Filip Kawczyski

University of Warsaw
filip.kawczynski@gmail.com

The Hybrid Theory of Reference for Proper

Names
Abstract: In this paper I present main ideas of the Hybrid Theory of Reference for
Proper Names. First, I try to define position of the Hybrid Theory within the
discussion about reference. Then I briefly explain most significant aspects of the
theory as they were defined by Gareth Evans. Apart from that, I also offer some
additions to the theory. The addition, I spend most space on concerns phrases that I
call mock names which are expressions that look like proper names but in fact are
nothing more than abbreviations for descriptions used attributively.

0. Introduction

The Hybrid Theory of Reference for Proper Names has arisen as a

response to Descriptivism on the one hand, and Kripkes Causal Theory
on the other both facing numerous difficulties. The Hybrid Theory
attempts to reconcile some notions of the former with some elements of
the latter. However, as we know, arranging familiar concepts into a new
order often results in rise of many brand new ideas; and that is very true
when considering the Hybrid Theory.
Although the discussion about reference of proper names lasts at least
since Freges famous paper On Sense and Reference, I suppose it is
still reasonable to remind central thesis of two main adversaries in the
dispute i.e. descriptivists on the one hand, and causal theorists on the
other. I believe that tension between Descriptivism and the Causal
Theory consists primarily in different attitudes towards role that
intentional content associated with a given name plays in determining
reference of the name.
Descriptivists claim that the intentional content is wherein the crux of
the matter of determining reference lies. Such content concerns
properties of the object being reference of a name. For instance, in the

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content which I intentionally associate with name Bertrand Russell it

is included that object which is reference of that name possesses a
property of being the author of On Denoting. It seems natural that
linguistic items which can be used to express such intentional content
are descriptions (e.g. the author of On Denoting). What is distinctive
for descriptivist point of view is the assumption that the entire
intentional content associated with a name N expressible by
descriptions uniquely identifies the object which is the reference of
N. The most important descriptivist thesis is that description (single
one or disjunction of many depending on a version of the theory)
associated with N determines which object should be considered as the
reference of N.
As we know from Kripke, Descriptivism is wrong. A few arguments
he presented against this theory in his book (1972) are commonly
considered as compelling.1 There is no need to recapitulate them in
details; in general, they all point at essential drawback Descriptivism
suffers from, which consists in laying too great emphasis on the role
played by intentional content in determining reference, while as
Kripke has shown it is not the case that intentional content is a crucial
factor in that process. In other words, descriptivists demand too much
from speakers using proper names in fact, we extremely rarely
associate with a name we use some content which really uniquely
identifies reference. Descriptions we are able to speak of some object
usually are not distinct enough to identify it in an unambiguous way.
Instead of the above descriptivist view Kripke proposed an idea
commonly known as the Causal Theory. According to this view
mechanism of proper names reference consists in causal communication
chains of reference-borrowing. A way in which chains work seems fairly
simple: if I hear someone using name Bertrand Russell as referring to
Bertrand Russell I can borrow the name (and thus, incorporate it into my
idiolect) and start using it on my own (as a competent user of it). In this

1
Three most famous of those arguments are: epistemic argument (from the lack of
knowledge, e.g. Feynman case), semantic argument (Gdel-Schmidt case) and
modal argument (from unwanted necessity).

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theory intentional aspect of using name is reduced to a very minimum

namely to a rule which may be called Dont change the reference rule.
The rule says that if I borrow a name from someone else I should have
an intention to use the name with the same reference with which person
from whom I have borrowed the name uses it.
As it was mentioned above, Kripke reproached decriptivists for
putting too much emphasis on intentional content; paradoxically, lack of
intentional aspect appears to be a nail in the coffin of his own theory.
There are several persuasive arguments against the Causal Theory and
they all unanimously show that the idea of chains of reference-
borrowing together with Dont change the reference rule cannot reveal
a full picture of reference of proper names.2 If the chains, that are devoid
of intentional content (strictly speaking: possess the minimum possible
intentional content), were everything what constitutes our using of
proper names, it is quite obvious that a lot can go wrong within such
chains. In other words, causal chains themselves are rather poor
mechanism of reference and if it would have been the case that they are
fully responsible for institution of using proper names, proper names
probably would have disappeared long ago as a weak link of the
evolution of language.
Thus, as we have seen, neither Descriptivism, nor the Causal Theory
seems to be correct. However, also neither of them appears to be
completely wrong. What can serve as an antidote for this awkward
situation might be and it is my firm belief that should be the Hybrid
Theory of Reference for Proper Names. Hybridists agree with
descriptivists that intentional content associated with a name serves a
significant function in determining reference of the name, yet disagree
with the descriptivist statement that it plays decisive role and thus, do
not agree with the claim saying that it is descriptions (expressing the
content) that entirely determine the reference. On the other hand,

2
In my opinion three most powerful arguments against Kripke's theory are:
1) argument from the change of reference (famous Madagascar case) see
Evans (1973); 2) argument from the lack of competence see Evans (1973) and
Putnam (1973); 3) argument from the lack of causal link see Searle (1983).

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hybridist follows Kripkean theorys adherent in saying that there are

some communication chains of reference-exchange. However, paths of
causal theorists and hybrid theorists diverge when it comes to
considering intentionality; while the former states that Dont change the
reference rule is enough, the latter says something exactly opposite
namely that some more intentional aspect than the above rule is
necessary for building up a complete and correct picture of how proper
names work.
Basic groundwork for the Hybrid Theory I would like to stand up for
has been laid by Evans in his influential book (1982). I think that
conceptual framework established by Evans is by and large correct,
however, it requires numerous additions in various places. Now I would
like to briefly present key notions of the theory, as formulated by Evans,
and also offer some further developments of the Hybrid Theory.

1. Practice

Evans very aptly remarked that one of the most distinctive features of
proper names was that they were always used within some practice of
using a given name as referring to a given object.3 Moreover, proper
names are the only expressions that require such specific practice.
Imagine I utter a sentence The tallest man who took part in Round
Table Agreement prefers tea to coffee. About the description the tallest
man who took part in RTA we can reasonably assume that this is the
first time whoever uses it however, it inflicts no harm to correctness
and comprehensibility of my utterance. Although I use the description
for the first time in history, it still refers to the tallest man who took part
in RTA (if there was such a person).4 Now we can conceive that I utter:
Mr. Burlesque prefers coffee to tea. If no one has ever been named

3
The notion of practice is intentionally left without a definition. However, it is
reasonable to consider in a sense the whole Hybrid Theory as a lengthy
contextual definition of that notion.
4
Furthermore, in my utterance I speak truly or falsely of the tallest man who took
part in RTA that he prefers tea to coffee.

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with the word burlesque, i.e. there is no established practice of using

that word as referring to some particular person, my utterance cannot
count as a correct use of language at all, because it is not defined to
whom Mr. Burlesque refers. In such a case, the utterance should be
qualified rather as some pseudo-use of language (as Strawson would put
it). Thus, in the situation involving description although there is no
special practice of using the phrase the tallest man... we still deal with
correct and comprehensible use of language; on the contrary, we did not
use the word burlesque as if it were a proper name. Broadly speaking,
if a particular use of a proper name is about to be successful, it must be
preceded with a specified range of preliminary uses, i.e. a practice of
using a word as a proper name referring to some particular object must
be established. Uses (from among preliminary uses) that are essential for
establishing practice are those involved in defining some word as a
proper name of some object. They can take very diverse shapes; we can
say I name this ship Bertrand (as uttered together with a pointing
gesture) as well as I name the heaviest ship in the port of Rotterdam
Bertrand or even Bertrand is the heaviest ship in the port of
Rotterdam. All of those I call after Devitt (1981) Naming Sentences
(NS in short).5 NSs are not only those sentences that occur in situation
of naming (or baptizing). As a NS should also be qualified every
sentence including new proper name uttered until the practice in
question may be considered as established. It is impossible to pinpoint
exact moment when practice becomes established but I think it is not a
serious disadvantage of the Hybrid Theory. I believe it is enough to say
what Evans has said on this issue, namely that a practice of referring to
some object with name N is established when members of the practice
regularly use N when they want to refer to that object; in other words
when the object is known as N among them (Evans 1982: 376-377).
The most important thing to say about NSs is that they always include

5
Naming itself has not been exhaustively analysed by Evans (neither by other
names theorists). I have carried on such in-depth analysis of various types of
naming, yet because of limited space here, its presentation must be put off to
another paper.

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phrase fixing reference to the object which is bearer of a name. A

definite description (e.g. the heaviest ship in the port of Rotterdam) or
a pronoun (e.g. this accompanied by a gesture) can play such a role.
Regardless of the shape NS actually takes, it is always used by a
producer of a practice. The distinction between producers and
consumers of a practice is another key notion of the Hybrid Theory.

2. Producers, consumers and reference borrowing

There is some intuitive and indubitable difference between my using

name of my wife (whom I perceive every day) and the using of that
name by my friend who has never seen my wife and knows her only
from the stories I tell him by phone. On the other hand, some other
doubts may appear as a result of comparing my uses of the name of my
wife with my uses of the names like Aristotle or Shakespeare (i.e.
names of the people to whom I have never borne any direct epistemic
relation, see Taasiewicz 2009). I think that Evans drew the distinction
for two different roles played by members of a practice i.e. producer's
role and consumer's role in order to avoid above mentioned doubts
emerging from different kinds of epistemic relation that may occur
between people using proper name and object being bearer of that name.
Let us see now how a new practice takes off. Imagine a group of
people who want to talk about (and thus to refer to) a certain object X.
They are acquainted with X, i.e. they perceive it with their senses. The
content of some of their mental states emerge from perceiving that
object. If the speakers would like to express their beliefs about X they
could use definite descriptions or pronouns, but if they really cared about
exchanging thoughts about X, they would probably try to introduce a
proper name for it. Thus, they start to provide a new practice of using a
name, let us say N as referring to X. Such members of the practice are
its producers.6 As I mentioned earlier, all sentences that producers use to
constitute the new practice belong to the class of NSs. It is now worthy
6
As I said in the previous footnote, I intentionally do not expand considerations
concerning naming here.

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to emphasize again that every NS must include as its component an

expression correctly fixing reference to the object being named. By
saying correctly, I mean that it is the case that all producers want to
name the same object and they use words referring to the very object
indeed.
Thus, producers are those members of a practice who start the practice
and develop it to a grown-up level. What is distinctive about producers
is that they inject into the practice some new information concerning the
bearer of a given name. The issue of the kind of information delivered
by producers has not been discussed by Evans, and in my opinion the
character of that information should be specified. I propose to define the
kind of information specific for producers as data. Data would be the
information about object gained in virtue of the acquaintance with that
thing.7 If someone was perceiving a ship made of wood, that verity (that
the ship is wooden) would be a datum for him; however, when he passed
on that verity to somebody else (who was not acquainted with the ship),
for the latter person it would become information. Only producers know
directly the object that is about to be named, therefore only they can
introduce some new data about it into the new practice of calling it N.
However, of course, they can also inject into the practice some non-data
information.
Persons who are not acquainted with the bearer of a given name, and
ipso facto do not inject new data, are called consumers. At the early
stage of a practice, consumers are introduced by producers while as the
practice grows, new consumers more and more often will be introduced
by other consumers. There are different ways of introducing; the most
common is via sentences of the form N is the (as uttered by
introducer) where the is a definite description uniquely identifying
individual (X). Evans accurately remarks that:

When someone hears the claim N is the , and takes N to be an ordinary

proper name, he supposes that there is (or was) a person going about the world
known as N; and that the claim embodies not only information that there is

7
Class of data is a subset of class of information.

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something that is uniquely , but also an identification of that object as the

object known as N. (Evans 1982: 378)

Recipient of the introducing sentence can deduce from it, inter alia, that
there is some object X that is known as N, thus there is a practice of
dubbing X N. It might be said that the hearer is an eye-witness (or
rather an ear-witness) to the existence of such practice. Evans claim is
important, because it aptly accounts for how we in fact use proper
names.8

3. How to distinguish practices?

A natural question to ask now is how to identify in which practice a

speaker takes part when he uses a name N? In other words, how to
distinguish various practices as separate?
Doubtlessly, identifying the occurring name is not enough here. Words
themselves can be identified syntactically by qualifying them to relevant
types. However, it is extremely common case when tokens of the same
name-type occur as referring to different objects and thus they for sure
belong to separate practices. For instance, name Filip refers to me, yet
it also refers to countless other men and we certainly would not be
willing to count every use of token belonging to type Filip as part of
the same single practice.
Similarly, identifying the bearer of a given name is not enough. I am
the bearer of the name Filip but I can also be the bearer of many
various nicknames, e.g. someone may dub me Mr. Proper Name. We
definitely would not agree for judging use of Filip and use of Mr.
Proper Name both referring to the same object, me as belonging to
one practice.
What may seem less obvious, identifying name and bearer together
will not solve our puzzle too. Consider a following double-life scenario.
There is a practice of calling me Filip. People who take part in this

8
It also shows how vicious are phrases that I describe as mock names in further
part of this paper.

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practice possess some information about me, e.g. that I am interested in

philosophy of language or that I am thin, I have dark hair, and so on. By
day I lead a peaceful life of thin and dark-haired philosopher, however,
by night I become a spy in some secret service. As I work there, I put
pillows under my clothes and wear a blonde wig to change my look. It is
widely known that spies have nicknames, and because I try to be very
clever and cunning I decided to take my original name as a nickname. In
effect people with whom I work as a spy know me as Filip, who is
stocky and blonde. Thus, people who know me by day call me Filip
and collaborators in secret service also call me Filip. However, even
though both by day and by night we deal with tokens of the same name
and with the exactly same person as reference of the name, I think that it
is perfectly reasonable to speak of two distinct practices. One practice is
run by day, and the other by night.
What then can enable us to distinguish practice occurring by day from
the one led by night? The name and the person in question are the same.
Yet, what changes from the former context to the latter is the set of
information concerning the name and the bearer circulating amid
practices' members. The set of information circulating by day includes
that I am thin and dark-haired while the night one that I am stocky and
blonde. Two different sets of information define two separate practices.
Thus, identifying sets of information is a key to identify distinct
practices.

4. Two main thesis concerning reference

Every theory of reference for proper names has to explain how the
reference mechanism works, i.e. what determines that a given use of a
name refers to this and not to other particular object. I believe that
the Hybrid Theory found the golden mean between orthodoxies of
Descriptivism and the Causal Theory. Undoubtedly, users of a name do
have some beliefs that they associate with the name as well as with its
bearer. However, this information does not have to be decisive for
determining which object is reference of the name. There is no need to

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know a single fact uniquely identifying Feynman to be able to refer to

him with name Feynman.9 On the other hand, acquiring an ability to
refer is definitely not as facile as Kripke claimed it to be and the
information about bearer of the name is not redundant in the presence of
causal communication chains.
Now I would like to present two main theses of the Hybrid Theory
concerning the way in which the mechanism of proper names reference
works. The first thesis was offered by Evans and the second one is mine.

I. Information possessed by a speaker about the bearer of a name N

does not determine which object the speaker refers to when using the
name; however, it determines which practice the speakers use of the
name belongs to (see Evans 1982: 384).

II. Which object speaker refers to when using a name N is determined

by that which object has been named with N during naming that has
initiated that practice of using N to which speakers use belongs.

I cannot go into details here, but the Hybrid Theory based on two above
theses is able to solve some traditional problems concerning proper
names, like Freges puzzle, empty names issue or difficulty with
sentences about existence (with proper name as a subject). On the other
hand, the Hybrid Theory stays completely insensitive to arguments
advanced against both Descriptivism and the Causal Theory (listed in the
Introduction).

5. Mock proper names

In this section, I would like to present one of the additions to the Hybrid
Theory that I believe is quite an interesting and significant extension of
the theory.
In the above-cited passage, Evans (1982) uses the phrase ordinary
9
I refer here, of course, to the famous Kripkes Feynman case from the second
lecture of his (1972).

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proper names, but he does not explain in the book what it means for a
proper name to be an ordinary one and what differentiates ordinary
proper names from not-ordinary ones.
I expand Evans' theory to say that the great majority of proper names
are ordinary proper names. Filip, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Warsaw,
etc. these are all ordinary proper names. However, I claim that there
are some words that look like (or behave like) proper names, but there is
something vicious about them that leads me to define them as mock
proper names. Mock proper names are those for which the reference
mechanism can be fully explained by Descriptivism, since they are
nothing more than abbreviations of descriptions. To clarify my claim we
need to move back to the naming act.
The crux of naming is fixing the reference to the object which is about
to be named. Thus, it is very important for NSs to include some phrase
that correctly fixes the reference. There is several ways of fixing
reference and one of them is to use a definite description uniquely
identifying the object in question. As we know since Donnellans works
(see his 1966 and 1968) definite descriptions can occur within either
attributive or referential use. Very briefly speaking, description is used
attributively when its descriptive content plays a decisive role in
determining which object is the reference of that description. When we
use description in attributive way we do not want to refer to some
particular object but to whichever object that possesses property
mentioned in the description. When we see Smiths corpse and say
Smiths murderer is insane, we do not have an intention to refer to
some particular person, but to whoever who in fact murdered Smith (see
Donnellan 1966: 285-286). It might be said that in attributive use of a
description it is the property mentioned in the description that is
important, while the object referenced is considered for the sake of
having that property. On the contrary, in referential use it is the object
what is most significant whereas content concerning some property stays
peripheral. Imagine I see a man at the party and utter the sentence The
man drinking whisky wears an awful tie; in such case it does not matter
whether that man drinks whisky or ice tea I refer to this particular man

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and speak truly or falsely of him that he wears an awful tie (for
expanded considerations concerning attributive and referential uses of
descriptions see my paper 2007).10
My claim is that every time we deal with naming via some ordinary
proper name, if a description plays a role of element fixing reference to
the object being named, the description is used referentially. On the
other hand, if a description used attributively is used to fix the reference,
then we deal with a mock proper name.
Suppose, I am a researcher of aquatic fauna and I am especially
interested in stating something about the heaviest fish in the Black Sea; I
can naturally use description the heaviest fish in the Black Sea to do
that. I believe that judging such use of description as attributive does not
arouse any controversy I do not want to talk about some particular fish,
but about whichever animal possesses the property of being the heaviest
fish in the Black Sea; so I may utter, for instance: The heaviest fish in
the Black Sea weighs less than the lightest elephant in Africa. However,
if using description by some reason appears inconvenient to me, I may
try to create a short cut of the description and say Lets call the heaviest
fish in the Black Sea Oscar.11 Then, in my opinion, I do not introduce
some new ordinary proper name, but some mock name. No actual act of
naming took place; what I did in fact was create a definition: Oscar =df
object possessing property of being the heaviest ship in the Black Sea
(whichever it is). As a result, Oscar looks like an ordinary proper
name, but it is just a mock name an abbreviation for description used
attributively. If somewhere in depth of the Black Sea some rather slight
but very predatory fish devoured Oscar in whole, we would not, I
suppose, have any problem claiming that from this moment on the name
Oscar refers to that predatory fish. Both before and after the change of
reference of the description the heaviest fish in the Black Sea we could
use the sentence The heaviest fish in the Black Sea weighs less than the
lightest elephant in Africa and in both cases we would express exactly

10
Thus, it does not matter whether the description the man drinking whisky is
satisfied by the person I want to talk about.
11
This is modified version of the example from Devitt (1981: 40-41).

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the same proposition, namely that the relation of weighing less than
occurs between some object as having some property (of being the
heaviest fish in the Black Sea) and some other object as having another
property (of being the lightest elephant in Africa).
It seems entirely reasonable to ask whether mock names are proper
names at all. They do not serve a function that is distinctive for proper
names, namely that with a proper name we always refer to the same
particular object. As we have seen, mock names do not refer to particular
object at every time, but rather to the object which satisfies relevant
description at the time of using the mock name. However, independently
of whether we would like to qualify mock names as proper names or not,
mock names exist in our language (although they are extremely less
common than ordinary proper names). Words like Zeus, Jack the
Ripper, and probably also Homer are examples of mock names. They
refer to whichever object has some particular feature; for instance,
Zeus refers to any object that is Greek king of the gods, is the ruler of
Mount Olympus, and so on.

References

Devitt, Michael 1981. Designation. Columbia University Press, New York.

Donnellan, Keith 1966. Reference and Definite Descriptions. The Philosophical
Review 75: 3, 281-304.
Donnellan, Keith 1968. Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again. The
Philosophical Review 77: 2, 203-215.
Evans, Gareth 1973. The Causal Theory of Names. Aristotelian Society
Supplementary 47, 187-208.
Evans, Gareth 1982. The Varieties of Reference. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Kawczyski, Filip 2007. O atrybutywnych i referencyjnych uyciach deskrypcji
okrelonych. Filozofia Nauki 60: 4, 15-35.
Kripke, Saul 1972. Naming and Necessity. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
Putnam, Hilary 1973. Explanation and Reference. In: Maynard Patrick (ed.),
Conceptual Change, Dordecht: Riedel, 199-221.

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Searle, John 1983. Intentionality. An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press.
Taasiewicz, Mieszko 2009. Nazwy wasne a uycia imienne. Filozofia Nauki,
(forthcoming).

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