Neptali Gonzales vs.
Catalino Macaraig The Consolidated Memoranda were respectively filed on 26 June 1990 by petitioners, and on 1 August 1990 by
This constitutional controversy between the legislative and executive departments of government stemmed
from Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on 2 February 1989,
"Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the Philippines the
Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality of the Veto by the
President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989
(H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes."
Petitioners are thus before us as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of the Senate
and as "substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this case."
Respondents are members of the Cabinet tasked with the implementation of the General Appropriations Act of
1989 and 1990, some of them incumbents, while others have already been replaced, and include the National
Treasurer and the Commission on Audit Chairman, all of whom are being sued in their official
capacities.chanrobles.com:
The Background Facts
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for the Fiscal
Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by
the President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to the President
for consideration and approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become Rep. Act
No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General Provision," were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset, further expressed:
"WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is hereby Resolved, That the Senate express its sense that the veto by the
President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186)
is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without any force and effect; hence, the aforesaid Section 55
remains;
"x x x"
Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed, with a prayer for the
issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the constitutionality or
legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin respondents from implementing Rep. Act
No. 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the Court.
The Comment, submitted by the Solicitor General on 25 August 1989 (after several extensions granted), was
considered as the Answer to the Petition and, on 7 September 1989, the Court Resolved to give due course to
the Petition and to require the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Petitioners filed their
Memorandum on 12 December 1989. But, on 19 January 1990, they filed a Motion for Leave to File and to
Admit Supplemental Petition, which was granted, basically raising the same issue as in the original Petition, this
time questioning the Presidents veto of certain provisions, particularly Section 16, of House Bill 26934, or the
General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1990, which the President declared to have become Rep. Act No.
6831.
The Solicitor Generals Comment on the Supplemental Petition, on behalf of respondent public officials, was
submitted on 24 April 1990. On 15 May 1990, the Court required the parties to file simultaneously their
consolidated memoranda, to include the Supplemental Petition, within an inextendible period of thirty (30)
days from notice. However, because the original Resolution of 15 May 1990 merely required the filing of a
memorandum on the Supplemental Petition, a revised Resolution requiring consolidated memoranda, within
thirty (30) days from notice, was released on 28 June 1990.
respondents. On 14 August 1990, both Memoranda were Noted and the case was deemed submitted for
deliberation.
On 11 September 1990, the Court heard the case on oral argument and required the submittal of supplemental
Memoranda, the last of which was filed on 26 September 1990.
The Vetoed Provisions and Reasons Therefor
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY 89] hereinafter), which was vetoed by the
President, reads:
"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations Disapproved
and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President in the Budget submitted
to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has been disapproved or reduced in
this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations authorized for other purposes by
augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose recommended by the President in the Budget shall be
deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act."
We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:
"The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would nullify not
only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and Heads of Constitutional
Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations. A careful review of the legislative action on the budget as
submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of agencies as recommended by the President, as well as
those of the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An
unwanted consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the
implementation of essential public services and infrastructure projects.
"Furthermore, this provision is inconsistent with Section 12 and other similar provisions of this General
Appropriations Act."
A substantially similar provision as the vetoed Section 55 appears in the Appropriations Act of 1990, this time
crafted as follows:
"B. GENERAL PROVISIONS
"Sec. 16. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of Constitutional Commissions
under Article IX of the Constitution and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT NO ITEM OF
APPROPRIATION RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE VII, SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS BEEN DISAPPROVED OR REDUCED BY CONGRESS
SHALL BE RESTORED OR INCREASED BY THE USE OF APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZED FOR OTHER PURPOSES IN
THIS ACT BY AUGMENTATION. AN ITEM OF APPROPRIATION FOR ANY PURPOSE RECOMMENDED BY THE
PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPROVED BY CONGRESS IF NO
CORRESPONDING APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE IS PROVIDED IN THIS ACT."
It should be noted that in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the "Use of Savings" appears in Section 12, separate and
apart from Section 55; whereas in the 1990 Appropriations Act, the "Use of Savings" and the vetoed provision
have been commingled in Section 16 only, with the vetoed provision made to appear as a condition or
restriction.
Essentially the same reason was given for the veto of Section 16 (FY 90), thus:
"I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution in
relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes the President to
use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the Government.
"Parenthetically, there is a case pending in the Supreme Court relative to the validity of the Presidents veto on
Section 55 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 6688 upon which the amendment on this Section was
based. Inclusion, therefore, of the proviso in the last sentence of this section might prejudice the Executive
Branchs position in the case.
"Moreover, if allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the
President, but also that of the officials enumerated under Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution, to
augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective appropriations.
"An unwanted consequence of this provision would be the inability of the President, the President of the
Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and heads of
Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations even in cases of national emergency or in the event of urgent
need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and infrastructure projects."
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY 89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY 90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
The Contending Views
In essence, petitioners cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as
regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are provisions; (2) when the
President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should
veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or
restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power
of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and,
therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, counters that the issue at bar is a political question
beyond the power of this Court to determine; that petitioners had a political remedy, which was to override the
veto; that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act and, therefore, merits the
Presidents veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the appropriations for the executive
branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law, specifically Sections 44 and 45 of Pres. Decree No.
1177, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6670 (4 August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the
Constitution to veto provisions or other "distinct and severable parts" of an Appropriations Bill.
Judicial Determination
With the Senate maintaining that the Presidents veto is unconstitutional, and that charge being controverted,
there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of Congress and the executive
department that may be taken cognizance of by this Court.
"Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the judiciary
cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the
scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of
the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial power conferred by the Constitution
in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom
Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in
many instances" (Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 209).
We take note as well of what petitioners stress as the "imperative need for a definitive ruling by this Court as to
the exact parameters of the exercise of the item-veto power of the President as regards appropriation bills . . .
in order to obviate the recurrence of a similar problem whenever a general appropriations bill is passed by
Congress." Indeed, the contextual reiteration of Section 55 (FY 89) in Section 16 (FY 90) and again, its veto by
the President, underscore the need for judicial arbitrament. The Court does not thereby assert its superiority
over or exhibit lack of respect due the other co-ordinate departments but discharges a solemn and sacred duty
to determine essentially the scope of intersecting powers in regard which the Executive and the Senate are in
dispute.
Petitioners have also brought this suit as taxpayers. As ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC (No. L-44640, 12 October
1976, 73 SCRA 333), this Court enjoys the open discretion to entertain taxpayers suits or not. In Tolentino v.
COMELEC (No. L-34150, 16 October 1961, 41 SCRA 702), it was also held that a member of the Senate has the
requisite personality to bring a suit where a constitutional issue is raised.
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation
mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of
the principle in appropriate cases.
"SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may
be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government."
Nor is this the first time that the constitutionality of a Presidential veto is raised to the Court. The two oft-cited
cases are Bengson v. Secretary of Justice (62 Phil. 912 [1936]), penned by Justice George A. Malcolm, which
upheld the veto questioned before it, but which decision was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the same
entitled case in 292 U.S. 410, infra, essentially on the ground that an Appropriations Bill was not involved. The
second case is Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia (G.R. No. L-20740, 30 June 1964, 11 SCRA 486), infra, which
rejected the Presidents veto of a condition or restriction in an Appropriations Bill.
The Extent of the Presidents Item-veto Power
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions and not items and are,
therefore, outside the scope of the item-veto power of the President.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution reading, in full, as
follows:
"Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it.
If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue,
or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object."
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the veto of the
entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or the line-veto power.
It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As
specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the
power given the executive to disapprove any item or items in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the
authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item.
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and first came into being in the
former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. This was followed by the 1935 Constitution, which
contained a similar provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the veto power was made more
expansive by the inclusion of this sentence:
". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President can not veto
the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it relates . . ."
The 1935 Constitution further broadened the Presidents veto power to include the veto of item or items of
revenue and tariff bills.
With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and compact form, thus:
"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object."
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Section 27 [2], supra), is a
verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other words, also eliminated has been any
reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should this exclusion be interpreted to mean as a
disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill
refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916). It is
an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124,
125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299
U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an item of an appropriation bill obviously means an
item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to
be put into an appropriation bill."
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the 1987
Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents veto power as previously
defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated proviso merely pronounces
the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS, Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing
the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general
appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision
shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25
[2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation
to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
Petitioners further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the President partakes of the
nature of legislative powers it should be strictly construed, is negative by the following dictum in Bengzon,
supra, reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this
respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact
laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will
of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in
exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise
interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto
the same as they will presume the constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature"
(Commonwealth v. Barnett [1901], 199 Pa., 161; 55 L.R.A., 882; People v. Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N.Y.S.,
52; Fulmore v. Lane [1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State [1927], 53 A.L.R., 258 [at 917]).
Inappropriateness of the so-called "Provisions"
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, we are of the opinion
that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of the term. Article VI,
Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be limited in
its operation to the appropriation to which it relates."
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some"
particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the vetoed
"provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items
disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or reduced items are
nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be made to the original
recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by petitioners themselves, i.e., the
"Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office" (Annex B-1 and B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections
are more of an expression of Congressional policy in respect of augmentation from savings rather than a
budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although labelled as
"provisions," are actually inappropriate provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the
Presidents veto power. (Henry v. Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)
"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the legislature,
neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on him as chief
executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in
separate legislation. The Governors constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . . cannot be
abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general appropriation bill, thereby forcing the
Governor to choose between approving unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing items of expenditure
essential to the operation of government. The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governors veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting
general law measures so that they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation.
Otherwise, the legislature would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-
equal branch of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing
to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governors constitutional right to veto
matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional powers
of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts inappropriate
provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as items for purposes of the
Governors item veto power over general appropriation bills.
x x x
". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general appropriation bill with
veto-proof logrolling measure, special interest provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or
riders, substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto. . . ." (Emphasis
supplied)
Inappropriateness of the so-called "Conditions/Restrictions"
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill and where
conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike them out, citing
Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE, 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (No. L-20740,
June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are
such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto power.
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how money shall
be spent; and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature may include in Appropriation
Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of funds. Settled also is the rule that
the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an appropriation while allowing the appropriation
itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the
veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition
related was deemed invalid and without effect whatsoever.
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some matters
which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation (Henry v. Edwards, La, 346, So 2d 153). Restrictions
or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money items in a budgetary sense in the
schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness.
"It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are appropriated.
Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a connexity with money
items of appropriation that they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures . . . the ultimate test is one of
appropriateness" (Henry v. Edwards, supra, at 158).
Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) must also be held to be inappropriate
"conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY 90), have been "artfully drafted" to appear as true
conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for substantive and,
therefore, separate legislation.
Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The reason, as
explained earlier, is that items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on the face of the
enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when compared with the original budgetary
submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) themselves provide that an item "shall
be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is
provided in this Act."
Considering that the vetoed provisions are not, in the budgetary sense of the term, conditions or restrictions,
the case of Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (supra), invoked by petitioners, becomes inapplicable. In
that case, a public works bill contained an item appropriating a certain sum for assistance to television stations,
subject to the condition that the amount would not be available to places where there were commercial
television stations. Then President Macapagal approved the appropriation but vetoed the condition. When
challenged before this Court, it was held that the veto was ineffectual and that the approval of the item carried
with it the approval of the condition attached to it. In contrast with the case at bar, there is no condition, in the
budgetary sense of the term, attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill which was struck
out. For obviously, Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment
from savings; in other words, "a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill"
(Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, supra).
The Power of Augmentation and The Validity of the Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) because they nullify the authority of
the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item in the General
Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, as
guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Said provision reads:
"Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations"
(Emphasis ours).
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
This Court upheld the validity of the power of augmentation from savings in Demetria v. Alba, which ruled:
". . . to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed the
enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from savings in
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway
granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e.,
transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there
are savings from another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body" (G.R. No.
71977, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 214).
The 1973 Constitution contained an identical authority to augment from savings in its Article VIII, Section 16 (5),
except for mention of the Prime Minister among the officials vested with that power. 1
In 1977, the statutory authority of the President to augment any appropriation of the executive department in
the General Appropriations Act from savings was specifically provided for in Section 44 of Presidential Decree
No. 1177, as amended (RA 6670, 4 August 1988), otherwise known as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977." It
reads:
"Sec. 44. . . .
"The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive Department in
the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another department, bureau, office or
agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Art. VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the Constitution (now
Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI)" (Emphasis ours), (N.B.: The first paragraph declared void in Demetria v. Alba, supra, has
been deleted).
Similarly, the use by the President of savings to cover deficits is specifically authorized in the same Decree.
Thus:
"Sec. 45. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits. Except as otherwise provided in the
General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations
Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President be
used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: ". . .
A more recent grant is found in Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the text of which is
repeated in the first paragraph of Section 16 (FY 90). Section 12 reads:
"Sec. 12. Use of Savings. The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in
other items of their respective appropriations."
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given, the
heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of
separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of
government) and not from one department (branch) to another (CRUZ, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law
[1989] p. 155).
When Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90), therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of
appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional and statutory authority of
the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no
means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite the entire budget, as petitioners contend, the leeway
granted being delimited to transfers within the department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only
from savings.
More importantly, it strikes us, too, that for such a special power as that of augmentation from savings, the
same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is "one the primary and
specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a legislative authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of
augmentation from savings, on the other hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of
money. It is a non-appropriation item inserted in an appropriation measure.
The same thing must be said of Section 55 (FY 89), taken in conjunction with Section 12, and Section 16 (FY
90), which prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations disapproved and/or reduced
by Congress. They are non-appropriation items, an appropriation being a setting apart by law of a certain sum
from the public revenue for a specific purpose (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912, 916 [1936]). It
bears repeating that they are more of a substantive expression of a legislative objective to restrict the power of
augmentation granted to the President and other key officials. They are actually matters of general law and
more properly the subject of a separate legislation that will embody, define and delimit the scope of the special
power of augmentation from savings instead of being inappropriately incorporated annually in the
Appropriation Act. To sanction this practice would be to give the Legislature the freedom to grant or withhold
the power from the Executive and other officials, and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of that power.

If, indeed, by the later enactments of Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90), Congress, as petitioners argue,
intended to amend or repeal Pres. Decree No. 1177, with all the more reason should it have so provided in a
separate enactment, it being basic that implied repeals are not favored. For the same reason, we cannot
subscribe to petitioners allegation that Pres. Decree No. 1177 has been revoked by the 1987 Constitution. The
1987 Constitution itself provides for the continuance of laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, repealed,
or revoked (1987 Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3).

If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were unconstitutional,
the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be overridden by the votes of
two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 27[1], supra). But Congress made no
attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners argument that the veto is ineffectual so that there is
"nothing to override" (citing Bolinao) has lost force and effect with the executive veto having been herein
upheld.

As we see it, there need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government adhere to
the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with due deference to the constitutional
responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of governmental powers remains
on even keel. WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is
hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her
capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.
REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUAN O. REYES, JR. and
GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF THEIR MONTHLY PENSION.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the General
Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions of retired Justices
of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. They filed the instant
petition on their own behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals similarly situated.
Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague as Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the Treasurer of the Philippines. The
respondents are sued in their official capacities, being officials of the Executive Department involved in the
implementation of the release of funds appropriated in the Annual Appropriations Law.
We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and decide the petition on its
merits.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:
On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices of the
Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years service either in the
Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the age of seventy (70) years or
who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office. The retired Justice shall receive during
the residue of his natural life the salary which he was receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957) which provided that:
Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals is increased or
decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the
retirement pension which a Justice who as of June twelve, nineteen hundred fifty-four had ceased to be such to
accept another position in the Government or who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in office.
Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or decrease shall not be affected
thereby.
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under Republic
Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974, on the occasion of the Armed
Forces Loyalty Day, President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which extended similar retirement
benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving them also the automatic readjustment features of Republic
Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975 repealing
Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No. 1568 and
Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions and the officers
and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement pension of officers
and enlisted men was subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later decree Presidential Decree 1909 was
also issued providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of the Armed Forces who
have retired prior to September 10, 1979.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number in the tens of
thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are only a
handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the Constitutional
Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed provisions of Republic Act
No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under the impression that Presidential Decree 644 became
law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7, 1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill No.
16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to
restore said retirement pensions and privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional
Commissions, in order to assure those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional
Commissions adequate old age pensions even during the time when the purchasing power of the peso has been
diminished substantially by worldwide recession or inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the petitioner
retired Chief Justice, a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired Presiding Justice are
presently receiving monthly pensions of P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and P2,333.33 respectively.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that according to her "it
would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce
strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in Republic Act No. 6758 known as
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further said that "the Government should not grant
distinct privileges to select group of officials whose retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy
preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of our civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez,
Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition dated April 22, 1991 which we treated as
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The petitioners asked this Court far a readjustment of their monthly
pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out that Presidential Decree 644 repealing
Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no valid publication pursuant to Taada v. Tuvera, (136
SCRA 27 [1985]) and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]). Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared
for the first time only in the supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly dated April
4, 1977 but published only on September 5, 1983. Since Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force and effect
of law, it therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797.
In a Resolution dated November 28, 1991 the Court acted favorably on the request. The dispositive portion
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the requests of retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes and
Guardson Lood are GRANTED. It is hereby AUTHORIZED that their monthly pensions be adjusted and paid on
the basis of RA 1797 effective January 1, 1991 without prejudice to the payment on their pension differentials
corresponding to the previous years upon the availability of funds for the purpose.
Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 1992
certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates due the retired
Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:
XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY
A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.
For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of courts, adjudication of
constitutional questions appealed and other cases, operation and maintenance of the Judicial and Bar Council in
the Supreme Court, and the adjudication of regional court cases, metropolitan court cases, municipal trial court
cases in Cities, municipal circuit court cases, municipal, court cases, Shari'a district court cases and Shari'a
circuit court cases as indicated hereunder P2,095,651,000
xxx xxx xxx Special Provisions.

Special Provisions.
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the appropriation for the
Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any
item of the Court's appropriations for: (a) printing of decisions and publications of Philippine Reports; b)
commutable terminal leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and any payment of
adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA;
(c) repair, maintenance, improvement, and other operating expenses of the courts' books and periodicals; (d)
purchase, maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; e) necessary expenses for the employment of
temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for judicial administration; f) maintenance and
improvement of the Court's Electronic Data Processing; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice,
attendance in international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and
representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chief of Offices
and other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorneys-
de-oficio; PROVIDED, that as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increases in salary and allowances shall be subject to
the usual procedures and policies as provided for under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws. (page 1071,
General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in
accordance with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, the Presiding
Justice may be authorized to use any savings in any item of the appropriation for the Court of Appeals for
purposes of: (1) improving its compound and facilities; and (2) for augmenting any deficiency in any item of its
appropriation including its extraordinary expenses and payment of adjusted pension rates to retired justices
entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1079, General Appropriations Act,
FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for
payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates
to retired justices of the Court of Appeals entitled thereto pursuant to the Ruling of the Supreme Court in
Administrative Matter No. 91-6-225-C.A. (page 1079 General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT
For general fund adjustment for
operational and special requirements

4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein appropriated for as indicated hereunder P500,000,000
payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the payment of pensions at the adjusted rates
to retired justices of the Supreme Court entitled thereto pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Administrative xxx xxx xxx
Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
Special Provisions
xxx xxx xxx
1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for:
Activities and Purposes
xxx xxx xxx
1. General Administration and Support Services.
1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations, including the payment of back salaries and
a. General administrative Services P 43,515,000 related personnel benefits arising from decision of competent authority including the Supreme Court decision
in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. and COA decision in No. 1704." (page 11649 Gen. Appropriations
b. Payment of retirement gratuity Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)

of national goverment officials On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 4 the
Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts (General Appropriations Act,
and employees P 206,717,000 FY 1992, page 1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions
for the Court of Appeals (page 1079) and the underlined portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special
c. Payment of terminal leave benefits to Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments (page 1164, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).

officials and employees antitled thereto P 55,316,000 The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the payment of the retired Justices
d. Payment of pension totired jude of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted effectively nullified the veto of the President
on House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000 Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-
enacting Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions was
(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992) further justified by reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297: "they would erode the very
foundation of our collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy and standardization of
C. COURT OF APPEALS compensation. We should not permit the grant of distinct privileges to select group of officials whose
retirement pensions under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast majority of
For general administration, administration our civil servants."

of personnel benefit, benefits and the Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that:

adjudication of appealed and other cases 1) The subject veto is not an item veto;

as indicated hereunder P114,615,000 2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;
4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM-91-8-225-CA, brought to the attention of this Court that the veto
constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Court's
resolution.
On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA with G.R. No.
103524.
The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.
I
It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must prevail. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons
including the highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it follows that the three
branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the limits of authority conferred by
the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither Congress, the President nor the Judiciary
may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of government. The legislature is generally limited to
the enactment of laws, the executive to the enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and
application to cases and controversies.
The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As the
guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each branch of
government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire Government itself
or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. The essence of this judicial duty was
emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139
[1936]) to wit:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any superiority over
the other department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument
secures and guarantees to them. (Emphasis supplied)
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested power.
But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not
absolute.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI,
Constitution)
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or she cannot
act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the
exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to appropriation, revenue or
tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of government and it cannot veto the
entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to approve into
law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided
the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue
measure.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item
or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452, 464 [1990])
We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item in a bill
refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon, supra, at 916.) It is
an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125,
etc., 176 Va. 281) The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410,
414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed, 312) declared "that an "tem" of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in
itself is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)
We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must have been the basis of the
disputed veto.
The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the Government to meet
certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by the specific items for the
different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the government.
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by Congress to insure
that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will readily
show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item
has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by
transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to the Chief
Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of the Supreme Court and the
Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the general fund adjustment is
not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. This was not touched. It was not
vetoed.
More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992
Appropriations Act were being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else.
What were really vetoed are:
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-
225-CA.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the
provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set
aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto power.
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege was extended
to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595.
On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed Republic Acts 1797
and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired Armed Forces officers and men was
surreptitiously restored through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.
It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and Constitutional
Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through House Bill No. 16297 in 1990.
When her finance and budget advisers gave the wrong information that the questioned provisions in the 1992
General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome her earlier 1990 veto, she issued the veto now
challenged in this petition.
It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it follows that Rep.
Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it was
enforced from 1951 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away validly. The
veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-
existent premises.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions of the 1992
General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her
power to accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never achieved that purpose
because it was not properly published. It never became a law.
The case of Tada v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]) specifically requires that "all laws
shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code." This was the Court's answer to the petition of
Senator Lorenzo Taada and other opposition leaders who challenged the validity of Marcos' decrees which,
while never published, were being enforced. Secret decrees are anathema in a free society.
In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 91-9-225-CA secured certification from
Director Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office that the April 4, 1977 Supplement to the Official
Gazette was published only on September 5, 1983 and officially released on September 29, 1983.
On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has already categorically spoken
in a definitive ruling on the matter, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not immediately or soon thereafter
published although preceding and subsequent decrees were duly published in the Official Gazette. It now
appears that it was intended as a secret decree "NOT FOR PUBLICATION" as the notation on the face of the
original copy thereof plainly indicates (Annex B). It is also clear that the decree was published in the back-dated
Supplement only after it was challenged in the Taada case as among the presidential decrees that had not
become effective for lack of the required publication. The petition was filed on May 7, 1983, four months
before the actual publication of the decree.
It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975. Moreover, the publication
was made in bad faith insofar as it purported to show that it was done in 1977 when the now demonstrated
fact is that the April 4, 1977 supplement was actually published and released only in September 1983. The
belated publication was obviously intended to refute the petitioner's claim in the Taada case and to support
the Solicitor General's submission that the petition had become moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published and that, consequently, it did
not have the effect of repealing RA 1797. The requesting Justices (including Justice Lood, whose request for the
upgrading of his pension was denied on January 15, 1991) are therefore entitled to be paid their monthly
pensions on the basis of the latter measure, which remains unchanged to date.
The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure stability in
legal relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]) Like other decisions of this Court,
the ruling and principles set out in the Court resolution constitute binding precedent. (Bulig-Bulig Kita
Kamaganak Association, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial Court, etc., G.R. 847500 16 May 1989, En
Banc, Minute Resolution)
The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they undermine the
principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and overrule a decision of the
Supreme Court.
We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within its powers to pass
laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or defining what the law is and whether or not it
violates a provision of the Constitution.
As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957. Funds necessary to pay
the retirement pensions under these statutes are deemed automatically appropriated every year.
Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and savings
which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution. As long as
retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the government to pay
the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA.
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is arrogating
unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has no power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power is
merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
II
There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power to set
aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No. 1797 trenches
upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:
Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and
regularly released.
We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has on various
past occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De la Llana v. Alba (112 SCRA
294 [1982]), it ruled:
It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed with rights, to
secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it has to grant them either
expressly or implicitly certain powers. These they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. . . .
A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative. The law may vest in
a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities
more efficiently. . . . It is an added guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any
fear of reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by
their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base or
unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending
that of a purely personal right. (At pp. 338-339)
The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain mandate of the Constitution on fiscal autonomy. The OSG
Comment reflects the same truncated view of the provision.
We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only does it allocate less than
one percent (1%) of the national budget annually for the 22,769 Justices, Judges, and court personnel all over
the country but it also examines with a fine-toothed come how we spend the funds appropriated by Congress
based on DBM recommendations.
The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:
The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman to submit budget
proposals in accordance with parameters it establishes. DBM evaluates the proposals, asks each agency to
defend its proposals during DBM budget hearings, submits its own version of the proposals to Congress without
informing the agency of major alterations and mutilations inflicted on their proposals, and expects each agency
to defend in Congress proposals not of the agency's making.
After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the President, the tight and
officious control by DBM continues. For the release of appropriated funds, the Judiciary, Constitutional
Commissions, and Ombudsman are instructed through "guidelines", how to prepare Work and Financial Plans
and requests for monthly allotments. The DBM evaluates and approves these plans and requests and on the
basis of its approval authorizes the release of allotments with corresponding notices of cash allocation. These
notices specify the maximum withdrawals each month which the Supreme Court, the Commissions and the
Ombudsman may make from the servicing government bank. The above agencies are also required to submit to
DBM monthly, quarterly and year-end budget accountability reports to indicate their performance, physical and
financial operations and income,
The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and when importuned for needed
funds, to release additional allotments to the agency. Since DBM always prunes the budget proposals to below
subsistence levels and since emergency situations usually occur during the fiscal year, the Chief Justices,
Chairmen of the Commissions, and Ombudsman are compelled to make pilgrimages to DBM for additional
funds to tide their respective agencies over the emergency.
What is fiscal autonomy?
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a
guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom and dispatch that their needs
require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not
exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate
and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100 typewriters but
DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress without even informing us,
the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence end flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based. In the interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree
with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is tantamount to
dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. The
freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds appropriated for the
expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular item to cover deficits or
shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must
enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just
as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the authority of the
President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from savings in the interest of
expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once given, the
heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of
separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or branch of
government) and not from one department (branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for the
payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the abovestated
pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the
Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal autonomy."
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due them
pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been enacted by
practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62 A2d 236), and
presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of Judges or Justices on
retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has complied with the statutory
prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary becomes vested and may not,
thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is to entice
competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with
relative security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been incapacitated
by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices Starting From the Sixth Year
of their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates. Through the
years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump sum of 5
years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were entitled was to be
computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation
allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The Supreme Court in a resolution dated
October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices
which should include the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances the
retiree was receiving on the date of retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices,
supra)
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly favored is,
again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of thousands
while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age 70 while military men
retire at a much younger age some retired Generals left the military at age 50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in
Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups. Any ideas arising from an alleged violation of the
equal protection clause should first be directed to retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for
the retirement provision is not based on indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful
of retired Justices whose retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections given by the
Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
The law was declared void on the ground that the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for
private interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that ancient period.
Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for slum clearance, low-cost
housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private persons are the immediate
beneficiaries. What was "robbery" in 1874 is now called "social justice." There is nothing about retirement
benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from an old textbook or encyclopedia which could
not even spell "loan" correctly. Good lawyers are expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant
citations.

The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the power to
declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional needs a high degree
of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be reduced by Congress. Neither may
it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may not be removed until they reach age 70
except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel are under the administrative supervision of the
Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by
the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn, is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Our salaries may not be
decreased during our continuance in office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative
or quasi-judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of,
but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and section 30,
Article VI, Constitution)
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court and the
ground that there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential treatment" to retired Justices
ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these Constitutional provisions on special
protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our entire constitutional system is premised to a large
extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All these provisions are intended to preserve that independence.
So are the laws on retirement benefits of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds, raised from taxes on other
citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already leading private lives and have ceased performing
public service. Said the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: "To lay with one hand
the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon favored
individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of law . . ." (Law Association V.
Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of an office
whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary requesting
adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday living expenses not to
mention the high cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v.
COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for
his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his
livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a
grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the
value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is done and his
youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening
shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the government can
not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and unconstitutional.
The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and subsisting. The respondents are
ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated
for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991 is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.
SO ORDERED.

Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia Muoz Palma,
Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and all lawyers under him who
represent the government before the two courts and whose predecessors themselves appeared before these
retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners toward these Justices who are now in the
evening of their years.

All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as engaging in
"robbery" is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.

If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then quality of
research in that institution has severely deteriorated.

In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v. Topeka but Citizen's
Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655; 87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455
[1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing cities and counties to issue bonds for the
purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other public works to aid private railroads improve their services.
 of the complaint. The court then required the Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and, as prayed for, issued
a writ of preliminary injunction. The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition, on the ground of
G.R. No. L-15138 July 31, 1961 lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it being argued that
pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and
BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee, Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original
vs. jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working
ATANACIO A. MARDO, and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants. conditions. Said motions to dismiss were denied by the court. Answers were then filed and the case was heard.
Thereafter, the court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as Executive
x---------------------------------------------------------x Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A issued pursuant thereto, did not repeal the
provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of
G.R. No. L-15377 July 31, 1961 money claims arising from violations of labor standards. The question of venue was also dismissed for being
moot, the same having been already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and prohibition previously
NUMERIANA RAGANAS, plaintiff-appellant, filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v. De Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in
vs. our resolution of July 7, 1958. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, respondents Hearing
SEN BEE TRADING COMPANY, MACARIO TAN, and SERGIO TAN, defendants-appellees. Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us.

x---------------------------------------------------------x In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, a complaint
(RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and
G.R. No. L-16660 July 31, 1961 Assistant Manager thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4, 1955,
for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours and for Sundays and legal
VICENTE ROMERO, petitioner-appellee, holidays) and vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. Chin
vs. Hua Trading, et al., filed their answer and, issues having been joined, hearing thereof was started before Chief
ANGEL HERNANDO ETC., and SIA SENG, respondents-appellants. Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. Before trial of the case could be
terminated, however, Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition for
x---------------------------------------------------------x prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 26826)), to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding
with the disposition of the case, on the ground that they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same, as
G.R. No. L-16781 July 31, 1961 Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956, in relation to Republic Act No. 997,
as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, empowering them to adjudicate the complaint, is invalid or
CHIN HUA TRADING COMPANY, and LAO KANG SUY, petitioners-appellees, unconstitutional. As prayed for, a preliminary injunction was issued by the court. After due hearing the court
vs. rendered a decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void and therefore, granted the writ
ATANACIO A. MARDO, JORGE BENEDICTO, and CRESENCIO ESTAO, respondents-appellants. of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously issued. From this decision, the claimant
and the hearing officers appealed to the Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us, as it involves only
x---------------------------------------------------------x questions of law.

G.R. No. L-17056 July 31, 1961
FRED WILSON & CO., INC., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MELITON C. PARDUCHO, ETC., and MARIANO PABILIARE, respondents-appellees.
R. L. Resurreccion for petitioner-appellee.
Paciano C. C. Villavieja for respondents-appellants.
BARRERA, J.:
These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here treated together in this
single decision because they present but one identical question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the
authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers jurisdiction to the
Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages,
overtime and separation pay, etc.
In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a
complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller
from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed,
without being paid separation pay. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him as separation pay plus
damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance
of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding
with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter
In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu a complaint
(Civil Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that
she was employed by appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service she
was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave pay. She prayed for judgment on
the amount due her for the same plus damages. To said complaint, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, on the
ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should, under
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor; and there is pending
before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a claim for separation vacation, sick and maternity leave
pay filed by the same plaintiff (appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). Acting on said motion, the
court dismissed the case, relying on the provision of Section 25, Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and
on our resolution in the case of NASSCO v. Arca, et al. (G.R. No. L-12249, May 6, 1957). From this order,
appellant Raganas appealed to the Court of Appeals, but said court certified the case to us.
In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the Department of Labor a complaint
(Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay.
Sia Seng, filed an answer. At the date set for hearing the latter did not appear despite due notice to him and
counsel. Upon his petition, Romero was allowed to present his evidence. Thereafter, a decision was rendered
by the Hearing Officer in favor of Romero. Upon the latter's motion for execution, the records of the case were
referred to Regional Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ of execution, being the
officer charged with the duty of issuing the same. Hernando, believing that Sia Seng should be given a chance to
present his evidence, refused to issue the writ of execution and ordered a re-hearing. As a consequence,
Romero filed with the Court of First Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus (Case No. Br. II-35) praying that
an order be issued commanding respondent Regional Labor Administrator to immediately issue a writ of
execution of the decision in Wage Case No. 196-W. To this petition, respondent Regional Labor Administrator
filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that it states no cause of action, but action thereon was deferred until
the case is decided on the merits. Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the validity of the rules and regulations
issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A. After hearing, the court rendered a decision
ordering, inter alia, respondent Regional Labor Administrator to forthwith issue the corresponding writ of
execution, as enjoined by Section 48, of the Rules and Regulations No. 1 of the Labor Standards Commission.
From this decision of the Court of First Instance, Sia Seng and Regional Labor Administrator Hernando appealed
to us. Appellant Sia Seng urges in his appeal that the trial court erred in not dismissing the petition, in spite of
the fact that the decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered by a hearing officer who had
no authority to render the same, and in failing to hold that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A was not validly passed
as a statute and is unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor a
complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc., alleging that petitioner engaged his services as
Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was
summarily dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. He also claimed that
during his employment he was not paid for overtime rendered by him. He prayed for judgment for the amount
due him for such overtime and separation pay. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that
said regional office "being purely an administrative body, has no power, authority, nor jurisdiction to adjudicate
the claim sought to be recovered in the action." Said motion to dismiss having been denied by respondent
Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho, petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 41954) to restrain
respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case, and praying, among others, that Reorganization Plan
No. 20-A, insofar as it vests original and exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular
courts of justice) on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor, be
declared null and void and unconstitutional. As prayed for, the court granted a writ of preliminary injunction.
Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare filed answer and the case was heard. After hearing, the court
rendered a decision declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. 1241, Plan No.
20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in 1956' (Res. of May 6, 1957 in National
Shipyards Steel Corporation v. Vicente Area, G.R. No. L-12249). It follows that the questioned reorganization
Plan No. 20-A is valid.".
Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. appealed directly to us from this decision.
The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take cognizance of the subject
matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which is hereunder
quoted:
25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases falling under the Workmen's
Compensation law, and cases affecting all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working
conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and
maternity leave of employees and laborers; and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and
payment for medical services of domestic help.
Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;
(b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working conditions, unpaid
wages, underpayment, overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and .
(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for medical services of
domestic help.
Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of Labor, except the
Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation law, had no compulsory power to settle cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had
being to mediate merely or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing, In case of refusal by a party to submit
to such settlement, the remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court.1
It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting money claims such as those
sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new conferment of power to the Department of Labor not
theretofore exercised by it. The question thus presented by these cases is whether this is valid under our
Constitution and applicable statutes.
It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997, which created the Government
Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter was empowered
(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be necessary, or create those which
way be necessary for the efficient conduct of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis
supplied.)
But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to administrative, not judicial
functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission was created to carry out the
reorganization of the Executive Branch of the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended
by R.A. No. 1241), which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution expressly provides
that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established
by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be
conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-judicial powers involving the
exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the performance of administrative functions.2 But in so
doing, the legislature must state its intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-
judicial prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in connection with the
performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the courts.3
If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when clothing administrative bodies
with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to
a body such as the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in connection
with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No. L-14837 and companion
cases, June 30, 1961);
. . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to authorize the transfer of powers
and jurisdiction granted to the courts of justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be
created by the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the Constitution that judicial
powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission was
not authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away from these their jurisdiction and transfer said
jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not
have intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an executive body, as the Legislature
may not and cannot delegate its power to legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of the
Government. (Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. vs. Price Stabilization Board, G.R. No. L-4465, July 12, 1951;
Surigao Consolidated vs. Collector of Internal Revenue G.R. No. L-5692, March 5, 1954; U.S. vs. Shreveport, 287
U.S. 77, 77 L. ed 175, and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11 Am. Jur 921-922.) (Emphasis supplied.)
But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or quasi-judicial functions to the
Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the
non-disapproval of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of Republic
Act No. 997, as amended. It is, in effect, argued that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is not merely the creation of
the Reorganization Commission, exercising its delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congress itself, a regular
statute directly and duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode provided in the
enabling act.
The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of this argument reads as
follows:
SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by the President during the Second
Session of the Third Congress shall be deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session, and those of
the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after the adjournment of the Second
Session, shall be deemed approved after the expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following
the date on which the plan is transmitted to it, unless between the date of transmittal and the expiration of
such period, either House by simple resolution disapproves the reorganization plan or any, modification
thereof. The said plan of reorganization or any modification thereof may, likewise, be approved by Congress in a
concurrent Resolution within such period.
It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the
President who, in turn, transmitted the same to Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its sessions
without passing a resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended that,
independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier in this opinion), said plan,
nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision.
Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in this jurisdiction. By specific
provision of the Constitution
No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form
furnished the Members at least three calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress),
except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment. Upon the last
reading of a bill no amendment thereof shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec. 21-[a], Art. VI).
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he approves
the same, he shall sign it, but if not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by
two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be
returned by the President as herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been
presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he has signed it, unless the Congress by
adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty
days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).
This ruling does not affect the resolution of this Court in the case of National Steel & Shipyards Corporation v.
Arca et al., G.R. No. L-12249, dated May 6, 1957, considering that the said case refers to a claim before the
Workmen's Compensation Commission, which exercised quasi-judicial powers even before the reorganization
of the Department of Labor.
WHEREFORE
(a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G.R. No. L-15138 is hereby affirmed,
without costs;
(b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G.R. No. L-16781 is hereby affirmed,
without costs;
(c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed from in case G.R. No. L-15377 is
set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, without costs;
(d) In case G.R. No. L-16660, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, directing the Regional Labor
Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of the Regional Office No. 2, is hereby reversed, without
costs; and .
(e) In case G.R. No. L-17056, the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before the Regional office No. 3, is hereby reversed
and the preliminary injunction at first issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs.
SO ORDERED.

A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the Reorganization Act and that
prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the first,
consent or approval is to be manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case,
the contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and separate action by
each House of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and well-understood parliamentary law (which requires
that the) two houses are to hold separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one
upon a proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley, Constitutional
Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).

Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any measure, as that word is
commonly used and understood, and with the requirement presentation to the President. In a sense, the
section, if given the effect suggested in counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes
required by the Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action taken by
Congress. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent opening the way, if Congress is so
disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the
Executive who, under our Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. To
sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental scheme four democracy.

Even in the United States (in whose Federal Constitution there is no counterpart to the specific method of
passaging laws prescribed in Section 21[2] of our Constitution) and in England (under whose parliamentary
system the Prime Minister, real head of the Government, is a member of Parliament), the procedure outlined in
Section 6(a) herein before quoted, is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule-making power, to
preserve the control of the legislature and its share in the responsibility for the adoption of proposed
regulations.4 The procedure has ever been intended or utilized or interpreted as another mode of passing or
enacting any law or measure by the legislature, as seems to be the impression expressed in one these cases.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as
confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases other than these falling under the Workmen's
Compensation on Law, is invalid and of no effect.
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons,
respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Taada, and Vicente J.
Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New Bilibid
Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which
reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as
answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be
committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal,
until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8,
such discharge to be ordered when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said
special committee the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly stated as
follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration,
bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000,
respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, thru his attorney-
in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the
said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through
his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the
alleged interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine Government held
a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period of
25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that
option by tendering to the owner the sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on
June 21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has
remained in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt,
who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the remainder in
annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his part to make any of said payments
would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to
him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase
price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946, the
Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and
promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten successive installments of
P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February
14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947,
the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress
Administration by an absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the
Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the
resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure to
pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months. Subsequently the Court of First Instance of
Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the
Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme Court.1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the Philippine
Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress
Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank, from which the
money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as
stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG
ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress Administration, has bought
the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31, 1949, the Buenavista
Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into between the San
Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase the Buenavista Estate
because the occupation government had made tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos,
Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of Ownership in the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes
during the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust
Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue of the recission of
the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five members to be appointed
by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of
the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the
price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee
may deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public hearings; issue
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents
before it; and may require any official or employee of any bureau, office, branch, subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in the
performance of its functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and
recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses, among the most
important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee
sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and irregularity of the Government's
paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he
seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine who were
responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt
with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000; and that on
the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account
of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash,
which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of
P440,000 that gave rise to the present case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the disposition of funds, I take the
position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were being violated, and that all requisites had been The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the big amount on October
complied with. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of representative. I beg to be excused from 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?
making answer which might later be used against me. I have been assured that it is my constitutional right to
refuse to incriminate myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this Committee, who, I Mr. ARNAULT. No.
understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my position.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the committee,
interrogated him as follows: Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.

Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten statement, were legal? The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this big amount of P440,000
which forms part of the P1- million paid to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own statement, did not violate
any law? The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?

Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so. Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.

xxx xxx xxx The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?

Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws were violated, how is it Mr. ARNAULT. No.
that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps you took to have this money delivered to Burt,
you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate you? The CHAIRMAN. By cable?

Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people. Mr. ARNAULT. No.

xxx xxx xxx The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?

Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you would be incriminated,
or you would be incriminating somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me
as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner,
the latter testified as follows:
Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these P440,000 to a certain
person whose name you do not like to reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?

The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949, is payable to cash; and Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did you do with that amount?
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here in the
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. Philippines?

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000 which you cashed on Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
October 29, 1949?
The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a Filipino?
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave you the verbal
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know. instruction?

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom you delivered this big Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
amount of P440,000?
The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving these P440,000? The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know. Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know? The CHAIRMAN. Several times?

Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know. Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.

The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain person should The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
receive these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times, you never were able to
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain person without receipt? find out what was his name?

Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I meet him. Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course, we have not done
business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I
The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946? am "chiflado" because I don't know their names.

Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that. The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?

The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the two cases involving the Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
Buenavista and Tambobong estates?
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person? What is his complexion:
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know. light, dark or light brown?

The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you knew already that
person?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller. He walks very straight,
with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times. The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you never came to know his
residence?
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read to him the
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name? following resolution:

Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it. Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:

The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection is Spanish; can you That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of contumacious acts
remember the first letter with which that family name begins? committed by him during the investigation conducted by the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution
No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President of the
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F. Senate propounded to him the following interrogatories:

The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name? 1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the
P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible for you not to remember not only because
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know. of the big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also by your own statements you knew him as
early as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money
to him without receipt, and the last time you saw him was in December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that the questions
were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be
compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator Sumulong, over the
objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the name of that person to
whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not remember his name. That was the reason then
for refusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you have just cited, you are refusing to
reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be self-
incriminating. Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your former claim that you cannot
remember the name of that person, and that your reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that
person is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other words, the question is this: What is your real
reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000: that you do not
remember his name or that your answer would be self-incriminating?
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the accused should not be
required to testify unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is very clear. It does not
incriminate him.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee on the first, second,
and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the
reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot change anything in those statements that I
made because they represent the best that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave during the
investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the same reason
that you are now alleging because during the investigation you told us: "I do not remember his name." But,
now, you are now saying: "My answer might incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first, second, and third
hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the question. I beg to be excused from making any
answer that might be incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of not remembering the
name of the person has not been included, it is an oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you remember or not the name of
the person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you say that your answer
might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you cannot answer the question; so how could your
answer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to answer those questions.
That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no means of knowing what the situation is about. I
have been in jail 13 days without communication with the outside. How could I answer the question? I have no
knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of which I am completely ignorant.
xxx xxx xxx
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.
The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does not incriminate the
witness.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be excused from making further
answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President of the Senate, dated
May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000
because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a
private individual you might render yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those
statements when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a public
official or a private individual ? We are giving you this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of
yours that your answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or you are just trying to make a
pretext for not revealing the information desired by the Senate.
The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it. That is all I can say how I
stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I had to secure the help of
a lawyer to help me in my period of distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he should not be
adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending
to elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered the P440,000; but the
petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember. The President of the Senate then
propounded to him various questions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when witness was
seven years of age and ending as recently as the post liberation period, all of which questions the witness
answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired
information from the witness, as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver the P440,000 as a
gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time ago and, on the other
hand, you remember events that occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner
was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed to continue its
investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue
the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other
matters related therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration because it is the
first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time
this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of Congress to punish a person not a member for
contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements here will set an important precedent for the
future guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the general
principles of law which form the background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three
independent but coordinate Departments Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested
in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives. (Section 1, Article VI.) Each
house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. (Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is
vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.)
Like the Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision empowering either of the
two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United
States the legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and
the respective legislatures of the different States, on the other the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States, respectively, or to the
people in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may
therefore be said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the Congress of
the United States or any State Legislature. Our form of Government being patterned after the American system
the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices we can, in
this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end
that it may exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body
cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience
has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is
needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution
expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary
implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204;
5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his
testimony is required in a matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26
L. ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than either the
Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into
which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its
inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with
the range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to investigate the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to
the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8 hereinabove quoted. The transaction
involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of
public funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by
Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating
committee has recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any
other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those attached to his own
office, without ]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any
President of the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in
which the Government is a party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive or
administrative officers who are appointees of the President; and (3) providing that purchases of the Rural
Progress Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective
without previous congressional confirmation.2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of his contention
that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any
intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not embarrassed, obstructed, or
impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating committee has already rendered its
report and has made all its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its
findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned
in its report, to wit: "In justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion
that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by
the Senate to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person . . ."
Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and argued the case for the respondents,
denied that that was the only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the witness. He said that
the investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had
not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by Resolution No. 8; that,
by Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and directed to continue its investigation, more
particularly to continue its examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000 and other matters related therewith; that the bills recommended by his committee had not been
approved by the House and might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that those
bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation
is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, we think
the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that
inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested
by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is
empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or
investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the
subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness
must be material to any proposed or possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must
be determined by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or
lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum
total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information
elicited from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited to
determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that
jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is insinuated, that the
ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness is not subject to review by
this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As was said by
the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a
legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was
intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval
by the Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary deduction
from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not pertinent to the matter
under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged
immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to contest its
jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has
jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse
of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue under
consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by
the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate
Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee,
among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and
it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000 involved in said deal is
pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not
that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any
proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that
every question propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is
that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a result of the
uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom the
witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been approved by the lower
house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they
should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from approving other
measures it may deem necessary after completing the investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our
province, to determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for
overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in question was
conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the press, that senators were
yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were speculating in stocks
the value of which would be affected by pending amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of
stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared before the committee in
response to a subpoena and asked, among others, the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known as sugar stocks,
for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the interest, directly or indirectly,
of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of the Senate.
Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas
corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in that case was whether the
committee had the right to compel the witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that the
committee did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolution directed the
committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during
the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate might or might not do upon the
facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be
defensible, as contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body of what
the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the
part of the Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent upon the
judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such
assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that resolution
expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume
that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if the
act is capable of being so construed. On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the judiciary has instituted
an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing
that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not
reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate
and prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall determined those parties
are and shall taken such measures as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong that may
have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the transaction
involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the
duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by
the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not applicable
here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States related to a
private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook and Company had had an interest in
the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court
in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had
effected a settlement of the bankrupts' interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination
and approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United States, were
dissatisfied with the settlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature
and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the amount of property involve,
in which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with power
to send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking
thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation;
that the matter was one in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts' estate and the
trustee's settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court; and that the United States and other creditors
were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking the
investigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a
power which could only be properly exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in
its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of
Congress possesses a "general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power
actually possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and in
respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or
redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of this power , but must be left to the
court, conformably to the constitutional separation of government powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that the subject of
the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either
House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction
involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction
of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had
an interest in the pool, was pending adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power
on the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall
have determined who the parties responsible are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the
transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from
legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699;
James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L.
Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the
case purely as an attempt by the House to secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the
bankrupt concern. To him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay Cooke and
Co., with the Government, acting through the House, attempting to override the orderliness of established
procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but before Congress. That bankruptcy
proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court gave added impetus to
such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and
unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect of the investigation had not been disclosed to
the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the
great administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public monies, that the particular
failure was of consequence mainly in relation to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the
facts connected with one such default revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration, such
considerations had not been put before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the
particular investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and
familiar in legislative practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the
inquiry, place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and customary part of the
legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of the court in
Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be achieved. The power of
Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for abstract speculation but one to be
determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities,
determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon such disclosures. Their presence,
whether determinative of legislative or judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor
the Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The question
there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its
authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written, published, and sent to
the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of
the committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of
the House of Representatives. Power to make inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not
involved. The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had implied power to punish a
person not a member for contempt, but held that its action in this instance was without constitutional
justification. The decision was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not
calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This
brief statement of the facts and the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof
to the present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of
the committee an offensive and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of the
witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the power and
jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power to
punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here in favor of the Senate's
(and not of the Petitioner's ) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the
opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los
Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member
of the House of Representatives while the latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend
the session which was then about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to attend
the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which Candido Lopez
made against him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of
contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period
of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not complied with because the session of the House of
Representatives adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the next session on
September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in
the Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court, six
justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of
imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session of the body in
which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine
Legislature had no power to punish for contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of
the United States and not of a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and
Justice Romualdez wrote separate opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the
Legislature had inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order of
commitment could only be executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive pronouncement was
made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of Anderson vs.
Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on the moment of
its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two limitations
which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied to
subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such imprisonment may not be extended
beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the existence of
the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its
existence and not to any particular session thereof. This must be so, inasmuch as the basis of the power to
impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable
during the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the
Legislature, which would continue to be a menace to its preservation during the existence of the legislative
body against which contempt was committed.
If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative body exercising it is
in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce continue until the final adjournment and the
election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley's Constitutional Limitations
and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the
case before us, the members composing the legislative body against which the contempt was committed have
not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm
are obiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives of the United States for assault and battery and false imprisonment. The plaintiff had been
arrested for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and
then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of the penalty was not involved in that case. The
question there was "whether the House of Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against
themselves, under any circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives had the power
to punish for contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant. In Marshall vs.
Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the power under the Constitution to deal with the
conduct of the district attorney in writing a vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict
punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court held that the House
had no such power because the writing of the letter did not obstruct the performance of legislative duty and
did not endanger the preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that
ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner
from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the
Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of five senators to investigate
various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice after Attorney General Harry M.
Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of the investigation the committee caused to be served
on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of
Washington Court House, Ohio, a subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving
testimony relating to the subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse
for his failure. The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the
President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his deputy to take
into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before
the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry as the
Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in
custody to await the further order of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court
in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the
ground that the Senate, in directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the
Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the witness
was that the case ha become moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee was appointed
during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to the period of the
Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and amendatory resolution authorizing the
committee to sit at such times and places as it might deem advisable or necessary. It is said in Jefferson's
Manual: "Neither House can continue any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the
session without the consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting them
commissioners for the particular purpose." But the context shows that the reference is to the two houses of
Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the same with the House
of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a single Congress: but it cannot well be the
same with the Senate, which is a continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so
divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end of each Congress, two thirds
always continuing into the next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may continue its committees
through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and, after quoting the above statement from
Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate, however being a continuing body, gives authority to its committees
during the recess after the expiration of a Congress." So far as we are advised the select committee having this
investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has been continued by an
affirmative order. Apparently its activities have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this
as it may, it is certain that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to that effect, and if,
continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This being so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the
case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in
Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316;
31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission did not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was capable of
repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect
and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was interrupted by reason of the
habeas corpus proceedings. In these circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as was done in the
case cited.
What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness from custody be
reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose members are
elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years,
two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may occur thru death or resignation.
Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every
Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will
expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the
first session of the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could be
enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound
reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to
the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power
to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional function without
impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed during recess by duly
constituted committees charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to
any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be
to defeat the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is
coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing body and
which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may
constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The Senate has
ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is within its
competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the refusal of the petitioner as a
witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the
committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to answer the questions, the witness has
obstructed the performance by the Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove
the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall
have answered them. That power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in
performing the particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only
during the session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform
its function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance. Aside
from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the adjournment of the
session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the
contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and
vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively and
oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that
the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary to this
assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always open to those whose rights
might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would
incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that person be
a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a private individual the latter
might accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. At
first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all requisites
had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused from making answers "which might later be
used against me." A little later he explained that although the transactions were legal he refused to answer
questions concerning them "because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people
. . . I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal
transaction without having to account for the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the Committee
that his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without securing any receipt, he turned over the
P440,000 to a certain person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in
1946; that as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of
the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the
P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again two or three times, the last time
being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches
and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the witness would not reveal the name of that person on these pretexts: " I
don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of that person
to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he
should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it
is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the
case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to testify before a grand jury engaged
in investigating a charge of gambling against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said
men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate
him: (1) "Was there a game of cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are
sitting?" (2) "Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand
jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions are proper and that the
answers thereto would not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer the
first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second question: "I
don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among other
things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely because they declared that
so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced
answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to reply under a claim of
constitutional privilege.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain
his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of authorities on the
applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At least, it is not
enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him. as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The
danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the circumstances, and from
the whole case, as well as from his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or
not. . . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient
to entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he is at
the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege
by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)

It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case whether the
witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is not
relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is
for the trial judge to decide that question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)

As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to
give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact
fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the Constitution. The witness in this
case has been vociferous and militant in claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his
duties and obligations to the Government which protects those rights under the law. When a specific right and
a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and
imperative, the former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen
may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life
of others. As Mr. Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the
fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the
security." Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his
liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his liberty is
restrained were made for his welfare.

From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.
G.R. No. L-6749 July 30, 1955
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS, as Director of Prisons, respondent-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Solicitor
Jaime De Los Angeles for appellant.
Estanislao A. Fernandez and Roman B. Antonio for appellee.
LABRADOR, J.:
This an appeal from judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, Honorable Jose F. Flores
presiding, in habeas corpus proceeding, declaring that the continued detention and confinement of Jean L.
Arnault in the new Bilibid Prison, in pursuance of Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November 8, 1952, is illegal,
for the reason that the Senate of the Philippines committed a clear abuse of discretion in considering his
answer naming one Jess D. Santos as the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made in the sale
of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate, as a refusal to answer the question directed by the Senate committee
to him, and on the further ground that said Jean L. Arnault, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is
consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
Petitioner-appellee was an attorney in-fact or Ernest H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase of the
Buenavista and Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was effected on
October 21, 1949 and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. On February 27, 1950, the Senate of the
Philippines adopted Resolution No. 8, whereby it created a Special Committee to determine "whether the said
purchase was honest, valid and proper, and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just, the parties
responsible therefor, any other facts the Committee may deem proper in the premises." In the investigation
conducted by the Committee in pursuance of said Resolution, petitioner-appellee was asked to whom a part of
the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner-appellee refused to answer this question,
whereupon the Committee resolved on May 15, 1950, to order his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant
at-arms of the Philippines Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison in Rizal until such time when he shall
reveal to the Senate or to the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to
answer questions pertinent thereto. In G.R. No. L-3820, petitioner-appellee herein questioned the validity of
the confinement so ordered, by a petition for certiorari filed in this Court. He contended that the Senate of the
Philippines has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
delivered P440,000., that the Legislature lacks authority to punish him for contempt beyond the term of the
legislative session, and that the question of the Senate which he refused to answer is an incriminating question
which the appellee is not bound to answer. All the abovementioned contentions were adversely passed upon
by the decision of this Court, so his petition for release was denied.
In the month of December, 1951, while still in confinement in Bilibid, petitioner-appellee executed an affidavit,
Exhibit A, wherein he gives in detail the history of his life, the events surrounding acquisition of the Buenavista
and Tambobong Estates by Gen. Burt, the supposed circumstances under which he met one by the name of Jess
D. Santos. Upon the presentation of the said affidavit to the said Senate Special Committee, the latter subjected
petitioner to questioning regarding the identity of Jess D. Santos, and after said investigation and questioning
the Committee adopted Resolution No. 114 on November 8, 1952. This Resolution reads as follows:
RESOLUTION APPROVING THE REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA AND
TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL, AND ORDERING THE DIRECTOR OF PRISON TO CONTINUE HOLDING JEAN L.
ARNAULT IN HIS CUSTODY, AND IN CONFINEMENT AND DETENTION AT THE NEW BILIBID PRISON AT
MUNTINLUPA, RIZAL, UNTIL THE SAID ARNAULT SHALL HAVE PURGED HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT OF THE SENATE.
WHEREAS, on the 15th May 1950 the Senate of the Philippines, transcending divisions of party and faction in
the national interest, adopted a Resolution ordering the detention and confinement of Jean L. Arnault at the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, until he should have purged himself of contempt of the Senate by
revealing the person to whom he gave the sum of P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates deal, and by answering other pertinent questions in connection therewith;
WHEREAS, after considering the lengthy testimony offered by the said Jean L. Arnault, and the report thereon
rendered by the Senate Special Committee on the said deal, the Senate holds and finds that, despite numerous
and generous opportunities offered to him at his own instance and solicitation, the said Jean L. Arnault has
failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the said amount of
P440,000, and to answer other pertinent questions in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
deal;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the situation of the said Jean L. Arnault has not materially changed
since he was committed to prison for contempt of the Senate, and since the Supreme Court of the Philippines,
in a judgment long since become final, upheld the power and authority of the Senate to hold the said Jean L.
Arnault in custody, detention, and confinement, said power and authority having been held to be coercive
rather than punitive, and fully justified until the said Jean L. Arnault should have given the information which he
had withheld and continues contumaciously to withhold;
WHEREAS, the insolent and manifest untruthful statements made by the said Jean L. Arnault on the occasions
above referred to constitute a continuing contempt of the Senate, and an added affront to its dignity and
authority, such that , were they to be condoned or overlooked, the power and authority of the Senate to
conduct investigations would become futile and ineffectual because they could be defied by any person of
sufficient stubbornness and malice;
WHEREAS, the Senate holds and finds that the identity of the person to whom the said Jean L. Arnault gave the
amount of P440,000 in connection with the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and the further
information which the Senate requires and which the said Jean L. Arnault arrogantly and contumaciously
withholds, is required for the discharge of its legislative functions, particularly so that adequate measures can
be taken to prevent the repetition of similar frauds upon the Government and the People of the Philippines and
to recover said amount; and
WHEREAS, while not insensible to the appeal of understanding and mercy, the Senate holds and finds that the
said Jean L. Arnault, by his insolent and contumacious defiance of the legitimate authority of the Senate, is
trifling with its proceedings, renders himself unworthy of mercy, and, in the language of the Supreme Court, is
his own jailer, because he could open the doors of his prison at any time by revealing the truth; now therefore,
be it
Resolved by the Senate of the Philippines, That the Senate hold and find, as it hereby holds and finds, that Juan
L. Arnault has not purged himself of contempt of the Senate, and has in no way altered his situation since he
has committed to coercive not punitive, imprisonment for such contempt on the 15th day of May, 1950; and
that Senate order, as it hereby orders, the Director of Prisons to hold the said Jean L. Arnault, in his custody,
and in confinement and detention at the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa, Rizal, in coercive imprisonment,
until he should have purged himself of the aforesaid contempt to the satisfaction, and until order to that effect,
of the Senate of the Philippines or of its Special Committee to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates deal.
Adopted, November 8, 1952 . (Exhibit 0)
In his petition for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance, petitioner-appellee alleges: (1) That
the acquisition by the Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates was not illegal nor irregular nor scandalous nor malodorous, but was in fact beneficial to
the Government; (2) that the decision of this Court in G. R. No. L-3820 declared that the Senate did not
imprison Arnault "beyond proper limitations", i.e., beyond the period longer than arresto mayor, as this is the
maximum penalty that can be imposed under the provisions of Article 150 of the Revised Penal Code; (3) that
petitioner-appellee purged himself of the contempt charges when he disclosed the fact that the one to whom
he gave the P440,000 was Jess D. Santos, and submitted evidence in corroboration thereof; (4) that the Senate
is not justified in finding that the petitioner-appellee did tell the truth when he mentioned Jess D. Santos as the
person to whom he gave the P440,000, specially on the basis of the evidence submitted to it; (5) that the
legislative purpose or intention, for which the Senate ordered the confinement may be considered as having
been accomplished, and, therefore, there is no reason for petitioner-appellee's continued confinement.
The claim that the purchase of the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates is beneficial to the government and is
neither illegal nor irregular is beside the point. To our minds, two questions are decisive of this case. The first is:
Did the Senate Special Committee believe the statement of the petitioner-appellee that the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 is one by the name of Jess D. Santos and if it did not, may the court review said finding? And
the second is: If the Senate did not believe the statement, is the continued confinement and detention of the
petitioner-appellee, as ordered in Senate Resolution of November 8, 1952, valid?
On the first question, the Senate found as a fact that petitioner "has failed and refused, and continues to fail
and refuse, to reveal the person to whom he gave the amount of P440,000" and that the situation of petitioner
"has not materially charged since he was committed to prison." In the first resolution of the Senate Special
Committee of May 15, 1950, it found that petitioner "refused to reveal the name of the persons to whom he
gave the P440,000, as well as to answer other pertinent questions related to said amount." It is clear and
evident that the Senate Committee did not believe petitioner's statement that the person to whom he
delivered the abovementioned amount is one by the name of Jess D. Santos. The court a quo, however,
arrogating unto itself the power to review such finding, held that the "petitioner has satisfactorily shown that
the person of Jess D. Santos actually and physically existed in the human flesh," that the opinion or conclusion
of the Senate Committee is not borne to out by the evidence produced at the investigation, that the Senate
abused its discretion in making its conclusion and that under these circumstances the only thing that could in
justice be done to petitioner is to order his release and have his case endorsed to the prosecution branch of the
judicial department for investigation and prosecution as the circumstances warrant.
There is an inherent fundamental error in the course of action that the lower court followed. It assumed that
courts have the right to review the findings of legislative bodies in the exercise of the prerogative of legislation,
or interfere with their proceedings or their discretion in what is known as the legislative process.
The courts avoid encroachment upon the legislature in its exercise of departmental discretion in the means
used to accomplish legitimate legislative ends. Since the legislature is given a large discretion in reference to the
means it may employ to promote the general welfare, and alone may judge what means are necessary and
appropriate to accomplish an end which the Constitution makes legitimate, the courts cannot undertake to
decide whether the means adopted by the legislature are the only means or even the best means possible to
attain the end sought, for such course would best the exercise of the police power of the state in the judicial
department. It has been said that the methods, regulations, and restrictions to be imposed to attain results
consistent with the public welfare are purely of legislative cognizance, and the determination of the legislature
is final, except when so arbitrary as to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen. Furthermore, in the
absence of a clear violation of a constitutional inhibition, the courts should assume that legislative discretion
has been properly exercised. (11 Am. Jur., pp. 901-902).
These the judicial department of the government has no right or power or authority to do, much in the same
manner that the legislative department may not invade the judicial realm in the ascertainment of truth and in
the application and interpretation of the law, in what is known as the judicial process, because that would be in
direct conflict with the fundamental principle of separation of powers established by the Constitution. The only
instances when judicial intervention may lawfully be invoke are when there has been a violation of a
constitutional inhibition, or when there has been an arbitrary exercise of the legislative discretion.
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three coordinate and
substantially independent organs: the legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of
the government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the highest expression of the
popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. (People of the Philippine Islands, et al. vs. Vera, et al 65 Phil., 56; See also Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 63 Phil., 139)
All that the courts may do, in relation to the proceedings taken against petitioner prior to his incarceration, is to
determine if the constitutional guarantee of due process has been accorded him before his incarceration by
legislative order, and this because of the mandate of the Supreme Law of the land that no man shall be
deprived life, liberty or property without due process of law. In the case at bar such right has fully been
extended the petitioner, he having been given the opportunity to be heard personally and by counsel in all the
proceedings prior to the approval of the Resolution ordering his continued confinement.
The second question involves in turn the following propositions: Does the Philippine Senate have the power and
authority to pass its resolution ordering the continued confinement of the petitioner? In the supposition that
such power and authority exist, was such power legitimately exercised after the petitioner had given the name
Jess D. Santos? A study of the text of the resolution readily shows that the Senate found that the petitioner-
appellee did not disclose, by the mere giving of the name Jess D. Santos, the identity of the person to whom the
sum of P440, 000 was delivered, and, in addition thereto that petitioner withheld said identity arrogantly and
contumaciously in continued affront of the Senate's authority and dignity. Although the resolution studiously
avoids saying that the confinement is a punishment, but merely seeks to coerce the petitioner into telling the
truth, the intention is evident that the continuation of the imprisonment ordered is in fact partly unitive. This
may be inferred from the confining made in the resolution that petitioner-appellee's acts were arrogant and
contumacious and constituted an affront to the Senate's dignity and authority. In a way, therefore, the
petitioner's assumption that the imprisonment is punitive is justified by the language of the resolution,
wherefore the issue now before Us in whether the Senate has the power to punish the contempt committed
against it under the circumstances of the case. This question is thus squarely presented before Us for
determination.
In the previous case of this same petitioner decided by this Court, G. R. No. L-38201, Arnault vs. Nazareno, et al.
(46 Off. Gaz., No. 7, 3100), it was admitted and we had ruled that the Senate has the authority to commit a
witness if he refuses to answer a question pertinent to a legislative inquiry, to compel him to give the
information, i.e., by reason of its coercive power, not its punitive power. It is now contended by petitioner that
if he committed an offense of contempt or perjury against the legislative body, because he refused to reveal the
identity of the person in accordance with the demands of the Senate Committee, the legislature may not punish
him, for the punishment for his refusal should be sought through the ordinary processes of the law, i. e., by the
institution of a criminal action in a court of justice.
American legislative bodies, after which our own is patterned, have the power to punish for contempt if the
contempt has had the effect of obstructing the exercise by the legislature of, or deterring or preventing it from
exercising, its legitimate functions (Annotation to Jurney vs. MacCraken, 79 L. ed. 814). While the power of the
United States Senate to punish for contempt was not clearly recognized in its earlier decision (See Marshal vs.
Gordon, 61 L. ed. 881), the Supreme Court of the United States two decades ago held that such power and
authority exist. In the case of Jurney vs. MacCraken (294 U. S. 123, 79 L. ed. 802), the question before it was
whether or not the Senate could order the confinement of a private citizen because of the destruction and
removal by him of certain papers required to be produced. The court said:
First, The main contention of MacCracken is that the so-called power to punish for contempt may never be
exerted, in the case of a private citizen, solely qua punishment. The argument is that the power may be used by
the legislative body merely as a means of removing an existing obstruction to the performance of its duties;
that the power to punish ceases as soon as the obstruction has been removed, or its removal has become
impossible; and hence that there is no power to punish a witness who, having been requested to produce
papers, destroys them after service of the subpoena. The contention rests upon a misconception of the
limitations upon the power of the Houses of Congress to punish for contempt. It is true that the scope of the
power is narrow. No act is so punishable unless it is of a nature to obstruct the performance of the duties of the
legislature. This may be lack of power, because, as in Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, there
was no legislative duty to be performed; or because, as in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37
S. Ct. 448, L. R. A. 1917F, 279, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, the act complained of is deemed not to be of a character to
obstruct the legislative process. But, where the offending act was of a nature to obstruct the legislative process,
the fact that the obstruction has since been removed, or that its removal has become impossible is without
legal significance.
The power to punish a private citizen for a past and completed act was exerted by Congress as early as 1795;
and since then it has been exercised on several occasions. It was asserted, before the Revolution, by the
colonial assemblies, in intimation of the British House of Commons; and afterwards by the Continental Congress
and by state legislative bodies. In Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat, 204, 5 L. ed. 242, decided in 1821, it was held
that the House had power to punish a private citizen for an attempt to bribe a member. No case has been found
in which an exertion of the power to punish for contempt has been successfully challenged on the ground that,
before punishment, the offending act had been consummated or that the obstruction suffered was
irremediable. The statement in the opinion in Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct. 448, L.
R. A. 1917F. 279 Ann. Cas. 1918B, 371, supra, upon which MacCracken relies, must be read in the light of the
particular facts. It was there recognized that the only jurisdictional test to be applied by the court is the
character of the offense; and that the continuance of the obstruction, or the likelihood of its repetition, are
considerations for the discretion of the legislators in meting out the punishment.
Here, we are concerned not with an extention of congressional privilege, but with vindication of the established
and essential privilege of requiring the production of evidence. For this purpose, the power to punish for a past
contempt is an appropriate means. Compare Ex parte Nugent (C. C.) 1 Brunner, Col. Cas. 296, Fed. Cas No.
10375; Steward vs. Bleine, 1 MacArth. 453. The apprehensions expressed from time to time in congressional
debates, in opposition to particular exercise of the contempt power concerned, not the power to punish, as The judgment appealed from should be, as it hereby is, reversed, and the petition for the issuance of the writ of
such, but the broad, undefined privileges which it was believed might find sanction in that power. The ground habeas corpus denied. The order of the court allowing the petitioner to give bail is declared null and void and
for such fears has since been effectively removed by the decisions of this Court which hold that assertions of the petitioner is hereby ordered to be recommitted to the custody of the respondent. With cost against the
congressional privilege are subject to judicial review. Melbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U. S. 168, 26 L. ed. 377, petitioner-appellee.
supra; and that the power to punish for contempt may not be extended to slanderous attacks which presents
no immediate obstruction to legislative processes. Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U. S. 521, 61 L. ed. 881, 37 S. Ct.
448, L.R. A. 1917F, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 731 supra.

The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power, or
necessary to effectuate said power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and
information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the
Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its
respective authority, it must have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independently
of the other's authority and power. And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of
refusal, every act of defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the
affronts committed against its authority or dignity. The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with
by the legislature in order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be distinguished from
the judicial process by which offenders are brought to the courts of justice for the meting of the punishment
which the criminal law imposes upon them. The former falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the
latter within the domain of the courts; because the former is a necessary concommitant of the legislative power
or process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the criminal law.

We must also and that provided the contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is
committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to deal with the defiant and
contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion
and a mere exertion of arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise of the
authority is not subject to judicial interference. (Marshall vs. Gordon, supra).

The next question concerns the claim that the petitioner has purged himself of contempt, because he says he
has already answered the original question which he had previously been required to answer. In order that the
petitioner may be considered as having purged himself of the contempt, it is necessary that he should have
testified truthfully, disclosing the real identity of the person subject of the inquiry. No person guilty of contempt
may purge himself by another lie or falsehood; this would be repetition of the offense. It is true that he gave a
name, Jess D. Santos, as that of the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. The Senate
Committee refused to believe, and justly, that is the real name of the person whose identity is being the subject
of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued the original contempt, or
reiterated it. Furthermore, the act further interpreted as an affront to its dignity. It may well be taken as insult
to the intelligence of the honorable members of the body that conducted the investigation. The act of defiance
and contempt could not have been clearer and more evident. Certainly, the Senate resolution declaring the
petitioner in contempt may not be claimed as an exertion of an arbitrary power.

One last contention of petitioner remains to be considered. It is the claim that as the period of imprisonment
has lasted for a period which exceeded that provided by law punishment for contempt, i. e., 6 months of
arresto mayor, the petitioner is now entitled to be released. This claim is not justified by the record. Petitioner
was originally confined by Resolution No. 17 on May 15, 1950. On December 13, 1951, he executed his affidavit
and thereafter he was called to testify again before the Senate Committee. The latter passed its Resolution No.
114 on November 6, 1952, and he presented the petition for habeas corpus in this case on March 3, 1953, i. e.,
five months after the last resolution when the Senate found that the petitioner committed another contempt. It
is not true, therefore, that the petitioner's punishment is beyond the full period prescribed in the criminal law.

Besides, the last resolution of November 8, 1952 is also of a coersive nature, in the sense that the Senate
Committee still demands and requires the disclosure of the fact which the petitioner had obstinately refused to
divulge. While the Philippine Senate has not given up hope that the petitioner may ultimately disclose the
record, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is an abuse of the legislative
power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the legislative discretion.
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR., LEONARDO GAMBOA,
KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA, AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE
CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through the CHAIRMAN, HON.
WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injuective
relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and
produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa
Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG
Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the allegations
therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by themselves
and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in
devices, schemes and strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J. Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho,
Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and
his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and
Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies
such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and
Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the Manila
Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by
employing devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the massive infusion and
hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin
Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of Philgurantee officials led by chairman
Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose M.
Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing
additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to
borrow more capitals, so much so that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2
Billion as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week following the February 1986
People's Revolution, in conspiracy with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of
the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr.,
and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to conceal
and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective funds,
properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the FMMC senior manager and
some of the Bengzon law partners, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V.
Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's
interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila
Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36
corporations in all, to PNI Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose F.S.
Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or three days after the creation of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and preempting the
Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already
divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well intact and being
protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with the FMMC senior
managers who still control and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve
the said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million as "donation" to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the Bengzon law firm represented
by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario
D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial
International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it
to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50%
each, the Fund's (a) 8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in the amount of
P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI
Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus
prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total
shareholding of the Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the PCIB, and this
development (which the defendants themselves orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an
excuse for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for allegedly exceeding the
30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that
what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the
extent of the excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they
allowed to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the names and managerial
expertise of the FMMC senior manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T.
Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr.
together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez,
Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among
others, the 6,229,177 shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils. Equities, Inc. and
Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and
continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in the names of
Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for
the claim of P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly
owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin
Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6
August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried
in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the Romuladez firms had not been
sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the
Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly
after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG
approval, to a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law,
had effectively taken over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the
same price of P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3

On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a
matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate
on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies
(FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case,
particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to
appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony may
"unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S.
Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and averring that the
publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the
other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to file their
memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989
rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to pursue and continue
its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance
and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear
and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and
injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraning order
and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with
the Court of motion for intervention, 8 which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and
required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on the petition in intervention. In
compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional question
raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives of the
lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and
special commitees like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine
of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not hrough express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive
cognizance of matters wihtin its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from
the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be
absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system
of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping and interlacing of
funcstions and duties between the several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the
integral or constituent units thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent
of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way.
And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over
the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the
solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority
under the Constitution and to established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even the, this power of
judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord the presumption of
constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect
the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the Constitution.
Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." 13
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of
determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into
private affirs in purported aid of legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or
disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the power of the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. 15
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or
unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided
therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure"
and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected." It follows then
that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and the
right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-
examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation.
They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such
as to legislate or to expel a member.

Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any speech or
resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In
order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had to the speech or
resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which was
published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over
the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a letter to Senator Enrile on 4
September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former
PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7
on 31 August 1988 that there has been no takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a
"takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to avail of the
privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a
Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his (Enrile's) charges that he
(Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18
Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being that I received, Mr.
President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he
denied categorically that he has taken over the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes
SOLOIL Incorporated.
xxx xxxx xxx
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to the Presidential
Commission of Good Government written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in
his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then
Governor Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration order
on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that relatives of the
President of the Philippines were personally discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of
sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by management because they said
another representation was being made to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder.
They even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL, so the order of sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our
order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down our request to make available to us the
records of the company. In fact it was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist on
doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we
decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of
the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not to continue our work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr.
President:
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr.
Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been
divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who according to them, is the brother-in-law of
the President. They even went further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the brother of
her excellency is also interested in the ownership and management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for
supporting papers which will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and Mendiola refused
vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted directly to this Commission. To
our mind their continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even to the President if our
dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally
confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the
newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG solely to determine the
appropriate price. The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making baseless and malicious
statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of the law in the case
particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which
reads as follows and I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by
consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of
the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene
directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, that
this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to
whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the
officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august Body to make its own
conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon
the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon
commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned inquiry is to be
conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in
view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-
governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development, to look into the
charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-
rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of
Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG
Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness,
incompetence and corruption" and that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges
filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-
directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;

WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental organization had made
representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into the charges against
the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took
place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our people
such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and employment
generation for rural and urban workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public and private lives
integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest our youth become disillusioned and lose
hope and return to an Idelogy and form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic
participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good Government be investigated
by the appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the
Constitution. 19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the
three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII
of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez
to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did
not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the
government but are private citizens.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation"
becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to
find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019,
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather
than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the
pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20 it was held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process. That power is broad. it
encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed
statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling
Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not unlimited. There is no general
authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of congress.
This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law
enforcement or trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress. Investigations
conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are
indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that
complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as defendants therein, is
the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in
said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective answers thereto, the issue sought to
be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to
conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility
of conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment
were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the
ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy already before
the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much
earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only investigate into those
areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the
exclusive province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the
Judiciary, it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant
the Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject to all
relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of
the Bill of Rights'." 22
In another case
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The
critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in
demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional
investigation is justified by a public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to
abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not
unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or
assembly. 23
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. 24
Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the accused in a criminal case;
but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25 thus
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an
incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to
answer any all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but only if they
partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs. Pamaran,
26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to
invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suit
It was held that:
We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse
to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a
question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not
the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistenly
been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be
visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by the
respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the
questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the principle of separation of
powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the circumtance that
petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues
intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet Committee, the respondent
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify
before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.SO ORDERED.
ENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Senate President, JUAN M.
FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore, FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority
Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON,
"COMPANERA" PIA S. CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A. MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III,
RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the Philippines, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history of
republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain
information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive power in
only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said: "Decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree
than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will
be diminished."1
History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to abuse,
hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.

G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006 The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused such
power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray for its declaration
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep. CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. as null and void for being unconstitutional.
RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep. JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by
FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under review has
BALBIN, Petitioners, come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong presumption of constitutionality.
vs. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over
Respondent. any issuance of the government that contravenes its mandates.

x-------------------------x In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006 employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned
and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, (PNP).
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of
Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, Respondents. the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource speakers in a public hearing
on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and
x-------------------------x Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions
G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006 of the contract covering the North Rail Project.

ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner, The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations2 dated September 22, 2005
vs. to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M. Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of
the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo;
x-------------------------x Assistant Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and
Assistant Commandant, Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource
G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006 persons in a public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has Opened a
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner, Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May 2005"; (2) Privilege Speech
vs. of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and
Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No. 285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution
x-------------------------x Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in
the National Interest, on the Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate
G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006 Resolution No. 295 filed by Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and
Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR AMORANDO, ALICIA A.
RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B. JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff, General
ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, Generoso S. Senga who, by letter3 dated September 27, 2005, requested for its postponement "due to a
vs. pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention" while "some of the invited AFP
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent. officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."

DECISION On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita a letter4 dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement of the hearing
CARPIO MORALES, J.: [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department have been invited" in
order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that
they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation."
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote5 Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to accede
to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as notices to all
resource persons were completed [the previous] week."
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter6 from the President of the North
Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail project be
postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract agreements relative to
the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,"7 which, pursuant to
Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI, Section 22
of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of powers between co-
equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the operation
of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No.
95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees shall not use or divulge confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made available to the public to
prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers
covered by this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this executive
order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9
July 2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should not be
divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
(Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No.
130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July
2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered by the
executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the judgment of
the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other officers who
in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by the
executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated in Section 2
(b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress to
ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege
and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a copy of E.O.
464, and another letter8 informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the
meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without the consent of the
President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the required consent from the
President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing on the alleged wiretapping, Gen.
Senga sent a letter9 to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the Committee on National Defense and Security,
informing him "that per instruction of [President Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of
the [AFP] is authorized to appear before any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written
approval from the President" and "that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to
appear before the public hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28
September 2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the investigation
scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig.
Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative inquiries
without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were made
to face court martial proceedings.
As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita, citing E.O.
464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government officials: Light
Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit Authority Administrator Roberto
Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel
Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling
Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza, Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II,
Monetary Board Member Juanita Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso
Abaya and Secretary Romulo L. Neri.10 NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O.
464.11
On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for certiorari and
prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur Ocampo,
Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an organization of
government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group of lawyers dedicated to the
promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing to file the suit because of the
transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and
void for being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions
on officials who appear before Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that
E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan
Muna alleges that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur
Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws; Courage
alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened by, their submission to
the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and CODAL alleges that its members have
a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to information and to transparent governance are
threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen, taxpayer
and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that E.O. 464 be
declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.12 (ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17 legal
resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with the poor and
marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens of the Philippines and a
part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to enforce its constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to the public by E.O. 464,13 prays, that said
order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be
ordered to cease from implementing it.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the resolution of
the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as it has already
sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and impedes the valid
exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great public interest and concern,
filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared
unconstitutional.
On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the Philippine
Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it hampers its legislative agenda to be
implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and
transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative
branches of the government.
Meanwhile, by letter14 dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga for him
and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on February 10, 2005.
Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter15 dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant to Executive Order No. 464,
th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance from the President to allow [them] to appear before the public
hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is approved by the President." As none of those invited
appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was cancelled.16
In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the Blue
Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials were invited to the
hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005 but most of them failed to
attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana,17 and those from the Department of Budget and
Management18 having invoked E.O. 464.
In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and Presidential
Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,19 DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez20 and Department of Interior and Local
Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus21 communicated their inability to attend due to lack of
appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the February 13, 2005 budget hearing,
however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive Secretary Ermita.
On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines as the official
organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to be informed on matters of public
interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464
be declared null and void.
All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive issues were
ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2) whether E.O. 464 violates
the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4, Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI,
Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16. The procedural issue of whether there is an actual
case or controversy that calls for judicial review was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to
discuss it in their respective memoranda.
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective memoranda,
paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face, unconstitutional; and
(2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances, namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer
scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the
Venable contract.22
Petitioners in G.R. No. 16966023 and G.R. No. 16977724 filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006, while those
in G.R. No. 16966725 and G.R. No. 16983426 filed theirs the next day or on March 8, 2006. Petitioners in G.R.
No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file memorandum27 was
granted, subsequently filed a manifestation28 dated March 14, 2006 that it would no longer file its
memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this Court to issue a Resolution
reprimanding them.29
Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 2130
Art. VI, Sec. 2231
Art. VI, Sec. 132
Art. XI, Sec. 133
Art. III, Sec. 734
Art. III, Sec. 435
Art. XIII, Sec. 16 36
Art. II, Sec. 2837
Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated memorandum38
on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether the
requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is in order.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to
wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person
challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated,
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.39
Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy where the
disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be omitted.
Standing
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660 and 169667
make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the executive department in the
investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were brought to vindicate the constitutional
duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its
oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative,
power, and privilege of the House of Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there
being no mention of any investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which
was aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464.
As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and underrepresented, and
that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have standing as advocates and defenders of
the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls short of that required to confer standing on them
as parties "injured-in-fact."40
Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a taxpayer for the
implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending power.41
With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or direct
injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the proper parties to
assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin42 and Valmonte v.
Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,43 respondents assert that to be considered a proper party, one must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury due
to the enforcement of E.O. 464.44
That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public decision-
making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation45 is not disputed. E.O. 464, however,
allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that is crucial to law-making.46
Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and direct interest over the outcome of
the controversy and is the proper party to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office
and are allowed to sue to question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes their
prerogatives as legislators.47
In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan Muna), Joel
Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and Liza Maza (Gabriela) are
allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of any claim that an investigation
called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was aborted due to the implementation of E.O.
464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights
and duties as members of Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight
functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three seats in
the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the legislative
process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that will benefit the nation.48
As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing on the
standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.49
In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and the
incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer members,50 invoke their
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that the right to information,
curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of other constitutional rights51 and to
the maintenance of the balance of power among the three branches of the government through the principle of
checks and balances.52
It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the constitutionality of
laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and personal. In Franciso v. House of
Representatives,53 this Court held that when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the mere
fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the transcendental
issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a constitutional crisis. For it to be
accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance, however, it must establish (1) the character of
the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government,
and (3) the lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.54 The
first and last determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R.
Nos. 169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner PDP-
Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda is vague
and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the rest of the political parties.
Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable element of a dispute which serves in part
to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial resolution.55 In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a
political party does not suffice to clothe it with legal standing.
Actual Case or Controversy
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited by the
Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail project and the
wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President Arroyo has
actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.56 These officials, they claim,
merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent of the President, not that the
President prohibited their attendance.57 Specifically with regard to the AFP officers who did not attend the
hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the instruction not to attend without the Presidents
consent was based on its role as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the President
will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that such apprehension is
not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited the
appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or controversy
insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate withholding of consent or an
express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited to the
hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further event before
considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer abandonment of duty if this Court
would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Constitutionality of E.O. 464

E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives Congress of
the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether such withholding of
information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of Congress to obtain information,
otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution which
reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the latter, it
vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein the Batasang Pambansa and its
committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,58 a case decided
in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry is inherent in the power
to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading witness in the
controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to answer the questions of
the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate, detained for contempt. Upholding the
Senates power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power
of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.59 . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced from the
same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to legislate.60 The
matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation
are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault was a
proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public funds of which
Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government agencies created by
Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be incongruous to
hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and
informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of
information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation of
their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning, Congress has the right to
that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of Congress
to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than executive or judicial
power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1,
Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,61 the inquiry itself might not properly be in aid
of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not usurp judicial
functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as occurred in Bengzon is to
indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed
statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such statement in its invitations, along with the usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less
room for speculation on the part of the person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of inquiry. The
provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published rules of
procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published
rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons affected,
even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional circumstances, none
appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the legislative power of inquiry might be
established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights guaranteed to members of the executive department
under the Bill of Rights. In such instances, depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive
Branch to forestall these abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of inquiry,
which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures prominently in the
challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,62 and in its very title, a discussion
of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation
of the 1986 Constitution.63 Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined
and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress."64 Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level
executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."65
Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept. 66 It has encompassed claims of varying
kinds.67 Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive privilege," it may
be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to furnish information may be
actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may be asserted, with differing degrees of
success, in the context of either judicial or legislative investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents, beginning
with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure would subvert crucial
military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or the privilege of the Government
not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of violations of law to officers charged with the
enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for internal deliberations has been said to attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. 68
Tribes comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist disclosure of
information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique role and
responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the executive had a right to
withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts have also granted the executive a
right to withhold the identity of government informers in some circumstances and a qualified right to withhold
information related to pending investigations. x x x"69 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope of the
doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive from
disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption is necessary to
the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining governmental operations,
and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to documents integral to an appropriate
exercise of the executive domestic decisional and policy making functions, that is, those documents reflecting
the frank expression necessary in intra-governmental advisory and deliberative communications.70 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it would be
considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege, the question that
must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the traditional privileges, but
also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural setting.71
The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon, 72 decided in 1974. In issue in that
case was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege against a subpoena issued by a district
court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating to the Watergate investigations. The
claim of privilege was based on the Presidents general interest in the confidentiality of his conversations and
correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in
the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a
Presidents powers. The Court, nonetheless, rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege
must be balanced against the public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court
was careful to clarify that it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against
congressional demands for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.73 Despite frequent
assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President Washingtons refusal to
turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S. Supreme Court has never
adjudicated the issue.74 However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a case
decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the Presidents privilege over his conversations against a
congressional subpoena.75 Anticipating the balancing approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon,
the Court of Appeals weighed the public interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that
would be served by disclosure to the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court
declined to enforce the subpoena. 76
In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez.77
Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of
the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim
of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who assist
him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners. It did not
involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to information.78 Nonetheless, the Court
recognized that there are certain types of information which the government may withhold from the public,
thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that executive privilege may be claimed against citizens
demands for information.
In Chavez v. PCGG,79 the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that there is a
"governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic
and other national security matters."80 The same case held that closed-door Cabinet meetings are also a
recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,81 the Court ruled that the right to information does not extend
to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"82 by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings. It also held that
information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting national security, and information on
investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused were exempted
from the right to information.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in
this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts,
or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive
officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed,
the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences between the two provisions,
however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior determination
by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has, through the challenged order,
made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3, the coverage of department heads under
Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads possession of any information which might be
covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference
to executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or
upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the President of
the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their scheduled
appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the
appearance shall be conducted in executive session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of Article VI.
Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis Section 21 which provides for the
power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation." As the following excerpt of the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers were aware that these two provisions
involved distinct functions of Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour] yesterday, I
noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the House of
Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam President, because in
our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa as the Gentleman himself has experienced in the interim
Batasang Pambansa one of the most competent inputs that we can put in our committee deliberations, either
in aid of legislation or in congressional investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite
them, but if they do not come and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that the Cabinet
ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when requested under Section
22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or subpoenaed by the committee of either
House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or congressional investigation. According to Commissioner
Suarez, that is allowed and their presence can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this,
Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was originally the
Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held in contempt of the House.83
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. The
reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of the amendment to make
the appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on Style,
precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its original position
as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on inquiries in aid of legislation.
This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr. Presiding
Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative Department,
Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I propose that
instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned that in
Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own lawmaking;
whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power because in Legislative
Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I hope Commissioner Davide will
consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement
to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very
essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of Commissioner
Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now become Section 22. Would it
be, Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.84 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong proceeded
from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the legislature. Both
Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is different from the power
to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davides only concern was that the two provisions
on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being complementary to each other. Neither
Commissioner considered them as identical functions of Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners alone. From the above-quoted exchange, Commissioner
Maambongs committee the Committee on Style shared the view that the two provisions reflected distinct
functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was speaking in his capacity as Chairman of
the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may thus be presumed as representing that of his
Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It is a
period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers accountable
for their acts and the operation of the government,85 corresponding to what is known in Britain as the question
period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973 Constitution86 which made the
appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to the parliamentary system established by
that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National Assembly for the
program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike in the presidential system
where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated before their term expired, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly.
The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister and the Cabinet may be changed.87
The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the question
hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of powers.88 To that
extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs from the question period of
the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to appear in a question hour does not,
however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances.
In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that the
Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of departments and agencies
in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails in a parliamentary
system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and executive branches. It is this very
separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information from the executive so essential, if the
functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the people are adequately to be carried out. The
absence of close rapport between the legislative and executive branches in this country, comparable to those
which exist under a parliamentary system, and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the
British question period have perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from
the executive essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the
right to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours becomes
a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely upon information
parceled out ex gratia by the executive.89 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the
other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in
pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the statutes which it
has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a matter of duty. In such
instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may only request their
appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation"
under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.90
In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack
of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive branch is a
co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply
with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her
being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of
government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry. Unlike the
Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is exempt on the basis not
only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the constitutional independence of the
judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the
oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief Justice.
Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court now
proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the absence of any
reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The
reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in
a way that will render it constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation.
Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,
unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is broad. It covers all senior
officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials
who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of
Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the title of
Section 2 "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" , it is evident that under the rule of ejusdem
generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of
coverage under executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually covers
persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is properly invoked in relation
to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege,
the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read as an abbreviated way of
saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned,
privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of
the challenged order.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered by the
executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the appearance of the official
concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent
means nothing more than that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O.
464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized by the
President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of information that is
covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the officials not showing up in
the legislative investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such invocation must
be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office authorized by the President,
has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the President has not reversed such
determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to
an implied claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the President,
on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President Drilon
illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail Project
of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be informed that officials
of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to attend the same without the
consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005), entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The
Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of
Public Officials Appearing In Legislative Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other
Purposes". Said officials have not secured the required consent from the President. (Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are being
requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence.
Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot
attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes that the
invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the order means that a
determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President, that the invited official
possesses information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it is not stated in the letter that
such determination has been made, the same must be deemed implied. Respecting the statement that the
invited officials have not secured the consent of the President, it only means that the President has not
reversed the standing prohibition against their appearance before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermitas letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch, either through
the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a determination that the information
required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing, there has been no contrary
pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege has been made by the executive.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may be
invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the possession of the
executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted in the
separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations, correspondences, or
discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-deliberations of the Supreme Court and
other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This
kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory
ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect
the independence of decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power.
This is not the situation in the instant case.91 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims
of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to
determine whether it is valid.

While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the ground invoked
therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim of privilege, a defect that
renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive
Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any
specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic
secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are
covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is
being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere
statement of what is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and
the public officers covered by this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It
does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such declaration leaves Congress in the dark
on how the requested information could be classified as privileged. That the message is couched in terms that,
on first impression, do not seem like a claim of privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make
Congress doubly blind to the question of why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that
it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must, therefore, be
clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor waived by a
private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head of the
department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration by that officer. The court
itself must determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so
without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.92 (Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of determining
whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the circumstances in which it is made,
it should be respected.93 These, in substance, were the same criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted
against the Ombudsman in Almonte v. Vasquez94 and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.95
A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure impossible,
thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs needs to determine whether to
override any claims of privilege.96 (Underscoring supplied)
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:97
On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In stating
its objection to claimants interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the disclosures sought
by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is designed to protect. The
government has not shown nor even alleged that those who evaluated claimants product were involved in
internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance. Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported
claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must be established. To find these interrogatories
objectionable, this Court would have to assume that the evaluation and classification of claimants products
was a matter of internal policy formulation, an assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua
sponte.98 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy99 similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide precise and
certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America100 amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the
documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality. Without
this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very thing sought to be
protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte speculation with which to
weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim of privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore,
despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not
recognize the claim in the instant case because it is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and
reasonable determination as to its applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has
given no precise or compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of
the whole procedure.101 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of privilege clearly
stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:102
We think the Courts decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly relevant to these
questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that if (petitioner) had legitimate reasons for failing to produce
the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of Representatives, by whose authority the
subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his) reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the
writ. Such a statement would have given the Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry
by taking other appropriate steps to obtain the records. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider
the objection or remedy is in itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to
make any such statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a
congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with such
particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.103 A useful
analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege against self-incrimination.
Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.104 declares:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would
incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the court to say
whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly appears to the court that he is
mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense
in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very
protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from
the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or
an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." x x
x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely invokes
E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient
for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each
case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only on the
heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does not purport to be
conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a mere expression of opinion by
the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged unlawful
delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, in particular,
cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the President can assert executive privilege to
withhold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect
of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.

Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch,105 or in those
instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities.106 The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain informations
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity
must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the
power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on
her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President,"
which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize
her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant
case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further
invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own
judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the
President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary in order to
provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed
calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to
appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the
President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries
in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section
21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied claims of
executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly motivated by the
need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in the
hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their right to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that what is involved
in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right of the people to
information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the
power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the demand
of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a
citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong only to Congress and not
to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow, except in a
highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are exercising their right to
information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the
people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public
concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives
and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus
holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the
government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only
to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such
bear fruit.107 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in the
sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from
the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not directly apply to people in
general, Taada v. Tuvera states:
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An example is a
law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably
does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of
justice.108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged order must
be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct effect on the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of public interest which members
of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus requires that the people should have been
apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible. For
[w]hat republican theory did accomplishwas to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy, based on the
divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity, based on the doctrine of
popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)109
Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot
be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the
operations of government, but we shall have given up something of much greater value our right as a people
to take part in government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No. 464 (series of
2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a) are, however, VALID.
SO ORDERED.
Sabio V. Gordon
GR 174340
Aquino installed her regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,[1] creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates.[2] Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: No member or staff of the Commission shall be required
to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within
its official cognizance. Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGGs unhampered performance of its task.[3]
Today, the constitutionality of Section 4(b) is being questioned on the ground that it tramples upon the Senates
power to conduct legislative inquiry under Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The facts are undisputed.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455
(Senate Res. No. 455),[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.
The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:
WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to
P4.3 million, as compared to the previous years mere P106 thousand;
WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center,
Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly advanced
to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of
Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive
committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated
interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the PHC,
PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from any anomalous transaction, and to conserve or salvage any remaining value of
the governments equity position in these corporations from any abuses of power done by their respective
board of directors;
WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on
the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the
alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.
Adopted.
(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. However,
on March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to the Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises.[5]
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource
persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate
Res. No. 455.[6]
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[7] At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum,[8] approved by Senate President
Manuel Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier
and Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006 and testify on what they know
relative to the matters specified in Senate Res. No. 455. Similar subpoenae were issued against the directors
and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, namely: Benito V. Araneta, Philip J. Brodett, Enrique L. Locsin,
Manuel D. Andal, Roberto L. Abad, Luis K. Lokin, Jr., Julio J. Jalandoni, Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao,
Alma Kristina Alloba and Johnny Tan.[9]
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated
his earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. On the other hand, the directors and officers of
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation relied on the position paper they previously filed, which raised issues on the
propriety of legislative inquiry.
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another
notice[10] to Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September
6, 2006. The notice was issued under the same authority of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served
upon (him) last 16 August 2006.
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter[11] dated September 4, 2006 to
Senator Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation,[12] which
partly reads:
Doubtless, there are laudable intentions of the subject inquiry in aid of legislation. But the rule of law requires
that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily,
laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. (Brillantes, Jr., et al. v. Commission on Elections, En
Banc [G.R. No. 163193, June 15, 2004])
On this score, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 should not be ignored as it explicitly provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial legislative
or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on the power of legislative inquiry, and a
recognition by the State of the need to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered
performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b) of which had not been amended,
repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential fiat to amend or repeal the provision
in controversy. Until then, it stands to be respected as part of the legal system in this jurisdiction. (As held in
People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995: Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock
of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary
powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought
to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, 4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist encroachments by governments,
political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.)
xxxxxx
Relevantly, Chairman Sabios letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006 pointed out that the anomalous
transactions referred to in the P.S. Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases before the regular courts,
the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court (Pending cases include: a. Samuel Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al.,
CA-G.R. No. 89102; b. Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No. 06-095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d.
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil Case No. 04-
1049) for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon under the principle of sub judice. The laudable
objectives of the PCGGs functions, recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of the PCGG will
be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded by a legislative investigation of cases that are
already pending before the Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, (203 SCRA 767, 784 [1991]) the Honorable Supreme Court held:
[T]he issues sought to be investigated by the respondent Committee is one over which jurisdiction had been
acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue has been pre-empted by that court. To allow the respondent
Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue already before the Sandigabayan would not only pose
the possibility of conflicting judgments between a legislative committee and a judicial tribunal, but if the
Committees judgment were to be reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence
being made to bear on the ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
xxxxxx
IT IS IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS that the Commission decided not to attend the Senate
inquiry to testify and produce evidence thereat.
Unconvinced with the above Compliance and Explanation, the Committee on Government Corporations and
Public Enterprises and the Committee on Public Services issued an Order[13] directing Major General Jose
Balajadia (Ret.), Senate Sergeant-At-Arms, to place Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners under arrest for
contempt of the Senate. The Order bears the approval of Senate President Villar and the majority of the
Committees members.
On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at
IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on
Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat
Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
against the same respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the
Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174318.
Meanwhile, Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its officers and directors, namely: Philip G. Brodett, Luis K.
Lokin, Jr., Roberto V. San Jose, Delfin P. Angcao, Roberto L. Abad, Alma Kristina Alobba and Johnny Tan filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the Senate Committees on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Gordon and Arroyo, and Members. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 174177.
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari and prohibition) Chairman Sabio,
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier; and the PCGGs nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first,
respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason; second,
the inquiries conducted by respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation; third, the inquiries were
conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation;
and fourth, respondent Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt.
In G.R. No. 174177, petitioners Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors and officers alleged: first,
respondent Senate Committees have no jurisdiction over the subject matter stated in Senate Res. No. 455;
second, the same inquiry is not in accordance with the Senates Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation; third, the subpoenae against the individual petitioners are void for having been issued without
authority; fourth, the conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to Senate Res. No. 455 constitutes undue
encroachment by respondents into justiciable controversies over which several courts and tribunals have
already acquired jurisdiction; and fifth, the subpoenae violated petitioners rights to privacy and against self-
incrimination.
In their Consolidated Comment, the above-named respondents countered: first, the issues raised in the
petitions involve political questions over which this Court has no jurisdiction; second, Section 4(b) has been
repealed by the Constitution; third, respondent Senate Committees are vested with contempt power; fourth,
Senates Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly published; fifth,
respondents have not violated any civil right of the individual petitioners, such as their (a) right to privacy; and
(b) right against self-incrimination; and sixth, the inquiry does not constitute undue encroachment into
justiciable controversies.
During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were directed to submit simultaneously
their respective memoranda within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from date. In the meantime,
per agreement of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was allowed to go home. Thus, his petition for habeas
corpus has become moot. The parties also agreed that the service of the arrest warrants issued against all
petitioners and the proceedings before the respondent Senate Committees are suspended during the pendency
of the instant cases.[14]
Crucial to the resolution of the present petitions is the fundamental issue of whether Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
is repealed by the 1987 Constitution. On this lone issue hinges the merit of the contention of Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners that their refusal to appear before respondent Senate Committees is justified. With the
resolution of this issue, all the other issues raised by the parties have become inconsequential.
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent
Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting
all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial,
legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions
that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a brief consideration
of the Congress power of inquiry is imperative.
The Congress power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores
through McGrain v. Daugherty,[15] cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.[16] In those earlier days, American courts
considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar[17]
explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:
Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies composing
the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable them to legislate.It is well-
established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may institute any investigation having
reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights, or
privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be important that it should have exact
information, and in respect to which it would be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily
implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential
to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function.In American legislatures the investigation of public
matters before committees, preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the
committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the right of either house to
compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to punish for disobedience has been
frequently enforced.The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in respect to which it may be
necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for legislative aid.
Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of
inquiry is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function, thus:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and
effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power
of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions
which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.
Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their
maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.[18] Then came the 1987 Constitution
incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as
influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.[19]
Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of any of its
committee. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the
committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative function are also available to the committees.[20]
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The
Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,[21] where it categorically ruled
that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced
the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper
subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section
21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be
countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes.[22] It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.[23] PCGG belongs to this
class.
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of
any constitutional basis.
Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: Public
office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest
lives.
The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and
charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for
the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention
of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other
words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.[24]
Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It
places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies.
Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-
accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Pea,[25] Justice Florentino P. Feliciano
characterized as obiter the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O.
No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:
The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear
that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of
Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG
or any member thereof from civil liability for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task
contemplated by this Order, the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be open to most
serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of
members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a
privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x x x.
xxxxxx
It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be
required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders
of this Court.
Chavez v. Sandiganbayan[26] reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this
Court even before the filing of the present petitions.
Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions ensuring the peoples access
to information:
Article II, Section 28
Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations
of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively
their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte,
Jr.[27] the Court explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any
democracy, thus:
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication
between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political
discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will.
Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to
formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the
citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate therein in
order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely depend on the information
gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to information really goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the
government.[28] The cases of Taada v. Tuvera[29] and Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission[30] have recognized
a citizens interest and personality to enforce a public duty and to bring an action to compel public officials and
employees to perform that duty.
Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and
other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. In Senate v. Ermita,[31] this
Court stressed:
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the
people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public
concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own
opinions on the matter before Congress opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives
and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates
or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the
Constitution or its basic principles.[32] As shown in the above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with
Article VI, Section 21 (Congress power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public accountability), Article
II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information).
Significantly, Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Constitution provides:
All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other executive issuances
not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions
and other executive issuances inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions invalidating laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances inconsistent with the Constitution. In Pelaez v. Auditor General,[33]
the Court considered repealed Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 authorizing the Executive
to change the seat of the government of any subdivision of local governments, upon the approval of the 1935
Constitution. Section 68 was adjudged incompatible and inconsistent with the Constitutional grant of limited
executive supervision over local governments. In Islamic Dawah Council of the Philippines, Inc., v. Office of the
Executive Secretary,[34] the Court declared Executive Order No. 46, entitled Authorizing the Office on Muslim
Affairs to Undertake Philippine Halal Certification, void for encroaching on the religious freedom of Muslims. In
The Province of Batangas v. Romulo,[35] the Court declared some provisions of the General Appropriations Acts
of 1999, 2000 and 2001 unconstitutional for violating the Constitutional precept on local autonomy. And in Ople
v. Torres,[36] the Court likewise declared unconstitutional Administrative Order No. 308, entitled Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System, for being violative of the right to privacy protected by
the Constitution.
These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is the highest law of the land. It is the basic
and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest
officials of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if it conflicts with the
Constitution.[37] Consequently, this Court has no recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by
the 1987 Constitution.
Significantly, during the oral arguments on September 21, 2006, Chairman Sabio admitted that should this
Court rule that Section 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate, he will answer the
questions of the Senators, thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b) is unconstitutional or that it does not apply to the Senate,
will you answer the questions of the Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the Supreme Court as Chief of Staff of
Justice Feria. I would definitely honor the Supreme Court and the rule of law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PANGANIBAN:
You will answer the questions of the Senators if we say that?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Yes, Your Honor. That is the law already as far as I am concerned.
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his Commissioners are shielded from
testifying before respondent Senate Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In effect, his argument that the
said provision exempts him and his co-respondent Commissioners from testifying before respondent Senate
Committees concerning Senate Res. No. 455 utterly lacks merit.
Incidentally, an argument repeated by Chairman Sabio is that respondent Senate Committees have no power to
punish him and his Commissioners for contempt of the Senate.
The argument is misleading.
Article VI, Section 21 provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It must be stressed that the Order of Arrest for contempt of Senate Committees and the Philippine Senate was
approved by Senate President Villar and signed by fifteen (15) Senators. From this, it can be concluded that the
Order is under the authority, not only of the respondent Senate Committees, but of the entire Senate.
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the Senate and the House of
Representatives, but also to any of their respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to
the committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution, correctly pointed out its
significance:
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of investigation not just of
Congress but also of any of its committees. This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of
investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the means which the Houses can take in order to
effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the Committees.[38]
This is a reasonable conclusion. The conferral of the legislative power of inquiry upon any committee of
Congress must carry with it all powers necessary and proper for its effective discharge. Otherwise, Article VI,
Section 21 will be meaningless. The indispensability and usefulness of the power of contempt in a legislative
inquiry is underscored in a catena of cases, foreign and local.
In the 1821 case of Anderson v. Dunn,[39] the function of the Houses of Congress with respect to the contempt
power was likened to that of a court, thus:
But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the grounds of the decision are not very clearly
stated, we take them to be: that there is in some cases a power in each House of Congress to punish for
contempt; that this power is analogous to that exercised by courts of justice, and that it being the well
established doctrine that when it appears that a prisoner is held under the order of a court of general
jurisdiction for a contempt of its authority, no other court will discharge the prisoner or make further inquiry
into the cause of his commitment. That this is the general ruleas regards the relation of one court to another
must be conceded.
In McGrain,[40] the U.S. Supreme Court held: Experience has shown that mere requests for such information
are often unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. The Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,[41]
sustained the Congress power of contempt on the basis of this observation.
In Arnault v. Balagtas,[42] the Court further explained that the contempt power of Congress is founded upon
reason and policy and that the power of inquiry will not be complete if for every contumacious act, Congress
has to resort to judicial interference, thus:
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon
reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power.
How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on which to base intended legislation if it
cannot require and compel the disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a
defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation
of powers, making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended
each departments authority to be full and complete, independently of the others authority or power. And how
could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial department for the appropriate remedy,
because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity.[43]
In Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,[44] the Court
characterized contempt power as a matter of self-preservation, thus:
The exercise by the legislature of the contempt power is a matter of self-preservation as that branch of the
government vested with the legislative power, independently of the judicial branch, asserts its authority and
punishes contempts thereof. The contempt power of the legislature is, therefore, sui generis x x x.
Meanwhile, with respect to G.R. No. 174177, the petition of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation and its directors
and officers, this Court holds that the respondent Senate Committees inquiry does not violate their right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.
One important limitation on the Congress power of inquiry is that the rights of persons appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be subject
to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action. As held in Barenblatt v. United States,[45]
the Congress, in common with all the other branches of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to
the limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case,
the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.
First is the right to privacy.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.[46] Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a constitutional right and
the right most valued by civilized men,[47] but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights which mandates that, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy and everyone
has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.[48]
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that explicitly
create zones of privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to determine what, how much,
to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed.[49] Section 2 guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose. Section 3 renders inviolable the privacy of communication and
correspondence and further cautions that any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.[50] Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries
are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable expectation of
privacy?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senates public hearing to deliberate on Senate
Res. No. 455, particularly on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications
Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.
Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and
directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government
has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to
information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
In Morfe v. Mutuc,[51] the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,[52] employed the rational basis relationship test
when it held that there was no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure
information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain
a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration.[53] In Valmonte v.
Belmonte,[54] the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy
a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer
scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on
matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in millions
of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate
to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as well as from
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary legislation to prevent corruption and
formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding PCGGs efficacy. There being no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No.
455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it must be emphasized that this right maybe invoked by the said
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation only when the incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing in advance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of them.[55]
That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying respondent Senate Committees their
power of inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is abused, such issue may be presented before the
courts. At this juncture, what is important is that respondent Senate Committees have sufficient Rules to guide
them when the right against self-incrimination is invoked. Sec. 19 reads:
Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer that will
incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an executive session.
No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an
incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty to give
testimony.
In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall
determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall resume its
investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered shall be repeated to the witness.
If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may punish him for contempt for
contumacious conduct.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being
litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of
criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in
their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every
citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify
fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti, and
Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as
well as its directors and officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent
Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No.
455.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot. The petitions in
G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.

Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate Committees
power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and
Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio
Jalandoni, PCGGs nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, petitioners
in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate
Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.

SO ORDERED.
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs.
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE
ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.
RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to
protect public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its purpose, among others, is to assure that the
nation will receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled communication and exchange of
information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or forming policies and
arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The
confidentiality of the Presidents conversations and correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the
confidentiality of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the right to privacy of all citizens and
more, because it is dictated by public interest and the constitutionally ordained separation of governmental
powers.
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to exercise its power of review and arbitrate a hotly, even
acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Courts co-equal branches of government. In this task, this Court
should neither curb the legitimate powers of any of the co-equal and coordinate branches of government nor
allow any of them to overstep the boundaries set for it by our Constitution. The competing interests in the case
at bar are the claim of executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and the respondent Senate
Committees assertion of their power to conduct legislative inquiries, on the other. The particular facts and
circumstances of the present case, stripped of the politically and emotionally charged rhetoric from both sides
and viewed in the light of settled constitutional and legal doctrines, plainly lead to the conclusion that the claim
of executive privilege must be upheld.
Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision dated March 25, 2008 (the "Decision"), granting the
petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the respondent Senate Committees on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,1 Trade and Commerce,2 and National Defense and Security
(collectively the "respondent Committees").3
A brief review of the facts is imperative.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11)
hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the
Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment
("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") Chairman Benjamin Abalos
offered him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he informed
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not
to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President Arroyo and petitioners discussions relating to
the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific, petitioner refused
to answer questions on: (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether or not
she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve it.6
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners answers to these three questions by requiring him to
appear and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita wrote to respondent Committees and requested them to dispense with petitioners testimony on the
ground of executive privilege.7 The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita pertinently stated:
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations and correspondence
between the President and public officials which are considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R.
95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9, 2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations
of the President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The
expectation of a President to the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which
we accord deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of conversations of the
President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge of her duties
and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the confidentiality of her conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Given the confidential
nature in which these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any
further details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled doctrine of executive
privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an unprecedented 11-hour hearing,
wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him except the foregoing questions involving executive
privilege, we therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed
with.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees upon orders of the President
invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioners reply to
respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he
thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege. He also
manifested his willingness to appear and testify should there be new matters to be taken up. He just requested
that he be furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for
advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re:
P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN
Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the
Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.8 He insisted that he had not
shown "any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He emphasized his willingness to testify on
new matters, but respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of questions. He
also mentioned the petition for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December 7, 2007. According to
him, this should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the order dated January 30, 2008 which
declared him in contempt and directed his arrest and detention.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction) on February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated February 4, 2008, the parties were required to
observe the status quo prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions were covered by executive privilege; and second, respondent Committees
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order. Anent the first ground, we considered the
subject communications as falling under the presidential communications privilege because (a) they related to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b) they were received by a close advisor of the
President, and (c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a compelling need that would justify the
limitation of the privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority. As to the second ground, we found that respondent Committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order because (a) there was a valid claim of executive privilege, (b) their
invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as
to the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure," and (e) they issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.
On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration, anchored on the
following grounds:
I
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS WERE
ISSUED BY RESPONDENT COMMITTEES PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, AND NOT
MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS.
II
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION, THERE CAN BE NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE
INFORMATION WITHHELD IN THE INSTANT CASE IS PRIVILEGED.
III
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION, THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD THAT
THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE SUBJECT THREE (3) QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR WHICH EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED CONSTITUTE
STATE SECRETS.
B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE DECISION IS APPLIED, THERE IS NO
SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE ARE PRESENT.
C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING OF A COMPELLING NEED TO JUSTIFY THE DISCLOSURE OF
THE INFORMATION SOUGHT.
D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE
RESPONDENTS PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PRIMARY FUNCTION TO ENACT LAWS.
E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO INFORMATION, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
POLICIES ON PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OUTWEIGH THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.
IV
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION, RESPONDENTS DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED CONTEMPT ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE SUPPOSED REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN IN SENATE V. ERMITA.
C. RESPONDENTS DULY ISSUED THE CONTEMPT ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INTERNAL RULES.
D. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT ITS RULES OF PROCEDURE BE DULY PUBLISHED, AND WERE DENIED DUE
PROCESS WHEN THE COURT CONSIDERED THE OSGS INTERVENTION ON THIS ISSUE WITHOUT GIVING
RESPONDENTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.
E. RESPONDENTS ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY OR PRECIPITATE.
In his Comment, petitioner charges respondent Committees with exaggerating and distorting the Decision of
this Court. He avers that there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent Committees from investigating the NBN
Project or asking him additional questions. According to petitioner, the Court merely applied the rule on
executive privilege to the facts of the case. He further submits the following contentions: first, the assailed
Decision did not reverse the presumption against executive secrecy laid down in Senate v. Ermita; second,
respondent Committees failed to overcome the presumption of executive privilege because it appears that they
could legislate even without the communications elicited by the three (3) questions, and they admitted that
they could dispense with petitioners testimony if certain NEDA documents would be given to them; third, the
requirement of specificity applies only to the privilege for State, military and diplomatic secrets, not to the
necessarily broad and all-encompassing presidential communications privilege; fourth, there is no right to pry
into the Presidents thought processes or exploratory exchanges; fifth, petitioner is not covering up or hiding
anything illegal; sixth, the Court has the power and duty to annul the Senate Rules; seventh, the Senate is not a
continuing body, thus the failure of the present Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation (Rules) has a vitiating effect on them; eighth, the requirement for a witness to be furnished
advance copy of questions comports with due process and the constitutional mandate that the rights of
witnesses be respected; and ninth, neither petitioner nor respondent has the final say on the matter of
executive privilege, only the Court.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that: (1) there is no categorical pronouncement from
the Court that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent Committees pursuant to their oversight function;
hence, there is no reason for them "to make much" of the distinction between Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of
the Constitution; (2) presidential communications enjoy a presumptive privilege against disclosure as earlier
held in Almonte v. Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10; (3) the communications elicited by
the three (3) questions are covered by executive privilege, because all the elements of the presidential
communications privilege are present; (4) the subpoena ad testificandum issued by respondent Committees to
petitioner is fatally defective under existing law and jurisprudence; (5) the failure of the present Senate to
publish its Rules renders the same void; and (6) respondent Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt order.
Incidentally, respondent Committees objection to the Resolution dated March 18, 2008 (granting the Office of
the Solicitor Generals Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Attached Memorandum) only after the
promulgation of the Decision in this case is foreclosed by its untimeliness.
The core issues that arise from the foregoing respective contentions of the opposing parties are as follows:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive presidential communications privilege in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are critical to the exercise of their functions; and
(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
I
There Is a Recognized Presumptive
Presidential Communications Privilege
Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Courts declaration that presidential communications are
presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent Committees then claim that the Court erred
in relying on the doctrine in Nixon.
Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in
the earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the presidential communications privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution. Even Senate v. Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent Committees, reiterated this concept.
There, the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim of executive privilege was recognized, among them
Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),14 and Chavez v. PEA.15
The Court articulated in these cases that "there are certain types of information which the government may
withhold from the public,16" that there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to
state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other national security matters";17 and that "the right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as privileged information under the separation of powers,
by which the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door Cabinet
meetings."18
Respondent Committees observation that this Courts Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision.
The Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true intent and meaning of a decision, no specific
portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its entirety.19
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita,
which declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion
of the decision in the said case reads:
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United States and in
this jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts,
or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While
executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground
invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive
officials are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed,
the extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being
claimed by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in
the Executive Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is one of those mentioned in the said
Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no presumption of authorization to
invoke executive privilege given by the President to said executive official, such that the presumption in this
situation inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing ruling in this wise:
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a certain
information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and has the effect
of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the
President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to
authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive
privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential nature of which is
crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch, or in those instances
where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities.
The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption
from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree
as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President the
power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on
her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the President",
which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being an extraordinary power, it must be
wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize
her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant
case where the authorization is not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further
invalid on this score.
The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization to invoke executive privilege granted by the
President to executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not obtain in this case.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege
on a specific matter involving an executive agreement between the Philippines and China, which was the
subject of the three (3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the Senate Committees
investigation. Thus, the factual setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in Senate v. Ermita.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision in this present case hews closely to the ruling in
Senate v. Ermita,21 to wit:
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation
of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how it has been defined and
used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from the public,
the courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President and high-level executive
branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public." x x x In this
jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte
used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following portion of the Nixon
decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like the claim
of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he has all the values to which we accord deference for
the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. A President and those who
assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do
so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and
italics supplied)
Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a presumptive privilege for Presidential communication,"
which was recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe the passage in Senate v. Ermita adverted to
in the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent Committees, referring to the non-existence of a "presumptive
authorization" of an executive official, to mean that the "presumption" in favor of executive privilege "inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" is to distort the ruling in the Senate v. Ermita and
make the same engage in self-contradiction.
Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional underpinning of the relationship between the Executive
Department and the Legislative Department to explain why there should be no implied authorization or
presumptive authorization to invoke executive privilege by the Presidents subordinate officials, as follows:
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power - the President on whom executive power is
vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of impeachment. It is based on he being
the highest official of the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of governments
which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of presidential communications when invoked by the
President on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that the same
be recognized and be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or critical need for
disclosure by the one assailing such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will render meaningless the
presumption accorded by settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate v. Ermita
reiterates jurisprudence citing "the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications."23
II
There Are Factual and Legal Bases to
Hold that the Communications Elicited by the
Three (3) Questions Are Covered by Executive Privilege
Respondent Committees claim that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered by
executive privilege because the elements of the presidential communications privilege are not present.
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a "quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution does not vest it in the
President alone, but also in the Monetary Board which is required to give its prior concurrence and to report to
Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of another entity does not make such power less executive.
"Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment of something, the concentrated essence of
substance.24 On the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty cannot be delegated to another
or, even if delegated, the responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.26
Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit
to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not
diminish the executive nature of the power.
The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by each branch of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine of checks and
balances, which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these
three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain legislative acts require action from the President for their
validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A good example is the power to pass a law. Article
VI, Section 27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact that the approval or vetoing of the bill
is lodged with the President does not render the power to pass law executive in nature. This is because the
power to pass law is generally a quintessential and non-delegable power of the Legislature. In the same vein,
the executive power to enter or not to enter into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less
executive in nature because of conditions laid down in the Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the
said executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration of the application of the "doctrine of operational
proximity" for the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope of the presidential communications
privilege to communications between those who are operationally proximate to the President but who may
have "no direct communications with her."
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely
to limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege. The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a
limitless extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to
White House staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to White House staff that has "operational
proximity" to direct presidential decision-making, thus:
We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully circumscribed to accomplish the purposes of the
privilege, could pose a significant risk of expanding to a large swath of the executive branch a privilege that is
bottomed on a recognition of the unique role of the President. In order to limit this risk, the presidential
communications privilege should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with ensuring that the
confidentiality of the Presidents decision-making process is adequately protected. Not every person who plays
a role in the development of presidential advice, no matter how remote and removed from the President, can
qualify for the privilege. In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the White House in
executive branch agencies. Instead, the privilege should apply only to communications authored or solicited
and received by those members of an immediate White House advisors staff who have broad and significant
responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice to be given the President on the particular matter to
which the communications relate. Only communications at that level are close enough to the President to be
revelatory of his deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of his advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is
"operational proximity" to the President that matters in determining whether "[t]he Presidents confidentiality
interests" is implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a large swath of the executive branch" (a fear
apparently entertained by respondents) is absent because the official involved here is a member of the Cabinet,
thus, properly within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of her official
family. Nevertheless, in circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote, this Court also mentioned
in the Decision the organizational test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice.28 This goes to
show that the operational proximity test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in every case. In
determining which test to use, the main consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege only to
officials who stand proximate to the President, not only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their
positions in the Executives organizational structure. Thus, respondent Committees fear that the scope of the
privilege would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the operational proximity test is unfounded.
C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987
Constitutional provisions on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in upholding the Presidents invocation, through the
Executive Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between respondent Committees specific and
demonstrated need and the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality, there is a need to strike the
balance in favor of the former; and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded the provisions of the
1987 Philippine Constitution on government transparency, accountability and disclosure of information,
specifically, Article III, Section 7;29 Article II, Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI, Section
10;33 Article VII, Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections 9,35 21,36 and 22.37
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive privilege is not merely founded on her generalized
interest in confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita specified
presidential communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and economic relations with another sovereign
nation as the bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Given the confidential
nature in which this information were conveyed to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further
details of these conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis
supplied)
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require the Executive to state the reasons for the
claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to protect.
This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.
It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure of the Presidents communication with her advisor.
The NBN Project involves a foreign country as a party to the agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting
of minds between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the President says about the agreement -
particularly while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China will surely view with particular
interest. There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. We reiterate the importance of secrecy in matters involving
foreign negotiations as stated in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 38 thus:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend on secrecy, and even
when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures, demands, or eventual concessions which
may have been proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious
influence on future negotiations or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in
relation to other powers. The necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the
power of making treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the
body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the House of
Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a negotiation with a
foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.
US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of allowing Congress access to all papers relating to a
negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the recent case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party, et al. v.
Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39 upheld the privileged character of diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan, the Court
stated:

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid
limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government
exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable
safeguards for the sake of national interest." Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in Peoples Movement
for Press Freedom (PMPF) v. Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the privilege in more
precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking information from the Presidents representatives
on the state of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. The Court denied the
petition, stressing that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the constitutional
provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to information." The Resolution
went on to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in
executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has
been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes
and Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In the words of Mr. Stimson:
"A complicated negotiation cannot be carried through without many, many private talks and discussion, man
to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals. Delegates from other countries come and tell you in
confidence of their troubles at home and of their differences with other countries and with other delegates;
they tell you of what they would do under certain circumstances and would not do under other circumstances
If these reports should become public who would ever trust American Delegations in another conference?
(United States Department of State, Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284)
xxxx
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is
concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, "It
can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the
Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War
declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived at." He quickly abandoned his thought.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a method of publicity is possible. In the moment that
negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to "muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or a
frank declaration of the concession which are exacted or offered on both sides would quickly lead to a
widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully
published, there is ample opportunity for discussion before it is approved. (The New American Government and
Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the
President is the sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign countries,viz:
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and
consent of the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great arguments of March 7, 1800, in the House
of Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong., col. 613 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the
original)
Considering that the information sought through the three (3) questions subject of this Petition involves the
Presidents dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court is wary of approving the view that
Congress may peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of the President but even her
confidential and informal discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said questions serve some
vague legislative need. Regardless of who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted consequences of
subjecting a Chief Executive to unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased frequency and great
publicity. No Executive can effectively discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and unchecked
legislative incursion into the core of the Presidents decision-making process, which inevitably would involve her
conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
With respect to respondent Committees invocation of constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the
people to information and public accountability and transparency, the Court finds nothing in these arguments
to support respondent Committees case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional right of the people to information and the
constitutional policies on public accountability and transparency. These are the twin postulates vital to the
effective functioning of a democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of
those to whom the power has been delegated if they are denied access to information. And the policies on
public accountability and democratic government would certainly be mere empty words if access to such
information of public concern is denied.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege with respect to three (3) specific questions, did
not in any way curb the publics right to information or diminish the importance of public accountability and
transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project.
They could continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify again. He himself has repeatedly
expressed his willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the scope of respondents investigation
the three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot be
compelled to appear before respondents to answer the said questions. We have discussed the reasons why
these answers are covered by executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality
of such information is a recognized principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right to
information is not an absolute right.
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent Committees do not espouse an absolute right to
information. By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such right to the regulation of the law is
unmistakable. The highlighted portions of the following provisions show the obvious limitations on the right to
information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,40 it was stated that there are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may be exercised or the correlative state duty may be
obliged. Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to such rights, among them: (1) national
security matters, (2) trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential
information. National security matters include state secrets regarding military and diplomatic matters, as well
as information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements. It
was further held that even where there is no need to protect such state secrets, they must be "examined in
strict confidence and given scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of respondent Committees to obtain information
allegedly in aid of legislation, not the peoples right to public information. This is the reason why we stressed in
the assailed Decision the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of
a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the same
obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress" and "neither does the right to information
grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to
Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning at this juncture that the parties here are
respondent Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior request for information on the part of
any individual citizen. This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the distinctions between the
Legislature's right to information in a legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's right to information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from them is to respect matters that are covered by
executive privilege.
III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show That
the Communications Elicited by the Three Questions
Are Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees devote an unusually lengthy discussion on the
purported legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an oversight inquiry.
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not pass upon the nature of respondent Committees
inquiry into the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes respondent Committees power to investigate
the NBN Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot uphold the view that when a constitutionally
guaranteed privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course of a legislative investigation, the
legislative purpose of respondent Committees questions can be sufficiently supported by the expedient of
mentioning statutes and/or pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have relevance. The
jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption of
privilege can only be overturned by a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the information covered by
executive privilege.
In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify
the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority." In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue that the information
elicited by the three (3) questions are necessary in the discharge of their legislative functions, among them, (a)
to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents assertions.
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege is subject to balancing against other interests and it
is necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner that would preserve the essential functions of each
branch. There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege and the legitimate claims of the judicial
process. In giving more weight to the latter, the Court ruled that the President's generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial.
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified privilege would stand in the way of the primary
constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal prosecutions. The said Court further
ratiocinated, through its ruling extensively quoted in the Honorable Chief Justice Puno's dissenting opinion, as
follows:
"... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is
nowhere more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold aim (of criminal justice) is that guild shall
not escape or innocence suffer.' Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88, 55 S.Ct., at 633. We have elected to
employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all issues before a court of law. The
need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of
criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of
the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure
of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to
the function of courts that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.
xxx xxx xxx
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth
Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right 'to be confronted with the
witness against him' and 'to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the
manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all relevant
and admissible evidence be produced.
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential
communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the
fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A
President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in nature,
whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and
central to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of justice. Without access to
specific facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President's broad interest in confidentiality
of communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to
have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the fundamental
demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. The generalized assertion of
privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial. (emphasis
supplied)
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a courts need for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal
case but rather with the Senates need for information in relation to its legislative functions. This leads us to
consider once again just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of respondent Committees
functions. The burden to show this is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude into the sphere
of competence of the President in order to gather information which, according to said respondents, would
"aid" them in crafting legislation.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon41 expounded on the nature of a
legislative inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether the
subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative functions. There is a clear difference
between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like
functions. While fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments
normally depend more on the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political
acceptability, than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of
conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury turns entirely on
its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did or did not
commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning the
content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral
statements recorded in their original form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process,
at least not in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been in the
Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments has been
substantially undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot be equated with the compelling or demonstratively
critical and specific need for facts which is so essential to the judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies.
Also, the bare standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be lightly applied to the instant case, which unlike
Arnault involves a conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate Branches of the Government.
Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving the conflicting claims between the Executive and
the Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the presumptive presidential communications privilege.
This is conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable Chief Justice Puno, which states:
A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor
of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the
other related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al., v.
Nixon in the D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all recognize that there is a presumptive
privilege in favor of Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a
presumption in favor of confidentiality of Presidential communications.
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications puts the burden on the respondent Senate
Committees to overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific need for the information to be elicited
by the answers to the three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to craft legislation. Here, there is
simply a generalized assertion that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power to legislate and a
broad and non-specific reference to pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to these bills could
not be determined without the said information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly pointed out by
the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Separate Concurring Opinion:
If respondents are operating under the premise that the president and/or her executive officials have
committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the
answer to those three questions will not necessarily bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with such
legislation. They could easily presume the worst of the president in enacting such legislation.
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not critically needed before legislatives bodies can
come up with relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by courts of law. Interestingly, during the
Oral Argument before this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly admitted that the Senate
could still come up with legislations even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In other words,
the information being elicited is not so critical after all. Thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to the lawmaking function of the Senate. For instance,
question Number 1 whether the President followed up the NBN project. According to the other counsel this
question has already been asked, is that correct?
ATTY. AGABIN
Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking function of the Senate?
ATTY. AGABIN
I believe it is critical, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Why?
ATTY. AGABIN
For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator Miriam Santiago, she would like to indorse a Bill to
include Executive Agreements had been used as a device to the circumventing the Procurement Law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
But the question is just following it up.
ATTY. AGABIN
I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor, because if we look at this problem in its factual setting as
counsel for petitioner has observed, there are intimations of a bribery scandal involving high government
officials.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Again, about the second question, were you dictated to prioritize this ZTE, is that critical to the lawmaking
function of the Senate? Will it result to the failure of the Senate to cobble a Bill without this question?
ATTY. AGABIN
I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a proposed amendment to the Procurement Law, Your
Honor, because the petitioner had already testified that he was offered a P200 Million bribe, so if he was
offered a P200 Million bribe it is possible that other government officials who had something to do with the
approval of the contract would be offered the same amount of bribes.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Again, that is speculative.
ATTY. AGABIN
That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
How about the third question, whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told
about the alleged bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking function of the Senate? And the question is may
they craft a Bill a remedial law without forcing petitioner Neri to answer this question?
ATTY. AGABIN
Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere speculation. And sound legislation requires that a proposed
Bill should have some basis in fact.42
The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to pinpoint the specific need for the information sought
or how the withholding of the information sought will hinder the accomplishment of their legislative purpose is
very evident in the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the respondent Committees to successfully
discharge this burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of presidential communication stands. The
implication of the said presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the burden of proof as to whether the
disclosure will significantly impair the Presidents performance of her function. Needless to state this is
assumed, by virtue of the presumption.
Anent respondent Committees bewailing that they would have to "speculate" regarding the questions covered
by the privilege, this does not evince a compelling need for the information sought. Indeed, Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon43 held that while fact-finding by a legislative
committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the predicted
consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability than on a precise reconstruction of
past events. It added that, normally, Congress legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in its
hearings. We cannot subscribe to the respondent Committees self-defeating proposition that without the
answers to the three (3) questions objected to as privileged, the distinguished members of the respondent
Committees cannot intelligently craft legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be stressed that respondent Committees need for
information in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in instances when the purpose of the inquiry
is legislative in nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is merely an oversight function of
Congress.44 And if this is the primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the three (3) questions
covered by privilege, it may even contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in nature and not
oversight. In any event, whether or not investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight function of
Congress, respondent Committees investigation cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this Court ruled:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this
Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no
means does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.46 (Emphasis supplied)
There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really in
aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the Legislature."47 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the
President.48 While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the potential culpability of high government
officials, including the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply not a task for the Senate to
perform. The role of the Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt of a crime or wrongdoing.
Our Constitution has not bestowed upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary cannot legislate,
neither can the Legislature adjudicate or prosecute.
Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for truth,"
which in respondent Committees view appears to be equated with the search for persons responsible for
"anomalies" in government contracts.
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed
upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity,
the investigation of the role played by each official, the determination of who should be haled to court for
prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the
determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a
trial agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in
furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation. Investigations conducted solely to gather
incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible. There is no Congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure.49 In this regard, the pronouncement in Barenblatt v. United States50 is
instructive, thus:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without limitations. Since Congress may only investigate into the areas
in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive
province of one of the other branches of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it
cannot inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. (Emphasis supplied.)
At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed
against President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. Under our Constitution,
it is the Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or omission of any public official, employee,
office or agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient."51 The Office
of the Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine
whether or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable therefor. The same holds true for our
courts upon which the Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with finality. Indeed, the rules
of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure that the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of all persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and safeguarded.
Should respondent Committees uncover information related to a possible crime in the course of their
investigation, they have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the appropriate agency or branch of
government. Thus, the Legislatures need for information in an investigation of graft and corruption cannot be
deemed compelling enough to pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by executive privilege.
As discussed above, the Legislature can still legislate on graft and corruption even without the information
covered by the three (3) questions subject of the petition.
Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of petitioners claim of executive privilege on the
ground that there is no privilege when the information sought might involve a crime or illegal activity, despite
the absence of an administrative or judicial determination to that effect. Significantly, however, in Nixon v.
Sirica,52 the showing required to overcome the presumption favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature
of the presidential conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and
appropriateness of the function in the performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to which
the material was necessary to its fulfillment.
Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon does
not apply to the case at bar because, unlike in the said case, no impeachment proceeding has been initiated at
present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is true that no impeachment proceeding has been initiated,
however, complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against President Arroyo and other
personalities before the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier, the prosecutorial and judicial
arms of government are the bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution and our laws to determine
whether or not the allegations of anomaly in the NBN Project are true and, if so, who should be prosecuted and
penalized for criminal conduct.
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to
arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law. Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that "technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial
proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not be observed by the Committee." Court rules which
prohibit leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few,
do not apply to a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public official to the most ordinary citizen,
has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings by a competent court or body.
IV
Respondent Committees Committed Grave
Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order
because (1) there is no legitimate claim of executive privilege; (2) they did not violate the requirements laid
down in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the contempt order in accordance with their internal Rules; (4) they
did not violate the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution requiring the publication of their
Rules; and (5) their issuance of the contempt order is not arbitrary or precipitate.
We reaffirm our earlier ruling.
The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having been fully discussed in the preceding pages, we see no
reason to discuss it once again.
Respondent Committees second argument rests on the view that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring
invitations or subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry"
along with the "usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof" is not provided for by the Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum.
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity of compliance with these requirements.
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses.
Consequently, claims that the investigative power of Congress has been abused (or has the potential for abuse)
have been raised many times.53 Constant exposure to congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the
Executive to function effectively. The requirements set forth in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that
would not unduly limit Congress power. The legislative inquiry must be confined to permissible areas and thus,
prevent the "roving commissions" referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v. Thompson.54 Likewise, witnesses
have their constitutional right to due process. They should be adequately informed what matters are to be
covered by the inquiry. It will also allow them to prepare the pertinent information and documents. To our
mind, these requirements concede too little political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when viewed vis-
-vis the immensity of its power of inquiry. The logic of these requirements is well articulated in the study
conducted by William P. Marshall,55 to wit:
A second concern that might be addressed is that the current system allows committees to continually
investigate the Executive without constraint. One process solution addressing this concern is to require each
investigation be tied to a clearly stated purpose. At present, the charters of some congressional committees are
so broad that virtually any matter involving the Executive can be construed to fall within their province.
Accordingly, investigations can proceed without articulation of specific need or purpose. A requirement for a
more precise charge in order to begin an inquiry should immediately work to limit the initial scope of the
investigation and should also serve to contain the investigation once it is instituted. Additionally, to the extent
clear statements of rules cause legislatures to pause and seriously consider the constitutional implications of
proposed courses of action in other areas, they would serve that goal in the context of congressional
investigations as well.
The key to this reform is in its details. A system that allows a standing committee to simply articulate its reasons
to investigate pro forma does no more than imposes minimal drafting burdens. Rather, the system must be
designed in a manner that imposes actual burdens on the committee to articulate its need for investigation and
allows for meaningful debate about the merits of proceeding with the investigation. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioners request to be furnished an advance copy of questions is a reasonable demand that should
have been granted by respondent Committees.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to any
pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the questions to be asked. As it were, the subpoena
merely commanded him to "testify on what he knows relative to the subject matter under inquiry."
Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court. While it is true that this Court must refrain
from reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of government, however, when a
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress compliance therewith. We
cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. In this regard, the
pronouncement in Arroyo v. De Venecia56 is enlightening, thus:
"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated thus: The Constitution empowers each House to
determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by
the rule and the result which is sought to be attained."
In the present case, the Courts exercise of its power of judicial review is warranted because there appears to
be a clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of respondent Committees. Section 18 of the Rules
provides that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness before it who
disobey any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to answer proper questions by the
Committee or any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)
In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt order because
during the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only seven (7) Senators were present. This
number could hardly fulfill the majority requirement needed by respondent Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17) Senators and respondent
Committee on National Defense and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18) Senators. With respect
to respondent Committee on Trade and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9) Senators, only three (3)
members were present.57 These facts prompted us to quote in the Decision the exchanges between Senators
Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of lack of the required
majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt order.
When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008 hearing before this Court, Senator Francis Pangilinan
stated that any defect in the committee voting had been cured because two-thirds of the Senators effectively
signed for the Senate in plenary session.58
Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees that led to the issuance of the contempt order is
flawed. Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the members of the respondent Committees, the
contempt order was prepared and thereafter presented to the other members for signing. As a result, the
contempt order which was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful representation of the proceedings that
took place on said date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed the contempt order were present
during the January 30, 2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of person appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form part of the witness settled expectation. If the
limitations are not observed, the witness settled expectation is shattered. Here, how could there be a majority
vote when the members in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority? Petitioner has the right to
expect that he can be cited in contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in which the matter has
been fully deliberated upon. There is a greater measure of protection for the witness when the concerns and
objections of the members are fully articulated in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent
Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules anytime they wish. This is especially true here where
what is involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the Rules are not promulgated for their
benefit. More than anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in the proper observance of the
Rules.
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to respondent Committees fourth argument.
Respondent Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish its Rules because the same was
published in 1995 and in 2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing body; thus, it is not required
to republish the Rules, unless the same is repealed or amended.
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is
no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day business the
Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of
the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time. (emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters,
not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate
of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business,
then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter
of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their the respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard of petitioners motion for reconsideration alleging
term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision. the pendency of his petition for certiorari before this Court.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its
approval. (emphasis supplied)
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed. (emphasis supplied)
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an
election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date
of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules.
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation."59 The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they
are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance
with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same
shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on
notice.
On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political
branches of government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash, but
each must treat the other with official courtesy and respect. This Court wholeheartedly concurs with the
proposition that it is imperative for the continued health of our democratic institutions that we preserve the
constitutionally mandated checks and balances among the different branches of government.
In the present case, it is respondent Committees contention that their determination on the validity of
executive privilege should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their assertion that their internal
procedures and deliberations cannot be inquired into by this Court supposedly in accordance with the principle
of respect between co-equal branches of government. Interestingly, it is a courtesy that they appear to be
unwilling to extend to the Executive (on the matter of executive privilege) or this Court (on the matter of
judicial review). It moves this Court to wonder: In respondent Committees paradigm of checks and balances,
what are the checks to the Legislatures all-encompassing, awesome power of investigation? It is a power, like
any other, that is susceptible to grave abuse.
While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees well-intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption,
even in the highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not validate or accord to Congress powers
denied to it by the Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of government.
There is no question that any story of government malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As
respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the constitutional command of transparency and public
accountability. The recent clamor for a "search for truth" by the general public, the religious community and the
academe is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that demands an accounting of an entrusted power.
However, the best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political branches of government. The
customary partisanship and the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too great an obstacle in
arriving at the truth or achieving justice that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law. We believe the people deserve a more exacting "search for truth" than the process here in question, if that
is its objective.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next WHEREFORE, respondent Committees Motion for Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby DENIED.
Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
SO ORDERED.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings
conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result in violation of the rights of
witnesses should be considered null and void, considering that the rationale for the publication is to protect the
rights of witnesses as expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and effective.

Respondent Committees last argument is that their issuance of the contempt order is not precipitate or
arbitrary. Taking into account the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in their argument.

As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling witness, and contrary to the assertion of respondent
Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer had any other questions for him. He repeatedly
manifested his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond to new matters. His only request was
that he be furnished a copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to adequately prepare as a resource
person. He did not attend the November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive Secretary Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with his testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Note that
petitioner is an executive official under the direct control and supervision of the Chief Executive. Why punish
petitioner for contempt when he was merely directed by his superior? Besides, save for the three (3) questions,
he was very cooperative during the September 26, 2007 hearing.

On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes their haste and impatience. Instead of ruling on
Executive Secretary Ermitas claim of executive privilege, they curtly dismissed it as unsatisfactory and ordered
the arrest of petitioner. They could have informed petitioner of their ruling and given him time to decide
whether to accede or file a motion for reconsideration. After all, he is not just an ordinary witness; he is a high-
ranking official in a co-equal branch of government. He is an alter ego of the President. The same haste and
impatience marked the issuance of the contempt order, despite the absence of the majority of the members of
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY,
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE
AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.
x----------------------x
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE
HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention
x----------------------x
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON,
LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the
legitimacy of the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo
government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents
instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly
conducted by the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House
Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005,
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former
NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged "original" tape
recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the
committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played
in the chambers of the House.2
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the hearings indefinitely.
Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of
the resource persons.3
Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed with this Court a Petition for
Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4
docketed as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these
tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any
other purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off
the records of the inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using the
recordings in any of the House proceedings.5
Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the slumbering issue with a privilege
speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the
public "the whole unvarnished truth the whats, whens, wheres, whos and whys" of the alleged wiretap,
and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious
wiretapping activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacsons speech was referred to the Senate Committee on
National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking
to regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senates plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired
his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a
legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she recommended a legislative
investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court of
Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the
Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the intended legislative
inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public hearings on the "Hello Garci"
tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon,
Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16
on the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of the resource persons
summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No.
179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different objectives
the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the
committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on the parties standing, argued
at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "[l]egal standing or locus standi refers to a personal and
substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the
challenged governmental act x x x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has personally suffered some
actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court, in recent cases, has relaxed
the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v.
Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National
Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has
repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving
serious legal questions that greatly impact on public interest, in keeping with the Courts duty under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits
of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition by alleging that he is the
person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the
respondent committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano
stands to be directly injured by the House committees actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court
recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging that they are concerned
citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello
Garci" tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws
and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of
legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the
Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which
underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure
of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the laws and that intervenor
Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome
of the controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Courts ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners
Ranadas and Agcaoilis and intervenor Sagges allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the
questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that
in Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted standing to the petitioners therein
for, as in this case, they invariably invoked the vindication of their own rightsas taxpayers, members of
Congress, citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal professionwhich were
also supposedly violated by the therein assailed unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance
constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight
as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to
the Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has shown in prior cases climaxing in
the more recent case of Chavez, the Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior
decisions is the principle that the exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount
to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to hypothetical questions because any
attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no practical
relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge
in academic discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical
legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.38
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as aforementioned, the issuance of an
injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from
including the same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of
the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played in the House and heard by
its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry
were completed and submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot and academic. After all,
prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide
a remedy for an act already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue
with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear
derogation of the constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or the House of
Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the
basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil
Code, which provides that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation
only in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the
term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of
these rules when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v. Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section 21 of
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSGs explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every Congress to publish its rules of
procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or
after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senates membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of
rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation
conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this ruling with the following
rationalization:

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative body. The present Senate
has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the
term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into the
next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to "constitute
a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987
Constitution is not a continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry
of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion for Reconsideration) in the
same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a clarification.
Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity
with each national election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-
day business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress
before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the next session in the
same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken
by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters,
not in the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will typically have a different
composition as that of the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate
of which they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct of its business,
then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter
of course, continue into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the preceding elections shall begin their
term of office, the President may endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its
approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall remain in force until they are
amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new composition of the Senate after an
election and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are intended to be valid from the date
of their adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules.
The Rules simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they
are amended or repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be
presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next
Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished
business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish
the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that
the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put
public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective even
in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its main rules regarding
effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing
that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senates
defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law
instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in
accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not these
rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
Justice Carpios response to the same argument raised by the respondents is illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available
at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take
effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form
of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply with the due process
requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of
Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise known as the
Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely recognizes
the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct
of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the
rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take
judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be
prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative investigation
subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published rules
governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised in the
consolidated petitions.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let
a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.
ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST (formerly AASJS)1 OFFICERS/MEMBERS SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S.
ALBANO, ROMEO R. ROBISO, RENE B. GOROSPE and EDWIN R. SANDOVAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CESAR V. PURISIMA, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO, JR., in his
capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and HON. ALBERTO D. LINA, in his Capacity as
Commissioner of Bureau of Customs, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for prohibition1 seeks to prevent respondents from implementing and enforcing Republic Act (RA)
93352 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and
employees to exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation
of a Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board).3 It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment
status.4
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year,
as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is
taken from the fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.5
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department of Finance (DOF) or
his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her
Undersecretary, the Director General of the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her
Deputy Director General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners, two
representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the officials nominated by their
recognized organization.6
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation, distribution and release of
the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from the service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target; (3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the
Board; (4) prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including the issuance of
rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.7
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335,8 to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created for such purpose.9
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax
reform legislation. They contend that, by establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s]
the officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their
best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and
undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these officials and employees to serve the people with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid
basis for classification or distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all
other government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue targets to the President as
it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section 7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC
officials may be dismissed from the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%,
the law does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of revenue targets has
been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will therefore be easy for the President to fix an
unrealistic and unattainable target in order to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon
the enactment and approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits
legislative participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question the petition for being
premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet. Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that
will necessitate the exercise of this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public
policy requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert that the allegation
that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate the law.
Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC
because the functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the executive in the
implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law
enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and
serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the implementing
agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court finds that petitioners have
failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be
discussed.
Actual Case And Ripeness
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible
of judicial adjudication.10 A closely related requirement is ripeness, that is, the question must be ripe for
adjudication. And a constitutional question is ripe for adjudication when the governmental act being challenged
has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.11 Thus, to be ripe for judicial adjudication, the
petitioner must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed
by a favorable decision of the Court.12
In this case, aside from the general claim that the dispute has ripened into a judicial controversy by the mere
enactment of the law even without any further overt act,13 petitioners fail either to assert any specific and
concrete legal claim or to demonstrate any direct adverse effect of the law on them. They are unable to show a
personal stake in the outcome of this case or an injury to themselves. On this account, their petition is
procedurally infirm.
This notwithstanding, public interest requires the resolution of the constitutional issues raised by petitioners.
The grave nature of their allegations tends to cast a cloud on the presumption of constitutionality in favor of
the law. And where an action of the legislative branch is alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.14
Accountability of
Public Officers
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice,
and lead modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own personal gain but for the
benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By demanding accountability and service with responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, efficiency, patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be
responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties. This presumption
necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and
reinforces it by providing a system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their revenue-generation
capability and collection.15
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It cannot be overturned by mere
conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an
underlying principle to advance a declared public policy.
Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC officials and employees into
"bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there
must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.16 To invalidate
RA 9335 based on petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that
passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be rewarded for exemplary and
exceptional performance. A system of incentives for exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not
anathema to the concept of public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty,
industry, efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.
In United States v. Matthews,17 the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to officers of the
customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of the net proceeds of forfeitures in
violation of the laws against smuggling. Citing Dorsheimer v. United States,18 the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and reward their zeal and industry in
detecting fraudulent attempts to evade payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a reward when, as a
consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In
addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the
fruit of "bounty hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official duties.
One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the BOC. The officials, examiners, and
employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC] who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of
malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the performance of their duties shall
be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such
violation, negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise extraordinary diligence.
Equal Protection
Equality guaranteed under the equal protection clause is equality under the same conditions and among
persons similarly situated; it is equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of persons who are classified
based on substantial differences in relation to the object to be accomplished.19 When things or persons are
different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in law differently. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union,20 this Court declared:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all
citizens of the [S]tate. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation
which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the
other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of
classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its
jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that the
classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is it necessary
that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification may in many cases
properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not preclude the legislature from
recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.21 (emphasis
supplied)
The equal protection clause recognizes a valid classification, that is, a classification that has a reasonable
foundation or rational basis and not arbitrary.22 With respect to RA 9335, its expressed public policy is the
optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC.23 Since the subject of
the law is the revenue- generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC, the incentives and/or
sanctions provided in the law should logically pertain to the said agencies. Moreover, the law concerns only the
BIR and the BOC because they have the common distinct primary function of generating revenues for the
national government through the collection of taxes, customs duties, fees and charges.
The BIR performs the following functions:
Sec. 18. The Bureau of Internal Revenue. The Bureau of Internal Revenue, which shall be headed by and
subject to the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, who shall be appointed by the
President upon the recommendation of the Secretary [of the DOF], shall have the following functions:
(1) Assess and collect all taxes, fees and charges and account for all revenues collected;
(2) Exercise duly delegated police powers for the proper performance of its functions and duties;
(3) Prevent and prosecute tax evasions and all other illegal economic activities;
(4) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent and subordinate units; and
(5) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.24
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, the BOC has the following functions:
Sec. 23. The Bureau of Customs. The Bureau of Customs which shall be headed and subject to the
management and control of the Commissioner of Customs, who shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary[of the DOF] and hereinafter referred to as Commissioner, shall have the
following functions:
(1) Collect custom duties, taxes and the corresponding fees, charges and penalties;
(2) Account for all customs revenues collected;
(3) Exercise police authority for the enforcement of tariff and customs laws;
(4) Prevent and suppress smuggling, pilferage and all other economic frauds within all ports of entry;
(5) Supervise and control exports, imports, foreign mails and the clearance of vessels and aircrafts in all ports of
entry;
(6) Administer all legal requirements that are appropriate;
(7) Prevent and prosecute smuggling and other illegal activities in all ports under its jurisdiction;
(8) Exercise supervision and control over its constituent units;
(9) Perform such other functions as may be provided by law.25
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Both the BIR and the BOC are bureaus under the DOF. They principally perform the special function of being the
instrumentalities through which the State exercises one of its great inherent functions taxation. Indubitably,
such substantial distinction is germane and intimately related to the purpose of the law. Hence, the
classification and treatment accorded to the BIR and the BOC under RA 9335 fully satisfy the demands of equal
protection.
Undue Delegation
Two tests determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the
sufficient standard test. A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate.26 It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.27 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the limits of the delegates authority, announce the
legislative policy and identify the conditions under which it is to be implemented.28
RA 9335 adequately states the policy and standards to guide the President in fixing revenue targets and the
implementing agencies in carrying out the provisions of the law. Section 2 spells out the policy of the law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to optimize the revenue-generation capability and
collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) by providing for a system of
rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance
Evaluation Board in the above agencies for the purpose of encouraging their officials and employees to exceed
their revenue targets.
Section 4 "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing"29 the delegated power to the President to fix
revenue targets:
SEC. 4. Rewards and Incentives Fund. A Rewards and Incentives Fund, hereinafter referred to as the Fund, is
hereby created, to be sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their respective revenue
targets of the year, as determined by the Development Budget and Coordinating Committee (DBCC), in the
following percentages:
Excess of Collection of the Excess the Revenue Targets
Percent (%) of the Excess Collection to Accrue to the Fund
30% or below
15%
More than 30%
15% of the first 30% plus 20% of the remaining excess
The Fund shall be deemed automatically appropriated the year immediately following the year when the
revenue collection target was exceeded and shall be released on the same fiscal year.
Revenue targets shall refer to the original estimated revenue collection expected of the BIR and the BOC for a
given fiscal year as stated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing (BESF) submitted by the
President to Congress. The BIR and the BOC shall submit to the DBCC the distribution of the agencies revenue
targets as allocated among its revenue districts in the case of the BIR, and the collection districts in the case of
the BOC.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Revenue targets are based on the original estimated revenue collection expected respectively of the BIR and
the BOC for a given fiscal year as approved by the DBCC and stated in the BESF submitted by the President to
Congress.30 Thus, the determination of revenue targets does not rest solely on the President as it also
undergoes the scrutiny of the DBCC.
On the other hand, Section 7 specifies the limits of the Boards authority and identifies the conditions under
which officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target by at least 7.5% may be
removed from the service:
SEC. 7. Powers and Functions of the Board. The Board in the agency shall have the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To set the criteria and procedures for removing from service officials and employees whose revenue
collection falls short of the target by at least seven and a half percent (7.5%), with due consideration of all
relevant factors affecting the level of collection as provided in the rules and regulations promulgated under this
Act, subject to civil service laws, rules and regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due
process: Provided, That the following exemptions shall apply:
1. Where the district or area of responsibility is newly-created, not exceeding two years in operation, as has no
historical record of collection performance that can be used as basis for evaluation; and
2. Where the revenue or customs official or employee is a recent transferee in the middle of the period under
consideration unless the transfer was due to nonperformance of revenue targets or potential nonperformance
of revenue targets: Provided, however, That when the district or area of responsibility covered by revenue or
customs officials or employees has suffered from economic difficulties brought about by natural calamities or
force majeure or economic causes as may be determined by the Board, termination shall be considered only
after careful and proper review by the Board.
(c) To terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted in the preceding paragraph: Provided, That
such decision shall be immediately executory: Provided, further, That the application of the criteria for the
separation of an official or employee from service under this Act shall be without prejudice to the application of
other relevant laws on accountability of public officers and employees, such as the Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officers and Employees and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Clearly, RA 9335 in no way violates the security of tenure of officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC. The
guarantee of security of tenure only means that an employee cannot be dismissed from the service for causes
other than those provided by law and only after due process is accorded the employee.31 In the case of RA
9335, it lays down a reasonable yardstick for removal (when the revenue collection falls short of the target by at
least 7.5%) with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting the level of collection. This standard is
analogous to inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties, a ground for disciplinary
action under civil service laws.32 The action for removal is also subject to civil service laws, rules and
regulations and compliance with substantive and procedural due process.
At any rate, this Court has recognized the following as sufficient standards: "public interest," "justice and
equity," "public convenience and welfare" and "simplicity, economy and welfare."33 In this case, the declared
policy of optimization of the revenue-generation capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC is infused with
public interest.
Separation Of Powers
Section 12 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 12. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. There is hereby created a Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee composed of seven Members from the Senate and seven Members from the House of
Representatives. The Members from the Senate shall be appointed by the Senate President, with at least two
senators representing the minority. The Members from the House of Representatives shall be appointed by the
Speaker with at least two members representing the minority. After the Oversight Committee will have
approved the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) it shall thereafter become functus officio and therefore
cease to exist.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee in RA 9335 was created for the purpose of approving the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) formulated by the DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and CSC. On May 22,
2006, it approved the said IRR. From then on, it became functus officio and ceased to exist. Hence, the issue of
its alleged encroachment on the executive function of implementing and enforcing the law may be considered
moot and academic.
This notwithstanding, this might be as good a time as any for the Court to confront the issue of the
constitutionality of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created under RA 9335 (or other similar laws
for that matter).
The scholarly discourse of Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno on the concept of congressional oversight in
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections34 is illuminating:
Concept and bases of congressional oversight
Broadly defined, the power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken by Congress to enhance its
understanding of and influence over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly, oversight
concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies are properly administered, (c) to eliminate executive
waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative authority, and (d) to assess executive
conformity with the congressional perception of public interest.
The power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in the grant of legislative power itself and integral to the
checks and balances inherent in a democratic system of government. x x x x x x x x x
Over the years, Congress has invoked its oversight power with increased frequency to check the perceived
"exponential accumulation of power" by the executive branch. By the beginning of the 20th century, Congress
has delegated an enormous amount of legislative authority to the executive branch and the administrative
agencies. Congress, thus, uses its oversight power to make sure that the administrative agencies perform their
functions within the authority delegated to them. x x x x x x x x x
Categories of congressional oversight functions
The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its oversight powers may be divided into three
categories, namely: scrutiny, investigation and supervision.
a. Scrutiny
Congressional scrutiny implies a lesser intensity and continuity of attention to administrative operations. Its
primary purpose is to determine economy and efficiency of the operation of government activities. In the
exercise of legislative scrutiny, Congress may request information and report from the other branches of
government. It can give recommendations or pass resolutions for consideration of the agency involved.
xxx xxx xxx
b. Congressional investigation
While congressional scrutiny is regarded as a passive process of looking at the facts that are readily available,
congressional investigation involves a more intense digging of facts. The power of Congress to conduct
investigation is recognized by the 1987 Constitution under section 21, Article VI, xxx xxx xxx
c. Legislative supervision
The third and most encompassing form by which Congress exercises its oversight power is thru legislative
supervision. "Supervision" connotes a continuing and informed awareness on the part of a congressional
committee regarding executive operations in a given administrative area. While both congressional scrutiny and
investigation involve inquiry into past executive branch actions in order to influence future executive branch
performance, congressional supervision allows Congress to scrutinize the exercise of delegated law-making
authority, and permits Congress to retain part of that delegated authority.
Congress exercises supervision over the executive agencies through its veto power. It typically utilizes veto
provisions when granting the President or an executive agency the power to promulgate regulations with the
force of law. These provisions require the President or an agency to present the proposed regulations to
Congress, which retains a "right" to approve or disapprove any regulation before it takes effect. Such legislative
veto provisions usually provide that a proposed regulation will become a law after the expiration of a certain
period of time, only if Congress does not affirmatively disapprove of the regulation in the meantime. Less
frequently, the statute provides that a proposed regulation will become law if Congress affirmatively approves
it.
Supporters of legislative veto stress that it is necessary to maintain the balance of power between the
legislative and the executive branches of government as it offers lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to
the executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the option to cancel particular exercise of such
power without having to pass new legislation or to repeal existing law. They contend that this arrangement
promotes democratic accountability as it provides legislative check on the activities of unelected administrative
agencies. One proponent thus explains:
It is too late to debate the merits of this delegation policy: the policy is too deeply embedded in our law and
practice. It suffices to say that the complexities of modern government have often led Congress-whether by
actual or perceived necessity- to legislate by declaring broad policy goals and general statutory standards,
leaving the choice of policy options to the discretion of an executive officer. Congress articulates legislative
aims, but leaves their implementation to the judgment of parties who may or may not have participated in or
agreed with the development of those aims. Consequently, absent safeguards, in many instances the reverse of
our constitutional scheme could be effected: Congress proposes, the Executive disposes. One safeguard, of
course, is the legislative power to enact new legislation or to change existing law. But without some means of
overseeing post enactment activities of the executive branch, Congress would be unable to determine whether
its policies have been implemented in accordance with legislative intent and thus whether legislative
intervention is appropriate.
Its opponents, however, criticize the legislative veto as undue encroachment upon the executive prerogatives.
They urge that any post-enactment measures undertaken by the legislative branch should be limited to scrutiny
and investigation; any measure beyond that would undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. They contend that legislative veto constitutes an impermissible evasion of the Presidents veto
authority and intrusion into the powers vested in the executive or judicial branches of government. Proponents
counter that legislative veto enhances separation of powers as it prevents the executive branch and
independent agencies from accumulating too much power. They submit that reporting requirements and
congressional committee investigations allow Congress to scrutinize only the exercise of delegated law-making
authority. They do not allow Congress to review executive proposals before they take effect and they do not
afford the opportunity for ongoing and binding expressions of congressional intent. In contrast, legislative veto
permits Congress to participate prospectively in the approval or disapproval of "subordinate law" or those
enacted by the executive branch pursuant to a delegation of authority by Congress. They further argue that
legislative veto "is a necessary response by Congress to the accretion of policy control by forces outside its
chambers." In an era of delegated authority, they point out that legislative veto "is the most efficient means
Congress has yet devised to retain control over the evolution and implementation of its policy as declared by
statute."
In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the validity of legislative
veto provisions. The case arose from the order of the immigration judge suspending the deportation of Chadha
pursuant to 244(c)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The United States House of Representatives
passed a resolution vetoing the suspension pursuant to 244(c)(2) authorizing either House of Congress, by
resolution, to invalidate the decision of the executive branch to allow a particular deportable alien to remain in
the United States. The immigration judge reopened the deportation proceedings to implement the House order
and the alien was ordered deported. The Board of Immigration Appeals dismissed the aliens appeal, holding
that it had no power to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress. The United States Court of Appeals for
Ninth Circuit held that the House was without constitutional authority to order the aliens deportation and that
244(c)(2) violated the constitutional doctrine on separation of powers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declared 244(c)(2) unconstitutional. But the Court shied away from the
issue of separation of powers and instead held that the provision violates the presentment clause and
bicameralism. It held that the one-house veto was essentially legislative in purpose and effect. As such, it is
subject to the procedures set out in Article I of the Constitution requiring the passage by a majority of both
Houses and presentment to the President. x x x x x x x x x
Two weeks after the Chadha decision, the Court upheld, in memorandum decision, two lower court decisions
invalidating the legislative veto provisions in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 and the Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act of 1980. Following this precedence, lower courts invalidated statutes containing
legislative veto provisions although some of these provisions required the approval of both Houses of Congress
and thus met the bicameralism requirement of Article I. Indeed, some of these veto provisions were not even
exercised.35 (emphasis supplied)
In Macalintal, given the concept and configuration of the power of congressional oversight and considering the
nature and powers of a constitutional body like the Commission on Elections, the Court struck down the
provision in RA 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) creating a Joint Congressional Committee. The
committee was tasked not only to monitor and evaluate the implementation of the said law but also to review,
revise, amend and approve the IRR promulgated by the Commission on Elections. The Court held that these
functions infringed on the constitutional independence of the Commission on Elections.36
With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it neither
necessarily constitutes an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws nor undermines the
constitutional separation of powers. Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government. It may in fact even enhance the separation of powers as it prevents the over-
accumulation of power in the executive branch.
However, to forestall the danger of congressional encroachment "beyond the legislative sphere," the
Constitution imposes two basic and related constraints on Congress.37 It may not vest itself, any of its
committees or its members with either executive or judicial power.38 And, when it exercises its legislative
power, it must follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution,39 including the procedure for enactment of laws and presentment.
Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure such as this should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In
particular, congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses
on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation40 and
(2) investigation and monitoring41 of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.42
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution.
Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the
proposed implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee
formed by it, retains a "right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect. As
such, a legislative veto in the form of a congressional oversight committee is in the form of an inward-turning
delegation designed to attach a congressional leash (other than through scrutiny and investigation) to an
agency to which Congress has by law initially delegated broad powers.43 It radically changes the design or
structure of the Constitutions diagram of power as it entrusts to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or
implementing its own laws.44
Congress has two options when enacting legislation to define national policy within the broad horizons of its
legislative competence.45 It can itself formulate the details or it can assign to the executive branch the
responsibility for making necessary managerial decisions in conformity with those standards.46 In the latter
case, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the hands of the
legislature.47 Thus, what is left for the executive branch or the concerned administrative agency when it
formulates rules and regulations implementing the law is to fill up details (supplementary rule-making) or
ascertain facts necessary to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rule-making).48
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to implement and interpret the law which they
are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect.49 Such rules and regulations partake
of the nature of a statute50 and are just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself. As such,
they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are
set aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.51 Congress, in the guise of assuming the
role of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers established by the Constitution. In exercising discretion to approve
or disapprove the IRR based on a determination of whether or not they conformed with the provisions of RA
9335, Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a power exclusively vested in this Court by the Constitution.
Considered Opinion of
Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga
Moreover, the requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected to approval by Congress as a
condition for their effectivity violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism and the rule on
presentment.52
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution states:
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (emphasis supplied)
Legislative power (or the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal laws)53 is vested in Congress which
consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. A valid exercise of legislative power
requires the act of both chambers. Corrollarily, it can be exercised neither solely by one of the two chambers
nor by a committee of either or both chambers. Thus, assuming the validity of a legislative veto, both a single-
chamber legislative veto and a congressional committee legislative veto are invalid.
Additionally, Section 27(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If
he approves the same, he shall sign it, otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the
House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it.
If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be
sent, together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of
each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the members voting for or against shall be
entered in its Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated
within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(emphasis supplied)
Every bill passed by Congress must be presented to the President for approval or veto. In the absence of
presentment to the President, no bill passed by Congress can become a law. In this sense, law-making under the
Constitution is a joint act of the Legislature and of the Executive. Assuming that legislative veto is a valid
legislative act with the force of law, it cannot take effect without such presentment even if approved by both
chambers of Congress.
In sum, two steps are required before a bill becomes a law. First, it must be approved by both Houses of
Congress.54 Second, it must be presented to and approved by the President.55 As summarized by Justice
Isagani Cruz56 and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.57, the following is the procedure for the approval of bills:
A bill is introduced by any member of the House of Representatives or the Senate except for some measures
that must originate only in the former chamber.
The first reading involves only a reading of the number and title of the measure and its referral by the Senate
President or the Speaker to the proper committee for study.
The bill may be "killed" in the committee or it may be recommended for approval, with or without
amendments, sometimes after public hearings are first held thereon. If there are other bills of the same nature
or purpose, they may all be consolidated into one bill under common authorship or as a committee bill.
Once reported out, the bill shall be calendared for second reading. It is at this stage that the bill is read in its
entirety, scrutinized, debated upon and amended when desired. The second reading is the most important
stage in the passage of a bill.
The bill as approved on second reading is printed in its final form and copies thereof are distributed at least
three days before the third reading. On the third reading, the members merely register their votes and explain
them if they are allowed by the rules. No further debate is allowed.
Once the bill passes third reading, it is sent to the other chamber, where it will also undergo the three readings.
If there are differences between the versions approved by the two chambers, a conference committee58
representing both Houses will draft a compromise measure that if ratified by the Senate and the House of
Representatives will then be submitted to the President for his consideration.
The bill is enrolled when printed as finally approved by the Congress, thereafter authenticated with the
signatures of the Senate President, the Speaker, and the Secretaries of their respective chambers59
The Presidents role in law-making.
The final step is submission to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the
required publication.60
Where Congress delegates the formulation of rules to implement the law it has enacted pursuant to sufficient
standards established in the said law, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it
leaves the hands of the legislature. And it may be deemed to have left the hands of the legislature when it
becomes effective because it is only upon effectivity of the statute that legal rights and obligations become
available to those entitled by the language of the statute. Subject to the indispensable requisite of publication
under the due process clause,61 the determination as to when a law takes effect is wholly the prerogative of
Congress.62 As such, it is only upon its effectivity that a law may be executed and the executive branch acquires
the duties and powers to execute the said law. Before that point, the role of the executive branch, particularly
of the President, is limited to approving or vetoing the law.63
From the moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its
members to play any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation
of powers and is thus unconstitutional. Under this principle, a provision that requires Congress or its members
to approve the implementing rules of a law after it has already taken effect shall be unconstitutional, as is a
provision that allows Congress or its members to overturn any directive or ruling made by the members of the
executive branch charged with the implementation of the law.
Following this rationale, Section 12 of RA 9335 should be struck down as unconstitutional. While there may be
similar provisions of other laws that may be invalidated for failure to pass this standard, the Court refrains from
invalidating them wholesale but will do so at the proper time when an appropriate case assailing those
provisions is brought before us.64
The next question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the unconstitutionality of Section 12 of RA 9335 on the
other provisions of the law? Will it render the entire law unconstitutional? No.
Section 13 of RA 9335 provides:
SEC. 13. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Act is declared invalid by a competent court, the
remainder of this Act or any provision not affected by such declaration of invalidity shall remain in force and
effect.
In Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy,65 the Court laid down the following rules:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is
valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability
clause in a statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete
nullity of the statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion
that it is fair to presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid statute, which
carries out the legislative intent. x x x
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected,
as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the
statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be
carried out as a whole and would not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them.
The separability clause of RA 9335 reveals the intention of the legislature to isolate and detach any invalid
provision from the other provisions so that the latter may continue in force and effect. The valid portions can
stand independently of the invalid section. Without Section 12, the remaining provisions still constitute a
complete, intelligible and valid law which carries out the legislative intent to optimize the revenue-generation
capability and collection of the BIR and the BOC by providing for a system of rewards and sanctions through the
Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board.
To be effective, administrative rules and regulations must be published in full if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The IRR of RA 9335 were published on May 30, 2006 in
two newspapers of general circulation66 and became effective 15 days thereafter.67 Until and unless the
contrary is shown, the IRR are presumed valid and effective even without the approval of the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee to approve the implementing rules and regulations of the law is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL and therefore NULL and VOID. The constitutionality of the remaining provisions of RA
9335 is UPHELD. Pursuant to Section 13 of RA 9335, the rest of the provisions remain in force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
PIMENTEL vs. CONGRESS
EN BANC
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUN 22 2004.
G. R. No. 163783 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. vs. Joint Committee of Congress to Canvass the Votes Cast for
President and Vice-President in the May 10, 2004 Elections.)
RESOLUTION
By the present Petition for Prohibition, petitioner Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring
null and void the continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress (Joint Committee) to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections following the adjournment of
Congress sine die on June 11, 2004. The petition corollarily prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
directing the Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any further proceedings pursuant to the
Rules of the Joint Public Session of Congress on Canvassing.
Petitioner posits that with "the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth Congress of its last
regular session, [its] term ... terminated and expired on the said day and the said Twelfth Congress serving the
term 2001 to 2004 passed out of legal existence." Henceforth, petitioner goes on, "all pending matters and
proceedings terminate upon the expiration of ... Congress." To advance this view, he relies on "legislative
procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne [out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress."
Given the importance of the constitutional issue raised and to put to rest all questions regarding the regularity,
validity or constitutionality of the canvassing of votes fro President and Vice-President in the recently concluded
national elections, this Court assumes jurisdiction over the instant petition pursuant to its power and duty "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government" under Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution and its original jurisdiction over petitions for prohibition under Section 5 of the same Article.
After a considered and judicious examination of the arguments raised by petitioner as well as those presented
in the Comments filed by the Solicitor General and respondent Joint Committee, this Court finds that the
petition has absolutely no basis under the Constitution and must, therefore, be dismissed.
Petitioner's claim that his arguments are buttressed by "legislative procedure, precedent or practice [as] borne
[out] by the rules of both Houses of Congress" is directly contradicted by Section 42 of Rule XIV of the Rules
adopted by the Senate, of which he is an incumbent member. This section clearly provides that the Senate shall
convene in joint session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President not later than thirty days after the day of the elections in accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Moreover, as pointed out in the Comment filed by the Senate Panel for respondent Joint Committee and that of
the Office of the Solicitor General, the precedents set by the 1992 and 1998 Presidential Elections do not
support the move to stop the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee, they citing the observations of
former Senate President Jovito Salonga.
Thus, during the 1992 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on May 25, 1992. On
June 16, 1992, the Joint Committee finished tallying the votes for President and Vice-President.[1]cralaw
Thereafter, on June 22, 1992, the Eighth Congress convened in joint public session as the National Board of
Canvassers, and on even date proclaimed Fidel V. Ramos and Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Vice-
President, respectively
Upon the other hand, during the 1998 Presidential elections, both Houses of Congress adjourned sine die on
May 25, 1998. The Joint Committee completed the counting of the votes for President and Vice-President on
May 27, 1998.[3]cralaw The Tenth Congress then convened in joint public session on May 29, 1998 as the
National Board of Canvassers and proclaimed Joseph Ejercito Estrada as President and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
as President and Vice-President, respectively
As for petitioner's argument that "the [e]xistence and [p]roceedings [o]f the Joint Committee of Congress [a]re
[i]nvalid, [i]llegal and [u]nconstitutional [f]ollowing the [a]djournment [s]ine [d]ie [o]f [b]oth Houses of Congress
[o]f [t]heir [r]egular [s]essions on June 11, 2004," he cites in support thereof Section 15, Article VI of the
Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. The Congress shall convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular session, unless
a different date is fixed by law, and shall continue to be in session for such number of days as it may determine
until thirty days before the opening of its next regular session, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal
holidays. The President may call a special session at any time.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, however, the term of the present Twelfth Congress did not terminate and
expire upon the adjournment sine die of the regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004.
Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution cited by petitioner does not pertain to the term of Congress, but to its
regular annual legislative sessions and the mandatory 30-day recess before the opening of its next regular
session (subject to the power of the President to call a special session at any time).
Section 4 of Article VIII also of the Constitution clearly provides that "[t]he term of office of the Senators shall
be six years and shall commence, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next
following their election." Similarly, Section 7 of the same Article provides that "[t]he Members of the House of
Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law,
at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." Consequently, there being no law to the
contrary, until June 30, 2004, the present Twelfth Congress to which the present legislators belong cannot be
said to have "passed out of legal existence."
The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have come to a close upon the final adjournment of its
regular sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as that of being the
National Board of Canvassers. In fact, the joint public session of both Houses of Congress convened by express
directive of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to proclaim the newly elected
President and Vice-President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it has accomplished its constitutionally
mandated tasks. For only when a board of canvassers has completed its functions is it rendered functus officio.
Its membership may change, but it retains its authority as a board until it has accomplished its purposes.
(Pelayo v. Commission on Elections, 23 SCRA 1374, 1385 [1968], citing Bautista v. Fugoso, 60 Phil. 383, 389
[1934] and Aquino v. Commission on Elections, L-28392, January 29 1968)
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the
duly elected President and Vice-President, its existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well as that of
the Joint Committee to which it referred the preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the certificates
of canvass, has not become functus officio.
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its report for the approval of the joint public session of
both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without need of call by the President to a special session.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED