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Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
MASSENERGY
EQUATION,
VOLUME I
EINSTEINS
MASSENERGY
EQUATION,
VOLUME I
EARLY HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS
FRANCISCO FERNFLORES
Einsteins MassEnergy Equation, Volume I: Early History and
Philosophical Foundations
Copyright Momentum Press , LLC, 2018.
DOI: 10.5643/9781606508589
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
PREFACE ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS xi
1. Introduction and Conceptual Context 1
1.1 Einsteins 1905 Discovery of the MassEnergy Relation 1
1.2 Mass: From Newton to Einstein 3
1.2.1 Newton and Mass 4
1.2.2 Euler and Mass 7
1.2.3 Maxwell and Mass 13
1.2.4 Mach and Mass 15
1.3 Energy and Its Conservation in the 19th Century 18
1.4 Philosophical Reflections 23
2. Early Days of the MassEnergy Relation 25
2.1 Historical Review of Special Relativity 26
2.2 The First Demonstration 31
2.3 A Second Demonstration 42
2.4 A Third Demonstration 46
2.5 Philosophical Reflections on a Third Demonstration 51
2.6 Early Demonstrations, Philosophically Speaking 53
2.7 Composite Systems and the Inertia of Energy 57
2.8 Composite Systems, Philosophically Speaking 59
2.9 Einsteins Principle versus Constructive Theories 61
3. Einstein and Dynamic Demonstrations of E = mc2 65
3.1 Historical Review of Minkowski Spacetime 65
3.2 Einsteins 1935 Dynamic Demonstration 69
3.3 Einsteins Dynamic Demonstration, Philosophically
Speaking 79
3.4 Lewis and Tolmans 1909 Dynamic Demonstration 80
3.5 Feigenbaum and Mermins Dynamic Demonstration 91
3.6 Feigenbaum and Mermin, Philosophically Speaking 95
BIBLIOGRAPHY 99
INDEX 103
PREFACE
***
INTRODUCTION AND
CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT
Einstein first expressed the relativistic relationship between mass and energy,
which we now routinely denote E = mc2 , in a 1905 article titled Does the
Inertia of a Body Depend upon Its Energy-Content? The implicit answer to
the question in the title already says a lot. Einstein is claiming that the extent
to which an object resists a change in its state of motion, be it by an impulsive
force or a continuous force, depends on the energy-content of the body.
The energy-content of a body is today sometimes called its internal energy.
Given the general trend among physicists in the early 20th century to regard
energy as a property of physical systems and not as a material entity, it would
no doubt have seemed quite surprising in 1905 that, e.g., upon losing thermal
energy a body would offer less resistance to changes in its state of motion.
The first conclusion Einstein states in his 1905 article is this: If a body
releases the energy L in the form of radiation, its mass decreases by L/V 2
[1, p. 174], where Einstein is using V to designate the speed of light in
vacuo, for which we will hereafter consistently use the more familiar c.
Given the physical configuration Einstein uses to arrive at this result, the
term radiation in this conclusion refers to the electromagnetic radiation.
However, Einstein quickly points out that the form of energy the body gives
off seems to be irrelevant to the result, assuming, as he seems to do, that any
one kind of energy can be transformed into another. Thus, he says, we are
led to the more general conclusion that
the mass of a body is a measure of its energy content; if the energy changes
by L, the mass changes in the same sense by L/9 1020 , if the energy is
measured in ergs and the mass in grams [1, p. 174].
2 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
Notice also that Einsteins 1905 result about the relationship between
mass and energy is conceptually distinct from considerations in special rel-
ativity about how measurements of inertial mass are related for a pair of
observers who are in a state of relative inertial motion. The issue here is
not about what has sometimes been called relativistic mass. Also, because
some contemporary treatments can leave the reader with the impression that
the relationship between energy and mass in special relativity issues directly
from the definition of the four-momentum, it is also important to note that
Einsteins result, as we shall see in later chapters, depends on accepting
at least the principle of relativity, the light principle (which roughly states
that light travels at the same velocity regardless of the state of motion of
the observer or emitter), and the principle of conservation of energy. It is
from these physical hypotheses, and not merely from definitions of physi-
cal quantities, that Einstein derives an empirically testable prediction. This
prediction, when verified, shows that one property of physical objects that
Newton believed to be unchangeable except by physically separating a part
of the object, viz., its inertial mass, can vary depending on the energy-
content of that body. For example, having radiated some of its thermal
energy, a rock that has cooled resists changes to its state of motion a tiny bit
less. Quantitatively, of course, the change to the inertial mass for a typical
rock is minute. Still, from a Newtonian perspective, the temperature of the
rock, or the amount of thermal energy it has released, is entirely irrelevant
to any consideration of its inertial mass.
With this rough understanding of Einsteins 1905 massenergy result,
we shall devote the remainder of this chapter to setting Einsteins result in its
historical and philosophical context. Our focus will be to step gingerly across
some of the stones in the river that separates Newtonian physics and Ein-
steins special relativity. Specifically, we wish to illustrate the accepted and
common usage of the terms mass and energy in physics near the begin-
ning of the 20th century so that we may better understand how Einstein might
have thought about his result and how others would have understood it.1
1 Readers who are familiar with this history, and especially with the distinction between inertial
and gravitational mass, may safely skip either to 1.4 or directly to the next chapter.
4 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
m = V . (1.1)
2 Note that this expression sediments the use of the term mass as a noun, such as when we
say a mass suspended from a string . . . .
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 5
As we can only define density as the mass of unit volume, the circle is
manifest [5, p. 194].
There are, then, two questions we wish to address: (1) Why would Newton
define mass in an apparently circular way? (2) How do Machs criticism and
his own attempts to define mass help us clarify the meaning of the concept
of mass? Let us address question (1) first.
In A Guide to Newtons Principia, I. B. Cohen gives a compelling
account of why the charge of circularity against Newtons definition of mass
is misplaced [6]. The first important lesson to glean from Cohens work is
that in an earlier draft of Book I of Principia, Newton clearly illustrates the
need to introduce a term other than weight to discuss a bodys resistance
to changes in its state of motion. According to Cohen, Newton was aware
that weight varies at different locations on earth. For Newton, weight
is due to the force of gravity acting on an object, and it is this weight that
Newton claims to have found, by experiment, to be proportional to a bodys
quantity of matter [6, p. 87]. This is significant because it signals that
prior to Newton there was not a single, widely used term with a prescribed
meaning to refer to what we now call inertial mass. In the scholium to the
definitions, Newton states Thus far it has seemed best to explain the senses
in which the less familiar words are to be taken in this treatise [2, p. 408].
At the time Newton wrote Principia, the term mass was in this category
of less familiar words whose meaning is in need of explanation.
When we turn to the explanation that directly follows Definition 1 in
Principia, we find three important aspects of the explication of the term
mass that merit our attention. First, Newton lists a variety of examples of
materials whose density is variable and for which the product of density times
volume determines the amount of stuff present in a container. Newton
explains:
If the density of air is doubled in a space that is also doubled, there is four
times as much air, and there is six times as much if the space is tripled.
The case is the same for snow and powders condensed by compression or
liquefaction, and also for all bodies that are condensed in various ways
by any causes whatsoever [2, p. 403].
The role of the term density in this explanation is significant. The examples
Newton provides involve cases in which one can reasonably imagine that
the matter in question is composed of atomic (or at least individualizable)
particles. This suggests a rather intuitive interpretation of the term density
whose meaning is roughly the number of bits of matter in a given space. With
6 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
For the present, I am not taking into account any medium, if there should
be any, freely pervading the interstices between the parts of bodies [2,
pp. 403404].
Newton seems to be treating all bodies as having parts and denying any-
thing like a Cartesian aether that fills the spaces between these parts. As
Cohen points out, Newton was a convinced atomist, and it is precisely this
atomism that gives Newton a way to conceive of density that is distinct from
our familiar definition of mass per unit volume [6, p. 95].
A closely related observation from Cohen about Newtons use of the
term density is that in Newtons time, densities were typically expressed
as ratios and not using some unit of density [6, p. 90]. The significance of
this is that not only can one state a ratio of two densities when considering
materials of the same physical composition, e.g., the density of snow in this
container as compared to the density of snow in that container, but densities
were treated, in effect, as specific gravities [6, p. 94]. One could, even in
Newtons time, use an experimental procedure to determine the density of
snow, e.g., relative to the density of water.
The significance of these observations about the term density
increases when we continue reading Newtons explanation to Definition 1.
Newton says:
It [the quantity mass] can always be known from a bodys weight, for
by making very accurate experiments with pendulumsI have found it
to be proportional to the weight, as will be shown below [2, p. 404].
In Book II, Proposition 24, Corollary 2, Newton states that if two simple
pendulums have the same period of oscillation, the masses of the bobs will
be directly proportional to their weights. Thus, if we can determine the
weight of a body, either by direct measurement or by calculation, we thereby
determine its mass especially if we are, as Newton is, concerned only with
relative weights and masses, which frees us from having to determine the
constant of proportionality between mass and weight.
As Cohen points out, Newton states only one way for determining the
mass of an object in Principia, by determining the bodys weight [6, p. 88].
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 7
3 For a more detailed description of the history of the concept of mass, see [7].
8 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
Two things leap to the contemporary eye about Newtons own statement
of his second law. First, Newton is effectively defining a vector quantity.
Second, and more importantly, Newton is stating that the temporal rate of
change of momentum is proportional to the impressed force, a term he defines
in Definition 4. In our contemporary notation, the second law states:
dp
F. (1.2)
dt
As we have noted, because Newton worked exclusively with ratios of quan-
tities of the same type, he does not need to concern himself with determining
the constant of proportionality.
At a more conceptual level, the main difference between Eulers pre-
sentation and Newtons is that Newton begins his physics with definitions
of dynamical quantities. For example, Newtons first five definitions define
mass, momentum, force of inertia, impressed force, and centripetal force.
In contrast to Newton, in Theoria Euler begins his development of mechan-
ics with kinematical definitions and theorems. For example, Eulers first
five definitions define, for a moving point construed abstractly without any
physical properties, rest and motion, relative rest and motion, rectilinear and
curvilinear motion, and uniform and nonuniform motion. Significantly, Def-
inition 6 defines velocity as the ratio of the distances traversed to the times
[3, p. 11]. In his explanation to this definition, Euler is careful to point out
the legitimacy of dividing a distance by a time, something which as we have
seen was quite foreign at the time of Newton.
Eulers focus in the second chapter of Theoria, titled the elements of
internal motion, is three axioms that constitute a more refined assertion
of Newtons first law of motion combined with the views Euler shares with
Newton about the absolute nature of space and time. Euler states:
Axiom 1: Every body, even without being relative to other bodies, either
remains at rest or is moving, that is, it is either at absolute rest or in
absolute motion [3, p. 54].
At this stage, unlike Newton, Euler is not using the term body as synony-
mous with mass. Euler treats the meaning of the term body as intuitively
understood and then goes on to define the term inertia in Definition 11.
Euler states:
Definition 11: That quality of bodies, the reason for persisting in the same
state present within a body itself, is called inertia, and also sometimes
the force of inertia [3, p. 59].
In the two corollaries to Definition 11, Euler explains that inertia is the cause
of a body remaining in its state of motion and another cause besides the
inertia of this body cannot be assigned [3, p. 60].
Philosophically, one feels the strength of Eulers convictions concerning
inertia as the singular cause of a body persisting in its state is unsupported by
the purported conceptual clarity actually delivered by the definition of inertia
and its attending corollaries and scholium. If, in a metaphysical mood, we
ask What is inertia?, Eulers definition leaves us wanting, for it only tells
us inertia is an unknown property of objects that results in them persisting in
a uniform state of motion (including the state of rest). Euler also tells us, it
is true, that inertia is the only cause of bodies persisting in a state of uniform
motion, though we are left wondering why this must be so.
However, there is a more refined way to approach Eulers definition of
inertia. The term inertia functions, in Eulers Theoria, as a placeholder
for whatever it is in physical bodies that leads them to exhibit the idealized
behavior described in Eulers three axioms. While we do observe objects at
rest remaining at rest unless acted upon by a net impressed force, we tend
not to witness directly terrestrial objects moving with a constant nonzero
velocity. If the term inertia merely functioned as a name for that unknown,
hypothetical property of objects, one could argue that merely having a name
for that unknown property does not increase our understanding very much.
Yet, there are two reasons why Eulers careful treatment of inertia goes
beyond merely the selection of a name.
First, Euler improves our conceptual clarity of the foundations of
mechanics by introducing the term inertia as the single name for the
unknown property of objects to persist in the same state of motion. Signifi-
cantly, in the scholium to Definition 11, Euler states that we should reserve
the term force for causes that change the state of a body. Consequently,
10 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
since inertia is not what changes the state of a body but instead causes
it to persist in its state of uniform motion, Euler recommends that we stop
using the phrase force of inertia or vis inertiae as it engenders confusion
[8, p. 36].
Second, if Euler was merely adding to or modifying the vocabulary we
use to give qualitative descriptions of physical objects and processes, we
may have well chosen to ignore his suggestion. However, the significance
of the term inertia in a system of quantitative physics, and the importance
of not construing inertia as a force, is that inertia is a measurable quantity.
Precisely how we can measure inertia and how it is related to the notion of
a force is Eulers main focus in Chpt. 3 of Theoria.
For Euler, a force is the name given to that which prevails to change
the absolute state of bodies [3, p. 81]. If we interpret Euler as only picking
a name, then again it seems not much is gained. However, the measur-
able, quantitative relationships between instances of the term force and
especially the term inertia (or mass) solidify the meaning of the latter.
For example, in Theorem 3 of Chpt. 3, Euler proves the following:
From these assertions, it is clear, Euler points out, that the magnitude of
inertia is central to mechanics and merits its own name, which he then
specifies in Definition 15:
Definition 15: The mass of a body or the quantity of matter is called the
amount of the inertia which is present in that body, by which just as it
tries to continue in its own state so it tries to resist all changes [3, p. 95].
4 The precise mathematical details concerning instances of m are a bit vague in Euler. For
example, we have deliberately left the set of numbers to which m belongs unspecified. Because
Euler is committed to a form of atomism, he treats mass ratios as rational numbers. Any given
mass would then be a positive integer multiple of some unit mass. This would entail that an
objects mass could never be a nonrational, real number, such as .
12 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
In this definition, Euler is, on the one hand, introducing the term mass
exclusively as a measure of a bodys resistance to changes in state of motion.
On the other hand, Euler is using this definition as a bridge to the prior,
Newtonian notion of the mass of a body as related to the quantity of matter,
which is reasonable since for Euler also it would be difficult to imagine
anything contributing to the mass of an object other than what is intuitively
regarded as a material substance.
However, at a conceptual level, Euler has achieved something deeply
important to future physics: he has divorced the term mass from the intu-
itive notion of a measure of how much stuff there is in an object. We can
appreciate this by noticing how Eulers treatment of the term mass makes
it easy to operationalize the term. As Maxwell would later point out (see
1.2.3), assuming that we can find an empirical procedure for applying the
same force to two objects, if we apply the same force for the same amount of
time to two objects, we can determine the ratio of their masses by measur-
ing the ratio of the velocities they acquire. Consequently, the term mass
in Euler comes to designate an empirically measurable quantity because
of its proportionality to force, which follows familiar arithmetical rules for
combining instances of the term.
Finally, it is in Problem 9 that Euler comes close to writing F = ma.
Using contemporary notation, the problem is to determine the change in
motion for an object of mass m that is originally moving with a velocity
v when a force F acts in the same direction as v while the object moves
through a distance ds in a time dt. Euler clearly states that once the force F
2
begins to act on the body, its acceleration ddt 2s is a positive number that is
proportional to F/m. However, since Euler does not have a system of units
at his disposal, the most he could write is:
d 2s F
. (1.4)
dt 2 m
If we do assume, Euler suggests, a reference body of mass that serves as
our unit of mass, then we can write:
d 2s F
2
= , (1.5)
dt m/
or equivalently,
F = m a, (1.6)
d2s
where a = dt 2
and m = m/.
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 13
Eulers work draws our attention to what appeared to some, e.g., Mach [9],
to be a new circularity in the definition of mass. The mass m is defined as the
ratio of force F to acceleration a. However, to define a force F, one simply
writes F = ma (see, e.g., [9, p. 82]). Contemporary approaches in rational
mechanics circumvent this apparent circularity by noting, as Truesdell does,
that the term force is only implicitly defined, in the way that terms such
as point and line are in Euclidean geometry, by the particular collection
of axioms in which it appears [10, p. 129]. However, Maxwell attempted to
avoid the apparent circularity by assuming the notion of force as a primitive
term in his Matter and Motion [4]. Maxwells assumption is grounded on the
empirical possibility of applying the same force in different circumstances.
Furthermore, Maxwells work is of interest to us because his presentation
of Newtonian mechanics in Matter and Motion is deeply influenced by
developments in, and refinements to, the concept of energy in the mid to late
19th century.
After introducing Newtons second law of motion in 44 of Matter and
Motion, Maxwell immediately recognizes the need to define equal masses
and equal forces in 45 [4, p. 32]. Although he still talks about mass as the
quantity of matter, Maxwells definition of equal masses studiously avoids
this phrase. The only assumption we need to make to have such a definition,
Maxwell notes, is that objects have permanent properties.
Maxwell asks us to consider a thread of natural rubber (caoutchouc).
When stretched beyond a certain point, such a thread will exert a certain
force. If we stretch the thread to the same distance on two separate occasions,
14 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
and assuming that its properties remain constant, it will exert the same force.
From these elementary observations, which Maxwell treats as primary and
not in need of further explanation at least for the purposes of developing
the science of abstract dynamics, the definition of equal masses quickly
follows.
Suppose we have two objects M and N , Maxwell suggests. We attach
M to our rubber thread and pull on the thread. Assuming that no other force
is acting on M , a specific force F will act on M and accelerate it so that after
one unit of time it will acquire a velocity v. Now suppose we perform the
same operation with N and that at the end of one unit of time N also acquires
a velocity v. We can then conclude that M and N have the same mass [4,
p. 33]. Although Maxwell does not state it explicitly, we could say that two
objects M and N have equal mass if, and only if, after being acted upon
by the same force F for one unit of time, they acquire the same velocity v.
Again, while this definition of equal masses clearly depends on the definition
of equal force, it is not circular because the latter is operationally defined.
For Maxwell, despite having this definition of equal masses in hand,
it is nevertheless important to establish clearly its connection to methods
commonly used to measure mass. Maxwell explains that if we are dealing
with bodies of exactly the same kind [4, p. 33], by which he means bodies
of the same chemical composition, it is clear that we can use several methods
for comparing masses. In general, Maxwell says,
fact, and not something derived strictly from the three laws of motion, that
objects of different chemical composition experience the same acceleration
toward the earth. Maxwells discussion is worth quoting in full:
It is an observed fact that bodies of equal mass, placed in the same posi-
tion relative to the earth, are attracted equally towards the earth, whatever
they are made of; but this is not a doctrine of abstract dynamics founded
on axiomatic principles, but a fact discovered by observation, and ver-
ified by the careful experiments of Newton, on the times of oscillation
of hollow wooden balls suspended by strings of the same length, and
containing gold, silver, lead, glass, sand, common salt, wood, water, and
wheat [4, p. 34].
Although Maxwell does not explicitly mention it, the key lies in recognizing
that although two objects M and N may have equal mass as determined by
the empirical procedure Maxwell outlines to define equal masses, it need not
be the case that M and N respond (or couple) equally to noncontact forces
such as the force of gravity or, say, the magnetic force. It is an empirically
well-confirmed observation that objects that have the same inertial mass,
i.e., equal mass as Maxwell defines it, can be accelerated quite differently
by the same magnetic force. Maxwells point is just that a similar thing
could have been observed about gravitation. As it happens, this does not
turn out to be the case. Instead, it is a fact that in the same geographical
position the weights of equal masses are equal [4, p. 34], and it is this
fact, Maxwell explains, that underwrites our use of weighing as a measure
of mass.
Mach does not directly address Maxwells definition of mass, though in his
Science of Mechanics, he is famously critical of Newtons definition. As
early as 1867, 16 years before the publication of the first German edition
of the Science of Mechanics, Machs article On the definition of mass
already included his unique definition of mass, though that article, which
seems to have rather different philosophical motivations, does not include
the explicit criticisms of Newton. We will here briefly review both Machs
criticisms and his definition of mass not so much because it enhances the
conceptual clarity of the foundations of mechanics but because it reinforces
the important distinction between inertial and gravitational mass that was so
influential to Einstein in his quest for a relativistic theory of gravitation that
was sensitive to the massenergy relation.
16 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
Mach goes on to explain that about the only way one can imagine the phrase
quantity of matter to be meaningful is if one interpreted it to mean, roughly,
the number of atoms of a given substance in a given sample. In this descrip-
tion, by atoms one would have to mean this term in its strict philosophical
sense, i.e., the smallest, finite, indivisible amount of stuff there is. Famously,
Mach rejected any such notion because of his unique empiricist epistemol-
ogy, which was intimately wedded to a unique brand of sensationalism, i.e.,
very roughly, the view that the only things we can know directly are the
sensory contents of our own experience. However, Mach does not reject
the concept quantity of matter on these epistemological grounds. Instead,
Mach argues that if we lived in a world in which matter was homogeneous,
i.e., a world in which there was only one kind of stuff, then the phrase
quantity of matter would be meaningful indeed. Mach continues:
Imagine, then, that we have arranged things so that two interact bodies by
whatever means. For Mach, it is an empirical fact, which he calls a Theorem
of experience that,
So, if under these conditions, which are much more general than discussions
about gravitation as the interaction in question is completely unspecified,
impart an equal acceleration to each other, then they have the same mass.
This, in effect, is what Mach calls his definition of mass in the Science of
Mechanics, which he states as follows:
Definition of equal masses.5 All those bodies are bodies of equal mass,
which, mutually acting on each other, produce in each other equal and
opposite accelerations [5, p. 218].
Finally, if the accelerations of the two bodies are not equal, then their masses
are in the inverse proportion to their accelerations.
Machs definition is not without its challenges. For example, as Koslow
has reported, one of the criticisms leveled against Mach is that his defi-
nition of mass presupposes the definition of an inertial frame [11, p. 223
ff.]. However, to define an inertial frame one needs to appeal to the notions
of force and mass. Koslow concludes that this charge of circularity is mis-
placed, and he may be correct. If he is not, it may be that there is a cluster of
terms, including mass, force, inertia, and acceleration, at the foun-
dations of mechanics that constitute a definitional circle that commands that
we make a conventional decision about which one(s) to treat as primary.
Conventional, of course, does not mean arbitrary if, as we have seen in the
case of Maxwell, we have empirical procedures for identifying instances
of one of the terms by ostension. Still, the most important lesson to draw
from these discussions for our purposes is that these attempts to define mass
consistently improved our understanding of the distinction between inertial
mass and gravitational mass.
a cursory glance at documents from this time also reveals other intrigues
in the development of both thermodynamics in general and the principle of
conservation of energy more specifically.
For example, in the preface to his Sketch of Thermodynamics, after
explaining that part of his goal is to correct the erroneous reports other have
given of the history of the subject, P. G. Tait says:
Although these remarks may seem rather quaint to us today, Tait may have
had good reason for making them in the preface to his book. For as he himself
reports in the same preface, Clausius had accused Tait of misrepresenting
Clusius work in an earlier article. Tait then explains:
Yet, despite all the nonscientific debates about priority and intellectual prop-
erty, tainted as they were with nationalist tendencies and proclivities, not
to mention the very unique, if not quite eccentric, characters of the scien-
tists involved, a gradual convergence to a single concept of energy and its
attendant conservation principle took place.
By the close of the 19th century, Ernst Mach could confidently assert that
to-day the law of conservation of energy is accepted as a fully established
truth and receives the widest applications in all domains of natural science
[14, p. 22]. In the same article from 1894, in which Mach attempts to describe
the genesis of both the concept of energy and its associated conservation
principle, Mach explicitly recognized that the principle of conservation of
energy was outside mechanics. Mach says:
alterations are reversed they yield anew the mechanical work in exactly
the quantity which was required for the production of the part reversed.
This is the principle of conservation of energy; energy being the term
which has gradually come into use for the indestructible something of
which the measure is mechanical work [14, p. 23].
The law in question asserts, that the quantity of force which can be brought
into action in the whole of Nature is unchangeable, and can neither be
increased nor diminished [15, par. 8].
Thus, by the time Einstein was preparing his work on Special Relativity, it
was justifiable for him to regard the principle of conservation of energy as an
uncontroversial and well-established physical principle, i.e., a principle that
was empirically well-confirmed in a variety of different types of physical
scenarios and could be treated as if it was true of all physical systems.7
However, before turning to Einsteins discovery of the massenergy
relation in special relativity, there are three philosophical issues surrounding
6 The word force in both the title of Helmholtz article and throughout his text is an English
translation of the German word Kraft. Helmholtz explicitly states that the quantity of
Kraft is the amount of work. Consequently, from our contemporary perspective, the word
Force is not the best translation of Helmholtzs Kraft as he is clearly articulating a version
of the principle of conservation of energy.
7 This description of treating a statement as if it is true is consistent both with Einsteins
description of physical science in his letter to Solovine from 1952 [16] and with how he
speaks of taking an assertion and raising it to the status of a postulate in his 1905 paper on
relativity [17].
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 21
the principle of conservation of energy, and energy itself, that merit our
attention. These issues will figure, albeit only implicitly for the most part,
in our discussions in later chapters.
First, a significant feature of the principle of conservation of energy,
which was clearly recognized by natural philosophers in the 19th century, is
that it is a principle that is above or outside mechanics, though it clearly
applies to mechanics. Similarly, energy, unlike the inertial mass, was also
clearly recognized as a concept that is applicable not only to mechanics, but
to description of a wide range of physical processes. Consequently, the grad-
ual acceptance of the principle of conservation of energy, along with other
concomitant factors such as the development of Lagrangian and Hamilto-
nian mechanics, began to shift the attention of some physicists away from a
Newtonian program toward a new way to do physics.8
In the Preface to Principia, Newton explains that the aim of his book,
which sets out the mathematical principles of natural philosophy, is to
discover the forces of nature from the phenomena of motions and then to
demonstrate the other phenomena from these forces [2, p. 382]. By phe-
nomena Newton here means roughly first-level generalizations of empirical
data. For example, the Keplerian orbits of, say, the moons of Jupiter are a
good example of Newtons phenomena, because they are generalizations
induced from a finite set of observations (see [18]). The study of heat, how-
ever, resisted any explanation of phenomena by appeal to forces. Even when
heat became identified with motion, the task of finding some specific force
law to explain a phenomenon related to heat became otiose. Furthermore, the
identification of heat with work combined with the realization that one could
be certain that the quantity of work was conserved in any kind of physical
interaction regardless of whether one knew the nature of the specific forces
at work again shifted attention away from the Newtonian program of find-
ing specific force laws. A physics that was founded on physical principles,
which in a sense were more general than Newtons three laws of motion,
was quickly developing.
A second notable aspect of the analysis of physical systems from the
point of view of energy is the introduction of new conceptual tools, evident
in the language used by physicists, that were deployed in the description of
physical systems. There are two key notions that, with the hindsight of his-
tory, we can see had a deep influence in how the massenergy relation was
discussed in the early 20th century: (1) the notion that one type (or form)
8 Koslow makes a similar claim though he tends to emphasize less the shift in certain areas of
physics toward what Einstein would later call principle theories [11]. See 2.9.
22 EINSTEINS MASSENERGY EQUATION, VOLUME I
of energy can be transformed into another type of energy (2) the notion
that heat is equivalent to work. Energy, it was realized, could be manifest,
as the capacity to do work, in a variety of forms. Chemical energy, e.g.,
could be transformed into thermal energy which, in turn, could be trans-
formed into mechanical energy. Energy in one form, e.g., thermal energy,
could disappear only to be replaced by a different form of energy that
appeared. While this language was rather imprecise in meaning, it nev-
ertheless continued to influence not only discussions about energy, but, not
surprisingly, discussions about Einsteins massenergy relation. Similarly,
though without further research this is a bit more speculative, talk about the
equivalence of different types of energy may have influenced Einsteins
own way of talking about the massenergy relation especially during the
early days of his discovery.
Third, it bears mentioning that, although the issue had been largely
settled by Einsteins time, the epistemological standing of the princi-
ple of conservation of energy had been rather controversial. As Smith
reports, soon after Rankine introduced the phrase potential energy, the
astronomer royal Sir John Herschel argued that the principle of conserva-
tion of energy was a tautology [12, p. 6]. Rankine responded that while the
terms actual energy and potential energy made the principle of con-
servation of energy appear to be a tautology, it was not. The key lies in
noticing, Rankine suggested, that we can measure both the actual and poten-
tial energy in a physical system independently and verify empirically that
the law of conservation of energy is indeed confirmed. Thus, the law of
conservation of energy is not merely a bookkeeping device but a genuine
empirical law.
A separate epistemological question, which Einstein often mentioned in
a variety of his popular writings and letters, concerned whether the principle
of conservation of energy should be treated as an a priori principle, in the
philosophical sense of the term. There were, as expected, proponents on all
sides of this question. For example, J. R. Mayer held that the principle of
conservation of energy was ultimately a direct consequence of the meta-
physical principle that effects are always equal to their causes. The latter,
philosophers such as Mayer supposed, is something we can know about the
physical world simply by using our intellect and thinking clearly; it is an
a priori truth. On the other hand, natural philosophers such as P. G. Tait
were staunch empiricists who shared the view of the 18th-century philoso-
pher David Hume, who revered Newtons work, that any statement about
the physical world must receive its evidence from the physical world and
hence cannot be a priori. Finally, Mach, whose views we know influenced
INTRODUCTION AND CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT 23
A E
Abstract dynamics, 14 E = mc2 . See Massenergy relation
Act of emission, 3336, 46, 5051, Einstein, A., 6979
91, 93 Electromagnetic phenomena,
Atoms, 16, 58 2627, 66
Electron, 47, 50
B kinetic energy of, 51
Blacks caloric, 24 Elements, 63
Energy. See also Massenergy
C relation
Cause and effect, 96 and its conservation in 19th
Center-of mass theorem, 44 century, 1823
Chemical energy, 22 philosophical reflections, 2324
Classical thermodynamics, 18, 62 transformation, 22
Composite systems Equivalence of mass and energy, 59
and inertia of energy, 5758 Euler, L., 713
philosophically speaking, 5961
Conservation laws, 80 F
Constructive theories, 61 Feigenbaum, M., 9197
Einsteins principle vs., 6164 First demonstration, of
massenergy relation, 3142
D Force, 10
Density, defined, 45 Force of inertia. See Inertia
Dynamic demonstration of
massenergy relation
Einstein, A., 6979 G
philosophically speaking, 79 Gas container, analysis of, 6061
Feigenbaum, M. and Mermin, Gravitational field equation, 66
N. D., 9195
philosophically speaking, 9597 H
Lewis, G. N. and Tolman, R. C., Heat, concept of, 18
8091 Hume, David, 96
104 INDEX
Philosophical reflection S
on third demonstration of Second demonstration, of
massenergy relation, 5153 massenergy relation, 4246
of mass and energy in 19th Second-order effect, 90
century, 2324 Simultaneity, 2931
Post-Kantian empiricism, 23 Space diagram, 82
Potential energy, 22 Spacetime, Minkowski, 6569
Pre-Minkowskian period of Special relativity, 34, 2021, 40,
relativity, 57 50, 5455, 57, 61, 66, 69, 80,
Principle of Causality, 97 84, 97
Principle of conservation of energy historical review of, 2631
(PCE), 2021, 63, 70, 7273, as principle theory, 64
93, 96 Synchrony convention, 29
Principle of conservation of impulse
(PCM), 70, 7273, 92, 96
Principle of equivalence of mass T
and energy, 59 Taylor series expansions, 35
Principle of relativity, 15, 27, 42, Theorem of experience, 17
45, 53, 56, 57, 63, 64, 80 Theory of relativity, 45, 55, 57
Principle theories, 6164 Thermal energy, 22
Thermodynamics, 62
Q Third demonstration, of
Quantity of matter, 4, 5, 7, 1113, massenergy relation, 4651
16, 23 philosophical reflections on,
5153
R Thought-experiments analysis, 53
Radium, 41 Time dilation, 25, 39, 57, 81,
Relativistic kinetic energy, 7275 8385, 88, 90
Relativistic mass, 3, 8891, 89 Tolman, R. C., 8091
Relativistic momentum, 72, 91, Total energy
92, 96 of electron, 5152
Relativistic three momentum, of mass point, 58
7276
Relativity principle, 80
Rest-energy, 34, 5253, 5859, 69, W
70, 72, 73, 7778, 8687 Weight, 57
FORTHCOMING TITLES IN OUR ENERGY
PHYSICS AND ENGINEERING COLLECTION
Jonathan Swingler, Editor
Einsteins Mass-Energy Equation, Volume II: Quantum Mechanics and
Gravitation, Empirical Tests, and Philosophical Debates by Francisco
Fernores
Utilization of Variable Energy Sources by Wolf-GerritFrh
Electrical Power and Energy: Transformers, Synchronous Machines, and
Power Networks by Siong Lee Koh
Energy in Electrical Fields by Paul Weaver