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REPUBLIC VS ORBECIDO G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005

Facts:
In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myro Villanueva in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
In 1986, Orbecido discovered that his wife had had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Orbecido learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree
and married an American. Orbecido filed with the Trial Court a petition for Authority to
Remarry invoking Article 26 Paragraph 2 of the Family Code, the Court granted the petition.
The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought for
reconsideration but it was denied by the Trial Court.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of the respondent was proven as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.

Held:
Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading
it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.
Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article
26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter into
another marriage. However, in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and
on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who
was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an
American, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made
properly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial
Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

Suntay vs. Suntay GR No. 132524

Facts:
Petitioner Federico is the oppositor to respondent Isabels Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A. Suntay who had died without leaving a will. The
decedent is the wife of Federico and the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father, Emilio, had
predeceased his mother Cristina. The marriage of Isabels parents had previously been declared
by the CFI as null and void.Federico anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging, based on
Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has no right to succeed by right of representation as she is an
illegitimate child. The trial court had denied Federicos Motion to Dismiss, hence this petition
for certiorari. Federico contends that, inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the decision
declaring the marriage of Isabels parents null and void be upheld.

Issue:
In case of conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof,
which should prevail? Related thereto, was the marriage of Isabels parents a case of a void or
voidable marriage? Whether or not Isabel is a legitimate child?

Held:
Petition dismissed. Art. 10 of the Civil Code states that in case of doubt in the
interpretation and application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail. This is also applicable and binding upon courts in relation to its judgment.
While the dispositive portion of the CFI decision states that the marriage be declared null and
void, the body had shown that the legal basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code, which was in
effect at the time. Art. 85 enumerates the causes for which a marriage may be annulled. As such
the conflict between the body and the dispositive portion of the decision may be reconcilable as
noted by the Supreme Court. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages
is that void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. The effects of void marriages,
with respect to property relations of the spouses are provided for under Article 144 of the Civil
Code. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the
same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children under Article 89
irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On
the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it
is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. Juridically, the
annulment of a marriage dissolves the special contract as if it had never been entered into but the
law makes express provisions to prevent the effects of the marriage from being totally wiped out.
The status of children born in voidable marriages is governed by the second paragraph of
Article89 which provides that: Children conceived of voidable marriages before the decree of
annulment shall be considered legitimate; and children conceived thereafter shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children, and are also called natural
children by legal fiction. In view thereof, the status of Isabel would be covered by the second
paragraph of Article 89 of the Civil Code which provides that children conceived of voidable
marriages before the decree of annulment shall be considered legitimate.
SY vs CA [G.R. No. 142293. February 27, 2003] VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO,
6BS TRUCKING CORPORATION, and SBT TRUCKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT, respondents.

Facts:
Private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a truck helper for petitioners family-
owned trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. Throughout all the changes in names and
for 36 years, private respondent continuously served the trucking business of petitioners. When
Sahot was already 59 years old, he had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various
ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance
of his task as a driver. Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. On May 27th,
he was medically examined and treated for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II),
HPM, UTI, Osteoarthritis and heart enlargement. On said grounds, Belen Paulino of the SBT
Trucking Service management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At the
end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month of
June, 1994. It was at this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment
should he refuse to go back to work. They carried out their threat and dismissed him from work,
effective June 30, 1994. He ended up sick, jobless and penniless.
On September 13, 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a
complaint for illegal dismissal for recovery of separation pay against Vicente Sy and Trinidad
Paulino-Sy, Belen Paulino, Vicente Sy Trucking, T. Paulino Trucking Service, 6Bs Trucking
and SBT Trucking, herein petitioners.
Petitioners, on their part, claimed that sometime prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on
leave and was not able to report for work for almost seven days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked
permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30, 1994. It appeared that from the
expiration of his leave, private respondent never reported back to work nor did he file an
extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the trucking
company and its owners. Petitioners add that due to Sahots refusal to work after the expiration
of his authorized leave of absence, he should be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his
work. They contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his leave or at least inform petitioners
of his health condition.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the company. It held that Sahot failed to return to
work. However, upon appeal, the NLRC modified the LAs decision, ruling that Sahot did not
abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article
284 of the Labor Code.

Issue:
Whether or not there was valid termination of employment due to his illness.

Held:
 The SC held that although illness can be a valid ground for terminating an employee, the
dismissal was invalid. Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an
employee on the ground of disease. However, in order to validly terminate employment on this
ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
requires:
Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and
his continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his
co-employees, the employer shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical treatment. If the
disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee
but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his
former position immediately upon the restoration of his normal health.
The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be
dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the
employer of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public policy in
the protection of labor. In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical
certificate requirement before Sahots dismissal was effected. Since the burden of proving the
validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should likewise bear
the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been
complied with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health
authority, this Court has ruled against the validity of the employees dismissal. It is therefore
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the quantum of evidence required by law
that petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal; otherwise,
the dismissal would be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere
conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be
founded on clearly established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work. In addition,
we must likewise determine if the procedural aspect of due process had been complied with by
the employer. From the records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was not observed
in the separation of private respondent by the management of the trucking company. The
employer is required to furnish an employee with two written notices before the latter is
dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his
dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the
employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity
to answer and to be heard on his defense. These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record
purposes. What management did was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually
implement the threat when the occasion presented itself because of private respondents painful
left thigh. All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process were violated.
Clearly, therefore, Sahots dismissal is tainted with invalidity. Petition is denied. 63.
REPUBLIC VS. CA 236 SCRA 257

Facts:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order the marital status before
leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila. Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them
prior to the solemnization of their marriage. The trial court denied the petition holding that the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non- issuance of a marriage license prior to
the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage
license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue:
Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

Held:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the essential
requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a
city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of the
former.

Cario vs Cario Susan Nicdao Cario vs. Susan Yee Cario GR No. 132529
Facts:
SPO4 Santiago Cario married petitioner Susan Nicdao on June 20, 1969, with whom he
had two children, Sahlee and Sandee. On November 10, 1982, SPO4 Cario also married
respondent Susan Yee. In 1988, SPO4 Cario became bedridden due to diabetes and
tuberculosis, and died on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his
medical and burial expenses. Both Susans filed claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance from various government agencies pertaining to the deceased. Nicdao was able to
collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCVI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-ibig, while Yee
received a total of P21,000 from GSIS burial and SSS burial insurance. On December 14, 1993,
Yee filed for collection of money against NIcdao, praying that Nicdao be ordered to return to her
at least one-half of the P146,000 NIcdao had collected. For failing to file her answer, Nicdao was
declared in default. Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the
subsistence of and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage
between Nicdao and Cario. But she claimed good faith, having no knowledge of the previous
marriage until at the funeral where she met Nicdao who introduced herself as the wife of the
deceased. Yee submitted that Carios marriage to Nicdao was void because it was solemnized
without the required marriage license.

Issues:
Whether or not the subsequent marriage is null and void; Whether or not, if yes to above,
the wife of the deceased is entitled to collect the death benefits from government agencies
despite the nullity of their marriage.

Held:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked
for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes
of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to
be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However,
for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a
criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. Under the Civil Code
which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, and the absence therof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. It does not follow, however, that since the
marriage of Nicdao and the deceased was void ab initio, the death benefits would now be
awarded to Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void,
before a party can enter into a second marriage; otherwise, the second marriage would also be
void. One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property.

SALITA V MAGTOLIS 233 SCRA 100 JUNE 13, 1994

Facts:
Erwin Espinosa (32) and Joselita Salita (22) were married on January 25, 1986. Separated
in1988 and Erwin sued for annulment on the basis of psychological incapacity - also moved for
bill of particulars.

Issue:
Whether bill of particulars submitted by Erwin is of sufficient definiteness to enable
petitioner to properly prepare her responsive pleading

Held:
YES. SC held that the bill of particulars filed by Erwin is sufficient to state a cause of
action. Private respondent already alleged that petitioner is unable to understand and accept the
demands made by his profession (upon his time and efforts). To demand more detail would be
asking for information on evidentiary facts.SC sees no need to define or limit the scope of Art.
36 of the Family Code since the actual issue is with the sufficiency of the bill of particulars.
AFFIRMED CA DECISION.

Santos vs. Ca G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

Facts:
Plaintiff Leouel Santos married defendant Julia Bedia on September 20, 1986. On May
18 1988, Julia left for the U.S. She did not communicate with Leouel and did not return to the
country. In 1991, Leoul filed with the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for voiding the
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC dismissed the
complaint and the CA affirmed the dismissal.

Issue:
Does the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him, for
more than five years constitute psychological incapacity?

Held:
 No, the failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with her husband Leouel for
more than five years does not constitute psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity must
be characterized by (a) GRAVITY (b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE (c) INCURABILITY
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Art. 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem. PETITION IS DENIED

REPUBLIC VS. DAGDAG 351 SCRA 425

Facts:
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag,
20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage
certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on
October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on
October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without
explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then
disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees
with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her. In October 1993, he left
his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July
1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located,
summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation.
On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda
testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness. The trial court issued an Order
giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he
would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation,
the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an
investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. However, he intended to
intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating
prosecutors manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void
under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the
ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the
trial court holding that Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he
failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally
immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.

Issue:
Did the CA correctly declare the marriage as null and void under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground that the husband suffers from psychological incapacity, as he is emotionally
immature and irresponsible, a habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice?

Held:
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a
marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of law, on the facts of the case. Each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on all fours with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible,
avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court. In REPUBLIC VS. MOLINA (268
SCRA 198), the Court laid down the GUIDELINES in the interpretation of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Taking into consideration these guidelines, it is evident that Erlinda failed to
comply with the above-mentioned evidentiary requirements. Erlinda failed to comply with
guideline number 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to
the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Further, the allegation that the husband is a
fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. In fact, the crime for which he was arrested was
not even alleged. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present
controverting evidence since the trial courts decision was prematurely rendered.

REPUBLIC V. MOLINA

Facts:
 Roridel & Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church.
They had a son, Andre Molina. A year after the marriage, Reynaldo started manifesting signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility: (1) spent more time with his friends (2) depended on his parents
for aid & assistance (3) not honest with the finances (4) relieved of his job making Roridel the
breadwinner of the family. Roridel went to live with his parents and afterwards, Reynaldo
abandoned her and the child. Roridel filed a case for the declaration of nullity of their marriage
by virtue of her husbands psychological incapacity. Reynaldo claims that Roridels strange
behavior, refusal to perform marital duties & failure to run the household & handle finances
caused their quarrels. Roridel on the other hand claims that her husband is immature,
irresponsible, dependent, disrespectful, arrogant, chronic liar & infidel. He now lives with a
mistress with whom he has a child.

Issue:
WON Reynaldo is psychologically incapacitated?

Held:
NO. Marriage is valid. RATIO: 1. They seem to have a difficulty or outright refusal or
neglect in performing their obligations. Theyre not incapable of doing them. 2. Failure of their
expectations is not tantamount to psychological incapacity. 3. Guidelines for Art. 36 a. Burden of
proof to show nullity of marriage: plaintiff. Presumption of existence of marriage over its
dissolution & nullity. b. Root cause of incapacity should be: medically/clinically defined, alleged
in complaint, proven by experts, clearly explained in decision. c. Existing at time of celebration
of marriage. d. Medically/clinically permanent or incurable, whether absolute or relative.
Incapacity directly related to assumption of marital obligations, doesnt include incapacity in
profession, etc. e. Grave to render them incapable. Not mere refusal, neglect or difficulty or ill
will. f. Essential obligations outlined in FC Art. 68-71 and 220, 221, 225. State non-compliance
in petition with evidence, include in decision. g. Consider National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines interpretations. Not binding should be given
respect since this law originated from Canon law. Harmonize civil law w/religious faith. h.
Prosecuting attorney/fiscal and Sol. Gen. will appear as counsels for the state. They should
submit certification within 15 days from submission of case for resolution.

Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave
birth on November 16, 1987. In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite.
After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to
celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she
learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did not bother to see her nor their
child. Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained
unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of
summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his
answer. Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a
motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for investigation.

Issue:
Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.

Held:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Toshios act of abandonment
was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would
have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified
Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a
person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical
illness. Hence, Toshio was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.

Tuason vs. CA GR No. 116607

Facts:
In 1989, private respondent Maria Victoria L. Tuason filed with the RTC branch 149 of
Makati a petition for annulment or declaration of nullity of her marriage to petitioner Emilio
Tuason. In her complaint, Maria alleged that she and Emilio were married on June 3, 1972 and as
a result begot two children and at the time of the marriage Emilio Tuason was already
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligation which became
manifest afterward and resulted in violent fights between them. Maria also alleged that Emilio is
a drug user and a womanizer that in 1984 he left the conjugal hoome and cohabitated with three
women in succession. After he left the conjugal dwelling he gave minimal support to the family
and even refused to pay for the tuition of his children compelling Maria to accept donations and
dole-outs from her family and friends. Emilio likewise became spendrift and abused his
administration of the conjugal partnership.

Issues:
1. whether or not Maria's claim that Emilio was already psychologically incapacitated at
the time of the marriage and becomes manifest only after their marriage is a valid ground for
nullity of their marriage
2. whether or not Emilio Tuason's claim that he was deprived of due process is correct.

Held:
1. Yes. Emilio Tuason failed to present witnesses or evidences that would prove his
innocense that led to the court's decision to declare their marriage void under Art. 36 of the
Family Code nasedon the evidences presented by Maria Tuason
2. No because his failure to inform or to notify the courtabout his confinement or medical
treatment therefrom is negligence which is not excusable that led the court to deny his petition.

Sin vs. Sin GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001

Facts:
Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese citizen in January 1987.
Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
Trial ensued and the parties presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In
June 1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the State did not
participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with the trial court a manifestation dated
November 1994 stating that he found no collusion between the parties, he did not actively
participated therein. Other than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard
of him.

Issue:
Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the absence of the
participation of the State in the proceedings.

Held:
Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it
to appear on behalf of the state to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take
care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification briefly stating
his reasons for his agreement or opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are
bereft of an evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the case is
remanded for proper trial.

Pacete vs Carriaga 231 SCRA 321

Facts:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979, for the Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage between her erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la Concepcion, as well
as for legal separation between her and Pacete, accounting and separation of property. She
averred in her complaint that she was married to Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child
named Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a second marriage with Clarita de la
Concepcion and that she learned of such marriage only on August 1979. Reconciliation between
her and Pacete was impossible since he evidently preferred to continue living with Clarita. The
defendants were each served with summons. They filed an extension within which to file an
answer, which the court partly granted. Due to unwanted misunderstanding, particularly in
communication, the defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by the court. Thereafter,
the plaintiff filed a motion to declare the defendants in default, which the court forthwith
granted. The court received plaintiffs evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20, 21,
and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,
1980.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioners motion for
extension of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in default and in rendering its
decision on March 17, 1980 which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and Alanis and held to
be null and void the marriage of Pacete to Clarita.

Held:
The Civil Code provides that no decree of legal separation shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion between parties
exists. If there is no collusion, the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order to
take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not fabricated. The above stated provision calling
for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of uncontested proceedings for legal separation
(and of annulment of marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that marriage is more than a
mere contract. Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the Family Code, further
mandates that an action for legal separation must in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition, obviously in order to provide the parties a cooling-
off period. In this interim, the court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of the law is further or underscored by the
inclusion of a provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which provides that no defaults in
actions for annulments of marriage or for legal separation. Therefore, if the defendant in an
action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is
not fabricated.

Perez v CA G.R. No. 112329. January 28, 2000 J. Ynares-Santiago

Facts:
Primitivo B. Perez had been insured with the BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation for
P20,000.00. Sometime in October 1987, an agent of the insurance corporation, visited Perez in
Quezon and convinced him to apply for additional insurance coverage of P50,000.00. Virginia
A. Perez, Primitivos wife, paid P2,075.00 to the agent. The receipt issued indicated the amount
received was a "deposit." Unfortunately, the agent lost the application form accomplished by
Perez and he asked the latter to fill up another application form. The agent sent the application
for additional insurance of Perez to the Quezon office. Such was supposed to forwarded to the
Manila office. Perez drowned. His application papers for the additional insurance of P50,000.00
were still with the Quezon. It was only after some time that the papers were brought to Manila.
Without knowing that Perez died, BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation approved the application
and issued the corresponding policy for the P50,000.00. Petitioner Virginia Perez went to Manila
to claim the benefits under the insurance policies of the deceased. She was paid P40,000.00
under the first insurance policy for P20,000.00 but the insurance company refused to pay the
claim under the additional policy coverage of P50,000.00, the proceeds of which amount to
P150,000.00. The insurance company maintained that the insurance for P50,000.00 had not been
perfected at the time of the death of Primitivo Perez. Consequently, the insurance company
refunded the amount paid. BF Lifeman Insurance Corporation filed a complaint against Virginia
Perez seeking the rescission and declaration of nullity of the insurance contract in question.
Petitioner Virginia A. Perez, on the other hand, averred that the deceased had fulfilled all his
prestations under the contract and all the elements of a valid contract are present. On October 25,
1991, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner ordering respondent to pay 150,000
pesos. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision of the trial court saying that the
insurance contract for P50,000.00 could not have been perfected since at the time that the policy
was issued, Primitivo was already dead. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been
denied by respondent court, the instant petition for certiorari was filed on the ground that there
was a consummated contract of insurance between the deceased and BF Lifeman Insurance
Corporation.
Issue:
WON the widow can receive the proceeds of the 2nd insurance policy Held: No. Petition
dismissed.

Ratio:
Perezs application was subject to the acceptance of private respondent BF Lifeman Insurance
Corporation. The perfection of the contract of insurance between the deceased and respondent
corporation was further conditioned with the following requisites stated in the application form:
"there shall be no contract of insurance unless and until a policy is issued on this application and
that the said policy shall not take effect until the premium has been paid and the policy delivered
to and accepted by me/us in person while I/We, am/are in good health." BF Lifeman didnt give
its assent when it merely received the application form and all the requisite supporting papers of
the applicant. This happens only when it gives a policy. It is not disputed, however, that when
Primitivo died on November 25, 1987, his application papers for additional insurance coverage
were still with the branch office of respondent corporation in Quezon. Consequently, there was
absolutely no way the acceptance of the application could have been communicated to the
applicant for the latter to accept inasmuch as the applicant at the time was already dead.
Petitioner insists that the condition imposed by BF that a policy must have been delivered to and
accepted by the proposed insured in good health is potestative, being dependent upon the will of
the corporation and is therefore void. The court didnt agree. A potestative condition depends
upon the exclusive will of one of the parties and is considered void. The Civil Code states: When
the fulfillment of the condition depends upon the sole will of the debtor, the conditional
obligation shall be void. The following conditions were imposed by the respondent company for
the perfection of the contract of insurance: a policy must have been issued, the premiums paid,
and the policy must have been delivered to and accepted by the applicant while he is in good
health. The third condition isnt potestative, because the health of the applicant at the time of the
delivery of the policy is beyond the control or will of the insurance company. Rather, the
condition is a suspensive one whereby the acquisition of rights depends upon the happening of
an event which constitutes the condition. In this case, the suspensive condition was the policy
must have been delivered and accepted by the applicant while he is in good health. There was
non-fulfillment of the condition, because the applicant was already dead at the time the policy
was issued. As stated above, a contract of insurance, like other contracts, must be assented to by
both parties either in person or by their agents. So long as an application for insurance has not
been either accepted or rejected, it is merely an offer or proposal to make a contract. The
contract, to be binding from the date of application, must have been a completed contract. The
insurance company wasnt negligent because delay in acting on the application does not
constitute acceptance even after payment. The corporation may not be penalized for the delay in
the processing of the application papers due to the fact that process in a week wasnt the usual
timeframe in fixing the application. Delay could not be deemed unreasonable so as to constitute
gross negligence.

SOMOSA-RAMOS vs. VAMENTAGR No. L-34132, July 29, 1972

Facts:
Petitioner Lucy Somosa- Ramos, filed an action for legal separation based on the ground
of concubinage on the part of respondent Clemen Ramos. She also sought for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the return to her of her paraphernal and exclusive
property. The hearing on the motion was opposed by respondent Ramos alleging that if the
motion for preliminary injunction were heard, the prospect of reconciliation of the spouses would
become even more dim. Respondent judge Vamonte thereafter granted the motion of respondent
Ramos to suspend the hearing of the petition for a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise preclude
the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction applied for as an
ancillary remedy to such a suit

Held:
NO. The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive.
It must let the parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. There is then
some plausibility for the view of the lower court that an ancillary motion such as one for
preliminary mandatory injunction is not to be acted on. If it were otherwise, there would be a
failure to abide by the literal language of such codal provision. . That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what
is set forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal
separation, the spouse shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their
respective property. The husband shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but
if the court deems it proper, it may appoint another to manage said property, in which case the
administrator shall have the same rights and duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to
dispose of the income or of the capital except in accordance with the orders of the court." There
would appear to be then a recognition that the question of management of their respective
property need not be left unresolved even during such six-month period. An administrator may
even be appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal partnership. The absolute
limitation from which the court suffers under the preceding article is thereby eased. The parties
may in the meanwhile be heard. There is justification then for the petitioner's insistence that her
motion for preliminary mandatory injunction should not be ignored by the lower court. There is
all the more reason for this response from respondent Judge, considering that the husband whom
she accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the meanwhile continue in
the management of what she claimed to be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not
specifically denied by him.

BITANGCOR vs TAN

Facts:
In two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan against successful 1971
Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the
requisite morality for admission to the Bar" for violating the honor of two women. Tan had
sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by
complainant Bitangcor.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent Rodolfo Tan be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath

Held:
It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired, He had committed
a transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership
in the bar. He had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the
one side. On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations.
He was a successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he had not
been allowed to take the lawyer's oath (Justice E. Fernando IV). The court believes that the long
wait has rehabilitated him and taught him that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is
not to be taken lightly. The resolution of February 29, 1972 is set aside, and respondent Rodolfo
m. Tan is allowed to take the lawyers oath.

CHI MING TSOI V. CA

FACTS:
Gina and Chi Ming Tsoi were married on May 22, 1988. According to Gina, since the
time of their marriage, they never had a sexual intercourse. They underwent medical
examinations. She was found healthy & normal. Chi Ming underwent medication which was
confidential. She claims that her husbands a homosexual who married her to maintain his
residency status and to prove that he is really a man. Chi Ming claims that it is Gina who refuses
to have sexual intercourse. Gina filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground of Chi Mings psychological incapacity. New medical examination proved that Chi Ming
is capable of having sexual intercourse. Lower court & CA declared Alfonso as psychologically
incapacitated to discharge essential marital obligations due to his reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate marriage.

ISSUE:
WON Chi Ming is psychologically incapable?

HELD:
Yes. Granted. Marriage void.

RATIO:
No intercourse since marriage. Chi Ming should have discussed the problem with his
wife if she indeed refused to have sexual intercourse with him. Or he could have resorted to the
court if she still resisted. 1. Senseless & protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological
incapacity. 2. Procreation is one of the essential marital obligations and constant non-fulfillment
of such will destroy marriage. 3. Filipinas are modest, Leni would have not subjected herself to
such public scrutiny if she was just making this up. Chi Mings reluctance & unwillingness to
perform sexual acts with a wife he claims he loves dearly, proves that this is a hopeless situation
& of his serious personality disorder. Grave enough

Ilusorio vs. Bildner GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:
Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property valued at
millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio
Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten
6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and
Shereen. They separated from bed and board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he
was in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On
the other hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City. In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US,
he stayed with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin,
alleged that during this time their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to
deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person
and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did
not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in Makati. In March 1999,
petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging
that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano
from returning to Antipolo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or by
which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To justify the
grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective not merely nominal
or moral. Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86 years
of age and under medication does not necessarily render him mentally incapacitated. He still has
the capacity to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having the right of choice, he
may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived
of his right to privacy. The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child
but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty attached to the exercise of
his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion
of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

ARTURO PELAYO VS. MARCELO LAURON

FACTS:
On November 23, 1906, Arturo Pelayo, a physician, filed a complaint against Marcelo
and Juana Abella. He alleged that on October 13, 1906 at night, Pelayo was called to the house
of the defendants to assist their daughter-in-law who was about to give birth to a child.
Unfortunately, the daughter-in-law died as a consequence of said childbirth. Thus, the defendant
refuses to pay. The defendants argue that their daughter-in- law lived with her husband
independently and in a separate house without any relation, that her stay there was accidental and
due to fortuitous event.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants should be held liable for the fees demanded by the plaintiff
upon rendering medical assistance to the defendants daughter-in-law.

RULING:
 No. The Court held that the rendering of medical assistance is one of the obligations to
which spouses are bound by mutual support, expressly determined by law and readily demanded.
Therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the in-laws but rather on the part of the husband
who is not a party. Thus, decision affirmed.

SERRANO VS. SOLOMON

FACTS:
Solomon executed a Deed of Donation prior to his marriage to Feliciano. The deed stated
that if his marriage is childless and if Feliciano predeceases him, half of his properties will
belong to his siblings and the other half to the person who reared his wife(Serrano). Feliciano
predeceased Solomon

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation is considered donation propter nuptias

HELD:
Solomons donation cannot be considered donation propter nuptias. Marriage was not the
only condition for the donation since other conditions were imposed. Even if it was in
consideration of the marriage, it was not in favor of one or both of thespouses but in favor of a
third person.

SOLIS V. BARROSO

FACTS:
Spouses Lambino and Barroso made a donation propter nuptias (land) in favor of their
son Alejo and his fiance Fortunata. One of the conditions is that in case of death of one of the
donees, would revert to the donors, while surviving donee keeps the other half. Lambino and
Alejo died, Barroso reclaimed lands.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the donation propter nuptias was valid

HELD:
The donation propter nuptias by the spouses were made in a private, not public,
instrument. It is not valid and does not confer any rights. In donations propter nuptias, the
marriage is really a consideration, but not in the sense of being necessary to give birth to the
obligation. The marriage in a donation propter nuptias is rather a resolutory condition which, as
such, presupposes the existence of the obligation which may be resolved or revoked, and it is not
a condition necessary for the birth of the obligation.

HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING V. CA | HEIRS OF BUAZON- ACQUISITIVE

PRESCRIPTION

While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership
exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the
acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners.

FACTS:
This case involved 2 parcels of land: a riceland and sugarland in Pangasinan. The heirs of
Segunda claim that they own the disputed lands together with the Buazons. The Buazons aver
that: 1. Their father, Roque Buazon, acquired the land by virtue of a deed of donation propter
nuptias. 2. Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding and Roque Bauzon co-
owned the lands as heirs of Ramon Roque. Roque Buazon allegedly repudiated the co-ownership
of the sugarland in 1965 and repudiated it to himself and later on, Juan and Maria Maningding
renounced and quitclaimed their shares in the Riceland in favor of R. Buazon. 3. Subsequently,
Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis Bauzon and the sugarland to his daughter
Eriberta Bauzon (the respondents in this case), both transactions being evidenced by deeds of
sale. On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the transfers
made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the heirs sought the
partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but were unsuccessful. The
trial court awarded both parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in
equal shares after finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an
Affidavit of Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its
due execution and authenticity and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Buazon to his children. It
concluded that Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of
each parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs. The CA reversed the
ruling, declaring the donation and sales valid. Later on, the court reversed itself by declaring the
donation void for failure to comply with the necessary requirements. However, it ruled that the
properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the subject properties by
acquisitive prescription

RULING:
 Yes. While prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of ownership
exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all its effects when the
acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the rights of the other co-owners. In
the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the concept of owner by
virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as it was Roque Bauzon who
personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping the benefits of ownership were
manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more pronounced and public considering that
the parcels of land are located in a municipality wherein ownership and possession are
particularly and normally known to the community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as
he was never ousted therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was
uninterrupted and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the donation propter
nuptias was properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective
shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels of land
to the exclusion of all others. As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs possessed
the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were never given their shares
of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded an accounting of the produce and
the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately they slept on their rights and allowed
almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must
suffer the consequence of their inaction. Note: The donation propter nuptias was effected as early
as 21 April 1926. It was only in 1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition
of the properties and conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even
granting that Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948,
more than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has
already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.

IMPERIAL VS COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:
Petitioner Eloy Imperial purchased a parcel of land from his father Leoncio Imperial.
Although the transaction was denominated as a sale, both admit that it was adonation.
Subsequently, Leoncio filed an action for the annulment of the supposed deed of sale but a
compromise agreement was then made by both parties. When Leoncio died, his adopted son,
Victor, substituted him in the Compromise agreement. When Victor also died, his heirs (herein
private respondents) filed an action for annulment of the donation on the ground that the
conveyance of said property in favor of petitioner Eloy impaired the legitime of Victor, their
natural brother and predecessors-in-interest. Petitioner Imperial raises the defense that the
donation did not impair Victors legitime and that the action of respondents has already
prescribed.
Issue:
Was the donation made by Leoncio Imperial in favor of petitioner Eloy Imperial
inofficious and should be reduced?

Held:
No. Unfortunately for private respondents, a claim for legitime does not amount to a
claim of title. In the recent case of Vizconde vs. CA, we declared that what is brought to
collation is not the donated property itself, but the value of the property at the time it was
donated. The rationale for this is that the donation is a real alienation which conveys ownership
upon its acceptance, hence, any increase in value or any deterioration or loss thereof is for the
account of the heir of the donee.

SANTOS VS. ALANA

FACTS:
Rolando Santos, petitioner, and Constancia Santos-Alana, respondent, are half-blood
siblings both asserting their claim over a lot registered in the name of their father, Gregorio
Santos. He died intestate in 1986. During his lifetime, specifically in 1978 Gregorio donated the
lot to Rolando which the latter accepted. The deed of donation was annotated on Gregorio's title.
In 1981, Gregorio again sold the lot also to Ronaldo as per a Deed of Absolute Sale. In that same
year, by virtue of the annotated deed of donation, the title under Gregorio's name was cancelled
and a new one was issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila in Rolando's name. In 1991,
respondent Constancia filed a complaint for partition and reconveyance against R. She alleged
that during his lifetime, G denied having sold the lot to R; that she learned of the donation in
1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was deprived of her legitime. In his answer, R
countered that G's suit is barred by prescription considering that she is aware that he has been in
possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the lot was sold to him by
his father, hence, C can no longer claim her legitime. The trial court found that the Deed of
Absolute Sale was not signed by the parties nor was it registered in the Registry of Deeds. Thus,
it is not a valid contract. What is valid is the deed of donation as it was duly executed by the
parties and registered. The trial court then held that since G did not own any other property, the
donation to R is inofficious because it impaired C's legitime.

ISSUES:
I. Was the donation inofficious? II. Is the action barred by prescription?

HELD:
I. Whether the donation is inofficious. YES. It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of
the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this limitation no person may give or
receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will. In Imperial vs. Court of
Appeals, we held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of the donor as the value of
donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor deceased. At this
point, we emphasize that as found by the trial court, G did not sell the lot to R. He donated it.
The trial court also found that the donation is inofficious as it impairs C's legitime; that at the
time of G's death, he left no property other than the lot now in controversy he donated to R; and
that the deceased made no reservation for the legitime of C, his daughter and compulsory heir.
Pursuant to Article 752 earlier cited, G could not donate more than he may give by will. Clearly,
by donating the entire lot to R, we agree with both lower courts that G's donation is inofficious as
it deprives C of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil Code, consists of one-half
(1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both parties are
already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.
II. Whether C's suit is barred by prescription. NO. In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, we held that
donations, the reduction of which hinges upon the allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this
case), are not controlled by a particular prescriptive period, for which reason, we must resort to
the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the Civil Code, actions upon an
obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious
donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the
legitime of compulsory heirs. From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? In Mateo vs.
Lagua, involving the reduction, for inofficiousness, of a donation propter nuptias, we held that
the cause of action to enforce a legitime accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly
so, since it is only then that the net estate may be ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes
may be determined. Here, G died in 1986. Consequently, C had until 1996 within which to file
the action. Records show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period.

BITANGCOR vs TAN

FACTS:
In two consolidated cases of Bitangcor vs.Tan and Peredo vs.Tan against successful 1971
Bar examinee Rodolfo M. Tan, it was held that therein respondent "had fallen short of the
requisite morality for admission to the Bar" for violating the honor of two women. Tan had
sexual relations with both complainants without marriage and had sired a daughter by
complainant Bitangcor.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Rodolfo Tan be allowed to take the Lawyer's Oath

RESOLUTION:
 It cannot be denied that respondent's conduct left much to be desired, He had committed
a transgression, if not against the law, against the high moral standard requisite for membership
in the bar. He had proven false to his word. What is worse, he did sully her honor. This on the
one side. On the other hand, eighteen years had gone by from the time of the 1956 examinations.
He was a successful bar candidate but because of this lapse from moral propriety, he had not
been allowed to take the lawyer's oath (Justice E. Fernando IV). The court believes that the long
wait has rehabilitated him and taught him that failure to live up to the requisite moral standard is
not to be taken lightly. The resolution of february 29, 1972 is set aside, and respondent rodolfo
m. Tan is allowed to take the lawyers oath.

Abalos vs. Macatangay

Facts:
Arturo and Esther Abalos are husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati. On
June 2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement in favor of Galicano in which Arturo acknowledged he received a
P5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price and that
Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k. The
purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. The P5k check was dishonored due to insufficiency.
Apparently, Esther and Arturo have a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA in favor of her
sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was alleged that
that the RMOA is not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed thereto. And that Esther never
executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has prepared a check to
cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He demanded that the land
be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano sued the spouses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano. Whether or not
the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and that it cured the defect of
the earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano.

HELD:
No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best, the
agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to Galicano.
The promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no consideration distinct from
the price. Be it noted that the parties considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from
the purchase price. Taking arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is
still not binding for Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal
tender. Taking arguendo that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly perfected a
contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esthers signature was not affixed. The property
is conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses consents are required. Further, the earnest
money here is not actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil
Code. The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier
transaction between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO, G.R. No. 153802
March 11, 2005

FACTS:
Miguela Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr were married on August 8, 1967. During their
marriage the spouses purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City from a certain Dalida.
The subject property was declared for tax assessment purposes The Deed of Absolute Sale,
however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the
exclusion of his wife. Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor
of one Gesmundo, authorizing the latter to obtain a loan from petitioner Homeowners Savings
and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailos house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to
the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan from petitioner. As security therefor, Gesmundo executed
on the same day a Real Estate Mortgage constituted on the subject property in favor of petitioner.
The abovementioned transactions, including the execution of the SPA in favor of Gesmundo,
took place without the knowledge and consent of respondent.[ Upon maturity, the loan remained
outstanding. As a result, petitioner instituted extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the
mortgaged property. After the extrajudicial sale thereof, a Certificate of Sale was issued in favor
of petitioner as the highest bidder. After the lapse of one year without the property being
redeemed, petitioner consolidated the ownership thereof by executing an Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale.
In the meantime, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. died. In one of her visits to the subject property,
Miguela learned that petitioner had already employed a certain Brion to clean its premises and
that her car, a Ford sedan, was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire within the
premises. Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject
property, which was conjugal in nature, respondent instituted with the RTC San Pablo City a
Civil Case for Nullity of Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate of Sale, Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership, Deed of Sale, Reconveyance with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Damages against petitioner. In the latters Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the property in question was the exclusive
property of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a
Decision declaring the said documents null and void and further ordered the defendant is ordered
to reconvey the property subject of this complaint to the plaintiff, to pay the plaintiff the sum
representing the value of the car which was burned, the attorneys fees, moral and exemplary
damages. The appellate court affirmed the trial courts Decision, but deleted the award for
damages and attorneys fees for lack of basis. Hence, this petition

ISSUE:
1. WON THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO,
JR. ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AS CO-OWNER THEREOF IS VALID AS TO HIS
UNDIVIDED SHARE. 2. WON THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IS LIABLE FOR THE
PAYMENT OF THE LOAN OBTAINED BY THE LATE MARCELINO DAILO, JR. THE
SAME HAVING REDOUNDED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE FAMILY.

HELD:
The petition is denied.
1. NO. Article 124 of the Family Code provides in part: ART. 124. The administration
and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. . . . In
the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority
of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. . . . In applying Article 124 of the Family
Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and
void, including the portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the
sale. Respondent and the late Marcelino. were married on August 8, 1967. In the absence of a
marriage settlement, the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains governed
the property relations between respondent and her late husband. With the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains in the Family Code
was made applicable to conjugal partnership of gains already established before its effectivity
unless vested rights have already been acquired under the Civil Code or other laws. The rules on
co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of respondent and the late Marcelino
even in a suppletory manner. The regime of conjugal partnership of gains is a special type of
partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits
and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through
their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property wherein the rules on co-
ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules
on contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in the
chapter (on conjugal partnership of gains) or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. Thus,
the property relations of respondent and her late husband shall be governed, foremost, by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code. In case of conflict, the former prevails because the Civil Code
provisions on partnership apply only when the Family Code is silent on the matter. The basic and
established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property, which formed part of their
conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in the absence of
(court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the
conjugal property shall be void. The aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the
share of the spouse who makes the disposition or encumbrance in the same manner that the rule
on co-ownership under Article 493 of the Civil Code does. Where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Thus, both the trial court and the appellate court are correct in
declaring the nullity of the real estate mortgage on the subject property for lack of respondents
consent.
2. NO. Under Article 121 of the Family Code, [T]he conjugal partnership shall be liable
for: . . . (1) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to
the extent that the family may have been benefited; . . . . Certainly, to make a conjugal
partnership respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and
frustrate the avowed objective of the new Civil Code to show the utmost concern for the
solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.[ The burden of proof that the debt was
contracted for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gains lies with the creditor-party litigant
claiming as such. Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat (he who asserts, not he who
denies, must prove). Petitioners sweeping conclusion that the loan obtained by the late
Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a doubt redounded to the benefit
of his family, without adducing adequate proof, does not persuade this Court. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership cannot be held liable for the payment of the principal obligation.

VILLANUEVA- MIJARES ET. AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS April 12, 2000

FACTS:
Felipe Villanueva left a 15,336-square-meter parcel of land in Kalibo, Capiz to his eight
children: Simplicio, Benito, Leon, Eustaquio, Camila, Fausta and Pedro. In 1952, Pedro declared
under his name 1/6 portion of the property (1,905 sq. m.). He held the remaining properties in
trust for his co-heirs who demanded the subdivision of the property but to no avail. After Leons
death in 1972, private respondents discovered that the shares of Simplicio, Nicolasa, Fausta and
Maria Baltazar had been purchased by Leon through a deed of sale dated August 25, 1946 but
registered only in 1971. In July 1970, Leon also sold and partitioned the property in favor of
petitioners, his children, who thereafter secured separate and independent titles over their
respective pro- indiviso shares. Private respondents, who are also descendants of Felipe, filed an
action for partition with annulment of documents and/or reconveyance and damages against
petitioners. They contended that Leon fraudulently obtained the sale in his favor through
machinations and false pretenses. The RTC declared that private respondents action had been
barred by res judicata and that petitioners are the legal owners of the property in question in
accordance with the individual titles issued to them.
ISSUE:
Whether or not laches apply against the minors property that was held in trust.

RULING:
No. At the time of the signing of the Deed of Sale of August 26,1948, private respondents
Procerfina, Prosperedad, Ramon and Rosa were minors. They could not be faulted for their
failure to file a case to recover their inheritance from their uncle Leon, since up to the age of
majority, they believed and considered Leon their co-heir administrator. It was only in 1975, not
in 1948, that they became aware of the actionable betrayal by their uncle. Upon learning of their
uncles actions, they filed for recovery. Hence, the doctrine of stale demands formulated in
Tijam cannot be applied here. They did not sleep on their rights, contrary to petitioners
assertion. Furthermore, when Felipe Villanueva died, an implied trust was created by operation
of law between Felipes children and Leon, their uncle, as far as the 1/6 share of Felipe. Leons
fraudulent titling of Felipes 1/6 share was a betrayal of that implied trust

Valdez Jr. v. CA 489 SCRA 369

FACTS:
The case originated from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio
and Venida Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the MTC of
Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs are the registered owners of a
residential lot at Carolina Executive Village, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Antipolo, Rizal which they
acquired from Carolina Realty, Inc. by virtue of Sales Contract. It is alleged also that defendants,
without any color of title, occupied the said lot by building their house in the said lot thereby
depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof; that they were asked several times to
peacefully surrender the premises to the plaintiffs but the defendants refused and likewise did not
want to amicably settle before the Barangay. On the other hand, the defendants claim that
petitioners failed to state grounds for unlawful detainer (prior physical possession of the property
or that they were the lessors thereof). In the alternative, private respondents claimed ownership
over the land on the ground that they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession
thereof for more than thirty years, as attested by an ocular inspection report from the DENR.
MTC: ruled in favor of the plaintiffs RTC: affirmed MTC CA: reversed RTC and said that
plaintiffs failed to allege prior material possession which is mandatory in forcible entry nor was
their tolerance on the part of the owner to make out a case for unlawful detainer

ISSUES:
Whether petitioners have made a clear case of unlawful detainer/ whether MTC had
jurisdiction
HELD/RATIO:
NO. The case was actually one for forcible entry and not unlawful detainer. MTC had no
jurisdiction.
Accion interdictal comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of
force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful detainer, one illegally
withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any
contract, express or implied. The two are distinguished from each other in that in forcible entry,
the possession of the defendant is illegal from the beginning, and that the issue is which party has
prior de facto possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is originally
legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. To justify an
action for unlawful detainer, it is essential that the plaintiffs supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be recovered.
Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would
be an improper remedy. Indeed, to vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an
occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the
party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant was
illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the complaint, considering that
defendant started to occupy the subject lot and then built a house thereon without the permission
and consent of petitioners and before them, their mother. Clearly, defendants entry into the land
was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners, consequently, it is categorized
as possession by stealth which is forcible entry. This failure of petitioners to allege the key
jurisdictional facts constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since the complaint did not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had
no jurisdiction over the case. Petition denied and CA decision affirmed.

Manacop vs. CA GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992

FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a
bungalow located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a
deed of assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF
Cruz & Co). The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for
preliminary attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the
provisional remedy was issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City
owned by the Manacop Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached
property is a family home having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is
therefore exempt from attachment.

ISSUE:
WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.

HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law
under Article 153 of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a
retroactive effect such that all existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of
the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations
incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred
debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his property is therefore not exempt
form attachment. The petition was dismissed by SC.

Liyao vs. Liyao GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her mother
(Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda
Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the deceased and to be
entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and enjoyment of the
status as the child of the deceased having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by
the decedent during his lifetime. There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she
and the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that they
cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased. On the other hand, one of the children of the
deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were legally married and that her parents were
not separated legally or in fact.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of
the deceased.

HELD:
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted with the
scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the one to decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child can only be impugned in a
direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive evidence presented
by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his paternity.

Herrera vs Alba

Facts:
In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo
Herrera in order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera
denied Armis allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a
(deoxyribonucleic acid ) DNA testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological
father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that
DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be
admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-
incrimination.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Herrera is correct.

HELD:
No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is
not yet recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial
court, the prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question
as to the acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts.
This was the decisive ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002). In the Vallejo Case, the
Supreme Court recognized DNA analysis as admissible evidence. On the other hand, as to
determining the weight and probative value of DNA test results, the Supreme Court provides,
which is now known as the Vallejo Guidelines: In assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the
samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples,
the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures
were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests. The above test is derived from the Daubert Test which is a doctrine adopted from US
jurisprudence (Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.) The Daubert Test is a test to be
employed by courts before admitting scientific test results in evidence. More specifically, the
Daubert Test inquires: Whether the theory or technique can be tested, Whether the proffered
work has been subjected to peer review, Whether the rate of error is acceptable, Whether the
method at issue enjoys widespread acceptance In this case, the Supreme Court declared that in
filiation cases, before paternity inclusion can be had, the DNA test result must state that the there
is at least a 99.9% probability that the person is the biological father. However, a 99.9%
probability of paternity (or higher but never possibly a 100% ) does not immediately result in the
DNA test result being admitted as an overwhelming evidence. It does not automatically become
a conclusive proof that the alleged father, in this case Herrera, is the biological father of the child
(Alba). Such result is still a disputable or a refutable evidence which can be brought down if the
Vallejo Guidelines are not complied with. What if the result provides that there is less than
99.9% probability that the alleged father is the biological father? Then the evidence is merely
corroborative. Anent the issue of self-incrimination, submitting to DNA testing is not violative of
the right against self- incrimination. The right against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication (testimonial evidence) from a
defendant, not an exclusion of evidence taken from his body when it may be material. There is
no testimonial compulsion in the getting of DNA sample from Herrera, hence, he cannot
properly invoke self-incrimination.

Tecson Vs. Comelec 424 SCRA 277 G.R. No. 161434

Facts:
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner initiated a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the
son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had
existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

Issue:
Whether or Not FPJ is a natural born Filipino citizen.

Held:
It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born
citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative
father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the
presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime
in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have
well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent
FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children
are legitimate or illegitimate. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish
conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having
made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.

Macadangdang vs CA GR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS:
Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang
were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children. They started a
buy and sell business and sari- sari store in Davao City. Through hard work and good fortune,
their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill
business, abaca stripping, real estate etc. Their relationship became complicated and both
indulged in extramarital relations. Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965
when private respondent left for Cebu for good. When she returned in Davao in 1971, she
learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband. She then decided to take the initial action.
In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on
the legal separation.

HELD:
The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal
separation. When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the
lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the
liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated. The law clearly spells
out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the
liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on
intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been
allocated to the deceased spouse. Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of
the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the
effects of the decree of legal separation. These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows,
as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

Republic Vs Court of Appeals and Castro Case Digest Republic of the Philippines vs. CA
and Castro G.R. No. 103047 September 12, 1994

Facts:
Respondent Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony
performed by a City Court Judge of Pasig City and was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended the procuring of the documents
required for the celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license.
The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was
unknown to Castro's parents. They decided to live together when Castro discovered she was
pregnant. The cohabitation lasted only for four months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways.
Desiring to follow her daughter in the U.S, Castro wanted to put in order he marital status before
leaving for the U.S. She then discovered that there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas
prior to the celebration of their marriage as certified by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, Metro
Manila. Respondent then filed a petition with the RTC of Quezon City seeking for the judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage claiming that no marriage license was ever issued to them
prior to the solemnization of their marriage. The trial court denied the petition holding that the
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non- issuance of a marriage license prior to
the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability of the certifying
official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage
license issued. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was reversed.

Issue:
Is the marriage valid? Is there such a thing as a "secret marriage"?

HELD:
At the time of the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing
marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no marriage license shall be
solemnized without a marriage license first issued by the local civil registrar. Being one of the
essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the marriage void ab
initio. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge
of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" - a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records
show that the marriage between Castro and Cardenas as initially unknown to the parents of the
former.

ILANO v. CA G.R. No. 104376 February 23, 1994 NOCON, J.

FACTS:
Leoncia first met petitioner Artemio G. Ilano while she was working as secretary to Atty.
Mariano C. Virata. Leoncia, then managing a business of her own as Namarco distributor, met
petitioner again. Later, he courted her more than four years. Their relationship became intimate
and with his promise of marriage, they eloped. While they were living at Makati, private
respondent Merceditas S. Ilano was born Her birth was recorded as Merceditas de los Santos Ilano,
child of Leoncia Aguinaldo de los Santos and Artemio Geluz Ilano. Inasmuch as it was already
past seven o'clock in the evening, the nurse promised to return the following morning for his
signature. However, he left an instruction to give birth certificate to Leoncia for her signature, as
he was leaving early the following morning. During the time that petitioner and Leoncia were
living as husband and wife, he showed concern as the father of Merceditas. When Merceditas was
in Grade I at the St. Joseph Parochial School, he signed her Report Card for the fourth and fifth
grading periods CA REVERSED RTC judgment declaring plaintiff MERCEDITAS S. ILANO
as the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child.

ISSUE:
W/N MERCEDITAS S. ILANO is the duly acknowledged and recognized illegitimate
child.

Held:
Under the then prevailing provisions of the Civil Code, illegitimate children or those who
are conceived and born out of wedlock were generally classified into: (1) Natural, whether actual
or by fiction, were those born outside of lawful wedlock of parents who, at the time of
conception of the child, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other (2)
Spurious, whether incestuous, were disqualified to marry each other on account of certain legal
impediments. Since petitioner had a subsisting marriage to another at the time Merceditas was
conceived, she is a spurious child. Rights of an illegitimate child arose not because he was the
child. A recognition once validly made is irrevocable. It cannot be withdrawn. A mere change
of mind would be incompatible with the stability of the civil status of person, the permanence of
which affects public interest. Even when the act in which it is made should be revocable, the
revocation of such act will not revoke the recognition itself. To be sure, to establish the open
and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, it is necessary to comply with
certain jurisprudential requirements. Continuous does not, however, mean that the concession
of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it
continues (De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 866). The possession of such status means that the father
has treated the child as his own, directly and not through other, spontaneously and without
concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a
showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by
continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.
The mere denial by defendant of his signature, is not sufficient to offset the totality of
the evidence indubitably showing that the signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the
Certificate of Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as married does not
mean that Merceditas is not appellees daughter. This particular entry was caused to be made by
Artemio himself in order to avoid embarrassment.
It is difficult to believe that plaintiffs mother, who is a mere dressmaker, had long
beforehand diabolically conceived of a plan to make it appear that defendant, who claims to be a
total stranger to be a total stranger, was the father of her child, and in the process falsified the
latters signatures and handwriting.
The natural. Logical and coherent evidence of plaintiff from the genesis of the
relationship between Leoncia and appellee, their living together as circumstances of plaintiffs
birth, the acts of appellee in recognizing and supporting plaintiff, find ample support from the
testimonial and documentary evidence which leaves no room to reasonably doubt his paternity
which may not be infirmed by his belated denials.
Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is broad enough to render
unncessary the other paragraphs of this article. When the evidence submitted in the action for
compulsory recognition is not sufficient to meet requirements of the first three paragraphs, it may
still be enough under the last paragraph. This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence,
as provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiatio.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that private respondent is the spurious child
of petitioner, she is entitled to support. In awarding support to her, respondent court took into
account the following:
The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a
right to recover the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall be paid except from the date of
judicial or extrajudicial demand.
The complaint in this case was filed on August 14, 1972. Plaintiff, having been born
on December 30, 1963, was about 9 years old at the time and was already of school age spending
about P400.00 to P500.00a month for her school expenses alone, while defendant was earning
about P10,000.00 a month. She is therefore entitled to support in arrears for a period of 12 years,
4 months and 14 days, which is hereby fixed at P800.00 a month for the 1st 3 years; and considering
the declining value of the peso as well as her needs as she grows older, at a graduated increase of
P1,000.00 a month for the next 3 years; P1,300.00 a month for the succeeding 3 years; and
P1,500.00 a month for the last 3 years, 4 months and 14 days until she attained the age of majority.
 This being an action for legal support, the award of attorneys fees is appropriate under
Article 2208 (6) of the Civil Code. Moreover, the court deems it just and equitable under the given
facts and circumstances that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.

Acebedo vs. Arquero

Facts:
On June 1, 1994, Edwin A. Acebedo charged Eddie P. Arquero, Process Server of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Brookes Point, Palawan for immorality. Complainant alleged
that his wife, Dedje Irader cohabited as husband and wife at Bacudo Pulot, Brookes Point,
Palawan as a result of which a girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to two on May 21, 1989.
Attached to the letter-complaint was the girls Baptismal Certificate reflecting the names of
respondent and Dedje Irader as her parents. Respondent claimed that the immorality charge by
the petitioner was just a mere harassment and a product of complainants hatred and jealousy. By
respondents own admission however, he had an illicit relationship with the petitioners wife for
8-9 months. The reason for having this illicit relationship was explained by the respondent that
the petitioner and his wife had a kasunduan in writing and duly notarized. The Kasunduan
indicated that they would go to court to institute any action against the other.

Issue:
Whether or not the Kasunduan is enough ground to sever the marriage tie.

Ruling:
SC ruled that respondents justification fails, being an employee of the judiciary,
respondent ought to have known that the Kasunduan had absolutely no force and effect on the
validity of the marriage between complainant and his wife. Art 1 of the family code provides that
marriage is an inviolable social institution whose nature and consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an institution of public order and policy,
governed by rules established by law which cannot be made inoperative by stipulation of the
parties.
Respondent is suspended for 6 months.

Cang vs Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married, begot three children.
During the early years of their marriage, the Cang couples relationship was undisturbed. Not long
thereafter, however, Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair. Anna Marie
subsequently filed a petition for legal separation which was granted. They had an agreement for
support of the children and that Anna Marie can enter into agreements without the written consent
of Herbert. Petitioner left for the US. Meanwhile, the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie
filed for the adoption of the 3 minor Cang children. Upon learning of the adoption, Herbert went
back to the Philippines to contest it, but the petition for adoption was granted by the court.

Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the consent of a natural parent on the ground
that the latter has abandoned them?

Held:
Article 256 of the Family Code provides for its retroactivity insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. As amended
by the Family Code, the statutory provision on consent for adoption now reads: Art. 188. The
written consent of the following to the adoption shall be necessary: (2)the parents by nature of the
child, the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality. Based on the foregoing, it is
thus evident that notwithstanding the amendments to the law, the written consent of the natural
parent to the adoption has remained a requisite for its validity. As clearly inferred from the
foregoing provisions of the law, the written consent of the natural parent is indispensable for the
validity of the decree of adoption. Nevertheless, the requirement of written consent can be
dispensed with if the parent has abandoned the child or that such parent is insane or hopelessly
intemperate. In the instant case, records disclose that petitioners conduct did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims over his children as
to, constitute abandonment. Physical admittedly, petitioner was physically absent as he was then
in the United States, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support
for his children. He maintained regular communication with his wife and children through letters
and telephone. He used to send packages by mail and catered to their whims.

Cervantes vs Fajardo

Facts:
The minor was born to respondents Conrado Fajardo and Gina Carreion, who are common-
law husband and wife. Respondents offered the child for adoption to Gina Carreons sister and
brother-in-law. The herein petitioners Zenaida Carreon-Cervantes and Nelson Cervantes, spouses,
who took care and custody of the child when was barely two (2)weeks old. An Affidavit of
Consent to the adoption of the child by herein petitioners, was also executed by respondent Gina
Carreon. The adoptive parents received a letter from the respondents demanding to be paid the
amount of P150,000.00, otherwise, they would get back their child. Petitioners refused to accede
to the demand. Subsequently, the respondents took the child.
Issue:
Can respondents take back their child?

Held:
In all cased involving the custody, care, education and property of children, the latters
welfare is paramount. The provision that no mother shall be separated from a child under five (5)
years of age, will not apply where the Court finds compelling reasons to rule otherwise. In all
controversies regarding the custody of minors, the foremost consideration is the moral, physical
and social welfare of the child concerned, taking into account the resources and moral as well as
social standing of the contending parents. Never has this Court deviated from this criterion. It is
undisputed that respondent Conrado Fajardo is legally married to a woman other than the
respondent Gina Carreon, and his relationship with the latter is a common-law husband and wife
relationship. His open cohabitation with co-respondent Gina Carreon will not accord the minor
that desirable atmosphere where she can grow and develop into an upright and moral-minded
person. Besides, respondent Gina Carreon had previously given birth to another child by another
married man with whom she lived for almost three (3) years but who eventually left her and
vanished. Upon the other hand, petitioners who are given her a future better than what the natural
mother, who is not only jobless but also maintain an illicit relation with a married man, can most
likely give her. Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge
and consent of respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the
authority vested in natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the
spouse of the natural parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall
be exercised jointly by both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody
of the adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA

GARCIAHONORATO B. CATINDIG, Petitioner
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his
minor illegitimate child Stephany Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie
has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified
to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia to be changed to Catindig, his surname.
Finding the petition to be meritorious, the same is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia is hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance with respect to
her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and
legal heir. Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the minor shall be known
as STEPHANIE CATHY CATINDIG. On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.

Issue:
Whether or not, an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the
surname of her natural mother as her middle name?

Held:
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adopted may use.
Article 10 of the New Civil Code provides that: In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is partly MODIFIED in the
sense that Stephanie should be allowed to use her mothers surname Garcia as her middle name.
Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name be entered in the decree of
adoption.

Article 15: Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons re binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Van Dorn vs. Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
Alice Reyes VanDorn, a FilipinoCitizen andprivate respondent, Richard Upton, a US
citizen, wasmarriedin Hong Kongin1979. Theyestablishedtheir residence inthe Philippines
andhad2 children. Theywere divorcedin Nevada, USA in1982 andpetitioner remarried, thistime
withTheodore VanDorn. A suit against petitioner was filedonJune 8, 1983, statingthat
petitioners business inErmita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a conjugal propertywithUpton and
prayedtherein that Alice be ordered to render anaccountingof the business andhe be declaredas
the administrator of the saidproperty.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreigndivorce between the petitioner andprivate respondent in
Nevada is bindinginthe Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.

HELD:
 Private respondent is nolonger the husbandof the petitioner. He wouldhave no standing to
sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estoppedbyhis own representation
before the court from asserting hisright over the allegedconjugal property. Furthermore, aliens
mayobtaindivorces abroad, which maybe recognizedinthe Philippines, provided theyare
validaccording to their national law. Petitioner is not boundto her marital obligations to
respondent byvirtue ofher nationalitylaws. She should not be discriminated against her
owncountryif the endof justice is to be served.

Tenchavez vs. Escano 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish
ancestry got married on Feburary24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-
army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the
love affair of the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel
came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez
as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and
Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents.
However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad, he disagreed for a new marriage.
Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left
for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on
approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the
annulment of her marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an
American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958.
Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded
Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE:
Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escanois valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give
recognition onforeign decrees ofabsolute divorce between Filipinocitizens because it would be a
violationof the Civil Code. Such grant wouldarise to discriminationin favor ofrich citizens
whocanafford divorce inforeigncountries. The adulterous relationshipof Escano with her
Americanhusbandis enough grounds for the legal separationprayedbyTenchavez. In the eyes of
Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escanoare still married. A foreigndivorce betweenFilipinos
sought anddecreed is not entitledto recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitledto
validityin the Philippines. Thus, the desertionandsecuring of an invaliddivorce decree byone
spouse entitled the other for damages. WHEREFORE, the decisionunder appeal is
herebymodifiedas follows: (1) Adjudgingplaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitledto a decree
of legalseparation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta
Escaoto payplaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys'
fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to paythe appellee, MamertoEscaoandthe
estate of his wife, the deceasedMena Escao, P5,000 bywayof damages andattorneys' fees.

BARRETO GONZALES vs GONZALES 58 Phil 238March 7, 1933

FACTS:

The plaintiff & defendant were bothcitizens of the Philippines, married& lived together from
January1919 until Springof 1926. After whichtheyvoluntaryseparated& have not livedtogether as
man& wife, theyhad4 minor childrentogether.
After negotiations, both parties mutuallyagreedto allowManuela Barreto(plaintiff) for her & her
childrens support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthlywhichto be increasedincases of
necessity& illness, andthat the title of certainpropertiesbe put inher name.
Shortlyafter the agreement, Augusto Gonzales (defendant), whento Reno, Nevada & secured
inthat jurisdictionanabsolute divorce onthe ground ofdesertion datedNovember 28, 1927. On that
same date he went throughthe forms of marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3
children withher.
When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the amount he had agreedto paymonthly for the
support of Manuela Barreto& her children & has not made the payments fixedinthe Reno divorce
as alimony.
Gonzales came backto the Philippines inAugust 1928 and shortlyafter, Barretobrought an
actionat the CFI-Manila requesting to confirm & ratifythe decree of divorce issuedbythe courts
of Nevada & invokedsec 9 of Act 2710. Such is requested to be enforced, anddeliver to the
Guardianad litem the equivalent of what wouldhave beendue to their childrenas their legal
portion fromrespective estateshadtheir parents diedintestate onNovember 28, 1927,
theyalsoprayed that the marriage existingbetweenBarreto & Gonzalesbe declared dissolved&
Gonzales be orderedto payBarretoP500 per month, counsel fees ofP5000 & all the expenses
incurredin educating the 3 minor sons. The guardians of the childrenalso filed as intervenors
inthe case.
After the hearing, the CFI-Manila granted the judgement infavor of the plaintiff & intervenors,
but reducedthe attorneys fees to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the actionagainst the
defendant, Hence, thisappeal byGonzales sayingthat the lower court erred intheir decision.
ISSUE:
WON anyforeign divorce, relatingto citizens of the Philippine Islands, will be
recognizedinthis jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, andunder conditions for whichthe courts of
the Philippine Islands would grant a divorce.

HELD:
NO. The lower court erredingrantingthe reliefas prayedfor ongranting the divorce,
because:
The court said that securingthe jurisdictionof the courts to recognize & approve the
divorce done inReno, Nevada cannot be done accordingto the public policyin this jurisdictionon
the questionof divorce.
Its clear in Act No. 2710 & court decisions on cases such as Goitia VS. Campos Rueda
that the entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation untilthe case was
submittedpraying the ratificationof the Reno Divorce wasclearlya circumventionof the law
regarding divorce & will be done under conditions not authorized byour laws.
The matrimonial domicile of the couple had always been the Philippines& the residence
acquired bythe husbandin Reno, Nevada was a bona fide residence & didnot confer
jurisdictionuponthe court of that state to dissolve the matrimonial bonds inwhichhe had entered
in 1919.
Art 9 & Art 11 of the Civil Code & The Divorce Lawof the Philippines does not
allowsuchto be done, the effect of foreigndivorce inthe Philippines says that litigants cannot
compel the courts to approve oftheir ownactions or permit the personal relations of the Citizens
of the Philippines to be affectedbydecrees ofdivorce of foreigncourts in manner whichout
government believes is contraryto public order & good morals. SC RULING:The decisionof
CFI-Manila was REVERSED & Defendant is absolvedfrom the demands made against himinthis
action. CONNECTION TO PERSONS, FAMILY RELATION/ CIVIL CODE:
3. 3 Article 9 of the Old CivilCode, nowinArt 15 says that Laws relating to
familyrights & duties or to status, condition, and legal capacityof persons, are binding upon
Spaniards even though theyreside in a foreigncountry
The last part ofArt 11 of the Old CivilCode, nowinArt 17 alsostates ...the prohibitive
laws concerningpersons, their acts & their property, andthose intendedto promote public order &
good morals, shall not be rendered without effect byanyforeignlaws or judgements or by
anythingdone or anyagreements entered into ina foreign country. Divorce Laws of the
PhilippinesThe hardships ofexistingdivorce laws ofthe Philippine Islands are well known to
the members ofthe Legislature. It is the dutyof the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as
writtenbythe Legislature if theyconstitutional. Courts have no right to saysuchlaws are too strict
or too liberal.
At the time thisdecisionwas renderedthere was stillabsolute divorce inthe Philippines on
the groundof Adulteryon the part of the wife, andConcubinage on the part of the husband; the
divorce, however, couldbe grantedonlyuponshowing that the defendant hadbeen convictedbyfinal
judgement for the adulteryor concubinage as the case maybe. The new Civil Code
hasabolishedabsolute divorce, leaving onlylegalseparation, which is equivalent to relative
divorce.

Barnuevo vs Fuster 299 Phil 606

FACTS:
February7, 1875: GabrielFuster andConstanza Yanezwere married(Catholic/canonical)in
Malaga, Spain. On February1892:Fuster went to the Philippines, settled, andacquired real
andpersonal property. 1896: Constanza came to Manila andlived withher husbandinconjugal
relations until April 1899. April 4, 1899:Theymade anagreement (public document):
Theyresolved to separate andlive apart, bothconsentingto suchseparation, andbyvirtue thereofthe
husbandauthorized the wife to move to Spain, there to reside insuch place as the said
ladypleases. (B. of E., P.13) Fuster acknowledgedthat he would send the sum of 300 pesetas
monthly, payable in Madrid, Spainto support hiswife starting June 1899. However, onthe month
ofAugust of the same year, he stopped to make further payments. March 11, 1909: Constanza
startedfiling divorce proceedings against Fuster, indicating adulterycommittedbyher husbandinor
about the year 1899 witha certain womanthat she namedin the complaint andwith whomhe
hadlivedandcohabitedandbywhom he had two children. Plaintiff prays that: she be granted a
decree of divorce the court order the separationof propertiesbetweenthe plaintiff anddefendant
the conjugal societybe therefore liquidatedandafter the amount of the conjugal property had been
determined, that one half thereofbe adjudicatedto her as to the amount of pensionowing for her
support but not paidto her, that the defendant be orderedto payher the sum of 36,000
Spanishpesetas, that is 7,220 Spanish dollars, which, reducedto Philippine currencyat the rate of
exchange on the date of the complaint, amounted to P12,959.90 Court of First Instance ofthe
cityof Manilaheld itself to have jurisdiction decreedthe suspension oflife incommonbetween the
plaintiffand defendant ordered the latter to paythe former 5,010.17 That the communal
propertybe dividedbetweenthe partieswith costs against the defendant And in event that the
parties couldnot agree to the division, it was to be effected by commissioners according to law
Both parties appealed, but notwithstanding the appeal, the partitionof the property, by means of
commissioners, wasproceeded with. Defendants Appeal Lack of jurisdictionover the persons
and over the subject matter of the litigation;andover the persons ofthe contending parties,
because neither of the spouses was a resident of the Philippines onthe date of the complaint.
The court erred in its findingthat he hadcommitted adulterywitha certain womanfrom 1899 until
1909. The court also erredinits findingthat the adulterywas accompaniedbypublic scandaland
injured the dignityof his wife. o In law, it is not necessarythat adultery, to be a cause for divorce,
shouldbe accompaniedbypublic scandaland contempt for the wife. There is nolaw that requires
this. For having decreedthe divorce, suspensionof the marriedlife, andthe separationof the
properties ofthe parties. Against the findingof the court that there exists
conjugalproperty(appellant maintains that it has nofoundation) the court erredin orderingthe
defendant to payto the plaintiff P5,010.17, whereas the plaintiff hadmade no demand inher
complaint with respect to this sumand that the plaintiff has allowedtenyears to elapse before
claimingit, her actionprescribed in1904, that is to say, after 5 years. the court erredin
empowering the receiver to proceedto the separationof propertyandin appointingcommissioners
to make the partitionanddistributionbetweenspouses the whole ofthe propertyshouldbe
adjudicatedto the defendant as being exclusivelyhis Plaintiffs Appeal
1. 4. 4 petitioner prays that the judgment be reversedand that inits place thiscourt order the
defendant to payto the plaintiff her claimof P12,959.90 (insteadof P5,010.17) plus the additional
sumwhichthe alimonyamounts to at the rate ofP107.70 per month, dating from the 1st of August
1909 until the date of payment withlegal interest from the date ofthe filing of the complaint until
the date of payment. Findings of the court: a. the total amount of the alimonyowing to the
plaintiffamounted to 34,200 pesetaso the sum that the plaintiffhadcollectedinMadridwas 6,365.68
o that the remainder was 27,834.32 andwas equivalent t 5,566.86 Mexican currencyo Mexican
peso wasworth 90 centavos Philippine currency. b. Therefore, the sum was equivalent to P5,010
Phil currencyo There was no evidence as to the kind ofpesetasagreedupon, it was to be
presumedthat it was that current at the time andplace where the agreement wasmade, which was
Mexicanpesetas it does not appear that the defendant inhis answer accepted the fact in the
manner allegedinthe complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the partitionof propertydecreedin the judgment of the Court of First
Instance should be confirmed.

HELD:
The partitionof propertydecreedin the judgment appealedfrom of the 9th ofSeptember
1911, should be andis herebyconfirmed. The twojudgments appealed fromare hereby affirmed,
without special pronouncement ofcosts in thisinstance. Paraphernalpropertyis that which the wife
brigs to the marriage without being included in the dowryandthat she mayacquire after the
creationof the same without being added thereto. But, it is a provisionof article 1384 that the
wife shall have the management ofthe paraphernal propertyunlessshe has deliveredthe same to
her husband, before a notary, in order that he mayadminister said property. In suchcase the
husbandis obligedto create a mortgage for the value of the personal propertyhe mayreceive, or to
secure saidproperty, in the manner establishedfor the dowryproperty. Article 16: Real
propertyas well as personal propertyis subject to the law ofthe country where it is stipulated.
However, intestate andtestamentarysuccessions, both withrespect to the order of successionandto
the amount of successional rights andto the intrinsic validityof testamentaryprovisions, shall be
regulatedbythe national law of the personwhose successionis under consideration, whatever
maybe the nature of the propertyand regardless of the countrywhereinsaidpropertymaybe found.
ARTICLE 16: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated. However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the
order of successionand to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found.

Testate Estate of Bohanan vs Bohanan et al 106 phil 997

FACTS:
Testator was borninNebraska, therefore a citizenof Nebraska or at least a citizen of
California where some ofhis propertiesare located. Thiscontentionis untenable. Notwithstanding
the longresidence of the decedent inthe Philippines, his stayhere was merelytemporary, andhe
continued and remainedto be a citizenof the United Statesandof the state of his particular choice,
whichis Nevada, as statedin his will. The court finds that the testator was at the time of hisdeatha
citizenof the US andof the State of Nevada and declares that hiswill andtestament is fullyin
accordance with the laws of the State andadmits the same to probate. On April 24, 1950, CFI
judge, Hon. Amparoadmittedto probate the last will and testament of the testator Testator made a
last will withthe ff. partitions: of residuaryestate to the Framers and Merchant
NationalBankof L.A., intrust onlyfor the benefit of hisgrandson, EdwardGeorge Bohanan,
whichconsists ofP90,81.67 in cash and sharesinstockof several mining companies Other
halfof the residuaryestate to testators brother andhis sister, share andshare alike P6,000
grandsonEdward Gilbert, andhis daughter MaryLydia P10,000 Clara Daen. P2,000 Katherine
Woodward P4,000 Beulah Fox P2,000 ElizabethHastings Ex-wife and childrenquestions the
validityof the testamentaryprovisions disposingof the estate inthe manner above indicated,
claiming that theyhave been deprived ofthe legitime that the laws ofthe forumconcede to them.
CFI dismissedthe objections filed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the testamentaryprovisions are valid.

HELD:
The order of the court approving the project of partitionmade inaccordance withthe
testamentaryprovisions is herebyaffirmed. The Old Civil Code is applicable because testator died
in1944. Art. 10(2) of the Old Civil Code statesthat Nevertheless, legal
andtestamentarysuccessions, in respect to the order of successionas well as to the extent ofthe
successionalrights and the intrinsic validityof their provisions, shall be regulated bythe national
law ofthe person whose succession is inquestion, whatever maybe the nature ofpropertyandthe
countryin which it is to be found. Testator was a citizenof the State of Nevada because he
hadselectedthisas his domicile and permanent residence. Sec. 9905 of Nevada CompiledLaws of
1925:Every personover the age ofeighteenyears, of soundmind, maybylast will dispose of all his
or her estate, real andpersonal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testators
debts. The ex-wife has nolegal claim to anyportionof the estate left bythe testator since noright to
share in the inheritance in favor ofa divorcedwife exists in the State ofNevada andsince the court
a quohadalreadyfound that there wasno conjugal propertybetweenthe testator and the ex-wife. It
does not appear that at the time of the hearingof the project of partition, Section9905 of the
Nevada CompiledLaws was introducedas evidence. The Law ofNevada can onlybe proved inour
courts inthe manner providedbyour Rules: Sec 41. Proof of public or official record:An official
recordor anyentrytherein, when admissible for anypurpose maybe evidencedbyanofficial
publicationthereofor bya copyattestedbythe officer having the legal custodyof the record, or
byhis deputy, and accompanied, if the recordif not kept inthe Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer hadcustody.

Bellisvs Bellis 20 scra 358

FACTS:
Amos Bellis wasa citizenof the State of Texas, andof the United States. Byhis first wife
whom he divorcedhe hadfive legitimate children, byhis secondwife, who survived him, he had
three legitimate children, andthree illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one
disposingof his Texas propertiesandthe other disposinghis Philippine properties. In both wills,
his illegitimate children were not givenanything. The illegitimate children opposedthe will onthe
groundthat theyhave been deprived oftheir legitimesto whichthey should be entitled, if Philippine
law were to be applied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law ofthe deceasedshoulddetermine the successionalrights of
the illegitimate children.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said childrenare not entitledto their legitimes under the
Texas Law, beingthe national law ofthe deceased, there are nolegitimes. The parties admit that
the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizenof the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws
of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validityof the
provisionof the will andthe amount of successional rights are to be determinedunder Texas law,
the Philippine law onlegitimes cannot be appliedto the testacyof Amos G. Bellis. Article 16, par.
2, andArt. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the nationallawof the decedent, in intestate
or testamentarysuccessions, withregardto four items:(a) the order of succession;(b)the amount of
successional rights;(e) the intrinsic validityof the provisions of the will;and(d)the capacityto
succeed. Intestate andtestamentarysuccessions, bothwith respect to the order of succession andto
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validityof testamentaryprovisions, shallbe
regulatedbythe national law of the personwhose successionis under consideration, whatever
maybe the nature of the propertyandregardless of the countrywhereinsaid propertymaybe found.

AZNAR vs. GARCIA 7 scra 95

FACTS:
Edward S. Christensen, thoughborninNew York, migratedto California where he resided
and consequentlywas considereda California Citizenfor a periodof nine years to 1913. He came
to the Philippineswhere he became a domiciliaryuntil the time of hisdeath. However, during the
entire periodof hisresidence inthiscountry, he hadalways consideredhimself as a citizenof
California. In his will, executedonMarch 5, 1951, he institutedanacknowledgednatural daughter,
Maria LucyChristensen as hisonlyheir but left a legacyof some moneyinfavor of Helen
Christensen Garciawho, ina decision renderedbythe Supreme Court had beendeclaredas an
acknowledgednatural daughter of his. Counsel of Helenclaims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil
code, California lawshould be applied, the matter is returnedbackto the lawof domicile, that
Philippine lawis ultimatelyapplicable, that the share of Helenmust be increasedin viewof
successional rights of illegitimate childrenunder Philippine laws. On the other hand, counselfor
daughter Maria , inas much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national
of the deceasedmust apply, our courts must applyinternal law of California on the matter. Under
Californialaw, there are nocompulsoryheirs and consequentlya testator shoulddispose
anypropertypossessedbyhim in absolute dominion.

ISSUE:
Whether Philippine Law or CaliforniaLawshould apply.

HELD:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
ChristensenGarcia said ineffect that there are two rulesinCaliforniaon the matter. 1. The conflict
rule which shouldapplyto Californians outside the California, and 2. The internal Lawwhich
shouldapply to California domiciles in California. The California conflict rule found onArt. 946
of the California Civil code States that, Ifthere is no law to the contraryinthe place where
personal propertyis situated, it is deemedto followthe decree ofits owner and is governed bythe
law of the domicile. Christensen beingdomiciledoutside California, the lawof hisdomicile, the
Philippinesis ought to be followed. Wherefore, the decisionappealedis reversed and case is
remandedto the lower court with instructions that partitionbe made as that ofthe Philippine
lawprovides. HUMANRELATIONS:
Uypitching vs Quiamco 510 scra 17

FACTS:
1982: respondent ErnestoC. Quiamcowas approachedbyJuanDavalan, Josefino Gabutero
and Raul Generoso to amicablysettle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robberyfiled by
Quiamco against them. Theysurrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle anda
photocopyof its certificate of registration. The motorcycle wasparkedinan openspace inside
respondents business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and
accessible to the public. October 1981:the motorcycle had beensold oninstallment basis to
Gabutero bypetitioner Ramas UypitchingSons, Inc., a family-ownedcorporation managed
bypetitioner Atty. ErnestoRamasUypitching. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was
mortgagedto petitioner corporation. WhenGabuterocould nolonger paythe installments, told
petitioner corporations collector, WilfredoVerao, that the motorcycle hadallegedlybeen
takenby respondents men. January26, 1991:petitioner Uypitching, accompaniedbypolicemen,
went to Avesco-AVNE Enterprises to recover the motorcycle. Unable to find respondent, the
policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE Enterprisesand, on petitioner Uypitchings
instructionandover the clerks objection, took the motorcycle. February18, 1991: petitioner
Uypitchingfileda criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violationof the Anti-
FencingLawagainst respondent inthe Office ofthe CityProsecutor of Dumaguete City. July30,
1994: the trial court rendereda decision finding that petitioner Uypitchingwas motivatedwith
malice andill will when he calledrespondent a thief, took the motorcycle in an abusive manner
andfileda baseless complaint for qualifiedtheft and/or violationof the Anti- Fencing Law.
Petitioners appealedthe RTCdecisionbut the CA affirmedthe trial courts decision. Thus, this
petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners are liable for damages?

HELD:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. As they never questioned the findings of
the RTC and CA that malice and ill will attended not only the public imputation of a crime to
respondent but also the taking of the motorcycle, petitioners were deemed to have accepted the
correctness of such findings. A mortgagee may take steps to recover the mortgaged property to
enable it to enforce or protect its foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-defined
procedure for the recovery of possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to
obtain possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action
either to recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to obtain judicial
foreclosure. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire
legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondents
establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search
warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner
Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and
2. 7. 7 must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party will attach. In this case, the manner by
which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners instance was not only attended by bad faith but
also contrary to the procedure laid down bylaw. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory
statement, petitioners exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was utterly
prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an
unfounded complaint could not in anyway be considered to be in accordance with the purpose
for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners actions
showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners
acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners
willfully caused damage to respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.

Liwayway Vinzons-Chato vs. Fortune Tobacco, Corp. G.R. No. 141309, June 19, 2007

FACTS:
This is a case for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code filed by Fortune against
Liwayway as CIR. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted RA 7654, which provided that
locally manufactured cigarettes which are currently classified and taxed at 55% shall be charged
an ad valorem tax of 55% provided that the maximum tax shall not be less than Five Pesos per
pack. Prior to effectivity of RA 7654, Liwayway issued a rule, reclassifying Champion,
Hope, and More (all manufactured by Fortune)as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing
foreign brand subject to the 55% ad valorem tax. Thus, when RA 7654 was passed, these
cigarette brands were already covered. In a case filed against Liwayway with the RTC, Fortune
contended that the issuance of the rule violated its constitutional right against deprivation of
property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. For her part,
Liwayway contended in her motion to dismiss that respondent has no cause of action against her
because she issuedRMC37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of
her authority. She claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the
latter is the one responsible for her acts. She also contended that the complaint states no cause of
action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith. The order denying the motion to dismiss was
elevated to the CA, who dismissed the case on the ground that under Article 32, liability may
arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad faith. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES:
 Whether or not a public officer maybe validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in connection with the discharge of the functions of his/her office. Whether or not
Article32, NCC, should be applied instead of Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code.

HELD:
On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which
a person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope
of his assigned tasks. An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the
office which he/she heads is not liable for damages that may have been caused to another, as it
would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for
monetary claims without its consent. However, a public officer is by law not immune from
damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of
his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. Specifically,
under Sec. 38, Book I, Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad faith,
malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Sec. 39 of the
same Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officers act is characterized by
willfulness or negligence. In Cojuangco, Jr. V. CA, a public officer who directly or indirectly
violates the constitutional rights of another, maybe validly sued for damages under Article 32 of
the Civil Code even if his acts were not so tainted with malice or bad faith. Thus, the rule in this
jurisdiction is that a public officer maybe validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in
the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer:(1) acted
with malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional
right of the plaintiff. On the second issue, SC ruled that the decisive provision is Article 32, it
being a special law, which prevails over a general law (the Administrative Code). Article 32 was
patterned after the tort in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been
defined as the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives
some injury, directly or indirectly, in person, property or reputation. There are cases in which it
has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state
of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the defendant has been
rendered immaterial. The reason sometimes given for the rule is that otherwise, the mental
attitude of the alleged wrongdoer, and not the act itself, would determine whether the act was
wrongful. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive, does not render
lawful an act which is
3. 8. 8 otherwise an invasion of anothers legal right; that is, liability in tort in not precluded
by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

Estrada vs. Escritor 492 SCRA 1. 22 JUN2006

FACTS:
 Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and had a
son with him as well. Respondents husband died a year before she entered into the judiciary
while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Complainant Estrada requested the
Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent. According to complainant, respondent should not
be allowed to remain employed therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religionthe Jehovahs
Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly have a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness under the approval of their congregation. Such a declaration is
effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.

RULING:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom of
religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of the fundamental rights
in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable and sacred of human rights. The
States interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be merely abstract or symbolic in order to be
sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not
evinced any concrete interest in enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent
or her partner. Thus the States interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an
unenforced prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public
and secular morality. The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent
neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. Assuming arguendo that
the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to further demonstrate that the state has
used the least intrusive means possible so that the free exercise is not infringed anymore than
necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be
penalized for it constitutes an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.

Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol [G.R. No.164774. April 12, 2006]

FACTS:
Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The company policies
stated that: New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up
to [the] 3rddegree of relationship, already employed by the company In case of two ofour
employees (both single, one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship during
the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above. The complainants alleged that when they married co-
employees, they were compelled to resign because of the company policy. Arguing that said
policy is illegal, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.

ISSUE:
Whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company
violates the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid
exercise of management prerogative.

HELD:
The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: It shall be
unlawful for an employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of
employment that a woman employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that
upon getting married a woman employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually
dismiss, discharge, discriminate or otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of
her marriage. Two types of employment policies involve spouses: 1. no-spouse employment
policies - policies banning only spouses from working in the same company; 2. anti-nepotism
employment policies- those banning all immediate family members, including spouses, from
working in the same company In the US, there is what they call as bona fide occupational
qualification exception, that is, unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the
business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not
discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse. And to justify
a bona fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) That the
employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and
4. 9. 9 (2) That there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons
meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job. In the
Philippines we employ the standard of reasonableness of the company policy which is parallel to
the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. This was illustrated in the cases of Duncan
Association of Detailman vs. Gaxo Wellcome (2004) and PT&T vs. NLRC (1997). These cases
instruct us that the requirement of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the
questioned employment policy. The employer has the burden to prove the existence of a
reasonable business necessity. In the case at bar, there is no a reasonable business necessity. The
employees were hired after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they
married a co- employee. Star Paper failed to show how the marriages of the employees could be
detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on the mere fear that employees
married to each other will be less efficient.