILON LAGLIBA Y

ABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA, appellant.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is the appeal of appellant Rene Gayot Pilola for the reversal of the Decision [1] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 164, convicting him of murder, sentencing him to
suffer reclusion perpetua and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa y
Rulloda in the amount of P50,000 for the latters death.
The Indictment
On June 7, 1998, Edmar Aguilos, Odilon Lagliba y Abregon and appellant Rene Gayot Pilola
were charged with murder in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 1988 in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with one Ronnie Diamante who is still at-large and no fixed
address and mutually helping and aiding with one another, armed with double-bladed knives and a
bolo and with intent to kill, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault hack and stab one Joselito Capa y Rulloda, as a
result of which the latter sustained hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body, which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Of the three accused, Odilon Lagliba was the first to be arrested [3] and tried, and subsequently
convicted of murder.[4] The decision of the trial court became final and executory.Accused Edmar
Aguilos remains at large while accused Ronnie Diamante reportedly died a month after the
incident. Meanwhile, herein appellant Rene Gayot Pilola was arrested. He was arraigned on March
523
9, 1994, assisted by counsel, and pleaded not guilty to the charge. [5]Thereafter, trial of the case
ensued.
The Evidence of the Prosecution[6]
On February 5, 1988, at around 11:30 p.m., Elisa Rolan was inside their store at 613 Nueve de
Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City, waiting for her husband to arrive. Joselito Capa and Julian Azul,
Jr. were drinking beer. Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba arrived at the store. Joselito and Julian
invited them to join their drinking spree, and although already inebriated, the two newcomers
obliged. In the course of their drinking, the conversation turned into a heated argument. Edmar
nettled Julian, and the latter was peeved. An altercation between the two ensued. Elisa pacified the
protagonists and advised them to go home as she was already going to close up. Edmar and Odilon
left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned,
blocking their way. Edmar took off his eyeglasses and punched Julian in the face. Elisa
shouted: Tama na. Tama na. Edmar and Julian ignored her and traded fist blows until they reached
Aling Soteras store at the end of the street, about twelve to fifteen meters away from Elisas
store. For his part, Odilon positioned himself on top of a pile of hollow blocks and watched as Edmar
and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Joselitos
intervention apparently did not sit well with Odilon. He pulled out his knife with his right hand and
stepped down from his perch. He placed his left arm around Joselitos neck, and stabbed the
latter. Ronnie and the appellant, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the
victim and decided to join the fray. They pulled out their knives, rushed to the scene and stabbed
Joselito. Elisa could not tell how many times the victim was stabbed or what parts of his body were
hit by whom. The victim fell in the canal. Odilon and the appellant fled, while Ronnie went after Julian
and tried to stab him. Julian ran for dear life.When he noticed that Ronnie was no longer running
after him, Julian stopped at E. Rodriguez Road and looked back. He saw Ronnie pick up a piece of
hollow block and with it bashed Joselitos head. Not content, Ronnie got a piece of broken bottle and
struck Joselito once more.Ronnie then fled from the scene. Joselito died on the spot. Elisa rushed to
Joselitos house and informed his wife and brother of the incident. [7]
The next day, Dr. Bienvenido Muoz, Supervising Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito and prepared Autopsy Report No. N-
88-375,[8] with the following findings:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Pallor, conjunctivae and integument, marked and generalized.
Contused abrasions: temple, right, 3.0 x 3.0 cm.; mandibular region, right, 2.0 x 8.0 cm.; back,
suprascapular region, left, 3.0 x 4.0 cm.; deltoid region, right, 1.0 x 3.0 cm.
Lacerated wound, scalp, occipital region, 4.0 cm.
Incised wounds: forehead, right side, 5.5 cm.; arm, left, upper third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.
Stab wounds:
1. Elliptical, 1.8 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, medial extremity is sharp,
lateral extremity is blunt; located at the anterior chest wall, level of 3 rd intercostal space, right, 5.0
cm. from anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, non-penetrating, with an
approximate depth of 3.0 cm.;
524
2. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost horizontally, edges are clean-cut, one extremity is sharp and the
other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 3 rd intercostal space, left, 3.0 cm.
from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity,
penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an approximate depth of 10.0 cm.;
other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 4 th intercostal space, 12.0 cm.
from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating upper lobe of left
lung with an approximate depth of 9.0 cm.;
other is blunt; located at the antero-lateral aspect of chest, level of 5 th intercostal space, left, 15.0 cm.
from anterior median line; directed backward, downward and medially, penetrating the left thoracic
cavity and then lower lobe of left lung and then penetrating the left ventricle of the heart with an
approximate depth of 11.0 cm.;
other is blunt; located at the lateral chest wall, level of 7 th intercostal space, left, 16.0 cm. from
anterior median line; directed backward, upward and medially, into the left thoracic cavity and then
penetrating the lower lobe of left lung with an approximately depth of 10.0 cm.;
other is blunt; located at the lumbar region, left, 14.0 cm. from anterior median line; directed
backward, upward and medially, into the abdominal cavity and then penetrating ileum;
7. Elliptical, 1.5 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower
extremity is blunt; located at the chest, lateral, level of 9 th intercostal space, left; 14.0 cm. from
posterior median line; directed forward, upward and medially, non-penetrating with an approximate
depth of 4.0 cm.;
8. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower
extremity is sharp; located at the abdomen, postero-lateral aspect, 15.0 cm. from posterior median
line; directed forward, upward and laterally, into the abdominal cavity and then perforating the spleen
and pancreas with an approximate depth of 13.0 cm.;
9. Elliptical, 5.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is blunt, lower
extremity is sharp; located at the left arm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, downward and
medially, involving skin and underlying soft tissues with an approximate depth of 6.0 cm.;
10. Elliptical, 2.3 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity is sharp, lower
extremity is blunt; located at the left forearm, upper third, anterior; directed backward, upward and
medially and communicating with another wound, arm, left, medial aspect, 2.0 cm.;
11. Elliptical, 2.0 cm., oriented almost vertically, edges are clean-cut, upper extremity blunt, lower
extremity, sharp; located at the left arm, lower third, posterior aspect, directed forward, downward
and medially, communicating with another wound, arm, left, lower third, posterior aspect, 1.5 cm.
Hemothorax, left 900 c.c.
Hemopericardium 300 c.c.
Hemoperitoneum 750 c.c.
Brain and other visceral organs, pale.
525
Stomach-filled with rice and other food particles.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple stab wounds.
The Evidence of the Appellant
The appellant denied stabbing the victim and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that at
around 11:00 p.m. of February 5, 1988, he was in the house of his cousin, Julian Cadion, at 606
Nueve de Pebrero Street, Mandaluyong City. He suddenly heard a commotion coming from
outside. Julian rushed out of the house to find out what was going on. The appellant remained inside
the house because he was suffering from ulcer and was experiencing excessive pain in his
stomach. The following morning, the appellant learned from their neighbor, Elisa Rolan, that Joselito
had been stabbed to death. The appellant did not bother to ask who was responsible for the
stabbing.[9]
Julian alias Buboy Cadion corroborated the appellants testimony. He testified that the appellant
was in their house on the night of February 5, 1988, and was suffering from ulcer. The appellant
stayed home on the night of the incident. [10]
Agripina Gloria, a female security guard residing at Block 30, Nueve de Pebrero, 612, Int. 4,
Allison St., Mandaluyong City, testified that on February 5, 1988 at around 11:00 p.m., she heard a
commotion outside. Momentarily, she saw Ronnie rush into the kitchen of the house of her niece
Teresita; he took a knife and run towards Nueve de Pebrero Street where Edmar and Julian were
fighting. She then followed Ronnie and saw Joselito trying to pacify the protagonists.Ronnie grabbed
Joselito and instantly stabbed the latter, who for a while retreated and fell down the canal. Not
content, Ronnie repeatedly stabbed Joselito. Thereafter, Ronnie ran towards the direction of the
mental hospital. Agripina did not see Odilon or the appellant anywhere within the vicinity of the
incident.[11]
On May 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds RENE GAYOT PILOLA of 606 Nueve de Febrero Street,
Mandaluyong City, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, he is hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.Pilola is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of deceased Joselito
Capa alias Jessie in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity for his
death jointly and solidarily with Odilon Lagliba who was earlier convicted herein. With cost against
the accused.[12]
In the case at bar, the appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS CONSPIRACY ANENT THE
ASSAILED INCIDENT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ELISA ROLAN AND IN SETTING ASIDE THE
EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
526
THE TRIAL COURT MANIFESTLY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE
CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[13]
The appellant avers that Elisa is not a credible witness and her testimony is barren of probative
weight. This is so because she contradicted herself when she testified on direct examination that
Ronnie struck the head of the victim with a hollow block. However, on cross-examination, she stated
that it was Edmar who struck the victim. The inconsistency in Elisas testimony impaired her
credibility.
The contention of the appellant does not hold water.
First. The identity of the person who hit the victim with a hollow block is of de
minimisimportance. The victim died because of multiple wounds. The appellant is charged with
murder for the killing of the victim with a knife, in conspiracy with the other accused.
Second. The perceived inconsistency in Elisas account of events is a minor and collateral detail
that does not affect the substance of her testimony, as it even serves to strengthen rather than
destroy her credibility.[14]
Third. Elisa has been consistent in her testimony that the appellant was one of the men who
stabbed the victim, the others being Ronnie and Odilon. Elisas testimony is corroborated by the
autopsy report of Dr. Bienvenido Muoz and his testimony that the victim sustained eleven stab
wounds. The doctor testified that there were two or more assailants:
Q Could you tell the court what instrument could have been used by the perpetrator in
inflicting those two incise wounds?
A Those incise wounds were caused by a sharp instrument like a knife or any similar
instrument.
Q Now you also found out from the body of the victim eleven stab wounds?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, tell the court in which part of the body of the victim where these eleven stab
wounds [are] located?
A Shall I go one by one, all the eleven stab wounds?
Q All the eleven stab wounds?
A One stab wound was located at the front portion of the chest, right side. Another stab
wound was located also on the chest left side, another stab wound was located at the
antero lateral aspect, its the front of the chest almost to the side. And also another
one, also at the chest, another stab wound was at the left side of the chest and
another one was at the lumbar region of the abdomen left side or where the left kidney
is located, lumbar area. Another one at the side of the chest, left side of the
chest. Another stab wound in the abdomen, another stab wound at the left
arm. Another one at the left forearm and the last one in the autopsy report is located at
the left arm. These are all the eleven stab wounds sustained by the victim.
A The instrument used was a sharp pointed edge or a single bladed instrument like a knife,
kitchen knife, balisong or any similar instrument.
Q Considering the number of stab wounds, doctor, will you tell us whether there were
several assailants?
A In my opinion, there were more than one assailants (sic) here because of the presence of
different types of stab wounds and lacerated wounds. This lacerated wound could not
have been inflicted by the one holding the one which inflicted the instrument . .
(discontinued) which inflicted the stab wounds.
527
Q So there could have been two or three assailants?
A More than one.[15]
The physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of the veracity of Elisas testimony.
[16]
Fourth. Even the appellant himself declared on the witness stand that he could not think of any
reason why Elisa pointed to him as one of the assailants. In a litany of cases, we have ruled that
when there is no showing of any improper motive on the part of a witness to testify falsely against
the accused or to falsely implicate the latter in the commission of the crime, as in the case at bar, the
logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that the testimony is worthy of full faith
and credence.[17]
Fifth. The trial court gave credence and full probative weight to Elisas testimony. Case law has it
that the trial courts calibration of the testimonial evidence of the parties, its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and the probative weight thereof is given high respect, if not conclusive effect,
by the appellate court.
The appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and
Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He contends that for one to be a conspirator, his participation
in the criminal resolution of another must either precede or be concurrent with the criminal acts. He
asserts that even if it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the
victim, it was Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He could not
have conspired with Odilon as the incident was only a chance encounter between the victim, the
appellant and his co-accused. In the absence of a conspiracy, the appellant cannot be held liable as
a principal by direct participation. Elisa could not categorically and positively assert as to what part of
the victims body was hit by whom, and how many times the victim was stabbed by the appellant. He
asserts that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation.
We are not persuaded by the ruminations of the appellant.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit
it.[18] Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the
same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After
all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy. It may be inferred
from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that
they had acted with a common purpose and design. [19] Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that
two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in
fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence
of sentiment.[20] There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the
other offenders,[21] and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was
not in on the scheme from the beginning.[22] One need only to knowingly contribute his efforts in
furtherance of it.[23] One who joins a criminal conspiracy in effect adopts as his own the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators. If conspiracy is established, all the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the manner and extent of their participation since in contemplation of law, the
act of one would be the act of all. [24] Each of the conspirators is the agent of all the others. [25]
To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. [26] The mere presence of an
accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make
him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose. [27] Conspiracy to exist does not require an
agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy
exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and
were united in its execution.[28] As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of
528
conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together,
indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end. [29]
Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held
criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or
immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code:
Art. 4. Criminal liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is
sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victims death. Both the offenders are
criminally liable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts.
[30]
Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for
the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice,
under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code:
Art. 18. Accomplices. Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate
in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts.
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of
criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he
concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are
not indispensable to the commission of the crime. [31] Accomplices come to know about the criminal
resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to
commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its
execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to
the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. [32]However,
where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves
are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. [33]
In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie
were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and
Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective
knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from
the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian,
Ronnie returned to where Joselito fell and hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie
then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before, during, and after the
stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to kill the victim.
The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is no
evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was
already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in
stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated.
All things considered, we rule that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the
victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latters death. The appellant is not merely an
accomplice but is a principal by direct participation.
Even assuming that the appellant did not conspire with Ronnie and Odilon to kill the victim, the
appellant is nevertheless criminally liable as a principal by direct participation. The stab wounds
inflicted by him cooperated in bringing about and accelerated the death of the victim or contributed
materially thereto.[34]
529
The trial court correctly overruled the appellants defense of alibi. Alibi is a weak, if not the
weakest of defenses in a criminal prosecution, because it is easy to concoct but hard to disprove. To
serve as basis for acquittal, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence. For it to
prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was absent from the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission, but also that it was physically impossible for him to have been present then. [35] In
this case, the appellant avers that at the time of the stabbing incident, he was resting in the house of
his cousin at 606 Nueve de Pebrero Street as he was suffering from stomach pain due to his ulcer.
[36]
But the appellant failed to adduce any medical certificate that he was suffering from the
ailment. Moreover, Elisa positively identified the appellant as one of the men who repeatedly stabbed
the victim. The appellants defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive and straightforward
identification of the appellant as one of the victims assailants. The appellant himself admitted that his
cousins house, the place where he was allegedly resting when the victim was stabbed, was merely
ten to fifteen meters away from the scene of the stabbing. Indeed, the appellants defense of denial
and alibi, unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving and
cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive testimony of prosecution eyewitness
Elisa Rolan.[37]
The appellants defenses must crumble in the face of evidence that he fled from the situs
criminis and later left his house. The records show that despite being informed that he was sought
after by the authorities as a suspect for the killing of the victim, the appellant suddenly and
inscrutably disappeared from his residence at Nueve de Pebrero. As early as May 5, 1988, a
subpoena for the appellant was returned unserved because he was out of town. [38] The appellants
own witness, Julian Cadion, testified that the appellant had left and was no longer seen at Nueve de
Pebrero after the incident, thus:
Q So, how long did you stay at 606 Nueve de Pebrero after February 5, 1988?
A One week only, sir, and then three weeks after, I returned to Nueve de Pebrero.
Q The whole week after February 5, 1988, was Rene Pilola still living at 606 Nueve de
Pebrero?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.
Q And then three weeks thereafter, you went back to Nueve de Pebrero. Is that what you
were then saying?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, at the time that you went back to 606 Nueve de Pebrero, was Rene Pilola there?
A I did not see him anymore, sir.[39]
The records show that the appellant knew that he was charged for the stabbing of the
victim.However, instead of surrendering to the police authorities, he adroitly evaded arrest. The
appellants flight is evidence of guilt and, from the factual circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
no reason can be deduced from it other than that he was driven by a strong sense of guilt and
admission that he had no tenable defense. [40]
The Crime Committed by the Appellant

and the Proper Penalty Therefor
The trial court correctly convicted the appellant of murder qualified by treachery. Abuse of
superior strength likewise attended the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is the swift
and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. [41] In this
530
case, the attack on the unarmed victim was sudden. Odilon, without provocation, suddenly placed
his arm around the victims neck and forthwith stabbed the latter. The victim had no inkling that he
would be attacked as he was attempting to pacify Edmar and Julian. Ronnie and the appellant, both
also armed with deadly weapons, rushed to the scene and stabbed the victim, giving no real
opportunity for the latter to defend himself. And even as the victim was already sprawled on the
canal, Ronnie bashed his head with a hollow block. The peacemaker became the victim of violence.
Unquestionably, the nature and location of the wounds showed that the killing was executed in a
treacherous manner, preventing any means of defense on the part of the victim. As testified to by Dr.
Bienvenido Muoz, the victim was stabbed, not just once, but eleven times mostly on the chest and
the abdominal area. Six of the stab wounds were fatal, causing damage to the victims vital internal
organs.[42]
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery. [43]There is
no mitigating circumstance that attended the commission of the felony. The penalty for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Since no aggravating and
mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the proper penalty is reclusion
perpetua, conformably to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.
Civil Liabilities of the Appellant
The trial court correctly directed the appellant to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselita Capa the
amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto, in accord with current jurisprudence. [44] The said
heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000, also conformably to current
jurisprudence.[45] In addition, the heirs are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.
[46]
WHEREFORE, the Decision, dated May 3, 1995, of Branch 164 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 73615, finding appellant Rene Gayot Pilola GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The appellant is
hereby directed to pay to the heirs of the victim Joselito Capa the amount of P50,000 as civil
indemnity; the amount of P50,000 as moral damages; and the amount of P25,000 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED.
531
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-8187 January 29, 1913

vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.
Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder, and sentencing him to be
hanged.
The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of Parang. He is alleged
to have committed the murder by inducement. The proofs tend to demonstrate that on the 24th day
of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The
following day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the house, whereupon the
accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the
presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in
the afternoon. Sariol remained there with his hands tied behind his back until night, when the
accused, in the presence of several witnesses, ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery
and there killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an order to that effect from the
governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time that Sariol was killed,
and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the work being well done, the accused ordered
Akiran to take his (the accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the
cemetery, in an isolated spot a considerable distance from the road and about 200 yards from the
nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the first blow with his bolo, while Akiran joined in
and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed had his hands tied behind his back.
On returning to the house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding told the accused that
Sariol had been killed, whereupon the accused said that it was all right and appeared to be very
much pleased.
The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the recognized headman of Parang,
and it appears from the testimony of the witnesses, Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very
powerful influence over them, hence this power over them was such that any order issued by him
had the force and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the witnesses testified: "He (the accused)
knows what is good and what is bad, and he is the headman of the governor. He is headman of
532
Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There
is none, only himself." He further said: "The people do not hesitate to take his orders because he is
the headman of the governor." Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get angry with the
people, what would he do to them?" this witnesses answered: "I do not know; might kill them."
Another witness, answering the question as to why he did not run away instead of going to the
Chinese cemetery as the accused ordered him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well,
take the same thing as the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do it." Prior to
this time the same witness had said: "If a chief says anything to a man like me and tells me it is by
order of the governor and that he has a warrant there, well, a man like me does what he tells me."
Another witness declared: "I am afraid of him. I did not believe that he would make me do anything
unjust." The same witness afterwards testified in answer to the question: "Would you have killed this
man if any other person besides Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would not."
Another witness declared: "Well, he was the headman. It was the headman's orders, and if we did
not do it, he would get angry with us." This witness, answering the question, "Did Panglima make
you think that he was acting under the orders of the Government in causing this man to be killed?"
testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question, "And you thought that it was a legal
execution, did you?" answered, "Yes, because he (the accused) is not afraid of the governor."
We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who, at his orders, killed
the deceased was such as to make him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such
orders.
Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime "who directly
force or induce others to commit it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:
They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for
example, with a pistol in hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit
the crime. In our commentary on paragraph 9 of article 8 (page 28), we have already said
that he who suffers violence acts without will and against his will, is no more than an
instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty
persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime.
One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by

any other similar act which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and which
was done for the purpose of inducing such criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose.
We have already seen in our commentary on paragraph 12 of article 8 that the one who
physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he acted
with due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the
one who orders, that is, upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to
commit the act. But in case the obedience of the inferior is not due to the superior and
therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore, exempt him from criminal responsibility as
the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly induced him to the
criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime.
The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand which commits the
crime makes him who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime
by direct inducement, because without such offer or promise the criminal act would never
have been committed. But this does not mean that the one who actually commits the crime
by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal responsibility;
on the contrary, we have already seen in our comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that
such circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime.
533
We have heretofore said that in addition to the precepto and the pacto there are similar
means by which another may be induced to commit a crime which also make the one who
offers the inducement the principal in the crime by virtue of the provisions of article 13,
paragraph 2. But it must be borne in mind that theseacts of inducement do not consist in
simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simplewords uttered at the
time the act was committed. Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act,
an inducement condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the
Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or
such words have a great dominance and great influence over the person who acts; it is
necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or
as violence itself.
The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the principles involved and their
application to particular cases:
It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who, during a riot in which a person
was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing that he did anything
more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide
by inducement, the court saying that, "considering that, although the phrases pronounced were
imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be considered the
principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred from such
phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the
criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed."
In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid down that "a person who
advised a married woman whose husband was very stingy and treated her badly that the only thing
for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of the crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that
imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."
In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who simply said to his son who
was at the time engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the
injuries committed after such advice was given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being
held in mind that the inducement to the commission of the crime by means of which a person may
be considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the act itself can only be founded
in commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so powerful that it alone
produces the criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez,
inasmuch as the circumstances which surrounded the event at the time do not appear in sufficient
detail to show with clearness the effects which the words produced, or the relative situation of the
deceased and of the one who killed him, or the point to which the fight had progressed at the time
the words were spoken. Moreover, the decision of the court below does not show sufficient facts
upon which to affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke
the words referred to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to use said weapon."
In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of having proposed to other
persons the abstraction of the tickets which were the subject matter of the robbery, at the same time
telling them the place where they were to be found, does not constitute inducement to commit the
robbery because the proposal to commit the robbery was not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause
of the crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been committed without it; nor was the
indication of the place where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to induce the robbery."
The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing concrete cases in which
the acts of the accused were not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute inducement. They not
only lay down the legal principles which govern in prosecutions of this character, but they also
illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those principles to actual cases.
534
The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the acts of the accused
constitute inducement under the law and illustrate the application of the principles to concrete cases.
In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court were: "It appeared that Lulu,
who was living with Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town of X, gave birth to a child on the
morning of the 28th of March, the offspring of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously
agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to William as soon as it was born, with
instructions to deposit it in some frequented place so that it might be found and taken up; but Joe
changed his mind and handed the child over to the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it
whatever you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually did." Under the
facts the accused was held guilty by inducement.
In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a woman who, living with
a man in scandalous concubinage in the presence of a daughter who continually manifested her
disgust and repugnance for such conduct, conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred
and conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious methods, obtaining for that purpose
poison and various deadly weapons, and contriving that she and her family and all of the tenants in
the house should go to the theater on an evening during which the daughter was sick and obliged to
remain at home, in order that her lover might be entirely undisturbed in killing the daughter and that
he might not be surprised in the act, such woman is the author and principal of the crime the same
as her lover who actually committed the deed."
In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes advantage of his position as
an inspector for the maintenance of public peace and proposes to a private citizen the perpetration
of a robbery, with the threat that unless he did commit the robbery he would be arrested as an
escaped prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the officers from the vicinity of the place to
be robbed, and who after the robbery received a part of the booty, was guilty of the crime as
principal, although he did not take personal part therein."
In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a barrio who, accompanied by
a number of peace officers, ordered them to stop certain music that was being played in the public
street, and after the order had been obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons expressed
his resentment against the act whereupon the alcalde ordered the peace officers to attack the man,
which they did, inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by
inducement."
In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from the balcony of his house
cried out in a loud voice to his sons who were fighting with others to kill those with whom they were
fighting before they were killed themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big thing as a
little, was guilty of the crime oflesiones graves by inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under
such orders."
In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the inducement and the
commission of a crime whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same extent and effect as if
he had physically committed the crime exist merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or
agreement for a consideration, or through influence so effective that it alone determines the
commission of the crime."
In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the proposition that the secretary of
theayuntamiento who induced a certain persons to form new lists of compromisarios five days prior
to the election of senators was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists, saying: "It
appearing and it being a fact proved that the secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio
Dura, induced the members of the council to commit the act stated, his participation as principal in
the commission of the act is well established according to the provisions of paragraph 2, article 13,
of the Penal Code, because such inducement coming from a person of such influence as the
535
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered sufficiently dominant to turn the
mind of those induced."
In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a woman who was at enmity
with an uncle for having refused to renounce in her favor a donation which a relative had given to
him, who made frequent threats to kill the uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum
of money together with the land involved in the donation if he would kill the uncle, and who told her
son that, if they were unable to get anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do it himself as he would
thus inherit 15,000 pesetas with which they could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he
must leave the house because he was a coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of murder
committed by the son under such inducement. The court said: "It being borne in mind that the
suggestions with which the mother moved the mind of her son to kill the uncle had the force of a real
inducement and inclined and decided the will of the son by means of the relations which she bore to
him as well as the reward which she held up before him."
In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as principal in a crime, him who,
"by direct and influential means and taking advantage of the inexperience of a boy of tender age,"
induces him to commit a crime, was warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the fact that
the inducement exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the
jewels in question from his grandmother's house shows such a direct and inducing cause of the
criminal act that without such inducement the crime would not have been committed."
In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement referred to in paragraph 2,
article 13, of the Penal Code exists whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime
is determined by the influence of the inducer over the mind of him who commits the act, whatever be
the source of such influence."
In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the "principal by inducement
in five different larcenies, it having been proved that the inducer, knowing that the oil which was
brought to her for sale was stolen by the persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them
thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels in which to carry it and contributed on
five different occasions to the realization of the larcenies, it appearing that the physical authors of the
crime were boys under 15 years of age and that they acted upon the suggestions of the inducer
without discernment or judgment of their own," the court saying that in view of the fact that she knew
that the oil which she first purchased from the boys was stolen oil, that the boys were less than 15
years of age, and therefore easily led, that she furnished the vessels in which to carry the stolen
property all indicate conclusively that the five crimes were committed by the influence exercised
by the woman, which inducement was not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but was
that which determined its commission."
In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command of a master to his
servant, by reason of the special relations which exist between them, contains the elements of
inducement which makes the master who orders such servant to cut wood belonging to a third
person, in order that he might benefit thereby, the principal of the crime committed by such servant,"
the court saying that "in view of the fact that the command of the master to the servant, made within
the sphere and under the ordinary conditions of domestic life, when they relate to acts simple and
apparently legitimate, contains the necessary elements, directly and sufficiently efficacious, of
inducement according to the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, it appearing
that the master, taking advantage of the ascendency and authority which he naturally must exercise
over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry away wood from land which he knew did not
belong to him, without disclosing to the servant that circumstance, which concealment gave rise to
the influence which the master exercised over the servant in that particular act."
The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply the foregoing principles
to particular cases.
536
In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that one of the
defendants conceived the idea of the robbery of a warehouse and assisted in procuring false keys
with which to open it. He took no immediate part in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion
said:
These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-
Yoc, as the instigator of the crime herein prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the
robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea of its commission, and, being unable or
unwilling to carry it out himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the material execution
of the crime by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to steal.
The better to induce him to commit the offense, he clearly demonstrated how easily it could
be accomplished, instructed him as to the best means of carrying it out, and offered him
money to pay for the false key. He thus removed all the difficulties in the way of
determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in question. These acts
constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said robbery, and place
the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13
of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that the accused
induced certain Igorrotes to kill a third person by holding up before them the fact that by such act
they would be able to obtain P40 which was then in the house of the victim, as well as the carabao
which he owned, saying to them, "If you go to work you only make a little; it is better to kill this man
and take his carabao and the P40 which was received from the sale of the house in town." They
having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the proposed victim and having returned and
explained why they had not been able to kill them, the accused said to them: "Why did you eat my
chickens if you are not going to do what I told you to do. I came here to spend the night in
Cambaguio because I thought you were going to kill them." The Igorrotes then spent three days
clearing some land for another person from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the third day
of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now you must repeat what I told you to do, and
comply with our agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You
go to the bushes and conceal yourselves in the same place you were concealed before." The
murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts and inducer of the crime, and that he was
liable as principal. (Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of January, 1887, 12th of
January, 1889.)
In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared that the accused had
a conversation with Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he knew Antonio
Gavato and his associates, to which he replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to
confer upon you a commission, which is as follows: Order must be disturbed in the cockpit of
Gavato, and when you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant to obey
this order, but defendant gave him something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and then
he gave him a bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I have ordered and in case you incur any
responsibility I will be responsible to the court, and as soon as you wound any person or persons,
return to me and I will defend you." The court held that these facts constituted sufficient inducement
to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code.
In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:
Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman, and more or less
dependent upon his uncle for subsistence. On the other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when
this crime was committed, a man of great influence in Escalante. He had a great number of
people working for him, one of whom was his nephew Mauricio. He was the local political
leader of his party. One of his nephews was president of the town. He had two brothers-in-
law in the municipal council. Of his nephews, one was chief of police and two others were
members of the police force. He had acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred toward the
537
Roman Catholic Church and the Spanish friars and priests. He called a meeting in his own
house on the afternoon of May 15, where the question of murdering the priest was
discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting. He dominated all who were present. He
selected his nephew Mauricio to commit the crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio,
immediately after murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle Gil and reported
the fact. The influence exercised by Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great and powerful
that the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That Mauricio was directly induced to murder
the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can be no question.
In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was held that the "one
who employs an innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal, although he does nothing
himself in the actual commission of the crime."
In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that "a married woman
suggested to her paramour, with whom she had been maintaining illicit relations that he kill her
husband in order that thereafter they might live together freely. The paramour acting upon these
suggestions and actuated by a desire to possess the woman for himself without the interference of
the husband, killed him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their escape and lived together
as man and wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:
We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully established por
pacto (for a consideration); that is to say, on the understanding that the woman would live in
illicit relations with the murderer after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by
precept) which constituted "a real, intentional, direct and efficacious exciting inducement
(excitacion) to commit the crime." The propositions and suggestions of the woman
constituted something more than mere counsel or advice which her co-defendant was
entirely free to accept or not, in that they were coupled with a consideration which, in view of
the relations existing between them, furnished a motive strong enough to induce the man to
take the life of her husband; and for the further reason that due to these illicit relations she
had required such an influence over her co-defendant that her insistent suggestions that he
commit the crime had a marked and controlling influence upon his mind.
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that the accused
proposed to his companions an assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa; that armed with
a talibon he accompanied them during the assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood
watch at the foot of the stairs of said house so that his companions would not be caught, and that,
finally, he accompanied them to the place where the deceased was killed. These facts were held by
the court to be sufficient to make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by direct
participation.
In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not
seem to have existed, however, any official relation between the accused and the persons whom he
induced to kill Sariol. While he appears to have been the headman of Parang, those whom he
induced held no official position under him and owed him, legally speaking, no obedience. According
to tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been a person whose word was law
and whose commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to those who
physically committed the crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring,
the acts committed, and urged upon them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of the
Government. This representation was false, but it produced the same effect as if it had been true. It
cannot be doubted that the accused knew the representation was false and purposely and
intentionally made it as an additional factor going to insure obedience to his orders.
Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts of the accused
within the definition of inducement by command, and we do not believe there is, there would still
remain all of the elements necessary to qualify the crime as murder by inducement. From the
538
authorities heretofore cited and the principles laid down therein as those which must govern in the
determination of whether or not the acts of an accused constitute inducement under the law, it may
be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a
nature and made in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such
inducement was offered with the intention of producing that result, then the accused is guilty by
inducement of the crime committed by the person so induced. The inducement to the crime must be
intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in view.
The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there exists on the
part of the inducer the most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the
commission of the crime, together with the presentation to the person induced of the very strongest
kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the result of indiscretion or lack of
reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or temptation. A
chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a
thoughtless act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for
some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed
the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it
produce a result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the
extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid
down to concrete cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made directly
with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the
determining cause of the crime.
In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the persons who actually
committed the crime that he had an order from the Government requiring the death of Sariol and that
they were under obligation to carry out that order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement
was offered by the accused directly to the persons interested with the intention of moving them to do
his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal act. While it may be said,
and is true, that the personal commands of the accused were entirely sufficient to produce the
effects which actually resulted and that such commands may be considered the moving cause of the
crime, still there is no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation that the accused had in his
possession an order from the Government commanding the death of Sariol was also of material
influence in effecting the death; and where two fundamental causes work together for the production
of a single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction upon one theory and the other
upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.
There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There were present, also, the
aggravating circumstances of desplobado and nocturnity.
We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well founded, and we
accordingly affirm the same, with costs.
539
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42476 July 24, 1935

vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO CORTESANO, defendants-
appellants.
Jose Ma. Capili and Habana and Quimpo for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding them guilty of
frustrated homicide, with the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken of their superior
strength, and sentencing each of them to suffer an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision
correccional to twelve years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel Pulido jointly and severally in the
sum of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the corresponding
costs.
The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is that the lower court erred
in convicting the appellants, and in not acquitting them with the costs de oficio.
The first question to be considered is the participation of the several defendants in the commission
of the crime.
It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano
were working on the hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi
Omine, who was the overseer or manager, with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross receipts.
The four defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.
Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through the plantation.
According to the offended party he refused to grant this request because there was already an
unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the other hand contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission
requested and he began work on December 24, 1933. When Angel Pulido and his son, Hilario,
accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan, were returning home from the
cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants had been destroyed for
the purpose of opening a new road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido and
his party went to the house of the defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is a sharp
conflict in the evidence as to what followed. The witnesses for the prosecution contend that while the
offended party was talking with Omine, Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, but was prevented by
540
Hilario Pulido; that Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound him except
on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano then held Angel Pulido by the arms, and
when Eduardo Autor approached, Omine shouted to him "pegale y matale", and Autor struck Angel
Pulido in the breast with his bolo.
Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand maintain that the offended party
and his son were the aggressors; that the first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to
Kiichi Omine an offensive epithet and asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck
him in the breast with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo Autor attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido
and his son attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with brass knuckles; that
Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was wounded by Eduardo Autor;
that Kiichi Omine never uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.
The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his son, and a Bagobo, named
Saito, who was their relative and lived with them. Barabadan was not presented as a witness. The
witnesses for the defense were the four appellants.
The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was struck by Eduardo
Autor. The anger of Angel Pulido and his son was, however, directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine,
who was responsible for the destruction of the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy
among the defendants, but the offended party and his son and his relative, Saito, narrated the facts
of the incident in such away that all the four defendants would appear to be equally responsible for
the injury sustained by the offended party. The evidence does not convince us that Ladion and
Cortesano took any part in the fight; on the contrary it inclines us to believe that they ran away and
were not present when Angel Pulido was wounded. This impression is strengthened by the fact that
they were not included in the original complaint subscribed and sworn not by the offended party on
December 29th. They were not included as defendants until the amended complaint was filed on
February 19, 1934. But if they were present and held the offended party by the arms, as alleged by
him, the evidence does not show that they held him for the purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to
strike him with his bolo. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for the purpose of preventing
the offended party and his son from continuing their attack on Omine. There was no need for Ladion
and Cortesano to hold Angel Pulido in order to enable Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo, or
for Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y matale". According to the witness for
the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck each other in the face with their
fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario Pulido with his
bolo. Angel Pulido would naturally intervene in the fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if
he did so, Autor, who had already drawn his bolo, would strike him without the need of any
inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances of this case, even if it were
satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in question, we are of the opinion that they
would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not appear that the
words uttered by Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first place, as we
have indicated, Eduardo Autor had already other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is
alleged to have uttered the words of inducement. In the second place, the words in question were
not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the offended party with his bolo.
Although Eduardo Autor was working under the direction of Omine, apparently according to the
testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any
particular influence over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited by the Solicitor-General of a father giving
orders to his son are obviously different from the case at bar.
541
In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held that in order that a
person may be convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be made
directly with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement be the
determining cause of the commission of the crime. In that case various decisions of the Supreme
Court of Spain illustrating the principles involved and their application to particular cases were cited
with approval. One of the decisions cited was that of April 24, 1871, where it was held that one who,
during a riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not
appearing the he did anything more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not
guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement. The Supreme Court of Spain said: "Considering that,
although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent
that they may be considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and
must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not have been
performed." Another decision cited was that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a father
who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in combat with another. "Hit him! Hit him!",
was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given.
Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code without change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order that, under the provisions
of the Code, such act can be considered direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such
words have great dominance and great influence over the person who acts, that it is necessary that
they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as violence itself. (2
Viada, 386, 5th Edition.)
We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the
injury inflicted by him on Angel Pulido.
The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the wound of the offended party,
found that it was the intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the offended party, and
accordingly found said defendant guilty of frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does
not justify this finding. It is true that the wound was serious and in a vital part of the body, but judging
from the nature of the wound, which was about eleven inches in length, extending from the breast to
the lower ribs on the right side, we think it is probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a
downward stroke. It was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and without
being aimed at any particular part of the body. As we have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the
offended party only once. This fact tends to show that it was not his intention to take the offended
party's life. If he had so intended, he could easily have accomplished his purpose, so far as the
record shows. It might be contended that Eduardo Autor did not strike the offended party a second
time, because he thought that he had already killed him. This was apparently the theory of the
prosecution, because the offended party and his witnesses testified that the offended party dropped
down unconscious when he was wounded, but the evidence does not seem to us to sustain that
contention. In the first place a cutting wound like that in question would not ordinarily render the
injured man immediately unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses for the prosecution,
that Angel Pulido did not fall down unconscious; but swayed and asked for help, while the blood was
flowing from his breast and stomach; that Saito approached the wounded man to support him and
take him home.
542
It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the result unless the intent
to kill is manifest.
When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an act which was not
realized, the facts from which it is claimed that intention sprang must be such as to exclude all
contrary supposition. When this intention is not necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by
the defendant, greater importance should not be given to such acts than that which they in
themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be extended beyond that which is actually
involved in the material results of his act. Intention may only be deduced from the external acts
performed by the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a definite result, the courts
cannot, without clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other result was intended. (U.S. vs.
Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)
There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was accidentally wounded in a
struggle for the possession of the offended party's bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of
Autor, Exhibit E, executed on December 26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his bolo
and struck Angel Pulido in the stomach because Pulido was very aggressive.
We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves, since the offended
party was incapacitated for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than ninety days,
and not of frustrated homicide.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion,
and Agapito Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As
to the appellant Eduardo Autor, the decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of
lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight months, and twenty-one days of prision
correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the
corresponding costs. In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to
be served by him is fixed at one year of prision correccional
543
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988

vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is constitutionally
presumed innocent, depends upon the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the
defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his prosecution for murder with assault upon a
person in authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even stronger by the defense itself.
As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to Napoleon Montealegre was
committed as follows:
At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilia was eating at the Meding's
Restaurant in Cavite City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table.
Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car
whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his vehicle, Camantigue joined Abadilla in the
restaurant and soon thereafter the two smelled marijuana smoke from the table occupied by Vicente
Capalad and the accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared both of
them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' Forcing them up, he asked the waitress ff she knew
them but the waitress said she did not. 1 Then the mayhem began.
While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad with his left
hand, Capalad suddenly and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a scabbard tucked in the right
side of his waist and started stabbed Camantigue in the back. 2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to
draw the gun from his holster but Montealegre, thus released, restrained Camantigue's hand to
prevent the latter from defending himself Montealegre used both his hands for his purpose 3 as
Capalad continued stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three fen to the floor
and Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered toward the door. Camantigue fired
and, continuing the pursuit outside, fired again. 5 Capalad fled into a dark alley. Camantigue
abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to a hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in the
alley with a bullet wound in Ms chest. Neither Camantigue nor Capalad survived, both expiring the
following day. 6
The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7 Having been informed of the
incident, Capt. Cipriano Gilera of the Cavite police immediately organized a team that went to look
for him that very night. 8 They did not find him in his house then but he was apprehended in the
544
morning of March 12,1983, on board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He gave his name as Alegre but
later admitted he was the fugitive being sought. 9
Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testified that death was
caused by shock due to massive internal hemorrhage caused by seven stab wounds affecting the
heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and diaphragm. 10 The weapon used was 6" in length and
about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and the blood found on it was analyzed as human. 11 The stabbing
incident was narrated in detail at the trial by Abadilla, 12 who was corroborated by Generoso San
Juan. 13
On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre prevented Camantigue from drawing his
pistol while he was being stabbed by Capalad, demonstrating with the aid of court personnel the
relative positions of the three during the incident. 14
On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more emphatically, thus:
Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue upon drawing
his gun, what happened to Camantigue?
A. He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense because he was being
held by Montealegre and he was being stabbed at the back. 15
He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of the accused-appellant
Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at the back, accused
Montealegre was being held by Pfc. Camantigue at that time?
A. Yes, sir.
Q And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of Camantigue at that time?
A. Yes sir.
Q And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir, he knew. 16
In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared:
Q. And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to draw gun,
Montealegre grabbed the hand of Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. With what hand?
A. Both hands, sir.
545
Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?
A. No. sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.
Q. With both hands?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands rights hand of Camantigue?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both hands the hand of
Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?
17
A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor.
San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct examination.
Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was Montealegre?
A. He was on the right side.
Q. What was he doing at that time?
A. When Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun but Montealegre
held his hand.
Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?
A. No. sir.
Q. What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun? They slammed down
on the floor and when they were already on the floor, I ran away because I was
already figures lightened. 18
The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he insisted:
A. When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre suddenly held the
hand of Camantigue.
Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue, what happened
to Camantigue?
546
A. He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was holding his hand,
Capalad was stabbing him at the back. 19
And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows:
Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while Montealegre was holding
the right hand of the policeman to prevent him from drawing his gun?
A. Yes, sir. 20
The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in confinning his own guilt. He
claimed he ran away before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of denials, evasions,
contradictions, claims of ignorance and forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have
the ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the kind of defense he offered to exculpate
himself from the charge established against him by the prosecution.
Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad, what happened if
any?
A. Camantigue pulled his gun.
Q. What happened after that?
21
A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened.
xxx xxx xxx
A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really happened.
Q. Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?
A. I did not see. 22o
xxx xxx xxx
Q. From whom did you come to know that Pfb. Camantigue shot and killed Vicente
Capalad?
A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that Camantigue killed
Capalad. 23
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc.Camantigue was holding both of you,
did you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc. Camantigue?
547
A. I did not see anything. 24
xxx xxx xxx
Q. And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue while Capalad was
on the left side?
A. I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the left.
Q. But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of Camantigue?
A. I am not sure if that is the right side.
Q. But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster were placed?
25
A. I cannot remember.
It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was happening on that
evening of March 11, 1983. As one of the principal figures of the stabbing incident, he could not have
not known, nor could he later not remember, that startling event that even more onlookers could not
forget. The evidence has established that the accused-appellant was directly and personally
involved and was in fact one of the two persons held by the victim when he was stabbed. Yet
Montealegre would now insist, quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that
night.
If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would have been less likelihood
of Capalad's attack as Camantigue's attention would have been fully concentrated on his lone
captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing to restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol
and defending himself against Capalad if the accused-appellant had, by his own account, already
escaped before the stabbing.
It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the accused-appellant did was
attempt to hide, only to be found the following morning on board a bus bound for outside Cavite City.
When apprehended, he first gave a false name before he finally admitted his Identity, thus beginning
the mesh of contradictions, admissions and denials, in which he would enshare himself.
The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the time of the stabbing, the
victim was in uniform and, therefore, could easily be recognized as a person in authority. Several
witnesses testified as to his attire when he was killed. 26 And even assuming that the victim was in
civilian clothes on that tragic night, the record shows that no less than the accused-appellant himself,
replying to questions put to him by the prosecution, declared twice that he knew the victim to be a
policeman. 27
The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad
in the killing of the police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing
Camantigue seven times and the accused-appellant holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him
from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true that the accused- appellant did not
himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having prevented
548
Camantigue from resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by
indispensable cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.
As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal
resolution, that is, there is either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention
immediately before the commission of the crime charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of
the offense by performing another act without which it would not have been accomplished.
The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence correspondence of a prior
agreement between Capalad and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of
such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view, which conforms to our consistent holding on this
matter:
Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred from the acts of the
appellants. It is enough that, at the time the offense was committed, participants had the
same purpose and were united in its execution; as may be inferred from the attendant
circiumstances. 29
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill Regino Bautista. The
whole incident happened because the accused came upon Bautista and Mallabo fishing
within or near the fishpond enclosure of Carlo Aquino which was under the care of Vicente
Cercano.
But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be established, it is not
necessary or essential that there be a previous plan or agreement to commit the assault; it
is sufficient that at the time of the aggression all the accused by their acts manifested a
common intent or desire to attack Bautista and Mallabo, so that the act of one accused
became the act of all. 30
If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards accomplishment of the
same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent,
were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and
concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among
them to concert is proven. A conspiracy only be entered into after the commencement of
overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime. 31
As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:
There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from behind when the
latter was stabbed by his collaborated Victor Buduan, was a positive act towards the
realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as
instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that had not appellant held both arms of the victim
from behind, the latter could have partied the thrust or even run away from his assailant. By
immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and although there was no anterior
conspiracy , the two cousins showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediateIy
before the actual stabbing. 32
549
xxx xxx xxx
It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized the running decedent in
such a manner that the latter could not even move or tum around. This enabled the
pursuing Labis, who was armed with a drawn bolo and was barely five meters away from
the decedent, to finally overtake him and stab him at the back with hardly any risk at all.
Cabiles therefore performed another act-holding the decedentwithout which the crime
would not have been accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable
cooperation. 33
The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the
complex crime of murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon a person in authority.
Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty imposed upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus the civil indemnity, which is hereby increased to
P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical and fimeral expenses in the sum of P37,380.00 as proved at
the trial.
Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty while enforcing the law
against the abuse of dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no less than seven vicious stabs by
a man who, by his own admission, was at the time of the incident "burned" on marijuana. The kiner
also eventually succumbed, and that made the second life needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug
addiction. There was another Iife also ruined, this time of the 28 year-old accused-appellant himself,
although, fortunately for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever foreclosed. In the
somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he has done, he may yet find his
ultimate redemption in rehabilitation and remorse.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified, without any

pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-5241 November 19, 1909
550
vs.
LINO EGUIA LIM BUANCO (alias LIM BUANCO) and LUCIANO DE LOS REYES, defendants-
appellants.
O'Brien and De Witt for appellant Lim Buanco.

Felipe Buencamino for appellant Luciano de los Reyes.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for appellee.
ELLIOTT, J.:
The defendants, Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes, were
charged with and convicted of the crime of estafa. The information is identical in language with that
on which the same defendants were convicted in the case of the United States vs. Lino Eguia Lim
Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240 (filed herewith) 1, except that it
charges the obtaining of the sum of 1,000 pesos upon a check for that amount, bearing date of
October 6, 1906. In the other case the money was obtained on a check for 2,000 pesos.
In this case the demurrers to the information were overruled, and separate trials were granted to the
defendants. They were both convicted, and on January 16, 1909, were sentenced to six months of
arresto mayor in the publiccrcel of Bilibid, in the city of Manila, the sentence to become operative
and to take effect at the expiration of the sentence imposed the same day in the case entitled The
United States vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240
above referred to, and that they jointly and separately indemnify the Banco Espaol-Filipino in the
sum of P1,136.50, equivalent to 5,682.50 pesetas, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary
imprisonment for the time and in the manner and place prescribed by law, and that each defendant
pay one-half costs of this case.
The facts as found by the trial court and justified by the evidence, are as follows:
For at least three and half year prior to the 6th day of October, 1906, Luciano de los Reyes was
employed in the Banco Espaol-Filipino, and there served and acted as bookkeeper and check
registry clerk. During that time he was in charge of certain current account books of the bank, and it
was his duty to inspect certain checks presented to the bank for payment, including those drawn by
Lim Buanco; to examine the account of the maker of each of said checks, and to determine whether
or not the drawer of the check had a sufficient balance to his credit to require the payment of the
check. In the performance of these duties Reyes was required to indorse upon each check, if it was
entitled to payment, the words "Corriente, P. O. Luciano de los Reyes." After the check was marked
in this manner it was passed to the cashier of the bank, who, in reliance upon the indorsement, paid
or ordered the same to be paid.
During the period referred to the defendant Lim Buanco had an account with the bank, and drew
large sums of money therefrom, by means of checks signed by him, and inspected and indorsed as
above by Reyes. During this time a conspiracy existed between the defendants Lim Buanco and
Reyes for the withdrawal of funds from the bank by Lim Buanco, regardless of whether he had any
funds in the bank to his credit, and in furtherance of this conspiracy, the entries in the accounts of
Lim Buanco on the books of the bank were fraudulently and illegally manipulated by Reyes in such a
manner as to make the books show an apparent credit balance, when in fact Lim Buanco was owing
to the bank a large sum of money.
551
On the 6th day of October, 1906, Lim Buanco drew a check on the Banco Espaol-Filipino for the
sum of 1,000 pesos, and this check was through the agency of another bank in which it was
deposited by Lim Buanco, presented in due course of business to and paid by the Banco Espaol-
Filipino. Before the check was thus paid, Reyes, acting in his capacity as an employee of the bank,
indorsed thereon the words "Corriente, P. O. Luciano de los Reyes," although at the time this
indorsement was made, Lim Buanco had no actual credit balance in the bank, and no permission
had been given him by any officer or officers in authority of said bank to overdraw his account. In this
manner the defendants Lim Buanco and Reyes, in furtherance of the conspiracy to cheat, deceive,
and defraud the bank, secured the payment of said check, although they both knew at the time that
the defendant Lim Buanco had no credit balance in said bank, but was in fact indebted to the bank in
the sum of more than 300,000 pesos, which had previously been withdrawn from the bank by means
of similar checks drawn by Lim Buanco, and fraudulently indorsed as correct by Reyes. The amount
of money thus fraudulently obtained from the bank by means of the check as aforesaid, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the date of the check to the date of the decision in
the court below, to wit, January 16, 1909, amounted to the sum of P1,635.50, Philippine currency,
equivalent to 5,682.50 pesetas, which the court determined to be the damage occasioned to and
suffered by the bank by reason of the aforesaid fraudulent conduct of the defendants acting together
in furtherance of said conspiracy. No part of the said sum has been returned or paid back to the
Banco Espaol-Filipino by Lim Buanco, or by Reyes, or by any person acting for or in his or their
behalf. The trial court also found that Lim Buanco and Reyes each had voluntarily admitted the crime
as charged against him.
Separate trial were granted to the defendants, but the court, after both were convicted, embodied its
finding of facts and conclusions in one decision, and one joint sentence was pronounced upon the
defendants. Thereafter each defendant separately moved for a new trial, which was denied, and an
appeal was taken to this court, where, as in the court below, they appear be separate attorneys.
Although separate briefs are filed, the various assignments of errors raise essentially the same
questions.
The questions here presented as to the sufficiency of the complaint, the nature of the crime, the right
to separate trials, and the fact of the reference by the trial court to the fact that neither defendant
testified in his own behalf, were raised in the case of the United States vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco
(alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los Reyes, No. 5240, and determined against the defendants.
What was said with reference thereto in the opinion in that case need not be here repeated. The
rulings made are adhered to and followed. It remains to be determined whether the defendants have
been once before in jeopardy for the same offense charged against them by the information in this
case.
The defendants each interpose the plea of former jeopardy, and contend that the acts charged in this
information were done in furtherance of the conspiracy which was alleged in the information in case
No. 5240, entitled "The United States vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de
los Reyes," which was tried on the day previous to that on which the present case was tried. This
contention rests upon the assumption that the crime for which the defendants were in the first case
convicted consisted of obtaining the entire sum of more than 300,000 pesos from the Banco
Espaol-Filipino by means of a fraudulent conspiracy between the defendants, and that their acts
done in furtherance of said conspiracy constituted a single continuing offense. In the former case the
defendants were charged with having defrauded the bank by means of a certain check for 2,000
pesos. In the present case they are charged with having defrauded the bank by means of a certain
other check for 1,000 pesos, and in another case which was submitted herewith, they are charged
552
with having defrauded the same bank by means of another check for the sum of 3,500 pesos. The
first two checks bore date of October 6, 1906, and the other, April 2, 1906. In the information in each
case it is alleged in substance that the defendants and each of them conspired to defraud the bank;
that the defendant Lim Buanco falsely represented that there were funds in the bank to pay the
check in question; that the check was fraudulently marked "Corriente, P. O. Luciano de los Reyes,"
by Reyes, who knew at the time that Lim Buanco had no money to his credit to pay the check, and
that the fraud was effected in furtherance of a conspiracy between the two parties. But in each case
the defendants and each of them are charged with having defrauded the bank of a specific sum of
money by means of a specifically mentioned and identified check, and the particular check described
in the information and introduced in evidence in each case is for a different amount from that
referred to in the information and introduced in evidence in the other cases. The check referred to in
one information could not therefore have been properly offered in evidence to prove the allegation in
either of the other cases. These informations do not charge the defendants with the technical crime
of conspiracy. The substance of the allegation in each case is that the money was obtained from the
bank by means of the fraudulent cooperation of Lim Buanco and Reyes under circumstances which
constitute the deceit necessary to constitute the crime of estafa, and of the crime only the
defendants were convicted. (U. S. vs. Lino Eguia Lim Buanco (alias Lim Buanco) and Luciano de los
Reyes, No. 5240.) It is true that by the same methods, and by means of other checks drawn,
certified, and their payment secured in the same fraudulent manner, a large sum of money in the
aggregate was withdrawn from the bank, but nevertheless each act constituted a separate crime.
The preparation, approval, and payment of numerous checks under such circumstances can not be
considered as one continuing offense. Each separate fraudulent obtaining of money from the bank
by means of such methods constituted a distinct crime, and a conviction of one such crimes can not
be pleaded in bar to a prosecution for another. lawphil.net
It may be noted, however, that even if it were true that the defendants had been charged and
convicted of conspiracy, the plea of former jeopardy would not be good as against a prosecution for
one of several crimes, each distinct from the other, committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. In a
monographic note in the case of People vs. McDaniels (92 American State Reports, 81), it is said
that [p. 134]: Where several acts are done in pursuance of a conspiracy, each act being distinct from
the other, the fact that they are in fact done in pursuance of a conspiracy does not make one act the
"same offense" as the other.
This statement is sustained by the case of Wallace vs. State (41 Fla., 547, 26 South., 713), where it
was held that While the conspiracy may be single, and therefore subject to one indictment only,
yet the felonies accomplished by means of the conspiracy were separate and distinct, depending
upon the different acts, provable by different evidence, and accomplished by distinct though similar
means. The evidence essentially necessary to sustain one indictment would not sustain either of the
others, nor could defendant be convicted upon the information upon the evidence necessary to
sustain either of the others.
We find no material errors in this record. The defendants were properly convicted and sentenced,
and the judgment is therefore affirmed. So ordered.
[G.R. No. 126050. January 16, 2001]
553
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SPO2 ELEAZAR M. MADALI, SPO2
EUSTAQUIO V. ROGERO, and SPO1 RANDY M. RUBIO,accused-appellants.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Romblon, Romblon
finding accused-appellants Eleazar M. Madali, Eustaquio V. Rogero, and Randy M. Rubio, all
members of the Philippine National Police, guilty of the murder of Reynaldo M. Abrenica and
sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellants were also ordered jointly and
severally to pay the heirs of the deceased P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P124,800.00 for loss of
earning capacity, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P150,000.00 as exemplary damages, P70,000.00
as attorneys fees, P50,000.00 as expenses of litigation, and P60,000.00 as actual damages, and to
pay the costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. In accordance with Art. 29 of
the Revised Penal Code, accused-appellants preventive imprisonment was ordered credited in their
favor.
The following facts are undisputed:
On February 4, 1992, at around 11 p.m., Reynaldo Abrenica and his wife Helen came home at
the house of Harry Mindo in Romblon, Romblon where Reynaldo had some drinks. Helen went to
bed ahead of her husband in their bedroom on the second floor of their house. When Helen woke up
at around 1 a.m., she found that her husband was not beside her. She looked for him in the
bathroom but could not find him there either. She turned on the light and went to the stairs and there,
on the landing of the stairs, she found her husband lying with his head towards the wall, his left hand
placed on his back and his right arm pinned under his body. [2] He was wearing a white sleeveless
undershirt (sando) with a towel over his bare buttocks. There were feces hanging from his anus.
Helen did not find any trace of blood on the body of her husband nor in the place where it lay. [3]
When she touched her husband she found he was dead. Helen became hysterical and went outside
the house for help, crying that her husband had accidentally fallen from the stairs. [4]
After it was dressed, Reynaldos body was loaded in a jeep by neighbors Joey Salgado, Romeo
Ibal, Eduardo Galang, and Landoy Galang so that it could be taken to the hospital. Segundo Orola,
also a neighbor of the Abrenicas, was going to drive the jeep but found that its headlights were not
functioning. So his wife Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua went to the municipal building to look for
another vehicle. They found a tricycle they could use to guide the jeep. Accused-appellant Eleazar
M. Madali, who was on duty at that time, drove the tricycle. With the tricycle ahead, the way was
lighted for the jeep bearing Reynaldo. However, Reynaldo was declared dead on arrival in the
hospital. An autopsy conducted on Reynaldos cadaver by Dr. Vladimir Villaseor of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory showed the following:
FINDINGS:
Body belongs to a fairly nourished, fairly developed previously embalmed male cadaver.
TRUNK AND EXTREMITIES:
1) Swelling, fronto-parietal region, measuring 9 x 7 cm., along the anterior midline,

superimposed lacerated wound, measuring 1.3 x 0.5 cm.
554
2) Scalp hematoma, frontal region, measuring 8 x 6 cm., along the midsagittal line.
3) Scalp hematoma, parietal region, measuring 5 x 4.5 cm. along the midsagittal line.
4) Area of multiple abrasions, left clavicular region, measuring 7 x 5 cm., 17 cm. from the
anterior midline.
5) Abrasion, proximal 3rd of the left arm, measuring 1.5 x 0.5 cm., 3.5 cm., lateral to its
posterior midline.
6) Abrasion, proximal 3rd of the right arm, measuring 6 x 1 com., 5 cm. lateral to its anterior
midline.
7) Contusion, middle 3rd of the left thigh, measuring 6 x 3 cm., 2 cm. lateral to its posterior
midline.
8) Contusion, middle 3rd of the left thigh, measuring 6 x 6 cm., 2 cm. lateral to its anterior
midline.
9) Contusion, proximal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 6 x 4 cm., along its anterior midline.
10) Contusion, middle 3rd of the right thigh, measuring 3 x 2.5 cm, 6 cm. medial to its
anterior midline.
11) Abrasion, middle 3rd of the right leg, measuring 2 x 0.8 cm., 1 cm. medial to its anterior
midline.
12) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 2 x 1.5 cm, 2 cm. medial to its anterior
midline.
13) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 5 x 3 cm., 4 cm. medial to its anterior
midline.
14) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 2 x 1.5 cm., 2 cm. medial to its posterior
midline.
15) Contusion, distal 3rd of the left leg, measuring 5 x 3 cm., 4 cm. medial to its posterior
midline.
16) Sore, right clavicular region, measuring 7 x 1 cm., 11 cm. from the anterior midline.
17) Swelling, middle 3rd of the left arm, measuring 13 x 4 cm., 6 cm. medial to its anterior
midline.
PLEURAL, PERICARDIAL AND PERITONEAL CAVITIES:
The pleural, pericardial and peritoneal cavities are free from adhesions and fluid accumulations.
BRAIN:
The brain is pale white in appearance with shallow sulci and gyri. There are subdural hemorrhage
noted at the anterior lobes of both cerebral hemispheres. Circle of Willis shows minimal amount of
atheromatous deposits but otherwise patent. Cut section reveals widening of the white matter and
congestion.
555
Microsection shows varying degrees of neuronal degeneration and focal dilated blood vessels,
lumen of which are filled by blood fluid.
Assessment: Cerebral edema and congestion.
LUNGS:
Both lungs are dark gray in color with areas of anthracosis. More pronounced at the right upper lobe.
There is crepitancy on pressure. The primary and secondary bronchi contain minimal amount of dark
reddish fluid. Serial section shows areas of focal congestion.
Microsection shows severe congestion at the alveolar capillaries and the pulmonary alveoli are filled
with eosinophilic fluid. Focal emphysema noted. Bronchial smooth muscle wall is slightly thickened
and mildly infiltrated with round cell infiltrates.
Assessment: Pulmonary edema and congestion, moderate to severe Chronic Bronchitis.
HEART:
The heart is pale reddish brown in color, enveloped in moderate amount of epicardial fats, with
multiple petechial hemorrhages noted in the surface. Cut section reveals clotted blood embedded on
both chambers. The left ventricular wall measures 1.3 cm. thick while the right ventricular wall
measures 0.5 cm. thick. Valvular leaflets are soft and pliable. Coronary artery shows minimal amount
of atheromatous deposits.
Microsection shows separation of the myocardial muscle fiber by edema and is mildly infiltrated by
round cells. Coronary arteries patent with slight thickening of its vascular wall.
Assessment: Dilatation, ventricle
Atherosclerosis - 30 40%
LIVER:
The liver is yellowish brown in color, doughy to firm in consistency. A nut-meg liver pattern on section
with focal areas of congestion.
Microsection shows focal areas of vacuolation of the hepatic cells. The sinusodial spaces are filled
with red blood cells, mildly infiltrated with mononuclear cell infiltrates.
Assessment: Fatty changes, liver, moderate
Congestion, liver
KIDNEYS:
Both kidneys are reddish brown in color. Capsules are stripped-off with difficulty, leaving a fine
granular cortical surface. Cut section reveals a well-defined cortico-medulary junction.
556
Microsection shows moderate to extensive acute tubular necrosis with tubular degenerations and
focal thickening of its vascular wall.
Assessment: Acute tubular necrosis
Tubular degeneration
SPLEEN:
The spleen is dark gray in color, firm and slightly wrinkled. Cut section reveals congestion.
Microsection shows congestion and hemorrhage on both the red and white pulp. Scanty germinal
follicles are noted.
Assessment: Congestion and hemorrhage, spleen
PANCREAS:
The pancreas is pale yellowish brown in color, doughy in consistency, lobulated with petechial
hemorrhages noted at the head and tail of the pancreas.
Microsection shows focal hemorrhages within the parenchyma and areas of dilated, slightly
thickened ducta filled with impessated secretions. Other areas show focus of pseudocyst formation.
Assessment: Acute hemorrhagic Pancreatitis
There are subdural hemorrhages noted on both cerebral hemispheres.
Stomach is full of partially digested food particles consisting mostly of rice.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is Intracranial hemorrhage as a result of traumatic head injury. [5]
On December 1, 1995, three years after the death of Reynaldo Abrenica, this case was filed,
after an alleged eyewitness, Mercy Villamor, surfaced and implicated accused-appellants in the
death of Reynaldo. The information against accused-appellants alleged
That in or about the early morning of February 5, 1992, in Romblon, Romblon, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other, with intent to kill, and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict mortal wounds upon the person of one Reynaldo M.
Abrenica thereby causing the latters death. [6]
Accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon they were tried.
Mercy Villamor was a former bar girl at the Boulevard Music Lounge in Bagacay, Romblon,
Romblon. She worked there from June 2, 1990 to April 1992 and met accused-appellants who
became her customers. She testified that accused-appellant Madali courted her in September 1990
557
and became her boyfriend in November of that year. She claimed that she had a son by Madali. The
boy, named Mark Anthony, was born on November 10, 1992. Mercy claimed that Reynaldo M.
Abrenica was also her customer at the night club. Reynaldo allegedly courted her in October 1991
and became her boyfriend on December 22, 1991, although she was still having an affair with Madali
at that time.
According to Mercy, one evening in December 1991, the two men in her life met. Mercy was at
Reynaldos table at the Boulevard Music Lounge when Madali entered through the back door. Mercy
asked Madali why he was there when his wife was supposed to be in town. Madali told her that he
wanted to sleep at the music lounge and proceeded to the second floor. Mercy then rejoined
Reynaldo. When Reynaldo asked whether Madali was her boyfriend, Mercy said Madali was the
brother of the boyfriend of the owner of the night club, Hilda Yap. According to Mercy, before
Reynaldo left, they agreed to go swimming on February 4, 1992. Mercy said she then went upstairs
and lay beside Madali. When Madali asked whether Reynaldo was her boyfriend, Mercy answered in
the affirmative. Mercy told him that she was going swimming with Reynaldo on February 4, 1992.
Madali tried to dissuade her but she was adamant.
Mercy testified that while she was walking around town on February 4, 1992, at around 9 p.m.,
she met Reynaldo who was on a motorcycle. She said Reynaldo apologized to her for not going
swimming with her on that day because his wife had arrived from Manila. He gave her an envelope
and told her to meet him that same night at 11:30 p.m. in his jeep then parked outside his house.
After Reynaldo left, Mercy opened the envelope and found a P500.00 bill inside with a note saying, I
love you, Mercy.
Mercy claimed that she and a friend, Mayet Espinosa (a.k.a. Leonora Orboc), who was then
pregnant, went to meet Reynaldo at 11 p.m. on that date. On their way, they met Madali, who was in
uniform and riding his motor tricycle. He asked where they were going. Mercy said they were going
home, but Madali did not believe her.
Mercy said she and Mayet then proceeded to Reynaldos house. Reynaldo was inside his jeep.
The two women then joined him inside the jeep. Mercy said that while she and Reynaldo were
talking, Mayet saw, on the jeeps side mirror, someone walking towards them. It was accused-
appellant Madali, and the two hurriedly got off the jeep and hid behind a pile of boxes nearby.
According to Mercy, Madali approached Reynaldo and asked, Pare, kausap mo yata si Mercy. (Pal,
you seem to have been talking with Mercy), to which Reynaldo replied, Eh, ano ngayon? (So,
what?). Madali then pulled his gun and hit Reynaldo on the head with it. Madali hit Reynaldo on the
head three times with his gun, as a result of which Reynaldo fell on the ground. Mercy said accused-
appellants Rogero and Rubio, who were also in uniform, came and helped Madali carry Reynaldos
body inside the latters house. Thereafter, accused-appellants closed the door. According to Mercy,
after witnessing the incident, she and Mayet returned to the Boulevard Music Lounge.
At around 1 a.m., Madali arrived at the Boulevard Music Lounge. Mercy noticed that his uniform
was stained with blood. When she asked him why there was blood on his uniform, he said he had
run over a dog. Mercy retorted, "Nakasagasa ka ng aso o pumatay ka ng tao? (You ran over a dog
or you killed someone?) In fact, according to Mercy, when she washed Madalis clothes, she noticed
that his shoes were also stained with blood.
She said she did not report what she had seen because she was afraid for her life as Madali
had threatened her. She said that she only implicated accused-appellants in her sworn statement on
December 14, 1994[7]before the Commission on Human Rights, after she had been informed about
the Witness Protection Program of the Department of Justice. Mercy was entered in the program
only on April 15, 1995.[8]
558
Accused-appellants denied liability for the death of Reynaldo Abrenica. Accused-appellant
Madali testified that, at about 11 p.m. of February 4, 1992, he was in his house asleep. He set his
alarm clock to 11:40 p.m. because he was on duty at the police station from 12 midnight to 8 a.m. of
the next day. He said he arrived at the station at around 11:50 p.m. and stayed for awhile with
accused-appellant Rogero in the latters jeep. Rogero had the same schedule as Madali. According
to Madali, when Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua came for assistance in bringing Reynaldo
Abrenica to the hospital, he took the police motor tricycle and went with the two to the Abrenica
residence. Then, with him leading the way because the jeeps headlights would not function, they
took Reynaldo Abrenica to the hospital.
Madali said he had the chance to talk to Reynaldos wife Helen in the hospital, and she said that
she heard the sound of something falling and thought that it was their plastic container which fell.
Madali denied having an affair with Mercy Villamor. He stated that he only came to know her
sometime in December 1991 when he and the other accused-appellants, Rogero and Rubio, and
other policemen were introduced to her by Hilda Yap at the Boulevard Music Lounge. Madali denied
having a child by Mercy. In fact, he said, when his wife heard about the rumor that Mercy bore him a
child, his wife summoned Mercy to their house, but Mercy said she did not spread any rumor about
her having a child by Madali.
Madali likewise denied he bore the Abrenicas ill will. He said that he and his wife in fact
attended the nine-day prayers (pasiyam) for the soul of Reynaldo and, at the end of the ninth day,
they were invited by Helen to dinner together with others who had condoled with her.
Accused-appellant Rogero testified that on February 4, 1992, his tour of duty as foot patrol and
vigilante was from 12 midnight to 8 a.m. He arrived at the police station at about 11:40 p.m. in his
jeep. He saw accused-appellant Rubio, whose duty as station guard and desk officer was from 8
p.m. to 12 midnight, standing outside the station. Rogero said he stayed in his jeep for sometime
until it was time to begin his duty. He was joined by Madali who had the same schedule of duty.
When Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua arrived, Madali attended to them. He was later asked by
Madali to follow him to the Abrenica residence. Madali left with Orlene Orola and Leonilo Mangua
aboard the police tricycle. According to Rogero, he woke accused-appellant Randy Rubio up and the
two of them proceeded to the Abrenica residence. Rogero said he and Rubio were told by Susan
Ybaez that Reynaldo fell from the stairs and was taken to the hospital. Rogero said he and Rubio
then proceeded to the hospital where they were told by Madali that Reynaldo fell from the stairs.
They stayed at the hospitals lobby for about two hours and then returned to their station. Madali later
followed them to the police station. According to Rogero, he took Rubio to their headquarters and
then went to the front of the post office, where he stayed until 6 a.m. before going home. [9]
Leonora Orboc, also known as Mayet Espinosa, testified for the defense. She denied being with
Mercy Villamor when the latter met Reynaldo M. Abrenica near the latters house on February 4,
1992. She stated that she worked from 10 p.m. of February 4, 1992 at the cash register at the
Boulevard Music Lounge. She was then nine months pregnant. She said that she knew that Mercy
was at the Boulevard Music Lounge that night because she tried to rouse her from her sleep as
many customers were looking for her, but Mercy refused to get up. Mayet likewise denied that she
witnessed the murder described by Mercy in court.[10]
On May 25, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) SR. POLICE OFFICER II ELEAZAR M. MADALI, (2)
SR. POLICE OFFICER II EUSTAQUIO V. ROGERO and (3) SR. POLICE OFFICER I RANDY M.
RUBIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder under the Information, dated
559
December 1, 1995, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of the law.
These three (3) accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay the heirs of the deceased
Reynaldo M. Abrenica the following sums, namely, (1) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (2)
P124,800.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) P150,000.00 as moral damages; (4)
P150,000.00 as exemplary damages; (5) P70,000.00 for attorneys fees and appearance fees; (6)
P50,000.00 for expenses of litigation; and (7) P60,000.00 as actual damages, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their favor to
its full extent pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants assign the following errors as having been allegedly
committed by the trial court:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FAILING TO RESOLVE DOUBTS AND

DISCREPANCIES IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING CREDIBLE THE TESTIMONIES OF TWO PIVOTAL
WITNESSES, MERCY VILLAMOR AND DR. VLADIMIR VILLASENOR.[12]
On June 2, 1997, Atty. Reynaldo Z. Calabio filed a Notice of Appearance [13] has counsel for
complainant Helen M. Abrenica, widow of the deceased Reynaldo M. Abrenica. His request to be
allowed to appear on behalf of the complainant was denied for lack of merit. [14]
On July 16, 1997, complainant filed a Motion for Time to File Brief, separate from that which the
Office of the Solicitor General would file, by way of answer to the brief of accused-appellants. [15] This
was likewise denied for lack of merit. [16]
On November 20, 1997, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion In
Lieu of Appellees Brief recommending the acquittal of accused-appellants. [17] In view of the position
taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, complainant filed on December 8, 1997 a Manifestation
and Motion to be Allowed to File Brief. [18] On February 13, 1998, she filed a Memorandum for the
Private Complainant,[19] which was noted in the Courts resolution of March 25, 1998.
When required to comment on complainants motion for leave to file a separate brief, the
Solicitor General stated that since complainant had already filed a memorandum, there was no
further need for a brief sustaining the decision on appeal. On the other hand, complainant stated that
her memorandum had already been noted by the Court and, in the interest of a balanced
presentation of facts and the issues, the same should be considered in the resolution of this appeal.
Rule 122, 1 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that (a)ny party may appeal
from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. It has been held
that the word party in the provision in question includes not only the government and the accused
but other persons as well, such as the complainant who may be affected by the judgment rendered
in the criminal proceedings. The complainant has an interest in the civil liability arising from the
crime, unless of course he has reserved to bring a separate civil action to recover the civil liability. [20]
Hence, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainants role is that of a witness for the
prosecution.[21] Ordinarily, the appeal of criminal cases involves as parties only the accused, as
560
appellants, and the State, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, as the appellee. The
participation of the private offended party would be a mere surplusage, if the State were simply to
seek the affirmation of a judgment of conviction. However, where the Office of the Solicitor General
takes a contrary position and recommends, as in this case, the acquittal of the accused, the
complainants right to be heard on the question of award of indemnity and damages arises. In the
interest of justice and equity and to provide perspective for this appeal, therefore, the Court hereby
allows in this case the memorandum filed by complainant which is hereby admitted as part of the
records of this appeal.
Nevertheless, after considering the records of this case, we agree with the Solicitor General that
the evidence is insufficient to sustain accused-appellants conviction and, therefore, the decision of
the trial court should be reversed and accused-appellants should be acquitted.
First. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the supposed eyewitness,
Mercy Villamor, despite its many improbabilities and inconsistencies which renders it doubtful.
(1) Mercy testified that, on February 4, 1992, Reynaldo Abrenica asked that, as they could not
go out because his wife had arrived from Manila, they meet instead at 11:30 p.m. in his jeep which
was parked in front of the Abrenica residence. This is incredible. If Reynaldo allegedly called off their
date because his wife was in town, why would he instead appoint a place for their tryst right in front
of his house where it was more likely they would be seen by his wife?
(2) Mercy testified that she saw accused-appellants, who were in their uniforms, bringing
Reynaldo inside his house, Madali holding him by the nape, Rogero by the right arm, and Rubio
holding the two legs. It is inconceivable, however, that accused-appellants would do this because
they were in their uniforms and they could easily be noticed. The sight of uniformed policemen
carrying a body would attract attention.
(3) Mercy claimed that at around 1 a.m. of February 5, 1992, accused-appellant Madali arrived
at the Boulevard Music Lounge and she noticed that he had blood on his uniform and his boots. But
Helen Abrenica, another prosecution witness, testified that there was no blood on her husbands
body or on the floor or on the wall when she found him on the landing of their staircase. Indeed,
Reynaldo Abrenica never suffered any stab or incised wound, and the theory of the prosecution was
simply that he was clubbed to death.
(4) Mercy said that Reynaldos jeep was parked along Republica Street in front of his house. The
jeep was facing the pier. In the opposite direction are the market and the post office. According to
Mercy, while they were seated inside the jeep, her companion, Mayet Espinosa, saw accused-
appellant Madali on the side mirror of the vehicle. Accused-appellant was allegedly coming from the
direction of the market and the post office.
This is contrary to the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, Helen Abrenica and the
spouses Segundo and Orlene Orola, who said that the jeepney was facing the direction of the
market and the post office. In fact Helen Abrenica said that when they arrived home on February 4,
1992, they passed through the pier so that when Reynaldo M. Abrenica parked the vehicle it was
facing in the direction of the market and the post office. This was also the position of the vehicle
when Segundo and Orlene Oroloa arrived at the Abrenica in response to the cry for help of Helen. It
was, therefore, not possible for Mayet Espinosa to have seen accused-appellant on the side mirror
of the vehicle.
At any rate, Mayet Espinosa denied that she and Mercy went to meet Reynaldo M. Abrenica in
front of his house on the night of February 4, 1992. Mayet testified for the defense. She said that at
the time and on the date in question, she was at the Boulevard Music Lounge while Mercy was
561
upstairs sleeping, refusing to get up despite the fact that customers of the night club wanted to have
her.
Mayets testimony is more credible. At the time of the incident she was heavy with a child. Why
should she go with Mercy who had a date with her lover? It is more probable that she worked at the
cash register in the Boulevard Music Lounge than that, as Mercy claimed, she went with her to see
the latters lover.
(5) Mercy said that at around 9 p.m. of February 4, 1992, she saw Reynaldo riding on his
motorcycle and she was told that they could not go out that night because Madalis wife was around.
This is contrary to Helen Abrenicas testimony that at that time Reynaldo was having drinks in the
house of his friend, Harry Mindo, and that they left that place at around 10:30 p.m. [22]
(6) Mercy claimed that Reynaldo was wearing shorts and was half naked when they met inside
his jeep. This is not what he had on when he was found. When he was found, Reynaldo was
wearing a white sleeveless undershirt and was naked from the waist down with only a towel placed
over his buttocks.
(7) Mercy said she saw Reynaldo being carried by accused-appellants into his house. Reynaldo
was found lying in a prone position with knees bent toward his chest and his head facing the wall.
The space in which his body was found was only 25 inches by 41 inches. [23] It was so small that if
three men carried his body and dumped it there, they would have made noise and would have been
detected by the occupants of the house. So small indeed was the space constituting the landing of
the stairs that Reynaldos body had to be crumpled so that his knees were bent toward his chest
while his left hand had to be placed on his back and his right arm pinned under his body. If accused-
appellants killed Reynaldo, they could just have left him on the street or placed him inside his
jeepney. The risk of being seen carrying the body inside the house up to the first flight of stairs to the
landing where it was found was too great.
In addition to the inconsistencies and improbabilities in her testimony, Mercys testimony shows
hedging and trimming as is clear from the following portion of the transcript of stenographic notes:
Q - You alighted from the jeep when you saw Madali coming because you were afraid and you
wanted to hide from him, is that correct?
A - We were not afraid, if he would see us because we told him we are going home.
Q - Why did you hide?
A - Because Bebot might see us, we told him before that we are going home.
Q - That is why you hid so that you will not be seen by Madali, is that not right?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - You did not want that any portion of your body could be seen by Madali at that time?
A - I dont want because we told him we are going home. [24]
This is not the only instance where Mercy gave confused and unsure statements. Testifying
concerning the distance between the place where she and Mayet were hiding and the place where
they saw Madali allegedly hitting Reynaldo several times on the head, Mercy said:
Q - And you were how many meters away while watching and hiding behind the kamada of
kahon?
562
A - It is near, from here to there.
....
Q - During the direct you answered apat (4) na dipa, 4 arms length, do you remember that?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - As a matter of fact the Court measured the distance you pointed earlier, do you remember
that?
A - Yes, sir.
ATTY. ARIAS Continuing:
Q - And that was the distance you said apat (4) na dipa, four (4) arms length, do you remember
having stated that?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Madam Witness, you stated that in your affidavit that you are four (4) arms length away from
where the pokpoking occurred?
A - I do not know, I cannot remember.
....
ATTY. ARIAS Continuing:
Q - I am showing to you Exhibit A-2, No. 15, line 18, and I will let you refresh your memory, at
paglapit ni Bebot Madali sa kinauupoan ni Rey sa loob ng jeep (harapan ng manibela) ay
binati pa ni Bebot si Rey ng kausap mo yata si Mercy, dinig na dinig namin ito ni Mayet
sapagkat ang kinaroroonan namin ay dalawang (2) metro lamang, do you remember having
given that answer?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And you stated in the affidavit two (2) meters, dalawang (2) metro lamang?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - You know that a meter is shorter than one (1) dipa?
A - The same.
Q - So, when you said, two (2) meters that should be dalawang (2) dipa, according to you?
A - Two (2) arms length.
Q - And you know that two (2) arms length is shorter than apat (4) na dipa?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - And you now discover that what you told earlier that Madali was four (4) arms length is not
correct but only dalawang (2) metros or according to you pareho lang dalawang (2) dipa, is
that correct?
A - No, sir.[25]
....
563
ATTY. ARIAS continuing:
Q - All right. You saw Madali struck the victim, how far were you?
ATTY. CALABIO:
From where?
ATTY. ARIAS:
Doon sa pinagpukpukan.
A - This distance, about two (2) arms length.
ATTY. ARIAS:
I want to make of record that the witness had shown to us the distance by stretching her two (2)
arms and pointing a little bit near and later on when she looked at the private prosecutor she
changed her answer and said . . . .[26]
The inconsistencies, improbabilities, and uncertainties in Mercys testimony are many, and they
relate to material points. The suspicion cannot be helped that she was a rehearsed witness. [27] It
cannot be too often repeated that for evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but must itself be credible. The evidence must be what the common
experience and observation of mankind would approve of as probable under the circumstances. [28]
We cannot help noticing that, in order to go through her direct examination, Mercy had to be asked
leading questions by the private prosecutor. Contrary to the observation of the trial court, she was
not consistent on cross-examination. In fact, she had to be cued by the prosecutor by timely
manifestations. There were several instances when she did not make sense when confronted with
her conflicting statements. In her dire attempt to explain away the irreconcilable statements in her
affidavits and in her testimony in court, she used lame and shallow excuses.
Second. This case was not filed until three years after the death of Reynaldo M. Abrenica, and
that was because Mercy Villamor came out with a claim that she saw accused-appellants kill
Reynaldo. She claimed that she could not reveal earlier what she knew about the crime because of
threats made by accused-appellant Madali. However, Mercy never explained the circumstances
under which she was threatened. In fact, she admitted she only entertained the fear that Madali
would harm her if she talked about what she allegedly knew. When asked when she was allegedly
threatened, she stated that it was at 9 a.m. of February 4, 1992. At that time, however, the incident
had not yet occurred.[29]
Third. On the other hand, the testimony of Dr. Villaseor that the head injuries sustained by
Reynaldo were caused by a blunt instrument is contrary to the statement he gave before the Office
of the Ombudsman that the cause of Reynaldos death could not have been a blunt instrument. [30]
Although this statement was prepared by the investigator in the Office of the Ombudsman, it was
signed by Dr. Villaseor. Dr. Villaseor tried to explain the prior inconsistent statement by means of the
lame excuse that he failed to include some matters in his statement because he did not then have
his files with him.
Fourth. The trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. The
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the
part of the person attacked. [31] In this case, Reynaldo allegedly said Eh, ano ngayon? to Madali when
the latter demanded to know whether he (Reynaldo) was talking to Mercy. The remark was certainly
provocative and Reynaldo knew that his reply would invite a retaliation. Thus, Reynaldo could not
have been surprised by Madalis alleged attack.
564
In sum, the prosecution failed to prove beyond doubt that the death of Reynaldo M. Abrenica
was not accidental but intentional and that accused-appellants were guilty of killing him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Municipality of Romblon,
Romblon is REVERSED and accused-appellants Eleazar M. Madali, Eustaquio V. Rogero, and
Randy M. Rubio are ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt. Consequently, they are
ordered forthwith released from custody unless they are being lawfully held for another cause.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to implement this Decision and to report to
this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Article 18: Accomplices
People V. Tamayo, 44 Phil 38
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO TAMAYO, JULIO TAMAYO,

FLORENCIO PATALINGHUG, JR., a.k.a. FELIX PATALINGHUG ,JR., and NATIVIDAD TAMAYO
(ACQUITTED), accused.
FLORENCIO PATALINGHUG, JR., accused-appellant.
565
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Accused Rolando Tamayo, Julio Tamayo, Florencio Patalinghug, Jr.,[][1] and Natividad Tamayo were
charged with double murder before the Regional Trial Court of the Seventh Judicial Region (Branch
62, Oslob, Cebu) in an information dated November 29, 1994, to wit:
That on October 25, 1994 at 7:30 oclock in the evening, more or less, at sitio Tubod, Cerdea,
Municipality of Malabuyoc, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
one another, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Leodegario Fuentes and Renante
Fuentes, with the use of unknown caliber handgun, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot
wounds which caused their instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[][2]
After a plea of not guilty was entered, the accused filed motions for admission to bail before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20, where this case was originally raffled. However, these
motions were denied by said court in an order dated March 25, 1996.
With the creation and operation of RTC-Oslob, Cebu on February 15, 1996, this case was ordered
unloaded from RTC-Cebu City, Branch 20, and transferred to RTC-Oslob, Cebu, Branch 62, in an
amended order dated September 23, 1996. Further presentation of prosecution evidence was
thereafter conducted in the latter court.
The prosecution presented several witnesses.
Lilia Fuentes recalled that at about 7:30 oclock in the evening of October 25, 1994, she was having
dinner with her husband, Leodegario, and their six children in their house at Cerdea, Malabuyoc,
Cebu, when they heard the dogs barking. Leodegario was about to check why the dogs were
barking when three persons whom she identified as Rolando Tamayo, Julio Tamayo and Florencio
Patalinghug, Jr., suddenly barged into their house through an unlocked kitchen door. Rolando came
first, followed by Julio who was holding a flashlight and Florencio who entered last. Julio focused the
flashlight on Leodegarios face and seconds later, Rolando shot Leodegario on the chest. After
shooting Leodegario, Rolando fired his gun again, this time hitting Renante, 18-year old son of
Leodegario and Lilia. Overcome with fear, Lilia embraced her other children who were crying. She
saw Rolando aiming his gun at them. She heard three clicks from the gun but fortunately the gun did
not fire. Thereafter, Rolando, Julio and Florencio left, dragging Renante out of the house. Lilia then
gathered the rest of her children and, while going down the stairs of their house, Lilia saw Natividad
Tamayo, the wife of Julio, hurriedly walking away from their house. Lilia and her children went to the
house of their neighbor, Helen Ambos, to seek refuge. After an hour, they proceeded to the house of
Amalia Fuentes, Lilias niece, and stayed there until the morning of the following day. That day, the
dead body of Renante was found some 200 meters away from their house. On October 27, 1994,
Lilia reported the incident to the police.[][3]
SPO2 Faustino Filipinas of Malabuyoc Police Station testified that at around 2 oclock in the morning
of October 26, 1994, Alex Cardines, a barangay tanod of Cerdea, Malabuyoc, Cebu, reported a
shooting incident, allegedly perpetrated by Rolando Tamayo, Julio and Natividad Tamayo, and
Florencio Patalinghug, Jr. On October 27, 1994, Lilia lodged a complaint against the four accused for
566
the death of her husband Leodegario and son Renante. That same morning, Rolando and Julio were
arrested while Natividad and Florencio were arrested the following day.[][4]
Dr. Danilo Cabigon, Municipal Health Officer of Malabuyoc, Cebu, testified that he conducted a post-
mortem examination on the cadavers of the victims on October 26, 1994. Dr. Cabigons autopsy
showed that Leodegario sustained one gunshot wound above the right chest. He declared that
Leodegario died due to hemorrhage, thoracic cavity due to gunshot wound, penetrating the big blood
vessel and right lung. On the other hand, his post-mortem examination of Renantes body revealed
that the victim sustained a single gunshot wound on his left chest which resulted in massive
hemorrhage causing death.[][5]
The defense presented its own version through its witnesses.
Accused Natividad Tamayo claimed that at around 7 oclock in the evening of October 25, 1994, she
was eating her supper along with husband, Julio, and daughter, Leonida, in their house at Cerdea,
Malabuyoc, Cebu. After finishing her household chores, she went to sleep at about 8:30 oclock in the
evening. On October 26, 1994, while she and Julio were working at their farm at Sitio Lapad Bato, a
barangay tanod approached and told them that they needed to go to the barangay hall to clarify
some important matters. It was then that they learned they were being implicated in the death of
Leodegario and Renante Fuentes.[][6]
Julio Tamayo corroborated his wife Natividads testimony in all points material to their common
defense.[][7]
Rey Cardente, a relative of Helen Ambos, declared that in the evening of October 25, 1994, he was
at the house of Helen Ambos when a nervous Lilia Fuentes arrived and told Helen that Leodegario
and Renante were shot. But when asked who committed the crime, Lilia answered that she did not
know. She just continued sobbing.[][8]
Accused Rolando Tamayo claimed that, at the time of the alleged incident, he was at home for a
novena prayer in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary. After the event, all the participants went home
except for Gregorio Balansag who opted to spend the night at Rolandos house. The next day,
Rolando was invited for questioning at the barangay hall. There he saw his father, Julio, and mother,
Natividad, and learned that the three of them were implicated in the killing of Leodegario and
Renante Fuentes.[][9]
Gregorio Balansag affirmed the testimony of Rolando Tamayo that a novena prayer was held at
Rolandos place from 6:30 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. on October 25, 1994. He stayed at Rolandos house for
the night and all the time that he was there, Rolando did not go out of his house.[][10]
Crisanto Cardente, a neighbor of Florencio Patalinghug, Jr. at Cerdea, Malabuyoc, Cebu, testified
that in the afternoon of October 25, 1994, he met Florencio Patalinghug, Jr. who invited him to come
to his house for the death anniversary of his younger sister. He had dinner with Florencios family and
went home at around 11 oclock in the evening. He was sure that Florencio did not leave the house
that night.[][11]
Accused Florencio Patalinghug, Jr., a resident of Cerdea, Malabuyoc, Cebu, asserted that, on
October 25, 1994, he was at home for the death anniversary of his younger sister. The affair lasted
until 11:00 p.m. The next morning, a policeman brought him to the house of Lilia Fuentes where he
was asked whether he knew who killed Leodegario and Renante. He answered that he did not know
who the perpetrators were. He even helped in cleaning the caskets of the victims. On October 28,
567
1994, while peddling mangoes in Malabuyoc, Cebu, he was approached by a policeman who told
him that he was being invited for investigation by the Chief of Police of Malabuyoc, Cebu. The
policeman asked him to pin down the Tamayos as the persons responsible for the killing of
Leodegario and Renante, otherwise, he would be included as one of the accused. He admitted
knowing his co-accused as he used to work at their farm.[][12]
The prosecution presented Carmelita Cardao as a rebuttal witness. She maintained that no novena
prayers were held on October 25, 1994 inasmuch as the image of Our Lady of Fatima had already
been transferred to another sitio. She further averred that she was always present everytime there
was a prayer meeting as she was usually the prayer leader. In fact, she never saw Rolando Tamayo
in any of the novena prayers.[][13]
On September 15, 1998, the trial court rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Julio Tamayo, Rolando Tamayo and Florencio Patalinghug,
Jr. guilty of the crime of Double Murder beyond reasonable doubt and they are hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua each for two (2) counts and to indemnify the heirs of the
victims jointly and severally the sum of P100,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Accused Natividad Tamayo is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence.
The Provincial Warden, Cebu Provincial Detention and Rehabilitation Center (CPDRC) Cebu City is
hereby directed to discharge from custody the live person of accused Natividad Tamayo immediately
upon receipt hereof, unless there is any other cause for which she should continue to be detained.
Cost to be taxed against the three (3) accused also jointly and severally.
SO ORDERED.[][14]
Only accused Florencio Patalinghug, Jr. interposed the instant appeal, contending that the trial court
erred:
I. IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTIONS LONE

EYEWITNESS, LILIA FUENTES;
II. IN RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DEFENSE OF ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL

OVER THE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION BY PROSECUTIONS LONE EYEWITNESS;
III. IN RULING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION WAS SUFFICIENT
TO CONVICT HE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO (2)
COUNTS OF MURDER; AND
IV. IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF TWO (2) COUNTS OF MURDER AND
SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA FOR EACH COUNT.
[][15]
The first and second assignments of error being interrelated, shall be discussed together.
In assailing the decision of the trial court, accused-appellant attacks the credibility of the lone
eyewitness, Lilia Fuentes, wife and mother of victims Leodegario and Renante, respectively, alleging
that Lilias version was replete with improbabilities and inconsistencies. Accused-appellant also tries
to discredit Lilia by claiming that she could not have positively identified him because the assault
568
happened in the dark as the exact place where the crime was committed was lit only by a kerosene
lamp.
We do not agree. Lilia Fuentes positively established the presence of accused-appellant in her
house on the night of October 25, 1994 and we find no reason to disturb the trial courts evaluation of
her testimony. She testified on direct examination as follows:
Atty. Abellana: (to witness)
Q - Who entered first into your house when those three men barged your door?
A - Rolando Tamayo.
Q - Who followed him?
A - Julio Tamayo.
Q - Who was next?
A - Nickname is Felix and the full name is Florencio Patalinghug.
Q - Why do you know them?
A - Because they are from that place, sitio Kaluktugan.
Q - If Rolando Tamayo is in the court room now, will you please point him out?
A - (Witness pointing to a man and when asked, he identified himself as one Rolando Tamayo.)
Q - How about Julio Tamayo, if he is in the courtroom, will you please point him out?
A - (Witness pointing to man and when asked, he identified himself as one Julio Tamayo.)
Q - How about Felix Patalinghug?
A - (Witness pointing to a man and when asked, he identified himself as one Felix Patalinghug.)
Q - What happen (sic) when those three (3) persons entered into your house?
A - Julio Tamayo was the one bringing the flashlight and beam the light to my husband and Rolando
Tamayo was the one who shot my husband.
Q - Was your husband hit when your husband was shot by Rolando Tamayo?
A - Yes, he was hit.
Q - Where was your husband hit?
A - On his breasts.
Q - What did the three do especially Rolando Tamayo after shooting your husband?
A - He fired again and then it was my son who was hit.
569
Q - To what direction this second shot was made to which your son was being hit?
A - Towards my son.
COURT: (to witness)
Q - How old is your son?
A - 18 yrs. old your Honor.
Q - What is the name of your son again?
A - Renante Fuentes.
Q - When Rolando Tamayo shoot his firearm for the second time, was your son hit?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Where was he being hit?
A - He shouted, Ma, naigo ko! (Ma, I was hit.)[][16]
Also, on cross-examination, Lilia declared:
Q: On the day of the incident, there was no moon?
A: I was not able to notice if there was moon because of fear but it was a little bright.
ATTY. SON:
Q: When you used the term a little bright or hayag, what was the source of that light?
A: From the sky. xxx[][17]
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Now, you mentioned yesterday that there was light coming from the sky, did that light reached
(sic) the inside portion of your house?
A: There was light inside our house, sir, because we have lamps.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Alright, that lamp which you said was inside the house, emitted light inside the house, is that
correct?
A: Yes, because there was light in the sala and also there was light in the kitchen
Q: Bright enough, when a person goes inside the house, he can be seen?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How far were you from the door when the 3 accused allegedly entered and barged into your
house?
570
A: About one meter more or less. [][18]
Indubitably, Lilia was able to identify accused-appellant because she was at the scene of the crime.
In fact, she was situated at a distance of only about one meter from the accused-appellant and his
companions. Likewise, there was ample illumination coming from the lamps located in the kitchen
and living room of their house. Further, the flashlight used by Julio Tamayo adequately improved the
lighting condition of the place. Illumination produced by a kerosene lamp or flashlight is sufficient to
allow identification of persons.[][19]
Accused-appellant also attempts to make much capital out of inconsistencies in the testimony of
Lilia. He specifically points to the declaration of Lilia that at the time he, Julio and Rolando entered
her house, the kitchen was illuminated by a gas lamp which was on a table between herself and the
three assailants.[][20] However, when the trial court sought clarification on the exact location of the
gas lamp, Lilia stated that the table was in the living room and not in the kitchen.[][21] These
conflicting statements, accused-appellant insists, makes the witness credibility doubtful.
The contradictions in the testimony of the eyewitness Lilia pointed out by accused-appellant refer to
a very minor detail which is not sufficient to overthrow the probative value accorded by the trial court
to her testimony. It has been our standard ruling that minor inconsistencies and contradictions in the
testimony do not affect the credibility of witnesses. On the contrary, they may even be considered
badges or manifestations of truthfulness and thus enhance a witness credibility.[][22]
The defense argues that the trial court (Regional Trial Court of Oslob, Cebu, Branch 62) had no
opportunity to observe and examine the demeanor of the prosecutions eyewitness Lilia because her
testimony was given before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20 during the hearings on
the application for bail filed by all the accused. Thus, the conclusions and findings of the trial court
should not be given evidentiary weight.
Contrary to accused-appellants contention, the fact that Judge Jesus dela Pea (who rendered the
appealed decision) was not the one who heard the testimony of the eyewitness will not per se
warrant a reversal of the decision, more so when the judgment is fully supported by the evidence on
record as in the case at bar. This Court has ruled that, while the trial judge who presided at the trial
would be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the testimony of the witnesses, it does
not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just
decision. This is in fact the main reason why all trial courts are mandatorily required to be courts of
record. Whoever is tasked to render judgment in a case can rely on the transcribed stenographic
notes taken during the trial as the basis for his decision.[][23] In this case, Judge dela Peas
evaluation of Lilias testimony is supported by the evidence on record. It is settled that the trial courts
factual findings are binding on this Court when they are supported by the evidence on record.[][24]
Accused-appellant further claims that Lilias behavior while the shooting incident was happening and
her failure to immediately report the crime were contrary to human nature and experience. It is an
accepted fact that people react differently in particular situations and respond to stimuli in varying
ways and degrees. Witnesses of startling occurrences do not react similarly, depending on the
situation and their state of mind.[][25]
Lilia mentioned in her testimony that, after her husband and son were shot, she was terrified and all
she could do was embrace her little children. Clearly, what was foremost in her mind then was to
shield her children from the same tragedy that struck her husband and son. Truly, no clear-cut
standard form of behavior can be drawn. If Lilia did not run for cover after her husband and son were
shot, it was because she was terrified and this was perfectly normal.
571
Accused-appellant also hinges his defense on alibi. For such a defense to prosper, it is not enough
for the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime occurred. He must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.[][26]
Accused-appellant claims that when the shooting occurred, he was at home commemorating the
death anniversary of his younger sister. However, his house was only one kilometer away from
where victim Leodegario Fuentes and his family lived. Thus, it was not physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime.
Moreover, positive identification by an eyewitness prevails over the defense of alibi.[][27] Hence,
accused-appellants attempt to exculpate himself through alibi must fail.
The third assignment of error pertains to the issue of conspiracy among Julio Tamayo, Rolando
Tamayo and accused-appellant. In ruling that there was conspiracy among the three accused, the
trial court relied mainly on the testimony of the eyewitness, Lilia Fuentes, who testified that she saw
the three accused enter her house and shoot her husband and son.
We disagree with the trial court on this respect. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a
conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. There is need for concurrence of wills or unity of action and purpose
or for common and joint purpose and design. Admittedly, direct proof of a previous agreement need
not be established for conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint
purpose, concerted action and community of interest.[][28] Nevertheless, except in the case of the
mastermind of a crime, it must also be shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance
of the conspiracy.[][29] Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to make one a party to a conspiracy. As this
Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures but by
positive and conclusive evidence. In fact, the same quantum of proof necessary to establish the
crime is required to support a finding of conspiracy, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.[][30]
Lilia Fuentes testimony regarding accused-appellants participation in the shooting of her husband
and son consisted of the following: (1) he was one of the three men who entered her house on the
night of October 25, 1994 and (2) he, together with the two other accused, dragged the body of
Renante out of the house after Renante was shot by Rolando Tamayo. Lilias testimony contained
nothing that could indicate that accused-appellant directly participated in the overt act of shooting the
victims. The fact that accused-appellant was with the other accused when the crime was committed
is insufficient proof of conspiracy. Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not amount to
conspiracy. The prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.[][31] The
testimony of Lilia failed to do so.
However, though accused-appellants presence was not enough to prove conspiracy, he was
definitely not an innocent spectator either. He was at the scene of the crime to aid or abet the
commission thereof. This made him not a conspirator but an accomplice.
An accomplice is one who knows the criminal design of the principal and cooperates knowingly or
intentionally therewith by an act which, even if not rendered, the crime would be committed just the
same.[][32] To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present: (1) the
community of criminal design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct
participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose and (2) the performance of previous or
simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime.
572
It is significant to note that the plan to kill the Fuenteses could have been accomplished even without
accused-appellants participation. It should be noted further that he was unarmed that night. The
prosecution evidence has certainly not established that accused-appellant was part of the
conspiracy to kill the victims. The lack of such complete evidence of conspiracy impels this Court to
impute to him a milder form of responsibility, i.e., guilt of a mere accomplice. The resolution of the
fourth assignment of error is relevant in view of its effect on accused-appellants penalty.
Accused-appellant asserts that the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
were not properly established in this case, thus the crime committed was not murder.
Under our penal law, treachery is present when the attack is sudden and unexpected, and renders
the victim unable to defend himself. Even if the attack is frontal, treachery may still exist when it is
done in a sudden and unexpected manner, and the victim is not given any chance to retaliate and
defend himself, thus ensuring the safety of the malefactors.[][33] In the present case, it is obvious
that the victims were caught off-guard by the unexpected attack of the assailants. The victims were
having dinner when Julio, Rolando and Florencio surreptitiously entered their house and, without
warning, shot the victims who were at that time unarmed and completely unaware of any impending
danger to their lives. There was no way the victims could have defended themselves from the
assailants treacherous attack.
However, the prosecution was not able to prove evident premeditation. For this circumstance to be
appreciated, there must be proof, as clear as that of the killing, of the following elements: (1) the time
when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that he clung to his
determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between determination and execution to allow himself
time to reflect upon the consequences of his act.[
][34] None of these elements was proven in this case. Evident premeditation could not therefore
aggravate the offense committed.
All told, the crime committed is murder and the penalty prescribed for it is reclusion perpetua to
death. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, where two indivisible penalties are prescribed for
an offense and there is neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
crime, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Inasmuch as no mitigating or aggravating circumstance
attended the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed
on the principal accused. On the accused-appellant as an accomplice, the proper penalty is one
degree lower than that of a principal. He is also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accused-appellant Florencio

Patalinghug, Jr. is convicted as an accomplice, not as a principal, in the crime of murder. He is
therefore sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum, for each of the two
counts of murder. He shall also, jointly and severally with the other accused, pay as civil indemnity
the amount of P50,000 for each count.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Morales, JJ., concur
573
People V. Realon, 99 SCRA 422
G.R. No. L-30832 August 29, 1980
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.SIMPLICIO REALON and EUTROPIO

SOLIVEN, accused-appellants.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the death sentence imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court of Baguio
City (Second Judicial District) in Criminal Case No. CCC-II-33-BB on the accused-appellants
Simplicio Realon and Eutropio Soliven for the crime of Murder qualified by treachery and attended
by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
The information filed on April 14, 1969 in the Court below by Acting First Assistant City Fiscal
Antonino L. Cortes charges both accused as follows:
574
That on or about the 13th day of April 1969, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said defendants, SIMPLICIO REALON and EUTROPIO
SOLIVEN, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, and armed with a deadly
weapon, to wit: "Paltic," 12 gauge, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and
shoot VICENTE RAMOS at the back of his head Oust above the nape), with treachery and known
premeditation, and as a result thereof, said VICENTE RAMOS died almost instantly.
All contrary to law, and with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia, and the generic aggravating
circumstance of known premeditation.
Baguio City, Philippines, April 14, 1969. 1
During arraignment, the two accuse entered a plea of not guilty with the assistance of two defense
counsels. 2 Thereafter, trial proceeded.
For a better perspective of the incident involved in this case, it is well to start with the following
uncontroverted facts:
On April 13, 1969 which was a Sunday, at about past three o'clock in the afternoon at the grandstand
in the, Athletic Bowl located at the Burnham Park in Baguio City, a group of more than forty (40) male
and female public school teachers were assembled and rehearsing a song for the inaugural
ceremonies of the Benguet Division of the Bureau of Public Schools at La trinidad, Benguet. The
group was arranged in four horizontal rows on four steps of the grandstand and facing the basketball
court below. Those belonging to the different voice groups of soprano, alto, tenor and bass were
together or placed near each other so that on the fourth or uppermost row from left to right facing the
conductress, Lena Domingo, and the basketball court stood the members of the tenor group which
included, Serafino Gayudan, Simplicio Realon (one of the accused), Severino Dionisio, Jose Viray,
Cipriano Bayangan, and Basilio Tumpac, Jr., then Vicente Ramos (the deceased victim), Federico
Pacleb, Mr. Puyasan, Mr. Balao, Andrew Sagubo, and Joseph Dampac, all members of the bass
group. Between Federico Pacleb and Puyasan was a post.
Earlier, Joseph Dampac, Andrew Sagubo and the accused Simplicio Realon arrived together, the
latter being accompanied by the other accused Eutropio Soliven, a mason working for one Delfin
Balajadia of Baguio City. During the song practice, and apparently while waiting for his co-accused
Realon, Soliven seated himself somewhere higher up the steps of the grandstand behind the fourth
line of the teachers, more specifically at the back of the tenor group.
Because the place of the rehearsal was situated in a public park, there was a considerable number
of people around. Children were playing at the uppermost step or part of the grandstand, just above
the singing group but to the left, and in the ball court below, some young men were playing
basketball. Within the immediate vicinity of the grandstand, it being a Sunday, there were
promenaders and excursionists, young and old, either walking or just lazing around.
The teachers in the grandstand were holding copies of their song selection and were actually singing
and blending their voices to the song "Come Where the Lilies Bloom" when accused Simplicio
Realon pulled out of the formation and shortly thereafter, a loud explosion was heard. Immediately,
panic ensued. Adults and children were screaming, some were running in different directions while
others were scampering to safety. Realon and Soliven left the grandstand in haste, one following the
other. Near the main gate of the Athletic Bowl, both Realon and Soliven were caught and held
separately, then turned over first to Patrolman Patrick Tolentino, then to Patrolman Jose Abellera,
575
both of the Baguio City Police Department. Pat. Abellera later brought the two accused to the City
Hall for investigation.
Immediately after the loud explosion, Vicente Ramos, one of the teachers. fell from where he was
standing in the grandstand. It turned out ' that he was shot at the upper portion of the nape. He died
from the gunshot wound inflicted. The Necropsy Report 3 dated April 14, 1969 of Dr. Perfecto O.
Micu, Medico-Legal Officer of the Baguio City Police Department who examined the cadaver of the
deceased Ramos, reveals the following:
Postmortem Findings:
1. Gunshot wound of entry (buckshot), consisting of a lacerated wound stellate in shape (with 5
points), with a diameter of 2. cms., located on the nape (posterior part of the neck) and directed
inward and upward. Resultant effects:
a) Laceration of the skin, muscles, nerves and blood vessels on the back part of the neck.
b) Fracture, comminuted opera base of the skull, posterior to and abutting the foramen magnum
severe.
c) Fracture, comminuted open, first cervical vertebra, severe.
d) Laceration (complete severance) of the vertebral artery, severe.
e) laceration of the Cerebellum, medulla oblongata, and brain stem, severe.
f) Intracranial and other internal and external hemorrhages, massive.
2. Contusion hematoma, upper right eyelid, severe,
3. Shed blood about 300 cc. at the place where. the body fell (2nd step of grandstand).
4. Four (4) metal pellets, distortated in shapes, about size smaller than corn grains and three (3)
brown hard board stoppers about 16 mm. in diameters each-recovered from the cranial cavity
through the wound.
5. Numerous blackish powder burns around the wound.
Cause of Death
Fractures, complete, open, comminuted base of skull and first cervical vertebra, severe; laceration.
complete, vertebral artery and other blood vessels; lacerations, cerebellum, medulla oblongata, and
brain stern, severe and resultant intracranial internal and external hemorrhages, massive, all due to
the gunshot (buckshot) wound On the back of the neck.
Dr. Micu testifying for the prosecution, stated that when he performed the autopsy, he actually found
two wounds on the person of the deceased Ramos a gunshot wound at the nape and a contusion
with hematoma near the eye. He stated, however, that the pellets which came from the gunshot
which caused the first wound. Because of the presence of blackish powder burns within the vicinity
of the gunshot wound, he estimated that at the time of firing, the distance between the skin of the
back of the victim's neck and the muzzle of the gun used was between two to three inches, more or
less. He further added that the gunshot wound could cause instantaneous death because the shot
passed the spinal cord which is a vital organ.
576
Aside from Dr. Micu the prosecution presented as witnesses five teachers who were among the
participants in the rehearsal, four of whom belonged to the row of the accused Realon and the victim
Ramos, which row was the fourth or last row; Remedios D. Ramos, the widow of the deceased
victim; Alejandro Alo; Patrolman Patrick Tolentino; and three bystanders, namely Adeline Lumbag,
Romeo Mandawe, and Ricardo Birog.
A brief recital of their respective testimonies follow:
Witness SERAFINO GAYUDAN, an elementary school teacher of Catubleng Barrio School, Buguias,
Benguet, who stood at the extreme left of the last row of the chorus, recalled that during the song
rehearsal at the Burnham Park grandstand, the accused Soliven placed himself at the back of the
group of teachers about one meter directly behind him. This witness further testified that while they
were singing "Come Where the Lilies BLOOM" he noticed the accused Realon, who was just beside
him to his right, pull out of line, About less than a minute thereafter, he heard an explosion, then saw
Vicente Ramos fall. He jumped down one step from his position, then turned his back and saw both
accused Realon and Soliven running towards the direction of the skating rink at the Burnham Park.
Just before he went to help the victim Ramos, he saw several children running after the two accused
shouting something which he could not understand. About ten minutes later, he saw the accused
arrested near the tennis court where the body of the victim was brought. He did not see any weapon
in the possession of the accused Realon nor did he see who shot the victim Ramos. (t.s.n., pp. 47-
63, May 14, 1969).
Witness SEVERINO DIONISIO, a teacher at the Badayan Elementary School Buguias, Benguet,
declared that he was the third on the last row from the left; he testified that the accused Soliven was
seated about two feet behind Serafino Gayudan and the accused Realon who were both to his
(witness') left. Like Serafino Gayudan, this witness noticed the accused Realon leave his place in the
last row of the group while they were in the middle of a song. He noticed further that said accused
moved towards the right, and a few moments later, there was a gun explosion. This witness sat
down for cover, then after about two seconds turned his head to see where the explosion came from.
He saw Vicente Ramos collapse and fall forward. Then he saw both accused running towards the
Burnham Park Lake with the accused Soliven in the lead. He also saw that the children who were
earlier playing at the upper portion of the grandstand to their left were now ruling after the two
accused. The children were shouting but he could not distinguish the words, except that he heard
them say that they saw a gun. This witness, however, did not see if the accused Realon had a gun.
(t.s.n. pp. 146-158, May 23, 1969).
Another witness, CIPRIANO BAYANGAN, an elementary school teacher of Saclalan Barrio School,
Buguias, Benguet, who stood second to the left of the victim Ramos, testified that while the group
was in the middle of "Come Where the Lilies Bloom," he turned his head to the right and saw a gun
about two inches away from and pointed at the head of said Ramos, who was about one meter away
from him. After the gun exploded, this witness covered the back of his head with his two hands, then
he saw the victim lying on the cement floor of the grandstand, blood oozing from the back of his
head where the gun had been pointed at. This witness described the barrel of the gun as "very big"
and declared that the color of the handle was brown. When showed the gun marked as Exhibit "A"
for the prosecution, he stated that "(t)he barrel is similar to this and the handle is brown like this. " He
did not see who fired the gun. (t.s.n., pp. 37-47, May 14,1969).
FEDERICO PACLEB, another prosecution witness, who stood beside and to the right of the victim
Ramos, declared that just before the loud explosion, the teachers were singing with their attention
focused on their respective copies of the song they were rehearsing. After the explosion which he
577
thought came from a firecracker, he touched his left ear because he could not hear anymore, and he
felt pain. About twenty-five seconds later, he turned and saw that the victim had fallen. He also saw
the victim's wife Mrs. Ramos, crying for help. Some of the teachers went to help but he did not.
Instead, he went with the other teachers who ran away because he was frightened. He did not see
who fired the shot nor did he see the two accused after the explosion. (t.s.n., pp. 159-164, May
23,1969).
MARCOS PALECPEC, elementary school teacher of Bangao Elementary School, resident of Baguio
City, was the last among the teachers who testified for the prosecution. He declared that he was then
the, municipal principal for administrative matters, hence the accused Realon was one of the
teachers under him administratively. He recounted that in the afternoon of April 13, 1969, he was
among those who attended the scheduled song rehearsal at the Athletic Bowl of the Burnham Park.
He was already at the appointed place at the grandstand when accused Realon arrived and
approached him. The latter apologized for being late and for being drunk. This witness thereupon
asked said accused, "Can you practice?" and Realon answered "Yes" then proceeded to join the
group. In the actual formation, this witness stood in the second row and thus had his back to the
accused and the victim who were both in the last row at the back. He claimed that he did not see
who shot the deceased. (t.s.n., pp. 201-205, June 5, 1969).
The widow, Mrs. REMEDIOS D. RAMOS, also testified and related an alleged incident between her
late husband and the accused Realon more than two years prior to the death of the former. At that
time, her husband was the head teacher at the Guinaoang Elementary School with supervisory
authority over Realon who was a shop teacher in the same school. Mrs. Ramos recalled that at
around 11 o'clock in the evening of October 13, 1966, Realon was drunk and was going in and out of
his quarters uttering words like "Come down,. bull shet, head teacher of Guinaoang! He is a thief!
Twenty centavos, one peso contributions. Even if you report me to the D.O. I am not afraid. Come
down! ... I am not afraid. Do not compare me with Viray!"' As a consequence of that incident, the late
Vicente Ramos wrote a letter to the then District Supervisor, Mr. Dampac. Mrs. Ramos came upon a
draft of said letter among her husband's papers after his death, and the same was produced in Court
and marked in evidence as Exhibit "J". Translated from Ilocano and read into the record by the
Deputy Clerk of Court, the draft reads as follows:
The undersigned requests that Mr. Realon, shop teacher in this school be investigated accordingly
for his utterances with a loud shout that he made in the evening of October 13, 1966, 11 o'clock
which was few meters (sic) from our quarters of the northern side of this quarters (sic) and
sometimes to the eastern side coming closer to ours he started reciting thus:
Hoy, contributions, contributions, sometimes one peso, sometimes twenty centavos. Come down
there and shoot me. I am not afraid. You should be grateful because I have no intention against you,
because if there is, you should have long been dead. You tell us to give contributions, but we don't
know anything about it because these contributions are for your family. You are a thief, Mr. Ramos.
Now shoot me. You report me and I will answer it. You demand contributions, but this is for your
family. Ha, stupid, you old man. Sigue, shoot me. It is good I have no gun. You demand contribution,
but it is not good at all not for the good of the majority, and it is for your wife It is a shady deal. Ha,
Mrs. Ramos? What you have done to Viray, don't do it to me! Head teacher of Guinaoang, you are a
thief, bull shet Report this to the D.O. If you report me I am not afraid!'
The foregoing statements were repeated many times.
578
About a week after the incident, continued Mrs. Ramos, the District Supervisor, Mr. Dampac, went to
Guinaoang and conducted an investigation in closed doors. After the investigation, the matter "case
settled." Sometime in December, 1966, or January, 1967, Realon brought a goat to the residence of
the Ramos spouses which the male teachers, including Mr. Dampac, butchered and partook of while
drinking. According to Mrs. Ramos, she heard from Mr. Palecpec and her husband that Realon said
of the goat, "This is my fine, sir."
Mrs. Ramos further recounted another incident which happened at the end of the same school year
(1966-1967) after the closing exercises. Realon was drunk again and he threw stones at the
teachers' quarters while uttering unprintable words. Mrs. Ramos stated that "his (Realon's) ire was
vented against Mrs. Alegre including us." She and the other female teachers who were inside the
quarters just kept silent. Her husband was then in the school offices.
When the school year ended, the Ramos spouses were transferred to Sinipsip while Realon stayed
on at Guinaoang until he was transferred, to Lingaoan but still under the supervision of Mr. Ramos.
They saw each other on several occasions and once Realon greeted Mrs. Ramos "Good Morning"
but most of the time, according to this witness, "Sabalit ti panagkita-kita na kada kam," "kasla kami
traidor" (he looked) at us as though we were traitors). On several occasions, too, she saw Realon in
the company of the other accused Soliven.
One week before the shooting at the Athletic Bowl grandstand, Mrs. Ramos claims that her husband
showed her a gun, which she later Identified as Exhibit "K". She was informed by Mr. Ramos that he
bought the gun "for security reasons" as Realon had evil plans against him. Two days before the
song rehearsal on April 13, 1969, Vicente Ramos told his wife that he "sensed a plan by Mr. Realon,"
and that he learned that Realon had a gun. (t.s.n., pp. 110-141, May 15,1969).
ALEJANDRO ALO, a gardener in the employ of the Department of Parks, Baguio City, and assigned
in the Burnham Park Lake, declared that in the afternoon of April 13, 1969, he was near the lake
when he saw many people rushing out of the Athletic Bowl. He particularly noticed two children who
were saying, "Those were the persons who killed!", pointing at the two accused who were running.
He gave chase and at the skating rink, he collared one of the accused, Soliven, while the others
caught Realon. He held Soliven for about five minutes, then turned him over to policeman Tolentino
and Abellera. It was Pat. Abellera who brought the two accused to the police station in his car. This
witness added that from the time of their apprehension up to the time they were indorsed to the
policemen about 5 minutes thereafter, both accused did not make any protest nor did they say
anything. (t.s.n., pp. 22-29, May 14, 1969, and pp. 404-411, June 19, 1969).
Patrolman PATRICK TOLENTINO of the Baguio City Police Department testified that in the afternoon
of April 13, 1969, he was assigned to render traffic duty at the Burnham Park. It was about 3 o'clock
while he was at the left side of the Burnham Park Lake when he heard an explosion which sounded
like a firecracker. He was thereupon informed by Alejandro Alo, the park gardener, that there was a
quarrel at the Athletic Bowl. He, Alo and others then went towards the Athletic Bowl. At the entrance
thereof, they met two children who said to him (Pat. Tolentino), "So da gita (They are the ones),
pointing at the fleeing accused who were already about 30 to 40 meters away. He blew Ms whistle to
make the accused stop running but they did not pay heed. When the accused reached the skating
rink, Alo caught Soliven, while Realon was caught by the others. At the skating rink, Pat. Tolentino
was handed a gun, Exhibit "A", by a boy about 17 years of age, with the information that it was
thrown away by the accused. He smelled the muzzle of the gun and found that it was recently fired.
Peering through the barrel, he saw one used shell or cartridge. He brought the gun, Exhibit "A" with
him to the place where the body of the victim was being examined by investigators. There he was
579
told by Palecpec that there was another gun at the grandstand. He verified this report and saw the
other gun referred to, Exhibit "K", a 32-caliber Japanese Lugger, lying on the steps of the grandstand
about one meter from where there was blood. Earlier, the investigators found a magazine of a
Japanese Lugger in the clothing of the deceased. In the grandstand, an investigator came and took
the Lugger, Exhibit "K". Patrolman Jose Abellera arrived and took the first gun, Exhibit "A", with him
when he brought the two accused to the police station. (t.s.n., pp. 64-87, May 14, 1969). At the time
that the two accused were being held, neither of them showed any kind of protest. (t.s.n., p. 403,
June 18,1969).
The bystanders who testified for the prosecution were Adeline Lumbag, an 18-year old college
student, Romeo Mandawe, an 11-year old Grade VI student, and Ricardo Birog, an 18-year old
houseboy who reached Grade VI.
ADELINE LUMBAG informed the Court that in the afternoon of April 13, 1969, she accompanied her
aunt, Miss Victoria Sungay, a substitute teacher, to the Athletic Bowl of the Burnham Park. While
waiting for her aunt who was a participant in the song practice, she seated herself on the steps of
the grandstand near the group of teachers, about two and a half meters from the last person in the
formation at her side. In the middle of a song, she planned to go up the steps of the grandstand but
as she started to do so, she changed her mind and turned back. As she turned back, she heard a
shot and she looked at the direction from whence it came. She saw smoke coming from within the
group and noticed that the crowd was starting to scatter, some of the teachers scampering to
different directions. She did not see who fired the shot but as she tried to approach the victim, who
was about seven meters away, she met two men running away from the group. (At this point during
the direct examination, this witness was reluctant to Identify the fleeing pair, but upon the Court's
prodding, she pointed at the two accused.) She Identified Soliven as the one running ahead followed
by Realon whom she said was tucking a gun at his left waist while running. Both men passed her at
a distance of about two meters. She also had a good view of the gun which she said was "just the
same as" Exhibit "A" because of the side and the size of the muscle. (t.s.n., pp. 1-21, May 14,1969).
Miss Lumbag's presence within the vicinity of the scene of the crime was confirmed by the testimony
of Serafino Gayudan. (t.s.n., p. May 14,1969).
ROMEO MANDAWE, an eleven-year old boy, testified that he was with his two younger brothers,
aged 6 and 7 years, at the Burnham Park in the afternoon of April 13, 1969. They had come from
Church, that day being a Sunday. They were near the lake when they heard a gun shot. After the
explosion, this witness saw the accused Soliven running from the grandstand followed by many
children who were also running. He saw Soliven threw a gun inside a garbage drum, then proceed to
run towards the direction of the skating rink. The gun, this witness recalled, had a big muzzle and a
white handle. He then saw another man retrieve the gun from the garbage drum and hand it over to
a policeman near the gate of the Athletic Bowl. Soliven was caught by the park gardener and a
policeman at the skating rink. Witness Mandawe went to the tennis court to view the body of the
victim and recognized the dead man as his neighbor, Vicente Ramos. Immediately, he went to inform
the victim's son, Eduardo Ramos, that his father was dead, (t.s.n., May 15, 1969, pp. 90-108).
RICARDO BIROG testified as the lone eyewitness to the actual shooting as follows: He was
employed as a houseboy in the home of Pedro Madarang in Baguio City. April 13, 1969 which was a
Sunday, was his off-day. In the afternoon of that day, he was with one Julie Carbonell at the
Burnham Park. They stayed for a while near the skating rink then he left Julie there to go to the
basketball court where a game was going on. From there, he saw a group of persons singing at the
grandstand near the basketball court. He then went up the grandstand, to its uppermost steps. He
580
seated himself about 25 meters behind the group to its left facing the basketball court. From this
oblique position, he noticed the accused Soliven seated about three meters also to the left of and
behind the group. After about twelve minutes of watching the song practice, he saw the accused
Realon, who was the second man from the left side of the fourth and uppermost row in the group,
move to the right and with his (Realon's) right hand point a gun at and shoot the deceased victim at
the back of the neck. The end of the gun was about two inches from the victim's neck at the time of
the explosion. The gun had a big muzzle and was about seven inches long. After the explosion, the
victim slowly felt while the two accused Realon and Soliven ran away together, Realon tucking the
gun at his left waist. This witness then declared that he ran to the side of the grandstand to have a
view of the fleeing accused and saw that when they were near two big trees about fifteen meters
from the grandstand, Realon pulled out. the gun from his waist and passed it to Soliven. The last he
saw of the accuse was when they were going out of the gate of the Athletic Bowl.
This witness Identified the gun as Exhibit "A". He further averred that he did not relate the incident to
anybody except two teenagers in front of the St. Louis University, and that it was on May 11, 1969, or
about a month after the incident, when he was asked by the fiscal to testify in this case. (t.s.n., pp.
169-200, June 5, 1969).
For the defense, the following were presented in Court: the two accused, Simplicio Realon and
Eutropio Soliven; Andrew Sagubo, one of the teachers; Delfin Balajadia, accused Soliven's
employer, and Patrolman Jose Abellera.
Accused SIMPLICIO REALON testified that on July 19, 1966, he started teaching at the Guinaoang
Elementary School where his head teacher was the late Vicente RAMOS. He confirmed that there
was an incident between him and Ramos sometime in October, 1966 when he called the latter a
thief and accused him of using his collections for his family. This accused claimed that the matter
was investigated and thereafter, he and Ramos were in good terms with each other, although it was
only two or three months later that he was able to bring the goat which District Supervisor Dampac
had suggested for the amicable settlement of his differences with Ramos. Thereafter, he and Ramos
were transferred and assigned to different places but when they met each other on certain
occasions, he always greeted the Ramos spouses.
In the evening of April 12, 1969, he arrived at Baguio City for the song rehearsal scheduled the
following day. He boarded at the house of Aproniano Soliven whom he had known from the time he
got married. It was there that he saw the other accused Eutropio Soliven, Aproniano's brother.
In the morning of April 13, 1969, he was accompanied by said accused Soliven to the residence of
Andrew Sagubo to get his check, but he was informed by the latter that the check had not arrived
yet. Both accused then went to the market. then had lunch at the house of Aproniano. After lunch,
accused Soliven invited Realon to a dog party. Realon accepted the invitation provided that they
would go after the practice at the Burnham Park. At about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, while both
accused were walking along General Luna Road, Soliven left Realon to urinate. When Soliven came
back, he was holding a toy gun with paper bullets exhibit "2" for the defense) which he claimed he
had picked up. Realon "played" with the toy gun for a while, then asked Soliven if he could have it for
his son, but Soliven refused so the toy gun was returned to him. They went on and saw Andrew
Sagubo having his shoes shined. Realon also had his shoes shined, and so did Joseph Dampac
who came along shortly. After their shoes were shined, Soliven volunteered to treat the three
teachers, Realon, Sagubo and Dampac, to a drink. After the drink at a nearby store, they all boarded
a cab and went to the Burnham Park.
581
Upon their arrival at the park, Realon approached Principal Palecpec to apologize for being late.
Soliven sat himself at the back of the group of teachers about one meter away. During the practice
and in the middle of a song, Realon claims that he folded his copy of the song, put it in his pocket
and left his position in the fourth and last row of the group with the intention of telling Soliven to go
ahead to the dog party because he (Realon) could not go anymore. As he was approaching Soliven
to where the latter moved in line with the fourth row, he heard a very loud explosion which sounded
like a backfire of a truck. He was frightened and saw Soliven standing up. When Soliven stood up,
the toy gun (Exhibit "2") fell from him. Realon then turned his back and saw the teachers running to
different directions. He heard someone shout, "Take cover!" so he went down the grandstand
walking fast because he was afraid and all the teachers had gone away and he did not want to be
left alone. Soliven was ahead of him about 6 to 7 meters also walking fast. When he was nearing the
gate, he met Patrolman Tolentino to whom he said, "Sir, there is a commotion there. Please go and
see. " Pat. Tolentino went right away. Realon continued out of the gate and about 40 meters
therefrom, he saw that Soliven was apprehended by a policeman. He himself was apprehended and
held by a man not in uniform but who showed a badge and claimed he was a "justicia". Later, a jeep
arrived and Soliven and he were told to ride the jeep. The two men who caught them also rode in the
jeep. They were all brought to the police department. (t.s.n., pp. 323-400, June 1718, 1969).
Accused EUTROPIO SOLIVEN's testimony was in accord with that of his co-accused insofar as he
(Soliven) was concerned. Additionally, he declared that he had known Realon from the time the latter
married his townmate, now Mrs. Realon, although he is not related to his said co-accused. At the
time of the incident in question, he had been employed for five days as a mason by Delfin Balajadia.
It was to his said employer's dog party that he invited Realon on April 13, 1969.
This accused also claims that he picked up the toy gun (Exhibit "2") in the vacant lot where he
relieved himself in the afternoon of April 13, 1969. He allowed Realon to try the toygun, and the latter
used up all its paper bullets, but he refuse to give the toy gun away to Realon because he had
intended to give it to his own child. When they both went on their way, he placed the toy gun well
inside his pocket.
At the Burnham Park while waiting for Realon, he sat at the back of the group of teachers, then
transferred about five meters to the left because he wanted to watch the basketball game going on
below the grandstand. It was when he saw Realon approaching him when he heard the explosion.
He immediately stood up and the toy gun fell from him. He picked it up and put it back inside his
pocket. He ran away because he was afraid as he knew there were tough guys in Baguio and
because he was in a hurry to go to Balajadia's dog party. At the skating rink, he was collared by
someone, then turned over to a policeman. (t.s.n., pp. 254-316, June 10, 1969).
ANDREW SAGUBO confirmed both accused's testimony regarding their call at his residence in the
morning of April 13, 1969, and their meeting each other again along General Luna Road at around
two o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, up to the time they all went together to the Athletic Bowl
in a taxicab. At the grandstand, however, this witness did not notice where the accused Soliven
seated himself but he saw about four or five children playing at a place higher up the steps of the
grandstand. This witness was in the fourth row, the second man from the right facing the basketball
court, but he claims that he did not see anyone pull out of the line before the explosion. Immediately
after the explosion, he saw Realon just standing where he was supposed to be, then saw him leave
the place, going towards the left of the grandstand. He (Sagubo), together with a co- teacher Joseph
Dampac, tried to help when they saw the victim Ramos lying on the steps of the grandstand and
Mrs. Ramos crying. (t.s.n., pp. 210- 244, June 9,1969).
582
Witness DELFIN BALAJADIA confirmed that at the time of the incident, the accused Soliven had
been working for him as a mason on and off for about a week, and that he had organized a dog
party for his laborers, including Soliven, to be held at four o'clock in the afternoon of April 13, 1969.
According to this witness, the dog party was held as planned but the accused Soliven was not able
to attend.
Patrolman JOSE ABELLERA recalled that in the afternoon of April 13, 1969, he was then at the
Burnham Park near the parking station when he heard a shot and noticed people running towards
the direction of the Athletic Bowl. He rode in his car and went to the place. At the gate of the Athletic
Bowl, he saw Pat. Tolentino. The latter turned over to him a pistolized shotgun and the two suspects,
Realon and Soliven. The. two park gardeners, Alejandro Alo and one Andaya, were there. He
brought the gun, the suspects, and the two gardeners to the police station in his car. At the station,
he frisked the suspects as customarily done and found tucked in the waist of Soliven a toy gun
(Exhibit "2") which he handed over to the desk sergeant. (t.s.n., pp. 245-252, June 9,1969).
After the case was submitted for decision, the lower court rendered on July 15, 1969 the decision
appealed from, the dispositive portion of which states:
The court, therefore, finds the accused Simplicio Realon and Eutropio Soliven guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder as charged in the information qualified by treachery and
aggravated by evident premeditation. There being no mitigating circumstance to offset it, the court
has no alternative but to impose the maximum penalty of death to each of the accused, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased jointly and severally in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos
(P12,000.00).
The accused shall also pay jointly and severally the heirs the sum of Three Thousand Pesos
(P3,000.00) as moral damages, plus Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased and One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) in exemplary damages, and the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 4
In their Brief, appellants Realon and Soliven make the following Assignment of Errors :
I. The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ricardo
Birog, Romeo Mandawe and Adeline Lumbag;
II. The lower court erred in finding that accused Simplicio Realon had the motive to kill Vicente
Ramos;
III. The lower court erred in not giving due significance to the suppression by the prosecution of the
testimony of the National Bureau of Investigation officer who fingerprinted and paraffin-tested the
accused;
IV. The lower court erred in convicting the accused and imposing the death penalty; in finding
conspiracy attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. 5
Anent the first assigned error, appellants maintain that the lower court should have discredited and
disregarded the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ricardo Birog, Romeo Mandawe and Adeline
Lumbag for being doubtful, unreliable and/or incredible.
583
The rule is well-settled that "where the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, the appellate court wig
generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide
the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their treatment and manner of
testifying during trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case. 6 In the instant case, We find no justifiable or
compelling reason to disturb the findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses singled out by herein appellants.
With respect to the eyewitness Ricardo Birog, appellants set forth the following circumstances which
allegedly cast grave doubt on the said witness' minute witness, his name was not included in the
informatiocredibility and on his supposed presence at the place of incident: first, Birog was a last n,
and he was not presented during the hearing on the petition for bail; second, Birog did not report
what he allegedly saw to the police, to his employer, or to the Fiscal, but he related the story to two
teenagers both unknown to him; third, Birog was presented as an alleged eyewitness, but it appears
that the Fiscal simply asked him to come to Court and did not even bother to take down his
statement; fourth, Birog's testimony shows that he could not have been present during the
occurrence of the incident in question; and fifth, Birog claimed that he did not know the persons
assembled at the grandstand of the Athletic Bowl rehearsing songs nor remember their faces, and
that he did not know Realon nor Ramos before the incident, yet he was able to show where the latter
were positioned in the formation of teachers. Appellants further express bewilderment at the fact that
nowhere in the records is there an explanation as to how witness Birog was "discovered" by the
prosecution. 7
As to the first circumstance, although the defendant in a criminal case is entitled as a matter of right
to be furnished by the prosecution with a list of witnesses to be presented against him during the
trial, the last sentence of Section 1, Rule 116 8 of the Rules of Court allows the prosecution to call at
the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information. 9 Thus in the case of
People vs. Zapatero, We reiterated the ruling that "the prosecution is not precluded from calling as a
witness a person who was not listed as a witness in the information. 10
In this case, therefore, there was nothing irregular with the presentation of witness Birog at the trial
by reason of the fact that his name was not included in the list of witnesses at the end of the
Information filed against herein appellants. Moreover, it appears that the prosecuting fiscal came to
know of Birog's witnessing the incident only after the Information had been filed in the lower court on
April 14, 1969. Birog himself declared that it was only on May 11, 1969 that he was asked by Fiscal
Carbonen to testify (t.s.n., p. 179, June 5, 1969). Birog's name could therefore not have been
included in the Information which was filed on an earlier date. And even if the Fiscal had known of
Birog at the time he filed the Information, no right of the accused is violated. As We ruled in People
vs. Estrada, 11 the doctrine enunciated therein states its rationale, thus:
... the right of the prosecution to can at the trial witnesses other than those listed in the complaint or
information may not be seriously questioned. This right is supported by the rules and jurisprudence
on the matter. While the accused in a criminal prosecution is entitled to know the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, yet it does not mean that he is entitled to know in advance the names
of all the witnesses for the prosecution. The success of the prosecution might be endangered if such
right be granted to an accused, for the known witnesses might be subjected to pressure or coerced
not to testify. The time for the accused to know all the witnesses against him is when they take the
witness stand
584
Lastly, the fact that no explanation appears in the records as to how the prosecution came to know
of Birog and his presence at the scene of the crime cannot be a basis for appellant's assertion that
this witness was "discovered" as a last minute witness to fill a gap in the prosecution's evidence. A
mere suggestion or insinuation that a witness is perjured or planted will not suffice to destroy his
credibility. The allegation must be supported by convincing and satisfactory proof, and such proof
herein appellants have failed to provide
As to the second circumstance urged upon Us by appellants, We do not find it highly incredible that
Birog did not report what he knew about the incident to the authorities or to his employer, and
instead related the story to strangers. It must be remembered, as correctly observed by the trial
court that Birog "was merely a houseboy who reached only the sixth grade, unaccustomed to the
ways of public life, much less to determine whom to confer with in matters of criminal prosecution. 12
Given his quite modest means of livelihood, Birog understandably did not want to be involved in the
case, so he chose not to confide in those persons who could compels his involvement, but only to
the two teenagers who were not known to him and who in all probability did not know him as well.
The natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. 13 As was
held in People vs. Delfin et al, 14 "... the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged into criminal
investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility." 15 In any case,
herein witness Ricardo Birog had agreed to be, as in fact he was, presented in court as a witness for
the prosecution, and he declared what he knew about the shooting incident.
Moreover, the circumstance that Birog did not execute a written statement prior to his oral testimony
in court could not in any way affect his credibility as a witness. There is no law which requires that
the testimony of a prospective witness be first reduced to writing in order that his declarations in
court at a later tune may be believed or accepted by the trial judge. "The rules do not make it a
condition precedent for a witness to give his affidavit before taking the stand. The procedure is
adopted to safeguard the parties from a recalcitrant witness." 16 In the case of U.S. vs. Dacir, the
Supreme Court pronounce the rule as to the basis of the credibility of a witness' testimony, thus:
The value as evidence of the testimony of a witness given in open court in the course of a trial had
therein is due for the most part to the following considerations: That under such conditions it is given
under the sanction of an oath and of the penalties prescribed for perjury; that the witness' story is
told in the presence of an impartial judge in the course of a solemn trial in open court; that the
witness is subject to cross-examination, with all the facilities afforded thereby to test the truth and
accuracy of his statements and to develop his attitude of mind toward the parties, and his disposition
to assist the cause of truth rather than to further some personal end; that the proceedings are had
under the protection of the court and under such conditions as to remove, so far as is humanly
possible, all likelihood that undue or unfair influences will be exercised to induce the witness to
testify falsely; and finally that under the watchful eye of a trained judge his manner, his general
bearing and demeanor and even the intonation of his voice often unconsciously disclose the degree
of credit to which he is entitled as a witness. 17
The fourth and fifth circumstances cited by appellants, which are equally not deserving of merit, may
be considered together. Appellants claim that Birog's testimony shows that he could not have been
present during the shooting incident because he did not know what songs the teachers were singing
or how many songs were sung, he could not calculate how long he stayed watching the teachers
and he could not remember the faces of those present at the rehearsal because he saw "only the
one who shot". Appellants also assert as unbelievable the fact that Birog could remember the face of
585
Realon, and likewise point out the incongruity between the two sketches (Exhibits "I" and "I-A")
drawn by Birog.
First of all, it is not true that Birog could not say how long he stayed to watch the song rehearsal. He
specifically stated during cross-examination that he was in the grandstand "about twelve minutes"
before the shooting took place (t.s.n.. p. 183, June, 5, 1969). Secondly, it is understandable that
Birog could not remember the faces of the teachers, how many songs were sung and what song was
being sung at the time of the shooting. It must be kept in mind that he was a mere bystander. He
was seeing the group of forty or so teachers for the first time and in a place where there were many
other people around. He did not even go to the park with the intention of watching the teachers, as in
the first place, he could not have known that there was going to be a practice. His presence at the
specific place where he was when the shooting occurred was accidental. Nor was he seated or
positioned in front of the teachers to be able to see their faces. He was up the grandstand at the
back of the formation. And even if he passed ' in front of the group, he could not have possibly
memorized all those faces. Neither could he be expected to recall the songs that were sung if in the
first place he was not familiar with the songs. As a matter of fact, there is evidence to show that even
some of the teacher participants were learning their songs for the first time that day.
On the other hand, it should not come as a surprise that Birog remembered the face of Realon, and,
for that matter, that he could also Identify Soliven. Birog specifically declared that when the two
accused fled, "... they were running near me" (t.s.n., p. 195, June 5, 1969), and even when the
accused had left the grandstand, Birog ran to have another look at them and that was when he saw
Realon pass the gun (Exhibit "A") to Soliven between the two big trees (t.s.n., pp. 176 and 193, June
5, 1969). Besides, regardless of the fact that Birog did not know either of the accused prior to the
shooting, he indicated in a sketch that the assassin was the second man from the left in the last line
of the group of teachers. It is admitted that such was the position of accused Realon during the song
practice.
The matter of the discrepancy between the two sketches of Birog is not of any consequence. Birog
himself stated that the first sketch was wrong so he drew another one. In other words, he Identified
the second sketch as the correct one. Lastly, contrary to appellant's assertions, an objective and fair
examination of Birog's entire testimony shows that he was at the place of the incidence of the crime
when it was committed and that he actually witnessed the shooting at the time when it was being
perpetrated. With respect to the 11-year old witness Romeo Mandawe, appellants likewise contend
that his testimony should be discredited because 1. although he testified that he saw and could
Identify the gun used in the shooting, when shown Exhibit "A" he stated that what he saw was a
different gun with a big muzzle and with a different handle, and 2. while this witness testified that he
saw the gun being placed in a drum, he did not inform the police about it. 18
From the records, the evidence shows factually that when confronted with Exhibit "A", witness
Mandawe did not expressly say that it was a different gun that he saw. He merely stated that "It has
a different handle" (t.s.n., p. 92, May 15, 1969), and on cross-examination, he said "the one I saw
was with (a) white handle" (t.s.n., p. 101, May 15, 1969). On the other hand, when asked to describe
the gun which he saw, he replied, "It has a big muzzle" (t.s.n., p. 99, May 16, 1969), exactly the
same description given by the other witnesses who saw the gun used in the shooting. Coincidentally,
Exhibit "A" also has a big muzzle. This witness may have been mistaken as to the color of the
handle of the gun but considering the excitement attendant to the event, this is trivial and
inconsequential. The vital point in his testimony is that he saw the accused Soliven throw the gun
inside a garbage drum and afterwards, the gun was retrieved by another man who delivered it to a
policeman. This part of Mandawe's testimony is again corroborated by other prosecution witnesses.
586
The circumstance that Mandawe did not inform the police that he saw the gun thrown inside the
drum, even if true, is also not material to this witness' credibility. Being a young boy, he could not be
expected to volunteer information to the authorities especially if he was not being asked. In any
case, he has revealed what he knew in Court, and We find no justifiable reason to disbelieve the
parts of his testimony which are sufficiently corroborated by the other evidence on record.
With respect to prosecution witness Adeline Lumbag, appellants express incredulity at her claim that
she stayed after the shooting and even approached the victim while all the others, including the male
teachers, were scampering to safety. Appellants point out that in the confusion that ensued, with
everybody running around, she could not have seen the accused Realon tuck a gun inside his waist
as her view was obstructed.
Appellants' position, however, assumes facts which are not of record. Although it is not doubted that
immediately after the loud explosion, people were scared and ran for cover, there is no evidence to
show that all the teachers ran in the same direction as Realon. On the contrary, the evidence shows
that the teachers scampered in different directions and most of them went downwards to the lower
portion of the grandstand. Even if it were to be speculated that some of the teachers went towards
the direction taken by Realon, they could not have been that many as to have completely obstructed
Adeline's view of the said accused. In fact, the testimony of Adeline does not disclose whether or not
some teachers ran abreast of or near Realon. What is clear is that she saw both the accused
running one after the other, passing her at a distance of about two meters and that she saw Realon
tucking a gun at his waist.
Neither does the evidence show that everybody left the grandstand after the shooting, as appellants
would assume. It was not only Adeline Lumbag who remained where she was and who tried to
approach the place where the victim was. Mrs. Ramos, the victim's widow, was the first to go near
her husband. Some of the teachers went to help, three of whom were Joseph Dampac, Serafino
Gayudan, and one of the defense witnesses, Andrew Sagubo. It is not clear why Adeline Lumbag
moved toward the victim but she said she did and it could have been for a number of different
reasons. In any case, although Adeline Lumbagos actuations as claimed by her may be
characterized as exceptional considering the reaction of the majority of the persons in the
grandstand and its vicinity, We do not find this a ground for discrediting her testimony. It is a fact that
different people react differently to the same types of situations.
As a final disposition of the first error assigned by herein appellants, We quote the following
observations of the trial court which We find to be persuasive, clear and convincing:
... the declarations of the principal witnesses Adeline Lumbag, Alejandro Alo, Ricardo Birog, Romeo
Mandawe and Patrick Tolentino, who are disinterested witnesses, were clear, unequivocal and
convincing. From the declarations of these witnesses, the court notes the continuous and unbroken
chain of events and circumstances which, to an unbiased mind, all tend to point to the positive
Identification of both accused. The testimony of Ricardo Birog has all the earmarks of truth. The
court carefully observed him while testifying and his answers were sincere, clear, candid and
unerring. 19
In the second assigned error, appellants contend that the lower court erred in finding that the
accused Simplicio Realon had a motive to kill the deceased Ramos because of the incident then
which took place in 1966 and investigated by the District Office, and after which Realon was
transferred to another school. The decision under review states:
587
... Whether or not his transfer was the result of the investigation or thru the proddings of the
deceased, or a matter of administrative routine, the evidence fails to show, the bare fact being that
the accused Realon was eventually transferred to another station. Quite naturally, the accused
resented his transfer. He had reasons to believe that, despite the goat he bought, the deceased was
responsible for his transfer. This, the court finds, was the motive behind the killing. The accused
nurtured a hatred for the deceased and vowed revenge. 20
We agree with the trial court's finding that revenge was the motive. The unfortunate incident between
Realon and Ramos above referred to could not easily be forgiven and forgotten. It had definitely
caused both of them much embarrassment and humiliation, especially for Realon who was then a
young teacher just starting his career. His record as a teacher was undoubtedly tainted after Ramos
reported the matter of his drunkenness and undesirable conduct to the District Office, and instigated
an investigation to be conducted thereon. Realon resented Ramos for doing what he did, without
regard for the propriety or impropriety of the latter's actions. Despite the attempt at amicable
settlement, We are convinced that the differences were not really "settled". Even if it were true, as
Realon alleges, that he greeted the Ramos spouses "Good Morning" or "Good Afternoon" on several
occasions subsequent to the incident, such actuations were merely an outward show of civility or
respect, Ramos then having supervisory authority over him. Mrs. Ramos, though admitting that
Realon greeted her and her late husband once, testified that the said accused threw contemptuous
looks at them.
The fact that the incident between the accused Realon and the deceased Ramos took place in
October of 1966 and the latter was killed in April of 1969 does not rule out revenge as the motive in
this case. As We had the occasion to say in the case of People vs. Turalba: "Although the incident
transpired in 1962 and the killing was perpetrated in 1964, the long interval of time would not
necessarily mean that the flame of revenge had flickered and died. To proud and sensitive persons,
who desire to retain a good reputation or image in the community and who do not want to be
regarded as cowards, such an affront or loss of face would rankle for many years. The suppressed
rage would find adequate release only in some sort of vindictive retaliation. 21
Regardless of whether or not the accused had any motive to kill, however, We have consistently held
in a long line of cases that when there is no doubt as to the Identity of the culprit, motive is not
essential to conviction. 22 We so hold now. There is overwhelming evidence in the case at bar
pointing to accused Realon as the gunwielder. He was positively Identified by a disinterested and
credible eyewitness as the one who fired at the deceased. Two witnesses, the teachers who stood
on either side of Realon during the song practice, declared that they noticed the latter leave his
place in the last row just a few moments before the gun shot rang out. One of them significantly
added that upon pulling out of the line, Realon "moved to the right," or towards the place where the
victim was. Upon the other hand, there is no evidence that immediately before the shooting,
somebody else in the group left his place in the formation or that an outsider approached the victim
from behind. Two disinterested bystanders testified that after the loud explosion, they saw Realon
tuck a gun at his waist while fleeing with the other accused Soliven. One of these witnesses added
that after both accused had ran some distance, he saw Realon pass the gun to Soliven. Another
disinterested witness saw the accused Soliven throw the gun inside a garbage drum. Children who
were playing at the grandstand chased the running pair and were heard to shout that they saw a
gun. The children even informed the policeman "They are the ones," pointing at the two accused.
The latter continued in their flight despite a warning whistle from the policeman, and when they were
caught at last, they did not show any kind of protest. The fatal gun was recovered immediately after
the incident and found by the police to have been recently fired. The gun was likewise Identified by
witnesses during the trial.
588
We have held that the testimony of only one witness, if credible and positive and if it satisfies the
Court beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient to convict the accused. 23 Such is the testimony of
eyewitness Ricardo Birog, the prosecution's direct and strongest evidence. In addition thereto, there
is ample corroborative evidence, testimonial as well as real, to support the inevitable finding of guilt.
For the defense, on the other hand, the evidence is weak and unconvincing. Realon claims that he
folded his copy of the song lyrics and put it inside this pocket before he left his place in the fourth
row to tell Soliven to go ahead to the dog party. The question, however, is why he had to fold and
keep that piece of paper that he was holding. A few words to Soliven, who was only a few meters
away from him, would not take a long time and certainly a piece of paper would not interfere with or
in any way disturb their conversation. Realon's act of folding the paper and putting it inside his
pocket would rather suggest an intention NOT to return to the song practice anymore. It could also
imply that he intended to use his hands for some other purpose, hence he had to get rid of the
paper. At this point, the significance of the testimony that Realon "moved to the right" is likewise
brought to the fore. The victim was to the right of Realon while Soliven was to his left. When Realon
"moved to the right," he did not go to where Soliven was, contrary to the claim of the defense.
Moreover, considering everything that has been Id above, it strikes Us as too much of a coincidence
that Realon had to leave his place only a few moments before the victim was shot.
We also note that during the trial, the defense was careful to use the phrase "walking fast" in
describing how the two accused left the grandstand immediately after the gun shot was heard. In
addition, it is also claimed that the accused were frightened of the explosion. If this were true, why
did the accused merely "walk fast"? They should have ran like the others who scampered to safety.
Or perhaps the accused actually "ran" but were careful not to say so in court lest it be understood to
mean that they "fled" from the scene of the crime, for after all flight is considered as evidence
tending to establish guilt. 24 Yet that was exactly what they did, according to several disinterested
witnesses who saw the accused leave the grandstand and up to the time they reached the skating
rink where they were finally caught.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the failure of the prosecution to present the NBI
officers who fingerprinted and paraffin- tested the accused-appellants gives rise to the application of
the rule that evidence wilfully suppressed shall be disputably presumed to be adverse if produced,
under Rule 131, Sec. 5 (e) of the Rules of Court. The contention is without merit.
The rule on suppression of evidence finds no applicability in cases where the evidence allegedly
suppressed is merely corroborative or cumulative. Thus:
No inference arises against a party failing to call a witness where the only object of calling such
witness would be to produce corroborative or cumulative evidence ... (31 C.J.S., 857).
Failure to present some witnesses for the prosecution, even if the omitted witnesses are
eyewitnesses of the crime, does not of necessity give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced, which does not apply to the suppression of merely
corroborative evidence (People vs. Tuzon, 56 Phil. 649, citing, U.S. vs. Gonzales, 22 Phil. 325 and
U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil 797.) 25
In the instant case, the testimony of the NBI officers would indeed merely be corroborative in view of
the overwhelming evidence on the positive Identification of both accused.
Furthermore, the presumption of suppression of evidence is inapplicable to a case where the

evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the prosecution and would have the same
589
weight against one party as against the other. 26 Stated other wise, the unproffered evidence which
appellants urge Us to presume as unfavorable to the prosecution was equally available or accessible
to the defense. The Government, represented by the Fiscal, does not have the exclusive prerogative
or privilege to avail of the services of the NBI or to have the officers of said office summoned in court
in connection with a criminal case. The defense itself, during the trial, could have presented the NBI
officers and/or the results of the fingerprint and paraffin tests allegedly conducted if the evidence so
presented was favorable to the accused, but the defense did not avail of said privilege. It is rather
late in the day to complain that the NBI officers were not called to testify.
At this point, it is pertinent to quote from the case of People vs. Equipilag, et al, thus:
We do not depreciate the value of paraffin tests ... as aids to criminal investigation and analysis as
well as to judicial appreciation of the probability of guilt; we are of the opinion, however, that their
absence does not constitute a bar to a judgment of conviction where, on the basis of the evidence
adduced 4 we are convinced with moral certainty, that the accused are guilty. 27
Still under the third assignment of error, appellants contend that "the fact that the prosecution,
without explanation, failed to call several witnesses, three mentioned in the Information and two
others mentioned by its lone witness gives to the presumption that their testimony would not be
favorable to the prosecution's cause." The contention is misleading hence should not even deserve
consideration.
A verification of the original records in the trial court reveals the falsity of herein appellants' averment
that three witnesses mentioned in the Information were not presented by the prosecution. Of the
seven witnesses named in the Information, it was only Mrs. Lena Domingo who did not testify during
the trial. 28 And the prosecution presented not one but twelve witnesses. We therefore do not know
whom appellants refer to as the prosecution's "lone witness", much less the alleged "two other
mentioned" by said lone witness.
Nevertheless, in connection with the non-presentation of Mrs. Lena Domingo, the records show that
a subpoena dated April 22, 1969 was issued to Mrs. Domingo but the same could not be served on
her because she was "out of town." 29 "No adverse inference will be drawn against a party by
reason of the absence of a witness who has been subpoenaed and against whom an attachment
has been issued to compel his attendance. 30 At any rate, examining Mrs. Domingo's statement
which is on record, 31 taken and sworn to on the day of the shooting itself, there appears nothing
therein that is prejudicial to the case for the prosecution.
The fourth and last assignment of error raises, among others, the issue of whether or not conspiracy
between the two accused was established by the evidence. The lower court premises its finding of
conspiracy on the following circumstances: "(1) In the evening of May (April) 12, 1969, Realon and
Soliven met in the house of the latter's brother Aproniano; (2) the following morning, they were
together again allegedly to see Mr. Andrew Sagubo at La Trinidad to claim Realon's salary check. (3)
Then they proceeded together to the market at Baguio City; (4) they lunched together at the house
of Aproniano Soliven, brother of Eutropio; (5) They went together again to Gen. Luna Road in the
afternoon; (6) Soliven previously provided himself with a toy-gun ... (7) They drank gin together at
Gen. Luna Road. (8) Arriving at the grandstand, Soliven sat behind the fourth row ... (9) They ran
together after the shooting and on the way Realon passed the fatal gun to Soliven who quickly
dumped it in a garbage barrel, 32 holding both accused Realon and Soliven guilty as co-principals in
the crime of murder and sentencing them to the capital penalty of death. The Solicitor General
maintains that the finding of conspiracy should be upheld.
590
We do not agree. Upon a review of the record, We are not satisfied that conspiracy has been duly
proven. To begin with, the evidence is clear that accused Soliven did not actively participate in the
shooting of the deceased victim. It may likewise be considered that only Realon had a known
possible motive to kill the late Ramos. On the part of Soliven, there is no proof that he knew or had
ever met Ramos before the shooting incident. More importantly, it is Our considered opinion that
neither the circumstances cited by the trial court enumerated above nor the facts established by the
evidence suffice to meet the requirement of conclusive proof 33 to declare the existence of
conspiracy. We have consistently held that conspiracy must be shown by positive and convincing
evidence, 34 as clearly as the commission of the offense itself, 35 although direct proof is not
necessary. 36
It is an admitted fact that the two accused were together from the evening of April 12, 1969 up to the
time of the shooting the very next day. However, it is neither alleged nor shown that their meeting at
Aproniano Soliven's house on the date abovementioned was planned. Accused Eutropio Soliven had
been boarding with his brother for some time, while Realon arrived in Baguio to attend the song
rehearsal scheduled the day after his arrival. Neither is there any evidence that either of the accused
knew that the other was going to be in the particular place where they met or that the meeting was
purposely sought by one of them. The most than can be said on the basis of the evidence at hand is
that the encounter at Aproniano Soliven's residence was purely coincidental. Further, the accused's
being together on the day of the shooting, April 13, 1969, is also not unusual to be considered
suspicious. They were former townmates, it so happened that they lodged at the same place, and
their known activities for two days, April 12 and 13, up to the day of the shooting were perfectly
legitimate. In the morning, they went to get Realon's check from Mr. Andrew Sagubo. This was
confirmed by the latter. Upon being informed that the check had not yet arrived, the accused claimed
that they went to the market. This was not contradicted. Then they had lunch at their lodging house
then proceeded to Gen. luna Road where they met Sagubo and Dampac and where the latter and
Realon had their shoes shined. Sagubo and Dampac were also with the accused when they stopped
at a nearby store for a drink. The four of them arrived at the Burnham Park. Earlier, accused Soliven
invited Realon to a dog party, hence it was quite natural that Soliven accompanied Realon to the
rehearsal and waited for the latter at the grandstand where the practice was held. That there was
going to be a dog party was corroborated by Soliven's employer, Delfin Balajadia, whom We find to
have no reason to testify falsely in court. Up to the time of the shooting, there is nothing in the
evidence that would suffice to make Soliven liable as a co-conspirator or even an accomplice. With
regards to his presence at the scene of the crime, the jurisprudence laid down in People vs.
Custodio 37 penned by Mr. Justice Felix Q. Antonio is elucidating, and We quote:
It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes the existence of a preconceived plan
or agreement and in order to establish the existence of such a circumstance, it is not enough that the
persons supposedly engaged or connected with the same be presented when the crime was
perpetrated. There must be established a logical relationship between the commission of the crime
and the supposed conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate connection between and
among the latter, such as by their overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design
Considering the farreaching consequences, of criminal conspiracy, the same degree of proof
required for establishing the crime is required to support a finding of its presence, that is, it must be
shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.
The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him liable, upon the other hand, as an
accomplice, it must be shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the principal which
may be demonstrated by previous or simultaneous acts which contribute to the commission of the
offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly stated in People vs. Tamayo: 'It is an
591
essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is further
necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of
supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. '... From our view
of the evidence it has not been convincingly established that appellant cooperated in the commission
of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through
external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the clime in an
efficacious way. Such circumstances being absent, his mere passive presence at the scene of the
crime certainly does not make him either a co-principal or an accomplice in the commission of the
offense. 38
As We held in the recently decided case of People vs. Toling, et al. 39 with respect to one of the
appellants therein, the accused "cannot be held criminally responsible as principal ...since there is
no direct proof that he conspired with his co-appellants or directly participated in the commission
thereof. He cannot also be held criminally responsible as an accomplice. In order to hold one liable
as an accomplice, it is essential that it be proved beyond reasonable doubt that between the
supposed accomplice and the principal, there is community of criminal purpose which implies that it
be shown that the supposed accomplice committed the acts imputed to him with the intention to help
morally or materially in the commission of the crime."
This is not to say, however, that the accused Soliven is without any liability at all. The evidence
clearly and evidently establishes his participation and involvement as an accessory to the crime
committed by Realon. We are convinced from the circumstances of the case at bar and Soliven's
actuations immediately subsequent to the shooting up to the time of his appellant apprehension that
he has incurred criminal liability as an accessory.
The Revised Penal Code defines accessories as follows:
Art. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery;
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the
accessory act with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, of an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime. (Emphasis supplied.)
In finding Soliven guilty as an accessory, We have considered the following facts and circumstances
as gathered from the evidence: (1) from where he was seated at the grandstand of the Athletic Bowl,
Soliven must have seen Realon leave his place in the formation, approach the victim from behind
and fire the gun at the latter; (2) Soliven ran with Realon when the latter fled from the scene of the
crime; (3) while in flight, Realon passed the fatal weapon to Soliven who in turn dumped the gun
inside a garbage barrel; and (4) upon his apprehension Soliven did not show or make any act of
protestation. From the foregoing, there can be no conclusion other than that Soliven witnessed his
friend Realon commit the crime and that having done so, Soliven assisted in Realon's escape by
concealing the instrument used in the perpetration of the offense in an obvious effort or attempt to
592
prevent its discovery. The additional fact that Soliven made no protest at the time of his
apprehension only serves to indicate a guilty mind.
That the offense was accomplished with treachery is beyond question. The sudden and unexpected
attack from behind directly and specially insured the killing without risk to Realon since the victim
Ramos had no chance to retaliate at all. 40 It indubitably appears that Realon had consciously
adopted and deliberately chosen a mode of attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the crime
without risk to himself 41 arising from any defense which Ramos might have made. Indeed, the
surprise assault precluded the victim from making any defense at all. Realon, therefore, committed
murder qualified by alevosia
Lastly, We find merit in appellants' contention that the lower court erred in finding that the killing was
attended by the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation. To properly appreciate
premeditacion conocida the prosecution must conclusively establish: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his
determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to
allow him to reflect. 42 None of these requisites are present in the instant case. As in the case of
People vs. Mil, 43 "if there is nothing in the case that can serve as a ground ... to determine if the ...
criminal resolution was meditated on, reflected upon or persisted in, which constitutes premeditation,
this circumstance is not present. The evidence must show not only when the intent to commit the
crime was engendered in the mind of the accused, but the motive which gave rise to it, the means
which he selected beforehand to carry out his criminal intention, in short, all those facts and
antecedents which together show that the crime was knowingly premeditated, as required by law,
and that the accused acted not only with pre-existing design, which is a condition ordinarily found in
all crimes, but with a cold and deep meditation and tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of
his criminal purpose.
While there is evidence to show that there had been a previous quarrel or disagreement between the
accused Realon and the deceased victim which would suffice to give the former a motive to kill in
revenge, such evidence standing alone cannot justify a finding of evident premeditation. Thus, "while
at first blush it would seem that there was evident premeditation, since the killing was motivated by
vindictiveness, nevertheless, that circumstance cannot be regarded as aggravating due to the
absence of requisites. 44 "(I)t is not enough that premeditation be suspected or surmised, but the
criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evincing the determination to commit
the crime." 45 The circumstance of evident premeditation must be established and proven as clearly
as the criminal act itself. 46
The crime committed by appellant Simplicio Realon being murder, qualified by treachery, without any
generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the proper
penalty to be imposed on him is reclusion perpetua the medium period of the penalty for murder
(Arts. 64 and 248, Revised Penal Code).
As to appellant Eutropio Soliven, his guilt or culpability is only as an accessory to the same murder
and penalized with imprisonment of two degrees lower than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony (Art. 53, R.P.C.). Since the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death two degrees lower is prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its medium period, the same to be imposable in its medium period or from six (6) years and
one (1) day to eight (8) years. Imposing the Indeterminate Sentence Law, said accused should be
and is hereby sentenced to imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law.
593
However, since the accused Eutropio Soliven has been in prison since 1969, according to the
records, he should be deemed to have served his sentence and should be released, unless he is
being detained for another cause.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, We find the appellant Simplicio Realon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder without any modifying circumstance, and he is hereby
sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
We also find the appellant Eutropio Soliven guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the
same murder, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum,
with the accessory penalties of the law. Since said accused Eutropio Soliven has been in prison
since 1969 up to the present, he is deemed to have served his sentence and should be released
therefrom, unless detained for any other cause.
In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez, De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.,
concur.
Abad Santos, J, is on leave.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment against appellant Simplicio REALON; but dissent from that against
appellant Eutropio SOLIVEN and vote for his acquittal on the ground that the evidence cited on page
32 of the decision against SOLIVEN is manifestly insufficient to justify beyond reasonable doubt his
conviction even as an accessory.
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
The clearly well written opinion of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Juvenal K. Guerrero differs, I
regret to say, from my personal appraisal of the respective criminal liabilities of the two appellants in
this case. To my mind, since the Court is of the view that the 1969 incident between appellant
Realon and the deceased Ramos evinced vindictiveness or revenge in the mind and heart of the
former, notwithstanding positive evidence in the record that the two had reconciled, with a goat
giving ritual at that, it should follow that the desire to kill Ramos must have persisted with Realon all
the time up to the moment of the killing. With such frame of mind and armed as he was when he
went to the rehearsal knowing Ramos would be there and further positioning himself somewhere in
the back rows behind the deceased convince me that there was evident premeditation. I, therefore,
dissent in this respect. With the incontestably proven alevosia with which Realon shot his victim, my
vote is that said appellant is guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by
treachery, hence the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in toto as to him.
On the other hand, I am not morally persuaded that appellant Soliven is guilty even as an accessory
after the fact. It is quite probable or even true that he knew Realon had shot Ramos, but his running
away together with him is no indication at all of any kind of criminal element insofar as he is
concerned. Having gone to the Athletic Bowl at Burnham Park together, without any evidence
594
whatsoever that he knew of Realon's malevolent intentions or otherwise innocent thereof, he waited
for him (Realon) because he had invited him to go to the dog party of Mr. Balajadia, Soliven's
employer. Soliven must have been as surprised and startled as almost all the others around were. It
is but natural to conclude, as a matter of ordinary human experience that he ran in the same
direction as Realon by instinct, considering they were together in going to that place. No one can
state with certainty, and no evidence can be found in the record, exactly why he ran that way. To
assume that he intended to help Realon is to presume guilt which is constitutionally enjoined. True,
there is evidence that when they were running away, Realon passed the fatal gun, Exhibit A, to him
and that he threw it into a garbage can. But again, under the circumstances, there being no evidence
that he asked for the gun from Realon or that it was given to him by agreement, anyone would have
tried to dispose of it lest it be found in his possession thereby directly connecting him with the
shooting. I am for giving Soliven the benefit of the doubt. His silence during his apprehension should
not be taken against him nor the weakness of his defense evidence. In brief, I cannot take it within
my conscience to besmirch the personal record of Soliven with a criminal conviction even only as an
accessory when I feel very strongly that his act of getting rid of the gun handed to him by Realon
must have been done by him also instinctively as a matter of self-protection, there being not a bit of
antecedent linking him to Realon's crime. My vote is to acquit him on, at least. reasonable doubt.
Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the judgment against appellant Simplicio REALON; but dissent from that against
appellant Eutropio SOLIVEN and vote for his acquittal on the ground that the evidence cited on page
32 of the decision against SOLIVEN is manifestly insufficient to justify beyond reasonable doubt his
conviction even as an accessory.
BARREDO, J., dissenting:
The clearly well written opinion of our esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Juvenal K. Guerrero differs, I
regret to say, from my personal appraisal of the respective criminal liabilities of the two appellants in
this case. To my mind, since the Court is of the view that the 1969 incident between appellant
Realon and the deceased Ramos evinced vindictiveness or revenge in the mind and heart of the
former, notwithstanding positive evidence in the record that the two had reconciled, with a goat
giving ritual at that, it should follow that the desire to kill Ramos must have persisted with Realon all
the time up to the moment of the killing. With such frame of mind and armed as he was when he
went to the rehearsal knowing Ramos would be there and further positioning himself somewhere in
the back rows behind the deceased convince me that there was evident premeditation. I, therefore,
dissent in this respect. With the incontestably proven alevosia with which Realon shot his victim, my
vote is that said appellant is guilty of murder qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by
treachery, hence the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed in toto as to him.
On the other hand, I am not morally persuaded that appellant Soliven is guilty even as an accessory
after the fact. It is quite probable or even true that he knew Realon had shot Ramos, but his running
away together with him is no indication at all of any kind of criminal element insofar as he is
concerned. Having gone to the Athletic Bowl at Burnham Park together, without any evidence
whatsoever that he knew of Realon's malevolent intentions or otherwise innocent thereof, he waited
for him (Realon) because he had invited him to go to the dog party of Mr. Balajadia, Soliven's
employer. Soliven must have been as surprised and startled as almost all the others around were. It
595
is but natural to conclude, as a matter of ordinary human experience that he ran in the same
direction as Realon by instinct, considering they were together in going to that place. No one can
state with certainty, and no evidence can be found in the record, exactly why he ran that way. To
assume that he intended to help Realon is to presume guilt which is constitutionally enjoined. True,
there is evidence that when they were running away, Realon passed the fatal gun, Exhibit A, to him
and that he threw it into a garbage can. But again, under the circumstances, there being no evidence
that he asked for the gun from Realon or that it was given to him by agreement, anyone would have
tried to dispose of it lest it be found in his possession thereby directly connecting him with the
shooting. I am for giving Soliven the benefit of the doubt. His silence during his apprehension should
not be taken against him nor the weakness of his defense evidence. In brief, I cannot take it within
my conscience to besmirch the personal record of Soliven with a criminal conviction even only as an
accessory when I feel very strongly that his act of getting rid of the gun handed to him by Realon
must have been done by him also instinctively as a matter of self-protection, there being not a bit of
antecedent linking him to Realon's crime. My vote is to acquit him on, at least. reasonable doubt.
People V. Doctolero, 193 SCRA 632
G.R. No. 34386 February 7, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias

"ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C. DOCTOLERO alias
"VERGEL," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged
with and convicted in the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple
murder and unspecified physical injuries, appealed from the decision of the court a quo the decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero guilty as
principal, and his co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in
596
committing the crime of Murder, which caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman
Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting physical injury on the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo.
Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances to mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico
Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA
PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero,
and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto mayor, for inflicting slight
physical injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and
Virgilio Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of
prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the
penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for
the death of Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17
Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional
penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight physical injury suffered by
the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all surnamed
Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of
P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00; and the
heirs of the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay three-fourths (3/4) of
the costs. The accused Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-fourth (1/4) cost de oficio. 1
The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San Fabian,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovenamed accused, armed with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat,
conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation
and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with extreme cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and strike Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania
Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the same accused while already on the
road, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting
upon him multiple mortal wounds which caused his death. 2
Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its decision, the trial
court made the following findings and a summary of the evidence for the prosecution thus:
It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman
were killed in the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of
Pangasinan, where they were living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was
on the same occasion, slightly injured while being fed on the breast of his mother. On the road, a few
meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He
was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he died on the way. . . .
The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado and
Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de
Guzman, and in inflicting physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with
their father and co-accused, Antonio Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos
which caused the death of the latter.
The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and Paciencia
Sagun-Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, he
597
and his wife, Maria Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-
Sagun) were on their way home to Barrio Binday. They came from the field where they bundled their
harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road in Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico
Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason, held the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun
with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that blow and wrestled
with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo became
frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the
bolo of the former, so she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning palay in the
yard of her uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and
Virgilio (all surnamed Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones,
Ludovico allegedly shouted for the man in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went
towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio,
coming down from the house going towards her. She told them: "Why can't you be patient and
forget?" But she was asked not to interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero, half-brother of
Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of the three accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun,
when he met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why
they can't be patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill
you." Then they struck Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father
Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo
Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.
The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the testimony of Maria

Oviedo-Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she was in the house of Marcelo
Doctolero, to whom she reported the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she
saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio throwing stones at their house and called to
all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to their house to get her children but she
saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio going up. So she hid behind the palm tree, a
few meters away from their house. While there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted mother)
shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your children." Then she saw the three accused coming down from
the house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed
several times until he fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a
bolo. Then they all left. 3
On the other hand, appellants present the following version:
On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing
of Bo. Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife,
Maria Oviedo, Antonio Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brother-
in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-
Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on their way home. (p. 8, Ibid).
Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed, however,
Antonio Oviedo holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio
Oviedo was like that. The latter unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing.
He parried the bolo with his left hand (p. 9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).
At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his
bolo. They watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria
598
Oviedo, hitting the back of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were
towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).
Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to
escape by boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with
Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).
Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal, together
with his small children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen
downstairs also eating his meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-
Salazar).
He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might meet
something bad that night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until the door. Then he
ran away. His father asked him what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4,
Salazar).
He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins, Juanito
and Cresencia Doctolero. As he came near his house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was
also his immediate neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get down.
When Marcial did not get down, he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not there. So he
went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told him that Marcial Sagun went towards the South. He
was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of his neck, causing him to see darkness
and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing, February 17, 1971).
Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the buri tree,
thinking that he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming from the south or the
east. So he tried to move, but as he did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the
yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark he did not recognize the man and thinking that it was
Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that the man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he
returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He asked Marcelo Doctolero where Marcial Sagun
was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him on the
shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo
Doctolero tried to hit him for a second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it
away, causing Marcelo Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo
Doctolero unsheathed Ms bolo. When the latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero
boloed him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid). 4
The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to the child. A
doctor and a photographer went to the scene of the crime and pictures were then taken. 5
Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below established that
. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side of the forehead. There is
fracture of the underlying skull.
599
(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with fracture of the underlying
skull.
(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with fracture of the underlying
skull.
(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left eyebrow to the right eyebrow.
There is also fracture of the underlying skull.
(5) Incised wound 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the month towards the lower
border of the right ear. The lower lobe of the ear is detached.
(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.
(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a severance from the level of the
middle finger.
(8) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm, left.
(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.
xxx xxx xxx
One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab wound around 3 cms. long
and 4 inches in depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the left border of the sternal bone." (Exh.
C). And nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal bone at
the level of the 2nd intercostal space.
(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right clavicular region.
(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the second wound.
(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying skull at the right frontal
portion of the head.
(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the head.
(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony portion, left.
(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.
(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.
(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of the hand right. There
was fracture of some of the underlying bones. 6
Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital, Dr. Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru,
about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was another
about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There was also an incised wound, about 1/2
600
inch, temporal right." He further testified that the child was admitted to the hospital on November 8,
1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later. 7
During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on May
17, 1976 the Court resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal8
and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day.9
In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for accused-
appellants, dated May 9, 1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death
certificate attached thereto as Annex "A". 10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability of
appellant Conrado Doctolero.
The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the
commission of the crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated in the
commission thereof and raises the effete defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place
where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension, however, was not corroborated by any
evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the testimony of a co-
conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source and must
be scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion.11
This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical
testimony of the principal witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the
prosecution Witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more
credence. 12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against appellants. The only
imputed grudge that Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had against appellants occurred years ago
and she was, at the time she testified, on good terms with appellants as shown by the following
testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:
Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic) your
relationship with her was harmonious and rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?
A Yes, sir.
Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail to see
you in your house?
A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house. 13
As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun (wife of Marcial
Sagun) pointed to the three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the
persons who went up her house that night of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a
grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that previous incident at the crossing
yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should also implicate Conrado and Virgilio
Doctolero in the commission of the crime." 14
When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the
witnesses to falsely implicate the accused, identification should be given full credit. 15
601
And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution
was moved by improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is
entitled to full faith and credit. 16
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain inconsistencies that
allegedly render the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies,
however, are not so substantial as to destroy their credibility. As correctly explained by the People,
the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witness
pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on the part of each
observer in relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of
witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute
evidence of good faith. Not all persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same
manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses should disagree on minor details. 17
In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer
to minor details cannot destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. 18 And where the
prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify the appellants as the authors of the crime and
the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil material points, the contradictions become
insignificant.19
Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the
investigation himself and personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is
accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed that
they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof to the contrary.
Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was motivated by an improper motive other
than that of accomplishing his mission. 20
Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police department of San
Fabian, Pangasinan shortly after the crimes were committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros
were involved. He further testified that when he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime
and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the accused Doctoleros came with
bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun. 21
In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his investigation and the weight to
be accorded to his findings was properly addressed to the trial court.
The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as accomplices in
the slaying of the women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree with its findings and the
ratiocination of the Solicitor General with its evidentiary substantiation:
Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at
the house of Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women thereat protesting what
they were doing and shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146,
tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is
impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not
aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and
Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room of said house.
Furthermore, from the nature, number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two
women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two
brothers Virgilio and Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either the
screams of pain of their brother's victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their
602
bodies when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly hacking them several times. . . . Under these
circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio themselves knew what
was going on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and did nothing to stop
their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to death. It is, therefore,
reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother
Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed,
there is no question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun
gave their brother Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did
proceed, in committing the heinous crimes against two defenseless women and a child. 22
We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the
others went inside to rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material
and moral aid, making him guilty as an accomplice. 23
Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse,
thus negating a common criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one
can be an accomplice even if he did not know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided
he was aware that it was an illicit act. 24
This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus 25 that where the accomplices
therein consented to help in the commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for the
resulting homicide even if the purpose of the principal to commit homicide was unknown to the
accomplices.
Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero did not refer to whether or not they were liable but only with regard to the extent of
their participation. There being ample evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on
the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder form of liability or responsibility which is
that of being mere accomplices,26
no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.
The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan
Oviedo. The child required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants
therefor is for less serious physical injuries punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the
Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a penalty of twenty (20) days of
arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an
accomplice.
The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated only his
criminal liability but not his civil liability. 27
Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same
should not apply to Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the
judgment rendered by the trial court having long since become final and executory with respect to
him.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered
IMPOSING on appellant Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years of
prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal each for the death
of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and a penalty of twenty (20)
603
days of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. Appellant
Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of
P50,000.00 for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de
Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.
People V. Watimar, GR NOS. 121651-52 August 16,2000
[G.R. Nos. 121651-52. August 16, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERNANDO WATIMAR, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
Incestuous rape, such as that committed by a father against his own daughter, is a dastardly and
repulsive crime[][1] that has no place in our society. Time and again the Court has condemned in no
unequivocal terms the bestial acts of rape perpetrated by fathers against their daughters. The case
before us now is no different.
On the basis of two (2) sworn criminal complaints executed by the offended party, accused Fernando
Watimar was charged with the crime of Rape in two (2) Informations. The Information in Criminal
Case No. 5513-AF[][2] alleges
604
That on or about the 26th day of March 1990, in Sitio Tingga, Brgy. Macapsing, Municipality of Rizal,
Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused father of the victim, with lewd design and at the point of a knife and threat to kill, did
then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of her (sic) daughter
MYRA WATIMAR.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The other Information in Criminal Case No. 5514-AF is a virtual reproduction of the abovequoted
information, the only difference being that the rape was committed on November 28, 1992.[][3]
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the charges.[][4] Trial thereafter ensued, after
which the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 25, rendered judgment[][5] against
accused, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows, viz:
1. In Crim. Case No. 5513-AF, the Court finding the accused Fernando Watimar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalty of the law, to pay the complaining witness Myra Watimar
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00, as exemplary damages, without, however,
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs; and
2. In Crim. Case No. 5514-AF, the Court finding the accused Fernando Watimar guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, with the accessory penalty of the law, to pay the complaining witness Myra Watimar
P50,000.00, as moral damages, without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
Accused-appellant interposed this appeal alleging that
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
THE PROSECUTION WITNESS MYRA WATIMAR WHICH IS NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY
MEDICAL FINDINGS WHICH WOULD BE MATERIALLY AND ESSENTIALLY RELEVANT TO THE
CRIME CHARGED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING ANY CREDENCE WHATSOEVER TO THE
DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTNG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE

THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The facts as found by the trial court are:
Myra Watimar, 20 years old when she took the witness stand, single, farm helper and a resident of
Macapsing, Rizal, Nueva Ecija, testified that she is the complainant in the two (2) criminal cases;
that she stated that in the evening of March 26, 1990, she slept together with her brothers and
605
sisters, namely: Bernardo, Marilou, Leonardo, Ariel and Lea, without her mother who went to the
hospital as her aunt was about to give birth; that her father slept with them in the same room; that at
about 2:00 in the early dawn of March 26, 1990, she felt that somebody was on top of her and [was]
kissing her neck; that she recognized him to be her father Fernando Watimar, but when she
recognized him, her father talked and a knife was pointed at her neck with an instruction that she
should not resist, otherwise, she will be killed; that despite the threat of her father, she resisted and
told her father not to molest her, because she is his daughter (the witness was crying); that despite
the resistance and plea of the daughter, her father went on top of her, removed her panty and placed
himself on top of the complaining witness; that he was able to do the bestial act despite the
resistance made by kicking him; that after the father succeeded in sexually molesting her on March
26, 1990, she just kept crying in the corner of their house.
That on November 28, 1992, at 10:00 oclock in the evening while the complaining witness was
cooking alone, she was surprised when somebody was at her back who happened to be Fernando
Watimar, her father, who suddenly kissed her and pulled her bringing her to the place where they
used to sleep; that she resisted and wanted to extricate herself from her father by kicking him, but
the accused is stronger than she is; she pleaded to her father not to molest her again but the father
did not heed her plea and he again succeeded in having his sexual desire, on this point, the
testimony of the victim is as follows:
Q- How can he succeed with his desire to sexually abuse you?
A- He forcibly opened my thigh[s] and I was appealing to him that I am his daughter, yet he did not
heed my plea, sir.
Q- Did you offer any resistance when he was trying to separate your thigh[s]?
A- Yes, sir.
Q- How did you resist your father when he was trying to separate your thigh[s]?
Court Interpreter:
The witness is demonstrating that she is placing her two (2) legs together, yet, the father started
to hurt her.
Pros. R. Beltran:
Q- How did he hurt you at that time?
A- He pushed my thigh[s], sir.
Q- Did he push your thigh[s] hardly (sic)?
A- Once, only, sir.
Q- After that what happened?
A- That was the time he succeeded with his lust, sir.[][6]
On the other hand, the defenses version of what transpired can be gleaned from the testimony of
accused-appellant as summarized thus in his brief, to wit:
606
Fernando Watimar testified that he is 50 years old, married, a thresher by profession, and a resident
of Sitio Tingga, Macapsing, Rizal, Nueva Ecija xxx.
On direct examination, he testified that during the month of March 1990, he was working as a
thresher operator. He testified that he arrived at 1:00 oclock a.m. on March 27, 1990 and found his
family sleeping. His wife woke up and gave him something to eat. Later that same day, his wife was
no longer at home when he woke up but his daughter Myra Watimar, the herein complainant was still
asleep. Nothing unusual happened from the time he arrived home until the time he woke up and
readied himself to report for work. He reported for work to Valentin Santiago at the latters residence
in Vega, Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, which was about 1 kilometer away from his house. When he
inquired from his children as to the whereabouts of his wife, he was told that the latter had brought
the wife of his brother-in-law to the hospital to give birth. His wife did not leave any messages for him
nor did she ask his permission before leaving the house. Upon his arrival at the house of Valentin
Santiago, the latter instructed him to thresh the palay of a certain person whose name, due to lapse
of time, he could no longer recall. That morning, he prepared breakfast for himself and did not order
his daughter Myra to serve him because she was a lazy person and did not even wash clothes when
told to do so.
In November 1992, particularly on the date when she allegedly raped his daughter again, he testified
that he was working as a truck helper for Valentin Santiago in Angeles City. On that date, the truck
was in Angeles City before proceeding to Ilocos. There were three of them on that truck, the
accused-appellant, the truck driver and the merchant or biyahero. In Angeles City, they went to the
Tibagan Market to load the truck with watermelons which would be brought to Manila. They arrived
in Angeles City around 11:00 oclock in the morning after departing from Bongabon, Nueva Ecija at
around 7:00 oclock in the evening on Nov. 28, 1992. He left Angeles City at around 7:00 o clock in
the evening and proceeded to Ilocos where they again loaded the truck with watermelons. According
to him, he was unable to go home for a period of one month due to his work as truck helper.
He also testified that he could think of no reason why his daughter would charge him falsely but he
knew that the false accusations had been instigated by his father-in-law who had told him that it was
better that the family name Watimar will sink rather than the family name Benolias. According to the
accused-appellant, this was because the one who caused the pregnancy of his daughter was his
brother-in-law Celestino Benolias, Jr., the youngest brother of his wife. He learned all this when he
asked his daughter at one time why she no longer went to her grandmothers house and she had
answered that she would not do so as long as that man is there, supposedly referring to Celestino
Benolias, Jr. He was never in good terms with his brother-in-law to the extent that the latter had
threatened him at gun point and even mentioned salvaging him and throwing him in the river. He
also characterized his brother-in-law as a drug user who, when he was under the influence, had
twice poked a gun at him. Accused-appellant could not remember when he brought his daughter to
the hospital but remembered that he was one of those who had brought her to the hospital. He no
longer stayed at the hospital because he still had work to do. He also said that he gave a total of
P3,000.00 for his daughters hospitalization but that, as he had already been apprehended, he no
longer knew what happened to the money. He only learned about his daughters giving birth the
following afternoon. The knowledge of his daughters condition affected him so much that, had he
known for certain who caused her pregnancy, he would have killed that person. He said he did not
notice his daughters pregnancy. He asked his daughter who the father of her child was but the latter
did not reply. When he asked his wife, the latter merely insisted that his surname should be given to
the child, a fact he disagreed with. It was out his hands, however, as his sister-in-law affixed the
name Watimar on the birth certificate. He is convinced now that the father of the child is none other
than his brother-in-law Celestino Benolias, Jr.
607
In reviewing rape cases, the Court is guided by the following principles: 1.] to accuse a man of rape
is easy, but to disprove it is difficult though the accused may be innocent; 2.] considering that in the
nature of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and 3.] the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merit and not be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence
for the defense.[][7] Corollary to the foregoing legal yardsticks is the dictum that when a victim of
rape says that she has been defiled, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape has
been inflicted on her and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be
convicted on the basis thereof.[][8]
The Court has said time and again that in reviewing rape cases, it will be guided by the settled
realities that an accusation for rape can be made with facility. While the commission of the crime
may not be easy to prove, it becomes even more difficult for the person accused, although innocent,
to disprove that he did not commit the crime. In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where
only two persons are normally involved, the testimony of the complainant must always be scrutinized
with great caution.[][9] Thus, in a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility becomes the
single most important issue.[][10]
Guided by these principles, the Court has meticulously scrutinized the testimony of complaining
witness Myra Watimar and ultimately reached the conclusion that the acts charged did in fact occur.
Myras testimony on the acts of rape perpetrated against her by her father is clear and could have
only been narrated by a victim subjected to those sexual assaults. Nowhere is accused-appellants
bestiality graphically detailed than in the following narration of the victim:
Q. At about 2:00 in the early morning of that date, was there anything unusual that happened to
you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What is that?
A. On that night, sir, I was sleeping and there was somebody on top of me and kissing my neck.
Q. Were you able to recognize that somebody who was kissing your neck?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was he?
A. Fernando Watimar, sir.
Q. How did you recognize him?
A. I recognized him, sir, because he talked and a knife was pointed at my neck, and he instructed
me not to resist because, otherwise he will kill me, sir.
Q. What did you do when he pointed that knife on your neck and threatened you?
A. I resisted him, sir, and told him not to do it to me because I am his daughter.
PROSECUTOR R. BELTRAN:
At this point, Your Honor, may I place on record that the witness is crying.
608
COURT:
Place that on record.
PROSECUTOR R. BELTRAN:
Q. What happened to your plea to your father not to molest you because you are his daughter?
A. He continued his lust to me, sir.
Q. After that what happened?
A. I was appealing to him, sir, but because of his superior strength he continued with his lust. I
pleaded to him but he continued by removing my panty, sir.
Q. Did he succeed in removing your panty?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened when your panty was removed?
A. He placed his body on top of me, sir.
Q. After placing his body on top of you, what happened next?
A. I continued pleading to him, sir, but he successfully inserted his penis.
Q. How did he succeed in inserting his penis inside your private organ?
A. He forcibly opened my thigh, sir.
Q. When he forcibly opened your thigh, did you not make any resistance or whatsoever?
A. I resisted, sir, I pulled him, sir, I was kicking but because he is stronger than me he succeeded.
COURT
Proceed.
PROSECUTOR R. BELTRAN
Q. How many times did you kick him?
A. Many times, sir, I cannot remember anymore how many.
Q. Nobody was awakened in your house at that time?
A. Nobody, sir, because they were sleeping then.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Was that the only occasion when you were sexually abused by your own father?
A. It was repeated for several times, sir.
Q. Can you remember the dates when you were sexually abused by your father?
609
A. What I remember, sir, is November 28, 1992 when I gave birth, sir.
Q. Where were you on November 28, 1992 at around 10:00 oclock in the evening?
A. I was at home, sir.
Q. What were you doing on that date and time?
A. I was then cooking, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. While you were cooking at around 10:00 oclock in the evening on November 28, 1992, was
there anything unusual that transpired?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that unusual thing that happened to you?
A. I was surprised, sir, when somebody was at my back.
Q. Who was that somebody that was at your back?
A. Fernando Watimar, sir.
Q. You are referring to the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened when all of a sudden the accused Fernando Watimar appeared at your back?
A. He suddenly kissed me, sir, and he pulled me.
Q. Where did he pull you?
A. He pulled me and brought me to the place where we used to sleep, sir.
Q. Did you offer any resistance when your father pulled you at that place where you used to sleep?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did you resist him?
A. I resisted, sir, I wanted to extricate myself, sir.
Q. How did you try to extricate yourself from the hold of your father?
A. I was kicking him, sir, but he is stronger than me, sir.
Q. So, what happened after that?
A. He was able to let me down to the place where we used to sleep, sir.
A. I was then pleading to him not to do it again to me, sir.
610
Q. Did he heed to your plea?
A. No, sir.
Q. So what happened after that?
A. He again succeeded with his desire, sir.
Q. How can he succeed with his desire to sexually abuse you?
A. He forcibly opened my thigh and I was appealing to him that I am his daughter, yet, he did not
heed my plea, sir.
Q. Did you offer any resistance when he was trying to separate your thigh?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How did you resist your father when he was trying to separate your thigh?
A. I was struggling, sir.
Q. How would you describe your struggling (pagkukumusot) with your father while he was opening
your thigh?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness is demonstrating that she is placing her two (2) legs together, yet the father started
to hurt her.
PROS. BELTRAN
Q. How did he hurt you at that time?
A. He pushed my thigh, sir.
Q. Did he push your thigh hardly?
A. Yes, Sir.
Q. How many times did he push your thigh?
A. Once only, sir.
A. That was the time he succeeded with his lust, sir.
Accused-appellant insists that the foregoing narration of the victim deserves scant consideration as it
is tainted with factual infirmities and contrary to human experience and conduct.[][11] To buttress his
claim of innocence, accused-appellant first adverts to the supposed impossibility of consummating
the crime in a room measuring a mere two meters in area where the victim was sleeping beside her
five other brothers and sisters. According to him: It boggles the mind and confounds reason to
accept the proposition that the accused-appellant was able to consummate the act despite the fact
that she attempted to resist and in fact caused some commotion in her determined efforts to
611
extricate herself from her father and none of her brothers and sisters were alerted to the event then
transpiring.[][12]
The argument is tenuous.
The possibility of rape is not negated by the presence of even the whole family of the accused inside
the same room with the likelihood of being discovered. Indeed, the Court pointed out only recently in
People v. Arteche Antonio y Payagan[][13] that for rape to be committed, it is not necessary for the
place to be ideal, or the weather to be fine, for rapists bear no respect for locale and time when they
carry out their evil deed.[][14] Rape may be committed even when the rapist and the victim are not
alone, or while the rapists spouse was asleep, or in a small room where other family members also
slept, as in the instant case. The presence of people nearby does not deter rapists from committing
their odious act.[][15] Verily
The court has time and again held that the evil in man has no conscience. The beast in him bears no
respect for time and place, driving him to commit rape anywhere even in places where people
congregate such as parks, along the road side, within school premises, and inside a house where
there are other occupants.[][16] Rape does not necessarily have to be committed in an isolated
place and can in fact be committed in places which to many would appear to be unlikely and high-
risk venues for sexual advances.[][17] Indeed, no one would think that rape would happen in a public
place like the comfort room of a movie house and in broad daylight.[][18]
Suffice it to state in this regard that the argument that rape cannot be committed in a house where
other members of the family reside or may be found is a contention that has long been rejected by
the Court, rape being no respecter of time and place.[][19]
Accused-appellant further contends that the victim did not do everything in her power to prevent the
assault on her virtue. He argues that the complaining witness admitted that although accused-
appellant initially threatened her at knife point, both his hands were free when he finally committed
the act. Accused-appellant states that it is inexplicable why she did not seize this opportunity to
make good her efforts.[][20]
The contention fails to persuade.
The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance,[][21] especially where
there is intimidation.[][22] In fact, physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is exercised upon the victim and she submits herself against her will to the rapists lust
because of fear for her life or personal safety.[][23] Indeed, it has been said that in rape cases, it is
not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death[][24] or sustained injuries in the hands
of the rapist.[][25] It suffices that intercourse takes place against her will or that she yields because
of a genuine apprehension of great harm.[][26] In incestuous rape, actual force and intimidation is
not even necessary.[][27] The reason for this is that in a rape committed by a father against his own
daughter, the moral ascendancy of the former over the latter substitutes for violence and
intimidation.[][28]
Accused-appellant next claims that the complete absence of any medical finding or examination
which would directly contribute to establish that rape was indeed committed is a point too glaring to
be ignored in the light of the fact that the complainant allowed more than two (2) years to pass
before filing the case.[][29]
The argument is likewise unpersuasive.
612
A medical examination is not indispensable to the prosecution of rape as long as the evidence on
hand convinces the court that conviction for rape is proper.[][30] As recently pointed out by the Court
in People v. Wilson Dreu @ Adang Dreu[][31] -
Although the results of a medical examination may be considered strong evidence to prove that the
victim was raped, such evidence is not indispensable in establishing accused-appellants guilt or
innocence. In People v. Docena we stated:[][32]
That there was no medical examination report presented, sign of resistance during the actual
copulation, or proof of violence committed against MARGIE does not detract from our conclusion
that she was raped. A medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Medical
findings or proof of injuries, virginity, or an allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of
the crime are not essential in a prosecution for rape
[The defenses contention is not bolstered by the victims] failure to put up a strong resistance or
shout for help, nor by the fact that there was no sign of force or intimidation, which should be viewed
in the context of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense. It
is subjective, thus, lack of physical resistance cannot be considered consent.
Accused-appellant further points out that his characterization as being a good father and husband by
his wife, Isabelita Watimar, echoed by his employer, Valentin Santiago as well as his father-in-law,
Celestino Benolias, Sr., juxtaposed with complainants characterization of him as being
temperamental and unduly harsh, would at the very least generate reasonable doubt as to his being
the perpetrator of the acts charged against him.[][33]
This claim deserves short shrift.
Suffice it to state that no young and decent woman would publicly admit that she was ravished and
her virtue defiled unless such was true for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor.[][34] A
daughter would not concoct a story of defloration against her father, accuse him of so grave a crime
as rape, allow an examination of her private parts, submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny
via an open trial, if she were not truly aggrieved or her sordid tale was not true and her sole
motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and punished.[][35] In short, a teenage
unmarried lass would not file a rape case against anybody, much less her own father, if it were not
true.[][36]
Accused-appellant, lastly, faults the complainant for tarrying for three (3) long years before telling her
mother about his nefarious conduct despite countless opportunities to seek the aid of her mother
and other relatives particularly her grandfather who lived a mere ten (10) meters from her house. He
insists that even assuming arguendo that the initial shock was so great as to deprive her of the
facility to report these misdeeds to anyone, it is stretching the realm of logic and reason to accept
her belated claims at face-value three (3) years after the operative fact giving rise to her trauma.[]
[37]
The contention deserves scant consideration.
As aptly stated in People v. Arthur De Leon y Lagmay @ Joel:[][38] This Court has consistently held
that delay in reporting rape incidents in the face of physical violence cannot be taken against the
victim. A rape victims action is oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than reason. It is fear,
springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build up a climate of extreme
psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim to silence and submissiveness.[][39]
613
While indeed the complainant may have tarried in reporting her defilement, the three-year hiatus in
reporting the crimes adverted to by accused-appellant will not extricate him from his predicament.
This is especially so considering the Courts recent pronouncement in People v. Conrado Cabana @
Randy,[][40] which states that
... The delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her virtue is neither
unknown or uncommon.[][41] As held in the case of People vs. Malagar:[][42]
Vacillation in the filing of [a] complaint by [a] rape victim is not an uncommon phenomenon. This
crime is normally accompanied by the rapists threat on the victims life, and the fear can last for quite
a while. There is also the natural reluctance of a woman to admit her sullied chastity, accepting
thereby all the stigma it leaves, and then to expose herself to morbid curiosity of the public whom
she may likely perceive rightly or wrongly, to be more interested in the prurient details of the
ravishment than in her vindication and the punishment of the rapist. In People vs. Coloma[][43] we
have even considered an 8-year delay in reporting the long history of rape by the victims father as
understandable and so not enough to render incredible the complaint of a 13-year old daughter.
Zorayda was only sixteen years old when she was subjected to the lustful desires of the accused;
thus, she was understandably cowed into silence as the accused-appellant warned her not to tell her
mother about the incident. No woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose
herself to a public trial if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished[][44] to avenge her honor[][45] and to condemn a grave injustice to her.[][46]
Accused-appellant merely raised denial and alibi as his defense. The Court has consistently held in
previous cases too numerous to cite that for alibi to prosper, it must be proven that during the
commission of the crime, the accused was in another place and that it was physically impossible for
him to be at the locus criminis. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and unless supported
by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot prevail over the positive declarations of the
victim who, in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly identified accused-appellant as the
defiler of her chastity. Succinctly stated, the positive assertions of accused-appellants daughter that
he raped her is entitled to greater weight.[][47] While denial and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape
cases, bare assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical testimony of the victim.[][48]
All told, we find no reason to reverse the ruling of the trial court. The acts of rape are rendered all the
more heinous and reprehensible in this case inasmuch as the perpetrator is the father of the victim.
People v. Lao[][49] scathingly condemned this kind of criminal thus:
Such a father deserves no place in society, and more especially in a country like the Philippines
whose fundamental law considers the family as a basic autonomous social institution and the
foundation of the nation, recognizes the sanctity of family life and mandates the State to defend the
right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development.
The two acts complained of in this case were committed in 1990 and 1992, respectively, at which
time Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provided:
ART. 335. When and how rape committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force and intimidation;
614
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances
mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that a deadly weapon was employed in the commission of the offenses charged in this
case, the imposable penalty ranges from reclusion perpetua to death. The use of the bladed weapon
already qualified the acts of rape.[][50]
A circumspect scrutiny of the record shows that none of the aggravating circumstances enumerated
in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code was alleged and proven by the prosecution. Where there is
no aggravating circumstance proved in the commission of the offense, the lesser penalty shall be
applied.[][51] While the employment of the knife was sufficiently established by the prosecution, such
clear showing can not justify the imposition of the death penalty in the absence of an aggravating
circumstance. Furthermore, at the time of commission of the crimes in this case, the imposition of
the death penalty was suspended.[][52] Hence, the trial court correctly sentenced accused-appellant
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.[][53]
The Court notes that the court a quo, while awarding P50,000.00 as moral damages in each count of
rape, did not award any indemnity ex delicto which current jurisprudence has fixed at P50,000.00.[]
[54] It needs be stressed in this regard that civil indemnity is separate and distinct from the award of
moral damages which is automatically granted in rape cases.[][55] Pursuant to controlling case law,
the award of P50,000.00 ex delicto is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[][56] Moral
damages are additionally awarded without need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.[][57] This is
because it is recognized that the victims injury is concomitant with and necessarily resulting from the
odiousness of the crime to warrant per se the award of moral damages.[][58]
The anguish and the pain a victim had to endure are evident.[][59] The Court need not belabor the
fact that the offended party in a rape case is victim many times over. In our culture which puts a
premium on the virtue of purity or virginity, rape stigmatizes the victim more than the perpetrator.[]
[60]
Considering that the offender is the father of the victim, we agree with the trial court that accused-
appellant should likewise pay the victim exemplary damages.[][61] Accused-appellant should,
therefore, be liable for exemplary damages of P25,000.00 for each count of rape.[][62]
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision appealed from, finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua for
each crime, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that the accused-appellant is ordered to pay
the victim Myra Watimar for each count of rape the amounts of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity
ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 by way of exemplary damages
615
1. Profiting from the effects of the crime
A. Mendoza V. People, 157 SCRA 464
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ROLANDO MENDOZA y CARPIO, appellant.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The reasons for the admissibility of a dying declaration as an exception to the hearsay rule are (a)
necessity and (b) trustworthiness. Necessity, because death renders a declarants taking the witness
stand impossible, and it often happens that there is no other equally satisfactory proof of the crime.
Hence, the declaration is allowed to prevent a failure of justice. And trustworthiness, for in the
language of Lord Baron Eyre, the declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of
death and every hope of this world is gone, when every motive for falsehood is silenced and the
mind induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth. A situation so solemn and
616
awful is considered by the law as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath
administered in court.[][1] The idea, more succinctly expressed, is that truth sits on the lips of dying
men.[][2]
The Case
Before us is an appeal from the March 15, 2000 Decision[][3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City (Branch 127) in Criminal Case No. C-55995 (99), convicting Rolando Mendoza of
murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.
The decretal portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE premises considered and the prosecution having established to a moral certainty the
guilt of Accused ROLANDO MENDOZA of the crime of murder as defined and penalized under Art.
248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, this Court hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the legal heirs of the deceased the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00; to compensate MELY CRUZ [for] the stipulated actual damages of
P65,000.00; to pay Mrs. BEATRIZ VALDOZ moral damages of P40,000.00 and to pay the costs,
without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in the service of his
sentence in accordance with Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.[][4]
The Information,[][5] dated January 27, 1999, charged appellant, together with his co-accused
Reynaldo Balverde, as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of October, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any justi[fi]able cause,
conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with deliberate intent to kill and with treachery
and evident prem[e]ditation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and stab with bladed weapons on the different parts of his body one PRUDENCIO VALDOZ Y
SANTOS, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious physical injuries which injuries caused the victims
death at East Avenue Medical Center after several days of confinement.[][6]
On March 15, 1999, the trial court issued warrants of arrest[][7] against the two accused. Herein
appellant was arrested on October 19, 1999[][8] but his co-accused, Balverde, has remained at
large. When arraigned on November 3, 1999, appellant pleaded[][9] not guilty after the Information
had been read and interpreted to him in a language that he fully understood.[][10] After pretrial, trial
on the merits ensued against him alone. Thereafter, the lower court promulgated its assailed
Decision. The Public Attorneys Office, counsel for appellant, filed the Notice of Appeal on March 27,
2000.[][11]
The Facts
In its Brief,[][12] the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecutions version of the facts as
follows:
About 8:00 in the evening of October 11, 1998, Eduardo Mariquit was walking on his way home from
his sisters house. While traversing Sta. Rita Street, San Vicente Ferrer, Tala, Caloocan City, he saw
Prudencio Valdoz repeatedly stabbed by appellant Rolando Mendoza alias Patsy and Reynaldo
617
Balverde, Jr. alias Jingjing. Using a kitchen knife, appellant stabbed Prudencio Valdoz on the
stomach. Likewise, Reynaldo Balverde stabbed Prudencio twice with a butchers knife, hitting the
latter below the left armpit. Wounded, Prudencio Valdoz staggered and collapsed. Reynaldo
Balverde alias Jingjing approached Eduardo Mariquit and warned him saying wala kang nakita, wala
kang narinig. Thereafter, appellant and Reynaldo Balverde fled. Eduardo Mariquit went to help
Reynaldo Valdoz. He assisted him in going to his house which was about twelve (12) meters away.
Eduardo Mariquit thereafter went to see the victims brother, Manuel Valdoz, and informed him that
Prudencio was stabbed by appellant Rolando Mendoza alias Patsy and Reynaldo Balverde alias
Jingjing.
Meanwhile, Estrellita Carmelo was watching TV inside her house at 587 Barangay Sta. Rita, Tala,
Caloocan City, when she noticed a commotion taking place outside. She heard people shouting that
somebody was stabbed.
Estrellita Carmelo went out and saw Prudencio, her neighbor and co-worker, lying still and wounded.
Estrellita Carmelo, accompanied by her neighbors, brought Prudencio to the Tala Hospital in a
tricycle. Because the Tala Hospital lacked the necessary equipment to treat the victim, he was
transferred to East Avenue Medical Center in Quezon City. Inside the operating room, Prudencio
Valdoz beckoned to Estrellita Carmelo to come near him. When Estrellita moved closer and placed
her ear near Prudencios mouth, Prudencio, who was in great pain, told Estrellita x x x, Ate, baka
mamatay ako sasabihin ko sa iyo kung sino an[g] sumaksak sa akin, tandaan mo lang huwag mong
kalimutan. Prudencio told Estrellita that Rolando Mendoza alias Patsy and Reynaldo Balverde alias
Jingjing stabbed him. Estrellita Carmelo stayed with the victim at the hospital till the next day.
The following day, Manuel Valdoz called the police. PO3 Alex Barroga of the Caloocan City Police
Station 6 arrived in the morning at the East Avenue Medical Center. He interviewed the victim and
took his statements. In the presence of his relatives and Estrellita Carmelo, the victim, who was
gasping for breath, gave his ante mortem statement. He pointed to appellant Rolando Mendoza alias
Patsy and Reynaldo Balverde alias Jingjing as the persons who stabbed him. The victim affixed his
signature on the ante mortem statement, with Manuel Valdoz and Merle Valdoz as witnesses.
On October [1]9, 1998, the victim died.
Police Superintendent Ma. Cristina B. Freyra, Medico-Legal Officer, PNP Crime Laboratory Services,
Camp Crame, Quezon City conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim. In a Medico-Legal
Report No. M-1595-98, dated October 3, 1998, Dr. Freyra stated the following findings and
conclusion:
FINDINGS:
POSTMORTEM FINDINGS:
Fairly nourished, fairly developed, male cadaver in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity at the
dependent portions of the body. The conjunctiva lips and nailbeds are pale. There is a surgical
incision along the anterior midline of the abdomen, measuring 35 cm long with 34 stitches applied,
including 6 tension sutures. Needle puncture marks noted at the distal 3rd of both firearms.
TRUNK:
1) Stab wound, epigastric region measuring 2.6 cm long with 4 stitches applied, 13 cm left of the
anterior midline, 120 cm from the heel, 6 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards and
medialwards, piercing the left dome of the diaphragm which was surgically repaired.
618
2) Stab wound, periumbilical region, measuring 1 cm long, just left of the anterior midline, 105 cm
from the heel, 9 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, piercing the head of
the pancreas and the loops and mesentery of the small intestine.
3) Stab wound, left anterior lumbar region, measuring 1.5 cm long with 2 stitches applied, 19 cm
from the anterior midline, 96 cm from the heel, 9 cm deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards and
medialwards, piercing the loops and mesentery of the small intestine.
There is thick greenish yellow exudate in the abdominal cavity.
Stomach is empty.
The rest of the visceral organs are grossly unremarkable.
CONCLUSION:
Cause of death is septic shock secondary to multiple wou[n]ds, trunk S/P Exploratory laparotomy.
Dr. Freyra declared that a typographical error was committed by the typist who inadvertently omitted
to state Stab Wound No. 3 in the Medico-Legal Report. Dr. Freyra thus indicated in her own
handwritting, Stab Wound No. 3 as follows:
STAB WOUND NO. 3 ANTERIOR LUMBAR REGION, MEASURING 2 CM LONG WITH 1 STITCH
APPLIED 14 CM FROM MIDLINE ANTERIOR, 107 CM FROM THE HEEL, 5 CM DEEP, DIRECTED
POSTERIOR, UPWARD, AND MEDIALWARD, PIERCING THE LOOP AND MESENTERY OF
SMALL INTESTINE.
Dr. Freyra further declared that the four (4) stab wounds sustained by the victim were all fatal.[][13]
(Citations omitted)
Appellant denies participation in the killing of Prudencio Valdoz.[][14] He adds that the trial court
gave too much weight and credence to the allegedly incredible testimony of prosecutions principal
witness. Appellant reproduced the trial courts narration of the facts, as follows:[][15]
Evidence for the Defense
As summarized by the trial court, the evidence for the defense, on the other hand, is quoted
hereunder:
At past 8:00 p.m. of 11 October 1998, he (Accused MENDOZA) with co-accused REYNALDO
BALVERDE, JR., @ JING-JING (accused BALVERDE for short) was walking home toward Dr. Puno
Street, Barrio Sta. Rita North, Tala, this City coming from Sta. Rita South. Upon reaching the closed
store of the BALVERDE, they saw Victim standing thereat with both hands tucked in his pockets.
Thereupon Accused BALVERDE asked Victim how come he was still there at that time and the latter,
who was apparently drunk, retorted: BAKIT, ANONG PAKIALAM MO. Thence Accused BALVERDE
instructed Victim to go home but instead of acceding thereto Victim cursed him. At this juncture
Accused MENDOZA intervened and after pacifying [the] victim, prevailed upon him to go home. As
the latter was walking toward his house, Accused BALVERDE asked if they would still watch VHS
tape but he failed to receive any answer, hence, Accused MENDOZA decided to go home. After
negotiating a distance of about ten (10) meters accused MENDOZA looked back and saw Accused
BALVERDE hurriedly walking uphill toward the direction of Victim, prompting accused Mendoza to
619
follow him. While about 8 to 9 meters away from Accused BALVERDE, Accused MENDOZA called
his name and in the process Victim whose attention was also alerted thereby, turned around and the
next thing Accused MENDOZA saw was Accused BALVERDE and the victim engaging themselves in
a fist-fight. Upon approaching the duo, Accused MENDOZA held with his left hand the right hand of
Accused BALVERDE which was in Victims waist and at the same time holding with his right hand
Victim's arm, and then he pushed the protagonists, telling them: ANO BA KAYO PARANG HINDI
TAYO MAGKAKILALA. Considering that the source of illumination at the scene was an electric post
which was quite far, accused MENDOZA was unable to see clearly what actually transpired between
the duo, except that he noticed when Victim raised his left arm and simultaneously uttering: Hah
before walking ahead and at about a distance of 4 to 5 meters away he fell to the ground on his
bended knees. Thinking that this was only brought about by victims state of drunkenness, accused
MENDOZA approached the Victim to take him home. At that instance, accused MENDOZAs brother-
in-law JOSELITO GUTIERREZ (JOSELITO for short) and a certain teenager arrived and helped him
(Accused MENDOZA) in lifting the Victim who when exposed to the light, they saw his T-shirt to be
soaking with blood. At that instance, accused MENDOZA spotted accused BALVERDE running away
uphill, thus, he tried to follow the latter to hold him answerable to whatever he did to victim. However,
he lost track of accused BALVERDE when the latter entered an alley, hence, accused MENDOZA
returned to where he came from and seeing victim already on board a tricycle with some
companions including JOSELITO who was in another tricycle he decided to go home; that he never
went to the police to identify the real assailant of victim; that he worked as a painter in Antipolo but
used to go home every weekend and it was on 19 October 1999 when the police arrested him in
connection with this case. Accused MENDOZA further stated that prosecution witness EDUARDO
MARIQUIT must have entertained a grudge against him for reason that three weeks prior to the
incident he drove him away without giving him anything to eat since their food at the table were just
enough for the family especially his children and that before this, MARIQUIT used to drop-by their
house on Sundays to beg for some food.[][16]
In finding appellant guilty of murder, the court a quo gave full faith and credence to the testimony of
the prosecutions principal witness, Eduardo Mariquit, who had positively identified appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime. It likewise accepted the antemortem statement of the victim regarding his
death and deemed such statement to have been made under the consciousness of impending
death. These circumstances were held to prevail over appellants defense of denial. Finally, the lower
court also ruled that the killing was attended by treachery.
Hence, this appeal.[][17]
The Issues
In his appeal before us, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:
The trial court erred in giving too much weight and credence to the incredible testimony of the
prosecutions principal witness anent the subject incident and in totally disregarding the testimony of
the accused-appellant to the effect that it was his co-accused who stabbed the victim.
II
The trial court erred in giving probative value to the alleged ante-mortem statement of the victim.
620
III
The trial court erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime charged despite want of moral
certainty.
IV
On the assumption however that the accused-appellant is guilty, the trial court erred in convicting
him of murder since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not present relative to the incident
in question.[][18]
For a more systematic presentation, we shall reclassify the above alleged errors into three: (1)
credibility of the witnesses, (2) evaluation of the antemortem statement, and (3) presence of
treachery.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue: Credibility of the Witnesses
As in most criminal cases, the crux of the controversy lies in the evaluation of the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses vis--vis the denial presented by the defense.
Appellant rejects the testimony of Mariquit and submits that contrary to the x x x finding of the trial
court, [his] testimony x x x anent the subject incident leaves much to be desired.[][19] Appellant
alleges that said testimony was replete with material inconsistencies, if not contradictions on equally
substantial points.[][20]
We disagree. Categorical, candid and convincing was Mariquits testimony, which positively pointed
to appellant and his co-accused, Balverde, as the culprits. As in most criminal cases, the linchpin in
the resolution of the instant case is the credibility of the witnesses.
Time and time again, this Court has declared that the findings of the trial court on this matter should
not be disturbed on appeal, unless the latter has overlooked some facts or circumstances of
substance and value which, if considered, might well affect the result of the case. This doctrine is
premised on the undisputed fact that, since the trial court has the best opportunity to observe the
demeanor of witnesses while on the stand, it can discern whether or not they are telling the truth.[]
[21] The unbending jurisprudence is that its findings on the matter of credibility of witnesses are
entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[][22] Appellant herein
has not given the Court sufficient reason to deviate from this doctrine.
He contends that the court a quo erred in giving credence to Mariquits testimony, which supposedly
suffered from inconsistencies and contradictions on material points. He also points out several
contradictions between the sworn statement and the court testimony of the said witness on what
transpired before, during and after the stabbing of Valdoz.
First, while Mariquit testified that he had witnessed the stabbing incident, he also stated during the
cross-examination that it was only when he was on his way home that he met the victim holding the
latters bloodied stomach. According to appellant, this inconsistency becomes more apparent in the
sworn statement of this witness. Second, the latter intimated therein that the other accused,
Balverde, was holding a butchers knife while choking and trying to stab the former. The same
621
witness testified in open court, however, that Balverde had merely approached and told him, Wala
kang nakita, wala kang narinig.[][23]
Third, the witness was allegedly inconsistent on the events that transpired after the stabbing
incident. While he testified earlier that he had gone home thereafter, he told the court later on that he
had actually helped and even brought the victim to the latters house. Fourth, appellant assails the
witness testimony on the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim, because this figure was
belied by the medical findings. Fifth, appellant argues that while Mariquit insisted that he witnessed
the incident, such assertion was contradicted by the latters testimony during trial. The said witness
admitted therein that he met appellant only after the former had relayed the occurrence to the victims
brother.
Refutation of Alleged Discrepancies
We begin by stating that Mariquit testified in a categorical, straightforward, consistent and

spontaneous manner on how appellant and Balverde had stabbed and killed Valdoz, as follows:
PROS. SISON/WITNESS:
Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court where were you on October 11, 1998 at about 8:00 in
the evening?
A I was on my way home, sir.
Q From where did you come from at that time?
A In the house of my sister, sir.
COURT: (butts in)/WITNESS:
Q Wait, where is the house of your sister located?
A Same place, Your Honor.
Q What same place?
A Sta. Rita, San Vicente Ferrer, Tala, Caloocan City, Your Honor.
PROS. SISON/TO WITNESS:
Q While walking to your residence, what happened if there was any?
A I saw Jing-jing and Patsy on my way home, sir.
Q When you saw them what happened?
A When I saw them they were stabbing Boy Valdoz, sir.
Q And what happened next?
A Jing-jing approached me and told me WALA KANG NAKITA, WALA KANG NARINIG.[][24]
xxx xxx xxx
Q If you can see this Patsy again will you be able to identify him?
622
A Yes, sir.
Q Will you look around the courtroom and point at him if he is here right now?
A (Witness pointing to accused Rolando Mendoza.)
Q Of course, if you can see Jing-jing again you will be able to identify him also just like accused
Rolando Mendoza?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was accused Rolando Mendoza and a certain Jing-jing who stabbed
Prudencio Valdoz?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you know that Rolando Mendoza and Jing-jing were the ones who stabbed Boy
Valdoz?
A Nakita ko po.[][25]
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said a while ago that Prudencio Valdoz was stabbed by Jing-jing and Patsy, was Prudencio
Valdoz hit?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why did you say that he was hit by those stab thrust[s]?
A Nakita ko po.
Q Why, what happened to him after the stabbing?
A He was able to take a few steps before he fell, sir.
Q Now, will you tell us what kind of bladed weapon that was used in stabbing Prudencio Valdoz?
A Kutsilyo and a butchers knife, sir.
Q Who was then holding that butchers knife?
A Jing-jing, sir.
Q Describe that butchers knife which you said held by Jing-jing?
A About a foot long, sir.
COURT:(butts in)/WITNESS:
Q Including the handle?
A More than a foot long including the handle and about and inch thick, Your Honor.
PROS. SISON:/WITNESS:
623
Q How about that kutsilyo held by Patsy?
A Six (6) to seven (7) inches including the handle, sir.
COURT:(butts in)/WITNESS:
Q How about the blade, how thick?
A About an inch thick, Your Honor.[][26]
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said, you actually saw the stabbing, you tell this Court how it was done. Let us go first to
Jing-jing, how did he stab the victim?
A (The witness demonstrated how Jing-jing stabbed the victim by his right hand.)
Q How many thrust[s]?
A Isa lang po ang nakita ko.
Q Fronting to each other?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How about Patsy how did he stab the victim?
A Patagilid po. Hitting the victim below the left armpit, Your Honor.
Q How many thrust[s] did Patsy deliver?
A Two (2) Your Honor.
Q And [did] those thrust[s] hit the victim?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q What part of the body?
A (The witness pointing at the side of the body, below the left armpit.)
Q Are you sure?
A Sigurado po.[][27]
The trial court even noted that despite the efforts, albeit futile, exerted by the defense counsel to get
from the mouth of Mariquit what he wanted the latter to say, the fact remains that said witness was
steadfast and consistent in his answer [that he had] seen the actual stabbing of the victim by [the]
accused [and] the court is inclined to believe [it,] being replete with details which only a person who
truly witnessed the event could relate.[][28]
Regarding the fact that Mariquit testified that he met the victim only after the incident, this does not in
any way negate the formers testimony on having actually witnessed the stabbing. This much can be
gleaned from his testimony in court:
624
Q Why did you say in your Sinumpaang Salaysay which was shown to you by the Defense
Counsel in paragraph 2, you said nasalubong ko si Prudencio Valdoz na duguan sapo ang kanyang
tiyan, why did you say that?
A Nakita ko po at, tinulungan ko siya.
PROS. SISON:
There is no inconsistency because the stabbing comes first than the meeting of the victim.
COURT:
It[]s very clear in the Sworn statement that he was walking then he met Prudencio bloodied holding
his stomach.
COURT:/WITNESS:
Q Which is true now?
A Nakita ko po ang pangyayari.
Q Why did you not tell that in your Sworn Statement?
A Hindi ko po alam ang gumawa niyan, yung Pulis ang gumawa niyan.
Q But you said, it was read to you by the Police?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Why did you not invite the attention of the Police?
A Wala na po.
Q What do you mean by wala na po?
A Wala na po akong magagawa kasi napirmahan na.[][29]
The stabbing incident indeed came before Mariquit could meet the victim. The witness never testified
that he had arrived only after the stabbing incident and met the victim afterwards. His categorical
and positive statement was that he witnessed the stabbing and met the victim afterwards. In fact,
even during his cross-examination, he reiterated the fact that he had witnessed the stabbing and
seen the victim and the assailants including appellant.
As to the events that transpired after the incident, appellant suggests that Mariquit gave inconsistent
statements on whether the latter had just gone home afterwards or indeed helped the victim reach
home. We see no material inconsistency in the statements of the said witness either in his affidavit
or in his testimony in court.
Appellant attempts to muddle the events by alleging that the statements of Mariquit contained
inconsistencies. Those inconsistencies, however, appear to touch merely on the order of the events
as they transpired. These are of minor import and do not shatter altogether the credibility or the
testimony of this witness. The fact that he met appellant and his co-accused after the stabbing did
not mean that he could not have witnessed the stabbing. One event necessarily comes after the
next.
625
Granting there were inconsistencies, these do not detract from the fact that appellant was positively
identified by Mariquit as one of the assailants. This conclusion is supported by both the affidavit of
the latter and his testimony in court. The same is true of his statement as to what Balverde did or
said to him after the incident. Judging from his consistent assertions, Mariquit was clearly threatened
by Balverde.
Finally, as to the alleged error in the statement of Mariquit on the number of stab wounds inflicted on
the victim, it would be unfair to expect the former to ascertain an exact figure in a startling event like
a killing. A fair estimate is enough. The important thing is that the stabbing took place, the victim
died, and the witness identified the culprits.[][30]
Recall of All Details Not Required
Considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human memory, truth-telling witnesses are not
always expected to give error-free testimonies.[][31] They are not expected to remember every
single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.[][32] This Court has stated time and time again
that minor inconsistencies in the narration of witnesses do not detract from their essential credibility
as long as their testimonies are coherent and intrinsically believable on the whole.[][33] Inaccuracies
may in fact suggest that they are truthful and unrehearsed.
Likewise, the alleged conflict between the sworn statement and the testimony of Mariquit does not
vitiate his credibility as a witness. It has been held that affiants are not necessarily discredited by
discrepancies between their testimonies on the witness stand and their ex parte statements, which
are generally incomplete.[][34] Basic is the rule that affidavits taken ex parte are judicially considered
to be incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestions and sometimes from
want of suggestions and inquiries, without the aid of which witnesses may be unable to recall the
connected circumstances necessary for their accurate recollection.[][35] Affidavits are generally
subordinated in importance to open court declarations, because the former are often executed when
affiants mental faculties are not in such state as to afford them a fair opportunity to narrate in full
incidents that have transpired.[][36] Moreover, testimonial evidence carries more weight than an
affidavit.[][37]
The responsibility of appellant for Valdozs death was indubitably established by both the sworn
statement and the testimony of the said witness.
Appellant vigorously denies any participation in the death of Valdoz, maintaining that it was Balverde
who actually stabbed and killed the victim. In the light of the positive identification of appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime, this denial cannot be sustained.[][38] Naturally, he would pass the blame to
his co-accused in the belief that the latter, who has not yet been apprehended, will be in no position
to contradict the formers assertions. Appellant ascribes ill motive to Mariquit. The latter allegedly
testified the way he did, because the former had driven him away without giving him anything to eat.
We agree with the trial court in assessing such argument as flimsy, when it ruled as follows:
Anent the ill-motive, supra, ascribed by the Accused against MARIQUIT for testifying the way he did
against him in that 3 weeks prior to the incident, Accused has had the occasion to drive away
MARIQUIT without giving him anything to eat for reason that the food they had on the table were just
enough for his children and that MARIQUIT was admittedly the beneficiary of the dole outs in kind
and/or cash from Victims brother MANUEL VALDOZ, this was given scant consideration by this
Court, finding the same to be flimsy nay not good enough reason for anyone to implicate to a
commission of a heinous crime, an otherwise innocent acquaintance. Furthermore, this Court had
observed closely the conduct and deportment of MARIQUIT on the witness stand and definitely it is
626
not to be lightly supposed that he would be capable of callously violating his conscience by blaming
the murder of Victim upon the Accused who he believed to be innocent thereof. Indeed there are
authorities to the rule that the courts have always been cautious in dealing with the allegation of ill-
will on the part of witnesses because of the facility by which accused can concoct the same.[][39]
Second Issue: Evaluation of the Antemortem Statement
Equally important is the fact that the evidence of the prosecution is corroborated not only by
Mariquits positive identification of appellant, but also by the victims antemortem statement given
both to the police and to Estrellita Carmelo, a co-worker. Such declaration identified appellant and
Balverde as the assailants.
Antemortem statements are governed by Section 37 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which is
reproduced as follows:
Sec. 37. Dying Declaration - The declaration of a dying person, made under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in any case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as
evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death.
A dying declaration, also known as an antemortem statement or a statement in articulo mortis, is

admissible under the following requisites: (1) death is imminent and the declarant is conscious of
that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause and the surrounding circumstances of such death;
(3) the declaration relates to a fact which the victim is competent to testify to; and (4) the declaration
is offered in a case wherein the declarants death is the subject of the inquiry.[][40]
Disputed in this case is the first requisite. The issue of whether a declaration was made under the
consciousness of an impending death is a matter of evidence.[][41] It must be shown that such
declaration was made under a realization that ones demise or at least its imminence, not so much its
rapid occurrence, was at hand.[][42] This may be proven by the statement of the victim or inferred
from the nature and extent of the victims wounds or other relevant circumstances.[][43]
Appellant specifically impugns the antemortem statement made by the victim before PO3 Alex
Barroga on October 12, 1998, alleging that it was not made under a consciousness of impending
death. That Valdoz was still strong, as testified to by his brother, is what appellant tries to impress
upon this Court, so as to negate consciousness of imminent death.
We are not persuaded by appellants arguments. First, the testimony of the brother of Valdoz
regarding the latters state of health relates to the days after the antemortem statement was made.
As clearly testified to by the brother of the victim, the formers conversation with the latter had
occurred between October 16 and 18, 1998; and the antemortem statement, on October 12, 1998.
The brother testified that, at the time, the victim seemed strong enough to even move and sway his
body to demonstrate how he had been stabbed. This fact, however, did not necessarily show that
when the antemortem statement was taken four days earlier, the victim was not under a
consciousness of death. The brothers testimony did not in any way negate the victims
consciousness of impending death at the time the dying declaration was made.
Statement Reflects Consciousness of Death
Second and more important, the antemortem statement itself reflects Valdozs consciousness of
impending death in this wise:
03. TANONG Sa palagay mo, ikamamatay mo ang tinamong sugat sa pagsaksak sa iyo?
627
S - Opo.[][44]
Furthermore, judging from the nature and the extent of his wounds, there can be no other conclusion
than that the victim must have realized the seriousness of his condition.
Ma. Cristina Freyra, the medicolegal officer who had conducted the autopsy examination on the
victim, testified as to the degree and seriousness of the stab wounds suffered by the latter, as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: [Y]ou mentioned madam witness that sta[b] wound No. 3 was not indicated here in this Report
No. M-1595-98, will you please tell the honorable court the nature of that stab wound?
WITNESS:
A: [I]t was indicated on the left side of the abdomen and also fatal wound sir.
Q: [W]hy did you say it was also fatal wound?
A: [I]n fact all the wounds are fatal because they penetrated the left dome of the diaphra[g]m and
the small intestines sir.[][45]
Clearly, not only did the victim express in words his consciousness of his inevitable demise; the very
nature of his wounds indubitably generated a consciousness that death was near.
Finally, the fact that the victim did not expire right after his declaration, but survived seven days
thereafter, will not alter the probative force of his dying declaration. The occurrence of a declarants
death immediately thereafter is not indispensable.[][46] The rule on dying declarations does not
require that the person should be at the time in the throes of death, or that he should die
immediately, or within any specified time thereafter, in order to give the declaration probative force.
Where a person has been fatally wounded, is in sore distress therefrom, and believes that he will not
recover and is soon to die, his statement made in this belief relating to the cause of his injury is
admissible, if it appears that he subsequently died from the direct effects of the wound, although he
may have revived after making the statements or may have lived a considerable time thereafter, and
may have again begun to hope for recovery.[][47]
It must also be noted that the victim made another antemortem statement to his co-worker, Estrellita
Carmelo. This oral statement passes the requisites of a dying declaration as discussed earlier. That
it was made under a consciousness of imminent death is without question, as shown by the witness
testimony which we quote:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Upon arrival at the [e]ast [a]venue [m]edical [c]enter[,] what happened there?
A: When I was inside the hospital Prudencio Valdoz was signalling me to come near him sir.
Q: Where was he at the time the victim was signalling you to come near him?
A: Inside the operating room sir.
Q: Did you approach Prudencio Valdoz?
628
A: Yes sir.
Q: When you were already near him, what transpired?
A: I placed my ear directly in to his mouth and he said something although he was suffering from
pain.
Q: Did you ask any question to him?
A: Yes sir.
Q: What was that question?
A: Who stabbed him sir.
Q: And what was [the] answer?
A: Sir Rolando Mendoza and Reynaldo Balverde. Rolando Mendoza alias Patsy and Reynaldo
Balverde alias Jing-Jing.
Q: Now what else did the victim Prudencio Valdoz tell you?
A: Prudencio Valdoz told me, ate, baka mamatay ako sasabihin ko sa iyo kung sino ang sumaksak
sa akin, tandaan mo lang huwag mong kalimutan.[][48]
Third Issue: Presence of Treachery - Be that as it may, we do not agree with the finding of the trial
court that treachery attended the killing. To prove treachery, the following must be shown: (1) the
employment of such means of execution as would give the person attacked no opportunity for self-
defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[][49]
It is also the running case law that where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven.
Without any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act that
resulted in the victims death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.[][50] It is not sufficient that
the victim was unarmed and that the means employed by the malefactor brought the desired result.
The prosecution must prove that appellant deliberately and consciously adopted such means,
method or manner of attack as would deprive the victim of an opportunity for self-defense or
retaliation.[][51]
In the case at bar, although the prosecutions principal witness testified that he actually witnessed the
stabbing, there was no statement to describe the circumstances surrounding the incident. Neither
did the prosecution show how the attack was commenced.
We have ruled in a litany of cases that treachery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear
and convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.[][52] The same degree of proof to
dispel any reasonable doubt is required before treachery may be considered as an aggravating or a
qualifying circumstance.[][53] Hence, where the circumstances surrounding either the manner of the
attack or how the aggression was commenced has not been proven, as in this case, the appellant
should be given the benefit of the doubt, and the crime should be considered only as homicide
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
This provision prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal for homicide. There being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance that can properly be appreciated, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period.
629
As regards appellants pecuniary liabilities, we affirm the award of P50,000 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, consistent with current jurisprudence.[][54] This award needs no proof other than the
commission of the crime. Further, proven moral damages amounting to P40,000 are reasonable,
considering the grief suffered by the victims mother, a 75-year-old widow, at the sudden loss of her
son who was her sole companion at home and the one supporting her. Moral damages -- which
include mental anguish, serious anxiety and wounded feelings -- may be recovered in criminal
offenses resulting in the victims death.[][55] Likewise, we affirm the award of P65,000 stipulated[][56]
actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Appellant Rolando Mendoza is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9)
years of prision mayor as minimum to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. He is
likewise ordered to pay the legal heirs of Prudencio Valdoz P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto; Mely
Cruz, P65,000 as actual damages; and Mrs. Beatriz Valdoz, moral damages in the amount of
P40,000. No pronouncement as to costs
B. Taer V. People, 313 SCRA 220
G.R. No. 85204 June 18, 1990
JORGE TAER, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Lord M. Marapao for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in "People
v. Jorge Taer," CA-G.R. CR No. 01213, 1 dated May 26, 1988, which affirmed in toto the conviction
of Jorge Taer for the crime of cattle rustling by the Regional Trial Court of Bohol in Criminal Case No.
3104, 2 and the resolution of the same court denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
After the required preliminary investigation in the 11th Municipal Circuit Court at Valencia-Dimiao, in
the province of Bohol, the following information was filed in the then Court of First Instance of Bohol,
14th Judicial District, Branch IV, at Tagbilaran City:
630
The undersigned, Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal, hereby accuses Emilio Namocatcat alias Milio,
Mario Cago, Jorge Taer and Cerilo Saludes for the crime of Theft of Large Cattle, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December, 1981, in barangay Lantang, municipality of Valencia,
province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping with each other, with the intent of
gain and without the consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and lead away two (2) male carabaos with the total value of FOUR
THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00), Philippine Currency, belonging to and owned by Tirso Dalde and
Eladio Palaca; to the damage and prejudice of the said offended parties in the aforestated amount.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Articles 308, 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code,
with the aggravating circumstance of nighttime being purposely sought for or taken advantage by the
accused to facilitate the commission of the crime.
City of Tagbilaran, June 1, 1982. 3
After proper proceedings and trial, Saludes and Cago were acquitted but Taer and Namocatcat were
convicted. The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court, dated July 6, 1984, reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Emilio Namocatcat and Jorge Taer GUILTY beyond doubt of
the theft of large cattle and appreciating against them the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity
and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 533 each is hereby sentenced to undergo the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE DAY TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN
(10) MONTHS and TWENTY ONE (21) DAYS, together with the accessory penalties, and to pay the
costs; they are entitled to credit for their preventive imprisonment. Accused Mario Cago and Cirilo
Saludes are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. 4
Only Jorge Taer appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, finding the evidence of the
prosecution that conspiracy indeed existed between Emilio Namocatcat and Jorge Taer, affirmed in
toto the decision appealed from. But the affirmance did not affect Emilio Namocatcat because, as
adverted to earlier, he did not appeal his conviction by the Regional Trial Court.
Hence, this petition for review was filed by Taer alone.
In sum, Taer interposed these twin arguments:
1. That the extent of his participation did not go beyond the participation of the original defendants
Cirilo Saludes and Mario Cago. Therefore, he submits that the acquittal of these two by the trial court
should also lead to his acquittal; 5
2. That the only evidence proving the alleged conspiracy between him and Emilio Namocatcat was
the confession of his co-accused Emilio Namocatcat. However this should not be considered as
admissible because the same is hearsay under the rule of res inter alios acta. 6
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court show that:
In the evening of December 5, 1981, accused Cirilo Saludes slept in the house of his compadre
accused Jorge Taer at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez, Bohol, whereat he was benighted. At about 2:00
o'clock dawn, December 6, 1981, accused Emilio Namocatcat and Mario Cago arrived at Taer's
631
house with two (2) male carabaos owned by and which Namocatcat wanted Taer to tend. The said
carabaos were left at Taer's place.
Tirso Dalde and Eladio Palaca of Lantang, Valencia Bohol discovered in the morning of December 6,
1981 that their respective male carabaos, 3 to 4 years old, were missing at the different grazing
grounds whereat they tied the same the afternoon preceding.
After searching in vain for the carabaos at the vicinity, Dalde and Palaca reported the matter to the
police. On December 15, 1981, one Felipe Reyes of Hinopolan, Valencia, Bohol, informed Dalde that
he saw the latter's lost carabao at Datag, Garcia-Hernandez. Forthwith Dalde and Palaca went on
that day to Datag and there they found their missing carabaos tied to a bamboo thicket near the
house accused Taer who was then not in the house as he was in Napo, Garcia-Hernandez,
attending the fiesta where he cooked for the accused Saludes. Upon query by Dalde and Palaca
why their carabaos were found at his place, accused Taer, according to Dalde and Palaca replied
that the carabaos reached his place tied together without any person in company. According to
accused Taer, what he told Dalde and Palaca was that the carabaos were brought to his place by the
accused Namocatcat who asked him to tell anybody looking for them that they just strayed thereat.
The 2 carabaos were taken by Dalde and Palaca from accused Taer's possession on that day,
December 15. 7
xxx xxx xxx
The Court of Appeals would consider these as proof of the existence of conspiracy:
Altho (sic) accused Taer admitted that before December 6, 1981, he had not met accused
Namocatcat since 1975 and had not previously tended any carabao belonging to Namocatcat, it is
unbelievable that Taer was not suspicious of the origin of the 2 male carabaos which to say the least
were delivered to him to be tended under strange circumstances, to wit, at the unholy hour of 2:00
o'clock dawn after a travel of 14 kilometers' in the dead of the night. He unreservedly accepted the
charge of tending them with the agreement as to the sharing of the produce out of said carabaos
(sic) use. If, as he asserted, Namocatcat left the carabaos with him with the word that if anybody
would look for them he was to tell that the carabaos just strayed into his other carabaos (sic), the
more Taer ought to be more suspicious as to the origin of said carabaos, yet, since that dawn
delivery on December 6, 1981, until they were retrieved from his possession, he never apprised the
barangay captain, living just 2 kilometers away from his house, about the matter. He continued to
hold on to the stolen carabaos until they were recovered 10 days later.
Ordinarily, one would not hold on to a thing he suspects to be stolen to obviate any criminal
responsibility or implication. But accused Taer did the opposite-a clear indication that he and
accused Namocatcat did have some kind of an unlawful agreement regarding the stolen carabaos.
He did not even reveal immediately to the authorities that the carabaos delivered to him by
Namocatcat were stolen and he tried his best to keep under cover Namocatcat's Identity.
The Court, therefore, finds that conspiracy between accused Namocatcat and Taer in the theft of the
carabaos has been established beyond doubt. 8
xxx xxx xxx
We disagree with the findings of the respondent court; they are mere suspicions and speculations.
The circumstances adverted to above do not establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt.
632
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement regarding the commission of
an offense and decide to commit it. Although the facts may show a unity of purpose and unity in the
execution of the unlawful objective, essential however is an agreement to commit the crime and a
decision to commit it. 9
Only recently we emphasized the rule that:
Conspiracy must be established not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. The
same degree of proof necessary to establish the crime is required to support a finding of the
presence of criminal conspiracy, which is, proof beyond reasonable doubt. 10
Thus mere knowledge, acquiescence to, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to
cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation
in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
At most the facts establish Taer's knowledge of the crime. And yet without having participated either
as principal or as an accomplice, for he did not participate in the taking of the carabaos, he took part
subsequent to the commission of the act of taking by profiting himself by its effects. Taer is thus only
an accessory after the fact.
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code states:
Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having
participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in
any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime; 11
xxx xxx xxx
person who received any property from another, and used it, knowing that the same property had
been stolen is guilty as an accessory because he is profiting by the effects of the crime." By
employing the two carabaos in his farm, Taer was profiting by the objects of the theft. 12
On the conspiracy charge, the most cogent proof that the prosecution could ever raise was the
implication made by the accused Namocatcat (he did not appeal his conviction to the Court of
Appeals) in his affidavit of confession. 13
However, the settled rule is that the rights of a party can not be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another. 14
The testimony, being res inter alios acta, can not affect another except as provided in the Rules of
Court. This rule on res inter alios acta specifically applies when the evidence consists of an
admission in an extrajudicial confession or declaration of another because the defendant has no
opportunity to cross-examine the co-conspirator testifying against him. 15
Since this is the only evidence of the prosecution to prove the conspiracy with Namocatcat, this
uncorroborated testimony can not be sufficient to convict Taer.
The offense for which Taer is accused is covered by Articles 308, 309, and 310, as amended by "Me
Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974. 1116 The penalty imposed on the principal for the crime of cattle
rustling is:
633
Sec. 8. Penal provisions. Any person convicted of cattle rustling as herein defined shall,
irrespective of the value of the large cattle involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum
period to reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed without violence against
or intimidation of persons or force upon things. If the offense is committed with violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on the
occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be
imposed. 17
xxx xxx xxx
Inasmuch as Taer's culpability is only that of an accessory after the fact, under Art. 53 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated
felony shall be imposed.
The penalty two degrees lower than that imposed under the first sentence of Section 8 of PD No.
533 is arresto mayor maximum or 4 months and one day to 6 months to prision correccional medium
or 2 years 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. In addition, the Revised Penal Code
provides that when the penalties prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single
divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, the courts shag observe the rule that when
there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, they shall impose the penalty prescribed
by law in its medium period. 18 Hence the imposable penalty would be prision correccional minimum
or 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months imprisonment.
Since the maximum term of imprisonment exceeds one year, we apply the Indeterminate Sentence
Law. 19
This law provides that the maximum term of imprisonment shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said code which is prision
correccional minimum or 6 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months. And the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty
next lower would be in the range of destierro maximum or 4 years 2 months and 1 day to 6 years to
arresto mayor medium or 2 months and 1 day to 4 months.
WHEREFORE, the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran and affirmed by the
respondent Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED in that the herein JORGE TAER is convicted as
an accessory of the crime of cattle-rustling as defined and penalized by PD No. 533 amending Arts.
308, 309, and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and he will serve the minimum penalty within the
range of arresto mayor medium, which we shall fix at 4 months imprisonment and the maximum
penalty of prision correccional minimum which we shall fix at 2 years.
With costs.
634
A. Dizon- Pamintuan V. People, 234 SCRA 63
G.R. No. 111426 July 11, 1994
NORMA DIZON-PAMINTUAN, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Puno and Puno for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The chief issue presented for our determination in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court is the correctness of the decision of 29 March 1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 11024 1 which affirmed the decision of Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in
Criminal Case No. 88-64954 2 finding the petitioner guilty of the violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
(P.D. No. 1612) but set aside the penalty imposed and ordered the trial court to receive additional
evidence on the "correct valuation" of the pieces of jewelry involved for the sole purpose of
determining the penalty to be imposed.
The information in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 charged the petitioner with the violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law in that
on or about and during the period from February 12, to February 24, 1988, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent of gain for herself or for another, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly buy and keep in her possession and/or sell or dispose of the
following jewelries, to wit: one (1) set of earrings, a ring studded with diamonds in a triangular style,
635
one (1) set of earrings (diamond studded) and one (1) diamond-studded crucifix, or all valued at
P105,000.00, which she knew or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery committed by Joselito Sacdalan Salinas against the owner Teodoro and Luzviminda
Encarnacion. 3
On the basis of the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Teodoro Encarnacion (one of the offended
parties), Cpl. Ignacio Jao, Jr., and Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez, both of the Western Police District, the
trial court promulgated on 16 November 1990 its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilty of the accused for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612 beyond reasonable doubt, the accused Norma Dizon-Pamintuan is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of
prision mayor to NINETEEN (19) YEARS of reclusion temporal.
No civil liability in view of the recovery of the items, subject-matter of this case.
With costs. 4
The evidence of the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Teodoro Encarnacion, Undersecretary, Department of Public Works and Highways testified that he
has just arrived at his residence located at Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque at around 9:45 p.m.
of February 12, 1988 coming from the Airport and immediately proceeded inside the house, leaving
behind his driver and two housemaids outside to pick-up his personal belongings from his case. It
was at this point that five unidentified masked armed persons appeared from the grassy portion of
the lot beside the house and poked their guns to his driver and two helpers and dragged them inside
his house. That the men pointed a gun at him and was made to lie face down on the floor. The other
occupants, namely his wife, the maids and his driver were likewise made to lie on the floor.
Thereafter, the robbers ransacked the house and took away jewelries and other personal properties
including cash. After the intruders left the house he reported the matter immediately to the police. He
was then interviewed by the Paraaque police and was informed that an operation group would be
assigned to the case.
He likewise reported the matter to the Western Police District on February 15, 1988. Two days later,
a group of WPD operatives came over to his house and he was asked to prepare a list of items of
jewelry and other valuables that were lost including a sketch of distinctive items. He was later told
that some of the lost items were in Chinatown area as tipped by the informer the police had
dispatched. That an entrapment would be made with their participation, on February 14, 1988. As
such, they went to Camp Crame at around 9:00 a.m. and arrived at the vicinity of 733 Florentino
Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila at about 10:00 a.m.; that he is with his wife posed as a buyer and
were able to recognize items of the jewelry stolen displayed at the stall being tended by Norma
Dizon Pamintuan; the pieces were: 1 earring and ring studded with diamonds worth P75,000 bought
from estimator Nancy Bacud (Exh. "C-2"), 1 set of earring diamond worth P15,000 (Exh. "C-3") and 1
gold chain with crucifix worth P3,000 (Exh. "C-4").
Corporal Ignacio Jao, Jr. of the WPD testified that he was with the spouses Teodoro Encarnacion, Jr.
in the morning of February 24, 1988 and they proceeded to Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila at the stall of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan together with Sgt. Perez. After the spouses
Encarnacion recognized the items subject matter of the robbery at the display window of the stall
being tended by the herein accused, they invited the latter to the precinct and investigated the same.
636
They likewise brought the said showcase to the WPD station. He further testified that he has no prior
knowledge of the stolen jewelries of the private complainant from one store to another.
Pfc. Emmanuel Sanchez of the WPD testified that he reported for duty on February 24, 1988; that he
was with the group who accompanied the spouses Encarnacion in Sta. Cruz, Manila and was
around when the couple saw some of the lost jewelries in the display stall of the accused. He was
likewise present during the early part of the investigation of the WPD station. 5
The recovery of the pieces of jewelry, on the basis of which the trial court ruled that no civil liability
should be adjudged against the petitioner, took place when, as testified to by Teodoro Encarnacion,
the petitioner "admitted that she got the items but she did not know they were stolen [and that] she
surrendered the items and gave them to [his] wife." 6
On the other hand, the version of the defense, as testified to by Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan, is
summarized by the trial court thus:
The defense presented only the testimony of Rosito Dizon-Pamintuan who testified that he is the
brother of Norma Dizon-Pamintuan and that sometime around 11:00 a.m. of February 24, 1985, he,
together with the accused went infront of the Carinderia along Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz,
Manila waiting for a vacancy therein to eat lunch. Suddenly, three persons arrived and he overheard
that Cpl. Jao told her sister to get the jewelry from inside the display window but her sister requested
to wait for Fredo, the owner of the stall. But ten minutes later when said Fredo did not show up, the
police officer opened the display window and got the contents of the same. The display stall was
hauled to a passenger jeepney and the same, together with the accused were taken to the police
headquarters. He likewise testified that he accompanied his sister to the station and after
investigation was sent home. 7
In convicting the petitioner, the trial court made the following findings:
The prosecution was able to prove by evidence that the recovered items were part of the loot and
such recovered items belong to the spouses Encarnacion, the herein private complainants. That
such items were recovered by the Police Officers from the stall being tended by the accused at that
time. Of importance, is that the law provides a disputable presumption of fencing under Section 5
thereof, to wit:
Mere possession of any goods, article, item object, or anything of value which has been the subject
of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
There is no doubt that the recovered items were found in the possession of the accused and she
was not able to rebut the presumption though the evidence for the defense alleged that the stall is
owned by one Fredo. A distinction should likewise be made between ownership and possession in
relation to the act of fencing. Moreover, as to the value of the jewelries recovered, the prosecution
was able to show that the same is Ninety Three Thousand Pesos (P93,000.00). 8
The petitioner then appealed her conviction to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CR No. 11024) where
she raised two issues: (1) that the judgment was based on a mere presumption, and (2) that the
prosecution failed to show that the value of the jewelry recovered is P93,000.00.
In its challenged decision of 29 March 1993, the Court of Appeals disposed of the first issue in this
wise:
637
The guilt of accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. All the elements of the
crime of fencing in violation of the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979 (P.D. No. 1612), to wit:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. A person, not a participant in said crime, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals,
sells or disposes, or buys and sells; or in any manner deals in any article or item, object or anything
of value;
3. With personal knowledge, or should be known to said person that said item, object or anything of
value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
4. With intent to gain for himself or for another;
have been established by positive and convincing evidence of the prosecution . . .
...
The fact that a crime of robbery has been committed on February 12, 1988 is established by the
testimony of private complainant Teodoro T. Encarnacion who immediately reported the same to
Paraaque Police Station of the Southern Police District (TSN, Hearings of October 3, 1988,
November 9, 1988 and January 11, 1989; Exh. A) and submitted a list and sketches of the jewelries
robbed, among other things, from their residence located at Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque,
Metro Manila (Exh. C, C-1 to C-4 and D).
The second element is likewise established by convincing evidence. On February 24, 1988,
accused-appellant was found selling the jewelries (Exhs. C-2, C-3 and C-4) which was displayed in a
showcase in a stall located at Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. [Testimonies of Teodoro
Encarnacion (id. supra); Cpl. Ignacio Jao (TSN, Hearing of February 13, 1989) and Pfc. Emmanuel
Sanchez (TSN, Hearing of June 4, 1989)].
On the element of knowledge that the items are derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery
and of intent to gain for herself or for another, the Anti-Fencing Law provides:
Sec. 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of
value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.
Knowledge and intent to gain are proven by the fact that these jewelries were found in possession of
appellant and they were displayed for sale in a showcase being tended by her in a stall along
Florentino Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. 9
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals was of the opinion that there was not enough evidence to prove
the value of the pieces of jewelry recovered, which is essential to the imposition of the proper
penalty under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1612. It opined that the trial court erred in concluding that "the
value of the recovered jewelries is P93,000.00 based on the bare testimony of the private
complainant and the self-serving list he submitted (Exhs. C, C-2 and C-4, TSN, Hearing of October
3, 1993)." 10
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the trial court did not commit any reversible error, its decision dated
October 26, 1990 convincing accused appellant is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the
penalty imposed is SET ASIDE and the Regional Trial Court (Branch 20) of Manila is ordered to
638
receive evidence with respect to the correct valuation of the properties involved in this case, marked
as Exhibits "C", "C-2" and "C-4" for the sole purpose of determining the proper penalty to be meted
out against accused under Section 3, P.D. No. 1612. Let the original records be remanded
immediately. 11
Hence, this petition wherein the petitioner contends that:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE

DECISION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT JUDGE CAEBA, IN BLATANT DISREGARD OF
APPLICABLE LAW AND WELL-ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY ERRED IN REMANDING THE CASE

TO THE COURT A QUO FOR RECEPTION OF EVIDENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING THE CORRECT PENALTY TO BE IMPOSED. 12
On 23 February 1994, after the public respondents had filed their Comment and the petitioner her
Reply to the Comment, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
The first assigned error is without merit.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who,
with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell
or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of
value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft."
Before P.D. No. 1612, a fence could only be prosecuted for and held liable as an accessory, as the
term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty applicable to an accessory is
obviously light under the rules prescribed in Articles 53, 55, and 57 of the Revised Penal Code,
subject to the qualification set forth in Article 60 thereof. Nothing, however, the reports from law
enforcement agencies that "there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and private
properties" and that "such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless
elements because of the existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen
properties," P.D. No. 1612 was enacted to "impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the
effects of the crimes of robbery and theft." Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft
could be prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the
latter case, he ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing.
Elsewise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses. 13 The state may thus choose to prosecute him either under the
Revised Penal Code or P.D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable
considering that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of fencing
14 and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. 15
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
639
in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from
the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
In the instant case, there is no doubt that the first, second, and fourth elements were duly
established. A robbery was committed on 12 February 1988 in the house of the private complainants
who afterwards reported the incident to the Paraaque Police, the Western Police District, the NBI,
and the CIS, and submitted a list of the lost items and sketches of the jewelry taken from them
(Exhibits "C" and "D"). Three of these items stolen, viz., (a) a pair of earrings and ring studded with
diamonds worth P75,000.00 (Exhibit "C-2"); (b) one set of earrings worth P15,000.00 (Exhibit "C-3");
and (c) a chain with crucifix worth P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C-4"), were displayed for sale at a stall tended
to by the petitioner in Florentino Torres Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila. The public display of the articles for
sale clearly manifested an intent to gain on the part of the petitioner.
The more crucial issue to be resolved is whether the prosecution proved the existence of the third
element: that the accused knew or should have known that the items recovered from her were the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness
thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has
something within the mind's grasp with certitude and clarity. 16 When knowledge of the existence of
a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a
high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist. 17 On the other
hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and
intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his
conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 18 Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness
about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state with certainty what
is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt acts of that person.
And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the court should choose
the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence. 19
Since Section 5 of P.D. No. 1612 expressly provides that "[m]ere possession of any good, article,
item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima
facie evidence of fencing," it follows that the petitioner is presumed to have knowledge of the fact
that the items found in her possession were the proceeds of robbery or theft. The presumption is
reasonable for no other natural or logical inference can arise from the established fact of her
possession of the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. This presumption does not offend the
presumption of innocence enshrined in the fundamental law. 20 In the early case of United States
vs.Luling, 21 this Court held:
It has been frequently decided, in case of statutory crimes, that no constitutional provision is violated
by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact or facts shall constitute prima
facie evidence of guilt, and that then the burden is shifted to the defendant for the purpose of
showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed without unlawful intention.
(Commonwealth vs. Minor, 88 Ky., 422.)
640
In some of the States, as well as in England, there exist what are known as common law offenses. In
the Philippine Islands no act is a crime unless it is made so by statute. The state having the right to
declare what acts are criminal, within certain well defined limitations, has a right to specify what act
or acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt,
and then to put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are
not committed with any criminal intent or intention.
In his book on constitutional law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz said:
Nevertheless, the constitutional presumption of innocence may be overcome by contrary

presumptions based on the experience of human conduct [People vs. Labara, April 20, 1954].
Unexplained flight, for example, may lead to an inference of guilt, as 'the wicked flee when no man
pursueth, but the righteous is as bold as a lion. Failure on the part of the accused to explain his
possession of stolen property may give rise to the reasonable presumption that it was he himself
who had stolen it [U.S. vs. Espia, 16 Phil. 506]. Under our Revised Penal Code, the inability of an
accountable officer to produce funds or property entrusted to him will be considered prima facie
evidence that he has appropriated them to his personal use [Art. 217]. According to Cooley, the
constitutional presumption will not apply as long as there is "some rational connection between the
fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact from proof of another shall
not be so unreasonable as to be purely arbitrary mandate" [1 Cooley, 639].
The petitioner was unable to rebut the presumption under P.D. No. 1612. She relied solely on the
testimony of her brother which was insufficient to overcome the presumption, and, on the contrary,
even disclosed that the petitioner was engaged in the purchase and sale of jewelry and that she
used to buy from a certain Fredo. 23
Fredo was not presented as a witness and it was not established that he was a licensed dealer or
supplier of jewelry. Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 provides that "all stores, establishments or entitles
dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the
necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated National Police in the
town or city where such store, establishment or entity is located." Under the Rules and Regulations
24 promulgated to carry out the provisions of Section 6, an unlicensed dealer/supplier refers to any
person, partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other entity or establishment not licensed
by the government to engage in the business of dealing in or supplying "used secondhand articles,"
which refers to any good, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an unlicensed
dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact been used.
We do not, however, agree with the Court of Appeals that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
actual value of the recovered articles.
As found by the trial court, the recovered articles had a total value of P93,000.00, broken down as
follows:
a) one earring and ring studded with diamonds (Exh. "C-2") P75,000.00
b) one set of earring (Exh. "C-3") P15,000.00
c) one gold chain with crucifix (Exh. "C-4") P3,000.00
These findings are based on the testimony of Mr. Encarnacion 25 and on Exhibit "C," 26 a list of the
items which were taken by the robbers on 12 February 1988, together with the corresponding
641
valuation thereof. On cross-examination, Mr. Encarnacion re-affirmed his testimony on direct
examination that the value of the pieces of jewelry described in Exhibit "C-2" is P75,000.00 27 and
that the value of the items described in Exhibit "C-3" is P15,000.00, although he admitted that only
one earring and not the pair was recovered. 28 The cross-examination withheld any question
on the gold chain with crucifix described in Exhibit "C-4." In view, however, of the admission that only
one earring was recovered of the jewelry described in Exhibit "C-3," it would be reasonable to
reduce the value from P15,000.00 to P7,500.00. Accordingly, the total value of the pieces of jewelry
displayed for sale by the petitioner and established to be part of the proceeds of the robbery on 12
February 1988 would be P87,000.00.
Section 3(a) of P.D. No. 1612 provides that the penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon the
accused if the value of the property involved is more than P12,000.00 but does not exceed
P22,000.00, and if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional P10,000.00; the total
penalty which may be imposed, however, shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty
shall be termed reclusion temporal and the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the
Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed. The maximum penalty that can be imposed in this case
would then be eighteen (18) years and five (5) months, which is within the range of reclusion
temporal maximum. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law which allows the imposition of an
indeterminate penalty which, with respect to offenses penalized by a special law, shall range from a
minimum which shall not be lower than the minimum prescribed by the special law to a maximum
which should not exceed the maximum provided therein, the petitioner can thus be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum to eighteen (18) years and five (5) months of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum,
with the accessory penalties corresponding to the latter.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the penalty imposed by the
trial court and in remanding the case to the trial court for further reception of evidence to determine
the actual value of the pieces of jewelry recovered from the petitioner and for the imposition of the
appropriate penalty.
We do not agree with the petitioner's contention, though, that a remand for further reception of
evidence would place her in double jeopardy. There is double jeopardy when the following requisites
concur: (1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (2) the first jeopardy must have
validly been terminated, and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the
first. 29 Such a concurrence would not occur assuming that the case was remanded to the trial
court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is partly GRANTED by setting aside the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 11024 insofar as it sets aside the penalty imposed by
Branch 20 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Criminal Case No. 88-64954 and orders the
remand of the case for the trial court to receive evidence with respect to the correct value of the
properties involved. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject to the
modification of the penalty which is hereby reduced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten
(10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor maximum as minimum to Eighteen (18) years and Five
(5) months of Reclusion Temporal maximum as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the latter.
642
B. Tan V People, 313 SCRA 598
RAMON C. TAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal via certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals*
affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 19,** convicting petitioner of the crime of
fencing.
Complainant Rosita Lim is the proprietor of Bueno Metal Industries, located at 301 Jose Abad
Santos St., Tondo, Manila, engaged in the business of manufacturing propellers or spare parts for
boats. Manuelito Mendez was one of the employees working for her. Sometime in February 1991,
Manuelito Mendez left the employ of the company. Complainant Lim noticed that some of the
welding rods, propellers and boat spare parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass
screws were missing. She conducted an inventory and discovered that propellers and stocks valued
at P48,000.00, more or less, were missing. Complainant Rosita Lim informed Victor Sy, uncle of
Manuelito Mendez, of the loss. Subsequently, Manuelito Mendez was arrested in the Visayas and he
admitted that he and his companion Gaudencio Dayop stole from the complainants warehouse some
boat spare parts such as bronze and stainless propellers and brass screws. Manuelito Mendez
asked for complainants forgiveness. He pointed to petitioner Ramon C. Tan as the one who bought
the stolen items and who paid the amount of P13,000.00, in cash to Mendez and Dayop, and they
split the amount with one another. Complainant did not file a case against Manuelito Mendez and
Gaudencio Dayop.
On relation of complainant Lim, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Manila, Branch 19, an information against petitioner charging him with violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) committed as follows:
643
That on or about the last week of February 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously knowingly receive, keep, acquire and possess
several spare parts and items for fishing boats all valued at P48,130.00 belonging to Rosita Lim,
which he knew or should have known to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of theft.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on November 23, 1992, petitioner Ramon C. Tan pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged and waived pre-trial. To prove the accusation, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
complainant Rosita Lim, Victor Sy and the confessed thief, Manuelito Mendez.
On the other hand, the defense presented Rosita Lim and Manuelito Mendez as hostile witnesses
and petitioner himself. The testimonies of the witnesses were summarized by the trial court in its
decision, as follows:
ROSITA LIM stated that she is the owner of Bueno Metal Industries, engaged in the business of
manufacturing propellers, bushings, welding rods, among others (Exhibits A, A-1, and B). That
sometime in February 1991, after one of her employees left the company, she discovered that some
of the manufactured spare parts were missing, so that on February 19, 1991, an inventory was
conducted and it was found that some welding rods and propellers, among others, worth P48,000.00
were missing. Thereafter, she went to Victor Sy, the person who recommended Mr. Mendez to her.
Subsequently, Mr. Mendez was arrested in the Visayas, and upon arrival in Manila, admitted to his
having stolen the missing spare parts sold then to Ramon Tan. She then talked to Mr. Tan, who
denied having bought the same.
When presented on rebuttal, she stated that some of their stocks were bought under the name of
Asia Pacific, the guarantor of their Industrial Welding Corporation, and stated further that whether the
stocks are bought under the name of the said corporation or under the name of William Tan, her
husband, all of these items were actually delivered to the store at 3012-3014 Jose Abad Santos
Street and all paid by her husband.
That for about one (1) year, there existed a business relationship between her husband and Mr. Tan.
Mr. Tan used to buy from them stocks of propellers while they likewise bought from the former brass
woods, and that there is no reason whatsoever why she has to frame up Mr. Tan.
MANUELITO MENDEZ stated that he worked as helper at Bueno Metal Industries from November
1990 up to February 1991. That sometime in the third week of February 1991, together with
Gaudencio Dayop, his co-employee, they took from the warehouse of Rosita Lim some boat spare
parts, such as bronze and stainless propellers, brass screws, etc. They delivered said stolen items to
Ramon Tan, who paid for them in cash in the amount of P13,000.00. After taking his share (one-half
(1/2) of the amount), he went home directly to the province. When he received a letter from his
uncle, Victor Sy, he decided to return to Manila. He was then accompanied by his uncle to see Mrs.
Lim, from whom he begged for forgiveness on April 8, 1991. On April 12, 1991, he executed an
affidavit prepared by a certain Perlas, a CIS personnel, subscribed to before a Notary Public
(Exhibits C and C-1).
VICTORY [sic] SY stated that he knows both Manuelito Mendez and Mrs. Rosita Lim, the former
being the nephew of his wife while the latter is his auntie. That sometime in February 1991, his
auntie called up and informed him about the spare parts stolen from the warehouse by Manuelito
Mendez. So that he sent his son to Cebu and requested his kumpadre, a police officer of Sta.
Catalina, Negros Occidental, to arrest and bring Mendez back to Manila. When Mr. Mendez was
644
brought to Manila, together with Supt. Perlas of the WPDC, they fetched Mr. Mendez from the pier
after which they proceeded to the house of his auntie. Mr. Mendez admitted to him having stolen the
missing items and sold to Mr. Ramon Tan in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Again, he brought Mr. Mendez to Sta.
Cruz where he pointed to Mr. Tan as the buyer, but when confronted, Mr. Tan denied the same.
ROSITA LIM, when called to testify as a hostile witness, narrated that she owns Bueno Metal
Industries located at 301 Jose Abad Santos Street, Tondo, Manila. That two (2) days after Manuelito
Mendez and Gaudencio Dayop left, her husband, William Tan, conducted an inventory and
discovered that some of the spare parts worth P48,000.00 were missing. Some of the missing items
were under the name of Asia Pacific and William Tan.
MANUELITO MENDEZ, likewise, when called to testify as a hostile witness, stated that he received
a subpoena in the Visayas from the wife of Victor Sy, accompanied by a policeman of Buliloan, Cebu
on April 8, 1991. That he consented to come to Manila to ask forgiveness from Rosita Lim. That in
connection with this case, he executed an affidavit on April 12, 1991, prepared by a certain Atty.
Perlas, a CIS personnel, and the contents thereof were explained to him by Rosita Lim before he
signed the same before Atty. Jose Tayo, a Notary Public, at Magnolia House, Carriedo, Manila
(Exhibits C and C-1).
That usually, it was the secretary of Mr. Tan who accepted the items delivered to Ramon Hardware.
Further, he stated that the stolen items from the warehouse were placed in a sack and he talked to
Mr. Tan first over the phone before he delivered the spare parts. It was Mr. Tan himself who accepted
the stolen items in the morning at about 7:00 to 8:00 oclock and paid P13,000.00 for them.
RAMON TAN, the accused, in exculpation, stated that he is a businessman engaged in selling
hardware (marine spare parts) at 944 Espeleta Street, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
He denied having bought the stolen spare parts worth P48,000.00 for he never talked nor met
Manuelito Mendez, the confessed thief. That further the two (2) receipts presented by Mrs. Lim are
not under her name and the other two (2) are under the name of William Tan, the husband, all in all
amounting to P18,000.00. Besides, the incident was not reported to the police (Exhibits 1 to 1-g).
He likewise denied having talked to Manuelito Mendez over the phone on the day of the delivery of
the stolen items and could not have accepted the said items personally for everytime (sic) goods are
delivered to his store, the same are being accepted by his staff. It is not possible for him to be at his
office at about 7:00 to 8:00 oclock in the morning, because he usually reported to his office at 9:00
oclock. In connection with this case, he executed a counter-affidavit (Exhibits 2 and 2-a).[1]
On August 5, 1996, the trial court rendered decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused RAMON C. TAN is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Anti-Fencing Law of 1979, otherwise known as Presidential Decree
No. 1612, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY to TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor and to indemnify Rosita Lim the value of the stolen
merchandise purchased by him in the sum of P18,000.00.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, August 5, 1996.
645
(s/t) ZENAIDA R. DAGUNA Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
After due proceedings, on January 29, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered decision finding no error
in the judgment appealed from, and affirming the same in toto.
In due time, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration; however, on June
16, 1998, the Court of Appeals denied the motion.
Hence, this petition.
The issue raised is whether or not the prosecution has successfully established the elements of
fencing as against petitioner.[2]
We resolve the issue in favor of petitioner.
Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows,
or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.
[3]
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon things.[4]
The crime of theft is committed if the taking is without violence against or intimidation of persons nor
force upon things.[5]
The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to
commit, or to have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft.[6]
Before the enactment of P. D. No. 1612 in 1979, the fence could only be prosecuted as an accessory
after the fact of robbery or theft, as the term is defined in Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, but
the penalty was light as it was two (2) degrees lower than that prescribed for the principal.[7]
P. D. No. 1612 was enacted to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the
crimes of robbery and theft. Evidently, the accessory in the crimes of robbery and theft could be
prosecuted as such under the Revised Penal Code or under P.D. No. 1612. However, in the latter
case, the accused ceases to be a mere accessory but becomes a principal in the crime of fencing.
Otherwise stated, the crimes of robbery and theft, on the one hand, and fencing, on the other, are
separate and distinct offenses.[8] The State may thus choose to prosecute him either under the
Revised Penal Code or P. D. No. 1612, although the preference for the latter would seem inevitable
considering that fencing is malum prohibitum, and P. D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of
fencing[9] and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property.[10]
In Dizon-Pamintuan vs. People of the Philippines, we set out the essential elements of the crime of
fencing as follows:
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from
the proceeds of the said crime;
646
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.[11]
Consequently, the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused by establishing the existence of
all the elements of the crime charged. [12]
Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the essential elements of
fencing, there can be no conviction for such offense.[13] It is an ancient principle of our penal system
that no one shall be found guilty of crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt (Perez vs.
Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 9).[14]
In this case, what was the evidence of the commission of theft independently of fencing?
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he
stole those items and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never reported the theft or
even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee, confessed
to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public
crime. It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without
a victim. As complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for certain that there was
committed a crime of theft. Thus, the first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of
robbery or theft has been committed.
There was no sufficient proof of the unlawful taking of anothers property. True, witness Mendez
admitted in an extra-judicial confession that he sold the boat parts he had pilfered from complainant
to petitioner. However, an admission or confession acknowledging guilt of an offense may be given
in evidence only against the person admitting or confessing.[15] Even on this, if given extra-judicially,
the confessant must have the assistance of counsel; otherwise, the admission would be inadmissible
in evidence against the person so admitting.[16] Here, the extra-judicial confession of witness
Mendez was not given with the assistance of counsel, hence, inadmissible against the witness.
Neither may such extra-judicial confession be considered evidence against accused.[17] There must
be corroboration by evidence of corpus delicti to sustain a finding of guilt.[18] Corpus delicti means
the body or substance of the crime, and, in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has
been actually committed.[19] The essential elements of theft are (1) the taking of personal property;
(2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking away was done with intent of gain; (4) the taking
away was done without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking away is accomplished without
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things (U. S. vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000).[20]
In theft, corpus delicti has two elements, namely: (1) that the property was lost by the owner, and (2)
that it was lost by felonious taking.[21] In this case, the theft was not proved because complainant
Rosita Lim did not complain to the public authorities of the felonious taking of her property. She
sought out her former employee Manuelito Mendez, who confessed that he stole certain articles
from the warehouse of the complainant and sold them to petitioner. Such confession is insufficient to
convict, without evidence of corpus delicti.[22]
What is more, there was no showing at all that the accused knew or should have known that the very
stolen articles were the ones sold to him. One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the
cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the existence of something, or has
the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the minds grasp with certitude and clarity.
When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that
647
it does not exist. On the other hand, the words should know denote the fact that a person of
reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another
or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. Knowledge refers to a mental
state of awareness about a fact. Since the court cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and state
with certainty what is contained therein, it must determine such knowledge with care from the overt
acts of that person. And given two equally plausible states of cognition or mental awareness, the
court should choose the one which sustains the constitutional presumption of innocence.[23]
Without petitioner knowing that he acquired stolen articles, he can not be guilty of fencing.[24]
Consequently, the prosecution has failed to establish the essential elements of fencing, and thus
petitioner is entitled to an acquittal.
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR. No. 20059 and hereby ACQUITS petitioner of the offense charged in Criminal Case No.
92-108222 of the Regional Trial Court, Manila. Costs de oficio.
4. Assisting the principal to escape
A. People V. Talingdan, 84 CRA 19
G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN

TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.
PER CURIAM:
Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life imprisonment, with
indemnity to the offended party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of
P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the
accused the namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras, Pedro Bides and Teresa
Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no certificate nor any
other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged with
parricide.
Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant
Teresa Domogma and their children, arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra,
some 100 meters distant from the municipal building of the place. For sometime, however, their
relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had deserted their family home a
couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different occasions,
appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and
during those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go
down the house and leave them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was
going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly
charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not be his. About a month or so
before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a period of
more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen
648
together in the town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before
he was gunned down, Bernardo and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several
times; the latter went down the house and sought the help of the police, and shortly thereafter,
accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to come down; but
Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the
latter left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between
10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then
in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother, Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut owned by Bernardo, some 300 to
400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of them say
"Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her
daughter, she shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".
Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-
year old daughter of Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw her
mother go down the house through the stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the other
appellants. As they were barely 3-4 meters from the place where the child was in the "batalan", she
heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern what they were saying.
She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the kitchen through
the open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used to
see them almost everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting
did not last long, after about two (2) minutes Teresa came up the house and proceeded to her room,
while the other appellants went under an avocado tree nearby. As supper was then ready, the child
caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the kitchen did not heed his
daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also excused herself by
saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as
she was through she again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the
presence of persons downstairs, but Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the
kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon stayed nearby watching him. At that
moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four accused then
climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time,
but when Corazon tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I will kill you",
so she kept silent. The assailants then fled from the scene, going towards the east.
The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came
out of her "silid" later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon informed
her that she recognized the killers of her father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to
reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever did so. Still later on, other persons
arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy on which was
performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36
hours after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from Manila
arrived one day after the burial followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she
resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the Identities of the killers of her father because she
was afraid of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the circumstances surrounding his killing
to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter executed on August 5,
1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5)
appellants.
649
On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with
Bernardo, was a resident of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two (2)
brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why said brothers of hers had been continuously and
regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time she was still single up to the
time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage, they
moved to and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3)
carabaos and two (2) horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place,
separate and distinct from the parcel of land worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other
children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5 meters away from the
house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband
never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his
own mother who wanted that Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo
never did, and at those times, Bernardo would admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her in-laws
also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings of Bernardo for the support of
her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her because she did not
give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She
never left their conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-law, and if she
ever did leave the house to go to other places they were only during those times when she had to go
to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB branch there, and even on said trips, she was
sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves Sallapadan in the
morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued in the morning and
always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the weapons
carrier is owned by a resident of Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan
only when the latter became a policeman in Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos and
horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and Bernardo would go and report the
matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to his policemen, one of whom is Talingdan, so
that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors,
the latter's home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship had never
existed between them.
Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house cooking their food for
supper. Two of the children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in
the adjoining room making a plow. He had to make the plow at that time of the night because at
daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as the food was ready, she and the
children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper, and he then
proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the kitchen
when suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming from near their
"batalan". They were all so terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet
at that precise time that her husband was shot, as she and the children were still in the other room
on their way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from Bernardo. But soon Teresa heard her
husband crying in pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms. She did
not see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was
in her arms when the first group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them
were the chief of police, some members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even
advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6)
months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation of the surroundings and he
found some empty shells and foot prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan". He
also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan" and on the nothern wallings of
the kitchen. Later, Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of her
650
husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra, and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother
and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing, as they have left their house in
Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to till there in a case
with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and
after Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their house, they conducted an
investigation, but she did not give them any information relative to the Identity of the persons who
shot her husband because she did not really see them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law,
Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra, and the latter from Manila,
and after the usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's children
under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes
to grind against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had forced the
said child to testify against her. She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies
during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some people over the land they work on.
Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at
the time of the killing of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the place at the time, he
was one of the two (2) policemen who escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the
latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving Sallapadan on June 22 and returning
thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do with the said killing.
On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the
date of said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of police of the
place to accompany him in answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The other two
appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on
that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had been staying in her house for a
long time. They were sleeping when the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who
was then municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did not join them,
but continued sleeping. They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300
meters away from the place of the killing, that evening of June 24, 1967.
After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and defense, We have
no doubt in Our mind that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan,
Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting
inconspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter was sitting by the supper table in
their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the offense by the
witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby. They
were all known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often before
that night. Although only Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had climbed
the stairs of the "batalan", it was Bides who threatened her that he would kill her if she called for
help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even before the four appellants went up the "batalan",
they already fired shots from downstairs.
We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the
deceased Bernardo and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her several
times. She went to seek the help of the police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their
town, who went to the vicinity of their house and challenged her father to come down, but the latter
refused because the former was a policeman and was armed. And so, Talingdan left after shouting
to her father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."
We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous relationship between
her mother and appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier above. So also her testimony that in
651
the morning following the quarrel between her father and her mother and the threat made by
Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she saw all the herein four male accused-
appellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away from their house,
near where she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask
"Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her mother did
say to her in shoving her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill him." If it
were true that there was really such a message, it is to be wondered why she never relayed the
same to her father, specially when she again saw the said appellants on the very night in question
shortly before the shooting talking together in subdued tones with her mother and holding long arms.
Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.
Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have carefully
reviewed that appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are
guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as charged, and that they committed the said offense in
conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and in the dwelling of the offended party. In
other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense, namely,
evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating
circumstance has been proven.
Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions
and inconsistencies and badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged
by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness
varied on cross-examination the exact time of some of the occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1)
whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2) whether it was
before or after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23,
1967, that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or
still downstairs when they first fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having seen
appellants in the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly shooting her father to death.
Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances
related by her. We agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:
Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of Corazon Bagabag by
pointing out five supposed unnatural declarations in her testimony; First, she said that her father,
appeared unconcerned when she informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as
correctly observed by the prosecuting fiscal the witness does not know then "the mentality of her
father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared that the accused
conversed that Saturday night preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted place
although there was a place which was unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that the
accused were too engrossed in their conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they were
talking was lighted or not, and unmindful even of the risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that
Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not fire their guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire,
however, since they were privies to the same criminal design, would this alter their culpability?
Should the witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for merely stating an observation on her part
which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also declared that only three bullets from the
guns of the four male accused found their mark on the body of her father. But would this not merely
prove that not all the accused were good shots? And fifth, the witness declared that her father was
still able to talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that his death was instantaneous It is
respectfully submitted, however, that the doctor's opinion could yield to the positive testimony of
Corazon Bagabag in this regard without in the least affecting the findings of said doctor as regards
652
the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus viewed, there are no evident badges of falsehood in
the whole breadth and length of Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)
Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if it were not
basically true, is hardly conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she
testified, an age when according to Moore, a child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the
suggestion of others" because "he has already got some principles, lying is distasteful to him,
because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he never loses
an opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent
explanation has been offered why she would attribute the assault on her father to three other men,
aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations with her mother, were she merely making-up her
account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been shown.
Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His
Honor pointed out that said "testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was constant,
firm and steady in her answers to questions directed to her." We have Ourselves read said testimony
and We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We cannot, therefore, share
appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave imputation of a
mother's infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently
impressed in the mind of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the child, right or
wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to get even with her wicked mother. We feel Corazon was
too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the manner the defense suggests. We are
convinced from a reading of her whole testimony that it could not have been a fabrication. On the
whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout
her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-
interrogations, if she had not actually witnessed the event she had described. We reject the
possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to testify as she did.
The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious consideration.
Anent these alleged errors, suffice it to say that the following refutations of the Solicitor General are
well taken:
Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Dalisan that
the distance between the assailants and the deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the
shots were fired. But the appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first
shot was fired, the gunman was about 3- meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29,
1968), which disproves the theory of the defense that the killers fired from a stonepile under an
avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters away from the deceased's house. Appellants also insist that the
Court a quo ignored the testimonies of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police
Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks on the southern walling of the house of the
deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the aforementioned avocado tree. The trial
court, however, made the following apt observations on the testimony of defense witness Cpl.
Bonifacio Hall:
This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the crime after the
deceased had already been buried; that he investigated the widow as well as the surroundings of the
house where the deceased was shot. He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He
stated that the 'batalan' of the house of the deceased has a siding of about 1- meters high and that
he saw bullet holes on the top portion of the wall directly pointing to the open door of the 'batalan' of
the house of the deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have been the position of
653
the assailant in shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might have been standing. The
assailant could not have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the sidings of the 'batalan' because
the 'batalan' is only 1- meters high, and further, when asked as to the level of the ground in relation
to the top sidings of the 'batalan,' he answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is
true, it is impossible for the assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the 'batalan,'
hence, the testimony of this witness who is a PC corporal is of no consequence and without merit.
The court is puzzled to find a PC corporal testifying for the defense in this case, which case was filed
by another PC sergeant belonging to the same unit and assigned in the same province of Abra (pp.
324- 325, rec.).
As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to state that no
testimony has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said shells to the bullets that were fired
during the shooting incident. Surmises in this respect surely would not overcome the positive
testimony of Corazon Bagabag that the accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan' of
their house. (Pp. 11-12, People's Brief.)
At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of the crime when
it happened. This defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial court, but it was properly brushed
aside as untenable. In their brief, no mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind of
the defense itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained and they do not, therefore, insist on it.
Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent ratiocination of His
Honor in reference thereto thus:
This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand firmly in the face of a
positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness who pointed out to the accused as the
authors of the crime. This is so because, first, according to the three accused Bides, Tobias and
Berras they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only
250 meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the sake of argument, but without
admitting, that they were already sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon
Bagabag clearly stated that her father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately between
6:00 and 6:30 in the evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have committed
the crime and went home to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of the crime.
According to Pedro Bides, the house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of
the victim. Second, the three accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs.
Bayongan, the owner of the house where they slept that night to corroborate or bolster their defense
of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)
xxx xxx xxx
Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of alibi, stated that on
June 22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with
policeman Cresencio Martinez for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in
Sallapadan in the early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the same day. According
to him, he went to accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued Cathedral and after
conducting the mayor to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor
Banawa near the Filoil Station at Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the mayor until after
they went home to Sallapadan on June 26th.
This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned anytime on the
evening of June 22 or anytime before the commission of the offense to Sallapadan and commit the
654
crime on the 24th at sunset, then returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back
to Sallapadan on the 26th.
The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have been accompanied by
witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is
still the mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who
accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were
not the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the testimony of Nemesio
Talingdan?
Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the Cursillo Movement,
was presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness stand, he stated that he
belongs to Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to
23, 1966, at the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a
matter of fact, Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on October 20 to 23,
1966, as could be seen in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears
because they both attended Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.
(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the testimony of accused
Nemesio Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)
Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General
has submitted a recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as
she appears to the Counsel of the People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she
actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband because there is no showing of 'actual
cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his death. If at all,
what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part,
which it is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator per People vs.
Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not see it exactly that way.
True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt,
for which reason, sue cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand
at all in the actual shooting of her husband. Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning
and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it was going to be done and did not
object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she masterminded it
either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be
plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been having her own
unworthy ways with him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his complete
elimination. Why go to so much trouble for something she was already enjoying, and not even very
surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had occasion to make to Teresa one time was "If
you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for all her
faults was just to slap her.
But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally
convincing proof that she is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-
accused. She was inside the room when her husband was shot. As she came out after the shooting,
she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of her father. When Corazon
Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only enjoin
her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't
tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who
655
repaired to their house to investigate what happened, instead of helping them with the information
given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in mind. In other words, whereas, before
the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude regarding her co-
appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became
active in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting
in the escape of the principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact
under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code.
As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by treachery.
It being obvious that appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault
their victim, taking advantage of their number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery
to insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In addition, it is indisputable that appellants
acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo Thursday night, then he
met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday evening just
before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his
paramour, Teresa and enough time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with
their objective. Finally, they committed the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.
In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by treachery,
and attended by the generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and that the
offense was committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the Court has no alternative under the
law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to appellant Teresa, she is hereby
found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio
Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two
aggravating circumstances, without any mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby
sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law. Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as
accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision
mayor as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of
the trial court is affirmed, with costs against appellants.
Barredo, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Antonio, Fernando, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be convicted, not
merely as an accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the death penalty, is concerned. A
marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage; because the presumption
that the deceased and the accused Teresa were married subsists by reason of the fact that they had
been living together for about thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of the child-witness
Corazon, who was 12 years old at the time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the accused-
appellants, and who was 13 years of age when she testified. They have other children aside from
Corazon.
656
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact has been clearly
demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared categorically that she
plotted with her co-appellants the assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time and
time again by her repeated illicit relations with her co-accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman
and their neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa, without a feeling for shame
and unnaturally lacking any concern for her minor children of tender age, deserted several times
their family home to live with and continue with her immoral relations with appellant Talingdan with
whom at one time she cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her patient husband had to look for
her and to beg her to return each time she left the family abode for the embrace of her lover.
We should believe Corazon's statement that between 10 and 11 o'clock Friday morning, she saw her
mother, appellant Teresa, meeting with her other co-appellants in a small hut owned by her father
some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house near the creek where she was then washing
clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say "Could he elude a bullet?"; that when her mother
noticed her presence, her mother shoved her away saying, "You tell your father that we will kill him";
that in the evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the other appellants in the yard about
3 to 4 meters from where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them conversing in subdued
tones; that she was able to recognize all of them by the light coming from the kitchen lamp through
the open "batalan"; that she knows all of them very well as they are all residents of their barrio and
she used to see them almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed with long guns;
that their meeting did not last long; that after about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up
the house and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree nearby;
that when supper was ready she called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call but
continued working on a plow while her mother excused herself by saying she would first put her
small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again called her parents to eat;
that about this time she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her father
paid no heed to what she said; that her father proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the
door while Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that moment her father was shot from
below the stairs of the "batalan"; that the four accused then went up the stairs of the "batalan" with
their long guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive, appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired
at him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help, appellant Bides warned her saying "You
call for help and I will kill you"; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the east.
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be accorded belief in the same way that
credence was given to her statement that, upon her mother's inquiry immediately after the shooting
as to whether she recognized the assailants of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother that
she Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits; for which reason her
mother warned her "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody."
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and Teresa had a quarrel during which
Bernardo slapped Teresa several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and sought the help
of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When
Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman and was then armed, appellant Talingdan
left after warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against
the life of her husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a paramour of appellant
Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the
company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.
657
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral compunction in deserting her family
and her children for the company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this several times and
continued to do so until the violent death of her husband even as she was carrying a six-month old
baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband denied.
CASTRO, CJ., concurring:
Concurs, with the observations, however, that the evidence points to the appellant Teresa Domogma
as a co-principal and that she should therefore also be held guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice Makasiar insofar as the penal liability of the
accused Teresa Domogma is concerned.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, J., dissenting:
I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be convicted, not
merely as an accessory, but of parricide as principal and meted the death penalty, is concerned. A
marriage certificate is not indispensable to establish the fact of marriage; because the presumption
that the deceased and the accused Teresa were married subsists by reason of the fact that they had
been living together for about thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of the child-witness
Corazon, who was 12 years old at the time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the accused-
appellants, and who was 13 years of age when she testified. They have other children aside from
Corazon.
That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact has been clearly
demonstrated by the testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared categorically that she
plotted with her co-appellants the assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time and
time again by her repeated illicit relations with her co-accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman
and their neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa, without a feeling for shame
and unnaturally lacking any concern for her minor children of tender age, deserted several times
their family home to live with and continue with her immoral relations with appellant Talingdan with
whom at one time she cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her patient husband had to look for
her and to beg her to return each time she left the family abode for the embrace of her lover.
We should believe Corazon's statement that between 10 and 11 o'clock Friday morning, she saw her
mother, appellant Teresa, meeting with her other co-appellants in a small hut owned by her father
some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house near the creek where she was then washing
clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say "Could he elude a bullet?"; that when her mother
noticed her presence, her mother shoved her away saying, "You tell your father that we will kill him";
that in the evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the other appellants in the yard about
3 to 4 meters from where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them conversing in subdued
tones; that she was able to recognize all of them by the light coming from the kitchen lamp through
the open "batalan"; that she knows all of them very well as they are all residents of their barrio and
she used to see them almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed with long guns;
that their meeting did not last long; that after about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up
the house and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree nearby;
658
that when supper was ready she called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call but
continued working on a plow while her mother excused herself by saying she would first put her
small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again called her parents to eat;
that about this time she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her father
paid no heed to what she said; that her father proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the
door while Corazon stayed nearby watching him; that at the that moment her father was shot from
below the stairs of the "batalan"; that the four accused then went up the stairs of the "batalan" with
their long guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive, appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired
at him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help, appellant Bides warned her saying "You
call for help and I will kill you"; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the east.
The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be accorded belief in the same way that
credence was given to her statement that, upon her mother's inquiry immediately after the shooting
as to whether she recognized the assailants of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother that
she Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits; for which reason her
mother warned her "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody."
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and Teresa had a quarrel during which
Bernardo slapped Teresa several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and sought the help
of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When
Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman and was then armed, appellant Talingdan
left after warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.
Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against
the life of her husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a paramour of appellant
Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the
company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.
From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral compunction in deserting her family
and her children for the company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this several times and
continued to do so until the violent death of her husband even as she was carrying a six-month old
baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband denied.
CASTRO, CJ., concurring:
Concurs, with the observations, however, that the evidence points to the appellant Teresa Domogma
as a co-principal and that she should therefore also be held guilty of murder and sentenced to death.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice Makasiar insofar as the penal liability of the
accused Teresa Domogma is concerned.
659
B. Vino V People, 178 SCRA 626
G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989
LITO VINO, petitioner, vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court
dated January 18, 1989 denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an
accessory to murder can stand in the light of the acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate
proceeding.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos
Street, Poblacion, Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At
around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots.
Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he had been shot. He saw Roberto
ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and his wife,
his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was
crying and they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights
and the street lights and coming down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius
saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle coming from the south. Vino was the one driving
the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching Ernesto's house, they stopped to
watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter, the two left.
Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took
his ante-mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie
Salazar was Identified as his assailant.
660
The autopsy report of his body shows the following- Gunshot wound
POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal
1 & 2 cm. diameter left
Slug found sub cutaneously,
2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.
CAUSE OF DEATH
Tension Hemathorax 1
Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto
N. Ordono in the Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the
municipal court indorsed the case of Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO)
inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case against Vino was given due course by
the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the fiscal's office who
then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales,
Pangasinan.
Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the
presentation of evidence for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the
accused filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an
answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the trial court finding Vino guilty as an
accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as maximum.
He was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere
accessory to the crime and to pay the costs.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an appeal to
the Court of Appeals. In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower
court. 3
Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:
1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS
BEING CHARGED SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON
THAT THE CRIME PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.
2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW

TO CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE ACTUAL;
3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES

PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4
During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO
was remanded to the civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later
charged with murder in the same Regional Trial Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No.
661
2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988, petitioner informed this Court that
Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on August 29, 1988.
The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by the
Solicitor General in behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the
petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for reconsideration to which
the respondents were again required to comment. The required comment having been submitted,
the motion is now due for resolution.
The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a
principal for the crime of murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in
the affirmative.
Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of
the Revised Penal Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of
the same offense are the accomplice and the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder
had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that Jessie Salazar was the assailant.
That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have known its commission is the only
logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with
Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two
witnesses, Ernesto and Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively
assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's liability is that of an accessory.
This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established
by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense
proved, in which case the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which
is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a
mistake in charging the proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense
charged, or of any other offense necessarily included therein, in which case the defendant must not
be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in custody, so that he can be
charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6
In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the
said crime was established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The
variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held
responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his
participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily includes the
lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information
charging him as a principal.
At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then and
there. The degree of responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this
lapse did not violate the substantial rights of petitioner.
The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without
awaiting the result of the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative.
The corresponding responsibilities of the principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each
other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence the
662
determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal.
The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the
conviction of the petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that
notwithstanding the acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or
insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime
was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the
acquittal of the principal must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown
that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was
no basis for the conviction of the accessory.
In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as
an accessory was established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same
offense had been proven in the separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal.
However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt by the same judge who convicted
Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not clearly
established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto
Tejada and Renato Parvian who were listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of
Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.
The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar
as his assailant on the ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his
father and brother who came to his aid immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored
the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies to subject to ballistic examinations the
bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet empty shells
recovered at the crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar.
Thus, the trial court made the following observation:
There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law enforcement
agencies to gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of concern of the public
prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the successful prosecution of the case. 9
Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the
prosecution to adduce the quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not
positively identified as the person who was seen holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified
person as passenger holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the
commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the crime and the participation of the
principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds that the
accessory can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried
and sentenced. Should the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense
663
and the responsibility of the accused as an accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should
be held criminally liable as an accessory.
Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as
two witnesses saw him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case
of Salazar, as above discussed, he was acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was
positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the
case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his liability as such an
accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the
assailant from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for
the purpose of the prosecution of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the
responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL. SO
ORDERED.Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an accessory for
helping in the escape of the principal even if the latter is himself found not guilty. The examples given
are quite convincing. However, I do not think they apply in the case at bar, which is sui generis and
not covered by the general principle.
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as
the principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient
Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the escape not of an unnamed principal but,
specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now
being held liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction should
therefore be reversed.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
664
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as
where the principal was found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of
the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the
effects or instruments may be convicted if the commission of the crime has been proven, even if the
principal has not been apprehended and convicted.
But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in
his escape, may not be convicted unless the principal, whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or
assisted in escaping, has been identified and convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev.
Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of
Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced trial separately and subsequently) was
acquitted, ironically by the same court that convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as
accessory in the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in his tricycle after
Tejada was killed. Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove
that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle did not constitute the act
of assisting in the escape of a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in
the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against accused as an accessory to
theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, for having concealed
the effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen watch. Although the principal, a young
housegirl, was acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the accessory was
nevertheless convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory under
paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because the crime of arson
was not proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and
inseparable from that of the principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but the
identity of the murderer was not (for the principal accused was acquitted by the trial court), the
petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape from the scene of the
crime, may not be convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger
was not proven to be the murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the
principle that "the accessory follows the principal" appropriately applies.
I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.
Separate Opinions
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an accessory for
helping in the escape of the principal even if the latter is himself found not guilty. The examples given
are quite convincing. However, I do not think they apply in the case at bar, which is sui generis and
not covered by the general principle.
665
As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as
the principal at Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient
Identification. Vino was convicted of helping in the escape not of an unnamed principal but,
specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now
being held liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's conviction should
therefore be reversed.
GRIO-AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.
There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:
ART. 19. Accessories. Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the
subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of
treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be
habitually guilty of some other crime.
An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as
where the principal was found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of
the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84 Phil. 473).
An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the
effects or instruments may be convicted if the commission of the crime has been proven, even if the
principal has not been apprehended and convicted. But an accessory under paragraph 3 who
allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in his escape, may not be convicted unless
the principal, whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified
and convicted.
I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev.
Penal Code, for allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of
Roberto Tejada, can stand since Salazar (who faced trial separately and subsequently) was
acquitted, ironically by the same court that convicted Vino earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as
accessory in the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar in his tricycle after
Tejada was killed. Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove
that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle did not constitute the act
of assisting in the escape of a killer.
The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in
the ponencia are not in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against accused as an accessory to
theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, for having concealed
the effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen watch. Although the principal, a young
666
housegirl, was acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the accessory was
nevertheless convicted.
In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory under
paragraph 2 for not reporting the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because the crime of arson
was not proven, the fire being accidental.
The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and
inseparable from that of the principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but the
Identity of the murderer was not (for the principal accused was acquitted by the trial court), the
petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape from the scene of the
crime, may not be convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger
was not proven to be the murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of
Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the
principle that "the accessory follows the principal" appropriately applies. I therefore vote to acquit the
petitioner
1. Compound (Delito Comuesto)
A. People v. Pincalin, 102 SCRA 136
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-38755 January 22, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JOSE PINCALIN, RODOLFO BELTRAN,

EDUARDO EMPLEO and ALEJANDRO JANDOMON, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another convict-against-convict murder case involving prisoners in the national penitentiary.
As shown in People vs. Garcia, L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497, at around eight-forty-five in
the morning of Good Friday, April 9, 1971, certain Visayan prisoners, members of the Oxo gang,
were killed by their fellow-prisoners from Luzon, members of the Sigue- Sigue Sputnik (SSS) gang.
To avenge those killings, the herein accused, Jose Pincalin, Rodolfo Beltran, Eduardo Empleo and
Alejandro Jandomon, all Visayans (except Beltran) and members of the Oxo and Happy-Go-Lucky
gangs, conspired at about ten o'clock in the morning of that same Good Friday to kill some of their
fellow- prisoners in dormitory 6-A of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa Rizal, who were members of
the Sputnik gang.
They agreed that Pincalin would kill Leonardo Francisco that Beltran and Empleo would kill Victorino
Abril, and that Jandomon would kill Florentino Tilosa. The accused armed themselves with
improvised bladed weapons known among prisoners as matalas.
About an hour later, the accused proceeded to implement the objective of the conspiracy. While Abril
was seated on his bed watching someone who was making a basket Beltran and Empleo
approached him frontally and stabbed him Abril fell on the floor. While in that position, Empleo
stabbed him six times while Beltran stabbed him five times.
667
The second victim, Tilosa was standing near the door of the dormitory when Jandomon stabbed him
on the right side of his body. As Tilosa resisted, Jandomon stabbed him repeatedly until he collapsed
on the floor.
The third victim, Francisco, was standing near a wall facing the prison hospital and, as he heard Abril
asking why he was assaulted when he had not done anything wrong, Francisco was stabbed by
Pincalin in the abdomen near the waist. Fransisco avoided further assaults from Pincalin by climbing
a window.
Afterwards, Pincalin, Empleo, Beltran and Jandonion surrendered with their weapons to a prison
inspector named Manalac and a prison guard named Pantua. On that same day they executed
separate extrajudicial confessions in Tagalog which were sworn to before the Assistant Director of
Prisons.
The autopsy disclosed that Tilosa, 37, a native of Mulanay, Quezon, suffered six gaping stab wounds
in the chest and abdomen two of which penetrated his right lung and liver, and two stab wounds in
the left forearm, or eight stab wounds in all.
Abril, 34, a native of Barrio Veronica, San Pablo City, sustained five gaping stab wounds in the chest,
one of which penetrated his left lung, a gaping incised wound in the right leg, and abrasions in the
chest and wounds in the back and arms, or fourteen stab wounds in all.
Francisco, 48, a native of Cavite City sustained a serious stab wound in the lumbar region of the
abdomen which was sutured Later, a surgical operation was performed on Fransisco.
About seventeen months after that killing, or on September 5, 1972, a special prosecutor filed an
information against the four accused, charging them with murder and frustrated murder, qualified by
treachery and evident premeditation and alleging that they perpetrated the offenses while serving
sentences in the national penitentiary. Upon arraignment, they pleaded not guilty.
The main evidence against the accused consisted of their ex- extra-judicial confessions. Francisco
A. Cometa, Jr., the prison guard investigator who took the confessions and made a written report of
the incident dated May 6, 1971, testified on the voluntariness of the confessions and confirmed his
report that the four accused were responsible for the two killings and the wounding of Francisco and
that gang rivalry motivated the assaults.
Cometa Identified the four accused in the course of his testimony. Cometa also Identified the
affidavits of Francisco and Lamberto Mapalad, a convict and alleged eyewitness who implicated the
accused in the assaults. However, Francisco and Mapalad did not testify. Hence, their affidavits are
hearsay.
At the trial, the four accused repudiated their confessions Jandomon, 37, a native of Binalbagan,
Negros Occidental, denied that he and his co-accused assaulted the three victims herein. He
admitted that he was a member of the Happy-Go-Lucky gang. He allegedly signed his confession
because he was confined in a room without breakfast and lunch up to ten-thirty in the evening of
April 9, 1971. He signed because he was hungry. Cometa allegedly said that if he did not sign the
confession he would not be allowed to go home.
Jandomon said that he could not read his confession because he does not know how to read. He
was not formally investigated. He does not remember whether he appeared before the Assistant
Director of Prisons to swear to his confession. He admitted that he was not mauled by the
investigator We were not mauled by Cometa", 12 tsn March 20, 1974).
668
Accused Beltran, 29, a native of Pasay City, a tubercular who finished Grade five, testified that he
did not know how Abril and Tilosa were killed. He denied that he entered into a conspiracy with
Pincalin, Jandomon and Empleo to assault the victims. He said that he was investigated by Cometa.
He admitted that he signed his confession because he trusted Cometa who assured him that he
could go home (umuwi) after signing it. At about nine o' clock in the morning of April 9, 1971, he was
taken to the investigation room by Cometa and made to face the wall. He declared that Cometa did
not maltreat nor intimidate him.
Accused Empleo, 32, a native of Bacolod City, who finished Grade one, declared that he did not
know who killed Abril and Tilosa. He was not interrogated by Cometa. He could not have read qqqs
confession because he does not know how to read. He signed it because he was hungry and dizzy.
He did not kill Abril and Tilosa. He admitted that he was not maltreated nor intimidated by Cometa.
He was a member of the Happy-Go- Lucky gang. He said that the enmity between Tagalogs and
Visayans was a common phenomenon in Muntinlupa.
Pincalin, 27, a native of Samar, who finished Grade two, testified that he had no participation in the
assaults committed on April 9, 1971. He denied having executed any confession However, he
admitted his signature and thumbmark in his confession. He said that he was not interrogated by
Cometa He admitted that he was not maltreated by Cometa. He said that he did not belong to any
gang in 1971 but in 1974 he was a member of the Batang Samahan ng Way-Leyte. He said that
Beltran was his "boy" (bata).
All the four accused admitted on the witness stand that they were serving sentences for different
crimes when the assaults in question were perpetrated.
By way of rebuttal, Cometa testified that the four accused were given their lunch at four twenty-five
in the afternoon of April 9, 1971. He took the confessions in the following manner:
Before I proceeded to the investigation proper, I interviewed them (the four accused) one by one
verbally. After that, I went to the brigade and looked for an eyewitness but I was not able to find an
eyewitness that day.
I talked to them and asked them whether the other (their) confessions were true or not and they
insisted that they were confessing to the truth. So that was the time I proceeded to the investigation
proper. (22 tsn March 26, 1974).
The trial court convicted the four accused of murder, which it regarded as a complex crime qualified
by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation and quasi-recidivism. Applying article 160 of
the Revised Penal Code, it sentenced each of them to one death penalty and ordered them to pay
solidarily to the heirs of the two deceased victims, Abril and Tilosa, an indemnity of twenty thousand
pesos.
The trial court also convicted the four accused of frustrated murder and sentenced each of them to
an indeterminate penalty of seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to twenty years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay solidarily an indemnity of
twelve thousand pesos.
The accused did not appeal from that decision. The case was elevated to this Court for automatic
review of the death penalty.
Accused Beltran died in prison of tuberculosis on May 7, 1977. Hence, his criminal liability was
extinguished. Resolution of November 17, 1977.)
669
Counsel de oficio, who was designated to present the side of the accused in this review, contends
that the guilt of the accused was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He observed that the
investigation conducted by Cometa was haphazard and in adequate. The case hinges on the
probative value of the confessions of the accused.
After taking into account the testimony of the investigator on the voluntariness of the confessions,
the fact that, admittedly the accused signed their confessions without any maltreatment or
intimidation and that there is no reason why the investigator would falsely impute to them the
commission of two murders and one frustrated murder by fabricating their confessions, we have
reached the conclusion that the confession should be regarded as conclusive proof of their guilt.
The other contention of counsel de oficio is that the lower court erred in imposing the death penalty,
considering the inhuman congestion in the national penitentiary, as described by Justice J. B. L.
Reyes in People vs. De los Santos, L-19067-68, July 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 702, 712.
We find that the four accused are guilty of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder
aggravated by quasi-recidivism. This case is governed by the rule that when for the attainment of a
single purpose, which constitutes an offense various acts are executed, such acts must be
considered as only one offense, a complex one (People vs. Penas 66 Phil. 682).
In other words, where a conspiracy animates several persons with a single purpose, their individual
acts done in pursuance of that purpose are looked upon as a single act, the act of execution, giving
rise to a complex offense. Various acts committed under one criminal impulse may constitute a
single complex offense. (People vs. Abella, L-32205, August 31, 1979.)
Therefore, the four accused should each be sentenced to death, as was done by the trial court.
However, following the precedent established in the De los Santos and Abella cases as well as in the
Garcia case, which involved four murders and double attempted murder committed on the same day
when the double murder and frustrated murder in this case were committed, the death penalty
should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In the De los Santos case, which like this case arose due to the virulent and continuing feud
between members of the Sigue-Sigue and Oxo gangs, there was a riot in the morning of Sunday,
February 16, 1958, in the national penitentiary. Five prisoners were killed. On the following day, a
similar riot occurred Four prisoners were killed. For the killing of the nine prisoners, the fourteen
accused (originally 46 were charged in two separate cases), only one reclusion perpetua was
imposed.
It should be noted that the killings in this case were the fourth incident which transpired on Good
Friday, April 9,. 1971. Thus at past eight o'clock in the morning of that day, four prisoners were killed
(Garcia case). Then at ten-five on that same morning, one prisoner was killed. At ten-twenty-five, two
prisoners were killed and at eleven-twenty-five, the two killings involved in this case were
perpetrated (96 SCRA 505).
In other cases where several killings on the same occasion were perpetrated, but not involving
prisoners, a different rule may be applied, that is to say, the killings would be treated as separate
offenses, as opined by Mr. Justice Makasiar and as held in some decided cases.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is set aside. The accused, Pincalin, Empleo and
Jandomon, are each sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to pay solidarily to each set of heirs of the
670
victims, Abril and Tilosa, an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to Francisco an indemnity of six
thousand pesos. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
B. People V Toling, 62 SCRA 17
G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and

JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for
plaintiff-appellee.
Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.
AQUINO, J.:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, finding them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and
ordering them to indemnify each set of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3)
Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R. Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F.
Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500 (Criminal Case No. SC-
966). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:
Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about
eighteen (or nine) kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers
tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose.
Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn
Jan. 14, 1966).
Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September, 1964.
Jose's three children one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.
Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give
him money. To have money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for
sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-
five pesos for his expenses.
On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and
took a bus to Allen. From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to
Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus, and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco
671
railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to
the big city.
At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter
which Aniano Espenola a labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an employment
agency where they learned the address of the Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was
working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency, they proceeded to her
employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson,
gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. It was then
noontime.
Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where they
ate their lunch at Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad
station that same day, January 8th, for their homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the
afternoon. The train left at six o'clock that evening.
The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had
one row of two-passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an
opposite seat. An aisle separated the two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth
three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door. Jose was seated between Antonio, who
was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman breast-feeding her
baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred
twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.
Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping
with her head resting on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in
line with the seat where the brothers were sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the
window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the opposite seat were seated a woman,
her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of Reganet.
Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers
bought some chicos which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It
was around eight o'clock in the evening.
Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors
(Exh. B) stabbed the man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on
his seat.
For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite
him. She was not able to get up anymore. 1
Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but
before she could escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was
supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm.
Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers scurried away for safety but the twins,
who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. 2
Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train
escort who, on that occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag,
Quezon. He was going to the dining car to drink coffee when someone informed him that there was
672
a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He immediately proceeded to return to coach
No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near the toilet. At a
distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9,
holding a knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward.
He shouted to the man that he (Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel
ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the count of three, or he would be shot.
Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little
finger (with the blade pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast.
He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel
saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated to the steps near the platform
when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.
Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.
Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he
received the information that there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and,
while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with
his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was later identified as Teresita B.
Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of the
coach and on the aisle.
Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors. When
Antonio was about to stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on
the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's
buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio offered resistance despite the blows
administered to him.
When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from
the train and turned them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their
names. The bloodstained scissors and knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad
tracks between Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals
for first-aid treatment. The dead numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the
official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were
autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some pictures of the victims (Exh. G
to I-2, J-1 and J-2).
Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab
wounds, namely:
(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.
(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.
(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.
(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.
(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.
673
(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.
(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and
(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9,
C-11, L to L-2, N to N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)
Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving
train to avoid being killed. They were:
(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .
(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.
(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and
(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5,
C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).
Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida
Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio
supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).
Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she
was first brought to the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of
the Philippine National Railways at Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of
charge. As a result of her injury, she was not able to engage in her occupation of selling fish for one
month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos. When she ran for safety with
her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos aside from two hundred pesos
cash in a paper bag which was lost.
The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone
headquarters at Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary
investigators took down the statements of Mrs. Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal,
Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements of the Toling brothers were
taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.
Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the
station" who wanted to get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he
stabbed somebody "who might have died and others that might not". He clarified that in the train four
persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons
because, inasmuch as he "was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody" (Exh. X or 8, 49
tsn Sept. 3, 1965).
Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from
Camarines" who was taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He
said that he stabbed two persons who were demanding money from him and who were armed with
knives and iron bars.
When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented that
everybody was trying "to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).
674
According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the
back with the scissors and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back,
gave them to him and told him to avenge himself with the scissors.
On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court
of Cabuyao, Laguna a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder.
Through counsel, the accused waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case
was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial Fiscal on March 10, 1965
filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple frustrated
murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after jumping from the running
train to avoid being stabbed).
At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial,
Judge Arsenio Naawa rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers
appealed.
In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses,
argues that the appellants acted in self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal
liability was only for two homicides and for physical injuries.
According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1
and 8), when the Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8,
1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he
took out his money from the right pocket of his pants and later put back the remainder in the same
pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were allegedly observing
them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected that the four men
harbored evil intentions towards them.
When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They
were talking in a low voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach,
the window being on the right of Antonio and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they
were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on the seat facing them, while the other
two seated themselves behind them. Some old women were near them. When the train was already
running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed a
balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was
holding also a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if
he would not hand over the money. Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money
provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his (Antonio's) place was still very far.
When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight
inches long including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it,
causing him to fall to the floor with his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his
pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed as those shown in the photographs of
Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and 5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A
and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the second man, another person from behind allegedly
stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor (Antonio has
two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained
consciousness when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money was gone.
675
Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded
his brother. Jose hit the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose
stabbed also that assailant in the middle part of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was
already weak. He fell down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by
Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which he himself had used. He recovered consciousness
when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.
The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital who
treated them during the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following
injuries on Antonio Toling:
Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the
forehead) and
Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right, penetrating
thoracic cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).
and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left,
penetrating the thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit
or "about one inch from the midline to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital
on January 17th.
The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which
resulted in the macabre deaths of several innocent persons, made the following observations:
What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It appears that the
accused travelled long over land and sea spending their hard earned money and suffering
privations, even to the extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as recompense with
respect to Antonio the meager sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with
respect to Jose to receive nothing at all from any of his three children whom he could not locate in
Manila.
It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite
some people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some
persons who easily get angry when stared at, however, the accused, when stared at by the persons
in front of them, immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused).
To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused coupled with their
unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them that broke
the limit of their self-control and actuated them to run amuck.
We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins,
whom, in the limited space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze
at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed
that their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and making depreciatory remarks or
jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained the notion or
suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might
victimize them by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-passengers.
Their pent-up hostility erupted into violence and murderous fury.
676
A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the
prosecution witnesses confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable
because the twins, according to a Constabulary investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the
witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong after pointing to the twins,
refused to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that they
might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn
November 5, 1965).
In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn
statements (Exh. 1 and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical
certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with
the knife was Antonio and the one who was armed with the scissors was Jose. The prosecution
witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh. B) and Jose
was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.
In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose
declared that he was armed with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station,
before he boarded the train and which he gave to Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair
of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom Sergeant Rayel espied as having
attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest would be
Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is
attested that Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after
the former had stabbed several persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not
Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).
The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract
from their credibility. The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins
that they stabbed several passengers.
Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's
decision. He argues that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does
not particularize on the supposed contradictions.
The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony
is that he saw one of the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide.
Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from
committing other killings.
It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not
corroborated by Aldea. Neither did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the
train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea
and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.
Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was
nighttime, it is not surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234,
December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and Rayel witnessed some of the
acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception and
recollection are not the same.
677
Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her
testimony that one of the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the
seat occupied by the twins. The truth is that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy
reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they stabbed some persons.
On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted
the stab wounds. There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the
twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1 and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies
of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were the authors of the killings.
Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante
delicto the CIS investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach
No. 9. It is probable that no one actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because
everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to save his life. The ensuing commotion and
confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal knowledge of how the twins
consummated all the killings.
On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9,
which was lighted, it was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the twins without
being readily perceived by the other passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there
really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they sustained, could be attributed to the
blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.
Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they admittedly
killed Antonio B. Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny
that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa. We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the
grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of two yokels from the Samar hinterland
who reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of civilization in urban
areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are convinced that the
record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.
To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court, because
they died due to stab wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and
P-2). The omission of her name in judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the
necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A. Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C.
Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries consisting of abrasions,
contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2, M to
M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they
met their untimely and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs
should be indemnified. As to three of them, the information charges that the accused committed
homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of evidence.
No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been
reinforced by testimony showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and
murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter would be criminally responsible for their deaths.
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended".
678
The presumption is that "a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c],
Rule 131, Rules of Court).
The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes
such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a
state of mind is responsible for the injuries which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701,
cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).
Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed
reasonably believes himself to be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape
jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-preservation, the assailant is responsible for
homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs. Valdez, supra, See People vs.
Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).
The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already
named precludes the imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of
the said victims.
The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of multiple
frustrated murder based on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal
and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence.
Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the injuries inflicted on them.
The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and
attempted murder qualified be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The
unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins upon their co-passengers, who did not
anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to defend themselves
(even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that
insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The
conduct of the twins evinced conspiracy and community of design.
The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence,
they cannot be regarded as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
which refers to cases where "a single act constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense
is a necessary means for committing the other".
As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a)
cuando un solo hecho constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal,
12th Ed. 650).
On the other hand, "en al concurso real de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de
las penas", is that "si son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la
logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652,
People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).
The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105
Phil. 1058 where the accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others,
was convicted of sixteen separate murders, one frustrated murder and two attempted murders;
People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case, where six defendants were
convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person who
679
fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil.
272, involving four murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S.
vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba, 37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82,
102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs. Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97
Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185; People vs. Cu Unjiengi,
61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes
committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were the
product of a single criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for
murder should be imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised
Penal Code. The death penalty imposed by the trial court was not warranted.
A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying
circumstances can be appreciated in the attempted murder case.
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence.
Defendants-appellants Antonio Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8)
separate murders and one attempted murder. Each one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion
perpetuas for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1) year of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for the
attempted murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven
victims named in the dispositive part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C.
Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the
service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph of article 70 of the
Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.
680
C. People V Tabaco, 270 SCRA 32
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIO TABACO, accused-

appellant.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
In four related informations, Mario Tabaco was charged with four counts of Murder for shooting to
death on March 22, 1987 Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Criminal Case No. 10-259), Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola
(Criminal Case No. 10-270), Felicito Rigunan (Criminal Case No. 10-284) and Pat. Romeo Regunton
(Criminal Case No. 10-317). Except for the names of the victims, the informations in these four (4)
cases identically read:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the Municipality of Aparri, Province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to
kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one [name], inflicting upon him several wounds which caused
his death.
Contrary to Law."[][1]
In Criminal Case No. 10-316, accused was charged in the following information with the complex
crime of Homicide and Frustrated Homicide for shooting to death Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the
wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo:
"That on or about March 22, 1987, in the municipality of Aparri, province of Cagayan, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mario Tabaco, armed with a gun, with intent to
kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot Jorge Siriban, Jr.,
and S/Sgt. Benito Raquepo, inflicting upon them wounds on their bodies, which wounds sustained
by Jorge Siriban, Jr., caused his death.
That the accused had performed all the acts of execution (with respect to the victim Sgt. Benito
Raquepo; which would have produced the crime of Homicide as a consequence but which
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his own will."[][2]
All cases were consolidated before Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Cagayan.
The mass of evidence for the prosecution, as found by the trial court, is as follows:
681
"In the evening of March 22, 1987, the 17th PC stationed at Aparri, Cagayan, under then Lt. James
Andres Melad, sponsored a cock derby, under the name of Jose Ting, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena
located at Aparri, Cagayan.
This being so, peace officers in uniform with long firearms were assigned as guards to maintain
peace and order at the cockpit arena namely: (1) Sgt. Benito Raquepo; (2) CIS Roque P. Datugan,
both from the 117th PC and (3) Pat. Andles Semana, INP, Aparri, Cagayan. Accused Mario Tabaco
who was in civilian clothes claims to have been also assigned by his Commanding Officer of 117th
PC, to verify the presence of NPAs and assist in the protection of VIPs in the cockpit arena, bringing
with him his M-14 issued firearm.
Other peace officers who came to participate were: (1) Policeman Mariano Retreta of INP, Buguey,
Cagayan, who arrived with the deceased Jorge Siriban and Licerio Antiporda, Jr., Licerio Antiporda
II; (2) Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer of 117th PC Company; (3) Policeman Romeo Regunton (deceased) who
was also armed, arrived in company with the deceased Ex-Mayor Arreola; (4) Fireman Rogelio
Guimmayen, INP Buguey; (5) Pat. Barba; and (6) CIC PC Paragas.
At about nine (9) o'clock in the evening of same date, the group of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola of
Buguey, Cagayan, arrived at the cockpit arena. His companions were (1) Antonio Villasin; (2)
Rosario Peneyra; (3) victim Lorclo Pita, Jr. and/or five (5) of them including the Mayor. They
occupied and were (4th row) north western part cockpit-gate. Others seated with the Mayor were: (1)
the late Capt. Oscar Tabulog; (2) the late Pat. Romeo Regunton, who was at the back of the mayor;
(3) the late Felicito Rigunan. The accused CIC Tabaco was seated on the arm of the bench situated
at the lower portion of the arena about more than three (3) meters away, (infront and a little bit in the
west), from the place where the late Mayor and his group were seated (at the 4th row of seats upper
portion). During the ocular inspection conducted, the Court noticed the distance to be more than
three (3) meters, and/or probably 4-5 meters.
At about ten(10) o'clock 1987, while the accused Mario Tabaco was seated as described above, he
suddenly without warning or provocation, shot the late mayor Jorge Arreola, with his M-14 rifle,
followed by several successive burst of gunfire, resulting in the shooting to death of the late Mayor
Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Pat. Romeo Regunton, although the latter
managed to run passing through the western gate near the gaffers cage but was chased by accused
Tabaco. Regunton was later found dead inside the canteen of Mrs. Amparo Go inside the Octagon
cockpit arena.
Pat. Mariano Retreta of INP Buguey, who was then at the Co's canteen, saw the accused going out
rushing from the cockpit arena, at a distance of one meter. Pat. Retreta is a relative and neighbor of
the accused Tabaco in Buguey, Cagayan. He tried to pacify Tabaco telling him 'what is that
happened again Mario.' Meanwhile, Sgt. Benito Raquepo of 117th PC, and one of those assigned to
maintain peace and order at the Octagon cockpit arena, who was at the canteen taking snacks,
heard five (5) successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit arena. In a little while, he saw
the accused Tabaco coming from inside the cockpit arena. Raquepo advised Tabaco 'Mario relax ka
lang' 'Mario keep calm.' They stood face to face holding their rifles and when Tabaco pointed his gun
towards Sgt. Raquepo, Pat. Retreta grappled for the possession of the gun to disarm Tabaco, and in
the process, the gun went off hitting Sgt. Raquepo and also the late Jorge Siriban who happened to
be near Raquepo. Siriban died on the spot while Raquepo survived his wounds on his legs due to
adequate medical treatment.
682
There were other persons injured that evening namely: (1) Antonio Chan injured on his right foot; (2)
Salvador Berbano injured on his right forearm and on his right abdomen and (3) Rosario Peneyra on
his face and right shoulder. But, the three, did not file their complaints."[][3]
Upon the other hand, the evidence for the defense as stated in the Brief for the Accused-appellant is
as follows:
"Ordered by his commanding officer in the 117th PC Company to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order at the Octagon Cockpit Arena located at Talungan, Aparri, Cagayan on March 22, 1987,
accused Mario Tabaco with his officially issued M-14 rifle and with the basic load of ammunition went
to the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987 in compliance to the orders of a superior officer
arriving thereat at about 12:00 o'clock noon, more or less. He directly went inside the cockpit arena
to make some observations and found out that there were several persons inside the said cockpit
who were in possession of firearms, some short and some long, and were seen in different places
and/or corners of the cockpit. Accused did not bother to verify as to why the said persons were
allowed to carry their firearms because of his impressions that if they did not have the authority, the
guards of the main gate of the cockpit would surely have confiscated the same from them. It was his
belief then that they may have come from other agencies of the government, assigned to help in the
maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit, Accused thus seated himself at the lowermost seat
(first step) of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena on March 22, 1987.
At about 9:00 o'clock that very night of March 22, 1987, while accused was seated at the lowermost
seat of the slanted bleachers of the Octagon Cockpit arena, he heard a gun report fired atop his
head. Having been officially assigned to help in the maintenance of peace and order in the cockpit
and that his presence must be known, his immediate reaction upon hearing the gun report was to
fire a warning shot in the air and directed to the ceiling and/or roof of the Octagon cockpit arena.
After firing a warning shot, his warning was answered by burst of gun fire coming from different
directions inside the cockpit arena, for which reason, he forced to leave and rush outside, holding his
M-14 rifle with the muzzle pointed downwards. As he (accused) rushed towards the main gate of the
cockpit arena, Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo saw him and who told him, (accused) to
relax lang. Accused testified that when Mariano Retreta and Sgt. Benito Raquepo told him to relax
lang, he all the time thought that the gun reports fired inside the cockpit arena was nothing to said
persons. Accused however, insisted to go out, but in so doing, Mariano Retreta pressed the gun
which he was holding downwards and grabbed said gun from accused. As the gun was pressed by
Mariano Retreta, said gun went off, hitting Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr.
That because of such incident, accused had to run away, out of fear to Sgt. Benito Raquepo and the
family of Jorge Siriban who may lay the blame on him. The following morning, accused surrendered
to the police authorities of Lallo, Cagayan, who happened to pass by, not on account of the death of
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Oscar Regunton which he did
not know at the time he surrendered, but on account of the death of Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the injury
sustained by Sgt. Benito Raquepo."[][4]
After trial, the court a quo, in a joint decision dated January 14, 1991, found accused-appellant guilty
as charged on all counts. In giving credence to the version of the prosecution over that of accused-
appellant, it found that:
"From the evidence adduced, it is easily discernible that the prosecution and defense cannot agree
on what actually transpired that night of March 22, 1987, at the Octagon Cockpit Arena, Aparri,
Cagayan leading to the shooting to death of subject victims. For, while the prosecution maintains
that it was the accused Mario Tabaco who shot the victims, the defense insists that he is not the
683
assailant, but somebody else or others, since the accused merely fired a warning shot upwards the
roof of the cockpit arena.
In fine, the Court is called upon to resolve the issue of credibility versions. 'Where there are directly
conflicting versions of the same incident, the Court, in its search for the truth, perforce has to look for
some facts and circumstances which can be used as valuable tools in evaluating the probability or
improbability of a testimony for after all, the element of probability is always involved in weighing
testimonial evidence. (Carolina Industries, Inc. vs. CMS Stock Brokerage, Inc., et al., L-46908, May
17, 1980, 97 SCRA 734; Lacsan vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-46485, November 21, 1979, 94 SCRA
461, both citing the case of People vs. Boholst Caballero, L-2349, November 25, 1974, 61 SCRA
180).
Towards this end, the prosecution presented three (3) eyewitnesses, namely: Antonio Villasin,
Rosario Peneyra and Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen in the shooting to death of the deceased victims,
Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. Also, the
prosecution presented Sgt. Benito Raquepo, Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer, and
three (3) eyewitnesses in the shooting to death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo.
So too, the prosecution presented PC Sgt. Antonio Domingo, Pat. Andres Semana, PC Sgt. Jose
Algeria and Pat. Merlin Bautista, as corroborative witnesses in both situational cases/incidents. As
well stated in the above findings of facts, prosecution witnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario
Peneyra actually saw the accused Mario Tabaco stood up from his seat at the lower front row and in
port arm position directed his M-14 rifle towards the place of the late Mayor Arreola, and his group at
the 4th row upper portion of the bleachers and fired three successive automatic gun shots that felled
Mayor Jorge Arreola, Capt. Oscar Tabulog, Pat. Romeo Regunton and one Felicito Rigunan. This
was corroborated by prosecution witness Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who was then ten (10)
meters away from the accused, which was not far, considering that the cockpit arena was well-
lighted at that time.
Not only that, immediately after the gun burst of automatic fire, the accused was seen coming out
rushing from inside the cockpit arena by INP Pat. Mariano Retreta and PC Sgt. Raquepo, the former
being a relative and neighbor, pacified accused Tabaco, telling 'what is that happened again Mario,'
while the latter told him 'Mario relax ka lang keep calm.' After which Mariano Retreta grappled for the
possession of the gun assisted by PC Sgt. Rogelio Ferrer when Tabaco refused to stop. Sgt. Ferrer
got the gun M-14 and surrendered it to his Commanding Officer, as corroborated by Sgt. Antonio
Domingo, while in the process of disarming the accused Mario Tabaco, when the gun went of, hitting
the deceased victim Jorge Siriban and Sgt. Raquepo."[][5]
The accused admitted that the M-14 rifle which he brought with him to the cockpit arena was heavily
loaded, but when the gun was taken from his possession by Pat. Retreta and PC Sgt. Ferrer, the
gun's magazine was already empty.
The court a quo said further:
"ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: When you took that M-14 from the accused, do you remember if it had a magazine that time?
A: Yes, sir with magazine.
Q: Do you have the magazine now?
A: It is with 117th PC Company, sir.
684
Q: After taking that M-14 from the accused, did you examine the rifle?
A: Yes, sir, I examined it.
Q: Did you examine the magazine of that rifle?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you examine if there are live bullets?
A: No live bullets, sir. "(TSN, direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, pp. 44-45, March 26, 1990 session,
stenographer L. Tamayo).
Further, Sgt. Ferrer continued:
"PROSECUTOR ATAL:
Q: You likewise mentioned in your direct examination that when you surrendered this gun, M-14,
and this magazine, there were no live ammunitions in the magazine?
A: There were two remaining bullets, sir.
Q: How many bullets in all?
A: Twenty, sir.
Q: You said you heard first seven gun reports?
A: Yes, sir I heard seven gun reports. (TSN, continuation of direct examination, Sgt. Ferrer, May
14, 1990 session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
MORE, there is evidence that empty/spent shells of bullets were found inside the cockpit arena (Exh.
'R' & 'R-1', pp. 157-158, record).
ATTY. ARIOLA:
Q: Showing to you Exh. 'R', do you know whose picture is this?
A: Picture of spent shells.
Q: How about Exh. 'R-1', do you know what is this?
A: The same, sir spent shells. (TSN, PC/CIS Sgt. Investigator Jose Algeria, p. 29, Oct. 1, 1990
session, Stenographer L. Tamayo).
Finally, another circumstance which maybe considered as adverse against the accused, is the fact
that he was really arrested and not that he voluntarily surrendered as appearing in the INP Lallo
Police Blotter, as testified to by Pat. Melin Bautista (Exh. 'S', p. 188, record).
Furthermore, it appears that the same accused Mario Tabaco, has still a pending case for murder
before Branch 6, of this Court. (Exh. 'T', p. 187, record).
The Court is impressed with the testimonies of the three prosecution eyewitnesses namely: Antonio
Villasin, Rosario Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen who narrated their versions of the
incident with ring of truth, which are both clear and convincing, in regard to the shooting to death by
685
accused Mario Tabaco of the deceased victims Ex-Mayor Jorge Arreola (Crim. Case No. 10-270),
Capt. Oscar Tabulog (Crim. Case No. 1259), Pat Romeo Regunton (Crim. Case No. 10-317) and the
late Felicito Rigunan (Crim. Case No. 10-284).
Such positive testimonies were corroborated by the testimonies of PC Sgt. Raquepo, PC Sgt. Ferrer
and Pat. Mariano Retreta, who saw the accused rushing outside the cockpit arena holding his M-14
rifle, immediately after the burst of successive and automatic gunfire inside the cockpit arena.
Although they have not seen the accused shoot the four victims (Arreola, Tabulog, Rigunan and
Regunton), yet their corroborative testimonies constitute sufficient combination of all circumstances,
so as to produce a conviction of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA
251; People vs. Trinidad, 162 SCRA 714), even as such circumstances proved reasonable leads to
the conclusion pointing to the accused Tabaco, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime. (People vs. Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Macatana, 161 SCRA 235). And, in the
face of all these circumstances, the burden of proof to establish his innocence LIES on the accused,
as the ONUS PROBANDI from that moment is now shifted to the accused. (Dulpo vs.
Sandiganbayan, 150 SCRA 138). A resort to circumstantial evidence is in the very nature of things, a
necessity, and as crimes are usually committed in secret and under conditions where concealment is
highly probable, and to require direct testimony would in many cases result in freeing criminals and
would deny the proper protection of society. (People vs. ROA, 167 SCRA 116).
As to the death of Jorge Siriban (Crim. Case No. 10-316) and the wounding of Sgt. Raquepo, there
is no adventure of doubt, that accused Mario Tabaco was the author of the crime charged and thus
be held responsible for the same. The evidence adduced in this case is overwhelming, coming no
less from accused's brothers PC personnel, who, aside from their direct testimonies, are entitled to
the settled rule that they have regularly performed their official duty. (Section 5[M], Rule 131,
Revised Rules of Court).
Accordingly, the Court is not impressed with the defense put up by the accused, even as it does not
inspire confidence, hence, the same deserves no credence.
The accused contends that he merely fired his gun up towards the roof, and that he could have not
shot the four (4) deceased victims with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola considering the elevation of
the 4th step or row in the upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, in relation to where the accused was,
the front row, in much lower elevation. The accused further contends that he could not have shot
afore-said victims, as maybe gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Rivera, especially to wound No. 2,
inflicted upon the body of the late Mayor Arreola.
The Court believes otherwise. In the first place, the three (3) eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin, Rosario
Peneyra and INP Fireman Rogelio Guimmayen, testified that they saw the accused stood up from
his seat and directed his gun M-14 towards the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola who were then at the
upper 4th row of cemented seats at the bleachers. They could have been inaccurate of the distance
of meters, as it could have been around 5 meters from where the accused stood up, which is a little
bit west of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who were then facing south, face to face with the
accused. This is true and the same will jibe with the findings of Dr. Rivera, where the gun shot
wounds inflicted upon the body of the late Capt. Tabulog, were on the left portion of his forehead
front to back (Wound No. 1); Wound No. 2, in his left temple; Wound No. 3, below his right clavicle of
his right shoulder and Wound No. 4, on his left thigh downward.
In the case of the late Mayor Arreola his wounds are: Wound No. 1, is on the left side of his head
above the hairline; Wound No. 2, right base of his neck and exited at the upper shoulder base
686
through and through. Wound No. 3, was on his left lower abdomen and his lower back as exit for
wound Nos. 1 and 2, the relative position of the assailant and the victim is face to face, so with
Wound No. 3. For wound No. 2, the point of entry is higher than the point of exit, but there is a
possibility that the victim Arreola, probably bent forward and the bullet ricocheted.
It must be noted that the seats in the upper bleachers where the group of the late Mayor stayed were
all cemented including their back rests and the bullets fired from the gun of the accused must have
rebounded or deflected from surface to surface, on the cemented back rests and seats hitting wound
No. 2, on the body of the Mayor and the bodies of Romeo Regunton and Felicito Rigunan. The
bullets RICOCHETED, at the place where the group of the Mayor stayed. Anent the cemented
railguard dividing the lower and upper bleachers, the same is not too high so as to obviate the
possibility of hitting the group of the late Mayor Arreola, especially as in this case, when the accused
stood up from his seat and fired at his victims. Witness Rosario Peneyra testified that his wound on
his face and right abdomen must have been caused by the debris of the said cemented railguard
which was hit by the bullets.
In the case of the death of Jorge Siriban, there is not much dispute as the evidence adduced is
overwhelming and even the defense admits that Siriban died due to gunshot wounds inflicted upon
him during the grappling of the subject gun (Exh. 'K').
The Court believes in the reliability and intrinsic credibility of the prosecution witnesses, there being
no competent evidence presented for them to falsely testify against the accused. There is no issue of
motive, as the accused was clearly and positively identified.
All told, the Court believes and so holds that herein accused Mario Tabaco is the author/culprit in the
shooting to death of the deceased victims, Jorge Arreola, Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and
Romeo Regunton, as well as the deceased Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo."[][6]
The dispositive part of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, prescinding from the foregoing, and fortified by the balm of clear judicial
conscience, the Court finds the accused Mario Tabaco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of all the
crimes charged against him:
1. In Criminal Cases Nos. (a) 10-259 (Oscar Tabulog); (b) No. 10-270 (Jorge Arreola); (c) 10-284
(Felicito Rigunan); and (d) 10-317 (Romeo Regunton), involving four (4) murder victims, but declared
to have been prosecuted in one Information; the same being a complex crime under Art. 248,
Revised Penal Code, the accused Mario Tabaco is sentenced to a single penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA, in its maximum period, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay
the heirs of the deceased victims Oscar Tabulog, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, the
amount of P50,000.00 each for a total of P150,00.00 subject to the lien herein imposed for payment
of the appropriate docket fees if collected, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
However, in Criminal Case No. 10-270, the accused Mario Tabaco is further ordered to pay the heirs
of the late Mayor Jorge Arreola, the grand total amount of P633,500.00, by way of total civil liability,
subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees, in case of successful
collection, both without subsidiary imprisonment in case insolvency.
2. In Criminal Case No. 10-316 for Homicide with Frustrated Homicide, the accused Mario Tabaco
is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from, ten (10) years and one(1) day Prision
Mayor as MINIMUM, to Seventeen (17) years, Four(4) months, one (1) day of RECLUSION
TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Jorge Siriban, the amount of
687
P50,000.00, by way of death indemnity, plus P30,000.00 to Sgt. Benito Raquepo, by way of medical
expenses incurred, subject to the lien herein imposed for payment of the appropriate docket fees in
case of successful collection; both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
3. The M-14 rifle (Exh. 'K' and 'K-2') the corpus delicti, presently deposited with 117th PC
Company, Aparri, Cagayan, is hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government; Perforce, the
Commanding Officer of the 117th PC, Aparri, Cagayan, is peremptorily ordered to deposit to the
Acting Branch Clerk of Court of this court, the said M-14 rifle with magazines, for proper disposition
in accordance with law and the rules.
4. The accused to pay the costs.
5. In the service hereof, the accused shall be entitled to the full length of time, he underwent
preventive imprisonment (March 23, 1987), provided he voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, he shall be credited to only
four-fifth (4/5) thereof. (Art. 29, NCC; as amended by RA 6127, June 17, 1970; U.S. vs. Ortencio, 38
Phil. 341; People vs. Chavez, 126 SCRA 1).
SO ORDERED."[][7] (Underscoring ours)
Notwithstanding the single penalty imposed by the trial court, accused still interposed the present
appeal on the following grounds:
(1) The trial court erred in convicting Mario Tabaco of the crime of murder in connection with the
deaths of Oscar Tibulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan, and Romeo Regunton.
(2) The trial court erred in holding Mario Tabaco liable for homicide on the death of Jorge Siriban and
the injury sustained by Benito Raquepo.
(3) The trial court erred in not giving credence to the testimony of accused-appellant Tabaco.
The pivotal issue presented in this case is one of credibility. Time and again, we have ruled that
when the issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses vis-a-vis the accused's denials, the trial court's
findings with respect thereto are generally not disturbed on appeal,[][8] unless there appears in the
record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the
significance of which has been misinterpreted.[][9] The reason for the rule is eloquently stated in the
case of People vs. de Guzman,[][10] thus:
"In the resolution of factual issues, the court relies heavily on the trial court for its evaluation of the
witnesses and their credibility. Having the opportunity to observe them on the stand, the trial judge is
able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere reading of the impersonal
record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale signs that will affirm the truth
or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the sudden pallor of a
discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply.
The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in confession or gazed
steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not show if tears were
shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only the judge trying
the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed and reasoned
verdict."[][11]
688
After a careful examination of the records, we find no ground or reason to set aside or disturb the
trial court's assessment of credibility of the eyewitnesses when they testified pointing to accused-
appellant as the assailant in the shooting of the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions.
1. Eyewitnesses Antonio Villasin and Rosario Peneyra, who were with the group of Ex-Mayor Arreola
on that fateful night of March 22, 1989, categorically testified that it was accused-appellant, whom
they positively identified in court, who fired his M-14 Rifle at their direction hitting the ex-mayor and
his companions.
Villasin's testimony on this point is as follows:
"COURT:
Q: You heard gun report, what can you say?
A: I saw that he was the one who made the gun report, sir.
ATTY ARRIOLA:
Q: Who was that 'he' you are referring to?
A: Mario Tabaco, sir. (p. 19, tsn, March 19, 1990)
Q: Why do you say that Mario Tabaco was the one from whom those gun reports come from?
A: Because he was the only person from whom I saw a gun, sir.
Q: What did you do also upon hearing those gun reports?
A: I had to seek shelter, sir.
Q: What happened to Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: He was hit, sir.
PROSECUTOR MIGUEL:
Q: You said that the accused shot Ex-Mayor Arreola, what kind of weapon did he use if you know?
A: M-14, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: After the incident (precedent) have you come to learn what happened to Regunton?
A: I came to know that he was dead, sir.
Q: Was that all you gathered?
A: Also Capt. Tabulog, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How many shots did you hear?
A: Three (3) shots, sir.
689
Q: All those three (3) shots were directed to Ex-Mayor?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You heard three shots according to you, was that successive or automatic?
A: Successive, sir.
Q: You were seated at the left side of Ex-Mayor Arreola, who was seated on his right side?
A: None, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Mr. witness, you said that you saw the deceased holding a gun when you first heard gun shot,
will you please describe the stands (position) of the accused?
A: Like this. (The witness demonstrated that the accused was standing on a forth (port) arm
position).
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What did he do with the gun when you saw him?
A: He fired the gun, sir.
Q: To what the gun was directed when he fired the gun?
A: To Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said earlier that after the incident you left the cockpit and returned, when you returned, what
did you see?
A: I saw two dead persons, sir.
Q: Whose cadavers were these that you saw?
A: The cadavers of Ex-Mayor Arreola and Capt. Tabulog, sir.
Q: How far was the cadaver of Tabulog to Arreola?
A: Less than a meter, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you saw the corpse of Capt. Tabulog, can you identify the person passing as you
mentioned?
A: They have similarity, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: When you heard first gun shot, can you tell the position of Arreola, you and your companions?
690
A: We were sitting at the backrest of the 4th seat, sir.
Q: Where were you facing?
A: We were facing south the arena.
Q: Where did the first gun shot came from?
A: It came from Mario Tabaco, sir.
Q: From what direction?
A: Infront of us, sir.
Q: Where was he, was he in your front?
A: He was in the first row of seats.
Q: After the first gun shot, what happened?
A: Somebody was killed, sir.
Q: Who was that?
A: Ex-Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: How many gun shot reports did you hear?
A: Many, sir.
ATTY. VILLENA:
Q: You said that you heard more gun shots, can you tell the nature, was there in succession or
automatic?
A: Automatic, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: Can you tell us your previous occupation?
A: An army man, sir.
Q: How long have you been employed with the army?
A: Five (5) years, sir.
Q: As an army before, have you ever been handled an M-14?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you tell us if you are familiar with M-14 being fired?
691
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you said earlier that you heard many more shots after you run, would you say that these
gun shots you heard were fired from M-14 rifle?
A: Those are that came from M-14, sir.
Q: Where were you at the time when you heard the automatic gun shot?
A: I was outside the cockpit, sir."[][12]
On cross-examination by the defense counsel, witness Villasin testified, thus:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: You said that after the first gun shot or gun report, Mr. Tabaco was on the first seat downward, is
it not?
A: Mr. Tabaco placed his left foot on the first seat aiming his gun, sir.
Q: Directly toward the first seat, is that what you mean?
A: It was directed to Ex-Mayor Arreola.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: I want to make it clear, Mr. witness, it was the first gun that you went to hide yourself at the gate
of the cockpit, is that correct?
A: After the 3rd gun shot, sir.
Q: And these three (3) gun reports, they were in a single successive shot, is it not Mr. witness?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: That person who allegedly passed by you or infront of you prior to the first gun report, did you
notice if he had a gun with him?
A: He passed by our back, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that person according to you was still there when the late Mayor Arreola was shot?
A: He was directly behind him when the gun reports were made, sir.
Q: You mean to say the first gun report?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that first gun report was hit Ex-Mayor Arreola?
A: The three gun reports hit the Mayor, sir."[][13]
692
For his part, Peneyra testified as follows:
"ATTY. ARRIOLA
Q: Do you remember what particular place of the cockpit when you go with Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What part of the cockpit?
A: We went up to the bleacher, sir.
Q: Do you remember how the bleachers were arranged inside the cockpit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How were they arranged?
A: In rows, step by step, sir.
COURT:
Q: How many rows?
A: Four rows, sir.
ATTY. ARRIOLA:
Q: And what row did you stay together with the late Mayor Arreola?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin took the 4th step, sir.
Q: And how about you?
A: We stood at their back west of them, sir.
Q: By the way, can you tell to the court what were your respective position of the place where you
stayed?
A: The late Mayor Arreola and Antonio Villasin sat at the backrest of the fourth step, sir.
Q: And how about you, where did you stay also?
A: I stood at the right back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: And how about Romeo Regunton?
A: He also stayed at the back of Mayor Arreola, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: While you were in that position together with your companions, do you remember if there was
untoward incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
693
Q: What was that untoward incident that happened?
A: That was the time when Mario Tabaco shot the late Mayor Arreola, sir.
Q: Do you know what did Mario Tabaco use in shooting the late Arreola?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm?
A: M-14, sir.
Q: And do you know if Mayor Arreola was hit when Mario Tabaco shot him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How do you know that Mayor Arreola was hit?
A: Because I saw it, sir.
Q: What did you do also?
A: When Mayor Arreola was already dead, I sought cover because I was also wounded.
Q: Do you know what happened also to Romeo Regunton?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened to him?
A: When I was wounded he also said, 'uncle I was also wounded.'
Q: What did you tell when he told you that?
A: I told him, 'you seek cover also my son'.
Q: How did Romeo Regunton took cover?
A: He moved slowly by dragging his body along the ground, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, how far were you from Mario Tabaco who fired upon the person of Mayor Arreola?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir."[][14]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: When for the first time when you were already in the cockpit arena did you see the accused
Mario Tabaco?
A: Before the shooting, sir.
694
Q: And approximately how many minutes or seconds did you see Mario Tabaco for the first time
prior to the shooting incident?
A: Probably 5 minutes before, sir.
Q: And in that place of the cockpit arena have you seen the accused herein Mario Tabaco?
A: He sat on the first row of the seats.
Q: And sitting on the first row of the bleachers, on what part of the cockpit arena did Mario Tabaco,
the accused sit?
A: He sat a little bit west of us, sir.
COURT:
Q: How far?
A: Probably more than 3 meters, sir.
Q: A little bit to the west, do I get from you that he was seated on the western part o the cockpit?
A: A little to the west, sir.
Q: And you together with the late Mayor Arreola were also on the western part of the cockpit?
A: We were on the northwest.
Q: Mario Tabaco, therefore, the accused in these cases was not directly in front of you?
A: A little bit west of us, sir.
Q: It was on that position of the accused Mario Tabaco and your position with the late Arreola on
the northwest when you according to you saw Mario Tabaco fired his gun, is that what you mean?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That the accused Mario Tabaco was on the first row when he allegedly shot on Mayor Arreola
who was on 4th row, is that what you mean?
A: Mario Tabaco stood up and faced us, sir.
Q: So while Mario Tabaco stood up and faced towards the direction where you were together with
the late Mayor Arreola still Mario Tabaco was on the floor of the cockpit arena?
A: Yes, sir, on the cemented floor.
Q: And immediately after you heard the first shot coming from the accused Mario Tabaco
considering that you were right behind the late Mayor Arreola, as you have stated in your direct
examination you immediately sought cover?
A: I only lay flat to the floor of the cockpit when Mario Tabaco fired three (3) shots.
xxx xxx xxx
695
Q: At the time you laid flat facing down and you did not come to know that Mayor Arreola was dead
already?
A: Why not, the first and second shots, I know him that he was already dead.
Q: And the three (3) shots that you heard were all directed towards Mayor Arreola?
A: Yes, sir, in our place.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: To whom the 3rd shot directed?
A: In our place, sir.
Q: No person was involved on the 3rd shot?
A: That was also the time when Romeo Regunton came toward me and told me that he was also
hit.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q: You don't know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir.
Q: You do not know the person who shot him?
A: It was Mario Tabaco because he was still firing then, sir."[][15]
The above testimonies of Villasin and Peneyra pointing to accused-appellant as the assailant in the
shooting of the ex-mayor and his companions were corroborated further by the testimony of another
eyewitness in the person of Rogelio Guimmayen. His account of the incident is as follows:
"PROSECUTOR ABAD:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: How far were you from Tabaco when you saw him holding that gun?
A: More or less ten (10) meters, sir.
Q: Where was he at that specific time and place?
A: Inside the cockpit, sir.
Q: Where were you also?
A: I was at the stairs, sir.
Q: When you saw him what happened if any?
696
A: When he entered he stopped and then the gun fired and that was the time when I got down, sir.
Q: Did you see to whom he was directing the gun?
A: It was directed to the Mayor's place, sir.
Q: How far was the Mayor from the accused Mario Tabaco?
A: More or less three (3) meters only. There was only one bench between them, sir.
Q: Did you see the accused firing his gun towards the Mayor?
A: With his first shot which was directed to the Mayor that was the time I got down to hide myself,
sir."[][16]
On cross-examination, this witness testified as follows:
"ATTY. CONSIGNA:
Q: So, it was at the time you were inside the cockpit arena that you heard gunfire?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you did not see who fired that gunfire while you were inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I was inside, I saw Mario Tabaco pointing a gun to the Mayor and the gun went off and
that's the time I took cover, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: And that was the last time you heard burst of gunfire inside the cockpit arena?
A: When I went outside, I heard shots inside and outside."[][17]
Set over against the foregoing positive and categorical testimonial declaration of the abovenamed
eyewitnesses for the prosecution is the accused-appellant's bare denial of the charges against him.
As between the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witnesses and the bare
denial of accused, the choice is not difficult to make. For, it is a settled rule that positive identification
by the prosecution witnesses of the accused as perpetrator of the crime is entitled to greater weight
than his bare denial and explanation.[][18]
Likewise, there is no evidence from the record, as none was adduced by accused-appellant, of any
ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to why would they testify adversely against
accused-appellant in the way that they did. Well-settled is the rule that where there is no evidence
and nothing to indicate, that the principal witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by improper
motive, the presumption was that they were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full
faith and credit.[][19]
2. Accused-appellant contends that eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra were not telling the truth
when they testified that it was accused-appellant who was the assailant in the shooting of Ex-Mayor
Arreola and his companions considering that Dr. Rivera, who examined the cadaver of Ex-Mayor
Arreola, testified that the trajectory of the bullets that hit the Ex-Mayor shows that the assailant was
on the same level as the Ex-Mayor, and the trajectory of the third bullet shows that the assailant was
at a higher level as the point of entry was higher than the point of exit. Appellant states that he was
697
seated at the first row which was the lowest while the Ex-Mayor and his companions were seated at
the fourth row which was the highest. This contention, however, is untenable.
Eyewitnesses Villasin and Peneyra testified that accused-appellant was at the first row of seats of
the slanted bleachers of the cockpit arena, when he stood up, stepped on one of the seats, aimed
his rifle at Ex-Mayor Arreola and his companions and fired at them.[][20]
The abovequoted testimonies explain very well why two gunshot wounds found on the cadaver of
Ex-mayor Arreola appear to have been inflicted while he and his assailant were face to face and at
the same level.
Upon the other hand, according to Dr. Rivera, one of the gunshot wounds of Ex-Mayor Arreola had a
point of entry higher than the point of exit because he must have already been lying down when his
wound was inflicted.[][21]
Well-established, too, from the evidence on record is accused-appellant's liability for the death of
Jorge Siriban, Jr. and the near-fatal wounding of Sgt. Benito Raquepo.
Not seriously disputed by accused-appellant are the testimonies of Sgt. Benito Raquepo and
policeman Mario Retreta. Sgt. Benito Raquepo testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of
March 22, 1987 while he was taking his snacks at the canteen of Co located at the left side of the
gate of the cockpit arena, he heard five successive gun reports coming from inside the cockpit
arena. While he was on his way inside the cockpit arena, he saw the accused-appellant coming from
inside the cockpit arena. He told the accused "Mario relax ka lang", after which the accused pointed
his gun at him. At that point in time, Mario Retreta who was among the persons near Mario Tabaco,
grabbed the gun from the latter. It was at that point when the gun went off hitting him on the right
thigh and the bullet exiting on his left thigh. He also saw that Jorge Siriban, who was then about
three meters away from his left side, was hit at his testicles.
Mario Retreta, a policeman and relative of accused-appellant, on the other hand corroborated in part
the testimony of Sgt. Raquepo. He testified that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of March 22,
1987, he was at the canteen of Mrs. Co. While thereat, he saw accused-appellant rushing out from
the cockpit arena. Before he saw accused-appellant, he heard a gun report from inside the cockpit
arena. He was then about one meter away from accused-appellant when he noticed Sgt. Raquepo
whom he is acquainted with, and Jorge Siriban who was then standing at the gate of the cockpit
arena. Sgt. Raquepo was facing accused-appellant and at that distance and position, he heard Sgt.
Raquepo said: "Mario keep calm". He also told accused-appellant: "What is that happened again,
Mario." When he saw accused-appellant change his gun position from port arm to horizontal
position, he got near accused-appellant and pressed down the muzzle of the gun when accused
appellant squeezed the trigger hitting Sgt. Raquepo on both thighs and also Jorge Siriban. A certain
Sgt. Ferrer joined in the grapple and was able to take away the gun from accused-appellant.
Sgt. Raquepo survived the gunshot wounds due to adequate medical assistance but Siriban was not
as lucky.
Accused-appellant claims that he did not have the criminal intent to kill Siriban or wound Sgt.
Raquepo, and that the gun would not have been fired in the first place had Mario Retreta, for no
apparent reason, not tried to grab the gun from him, are without merit.
698
Retreta testified that he grabbed the gun from accused-appellant because the latter changed his gun
from port arm position to horizontal position, and at that instance he thought accused-appellant
might harm Sgt. Raquepo.[][22]
Furthermore, even assuming that he lacked criminal intent in the killing of Sgt. Raquepo and the
near-fatal wounding of Siriban, his claim of innocence cannot be sustained. His undisputed act of
firing the gun, which is by itself felonious in total disregard of the consequences it might produce, is
equivalent to criminal intent.
Accused-appellant cannot evade responsibility for his felonious acts, even if he did not intend the
consequences thereof for, in accordance with Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is
incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
We note that while the accused was found guilty in all four (4) murder charges and the penalty of
reclusion perpetua should have been imposed on him in all four (4) murder charges, the trial court
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua for all four murder charges. The trial court explained the
single sentence for four murder charges in this wise:
"Whether or not the criminal cases Nos. 259, 270, 284 and 317, involving the killings of Oscar
Tabulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, respectively, should have been
prosecuted under only one Information.
The law provides:
Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes.
'When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period. (as amended by Art. No. 400). (Art. 48, Revised
Penal Code).'
Read as it should be, this article provides for two classes of crimes where a single penalty is to be
imposed; first, where the single act constitutes two or more g rave or less grave felonies (delito
compuesto); and second, when the offense is a necessarily means for committing the other (delito
complejo) and/or complex proper (People vs. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748).
In the cases at bar, the Provincial Prosecutor filed four (4) separate Informations of murder, which
should have been otherwise, as the shooting to death of the four (4) victims should have been
prosecuted under one information, involving four (4) murder victims.
The evidence shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or
successive automatic gun fires, meaning continuous. Hence, it is a complex crime involving four
murdered victims, under the first category, where a single act of shooting constituted two or more
grave or less grave felonies (delito compuesto), as decided in the cases of People vs. Dama, CA 44
O.G. 3339; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Pineda, L-26222, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA
748.
Paraphrasing a more recent decision of the Supreme Court, we say -- as the deaths of Oscar
Tahulog, Jorge Arreola, Felicito Rigunan and Romeo Regunton, in Criminal Cases Nos. 259, 270,
284 and 317 respectively, were the result of one single act of the accused Mario Tabaco, (People vs.
Guillen, 85 Phil. 307) the penalty --- is the penalty imposed for the more serious offense. The more
699
serious offense is murder, the killing have been attended by TREACHERY because the victims were
completely taken by surprise and had no means of defending themselves against Mario Tabaco's
sudden attack. The penalty is imposable in its maximum degree (People vs. Fernandez, 99 Phil.
515), but as the death penalty is no longer permitted the same is hereby reduced to a single penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA for the four (4) murders. (People vs. Herson Maghanoy, GR Nos.
67170-72, December 15, 1989).
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. 10-316, for homicide with Frustrated Homicide and it appearing
also that the death of Jorge Siriban and the wounding of Benito Raquepo, was the result of one
single act of the accused Tabaco, the applicable penalty is the penalty imposed for the more serious
offense. The more serious offense is HOMICIDE, to be imposed in its maximum degree of reclusion
temporal, which is 17 years, 4 months, 1 day to 20 years. There being no modifying circumstances
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed, and which is
hereby imposed, upon the accused Mario Tabaco is 10 years and 1 day of Prision Mayor as the
minimum, to 17 years, 4 months, 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, plus P30,000.00 actual
damages for medical expenses of Benito Raquepo.
It was duly proved beyond doubt that the gun (Exhs. 'K', SN No. 1492932, 'K-2' magazine of M-14
and Exh. 'L' Memo Receipt of M-14 issued to Tabaco), used by the accused, is admittedly an
automatic powerful weapon, more powerful than an M-16 armalite rifle. It is so powerful that the
bullets can penetrate even more than five (5) persons resulting to their deaths. And, this was proven
when, according to witness Rosario Peneyra, the bullets even destroyed the cemented rail guard
separating the lower and upper bleachers of the cockpit arena, and causing wounds on his face and
on his right shoulder. Additionally, we have the used/spent empty shells (Exh. 'R' and 'R-1')."[][23]
We hold that the trial court was in error in imposing only a single penalty of reclusion perpetua for all
four murder cases. The trial court holding that a complex crime was committed since "the evidence
shows that the four (4) victims were FELLED by one single shot/burst of fire and/or successive
automatic gun fires, meaning continuous (emphasis ours)"[][24] does not hold water.
Of course, to justify the penalty imposed, the trial court relied on the doctrines enunciated in People
vs. Pama[][25] (not People vs. Dama, as cited by the trial court), People vs. Lawas,[][26] and People
vs. Pineda.[][27]
The trial court misappreciated the facts in People vs. Pama. In said case, there was only one bullet
which killed two persons. Hence, there was only a single act which produced two crimes, resulting in
a specie of complex crime known as a compound crime, wherein a single act produces two or more
grave or less grave felonies. In the case at bench, there was more than one bullet expended by the
accused-appellant in killing the four victims. The evidence adduced by the prosecution show that
Tabaco entered the cockpit with a fully loaded M-14 sub-machine gun.[][28] He fired the weapon,
which contained 20 rounds of bullets in its magazine, continuously. When the rifle was recovered
from Tabaco, the magazine was already empty. Moreover, several spent shells were recovered from
the scene of the crime. Hence, the ruling enunciated in People vs. Pama cannot be applied. On the
contrary, what is on all fours with the case at bench is the ruling laid down in People vs. Desierto[]
[29]. The accused in that case killed five persons with a Thompson sub-machine gun, an automatic
firearm which, like the M-14, is capable of firing continuously. As stated therein:
"In the case at bar, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable because the death of each
of the five persons who were killed by appellant and the physical injuries inflicted upon each of the
two other persons injured were not caused by the performance by the accused of one simple act as
700
provided for by said article. Although it is true that several successive shots were fired by the
accused in a short space of time, yet the factor which must be taken into consideration is that, to
each death caused or physical injuries inflicted upon the victims, corresponds a distinct and separate
shot fired by the accused, who thus made himself criminally liable for as many offenses as those
resulting from every singe act that produced the same. Although apparently he perpetrated a series
of offenses successively in a matter of seconds, yet each person killed and each person injured by
him became the victim, respectively, of a separate crime of homicide or frustrated homicide. Except
for the fact that five crimes of homicide and two cases of frustrated homicide were committed
successively during the tragic incident, legally speaking there is nothing that would connect one of
them with its companion offenses." (emphasis ours)
In Desierto, although the burst of shots was caused by one single act of pressing the trigger of the
Thompson sub-machine gun, in view of its special mechanism, the person firing it has only to keep
pressing the trigger with his finger and it would fire continually. Hence, it is not the act of pressing the
trigger which should produce the several felonies, but the number of bullets which actually produced
them.[][30]
The trial court also misread People vs. Pineda.[][31] True, the case of Pineda provided us with a
definition of what a complex crime is. But that is not the point. What is relevant is that Art. 48 was not
applied in the said case because the Supreme Court found that there were actually several
homicides committed by the perpetrators. Had the trial court read further, it would have seen that the
Supreme Court in fact recognized the "deeply rooted x x x doctrine that when various victims expire
from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes."[][32] Clarifying the
applicability of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the Supreme Court further stated in Pineda that
"to apply the first half of Article 48, x x x there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of
criminal impulse is not written into the law."[][33] (emphasis supplied) The firing of several bullets by
Tabaco, although resulting from one continuous burst of gunfire, constitutes several acts. Each
person, felled by different shots, is a victim of a separate crime of murder. There is no showing that
only a single missile passed through the bodies of all four victims. The killing of each victim is thus
separate and distinct from the other. In People vs. Pardo[][34] we held that:
"Where the death of two persons does not result from a single act but from two different shots, two
separate murders, and not a complex crime, are committed."
Furthermore, the trial court's reliance on the case of People vs. Lawas[][35] is misplaced. The
doctrine enunciated in said case only applies when it is impossible to ascertain the individual deaths
caused by numerous killers. In the case at bench, all of the deaths are attributed, beyond a shadow
of a doubt, to the accused-appellant.
Consequently, the four murders which resulted from a burst of gunfire cannot be considered a
complex crime. They are separate crimes. The accused-appellant must therefore be held liable for
each and every death he has caused, and sentenced accordingly to four sentences of reclusion
perpetua.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in finding accused-
appellant guilty of four (4) counts of Murder and one (1) count of Homicide with frustrated homicide,
the judgment appealed from should be, as it is, hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
four sentences of reclusion perpetua be hereby imposed.
701
2. Complex Crime Proper
A. Enrile V Salazar, 186 SCRA 217
G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103],
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS,
AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent
of the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO, petitioners, vs.PROSECUTORS

FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE, FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.
MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence, People vs. Hernandez 1 once
more takes center stage as the focus of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the
validity of its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening period saw a number
of similar cases 2 that took issue with the ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would
Beem, where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to attract wide public
attention and excite impassioned debate, even among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite
the kind and range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990, Senate Minority Floor Leader
Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the
National Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch 103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had
issued on an information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors composed of
Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda
Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and none fixed in
702
the arrest warrant. The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the
Northern Police District, Brig. Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres. 3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for
habeas corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990),
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents
in this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been contemporaneously but separately filed by two
of Senator Enrile's co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar
questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because-and this is putting it very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and other
common crimes committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the Solicitor General would
distinguish between the complex crime ("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary
means for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal
Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto")
arising from a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it
should not apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March 6, 1990, after which the Court
issued its Resolution of the same date 8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of P100,000.00
(for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it
was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the provisional liberty of
the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator Enrile, and two 10 against granting
bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised and litigated in Senator Enrile's
petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view expressed in the main dissent of Justice
Montemayor in said case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under Article 48
of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed with common offenses, so-called;
703
this option was suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is not offered in his
written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means
for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which also
constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in its
course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against abandoning Hernandez. Two (2)
Members felt that the doctrine should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and
no new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President, exercising her powers under
the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the
former regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a new provision
(Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of
any of the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes rebellion), acts which
constitute offenses upon which graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for
the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed upon the offender."' 11 In thus
acting, the President in effect by legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently
powerful reason against so doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the theory that Hernandez is, or should
be, limited in its application to offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with
other common crimes committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four
Members of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely devoid of merit, the
consensus was that they were not sufficient to overcome what appears to be the real thrust of
Hernandez to rule out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in its course
under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is made clear by the following excerpt from the
majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot
be applied in the case at bar. If murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be imposable
upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision
mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never
exceeding 12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. in other words, in
the absence of aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him.
However, under Article 48 said penalty would have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of
sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that which would be proper if the several acts
performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
704
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75
del Codigo de 1932), esta basado francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del
Tribunal Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71 (later 75) of the Spanish Penal
Code (the counterpart of our Article 48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso de que un solo hecho constituya
dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito mas grave en su grado maximo,
hasta el limite que represents la suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se sancionaran los delitos por separado.
(Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in said amendment, restricting the
imposition of the penalty for the graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged were dealt with separately. The
absence of said limitation in our Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses, there can be no reason to inflict a
punishment graver than that prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing that
the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in its maximum period, Article 48 could
have had no other purpose than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties for
each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily
discernible. When two or more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed less
perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and distinct acts. Instead of sentencing
him for each crime independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the penalty for the
more serious one, on the assumption that it is less grave than the sum total of the separate penalties
for each offense. 12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary ruling of the Court, which is that
Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or innocence is not here inquired
into, much less adjudged. That is for the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions relevant to the petitioner's complaints
about the denial of his rights and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information filed against the petitioner does in
fact charge an offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion.
Thus, in Hernandez, the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-
appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said defendants, as means "necessary"
(4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
705
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot
exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in conformity with the
policy of this court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said
defendant may be allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute
books, while technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed
with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight
of rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or preliminary
investigation conducted? The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple
rebellion was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the strength of
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors,
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently irregular or
contrary to law in filing against a respondent an indictment for an offense different from what is
charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary
investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant for petitioner's arrest without first
personally determining the existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation the
complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of the Constitution. 15 This Court has
already ruled, however, that it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. 16 Petitioner claims that the
warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled off to the
respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous
records of the preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had what some might
consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to
assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the light of the Court's reaffirmation of
Hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is
bailable before conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition for habeas corpus in this Court
the appropriate vehicle for asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the petitioner's
right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by
filing a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
706
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the Hernandez ruling, the information charges
a non-existent crime or, contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than one
offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either hypothesis, the
obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before the
respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which petitioner has founded the
present petition, whether these went into the substance of what is charged in the information or
imputed error or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent Judge in dealing
with the charges against him, were originally justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and
should have been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of these questions was beyond the
ability or competence of the respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning and
less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to be of such complexity or
transcendental importance as to disqualify every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none,
in short that would justify by passing established judicial processes designed to orderly move
litigation through the hierarchy of our courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of
four Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view that the trial court should
not thus be precipitately ousted of its original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that
matter, denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that the respondent Judge
here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail. Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the
prosecutor's recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the better course for the
judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where a capital offense is charged. 19 It is, in any event,
incumbent on the accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to claim the right to a
bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a rush to this Court of other parties in
a similar situation, all apparently taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The proliferation of such pleas has only
contributed to the delay that the petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome of the present petition, but also
because to wash the Court's hand off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the merits. But in so doing, the
Court cannot express too strongly the view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial court and reached this Court only if
the relief appealed for was denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals on
review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer countenance, but will give short shrift
to, pleas like the present, that clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the lower courts. What has thus far
been stated is equally applicable to and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No.
92164) which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu and is therefore
determinable on the same principles already set forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20
that warrants of arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in Criminal Case No.
90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1,
1990, they were taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said warrants in
violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.
707
It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion has lost that quitessentiany
quixotic quality that justifies the relative leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that
present-day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power and have become no
better than mere terrorists to whom nothing, not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand
in the way of their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash of seemingly
senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and assorted mayhem so much in the news these days,
as often perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by and large attributable to,
or even claimed by so-called rebels to be part of, an ongoing rebellion.
It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-that not even the crowded streets of
our capital City seem safe from such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an apparent need to restructure the law
on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for
every sort of illegal activity undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such change,
for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given time, and what is needed lies beyond
interpretation. Hopefully, Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in this
matter, which is properly within its province.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Hernandez,
the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to
bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to petitioners being
merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both cases are ordered REMANDED to the
respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said
respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail bond flied with this Court shall become
functus oficio. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Medialdea, J., concurs in G.R. No. 92164 but took no part in G.R. No. 92163.
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously
intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
708
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued
to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy,
which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the
detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the
process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be
assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a
deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case,
habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391)
[Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ
of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner
of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was
"restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so
repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a
settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
has served its purpose.
709
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion
may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into
existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational
cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-
examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers
results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
710
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-
enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial
Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without bail
for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court.
Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known
Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-
existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible,
make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the
Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed
from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any
other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as
simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970,
34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to
the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two
departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid
confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on
those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid,
107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing
paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in
an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio
Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial
711
administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take
their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br.
VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978].
See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of
rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former
are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing of
probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb
had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United
States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group
picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right
to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of
making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not
only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play
which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the
judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
712
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or
fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the
conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts
before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in
the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary
lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may
rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more
severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
informations for a non-existent crime.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of
law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines
the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together,
would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces
of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these
713
modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ],
maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under the
Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article
8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as
of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine
of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative
acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is
that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether
Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez
could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not
distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v.
Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me
that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily
read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put
in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed
by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of
average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the question
714
ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the conclusions
reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in
the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are
indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that are
merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The majority of
the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense
perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter, the
resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed
outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in
the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is
indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the
rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion
of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous

events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
715
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime
provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed
against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from
the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A
coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the
remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view
thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon
us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
716
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused
before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others,
for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits
of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
(Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and
having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable.
Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified
to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was
penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government," 2
which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3 whether committed in furtherance,
of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may
be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms
because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I
take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty"
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional
liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
717
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while
charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as
charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez
had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to
the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with an
original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners
have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an
multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on
which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file
an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of
the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
Paras, J., concurs.
Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I join my colleagues in holding that the Hernandez doctrine, which has been with us for the past
three decades, remains good law and, thus, should remain undisturbed, despite periodic challenges
to it that, ironically, have only served to strengthen its pronouncements.
I take exception to the view, however, that habeas corpus was not the proper remedy.
718
Had the Information filed below charged merely the simple crime of Rebellion, that proposition could
have been plausible. But that Information charged Rebellion complexed with Murder and Multiple
Frustrated Murder, a crime which does not exist in our statute books. The charge was obviously
intended to make the penalty for the most serious offense in its maximum period imposable upon the
offender pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, no bail was recommended in the
Information nor was any prescribed in the Warrant of Arrest issued by the Trial Court.
Under the attendant circumstances, therefore, to have filed a Motion to Quash before the lower
Court would not have brought about the speedy relief from unlawful restraint that petitioner was
seeking. During the pendency of said Motion before the lower Court, petitioner could have continued
to languish in detention. Besides, the Writ of Habeas Corpus may still issue even if another remedy,
which is less effective, may be availed of (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663).
It is true that habeas corpus would ordinarily not he when a person is under custody by virtue of a
process issued by a Court.
The Court, however, must have jurisdiction to issue the process. In this case, the Court below must
be deemed to have been ousted of jurisdiction when it illegally curtailed petitioner's liberty. Habeas
corpus is thus available.
The writ of habeas corpus is available to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. But where the
detention or confinement is the result of a process issued by the court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or sentence, the writ ordinarily cannot be availed of. It may still be invoked though if the
process, judgment or sentence proceeded from a court or tribunal the jurisdiction of which may be
assailed. Even if it had authority to act at the outset, it is now the prevailing doctrine that a
deprivation of constitutional right, if shown to exist, would oust it of jurisdiction. In such a case,
habeas corpus could be relied upon to regain one's liberty (Celeste vs. People, 31 SCRA 391)
[Emphasis emphasis].
The Petition for habeas corpus was precisely premised on the violation of petitioner's constitutional
right to bail inasmuch as rebellion, under the present state of the law, is a bailable offense and the
crime for which petitioner stands accused of and for which he was denied bail is non-existent in law.
While litigants should, as a rule, ascend the steps of the judicial ladder, nothing should stop this
Court from taking cognizance of petitions brought before it raising urgent constitutional issues, any
procedural flaw notwithstanding.
The rules on habeas corpus are to be liberally construed (Ganaway v. Quilen, 42 Phil. 805), the writ
of habeas corpus being the fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action. The scope and flexibility of the writ-its capacity to reach all manner
of illegal detention-its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes-have always been
emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers (Gumabon v. Director of Bureau of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420) [emphasis supplied].
The proliferation of cases in this Court, which followed in the wake of this Petition, was brought
about by the insistence of the prosecution to charge the crime of Rebellion complexed with other
common offenses notwithstanding the fact that this Court had not yet ruled on the validity of that
charge and had granted provisional liberty to petitioner.
If, indeed, it is desired to make the crime of Rebellion a capital offense (now punishable by reclusion
perpetua), the remedy lies in legislation. But Article 142-A 1 of the Revised Penal Code, along with
719
P.D. No. 942, were repealed, for being "repressive," by EO No. 187 on 5 June 1987. EO 187 further
explicitly provided that Article 134 (and others enumerated) of the Revised Penal Code was
"restored to its full force and effect as it existed before said amendatory decrees." Having been so
repealed, this Court is bereft of power to legislate into existence, under the guise of re-examining a
settled doctrine, a "creature unknown in law"- the complex crime of Rebellion with Murder. The
remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of Habeas Corpus
has served its purpose.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I join the Court's decision to grant the petition. In reiterating the rule that under existing law rebellion
may not be complexed with murder, the Court emphasizes that it cannot legislate a new-crime into
existence nor prescribe a penalty for its commission. That function is exclusively for Congress.
I write this separate opinion to make clear how I view certain issues arising from these cases,
especially on how the defective informations filed by the prosecutors should have been treated.
I agree with the ponente that a petition for habeas corpus is ordinarily not the proper procedure to
assert the right to bail. Under the special circumstances of this case, however, the petitioners had no
other recourse. They had to come to us.
First, the trial court was certainly aware of the decision in People v. Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956)
that there is no such crime in our statute books as rebellion complexed with murder, that murder
committed in connection with a rebellion is absorbed by the crime of rebellion, and that a resort to
arms resulting in the destruction of life or property constitutes neither two or more offenses nor a
complex crime but one crime-rebellion pure and simple.
Second, Hernandez has been the law for 34 years. It has been reiterated in equally sensational
cases. All lawyers and even law students are aware of the doctrine. Attempts to have the doctrine re-
examined have been consistently rejected by this Court.
Third, President Marcos through the use of his then legislative powers, issued Pres. Decree 942,
thereby installing the new crime of rebellion complexed with offenses like murder where graver
penalties are imposed by law. However, President Aquino using her then legislative powers
expressly repealed PD 942 by issuing Exec. Order 187. She thereby erased the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder and made it clear that the Hernandez doctrine remains the controlling rule.
The prosecution has not explained why it insists on resurrecting an offense expressly wiped out by
the President. The prosecution, in effect, questions the action of the President in repealing a
repressive decree, a decree which, according to the repeal order, is violative of human rights.
Fourth, any re-examination of the Hernandez doctrine brings the ex post facto principle into the
picture. Decisions of this Court form part of our legal system. Even if we declare that rebellion may
be complexed with murder, our declaration can not be made retroactive where the effect is to
imprison a person for a crime which did not exist until the Supreme Court reversed itself.
And fifth, the attempts to distinguish this case from the Hernandez case by stressing that the killings
charged in the information were committed "on the occasion of, but not a necessary means for, the
commission of rebellion" result in outlandish consequences and ignore the basic nature of rebellion.
Thus, under the prosecution theory a bomb dropped on PTV-4 which kills government troopers
results in simple rebellion because the act is a necessary means to make the rebellion succeed.
However, if the same bomb also kills some civilians in the neighborhood, the dropping of the bomb
720
becomes rebellion complexed with murder because the killing of civilians is not necessary for the
success of a rebellion and, therefore, the killings are only "on the occasion of but not a 'necessary
means for' the commission of rebellion.
This argument is puerile.
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate offenses, if
each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property. The same act
cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy of prosecutors-
punishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians. The prosecution also
loses sight of the regrettable fact that in total war and in rebellion the killing of civilians, the laying
waste of civilian economies, the massacre of innocent people, the blowing up of passenger
airplanes, and other acts of terrorism are all used by those engaged in rebellion. We cannot and
should not try to ascertain the intent of rebels for each single act unless the act is plainly not
connected to the rebellion. We cannot use Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code in lieu of still-to- be-
enacted legislation. The killing of civilians during a rebel attack on military facilities furthers the
rebellion and is part of the rebellion.
The trial court was certainly aware of all the above considerations. I cannot understand why the trial
Judge issued the warrant of arrest which categorically states therein that the accused was not
entitled to bail. The petitioner was compelled to come to us so he would not be arrested without bail
for a nonexistent crime. The trial court forgot to apply an established doctrine of the Supreme Court.
Worse, it issued a warrant which reversed 34 years of established procedure based on a well-known
Supreme Court ruling.
All courts should remember that they form part of an independent judicial system; they do not belong
to the prosecution service. A court should never play into the hands of the prosecution and blindly
comply with its erroneous manifestations. Faced with an information charging a manifestly non-
existent crime, the duty of a trial court is to throw it out. Or, at the very least and where possible,
make it conform to the law.
A lower court cannot re-examine and reverse a decision of the Supreme Court especially a decision
consistently followed for 34 years. Where a Judge disagrees with a Supreme Court ruling, he is free
to express his reservations in the body of his decision, order, or resolution. However, any judgment
he renders, any order he prescribes, and any processes he issues must follow the Supreme Court
precedent. A trial court has no jurisdiction to reverse or ignore precedents of the Supreme Court. In
this particular case, it should have been the Solicitor General coming to this Court to question the
lower court's rejection of the application for a warrant of arrest without bail. It should have been the
Solicitor-General provoking the issue of re-examination instead of the petitioners asking to be freed
from their arrest for a non-existent crime.
The principle bears repeating:
Respondent Court of Appeals really was devoid of any choice at all. It could not have ruled in any
other way on the legal question raised. This Tribunal having spoken, its duty was to obey. It is as
simple as that. There is relevance to this excerpt from Barrera v. Barrera. (L-31589, July 31, 1970,
34 SCRA 98) 'The delicate task of ascertaining the significance that attaches to a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural norm or a municipal ordinance is committed to
the judiciary. It thus discharges a role no less crucial than that appertaining to the other two
721
departments in the maintenance of the rule of law. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid
confusion, it has to speak with one voice. It does so with finality, logically and rightly, through the
highest judicial organ, this Court. What it says then should be definitive and authoritative, binding on
those occupying the lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy. They have to defer and to submit.' (Ibid,
107. The opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] was cited). The ensuing
paragraph of the opinion in Barrera further emphasizes the point: Such a thought was reiterated in
an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes and further emphasized in these words: 'Judge Gaudencio
Cloribel need not be reminded that the Supreme Court, by tradition and in our system of judicial
administration, has the last word on what the law is; it is the final arbiter of any justifiable
controversy. There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take
their bearings. (Ibid. Justice J.B.L. Reyes spoke thus in Albert v. Court of First Instance of Manila (Br.
VI), L-26364, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 961. (Tugade v. Court of Appeals, 85 SCRA 226 [1978].
See also Albert v. Court of First Instance, 23 SCRA 948 [1968] and Vir-Jen Shipping and Marine
Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 125 SCRA 577 [1983])
I find the situation in Spouses Panlilio v. Prosecutors Fernando de Leon, et al. even more
inexplicable. In the case of the Panlilios, any probable cause to commit the non- existent crime of
rebellion complexed with murder exists only in the minds of the prosecutors, not in the records of the
case.
I have gone over the records and pleadings furnished to the members of the Supreme Court. I
listened intently to the oral arguments during the hearing and it was quite apparent that the
constitutional requirement of probable cause was not satisfied. In fact, in answer to my query for any
other proofs to support the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the answer was that the evidence would
be submitted in due time to the trial court.
The spouses Panlilio and one parent have been in the restaurant business for decades. Under the
records of these petitions, any restaurant owner or hotel manager who serves food to rebels is a co-
conspirator in the rebellion. The absurdity of this proposition is apparent if we bear in mind that
rebels ride in buses and jeepneys, eat meals in rural houses when mealtime finds them in the
vicinity, join weddings, fiestas, and other parties, play basketball with barrio youths, attend masses
and church services and otherwise mix with people in various gatherings. Even if the hosts
recognize them to be rebels and fail to shoo them away, it does not necessarily follow that the former
are co-conspirators in a rebellion.
The only basis for probable cause shown by the records of the Panlilio case is the alleged fact that
the petitioners served food to rebels at the Enrile household and a hotel supervisor asked two or
three of their waiters, without reason, to go on a vacation. Clearly, a much, much stronger showing of
probable cause must be shown.
In Salonga v. Cruz Pao, 134 SCRA 438 (1985), then Senator Salonga was charged as a
conspirator in the heinous bombing of innocent civilians because the man who planted the bomb
had, sometime earlier, appeared in a group photograph taken during a birthday party in the United
States with the Senator and other guests. It was a case of conspiracy proved through a group
picture. Here, it is a case of conspiracy sought to proved through the catering of food.
The Court in Salonga stressed:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
722
expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashimn v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right
to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress
constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in order to satisfy the
due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of
making sure that a transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not
only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play
which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the
judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is
ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause
exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no general formula or
fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the
conditions obtaining in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding
or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts
before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reason (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in
the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant
violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary
lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It
should continue to be so. (id., pp. 461- 462)
Because of the foregoing, I take exception to that part of the ponencia which will read the
informations as charging simple rebellion. This case did not arise from innocent error. If an
information charges murder but its contents show only the ingredients of homicide, the Judge may
rightly read it as charging homicide. In these cases, however, there is a deliberate attempt to charge
the petitioners for an offense which this Court has ruled as non-existent. The prosecution wanted
Hernandez to be reversed. Since the prosecution has filed informations for a crime which, under our
rulings, does not exist, those informations should be treated as null and void. New informations
charging the correct offense should be filed. And in G.R. No. 92164, an extra effort should be made
to see whether or not the Principle in Salonga v. Cruz Patio, et al. (supra) has been violated.
The Court is not, in any way, preventing the Government from using more effective weapons to
suppress rebellion. If the Government feels that the current situation calls for the imposition of more
severe penalties like death or the creation of new crimes like rebellion complexed with murder, the
remedy is with Congress, not the courts.
I, therefore, vote to GRANT the petitions and to ORDER the respondent court to DISMISS the void
informations for a non-existent crime.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority of the Court.
I believe that there are certain aspects of the Hernandez doctrine that, as an abstract question of
law, could stand reexamination or clarification. I have in mind in particular matters such as the
correct or appropriate relationship between Article 134 and Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is a matter which relates to the legal concept of rebellion in our legal system. If one examines
the actual terms of Article 134 (entitled: "Rebellion or Insurrection-How Committed"), it would appear
that this Article specifies both the overt acts and the criminal purpose which, when put together,
would constitute the offense of rebellion. Thus, Article 134 states that "the crime of rebellion is
723
committed by rising publicly and taking arms against the Government "(i.e., the overt acts comprising
rebellion), "for the purpose of (i.e., the specific criminal intent or political objective) removing from the
allegiance to said government or its laws the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, or any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of their powers or prerogatives." At the same time, Article 135
(entitled: "Penalty for Rebellion or Insurrection.") sets out a listing of acts or particular measures
which appear to fall under the rubric of rebellion or insurrection: "engaging in war against the forces
of the Government, destroying property or committing serious violence, exacting contributions or
diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated." Are these
modalities of rebellion generally? Or are they particular modes by which those "who promote [ ],
maintain [ ] or head [ ] a rebellion or insurrection" commit rebellion, or particular modes of
participation in a rebellion by public officers or employees? Clearly, the scope of the legal concept of
rebellion relates to the distinction between, on the one hand, the indispensable acts or ingredients of
the crime of rebellion under the Revised Penal Code and, on the other hand, differing optional
modes of seeking to carry out the political or social objective of the rebellion or insurrection.
The difficulty that is at once raised by any effort to examine once more even the above threshold
questions is that the results of such re-examination may well be that acts which under the
Hernandez doctrine are absorbed into rebellion, may be characterized as separate or discrete
offenses which, as a matter of law, can either be prosecuted separately from rebellion or prosecuted
under the provisions of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which (both Clause 1 and Clause 2
thereof) clearly envisage the existence of at least two (2) distinct offenses. To reach such a
conclusion in the case at bar, would, as far as I can see, result in colliding with the fundamental non-
retroactivity principle (Article 4, Civil Code; Article 22, Revised Penal Code; both in relation to Article
8, Civil Code).
The non-retroactivity rule applies to statutes principally. But, statutes do not exist in the abstract but
rather bear upon the lives of people with the specific form given them by judicial decisions
interpreting their norms. Judicial decisions construing statutory norms give specific shape and
content to such norms. In time, the statutory norms become encrusted with the glosses placed upon
them by the courts and the glosses become integral with the norms (Cf Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA
247 [1966]). Thus, while in legal theory, judicial interpretation of a statute becomes part of the law as
of the date that the law was originally enacted, I believe this theory is not to be applied rigorously
where a new judicial doctrine is announced, in particular one overruling a previous existing doctrine
of long standing (here, 36 years) and most specially not where the statute construed is criminal in
nature and the new doctrine is more onerous for the accused than the pre-existing one (People v.
Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607 [1974]; People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]; Gumabon v. Director of
Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 [1971]). Moreover, the non-retroactivity rule whether in respect of legislative
acts or judicial decisions has constitutional implications. The prevailing rule in the United States is
that a judicial decision that retroactively renders an act criminal or enhances the severity of the
penalty prescribed for an offense, is vulnerable to constitutional challenge based upon the rule
against ex post facto laws and the due process clause (Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 US 347,12 L.
Ed. 2d 894 [1964]; Marks v. U.S., 43 US 188, 51 L. Ed. 2d 260 [1977]; Devine v. New Mexico
Department of Corrections, 866 F. 2d 339 [1989]).
It is urged by the Solicitor General that the non-retroactivity principle does not present any real
problem for the reason that the Hernandez doctrine was based upon Article 48, second clause, of
the Revised Penal Code and not upon the first clause thereof, while it is precisely the first clause of
Article 48 that the Government here invokes. It is, however, open to serious doubt whether
Hernandez can reasonably be so simply and sharply characterized. And assuming the Hernandez
724
could be so characterized, subsequent cases refer to the Hernandez doctrine in terms which do not
distinguish clearly between the first clause and the second clause of Article 48 (e.g., People v.
Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960]). Thus, it appears to me
that the critical question would be whether a man of ordinary intelligence would have necessarily
read or understood the Hernandez doctrine as referring exclusively to Article 48, second clause. Put
in slightly different terms, the important question would be whether the new doctrine here proposed
by the Government could fairly have been derived by a man of average intelligence (or counsel of
average competence in the law) from an examination of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code as interpreted by the Court in the Hernandez and subsequent cases. To formulate the question
ill these terms would almost be to compel a negative answer, especially in view of the conclusions
reached by the Court and its several Members today.
Finally, there appears to be no question that the new doctrine that the Government would have us
discover for the first time since the promulgation of the Revised Penal Code in 1932, would be more
onerous for the respondent accused than the simple application of the Hernandez doctrine that
murders which have been committed on the occasion of and in furtherance of the crime of rebellion
must be deemed absorbed in the offense of simple rebellion.
I agree therefore that the information in this case must be viewed as charging only the crime of
simple rebellion.
FERNAN, C.J., concurring and dissenting:
I am constrained to write this separate opinion on what seems to be a rigid adherence to the 1956
ruling of the Court. The numerous challenges to the doctrine enunciated in the case of People vs.
Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515 (1956) should at once demonstrate the need to redefine the applicability of
said doctrine so as to make it conformable with accepted and well-settled principles of criminal law
and jurisprudence.
To my mind, the Hernandez doctrine should not be interpreted as an all-embracing authority for the
rule that all common crimes committed on the occasion, or in furtherance of, or in connection with,
rebellion are absorbed by the latter. To that extent, I cannot go along with the view of the majority in
the instant case that 'Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to
its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion" (p. 9, Decision).
The Hernandez doctrine has served the purpose for which it was appealed by the Court in 1956
during the communist-inspired rebellion of the Huks. The changes in our society in the span of 34
years since then have far-reaching effects on the all-embracing applicability of the doctrine
considering the emergence of alternative modes of seizing the powers of the duly constituted
Government not contemplated in Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code and their
consequent effects on the lives of our people. The doctrine was good law then, but I believe that
there is a certain aspect of the Hernandez doctrine that needs clarification.
With all due respect to the views of my brethren in the Court, I believe that the Court, in the instant
case, should have further considered that distinction between acts or offenses which are
indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the one hand, and those acts or offenses that are
merely necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion, on the other. The majority of
the Court is correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense
perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the latter, the
resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple offense and must be deemed
725
outside the operation of the complex crime provision (Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code. As in
the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to distinguish what is
indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of an offense, resulting thus in the
rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery, etc. committed in the course or on the occasion
of rebellion are absorbed or included in the latter as elements thereof.
The relevance of the distinction is significant, more particularly, if applied to contemporaneous

events happening in our country today. Theoretically, a crime which is indispensable in the
commission of another must necessarily be an element of the latter; but a crime that is merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of another is not an element of the latter, and if
and when actually committed, brings the interlocking crime within the operation of the complex crime
provision (Art. 48) of the Revised Penal Code. With that distinction, common crimes committed
against Government forces and property in the course of rebellion are properly considered
indispensable overt acts of rebellion and are logically absorbed in it as virtual ingredients or
elements thereof, but common crimes committed against the civilian population in the course or on
the occasion of rebellion and in furtherance thereof, may be necessary but not indispensable in
committing the latter, and may, therefore, not be considered as elements of the said crime of
rebellion. To illustrate, the deaths occurring during armed confrontation or clashes between
government forces and the rebels are absorbed in the rebellion, and would be those resulting from
the bombing of military camps and installations, as these acts are indispensable in carrying out the
rebellion. But deliberately shooting down an unarmed innocent civilian to instill fear or create chaos
among the people, although done in the furtherance of the rebellion, should not be absorbed in the
crime of rebellion as the felonious act is merely necessary, but not indispensable. In the latter case,
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code should apply.
The occurrence of a coup d' etat in our country as a mode of seizing the powers of the duly-
constituted government by staging surprise attacks or occupying centers of powers, of which this
Court should take judicial notice, has introduced a new dimension to the interpretation of the
provisions on rebellion and insurrection in the Revised Penal Code. Generally, as a mode of seizing
the powers of the duly constituted government, it falls within the contemplation of rebellion under the
Revised Penal Code, but, strictly construed, a coup d'etat per se is a class by itself. The manner of
its execution and the extent and magnitude of its effects on the lives of the people distinguish a coup
d'etat from the traditional definition and modes of commission attached by the Revised Penal Code
to the crime of rebellion as applied by the Court to the communist-inspired rebellion of the 1950's. A
coup d'etat may be executed successfully without its perpetrators resorting to the commission of
other serious crimes such as murder, arson, kidnapping, robbery, etc. because of the element of
surprise and the precise timing of its execution. In extreme cases where murder, arson, robbery, and
other common crimes are committed on the occasion of a coup d' etat, the distinction referred to
above on what is necessary and what is indispensable in the commission of the coup d'etat should
be painstakingly considered as the Court should have done in the case of herein petitioners.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to the
vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
BIDIN, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the majority opinion except as regards the dispositive portion thereof which orders the
remand of the case to the respondent judge for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail to be
posted by the petitioner.
726
I submit that the proceedings need not be remanded to the respondent judge for the purpose of
fixing bail since we have construed the indictment herein as charging simple rebellion, an offense
which is bailable. Consequently, habeas corpus is the proper remedy available to petitioner as an
accused who had been charged with simple rebellion, a bailable offense but who had been denied
his right to bail by the respondent judge in violation of petitioner's constitutional right to bail. In view
thereof, the responsibility of fixing the amount of bail and approval thereof when filed, devolves upon
us, if complete relief is to be accorded to petitioner in the instant proceedings.
It is indubitable that before conviction, admission to bail is a matter of right to the defendant, accused
before the Regional Trial Court of an offense less than capital (Section 13 Article III, Constitution and
Section 3, Rule 114). Petitioner is, before Us, on a petition for habeas corpus praying, among others,
for his provisional release on bail. Since the offense charged (construed as simple rebellion) admits
of bail, it is incumbent upon us m the exercise of our jurisdiction over the petition for habeas corpus
(Section 5 (1), Article VIII, Constitution; Section 2, Rule 102), to grant petitioner his right to bail and
having admitted him to bail, to fix the amount thereof in such sums as the court deems reasonable.
Thereafter, the rules require that "the proceedings together with the bond" shall forthwith be certified
to the respondent trial court (Section 14, Rule 102).
Accordingly, the cash bond in the amount of P 100,000.00 posted by petitioner for his provisional
release pursuant to our resolution dated March 6, 1990 should now be deemed and admitted as his
bail bond for his provisional release in the case (simple rebellion) pending before the respondent
judge, without necessity of a remand for further proceedings, conditioned for his (petitioner's)
appearance before the trial court to abide its order or judgment in the said case.
SARMIENTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree that People v. Hernandez 1 should abide. More than three decades after which it was
penned, it has firmly settled in the tomes of our jurisprudence as correct doctrine.
As Hernandez put it, rebellion means "engaging m war against the forces of the government," 2
which implies "resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical injuries and loss of life, and the
hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake. ..." 3 whether committed in furtherance,
of as a necessary means for the commission, or in the course, of rebellion. To say that rebellion may
be complexed with any other offense, in this case murder, is to play into a contradiction in terms
because exactly, rebellion includes murder, among other possible crimes.
I also agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the acts
complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention therein of
murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of rebellion is left
fully described. 4
At any rate, the government need only amend the information by a clerical correction, since an
amendment will not alter its substance.
I dissent, however, insofar as the majority orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court. I
take it that when we, in our Resolution of March 6, 1990, granted the petitioner "provisional liberty"
upon the filing of a bond of P100,000.00, we granted him bail. The fact that we gave him "provisional
liberty" is in my view, of no moment, because bail means provisional liberty. It will serve no useful
purpose to have the trial court hear the incident again when we ourselves have been satisfied that
the petitioner is entitled to temporary freedom.
727
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I concur in the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the ruling in People vs. Hernandez, 99 Phil.
515 "remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion."
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question, while
charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, "is to be read as
charging simple rebellion."
The present cases are to be distinguished from the Hernandez case in at least one (1) material
respect. In the Hernandez case, this Court was confronted with an appealed case, i.e., Hernandez
had been convicted by the trial court of the complex crime of rebellion with murder, arson and
robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to
the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
robbery does not exist. In the present cases, on the other hand, the Court is confronted with an
original case, i.e., where an information has been recently filed in the trial court and the petitioners
have not even pleaded thereto.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in the Hernandez case, was "ground-breaking" on the issue of
whether rebellion can be complexed with murder, arson, robbery, etc. In the present cases, on the
other hand, the prosecution and the lower court, not only had the Hernandez doctrine (as case law),
but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to
bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple
frustrated murder does not exist.
And yet, notwithstanding these unmistakable and controlling beacon lights-absent when this Court
laid down the Hernandez doctrine-the prosecution has insisted in filing, and the lower court has
persisted in hearing, an information charging the petitioners with rebellion complexed with murder an
multiple frustrated murder. That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head
should not be allowed to surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise
to nothing. The warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on
which they are anchored. And, since the entire question of the information's validity is before the
Court in these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even
under procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense (Sec. 13, Rule 110, Rules of
Court).
I submit then that it is not for this Court to energize a dead and, at best, fatally decrepit information
by labelling or "baptizing" it differently from what it announces itself to be. The prosecution must file
an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit the serious consideration of
the courts.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petitions, QUASH the warrants of arrest, and ORDER the
information for rebellion complexed with murder and multiple frustrated murder in Criminal Case
Nos. 90-10941, RTC of Quezon City, DISMISSED.
Consequently, the petitioners should be ordered permanently released and their bails cancelled.
728
B.People V. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611
[G.R. No. 127663. March 11, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO VALDEZ, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Accused-appellant Rolando Valdez seeks reversal of the judgment of conviction promulgated by

Branch 45 of the Regional Trial Court of the First Judicial Region stationed in Urdaneta, Pangasinan,
on October 24, 1996 sentencing him to death for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with double
Frustrated Murder, and likewise separately sentencing him to suffer the prison term of reclusion
perpetua for the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential Decree No.
1866).
The information against accused-appellant, Bernard Castro, and one John Doe for the complex
crime of Multiple Murder with Double Frustrated Murder charged:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September 17, 1995, at Sitio Cabaoangan, barangay
Nalsian, municipality of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan, and within and jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with
intent to kill, and each armed with caliber .30 carbines did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, simultaneously
attacked and fired their caliber .30 carbines at Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta,
Sandra Montano, William Montano and Randy Tibule while they were on board a tricycle, on their
way to a dance party, hitting them in the different parts of their bodies which caused the
instantaneous death of Ramon Garcia, Jr., Jean Marie Garcia, Willy Acosta and Sandra Montano, to
the damage and prejudice of their respective heirs, and inflicting fatal injuries to William Montano
and Randy Tibule, in the different parts of their bodies, having thus performed all the acts which
would have produced the crime of murder with respect to both but which did not by reason of causes
independent of the will of the accused, namely, the able and timely medical assistance given the
said victims William Montano and Randy Tibule, which prevented their death.
Contrary to Article 248 in Relation to Article 48 and Article 6 of the RPC.
(pp. 1-2, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8747)
The Information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions pertinently averred:
That on or about 8:30 oclock in the evening of September 17, 1995 at Sitio Cabaoangan, Barangay
Nalsian, Municipality of Manaoag, province of Pangasinan and within and jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in his
possession, custody and control, a firearm, to wit: Caliber .30 carbine without first having secured
the proper license thereof from the authorities and which he used in committing the offense of
multiple murder and double frustrated murder.
Contrary to Presidential Decree 1866.
(p. 1, Record of Crim. Case No. U-8749)
729
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial are succinctly summarized in the
Peoples brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William Montano (16 years old), Randy
Tibule (17 years old), Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr.,
were at the house of Randy Tibule in Manaoag, Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the
wedding party of Jean Maries cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18,
1996, pp. 23-24).
After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going to Cabaoangan. Behind
Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated inside the side car with Sandra and William Montano
(TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN June 18,1996, pp. 23-25).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan, they met appellant
Rolando Valdez and his companions who were armed with guns. The tricycles headlight flashed on
their faces. Without warning, they pointed their guns and fired at Montanos group. Thereafter, after
uttering the words, nataydan, mapan tayon (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and
companions left (TSN June 11,1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra Montano and Willie Acosta
dead (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 14-16). They sustained the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
- gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter, 1 inch lateral of the nipple right through and through trajecting
the middle lobe of the lungs, rt ventricle of the heart, middle lobe of the lung, left with point of exit 1
inch in diameter 1 inch lateral of the nipple, left.
(Exhibit B)
Ramon Garcia:
- gunshot wound, .5 cm. diameter point of entrance ear canal thru and thru trajecting the skull
brain substance with point of exit temporal area right.
- Another gunshot wound .5 cm. in diameter point of entrance anterior axilliary line left at the lable
nipple trajecting the lung (left) heart ventricle and lung (right) with point of exit 1 cm. in diameter, 1
inch lateral the nipple right.
(Exhibit C)
Sandra Montano:
- gunshot wound .6 cm. in diameter, point of entrance at the temporal area left, penetrating the
skin, skull minigas, brain substance (right) (tempral regis) where the slug lodge.
(Exhibit D)
Willie Acosta:
- gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point of entrance trajecting the upper 3rd
of the stomach thru and thru trajecting the upper third of the stomach of thoracic vein with the point
of exit 1 cm. in diameter at the level of the 7th thorasic vertebrae.
730
(Exhibit E)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived the attack. They suffered serious
gunshot injuries that could have caused their death were it not for the timely medical attention given
them (TSN July 3, 1996, p. 6). Montano sustained several gunshot wounds on the left arm, two on
the left upper back, another on the left shoulder and middle right finger (TSN June 25, 1996, p. 608).
Tibule sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fifth upper quadrant (stomach) and the other at the
left periumbelical (TSN July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).
(pp. 215-219, Rollo.)
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction in the two
cases, finding and disposing:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8747: --
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MULTIPLE MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER defined and penalized under
Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous Crime Law, the offense having been a
complex crime the penalty of which is in the maximum, and with the attendant aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, hereby sentences him the
ultimum supplicum of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as the Lethal
Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR., WILLIE ACOSTA, JEMARIE
GARCIA and SANDRA MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE, as follows:
1). To the heirs of the deceased Ramon Garcia, jr.:
a) P 50,000 as indemnity
b) P 52,116.00 as actual damages
c) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
2). To the heirs of the deceased WILLIE ACOSTA
3) To the heirs of the deceased JEMARIE GARCIA:
b) P 500,000.00 as moral damages
4) To the heirs of the deceased Sandra Montano:
731
5) To the victim WILLIAM MONTANO:
a) P 39,133.92 as actual damages
6) To the victim RANDY TIBULE:
a) P 36,233.65 as actual damages
WITH RESPECT TO CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8749: --
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM AND AMMUNITIONS (Presidential Decree No. 1866) and
hereby sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay the costs.
Finally, it is said: Dura lex, sed lex, translated as: The law is harsh, but that is the law!
SO ORDERED.
(pp. 180-181, Rollo.)
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring his plea for reversal on the following
assigned errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATERIAL, SUBSTANTIAL,

IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT, DISCREPANCIES IN THE AFFIDAVITS OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONIES IN COURT;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RECANTATIONS OF PROSECUTION

WITNESSES;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS DOUBTS ON THE
IDENTITY OF ACCUSED, ROLANDO VALDEZ AS THE GUNMAN;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MOTIVE ON THE PART OF
BERNARDO CASTRO TO FIRE AT, AS HE ACTUALLY FIRED AT THE OCCUPANTS OF
MOTORIZED TRICYCLE;
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AGAINST THE PROSECUTION ITS
DELIBERATE FAILURE TO PRESENT THE POLICE INVESTIGATORS WHO INVESTIGATED THE
INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE DEFENSE WHICH PRESENTED SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED ROLANDO VALDEZ DID NOT
DENY THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM FOR VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866 BECAUSE HE DID NOT
ALLEGEDLY TOUCHED IT IN HIS MEMORANDUM.
(pp. 106-107, Rollo)
732
After a painstaking review of the record and a deliberate consideration of the arguments of accused-
appellant, the Court does not find enough basis to reverse.
Accused-appellant claims that the trial court erred in failing to consider what he says are material,
substantial, important and significant discrepancies between the affidavits of prosecution witnesses
and their testimonies in court. Accused-appellant points to the Statement of William Montano, taken
by SPO1 Mario Suratos on September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1: p. 238, Record), and the Statement
taken on September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4: p. 291, Record), both in Villaflor Hospital, Dagupan City
where William Montano specifically named Bernard Castro as the person who flagged down the
motorized tricycle he and the other victims were riding. This, he claims, is inconsistent with his
testimony during the trial where he stated:
ATTY. RANCHEZ:
Q. Now, were you able to reach Sitio Cabauangan, Nalsiam, Manaoag, Pangasinan?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at around ten to fifteen meters,
somebody plugged (sic) down the tricycle, sir.
Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down your tricycle?
A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our motorcycle, sir.
Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight was immediately recognized by
me, sir.
Q Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately recognized?
A. That one, sir.
ACTG. INTERPRETER:
Witness pointing to a person wearing white t-shirt seated at the bench for the accused, and when
asked his name, he gave his name as Rolando Valdez.
(pp. 11-12, tsn, June 11, 1996)
We are not persuaded.
In his Statements dated September 20, 1995 (Exhibit 1) and September 24, 1995 (Exhibit 4), William
Montano pointed to Bernard Castro as the person who flagged down the motorized tricycle ridden by
the victims. On November 8, 1995, William and his co-victim/survivor Randy Tibule executed a
Pinagsamang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Demanda where they disclaimed having seen Bernard
Castro at the scene of the crime. They declared that after a more thorough consideration of what
transpired, they have realized that the filing of the complaint against Bernard Castro was a mistake
and the result of misunderstanding or misapprehension of what actually happened. In his testimony
in court, William, however, identified accused-appellant as the person illuminated by the headlight of
the tricycle, for which reason William readily recognized him. We, therefore, find nothing inconsistent
733
between his declarations during the investigation and his testimony in court. The lack of precision
with which he distinguished between the person who flagged down the tricycle and the other person
who he recognized because of the headlight of the tricycle cannot be considered as inconsistency at
all. The same holds true with claimed discrepancies between the statements of Randy Tibule during
the investigation and his testimony in court.
Accused-appellant stubbornly insists that following the withdrawal or retraction of the accusation of
several witnesses against Bernard Castro, these same witnesses accusation against accused-
appellant becomes doubtful.
We are not convinced.
In all the references by accused-appellant in pages 10-12 of his brief to the sworn declarations of
prosecution witnesses made during the investigation of the case, Bernard Castro may have indeed
been identified and named as one of the gunmen. It may readily be noted in these very same
references, however, that all these prosecution witnesses referred to two other companions, then
unidentified, of Bernard Castro. Even in the Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7) referred to in page 11 of the
brief, the police investigators categorically referred to Bernard Castro y Nazareno, alias Toti as one
of the suspects or assailants involved in the shooting incident (p. 112, Rollo). The logical conclusion
that may be drawn therefrom is that there is at least one other assailant in addition to Bernard
Castro, and as it developed, accused-appellant was subsequently and positively named as such.
Withal, we cannot subscribe to accused-appellants ratiocination that if the witnesses pointed to
Bernard Castro as one of the perpetrators of the crime, then it follows that accused-appellant cannot
be one other and additional perpetrator anymore. Accused-appellants reasoning on this point is
absolutely flawed. It is totally unacceptable.
Accused-appellant likewise seeks shelter in the mysterious withdrawal of the victims charges against
Bernard Castro. He insinuates that such recantation should not have been given any consideration.
But, this is water under the bridge. Anyway, even in the remotest possibility that the retraction of the
accusation against Bernard Castro may be reversed, it does not get accused-appellant off the hook.
Considering that accused-appellant had himself been positively identified, together with Bernard
Castro, as one of the other perpetrators of the crime, his conviction may still stand independently
and regardless of whether or not Castro is indicted or remains unprosecuted.
Accused-appellant further argues that it is not he but Castro who had the motive to shoot and fire at
the occupants of the motorized tricycle, mistaking one of the occupants thereof for Isidro Capistrano,
Castros former classmate and with whom he earlier had an altercation. It is very clear in his brief,
however, that accused-appellant predicates this argument on the mistaken premise that he was not
positively identified in the case at bar although he admits that it is established that he was at the
scene of the crime (p. 114, Rollo). This argument will not hold simply because it is settled that
accused-appellant had been positively identified by eyewitnesses and victims William Montano and
Randy Tibule. It is basic and fundamental rule that proof of motive is necessary for conviction only
when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, not when accused has been positively
identified as in the present case (People vs. Caggaunan, 94 Phil. 118 [1953]; People vs. Realon, 99
SCRA 422 [1980]; People vs. Pano, 257 SCRA 274 [1996]). Besides, it is also to be noted that lack
of motive for committing the crime does not preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a
matter of judicial knowledge that persons have killed or committed serious offense for no reason at
all (People vs. Cabodoc, 263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
734
Accused-appellant further contends that the prosecutions deliberate and intentional failure to present
the investigating police officers and their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit 7) constitutes culpable suppression of
evidence which, if duly taken into account, will merit his acquittal.
The argument is puerile, simply because the defense itself was able to present the police officers,
and exhibit 7 (p. 116, Rollo). It is to be further noted that as earlier pointed out, the declaration of
SPO1 Suratos and SPO1 Carbonel did not categorically rule out the possibility of convicting other
persons as co-principals of Castro. On the contrary, it is clear from such affidavit that there was more
than just one perpetrator of the crime. It even confirms and corroborates the eyewitness accounts of
William Montano and Randy Tibule pointing to accused-appellant as one of the other companions of
Castro.
After meticulously and carefully going through each and every piece of evidence on record, the
Court finds no reason to depart from the trial courts accord of credence to the eyewitness accounts
of William Montano and Randy Tibule who positively identified accused-appellant as one of the
persons who shot and fired at them and their companions that fateful night. We agree with the trial
court that the evidence points beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was one of those
principally responsible for the deaths of the four victims in this case and the wounding of two others.
There is also sufficient evidence that the aggravating circumstance of treachery attended the killings,
thus, qualifying the same to murder.
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of treachery
is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which
tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defensive
or retaliatory act which the victim might make (People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The
settled rule is that treachery can exist even if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected,
giving the victim no opportunity to repel it or depend himself against such attack. What is decisive is
that the execution of the attack, without slightest provocation from the victim who is unarmed, made
it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA 181 [1997]).
The trial court ruled that evident premeditation is likewise present. After reviewing the evidence,
however, we do not find any showing of evident premeditation on the part of accused-appellant.
While there may be testimonial evidence pointing to an altercation between Bernard Castro and a
certain Capistrano, it does sufficiently prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or surmised, but
criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing determination to commit the
crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be
premeditation; it must be evident premeditation (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
To establish the existence of evident premeditation, the following have to be prove: (1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had
clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the
execution to allow the offender to reflect on the consequences of his act (People vs. Juan, 254
SCRA 478 [1996]).
Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the crime does not constitute sufficient ground
to consider the existence of evident premeditation. At best, it may indicate the time when the
offenders determined to commit the crime (the first element). Their act of arming themselves with
caliber .30 carbines and thereafter waiting for their supposed victims at ambush positions may have
also indicated that they clung to their determination to commit the crime (the second element). More
735
important that these two elements is the proof that a sufficient period of time had lapsed between the
outward act evidencing intent and actual commission of the offense (the third element). There must
have been enough opportunity for the initial impulse to subside. This element is indispensable for
circumstance of evident premeditation to aggravate the crime. In People vs. Canial, 46 SCRA 134
[1972], this Court reiterates:
In other words, this circumstance can be taken into account only when there had been a cold and
deep meditation, and a tenacious persistence in the accomplishment of the criminal act. There must
be an opportunity to coolly and serenely think and deliberate on the meaning and the consequences
of what they had planned to do, an interval long enough for the conscience and better judgment to
overcome the evil desire and scheme.
(p. 649)
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the Court had stressed the importance of
sufficient time between the criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, affording
such opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment. Obviously, this element
is wanting in the case at bar. Right after the supposed heated argument between Bernard Castro
and Capistrano, Castro and company went home to get the firearms and not long thereafter
mounted the assault. There was no chance for the anger to subside. The culprits in the case at bar
had no opportunity for cool thought and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court is that of abuse of superior
strength. This contravenes the very basic and elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery (People vs. Mobe,
81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating circumstances, if we were to uphold the trial courts
premises on the complex nature of the crime committed, the death sentence, being the maximum
penalty for murder, would still have been the imposable penalty under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. The Court however, finds compelling reasons to reduce the sentence from one death
penalty (for the complex crime of multiple murder with double frustrated murder) and one reclusion
perpetua (for the complex crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions) to four counts of
reclusion perpetua (for 4 murders) and two indeterminate sentences of prision mayor to reclusion
temporal (for the 2 frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the Peoples brief that accused-appellant should
instead be convicted of four counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder is well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by the erroneous Information filed by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the complex crime of multiple murder
and double frustrated murder (p. 1, Record: Crim. Case No. U-8747). It may be noted that in his
Resolution dated September 26, 1995, the investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag,
Pangasinan, found a prima facie case for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101- 102, Ibid.) Too,
the same investigating judge in his Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found a prima facie case for
two counts of frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon reinvestigation by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder was instead filed per its Joint Resolution dated November 17, 1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.).
The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
736
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by Act
No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances defined above. The Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as falling under the first. It is
clear from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a single
act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that there was
more than one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It
cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of firing a single firearm. There were also
several empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime. This confirms the fact that several
shots were fired. Furthermore, considering the relative positions of the gunmen and their victims,
some of whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the
sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a
single bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to
the complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a
complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this
case. In the same manner, accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated
murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for the crime of murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty or reclusion perpetua.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper
penalty should be four sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts of
frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a
minimum of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal for each offense.
Now, to the matter of accused-appellants conviction for illegal possession of unlicensed firearm
under Presidential Decree No. 1866. It was recently held in the case entitled People vs. Molina
(G.R.No. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated in People vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212,
September 17, 1998), that there can be no separate conviction of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms under Presidential Decree No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act
No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance per

Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, which in part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fifteen days after its publication on June 21, 1997.
The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September 17, 1995. As in the case of
any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will generally have prospective application. In
cases, however, where the new law will be advantageous to the accused, the law may be given
retroactive application (Article 22, Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in
the case at bar from a separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, Republic
737
Act No. 8294 may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal
Possession of Firearm) subject of this present review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of firearm
should not be misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer be any prosecution for the crime
of illegal possession of firearm. In general, all pending cases involving illegal possession of firearm
should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No.
8294 are involved (murder or homicide under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or
attempted coup detat under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the case at bar cannot be considered as a special
aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of Multiple Murder), also
under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the four counts of murder from four
reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as this particular provision of Republic Act No.
8294 is not beneficial to accused-appellant because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will
not be given retroactive application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with respect to Criminal Case No. U-8747 is
hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four counts of
murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four sentences of reclusion perpetua. He is
also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of frustrated murder and hereby meted two
indeterminate sentences, each, ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The appealed
judgment relating to the civil liabilities of accused-appellant towards the six victims is AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case No. U-8749 involving Presidential Decree No. 1866 is hereby dismissed.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
738
C. People V. Garcia, GR 141125
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY and

THREE JOHN DOES, accused.
JEFFREY GARCIA y CARAGAY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659, of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 6, dated October 28, 1999, convicting accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia y Caragay of
Forcible Abduction with Rape and three counts of Rape, and sentencing him to death. [][1]
The victim, Cleopatra Changlapon, was nineteen years old and a sophomore student of B.S.
Physical Therapy at the Baguio Central University. On July 14, 1998, she left school at 6:30 p.m. to
go home to Km. 3, La Trinidad, Benguet. As she was crossing Bonifacio Street, Baguio City, she saw
a white van approaching so she stopped to let it pass. Suddenly, the van stopped in front of her. The
rear door slid open and Cleopatra was pulled by the arms into the van. She struggled as the door
closed and the van sped away. Something was sprayed on her face which made her eyes sting and
feel dizzy. She shouted, then she felt a fist blow on her stomach and she fell unconscious. [][2]
When Cleopatra came to, she was inside a room. She was totally undressed and was lying flat on
her back on a bed. In the room with her were four men. One of them, who had Bombay features,
was also totally naked while the other three were clad in briefs and smoking cigarettes. The Bombay-
looking man lay on top of her. She tried to push him away but he held her left arm. Another man with
long hair, whom she later identified as accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia, burned her right chin with a
lighted cigarette. Cleopatra fought back but accused-appellant held her right arm. While accused-
appellant was seated on her right side and holding her, the Bombay-looking man proceeded to have
sexual intercourse with her. She tried to kick him and close her legs, but two men were holding her
feet. The two men boxed her thighs and burned her legs with cigarettes.[][3]
After the Bombay-looking man finished having sexual intercourse with Cleopatra, accused-appellant
took his turn and went on top of her. One of the men sat on her right leg and pinned it down, while
another held her left leg. Cleopatra tried to punch accused-appellant with her right hand, but the
Bombay-looking man held her right arm. Accused-appellant then had sexual intercourse with her
while holding her left arm. [][4]
The third man, whom Cleopatra noted had pimples on his face, went on top of her. The Bombay-
looking man was still holding her right arm, while the man on top of her held her left arm. She tried to
close her legs but someone hit her right thigh, which forced her to keep her legs apart. The third man
with pimples succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. [][5]
The fourth man was next in raping Cleopatra. By that time, she was feeling helpless and was too
tired to struggle. As the fourth man was having sexual intercourse with her, she saw the Bombay-
looking man burning her panties with a lighted cigarette. She closed her eyes and heard the men
laughing. After the fourth man finished raping her, he got up. She felt dizzy and her private parts
739
were aching. She opened her eyes and tried to move, but accused-appellant hit her on the
abdomen. [][6]
One of the men again sprayed something on Cleopatras face which made her vision blurred. She
heard somebody say that it was 1:30.[][7] After that, she blacked out. When she regained
consciousness, she was lying by the roadside somewhere between Tam-awan and Longlong. It was
still dark. She already had her clothes on. She felt pain all over her body and was unable to move. A
taxi passed by and picked her up. Although she was afraid to ride the taxi, she boarded it just to get
home. The taxi brought her to her house.[][8]
Her aunt, Rufina Angog, saw Cleopatra alight the taxi crying. She also noticed that Cleopatras
clothes were inverted and she smelled bad. She woke up Cleopatras brothers and cousins.[][9] They
asked her what happened. Cleopatra just kept crying and was unable to talk. After some time, when
she was able to regain her composure, she told them that she had been raped by four men. [][10]
The following day, July 15, 1998, Cleopatra was brought to the Baguio City Police Station. After
giving her statement to the police, she was brought to the Crime Laboratory of the Baguio City
Police, where she was examined by Dr. Vladimir Villaseor.
In his Medico-Legal Report, Dr. Villaseor wrote the following findings:
FINDINGS:
General and Extra-genital:
Fairly nourished, fairly developed coherent female subject. Breasts are hemispherical with light
brown areola and nipples from which no secretion could be pressed out. Abdomen is soft and flabby.
The following are the injuries noted:
1. Second degree burns, mental region, measuring 1.3.1cm, 3cm from the anterior midline.
2. Second degree burns, left supra-mammary region, measuring 1 x 1cm, 8cm from the anterior
midline.
3. Second degree burns, left supra-mammary region, measuring 0.6x0.6 cm, 8.5cm from the
anterior midline.
4. Second degree burns, left hypothenar region, measuring 1x0.5cm, 7cm from the posterior
midline.
5. Second degree burns, left middle 3rd of the left thigh, measuring 2x1cm, 13cm from the anterior
midline.
6. Second degree burns, middle 3rd of the right thigh, measuring 1x 1cm, 10cm from the anterior
midline.
7. Contusion, left mammary region, measuring 3x1cm, 5cm from the anterior midline.
8. Contusion, right mammary region, measuring 1x1cm, 9cm from the anterior midline.
9. Contusion, middle 3rd of the right arm, measuring 5x3cm, 3cm from the anterior midline.
10. Contusion, middle 3rd of the right thigh, measuing 6x4cm, 3cm from the anterior midline.
740
11. Hematoma, left zygomatic region, measuring 4x4cm 7cm from the anterior midline.
There is tenderness on the mammary region, both thighs and at the abdominal region.
Genital:
There is abundant growth of pubic hair. Labia majora are full convex, gaping, with the congested
abraded labia minora presenting in between. On separating the same is disclosed a congested
hymen with shallow fresh lacerations at 7, 8 and 9 oclock and deep fresh laceration at 6 oclock
positions. External vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the examining index
finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities.
Cervix is congested with moderate amount of whitish secretion.
C O N C L U S I O N :
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
Barring unforeseen complications, it is estimated that the above injuries will resolve in 14-15 days.
R E M A R K S :
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram (-) diplococci and POSITIVE for
spermatozoa. [][11]
The panties that Cleopatra was wearing was also submitted to the Crime Laboratory for
examination. Dr. Villaseor found cigarette burns and seminal stains, [][12] as well as stains of blood
on the panties. [][13] The Medico-Legal Report states:
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
Specimen A - One (1) white printed panty with cigarette burns and with suspected seminal stains.
xxx xxx xxx.
F I N D I N G S :
Biochemical examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
test for the presence of seminal stains.
C O N C L U S I O N :
Specimen A revealed the presence of seminal stains. [][14]
On July 17, 1998, Cleopatra went back to the police station and gave a description of the four rapists
to the cartographer. [][15] She likewise executed another sworn statement to the police. [][16]
Meanwhile, accused-appellant was arrested at 4:30 p.m. of July 17, 1998 in connection with another
rape charge against him filed by a certain Gilda Mangyo.
The cartographic sketches were published in the Sun-Star newspaper. Police Officers Gilbert Bulalit
and Archibald Diaz saw the sketches and noticed that one of the suspects depicted in the
cartographic sketch bore a striking resemblance to accused-appellant, who was in their custody. []
[17] On July 26, 1998, Cleopatra was summoned to the police station to identify accused-appellant.
She was brought to the upper floor of the police building and asked to look below on the basketball
741
court of the city jail and see if any of the inmates looked familiar to her. [][18] Cleopatra recognized
accused-appellant among those watching the basketball game. [][19]
PO1 Bulalit brought accused-appellant to the office upstairs. When Cleopatra saw accused-appellant
face to face, she started to tremble and cry. Then she tried to attack him but she was restrained by
the police officers. [][20] On the same day, Cleopatra gave a supplemental statement to the police,
confirming her identification of accused-appellant as one of her rapists.[][21]
Inquest proceedings followed in due course. [][22] On July 27, 1998, formal charges for forcible
abduction with rape were brought against accused-appellant and three John Does, under an
information which alleged:
That on or about the 14th day of July, 1998, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of
force and intimidation abduct CLEOPATRA CHANGLAPON, 19 years old, by dragging her inside a
van and taking her to Tam-awan Village, Baguio City, against her will and with lewd design, and once
inside a house, had carnal knowledge of her, also by means of force and intimidation and against
her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [][23]
The information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 15805-R of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 6. Accused-appellant was arraigned, wherein he entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
ensued as against him, while the other three unidentified accused remained at large.
Accused-appellant testified that he spent the whole day of July 14, 1998 at the boarding house
where his brother-in-law lived, located at No. 36 Torres Bugallon Street, Aurora Hills, Baguio City. His
brother-in-law asked him to go there to take care of his nephew. That evening, while he was in the
said house watching television, some of his friends came over to visit him. They brought a bottle of
gin and began to have a drinking session. Accused-appellant did not join them because his stomach
was upset. Accused-appellants brother-in-law arrived a little before midnight, after which his guests
left. [][24] When asked about the charges of rape against him, he denied the same. [][25]
Catherine Faith Madella was among those who visited accused-appellant in the evening of July 14,
1998. She came to know him through her friend, Joy Tabinas, who was a tenant at the said boarding
house. Madella testified that she went to the boarding house on July 14, 1998 at 9:00 p.m. At 12:00
midnight, she went to the bedroom of Joy Tabinas and slept there. [][26] Her testimony was
corroborated by her boyfriend, Ronaldo T. Valdez, who also testified for the defense.[][27]
Joy Tabinas likewise testified that on July 14, 1998, she was at the boarding house. She watched
television with accused-appellant from 6:00 to 10:00 p.m. [][28]
On October 28, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision convicting accused-appellant of one count
of forcible abduction with rape and three counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the judgment
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court Finds the Accused Jeffrey Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and likewise of the three (3) crimes of rape in
conspiracy with three (3) others whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown as charged in
the Information and hereby sentences him to the supreme penalty of DEATH in each of the 4
offenses aforementioned; to indemnify the offended party, Cleopatra Changlapon, the sum of One
742
Hundred Forty Six Thousand, One Hundred Twenty Five Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos (P
146,125.75) as actual damages and Fifty Thousand Pesos as moral damages without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay one fourth (1/4) of the costs.
The police authorities are directed to exert all efforts to identify and arrest the three other accused
whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown.
Meantime, pending their arrests, the case is Archived in respect to the three (3) other accused
whose identities and whereabouts are yet unknown to be revived upon their arrest.
SO ORDERED. [][29]
In his Brief, accused-appellant raises the following errors:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT JEFFREY

GARCIA Y CARAGAY GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE COMPLEX CRIME OF
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE AND FOR THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE ALLEGEDLY
COMMITTED IN CONSPIRACY WITH THREE (3) OTHERS WHOSE IDENTITIES AND
WHEREABOUTS ARE STILL UNKNOWN.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT GIVING SCANT CONSIDERATION TO THE
THEORY OF THE DEFENSE THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY IS
ONLY A LOOK-ALIKE OF THE REAL CULPRIT.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLEOPATRA CHANGLAPON HAD
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED JEFFREY GARCIA Y CARAGAY AS ONE OF THOSE WHO ABDUCTED
AND RAPED HER. [][30]
Accused-appellant assails his conviction based on complainants identification. According to him, the
identification was improperly suggested by the police. We are not persuaded. Based on our own
review of the records of this case, we find that complainant was neither influenced nor induced by
the police to point to accused-appellant as one of her molesters. On the contrary, the transcripts
convincingly show that complainant was left to freely study the faces of the thirty or more inmates on
the basketball court below to see whether she recognized any of them. [][31] There was no
suggestion from the police to point to the new detainee, who had just been arrested on another rape
charge.
Owing to the gravity of the crime and penalty involved, we have meticulously studied the testimony
of complainant Cleopatra Changlapon and find it to be clear, straightforward and categorical. The
details of her narration are consistent on all material points. Her actions throughout her ordeal
correspond to normal human behavior. We take particular note of her natural and spontaneous
reaction of crying and attacking her molester when brought before her face to face. The records also
eloquently exhibit that she repeatedly cried throughout her testimony. All of these actuations bear the
ring of truth and deserve full faith and credit.
743
More importantly, complainants narration of the events is well substantiated by the physical
evidence. The second degree burns found on her face, chest and thighs prove that she was indeed
burned with lighted cigarettes whenever she attempted to fight her assailants. The medico-legal
officer confirmed that they were consistent with cigarette burns. [][32] Furthermore, the contusions
found on her body were said to be caused by a blunt instrument like a closed fist. [][33] This confirms
her testimony that she was repeatedly hit to stop her from struggling. The medico-legal officer placed
the time of infliction of the external physical injuries on complainant within the last twenty-four hours.
[][34] The findings on her genitals --- namely the gaping labia majora, the congested and abraded
labia minora, and the lacerations --- all suggest the entry of a foreign object, such as a fully erect
male organ. [][35] Finally, the presence of spermatozoa further confirms that complainant recently
had sexual intercourse. [][36]
In the face of complainants positive and categorical declarations that accused-appellant was one of
her rapists, accused-appellants alibi must fail.
It is a well-settled rule that positive identification of the accused, where categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails
over alibi and denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative and
self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. [][37]
Furthermore, in order that the defense of alibi may prosper, accused-appellant must establish not
only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed but also that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. [][38] In the
case at bar, the place of commission of the rapes --- somewhere between Tam-awan and Longlong
--- and the boarding house where accused-appellant alleged he was in the evening of July 14, 1998,
are both situated within Baguio City. The distance between Tam-awan and Aurora Hills, especially at
dawn, can be traversed in just a matter of minutes.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial court, accused-appellants witnesses failed to account for his
whereabouts after 12:00 midnight. At the time of the rape, complainant distinctly heard one of her
molesters state the time as 1:30. Since it was still dark when complainant was dropped off on the
side of the road, it can safely be assumed that the crimes were committed at dawn.
The trial court, therefore, did not err in convicting accused-appellant of the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised
Penal Code, are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of
forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when there is carnal knowledge with the
abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under twelve
years of age or is demented. [][39]
In the case at bar, the information sufficiently alleged the elements of forcible abduction, i.e., the
taking of complainant against her against her will and with lewd design. It was likewise alleged that
accused-appellant and his three co-accused conspired, confederated and mutually aided one
another in having carnal knowledge of complainant by means of force and intimidation and against
her will.
Aside from alleging the necessary elements of the crimes, the prosecution convincingly established
that the carnal knowledge was committed through force and intimidation. Moreover, the prosecution
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant succeeded in forcibly abducting
the complainant with lewd designs, established by the actual rape. [][40]
744
Hence, accused-appellant is guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. He should
also be held liable for the other three counts of rape committed by his three co-accused, considering
the clear conspiracy among them shown by their obvious concerted efforts to perpetrate, one after
the other, the crime. As borne by the records, all the four accused helped one another in
consummating the rape of complainant. While one of them mounted her, the other three held her
arms and legs. They also burned her face and extremities with lighted cigarettes to stop her from
warding off her aggressor. Each of them, therefore, is responsible not only for the rape committed
personally by him but for the rape committed by the others as well. [][41]
However, as correctly held by the trial court, there can only be one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. The crime of forcible abduction was only necessary for the first rape. Thus, the
subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as separate complex crimes of forcible
abduction with rape. They should be detached from and considered independently of the forcible
abduction. Therefore, accused-appellant should be convicted of one complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape and three separate acts of rape. [][42]
The penalty for complex crimes is the penalty for the most serious crime which shall be imposed in
its maximum period. Rape is the more serious of the two crimes and, when committed by more than
two persons, is punishable with reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353. Thus, accused-appellant should be sentenced to the
maximum penalty of death for forcible abduction with rape. [][43]
As regards the other three acts of rape, accused-appellant can only be sentenced to reclusion
perpetua. The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, superior strength
and motor vehicle. However, these were not alleged in the information. Under the amended
provisions of Rule 110, Sections 8 and 9 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the
information, otherwise, they cannot be considered against the accused even if proven at the trial.
Being favorable to accused-appellant, this rule should be applied retroactively in this case. [][44]
Hence, there being no aggravating circumstance that may be appreciated, and with no mitigating
circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be applied, pursuant to Article 63,
paragraph (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
Anent the matter of damages, the trial court correctly awarded the amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages. This was justified by complainants emotional and physical suffering, as narrated in her
testimony. [][45] Notably, the prosecution successfully proved that complainant lost her virginity
during the rape. [][46] As she narrated, virginity is a highly regarded virtue among the people of
Kalinga. [][47]
However, the trial court failed to award civil indemnity to the complainant. We have ruled that if rape
is committed or qualified by any of the circumstances which authorize the imposition of the death
penalty, the civil indemnity shall be not less than P75,000.00. [][48] For the other three counts of
simple rape, where the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, accused-appellant is liable for civil
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count. [][49]
We also find that the actual damages awarded by the trial court was well substantiated. Complainant
presented the required receipts for her medications, transportation and other expenses. [][50]
Complainant testified that as a member of the Kalinga tribe, she had to undergo the korong and
songa rituals, wherein they had to butcher several chickens, pigs, and carabaos, thereby incurring
total expenses of P90,000.00. [][51] These rituals were intended for complainants safety and to call
745
on the tribes spirits so that no more violence or misfortune may befall her. [][52] The grand total of all
these actual expenses, including those for medicines and transportation, as duly proved by the
receipts and computations presented in evidence, is P 146,125.75, [][53] the amount awarded by the
trial court.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 6, in Criminal Case No. 15805-R, convicting accused-appellant Jeffrey Garcia y Caragay of
one count of Forcible Abduction with Rape and three counts of Rape, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Death for the
complex crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape and Reclusion Perpetua for each of the three counts
of rape. Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay complainant Cleopatra Changlapon the
amounts of P146,125.75 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Costs against accused-appellant.
In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, upon finality of this Decision,
let the records of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of
pardoning power or executive clemency.
People V Alfeche, GR no 124213, August 17, 1998, 294 SCRA 352
746
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANTE ALFECHE y TAMPARONG, alias
WILLY, and JOHN DOE, accused, DANTE ALFECHE y TAMPARONG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Condemned to suffer the death penalty in each of two counts of rape by the Regional Trial Court of
Ormoc City, Branch 12, in its Joint Decision[][1] of 22 August 1995 in Criminal Cases Nos. 4615-0
and 4616-0, accused-appellant Dante Alfeche y Tamparong (hereafter DANTE) seeks the reversal of
his conviction as we review the judgment now on automatic appeal to us pursuant to Article 47 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of R.A. No. 7659.[][2]
The two cases were commenced by complaints signed by complainant Analiza Duroja (hereafter
ANALIZA). The accusatory portion of the complaint in Criminal Case No. 4615-0 reads as follows:
That on or about the 18th day of September 1994, at around 11:00 oclock in the morning, in Brgy.
Can-adieng, Ormoc City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused DANTE ALFECHE y Tamparong, Alias WILLY and JOHN DOE, in conspiracy with one
another, treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, by means of violence and intimidation,
with the use of a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
of the complainant herein ANALIZA A. DUROJA, a 17 year old lass, against her will. In violation of
Article 335, Revised Penal Code.
The complaint in Criminal Case No. 4616-0[][3] is similarly worded except as to the date and time
the crime was committed, that is, on or about the 11th of September 1994, at around 10:30 in the
evening. Only DANTE was apprehended. His co-accused Willy and John Doe have remained at
large.
DANTE waived preliminary investigation.[][4] Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of innocence.[][5]

Since the two cases involved the same parties and common evidence, the trial court ordered their
consolidation and joint trial.[][6]
The witnesses for the prosecution were ANALIZA, Sergio Dy, Francisca Duroja, Dr. Merly Tan, Dr.
Regino Mercado, Dr. Rosemarie Cam, and Luz Lucero. The defense relied on the testimonies of
DANTE, PS/Insp. Roel Acidre, Teresita Acain, Josephine Ollave, and Betty Orocay.
ANALIZA started working as a domestic helper for Sergio Dy and his family in Barangay Can-adieng
in Ormoc City, Leyte, on 9 March 1994. On 11 September 1994, at about 10:30 p.m., the Dy spouses
were at Ipil, Leyte, attending a meeting of the Couples for Christ. Their two grown-up children were
not at home either. Only ANALIZA and her one-year-old ward were left in the Dy residence. In
accordance with her employers instructions, she locked only the kitchen door and placed a chair to
the front door but kept it unlocked, as the Dys did not bring a key to the door. ANALIZA was watching
television in the sala when she heard a sound from the front door, then somebody, whom she
recognized as a certain Willy suddenly held her hand, gagged her mouth, and pointed a knife at her.
Willy had two companions, but she recognized only one of the two, namely, DANTE. While she was
thus gagged and held at the point of a knife, DANTE approached her and boxed her on her side, as
a result of which she lost consciousness.[][7]
Upon regaining consciousness some thirty minutes later, ANALIZA found her short pants removed
and her private part bleeding, which was unusual because she was not menstruating before she was
attacked. She immediately washed her private part and took a bath.[][8]
747
Her employers arrived at 12:30 a.m. the following day, but ANALIZA did not report the incident to
them. Neither did she inform the authorities or her mother, who lived some houses away, because
she was ashamed and also afraid of DANTEs threat that he would kill her mother if she told anyone
about the incident.[][9]
ANALIZA had not engaged in sexual intercourse prior to this assault.[][10]
Again, on 18 September 1994, at about 11:00 a.m., ANALIZA was alone with her ward in the Dy
residence. She was sauting pork when suddenly, the three accused again intruded into the house
through the back door. Willy held her hand and gagged her mouth, while John Doe first turned off the
stove and then laid her on the floor and pointed a knife at her. Thereupon, DANTE knelt on her legs,
undressed her, inserted his private part into hers, and made a push and pull motion. Some five
minutes later, DANTE stood up and immediately put on his pants. ANALIZA saw a whitish substance
on her organ, which came from DANTE. The latter then placed her left hand on a table and drove a
nail into it. DANTE and his companions forthwith left. The incident affected her work; nevertheless,
she was able to finish preparing lunch for her employers, who arrived at noon.[][11]
ANALIZA reported to the police that her hand was injured, and sought medical attention therefor.
She related nothing about the rape for fear that Dante would make good his threat to kill her mother.
It was only after she took poison several times that her mother came to know of the rapes. She tried
to kill herself because she was then pregnant and ashamed of what had happened to her. She gave
birth to a boy on 27 May 1995.[][12]
Dr. Regino Mercado, City Health Officer of Ormoc City, examined ANALIZA on 18 September 1994
and found a [p]unctured wound over the base of left 4th posterior finger. He then issued a medical
certificate.[][13] According to him, the injury could have been caused by a sharp instrument, possibly
a nail; and his interview of ANALIZA confirmed his theory. ANALIZA did not inform him who caused
the injury. He further observed that ANALIZA seemed frightened and depressed, which he attributed
to her recent ordeal. On cross-examination, Dr. Mercado stated that ANALIZA did not tell him that
she was raped. Neither did she complain of pain in her vagina, nor did she request an examination
of her private part.[][14]
Sergio Dy, ANALIZAs employer, declared that he was not at his home on 11 September 1994
between 8:00 and 11:00 p.m., as he was at a prayer meeting of the Couples for Christ in Ipil, Leyte.
He instructed ANALIZA to close the door and windows of the house while he was away; and that if
she felt sleepy while he was still away, she should place a chair at the door to shut it so that he could
get inside the house without waking her. He arrived home at around 11:00 p.m. ANALIZA did not
complain of any unusual incident. On 18 September 1994 between 9:00 and 11:00 a.m., Sergio was
attending to his business at the corner of Hermosilla and Real Streets in Ormoc City. He had lunch at
home at around noon, but again ANALIZA did not inform him of any unusual incident while he was
away. On cross-examination, Sergio added that it was only sometime in March 1995 that ANALIZA
told him that a person nailed her hand and that she was pregnant, but she never informed him that
she was raped.[][15]
According to Francisca Duroja, her daughter ANALIZA was a tomboy and had, therefore, no
boyfriend. She first learned that ANALIZA was pregnant when the latter attempted suicide by
drinking poison sometime in March 1995 at the office of Engineer Lucero. She brought her daughter,
who was already in a serious condition, to the Ormoc District Hospital. At the hospital ANALIZA
explained that she attempted suicide because she became pregnant after she was raped; and she
identified her assailants as DANTE, Willy, and an unknown person. Francisca and her daughter then
748
went to the police to complain about the incident. After the rape charges were filed in court, a certain
Joe Burgos came to her house and offered, allegedly on behalf of DANTE, to settle the cases
amicably, but she rejected the offer.[][16]
Dr. Merly Tan, a medical officer of the Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Ormoc
District Hospital, testified that ANALIZA was previously handled by the medical department when she
attempted suicide. Later, or on 31 March 1995, she examined ANALIZA in connection with the rape
incident. Her findings were summarized as follows:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Abdomen globularly enlarge[d] as to 8-9 months ACG
INTERNAL EXAMINATION - admits two fingers with ease.
Hymen - with 2,4,7,11 oclock laceration (old healed)[][17]
According to Dr. Tan, the hymenal lacerations could have been caused by sexual intercourse. Her
examination of ANALIZAs uterus disclosed that the fetus was about 8 to 9 months old; however,
since ANALIZA said that she was raped in September 1994, or about six months prior to the
examination, Dr. Tan doubted her findings and requested an ultrasound test,[][18] the result of which
was not shown to her.[][19]
Dr. Rosemarie Cam, who was responsible for ANALIZAs pre-natal care, declared that ANALIZAs
child was born on 27 May 1995 and could have been conceived on 11 September 1994 or 18
September 1994. She could not be certain as to the period of conception because she was unaware
of ANALIZAs menstrual cycle. On cross-examination, she opined that it was also possible that the
child was conceived earlier than 11 September 1994.[][20]
DANTE had another story to tell.
He is a native of Zamboanga, grew up in Davao City, and came to be in Ormoc City because of his
business of selling dried fish. He arrived in Ormoc City during the first week of January 1993 and
stayed in the house of Mylene Ablen in Barangay Can-adieng, which was separated by a chapel
from ANALIZAs house. ANALIZA, who was also known as Ethel in that Barangay, used to go to
Ablens house to play computer games. Soon they became sweethearts. During the last week of
January 1993, he took her to the Shalom Lodging House where he gave her P200, and they had
sexual congress. They repeated their tryst in February 1993. They stopped seeing each other when
he got involved with Naomi Marilao, whom he considered his common-law wife. He later lived with
Teresa Acain, whom he met because Teresas mother retailed dried fish. He maintained a
relationship with these three women only.[][21]
It was on 24 August 1994 that he eloped with Teresa Acain. Accompanied by a certain Babie, they
went to the house of Josephine Ollave at Barangay Patag, Ormoc City, where they stayed until the
end of September 1994. At around 10:30 p.m. of 11 September 1994, he was at Josephines house
with Teresa and the other occupants thereof. Throughout his stay at Josephines house, he never
went to Ormoc City proper.[][22]
However, on 16 September 1994, at around 6:00 p.m., he met with ANALIZA at the Boy Scout
Canteen. He then asked her to check-in with him at the Rajah Lodging House because he had a
reserved room there. She acquiesced, but once there he noticed that her tummy was already hard
and that turned [him] off. He asked her whether it was true that three persons had trespassed her
749
house and raped her. She confirmed the story, added that her hand had been pierced with a nail,
and even showed him the location of her wound. But she did not divulge the identity of her
assailants, much less accuse him of perpetrating the offense. She then asked for money, and he
gave her P40. He first learned of the charge against him on 29 March 1995 when he was arrested.[]
[23] DANTE denied knowing any Willy or John Doe.
On cross-examination, DANTE disclosed that while in transit at Cebu City, he met Mylene Ablen and
her husband, who told him that there was a good business in Ormoc City. He was then traveling with
card gamblers, being himself a hustler. In Ormoc City, Mylene told him that ANALIZA could be easily
gotten if she was given money; hence, he surmised that ANALIZA was no longer a virgin. He then
courted ANALIZA, and soon they became sweethearts. While he admitted having asked Joe Burgos
for help, he denied having asked the latter to seek an amicable settlement of the case.[][24]
Teresita Acain, DANTEs alleged lover since June 1994 and who claimed to be married to him,
testified that she was supposed to go to Tacloban City on 24 August 1994. Instead, she eloped with
DANTE. Accompanied by Betty Orocay, they went to the residence of Josephine Ollave in Barangay
Patag, Ormoc City, where they stayed until 27 September 1994. On 11 September 1994, at around
10:00 p.m., she and DANTE were just about to go to sleep at Josephines house. She could recall no
instance when he left the room where they were staying. On 18 September 1994, at about 11:00
a.m., she and DANTE were cleaning Josephines house and tending to the pigs.[][25]
Josephine Ollave recalled that on 24 August 1994, at around 7:00 p.m., her sister Betty, together
with DANTE and a certain Teresa, came to her house in Barangay Patag. She remembered the date
because it was her sons birthday. Betty asked her to allow the couple to stay over because they had
just eloped. Josephine acceded to the request. On 11 September 1994, at about 10:00 p.m., she
was at home with her husband, DANTE, and Teresa. On 18 September 1994, at around 11:00 a.m.,
she, her husband, DANTE, and Teresa were tending to the hogs; after which DANTE went inside the
house. DANTE and Teresa left her house during the last week of September 1994. On cross-
examination she informed the court that her house was only a 30- to 40-minute ride away from
Ormoc City by motorcab.[][26]
Police Inspector Roel Acidre, Commanding Officer of the Mobile Force Company of Ormoc City
Police Command based in Camp Downes, Ormoc City, testified that on 18 September 1994, at
around 8:00 p.m., Francisca Duroja and her daughter ANALIZA came to report that the latters hand
was pierced with a nail by DANTE. Acidre told the two to go to any hospital for medical treatment
and bring the result for appropriate legal action, but they never returned to the police station.[][27]
Betty Orocay testified that at around 4:00 p.m. of 16 February 1995 she saw DANTE enter the Boy
Scout Canteen in Ormoc City while she was eating at the said establishment. She asked DANTE to
join her for snacks, and the latter obliged. Later ANALIZA arrived, and DANTE approached her. Betty
heard DANTE invite ANALIZA to a lodging house. Betty left the canteen and proceeded to Zenaidas
Inn where she was to meet her boyfriend. At past 7:00 p.m. she saw DANTE proceed to the Rajah
Lodging House. Afterwards, while Betty was having dinner with her boyfriend at the Inn, she saw
ANALIZA go to that same lodging house.[][28]
Perceiving an attempt by the defense to destroy ANALIZAs credibility by portraying her as a

prostitute and a woman of loose morals, the prosecution sought to prove ANALIZAs good moral
character by presenting Luz Lucero as rebuttal witness. The 61-year-old Luz worked as a secretary
to her husband and as a councilwoman in her barangay. She has known ANALIZA since the latter
was a little girl, as ANALIZA lived only two houses away from their house. ANALIZA worked at the
750
Lucero residence, washing clothes. About once a week, she would join the Luceros for a stroll at the
plaza and for picnics. Later, she worked at the Dy residence; but after completing her chores for the
Dys, ANALIZA would still play with the Lucero children at the latters house. Luz never saw this girl in
the company of male friends despite her tomboyish behavior. ANALIZA could not be a prostitute; for
if she were, Luz would not have allowed her children to befriend the former.[][29]
The trial court found the defense witnesses and the tale they spun not credible enough. It could not
believe that DANTE, a fish vendor without extraordinary looks, could hook a 17-year-old virgin while
he was still a stranger in her place; or that the same woman would jump to bed with him on the first
opportunity to do so. On the other hand, it found ANALIZA to be a more credible witness, especially
that she told her story in between sobs. Moreover, her positive testimony prevailed over DANTEs
alibi. It found sufficient reason for her delay in reporting her experience, and recognized that after
drawing courage she went on to endure a public trial. It opined that even if DANTE and ANALIZA
were sweethearts from January to February 1993, he could still have raped her on 11 and 18
September 1994. And although she was unconscious during the alleged rape on 11 September
1994, it believed that the circumstances, when collectively considered, were sufficient to establish
the crime of rape.
The trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of nighttime (in the case of the first rape)
and dwelling against DANTE. It also recognized that the offense was committed by three persons
and with the use of a knife. It then imposed the supreme penalty of death; thus:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in criminal case No. 4615 finding the accused DANTE
ALFECHE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined and penalized under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Appreciating the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling with no mitigating circumstance to offset it, this court imposes upon the
same DANTE ALFECHE the penalty of DEATH. Decision is also hereby rendered in criminal case
no. 4616 finding the accused DANTE ALFECHE guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling and nighttime with no mitigating circumstance
to offset any of the two, this court imposes upon the said DANTE ALFECHE the penalty of DEATH.
Further, the said Dante Alfeche is directed to indemnify ANALIZA DUROJA the sum of THIRTY
THOUSAND PESOS in criminal case no. 4615 and the further sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
in criminal case no. 4616 as compensation for moral damages, and to pay the cost.
Since the penalty imposed was death, this case was brought to us for automatic review and
judgment.[][30]
In his Appellants Brief, DANTE contends that the trial court gravely erred (a) in convicting him for two
counts of rape and sentencing him to suffer the death penalty in each; and (b) in holding him liable to
pay the complainant P60,000 as civil indemnity.
DANTE maintains that the alleged rape on 11 September 1994 was not proved beyond reasonable
doubt because ANALIZA was unconscious at the time and could not therefore testify as to the
pertinent circumstances. On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) claims that
there were sufficient established circumstances to constitute an unbroken chain leading to no other
hypothesis than that DANTE was guilty of the crime charged, and that these circumstances were
sufficient to convict him. These circumstances were as follows:
(a) While Analiza was watching television at her employers house on September 11, 1994 at around
10:30 in the evening, three (3) persons entered the house; (b) One of the men whom she knew as
751
Willy suddenly held her hand, gagged her mouth and pointed a knife at her; (c) Another man whom
she recognized as appellant approached her and boxed her at her side; (d) Because of appellants
punch, Analiza lost consciousness; she regained consciousness about thirty (30) minutes later; and
(e) When she woke up, Analiza felt something unusual; she noticed that her shorts had been
removed and her vagina was bleeding. (Citations omitted).
We agree with DANTE that the first alleged rape was not sufficiently proved. Since rape is not
normally committed in the presence of witnesses,[][31] the only evidence that can oftentimes be
offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainants testimony.[][32] Said testimony must
be clear and positive to prove that the acts which constitute the elements of rape were committed.[]
[33] Although ANALIZA was unconscious when the first rape was allegedly committed, she could
have described circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events that would indicate that the
offense was actually perpetrated by the accused.[][34] In this case, ANALIZAs unconsciousness
broke the chain of events from which we could have inferred the occurrence of the offense.
ANALIZAs testimony says as much:
PROS. FULACHE
Q Why do you say that you do not know what was the cause of the bleeding in your sexual organ?
COURT
Q Before you became unconscious, were you bleeding already?
A Not yet, Your Honor.
COURT
Continue.
PROS. FULACHE
So that you did not know what happened when you were unconscious?
COURT
Of course.
WITNESS
A I did not know anything, Sir.[][35]
As regards the second rape, DANTE again argues that the offense was never proved beyond
reasonable doubt. The uncorroborated testimony of ANALIZA cannot be a basis for conviction.[][36]
Moreover, her testimony was contrary to human experience because the activities of the rapists,
from their turning off the stove in the kitchen to the forced sexual intercourse, presumably coupled
with resistance from her, could not have been accomplished in nine (9) minutes, even with military
precision. Another source of doubt was her activity when the accused entered the kitchen. She
testified that she had not yet prepared lunch; but, on cross-examination, she said that she was
sauting vegetables, which she later changed to pork. DANTE maintains that the discrepancies are
material because ANALIZA took pains to specify the acts of the accused in relation to what she was
doing at the time; hence, her testimony as to what she was doing must be as consistent as her
insistence on the alleged acts of the accused.
752
The OSG states that the inconsistencies relied upon by DANTE refer to collateral and minor matters,
which do not detract from ANALIZAs positive testimony. Even the most candid witnesses have been
known to make inconsistent statements; but these do not necessarily impair their credibility and,
instead, may even be a badge of truthfulness. What is significant is that ANALIZA categorically
stated that the accused entered her employers house and sexually assaulted her.
We believe that the aforementioned details the accuseds length of stay and the dish ANALIZA was
preparing are insignificant. Since it was not shown that ANALIZA looked at a watch before and after
the accuseds assault, she could not be expected to give an accurate appraisal of the accuseds
length of stay. Furthermore, a misestimation of time is too immaterial to discredit the testimony of a
witness, especially where time is not an essential element or has no substantial bearing on the fact
of the commission of the offense.[][37] Likewise, since several months passed before ANALIZA told
her story to the trial court, she could not be expected to remember what dish she was preparing at
the time unless the same had a significant connection with the events that transpired on that date.
As the OSG emphasizes, the victim should not be presumed to have total recall of the incident.[][38]
Indeed, this Court cannot, in rape cases, expect the poor victim to give an accurate account of the
traumatic and dreadful experience that she had undergone.[][39] Neither inconsistencies on trivial
matters nor innocent lapses affect the credibility of a witness.[][40] On the contrary, they may be
considered badges of veracity or manifestations of truthfulness on material points in the testimony.[]
[41] Put in another way, minor inconsistencies even tend to strengthen rather than weaken the
credibility of a witness because they erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony.[][42] At any rate,
the circumstances mentioned by DANTE do not touch upon the area of inquiry, that is, the acts
allegedly perpetrated by the accused which constituted the offense.
DANTE also asserts that the element of force or intimidation indispensable in rape was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt. ANALIZA testified that one of the accused, who was never identified,
pointed a knife at her while DANTE was raping her. This testimony was inconsistent, uncorroborated,
and incredible. Furthermore, ANALIZA gave no information on where or how she was threatened
with the knife, or what the unidentified accused was doing with the knife while DANTE was raping
her. She also failed to prove any struggle against her attackers, which would preclude a finding that
force or intimidation was employed.[][43]
The OSG claims that force and intimidation attended the commission of the second rape, consisting
in (1) Willys holding ANALIZAs hand, gagging her mouth, and keeping her immobile on the floor; (2)
John Does pointing a knife at her; and (3) DANTEs kneeling on her legs, further immobilizing her.
We reiterate that for rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force or intimidation employed in
accomplishing the crime be so great or of such character as could not be resisted. What is
necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the
accused had in mind.[][44] We have also held that intimidation is addressed to the mind of the victim,
and must be viewed according to her perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
offense.[][45] ANALIZA elaborated on how she was held down by the three assailants. Regardless of
how she was threatened with a knife, ANALIZA made it clear that she could not resist the accuseds
attack.
DANTE next disputes the application of the principle that no woman in her right senses would
concoct a tale so repugnant to her virtue and undergo the rigors of a public trial concerning her very
honor, because this is no guaranty that all self-inflicted indignities are for the sake of truth.[][46] He
theorizes that the said principle is applicable when the victim is between 12 and 16 years old and
753
clad in the armor of innocence. A kindred test of the complainants credibility is her conduct after the
alleged sexual assault. Such conduct must be consistent with human behavior; otherwise, the
complainants uncorroborated testimony is deemed incredible.[][47] DANTE maintains that ANALIZAs
behavior after the rape rendered her allegations incredible.
The OSG contends that there is no standard human response to a crime; hence, ANALIZAs opting
to finish her chores after she was raped should not discredit her testimony. ANALIZA also gave a
plausible explanation for her failure to report the rape, that is, she was ashamed and afraid.
We disagree with DANTEs view that the complainants age is the basis for the application of the
aforequoted principle. He even concedes that the precept has been employed in cases involving 17-
and 18-year-old victims, as well as married women, where the circumstances so warrant.[][48]
Therefore, it is the totality of the circumstances, and not the victims age alone, which determines
whether the principle should be applied.
Anent the victims conduct following the alleged rape, there is no standard form of behavior in this
regard. In one case, after having been raped, the victim accepted a P20 bill from the rapist and then
went home.[][49] In another case, some twelve hours after the rape, the victim accompanied her
sister to attend a wake; and there she played card games and jumped with joy whenever she won.[]
[50] In a few other cases, the victims merely kept silent about their harrowing experience despite
opportunities to divulge the same.[][51] In these examples the oldest of the victims was 16 years old,
but we will not jump into the sweeping conclusion that the victims age is the controlling factor in
upholding her credibility. It is more correct to state that the victims discernment of the consequences
of the rape, in relation to her reaction to the offense, influences our assessment of the victims
trustworthiness. Thus, in a case where the alleged victim was an adult, the absence of any
manifestation of her outrage demonstrated the dubiousness of the charge[][52] because the victim in
such a case could be deemed to have sufficient recognition of the impact on her of the offense.
ANALIZA was only 17 years old when she was sexually assaulted. Her educational attainment is
Grade VI.[][53] She lived most of her life as a servant of one household or another.[][54] It was not
shown that she was a woman of above average intelligence.
We must not discredit her story of rape merely because after the rape she did other things which
could not be expected from one who had just been raped. In the first incident, ANALIZA simply
washed her bloodied private part after she regained consciousness; and in the second incident, she
finished her cooking. We have said before that the workings of the human mind when placed under
emotional stress are unpredictable, and that people react differently. In such a given situation, some
may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked into insensibility; while others may openly
welcome the intrusion.[][55]
As to ANALIZAs failure to immediately report her ordeal, the same was due mainly to her feeling of
shame. We keep in mind the fact that ANALIZA grew up in the province under a code of behavior
characterized by shyness and chastity. We also take judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty
and antipathy in airing publicly things which affect her honor.[][56] Indeed, there are many victims of
rape who would rather keep to themselves forever than make public a painful and humiliating secret.
[][57]
Appreciating the foregoing circumstances together, we cannot expect ANALIZA to act in accordance
with the norms of behavior demanded of mature women.[][58]
754
A review of her testimony convinces us with moral certainty that DANTE raped her on 18 September
1994. Further strengthening our conclusion is the fact that the trial judge gave full faith and credit to
her testimony. It is doctrinally entrenched that the evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses by the
trial court is received on appeal with the highest respect because such court has the direct
opportunity to observe the witnesses on the witness stand and determine whether they are telling
the truth or not.[][59] As we stated in People v. De Guzman:[][60]
[T]he trial judge is able to detect that sometimes thin line between fact and prevarication that will
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. That line may not be discernible from a mere
reading of the impersonal record by the reviewing court. The record will not reveal those tell-tale
signs that will affirm the truth or expose the contrivance, like the angry flush of an insisted assertion
or the sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright
tone of a ready reply. The record will not show if the eyes have darted in evasion or looked down in
confession or gazed steadily with a serenity that has nothing to distort or conceal. The record will not
show if tears were shed in anger, or in shame, or in remembered pain, or in feigned innocence. Only
the judge trying the case can see all these and on the basis of his observations arrive at an informed
and reasoned verdict.[][61]
Furthermore, no ulterior motive was shown by DANTE why ANALIZA would concoct a story of rape
and openly accuse him thereof. It is settled that where there is no evidence that the principal witness
for the prosecution was actuated by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so actuated
and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[][62]
Against ANALIZAs story, DANTE has his alibi and tangential attack on the moral character of
ANALIZA whom he pictured to us to be a prostitute.
His alibi must fail not only because he was positively identified by ANALIZA as the one who raped
her on 18 September 1994, but also because he was unable to prove the requisites of the defense
of alibi. For alibi to prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the
crime was committed, but he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the crime scene at the time the crime was committed.[][63] Per his own evidence, DANTE
was just in another barangay (Patag) in Ormoc City on 18 September 1994. He did not dare show
how far is that to Barangay Can-adieng where the rape took place.
As to the suggestion that ANALIZA was a prostitute, that alone, even if it be conceded, cannot
absolve him of his liability for rape. First, prostitutes can be victims of rape.[][64] Second, it was not
shown that ANALIZA remained a prostitute up to 18 September 1994. Our own meticulous review of
the evidence convinces us that ANALIZA was not a prostitute; and the testimony of DANTE on this is
simply incredible in itself, let alone the fact that we do not find him to be a credible person. For
evidence to be believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but must also
be credible in itself.[][65] To us, DANTE is a confessed scoundrel portraying himself to be a veritable
Casanova whose story is gravid with implausibilities.
The only issue left is the penalty which may be imposed on DANTE for the rape on 18 September
1994. The trial court imposed the death penalty pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in view of the finding that the crime was committed by three persons
and with the use of a knife, and was attended with the aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
It must be first observed that the complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 4615-0 and 4616-0 charge
DANTE and his co-accused with rape in violation of Article 335, Revised Penal Code, instead of
Article 335, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659. Before Article 335 was amended
755
by R.A. No. 7659 the penalty for rape when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons was reclusion perpetua to death. Its third paragraph read: Whenever the crime of rape
is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
This paragraph was not touched by R.A. No. 7659. Nevertheless, from the ratification on 2 February
1987 of the Constitution until the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on 31 December 1993[][66] the
imposition of the death penalty was constitutionally prohibited pursuant to Section 14(2), Article III of
the former.[][67]
The complaints in the cases below do not use the language of the law, viz., with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons. In lieu of deadly weapon, the complaints use knife; and, there is
no specific allegation that the crime was committed by two or more persons, but only an allegation of
conspiracy among the three accused. These allegations are, however, sufficient for purposes of the
above-quoted third paragraph of Article 335.
A deadly weapon is any weapon or instrument made and designed for offensive or defensive
purposes, or for the destruction of life or the infliction of injury; or one which, from the manner used,
is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.[][68] In our jurisdiction, it has been
held that a knife[][69] is a deadly weapon.
Also, since the complaints charge three persons with the crime of rape, namely, DANTE, alias Willy,
and John Doe, who allegedly acted in conspiracy, it is too plain and obvious that two or more
persons are alleged to have committed the crime. The evidence proved that, indeed, the three acted
in concert to commit the crime of rape on 18 September 1994 charged in Criminal Case No. 4615-0.
The foregoing notwithstanding, it is timely to remind prosecutors to exercise due care in the
preparation of complaints or informations to the end that circumstances which by specific provisions
of law change the nature of the crime or upgrade the penalty therefor must be specifically alleged
using the language of the law.[][70]
Parenthetically, we also note that the complaints allege treachery as an aggravating circumstance.
Under Article 14 of the Penal Code treachery is applicable only to crimes against persons. At the
time ANALIZA was raped, rape was a crime against chastity, although under the Anti-Rape Law of
1997 (R.A. No. 8353), approved on 30 September 1997, rape is already a crime against persons.
By way of conclusion, we do not hesitate to rule that in Criminal Case No. 4615-0, the crime was
committed with the use of a deadly weapon and by two or more persons under the third paragraph of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The generic aggravating circumstance of
dwelling[][71] justified the imposition of the greater penalty of death.[][72] Dwelling was clearly
established during the cross-examination of ANALIZAs mother by the defense. Thus:
Q Is it not a fact that Analiza was staying in the house of her employer Mr. and Mrs. Dy, the whole
year of 1994?
A Yes, sir.
Q And being employed as domestic helper, Analiza would stay in the house of Mr. and Mrs. Dy
day and night?
A Yes, sir.
756
Q And only very seldom that Analiza goes to your house? A Yes, sir.[][73]
Dwelling is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the
law accords to human abode. The dwelling need not be owned by the victim.[][74] Thus, in People v.
Basa,[][75] dwelling was appreciated, although the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the
house of another. As aptly stated in People v. Balansi:[][76] [O]ne does not lose his right of privacy
where he is offended in the house of another because as [an] invited guest [or a housemaid as in the
instant case], he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the same intimacy of
life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief moment, home to him. He is entitled
to respect even for that short moment.
Premises considered, his conviction in Criminal Case No. 4615-0 and the penalty imposed, death,
must stand. Four members of this Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659, insofar
as it prescribes the death penalty, is unconstitutional; but they nevertheless submit to the ruling of
the majority of the Court that the law is constitutional and the death penalty should be imposed in the
case at bar.
Lastly, we note that the trial court awarded moral damages only without the civil indemnity provided
for in Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code. Pursuant to that Article and the latest case law,[][77]
ANALIZA should be awarded P75,000 as indemnity. As to moral damages, a conviction for rape may
properly carry with it an award therefor.[][78] Here we find the award justified because ANALIZA was
compelled to attempt suicide out of shame of what had happened to her and of the resulting
pregnancy. Given this extreme consequence of DANTEs offense, we raise the award of moral
damages from P30,000 to P50,000. In addition, ANALIZA is entitled to an award of exemplary
damages in the amount of P10,000 in view of the presence of one aggravating circumstance.[][79]
Furthermore, since ANALIZA begot a child by reason of the rape, DANTE must acknowledge and
support the offspring pursuant to Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 201 of
the Family Code.[][80]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the judgment in Criminal Case No. 4616-
0 and ACQUITTING accused-appellant DANTE ALFECHE y Tamparong on ground of reasonable
doubt. However, the judgment in Criminal Case No. 4615-0 convicting said accused-appellant of the
crime of rape committed on 18 September 1994 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is
AFFIRMED, with the modification that (1) an indemnity is hereby imposed in the amount of P75,000;
(2) the award of moral damages is increased from P30,000 to P50,000; and (3) exemplary damages
in the amount of P10,000 is also awarded in favor of the victim ANALIZA DUROJA.
Accused-appellant is further ordered to acknowledge and support the offspring born of the rape. The
amount of support shall be determined by the trial court after due notice and hearing, with support in
arrears to be reckoned from the date the appealed decision was promulgated by the trial court.In
accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659, amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of the case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of
the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.Costs against the accused-appellant.SO
ORDERED.
E. Batulanon V. People, GR No. 139857, September 15, 2006
G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006
LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
757
DECISION
This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
15221, affirming with modification the April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General
Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila
Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and the July 29, 1999
Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.
Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its

Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits
from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.
During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans
were discovered.4
Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against
Batulanon, to wit:
That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being
then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of
managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and
paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda Omadlao by then
and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160,
Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was
granted a loan and received the amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was
never granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in
her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said
accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the loan of P4,160 and
thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite
demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in
the aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency.5
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province
of South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the
duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same,
and paying out loans to members taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the name of Gonafreda Oracion by
then and there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan of
P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
758
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was
granted a loan, received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never
granted a loan, never received the same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her
name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused
did then and there release to herself the same and received the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter
misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands,
refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the
duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same
and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by
then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Ferlyn Arroyo
had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of P3,500.00,
thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and
was never granted loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said
accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn
Arroyo by signing therein the signature of Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn
Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency, when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo
never received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud
PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the amount of
P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still
refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned
amount of P3,500, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of
South Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
being then the manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the
duty of managing the affairs of the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same
and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and
document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI
by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the said Dennis
Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with,
and was granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a
759
deposit and was never granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth,
said accused did then and there again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the
name of Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it
appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said
Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her criminal intent and fraudulent
design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and receive the
loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate
and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused
and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the
aforementioned amount of P5,000, Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8
The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.
Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as
witnesses.
Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers9
testified that on certain dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying
amounts to four different individuals as follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A10 for
P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A11 for
P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No. 276A13 was
released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released
to Dennis Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan
because they were not bona fide members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand,
was a member of the cooperative but there was no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in
1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.16 Medallo stated that pursuant to the
cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for
loans.17
Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their
respective cash vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of
the amount stated therein.18 As to the signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared
that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.19
Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He
corroborated Medallo's testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not
members of PCCI. He stated that Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her
son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to
minors.20
Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its
Chairman in 1982 until 1983. He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and
Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of
Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is
760
Batulanon's handwriting.21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken, only that in
Arroyo's name was settled.22
The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a
hostile witness and Batulanon.
Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her
the PCCI General Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the
financial transactions of the cooperative for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the
Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was able to identify only Cash Voucher No.
237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers because the
Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the entries.23
Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the
names of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her
presence at the PCCI office after she personally released the money to them;24 that the three were
members of the cooperative as shown by their individual deposits and the ledger; that the board of
directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the correctness of the
entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release
loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence;25 that she signed the
loan application and voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified
that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity;26
that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are eligible for membership in the cooperative
provided they are children of regular members.
Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for
another loan as she still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan
but the cooperative refused to accept her payments after the cases were filed in court.27 She also
declared that one automatically becomes a member when he deposits money with the
cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did not
have by-laws yet.29
On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had
been registered since 1967.30
On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in all the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4
months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify
the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal interest from the institution of the complaints until
fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.31
The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months
of arresto mayor maximum, AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to
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indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen thousand one hundred sixty
(P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.
SO ORDERED.32
The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was
allegedly forged, thus the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion
and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as
Medallo.33 She avers that the crime of falsification of private document requires as an element
prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan transactions
because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative.34
The petition lacks merit.
Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial
document, appellant could be convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled
rule that it is the allegations in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the
technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v. People,35 we held:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the
technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the
merits. x x x That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else,
should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime
given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of
the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and important question to him is, "Did
you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a crime named murder?"
If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name of the
crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner
alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the
crime which those acts constitute.
The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 236 of the Revised
Penal Code are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in
paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3)
that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with
intent to cause such damage.37
In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph
2 of Article 171, i.e., causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. This is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion,
and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A, respectively, as payee of the amounts
appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they obtained a loan
and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts
reflected in the cash vouchers.
The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the
name of Omadlao and Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan
from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo, Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member,
she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.
762
Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in
the vouchers and made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these
persons. As to the signature of Arroyo, Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the
handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who signed the name of Arroyo.
Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons whose
signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover,
under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any
witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write,
or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has
thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that
Medallo was prompted by any ill motive.
The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission
of guilt is untenable. Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases,
except those involving quasi-offenses or criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt.
There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan
transactions are reflected in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only
grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not
members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four accounts, only that in Ferlyn
Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid legal
prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is
collected from Batulanon.39
The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not
commercial documents because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to
promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions41 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of
Commerce or other commercial law.42 Rather, they are private documents, which have been
defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public
notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved,
evidenced or set forth. 43
In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime
charged in the information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime
necessarily included therein.44 The prosecution in this case was able to discharge its burden
completely.
As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,45 it is important to

ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa.
If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime
to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a
document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the accused made
it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days
during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the
offended party, the Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused
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misappropriated the wages during which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of
falsification of private document.
In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the
pawn ticket and made it appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned
the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article
pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the
accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the
payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents,
succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.
In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.
Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty
should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21)
days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which
must be within the range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in
Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals correctly imposed the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.
Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer
the aforementioned penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to
indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00 representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without
deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's mother as the same was settled with the
understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered. The amount shall
earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994
until the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory, the
interest rate shall be 12% per annum until its satisfaction.
However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not
falsification. Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification
are the following:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those
in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
764
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that
of the genuine original; or;
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or
official book.
In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis
Batulanon's signature in the cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the
name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records, however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A,
petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: "by:
lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does
not fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful
about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the
proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false
statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud
which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for
falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty
of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash
voucher of Dennis.50
The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised
Penal Code are:
(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery
of, or to return, the same;
(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial
on his part of such receipt;
(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not
necessary when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant)51
Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation.
The latter, a treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds
of the company and used it for personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of
the same amount drawn on the Philippine National Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to
deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road Company until the end of the
month. When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been carried
in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only
P125.66 in his account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with
the PNB sufficient sum to cover the check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court
explained that:
Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element
of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or
diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for
this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the
765
intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to restore the funds
before the defalcation is discovered. x x x
Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary
elements of estafa x x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was
received by him for safe-keeping or administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the
responsible financial officer of the corporation and as such had immediate control of the current
funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the custody of the same. That he, in
the exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter the case nor can
the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted on
his own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty
of estafa.
Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted
to him for safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks
were to be retained by the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted
the funds for that period. The checks did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by
the appellant or remained under his personal control they were of no value to the corporation; he
might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his subordinate with instructions to
retain them.
xxxx
But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently
misappropriate the funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases
of this nature and, as we have seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities
have been cited who, at first sight, appear to hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short
periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed to extend this interpretation of the
law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own use, especially
where, as in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and makes
no distinction between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in
the present case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.
The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The
appellant's counsel argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the
Railroad Company during the period the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well
settled by former adjudications of this court that the disturbance in property rights caused by the
misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning
of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36 Phil., 821.)53
In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for
administration and in trust for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she
fraudulently used the name of her son who is likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her
misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also not disputed as she even admitted
receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is reflected in the
records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum
misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other
productive undertakings. At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's
misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute injury within the meaning of Article 315.
766
Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision
is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where the amount
defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There being no modifying
circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts
of falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum, for each count, and to indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated
the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until
finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this
judgment until its satisfaction; and
(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8)
months of prision correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit
Cooperative Incorporated the sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be
imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,, Appellee, -versus-
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON yHOMO, Appellant. G.R. No. 179943
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
767
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.
Promulgated:
June 26, 2009
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with
modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding
appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with homicide.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000,
Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and
Edralin Macahis, security guard; all employees of Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay
Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored Tamaraw FX arrived for
service at the said gasoline station.[3]
Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the drivers side
in order to take the key of the vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He saw
through the lowered window shield that there were about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle.
He proceeded to fill up P50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank.After doing this, he returned the key to
the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle would not start.[4]
Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy
Fortunato Lacambra III were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six
male passengers of the same vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They
were armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol.[5]
Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,[6] while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to
go near the Car Wash Section.[7] At that instance, guns were poked at them.[8]
768
Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's
wallet containing a pawnshop ticket and P50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on
his nape with a gun.[9]
Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money
worth P3,000.00.[10] Those four robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the
stomach.[11] Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin Macahis' service firearm.[12]
After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions
immediately leave the place.[13] The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San
Mateo, Rizal.[14] When the robbers left, Eduardo Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who
told him that the robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that Edralin Macahis had a gunshot
wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured Edralin
Macahis to the hospital.[15] Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the gunshot wound.
[16]
The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a
gun at him.[17]
However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his
Tita Emma at Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of
January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to
Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's cousin and the latter's younger brother, accompanied
appellant to the terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain Christian
Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo asked Christian
Gersalia if he would allow appellant to hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside
from Christian Gersalia, there were other passengers in the said vehicle.[18]
When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not
allowed to do so; instead, he was asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination.
While on the road, appellant fell asleep. When he woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then
saw Christian Gersalia and the other passengers conducting a hold-up. He never left the vehicle and
was not able to do anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the gunshots,
Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina.
On their way, they were followed by policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired back at
the policemen. It was then that the vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in
different directions leaving him behind. When the policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.
[19]
As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed
against appellant, Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,
Pantoy Servantes, an alias Rey, an alias Jonard, an alias Precie, and an alias Renato, which read
as:
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and
769
conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms
and acting as a band, with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of
superior strength and using disguise, fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means
of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX
GASOLINE STATION, owned by Regino C. Natividad, and represented by Macario C. Natividad, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash earnings worth
P3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of
P3,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with
unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia,
Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias
Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are
still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting
upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring and confederating , together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela,
Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato,
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and
and acting as a band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of
of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of
JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following, to wit:
a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at P1,500.00
b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at P2,000.00
c) Guess black bag valued at P500.00
d) Leather wallet valued at P150.00
e) White T-Shirt valued at P175.00
to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of P4,325.00 and on the occasion of the said
robbery, the above-named accused while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill,
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a
770
Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, and
of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN
MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously rob, steal, and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun with serial number
13265 valued at P12,000.00 owned by Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated
represented by its General Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said Alert
and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated in the aforesaid amount of P12,000.00 and on the
occasion of the said robbery the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms, with
intent to kill conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon
Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey, Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias
Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN
MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and
of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and intimidation, employed upon the person of
EDUARDO ZULUETA, a gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit:
771

a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's watch
(automatic) valued at P2,000.00
b) Cash money worth P50.00
to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of P2,050.00 and on the occasion of the said
robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill,
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a
Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk
which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte,
entered a plea of not guilty on all the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad,[20] then officer-
in-charge of Energex Gasoline Station where the incident took place; Edito Macahis,[21] a cousin of
the deceased security guard Edralin Macahis; Fortunato Lacambra III,[22] a gasoline boy of the
same gas station; Eduardo Zulueta,[23] also a gasoline boy of the same gas station, and Alberto
Quintos,[24] general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the deceased
security guard was employed.
The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine Homo,[25] a
cousin of appellant and the appellant[26] himself.
On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision[27] convicting appellant beyond
reasonable doubt of all the charges against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of
772
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D.
1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors
who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the
penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission of the
crime as an aggravating circumstance; to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned by Regino Natividad
and represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount ofP3,000.00 as compensatory damages and to
pay the costs;
2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond
crime as an aggravating circumstance, and to pay the costs;
reasonable ground of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of
crime as an aggravating circumstance; to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis in the amount of
P50,000.00 as death indemnity; to pay P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service
firearm if restitution is no longer possible and P50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;
Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D.
crime as an aggravating circumstance and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery, in the
amount of P2,050.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no longer
possible and to pay the costs.
As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date, remained at-
large, let a warrant of arrest be issued against them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to
the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon apprehension of the said accused.
As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias Rey,
Alias Jonard, Alias Precie and Alias Renato, whose true names, identities and present whereabouts
are still unknown and are still at-large, let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives
773
without prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification and apprehension of the said
accused.
SO ORDERED.
The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004,[28] in conformity
with the Decision dated July 7, 2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled The People of the Philippines v.
Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule insofar as they
provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this Court, en banc dated
September 19, 1995, in Internal Rules of the Supreme Court in cases similarly involving the death
penalty, pursuant to the Court's power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII,
Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an intermediate review by the CA before such cases are
elevated to this Court. This Court transferred the cases to the CA for appropriate action and
disposition.
The CA, on June 29, 2007,[29] affirmed with modification, the Decision of the RTC, with the
dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon

Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide of only one count.
Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, the penalty
imposed upon Marlon de Leon y Homo is hereby reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.
SO ORDERED.
On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,[30] the penalty imposed being
reclusion perpetua.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its Manifestation and
Motion In Lieu of the Supplemental Brief[31] dated February 4, 2008 stating that it will no longer file
774
a supplemental brief, considering that appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the
filing of a supplemental brief.
Appellant filed a Manifestation[32] on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-pleads and
adopts his Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief as Supplemental Brief.
Appellant, in his Brief,[33] assigned the following errors:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR

IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE SAME AND GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH

HOMICIDE, THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES
DESPITE THAT THE CRIME CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH
SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.
The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,[34] insisted that all the elements of the crime and the
appellant's participation in the crime had been established.
Appellant, in his Reply Brief,[35] argued that the penalty should not be death, but only
reclusion perpetua, because the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, although
alleged in the Information, was not alleged with specificity.
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons Penalties. - Any person
guilty of robbery with the use of violence against or any person shall suffer:
775
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.
In People v. De Jesus,[36] this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of robbery with
homicide, thus:
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the
confluence of the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against
persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.[37]
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery,
with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery.[38] The intent to commit
robbery must precede the taking of human life.[39] The homicide may take place before, during or
after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the
circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to
be taken into consideration.[40] There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless
imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with
homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from
the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the
occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the
robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide. The word homicide is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder,
parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of
personal property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt,
conviction of the accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in
court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the
robber or recovered by the owner.[41] The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of
776
the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in
the possession of the victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of
the exact amount or value involved.[42]
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took
part as principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly
appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.[43]
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery,
he is guilty only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit
robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained
from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-
conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.[44]
Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for
instance, it was committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the
possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d)
to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there is a nexus between the
robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the
robbery.
From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of evidence
presented by the prosecution, the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. There was
no mistaking from the actions of all the accused that their main intention was to rob the gasoline
station and that on occasion of such robbery, a homicide was committed. The question now is
whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to appellant, the
prosecution failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no merit to
appellant's argument.
If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of
the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association
and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among
them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.[45] The prosecution
was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a
convincing manner, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively
identified appellant as one of the robbers. Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one
of the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus:
Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon. Court. whether those two (2) persons
who poked their guns at you were (sic) present now?
A: Only one, sir, and there he is.
(At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by the name of MARLON ALBERT
DE LEON when asked.)
777
Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash or not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon was guarding you?
A: His gun was poked at me, sir.
Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside from that?
A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.
Q: What else, Mr. Witness?
A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.
Q: Who hit you with a gun?
A: His other companion, sir.[46]
Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:
Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section and hit him, was he also
armed?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?
A: Also .38 caliber, sir.
Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and ordered Zulueta to go to the
carwash section?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Kindly point to him?
A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Marlon Albert de Leon).
[47]
Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a
conspiracy existed and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of
the execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be
performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate
and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective
effort to achieve their common criminal objective.[48] Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the
778
act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary,[49] since all the conspirators are principals.
As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be disturbed. The well-settled
rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial courts findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which
could affect the result of the case.[50
For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence
during the commission of the crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to the matter.
Granting that he was merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt
himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach
himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof.[51] Appellant
offered no evidence that he performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the robbers
nor to prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value.Courts generally view
the defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can
concoct them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain
more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby
positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.[52]
Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count
of robbery with homicide. In the crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne
from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. As decided[53] by the Court of Appeals:
A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a

series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution.[54] Although there is a series of acts, there
is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty shall be imposed.[55]
In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and
that is the Energex gasoline station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the
money and valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these
circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continuing
offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.[56] This can be said of the case at
hand.
Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,[57] wherein the robbery that took
place in several houses belonging to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held
not to be taken as separate and distinct offenses. They formed instead, component parts of the
general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the Solicitor General argued that the
[appellant] had committed eight different robberies, because the evidence shows distinct and
different acts of spoilation in different houses, with several victimized persons.[58] The Highest
Tribunal, however, ruled that the perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from
one another.[59] Thus, the single offense or crime.
779
Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The decision[60] merely states
that, in view of the enactment of R.A. 9346, the sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant,
is automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua, but is silent as to how it had arrived into such a
conclusion.
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with
homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63
of the same Code provides that, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two
indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is
attended by one aggravating circumstance.[61] It must be remembered that the Informations filed
with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the
third paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an
unlicensedfirearm is a special and not a generic aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder
committed. As explained by this Court in Palaganas v. People:[62]
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as
those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the
Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period,
but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in
the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.[63] Moreover, it can
be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special
conditions to increase the penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot
increase the penalty to the next higher degree. Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and
complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does not change the character of the
offense charged.[64] It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven
during the trial in order to be appreciated.[65] Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating
circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating
circumstances are exactly the same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas in the case of special aggravating
circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating

circumstance provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866,[66] as amended by Republic Act No.
8294,[67] which is a special law. Its pertinent provision states:
780
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is silent as to
whether it is generic or qualifying.[68] Thus, it ruled that when the law is silent, the same must be
interpreted in favor of the accused.[69] Since a generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable
to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as the latter changes the nature of
the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to declare that the
use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.[70] This interpretation is erroneous, since we already held in several cases that with
the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or
homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating
circumstance.[71] Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant case since it took effect before the
commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm by the
petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating
circumstance and not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.
In another case,[72] this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be established by
testimony, even without the presentation of the firearm.[73] In the said case, it was established that
Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo died of, and Pedro Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic
examination of the slugs recovered from the place of the incident showed that they were fired from
a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively identified appellant
therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It was also established that the same
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court ruled that the trial court and the CA
correctly appreciated the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.
After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of
unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the
existence of the firearm can be established by mere testimony, the fact that appellant was not a
licensed firearm holder must still be established. The prosecution failed to present written or
testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to carry or own a firearm, hence,
the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.
Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Edralin
Macahis the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for
the stolen service firearm if restitution is no longer possible and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
Actual damages were never proven during the trial. Hence, this Court's rulings[74] on temperate
damages apply, thus:
In People vs. Abrazaldo,[75] we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual
damages for funeral expenses cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove
them, temperate damages may be awarded in the amount of P25,000[76] This doctrine specifically
refers to a situation where no evidence at all of funeral expenses was presented in the trial court.
781
However, in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than P25,000 are proved during the
trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the more recent case of People vs. Villanueva[77]
which modified the Abrazaldo doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000, the award of temperate damages for P25,000
is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser amount. To rule otherwise would be anomalous
and unfair because the victims heirs who tried but succeeded in proving actual damages of an
amount less than P25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no
receipts at all but would now be entitled to P25,000 temperate damages.[78]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion
perpetua in view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also
liable to pay the heirs of the victim, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in addition to the other civil
indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal.
SO ORDERED.
A. People V De Leon, 49 Phil 427
G.R. No. 109266 December 2, 1993
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs.HON. JUSTICE FRANCIS GARCHITORENA,

SANDIGANBAYAN (First Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Amado M. Santiago, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
782
QUIASON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court to set aside: (a) the
Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal CaseNo. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)
and to declare Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, disqualified from
acting in said criminal case; and (b) the Resolution of said court promulgated onMarch 14, 1993,
which deemed as "filed" the 32 Amended Informations against petitioner (Rollo, pp. 2-35 and pp. 36-
94).
On May 1, 1991, petitioner was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of
the Alien Legalization Program (Rollo, p. 36).
On May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with us a petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R.
No. 99289-99290 (Santiago v. Vasquez, 205 SCRA 162 [1992]), to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to
harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She alleged that this was in violation of Section
10, Article IX-C of the Constitution which provides that "(b)ona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination." The petition was dismissed on
January 13, 1992.
On October 16, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for inhibition of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which
motion was set for hearing on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, pp. 38-41).
On October 27, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division), of which Presiding Justice Garchitorena is
a member, set the criminal case for arraignment on November 13, 1992 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 42)
On November 6, 1992, petitioner moved to defer the arraignment on the grounds that there was a
pending motion for inhibition, and that petitioner intended to file a motion for a bill of
particulars (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
On November 9, 1992, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied the motion to defer the
arraignment (Rollo, p. 45).
On November 10, 1992, petitioner filed a motion for a bill of particulars (Rollo, pp. 47-48). The
motion stated that while the information alleged that petitioner had approved the application or
legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits and advantages it lacked a list of the favored
aliens. According to petitioner, unless she was furnished with the names and identities of the aliens,
she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.
On November 12, 1992 and upon motion of petitioner in G.R.No. 107598 (Miriam Defensor Santiago
v. Sandiganbayan, et al.), we directed the Sandiganbayan (First Division) to reset the arraignment to
a later date and to dispose of the two incidents pending before it (Re: disqualification of Presiding
Justice Garchitorena and the motion for the bill of particulars).
At the hearing on November 13, 1992 on the motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecution stated
categorically that they would file only one amended information against petitioner.
783
However, on December 8, 1992, the prosecution filed a motion toadmit the 32 Amended
Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to 18402; Rollo, pp. 61-126).
On March 3, 1993, Presiding Justice Garchitorena issued the questioned Resolution dated March
11, 1993, denying the motion for his disqualification (Rollo, pp. 151-164).
On March 14, 1993, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated a resolution, admitting the 32
Amended Informations and ordering petitioner to post the corresponding bail bonds within ten days
from notice (Rollo, pp. 165-185). Petitioner's arraignment on the 32 Amended Informations was set
forApril 12, 1993 at 8:00 A.M. (Rollo, p. 186).
Hence, the filing of the instant petition.
Acting on the petition for the issuance of a restraining order, we issued the Resolution dated March
25, 1993, ordering Presiding Justice Garchitorena "to CEASE and DESIST from sitting in the case
until the question of his disqualification is finally resolved by this Court and from enforcing the
resolution dated March 11, 1993, ordering petitioner to post bail bonds for the 32 Amended
Informations and from proceeding with the arraignment onApril 12, 1993" (Rollo, p. 194).
Re: Disqualification of the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice
The petition for disqualification of Presiding Justice Garchitorena is based on the publication of is
letter in the July 29, 1992 issue of the Philippine Star, which to petitioner "prejudged" the validity of
the information filedagainst her. Petitioner claims that Presiding Justice Garchitorena "cannot be
expected to change the conclusions he has subconsciously drawn in his public statements . . . when
he sits in judgment on the merits of the case . . ." (Rollo, pp. 16-17).
The letter in question was written in response to an item in Teodoro Benigno's column in the July 22,
1992 issue of the Philippine Star, criticizing the Sandiganbayan for issuing on July 11, 1992 a hold-
departure order against petitioner. Benigno wrote that said order reflected a "perverse morality" of
the Sandiganbayan and the lack of "legal morality" of its Presiding Justice, thus:
I cannot, for example accept the legal morality of Sandiganbayan Justice Francis Garchitorena who
would stop Miriam Defensor Santiago from going abroad for a Harvard scholarship because of graft
charges against her. Some of the most perfidious Filipinos I know have come and gone, left and
returned to these shores without Mr. Garchitorena kicking any kind of rumpus. Compared to the
peccadilloes of this country's outstanding felons, what Miriam is accused of is kindergarten stuff. The
Sandiganbayan Supremo got a lot of headlines for stopping Miriam but I contend this is the kind of
perverse morality we can do without (Rollo, p. 156).
The portion of the letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, which petitioner finds objectionable, reads
as follows:
(c) Mrs. Santiago has never informed any court where her cases are pending of her intention to
travel, whether the Regional Trial Court where she is charged with soliciting donations from people
transacting with her office at Immigration or before the Sandiganbayan where she is charged with
having favored unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program nor even the
Supreme Court where her petition is still pending (Rollo, p. 158).
In particular, petitioner considered as prejudgment the statement of Presiding Justice Garchitorena

that petitioner had been charged before the Sandiganbayan "with having favored unqualified aliens
with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program."
784
The statement complained of was just a restatement of the Information filed against petitioner in
Criminal Case No. 16698 in connection with which the hold-departure order was issued. Said
Information specified the act constituting the offense charged, thus:
That on or about October 17, 1988, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad
faith and manifest partiality, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the
application for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation
of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same,
thereby causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to
said aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused (Rollo, p. 36).
It appears that petitioner tried to leave the country without first securing the permission of the
Sandiganbayan, prompting it to issue the hold-departure order which Benigno viewed as uncalled
for. The letter of Presiding Justice Garchitorena, written in defense of the dignity and integrity of the
Sandiganbayan, merely stated that all persons facing criminal charges in court, with no exception,
have to secure permission to leave the country. Nowhere in the letter is the merit of the charge
against petitioner ever touched. Certainly, there would have been no occasion for the letter had
Benigno not written his diatribe, unfair at that, against the Sandiganbayan.
Notwithstanding petitioner's misgiving, it should be taken into consideration that the Sandiganbayan
sits in three divisions with three justices in each division. Unanimity among the three members is
mandatory for arriving at any decision of a division (P.D. No. 1606, Sec. 5). The collegiate character
of the Sandiganbayan thus renders baseless petitioner's fear of prejudice and bias on the part of
Presiding Justice Garchitorena (Paredes v. Gopengco, 29 SCRA 688 [1969] ).
Re: Claim of denial of due process
Petitioner cannot complain that her constitutional rights to due process were violated by reason of
the delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation. According to her, while the offense was
allegedly committed "on or before October 17, 1988", the information was filed only on May 9, 1991
and the amended informations on December 8, 1992 (Rollo, p. 14).
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 [1988] is inapplicable to petitioner's case. In Tatad, there
indeed was an unexplained inaction on the part of the public prosecutors inspite of the simplicity of
the legal and factual issues involved therein.
In the case at bench, there was a continuum of the investigatory process but it got snarled because
of the complexity of the issues involved. The act complained of in the original information came to
the attention of the Ombudsman only when it was first reported in the January 10, 1989 issue of the
Manila Standard. Immediately thereafter, the investigatory process was set in motion. The
investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but on request of
petitioner herself the investigation was first assigned to Special Prosecutor Gualberto dela Llana but
on request of petitioner herself the investigation was re-assigned to the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. The case was handled by a panel of four prosecutors, who submitted a draft
resolution for the filing of the charges on March 29, 1990. The draft resolution had to undergo the
hierarchy of review, normal for a draft resolution with a dissenting vote, until it reached the
Ombudsman in March 1991.
785
We note that petitioner had previously filed two petitions before us involving Criminal Case No.
16698 (G.R. Nos. 99289-99290; G.R.No. 107598). Petitioner has not explained why she failed to
raise the issue of delay in the preliminary investigation and the filing of the information against her in
those petitions. a piece-meal presentation of issues, like the splitting of causes of action, is self-
defeating.
Petitioner next claims that the Amended Informations did not charge any offense punishable under
Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of therein were authorized under
Executive Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of Investigation
adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and unmarried, minor
children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31,
1983. she concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to quash the
informations (Rollo, pp. 25-31).
In a motion to quash, the accused admits hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information
(People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963] ). Therefore, petitioner admitted hypothetically in her motion
that:
(1) She was a public officer;
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, who arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984;
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in "evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the execution of her official functions."
The foregoing allegations of fact constitute the elements of the offense defined in Section 3 (e) of
R.A. No. 3019.
The claims that the acts complained of were indeed authorized under Executive Order No. 324, that
petitioner merely followed in good faith the policy adopted by the Board of Commissioners and that
the aliens were spouses or unmarried minor children of persons qualified for legalization of stay, are
matters of defense which she can establish at the trial.
Anent petitioner's claim that the Amended Informations did not allege that she had caused "undue
injury to any party, including the Government," there are two ways of violating Section 3 (e) of R.A.
No. 3019. These are: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; and (b) by
giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.
In Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 100334, December 5, 1991, we held:
The use of the distinctive term "or" connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 (a). In
other words the act of giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference is
not an indispensable element of the offense of "causing any undue injury to any party" as claimed by
petitioners although there may be instances where both elements concur.
Re: Delito continuado
Be that as it may, our attention was attracted by the allegation in the petition that the public
prosecutors filed 32 Amended Informations against petitioner, after manifesting to the
786
Sandiganbayan that they would only file one amended information (Rollo, pp. 6-61). We also noted
that petitioner questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32 Amended Informations, the
splitting of the original information (Rollo, pp. 127-129). In the furtherance of justice, we therefore
proceed to inquire deeper into the validity of said plant, which petitioner failed to pursue with vigor in
her petition.
We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and
hence, there should only be one information to be file against her.
The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued crime" and
sometimes referred to as "continuous crime."
In fairness to the Ombudsman's Office of the Special Prosecutor, it should be borne in mind that the
concept of delito continuado has been a vexing problem in Criminal Law difficult as it is to define
and more difficult to apply.
According to Cuello Calon, for delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed
during a period of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose,
which means that two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and same
instant or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim(II Derecho
Penal, p. 520; I Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 630, 1987 ed.).
According to Guevarra, in appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality
there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator (Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,
1957 ed., p. 102; Penal Science and Philippine Criminal Law, p. 152).
Padilla views such offense as consisting of a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution (Criminal Law, 1988 ed. pp. 53-54).
Applying the concept of delito continuado, we treated as constituting only one offense the following
cases:
(1) The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same
time and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 67 Phil. 320 [1939] ).
(2) The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same
period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563 [1974] ).
(3) The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 49
Phil. 437 [1926] ).
(4) The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's
benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said benefits
(People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 [1964] ). The collection of the legal fees were impelled by the
same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made under
the same criminal impulse (People v. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975 [1955] ).
On the other hand, we declined to apply the concept to the following cases:
(1) Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December
1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956 (People v. Dichupa, 113 Phil. 306 [1961] ). The
said acts were committed on two different occasions.
787
(2) Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal said
offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications "were not the
result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify . . ." (People v. Cid, 66
Phil. 354 [1938] ).
(3) Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn
over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the
installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77 [1976] ).
(4) 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the
employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308 [1975]).
The concept of delito continuado, although an outcry of the Spanish Penal Code, has been applied
to crimes penalized under special laws,e.g. violation of R.A. No. 145 penalizing the charging of fees
for services rendered following up claims for war veteran's benefits (People v. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156
[1964] ).
Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code shall be supplementary to special laws,
unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may
be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws.
The question of whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or
separate offenses has troubled also American Criminal Law and perplexed American courts as
shown by the several theories that have evolved in theft cases.
The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of
several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny. Many courts have abandoned the "separate larceny doctrine," under
which there is a distinct larceny as to the property of each victim. Also abandoned was the doctrine
that the government has the discretion to prosecute the accused or one offense or for as many
distinct offenses as there are victims (annotation, 37 ALR 3rd 1407, 1410-1414).
The American courts following the "single larceny" rule, look at the commission of the different
criminal acts as but one continuous act involving the same "transaction" or as done on the same
"occasion" (State v. Sampson, 157 Iowa 257, 138 NW 473; People v. Johnson, 81 Mich. 573, 45 NW
1119; State v. Larson, 85 Iowa 659, 52 NW 539).
An American court held that a contrary rule would violate the constitutional guarantee against putting
a man in jeopardy twice for the same offense (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179). Another court observed
that the doctrine is a humane rule, since if a separate charge could be filed for each act, the accused
may be sentenced to the penitentiary for the rest of his life (Annotation, 28 ALR 2d 1179).
In the case at bench, the original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act
that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy
such privilege.
The original information also averred that the criminal act : (i) committed by petitioner was in
violation of a law Executive Order No. 324 datedApril 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to one
offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988.
788
The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original information, except
that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the
name of the individual whose stay was legalized.
At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that they
would file only one amended information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens. As
stated in the Order dated November 12, 1992 of the Sandiganbayan (First Division):
On the matter of the Bill of Particulars, the prosecution has conceded categorically that the
accusation against Miriam Defensor Santiago consists of one violation of the law represented by the
approval of the applications of 32 foreign nationals for availment (sic) of the Alien Legalization
Program. In this respect, and responding directly to the concerns of the accused through counsel,
the prosecution is categorical that there will not be 32 accusations but only one . . . (Rollo, p. 59).
The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time,
i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the
application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as
when the approval was embodied in the same document.
Likewise, the public prosecutors manifested at the hearing the motion for a bill of particulars that the
Government suffered a single harm or injury. The Sandiganbayan in its Order dated November 13,
1992 stated as follows:
. . . Equally, the prosecution has stated that insofar as the damage and prejudice to the government
is concerned, the same is represented not only by the very fact of the violation of the law itself but
because of the adverse effect on the stability and security of the country in granting citizenship to
those not qualified (Rollo, p. 59).
WHEREFORE, the Resolution dated March 3, 1993 in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) is AFFIRMED and its Resolution dated March 11, 1993 in Criminal
Case No. 16698 is MODIFIED in the sense that the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of
the Ombudsman is directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos.
18371 to 18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, i.e.,
No. 16698. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on March 25, 1993 is LIFTED
insofar as to the disqualification of Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena is concerned.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Puno, JJ.,
concur
Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the
majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the
decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the
issues there involved.
789
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply
directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court byMr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the
consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that
opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate
the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one
Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations, for that court seriously erred in not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those
Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my
dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205
SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner
as follows:
being the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application
for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby
causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to the said
aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of
Executive Order No. 324 approved applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that the Executive Order
"does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain
Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as
amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation for waiver of passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The
Order provides, among other things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines
790
before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status
from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who
arrived after January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she
had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the
spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter being alien spouses or parents who had
entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of
passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 to apply for waiver of passport
requirements and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved such
"legalization."
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus,
disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal
information in this case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation,
was expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and
enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement
that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and administration of Executive
Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and
discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably,
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
may waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of individual aliens for
humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become
public charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates
to a single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security and
members of subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens
under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;"
and (b) "for the public interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this
Act. 2
791
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of
grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature,
constituted official acts of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing
Executive Order No. 324. There is no question that the applications for waiver of passport
requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by
petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien
spouses and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in
paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that
petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor
children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that the fees
specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and
converted to her own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the
Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor children below 21
years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included an allegation of
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the
preliminary investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an allegation which actually a
conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally"
which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the
preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver
of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or
construction given by petitioner to Executive OrderNo. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for
waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of
qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for
humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring family unity there would be no
"injury," let alone an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport
requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be
an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive OrderNo. 324 be
held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a

statute or implementing regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with
the implementation of such a stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the
courts. This Court itself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such
administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967];
Salavaria v. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971];
Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an administrative interpretation be
ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible for such
interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who has so
acted, something far graver that error of law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is
corrupt personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan,
185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
792
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in
nature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe,
further, that there is nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue.
There is no real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart from those already admitted by
petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this
Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go
through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal
characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime.
Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious
consequences would follow for the administration of law and government rules and regulations in
general. For the thrust of the criminal information here would appear to be that public officers
interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal
liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such
interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal CaseNo. 16698 back in 1 May 1991.
approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still
going on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original
Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which petitioner in effect had asked
us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be terminated by now, one way or the
other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go through
the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of
the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two
(32) Amended Informations.
Romero, J., concurs.
# Separate Opinions
VITUG, J., concurring and dissenting:
While I share the view expressed by Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his dissent from the
majority opinion in Miriam Defensor-Santiago vs. Conrado Vasquez, et al. (205 SCRA 162), the
decision in said case, however, having become final, has, in my view, the effect of foreclosing the
issues there involved.
Accordingly, in this petition now at bench (G.R. No. 109266, I vote with the majority in simply
directing, for the reasons expressed for the Court by Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason, the
consolidation of the thirty-two Amended Informations into a single Information.
FELICIANO, J., dissenting:
I dissent from the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Quiason, to the extent that that
opinion directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman to consolidate
the thirty-two (32) Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 and 18402) into one
Information under the original case number, i.e., No. 16698.
793
I believe that the Court should order the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two (32) Amended
Informations, for that court seriously erred in not granting petitioner's Motion to Quash those
Informations. The grounds for my submission in this respect were spelled out in detail in my
dissenting opinion 1 in Miriam Defensor-Santiago v. Conrado M. Vasquez, Ombudsman, et al. (205
SCRA 162 at 174-180 [1992] ), which I beg leave to reproduce here:
The information filed before the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16698 charges the petitioner
as follows:
being the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally approve the application
for legalization of aliens who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984 in violation of Executive
Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 which does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby
causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted benefits and advantage to the said
aliens in the discharge of the official and administrative functions of said accused.
Contrary to law.
Essentially, the above information charges that petitioner had, in violation of the provisions of
Executive Order No. 324 approved applications for legalization of the stay of aliens who had arrived
in the Philippines after January 1, 1984. The information takes the position that the Executive Order
"does not allow the legalization of the same."
Executive Order No. 324 entitled "Waiving Passport Requirements for Immigrants under Certain
Conditions," dated April 13, 1988, was promulgated pursuant to section 47 (A)(3) of C.A. No. 613, as
amended, the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, which provides that
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act, the President is authorized:
(a) when the public interest to warrants:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) to waive the passport requirements for immigrants, under such conditions as he may prescribe.
Executive Order No. 324 provides that an alien may apply with the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation for waiver of passport beginning on a date to be designated by the Commissioner. The
Order provides, among other things, that the alien "must establish that he entered the Philippines
before January 1, 1984 and that he has resided continuously in the Philippines in an unlawful status
from such date to the filing of his application."
Petitioner is charged with having unlawfully waived the passport requirements of certain aliens who
arrived after January 1, 1984. It is clear from the record of this case, especially of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, that petitioner herself stated that she
had allowed aliens who had arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984, but who were the
spouses or minor children of qualified aliens the latter being alien spouses or parents who had
entered the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were themselves qualified for waiver of
passport requirements under Executive Order No. 324 to apply for waiver of passport
requirements and, after compliance with requirements of Executive Order No. 324, approved such
"legalization."
794
Executive Order No. 324 is not itself a statute prescribing penal sanctions for certain acts. Thus,
disregard of Executive Order No. 324 would not, by itself, give rise to criminal liability. The criminal
information in this case in effect links up Executive Order No. 324 with Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft Act reads
as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It must be noted, firstly, that petitioner, as the then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation,
was expressly authorized and obliged by Executive Order No. 324 to apply and administer and
enforce its provisions. Indeed, petitioner was authorized to issue rules and regulations to implement
that Executive Order (paragraph 16). Secondly, the application and administration of Executive
Order No. 324 involve, not ministerial or mechanical acts, but rather the exercise of judgment and
discretion, adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial in nature. Thirdly, and perhaps most notably,
paragraphs 11 and 12 of the Executive Order provide as follows:
11. Except as provided in Paragraph 12, herein, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
may waive exclusion grounds under the Immigration Act in the cases of individual aliens for
humanitarian purposes to assure family unity or for the public interest.
12. The following grounds for exclusion may not be waived by the Commissioner of Immigration and
Deportation, namely, (a) those relating to criminals; (b) those relating to aliens likely to become
public charges; (c) those relating to drug offenses, except for so much of those provisions as relates
to a single offense of simple possession of marijuana; and (d) those relating to national security and
members of subversive organization.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 11, it will be seen, expressly authorizes petitioner to waive grounds for exclusion of aliens
under the Immigration Act in two (2) cases: (a) "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity;"
and (b) "for the public interest." Under Section 29 (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, the classes of aliens excluded from entry into the Philippines include:
(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required under the provisions of this
Act. 2
Upon the other hand, paragraph 12 specifies the categories of persons in whose cases no waiver of
grounds of exclusion may be granted.
It will be seen that the acts of petitioner, which the information assumes to be criminal in nature,
constituted official acts of petitioner done in the course of applying, interpreting and construing
Executive Order No. 324. There is no question that the applications for waiver of passport
requirements by the spouses and minor children of qualified aliens were admitted and approved by
petitioner "for humanitarian purposes to assure family unity." It is also not disputed that the said alien
spouses and minor children did not fall under any of the (non-waivable) excluded classes listed in
paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 324. It is similarly undisputed that no one has pretended that
petitioner had any personal or corrupt interest in any of the cases of alien spouses and minor
children of qualified aliens she had acted upon. No one has suggested, for instance that the fees
specified in paragraph 9 of Executive Order No. 324 either were not collected by petitioner and
converted to her own use. It may be noted, incidentally, that paragraph 9 expressly authorizes the
795
Commissioner "in her discretion, [to] charge a lower fee for the spouse and minor children below 21
years old of the applicant." The criminal information, as noted above, included an allegation of
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality." It is clear, however, that the facts brought out in the
preliminary investigation offered absolutely no basis for such an allegation which actually a
conclusion offered by the Special Prosecutor, much like the words "wilfully, unlawfully and criminally"
which are recited redundantly in the criminal information here. Again, the facts disclosed in the
preliminary investigation showed no undue injury, "to the Government and no unwarranted benefit or
advantage" to the aliens outside of the simple acceptance and approval of the applications for waiver
of passport requirements (so called "legalization") by petitioner. In other words, if the interpretation or
construction given by petitioner to Executive OrderNo. 324 is correct i.e., that applications for
waiver of passport requirements by alien wives and minor children, arriving after January 1, 1984, of
qualified aliens who had themselves arrived in the Philippines before January 1, 1984 and who were
otherwise eligible under the terms and conditions of Executive Order No. 324 may be granted for
humanitarian purposes in the interest of allowing or restoring family unity there would be no
"injury," let alone an "undue injury," to the Government. Neither can the benefit of waiver of passport
requirements in the cases of such spouses and minor children of qualified aliens be deemed to be
an "unwarranted" benefit to such aliens if petitioner's interpretation of Executive OrderNo. 324 be
held to be correct.
It is a rule too firmly established to require documentation that contemporaneous interpretations of a

statute or implementing regulation by the executive or administrative officials precisely charged with
the implementation of such a stature or regulation, are entitled to great weight and respect from the
courts. This Court itself has in many instances deferred to such interpretations rendered by such
administrative officers. (See, e.g., Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations, 21 SCRA 1282 [1967];
Salavaria v. Buenviaje, 81 SCRA 722 [1978]; Asturias Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs, 29 SCRA 617 [1969]; University of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 37 SCRA 54 [1971];
Lim Hao Ting v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 573 [1958] ). But even if an administrative interpretation be
ultimately found to be incorrect as a matter of law by this Court, the official responsible for such
interpretation is not, for that reason alone, to be held liable personally, whether civilly or criminally or
administratively. It is just as firmly settled that to impose liability upon the public officer who has so
acted, something far graver that error of law or error of judgment must be clearly shown and that is
corrupt personal intentions, personal malice or bad faith. (See generally Marcelo v. Sandiganbayan,
185 SCRA 346 [1990]). As noted above, no such allegations were made during the preliminary
investigation in Criminal Case No. 16698.
My submission, with respect, is that whether the acts admittedly done by petitioner were criminal in
nature, is a legal question, on which petitioner in effect asks us to rule in this Petition. I believe,
further, that there is nothing to prevent this Court from addressing and ruling on this legal issue.
There is no real need for proof of any additional essential facts apart from those already admitted by
petitioner. It seems to me that a public officer is entitled to have legal questions like that before this
Court resolved at the earliest possible opportunity, that a public officer should not be compelled to go
through the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal
characterization of the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I respectfully submit, still further, that the acts charged do not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime.
Indeed, if the acts which petitioner admits having done constitute a criminal offense, very serious
consequences would follow for the administration of law and government rules and regulations in
general. For the thrust of the criminal information here would appear to be that public officers
interpret and apply statutory and regulatory provisions at their own peril and at the risk of criminal
796
liability, notwithstanding the absence of any corrupt intent to profit personally by any such
interpretation and application. (Emphasis in the penultimate and ultimate paragraphs supplied)
The Information, quoted internally above, was filed in Criminal CaseNo. 16698 back in 1 May 1991.
approximately two-and-a-half (2-1/2) years later, the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan are still
going on, and indeed appear to me to be back where the case was at the time the original
Information was filed. Had this Court ruled on the legal question which petitioner in effect had asked
us to rule in Santiago v. Vasquez (supra), the case should be terminated by now, one way or the
other. Once more, I respectfully submit that a public officer should not be compelled to go through
the aggravation, humiliation and expense of the whole process of criminal trial, if the legal nature of
the acts charged as criminal is the very issue at stake.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari and to require the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the thirty-two
(32) Amended Informations.
C. Gamboa V CA, GR No. L-41054, November 28, 1975
G.R. No. L-41054 November 28, 1975
JOSE L. GAMBOA and UNITS OPTICAL SUPPLY COMPANY, petitioners, vs.COURT OF

APPEALS and BENJAMIN LU HAYCO, respondents.
797
Assistant City Fiscal Leonardo L. Arguelles for petitioner Jose L. Gamboa.
Koh Law Offices for petitioner Units Optical Supply Company.
Arturo M. Tolentino and Montesa, Manikan and Associates for private respondent.
MARTIN, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
No. SP-03877, promulgated on July 17, 1975, which We treat as special civil action (SC Resolution
of September 2, 1975), involving the proper appreciation of the rule on plurality of crimes, otherwise
known as "concursus delictuorum", and the theory of "continuous crime".
The private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco was a former employee of petitioner company in its
optical supply business at Sta. Cruz, Manila. On January 5, 1973, one hundred twenty-four (124)
complaints of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code were filed against him
by the petitioner company with the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila. After the procedural preliminary
investigation, the Office of the City Fiscal filed seventy-five (75) cases of estafa against private
respondent before the City Court of Manila. Except as to the dates and amounts of conversions, the
75 informations commonly charge that "... the said accused, being then an employee of the Units
Optical Supply Company ..., and having collected and received from customers of the said company
the sum of ... in payment for goods purchased from it, under the express obligation on the part of the
said accused to immediately account for and deliver the said collection so made by him to the Units
Optical Supply Company or the owners thereof ..., far from complying with his said aforesaid
obligation and despite repeated demands made upon him ... did then and there ... misappropriate,
misapply and convert the said sum to his own personal use and benefit by depositing the said
amount in his own name and personal account with the Associated Banking Corporation under
Account No. 171 (or with the Equitable Banking Corporation under Account No. 707), and thereafter
withdrawing the same ... ."
A civil action for accounting (docketed as Civil Case No. 89373 of the Court of First Instance of
Manila) was likewise filed by Lu Chiong Sun, the owner of the Units Optical Supply Company,
complaining that during his hospital confinement from September 27, 1972 to October 30, 1972,
private respondent initiated discharging the business functions and prerogatives of the company.
And to paint a shade of validity to this exercise of powers, private respondent, thru fraud, deceit and
machinations duped Lu Chiong Sun into affixing his signature and thumbprint on a general power of
attorney in his (private respondent's) favor. With the use of this deed, private respondent closed the
accounts of Lu Chiong Sun with the Equitable Banking Corporation and, thereafter, opened accounts
in his own name with the same bank and with the Associated Banking Corporation.
While the criminal suits in particular were pending trial on the merits before the twelve branches of
the City Court of Manila, 1 private respondent commenced on May 15, 1974 a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XV) against the
petitioners herein and the City Court Judges of Manila, claiming that the filing, prosecution and trial
of the seventy-five (75) estafa cases against him is not only oppressive, whimsical and capricious,
but also without or in excess of jurisdiction of the respondents City Fiscal and the City Court Judges
of Manila. Private respondent asserts that all the indictments narrated in the seventy-five (75)
informations were mere components of only one crime, since the same were only impelled by a
single criminal resolution or intent. On October 31, 1974, the lower court dismissed the petition on
798
the ground that the series of deposits and the subsequent withdrawals thereof involved in the
criminal cases were not the result of only one criminal impulse on the part of private respondent.
As a consequence, private respondent Benjamin Lu Hayco appealed to the Court of Appeals. On

July 17, 1975, the Appellate Court reversed the order of the lower court and granted the petition for
prohibition. It directed the respondent City Fiscal "to cause the dismissal of the seventy-five (75)
criminal cases filed against petitioner-appellant, to consolidate in one information all the charges
contained in the seventy-five (75) informations and to file the same with the proper court." The raison
d'etre of the ruling of the Court of Appeals is that:
Where the accused, with intent to defraud his employer, caused the latter to sign a document by
means of deceit and false representation, which document turned out to be a general power of
attorney, and with the use of said document he closed the accounts of his employer in two banks
and at the same time opened in his name new accounts in the same banks, and then made
collections from the customers of his employer, depositing them in the bank accounts in his name,
the series of deposits made by him which he later withdrew for his own use and benefit, constitutes
but one crime of estafa, there being only one criminal resolution and the different acts performed
being aimed at accomplishing the purpose of defrauding his employer."
We thus readily recognize that the singular question in this present action is whether or not the basic
accusations contained in the seventy-five (75) informations against private respondent constitute but
a single crime of estafa.
It is provided in Article 48 of our Revised Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 4000, that "(w)hen a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period." The intention of the Code in installing this particular provision is
to regulate the two cases of concurrence or plurality of crimes which in the field of legal doctrine are
called "real plurality" and "ideal plurality". 2 There is plurality of crimes or "concurso de delitos" when
the actor commits various delictual acts of the same or different kind. "Ideal plurality" or "concurso
ideal" occurs when a single act gives rise to various infractions of law. This is illustrated by the very
article under consideration: (a) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies (described as "delito compuesto" or compound crime); and (b) when an offense is a
necessary means for committing another offense (described as "delito complejo" or complex proper).
"Real plurality" or "concurso real", on the other hand, arises when the accused performs an act or
different acts with distinct purposes and resulting in different crimes which are juridically
independent. Unlike "ideal plurality", this "real plurality" is not governed by Article 48. 3
Apart and isolated from this plurality of crimes (ideal or real) is what is known as "delito continuado"
or "continuous crime". This is a single crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single
criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of division. For Cuello Calon, when the actor, there being
unity of purpose and of right violated, commits diverse acts, each of which, although of a delictual
character, merely constitutes a partial execution of a single particular delict, such concurrence or
delictual acts is called a "delito continuado". In order that it may exist, there should be "plurality of
acts performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated
and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal
purpose or aim." 4
799
It is not difficult to resolve whether a given set of facts constitutes a single act which produces two or
more grave or less grave offenses or a complex crime under the definition of Article 48. So long as
the act or acts complained of resulted from a single criminal impulse it is usually held to constitute a
single offense to be punished with the penalty corresponding to the most serious crime, imposed in
its maximum period. 5, The test is not whether one of the two offenses is an essential element of the
other. 6 In People v. Pineda , 7 the court even expressed that "to apply the first half of Article 48, ...
there must be singularity of criminal act; singularity of criminal impulse is not written into the law."
Prior jurisprudence holds that where the defendant took the thirteen cows at the same time and in
the same place where he found them grazing, he performed but one act of theft. 8 Or, the act of
taking the two roosters, in response to the unity of thought in the criminal purpose on one occasion,
constitutes a single crime of theft. There is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of
different purposes, but only of one which was consummated, and which determines the existence of
only one crime. The act of taking the roosters in the same place and on the same occasion cannot
give rise to two crimes having an independent existence of their own, because there are not two
distinct appropriations nor two intentions that characterize two separate crimes. 9
In the case before Us, the daily abstractions from and diversions of private respondent of the
deposits made by the customers of the optical supply company from October 2, 1972 to December
30, 1972, excluding Saturdays and Sundays, which We assume ex hypothesi, cannot be considered
as proceeding from a single criminal act within the meaning of Article 48. The abstractions were not
made at the same time and on the same occasion, but on variable dates. Each day of conversion
constitutes a single act with an independent existence and criminal intent of its own. All the
conversions are not the product of a consolidated or united criminal resolution, because each
conversion is a complete act by itself. Specifically, the abstractions and the accompanying deposits
thereof in the personal accounts of private respondent cannot be similarly viewed as "continuous
crime". In the above formulation of Cuello Calon, We cannot consider a defalcation on a certain day
as merely constitutive of partial execution of estafa under Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal
Code. As earlier pointed out, an individual abstraction or misappropriation results in a complete
execution or consummation of the delictual act of defalcation. Private respondent cannot be held to
have entertained continously the same criminal intent in making the first abstraction on October 2,
1972 for the subsequent abstractions on the following days and months until December 30, 1972, for
the simple reason that he was not possessed of any fore-knowledge of any deposit by any customer
on any day or occasion and which would pass on to his possession and control. At most, his intent to
misappropriate may arise only when he comes in possession of the deposits on each business day
but not in futuro, since petitioner company operates only on a day-to-day transaction. As a result,
there could be as many acts of misappropriation as there are times the private respondent
abstracted and/or diverted the deposits to his own personal use and benefit. Thus, it may be said
that the City Fiscal had acted properly when he filed only one information for every single day of
abstraction and bank deposit made by private respondent. 10 The similarity of pattern resorted to by
private respondent in making the diversions does not affect the susceptibility of the acts committed
to divisible crimes.
Apropos is the case of People v. Cid, 11 where the Court ruled that the malversations as well as the
falsifications in the months of May, June, July and August 1936 imputed to the accused "were not the
result of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions or
misappropriations had of the funds entrusted to his care, and of as many falsifications also
committed to conceal each of said case. There is nothing of record to justify the inference that the
intention of the appellant when he committed the malversation in May, 1936 was the same intention
which impelled him to commit the other malversations in June, July, and August." The ruling holds
800
true when the acts of misappropriation were committed on two different occasions, the first in
January, 1955 to December, 1955, and the second in January, 1956 to July, 1956. It cannot be
pretended that when the accused disposed of the palay deposit in January, 1955 to December,
1955, he already had the criminal intent of disposing what was to be deposited in January, 1956 to
July, 1956. 12 There is no synonymy between the present case and that of People, v. Sabbun, 13
where the Court held that the illegal collections made on different dates, i.e., December, 1949;
January 1950 to February 1956; March 1956 to September 1957 constitutes a "continuing offense",
because the said collections were "all part of the fees agreed upon in compensation for the service"
to be rendered by the accused Sabbun in filing the claim of the spouses Dacquioag for U.S.
Veterans benefit and collecting the pensions received by the widow from time to time. "The
periodical collections form part of a single criminal offense of collecting a fee which is more than the
prescribed amount fixed by the law" and "were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees
for services rendered." As We have said, the various acts of defalcation perpetrated by private
respondent in the present case from October 2, 1972 to December 30, 1972 are susceptible of
division with separate criminal intents.
The respondent Court of Appeals harps upon the act of private respondent in allegedly inducing, with
intent to defraud, Lu Chiong Sun "to sign a document by means of deceit and false representation,
which document turned out to be a general power of attorney" and with the use of which, he closed
the accounts of the latter in two banks, at the same time opening in his name new accounts in the
same banks, for its conclusion that the acts complained of against private respondent constitute one
continuous crime of estafa. It is striking to note, however, that the accusatory pleadings against
private respondent are founded on Article 315, para. 1-b of the Revised Penal Code, which defines
and penalizes estafa by conversion or misappropriation. In this form of estafa, fraud is not an
essential element. 14 According to Groizard "impudence, barefacedness covetousness, and
disloyalty employed in taking advantage of an opportunity take here the place formerly occupied by
deceit." 15 "Fraudulent intent" in committing the conversion or diversion is "very evidently not a
necessary element of the form of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the
conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient.
The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is, comparatively few men misappropriate trust
funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the offender hopes to be able to
restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. We may say in passing that the view here
expressed is further strengthened by the fact that of the nine paragraphs of Article 535, the
paragraph here under discussion is the only one in which the words "fraud", or "defraud" do not
occur." 16 In other words, the alleged act of private respondent in causing, with intent to defraud, Lu
Chiong Sun to affix his signature and thumbprint on the general power of attorney is immaterial and
ineffective insofar as the charges of conversions are concerned. If at all, the said document may
serve only the purpose of closing the accounts of Lu Chiong Sun with the banks and nothing more.
Definitely, there is no necessity for it before private respondent could commit the acts of defalcation.
As a matter of fact, private respondent resorted to this document only on October 17, 1972, or 15
days after he had already commenced the abstraction on October 2, 1972. 17
The characterization or description of estafa as a continuing offense cannot be validly seized upon
by private respondent as basis for its inference that the acts of abstraction in question constitute but
a single continuing crime of estafa. The sole import of this characterization is that the necessary
elements of estafa may separately take place in different territorial jurisdictions until the crime itself is
consummated. The moment, however, that the elements of the crime have completely concurred or
transpired, then an individual crime of estafa has occurred or has been consummated. The term
"continuing" here must be understood in the sense similar to that of "transitory" and is only intended
801
as a factor in determining the proper venue or jurisdiction for that matter of the criminal action
pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. 18 This is so, because "a person charged
with a transitory offense may be tried in any jurisdiction where the offense is part committed. In
transitory or continuing offense in which some acts material and essential to the crime and requisite
to its consummation occur in one province and some in another, the court of either province has
jurisdiction to try the case, it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the case will
exclude the other." 19
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, subject matter of this proceeding, is hereby
reversed and set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 7, 1975,
enjoining the enforcement or implementation of the said judgment is hereby made permanent. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
D. People V Penas, GR 46353-46355, December 5, 1938
G.R. Nos. L-46353-46355 December 5, 1938
802
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RESURRECCION B. PEAS,
defendant-appellant.
Aniceto B. Fabia for appellant. Assistant Solicitor-General Abad Santos and J. G. Bautista for
appellee.
DIAZ, J.:
The appellant was convicted on three separate charges for estafa with falsification of public
documents by the Court of First Instance of Cebu and sentenced in each case to an indeterminate
penalty of four years, two months and one day of prision correccional to ten years and one day of
prision mayor, to pay a fine of P100, to indemnify the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines in the sum of P200 and to pay the costs, He appealed from these decisions of conviction
and attributes to the lower court the following errors:
1. In not declaring that he was placed in double jeopardy.
2. In not declaring that the acts alleged in each of three cases constitute only one offense.
3. In not acquitting him in each case. The informations in the three cases read as follows:
(G.R. No. 46353)
That on or about January 4, 1937, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, the accused Resurreccion B.
Peas, who was then assistant postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, and as such had in his
possession and custody a blank money order book, wilfully, criminally and illegally, with abuse of his
official position, falsified money order No. 419, series No. 6990, by making it appear that said money
order was issued in the municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, in favor of the accused Resurreccion B.
Peas, in the amount of $100, payable at the post office of the City of Cebu; he also imitated and
forged the signature of the postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Sulpicio Peafiel, thus causing false facts to
appear on said money order No. 6990, such as the intervention of persons who in fact did not
intervene nor had any knowledge of the issuance of said money order, for the herein accused
Resurreccion B. Peas did not deposit in the post office of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, the sum of $100 or
its equivalent of P200, nor did the postmaster, Sulpicio Peafiel, intervene or have any knowledge of
the issuance of said money order; that after falsifying money order No. 6990, the accused went to
the post office of Cebu and, with intent of gain, presented the money order and collected the amount
of P200 appearing therein, to the damage and prejudice of the Insular Government.
Contrary to article 315 in connection with article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.lawphil.net
(G.R. No. 46354)
That on or about January 4, 1937, in the city of Cebu, Philippines, the accused Resurreccion B.
Peas, who was then assistant postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, and as such had in his
possession and custody a blank money order book, wilfully, criminally and illegally, with abuse of his
official position, falsified money order No. 419, series No. 6991, by making it appear that said money
order was issued in the municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, in favor of the accused Resurreccion B.
Peas, in the amount of $100, payable at the post office of the City of Cebu; he also imitated and
forged the signature of the postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Sulpicio Peafiel, thus causing false facts to
appear on said money order No. 6991, such as the intervention of persons who in fact did not
intervene nor had any knowledge of the issuance of said money order, for the herein accused
803
the issuance of said money order; that after falsifying money order No. 6991, the accused went to
the post office of Cebu and, with intent of gain, presented the money order and collected the amount
of P200 appearing therein, to the damage and prejudice of the Insular Government.
Contrary to article 315 in connection with article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
(G.R. No. 46355) That on or about January 4, 1937, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, the accused
Resurreccion B. Peas, who was then assistant postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, and as such had
in his possession and custody a blank money order book, wilfully, criminally and illegally, with abuse
of his official position, falsified money order No. 419, series No. 6992, by making it appear that said
money order was issued in the municipality of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo, in favor of the accused
Resurreccion B. Peas, in the amount of $100, payable at the post office of the City of Cebu; he also
imitated and forged the signature of the postmaster of Barotac Viejo, Sulpicio Peafiel, thus causing
false facts to appear on said money order No. 6992, such as the intervention of persons who in fact
did not intervenor had any knowledge of the issuance of said money order, for the herein accused
the issuance of said money order that after falsifying money order No. 6992, the accused went to the
post office of Cebu, and, with intent of gain, presented the money order an collected the amount of
P200 appearing therein, to the damage and prejudice of the Insular Government.
Contrary to article 315 in connection with article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. (1) Previous to his
prosecution in the herein three cases the appellant was charged with and found guilty of infidelity in
the custody of documents for which he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six months and
one day to four years and two months of prision correccional and to pay a fine of P500, plus costs.
The facts constituting the crime of infidelity in the custody of documents, like those alleged in the
information in the case wherein the appellant was convicted of said crime, are entirely distinct from
those constituting the complex crime of estafa with falsification of public documents with which he
was charged in the said three cases. There is no point of similarity between the two offenses except
that in both crimes the perpetrator is a public officer and that the document concealed, removed or
destroyed in the case of infidelity in the custody of documents and that falsified in the case of
falsification are public or official documents. The conviction or acquittal in a case of infidelity in the
custody of documents is no bar to the prosecution for the crime of falsification of the same
documents. This is so because, one who conceals or destroys an official or public document in order
to be punishable under the provisions of article 226 of the Revised Penal Code, which prohibits and
penalizes infidelity in the custody of documents, need not falsify these documents in any of the ways
provided in article 171 of the said Code. It is enough that he should remove, conceal or destroy said
documents. In order that a public officer may be punished for the crime of falsification of a public
documents, it is not necessary that he should remove, conceal or destroy the falsified document.
The doctrines of double jeopardy and previous conviction do not apply to cases wherein the
following requisites are not present: that the defendant or defendants in both the former and later
cases are the same; that the acts complained of in the two cases are likewise the same, and that the
offenses are also the same or identical. (Secs. 24 and 26 of General Orders, No. 58; U. S. vs.
Claveria, 29 Phil., 527; U.S. vs. Bayona Vitog, 37 Phil., 42; U. S. vs. Ching Po. 23 Phil., 578; U. S.
vs. Lim Tigdien and Esteves, 30 Phil., 222.)
(2) On the dates alleged in the three informations, the appellant was assistant postmaster in the
municipality of Barotac Viejo, for which reason he was aware that no money order could be brought
or issued for a sum greater than $100, as expressly provided in section 1968 of the Administrative
804
Code. In accordance, therefore, with said provision of the law, in order to issue a money order for
P600, it was necessary to make three separate money orders.
As shown by Exhibits A, B and C, which are the falsified money orders subject of the three
informations, the appellant falsified the same on a single date: November 24, 1936, and he collected
them also on a single date, January 4, 1937 from which it is inferred that the three acts of
falsification and the said three acts of appropriation of the sum of P200 in each case proceed from a
single purpose of the appellant, namely, to appropriate for himself the sum of P600. If he had to
resort to this means falsifying three money orders, it was because he was aware that he could not
do otherwise, in view of the legal provision, which he was supposed to know, limiting the issuance of
money orders to sums not greater than P100 or P200. When, for the attainment of a single purpose
which constitutes an offense, various acts are executed, such acts must be considered only as one
offense. Under this view, the appellant committed only the complex crime of estafa with falsification
of three postal money orders which are, without doubt, official and public documents, the falsification
being the means he employed to appropriate, as he did for himself the sum of P600, to the prejudice
of the Government.
Considering that the law prescribes a more severe penalty for the crime of falsification (art. 171,
Revised Penal Code) than for estafa (art. 315, case 3, Revised Penal Code), we should impose on
the appellant, in conformity with the provisions of article 48 of the said Code, the maximum of prision
mayor, this being the penalty prescribed for the crime of falsification of public documents when
committed by public officers.
Wherefore, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that should be imposed on the
appellant in the said three cases is that of eight years and one day to ten years and one day of
prision mayor (People vs. Pao, 58 Phil., 545; People vs. Gayrama, 60 Phil., 796; People vs. Haloot,
37 Off. Gaz., 2901), to indemnify the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines in the
sum of P600, and to pay a fine of P2,000 and the costs.
(3) Having arrived at this conclusion, we consider it unnecessary to discuss the third error assigned
by the appellant to the lower court. In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgments are
unnecessary as expressed in this decision. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Imperial, Laurel and
Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting: I dissent only from that part of the majority opinion declaring that the
penalty next lower in degree, from which must be taken the minimum to be imposed on the appellant
in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law as amended by Act No. 4225, is prision mayor
in its medium degree, because the complex crime committed by him is penalized by the Revised
Penal Code with the maximum degree of prision mayor, plus a fine not to exceed P5,000. (Arts. 171
and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.) It is my opinion that the penalty should be taken from prision
correccional in accordance with the procedure outlined in my dissenting opinion in the case of
People vs. Haloot (37 Off. Gaz., 2901), for the reasons therein stated
E. People V. Madrigal- Gonzales, Nos L-16688-90, 7 SCRA 942
G.R. Nos. L-16688-90 April 30, 1963
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant, vs.PACITA MADRIGAL-GONZALES,

(formerly Pacita M. Warns), ET AL., accused-appellees.
805
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.Bausa, Ampil and Suarez and G.W.
Gonzales for accused-appellees.
PAREDES, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by the State against the decision of Branch XVIII of the CFI of Manila,
dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 & 36904, all entitled "The People of the Philippines
vs. Pacita Madrigal Gonzales, et al.", for falsification of official and public documents. When the
appeal was in the stage of preparation and submission of briefs, the Solicitor General presented with
this Court a pleading captioned "MANIFESTATION AND PETITION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW
APPEAL", instead of an appeal brief for the State, as appellant. The above manifestation was
opposed by the City Fiscal of Manila, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., who appeared in this Court, as
amicus curiae.
The pertinent antecedents of the instant proceedings are contained in the "Statement of the Case" in
the Manifestation and Petition to Withdraw presented by the Solicitor General, to which both the
amicus curiae, and the appellees concur, and which we reproduce hereunder:
"That on or about August 23, 1956, the herein accused-appellee Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was
charged with malversation of public funds, in the amount of P104,000.00 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, said case having been docketed as Criminal Case No. 36877 of said Court,
under an information alleging that said accused, while administrator of the Social Welfare
Administration (SWA), appropriated, took and misappropriated the said amount on five different
occasions comprised within the period from February, 1954 to September, 1955, in the City of
Manila;
"That simultaneously on the same date, the same accused-appellee Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales was
charged together with Angelita Centeno, Anita Paggabao, Lourdes Alburo, Remedios Serrano, Julia
Carpio, Calixto Hermosa and Crispula R. Pagaran alias 'Pula', with the crime of falsification of public
documents under 27 separate informations filed before the same Court of First Instance of Manila. In
said 27 separate informations, the eight accused were alleged to have conspired in the commission
of said offense in or about and during the period comprised between December, 1954 and
September, 1955, by having allegedly caused it to appear: that cash aids were given when no such
aids were indeed distributed to the persons named and at the time and place and in such amounts
specified, or by making and/or causing it to appear that certain relief supplies or merchandise were
purchased by the accused Pacita Madrigal-Gonzales when in truth and in fact no such relief supplies
were purchased, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of fact in said public and official
documents (Annexes A-1 to A-27, pp. 4-161, rec. of L-16688-90). The aforesaid separate
informations for falsification were couched in the same form and language, alleged the same period
of time of the commission of the felonious acts, i.e., between December, 1954, and September,
1955, and invariably described only two different modes of commission of the alleged falsifications,
to wit:
"... by taking advantage of their official positions falsified and/or caused to be falsified the following
described public documents by making and/or causing it to appear that certain cash aids were
distributed and given personally by said PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns)
to the persons named, and at the time and place and in such amounts specified, in said public
documents when in truth and in fact no such cash aids were ever distributed or given personally by
said accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) to said persons named,
at the time and place and in such amounts specified, in the following described public documents,
806
and otherwise making untruthful statements or narration of fact in the said public and official
documents to the effect that social cases studies had been made when in truth and in fact no such
social case studies were ever made, ...."
"... by taking advantage of their official positions, falsified and/or caused to be falsified the following
described public documents by making and/or causing it to appear that certain relief supplies or
merchandise were purchased by said accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M.
Warns),in such quantities and at such prices, from such business establishments or persons as
appear to be specified in the following described public documents, when in truth and in fact no such
relief supplies or merchandise were purchased by the accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES
(formerly Pacita M. Warns) in such quantities and at such prices, at such times and places and from
such business establishments or persons as are mentioned and specified in the said public
documents, and otherwise making untruthful statements or narration of facts in the said public and
official documents to the effect that such relief supplies as are appearing to have been purchased by
the accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) at such prices and from
such persons or business establishments, at such times and places, mentioned in the following
described public and official documents, were immediately distributed to calamity victims or sufferers
when in truth and in fact no such distributions of such relief supplies, valued and purchased by said
accused PACITA MADRIGAL GONZALES (formerly Pacita M. Warns) at so such prices as are
mentioned and stated in said public and official documents, were ever made, ...."
That on the same date, August 23, 1956, and accompanying the filing of said 27 separate
informations for falsification and one single information for malversation, the prosecution filed ex
parte petition for the consolidation of all said 27 falsification cases and one malversation case before
only one branch or sala of the Court of First Instance of Manila; or ex parte petition being couched in
the tenor following:
"The plaintiff, thru the undersigned, respectfully moves ex parte that all the above entitled cases be
assigned to one sala or branch of the Court and a joint trial be held thereon all the charges being
related to similar if not the same transactions and the evidence of the prosecution being in great part
the same for all said charges. As can be seen from the allegations of the informations, the
falsifications were committed to conceal the malversation. Having been committed to conceal rather
than to commit the malversation the offense is not a complex one and the separate charges had to
be made in several informations.
and accordingly granted by the trial court.
That after the Court of First Instance of Manila granted the ex-parte petition consolidating the said
cases before Branch II of the Manila Court, then presided by the Honorable Francisco E. Jose, the
prosecution suddenly reversed its stand and sought a reconsideration of said order of consolidation
and prayed instead for the distribution or farming out of said 27 falsification cases before all
branches of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as a consequence of which, and over the repeated
objections of the defense, said 27 cases for falsification were ordered distributed among the 18
different branches of said Court, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution, however, maintained the assignment of the lone case for malversation with Branch
II of the lower Court to which was assigned also three cases for falsification as above enumerated.
807
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove
their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
That after protracted quibbling on various procedural and technical aspects of the distribution of said
27 falsification cases in the manner above described before the 18 branches of the lower court, the
herein accused-appellees filed on or about October 15, 1956, a motion to quash Criminal Cases
Nos. 36878 and 36883 to 36884, inclusive, assigned to Branch XVIII of the lower court, on the
ground of double jeopardy, said motion having been filed also in each of the other 16 salas or
branches of the lower court before which the said cases were docketed, accused-appellees
predicating the aforesaid motion on the grounds: (a) that said 27 separate informations for
falsification indeed constitute only one indictable offense of falsification considering that the
falsifications allegedly committed separately as described under said separate informations were but
the result or product of one single criminal impulse or intent, and the same are therefore in the
nature of a continuing offense which should be alleged and prosecuted only under one information;
and (b) that the accused Pacita Madrigal Gonzales and her 7 co-accused had already been
arraigned and entered pleas of not guilty in Criminal Case No. 36885 before Branch XIII of said
lower court and in Criminal Case No. 36882 assigned to Branch X of the same court, by reason on
which all eight accused were already placed in jeopardy respect to the 25 other falsification charges
before the 16 other branches of said court;
That after hearing the arguments pro and con on the said motion to quash .... with the prosecution
and the defense filing memorandum and rebuttal memorandum on the issue of double jeopardy,
Branch XVIII of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by the Honorable Ruperto Kapunan,
Jr. to which was assigned Criminal Case Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904, all for falsification, in an
order promulgated on January 19, 1960, granted the aforesaid motion to quash on the ground of
double jeopardy, and held (a) that the 27 separate cases of falsification should indeed be tried
and/or prosecuted only under one information for the crime of falsification as a continuing offense
resulting from only one criminal intent or impulse, and (b) that according to the spirit rather than the
letter of the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and the complementary provision on
the matter in our Rules of Court, the accused Pacita Madrigal Gonzales and her seven co-accused
were placed in jeopardy of trial for the same offense immediately after entering their pleas with
Branch X of the said court, and therefore, said plea could be pleaded as a bar to their further
prosecution for the other offenses of falsification pending before said Branch XVIII.
That dissatisfied with the foregoing dismissal, the prosecution has interposed the instant appeal on
purely questions of law on January 21, 1960.
That after the perfection of the instant appeal, however, and during the pendency hereof, Branch X
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, presided by the Honorable Higinio Macadaeg, dismissed the
information in Criminal Case No. 36882 against the said accused-appellees herein without their
consent; while Branch XIII of the same Court of First Instance, presided by the Hon. Bienvenido Tan,
after presentation by the prosecution of the available evidence against the same accused-appellees
herein in Criminal Case No. 36885 for falsification, dismissed the said case by finding all said
accused innocent, with costs de officio, in its decision promulgated on March 24, 1960. ...."
The Solicitor General is of the belief that the dismissals of the cases by the three branches of the
Manila CFI constituted double jeopardy and, therefore, they are a bar to the further prosecution of
the remaining 24 informations for falsification. Upon the other hand, the amicus curiae claims that
808
the appeal of the State is meritorious, there is no double jeopardy; and the Orders granting the
motions to quash (Cases Nos. 36894, 36899 and 36904) were erroneous.
It would seem that the dominant issue which needs determination in the instant cases, is "whether
the Orders of the three (3) different branches of the Manila CFI, namely: the Order of Dismissal
issued by Judge Ruperto Kapunan (Branch XVIII) dated January 19, 1960, in Criminal Cases Nos.
36894, 36899 and 36904; the Order of Judge Macadaeg, dated March 23, 1960 (Branch X)
dismissing Criminal Case No. 36882; and the decision of Judge Tan (Branch XIII) dated March 24,
1960, in Criminal Case No. 36885, acquitting the accused, constitute a bar to the prosecution of the
remaining 22 falsification charges, filed against the same accused-appellees, which were lodged and
still pending resolution with the other branches of said Court on the ground of double jeopardy." The
resolution of this legal issue revolves on the circumstances of whether or not the twenty-seven (27)
falsifications were the product of only one criminal intent. It is argued that since all the falsifications
were supposedly committed within a specific period (from December, 1954 to September, 1955), and
that the allegations in the different informations for falsification are the same, said acts were but the
product or result of a singular criminal intent; that no less than the prosecution in said cases had
admitted in a manifestation, that the charges are "related to similar if not the same transactions and
the evidence of the prosecution being in great part the same for all said charges"; and that the
falsifications were committed to conceal the malversation.
One reason advanced by the trial court and the Solicitor General in holding that the falsifications
constituted a continuing offense, proceeding from a single criminal intent is that, according to the
manifestation of the City Fiscal and Special Prosecutor, the motive for these falsifications, was to
conceal the malversation. The appellees seem to confuse motive with criminal intent. Motive is not
an element of a felony; it is merely a prospectant circumstantial evidence. Criminal intent renders an
act a felony. Motive is a state of the mind of the accused, and it is he who can state his real motive in
committing a crime. Whatever the fiscal had manifested, as to the motive which had impelled the
accused to transgress the law, was but a speculation gathered in the process of investigation. The
existence of a motive, not having been alleged in the informations for falsification, in order to be
available to the accused in his defense of double jeopardy, or any ground for that matter, must have
to be proven, being, as heretofore stated, a prospectant circumstantial evidence. In other words, the
existence of the motive to conceal malversation, in the cases at bar, is a question of fact which
should be ventilated in a formal trial, in connection with the defense of double jeopardy. The Court
cannot assume that the purpose of committing the twenty-seven (27) falsifications was to conceal
the malversation. This is so because there is no showing that for every particular amount they had
malversed on a certain period, they had purposedly perpetrated the corresponding falsification to
cover up such amount, until the whole amount proposed to be malversed, shall have been
completely misappropriated. In the absence of such showing, it is to be presumed that in the
falsification of each document, the criminal intent was separated and distinct.
In effect, it will be noted that although all the informations in the 27 falsification cases were uniformly
worded, the numbers of the vouchers alleged to have been falsified and the amounts thereof are
different. We have in the three (3) cases, subject of the proceeding at bar, Voucher No. 4, dated
September 3, 1955, for P2,275.00; Voucher No. 6, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,590.00 and
Voucher No. 13, dated September 6, 1955, for P3,410.00. The other informations also show different
vouchers, dates and amounts. These undeniable facts, alleged in the informations, evidently show
that different acts of falsification were committed on different vouchers and covering distinct
amounts. Each information did not refer to all said acts of falsification. Neither is there merit in the
argument that said acts of falsification constituted a continuing offense, so as to have them all
809
prosecuted in only one information. This Court in a number of cases, dealing on the same subject,
held:
"The two pawn tickets were wholly separate and distinct documents. They had no relation to each
other as members of a series of instruments, so intimately related, that the falsification of one
individual of the series would be, in effect, a falsification of the entire series. The crime of falsification
of a private document was completed and consummated when, with intent to prejudice a third
person, the first pawn ticket was actually falsified; and a wholly separate and distinct crime was
initiated and consummated when the second ticket was falsified. That both documents may have
been falsified to be used together in the perpetration of an embezzlement in no wise affects the
case, as under the definition of the crime of falsification of private documents set out in Article 304 of
the Penal Code, the crime is consummated and complete at the moment when such a document is
actually falsified, to the prejudice of, or with intent to prejudice a third person, it matters not to what
use the document may be put thereafter. ..." (U.S. v. Infante & Barreto, 36 Phil. 148-149).
"The falsification of each of these six money orders committed separately by means of different acts
constitutes independent crimes of falsification (U.S. v. Infante & Barreto, 36 Phil. 146), and the
appropriation of the respective amounts thereof by the defendant, likewise constitutes different
crimes of malversation. In the record of payments then kept by the defendant, it appears that the
respective amounts of the money orders had been paid on different dates, proving that the
appropriation thereof was made on different occasions. Furthermore, no objection had been filed to
any of the informations presented in the trial court." (People v. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671)..
".... By reading the four informations inserted above, it clearly appears that the alleged acts of
falsification and malversation imputed to the accused-appellant were committed by him. .... It may
therefore be said that the malversations as well as the falsifications imputed to the accused in the
four cases under consideration were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to
embezzle and falsify, but of four or as many abstractions or misappropriations had of the funds
entrusted his care, and of as many falsifications also committed to conceal each of said acts. ....
(People v. Cid, 66 Phil. 354).
"The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the falsifications committed on April 30, 1931 and on
May 2 of the same year were not necessary means for the commission of the malversations on the
same dates, is correct. Each falsification and each malversation constitute independent offenses
which must be punished separately .... The acts being independent from each other and executed by
different voluntary actions, each constitutes an independent offense." (Regis v. People, 67 Phil. 43).
Upon the basis of the above authorities, we need not proceed any further to determine whether the
27 falsifications perpetrated on separate vouchers, at different dates and in various amounts,
constitute 27 separate and independent crimes, which were not continuous. It becomes, likewise,
unnecessary to inquire into the merits of the question of double jeopardy, because of the above
opinion.
"In respect of the defense of former jeopardy, made to a prosecution for forgery, it must appear by
the plea that the offense charged in both cases was the same in law and in fact. The plea will be bad
if the offenses charged in the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law, however nearly
they may be connected in fact. As to several acts of forgery, each generally constitutes a separate
crime, even though they are committed in the course of a continuous transaction, on the same date,
or even on the same piece of paper, unless each act constitutes merely a component part of an
indivisible instrument. ...." (23 Am. Jur., pp. 700-701).
810
Moreover, under the facts and circumstances appearing in the record, the grounds upon which the
appellees anchor their defense of double jeopardy in the motion to quash, are not clear and
indubitable. One cannot build up the defense of double jeopardy on mere hypothesis.
WHEREFORE, the Order of the lower court (Branch XVIII) dismissing Criminal Cases Nos. 36894,
36899 and 36904 on the ground of double jeopardy is set aside and another entered remanding the
said case for further proceedings. The Motion for Leave to Withdraw Appeal, presented by the
Solicitor General should be, as it is hereby denied. No special pronouncement as to costs
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias "KA
DJANGO," CARLOS NARRA, alias "KA JESSIE" and TEN (10) JOHN DOES, accused-
appellant.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka
Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52, in
Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled "People of the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias 'Ka
Django,' 'Carlos Narra,' 'Ka Jessie,' and 21 John Does" convicting him of murder and sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua.
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias "Ka
Django," "Carlos Narra", "Ka Jessie," et al., charging them of murder committed as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening in the Municipality
of Donsol, Province of Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his residence and brought him to Sitio Abre,
Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to
kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO
thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused his death to the damage and
prejudice of his legal heirs.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged with Murder for the killing of one
Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
2665 and 2672, respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de

parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted
considering the substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June 30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10)
armed companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with
811
them a person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be
extinguished and Malto complied.
Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987, Malto was awakened by a
gunshot.When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was
hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused
direct his companions to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went
back to his place, together with the military, on March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa
and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka
Django", as he told her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military. She, however, replied
that they were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their
farm and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality.
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted
by the New People's Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked
for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her
son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being
maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and
a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands
of Ka Django. Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as
belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to
print his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost.
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that
accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the
victims in the three criminal cases filed against him.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered convicting the accused and imposing the
following penalty:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django,
alias Carlos Narra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of Alfredo
Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the
accessory provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of the
victim Alfredo Arevalo, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards Crim.
Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is hereby
acquitted.
"In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full credit of his period of detention.
"With cost de-oficio.
812
"SO ORDERED."[1]
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the following lone error allegedly
committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF

MURDER, AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation
No. 347, dated March 25, 1994, entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other
Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed
in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National
Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty
Board. Attached to appellant's brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National Amnesty Commission
(NAC) dated November 17, 1999 which states:
"Quoted below is a resolution of the National Amnesty Commission dated 22 October 1998.[2]
'RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125 of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA
filed with the Local Amnesty Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
'Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under the Sandatahang Yunit
Pampropaganda and participated in the following armed activities:
'a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 14
February 1986;
'b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary at Barangay Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon
on 15 February 1986;
'c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay Banwang, Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in
1987;
'd) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military informer at Barangay Boroan, Donsol,
Sorsogon, on 21 March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and nuisance of the community, at Donsol,
Sorsogon, on 09 March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2665 was filed against
him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for his misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol,
Sorsogon, on 12 February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2664 was filed
against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former member of the CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic),
Mabini, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case No. 2773
was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
'h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay captain, at Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol,
Sorsogon, on 20 September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663 was filed against him.
813
'After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of the applicant, the Local Amnesty
Board concluded that his activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus
recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for amnesty.
'The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22 October 1999, resolved to approve the
recommendation of the Local Amnesty Board.
'WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA under Proclamation
No. 724 is hereby GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above, provided they were
committed on or before the date he was captured on 22 June 1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be
issued in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall become final after the lapse of
fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed
with the Commission by any party within said period.'"[3]
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of the National Amnesty Commission,
wrote the following letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
"Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca"
"Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting herewith the attached copy of
RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was
accused of the following cases:
"1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon,
Sorsogon.
Sorsogon.
Sorsogon.
Sorsogon.
Sorsogon.
"He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
"The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief prosecutor of the province, the
opportunity to take whatever action you may deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of
amnesty shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from receipt of this Notice,
unless a Motion for Reconsideration is filed with the Commission by any party within said period.
"Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process."[4]
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June 23, 2000 to the National Amnesty
Commission, requested information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by
any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC.[5]
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there
has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party.[6]
814
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted amnesty under Proclamation No. 724
dated May 17, 1996. It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
"Section 1. Grant of Amnesty. - Amnesty is hereby granted to all persons who shall apply therefor
and who have or may have committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their political
beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal Code or special laws, including but not limited
to the following: rebellion or insurrection; coup d'etat; conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion,
insurrection, or coup d'etat; disloyalty of public officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or
insurrection; sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition; illegal assembly; illegal
association; direct assault; indirect assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or
agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public order; unlawful use of means of
publication and unlawful utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of, incident to, or in connection with the
crimes of rebellion and insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence without
leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96
(conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles of War;
Provided, That the amnesty shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for personal
ends."
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political
offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations.[7] Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.[8]
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
In the case of People vs. Casido,[9] the difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
"Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted
to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward
and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that
is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the
rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense."
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N.
Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal.[10]
815
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial Court at
Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,[11] Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are
both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,[12] are ordered
DISMISSED. The release of Jose N. Patriarca who is presently detained at the Provincial Jail of
Sorsogon is likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some other legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten (10) days his compliance with this
decision.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109376. January 20, 2000]
816
PANFILO O. DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
In this special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, petitioner Panfilo O. Domingo (hereafter DOMINGO)
seeks to nullify the resolution[1] of 15 March 1993 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan
denying his motion to quash the information against him for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to
Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The records show that on 26 May 1987, the Philippine National Bank (PNB) filed a complaint with
the Tanodbayan against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos; Rodolfo M. Cuenca, then president
of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP); and Joaquin T. Venus,
Jr., former Deputy Presidential Assistant. The complaint was docketed as TBP Case No. 87-02391.
[2]
In an Order dated 1 September 1987, Special Prosecutor Juan T. Templonuevo dropped from the
complaint Ferdinand Marcos, who was out of the country and therefore outside the criminal
jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan, so as not to delay the preliminary investigation against the other
respondents. In the same order, it was also directed that a subpoena be issued to DOMINGO, the
President of PNB at the time of the questioned transactions, it appearing from the evidence on
record that he was involved in the case.[3]However, the subpoena addressed to DOMINGO at PNB,
Escolta, Manila, his last known address, was returned "unserved," since he was no longer
connected with the said bank at the time it was served.[4]
On 8 June 1988, in line with the ruling in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan,[5] then Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez issued Administrative Order No. 1 addressed to the Office of the Special Prosecutor and
Deputized Tanodbayan Prosecutors authorizing them to continue the preliminary investigation of
cases pending as of 27 April 1988 until the same are terminated.[6]
On 6 February 1992, after a finding of probable cause to implead DOMINGO in the case, Special
Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Teresita V. Diaz-Baldos issued an order directing him to submit a
counter-affidavit.[7] DOMINGO submitted on 9 March 1992 his counter-affidavit with the Office of the
Special Prosecutor.[8] Misoedp
On 9 July 1992, SPO III Diaz-Baldos issued a resolution recommending that DOMINGO and Rodolfo
M. Cuenca be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(e) in relation to Section 4(a) of Republic Act No.
3019, as amended, but that the complaint be dismissed as against Ferdinand E. Marcos for being
moot and academic by reason of his death, and as against Joaquin T. Venus for lack of merit.[9] This
was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, and the corresponding information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan on 30 July 1992. The case was docketed therein as Criminal Case No.
17847.[10] The information reads as follows:
That on or about the month of July 1980, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
PANFILO O. DOMINGO, being then the President of the Philippine National Bank, a government
financial institution, and hence a public officer, while in the performance of his official functions,
817
committing the offense in relation to his office and conspiring and confederating with then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and with RODOLFO M. CUENCA, a private individual, being then the
Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Construction and Development Company of the
Philippines (CDCP), a corporation duly organized and existing in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally, with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality cause undue injury to the Philippine National Bank and grant unwarranted benefits to
CDCP in the following manner: accused RODOLFO M. CUENCA, capitalizing and exploiting his
close personal association with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to obtain favorable loan
accommodations for CDCP, requested the latters assistance and intervention in securing the
approval by the Philippine National Bank Board of Directors of the application of the CDCP for a U.S.
$40 Million Letter of Credit and in foregoing the collateral requirements of CDCP, as a result of which
accused Panfilo O. Domingo, acceding to the pressure exerted by President Marcos in relation to
accused Cuencas requests, facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board of
Directors of Board Resolution No. 144 whereby the U.S.$40 Million Standby Letter of Credit applied
for by CDCP to secure the principal and interest on its loan with the Republic National Bank of Dallas
was approved, notwithstanding a collateral deficiency by CDCP on its previous accounts with PNB,
and again subsequently recommended to the PNB Board of Directors the approval of Board
Resolution No. 180 amending Board Resolution No. 144 in order to allow CDCP to use its loan
proceeds secured by the aforementioned letter of credit for its other international projects and
thereafter allowed CDCP to forego its collateral requirements, which act of the accused inflicted
undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume CDCPs obligation to the
Republic National Bank of Dallas after the latter had defaulted in the payment thereof, amounting to
U.S. $29 Million, and which likewise granted unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same amount.
On 11 August 1992, DOMINGO filed a petition for reinvestigation[11] with the Sandiganbayan. The
latter directed the prosecution to treat the petition as a motion for reconsideration of the 9 July 1992
resolution.[12] The motion was, however, denied by the Office of the Special Prosecutor on 14
January 1993.[13] Edpsc
On 19 February 1993, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information
against him on the grounds that (1) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription, and (2) the facts charged do not constitute an offense.[14] In its Resolution of 15 March
1993 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash.[15]
Not satisfied, DOMINGO filed the instant petition alleging that the respondent Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied his motion to quash
the information.
Meanwhile, on 17 August 1993, during his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 17847, DOMINGO
refused to enter a plea; hence, the Sandiganbayan ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for
him.[16]
We shall first take up the issue of prescription.
DOMINGO contends that his alleged criminal liability has already been extinguished by prescription.
In support thereof he claims that the prescriptive period commenced to run in July 1980 when the
crime was allegedly committed, and was only tolled on 6 February 1992, when he was impleaded as
party-respondent by Prosecutor Diaz-Baldos. The filing of the complaint with the Tanodbayan on 26
May 1987 produced no legal effect and could never be deemed to have validly interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period, considering that effective 2 February 1987, the Tanodbayan was
818
divested of its authority to conduct preliminary investigation unless duly authorized by the
Ombudsman.
We are not persuaded.
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be considered: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run;
and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. Sce dp
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) provides for its own prescriptive period.
Section 11 thereof reads: "All offenses punishable under this Act shall prescribe in ten years." This
was later amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, approved on 16 March 1982, which increased the
prescriptive period of the crime from ten years to fifteen years.
Since the law alleged to have been violated, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the
applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326,[17] as
amended, which provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and
if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the violation of the special law is
not known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the discovery
thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.[18]
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made because both
parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetrate fraud against the government.
[19] The alleged anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986
Revolution when one of the original respondents, then President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted
from office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of
those transactions.[20] Hence, the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the
date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA
Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed. Calrsp ped
As to when the period of prescription is interrupted, the second paragraph of Section 2 of Act. No.
3326, as amended, provides that it is "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person."
Whether the running of the prescriptive period was tolled on 1 September 1987, when DOMINGO
was impleaded as an accused, or on 30 July 1992, when the information against him was filed with
the Sandiganbayan, is immaterial; for only about one or six years, respectively, has elapsed from the
date of the discovery of the alleged offense. Thus, the prescriptive period, whether ten years as
provided in R.A. No. 3019 or fifteen years as provided in the amendatory Act, has not yet lapsed.
The motion to quash on the ground of prescription was, therefore, correctly denied.
We now come to the question of whether the facts charged in the information constitute an offense.
819
The fundamental test on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the
information do not amount to an offense is whether the facts asseverated would establish the
essential elements of the crime defined in the law.[21] In this examination, matters aliunde are not
considered.[22]
As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do
not constitute the offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis
alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are hypothetically admitted.[23] The informations
need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.[24]
DOMINGO, together with Rodolfo Cuenca, was charged with violation of Section 3(e), in relation to
Section 4(a), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. These provisions read:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already
penalized by existing laws, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and
are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(e). Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This
provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Sccal r
SEC. 4. Prohibition on private individuals. -- (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or
close personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family
or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material
or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business, transaction, application,
request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene. Family
relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The
word "close personal relation" shall include close personal relationship, social and fraternal
connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to
such public officer.
The elements of the offense under Section 3(e) are the following: (1) that the accused is a public
officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) that the said public officer
commits the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or
her public positions; (3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the government or
a private party; (4) that such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to such parties; and (5) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident
bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.[25]
The information specifically stated as follows:
(1) That DOMINGO was a public officer, being then the president of PNB, a government financial
institution, and Rodolfo Cuenca was a private individual, then Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the CDCP, who conspired and confederated with DOMINGO, capitalizing and exploiting his close
personal association with then President Marcos to obtain favorable loan accommodations for
CDCP;
820
(2) That DOMINGO committed the offense in relation to his office and while in the performance of his
official functions;
(3) That he facilitated and made possible the passage by the PNB Board of Directors of Resolution
No. 144, thereby causing undue injury and prejudice to PNB which was unjustly forced to assume
CDCPs obligation to the Republic National Bank of Dallas after the CDCP defaulted in the payment
of the loan amounting to US$29 Million;
(4) That such undue injury was caused by his facilitation of the approval of the Letter of Credit and
the waiver of the collateral deficiency, thereby granting unwarranted benefits to CDCP in the same
amount; and
(5) That he acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality.
Clearly, the facts alleged in the information constitute a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. Hence, the motion to quash must fail. C alrsc
Finally, DOMINGO avers that the long and inordinate delay in the termination of the preliminary
investigation and the filing of the information violated his right to speedy trial, invoking the ruling
enunciated in Tatad v. Sandiganbayan.[26]
The concept of speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible
concept. Hence, the doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated,
the factors that may be considered and balanced are the length of delay, the reasons for such delay,
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
[27] The right of an accused to a speedy trial is guaranteed to him by the Constitution, but the same
shall not be utilized to deprive the State of a reasonable opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. It
secures rights to an accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public justice.[28]
A review of the records show that his right has not been violated. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor, in its Comment/ Opposition to the Motion to Quash,[29] has adequately explained the
reason for the said delay, to wit:
The records show that accused Domingo filed his counter affidavit on March 3, 1992, and the case
was resolved on July 9, 1992. There was no undue delay in the resolution of this case despite the
gargantuan volume of cases filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
There [might have been] a delay in the conduct of the preliminary investigation but which is not
undue and intended as they were brought about by unforseen peculiar circumstances.
Sometime in 1987, when this case was in its initial stage of preliminary investigation, the authority of
the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct preliminary investigation and file cases with the
Sandiganbayan was questioned and was subsequently nullified by the Supreme Court in the cases
of Zaldivar vs. Gonzales and Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan (supra.). This necessitated the issuance of
Administrative Order No. 1 (supra.) in order that the Office of the Special Prosecutor will continue to
function as part of the Ombudsman. Following this event was the retirement of the assigned
Prosecutor, Juan T. Templonuevo, in the early part of 1989. When RA 6770 was enacted in
November 1989, the OSP was reorganized by the Ombudsman. After its reorganization in 1990, the
present case was assigned to SPO III Teresita Diaz-Baldos. The said SPO instead of resolving the
case, considering that the respondents have already been subpoenaed, gave another opportunity for
the accused herein to file their counter affidavits. She forthwith issued subpoena for the accused to
821
file their counter-affidavits. Accused-movant, Domingo filed his counter-affidavit in March 199[2].
Hence, the Resolution.[30] Mis act
Perforce, DOMINGO cannot validly claim that he was denied due process of law considering that
one of the principal reasons for the delay was precisely to afford him the opportunity to submit his
counter-affidavit since the first subpoena was returned unserved. After DOMINGO filed his counter-
affidavit on 9 March 1992, the corresponding information was in due time filed on 30 July 1992. The
delay, if any, was actually more beneficial, rather than prejudicial, to petitioner in that it was intended
to afford him the opportunity to refute the charges made against him.
It is also worthy to note at this point the long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition
will not lie to restrain a criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that criminal
acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of society. The writ may issue
only in specified cases, among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights.[31] Such
exceptions do not obtain in this case.
Thus, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the Sandiganbayan, the Resolution denying DOMINGOs Motion to Quash must be, and is hereby,
AFFIRMED.
WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is hereby DISMISSED. The Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to
try and decide Criminal Case No. 17847 with purposeful dispatch.
Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
822
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139405. March 13, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR,respondent.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution[1] dated February 3, 1999 of
the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) granting the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution[2] dated October 20, 1998 denying herein respondents Motion to Dismiss the Information
in Criminal Case No. 13044 and the Resolution[3] dated July 23, 1999 which denied petitioners
urgent motion for reconsideration.
On October 27, 1988, herein respondent, Arturo Pacificador y Fullon, and his erstwhile co-
accused, Jose T. Marcelo,[4] were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
an Information[5]that reads:
That on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January 6, 1976, in Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, Arturo Pacificador, then
Chairman of the Board of the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation, a government-owned
corporation, and therefore, a public officer, and Jose T. Marcelo, Jr., then President of the Philippine
Smelters Corporation, a private corporation, conspiring and confederating with one another and with
other individuals, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly, and with evident bad faith
promote, facilitate, effect and cause the sale, transfer and conveyance by the National Shipyard and
Steel Corporation of its ownership and all its titles, rights and interests over parcels of land in Jose
Panganiban, Camarines Norte where the Jose Panganiban Smelting Plant is located including all the
reclaimed and foreshore areas of about 50 hectares to the Philippine Smelters Corporation by virtue
of a contract, the terms and conditions of which are manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
Government as the consideration thereof is only P85,144.50 while the fair market value thereof at
that time was P862,150.00, thereby giving the Philippine Smelters Corporation unwarranted benefits,
advantages and profits and causing undue injury, damage and prejudice to the government in the
amount of P777,005.50.
After his arraignment, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Information in Criminal
Case No. 13044 on July 15, 1998 on the following grounds:
1) The court has no jurisdiction since the crime charged had been extinguished by prescription; and
2) The information does not charge an offense in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the
case of San Mauricio Mining Corporation, et al., vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., G.R. No. L-
47859 and L-57132 dated July 10, 1981.
On August 21, 1998 the petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.
On November 10, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying the Motion to
Dismiss the Information ruling that:
823
The information in this case, dated October 19, 1988, was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October
27, 1988 on which date the existing jurisprudence on matters of prescription of the offense was the
ruling enunciated in Francisco v. Court of Appeals (May 30, 1983, 122 SCRA 538) to the effect that
the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office also interrupts the period of prescription of the
offense.
The offense charged was allegedly committed from December 16, 1975 to January 6, 1976. The
running of the period of prescription of the offense may have started on January 6, 1976 but was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the appropriate investigating body. In the case at bench,
We find in the record no proof, or even an allegation, of the precise date of filing of the complaint
with the appropriate investigating body which investigated this case,to enable us to determine with
certainty if the offense charged have (sic) indeed prescribed.
The second ground submitted by the accused-movant is precipitate at this stage of the proceedings,
as it involves a matter of defense.
Thereupon, on December 7, 1998, respondent Pacificador moved for the reconsideration of

the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his Motion to Dismiss, contending that:
1) The prosecution of the crime charged is time-barred by prescription as shown by facts and
circumstances on record and of judicial notice; and
2) It is not precipitate for the Honorable Court to consider the Supreme Court ruling in San Mauricio
Mining Co. vs. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al., declaring the basic deed of sale as not illegal and
with justly adequate consideration.
On February 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reconsidered its Resolution of November 10, 1998
and dismissed the Information in Criminal Case No. 139405 against the respondent on the ground of
prescription. It ruled thus:
In Our resolution denying accused Pacificadors Motion to Dismiss, We applied Article 91 of the
Revised Penal Code and the doctrine laid down in Francisco vs. CA (122 SCRA 538) to the effect
that the filing of the complaint with the fiscals office or investigating body interrupts the running of the
period of prescription. This is where We committed an oversight. Instead of applying Act No. 3326,
as amended, xxx, We utilized Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
In this case, as the offense involved is the violation of R.A. 3019, a special law, it follows that in
computing the prescriptive period of the offense, it is not the provision contained in the Revised
Penal Code that should govern but that of Act No. 3326. xxx
In Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr., (211 SCRA 277), the Supreme Court, in a clear language, held that the
proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326 are judicial proceedings and do not include
administrative proceedings. xxx
The offense imputed on accused was allegedly committed from December 6, 1975 to January 6,
1976. The offense prescribed on January 3, 1986, or ten years from January 6, 1976.
The Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the Sandiganbayan on
July 23, 1999.
Hence, the petition.
824
In its Brief,[6] the petitioner contends that, contrary to the ruling of the Sandiganbayan, the
provision of Act No. 3326[7] on prescription of offenses punishable under special laws is not
applicable to the instant criminal case for the reason that Republic Act No. 3019 provides for its own
prescriptive period. Section 11 thereof provides that offenses committed and punishable under the
said law shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. However, inasmuch as Republic Act No. 3019 does not
state exactly when the fifteen-year prescriptive period begins to run, Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code should be applied suppletorily.[8] Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, which adopts the
discovery rule for the prescription of offenses, provides:
ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses.- The period of prescription shall commence to run
from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents,
and shall be interrupted by filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are
unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him.
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
Archipelago.
Petitioner also contends that the crime, subject of this case should be deemed as discovered
only on May 13, 1987 when a complaint was filed with the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) by the then Solicitor General Francisco Chavez. Hence, the filing of the
information on October 27, 1988 with the Sandiganbayan was well within the prescriptive period.
Additionally, petitioner contends that the ordinary principles of prescription do not apply in this
case for the reason that the respondent effectively concealed his criminal acts which prevented the
discovery of the offense until May 13, 1987. Even on the assumption that the registration of the
Deed of Sale was on December 29, 1975 when that document was executed by the parties, and
thus, amounted to a constructive notice to the whole world of the existence of the said Deed of Sale,
the registration thereof could not have given notice of fraudulent acts of the parties to the sale. The
situation prevailing at that time, that is, during the authoritarian regime of then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, did not permit the investigative and prosecuting arms of the government to institute
complaints against him, his wife and his cronies.
In his Comment,[9] respondent Arturo Pacificador argued that Act No. 3326 governs the
prescription of offenses punishable under special laws; that the registration of the Deed of Sale in
question is the correct reckoning or starting point for prescription inasmuch as the fact of registration
of said Deed of Sale in effect gave notice to the whole world not only of its existence but also of all
the facts contained therein; that, aside from the ground of prescription, the Information in Criminal
Case No. 13044 should be dismissed on the ground that it does not charge an offense inasmuch as
the issue of whether or not the contract of sale was disadvantageous to the government had long
been settled in the case of San Mauricio Mining Co. v. Hon. Constante A. Ancheta, et al.,[10] and
that the dismissal of the criminal case against him by the Sandiganbayan on the ground of
prescription is tantamount to acquittal which bars prosecution of the respondent for the same offense
under Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
It has been settled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 governs the computation of prescription of
offenses defined and penalized by special laws. In the case of People v. Sandiganbayan,[11] this
Court ruled that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 was correctly applied by the anti-graft court in determining
the reckoning period for prescription in a case involving the crime of violation of Republic Act No.
825
3019, as amended.In the fairly recent case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto,[12]we categorically ruled that:
Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive
period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 2. Prescription should begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment. (Emphasis ours)
The prescription shall be interrupted when the proceedings are instituted against the guilty person
and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double
jeopardy.
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall
commence to run on the day it was committed.
It can be gleaned from the Information in this case that respondent Pacificador allegedly
committed the crime charged on or about and during the period from December 6, 1975 to January
6, 1976. Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, provides that the offenses
committed under the said statute shall prescribe in fifteen (15) years. It appears however, that prior
to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195 which was approved on March 16,
1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the said statute was only ten (10)
years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019
as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the reason that the amendment, not
being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot be given retroactive
effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years from January 6, 1976.
The petitioner, however, vehemently denies having any knowledge of the crime at the time it
was allegedly committed by the respondent. It claims that the crime charged in the Information
should be deemed as discovered only on May 13, 1987 when the then Solicitor General, Francisco
Chavez, filed a complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) against
the respondent, for violation of the provision of R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We are not convinced. This Court takes notice of the fact that the subject Deed of Sale dated
December 29, 1975 relative to the sale of the parcels of land by the National Steel Corporation to the
Philippine Smelters Corporation, was registered shortly thereafter in the Registry of Deeds of the
Province of Camarines Norte. Subsequently, the Original Certificate of Title No. 0440 in the name of
the National Steel Corporation was cancelled and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No.
13060 was issued in the name of the vendee Philippine Smelters Corporation. On February 28,
1977, the Philippine Smelters Corporation even filed an action for quieting of title with the then Court
of First Instance of Camarines Norte, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2882,[13] which case forms
the basis for the Sandiganbayan to deduce that the subject Deed of Sale may be deemed registered
on the said date, at the latest.[14]
While petitioner may not have knowledge of the alleged crime at the time of its commission,
the registration of the subject Deed of Sale with the Registry of Deeds constitutes constructive notice
thereof to the whole world inlcuding the petitioner. Well entrenched is the jurisprudential rule that
registration of deeds in the public real estate registry is a notice thereof to the whole world. The
registration is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable,
826
included therein. All persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.[15] Hence, even if
the period of prescription is reckoned from February 28, 1977, the crime had already prescribed
when the Information in this case was filed with the Sandiganbayan on October 27, 1988.
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.[16] The said
legal principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of
amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran,
[17] this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at
liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he
may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence,
it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because
such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very
existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it
destroys proofs of guilt.
The instant case should be distinguished from the cases of People v.

Duque[18] and Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.
Desierto[19] wherein we upheld the view that the prescriptive period started to run only upon the
discovery of the illegal nature of the acts constituting the offense. The first case involves the crime of
illegal recruitment where the accused, Napoleon Duque, was found to have misrepresented himself
to several job applicants as a registered employment agent duly recognized by the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). Due to the said misrepresentation of the accused, the
applicable prescriptive period began to run not from the time of recruitment of job applicants by the
accused but from the time his recruitment activities were ascertained by the complainants and the
POEA to have been carried out without any license or authority from the government. The second,
or Desierto case, which was decided by this Court on October 25, 1999, involves the grant of alleged
behest loans by certain government-owned and controlled financial institutions to several individuals
and corporations closely associated with the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his relatives. It
was alleged that the public officials concerned, who were charged in the corresponding Informations,
connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans in covering up the anomalous
transactions. Under the circumstances, it was impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have
known the violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made. The
prescriptive period started to run only upon discovery of the alleged illegality of the transactions after
the investigations thereon were conducted.
In the case at bar, the petitioner contends that respondent concealed his criminal acts that
effectively prevented discovery thereof. The records of this case do not specifically show how the
respondent allegedly employed acts that could prevent the discovery of any illegality in the
transaction other than the bare assertion of the petitioner. There is also no allegation that the
government officials involved in the transactions connived or conspired with respondent
Pacificador. The said government officials were not even charged in the instant Information. On the
other hand, it was never disputed by the petitioner that the subject Deed of Sale was duly registered
with the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Camarines Norte and that the corresponding Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 13060 was subsequently issued to the vendee, Philippine Smelters
Corporation.[20]
827
In view of the foregoing, we do not find it necessary to discuss the other points raised by the
respondent in his Comment as additional grounds for the denial of the instant petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994
828
JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON.
DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and
JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Pea and Nolasco for petitioner.
Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the
first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings. 1 Bigamy carries
with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this crime
prescribes in fifteen (15) years. 2 The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run from the
day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . 3
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted. 4 At least, it is not
expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is already
time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from the time the
offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the
subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive
notice.
The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged
with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage with Ma.
Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid
and subsisting. 5
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.
In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October 1992,
he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of 21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed
for lack of merit. 6
In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the Office of
the Civil Registrar in 1975, 7such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record and thus
constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to have had
constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to run
on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the corresponding information for
bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in 1992.
Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as declared
by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady of Nativity
829
Church in Marikina on 15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of
registration the marriage contract was open to inspection by any interested person.
On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in
criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant, 8 we agree with the view
expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding the
possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains
Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be applied in the case at
bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597);
andPeople v. Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).
This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to
the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the fact that a bigamous marriage is generally
entered into by the offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a
bigamous marriage is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another marriage.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or interest therein is
made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said property is located. Verification in the
office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the transactions involving the said property can easily
be made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended
person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person.
Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive notice was applied,
involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly, marriage is not property.
The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice is not contrary to
the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed liberally in favor of the accused. To
compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to
almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration, the offender however
is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his
previous subsisting marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He
likewise conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person. And such a place
may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the bigamous marriage is rendered
quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime
of bigamy should be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the prescriptive period
for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of registration thereof, the prosecution of
the violators of the said offense would almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the
petitioner would encourage fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by
law. 9
830
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary
inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various local
civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or even third marriage has been
contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a task to even
contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for constructive
notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for
the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of such registering, filing or
entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or
in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for
applying the constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and sundry
for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the marriage
contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or for that
matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina so that
everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or minister
would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment
under the Marriage Law. 10 Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his first
spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local
civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple expedience of having the second
marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion the running of the fifteen-year
prescriptive period against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage with
ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the stability of
marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary concern of our
society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the
same is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
BENJAMIN (KOKOY) T. G.R. Nos. 165510-33
831
ROMUALDEZ, Petitioner, Present:
Quisumbing, - versus - Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.
HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO,
in his official capacity as the Ombudsman,
and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION
ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Promulgated:
Respondents.
July 28, 2006
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
RESOLUTION
For resolution is petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] assailing the Decision

dated September 23, 2005, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12,

2004and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending
the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned
cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10,
2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there
is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may
accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and
Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on
the ground of prescription.
In its Comment,[3] the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution;
that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct
of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989
interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986
until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.
For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment[4] that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and
RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Omdudsman need not wait for a new complaint
with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the
832
petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods
of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run
when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same
in the negative, should be applied.
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity; and (2) whether the offenses for
which petitioner are being charged have already prescribed.
Anent the first issue, we reiterate our ruling in the assailed Decision that the preliminary
investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 is a valid
proceeding despite the previous dismissal thereof by the Sandiganbayan in its Minute
Resolution[5] dated February 10, 2004 which reads:
Crim. Cases Nos. 13406-13429PEO. vs. BENJAMIN T. ROMUALDEZ
Considering that the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 143618-41, entitled
Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan (First Division, et al.) promulgated
on July 30, 2002 annulled and set aside the orders issued by this Court on June 8, 2000 which,
among others, denied the accuseds motion to quash the informations in these cases; that in
particular the above-mentioned Decision ruled that the herein informations may be quashed because
the officer who filed the same had no authority to do so; and that the said Decision has become final
and executory on November 29, 2002, these cases are considered DISMISSED. Let these cases be
sent to the archives.
The aforesaid dismissal was effected pursuant to our ruling in Romualdez v.

Sandiganbayan[6] where petitioner assailed the Sandiganbayans Order dated June 8, 2000in
Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 which denied his Motion to Quash, terminated the preliminary
investigation conducted by Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero and set his arraignment for violations of
Section 7 of RA No. 3019 on June 26, 2000.[7] In annulling and setting aside the aforesaid Order of
the Sandiganbayan, we held that:
In the case at bar, the flaw in the information is not a mere remediable defect of form, as
in Pecho v. Sandiganbayan where the wording of the certification in the information was found
inadequate, or in People v. Marquez, where the required certification was absent. Here, the
informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured even by conducting
another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and cannot be the
basis for criminal proceedings.[8]
833
In effect, we upheld in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[9] petitioners Motion to Quash and
directed the dismissal of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 because the informations were filed by an
unauthorized party, hence void.
In such a case, Section 6, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court is pertinent and applicable.Thus:
SEC. 6. Order sustaining the motion to quash not a bar to another prosecution;
exception. An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 3(g) and (i)[10] of this Rule.
An order sustaining a motion to quash on grounds other than extinction of criminal liability
or double jeopardy does not preclude the filing of another information for a crime constituting the
same facts. Indeed, we held in Cudia v. Court of Appeals[11] that:
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in
form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the
consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the
dismissal of the first information would not be a bar in petitioners subsequent prosecution. x x x.[12]
Be that as it may, the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in the instant
cases was not a violation of petitioners right to be informed of the charges against him. It is of no
moment that the cases investigated by the Ombudsman bore the same docket numbers as those
cases which have already been dismissed by the Sandiganbayan, to wit: Criminal Case Nos. 13406-
13429. As we have previously stated:
The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record keeping. It is
usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a
case.
This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely
for reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were
assigned, i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 x x x.[13]
834
Besides, regardless of the docket numbers, the Ombudsman conducted the above-referred
preliminary investigation pursuant to our Decision in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan[14] when we
categorically declared therein that:
The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated
the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in
G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the right
to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioners right was
violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer
without jurisdiction over the said cases.It bears stressing that our directive should be strictly
complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to due process.[15]
Anent the issue on the prescription of the offenses charged, we should first resolve the question of
whether this Court may validly take cognizance of and resolve the aforementioned issue considering
that as we have said in the assailed Decision, this case has never progressed beyond the filing of
the informations against the petitioner[16] and that it is only prudent that evidence be gathered
through trial on the merits to determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed.[17] We
reconsider our stance and shall rule in the affirmative.
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the accused may, at any time before he enters his plea,
move to quash the complaint and information[18] on the ground that the criminal action or liability
has been extinguished,[19] which ground includes the defense of prescription considering that Article
89 of the Revised Penal Code enumerates prescription as one of those grounds which totally
extinguishes criminal liability. Indeed, even if there is yet to be a trial on the merits of a criminal case,
the accused can very well invoke the defense of prescription.
Thus, the question is whether or not the offenses charged in the subject criminal cases have
prescribed? We held in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan[20] that:
In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following should be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.[21]
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for failure to file his
Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical
Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs.
Section 11 of RA No. 3019 provides that all offenses punishable therein shall prescribe in 15 years.
Significantly, this Court already declared in the case of People v. Pacificador[22]that:
835
It appears however, that prior to the amendment of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 by B.P. Blg. 195
which was approved on March 16, 1982, the prescriptive period for offenses punishable under the
said statute was only ten (10) years. The longer prescriptive period of fifteen (15) years, as provided
in Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 as amended by B.P. Blg. 195, does not apply in this case for the
reason that the amendment, not being favorable to the accused (herein private respondent), cannot
be given retroactive effect. Hence, the crime prescribed on January 6, 1986 or ten (10) years
from January 6, 1976.[23]
Thus, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner from 1962 up to March 15, 1982, the same
shall prescribe in 10 years. On the other hand, for offenses allegedly committed by the petitioner
during the period from March 16, 1982 until 1985, the same shall prescribe in 15 years.
As to when these two periods begin to run, reference is made to Act No. 3326 which governs the
computation of prescription of offenses defined by and penalized under special laws. Section 2 of
Act No. 3326 provides:
SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of
the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and
In the case of People v. Duque,[24] we construed the aforequoted provision, specifically the rule on
the running of the prescriptive period as follows:
In our view, the phrase "institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment" may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word
"until." Thus, Section 2 may be read as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law;
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof;"
or as:
"Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and until institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment." (Emphasis supplied)[25]
836
Thus, this Court rules that the prescriptive period of the offenses herein began to run from the
discovery thereof or on May 8, 1987, which is the date of the complaint filed by the former Solicitor
General Francisco I. Chavez against the petitioner with the PCGG.
In the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.

Desierto[26] this Court already took note that:
In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned transactions were
made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus,
the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.[27]
However, both respondents in the instant case aver that, applying Article 91 of the Revised
Penal Code suppletorily, the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until April 27,
2000 prevented the prescriptive period for the alleged offenses from running.
We disagree.
Section 2 of Act. No. 3326 is conspicuously silent as to whether the absence of the offender from
the Philippines bars the running of the prescriptive period. The silence of the law can only be
interpreted to mean that Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not intend such an interruption of the
prescription unlike the explicit mandate of Article 91. Thus, as previously held:
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative
lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of the interpretation,
enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be
judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not
authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the
legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.[28]
The only matter left to be resolved is whether the filing of the complaint with the PCGG in
1987 as well as the filing of the informations with the Sandiganbayan to initiate Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 in 1989 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period such that when the
Ombudsman directed petitioner to file his counter-affidavit on March 3, 2004, the offenses have
already prescribed.
837

Under Section 2 of Act No. 3326, the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are
instituted against the guilty person. However, there is no such proceeding instituted against the
petitioner to warrant the tolling of the prescriptive periods of the offenses charged against him.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[29] petitioner averred that PCGG acted without

jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion in conducting a preliminary investigation of cases not
falling within its competence.[30] This Court, in its resolve to deal with the merits of the case to
remove the possibility of any misunderstanding as to the course which it wishes petitioners cases in
the Sandiganbayan to take[31]declared invalid
the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG over the 24 offenses ascribed to Romualdez
(of failure to file annual statements of assets and liabilities), for lack of jurisdiction of said offenses.
[32]
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[33] petitioner assailed the validity of the informations filed

with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 considering that the same were
subscribed and filed by the PCGG. In granting petitioners plea, this Court held, thus:
Here, the informations were filed by an unauthorized party. The defect cannot be cured by
conducting another preliminary investigation. An invalid information is no information at all and
cannot be the basis for criminal proceedings.[34]
Indeed, the nullity of the proceedings initiated by then Solicitor General Chavez in 1987
with the PCGG and by the PCGG with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 is judicially settled. In
contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist that could have merited the suspension of the
prescriptive periods.
Besides, the only proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is
filed or initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case
of People v. Maravilla,[35] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal mayor for
purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period of prescription.
Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican,[36] this Court held that the filing of a complaint against a
public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the PCGG.Thus,
the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive periods.
838
However, in his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio contends that the offenses charged
against the petitioner could not have prescribed because the latter was absent from the Philippines
from 1986 to April 27, 2000 and thus the prescriptive period did not run from the time of discovery on
May 8, 1987, citing Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that [t]he term of
prescription should not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago.
Mr. Justice Carpio argues that
Article 10 of the same Code makes Article 91 x x x supplementary to [special laws], unless the latter
should x x x provide the contrary. Nothing in RA 3019 prohibits the supplementary application of
Article 91 to that law. Hence, applying Article 91, the prescriptive period in Section 11 of RA 3019,
before and after its amendment, should run only after petitioner returned to this jurisdiction on 27
April 2000.
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v.
Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of
the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v.
People.
He also expresses his apprehension on the possible effects of the ruling of the Majority
Opinion and argues that
The accused should not have the sole discretion of preventing his own prosecution by the simple
expedient of escaping from the States jurisdiction. x x x An accused cannot acquire legal immunity
by being a fugitive from the States jurisdiction. x x x.
To allow an accused to prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction unjustifiably tilts the
balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to the detriment of the States ability to investigate
and prosecute crimes. In this age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should not
encourage individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to leave
Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The majority opinion unfortunately
chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous practice.
With all due respect, we beg to disagree.
Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
839
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the
future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.
Pursuant thereto, one may be tempted to hastily conclude that a special law such as RA
No. 3019 is supplemented by the Revised Penal Code in any and all cases. As it is, Mr. Justice
Carpio stated in his Dissenting Opinion that
There is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10 of the RPC applies
suppletorily, as the Court has held in a long line of decisions since 1934, starting with People v.
Moreno. Thus, the Court has applied suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases
where the special laws are silent on the matters in issue. The law on the applicability of Article 10 of
the RPC is thus well-settled, with the latest reiteration made by this Court in 2004 in Jao Yu v.
People.
However, it must be pointed out that the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code
to special laws, by virtue of Article 10 thereof, finds relevance only when the provisions of the special
law are silent on a particular matter as evident from the cases cited and relied upon in the Dissenting
Opinion:
In the case of People v. Moreno,[37] this Court, before ruling that the subsidiary penalty
under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code may be applied in cases of violations of Act No. 3992 or
the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noted that the special law did not contain any provision that the
defendant can be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In the case of People v. Li Wai Cheung,[38] this Court applied the rules on the service of
sentences provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code in favor of the accused who was found
guilty of multiple violations of RA No. 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 considering the lack
of similar rules under the special law.
In the case of People v. Chowdury,[39] the Court applied Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the
Revised Penal Code to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under RA No. 8042
or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 because it was not defined therein
although it referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment.
840
In the case at bar, the silence of RA No. 3019 on the question of whether or not the
absence of the accused from the Philippines prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is
more apparent than real.
Even before the enactment of RA No. 3019 in 1960, Act No. 3326 was already in effect as
early as December 4, 1926. Section 3 thereof categorically defines special acts asacts defining and
penalizing violations of the law not included in the Penal Code.
Thus, in the case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v.

Desierto,[40] this Court was categorical in ruling that
The law on prescription of offenses is found in Articles 90 and 91 of the Revised Penal
Code for offenses punishable thereunder. For those penalized under special laws, Act No. 3326
applies.
Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to run from the day of
the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The
running of the prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.Clearly, Section 2 of Act No. 3326 did not provide that the absence of the
accused from thePhilippines prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference
that can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No. 3326, did not
consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a hindrance to the running of the
prescriptive period. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. To elaborate, -
Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others. This rule is expressed in the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain
matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the
intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[41]
Had the legislature intended to include the accuseds absence from the Philippines as a
ground for the interruption of the prescriptive period in special laws, the same could have been
expressly provided in Act No. 3326. A case in point is RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of
1997 where the legislature made its intention clear and was thus categorical that
841
SEC. 281. Prescription for Violations of any Provision of this Code All violations of any
provision of this Code shall prescribe after five (5) years.
Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings
for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty persons and
The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippines. (Emphasis
supplied)
According to Mr. Justice Carpio, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code fills the so-
called gap in Act No. 3326. Thus, while Act No. 3326 governs the operation of the prescriptive period
for violations of R.A. No. 3019, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code can and shall still be applied in
cases where the accused is absent from the Philippines. In effect, Article 91 would supplement Act
No. 3326.
This could not have been the intention of the framers of the law.
While it is true that Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code makes the Code suppletory to
special laws, however, Act No. 3326 cannot fall within the ambit of special law as contemplated and
used in Article 10 of the RPC.
In the case of United States v. Serapio,[42] the Court had the occasion to interpret the
term special laws mentioned in Article 7 of then Penal Code of the Philippines, which is now Article
10 of the Revised Penal Code, as referring to penal laws that punish acts not defined and penalized
by the Penal Code of the Philippines. Thus
This contention makes it necessary to define "special laws," as that phrase is used in article 7 of the
Penal Code. Does this phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) have the
meaning applied to the phrase "special laws," as the same is generally used? x x x It is confidently
contended that the phrase "leyes especiales," as used in the Penal Code (article 7) is not used with
this general signification: In fact, said phrase may refer not to a special law as above defined, but to
a general law. A careful reading of said article 7 clearly indicates that the phrase "leyes especiales"
was not used to signify "special laws" in the general signification of that phrase. The article, it will be
noted, simply says, in effect, that when a crime is made punishable under some other law than the
Penal Code, it (the crime) is not subject to the provisions of said code.[43]
842

Even if we consider both Act No. 3326 and Article 91 as supplements to RA No. 3019, the
same result would obtain. A conflict will arise from the contemporaneous application of the two
laws. The Revised Penal Code explicitly states that the absence of the accused from
the Philippines shall be a ground for the tolling of the prescriptive period while Act No. 3326 does
not. In such a situation, Act No. 3326 must prevail over Article 91 because it specifically and directly
applies to special laws while the Revised Penal Code shall apply to special laws only suppletorily
and only when the latter do not provide the contrary. Indeed, elementary rules of statutory
construction dictate that special legal provisions must prevail over general ones.
The majority notes Mr. Justice Carpios reservations about the effects of ruling that the
absence of the accused from the Philippines shall not suspend the running of the prescriptive
period. Our duty, however, is only to interpret the law. To go beyond that and to question the wisdom
or effects of the law is certainly beyond our constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already
explained
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a legislative
lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge
the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied
however after later wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into
the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have
supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.[44]
Mr. Justice Carpio also remarks that the liberal interpretation of the statute of limitations in
favor of the accused only relates to the following issues: (1) retroactive or prospective application of
laws providing or extending the prescriptive period; (2) the determination of the nature of the felony
committed vis--vis the applicable prescriptive period; and (3) the reckoning of when the prescriptive
period runs. Therefore, the aforementioned principle cannot be utilized to support the Majority
Opinions conclusion that the prescriptive period in a special law continues to run while the accused
is abroad.
We take exception to the foregoing proposition.
We believe that a liberal interpretation of the law on prescription in criminal cases equally
provides the authority for the rule that the prescriptive period runs while the accused is outside of
Philippine jurisdiction. The nature of the law on prescription of penal statutes supports this
conclusion. In the old but still relevant case of People v. Moran,[45]this Court extensively discussed
the rationale behind and the nature of prescription of penal offenses
843
We should at first observe that a mistake is sometimes made in applying to statutes of
limitation in criminal suits the construction that has been given to statutes of limitation in civil suits.
The two classes of statutes, however, are essentially different. In civil suits the statute is interposed
by the legislature as an impartial arbiter between two contending parties. In the construction of the
statute, therefore, there is no intendment to be made in favor of either party. Neither grants the right
to the other; there is therefore no grantor against whom the ordinary presumptions, of construction
are to be made. But it is, otherwise when a statute of limitation is granted by the State. Here the
State is the grantor, surrendering by act of grace its rights to prosecute, and declaring the offense to
be no longer the subject of prosecution.' The statute is not a statute of process, to be scantily and
grudgingly applied, but an amnesty, declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the
offence; that the offender shall be at liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a
citizen and that from henceforth he may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs
of his guilt are blotted out.Hence it is that statutes of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of
the defendant, not only because such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and
grace, but because the very existence of the statute, is a recognition and notification by the
legislature of the fact that time, while it gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it
fixed and positive periods in which it destroys proofs of guilt. Independently of these views, it must
be remembered that delay in instituting prosecutions is not only productive of expense to the State,
but of peril to public justice in the attenuation and distortion, even by mere natural lapse of memory,
of testimony. It is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt, and that statutes,
enforcing such promptitude should be vigorously maintained. They are not merely acts of grace, but
checks imposed by the State upon itself, to exact vigilant activity from its subalterns, and to secure
for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, there is no reason why we should deny petitioner the benefits accruing from the
liberal construction of prescriptive laws on criminal statutes. Prescription emanates from the liberality
of the State. Any bar to or cause of interruption in the operation of prescriptive periods cannot simply
be implied nor derived by mere implication. Any diminution of this endowment must be directly and
expressly sanctioned by the source itself, the State. Any doubt on this matter must be resolved in
favor of the grantee thereof, the accused.
The foregoing conclusion is logical considering the nature of the laws on prescription. The
exceptions to the running of or the causes for the interruption of the prescriptive periods may and
should not be easily implied. The prescriptive period may only be prevented from operating or may
only be tolled for reasons explicitly provided by the law.
In the case of People v. Pacificador,[46] we ruled that:
It bears emphasis, as held in a number of cases, that in the interpretation of the law on
prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is to be adopted. The said legal
principle takes into account the nature of the law on prescription of crimes which is an act of
amnesty and liberality on the part of the state in favor of the offender. In the case of People v. Moran,
this Court amply discussed the nature of the statute of limitations in criminal cases, as follows:
844
The statute is not statute of process, to be scantily and grudgingly applied, but an amnesty,
declaring that after a certain time oblivion shall be cast over the offense; that the offender shall be at
liberty to return to his country, and resume his immunities as a citizen; and that from henceforth he
may cease to preserve the proofs of his innocence, for the proofs of his guilt are blotted out. Hence,
it is that statues of limitation are to be liberally construed in favor of the defendant, not only because
such liberality of construction belongs to all acts of amnesty and grace, but because the very
existence of the statute is a recognition and notification by the legislature of the fact that time, while it
gradually wears out proofs of innocence, has assigned to it fixed and positive periods in which it
destroys proofs of guilt.[47]
In view of the foregoing, the applicable 10-and-15-year prescriptive periods in the instant
case, were not interrupted by any event from the time they began to run on May 8, 1987. As a
consequence, the alleged offenses committed by the petitioner for the years 1963-1982 prescribed
10 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 1997. On the other hand, the alleged offenses committed by
the petitioner for the years 1983-1985 prescribed 15 years from May 8, 1987 or on May 8, 2002.
Therefore, when the Office of the Special Prosecutor initiated the preliminary investigation
of Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 on March 3, 2004 by requiring the petitioner to submit his
counter-affidavit, the alleged offenses subject therein have already prescribed. Indeed, the State has
lost its right to prosecute petitioner for the offenses subject of Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049
pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners Motion for Reconsideration

isGRANTED. Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal
Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila are all hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
THIRD DIVISION
845
G.R. No. 84850 June 29, 1989
RICARDO A. LLAMADO, petitioner, vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LEON GAW,

respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioner.
FELICIANO, J.:
Petitioner Ricardo A. Llamado was Treasurer of Pan Asia Finance Corporation. Together with Jacinto
N. Pascual, Sr., President of the same corporation, petitioner Llamado was prosecuted for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in Criminal Case No. 85-38653, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
49. The two (2) had co-signed a postdated check payable to private respondent Leon Gaw in the
amount of P186,500.00, which check was dishonored for lack of sufficient funds.
In a decision dated 10 March 1987, the trial court convicted the petitioner alone, since jurisdiction
over the person of Pascual, who had thoughtfully fled the country, had not been obtained. Petitioner
was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of one (1) year of prision correccional and to pay a fine
of P 200,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioner was also required to
reimburse respondent Gaw the amount of P186,500.00 plus the cost of suit.
On 20 March 1987, after the decision of the trial court was read to him, petitioner through counsel
orally manifested that he was taking an appeal. Having been so notified, the trial court on the same
day ordered the forwarding of the records of the case to the Court of Appeals. On 9 July 1987,
petitioner through his counsel received from the Court of Appeals a notice to file his Appellant's Brief
within thirty (30) days. Petitioner managed to secure several extensions of time within which to file
his brief, the last extension expiring on 18 November 1987. 1
Petitioner Llamado, even while his Appellant's Brief was being finalized by his then counsel of
record, sought advice from another counselor. On 30 November 1987, petitioner, with the assistance
of his new counsel, filed in the Regional Trial Court a Petition for Probation invoking Presidential
Decree No. 968, as amended. The Petition was not, however, accepted by the lower court, since the
records of the case had already been forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals Manifestation and Petition for Probation" dated 16
November 1987, enclosing a copy of the Petition for Probation that he had submitted to the trial
court. Petitioner asked the Court of Appeals to grant his Petition for Probation or, in the alternative, to
remand the Petition back to the trial court, together with the records of the criminal case, for
consideration and approval under P.D. No. 968, as amended. At the same time, petitioner prayed
that the running of the period for the filing of his Appellant's Brief be held in abeyance until after the
Court of Appeals shall have acted on his Petition for Probation.
In a "Manifestation and Motion" dated 3 March 1988 and filed with the Court of Appeals, petitioner
formally withdrew his appeal conditioned, however, on the approval of his Petition for Probation. 2
Complying with a Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a
Comment stating that it had no objection to petitioner Llamado's application for probation. Private
respondent-complainant, upon the other hand, sought and obtained leave to file a Comment on
petitioner Llamado's application for probation, to which Comment, petitioner filed a Reply. Private
respondent then filed his "Comment" on the Office of the Solicitor General's Comment of 18 March
1988.
846
In a Resolution dated 17 June 1988, the Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice Magsino, denied the
Petition for Probation. A dissenting opinion was filed by Mr. Justice Bellosillo while Mr. Justice
Santiago submitted a concurring opinion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which Motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals on 23 August 1988, with another, briefer, dissenting opinion from Mr.
Justice Bellosillo.
Petitioner now asks this Court to review and reverse the opinion of the majority in the Court of
Appeals and, in effect, to accept and adopt the dissenting opinion as its own.
The issue to be resolved here is whether or not petitioner's application for probation which was filed
after a notice of appeal had been filed with the trial court, after the records of the case had been
forwarded to the Court of Appeals and the Court of Appeals had issued the notice to file Appellant's
Brief, after several extensions of time to file Appellant's Brief had been sought from and granted by
the Court of Appeals but before actual filing of such brief, is barred under P.D. No. 968, as amended.
P.D. No. 968, known as the Probation Law of 1976, was promulgated on 24 July 1976. Section 4 of
this statute provided as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant and upon application at any time of said defendant, suspend
the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the appellate court if an
appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The filing of the application shall be
deemeda waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
It will be noted that under Section 4 of P.D. No. 968, the trial court could grant an application for
probation "at any time" "after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant" and certainly after
"an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction." Thus, the filing of the application for
probation was "deemed [to constitute] automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal."
On 1 December 1977, Section 4 of P.D. No. 968 was amended by P.D. No. 1257 so as to read as
follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the court may, senteafter it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant but before he begins to serve his sentence and upon his
application, suspend the execution of said sentence and place the defendant on probation for such
period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best.
The prosecuting officer concerned shall be notified by the court of the filing of the application for
probation and he may submit his comment on such application within ten days from receipt of the
notification.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court, with notice to the appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction.
The filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the automatic
withdrawal of a pending appeal. In the latter case, however, if the application is filed on or after the
847
date of the judgment of the appellate court, said application shall be acted upon by the trial court on
the basis of the judgment of the appellate court. (Emphasis supplied)
Examination of Section 4, after its amendment by P.D. No. 1257, reveals that it had established a
prolonged but definite period during which an application for probation may be granted by the trial
court. That period was: 'After [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant but
before he begins to serve his sentence." Clearly, the cut-off time-commencement of service of
sentence-takes place not only after an appeal has beentaken from the sentence of conviction, but
even after judgement has been rendered by the appellate court andafter judgment has become final.
Indeed, in this last situation, Section 4, as amended by P.D. No. 1257 provides that "the application
[for probation] shall be acted upon by the trial court on the basis of the judgment of the appellate
court"; for the appellate court might have increased or reduced the original penalty imposed by the
trial court. It would seem beyond dispute then that had the present case arisen while Section 4 of the
statute as amended by P.D. No. 1257 was still in effect, petitioner Llamado's application for probation
would have had to be granted. Mr. Llamado's application for probation was filed well before the cut-
off time established by Section 4 as then amended by P.D. No. 1257.
On 5 October 1985, however, Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 was once again amended.
This time by P.D. No. 1990. As so amended and in its present form, Section 4 reads as follows:
Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall
have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said defendant within the
period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on
probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided,
That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the application shall be
deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis supplied)
In sharp contrast with Section 4 as amended by PD No. 1257, in its present form, Section 4
establishes a much narrower period during which an application for probation may be filed with the
trial court: "after [the trial court] shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant and within the
period for perfecting an appeal ." As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to the
first paragraph of Section 4 that expressly prohibits the grant of an application for probation "if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction." It is worthy of note too that
Section 4 in its present form has dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an application for
probation means "the automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal". The deletion is quite logical since
an application for probation can no longer be filed once an appeal is perfected; there can, therefore,
be nopending appeal that would have to be withdrawn.
In applying Section 4 in the form it exists today (and at the time petitioner Llamado was convicted by
the trial court), to the instant case, we must then inquire whether petitioner Llamado had submitted
his application for probation "within the period for perfecting an appeal." Put a little differently, the
question is whether by the time petitioner Llamado's application was filed, he had already "perfected
an appeal" from the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
848
The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, under
Section 39 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines for the
Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 and under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, or
more specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, is fifteen (15) days from the
promulgation or notice of the judgment appealed from. It is also clear from Section 3 (a) of Rule 122
that such appeal is taken or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with the Regional Trial Court
which rendered the judgment appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the People of the
Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner Llamado had manifested orally and in open court his intention
to appeal at the time of promulgation of the judgment of conviction, a manifestation at least
equivalent to a written notice of appeal and treated as such by the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner urges, however, that the phrase "period for perfecting an appeal" and the clause "if the
defendant has perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction" found in Section 4 in its current
form, should not be interpreted to refer to Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court; and that the
"whereas" or preambulatory clauses of P.D. No. 1990 did not specify a period of fifteen (15) days for
perfecting an appeal. 3 It is also urged that "the true legislative intent of the amendment (P.D. No.
1990) should not apply to petitioner who filed his Petition for probation at the earliest
opportunity then prevailing and withdrew his appeal." 4
Petitioner invokes the dissenting opinion rendered by Mr. Justice Bellosillo in the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner then asks us to have recourse to "the cardinal rule in statutory construction" that "penal
laws [should] be liberallyconstrued in favor of the accused," and to avoid "a too literal and strict
application of the proviso in P.D. No. 1990" which would "defeat the manifest purpose or policy for
which the [probation law] was enacted-."
We find ourselves unable to accept the eloquently stated arguments of petitioner's counsel and the
dissenting opinion. We are unable to persuade ourselves that Section 4 as it now stands, in
authorizing the trial court to grant probation "upon application by [the] defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal" and in reiterating in the proviso that
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appealfrom the judgment of conviction.
did not really mean to refer to the fifteen-day period established, as indicated above, by B.P. Blg.
129, the Interim Rules and Guidelines Implementing B.P. Blg. 129 and the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, but rather to some vague and undefined time, i.e., "the earliest opportunity" to withdraw
the defendant's appeal. The whereas clauses invoked by petitioner did not, of course, refer to the
fifteen-day period. There was absolutely no reason why they should have so referred to that period
for the operative words of Section 4 already do refer, in our view, to such fifteen-day
period. Whereas clauses do not form part of a statute, strictly speaking; they are not part of
theoperative language of the statute. 5 Nonetheless, whereas clauses may be helpful to the extent
they articulate thegeneral purpose or reason underlying a new enactment, in the present case, an
enactment which drastically but clearly changed the substantive content of Section 4 existing before
the promulgation of P.D. No. 1990. Whereas clauses, however, cannot control the specific terms of
the statute; in the instant case, the whereas clauses of P.D. No. 1990 do notpurport to control or
modify the terms of Section 4 as amended. Upon the other hand, the term "period for perfecting an
appeal" used in Section 4 may be seen to furnish specification for the loose language "first
opportunity" employed in the fourth whereas clause. "Perfection of an appeal" is, of course, a term of
art but it is a term of art widely understood by lawyers and judges and Section 4 of the Probation
Law addresses itself essentially to judges and lawyers. "Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible
849
meaning apart from the meaning given to those words in our procedural law and so the law-making
agency could only have intended to refer to the meaning of those words in the context of procedural
law.
Turning to petitioner's invocation of "liberal interpretation" of penal statutes, we note at the outset
that the Probation Law is not a penal statute. We, however, understand petitioner's argument to be
really that any statutory language that appears to favor the accused in a criminal case should be
given a "liberal interpretation." Courts, however, have no authority to invoke "liberal interpretation' or
"the spirit of the law" where the words of the statute themselves, and as illuminated by the history of
that statute, leave no room for doubt or interpretation. We do not believe that "the spirit of law" may
legitimately be invoked to set at naught words which have a clear and definite meaning imparted to
them by our procedural law. The "true legislative intent" must obviously be given effect by judges and
all others who are charged with the application and implementation of a statute. It is absolutely
essential to bear in mind, however, that the spirit of the law and the intent that is to be given effect
are to be derived from the words actually used by the law-maker, and not from some external,
mystical or metajuridical source independent of and transcending the words of the legislature.
The Court is not here to be understood as giving a "strict interpretation rather than a "liberal" one to
Section 4 of the Probation Law of 1976 as amended by P.D. No. 1990. "Strict" and "liberal" are
adjectives which too frequently impede a disciplined and principled search for the meaning which the
law-making authority projected when it promulgated the language which we must apply. That
meaning is clearly visible in the text of Section 4, as plain and unmistakable as the nose on a man's
face. The Court is simply reading Section 4 as it is in fact written. There is no need for the involved
process of construction that petitioner invites us to engage in, a process made necessary only
because petitioner rejects the conclusion or meaning which shines through the words of the statute.
The first duty of a judge is to take and apply a statute as he finds it, not as he would like it to be.
Otherwise, as this Court in Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila warned, confusion and
uncertainty in application will surely follow, making, we might add, stability and continuity in the law
much more difficult to achieve:
. . . [w]here language is plain, subtle refinements which tinge words so as to give them the color of a
particular judicial theory are not only unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which has caused so
much confusion in the law, which has made it so difficult for the public to understand and know what
the law is with respect to a given matter, is in considerable measure the unwarranted interference by
judicial tribunals with the English language as found in statutes and contracts, cutting the words here
and inserting them there, making them fit personal ideas of what the legislature ought to have
doneor what parties should have agreed upon, giving them meanings which they do not ordinarily
havecutting, trimming, fitting, changing and coloring until lawyers themselves are unable to advise
their clients as to the meaning of a given statute or contract until it has been submitted to some court
for its interpretation and construction. 6
The point in this warning may be expected to become sharper as our people's grasp of English is
steadily attenuated.
There is another and more fundamental reason why a judge must read a statute as the legislative
authority wrote it, not as he would prefer it to have been written. The words to be given meaning
whether they be found in the Constitution or in a statute, define and therefore limit the authority and
discretion of the judges who must apply those words. If judges may, under cover of seeking the "true
spirit" and "real intent" of the law, disregard the words in fact used by the law-giver, the judges will
effectively escape the constitutional and statutory limitations on their authority and discretion. Once a
850
judge goes beyond the clear and ordinary import of the words of the legislative authority, he is
essentially on uncharted seas. In a polity like ours which enshrines the fundamental notion of limiting
power through the separation and distribution of powers, judges have to be particularly careful lest
they substitute their conceptions or preferences of policy for that actually projected by the legislative
agency. Where a judge believes passionately that he knows what the legislative agency should have
said on the particular matter dealt with by a statute, it is easy enough for him to reach the conclusion
that therefore that was what the law-making authority was really saying or trying to say, if somewhat
ineptly As Mr. Justice Frankfurter explained:
Even within their area of choice the courts are not at large. They are confined by the nature and
scope of the judicial function in its particular exercise in the field of interpretation. They are under the
constraints imposed by the judicial function in our democratic society. As a matter of verbal
recognition certainly, no one will gainsay that the function in construing a statute is to ascertain the
meaning of words used by the legislature. To go beyond it is to usurp a power which our democracy
has lodged in its elected legislature. The great judges have constantly admonished their brethren of
the need for discipline in observing the limitations A judge must not rewrite a statute, neither to
enlarge nor to contract it. Whatever temptations the statesmanship of policy-making might wisely
suggest, construction must eschew interpolation and evisceration He must not read in by way of
creation. He must not read out except to avoid patent nonsense of internal contradictions. ... 7
Petitioner finally argues that since under Section 4 of Probation Law as amended has vested in the
trial court the authority to grant the application for probation, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction
to entertain the same and should have (as he had prayed in the alternative) remanded instead the
records to the lower court. Once more, we are not persuaded. The trial court lost jurisdiction over the
case when petitioner perfected his appeal. The Court of Appeals was not, therefore, in a position to
remand the case except for execution of judgment. Moreover, having invoked the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals, petitioner is not at liberty casually to attack that jurisdiction when exercised
adversely to him. In any case, the argument is mooted by the conclusion that we have reached, that
is, that petitioner's right to apply for probation was lost when he perfected his appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAGR No. 04678 is hereby AFFIRMED. No
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-67301 January 29, 1990
851
MANUEL V. BALA, petitioner, vs.THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, and PAUL AYANG-ANG Probation Officer, Manila Probation Office No.
4, respondents.
Coronet Law Office for petitioner.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The petitioner by this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order seeks the reversal of the order dated April 2, 1984 of the then Court of
First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC), of Manila, Branch XX. 1 The decretal portion of
the assailed order reads:
WHEREFORE, for the reasons above-stated, the motion to dismiss and/or strike out motion to
revoke probation, filed by Manuel Bala, thru counsel, should be, as it is hereby DENIED, for lack of
merit.
Let the motion be set for continuation of hearing on April 25 & 27, at 8:30 o'clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner had been indicted for removing and substituting the picture of Maria Eloisa Criss
Diazen which had been attached to her United States of America passport, with that of Florencia
Notarte, in effect falsifying a genuine public or official document. On January 3, 1978, the trial court
adjudged petitioner Manuel Bala in Criminal Case No. 24443, guilty of the crime of falsification of a
public document. The dispositive portion of the judgment states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Manuel Bala y Valdellon guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of a public or official document defined and
penalized under article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of not less than ONE (1) YEAR AND ONE (1) DAY and not exceeding THREE
(3) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS & TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
Pl,800.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency at the rate of P8.00 for each day, and
to pay the cost. He shall be credited with the period of preventive imprisonment that he may have
undergone in accordance with law.
The petitioner seasonably appealed, but the Court of Appeals, on April 9, 1980, affirmed in toto the
lower court's decision.
After the case had been remanded to the court of origin for execution of judgment, 2 the petitioner
applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated August 11, 1982.
The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and
conditions enumerated therein.
On September 23, 1982, the probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer for
permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Pias
specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probationer's request as he
found nothing objectionable to it.
By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, 3 one year
after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued
852
because the respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his
charge.
On December 8, 1983, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal Jose
D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge. 4 The motion
alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no
longer under probation, 5 his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously
adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he contended.
As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's probation, the
respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel Bala's
probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5,
1984. 6 The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation," dated January 10,
1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January
6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a supplemental report7 which recommended the revocation of
probation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences."
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation,
questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation period had already
expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically transferred the venue of the case from the
RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the RTC of Makati which latter court include under its
jurisdiction the Municipality of Las Pias the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13,
P.D. No. 968, which provides
Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ...
Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court,
control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that
place, and in such a case a copy of the probation order the investigation report and other pertinent
records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom
jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was
previously possessed by the court which granted the probation.
As stated at the outset, the respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
The present law on probation, Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1990, which amends section 4 of P.D. 968,
clearly states that "no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction."
However, in the case at bar, P.D. 1990 is inapplicable. P.D. 1990, which went in force on January 15,
1985 can not be given retroactive effect because it would be prejudicial to the accused.
It is worthy to note, that what was actually resolved and denied was the motion to dismiss and/or
strike out the motion to revoke probation which disposed of only the issue of the petitioner's transfer
of residence. The motion did not touch on the issue of the timeliness to revoke probation. The
respondent judge has not yet heard and received evidence, much less acted on the matter.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General submits that the present petition is premature.
853
The Court finds no merit in the petition. Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the
probationer by the court, contrary to the petitioner's submission.
Section 16 of PD 968 8 is clear on this score:
See. 16. Termination of Probation. After the period of probation and upon consideration of the
report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court may order the final discharge of the
probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon
the case is deemed terminated.
Thus, the expiration of the probation period alone does not automatically terminate probation.
Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of probation found in the provisions of the probation law.
Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of
final discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only from such
issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to exceed the period set in
the law. This is so because the period of probation, like the period of incarceration, is deemed the
appropriate period for the rehabilitation of the probationer. In the instant case, a review of the
records compels a revocation of the probation without the need of further proceedings in the trial
court which, after all, would only be an exercise in futility. If we render justice now, why should we
allow the petitioner to further delay it. Probationer Manuel Bala failed to reunite with responsible
society. Precisely he was granted probation in order to give him a chance to return to the main
stream, to give him hope hope for self-respect and a better life. Unfortunately, he has continued to
shun the straight and narrow path. He thus wrecked his chance. He has not reformed.
A major role is played by the probation officer in the release of the probationer because he
(probation officer) is in the best position to report all information relative to the conduct and mental
and physical condition of the probationer in his environment, and the existing institutional and
community resources that he may avail himself of when necessary. Indeed, it is the probation officer
who primarily undertakes the supervision and reform of the probationer through a personalized,
individualized, and community-based rehabilitation program for a specific period of time. On the
basis of his final report, the court can determine whether or not the probationer may be released
from probation.
We find it reprehensible that the respondent probation officer had neglected to submit his report and
recommendation. For, as earlier discussed, without this report, the trial court could not issue the
order of final discharge of the probationer. And it is this order of final discharge which would restore
the probationer's suspended civil rights. In the absence of the order of final discharge, the probation
would still subsist, unless otherwise revoked for cause and that is precisely what we are going to do.
We are revoking his probation for cause.
The petitioner, by applying for probation and getting it, consented to be emancipated from the yoke if
not stigma of a prison sentence, pledging to faithfully comply with the conditions of his probation,
among which are:
xxx
4. To be gainfully employed and be a productive member of society;
xxx
854
6. To cooperate fully with his program of supervision and rehabilitation that will be prescribed by the
Probation Officer. 9
These conditions, as the records show, were not complied with. This non-compliance has defeated
the very purposes of the probation law, to wit:
(a) promote the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him with individualized
treatment;
(b) provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender which might be less probable if
he were to serve a prison sentence; and
(c) prevent the commission of offenses. 10
By his actuations, probationer-petitioner Manuel V. Bala has ridiculed the probation program. Instead
of utilizing his temporary liberty to rehabilitate and reintegrate himself as a productive, law abiding,
and socially responsible member of society, he continued in his wayward ways falsifying public or
official documents.
Specifically, on April 30, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch XXX, convicted the petitioner, along with two other persons, Lorenzo Rolo y Punzalan and
Efren Faderanga y Fesalbon, for falsification of public and/or official documents (U.S. Passports),
under Article 172, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code, in five separate informations,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 29100, 29101, 29102, 29103, and 29107. The trial court imposed upon each
of them in all five (5) cases a prison term of "two (2) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to
four (4) years also of prison correccional, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000, the accessory
penalties thereof, and to pay the costs." On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
the RTC with modification by granting restitution of the amounts they collected from the offended
private parties. The judgment has since become final. As a matter of fact, for failure of the petitioner
to appear for execution of judgment despite notice, the trial court ordered the arrest of Manuel Bala
on July 10, 1989. A warrant of arrest against Bala was issued on July 12, 1989 and this warrant has
not yet been implemented because Bala absconded. These facts are evident and constitute
violations of the conditions of his probation. Thus, the revocation of his probation is compelling.
At any time during the probation, the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a probationer for
violation of any of the conditions of probation. The probationer, once arrested and detained, shall
immediately be brought before the court for a hearing which may be informal and summary, of the
violation charged. ... If the violation is established, the court may revoke or continue his probation
and modify the conditions thereof. If revoked, the court shall order the probationer to serve the
sentence originally imposed. An order revoking the grant of probation or modifying the terms and
conditions thereof shall not be appealable. 11
(Emphasis supplied.)
The probation having been revoked, it is imperative that the probationer be arrested so that he can
serve the sentence originally imposed. The expiration of the probation period of one year is of no
moment, there being no order of final discharge as yet, as we stressed earlier. Neither can there be
a deduction of the one year probation period from the penalty of one year and one day to three
years, six months, and twenty-one days of imprisonment because an order placing the defendant on
"probation" is not a "sentence," but is in effect a suspension of the imposition of the sentence. 12 It is
not a final judgment but an "interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the
855
convicted defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment if
the conditions are violated." 13
Lastly, probation is a mere privilege. Privilege is a peculiar benefit or immunity conferred by law on a
person or group of persons, not enjoyed by others or by all; special enjoyment of a good or
exemption from an evil; it is a special prerogative granted by law to some persons. 14 Accordingly,
the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. This discretion is to be exercised
primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. 15 If
the probationer has proven to be unrepentant, as in the case of the petitioner, the State is not barred
from revoking such a privilege. Otherwise, the seriousness of the offense is lessened if probation is
not revoked.
On the second assigned error, the petitioner argues that his transfer of residence automatically
transferred jurisdiction over his probation from the Manila Regional Trial Court to the same court in
his new address.
We disagree.
In criminal cases, venue is an element of jurisdiction. 16 Such being the case, the Manila RTC would
not be deprived of its ,jurisdiction over the probation case. To uphold the petitioner's contention
would mean a depreciation of the Manila court's power to grant probation in the first place. It is to be
remembered that when the petitioner-accused applied for probation in the then CFI of Manila, he
was a resident of Las Pias as he is up to now, although in a different subdivision. As pointed out
earlier, he merely moved from BF Homes to Philam Life Subdivision 33 Jingco Street, also in Las
Pias. 17 On the other hand, pursuing the petitioner's argument on this score to the limits of it logic
would mean that his probation was null and void in the place, because then the Manila CFI was
without jurisdiction to grant him probation as he was a resident of Las Pias.
It is therefore incorrect to assume that the petitioner's change of abode compels change of venue,
and necessarily, control over the petitioner, to the Executive Judge of the RTC of his new residence.
Thus, in the apportionment of the regional trial courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Las Pias is one among the municipalities
included in the National Capital Judicial Region (Metro Manila) with a seat at Makati. 18 Needless to
say, the Regional Trial Court in Makati, like the Manila Regional Trial Court, forms part of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region. 19Accordingly, the various branches of the
regional trial courts of Makati or Manila under the National Capital Region, are coordinate and co-
equal courts, the totality of which is only one Regional Trial Court. Jurisdiction is vested in the court,
not in the judges. In other words, the case does not attach to the branch or judge. 20 Therefore, in
this case, RTC Branch XX of Manila, which granted the probation, has not lost control and
supervision over the probation of the petitioner.
The petitioner also claims that he had verbally obtained permission to transfer residence from his
probation officer. This would not suffice the law is very explicit in its requirement of a prior court
approval in writing. Section 10 of PD 968 categorically decrees that the probationer must
xxx
(j) reside at premises approved by it (court) and not to change his residence without its
priorwritten approval;
856
xxx
Further, such written approval is required by the 21 probation order of August 11, 1982 as one of the
conditions of probation, to wit:
(3) To reside in BF Homes, Las Pias and not to change said address nor leave the territorial
jurisdiction of Metro Manila for more than twenty-four (24) hours without first securing prior
written approval of his Probation Officer.
In the light of all the foregoing and in the interest of the expeditious administration of justice, we
revoke the probation of the petitioner for violations of the conditions of his probation, instead of
remanding the case to the trial court and having the parties start all over again in needless
protracted proceedings. 22
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and the probation of the petitioner is hereby REVOKED.
Further, the trial court is ORDERED to issue a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner and for him to
serve thesentence originally imposed without any deduction. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108747. April 6, 1995.
PABLO C. FRANCISCO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE MAXIMO

C. CONTRERAS, Respondents.
857
DECISIO
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The novel issues presented in this petition may be reduced to (1) the legality and constitutionality of
Section 24, Resolution No. 2499 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) creating, for purposes
of the elections in the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK), the Boards of Election Supervisors (BES) and
making it the final arbiter of all election protests, and (2) the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts over
contests involving sangguniang kabataan elections.Petitioner Jose M. Mercado was proclaimed
winner in the 4 December 1992 election for chairman of the SK of Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan,
Batangas. The proclamation was made by the Board of Election Tellers (BET), acting as the Board of
Canvassers, on the basis of its tally which showed Mercado winning by one vote (49 to 48) over his
rival, private respondent Crisanto P. Pangilinan. 1 Mercado's victory was, however, short-lived.
Immediately after Mercado's proclamation as the winner by the BET, Pangilinan filed a formal protest
with the BES questioning the results of the election. He alleged that the BET Chairman, drinking gin
and Coke during the counting, had invalidated some votes without consulting the other board
members. The BES ordered the reopening of the ballot box and the recount of the votes for SK
Chairman. The recount reversed the earlier tally to 51 to 49 in favor of Pangilinan, who was
thereupon proclaimed the duly elected SK Chairman by the BES, which issued for that purpose its
own Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation.Mercado then filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Batangas City a petition for Certiorari and mandamus praying for the annulment of Pangilinan's
proclamation by the BES, and for the issuance of an order to compel the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) to recognize him as the duly elected SK Chairman of Barangay Mabalor
and to allow him to take his oath of office and discharge his duties as such.In his petition docketed
as Civil Case No. 3565, Mercado assailed the jurisdiction of the BES to act on the protest filed by
Pangilinan as the ground cited therein was allegedly in the nature of an election protest properly
cognizable by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court in accordance with Section 252 of the
Omnibus Election Code. He further claimed that, assuming that the BES has jurisdiction over the
protest, the grounds raised therein were deemed waived by Pangilinan's failure to invoke them at the
level of the BET, and that the BES acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in denying the petitioner of due process when it ordered the reopening of the ballot box
and the recounting of the votes without affording him the opportunity to be heard.In its Order dated
13 January 1993, the RTC dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court stated that it
was not aware of any law by which it could act on the matters raised in Mercado's petition since
Resolution No. 2499 of the COMELEC did not vest in the RTC jurisdiction over controversies
affecting Sangguniang Kabataan elections, constituting instead the BES, which is under COMELEC
jurisdiction, as the final arbiter of all election controversies within its level.Mercado moved for a
reconsideration of the dismissal order. He argued that the RTC was competent to act on his petition
because: (a) one mode of seeking judicial review is through the writ ofCertiorari which may be
issued by the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129; (b) under its Resolutions Nos. 2499 and 2520, the
COMELEC was to provide only technical assistance in the conduct of the SK election and therefore
could not grant any relief from the action of the BES; moreover, under said Resolution No. 2499, no
appeal to a higher administrative level was allowed from the action of the BES; and (c) the principle
of exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply to the case at bar, the jurisdictional and due
process issues raised therein being legal in nature.Unconvinced, the RTC, in its Order dated 2
March 1993, denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. It ruled that the reopening of the
ballot box for Barangay Mabalor and the recounting of the votes cast therein were perfectly within
the ambit of the BES's authority, and that Mercado should have gone to the DILG which has direct
control and supervision of the SK elections.Hence, Mercado's present petition under Rule 45 of the
858
Rules of Court for the review on pure questions of law of the Orders of 13 January 1993 and 2
March 1993 of the Batangas RTC. He initially raises the same issues he presented in Civil Case No.
3565 on the competency of the BES to take cognizance of Pangilinan's protest and his right to due
process, and he reiterates the arguments he adduced in his motion for reconsideration regarding the
jurisdiction of the RTC over Civil Case No. 3565. However, in refutation of the Solicitor General's
defense of the BES jurisdiction as conferred by COMELEC Resolution No. 2499, Mercado, in his
Consolidated Reply, now contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is null and void because: (a)
it prescribes a separate set of rules for the election of the SK Chairman different from and
inconsistent with that set forth in the Omnibus Election Code, thereby contravening Section 2, Article
I of the said Code which explicitly provides that "it shall govern all elections of public officers"; and,
(b) it constitutes a total, absolute, and complete abdication by the COMELEC of its constitutionally
and statutorily mandated duty to enforce and administer all election laws as provided for in Section
2(1), Article IX-C of the Constitution; Section 52, Article VIII of the Omnibus Election Code; and
Section 2, Chapter 1, Subtitle C, Title I, Book V of the 1987 Administrative Code.The issues
presented require a flashback into the history of the SK. It was initially organized by P.D. No. 684 (15
April 1975) as the Kabataang Barangay (KB), a youth organization composed of all barangay
residents who were less than 18 years of age which aims to provide its members with the
opportunity to express their views and opinions on issues of transcendental importance. Its affairs
were administered by a barangay youth chairman together with six barangay youth leaders, who
should at least be 15 years of age or over but less than 18. The then Secretary of Local Government
and Community Development was authorized to promulgate the implementing rules and
regulations.Pursuant to P.D. No. 1191 (1 September 1977), the Pambansang Katipunan ng
Kabataang Barangay ng Pilipinas was constituted as "a body corporate" with "the powers and
attributes of a corporation" and placed directly under the Office of the President. Its affairs were to be
administered by the Executive Committee which was empowered to promulgate rules and
regulations governing the KB. This youth organization was recognized in B.P. Blg. 337 (The Local
Government Code), 2 which raised the maximum age requirement of the members from 18 to
21.Under R.A. No. 7160 (The Local Government Code of 1991) , the Kabataang Barangay was
changed to the Sangguniang Kabataan. 3 It remains as a youth organization in every barangay,
composed of a chairman and seven members to be elected by the katipunan ng kabataan, and the
secretary and the treasurer to be appointed by the SK chairman with the concurrence of the SK. 4
The katipunan ng kabataan is composed of all citizens of the Philippines actually residing in the
barangay for at least six months who are 15 but not more than 21 and who are duly registered in the
list of the SK or in the official barangay list in the custody of the barangay secretary. 5 The chairman,
upon assumption of office, shall automatically become an ex-officio member of the sangguniang
barangay. 6 Under subparagraph (5), paragraph (e), Article 203, Rule XXVII of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, 7 the conduct and administration of
the elections for sangguniang kabataan members shall be governed by the rules promulgated by the
COMELEC.Pursuant to such authority and for purposes of the SK election authorized under Section
532 of R.A. No. 7160, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2499 which closely followed the
pattern set in the Constitution of the Kabataang Barangay providing for a Board of Election
Supervisors and Board of Election Tellers, with the former having direct general supervision in the
conduct of such election and as the final arbiter of all election protests. Article V of Resolution No.
2499 expressly provides:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryARTICLE VBOARD OF ELECTION
SUPERVISORS ANDBOARD OF ELECTION TELLERSSECTION 24. Board of election supervisors.
- There shall be created a board of election supervisors (BES) in every city or municipality composed
of the following: a) city/municipal local government operations officer as chairman; b) city/municipal
election officer as member; and c) city/municipal secretary as member.The board shall have direct
general supervision in the conduct of elections for sangguniang kabataan in the barangay and shall
859
act as final arbiter in the resolution of all election protests.No pro-proclamation cases shall be
allowed on matters relating to the election of sangguniang kabataan chairman and members.The
petitioner contends that COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 is illegal and unconstitutional because it
makes the BES the final arbiter of election contests involving the SK in contravention of Section 252
of the Omnibus Election Code which vests in the proper metropolitan or municipal trial court original
jurisdiction over such contests and, on a more fundamental ground, in contravention of Section 2,
Article IX-C of the Constitution which lodges on such courts exclusive original jurisdiction over
contests involving elective barangay officials. 8This contention is without merit for it assumes that the
SK election is an election involving elective barangay officials within the purview of the aforesaid
statutory and constitutional provisions.Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and that portion of
paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution on the COMELEC's exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over contests involving elective barangay officials refer to the elective barangay officials
under the pertinent laws in force at the time the Omnibus Election Code was enacted and upon the
ratification of the Constitution. That law was B.P. Blg. 337, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code, and the elective barangay officials referred to were the punong barangay and the
six sangguniang bayan members. 9 They were to be elected by those qualified to exercise the right
of suffrage. 10 They are also the same officers referred to by the provisions of the Omnibus Election
Code of the Philippines 11 on election of barangay officials. 12 Metropolitan and municipal trial
courts had exclusive original jurisdiction over contests relating to their election. The decisions of
these courts were appealable to the Regional Trial Courts. 13 These were the laws on elective
barangay officials which the Constitutional Commission took into account when it debated on that
portion of paragraph (2), Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution relating to contests involving
elective barangay officials. During such debates, the following discussions took
place:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryMR. MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryMadam
president and members of the Committee, I understand from the sponsorship speech that in matters
of contests of barangay, municipal and provincial officials, the jurisdiction is all exclusive to the
Commission on Elections. Under the present law that we have, cases involving election contests of
barangay officials are initiated in the municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court, subject to appeal
to the Regional Trial Court whose decision is final. In other words, "when it comes to barangay
officials, the COMELEC has nothing to do at all with the election contest. In the case, however, of
municipal officials, under the present law, the Omnibus Election Code, the original jurisdiction is with
the Regional Trial Court, and the decision is appealable to the Commission on Elections. We are
suggesting and we would like the Committee to take note of this that while we admit that in all
contests, whether it be barangay, municipal, provincial or city officials, the sole authority should be
the Commission on Elections that there should be a two-tiered resolution of cases in the sense
that when it comes to barangay officials, the municipal trial court or the metropolitan trial court should
have jurisdiction first, then it is appealable to the COMELEC.In the case of municipal officials, we are
thinking that the regional trial court should have jurisdiction, and then it is appealable to the
COMELEC. And in the case of provincial or city officials, the first jurisdiction, which is exclusive,
would be the COMELEC. I wonder if the Committee would take that into consideration considering
these facts. If we will allow the COMELEC to have executive [sic] jurisdiction over cases involving
barangay and municipal officials, one can just imagine the difficulty of the COMELEC, considering
that we have thousands of barangay and municipal officials. And as I understand from my private
conversation with the Chairman of the COMELEC, the Honorable Ramon Felipe, when it comes to
contests involving barangay and municipal officials, the COMELEC may have to send hearing
officers; whereas if we will allow the municipal trial court and the metropolitan trial court to have
jurisdiction over these cases, they will be given the proper consideration by the court. In the case of
contests involving municipal officials, the regional trial court, which is also a court, should have
jurisdiction, not the hearing officers of the COMELEC. So, we have a two-tiered situation here which
860
we lawyers think would be the best remedy considering again my allusion to the fact that there are
so many barangays and municipalities all over the country.That is just my suggestion. I do not know
if the Committee could respond to it so that we could perhaps present some amendments.MR.
REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryIn other words, insofar as the appellate jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections is concerned, it is still preserved despite the fact that it involves barangay,
municipal, city or provincial officials.MR. MAABONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryYes, we would
rather insist on that because that is a constitutional mandate.MR.
REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryThe Commissioner's proposal is only with respect to the
original jurisdiction; that is, insofar as election contests involving barangay officials are concerned,
the municipal trial courts have the original jurisdiction; whereas in the case of city and provincial
officials, the original jurisdiction is vested in the regional trial courts.MR.
MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryNo, Madam president. In the case of provincial and city
officials, the original and exclusive jurisdiction should be with the Commission on Elections.MR.
REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryIn the case of municipal officials then it will be the
regional trial courts which will exercise original jurisdiction.MR.
MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryThat is correctly put, Madam President.MR.
REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryBut altogether, in the ultimate analysis on appellate
jurisdiction, they will all have to go to the Commission on Elections eventually.MR.
MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryYes, Madam President. They will still be the sole judge
of all election contests. 14
xxx xxx xxx
MR. REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryMay I ask Commissioner Maambong a question?

MR. MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryYes, Madam President.MR.
REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryIs it his concern that we vest in the municipal trial courts
the matter of election contests for barangay officials and in the regional trial courts election contests
involving municipal officials thereby requiring a judicial officer to handle these cases, heightened by
the fact that the decisions of the municipal trial court or the regional trial court in those election
contests involving barangay and municipal officials are final and immediately executory?MR.
MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryUnder the present law, when it comes to appeals from
the municipal trial court to the regional trial court, these become final and executory, and we feel that
in this regard, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC has been diluted. And we do not like that, Madam
President.MR. REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryThank you. 15
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryIn that case, Madam President, may I proceed to

propose this amendment in collaboration and with the advice and consent of Commissioner de los
Reyes and Commissioner Rodrigo.THE PRESIDENT:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryWhat is the
amendment?MR. MAAMBONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryOn line 9, Section 2(2), delete the
words "Be the sole judge of" and in its stead insert the words EXERCISE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER. On line 11, before the word "provincial," insert the word REGIONAL and a
comma (,). After the word "provincial" on line 11, insert the word AND. After the word "city," delete the
comma (,) and the words "municipal and barangay." After the word "official," place a comma (,) and
insert the following: AND OF ALL CONTESTS INVOLVING MUNICIPAL AND BARANGAY
OFFICIALS ON APPEAL FROM THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AND FROM THE
METROPOLITAN OR MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS, RESPECTIVELY.I move for the approval of the
amendment, Madam President.THE PRESIDENT:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryIs this amendment
accepted by the Committee?MR. REGALADO:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryYes, Madam
861
President.THE PRESIDENT:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibrarySo, this is an amendment jointly
submitted by Commissioners Rodrigo, Maambong and de los Reyes.MR.
MAABONG:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryYes, Madam President.THE
PRESIDENT:nadchanroblesvirtualawlibraryIs there any objection to the amendment on Section 2(2),
line 9 and 11? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved. 16In the light of the
foregoing, it is indisputable that contests involving elections of SK (formerly KB) officials do not fall
within Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code and paragraph 2, Section 2, Article IX-C of the
Constitution and that no law in effect prior to the ratification of the Constitution had made the SK
chairman an elective barangay official. His being an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay
does not make him one for the law specifically provides who are its elective members, viz., the
punong barangay and the seven regular sangguniang barangay members 17 who are elected at
large by those who are qualified to exercise the right of suffrage under Article V of the Constitution
and who are duly registered voters of the barangay.The Court recognizes the consequences of the
quasi-judicial acts performed by the BES pursuant to Section 24 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2499
under the operative fact doctrine; thus, we hold that the Regional Trial Court is competent to review
the decision of the BES in election controversies within its level. As correctly stated by the petitioner,
it is a basic principle in administrative law that the absence of a provision for the review of an
administrative action does not preclude recourse to the courts.nadchanroblesvirtuallawlibraryIt is
generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power
there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law
and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute. The purpose of judicial review is to
keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial rights of parties affected
by its decisions. It is part of the system of checks and balances which restricts the separation of
powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications. 18 The Court further holds that there was
no need for the petitioner to exhaust administrative remedies; firstly, because Section 24 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2499 did not provide for recourse to a higher administrative body; and
secondly, the petitioner's cause falls within the exception to the rule in that his petition in Civil Case
No. 3565, aside from raising pure questions of law and jurisdiction, 19 also alleges deprivation of
due process. 20 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders of the
Regional Trial Court of Batangas City, Branch 4, in Civil Case No. 3565 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 3565 is REINSTATED for further proceedings. The Hon. Judge Conrado
R. Antona is directed to proceed with the case with deliberate dispatch, and if necessary, to conduct
a recount of the ballots to determine once and for all the true winner in the 4 December 1992
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections in Barangay Mabalor, Ibaan, Batangas. This decision is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
URBANO M. MORENO, G.R. No. 168550, Petitioner,
Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, - versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES,
862
CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS TINGA, and NORMA L.
MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents. GARCIA, and VELASCO, J., JJ.
Promulgated:
August 10, 2006
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition[1] dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the
Resolution[2] of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the
Resolution[3] of the Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002 which, in turn, disqualified him
from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay ofBarangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the
July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay andSangguniang Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running

forPunong Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28
of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia,[4]the imposition of the
sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also
argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law), the final discharge of the
probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction
and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December
18, 2000 allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result
of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samarfor
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be
disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration
filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed. According to
the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that those sentenced by
863
final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or
more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for
any elective local position.[5]Since Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000,
disqualification shall commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation
to Morenomerely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is
a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do
not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to
the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further,
even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly
constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment[6] dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec[7] definitively settled a similar
controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude stands even if the
candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment[8] dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and
pointing out material differences between his case and Dela Torre v.Comelec which allegedly
warrant a conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno,Dela Torre v. Comelec involves a
conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving moral turpitude covered by the
first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied
for probation nearly four (4) years after his conviction and only after appealing his conviction, such
that he could not have been eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period
specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification
under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase within
two (2) years after serving sentence found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, which
reads:
864

Sec. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude orfor an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving
sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
. . . .
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary
Detention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral turpitude
falling under the first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of whether Arbitrary Detention
is a crime involving moral turpitude was never raised in the petition for disqualification because the
ground relied upon by Mejes, and which theComelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged
disqualification from running for a local elective office within two (2) years from his discharge from
probation after having been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4)
Months and One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the
crime of Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue
being whether Morenos sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein
that the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which petitioner
was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain in this case. At any
rate, the phrase within two (2) years after serving sentence should have been interpreted and
understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision
means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Courts declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code, we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact thatDela Torre was not
even entitled to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial Court which,
however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment
of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to prevent
speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did not at once
apply for probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.[9]
865

Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance.The
phrase service of sentence, understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement of
a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court.[10] This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Courts attention
because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the
law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted
probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he
did not serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the
trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is not
a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held that the grant
of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well
as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession
or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted
from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing
with her teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification
from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period[11] imposed upon Morenowere similarly suspended
upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified
from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put
on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service
of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation,[12] the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to
comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.[13]
866

It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this
case. They focused on the fact that Morenos judgment of conviction attained finality upon his
application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the
letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or
more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by
reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service of sentence,
should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the two (2)-year
period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Morenofortifies his
position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that [t]he final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was granted. Thus,
when Moreno was finally discharged upon the courts finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as
a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code
which gives room for judicial interpretation,[14] our conclusion will remain the same.
It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as
to the intended meaning of the phrase service of sentence, i.e., whether the legislature also meant to
disqualify those who have been granted probation. The Courts function, in the face of this seeming
dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and the Local Government
Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimusinterpretandi.
Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes the
extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted.[15] Thus,
the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation. For
instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall not be extended to those sentenced to serve
a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the
security of the State; those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense
punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less
than P200.00; those who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence
at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable.[16]
867
It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which also
covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a
glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered by
the disqualification.
Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in
1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature approved the
enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code, it is presumed to
have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of probation on the disqualification
from holding public office. That it chose not to include probationers within the purview of the
provision is a clear expression of the legislative will not to disqualify probationers.
On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a
special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a
later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not
affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.[17
In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope
of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error which we here
correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run
for PunongBarangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002
SynchronizedBarangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his
conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from the
people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to
mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief
Justice ArtemioPanganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec[18] where he said that it would be far better to err
in favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on

Elections en banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15,
2002, as well as all other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in accordance with this Decision. No
SO ORDERED.
ARNEL COLINARES, G.R. No. 182748 Petitioner, Present: CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,VELASCO, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, BRION,- versus - PERALTA,

BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, SERENO, REYES,
and PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Respondent. Promulgated:
868
December 13, 2011
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b)
what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused who
appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with
frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal
Case T-2213.[1]
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June 25, 2000,
he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way, Jesus took a
leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel sneaked behind and struck
Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as
Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by the
roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right temple,
knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking
outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate[2] showing that Rufino suffered two lacerated
wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries were serious
and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-defense. He
testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias who
were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was but, rather
than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel several times
on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed.The latter picked up a stone and, defending
himself, struck Rufino on the head with it.When Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and
tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same
stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sisters house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily
surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the night of
the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the three
engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months
869
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prisionmayor, as maximum. Since
the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not
qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively,
seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the
penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but deleted the award for lost
income in the absence of evidence to support it.[3]Not satisfied, Arnel comes to this Court on petition
for review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor
General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed only the
lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, he
could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation
in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The
language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other
hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the
accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a
stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated
homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the
trial court.
870
The Courts Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely
acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was
legally justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the elements
of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise felonious deed
would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.[4]
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1) that

the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the offender
employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3)
that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.[5]
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing
to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for being
appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or an
imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not enough. The victim
must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.[6]
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and
Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnels testimony that it was Rufino who started
it. Arnels only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated
argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point
that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.[7]
In contrast, the three witnessesJesus, Paciano, and Ananiastestified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract from their
core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did it. Compared to
Arnels testimony, the prosecutions version is more believable and consistent with reality, hence
deserving credence.[8]
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for
frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and could not
have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
871
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his
victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible
doubt regarding homicidal intent.[9] And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things,
the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his
victim.[10]
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it
knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and the
location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he intended to kill
him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. In Palaganas v. People,[11] we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as
shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die because
of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victims
wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity
of the victims wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that head injuries are always very serious,[12] he
could not categorically say that Rufinos wounds in this case were fatal. Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not fatal on that very
day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on that case the
patient preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of the wound not the
depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of the frontal lo[b]e,
we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we did not measure the depth.[13]
872

Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his skull
incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head.The wounds were
not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal in seven or eight days. Dr.
Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and antit[e]tanus the
problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather go home and
then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.[14]
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the
prosecutions claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the Court
finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from
the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds
that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of four months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.
873

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by
the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968) provides:
That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.[15] Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated
homicide, he should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has
the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that
privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the
Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge
to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the judgment of
conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation.But, as it happens, two
judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by
the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme
Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He will not be
entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on him. More, the
Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to
bend over to the trial courts judgmenteven if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now
also be made to pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for
probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets
the whip). Where is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals[16] that the probation
law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of
grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and
eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty.Probation was his to ask! Still,
he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation. When
the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It served him
right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both appeal and
probation.
874
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement outlaws the
element of speculation on the part of the accusedto wager on the result of his appealthat when his
conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service of his
sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an escape hatch thus rendering nugatory the
appellate courts affirmance of his conviction.[17]
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to apply
for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a position to
say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court
imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains
that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for
probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed
on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel sought
from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to apply for
probation.
In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but only
of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a probationable
penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct
offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions.[18] As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded
as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its
letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
[19]
One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation after he appealed from the trial courts judgment of conviction would not be consistent with
the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to provide an opportunity for
the reformation of a penitent offender. An accused like Arnel who appeals from a judgment
convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.
875
This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a penalty in excess
of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court now
finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty of 2
years and 4 months.
Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced
penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the chance to
instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the probation law.
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel
the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right to apply for
probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself of the right had the
RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he
got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to
apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one
erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated
July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDSpetitioner Arnel
Colinares GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, andSENTENCES him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four
months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the amount of P20,000.00
as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for probation within 15 days from notice
that the record of the case has been remanded for execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose,
Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113433. March 17, 2000]
LUISITO P. BASILIO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS G. BERSAMIRA,
and FE ADVINCULA, respondents. Sc
DECISION
876
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review[1] under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks to annul and
set aside the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1992 and
January 5, 1994, respectively. The decision sustained the Order dated April 7, 1992 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 166, denying due course to petitioners appeal from the Judgment in
Criminal Case No. 70278 and allowing execution against the petitioner of the subsidiary indemnity
arising from the offense committed by his truck driver.
The relevant facts as gleaned from the records are as follows:
On July 23, 1987, Simplicio Pronebo was charged by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal with the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with double homicide and double physical
injuries.[4] The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 70278.
The information against him reads: Scmis
"The undersigned Assistant Fiscal accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz of the crime of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Double Homicide and Double Physical Injuries,
committed as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of July, 1987 in the municipality of Marikina, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and
person in charge of a dump truck with plate no. NMW-609 owned and registered in the name of
Luisito Basilio, without due regard to traffic laws, rules and regulations and without taking the
necessary care and precaution to prevent damage to property and avoid injuries to persons, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate said dump truck in a
careless, reckless, negligent and imprudent manner as a result of which said dump truck being then
driven by him hit/bumped and sideswiped the following vehicles, to wit: a) a motorized tricycle with
plate no. NF-2457 driven by Benedicto Abuel thereby causing damage in the amount of P1,100.00;
b) an automobile Toyota Corona with plate no. NAL -138 driven by Virgilio Hipolito thereby causing
damage in the amount of P2,190.50 c) a motorized tricycle with plate no. NW-9018 driven by
Ricardo Sese y Julian thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount d) an automobile
Mitsubishi Lancer with plate no. PHE-283 driven by Angelito Carranto thereby causing damage of an
undetermined amount and 3) a Ford Econo Van with plate no. NFR-898 driven by Ernesto Aseron
thereby causing damage of an undetermined amount; that due to the strong impact caused by the
collision, the driver Ricardo Sese y Julian and his 3 passengers including Danilo Advincula y Poblete
were hit/bumped which directly caused their death; while the other 2 passengers, namely; Cirilo
Bangot sustained serious physical injuries which required medical attendance for a period of more
than 30 days which incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the same period of
time and Dominador Legaspi Jr. sustained physical injuries which required medical attendance for a
period of less than nine days and incapacitated him from performing his customary labor for the
same period of time.
Contrary to law." Mis sc
After arraignment and trial, the court rendered its judgment dated February 4, 1991, which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Simplicio Pronebo y Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Reckless Imrpudence resulting in the death of Danilo Advincula and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months, as minimum to six (6) years
877
of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of danilo Advincula P30,000.00 for
the latters death, P31,614.00, as actual and compensatory damages. P2,000,000.00 for the loss of
his earning capacity. P150,000.00, as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the
costs of suit."[5]
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation, so that the above judgment became final
and executory.
Pertinently, the trial court also found that at the time of the vehicular accident accused Simplicio
Pronebo was employed as the driver of the dump truck owned by petitioner Luisito Basilio.
On March 27, 1991, petitioner Luisito Basilio filed with the trial court a "Special Appearance and
Motion for Reconsideration"[6] praying that the judgment dated February 4, 1991, be reconsidered
and set aside insofar as it affected him and subjected him to a subsidiary liability for the civil aspect
of the criminal case. The motion was denied for lack of merit on September 16, 1991.[7] Petitioner
filed a Notice of Appeal[8] on September 25, 1991. Mis spped
On September 23, 1991, private respondent filed a Motion for Execution of the subsidiary civil
liability[9] of petitioner Basilio.
On April 7, 1992, the trial court issued two separate Orders. One denied due course and dismissed
Basilios appeal for having been filed beyond the reglementary period.[10] The other directed the
issuance of a writ of execution against him for the enforcement and satisfaction of the award of civil
indemnity decreed in judgment on February 4, 1991.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari[12] under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court
with the Court of Appeals, alleging that respondent judge acted without jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the Order dated September 16, 1991, denying the petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the judgment dated February 4, 1991 insofar as the subsidiary liability
of the petitioner was concerned, and (2) the Order dated April 7, 1992, directing the issuance of a
writ of execution against the petitioner. Before the appellate court, petitioner claimed he was not
afforded due process when he was found subsidiarily liable for the civil liability of the accused
Pronebo in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated October 27, 1992, disposing as
follows: Spped
"ACCORDINGLY, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction is DENIED DUE COURSE and should be, as it is hereby,
DISMISSED for lack of persuasive force and effect."[13]
A motion for reconsideration[14] was filed by the petitioner on November 24, 1992. This was denied
in a Resolution[15] dated January 5, 1994. Hence this petition for review.
Now, petitioner, in his assignment of errors, avers that respondent Court of Appeals erred:
I. ... IN SUSTAINING THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE JUDGMENT OF 4
FEBRUARY 1991 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS REGARDS BOTH THE CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL ASPECTS WHEN THE ACCUSED APPLIED FOR PROBATION AT THE
PROMULGATION.
878
II. ... IN HOLDING THAT AS PETITIONER IS NEITHER AN ACCUSED OR A PARTY IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 70278, HE IS NOT ENTITLED TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
JUDGMENT OF SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY AGAINST HIM.
III. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS DAY IN COURT IN
VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS. Jo spped
IV. ... IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER WAS NOT ENTITLED TO THE AUXILIARY RELIEF OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION "IS CONCLUSIVE
UPON THE EMPLOYER".
V. IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT IN ABUSE OF AND/OR EXCESS
OF JURISDICTION.[16]
The issue before us is whether respondent Court of Appeals erred and committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the special civil action under Rule 65 filed by petitioner against the trial court.
To resolve it, we must, however, also pass upon the following:
(1) Had the judgment of February 4, 1991 of the trial court become final and executory when
accused applied for probation at the promulgation?
(2) May the petitioner as employer file a Motion for Reconsideration concerning civil liability decreed
in the judgment if he is not a party to the criminal case?
(3) May petitioner, as employer, be granted relief by way of a writ of preliminary injunction? Spped jo
Petitioner asserts that he was not given the opportunity to be heard by the trial court to prove the
absence of an employer-employee relationship between him and accused. Nor that, alternatively, the
accused was not lawfully discharging duties as an employee at the time of the incident. While these
assertions are not moved, we shall give them due consideration.
The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code.[17] This liability is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made.
[18] However, before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a
hearing set for the purpose of 1) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the
wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties (not necessarily
any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties; and 4) that said employee is
insolvent.[19]
In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the drawback in
the enforcement of the subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the alleged
employer is not afforded due process. Not being a party to the case, he is not heard as to whether
he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held: Miso
"To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this Court directed
the court a quo in Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein
that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability may be considered as part of the
proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been issued is
regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit."[20]
879
There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused
driver and the alleged vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and
the other, during the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence of due process.[21]
Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that was
involved in the incident.[22] Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured,
that provided the counsel for the accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract.[23] Petitioner
did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite knowledge, through counsel, that the
prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship.[24] With the convicts
application for probation, the trial courts judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view
that the lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all
his chances to intervene in the criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the
accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the appropriate time. Nex old
Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of judgment.
Even assuming that he was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of
subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court to make an opposition thereto, which he did on
October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no employer-employee relationship
between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any function in relation to his work
at the time of the incident.[25] In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on
December 3, 1991, and December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of the
motion for execution.[26] This was set for hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for
petitioner did not appear. Consequently, the court ordered in open court that the matter be submitted
for resolution. It was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioners counsel filed a counter-
manifestation[27] that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the
execution of the civil liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the
motion for execution of the subsidiary liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree
with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of law. Neither can we fault respondent
appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court. Mani kx
Accordingly, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated October 27, 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 27850 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160355. May 16, 2005]
880
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
78149 affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 743-C(93)
convicting the accused Ernesto Ancheta of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
The Antecedents
Ernesto Ancheta was employed by the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) as driver of
one of its passenger buses. On July 23, 1993, an Information was filed with the RTC of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66, charging Ancheta with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The inculpatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on November 23, 1992 at around 11:50 oclock (sic) in the morning, at Brgy. Dolores,
Municipality of Capas, Province of Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of a Philippine Rabbit Bus
bearing Plate No. CVE-707 with MVRR No. 63044987, registered in the name of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. of Tarlac, Tarlac, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and
with reckless imprudence and managed the said Philippine Rabbit Bus at Brgy. Dolores, Capas,
Tarlac, in a careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without due regard to laws, regulations,
ordinances and traffic code and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent accident to
persons and damage to property and in violation of the Land Transportation Laws, said bus driven
by the accused while cruising the MacArthur Highway towards the south direction, bumped the left
rear side of a Toyota jeep with Plate No. TAB 929 with MVRR No. 64284647 owned by Zenaida B.
Dizon of 193 M. Santos St., Pasay City, Metro Manila, and driven by Eduardo Mangawang towards
the north direction, and as a result thereof said Eduardo Mangawang ultimately died and the jeep he
was then driving sustained damages of an undetermined amount, to the damage and prejudice of
the deceased and the owner thereof.
Contrary to law.[3]
The accused was assisted by Atty. Crispiniano Lamorena, Jr., whom the PRBLI assigned as
counsel de parte. Atty. Andres Pangilinan entered his appearance as private prosecutor.
The trial court rendered judgment on November 12, 1999, convicting the accused of the crime
charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused, ERNESTO
ANCHETA, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Homicide.
Accordingly, the said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional in its minimum period as
minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional in its maximum period as maximum.
For the civil liability of the accused, Ernesto Ancheta is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Eduardo Mangawang the amounts of P28,600.00 as actual or compensatory damages
881
and P1,436,466.30 representing loss of earning capacity. The accused is similarly ordered to pay the
amounts of P50,000.00 by way of indemnification for the death of Eduardo Mangawang and
another P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The accused appealed the decision to the CA. On November 10, 2000, the appellate court
issued a Resolution dismissing the appeal due to Anchetas failure to file his brief as accused-
appellant.[5] The resolution of the CA dismissing the appeal became final and executory, thus, entry
of judgment was made of record on December 7, 2000. After the transmission of the records to the
RTC, it issued an Order on June 5, 2001 for the arrest of the accused.[6]
On June 29, 2001, the PRBLI, as Anchetas employer, filed a Notice of Appeal of the decision
of the RTC. On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying due course to the notice of appeal,
on its finding that the notice was filed long after the judgment of the RTC had become final and
executory.[7] The PRBLI filed a motion for the reconsideration of the order, claiming that it was not
served with a copy of the decision of the RTC convicting the accused of the crime charged; hence,
could not have appealed the same. On August 1, 2001, the trial court issued an Order denying the
said motion. The PRBLI filed an urgent motion, this time for clarification of the said order, which the
trial court denied in an Order dated August 31, 2001. Undaunted, the PRBLI filed a manifestation
with motion, citing the ruling of this Court in Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula.[8] On October 17, 2001, the
trial court issued an Order, this time, granting the motion and giving due course to the appeal of the
PRBLI. The trial court, likewise, ordered the records to be transmitted to the CA for the consideration
of the appeal, where the latter made the following assignment of errors:
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN THE APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS AND THE
EVIDENCE.
II
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN ATTRIBUTING SUPPOSED NEGLIGENCE AND LACK
OF FORESIGHT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED ANCHETA.
III
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SO GENEROUSLY AWARDING UNCONSCIONABLE

AMOUNTS IN SUPPOSED DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF EDUARDO MANGAWANG.[9]
On October 10, 2003, the CA rendered judgment affirming with modification the decision of
the RTC. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated November 12, 1999 of the Regional Trial
Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Criminal Case No. 743-C(93) is hereby AFFIRMED with the
correction that the actual damages to be awarded should only be P5,000.00. All other respects
remain. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The appellate court dismissed the appeal on the ground that the decision of the RTC had long
become final and executory when the PRBLI appealed the decision. It ruled that the PRBLI was
882
bound by the said decision against the accused therein.[11] Nevertheless, the appellate court
resolved the appeal on its merits and affirmed the decision of the RTC, but with modification.[12]
The PRBLI forthwith filed the present petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision of
the CA on the following grounds:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED
HAS ATTAINED FINALITY AS AGAINST PETITIONER.
B.
PETITIONER MUST BE AFFORDED THE STANDING AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO QUESTION

THE ACCUSEDS CONVICTION.[13]
The petitioner submits the ruling of this Court in Pajarito v. Seneris[14] and Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[15] that the decision of the trial court convicting the employee is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the civil liability but also, with regard to its
amount, should not apply to it. It avers that unlike in Pajarito and Miranda, the counsel of the
accused therein was given ample opportunity to defend the accused during the trial and on appeal in
the CA. The petitioner laments that in this case, the counsel it provided to defend the accused was
remiss in the performance of his duties and failed to notify it of the RTC decision, the November 10,
2000 Resolution of the CA, as well as the June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC; consequently, it was not
apprised of its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased, thus depriving the petitioner of its right to
due process. It avers that it was only on account of its own diligence that it discovered the decision
of the RTC, the November 10, 2000 Resolution of the CA and the June 5, 2001 Order of the RTC.
The petitioner further avers that it was not furnished with a copy of the said CA Resolution,
and of the Arrest Order of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. The petitioner posits that until it is furnished
with such copies, the period within which to assail the decision of the RTC on its civil liability to the
heirs of the deceased had not commenced to run.
The petitioner submits that it is unjust and unreasonable for the CA to deprive it of its right to
question its civil liability to the heirs of the deceased, considering the gross negligence of the
counsel that it had provided the accused.
By way of comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that
the decision of the RTC convicting Ancheta of the crime charged had become final and executory,
following the dismissal of his appeal before the CA. The decision of the RTC was conclusive on the
petitioner, not only with regard to its civil liability but also as to the amount thereof, absent any
collusion between the accused-employee and the private complainant. The petitioner was not a
direct party in the criminal case; hence, was not entitled to a copy of the decision of the RTC or to
appeal therefrom; it was, likewise, not entitled to be furnished a copy of the CA Resolution dated
November 10, 2000 and the Order of the RTC dated June 5, 2001. Hence, according to the OSG, it
cannot complain of denial of its right to due process. The OSG further asserts that the petition at bar
is premature, considering that no writ of execution has yet been issued by the RTC, and cites the
ruling of this Court in Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People[16] to buttress its stance.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
883
The ruling of the CA dismissing the petitioners appeal of the RTC decision convicting Ancheta
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is correct. However, the Court of Appeals erred in
modifying the decision of the RTC.
The petitioner, as the employer of the said accused, had no right to appeal from the said
decision because, in the first place, it was not a party in the said case. While the subsidiary liability
provided for by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code may render the petitioner a party in
substance and, in effect, it is not, for this reason, entitled to be furnished a copy of the decision of
the RTC, as well as the resolution and decision of the CA.
Indeed, the petitioner was entitled to protect its interest by taking actual participation in the
defense of its employee, Ancheta, by providing him with counsel. It cannot leave its employee to his
own fate because his failure is its failure.[17] The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, would
thereby be apprised of the progress of the case and the outcome thereof from time to time through
the said counsel. The failure of such counsel to apprise the petitioner of the progress of the case is
thus not equivalent to lack of due process. The pronouncement of the Court in Miranda v. Malate
Garage & Taxicab, Inc. [18] is instructive on this score:
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employee but in substance and, in effect, he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him
by law. It is his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the
criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to
his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the
employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain,
if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in
court. It was not without purpose that this Court sounded the following stern warning:
It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real
and deep interest in their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason
of or as a result of the performance of their duties, if only in the way of giving them the benefit of
counsel; and, consequently, doing away with the practices of leaving them to their fates. If these be
done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied.
(Martinez v. Barredo, supra.)[19]
In Ozoa v. Vda. de Madula,[20] the Court explained the effect of a judgment of conviction
against the employee on the subsidiary liability of the employer, as follows:
To be sure, the correctness of the legal principles cited by the Court a quo cannot be gainsaid. A
person criminally liable is also civilly liable; and upon the institution of the criminal action, the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the crime is also impliedly instituted unless
waived, or the filing of a separate action therefor is reserved. The employer is subsidiarily
answerable for the adjudicated civil liability ex delicto of his employee in the event of the latters
insolvency; and the judgment in the criminal action pronouncing the employee to be also civilly liable
is conclusive on the employer not only as to the actuality of that liability but also as to its amount.[21]
Since the petitioner was not a party in the RTC and in the CA on the appeal of its employee
(Ancheta), the petitioner cannot justifiably claim that it was deprived of its right to due process. As
explained by this Court in Martinez v. Barredo:[22]
The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before
us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under Article 1903 of the Civil Code,
884
but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon
his drivers criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal
action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his drivers
conviction and upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only
the employees primary civil liability but also his employers subsidiary liability for such criminal
negligence. (Almeida, et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil. 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476; 54 Law ed., 1116; Wise
& Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320;Francisco v. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur v.
Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil. 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.)[23]
Besides, as gleaned from the brief of the petitioner, as appellant in the CA, in CA-G.R. CV No.
78149, it sought the reversal of the decision of the RTC and the acquittal of its employee.
InPhilippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. People,[24] this Court held that such an appeal would be
impermissible for the following reasons:
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is
then called upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the appellant. This is the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.
Indeed, appellate courts have the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court
and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
If the present appeal is given [due] course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes
open to review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the
trial court may be meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double
jeopardy, since the judgment against him could become subject to modification without his consent.
[25]
Indeed, to allow an employer to dispute its civil liability in the criminal case via an appeal from
the decision of the RTC would be to annul, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a
competent court.[26]
The Court cannot second guess whether Anchetas failure to file his brief as appellant in the
CA was through the negligence of his counsel or because of the belief that, indeed, he was guilty of
the crime charged and it was purposeless and futile for him to still file such brief.
We agree with the contention of the OSG that the right of the petitioner as the employer of the
accused to due process occurs during the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an aliaswrit of
execution, on the basis of the sheriffs return that the writ of execution issued by the court for the
enforcement of its decision on the civil liability of the accused was not satisfied because of the latters
insolvency, the sheriff being unable to locate any property in the name of the accused. Such return
is prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.[27]
During the hearing of the motion for the issuance of an alias writ of execution, the prosecution
must prove that (a) the petitioner PRBLI was the employer of the accused; (b) it was engaged in
some kind of industry; (c) the crime was committed by the employee in the discharge of his duties;
and (d) execution against the employee is unsatisfied.[28] The prosecution may offer in evidence the
sheriffs return as prima facie evidence of the insolvency of the accused.
The petitioner, as the employer of the accused, may adduce evidence on questions which
may be involved in the execution since the trial court which rendered the decision has a general
supervisory control over the process of execution.[29]
885
From a ruling adverse to the employer, it may appeal by writ of error on questions of facts, or
mixed questions of facts and of law, or by certiorari on questions of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion of the trial court, thus:
It goes without saying that the determination thus made as regards the employers subsidiary civil
liability is not conclusive in the sense of being non-reviewable by higher judicial authority. It may be
appealed to a higher court at the instance of the aggrieved party either the offended party or the
employer by writ of error seeking review of questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law, or
through a petition for review on certiorari, limited to a consideration only of questions of law. Or
review may be sought by the institution of a special civil action of certiorari, upon the theory that the
determination was made by the trial court without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion.[30]
Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in modifying the decision of the RTC which had long
become final and executory. A final and executory decision, even if erroneous, can no longer be
modified.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal of the petitioner is AFFIRMED. However, that portion
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals modifying the decision of the Regional Trial Court, dated
November 12, 1999, is SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84516 December 5, 1989
DIONISIO CARPIO, petitioner, vs.HON. SERGIO DOROJA, (Presiding Judge, MTC, Branch IV,
Zamboanga City) and EDWIN RAMIREZ Y WEE, respondents.
PARAS, J.:
Before us is a petition to review by certiorari the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga
City, Branch IV, which denied petitioner's motion for subsidiary writ of execution against the owner-
operator of the vehicle which figured in the accident.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
Sometime on October 23, 1985, accused-respondent Edwin Ramirez, while driving a passenger
Fuso Jitney owned and operated by Eduardo Toribio, bumped Dionisio Carpio, a pedestrian crossing
the street, as a consequence of which the latter suffered from a fractured left clavicle as reflected in
the medico-legal certificate and sustained injuries which required medical attention for a period of (3)
three months.
An information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries was filed against
Edwin Ramirez with the Municipal Trial Court of Zamboanga City, Branch IV. On January 14, 1987,
the accused voluntarily pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and was accordingly convicted for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Less Serious Physical Injuries under an amended information
886
punishable under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. The dispositive portion of the decision
handed down on May 27, 1987 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDWIN RAMIREZ y WEE guilty as a principal beyond
reasonable doubt of the Amended Information to which he voluntarily pleaded guilty and appreciating
this mitigating circumstance in his favor, hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of One (1) month
and One (1) day to Two (2) months of Arresto Mayor in its minimum period. The accused is likewise
ordered to indemnify the complainant Dionisio A. Carpio the amount of P45.00 representing the
value of the 1/2 can of tomatoes lost; the amount of P200.00 which complainant paid to the
Zamboanga General Hospital, to pay complainant the amount of Pl,500.00 as attorney's fees and to
pay the cost of this suit. SO ORDERED. (p. 7, Rollo)
Thereafter, the accused filed an application for probation.
At the early stage of the trial, the private prosecutor manifested his desire to present evidence to
establish the civil liability of either the accused driver or the owner-operator of the vehicle. Accused's
counsel moved that the court summon the owner of the vehicle to afford the latter a day in court, on
the ground that the accused is not only indigent but also jobless and thus cannot answer any civil
liability that may be imposed upon him by the court. The private prosecutor, however, did not move
for the appearance of Eduardo Toribio.
The civil aspect of the above-quoted decision was appealed by the private prosecutor to the
Regional Trial Court Branch XVI, appellant praying for moral damages in the amount of P 10,000.00,
compensatory damages at P6,186.40, and attorney's fees of P 5,000.00. The appellate court, on
January 20, 1988, modified the trial court's decision, granting the appellant moral damages in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P 5,000.00), while affirming all other civil liabilities.
Thereafter, a writ of execution dated March 10, 1988 was duly served upon the accused but was,
however, returned unsatisfied due to the insolvency of the accused as shown by the sheriffs return.
Thus, complainant moved for a subsidiary writ of execution against the subsidiary liability of the
owner-operator of the vehicle. The same was denied by the trial court on two grounds, namely, the
decision of the appellate court made no mention of the subsidiary liability of Eduardo Toribio, and the
nature of the accident falls under "culpa-aquiliana" and not culpa-contractual." A motion for
reconsideration of the said order was disallowed for the reason that complainant having failed to
raise the matter of subsidiary liability with the appellate court, said court rendered its decision which
has become final and executory and the trial court has no power to alter or modify such decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner relies heavily on the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, 87 SCRA 275, which enunciates that "the
subsidiary liability of the owner-operator is fixed by the judgment, because if a case were to be filed
against said operator, the court called upon to act thereto has no other function than to render a
decision based on the indemnity award in the criminal case without power to amend or modify it
even if in his opinion an error has been committed in the decision." Petitioner maintains that the
tenor of the aforesaid decision implies that the subsidiary liability of the owner-operator may be
enforced in the same proceeding and a separate action is no longer necessary in order to avoid
undue delay, notwithstanding the fact that said employer was not made a party in the criminal action.
It is the theory of respondent that the owner-operator cannot be validly held subsidiarily liable for the
following reasons, namely: (a) the matter of subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal; (b) contrary
to the case of Pajarito v. Seneris, the injuries sustained by the complainant did not arise from the so-
887
called "culpa-contractual" but from "culpa-aquiliana"; (c) the judgments of appellate courts may not
be altered, modified, or changed by the court of origin; and (d) said owner was never made a party
to the criminal proceedings.
Thus, the underlying issue raised in this case is; whether or not the subsidiary liability of the owner-
operator may be enforced in the same criminal proceeding against the driver where the award was
given, or in a separate civil action.
The law involved in the instant case is Article 103 in relation to Article 100, both of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads thus:
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in
the discharge of their duties.
Respondent contends that the case of Pajarito v. Seneris cannot be applied to the present case, the
former being an action involving culpa-contractual, while the latter being one of culpa-aquiliana.
Such a declaration is erroneous. The subsidiary liability in Art. 103 should be distinguished from the
primary liability of employers, which is quasi-delictual in character as provided in Art. 2180 of the
New Civil Code. Under Art. 103, the liability emanated from a delict. On the other hand, the liability
under Art. 2180 is founded on culpa-aquiliana. The present case is neither an action for culpa-
contractual nor for culpa-aquiliana. This is basically an action to enforce the civil liability arising from
crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code. In no case can this be regarded as a civil action for
the primary liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the New Civil Code, i.e., action for culpa-
aquiliana.
In order that an employer may be held subsidiarily liable for the employee's civil liability in the
criminal action, it should be shown (1) that the employer, etc. is engaged in any kind of industry, (2)
that the employee committed the offense in the discharge of his duties and (3) that he is insolvent
(Basa Marketing Corp. v. Bolinao, 117 SCRA 156). The subsidiary liability of the employer, however,
arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal action. All these requisites present, the
employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the employee's conviction and upon proof of
the latter's insolvency. Needless to say, the case at bar satisfies all these requirements.
Furthermore, we are not convinced that the owner-operator has been deprived of his day in court,
because the case before us is not one wherein the operator is sued for a primary liability under the
Civil Code but one in which the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
employee's criminal negligence is sought to be enforced. Considering the subsidiary liability imposed
upon the employer by law, he is in substance and in effect a party to the criminal case. Ergo, the
employer's subsidiary liability may be determined and enforced in the criminal case as part of the
execution proceedings against the employee. This Court held in the earlier case of Pajarito v.
Seneris, supra, that "The proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary civil liability may be
considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution
has been issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are
proceedings in the suit. There is no question that the court which rendered the judgment has a
general supervisory control over its process of execution, and this power carries with it the right to
determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution."
The argument that the owner-operator cannot be held subsidiarily liable because the matter of
subsidiary liability was not raised on appeal and in like manner, the appellate court's decision made
888
no mention of such subsidiary liability is of no moment. As already discussed, the filing of a separate
complaint against the operator for recovery of subsidiary liability is not necessary since his liability is
clear from the decision against the accused. Such being the case, it is not indispensable for the
question of subsidiary liability to be passed upon by the appellate court. Such subsidiary liability is
already implied from the appellate court's decision. In the recent case of Vda. de Paman v. Seneris,
115 SCRA 709, this Court reiterated the following pronouncement: "A judgment of conviction
sentencing a defendant employer to pay an indemnity in the absence of any collusion between the
defendant and the offended party, is conclusive upon the employer in an action for the enforcement
of the latter's subsidiary liability not only with regard to the civil liability, but also with regard to its
amount." This being the case, this Court stated in Rotea v. Halili, 109 Phil. 495, "that the court has
no other function than to render decision based upon the indemnity awarded in the criminal case and
has no power to amend or modify it even if in its opinion an error has been committed in the
decision. A separate and independent action is, therefore, unnecessary and would only unduly
prolong the agony of the heirs of the victim."
Finally, the position taken by the respondent appellate court that to grant the motion for subsidiary
writ of execution would in effect be to amend its decision which has already become final and
executory cannot be sustained. Compelling the owner-operator to pay on the basis of his subsidiary
liability does not constitute an amendment of the judgment because in an action under Art. 103 of
the Revised Penal Code, once all the requisites as earlier discussed are met, the employer becomes
ipso facto subsidiarily liable, without need of a separate action. Such being the case, the subsidiary
liability can be enforced in the same case where the award was given, and this does not constitute
an act of amending the decision. It becomes incumbent upon the court to grant a motion for
subsidiary writ of execution (but only after the employer has been heard), upon conviction of the
employee and after execution is returned unsatisfied due to the employee's insolvency.
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent court disallowing the motion for subsidiary writ of execution
is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is directed to hear and decide in the same proceeding the
subsidiary liability of the alleged owner-operator of the passenger jitney. Costs against private
respondent.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25913 February 29, 1969
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO CASTRO, petitioners, vs.APOLONIO BUSTOS, respondent.
Sotto, Consengco and Dizon for petitioners. Sipin, Abarcar and Baluyot for respondent.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the Court of Appeals.
889
Respondent Apolonio Bustos was charged in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga on October
26, 1962 with the crime of murder for the killing of Raymundo Castro whose heirs are now the
petitioners. The trial court found Bustos guilty only of homicide and, crediting him with two mitigating
circumstances, namely, passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender, sentenced him to an
indeterminate prison term of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
years and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify the petitioners, who were
represented in the case by a private prosecutor, in the sum of six thousand pesos (P6,000) "without
prejudice to whatever the accused (respondent) is entitled from the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS) for his services of around twenty-six (26) years as a public school teacher, prior to
October 20, 1962." Both respondent and petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, respondent
asking that appellate, court acquit him and petitioners praying, on the other hand, that respondent be
convicted of murder, that the portion regarding what said respondent will receive from the GSIS be
deleted and that he be ordered to pay petitioners "the aggregate sum of P50,764.00 as indemnity
and actual, moral, temperate and exemplary damages." For the purposes of their appeal, petitioners
even filed unnecessarily a printed record on appeal. On October 18, 1965, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment modifying that of the trial court insofar as it concerned (1) the amount of
damages to be awarded petitioners thus:
... Aside from the P6,000 indemnity awarded by the trial court, which we uphold, we feel justified, in
the exercise of our discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the amount of
P6,000 plus P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary
of P2,676.00 ....
and (2) the mitigating circumstance of "obfuscation", appreciated as such by the trial court, which
was changed to "vindication of a grave offense", but affirming it in all other respects. Upon motion,
however, of respondent for the reconsideration of said decision, reiterating his plea for acquittal, or,
in the alternative, praying for the elimination of the award of moral and compensatory damages, the
Court of Appeals promulgated on November 13, 1965, an amended decision, the pertinent portions
of which are:
The arguments interposed by the appellant in his Motion for consideration to support the complete
reversal of the judgment appealed from, have been considered and passed upon in our decision,
and we see no reason to alter the same in so far as the appellant's guilt of the crime is concerned.
On the other hand, we agree with the appellant that in the interest of justice and equity and in view of
the presence of two mitigating circumstances, without any aggravating one to offset them, the award
of moral and compensatory damages should be eliminated.
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated October 18, 1965, is hereby amended by eliminating
therefrom the award of P6,000.00 representing moral damages, and of P13,380.00 representing the
decedent's loss of earnings.
From this amended decision, only petitioners have appealed to Us. The prayer in their petition for
certiorari asks for nothing more than that the amended decision of the Court of Appeals be revoked
and reversed, and its original decision be affirmed in toto insofar as the award of indemnity and
damages is concerned. Since We find the grounds of the appeal meritorious, We grant fully the
prayer in the petition.
This case affords this Court as appropriate an opportunity, as any other, to restate, in a more
comprehensive way, the law regarding the items of damages that are recoverable in cases of death
caused by a crime, whether the claim therefor is made in the criminal proceedings itself or in a
890
separate civil action. In the instant case, recovery of such damages is being sought in the criminal
proceedings but even if it were claimed otherwise, the indemnity and damages would be the same,
for generally, the items of damages are identical in both procedures, except with respect to
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation which can be awarded only when a separate civil action is
instituted. (Art. 2208, Civil Code) With the clarifications We are making herein, at least the writer of
this opinion expects that litigations regarding the aspects of the law herein passed upon may be
minimized.
As a start, it is to be noted that in the matter of damages, the original decision of the Court of
Appeals, while correct in making a particularization in the award of indemnity and damages,
nonetheless, still failed to comply strictly with the constitutional requirement that all decisions of
courts of record must state both the facts and thelaw on which they are based. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII,
Constitution) In said original decision, the Court of Appeals held:
Coming now to the damages asked by the heirs of the deceased: Aside from the P6,000.00
indemnity awarded by the trial court which we uphold, we feel justified, in the exercise of our
discretion, to award to the heirs of the deceased moral damages in the amount of P6,000 plus
P13,380.00 to compensate for the loss of earning of the decedent at the annual salary of P2,676.00
(Exh. V; p. 42 t.s.n. Vergara).
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is modified as above indicated in so far as it concerns the
amount of indemnity and damages to be awarded to the heirs of the deceased, and the mitigating
circumstance of vindication of a grave offense which takes the place of the circumstance of
obfuscation appreciated by the trial court; and affirmed in all other respects. Costs against the
appellant.
As can be seen, no legal or factual basis is stated therein for the award of indemnity and damages to
petitioners; worse, the impression is given that the said award is purely a matter of discretion on the
part of the court. Clearly, this is not in accordance with the law. Indeed, it must have been this failure
to refer to the pertinent legal provisions which induced the appellate court, at the mere invocation by
respondent of Art. 2204 of the Civil Code, to commit the error of readily eliminating in the amended
decision the items on moral damages and compensation for loss of earning of the decedent which its
original decision had correctly contained. Having held that it had discretion in the premises, the court
easily yielded to the argument that simply because it had credited the respondent with two mitigating
circumstances, it was already justified in eliminating the items of damages already adverted to,
presumably having in mind said Art. 2204 which provides that:
In crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to

the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Of course, this was clear error, inasmuch as construed literally or otherwise, the quoted provision
does not warrant a complete deletion of said items of damages. In any event the court evidently
failed to take into account that several other provisions can come into play considering the
circumstances in this case.
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom are governed
by the penal laws, "... subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of
Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating
damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
891
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civily liable." (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code).
This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes indemnification for consequential
damages (Art. 104, id.) and said consequential damages in turn include "... those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are subject,
however, as above indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, We will now turn to said
provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the
indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and
awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused
by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the
recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by law of testate or intestate
succession may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five
years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by this Court first,
to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v.
Pantoja, G. R. No. L-18793, promulgated October 11, 1968, and it must be stressed that this
amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of
pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court,
according to the circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime has been
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party," (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot however
be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or not they should be given. (Art.
2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the sole fact of death
(1st par., Art. 2206) and in cases wherein exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the
attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) "... damages to be adjudicated may be
respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art.
2204) but "the party suffering the loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a
family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or omisson in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest
as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court." (Art.
2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered only when
892
exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or, as We have already stated, when
there is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to
the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00, without the need of any
evidence or proof of damages, and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount to be fixed by the Court
according to the circumstances of the deceased related to his actual income at the time of death and
his probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court as a
matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said time on account of permanent
disability not caused by the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291,
Civil Code, the recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not more than
five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the court. This may be
recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more aggravating circumstances,
an amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the same to be considered separate from
fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expresses of litigation, the actual amount thereof, (but only when a
separate civil action to recover civil liability has been filed or when exemplary damages are
awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity of the deceased and for
moral damages are recoverable separately from and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these damages may, however, be
respectively increased or lessened according to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except
items 1 and 4 above, for obvious reasons.
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in eliminating in its
amended decision, the items of moral damages and compensation for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased. Indeed, as to the award of moral damages in case of death, this Court has already held
in Mercado v. Lira, etc., G. R. Nos. L-13328-29, September 29, 1961, that once the heirs of the
deceased claim moral damages and are able to prove they are entitled thereto, it becomes the duty
of the court to make the award. We held:
Art. 2206 states further that "In addition" to the amount of at least P3,000.00 to be awarded for the
death of a passenger, the spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased may demand moral damages as a consequence of the death of their deceased kin, which
simply means that once the above-mentioned heirs of the deceased claim compensation for moral
damages and are able to prove that they are entitled to such award, it becomes the duty of the court
to award moral damages to the claimant in an amount commensurate with the mental anguish
suffered by them.
893
This doctrine was reiterated in Maranan v. Perez, G. R. No. L-22272, June 26, 1967:
In connection with the award of damages, the court a quo granted only P3,000 to plaintiff-appellant.
This is the minimum compensatory damages amount recoverable under Art. 1764 in connection with
Art. 2206 of the Civil Code when a breach of contract results in the passenger's death. As has been
the policy followed by this Court, this minimal award should be increased to P6,000 .... Still, Art. 2206
and 1764 award moral damages in addition to compensatory damages, to the parents of the
passenger killed to compensate for the mental anguish they suffered. A claim therefor, having been
properly made, it becomes the court's duty to award moral damages. Plaintiff demands P5,000 as
moral damages; however, in the circumstances, We consider P3,000 moral damages, in addition to
the P6,000 damages aforestated, as sufficient. Interest upon such damages are also due to plaintiff-
appellant.
Likewise, in the matter of the compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, We also held in the case of Daniel Bulante v. Chu Liante, G.R. Nos. L- 21583 and L-
21591-92, May 20, 1968 that:
The next item objected to refers to the damages awarded to the heirs of the deceased passengers
for loss of earning capacity, separately from the indemnities by reason of death. The ground for the
objection is that loss of earning capacity was not specifically pleaded or claimed in the complaint.
This item, however, may be considered included in the prayer for "actual damages" and for other
"just and equitable reliefs", especially if taken in the light of Art. 2206, in connection with Art. 1764, of
the Civil Code, which allows, in addition to an indemnity of at least P3,000 by reason of death,
recovery for loss of earning capacity on the part of the deceased, the same to be paid to his heirs "in
every case ... unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the
defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death."
To be sure, these cases of Mercado v. Lira, Maranan v. Perez and Bulante v. Chu Liante from which
We have quoted, were actions based on contracts of common carriers. But the above-mentioned
doctrines are equally applicable to civil liability ex delicto because, after all, Art. 2206 of the Civil
Code which was applied in said cases is precisely the provision pertinent to liability arising from
crimes (and quasi-delicts). No doubt, said Article must have been relied upon by the court in the
above cases only because Art. 1764 of the Civil Code provides that said "Art. 2206 shall also apply
to the death of a passenger caused by the breach of contract of a common carrier." Accordingly, the
interpretation given to said article in those cases are applicable to the case at bar. In other words,
this must be so because under the Civil Code, the same rules on damages are generally to be
observed, whether death results from a crime or a quasi-delict or a breach of the contract of
common carriage.
As to the amount of the indemnity for moral damages and loss of earning capacity of the deceased
in the present case, the original decision of the Court of Appeals awarding them, does not afford
sufficient basis for Us to increase the amounts fixed by said court, as prayed for by appellants. As
has already been stated, the said decision failed to follow the Constitution, not only in not stating the
law on which it is based but also in not making the necessary findings of fact on which it based its
discretion in fixing the respective amounts it awarded for moral and compensatory damages. Legally,
therefore, We can, if We wish to, return this case to that court for it to supply these constitutional
omissions. We opt however, to save time and further difficulties for and damages to, the petitioners.
Extant in the records before Us is the fact that the respondent has never disputed that petitioners are
the widow and seven children of the deceased, three of whom were still minors at the time of his
death, nor that the said deceased was a public school teacher, 56 years old, and earning P2,276.00
894
a year. These facts appear to have been repeatedly asserted in the briefs of petitioners in the Court
of Appeals and in this Court. No denial was ever made by the respondent. When respondent moved
for the reconsideration of the original decision of the Court of Appeals, (Annex E of Petition
for Certiorari) he only argued that in view of the mitigating circumstances credited to him by said
court, petitioners were not entitled to moral damages and to indemnity for loss of earning capacity of
the deceased; the amounts fixed therefor by said court he never questioned. When petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration of the amended decision of the Court of Appeals, these facts
(relationship, earnings, etc.) were reiterated. (Annex G, id.) Respondent did not file any answer to
said motion despite the resolution requiring him to do so. (Par. 12, Petition for Certiorari) Neither has
respondent filed any brief in the present instance, notwithstanding repeated requests on his part for
extension to file the same, which, incidentally, were all granted. Under these circumstances, We feel
justified in brushing aside strict technicalities of procedure in order to accomplish substantial justice
more expeditiously. Anyway, as We said at the outset, petitioners are asking Us, in the prayer of their
petition for certiorari, for nothing more than to affirm "in toto" the original decision of the Court of
Appeals, and in their lone assignment of error in the present instance, their only claim is that "the
Court of Appeals erred when it issued the amended decision eliminating the award of P6,000 moral
damages and the award of P13,380.00 loss of earnings of the deceased Raymundo Castro." In
these circumstances, even if We should award the amounts of damages just mentioned, inspite of
the absence of the pertinent findings of fact by the Court of Appeals, We would not have to reach
beyond amounts that are undisputed by the respondent.
We, therefore, overrule the prayer for additional damages in petitioners' brief and We hold that, on
the basis of the facts not questioned by respondent, they are entitled only to the P6,000.00 as moral
damages and the P13,380.00 as compensatory damages for the loss of earning capacity of the
deceased awarded in the original decision of the Court of Appeals in addition, of course, to the
indemnity for death fixed also by said court at P6,000.00. This amount of P6,000.00 We cannot
increase to P12,000.00, as allowed in People v. Pantoja, supra, and the subsequent cases, (People
v. Mongaya G. R. No. L-23708, October 31, 1968, and People v. Ramos, G. R. No. L-19143,
November 29, 1968) because in the instant suit, neither party has appealed in relation thereto. This
case is now before Us on appeal by the offended party only as to specific portions of the civil
indemnity to be paid by the respondent. It would have been different if the whole criminal case were
up for our review because then, even without any appeal on the part of the offended party, We could
have still increased the said liability of the accused, here-in respondent. (See Mercado v.
Lira, supra.)
At this juncture, for the guidance of parties similarly situated as petitioners herein, and so that there
may be no useless expenses in appeals by offended parties in regard to the civil aspect of a criminal
case when no separate civil action has been filed by them, it should be made clear that when there
is no such separate civil action and the claim for civil indemnity is joined with the criminal case, no
record on appeal, whether printed, typewritten or mimeographed, is necessary, except perhaps
when formal pleading raising complicated questions are filed in connection therewith, and still, this
would be purely optional on the appellant because anyway the whole original record of the case is
elevated in appeals in criminal cases. It is already settled that appeals relating to the civil aspects of
a criminal case should follow the procedure for appeal required by rules of criminal procedure.
(People vs. Lorredo, 50 Phil. 209, 220-221; People v. ViIlanueva, G.R. No. L-18769, May 27,
1966)lawphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the amended decision of the Court of Appeals is modified as hereinabove indicated,
in so far as the civil liability of respondent is concerned, with costs against him in this instance.
895
EN BANC
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.ROGELIO BAYOTAS y

CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
896
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the
National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
General, relying on the case ofPeople v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is
based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of
the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or,
is it a judgment which is final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in
part, recites:
897
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia
firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado
por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when
judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal."
Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple
reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421.
Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp.
859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles
72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive
conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the
right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November
9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code,
Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is
sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the
criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby
we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability
898
does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. No. 19226-R,
September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime
Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death
of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there
is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the
said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes'
Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045);
consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
Polinar 7 andLamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years
after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability
under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase
and sale. (Emphasis ours)
899
xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged
with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his
criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard
on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In
such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the
case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should
be substituted as defendants-appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established
principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower
court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during
the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because
his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to
indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the
absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People
and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
900
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him
by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs.
Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although
he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil.
583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego
insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising
from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him,
thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly
appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased
insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling
in Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that
a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal
of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision
in Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.
To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and
no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere
in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delictowhen his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in
a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his
conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:
901
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. 12One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of
the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July
8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the sourceof his civil liability. Consequently, although Article
30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of
the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on
the criminal.
902
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for
the Sendaydiegoresolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims,
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him
by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken inSendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which,
relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication
therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already
passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the
Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment
of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in
the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside
and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together
with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion
from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
include even the restitution of personal or real property."15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive
enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses
for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is
clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence,
there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a
claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon
extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his
conviction.
903
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action,
this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same
must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:
a) Law 20
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
904
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
case, conformably with provisions of Article 115521 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. 22
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
905

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People v.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. L-52688 October 17, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edward C. Castaeda for accused-appellants.

A Santo Domingo Exit.

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

G.R. No. 89420 July 31, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

The pertinent facts of the case are:

SO ORDERED. (p. 30, Rollo)

Q Is there such a lucid intervals?

(TSN, p. 36, August 2, 1988)

A At our residence, sir, at San Vicente, Apalit, Pampanga.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What was his answer?

A I cannot always say that he is sane or insane, sir.

Q In other words, he may be sane and he may be insane?

AFFIRMED without costs.

G.R. No. L-37673 March 31, 1933

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

Carlos S. Tan for appellant.

[G.R. No. 126283. May 28, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RUBEN ESTEPANO, RODNEY

Q: How many more (who) helped?

A: Rodney Estepano and Rene Estepano.

Q: What is (sic) the weapon used by Texas (Ruben)?

A: Cane cutter (espading).

Q: How about Rene?

net earning life gross reasonable

capacity (x) = expectancy x annual less & necessary

income living expenses

x = 2 (80 - 34) x [24,000.00 12,000.00]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO

NIEL F. LLAVE, G.R. No. 166040

PANGANIBAN, C. J., Chairperson,

CALLEJO, SR., and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

April 26, 2006

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The Case for the Prosecution

The Case for the Accused

WHETHER OR NOT EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT PETITIONER BEYOND

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

THE MATERIAL INCONSISTENCIES BETWEEN THE TESTIMONY OF COMPLAINING WITNESS

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IS NOT A CREDIBLE WITNESS.

PETITIONER ACTED WITHOUT DISCERNMENT.

THE TESTIMONY RELIED UPON BY THE PROSECUTION IS HEARSAY.

THE COMPLAINT IS FABRICATED.

PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW.[60]

Petitioners arguments are bereft of merit.

The petition is not meritorious.

Q: From what time up to what time?

A: From 12:00 oclock noon up to 6:00 p.m.

A: Yes, Sir, on the same date I went to school.

Q: At about 6:00 p.m., Sept. 24, 2002, where were you?

Q: And what did you do after you went home?

A: I changed my clothes and then I proceeded to the store of my mother.

Q: And where is that store of your mother where you went?