MAYOR PABLO P.

MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE

ORO, petitioners,
vs.
PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, respondents.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners.

R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The
religious elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the
youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media
trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.

The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities,
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it
leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one
of the herein private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to
inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season.

The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and
hostile. On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS

PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO
ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE USING AND ALLOWING TO
BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR THE
OPERATION OF CASINO.

BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of

Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
 Sec. 1. That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation
of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be
issued to any person, partnership or corporation for the operation of
casino within the city limits.

Sec. 2. That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any

persons, partnership or corporation to use its business establishment or
portion thereof, or allow the use thereof by others for casino operation
and other gambling activities.

Sec. 3. PENALTIES. Any violation of such existing business

permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer the following
penalties, to wit:

a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty

(60) days for the first offense and a fine of
P1,000.00/day

b) Suspension of the business permit for Six

(6) months for the second offense, and a fine
of P3,000.00/day

c) Permanent revocation of the business

permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for
the third and subsequent offenses.

Sec. 4. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from
publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93
reading as follows:

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO

AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990

against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another
Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the establishment of
CASINO;

WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No.

3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing
Business Permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be
used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of CASINO;

WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99,
No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of the Local
Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact
measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general
welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining
to amusement or entertainment in order to protect social and moral
welfare of the community;

NOW THEREFORE,

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:

Sec. 1. The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan

de Oro is hereby prohibited.

Sec. 2. Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the

following penalties:

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the

proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the operation,
conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the City and closure
thereof;

b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1)
year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the
court against the manager, supervisor, and/or any person responsible in
the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling CASINO.

Sec. 3. This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its
publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the
writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was
denied on July 13, 1993. 2

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of
Appeals erred in holding that:

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of

Cagayan de Oro does not have the power and authority to prohibit the
establishment and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within the
City's territorial limits.

2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found

in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1) (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean
"illegal gambling."

3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are

therefore invalid on that point.

4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial

to cockfighting and are therefore invalid on that point.

5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with

the general powers and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and
inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.

6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v.
PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing
of the issues presented in this present case.

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and

regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming
Corporation, 4 this Court sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited
the benefits of the entity to the national economy as the third highest revenue-earner
in the government, next only to the BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause
now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall

exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to
the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among
other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology,
encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals,
enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full
employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:

Sec. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. (a) The

Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this
Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient

and effective city government, and in this connection, shall:

xxx xxx xxx

(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent,

suppress and impose appropriate penalties for
habitual drunkenness in public places,
vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution,
establishment and maintenance of houses of
ill repute, gamblingand other prohibited
games of chance, fraudulent devices and
ways to obtain money or property, drug
 addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug
pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing,
distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and
such other activities inimical to the welfare
and morals of the inhabitants of the city;

This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and
businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5

The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod
may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which
are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by
the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units
may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as
the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been
permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority
to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the
Local Government Code.

It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy
as mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as
various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In
giving the local government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and
other social problems, the Local Government Code has recognized the competence
of such communities to determine and adopt the measures best expected to promote
the general welfare of their inhabitants in line with the policies of the State.

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local
government units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of
chance, like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant allforms of gambling
without distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere
debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded from the scope of their
power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special law, as it could
have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local
government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their
territories, including the operation of casinos.

The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of
modifying the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than
P.D. 1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More
than this, the powers of the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued
by the Code insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant
to Par. (f) of its repealing clause reading as follows:

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local
Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the
petitioners, in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal
interpretation in favor of the local government units. Section 5 of the Code
specifically provides:

Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provisions

of this Code, the following rules shall apply:

(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be

liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the
lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local
government unit concerned;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally

interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life
for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)

Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various
provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the
general and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the
family and the proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call
attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance
prohibiting the playing of panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of
gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a
martial law instrument") in creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos
"on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines."

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for
that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of
gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it
has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-
racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this
Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts
do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the prerogative of the
political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or
practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only
by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our
scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches
decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who
will ultimately judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.

The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of
Ordinance No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid
down by law and not by our own convictions on the propriety of gambling.

The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held
that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:

1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.

2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.

5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.

 6) It must not be unreasonable.

We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling
and other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of
chance which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are
less than accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of
chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and
unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words with which it is
associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word "gambling" is associated
with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be read as referring
to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, must be
prevented or suppressed.

We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite
conclusively. But we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of
the inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy,
deserve more than short shrift from this Court.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869
and the public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from
exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The
petitioners have an ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the
ordinances that have changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail
against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made by the Local
Government Code itself, which was also enacted by the national lawmaking
authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the Code, but
merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino
over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This modification of P.D.
1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law can change or
repeal another law.

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the
decree has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already
dead, repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn
PAGCOR of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its
operations may now be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the
prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the
word "shall" as used therein is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government
units have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the
petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under this construction,
PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as they must
all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the mandatory duty
imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist
except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be able to
exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation
of casinos.

It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause,
conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the
specific laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause,
which is reproduced below, will disclose the omission:

Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise
known as the "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112
(1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are hereby repealed.

(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees,
orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to or concerning
the barangay are hereby repealed.

(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939

regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No.
5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential Decree No.
144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741; Presidential
Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended
by Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436,
464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of
no force and effect.

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it

governs locally-funded projects.

(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as

they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16,
and 29 of Presidential Decree No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72,
73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16
of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
 (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts
thereof which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co.
v. Apostol, 10 this Court explained:

The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on

the assumption that if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention
on the part of the lawmaking power to abrogate the prior law, this
intention must be given effect; but there must always be a sufficient
revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of
statutory construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not
be imputed to the Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or
provisions, with reference to which the question arises bear to each
other the relation of general to special.

There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary,

as the private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding
in two later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims
under the Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or
detention or of violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the
solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes.
This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local
Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were to make the entity more
responsive to the fiscal problems of the government.

It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another
in an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of
a coordinate branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between
P.D. 1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other
but to give effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the
case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is to hold that under the
Local Government Code, local government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally effective and mutually
complementary.

This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit,
the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept;
it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners'
suggestion that the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would
erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication
that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of
Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office from conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the
races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.

In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion
urged on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the
contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and
force of a statute, as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the
playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute
is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the
principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest
that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of
the statute.

Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and
rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of
life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it may destroy.
As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some
constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single
act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a
wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the
State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no
limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are
concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the
legislature. 11
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government
units has not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening
the policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here
confirm that Congress retains control of the local government units although in
significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions. The power
to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the
power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local government units of the power
to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however,
the national legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which
cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.

The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of
their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City
will be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope
of large or easy gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the
workman" 13 and that "habitual gambling is a cause of laziness and
ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The social scourge of gambling
must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be enforced to the limit."
George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity
and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the
legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as
was done in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That
decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the
touchstone of all official acts. We do not find such contravention here.

We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government
Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those
forms of gambling prohibited by law.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute
that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not
competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact
Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino
and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public
policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is
so ordered

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF

JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY
TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD
AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.

The City Legal Officer for petitioner.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.).

Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila.

L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.

CRUZ, J.:

The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local
Government Code reading as follows:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And

Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. The procedure for
approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in
accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public
hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment
thereof; Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or
legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of
Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date
of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not
have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the
accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided,
 finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the
lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting
upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings
with a court of competent jurisdiction.

Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies
and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila
Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in
the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law
and public policy.1

In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter
alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly, it
declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of
its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments
in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only the
power of supervision over local governments.2

The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that
the annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for
the enactment of tax ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had
indeed not been observed.

Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-
compliance with Circular 1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a
certified true copy of the challenged decision.3 However, on motion for
reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the decision attached, the
petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.

We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests
in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,4 even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is
charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution
vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost
circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on the doctrine of
separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork of the
legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts,
if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in
the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough
deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those
who participated in its discussion.5

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty
of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that
the measure was first carefully studied by the executive and the legislative
departments and determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption of
constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was indeed
an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the
required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot
escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.

In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice
to review tax ordinances and, inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar
distinction between control and supervision, the first being "the power of an officer
to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance
of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter," while the
second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law."6 His conclusion was that the challenged section
gave to the Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by
the Constitution in the President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation
not only of Article X, specifically Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing
powers of local governments,8 and the policy of local autonomy in general.

We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the
provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality
or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of
these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not
also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local
government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code
should be. He did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for
its annulment. He did not say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found
only was that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine
if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance with law, that is,
with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that
was an act not of control but of mere supervision.

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the
work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not
prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter
except to see to it that the rules are followed. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act not
of control but of mere supervision.

The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because
the jurisdiction claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election
contests in the Katipunan ng Mga Barangay was held to belong to the Commission
on Elections by constitutional provision. The conflict was over jurisdiction, not
supervision or control.

Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act,
which provided in its Section 2 as follows:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage,
unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That
the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity
of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by
him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or
 imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is
contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said
Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall
be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days
within which period the local legislative body may either modify the
tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a
court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part
or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked.
Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or
fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have
ceased to exist.

That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax
ordinance if, in his opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive
or confiscatory. Determination of these flaws would involve the exercise
of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of whether or not the
requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack of
control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this
Court but, at any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under
Section 187. All he is permitted to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of
the tax measure, without the right to declare that, in his opinion, it is unjust,
excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this matter. In fact,
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with,
the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
the wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.

The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the
Manila Revenue Code is another matter.

In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of
public hearings on the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested
parties as required by Art. 276(b) of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance published in three
successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a). No
minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held.
Neither were copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the
city in accordance with Sec. 511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the
Manila Revenue Code was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated
among the people for their information and guidance, conformably to Sec. 59(b) of
the Code.

Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had
been observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of
Manila had not been able to prove such compliance before the Secretary only
because he had given it only five days within which to gather and present to him all
the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the trial court.

To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the
respondents and called for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully
examined every one of these exhibits and agree with the trial court that the
procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the public hearings
were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The minutes of
the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show
that the proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard
on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published
in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue
of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.

The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission
does not affect its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues
of a newspaper of general circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been
shown that the text of the ordinance has been translated and disseminated, but this
requirement applies to the approval of local development plans and public
investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax ordinances.

We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as

their validity has not been raised in issue in the present petition.

WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged

decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code unconstitutional but AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural
requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code have been observed. No
pronouncement as to costs.

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T.
SANTOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LUIS SANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Local
Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity as Chief, Legal Service
of the Department of Local Government and SALVADOR CABALUNA
JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Local Government, respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.
Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President (acting through the
Secretary of Local Government), to suspend and/or remove local officials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) and a
member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof (G.R. No. 93746), respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative

complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in
1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the
Constitution, and arbitrary detention.1 The personalities involved are Joceleehn
Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; Salvador Cabaluna, her husband; Dr.
Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant City Health Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor;
Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo Pefia
Redondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and Pancho Erbite, a barangay
tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are set forth in the opinion of the
respondent Court of Appeals.2 We quote:

xxx xxx xxx

In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerk assigned to the
City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due to political reasons, having
supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0. Caram, the petitioner City Mayor,
using as an excuse the exigency of the service and the interest of the public,
pulled her out from rightful office where her qualifications are best suited and
assigned her to a work that should be the function of a non-career service
employee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of the Public
Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant's duties and functions, has
been detailed to take her place. The petitioner's act are pure harassments aimed
at luring her away from her permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitioner
handpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as Assistant City
Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office was padlocked without any
explanation or justification; that her salary was withheld without cause since
April 1, 1988; that when she filed her vacation leave, she was given the run-
around treatment in the approval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo
Villegas and that she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge
in an administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo
City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry
Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo are members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod
of the City of Iloilo. Their complaint arose out from the case where Councilor
Larry Ong, whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without
previous notice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had to
hold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the other complainants
sympathized with him and decided to do the same. However, the petitioner,
together with its fully-armed security men, forcefully drove them away from
Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ong denounced the petitioner's actuations the
following day in the radio station and decided to hold office at the Freedom
Grandstand at Iloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to
witness the incident. However, before the group could reach the area, the
petitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using a firetruck in
dozing water to the people and the bystanders.
 Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangay tanod,
appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13, 1988, without the
benefit of charges filed against him and no warrant of arrest was issued, Erbite
was arrested and detained at the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of
petitioner. In jail, he was allegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing
injuries He was released only the following day.3

The Mayor thereafter answered4 and the cases were shortly set for hearing. The
opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth the succeeding events:

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for hearing on
June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of the Department of Local
Government in Iloilo City. Notices, through telegrams, were sent to the parties
(Annex L) and the parties received them, including the petitioner. The
petitioner asked for a postponement before the scheduled date of hearing and
was represented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers, Atty.
Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come all the way from
Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually held only on June 20,1988
in view of the inability and unpreparedness of petitioner's counsel.

The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same venue-Iloilo
City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay the proceedings and moved for
a postponement under the excuse that he had just hired his counsel.
Nonetheless, the hearing officers denied the motion to postpone, in view of
the fact that the parties were notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings
(Annex M).

In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined the complainants and

their witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a preventive

suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last until October 11,1988 for a period
of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and the petitioner
again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988. On September 26,
1988, the complainants and petitioner were present, together with their
respective counsel. The petitioner sought for a postponement which was
 denied. In these hearings which were held in Mala the petitioner testified in
Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.

The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case and the
complainants testified including their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved for a

postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to 11, 1988
which was granted. However, the motion for change of venue as denied due
to lack of funds. At the hearing on November 7, 1988, the parties and counsel
were present. Petitioner reiterated his motion to change venue and moved for
postponement anew. The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition
of witnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed.
However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties were notified
of the hearing, the investigation was set to December 13 to 15, 1988.

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground that his
witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to lack of
transportation. The motion was denied and the petitioner was given up to
December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.

On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion for

postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up to December 15,
1988 to present his evidence. On December 15, 1988, the petitioner failed to
present evidence and the cases were considered submitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in the arbitrary
detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondent ordered the
petitioner's second preventive suspension dated October 11, 1988 for another
sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ
of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City.
The second preventive suspension was not enforced.5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action for
prohibition against the respondent Secretary of Local Government (now, Interior) in
the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City, where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of
preliminary injunction. Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action for
prohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issued another order,

preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in
twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting
mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 of the Court
of Appeals, a petition for prohibition,6 (Malabor it is to be noted, is one of the
complainants, and hence, he is interested in seeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)

On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, dismissing CA-

G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewise promulgated a decision, dismissing
CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In a Resolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a
Resolution certifying the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary
charged by the respondent Secretary, to this Court.

On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order, barring the respondent

Secretary from implementing the suspension orders, and restraining the enforcement
of the Court of Appeals' two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all three cases. In our
Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due course thereto.

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that the Department of
Local Government in hearing the ten cases against him, had denied him due process
of law and that the respondent Secretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile"
towards him7 arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino party8 and the running political rivalry they maintained in
the last congressional and local elections;9 and his alleged refusal to operate a lottery
in Iloilo City.10 He also alleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension
since it had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay elections of
November 14, 1988),11 notwithstanding which, the latter proceeded with the hearing
and meted out two more suspension orders of the aforementioned cases. 12 He
likewise contends that he sought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in
Manila) in order to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejected his
request.13 He states that he asked for postponement on "valid and
justifiable"14 grounds, among them, that he was suffering from a heart ailment which
required confinement; that his "vital"15 witness was also hospitalized16 but that the
latter unduly denied his request.17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) is that the
Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, of any authority to suspend
and remove local officials, an argument reiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera
Artieda (G.R. No. 93746).
As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the records do not show
very clearly in what manner the Mayor might have been deprived of his rights by
the respondent Secretary. His claims that he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are)
political rivals and that his "persecution" was politically motivated are pure
speculation and although the latter does not appear to have denied these contentions
(as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take his word for it the way we would
have under less political circumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud"
has often been a good excuse in contesting complaints.

The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's that Secretary Santos
had attempted to seduce him to join the administration party and to operate a lottery
in Iloilo City. Again, although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can
not accept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as he would have
us accept them18 for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say
so's were never corroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible public
official, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, is presumed to be
performing his duties regularly and in the absence of contrary evidence, no ill motive
can be ascribed to him.

As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested the respondent Secretary to

defer the hearing on account of the ninety-day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas
Blg. 337, the Court finds the question to be moot and academic since we have in fact
restrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints against the petitioners.19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid that he has not given
any compelling reason why we should overturn the Court of Appeals, which found
no convincing reason to overrule Secretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides,
postponements are a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, and based
on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced that the Secretary has been
guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that Secretary Santos' actuations
deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government,
as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.

It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution20 no longer allows the
President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of
suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the
Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and
second, by deleting the phrase21 as may be provided by law to strip the President of
the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds
support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The provision in question
reads as follows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over
local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and
municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component
barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the
scope of their prescribed powers and functions.22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935 Constitution, which we

quote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision over all Local governments
as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided by law") is
significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power of the President is "provided
by law" and (2) hence, no law may provide for it any longer.

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question, the Secretary of
Local Government acted in consonance with the specific legal provisions of Batas
Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, we quote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after the complaint is filed,
the Minister of local Government, or the sanggunian concerned, as the case
may be, shall require the respondent to submit his verified answer within
seven days from receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing and
investigation of the case within ten days after receipt of such answer of the
respondent. No investigation shall be held within ninety days immediately
prior to an election, and no preventive suspension shall be imposed with the
said period. If preventive suspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid
period, the preventive suspension shall be lifted.24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension may be imposed

by the Minister of Local Government if the respondent is a provincial or city
official, by the provincial governor if the respondent is an elective municipal
official, or by the city or municipal mayor if the respondent is an elective
barangay official.
 (2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are
joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent has
committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is
strong, when the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance
in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases,
preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said
suspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall be deemed
reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings
against him until its termination. However ' if the delay in the proceedings of
the case is due to his fault, neglect or request, the time of the delay shall not
be counted in computing the time of suspension.25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987
Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the
President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local
officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local
Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional
language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the
constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right
or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide
administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of
"as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local
governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local
government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local
autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in
particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local
government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or
Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal
corporations euphemistically to "small republics."26 Autonomy, in the constitutional
sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the
legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself
suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central
government.
It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-
executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government
code,27 a local tax law,28 income distribution legislation,29 and a national
representation law,30 and measures31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level.
It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local
government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally,
that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions
for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal
powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise
to the President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide
for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted
through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall,
initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government
units their powers, responsibilities and resources, and provide for the
qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to
stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by
severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals,
like the power of local legislation.33 The Constitution did nothing more, however,
and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the
Constitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President
mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation,
and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a
mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority as this Court has held,34 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No. 6 p. 2884,
this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the
power of control given to him over executive officials of our government
 wherein it was emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are
two different things which differ one from the other in meaning and extent.
Thus in that case the Court has made the following digression: "In
administration law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail
or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed
by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means
the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement
it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the President
over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires, as postulated
in Section 64(c) of the Revised Administrative Code. ...35

xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for test of the latter."36"Supervision" on the
other hand means "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.37 As we held,38 however, "investigating"
is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering".
The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least
three cases, Lacson v. Roque,39 Hebron v. Reyes,40 and Mondano v. Silvosa,41 and
possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.42 In Lacson, this Court said that
the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided
by law,"43 a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that
the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or
take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the
corresponding provincial board."44 However,
neither Lacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive
from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control
powers, but because no law allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority. Thus,
according to Lacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend
municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension
of public officers are always controlled by the particular law applicable and
its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations.45
In Hebron we stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer is specified

by law, the same must be deemed mandatory and adhered to strictly, in the
absence of express or clear provision to the contrary-which does not et with
respect to municipal officers ...46

In Mondano, the Court held:

... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial
supervision over municipal officials in the provincial governor who is
authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made under oath against
municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime
involving moral turpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit
written charges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing a copy
of such charges to the accused either personally or by registered mail, and he
may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge by one affecting the
official integrity of the officer in question." Section 86 of the Revised
Administration Code adds nothing to the power of supervision to be exercised
by the Department Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If it
be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as
that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, then such additional power must be deemed to have
been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII of the Constitution.47

xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinary measures on local
officials except on appeal from the provincial board pursuant to the Administrative
Code.48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power (to
suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that the President can not
exercise it on account of his limited power, but because the law lodged the power
elsewhere. But in those cases ii which the law gave him the power, the Court, as
in Ganzon v. Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of
the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes
that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although
Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the
President,50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not.51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the
Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal"
are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the
stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held
that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization."53 The Constitution as we observed, does nothing more than to
break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local
governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments
from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the
relation of partnership and inter-dependence between the central administration and
local government units, or otherwise, to user in a regime of federalism. The Charter
has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are
subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit
paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

As we observed in one case,54 decentralization means devolution of national

administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization

of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order
to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local
governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective
partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local
affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President
exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts
in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of

political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be
 autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its
constituency.55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon is albeit

another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the
fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact
facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases
yield prima faciefindings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public
office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly
another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to
suspend him out of office. As we held:56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His
term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and
the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge
of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so.
As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of the
electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to
the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against
administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, Ms
culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive
suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable
length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly,
there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only
victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga They were
deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that
sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such
an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.57
The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above
reasons,58 and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local
government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held,59 is simply "to
prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his
influence and authority over possible witnesses"60 or to keep him off "the records
and other evidence.61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against

an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it can not exceed sixty
days,62 which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period
is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors
have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventive imprisonment in which the
accused is held to insure his presence at the trial. In both cases, the accused (the
respondent) enjoys a presumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Code provides, it may
be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held,63 a longer suspension is unjust
and unreasonable, and we might add, nothing less than tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which is not a remote

possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and purposes, to make him spend the rest
of his term in inactivity. It is also to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspension
permanent.

It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that the Mayor's guilt
has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be for naught because needless to
say, the length of his suspension would have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out
his tenure considerably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of the respondent
Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet it is hardly any argument to
inflict on Mayor Ganzon successive suspensions when apparently, the respondent
Secretary has had sufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a case
against the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is intriguing is that
the respondent Secretary has been cracking down, so to speak, on the Mayor
piecemeal apparently, to pin him down ten times the pain, when he, the respondent
Secretary, could have pursued a consolidated effort.
We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of
Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary
of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave
abuse of discretion.

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under questions, and that any
talk of future suspensions is in fact premature. The fact remains, however, that
Mayor Ganzon has been made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and the
possibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (which amounts to a
violation of the Local Government Code which brings to light a pattern of
suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor the rest of his natural tenure. The Court
is simply foreclosing what appears to us as a concerted effort of the State to
perpetuate an arbitrary act.

As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer the duration of his third
suspension and lifting, for the purpose, the Temporary Restraining Order earlier
issued. Insofar as the seven remaining charges are concerned, we are urging the
Department of Local Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertake
steps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usual remedies of appeal,
judicial or administrative, or certiorari, if warranted, and meanwhile, we are
precluding the Secretary from meting out further suspensions based on those
remaining complaints, notwithstanding findings of prima facie evidence.

In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of

administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the
central government in the manner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was
meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the
latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the
fundamental premise of autonomy;

4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter
may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against
local officials;
5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does
not signify "control" (which the President does not have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve the suspension so far ordered,
but may no longer be suspended for the offenses he was charged originally;
provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or
request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of
suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the
petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper
charges are filed against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous
suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if
warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED. The Temporary

Restraining Order issued is LIFTED.1wphi1 The suspensions of the petitioners are
AFFIRMED, provided that the petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made
to serve future suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrative
charges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11, 1988. The
Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all such administrative cases
pending against Mayor Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann Rivera Artieda, is
AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

THE NATIONAL LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY, represented by ALEX L.

DAVID in his capacity as National President and for his own Person,
President ALEX L. DAVID, petitioners, vs. HON. VICTORIA ISABEL
A. PAREDES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 124,
Caloocan City, and THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR and LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, represented the HON. SECRETARY ROBERT Z.
BARBERS and MANUEL A. RAYOS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 131939. September 27, 2004]

LEANDRO YANGOT, BONIFACIO LACWASAN and BONY
TACIO, petitioners, vs. DILG Secretary ROBERT Z. BARBERS and
DILG Undersecretary MANUEL SANCHEZ, respondents.

DECISION
Tinga, J.:

At bottom, the present petition inquires into the essential nature of the Liga ng
mga Barangay and questions the extent of the power of Secretary of the Department
of Interior and Local Government (DILG), as alter ego of the President. More
immediately, the petition disputes the validity of the appointment of the DILG as
the interim caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay.
On 11 June 1997, private respondent Manuel A. Rayos [as petitioner
therein], Punong Barangay of Barangay 52, District II, Zone 5, District II, Caloocan
City, filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan,[1] alleging that respondent therein Alex L.
David [now petitioner], Punong Barangay of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Caloocan City
and then president of the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Liga ng mga
Barangay National Chapter, committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and
conduct of the proposed synchronized Liga ng mga Barangay elections in
1997. According to the petition, the irregularities consisted of the following: (1) the
publication of the notice in the Manila Bulletin but without notifying in writing the
individual punong barangays of Caloocan City;[2] (2) the Notice of Meeting dated
08 June 1997 for the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City did not specify whether the
meeting scheduled on 14 June 1997 was to be held at 8:00 a.m. or 8:00 p.m., and
worse, the meeting was to be held in Lingayen, Pangasinan;[3] and (3) the deadline
for the filing of the Certificates of Candidacy having been set at 5:00 p.m. of the
third day prior to the above election day, or on 11 June 1997,[4] Rayos failed to
meet said deadline since he was not able to obtain a certified true copy of the
COMELEC Certificate of Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which
were needed to be a delegate, to vote and be voted for in the Liga election. On 13
June 1997, the Executive Judge issued a temporary restraining order (TRO),
effective for seventy-two (72) hours, enjoining the holding of the general
membership and election meeting of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June
1975.[5]
However, the TRO was allegedly not properly served on herein petitioner David,
and so the election for the officers of the Liga-Caloocan was held as
scheduled.[6] Petitioner David was proclaimed President of the Liga-Caloocan, and
thereafter took his oath and assumed the position of ex-officio member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan.
On 17 July 1997, respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo
warranto, mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy
Quimpo, Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Caloocan City, and
Secretary Barbers.[7] Rayos alleged that he was elected President of
the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections held on 14 June 1997 by the members of
the Caloocan Chapter pursuant to their Resolution/Petition No. 001-97.[8] On 18 July
1997, the presiding judge granted the TRO, enjoining therein respondents David,
Quimpo and Secretary Barbers from proceeding with the synchronized elections for
the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters of the Liga scheduled on 19 July 1997, but
only for the purpose of maintaining the status quo and effective for a period not
exceeding seventy-two (72) hours.[9]
Eventually, on 18 July 1997, at petitioner Davids instance, Special Civil Action
(SCA) No. C-512 pending before Branch 126 was consolidated with SCA No. C-
508 pending before Branch 124.[10]
Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the DILG through
respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent
Motion,[11] invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local
government units and seeking the following reliefs:

WHEREFORE, in the interest of the much-needed delivery of basic services to the

people, the maintenance of public order and to further protect the interests of the
forty-one thousand barangays all over the country, herein respondent respectfully
prays:

a) That the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),

pursuant to its delegated power of general supervision, be appointed as the
Interim Caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until
such time that the new set of National Liga Officers shall have been duly
elected and assumed office; ...[12]
The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
DILG Secretary exercises the power of general supervision over all
government units by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18 February
1992; (2) the Liga ng mga Barangay is a government organization; (3) undue
interference by some local elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter
elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay; (4) improper issuance of confirmations of
the elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David and the National Liga Board;
(5) the need for the DILG to provide remedies measured in view of the confusion
and chaos sweeping the Liga ng mga Barangay and the incapacity of the
National Liga Board to address the problems properly.
On 31 July 1997, petitioner David opposed the DILGs Urgent Motion, claiming
that the DILG, being a respondent in the case, is not allowed to seek any sanction
against a co-respondent like David, such as by filing a cross-claim, without first
seeking leave of court.[13] He also alleged that the DILGs request to be appointed
interim caretaker constitutes undue interference in the internal affairs of the Liga,
since the Liga is not subject to DILG control and supervision.[14]
Three (3) days after filing its Urgent Motion, on 28 July 1997, and before it was
acted upon by the lower court, the DILG through then Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez, issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176.[15] It cited the reported
violations of the Liga ng mga Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by David and
widespread chaos and confusion among local government officials as to who were
the qualified ex-officio Liga members in their respective sangunians.[16] Pending the
appointment of the DILG as the Interim Caretaker of the Liga ng mga Barangay by
the court and until the officers and board members of the national Liga Chapter have
been elected and have assumed office, the Memorandum Circular directed all
provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional directors and other
concerned officers, as follows:

1. All concerned are directed not to recognize and/or honor any Liga Presidents of
the Provincial and Metropolitan Chapters as ex-officio members of the sanggunian
concerned until further notice from the Courts or this Department;

2. All concerned are directed to disregard any pronouncement and/or directive issued
by Mr. Alex David on any issue or matter relating to the affairs of the Liga ng mga
Barangay until further notice from the Courts or this Department.[17]

On 04 August 1997, public respondent Judge Victoria Isabel A. Paredes issued

the assailed order,[18] the pertinent portions of which read, thus:

The authority of the DILG to exercise general supervisory jurisdiction over local
government units, including the different leagues created under the Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160) finds basis in Administrative Order No. 267
dated February 18, 1992. Specifically, Section 1 (a) of the said Administrative Order
provides a broad premise for the supervisory power of the DILG. Administratively,
the DILGs supervision has been tacitly recognized by the local barangays,
municipalities, cities and provinces as shown by the evidences presented by
respondent David himself (See Annexes A to C). The fact that the DILG has sought
to refer the matters therein to the National Liga Board/Directorate does not ipso
facto mean that it has lost jurisdiction to act directly therein. Jurisdiction is conferred
by law and cannot be claimed or lost through agreements or inaction by
individuals. What respondent David may term as interference should caretakership
be allowed, this Court would rather view as a necessary and desirable corollary to
the exercise of supervision.[19]

Political motivations must not preclude, hamper, or obstruct the delivery of basic
services and the perquisites of public service. In this case, the fact of confusion
arising from conflicting appointments, non-action, and uninformed or wavering
decisions of the incumbent National Liga Board/Directorate, having been
satisfactorily established, cannot simply be brushed aside as being politically
motivated or arising therefrom. It is incumbent, therefore, that the DILG exercise a
more active role in the supervision of the affairs and operations of the National Liga
Board/ Directorate at least until such time that the regular National Liga
Board/Directorate may have been elected, qualified and assumed office.[20]

xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Urgent Motion of the DILG for

appointment as interim caretaker, until such time that the regularly elected National
Liga Board of Directors shall have qualified and assumed office, to manage and
administer the affairs of the National Liga Board, is hereby GRANTED.[21]

On 11 August 1997, petitioner David filed an urgent motion for the

reconsideration of the assailed order and to declare respondent Secretary Barbers in
contempt of Court.[22] David claimed that the 04 August 1997 order divested the duly
elected members of the Board of Directors of the Liga National Directorate of their
positions without due process of law. He also wanted Secretary Barbers declared in
contempt for having issued, through his Undersecretary, Memorandum Circular No.
97-176, even before respondent judge issued the questioned order, in mockery of the
justice system. He implied that Secretary Barbers knew about respondent judges
questioned order even before it was promulgated.[23]
On 11 August 1997, the DILG issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-
193,[24] providing supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of
the provincial and metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter
of the Liga ng mga Barangay. The Memorandum Circular set the synchronized
elections for the provincial and metropolitan chapters on 23 August 1997 and for the
national chapter on 06 September 1997.
On 12 August 1997, the DILG issued a Certificate of Appointment[25] in favor
of respondent Rayos as president of the Liga ng mga
Barangay of Caloocan City. The appointment purportedly served as Rayoss legal
basis for ex-officio membership in the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Caloocan City and to qualify and participate in the forthcoming
National Chapter Election of the Liga ng mga Barangay.[26]
On 23 August 1997, the DILG conducted the synchronized elections of
Provincial and Metropolitan Liga Chapters. Thereafter, on 06 September 1997, the
National Liga Chapter held its election of officers and board of directors, wherein
James Marty L. Lim was elected as President of the National Liga.[27]
On 01 October 1997, public respondent judge denied Davids motion for
reconsideration,[28] ruling that there was no factual or legal basis to reconsider the
appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker of the National Liga Board and to cite
Secretary Barbers in contempt of court.[29]
On 10 October 1997, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Certiorari[30] under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul public respondent judges orders of
04 August 1997 and 01 October 1997. They dispute the latters opinion on the power
of supervision of the President under the Constitution, through the DILG over local
governments, which is the same as that of the DILGs as shown by its application of
the power on the Liga ng mga Barangay. Specifically, they claim that the public
respondent judges designation of the DILG as interim caretaker and the acts which
the DILG sought to implement pursuant to its designation as such are beyond the
scope of the Chief Executives power of supervision.
To support the petition, petitioners argue that under Administrative Order No.
267, Series of 1992, the power of general supervision of the President over local
government units does not apply to the Liga and its various chapters precisely
because the Liga is not a local government unit, contrary to the stance of the
respondents.[31]
Section 507 of the Local Government Code (Republic Act No. 7160)[32] provides
that the Liga shall be governed by its own Constitution and By-laws. Petitioners
posit that the duly elected officers and directors of the National Liga elected in 1994
had a vested right to their positions and could only be removed therefrom for cause
by affirmative vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the entire membership pursuant to
the Liga Constitution and By-Laws, and not by mere issuances of the DILG, even if
bolstered by the dubious authorization of respondent judge.[33] Thus, petitioners
claim that the questioned order divested the then incumbent officers and directors of
the Liga of their right to their respective offices without due process of law.
Assuming the Liga could be subsumed under the term local governments, over
which the President, through the DILG Secretary, has the power of
supervision,[34] petitioners point out that still there is no legal or constitutional basis
for the appointment of the DILG as interim caretaker.[35] They stress that the actions
contemplated by the DILG as interim caretaker go beyond supervision, as what it
had sought and obtained was authority to alter, modify, nullify or set aside the
actions of the Liga Board of Directors and even to substitute its judgment over that
of the latter which are all clearly one of control.[36] Petitioners question the
appointment of Rayos as Liga-Caloocan President since at that time petitioner David
was occupying that position which was still the subject of the
quo warranto proceedings Rayos himself had instituted.[37] Petitioners likewise
claim that DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing supplemental
guidelines for the synchronized elections of the Liga, replaced the implementing
rules adopted by the Liga pursuant to its Constitution and By-laws.[38] In fact, even
before its appointment as interim caretaker, DILG specifically enjoined all heads of
government units from recognizing petitioner David and/or honoring any of his
pronouncements relating to the Liga.[39]
Petitioners rely on decision in Taule v. Santos,[40] which, they claim, already
passed upon the extent of authority of the then Secretary of Local Government over
the katipunan ng mga barangay or the barangay councils, as it specifically ruled that
the Secretary [of Local Government] has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of officers of the katipunan.[41]
For his part, respondent Rayos avers that since the Secretary of the DILG
supervises the acts of local officials by ensuring that they act within the scope of
their prescribed powers and functions and since members of the various leagues,
such as the Liga in this case, are themselves officials of local government units, it
follows that the Liga members are subject to the power of supervision of the
DILG.[42] He adds that as the DILGs management and administration of
the Liga affairs was limited only to the conduct of the elections, its actions were
consistent with its rule-making power and power of supervision under existing
laws.[43] He asserts that in assailing the appointment of the DILG as interim
caretaker, petitioners failed to cite any provision of positive law in support of their
stance. Thus, he adds, if a law is silent, obscure or insufficient, a judge may apply a
rule he sees fit to resolve the issue, as long as the rule chosen is in harmony with
general interest, order, morals and public policy,[44] in consonance with Article 9 of
the Civil Code.[45]
 On the other hand, it is quite significant that the Solicitor General has shared
petitioners position. He states that the DILGs act of managing and administering the
affairs of the National Liga Board are not merely acts of supervision but plain
manifestations of control and direct takeover of the functions of the
National Liga Board,[46] going beyond the limits of the power of general supervision
of the President over local governments.[47] Moreover, while the Liga may be
deemed a government organization, it is not strictly a local government unit over
which the DILG has supervisory power.[48]
Meanwhile, on 24 September 1998, James Marty L. Lim, the newly elected
President of the National Liga, filed a Motion for Leave to File Comment in
Intervention,[49] with his Comment in Intervention attached,[50] invoking the validity
of the DILGs actions relative to the conduct of the Liga elections.[51] In addition, he
sought the dismissal of the instant petition on the following grounds: (1) the issue of
validity or invalidity of the questioned order has been rendered moot and academic
by the election of Liga officers; (2) the turn-over of the administration and
management of Liga affairs to the Liga officers; and (3) the recognition and
acceptance by the members of the Liga nationwide.[52]
In the interim, another petition, this time for Prohibition with Prayer for a
Temporary Restraining Order, [53] was filed by several presidents of Liga Chapters,
praying that this Court declare the DILG Secretary and Undersecretary are not vested
with any constitutional or legal power to exercise control or even supervision over
the National Liga ng mga Barangay, nor to take over the functions of its officers or
suspend its constitution; and declare void any and all acts committed by respondents
therein in connection with their caretakership of the Liga.[54] The petition was
consolidated with G.R. No. 130775, but it was eventually dismissed because the
petitioners failed to submit an affidavit of service and proof of service of the
petition.[55]
Meanwhile, on 01 December 1998, petitioner David died and was substituted by
his legal representatives.[56]
Petitioners have raised a number of issues.[57] Integrated and simplified, these
issues boil down to the question of whether or not respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion in appointing the DILG as interim caretaker to administer and
manage the affairs of the National Liga Board, per its order dated 04 August
1997.[58] In turn, the resolution of the question of grave abuse of discretion entails a
couple of definitive issues, namely: (1) whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is a
government organization that is subject to the DILG Secretarys power of supervision
over local governments as the alter ego of the President, and (2) whether the
respondent Judges designation of the DILG as interim caretaker of the Liga has
invested the DILG with control over the Liga and whether DILG Memorandum
Circular No. 97-176, issued before it was designated as such interim caretaker, and
DILG Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 and other acts which the DILG made in
its capacity as interim caretaker of the Liga, involve supervision or control of
the Liga.
However, the Court should first address the question of mootness which
intervenor Lim raised because, according to him, during the pendency of the present
petition a general election was held; the new set of officers and directors had
assumed their positions; and that supervening events the DILG had turned-over the
management and administration of the Liga to new Liga officers and
directors.[59] Respondent Rayos has joined him in this regard.[60] Forthwith, the Court
declares that these supervening events have not rendered the instant petition moot,
nor removed it from the jurisdiction of this Court.
This case transcends the elections ordered and conducted by the DILG as interim
caretaker of the Liga and the Liga officers and directors who were elected to replace
petitioner David and the former officers.At the core of the petition is the validity of
the DILGs caretakership of the Liga and the official acts of the DILG as such
caretaker which exceeded the bounds of supervision and were exercise of control. At
stake in this case is the realization of the constitutionally ensconced principle of local
government autonomy;[61] the statutory objective to enhance the capabilities of
barangays and municipalities by providing them opportunities to participate actively
in the implementation of national programs and projects;[62] and the promotion of
the avowed aim to ensure the independence and non-partisanship of the Liga ng mga
Barangay. The mantle of local autonomy would be eviscerated and remain an empty
buzzword if unconstitutional, illegal and unwarranted intrusions in the affairs of the
local governments are tolerated and left unchecked.
Indeed, it is the declared policy of the State that its territorial and political
subdivisions should enjoy genuine meaningful local autonomy to enable them to
attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the attainment of national goals.[63] In the case of De Leon v.
Esguerra,[64] the Court ruled that even barangays are meant to possess genuine and
meaningful local autonomy so that they may develop fully as self-reliant
communities.[65]
Furthermore, well-entrenched is the rule that courts will decide a question
otherwise moot and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review.[66] For
the question of whether the DILG may validly be appointed as interim caretaker, or
assume a similar position and perform acts pursuant thereto, is likely to resurrect
again, and yet the question may not be decided before the actual assumption, or the
termination of said assumption even.
So too, dismissing the petition on the ground of mootness could lead to the wrong
impression that the challenged order and issuances are valid. Verily, that does not
appear to be the correct conclusion to make since by applying opposite precedents
to the issues the outcome points to invalidating the assailed order and memorandum
circulars.
The resolution of the issues of whether the Liga ng mga Barangay is subject to
DILG supervision, and whether the questioned caretakership order of the respondent
judge and the challenged issuances and acts of the DILG constitute control in
derogation of the Constitution, necessitates a brief overview of the barangay, as the
lowest LGU, and the Liga, as a vehicle of governance and coordination.
As the basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and
implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities
in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be
expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes may be amicably
settled.[67]
On the other hand, the Liga ng mga Barangay[68] is the organization of
all barangays, the primary purpose of which is the determination of the
representation of the Liga in the sanggunians, and the ventilation, articulation, and
crystallization of issues affecting barangay government administration and securing
solutions thereto, through proper and legal means.[69] The Liga ng mga
Barangay shall have chapters at the municipal, city and provincial and metropolitan
political subdivision levels.[70] The municipal and city chapters of the Liga are
composed of the barangay representatives from the municipality or city
concerned. The presidents of the municipal and city chapters of the Liga form the
provincial or metropolitan political subdivision chapters of the Liga. The presidents
of the chapters of the Liga in highly urbanized cities, provinces and the Metro
Manila area and other metropolitan political subdivisions constitute the
National Liga ng mga Barangay.[71]
As conceptualized in the Local Government Code, the barangay is positioned to
influence and direct the development of the entire country. This was heralded by the
adoption of the bottom-to-top approach process of development which requires the
development plans of the barangay to be considered in the development plans of the
municipality, city or province,[72] whose plans in turn are to be taken into account by
the central government[73] in its plans for the development of the entire
country.[74] The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this new development approach
materialize and produce results.
 The presidents of the Liga at the municipal, city and provincial levels,
automatically become ex-officio members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Panlalawigan,respectively. They shall serve as such
only during their term of office as presidents of the Liga chapters, which in no case
shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.[75]
The Liga ng mga Barangay has one principal aim, namely: to promote the
development of barangays and secure the general welfare of their inhabitants.[76] In
line with this, the Liga is granted the following functions and duties:
a) Give priority to programs designed for the total development of the
barangays and in consonance with the policies, programs and projects of
the national government;
b) Assist in the education of barangay residents for peoples participation in
local government administration in order to promote untied and concerted
action to achieve country-wide development goals;
c) Supplement the efforts of government in creating gainful employment
within the barangay;
d) Adopt measures to promote the welfare of barangay officials;
e) Serve as forum of the barangays in order to forge linkages with
government and non-governmental organizations and thereby promote the
social, economic and political well-being of the barangays; and
f) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions
which will bring about stronger ties between barangays and promote the
welfare of the barangay inhabitants.[77]
The Ligas are primarily governed by the provisions of the Local Government
Code. However, they are empowered to make their own constitution and by-laws to
govern their operations. Sec. 507 of the Code provides:

Sec. 507. Constitution and By-Laws of the Liga and the Leagues. - All other matters
not herein otherwise provided for affecting the internal organization of the leagues
of local government units shall be governed by their respective constitution and by-
laws which are hereby made suppletory to the provision of this Chapter: Provided,
That said Constitution and By-laws shall always conform to the provision of the
Constitution and existing laws.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code, the Liga ng mga Barangay adopted its
own Constitution and By-Laws. It provides that the corporate powers of
the Liga, expressed or implied, shall be vested in the board of directors of each level
of the Liga which shall:

a) Have jurisdiction over all officers, directors and committees of the said Liga;
including the power of appointment, assignment and delegation;

b) Have general management of the business, property, and funds of said Liga;

c) Prepare and approve a budget showing anticipated receipts and expenditures for
the year, including the plans or schemes for funding purposes; and

d) Have the power to suspend or remove from office any officer or member of the
said board on grounds cited and in the manner provided in hereinunder provisions.[78]

The National Liga Board of Directors promulgated the rules for the conduct of
its Ligas general elections.[79] And, as early as 28 April 1997, the Liga National
Chapter had already scheduled its general elections on 14 June 1997.[80]
The controlling provision on the issues at hand is Section 4, Article X of the
Constitution, which reads in part:

Sec. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments.

The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions uniformly differentiate the Presidents
power of supervision over local governments and his power of control of the
executive departments bureaus and offices.[81] Similar to the counterpart provisions
in the earlier Constitutions, the provision in the 1987 Constitution provision has been
interpreted to exclude the power of control.[82]
In the early case of Mondano v. Silvosa, et al.,[83] this Court defined supervision
as overseeing, or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers
perform their duties, and to take such action as prescribed by law to compel his
subordinates to perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of
an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for that of the latter.[84] In Taule v. Santos,[85] the Court held that the Constitution
permits the President to wield no more authority than that of checking whether a
local government or its officers perform their duties as provided by statutory
enactments.[86] Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of
mere oversight over an inferior body; it does not include any restraining authority
over such body.[87]
 The case of Drilon v. Lim[88] clearly defined the extent of supervisory power,
thus:

The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner
for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see that the
rules are followed[89]

In Section 4, Article X of the Constitution applicable to the Liga ng mga

Barangay? Otherwise put, is the Liga legally susceptible to DILG suspension?
This question was resolved in Bito-Onon v. Fernandez,[90] where the Court ruled
that the Presidents power of the general supervision, as exercised therein by the
DILG Secretary as his alter ego, extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay.

Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the liga ng mga
barangay, which is not a local government unit?

We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department of
Justice ruled that the liga ng mga barangay is a government organization, being an
association, federation, league or union created by law or by authority of law, whose
members are either appointed or elected government officials. The Local
Government Code defines the liga ng mga barangay as an organization of all
barangays for the primary purpose of determining the representation of the liga in
the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting
barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means,
solutions thereto.[91]

The rationale for making the Liga subject to DILG supervision is quite evident,
whether from the perspectives of logic or of practicality. The Liga is an
aggroupment of barangays which are in turn represented therein by their
respective punong barangays. The representatives of the Liga sit in an ex
officio capacity at the municipal, city and provincial sanggunians. As such, they
enjoy all the powers and discharge all the functions of regular municipal councilors,
city councilors or provincial board members, as the case may be. Thus, the Liga is
the vehicle through which the barangay participates in the enactment of ordinances
and formulation of policies at all the legislative local levels higher than
the sangguniang barangay, at the same time serving as the mechanism for the
bottom-to-top approach of development.
 In the case at bar, even before the respondent Judge designated the DILG
as interim caretaker of the Liga, on 28 July 1997, it issued Memorandum Circular
No. 97-176, directing local government officials not to recognize David as the
National Liga President and his pronouncements relating to the affairs of
the Liga. Not only was the action premature, it even smacked of superciliousness
and injudiciousness. The DILG is the topmost government agency which maintains
coordination with, and exercises supervision over local government units and its
multi-level leagues. As such, it should be forthright, circumspect and supportive in
its dealings with the Ligas especially the Liga ng mga Barangay. The indispensable
role played by the latter in the development of the barangays and the promotion of
the welfare of the inhabitants thereof deserve no less than the full support and respect
of the other agencies of government. As the Court held in the case of San Juan v.
Civil Service Commission,[92] our national officials should not only comply with the
constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit of
liberty upon which these provisions are based.[93]
When the respondent judge eventually appointed the DILG as interim caretaker
to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the
management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the
DILG. Even a cursory glance at the DILGs prayer for appointment as interim
caretaker of the Liga to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, until such
time that the new set of National Liga officers shall have been duly elected and
assumed office reveals that what the DILG wanted was to take control over the Liga.
Even if said caretakership was contemplated to last for a limited time, or only until
a new set of officers assume office, the fact remains that it was a conferment of
control in derogation of the Constitution.
With his Department already appointed as interim caretaker of the Liga,
Secretary Barbers nullified the results of the Liga elections and promulgated DILG
Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 dated 11 August 1997, where he laid down the
supplemental guidelines for the 1997 synchronized elections of the provincial and
metropolitan chapters and for the election of the national chapter of the Liga ng mga
Barangay;scheduled dates for the new provincial, metropolitan and national chapter
elections; and appointed respondent Rayos as president of Liga-Caloocan Chapter.
These acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and
constituted direct interference with the political affairs, not only of the Liga, but
more importantly, of the barangay as an institution.The election of Liga officers is
part of the Ligas internal organization, for which the latter has already provided
guidelines. In succession, the DILG assumed stewardship and jurisdiction over
the Liga affairs, issued supplemental guidelines for the election, and nullified the
effects of the Liga-conducted elections. Clearly, what the DILG wielded was the
power of control which even the President does not have.
Furthermore, the DILG assumed control when it appointed respondent Rayos as
president of the Liga-Caloocan Chapter prior to the newly scheduled
general Liga elections, although petitioner Davids term had not yet expired. The
DILG substituted its choice, who was Rayos, over the choice of majority of
the punong barangay of Caloocan, who was the incumbent President, petitioner
David. The latter was elected and had in fact been sitting as an ex-officio member of
the sangguniang panlungsod in accordance with the Liga Constitution and By-
Laws. Yet, the DILG extended the appointment to respondent Rayos although it was
aware that the position was the subject of a quo warranto proceeding instituted by
Rayos himself, thereby preempting the outcome of that case. It was bad enough that
the DILG assumed the power of control, it was worse when it made use of the power
with evident bias and partiality.
As the entity exercising supervision over the Liga ng mga Barangay, the DILGs
authority over the Liga is limited to seeing to it that the rules are followed, but it
cannot lay down such rules itself, nor does it have the discretion to modify or replace
them. In this particular case, the most that the DILG could do was review the acts of
the incumbent officers of the Liga in the conduct of the elections to determine if they
committed any violation of the Ligas Constitution and By-laws and its implementing
rules. If the National Liga Board and its officers had violated Liga rules, the DILG
should have ordered the Liga to conduct another election in accordance with
the Ligas own rules, but not in obeisance to DILG-dictated guidelines. Neither had
the DILG the authority to remove the incumbent officers of the Liga and replace
them, even temporarily, with unelected Liga officers.
Like the local government units, the Liga ng mga Barangay is not subject to
control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego.
In the Bito-Onon[94] case, this Court held that DILG Memorandum Circular No.
97-193, insofar as it authorized the filing of a petition for review of the decision of
the Board of Election Supervisors (BES) with the regular courts in a post-
proclamation electoral protest, involved the exercise of control as it in effect
amended the guidelines already promulgated by the Liga. The decision reads in part:

xxx. Officers in control, lay down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not
followed, it is discretionary on his part to order the act undone or redone by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officers merely see to it that the rules are followed, but he
himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done
to conform for to the prescribed rules. He cannot prescribe his own manner the doing
of the act.

xxx

xxx. The amendment of the GUIDELINES is more than an exercise of the power of
supervision but is an exercise of the power of control, which the President does not
have over the LIGA. Although the DILG is given the power to prescribe rules,
regulations and other issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to
merely monitoring compliance by local government units of such issuances. To
monitor means to watch, observe or check and is compatible with the power of
supervision of the DILG Secretary over local governments, which is limited to
checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof
perform their duties as per statutory enactments. Besides, any doubt as to the power
of the DILG Secretary to interfere with local affairs should be resolved in favor of
the greater autonomy of the local government.[95]

In Taule,[96] the Court ruled that the Secretary of Local Government had no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the election of officers
of katipunan ng mga barangay or barangay councils. In that case, a protest was
lodged before the Secretary of Local Government regarding several irregularities in,
and seeking the nullification of, the election of officers of the Federation of
Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes. Then Local
Government Secretary Luis Santos issued a resolution nullifying the election of
officers and ordered a new one to be conducted. The Court ruled:

Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the

President over local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no
authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the officers of the katipunan. To
allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than the law or the
Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials
for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity
aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments
so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that
the new elections to be conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and
direct interference by the Department with the political affairs of the barangays
which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential power to general supervision
over local governments.[97]
 All given, the Court is convinced that the assailed order was issued with grave
abuse of discretion while the acts of the respondent Secretary, including DILG
Memorandum Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are unconstitutional and ultra
vires, as they all entailed the conferment or exercise of control a power which is
denied by the Constitution even to the President.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial
Court dated 04 August 1997 is SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. DILG Memorandum
Circulars No. 97-176 and No. 97-193, are declared VOID for being unconstitutional
and ultra vires.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, G.R. No. 190259

ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE
SAHALI-GENERALE
Petitioners, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO, JJ.
HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity
as Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government and alter-ego of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
and anyone acting in his stead and on
behalf of the President of the Philippines,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(AFP), or any of their units operating in
the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao (ARMM), and PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their Promulgated:
units operating in ARMM,
Respondents. June 7, 2011

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women,
including some news reporters, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation 1946,[1] placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and
the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to undertake such
measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress
all incidents of lawless violence in the named places.

Three days later or on November 27, President Arroyo also issued

Administrative Order 273 (AO 273)[2] transferring supervision of the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) from the Office of the President to the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG). But, due to issues raised over
the terminology used in AO 273, the President issued Administrative Order 273-A
(AO 273-A) amending the former, by delegating instead of transferring supervision
of the ARMM to the DILG.[3]

Claiming that the Presidents issuances encroached on the ARMMs autonomy,

petitioners Datu Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and Regie Sahali-
Generale, all ARMM officials,[4] filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65.
They alleged that the proclamation and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary
to take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional governments powers, in
violation of the principle of local autonomy under Republic Act 9054 (also known
as the Expanded ARMM Act) and the Constitution. The President gave the DILG
Secretary the power to exercise, not merely administrative supervision, but control
over the ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM officials and replace them.[5]

Petitioner ARMM officials claimed that the President had no factual basis for
declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the
City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of
troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes an invalid exercise of the
Presidents emergency powers.[6] Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as
AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG
Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them.

In its comment for the respondents,[7] the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946, not to deprive the
ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places.[8] She
issued the proclamation pursuant to her calling out power[9] as Commander-in-Chief
under the first sentence of Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. The
determination of the need to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom. [10] She
must use her judgment based on intelligence reports and such best information as
are available to her to call out the armed forces to suppress and prevent lawless
violence wherever and whenever these reared their ugly heads.
On the other hand, the President merely delegated through AOs 273 and 273-
A her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter
ego any way. These orders did not authorize a take over of the ARMM. They did not
give him blanket authority to suspend or replace ARMM officials.[11] The delegation
was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.[12] Further, the
assailed proclamation and administrative orders did not provide for the exercise of
emergency powers.[13]

Although normalcy has in the meantime returned to the places subject of this
petition, it might be relevant to rule on the issues raised in this petition since some
acts done pursuant to Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A could impact on
the administrative and criminal cases that the government subsequently filed against
those believed affected by such proclamation and orders.

The Issues Presented

The issues presented in this case are:

1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the
principle of local autonomy under Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and
Section 1, Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;

2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers

when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of
lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City; and

3. Whether or not the President had factual bases for her actions.

The Rulings of the Court

We dismiss the petition.

One. The claim of petitioners that the subject proclamation and administrative
orders violate the principle of local autonomy is anchored on the allegation that,
through them, the President authorized the DILG Secretary to take over the
operations of the ARMM and assume direct governmental powers over the region.

But, in the first place, the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the
powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of
ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the
ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on
December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section
12,[14] of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the
ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-
Governor.[15] In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or
operations of the ARMM.
 Two. Petitioners contend that the President unlawfully exercised emergency
powers when she ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel in the places
mentioned in the proclamation.[16] But such deployment is not by itself an exercise
of emergency powers as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, which provides:

SECTION 23. x x x (2) In times of war or other national

emergency, the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for
a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe,
to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment
thereof.

The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of

emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law
enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The
calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places
is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a
congressional authority to exercise the same.

Three. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides.[17]

SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-

Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. x x x

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the
Presidents exercise of the above power,[18] it would generally defer to her judgment
on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Hon. Zamora,[19] it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the
determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress
lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave
abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment. Thus,
the Court said:

If the petitioner fails, by way of proof, to support the

assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this
Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the
pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is
not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since
matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of
several factors which are not always accessible to the courts.
Besides the absence of textual standards that the court may use to
judge necessity, information necessary to arrive at such judgment
might also prove unmanageable for the courts. Certain pertinent
information might be difficult to verify, or wholly unavailable to
the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed
forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof.

On the other hand, the President, as Commander-in-Chief

has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of
which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the
security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to
avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress
lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to
have any effect at all. x x x.[20]

Here, petitioners failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the
Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the
Presidents exercise of the calling out power had no factual basis. They simply
alleged that, since not all areas under the ARMM were placed under a state of
emergency, it follows that the take over of the entire ARMM by the DILG Secretary
had no basis too.[21]

But, apart from the fact that there was no such take over to begin with, the
OSG also clearly explained the factual bases for the Presidents decision to call out
the armed forces, as follows:
 The Ampatuan and Mangudadatu clans are prominent
families engaged in the political control of Maguindanao. It is also
a known fact that both families have an arsenal of armed followers
who hold elective positions in various parts of the ARMM and the
rest of Mindanao.

Considering the fact that the principal victims of the brutal

bloodshed are members of the Mangudadatu family and the main
perpetrators of the brutal killings are members and followers of the
Ampatuan family, both the military and police had to prepare for
and prevent reported retaliatory actions from the Mangudadatu
clan and additional offensive measures from the Ampatuan clan.

xxxx

The Ampatuan forces are estimated to be approximately two

thousand four hundred (2,400) persons, equipped with about two
thousand (2,000) firearms, about four hundred (400) of which have
been accounted for. x x x

As for the Mangudadatus, they have an estimated one

thousand eight hundred (1,800) personnel, with about two hundred
(200) firearms. x x x

Apart from their own personal forces, both clans have

Special Civilian Auxiliary Army (SCAA) personnel who support
them: about five hundred (500) for the Ampatuans and three
hundred (300) for the Mangudadatus.

What could be worse than the armed clash of two warring

clans and their armed supporters, especially in light of intelligence
reports on the potential involvement of rebel armed groups
(RAGs).

One RAG was reported to have planned an attack on the

forces of Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. to show support and sympathy
for the victims. The said attack shall worsen the age-old territorial
dispute between the said RAG and the Ampatuan family.
 xxxx

On the other hand, RAG faction which is based in Sultan

Kudarat was reported to have received three million pesos
(P3,000,000.00) from Datu Andal Ampatuan, Sr. for the
procurement of ammunition. The said faction is a force to reckon
with because the group is well capable of launching a series of
violent activities to divert the attention of the people and the
authorities away from the multiple murder case. x x x

In addition, two other factions of a RAG are likely to support

the Mangudadatu family. The Cotabato-based faction has the
strength of about five hundred (500) persons and three hundred
seventy-two (372) firearms while the Sultan Kudarat-based faction
has the strength of about four hundred (400) persons and three
hundred (300) firearms and was reported to be moving towards
Maguindanao to support the Mangudadatu clan in its armed fight
against the Ampatuans.[22]

In other words, the imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President
issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent
further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also
indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms
and armed men sympathetic to the two clans.[23] Thus, to pacify the peoples fears
and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out
the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the
armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected
places.

Notably, the present administration of President Benigno Aquino III has not
withdrawn the declaration of a state of emergency under Proclamation 1946. It has
been reported[24] that the declaration would not be lifted soon because there is still a
need to disband private armies and confiscate loose firearms. Apparently, the
presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among
the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the
passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.
 Since petitioners are not able to demonstrate that the proclamation of state of
emergency in the subject places and the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence there have clearly no factual bases, the Court must respect
the Presidents actions.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

HON. JOSE D. LINA, JR., SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN OF LAGUNA,

and HON. CALIXTO CATAQUIZ, petitioners, vs. HON. FRANCISCO DIZON
PAO and TONY CALVENTO, respondents. G.R. No. 129093

QUISUMBING, J.:
August 30, 2001

FACTS:
On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to install Terminal OM 20 for
the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a mayors permit to open lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor
Cataquiz on the ground that an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads:
ISANG KAPASIYAHAN TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL
GAMBLING LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA
As A Result of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratory
relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.
Petitioners contend that : (1)the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of
the Provincial Government of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of
lotto and all forms of gambling;(2) It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial
governments police power under the General Welfare Clause of R.A. 7160
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991;(3) they also maintain
that respondents lotto operation is illegal because no prior consultations and
approval by the local government were sought before it was implemented contrary
to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. For his part,
respondent Calvento argues that the resolution is, in effect, a curtailment of the
power of the state since in this case the national legislature itself had already
declared lotto as legal. As for the allegation that no prior consultations and
approval were sought from the sangguninang panlalawigan of Laguna, respondent
stated as a declaration of policy and not a self-executing provision of LGC of
1991.The respondent judge, Francisco Pano promulgated his decision enjoining the
petitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution of Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.
1995. Motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, petitioners filed petition for
review on certiorari.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Laguna and the denial of a mayors permit based thereon
are valid
2. Whether prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian
are needed before a lotto system can be operated in a given local
government unit.
RULING:
The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states the
objection of the council to said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the
part of the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid
ground to prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a
policy statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such
resolution is valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views
which maybe contrary to that of the national governments. However, this
freedom to exercise contrary views does not mean that local governments may
actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enacted by Congress. Given
this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not be
interpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto.
As for the second issue, Court ruled that petitioners erred in declaring that
sections 2 (C) and 27 of RA 7160 apply mandatorily in the setting up of lotto
outlets around the country. From careful reading of said provisions, the Court find
that these apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be
implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a program nor a
project of the national government, but of a charitable institution, the PCSO.
Though sanctioned by the national government, it is far fetched to say that lotto
falls within the contemplation of Section 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government
Code.
 Bangus Fry Fisherfolk, et al. vs. Lanzanas

The Facts

On 30 June 1997, Regional Executive Director Antonio G. Principe (RED

Principe) of Region IV, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), issued an Environmental Clearance Certificate (ECC) in favor of
respondent National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). The ECC authorized
NAPOCOR to construct a temporary mooring facility in Minolo Cove, Sitio Minolo,
Barangay San Isidro, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro. The Sangguniang Bayan of
Puerto Galera has declared Minolo Cove, a mangrove area and breeding ground for
bangus fry, an eco-tourist zone.[3]
The mooring facility would serve as the temporary docking site of NAPOCORs
power barge, which, due to turbulent waters at its former mooring site in Calapan,
Oriental Mindoro, required relocation to a safer site like Minolo Cove. The 14.4
megawatts power barge would provide the main source of power for the entire
province of Oriental Mindoro pending the construction of a land-based power plant
in Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. The ECC for the mooring facility was valid for two
years counted from its date of issuance or until 30 June 1999.[4]
Petitioners, claiming to be fisherfolks from Minolo, San Isidro, Puerto
Galera,[5] sought reconsideration of the ECC issuance. RED Principe, however,
denied petitioners plea on 15 July 1997. On 21 July 1997, petitioners filed a
complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, for the cancellation of
the ECC and for the issuance of a writ of injunction to stop the construction of the
mooring facility. Impleaded as defendants were the following: (1) NAPOCOR, (2)
RED Principe, (3) DENR Region IV Technical Director for Environment Oscar
Dominguez, (4) Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative (ORMECO), which is
engaged in the distribution of electricity in Oriental Mindoro, and (5) certain
officials of Puerto Galera.[6] Petitioners subsequently amended their complaint to
include as additional defendants the elective officials of Oriental Mindoro
represented by then Governor Rodolfo G. Valencia. Petitioners further prayed for
the demolition of mooring structures that respondents had already built.
On 28 July 1997, prior to the filing of the amended complaint, the trial court
issued a 20-day temporary restraining order enjoining the construction of the
mooring facility. However, the trial court lifted the same on 6 August 1997 on
NAPOCORs manifestation that the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro was
the one undertaking the construction of the mooring facility.[7]
 On 28 August 1997, before filing their answers, respondents ORMECO and the
provincial officials of Oriental Mindoro moved to dismiss the complaint. These
respondents claimed that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies,
rendering the complaint without cause of action. They also asserted that the Manila
RTC has no jurisdiction to enjoin the construction of the mooring facility in Oriental
Mindoro, which lies outside the Manila RTCs territorial jurisdiction.
Petitioners opposed the motion on the ground that there was no need to exhaust
administrative remedies. They argued that the issuance of the ECC was in patent
violation of Presidential Decree No. 1605,[8]Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No.
7160,[9] and the provisions of DENR Department Administrative Order No. 96-37
(DAO 96-37) on the documentation of ECC applications. Petitioners also claimed
that the implementation of the ECC was in patent violation of its terms.
In its order of 7 November 1997, the trial court granted the motion and dismissed
petitioners complaint.
Hence, this petition.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial courts order dismissing the complaint reads in part:

After careful evaluation and analysis, this Court finds the Motion to Dismiss
tenable and meritorious.

Petitioners have clearly failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before taking
this legal action in Court x x x.

It is x x x worth mentioning that the decision of the Regional Director may still be
x x x elevated to the Office of the Secretary of the DENR to fully comply with the
process of exhaustion of administrative remedies. And well settled is the rule in
our jurisdiction that before bringing an action in or resorting to the Courts of
Justice, all remedies of administrative character affecting or determinative of the
controversy at that level should first be exhausted by the aggrieved party (Pestanas
vs. Dyogi, L-25786, February 27, 1978). And petitioners failure to exhaust
administrative remedies renders his [sic] petition dismissible (Chia vs. Acting
Collector of Customs, 177 SCRA 755). And a dismissal on the ground of failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is tantamount to a dismissal based on lack of
cause of action (Baguiro vs. Basa, Jr., 214 SCRA 437; Pineda vs. CFI of Davao,
111 Phil. 643; Sarabia vs. Secretary ofAgriculture & Natural Resources, L-16002,
May 23, 1961; Gone, et al. vs. District Engineer, et. al., L-22782, August 29, 1975;
Abe-Abe, et al. vs. Manta, et. al., L-4827, May 31, 1979) although it does not
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter (Mun. of La Trinidad, et
al. vs. CFI of Baguio-Benguet, et al., L-33889, June 28, 1983).

Moreover, this Court finds the Opposition of the Petitioners highly untenable and
bereft of merits that the controverted act in question is patently illegal and there
was an immediate need for judicial intervention.

The ECC in question was issued by the Regional Office of the DENR which has
jurisdiction and authority over the same x x x. And corollary to this, the issue as to
whether or not the Minolo Cove is within the enclosed coves and waters embraced
by Puerto Galera bay and protected by Medio island is a clear question of fact
which the DENR may appropriately resolve before resorting to [the] Court[s].

This Court is likewise aware and cognizant of its territorial jurisdiction in the
enforcement of Writ of Injunction. That truly, [a] writ of injunction can only be
enforced within [the] territorial jurisdiction of this Court but not for acts which are
being or about to be committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. Thus, in
Philippine National Bank vs. Pineda, 197 SCRA 1, the Honorable Supreme Court
ruled: Regional Trial Courts can only enforce their writs of injunction within their
respective designated territories. Furthermore, we find the issuance of the
preliminary injunction directed against the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental
a jurisdictional paux [sic] pas (from Black Dictionary means jurisdictional falsity)
as the Courts of First Instance now Regional Trial Court[s], can only enforce their
writs of injunction within their respective designated territories.

And finally, this Court is not unmindful of the relevant and square application in
the case at bar of Presidential Decree No. 1818, Executive Order No. 380 dated
November 27, 1989, and Circular No. 2-91 of the Supreme Court that the National
Power Corporation (NPC) is a public utility, created under special legislation,
engaged in the generation and distribution of electric power and energy. The
mooring site of NPC in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro is one of its infrastructure
projects falling within the mantle of Executive Order No. 380, November 27, 1989
x x x.

And as held by the Supreme Court in the case of National Power Corporation vs.
Honorable Abraham P. Vera, et al., 170 SCRA 721, courts are without jurisdiction
to issue injunctive writs against [the] National Power Corporation.The latter enjoys
the protective mantle of P.D. 1818, (Circular No. 2-91).
xxx

Injunction in this case is not a mere ancillary [sic] writ but the main action itself
together with the Annulment of the Environmental Clearance Certificate
(ECC). Even assuming arguendo that the court [can] annul the ECC how can the
latter enforce the same against the Provincial Government of Oriental Mindoro
which was impleaded by the petitioners as a necessary party together with the
Oriental Mindoro Electric Cooperative and the government officials of Puerto
Galera, Oriental Mindoro, whose acts and functions are being performed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of this court? x x x Indisputably, the injunction and
annulment of ECC as prayed for in the petition are inseparable x x x.

The conclusion, therefore, is inescapable that petitioners have failed to exhaust all
the available administrative remedies and this Court has no jurisdiction to issue the
injunctive writ prayed for in the Amended [Complaint].[10]

The Issue

The issue is whether the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for
lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition has no merit.

Jurisdiction of the Manila RTC over the Case

Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law. Such

jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether
the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the reliefs sought.[11]
A perusal of the allegations in the complaint shows that petitioners principal
cause of action is the alleged illegality of the issuance of the ECC. The violation of
laws on environmental protection and on local government participation in the
implementation of environmentally critical projects is an issue that involves the
validity of NAPOCORs ECC. If the ECC is void, then as a necessary consequence,
NAPOCOR or the provincial government of Oriental Mindoro could not construct
the mooring facility. The subsidiary issue of non-compliance with pertinent local
ordinances in the construction of the mooring facility becomes immaterial for
purposes of granting petitioners main prayer, which is the annulment of the
ECC. Thus, if the court has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance of
the ECC, then it has jurisdiction to hear and decide petitioners complaint.
Petitioners complaint is one that is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It falls
within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts under
Section 19(1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691. The question of whether petitioners should file their complaint in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila or Oriental Mindoro then becomes a matter of venue, to be
determined by the residence of the parties.[12]
Petitioners main prayer is the annulment of the ECC. The principal respondent,
DENR Region IV, has its main office at the L & S Building, Roxas Boulevard,
Manila. Regional Executive Director Principe of the DENR Region IV, who issued
the ECC, holds office there. Plainly, the principal respondent resides in Manila,
which is within the territorial jurisdiction of the Manila RTC. Thus, petitioners filed
their complaint in the proper venue.
On the other hand, the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts to issue injunctive
writs is limited to acts committed or about to be committed within their judicial
region.[13] Moreover, Presidential Decree No. 1818 (PD No. 1818)
prohibited[14] courts from issuing injunctive writs against government infrastructure
projects like the mooring facility in the present case. Republic Act No. 8975 (RA
No. 8975), which took effect on 26 November 2000, superseded PD No. 1818 and
delineates more clearly the coverage of the prohibition, reserves the power to issue
such writs exclusively with this Court, and provides penalties for its
violation.[15] Obviously, neither the Manila RTC nor the Oriental Mindoro RTC can
issue an injunctive writ to stop the construction of the mooring facility. Only this
Court can do so under PD No. 1818 and later under RA No. 8975. Thus, the question
of whether the Manila RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint considering that its
injunctive writ is not enforceable in Oriental Mindoro is academic.
Clearly, the Manila RTC has jurisdiction to determine the validity of the issuance
of the ECC, although it could not issue an injunctive writ against the DENR or
NAPOCOR. However, since the construction of the mooring facility could not
proceed without a valid ECC, the validity of the ECC remains the determinative
issue in resolving petitioners complaint.

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

 The settled rule is before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he
should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure
prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a
party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. The premature
invocation of a courts intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and
dismissible on such ground.[16]
RED Principe of the DENR Region IV Office issued the ECC based on (1)
Presidential Decree No. 1586 (PD No. 1586) and its implementing rules establishing
the Environmental Impact Statement System, (2) DAO 96-37[17] and (3) the
Procedural Manual of DAO 96-37. Section 4[18] of PD No. 1586 requires a proponent
of an environmentally critical project, or a project located within an environmentally
critical area as declared by the President, to secure an ECC prior to the projects
operation.[19] NAPOCOR thus secured the ECC because the mooring facility in
Minolo Cove, while not an environmentally critical project, is located within an
environmentally critical area under Presidential Proclamation No. 2146, issued on
14 December 1981.[20]
The rules on administrative appeals from rulings of the DENR Regional
Directors on the implementation of PD No. 1586 are found in Article VI of DAO
96-37, which provides:

SECTION 1.0. Appeal to the Office of the Secretary. Any party aggrieved by the
final decision of the RED may, within 15 days from receipt of such decision, file
an appeal with the Office of the Secretary. The decision of the Secretary shall be
immediately executory.

SECTION 2.0. Grounds for Appeal. The grounds for appeal shall be limited to
grave abuse of discretion and serious errors in the findings of fact which would
cause grave or irreparable injury to the aggrieved party. Frivolous appeals shall not
be countenanced.

SECTION 3.0. Who May Appeal. The proponent or any stakeholder, including but
not limited to, the LGUs concerned and affected communities, may file an appeal.

The DENR Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 explains these provisions thus:

Final decisions of the RED may be appealed. These decisions include those
relating to the issuance or non-issuance of an ECC, and the imposition of fines and
penalties. By inference, the decision of the Secretary on the issuance or non-
issuance of the ECC may also be appealed based on this provision. Resort to courts
prior to availing of this remedy would make the appellants action dismissible on
the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

The right to appeal must be exercised within 15 days from receipt by the aggrieved
party of such decision. Failure to file such appeal within the requisite period will
result in the finality of the REDs or Secretarys decision(s), which can no longer be
disturbed.

An appeal shall not stay the effectivity of the REDs decision, unless the Secretary
directs otherwise.

The right to appeal does not prevent the aggrieved party from first resorting to the
filing of a motion for reconsideration with the RED, to give the RED an
opportunity to re-evaluate his decision. (Emphasis added)

Instead of following the foregoing procedure, petitioners bypassed the DENR

Secretary and immediately filed their complaint with the Manila RTC, depriving the
DENR Secretary the opportunity to review the decision of his subordinate, RED
Principe. Under the Procedural Manual for DAO 96-37 and applicable
jurisprudence, petitioners omission renders their complaint dismissible for lack of
cause of action.[21]Consequently, the Manila RTC did not err in dismissing
petitioners complaint for lack of cause of action.

On the Alleged Patent Illegality of the ECC

Petitioners nevertheless contend that they are exempt from filing an appeal with
the DENR Secretary because the issuance of the ECC was in patent violation of
existing laws and regulations. These are (1) Section 1 of Presidential Decree No.
1605, as amended, (2) Sections 26 and 27 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local
Government Code of 1991), and (3) the provisions of DAO 96-37 on the
documentary requirements for the zoning permit and social acceptability of the
mooring facility.
Petitioners contention is without merit. While the patent illegality of an act
exempts a party from complying with the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies,[22] this does not apply in the present case.

Presidential Decree No. 1605

 Presidential Decree No. 1605 (PD No. 1605),[23] as amended by Presidential
Decrees Nos. 1605-A and 1805, declares as ecologically threatened zone the coves
and waters embraced by Puerto Galera Bay as protected by Medio Island. This
decree provides in part:

Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the construction

of marinas, hotels, restaurants, other commercial structures; commercial or semi-
commercial wharfs [sic]; commercial docking within the enclosed coves of Puerto
Galera; the destruction of its mangrove stands; the devastation of its corals and
coastline by large barges, motorboats, tugboat propellers, and any form of
destruction by other human activities are hereby prohibited.

Section 2. x x x

No permit for the construction of any wharf, marina, hotel, restaurants and other
commercial structures in Puerto Galera shall be issued without prior approval of
the Office of the President upon the recommendation of the Philippine Tourism
Authority. (Emphasis supplied)

NAPOCOR claims that since Minolo Cove lies outside of Puerto Galera Bay as
protected by Medio Island,[24] PD No. 1605 does not apply to this case. However,
petitioners assert that Minolo Cove is one of the enclosed coves of Puerto
Galera[25] and thus protected under PD No. 1605. This is a question of fact that the
DENR Secretary should have first resolved. In any event, there is no dispute that
NAPOCOR will use the mooring facility for its power barge that will supply 14.4
megawatts of electricity to the entire province of Oriental Mindoro, including Puerto
Galera. The mooring facility is obviously a government-owned public infrastructure
intended to serve a basic need of the people of Oriental Mindoro. The mooring
facility is not a commercial structure; commercial or semi-commercial wharf or
commercial docking as contemplated in Section 1 of PD No. 1605. Therefore, the
issuance of the ECC does not violate PD No. 1605 which applies only to commercial
structures like wharves, marinas, hotels and restaurants.

Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160

Congress introduced Sections 26 and 27 in the Local Government Code to

emphasize the legislative concern for the maintenance of a sound ecology and clean
environment.[26] These provisions require every national government agency or
government-owned and controlled corporation to hold prior consultations with the
local government unit concerned and to secure the prior approval of
its sanggunian before implementing any project or program that may cause
pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of cropland,
rangeland, or forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species.Sections 26 and
27 respectively provide:

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of

Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-
owned or controlled corporation authorized or involved in the planning and
implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or
forest cover and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local
government units, non-governmental organizations, and other sectors concerned
and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the
measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.

Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be

implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in
Section x x x 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian
concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such projects are
to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have
been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

In Lina, Jr. v. Pao,[27] the Court interpreted these provisions in this manner:

Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof x x x.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to

mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Sections
26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result in
loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or
plant species; and (6) other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.

Again, Sections 26 and 27 do not apply to this case because as petitioners

admit,[28] the mooring facility itself is not environmentally critical and hence does
not belong to any of the six types of projects mentioned in the law. There is no
statutory requirement for the concerned sanggunian to approve the construction of
the mooring facility. It is another matter if the operation of the power barge is at
issue. As an environmentally critical project that causes pollution, the operation of
the power barge needs the prior approval of the concerned sanggunian. However,
what is before this Court is only the construction of the mooring facility, not the
operation of the power barge. Thus, the issuance of the ECC does not violate
Sections 26 and 27 of RA No. 7160.

Documentary Requirements for

ECC Applications

Under DAO 96-37, an ECC applicant for a project located within an

environmentally critical area is required to submit an Initial Environment
Examination, which must contain a brief description of the environmental setting
and a documentation of the consultative process undertaken, when
appropriate.[29] As part of the description of the environmental setting, the ECC
applicant must submit a certificate of locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners further contend that NAPOCOR, in applying for the ECC, did not
submit to the DENR Region IV Office the documents proving the holding of
consultations and the issuance of a locational clearance or zoning certificate.
Petitioners assert that this omission renders the issuance of the ECC patently illegal.
The contention is also without merit. While such documents are part of the
submissions required from a project proponent, their mere absence does not render
the issuance of the ECC patently illegal. To justify non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies due to the patent illegality of the ECC, the public officer must have issued
the ECC [without any] semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with
the pertinent laws; when manifestly, the officer has acted without jurisdiction or has
exceeded his jurisdiction, or has committed a grave abuse of discretion; or when his
act is clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority.[30]
RED Principe, as chief of DENR Region IV, is the officer duly authorized under
DAO 96-37[31] to issue ECCs for projects located within environmentally critical
areas. RED Principe issued the ECC on the recommendation of Amelia Supetran,
the Director of the Environmental Management Bureau. Thus, RED Principe acted
with full authority pursuant to DENR regulations. Moreover, the legal presumption
is that he acted with the requisite authority.[32] This clothes RED Principes acts with
presumptive validity and negates any claim that his actions are patently illegal or
that he gravely abused his discretion. While petitioners may present proof to the
contrary, they must do so before the proper administrative forum before resorting to
judicial remedies.

On the Alleged Non-Compliance with the Terms of the ECC

Lastly, petitioners claim that they are justified in immediately seeking judicial
recourse because NAPOCOR is guilty of violating the conditions of the ECC, which
requires it to secure a separate ECC for the operation of the power barge. The ECC
also mandates NAPOCOR to secure the usual local government permits, like zoning
and building permits, from the municipal government of Puerto Galera.
The contention is similarly without merit. The fact that NAPOCORs ECC is
subject to cancellation for non-compliance with its conditions does not justify
petitioners conduct in ignoring the procedure prescribed in DAO 96-37 on appeals
from the decision of the DENR Executive Director. Petitioners vigorously insist that
NAPOCOR should comply with the requirements of consultation and locational
clearance prescribed in DAO 96-37. Ironically, petitioners themselves refuse to
abide with the procedure for filing complaints and appealing decisions laid down in
DAO 96-37.
DAO 96-37 provides for a separate administrative proceeding to address
complaints for the cancellation of an ECC. Under Article IX of DAO 96-37,
complaints to nullify an ECC must undergo an administrative investigation, after
which the hearing officer will submit his report to the EMB Director or the Regional
Executive Director, who will then render his decision. The aggrieved party may file
an appeal to the DENR Secretary, who has authority to issue cease and desist orders.
Article IX also classifies the types of violations covered under DAO 96-37,
including projects operating without an ECC or violating the conditions of the
ECC. This is the applicable procedure to address petitioners complaint on
NAPOCORs alleged violations and not the filing of the instant case in court.

A Final Word

The Court commends petitioners for their courageous efforts to safeguard and
maintain the ecological balance of Minolo Cove. This Court recognizes the utmost
importance of protecting the environment.[33]Indeed, we have called for the vigorous
prosecution of violators of environmental laws.[34] Legal actions to achieve this end,
however, must be done in accordance with established rules of procedure that were
intended, in the first place, to achieve orderly and efficient administration of justice.
 WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for lack of merit.

Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary

The earth belongs in usufruct to the living.[1]
At the height of the garbage crisis plaguing Metro Manila and its environs,
parts of the Marikina Watershed Reservation were set aside by the Office of the
President, through Proclamation No. 635 dated 28 August 1995, for use as a sanitary
landfill and similar waste disposal applications. In fact, this site, extending to more
or less 18 hectares, had already been in operation since 19 February 1990 [2] for the
solid wastes of Quezon City, Marikina, San Juan, Mandaluyong, Pateros, Pasig, and
Taguig.[3]

This is a petition filed by the Province of Rizal, the municipality of San Mateo, and
various concerned citizens for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, denying, for lack of cause of action, the petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction assailing the legality and
constitutionality of Proclamation No. 635.

The facts are documented in painstaking detail.

On 17 November 1988, the respondent Secretaries of the Department of

Public Works and Highways (DPWH) and the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Governor of the Metropolitan Manila
Commission (MMC) entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA),[4] which
provides in part:
 1. The DENR agrees to immediately
allow the utilization by the Metropolitan Manila Commission of
its land property located at Pintong Bocaue in San Mateo, Rizal
as a sanitary landfill site, subject to whatever restrictions that the
government impact assessment might require.

2. Upon signing of this Agreement,

the DPWH shall commence the construction/development of
said dumpsite.

3. The MMC shall: a) take charge of

the relocation of the families within and around the site; b)
oversee the development of the areas as a sanitary landfill; c)
coordinate/monitor the construction of infrastructure facilities by
the DPWH in the said site; and d) ensure that the necessary civil
works are properly undertaken to safeguard against any negative
environmental impact in the area.

On 7, 8 and 10 February 1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo wrote

Gov. Elfren Cruz of the MMC, Sec. Fiorello Estuar of the DPWH, the Presidential
Task Force on Solid Waste Management, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig,
and Sec. Fulgencio Factoran, Jr., pointing out that it had recently passed a Resolution
banning the creation of dumpsites for Metro Manila garbage within its jurisdiction,
asking that their side be heard, and that the addressees suspend and temporarily hold
in abeyance all and any part of your operations with respect to the San Mateo
Landfill Dumpsite. No action was taken on these letters.

It turns out that the land subject of the MOA of 17 November 1988 and owned
by the DENR was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area. Thus, on 31
May 1989, forest officers of the Forest Engineering and Infrastructure Unit of the
Community Environment and Natural Resource Office, (CENRO) DENR-IV, Rizal
Province, submitted a Memorandum[5] on the On-going Dumping Site Operation of
the MMC inside (the) Upper Portion of Marikina Watershed Reservation, located at
Barangay Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal, and nearby localities. Said
Memorandum reads in part:
Observations:

3.1 The subject area is arable and agricultural in nature;

3.2 Soil type and its topography are favorable for
agricultural and forestry productions;
...

3.5 Said Dumping Site is observed to be confined within the

said Watershed Reservation, bearing in the northeastern
part of Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation. Such
illegal Dumping Site operation inside (the) Watershed
Reservation is in violation of P.D. 705, otherwise
known as the Revised Forestry Code, as amended. . .

Recommendations:
 5.1 The MMC Dumping Site Inside Marikina Watershed
Reservation, particularly at Brgy. Pintong Bocaue, San
Mateo, Rizal and at Bo. Pinugay, Baras/Antipolo, Rizal
which are the present garbage zones must totally be
stopped and discouraged without any political
intervention and delay in order to save our healthy
ecosystems found therein, to avoid much destruction,
useless efforts and lost (sic) of millions of public funds
over the land in question; (Emphasis ours)

On 19 June 1989, the CENRO submitted another Investigation Report[6] to the

Regional Executive Director which states in part that:
1. About two (2) hectares had been excavated by bulldozers and
garbage dumping operations are going on.

2. The dumping site is without the concurrence of the Provincial

Governor, Rizal Province and without any permit from DENR
who has functional jurisdiction over the Watershed Reservation;
and

3. About 1,192 families residing and cultivating areas covered by four

(4) Barangays surrounding the dumping site will adversely be
affected by the dumping operations of MMC including their
sources of domestic water supply. x x x x
 On 22 January 1990, the CENRO submitted still another Investigation
Report[7] to the Regional Executive Director which states that:
Findings show that the areas used as Dumping Site of the MMC
are found to be within the Marikina Watershed which are part of the
Integrated Social Forestry Project (ISF) as per recorded inventory of
Forest Occupancy of this office.

It also appears that as per record, there was no permit issued to

the MMC to utilize these portions of land for dumping purposes.

It is further observed that the use of the areas as dumping site

greatly affects the ecological balance and environmental factors in this
community.

On 19 February 1990, the DENR Environmental Management Bureau,

through Undersecretary for Environment and Research Celso R. Roque, granted the
Metro Manila Authority (MMA [formerly MMC]) an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) for the operation of a two-and-a-half-hectare garbage dumpsite.

The ECC was sought and granted to comply with the requirement of
Presidential Decree No. 1586 Establishing an Environmental Impact Statement
System, Section 4 of which states in part that,No persons, partnership or corporation
shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area
without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate. Proclamation No.
2146, passed on 14 December 1981, designates all areas declared by law as national
parks, watershed reserves, wildlife preserves, and sanctuaries as Environmentally
Critical Areas.

On 09 March 1990, respondent Laguna Lake Development Authority

(LLDA), through its Acting General Manager, sent a letter[8] to the MMA, which
reads in part:
Through this letter we would like to convey our reservation on
the choice of the sites for solid waste disposal inside the watershed of
Laguna Lake. As you may already know, the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) has scheduled the
abstraction of water from the lake to serve the needs of about 1.2
million residents of Muntinlupa, Paranaque, Las Pinas and Bacoor,
Cavite by 1992. Accordingly, the Laguna Lake Development
Authority (LLDA) is accelerating its environmental management
program to upgrade the water quality of the lake in order to make
it suitable as a source of domestic water supply the whole year
round. The said program regards dumpsites as incompatible within
the watershed because of the heavy pollution, including the risk of
diseases, generated by such activities which would negate the
governments efforts to upgrade the water quality of the
lake. Consequently, please consider our objection to the proposed
location of the dumpsites within the watershed. (Emphasis supplied by
petitioners)
 On 31 July 1990, less than six months after the issuance of the ECC,
Undersecretary Roque suspended the ECC in a letter[9] addressed to the respondent
Secretary of DPWH, stating in part that:
Upon site investigation conducted by Environmental
Management Bureau staff on development activities at the San Mateo
Landfill Site, it was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion
have resulted from improper development of the site. We believe
that this will adversely affect the environmental quality in the area if
the proper remedial measures are not instituted in the design of the
landfill site. This is therefore contradictory to statements made in the
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) submitted that above
occurrences will be properly mitigated.

In view of this, we are forced to suspend the Environmental

Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued until appropriate modified plans
are submitted and approved by this Office for
implementation.(Emphasis ours)

On 21 June 1993, the Acting Mayor of San Mateo, Enrique Rodriguez, Jr.,
Barangay Captain Dominador Vergara, and petitioner Rolando E. Villacorte,
Chairman of the Pintong Bocaue Multipurpose Cooperative (PBMC) wrote[10] then
President Fidel V. Ramos expressing their objections to the continued operation of
the MMA dumpsite for causing unabated pollution and degradation of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
 On 14 July 1993, another Investigation Report[11] submitted by the Regional
Technical Director to the DENR Undersecretary for Environment and Research
contained the following findings and recommendations:
Remarks and Findings:

....

5. Interview with Mr. Dayrit, whose lot is now being endangered

because soil erosion have (sic) caused severe siltation and
sedimentation of the Dayrit Creek which water is greatly polluted by
the dumping of soil bulldozed to the creek;

6. Also interview with Mrs. Vilma Montajes, the multi-grade

teacher of Pintong Bocaue Primary School which is located only about
100 meters from the landfill site. She disclosed that bad odor have (sic)
greatly affected the pupils who are sometimes sick with respiratory
illnesses. These odors show that MMA have (sic) not instituted/sprayed
any disinfectant chemicals to prevent air pollution in the area. Besides
large flies (Bangaw) are swarming all over the playground of the
school. The teacher also informed the undersigned that plastic debris
are being blown whenever the wind blows in their direction.

7. As per investigation report there are now 15 hectares being

used as landfill disposal sites by the MMA. The MMA is intending to
expand its operation within the 50 hectares.
 8. Lots occupied within 50 hectares are fully planted with fruit
bearing trees like Mangoes, Santol, Jackfruit, Kasoy, Guyabano,
Kalamansi and Citrus which are now bearing fruits and being harvested
and marketed to nearby San Mateo Market and Masinag Market in
Antipolo.

....

Recommendations:

1. As previously recommended, the undersigned also strongly

recommend(s) that the MMA be made to relocate the landfill site
because the area is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation and
Lungsod Silangan. The leachate treatment plant ha(s) been eroded
twice already and contaminated the nearby creeks which is the source
of potable water of the residents. The contaminated water also flows to
Wawa Dam and Boso-boso River which also flows to Laguna de Bay.

2. The proposed Integrated Social Forestry Project be pushed

through or be approved. ISF project will not only uplift the socio-
economic conditions of the participants but will enhance the
rehabilitation of the Watershed considering that fruit bearing trees are
vigorously growing in the area. Some timber producing species are also
planted like Mahogany and Gmelina Arboiea. There are also portions
where dipterocarp residuals abound in the area.
 3. The sanitary landfill should be relocated to some other area, in
order to avoid any conflict with the local government of San Mateo and
the nearby affected residents who have been in the area for almost 10-
20 years.

On 16 November 1993, DENR Secretary Angel C. Alcala sent MMA

Chairman Ismael A. Mathay, Jr. a letter[12] stating that after a series of investigations
by field officials of the DENR, the agency realized that the MOA entered into on 17
November 1988 is a very costly error because the area agreed to be a garbage
dumpsite is inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation. He then strongly
recommended that all facilities and infrastructure in the garbage dumpsite in Pintong
Bocaue be dismantled, and the garbage disposal operations be transferred to another
area outside the Marikina Watershed Reservation to protect the health and general
welfare of the residents of San Mateo in particular and the residents of Metro Manila
in general.

On 06 June 1995, petitioner Villacorte, Chairman of the PBMC,

wrote[13] President Ramos, through the Executive Secretary, informing the President
of the issues involved, that the dumpsite is located near three public elementary
schools, the closest of which is only fifty meters away, and that its location violates
the municipal zoning ordinance of San Mateo and, in truth, the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board had denied the then MMA chairmans application for a
locational clearance on this ground.
 On 21 August 1995, the Sangguniang Bayan of San Mateo issued a
Resolution[14] expressing a strong objection to the planned expansion of the landfill
operation in Pintong Bocaue and requesting President Ramos to disapprove the draft
Presidential Proclamation segregating 71.6 Hectares from Marikina Watershed
Reservation for the landfill site in Pintong Bocaue, San Mateo, Rizal.

Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the

government agencies aforementioned, the Office of the President, through Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August
1995, Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land
Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal
Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. The
pertinent portions thereof state:
WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements of the growing
population in Metro Manila and the adjoining provinces and
municipalities, certain developed and open portions of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources should now be
excluded form the scope of the reservation;

WHEREAS, while the areas delineated as part of the Watershed

Reservations are intended primarily for use in projects and/or activities
designed to contain and preserve the underground water supply, other
peripheral areas had been included within the scope of the reservation
to provide for such space as may be needed for the construction of the
necessary structures, other related facilities, as well as other priority
projects of government as may be eventually determined;
 WHEREAS, there is now an urgent need to provide for, and
develop, the necessary facilities for the disposal of the waste generated
by the population of Metro Manila and the adjoining provinces and
municipalities, to ensure their sanitary and /or hygienic disposal;

WHEREAS, to cope with the requirements for the development

of the waste disposal facilities that may be used, portions of the
peripheral areas of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, after due
consideration and study, have now been identified as suitable sites that
may be used for the purpose;

WHEREAS, the Secretary of the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources has recommended the exclusion of these areas
that have been so identified from the Marikina Watershed Reservation
so that they may then be developed for the purpose;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the aforecited

premises, I, Fidel V. Ramos, President of the Philippines, by virtue of
the powers vested in me by law, do hereby ordain:

Section 1. General That certain parcels of land, embraced by the

Marikina Watershed Reservation, were found needed for use in the
solid waste disposal program of the government in Metropolitan
Manila, are hereby excluded from that which is held in reserve and are
now made available for use as sanitary landfill and such other related
waste disposal applications.
 Section 2. Purpose The areas being excluded from the Marikina
Watershed Reservation are hereby placed under the administration of
the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, for development as
Sanitary Landfill, and/or for use in the development of such other
related waste disposal facilities that may be used by the cities and
municipalities of Metro Manila and the adjoining province of Rizal and
its municipalities.

Section 3. Technical Description Specifically, the areas being

hereby excluded from the Marikina Watershed Reservation consist of
two (2) parcels, with an aggregate area of approximately ONE
MILLION SIXTY THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY NINE
(1,060,529) square meters more or less, as follows: x x x x

Section 4. Reservations The development, construction, use

and/or operation of any facility that may be established within the
parcel of land herein excluded from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation shall be governed by existing laws, rules and regulations
pertaining to environmental control and management. When no longer
needed for sanitary landfill purposes or the related waste disposal
activities, the parcels of land subject of this proclamation shall revert
back as part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, unless otherwise
authorized.
 On 06 September 1995, Director Wilfrido S. Pollisco of the Protected Areas
and Wildlife Bureau wrote the DENR Secretary to express the bureaus stand against
the dumpsite at Pintong Bocaue, and that it is our view . . . that the mere presence of
a garbage dumpsite inside a watershed reservation is definitely not compatible with
the very purpose and objectives for which the reservation was established.

On 24 November 1995, the petitioners Municipality of San Mateo and the

residents of Pintong Bocaue, represented by former Senator Jovito Salonga, sent a
letter to President Ramos requesting him to reconsider Proclamation No. 635.
Receiving no reply, they sent another letter on 02 January 1996 reiterating their
previous request.

On 04 March 1996, then chairman of the Metro Manila Development

Authority (MMDA [formerly MMA]) Prospero I. Oreta addressed a letter to Senator
Salonga, stating in part that:
.

2. Considering the circumstances under which we are pursuing the

project, we are certain you will agree that, unless we are prepared
with a better alternative, the project simply has to be pursued in the
best interest of the greater majority of the population, particularly
their health and welfare.

2.1 The San Mateo Sanitary Landfill services, at least, 38% of

the waste disposal site requirements of Metro Manila where an
estimated 9 million population reside.
 2.2 Metro Manila is presently estimated to be generating, at least,
15,700 cubic meters of household or municipal waste, a 1.57
hectare of land area will be filled in a months time with a pile
31 meters high of garbage, or in a year, the accumulated
volume will require 18.2 hectares.

....

4. The sanitary landfill projects are now on their fifth year of

implementation. The amount of effort and money already invested
in the project by the government cannot easily be disregarded,
much more set aside in favor of the few settlers/squatters who
chose to ignore the earlier notice given to them that the area would
be used precisely for the development of waste disposal sites, and
are now attempting to arouse opposition to the project.

4.2 There is no place within the jurisdiction of Metro Manila, with

an area big enough to accommodate at least 3 to 5 years of
waste disposal requirements. x x x x

4.21 The present site at San Mateo was selected because, at the time
consideration was being made, and up to the present, it is found
to have the attributes that positively respond to the criteria
established:

4.21.1 The site was a government property and would not

require any outlay for it to be acquired.
 4.21.2 It is far from any sizeable community/settlements that
could be affected by the development that would be
introduced and yet, was within economic hauling distance
from the areas they are designed to serve.

4.21.21 At the time it was originally decided to locate

the landfills at the present site, there were not
more that fifteen (15) settlers in the area and they
had hardly established themselves. The
community settlements were located far from the
site.

4.21.22 The area was hardly accessible, especially to

any public transport. The area was being served by
a public utility jeep that usually made only two (2)
trips daily. During the rainy season, it could only
be reached by equipping the vehicle with tire
chains to traverse the slippery muddy trail roads.

4.21.3 There was, at least, seventy-three (73) hectares available

at the site.

4.3 While the site was within the Marikina Watershed Reservation under
the administration of the DENR, the site was located at the lower
periphery of the buffer zone; was evaluated to be least likely to affect
 the underground water supply; and could, in fact, be excluded from
the reservation.

4.31 It was determined to be far from the main water containment area
for it to pose any immediate danger of contaminating the
underground water, in case of a failure in any of the mitigating
measures that would be installed.

4.32 It was likewise too far from the nearest body of water, the Laguna
Lake, and the distance, plus the increasing accumulation of water
from other tributaries toward the lake, would serve to dilute and
mitigate any contamination it may emit, in case one happened.

4.33 To resolve the recurring issue regarding its being located within
the Marikina Watershed Reservation, the site had been
recommended by the DENR, and approved by the President, to
already be excluded from the Marikina Watershed reservation
and placed under the administration of MMDA, since the site
was deemed to form part of the land resource reserve then
commonly referred to as buffer zone.

5. Contrary to the impression that you had been given, relocating the site at
this point and time would not be easy, if not impracticable, because
aside from the investments that had been made in locating the present
site, further investments have been incurred in:
 5.1 The conduct of the technical studies for the development being
implemented. Through a grant-in-aid from the World Bank,
US$600,000 was initially spent for the conduct of the necessary
studies on the area and the design of the landfill. This was augmented
by, at least, another P1.5 million from the government for the studies
to be completed, or a total cost at the time (1990) of approximately
P20 million.

5.2. Additionally, the government has spent approximately P33 million

in improving on the roadway to make the site accessible from the main
road/highway.

5.3 To achieve the necessary economies in the development of the site,

the utilities had been planned so that their use could be maximized.
These include the access roads, the drainage system, the leacheate
collection system, the gas collection system, and the waste water
treatment system. Their construction are designed so that instead of
having to construct independent units for each area, the use of existing
facilities can be maximized through a system of interconnection. On
the average, the government is spending P14.8 million to develop a
hectare of sanitary landfill area.

6. Despite the preparations and the investments that are now being made on
the project, it is estimated that the total available area, at an accelerated
rate of disposal, assuming that all open dump sites were to be closed,
will only last for 39 months.
 6.1 We are still hard pressed to achieve advanced development on the
sites to assure against any possible crisis in garbage from again being
experienced in Metro Manila, aside from having to look for the
additional sites that may be used after the capacities shall have been
exhausted.

6.2 Faced with the prospects of having the 15,700 cubic meters of
garbage generated daily strewn all over Metro Manila, we are certain
you will agree that it would be futile to even as much as consider a
suspension of the waste disposal operations at the sanitary landfills.

On 22 July 1996, the petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a civil
action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for a temporary
restraining order/writ of preliminary injunction. The hearing on the prayer for
preliminary injunction was held on 14 August 1996.

On 13 June 1997, the court a quo rendered a Decision,[15] the dispositive part
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with application for a temporary restraining order/writ of
preliminary injunction for lack of cause of action, is hereby
DENIED.[16]
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the above decision on the
following grounds:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION IN DELIBERATELY IGNORING THE
SIGNIFICANT FACT THAT PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION
NO. 635 WAS BASED ON A BRAZEN FORGERY IT WAS
SUPPOSEDLY ISSUED, AS STATED IN THE PROCLAMATION
ITSELF AND REPEATEDLY ASSERTED BY RESPONDENTS IN
THEIR COMMENT, ON THE BASIS OF THE ALLEGED
RECOMMENDATION OF THE DENR SECRETARY DATED
JUNE 26, 1995 BUT WHICH ASSERTION WAS DENOUNCED BY
THE THEN SECRETARY ANGEL C. ALCALA HIMSELF IN A
SWORN STATEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 1996 AND
AGAIN DURING THE SPECIAL HEARING OF THE CASE IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS ON NOVEMBER 13, 1996 AS A FORGERY
SINCE HIS SIGNATURE ON THE ALLEGED
RECOMMENDATION HAD BEEN FALSIFIED, AS NOW
ADMITTED BY RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES IN THEIR
COMMENT FILED WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS, THROUGH
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN COMPLETELY IGNORING THE SIGNIFICANT
FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE OPERATING THE
LANDFILL BASED ON A SPURIOUS ENVIRONMENTAL
COMPLIANCE CERTIFICATE.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE R.A. 7586 WHEN THEY
ISSUED AND IMPLEMENTED PROCLAMATION NO. 635
CONSIDERING THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OR
DISESTABLISHMENT OF A PROTECTED AREA OR THE
MODIFICATION OF THE MARIKINA WATERSHED CAN ONLY
BE DONE BY AN ACT OF CONGRESS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT DELIBERATELY AND WILLFULLY
BRUSHED ASIDE THE UNANIMOUS FINDINGS AND ADVERSE
RECOMMENDATIONS OF RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES AND NON-PARTISAN OFFICIALS CONCERNED
WITH ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN FAVOR OF THE
SELF-SERVING, GRATUITOUS ASSERTIONS FOUND IN THE
UNSOLICITED, PARTISAN LETTER OF FORMER MALABON
 MAYOR, NOW CHAIRMAN PROSPERO ORETA OF THE MMDA
WHO IS AN INTERESTED PARTY IN THIS CASE.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT READILY

SWALLOWED RESPONDENTS ASSERTION THAT THE SAN
MATEO DUMPSITE IS LOCATED IN THE BUFFER ZONE OF
THE RESERVATION AND IS THEREFORE OUTSIDE OF ITS
BOUNDARIES, AND EVEN DECLARED IN ITS DECISION THAT
IT TOOK SERIOUS NOTE OF THIS PARTICULAR ARGUMENT.

VI

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION WHEN IT ENCROACHED ON THE FUNCTION OF
CONGRESS BY EXPRESSING ITS UNJUSTIFIED FEAR OF MINI-
SMOKEY MOUNTAINS PROLIFERATING IN METRO MANILA
AND JUSTIFYING ITS DECISION IN FAVOR OF AN
INTEGRATED SYSTEM OF SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
LIKE THE SAN MATEO LANDFILL.

On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a
Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,[17] pointing out that the effects of the El
Nio phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation. They noted that respondent MMDA had, in the meantime,
continued to expand the area of the dumpsite inside the Marikina Watershed
Reservation, cutting down thousands of mature fruit trees and forest trees, and
leveling hills and mountains to clear the dumping area. Garbage disposal operations
were also being conducted on a 24-hour basis, with hundreds of metric tons of wastes
being dumped daily, including toxic and infectious hospital wastes, intensifying the
air, ground and water pollution.[18]

The petitioners reiterated their prayer that respondent MMDA be temporarily

enjoined from further dumping waste into the site and from encroaching into the area
beyond its existing perimeter fence so as not to render the case moot and academic.

On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early

Resolution,[19] calling attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite by the
MMDA that caused the people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the Marcos
Highway to stop the dump trucks from reaching the site for five successive days
from 16 January 1999. On the second day of the barricade, all the municipal mayors
of the province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally, and notified
the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their
province.[20]

As a result, MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay, agreed

to abandon the dumpsite after six months. Thus, the municipal mayors of Rizal,
particularly the mayors of Antipolo and San Mateo, agreed to the use of the dumpsite
until that period, which would end on 20 July 1999.[21]
 On 13 July 1999, the petitioners filed an Urgent Second Motion for Early
Resolution[22] in anticipation of violence between the conflicting parties as the date
of the scheduled closure of the dumpsite neared.

On 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the

gravity of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood that violence would
erupt among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the
dumpsite on 31 December 2000.[23] Accordingly, on 20 July 1999, the Presidential
Committee on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA
with the Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the
City of Antipolo, wherein the latter agreed to further extend the use of the dumpsite
until its permanent closure on 31 December 2000.[24]

On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and

Local Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen
the San Mateo dumpsite in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage
in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation
epidemic.[25]

Claiming the above events constituted a clear and present danger of violence
erupting in the affected areas, the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Restraining
Order[26] on 19 January 2001.

On 24 January 2001, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order

prayed for, effective immediately and until further orders.[27]
 Meanwhile, on 26 January 2001, Republic Act No. 9003, otherwise known as
The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, was signed into law by
President Estrada.

Thus, the petitioners raised only two issues in their Memorandum[28] of 08

February 2005: 1) whether or not respondent MMDA agreed to the permanent
closure of the San Mateo Landfill as of December 2000, and 2) whether or not the
permanent closure of the San Mateo landfill is mandated by Rep. Act No. 9003.

We hold that the San Mateo Landfill will remain permanently closed.

Although the petitioners may be deemed to have waived or abandoned the

issues raised in their previous pleadings but not included in the
memorandum,[29] certain events we shall relate below have inclined us to address
some of the more pertinent issues raised in the petition for the guidance of the herein
respondents, and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar.[30]

The law and the facts indicate that a mere MOA does not guarantee the
dumpsites permanent closure.

The rally and barricade staged by the people of Antipolo on 28 January 1999,
with the full support of all the mayors of Rizal Province caused the MMDA to agree
that it would abandon the dumpsite after six months. In return, the municipal mayors
allowed the use of the dumpsite until 20 July 1999.

On 20 July 1999, with much fanfare and rhetoric, the Presidential Committee
on Flagship Programs and Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the
Provincial Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of
Antipolo, whereby the latter agreed to an extension for the use of the dumpsite until
31 December 2000, at which time it would be permanently closed.

Despite this agreement, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and

Local Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay
to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite on 11 January 2001, in view of the emergency
situation of uncollected garbage in Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent
health and sanitation epidemic; our issuance of a TRO on 24 January 2001 prevented
the dumpsites reopening.

Were it not for the TRO, then President Estradas instructions would have been
lawfully carried out, for as we observed in Oposa v. Factoran, the freedom of
contract is not absolute. Thus:

.. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., this Court stated: "The freedom of
contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be
absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, moral,
safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-
impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the
police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral
and general welfare." The reason for this is emphatically set forth
in Nebia vs. New York, quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance
Co. vs. Auditor General, to wit: "'Under our form of government the
use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be
 free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise
his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with
the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common
interest.'" In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police
power of the state. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)

We thus feel there is also the added need to reassure the residents of the
Province of Rizal that this is indeed a final resolution of this controversy, for a brief
review of the records of this case indicates two self-evident facts. First, the San
Mateo site has adversely affected its environs, and second, sources of water
should always be protected.

As to the first point, the adverse effects of the site were reported as early as
19 June 1989, when the Investigation Report of the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer of DENR-IV-1 stated that the sources of domestic water
supply of over one thousand families would be adversely affected by the dumping
operations.[31] The succeeding report included the observation that the use of the
areas as dumping site greatly affected the ecological balance and environmental
factors of the community.[32] Respondent LLDA in fact informed the MMA that the
heavy pollution and risk of disease generated by dumpsites rendered the location of
a dumpsite within the Marikina Watershed Reservation incompatible with its
program of upgrading the water quality of the Laguna Lake. [33]

The DENR suspended the sites ECC after investigations revealed ground
slumping and erosion had resulted from improper development of the
site.[34] Another Investigation Report[35]submitted by the Regional Technical
Director to the DENR reported respiratory illnesses among pupils of a primary
school located approximately 100 meters from the site, as well as the constant
presence of large flies and windblown debris all over the schools playground. It
further reiterated reports that the leachate treatment plant had been eroded twice
already, contaminating the nearby creeks that were sources of potable water for the
residents. The contaminated water was also found to flow to the Wawa Dam and
Boso-boso River, which in turn empties into Laguna de Bay.

This brings us to the second self-evident point. Water is life, and must be
saved at all costs. In Collado v. Court of Appeals,[36] we had occasion to reaffirm our
previous discussion in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,[37] on the primordial importance of watershed areas, thus: The most
important product of a watershed is water, which is one of the most important human
necessities. The protection of watersheds ensures an adequate supply of water for
future generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but
also cause loss of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational
responsibility that needs to be answered now.[38]

Three short months before Proclamation No. 635 was passed to avert the
garbage crisis, Congress had enacted the National Water Crisis Act [39] to adopt
urgent and effective measures to address the nationwide water crisis which adversely
affects the health and well-being of the population, food production, and
industrialization process. One of the issues the law sought to address was
the protection and conservation of watersheds.[40]
In other words, while respondents were blandly declaring that the reason for the
creation of the Marikina Watershed Reservation, i.e., to protect Marikina River as
the source of water supply of the City of Manila, no longer exists, the rest of the
country was gripped by a shortage of potable water so serious, it necessitated its own
legislation.

Respondents actions in the face of such grave environmental consequences

defy all logic. The petitioners rightly noted that instead of providing solutions,
they have, with unmitigated callousness, worsened the problem. It is this
readiness to wreak irrevocable damage on our natural heritage in pursuit of what
is expedient that has compelled us to rule at length on this issue. We ignore the
unrelenting depletion of our natural heritage at our peril.

I.

THE REORGANIZATION ACT OF THE DENR DEFINES AND

LIMITS ITS POWERS OVER THE COUNTRYS NATURAL RESOURCES

The respondents next point out that the Marikina Watershed Reservation,
and thus the San Mateo Site, is located in the public domain. They allege that as
such, neither the Province of Rizal nor the municipality of San Mateo has the
power to control or regulate its use since properties of this nature belong to the
national, and not to the local governments.

It is ironic that the respondents should pursue this line of reasoning.

 In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,[41] we had
occasion to observe that (o)ne of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935
Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the convention
in favor of the principle of state ownership of natural resources and the adoption
of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen as a
necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to control their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization.[42]

The Regalian doctrine was embodied in the 1935 Constitution, in Section

1 of Article XIII on Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources. This was
reiterated in the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV on the National Economy
and the Patrimony of the Nation, and reaffirmed in the 1987 Constitution in
Section 2 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony, to wit:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production,
joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens,
or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose
capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
 twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.[43]

Clearly, the state is, and always has been, zealous in preserving as much
of our natural and national heritage as it can, enshrining as it did the obligation
to preserve and protect the same within the text of our fundamental law.

It was with this objective in mind that the respondent DENR was mandated
by then President Corazon C. Aquino, under Section 4 of Executive Order No.
192, [44] otherwise known as The Reorganization Act of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, to be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of
the countrys environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed
areas, and lands of the public domain. It is also responsible for the licensing and
regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to
ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of
the present and future generations of Filipinos.

We expounded on this matter in the landmark case of Oposa v.

Factoran,[45] where we held that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
a fundamental legal right that carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. This right implies, among other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the countrys resources, which duty is reposed
in the DENR under the aforequoted Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192.
Moreover:
Section 3 (of E. O. No. 192) makes the following statement of
policy:

SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared

the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use,
development, management, renewal, and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-
shore areas and other natural resources, including the
protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different
segments of the population to the development and use of
the country's natural resources, not only for the present
generation but for future generations as well. It is also
the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost
implications relative to their utilization; development and
conservation of our natural resources. (Emphasis ours)

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV,

Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, specifically in Section 1
thereof which reads:

SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. - (1) The State shall

ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
 exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a
sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing
the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of
such natural resources equitably accessible to the different
segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a

true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.

The above provision stresses the necessity of maintaining a

sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of
the environment.[46] (Emphasis ours.)

In sum, the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 192
entrust the DENR with the guardianship and safekeeping of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation and our other natural treasures. However, although the
DENR, an agency of the government, owns the Marikina Reserve and has
jurisdiction over the same, this power is not absolute, but is defined by the
 declared policies of the state, and is subject to the law and higher
authority. Section 2, Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,
while specifically referring to the mandate of the DENR, makes particular
reference to the agencys being subject to law and higher authority, thus:

SEC. 2. Mandate. - (1) The Department of Environment and Natural

Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the
foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of

carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.

With great power comes great responsibility. It is the height of irony that the
public respondents have vigorously arrogated to themselves the power to control the
San Mateo site, but have deftly ignored their corresponding responsibility as
guardians and protectors of this tormented piece of land.

II.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE GIVES TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT

UNITS ALL THE NECESSARY POWERS TO PROMOTE THE GENERAL
WELFARE OF THEIR INHABITANTS
 The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also
violates Rep. Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.

Contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which

was passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local
Government Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.

Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project
or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. Likewise, Section 27
requires prior consultations before a program shall be implemented by
government authorities and the prior approval of the sanggunian is obtained.

During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining
order, Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force
declared before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required
consultations. However, he added that (t)his is the problem, sir, the officials we
may have been talking with at the time this was established may no longer be
incumbent and this is our difficulty now. That is what we are trying to do now, a
continuing dialogue.[47]

The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when, at
the height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to stop dump
 trucks from reaching the site, all the municipal mayors of the province of Rizal
openly declared their full support for the rally and notified the MMDA that they
would oppose any further attempt to dump garbage in their province.[48]

The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were in fact
fulfilling their mandate, when they did this. Section 16 allows every local
government unit to exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient
and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare, which involve, among other things, promot(ing) health and safety,
enhance(ing) the right of the people to a balanced ecology, and preserv(ing) the
comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

In Lina , Jr. v. Pao,[49] we held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with
the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government projects
affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular community
implementing the project. Rejecting the petitioners contention that Sections 2(c) and
27 of the Local Government Code applied mandatorily in the setting up of lotto
outlets around the country, we held that:
From a careful reading of said provisions, we find that these
apply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be
implemented in a particular local community. Lotto is neither a
program nor a project of the national government, but of a charitable
institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government,
it is far fetched to say that lotto falls within the contemplation of
Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the Local Government Code.
Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26
thereof. Section 26 reads:

SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the

Maintenance of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every
national agency or government-owned or controlled corporation
authorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of
any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land,
range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant
species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and
explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its
impact upon the people and the community in terms of
environmental or ecological balance, and the measures that will
be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.

Thus, the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be

interpreted to mean projects and programs whose effects are
among those enumerated in Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that:
(1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic change; (3)
may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may result
in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate
certain animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6)
other projects or programs that may call for the eviction of a
particular group of people residing in the locality where these will
 be implemented. Obviously, none of these effects will be produced by
the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna. (emphasis supplied)

We reiterated this doctrine in the recent case of Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v.

Lanzanas,[50] where we held that there was no statutory requirement for
the sangguniang bayan of Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a mooring
facility, as Sections 26 and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not
environmentally critical.

Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of
the municipality, grants the sangguniang bayan the power to, among other things,
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e) Code. These
include:
(1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts
which endanger the environment, such as dynamite fishing and
other forms of destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling
of logs, smuggling of natural resources products and of
endangered species of flora and fauna, slash and burn
farming, and such other activities which result in pollution,
acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of
ecological imbalance; [Section 447 (1)(vi)]
(2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of
property within the jurisdiction of the municipality, adopting
a comprehensive land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying
land within the jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent
 provisions of this Code, enacting integrated zoning
ordinances in consonance with the approved comprehensive
land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and regulations;
establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous centers;
and regulating the construction, repair or modification of
buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the
provisions of this Code; [Section 447 (2)(vi-ix)]

(3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under
Section 17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and
facilities, providing for the establishment, maintenance,
protection, and conservation of communal forests and
watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves, and other
similar forest development projects .and, subject to existing
laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and
operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for
the inhabitants and purifying the source of the water supply;
regulating the construction, maintenance, repair and use of
hydrants, pumps, cisterns and reservoirs; protecting the purity
and quantity of the water supply of the municipality and, for
this purpose, extending the coverage of appropriate
ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of said
water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the
reservoir, conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or
watershed used in connection with the water service; and
 regulating the consumption, use or wastage of water. [Section
447 (5)(i) & (vii)]

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met
before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of
local communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is
illegal.
III.

WASTE DISPOSAL IS REGULATED BY THE ECOLOGICAL

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT ACT OF 2000

The respondents would have us overlook all the abovecited laws because
the San Mateo site is a very expensive - and necessary - fait accompli. The
respondents cite the millions of pesos and hundreds of thousands of dollars the
government has already expended in its development and construction, and the
lack of any viable alternative sites.

The Court of Appeals agreed, thus:

During the hearing on the injunction, questions were also asked.
What will happen if the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill is closed? Where
 will the daily collections of garbage be disposed of and dumped? Atty.
Mendoza, one of the lawyers of the petitioners, answered that each
city/municipality must take care of its own. Reflecting on that answer,
we are troubled: will not the proliferation of separate open dumpsites
be a more serious health hazard (which ha(s) to be addressed) to the
residents of the community? What with the galloping population
growth and the constricting available land area in Metro Manila? There
could be a mini-Smokey Mountain in each of the ten citiescomprising
Metro Manila, placing in danger the health and safety of more people.
Damage to the environment could be aggravated by the increase in
number of open dumpsites. An integrated system of solid waste
management, like the San Mateo Sanitary Landfill, appears advisable
to a populous metropolis like the Greater Metro Manila Area absent
access to better technology.[51]

We acknowledge that these are valid concerns. Nevertheless, the lower

court should have been mindful of the legal truism that it is the legislature, by its
very nature, which is the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom,
reasonableness and expediency of any law.[52]

Moreover, these concerns are addressed by Rep. Act No. 9003. Approved
on 26 January 2001, The Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000 was
enacted pursuant to the declared policy of the state to adopt a systematic,
comprehensive and ecological solid waste management system which shall
ensure the protection of public health and environment, and utilize
environmentally sound methods that maximize the utilization of valuable
 resources and encourage resource conservation and recovery. [53] It requires the
adherence to a Local Government Solid Waste Management Plan with regard to
the collection and transfer, processing, source reduction, recycling, composting
and final disposal of solid wastes, the handling and disposal of special wastes,
education and public information, and the funding of solid waste management
projects.

The said law mandates the formulation of a National Solid Waste

Management Framework, which should include, among other things, the method
and procedure for the phaseout and the eventual closure within eighteen months
from effectivity of the Act in case of existing open dumps and/or sanitary
landfills located within an aquifer, groundwater reservoir or watershed
area.[54] Any landfills subsequently developed must comply with the minimum
requirements laid down in Section 40, specifically that the site selected must be
consistent with the overall land use plan of the local government unit, and
that the site must be located in an area where the landfills operation will not
detrimentally affect environmentally sensitive resources such as aquifers,
groundwater reservoirs or watershed areas.[55]

This writes finis to any remaining aspirations respondents may have of

reopening the San Mateo Site. Having declared Proclamation No. 635 illegal, we
see no compelling need to tackle the remaining issues raised in the petition and
the parties respective memoranda.

A final word. Laws pertaining to the protection of the environment were not drafted
in a vacuum. Congress passed these laws fully aware of the perilous state of both
our economic and natural wealth. It was precisely to minimize the adverse impact
humanitys actions on all aspects of the natural world, at the same time maintaining
and ensuring an environment under which man and nature can thrive in productive
and enjoyable harmony with each other, that these legal safeguards were put in place.
They should thus not be so lightly cast aside in the face of what is easy and expedient.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Republic v. Spouses Lazo

DECISION

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules on
Civil Procedure (Rules) seeks to annul and set aside the October 22, 2010
Decision1 and January 31, 2011 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107962, which affirmed the Order3 dated September 17, 2008 and
Supplement to the Order4 of September 17, 2008 dated September 19, 2008 of
Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, granting respondents'
prayer for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction in Civil Case No.
6798-V for Just Compensation with Damages against petitioner.

The facts appear as follows:

Respondents spouses Rogelio Lazo and Dolores Lazo are the owners and
developers of Monte Vista Homes (Monte Vista), a residential subdivision located
in Barangay Paing, Municipality of Bantay, Ilocos Sur. Sometime in 2006, they
voluntarily sold to the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) a portion of Monte
Vista for the construction of an open irrigation canal that is part ofthe Banaoang
Pump Irrigation Project (BPIP). The consideration of the negotiated sale was in a
total amount of 27,180,000.00 at the rate of 2,500.00 per square
meter.5 Subsequently, respondents engaged the services of Engr. Donno G.
Custodio, retired Chief Geologist ofthe Mines and Geosciences Bureau
Department of Environment and Natural Resources,6 to conduct a geohazard study
on the possible effects of the BPIP on Monte Vista. Engr. Custodio later came up
with a Geohazard Assessment Report (GAR),7 finding that ground shaking and
channel bank erosion are the possible hazards that could affect the NIA irrigation
canal traversing Monte Vista. He then recommended the following:

Construction of a two (2) or double slope retaining wallsanchored to a

reinforced foundation on both sides ofthe irrigation channel within the
Monte Vista Homes Subdivision Project (Phase I & II). A buffer zone of at
least 20 meters from the embankment to the nearest structure should be
strictly enforced.

Construction of a one (1) meter highconcrete dike above the retaining wall
to prevent surface run-off during heavy rainfall from flowing to the
irrigation canal. Likewise, to prevent future residents of the subdivision from
accidentally falling into the irrigation canal.

Construction of adequate draining system along the buffer zone to prevent

surface run-off during rainy season to percolate into the irrigation canal
embankment and/orscour the concrete dike and retaining wall.

Planting of ornamental trees/plants and shrubs along the buffer zone to

prevent destabilization of the irrigation canal embankment and for aesthetic
reasons in the area.8

On December 22, 2006, the Sangguniang Bayanof Bantay, Ilocos Sur approved
Resolution No. 34, which adopted the recommendations contained in the
GAR.9 Among others, it resolved that the GAR recommendations should be
observed and implemented by the concerned implementing agency of the NIA
BPIP.

Respondent Rogelio Lazo brought toNIAs attention Resolution No. 34 through his
letters dated January 15, 2007, September 5, 2007, and November 1, 2007.10 He
specifically asked for the implementation of the GAR recommendations and the
payment ofjust compensation for the entire buffer zone involving an aggregate area
of 14,381 sq. m., more or less.
When respondents demands were not acted upon, they decided to file a complaint
for just compensation withdamages against NIA on January 31, 2008.11 Prior to the
filing of an Answer, respondents filed an Amended Complaint with application for
a temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction.12 They further
alleged thatthe BPIP contractor is undertaking substandard works that increase the
risk of a fatal accident.

Per Order13 dated July 8, 2008, the trial court issued an ex parte 72-hour TRO and
directed the NIA to appear in a summary hearing on July 9, 2008 to show cause
why the injunction should not be granted. Instead of a personal appearance, the
NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Manifestation and
Motion14 praying that the TRO be lifted and the application for preliminary
injunction be denied for being prohibited by Republic Act. No. 8975.15 In the July
9, 2008 hearing, the trial court ordered respondents to comment on the
Manifestation and Motion (which was later on complied with)16 and extended the
TRO for 20 days from its issuance.17

During the July 23, 2008 hearing on respondents prayer for provisional relief, the
parties presented their respective witnesses. Engr. Jerry Zapanta, the Technical
Operations Manager of the NIA-BPIP, was petitioners sole witness, while Rogelio
Lazo and Engr. Custodio testified for respondents.

Petitioner filed its Answer18 to the Amended Complaint on August 22, 2008. After
which, respondents filed a Reply.19

On September 17, 2008, the trial court granted respondents application for
preliminary injunction.The dispositive portion of the Order reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the application for preliminary

prohibitory and mandatory injunction by plaintiffs is hereby GRANTED.

Defendant is hereby enjoined fromcontinuing further construction works on the

irrigation canalparticularly those located inside the Monte Vista Homes until the
issue in the main case is resolved.

Further, defendant is ordered tocomply with Resolution No. 34, Series of 2006 of
the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bantay Ilocos Sur, adopting the
recommendations of the Geohazard Assessment Report undertaken by Engr.
Donno Custodio, unless said Resolution has been revoked, superseded or modified
in such a manner that would negate compliance therewith by defendant.
SO ORDERED.20

Two days later, the trial court issued a Supplement to the Order of September 17,
2008, stating: The dispositive portion of the Order of September 17, 2008 is
supplemented with a last paragraph to read as follows:

"The Court hereby fixes the injunction bond in the amount of THREE MILLION
PESOS (Php3,000,000.00). Upon approval of the requisite bond, let the Writ of
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunctions issue."

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court ruled that the instant case falls under the exception of Section 3 of
R.A. No. 8975, because respondents demand for just compensation is by reason of
the property being burdened by the construction of the open irrigation canal in
Monte Vista which altered its use and integrity. In declaring that the right of
private individuals whose property were expropriated by the State is a matter of
constitutional urgency, it opined:

While [petitioner] insists that [respondents] were fully paid for the actual area
where the irrigation canal is being constructed, it refuses to compensate
[respondents] for their property burdened by the construction of the irrigation
canal. "Taking" in the constitutional sense may include trespass without actual
eviction of the owner, material impairment of the property or the prevention of the
ordinary use for which the property was intended. Thus, in National Power
Corporation vs. Gutierrez (193 SCRA 1, as cited by J. Antonio B. Nachurain his
Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2002 Edition, p. 37), the Supreme Court held
that the exercise of the power of eminent domain does not always result in the
taking of property; it may also result in the imposition of burden upon the owner of
the condemned property without loss of titleor possession.

It would indubitably appear in this case that there is really a necessity of

appropriating more of the [respondents] property by [petitioner] to ensure the
safety and security of operating the open irrigation canal. This could never bemore
true in the light of the Sangguniang Bayans Resolution [34], Series of 2006[,]
which adopted the recommendations contained in the Geohazard Assessment
Report. Significantly, [petitioner] never refuted that there was such a Resolution,
and worse, [petitioner] never explained why it never incorporated the
recommendations in the Resolution or even made an attempt to consult with the
concerned Sanggunian concerning the same.22
Also, the trial court found that petitioner violated R.A. No. 7160, or the Local
Government Code of 1991. It said:

The Local Government Code embodies the policy of the State to devolve the
powers and authority of a former centralized government. [Petitioner] seemed to
have disregarded all deference due to the local government of the Municipality of
Bantay when[,] despite the issuance of Resolution, it insisted that its design of the
open irrigation canal is adequately safe without consultation or asking a formal
audience with the Sangguniang Bayan and spell-out the design of the open
irrigation canal which could persuade the latter to reconsider its Resolution.

Section 3 (g) of the Local Government Code provides that:

"The capabilities of local government units, especially the municipalities and

barangays, shall be enhanced by providing them with opportunities to participate
actively in the implementation of national programs and projects;"

Section 5 of the same Codeleaves no doubt as to the empowerment of local

government units that it provides.

Section 5. Rules of Interpretation. In the interpretation of the provision of this

Code, the following rules shall apply:

"(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally

interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt any question thereon shall be resolved
in favor of devolution of powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair
and reasonable doubt as to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor
of the local government unit concerned;" x x x

[Petitioner][,] by reason of its failure to abide by the required consultation, had

effectively deprecated the function, authority and power of the Sangguniang Bayan
of the Municipality of Bantay. Consequently, without the prior approbation of the
Sanggunian[,] [petitioners] irrigation project cannot be absolutely declared as
representative of the consent of the local government. Hence, it must be enjoined
until compliance by [petitioner] on consultative requirement or clear and
convincing proof of incorporation of the Sanggunian Resolution in the project
design of the irrigation project has been adduced.23

Without moving for a reconsideration of the two Orders, petitioner directly filed a
petition for certiorari24 before the CA.
On May 14, 2009, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion for the Issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.25 In its May 27, 2009 Resolution, the CA
denied the motion and directed the parties to submit their respective
memoranda.26 Accordingly, both parties filed their Memorandum.27

Eventually, the CA dismissed the petition and affirmed the challenged Orders of
the trial court on October 22, 2010.

On procedural matters, the appellate court resolved the issues of whether petitioner
failed to exhaust administrative remedies and whether the petition should be
dismissed for lack of motion for reconsideration filed before the trial court. The
CA opined that the controversy falls squarely within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts and not of the Sangguniang Bayanconcerned, because what petitioner seeks
to nullify are the Orders of the trial court allegedly rendered in violation of R.A.
No. 8975 and not the act or propriety of the issuance of Resolution No. 34. It
agreed, however, with respondents that the petition for certiorari suffers from fatal
defect since it was filed without seeking first the reconsideration of the trial court.
It was said that petitioner omitted to show sufficient justification that there was no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

As to the substantive merits of the case, the CA affirmed that the payment of just
compensation and the alleged need to rectify the inferior construction work on the
irrigation canal are constitutional issues which are of extreme urgency justifying
the trial courts issuance of an injunctive writ. It held:

In the controversy below,what is put in issue is the consequent just compensation

as a result of the acquisition of a right-of-way for a national infrastructure project.
Hence, the application of Republic Act No. 8974 which pertinently provides:

"Sec. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. Whenever it is necessary to

acquire real property for the right-ofway or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency
shall initiate the expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the
following guidelines:

(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred percent (100%) of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or structures as
determined under Section 7 hereof.
 xxx xxx xxx

Applying the provision in the attendant circumstances surrounding the issues in

this petition, it is immediately apparent that in acquiring right-of-way for purposes
of implementing a government infrastructure project and before any taking of the
expropriated property may be effected, it is indispensable for the government to
pay the owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the
improvements and/or structures as determined through the guidelines provided by
law.

And not merely by implication, petitioner cannot take over the property to be
expropriated and perform act of dominion over the landowners property without
the prerequisite full payment of just compensation. The positioning of this Court
takes precedence from the ruling of the Supreme Court in the landmark case of
Republic of the Philippines vs. Hon. Henrick F. Gingoyon.

xxxx

Petitioner cannot seek solace to its claim that it did not expropriate respondents
property but rather purchased it through a negotiated sale. This claim can only be
true to the original plan of the irrigation canal. With the issuance of Resolution No.
34, petitioner is bound to expropriate more of respondents property for sound and
safety reasons, which, unless they pay the full amount of just compensation,
petitioner must be enjoined from acting as de jureowner thereof.

Presently, the legal assumption would be that juridical possession of the property
expropriated remains with respondents. Hence, injunction would be proper in this
case.

[Respondents] have proven an unmistakeable right over the property taken by NIA.
They have shown, in conformity with Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which
provides for the requisites before a preliminary injunction may be issued; that they
are entitled to the relief absent the full payment of just compensation, and thatthe
relief asked for petitioners to refrain from doing act of ownership over their
property, and to improve the quality of the construction workon the irrigation
canal. NIA, as a government expropriating agent, should refrain from continuing
the acts complained of; otherwise, grave and irreparable injury would result to the
prejudice of respondents.
Be it noted that for a writ of preliminary injunction to be issued, the Rules of Court
do not require that the act complained of be in clear violation of the rights of the
applicant. Indeed, what the Rules require is that the act complained of be
probablyin violation of the rights of the applicant.28

Anent petitioners non-compliance withthe requirements of the Local Government

Code, the CA sustained the trial courts finding:

Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before a
national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior consultation with the affected local
communities, and prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the projects implementation is
illegal.

We can take judicial notice thatthe construction and operation of an irrigation canal
scheme has seriousand intricate environmental impact on natural, ecological and
socio-economic conditions, which obviously includes lost of land use that would
most certainly affect the community where it is implemented. NIA should have
conducted prior consultations with the local government in consonance with the
foregoing provision of R.A. 7160. Strangely, it failed tomake such consultation.

Petitioner suggests that the local government should have conducted a separate
investigation on the aptness of the matter subject of the GAR or at least endorsed it
to other appropriate government agencies for confirmation in light of the fact that
the local government is dealing with NIA which is supposed to be anexpert on its
field. However, this Court cannot sustain a stand clearly borne out of neglect with
its obligation to consult the concerned local government prior to the
implementation of the irrigation project.

Petitioner never even cited any statute or law which mandates the local
government to conduct a separate investigation pertaining to the feasibility,
viability or ecological repercussion of any government infrastructure project to be
implemented within its territorial jurisdiction. The Constitution and Republic Act
7160 [are] adequate [sources] of the autonomous authority of local governments to
determine, based on resources or references at its disposal, the soundness of a
particular measure for a particular infrastructure project. It has the sole discretion
to promulgate enacting ordinances to execute such measure.

[Respondent] could not be persuaded to rely on the accuracy and integrity of the
Back to Office Report of NIA much more than it could rely on the alleged
credibility or expertise of the persons who prepared the report. Records do not
show that petitioner exerted effort to present these people to establish their
expertise; nor did they [make] affirmation on the contents of the Back to Office
Report. Resultantly, the testimony of petitioners witness and his allegations to
support the veracity of the contents of NIAs [Back] to Office Report are mere
self-serving statements and inadmissible for being hearsay.29

On January 31, 2011, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration;

hence, this petition that raises the following issues for resolution:

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF

SUBSTANCE WHICH IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND
PREVAILING JURISPRUDENCE

II

WHETHER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE JUSTIFIED PETITIONERS

IMMEDIATE RESORT TO THE COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT FILING A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE
TRIAL COURT.

III

WHETHER REPUBLIC ACT (R.A.) NO. 7160 IS APPLICABLE TO THIS

CASE.30

First off, the Court shall settle respondents procedural objections, to wit: (1)
petitioners did not follow the Rules when it filed a petition for certioraridirectly
with the CA without seeking for a reconsideration from the trial court; (2) the
petition was filed out of time due to belated payment of docket and other lawful
fees; and (3) petitioner is guilty of forum shopping.

The contentions are untenable.

A petition for certiorari may be given due course notwithstanding that no motion
for reconsideration was filed in the trial court. Although the direct filing of
petitions for certiorari with the CA is discouraged when litigants may still resort to
remedies with the trial court, the acceptance of and the grant of due course to a
petition for certiorariis generally addressed to the sound discretion of the court
because the technical provisions of the Rules may be relaxed or suspended if it will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice.31

The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua
nonbefore a petition for certiorarimay lie, its purpose being to grant an opportunity
for the court a quoto correct any error attributed to it by a re-examination of the
legal and factual circumstances of the case. However, the rule is not absoluteand
jurisprudence has laid down the following exceptions when the filing of a petition
for certiorariis proper notwithstanding the failure to file a motion for
reconsideration:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quohas no
jurisdiction;

(b) where the questions raised in the certiorariproceedings have been duly
raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised
and passed upon in the lower court;

(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and
any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;

(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be

useless;

(e) where petitioner was deprivedof due process and there is extreme
urgency for relief;

(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the
granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;

(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process;

(h) where the proceeding was ex parteor in which the petitioner had no
opportunity to object; and,

(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.32

We cannot but agree with petitioner that this case falls within instances (a), (b), (c),
(d), and (i) above-mentioned. As will be elucidated in the discussion below, the
assailed Orders of the trial court are patent nullity for having been issued in excess
of its jurisdiction. Also, the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings are the
same as those already raised and passed upon in the lower court; hence, filing a
motion for reconsideration would be useless and serve no practical purpose. There
is likewise an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further
delay would prejudice the interests of the Government. In its petition and
memorandum filed before the CA, petitioner in fact noted that the BPIP is intended
to cater the year-round irrigation needs of 6,312 hectares of agricultural land in
Bantay, Caoayan, Magsingal, San Ildefonso, San Vicente, Sto. Domingo, Sta.
Catalina, and Vigan in Ilocos Sur.33 Even Resolution No. 34 recognizes this. Public
interest is actually involved as the targeted increase in agricultural production is
expected to uplift the farmers standard of living. Lastly, the issue raised that is,
under the antecedent facts, whether the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion ingranting respondents prayer for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatoryinjunction despite the mandate of R.A. No. 8975 is one purely of law.

The CA and this Court unquestionably have full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actions for certiorarifiled
directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature
of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. We deem it proper to
adopt an open-minded approach in the present case.

Also, while it has been stressed that payment of docket and other fees within the
prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of the appeal and that such
payment is not a meretechnicality of law or procedure,34 the Court, in exceptional
circumstances,35 has allowed a liberal application of the Rules when the payments
of the required docket fees were delayed only for a few days. Indeed, late payment
of docket fees may be admitted when the party showed willingness to abide by the
rules through immediate payment of the required fees.36

In this case, records show that petitioner timely filed its motion for extension of
time to filea petition on March 2, 2011.37 The petition, however, was not docketed
because the required fees were not paid based on petitioners belief that it is
exempt therefrom. Nonetheless, payment was immediately made the following
day, March 3, 2011.38The tardiness of petitioner is excusable since no significant
period of time elapsed.

Finally, respondents argue that the filing of a Manifestation and Motion dated
March 25, 2011 by petitionerwith the trial court should be considered as an act of
forum shopping. They assert that the prayer to admonish them from closing or
blocking the irrigation canal that traverses their property is tantamount to asking
the trial court to lift the injunction order. Respondents contend that instead of
pleading for a restraining order from this Court, petitioner, in effect, belatedly
sought a reconsideration of the Orders dated September 17, 2008 and September
19, 2008 before the trial court.

We do not agree.

Forum shopping is committed by a party who, having received an adverse

judgment in one forum, seeks another opinion in another court, other than by
appeal or special civil action of certiorari.39 It is the institution of two or more suits
in different courts, either simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts
to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially the
same reliefs.40 In a fairly recent case,41 the Court reiterated:

There is forum shopping "when a party repetitively avails of several judicial

remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court." Forum shopping is an act of malpractice that is
prohibited and condemned because it trifles with the courts and abuses their
processes. It degrades the administration of justice and adds to the already
congested court dockets. An important factor in determining its existence is the
vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of similar cases
to claim substantially the same reliefs.

The test to determine the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicatain the other. Thus, there is forum shopping when the following elements
are present, namely: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights assertedand reliefs prayed for,
the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding
particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amounts to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Taking into account the surrounding circumstances, it cannot be said that

petitioners Manifestation and Motion dated March 25,2011 constitutes forum
shopping. The full text of which is quoted as follows:

MANIFESTATION AND MOTION

DEFENDANT, by counsel, to the Honorable Court, respectfully states:

1. On March 20, 2011, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) received a
facsimile letter dated March 10, 2011 from the Administrator of the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) seeking legal assistance to prevent the
plaintiffs from blocking the irrigation canal traversing their property which
would unduly disrupt the operations of the Banaoang Pump Irrigation
Project (BPIP).

xxxx

2. The above letter was precipitated by plaintiff Rogelio Lazos threat to bar
the operation of the section of the Banaoang Irrigation Canal constructed
within the Monte Vista Homes as can be gleaned from the letter dated
February 28, 2011 of Engr. Santiago P. Gorospe, Jr., Project Manager of the
BPIP to the NIA Administrator x x x.

3. It may be recalled that the Honorable Court issued an Order dated

September 17, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:

xxxx

4. It must be stressed that plaintiffs had been fully compensated for that
portion of their property at Monte Vista Homes acquired by the NIA for its
project; hence, the Republic of the Philippines is already the owner thereof.
Accordingly, plaintiffs have no right whatsoever to restrain the Republic
through the National Irrigation Administration, to exercise any of the
attributes of its ownership. Moreover, the injunction order does not authorize
plaintiffs to close or block the irrigation canal.

5. It is respectfully informed that the BPIP is now irrigating 3,300 hectares

out of the 5,200 hectares irrigable service area and it is possible to irrigate
the remaining area of about1,900 hectares this next cropping season. Thus, it
is very critical that the canal traversing plaintiffs property be allowed
unimpeded operation to [ensure] the continued irrigation services to the
farmers now depending on the BPIP.

PRAYER
WHEREFORE, it is respectfullyprayed that plaintiffs be admonished from closing
or blockingthe irrigation canal traversing their property for lack of authority to do
soand to await the final resolution of this case.

It is likewise prayed that defendant be granted suchother reliefs as are just and
equitable under the premises.

Makati City, Metro Manila for Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, March 25, 2011.42

To note, the above pleading was followed by another Manifestation and Motion
dated September 5, 2011, wherein petitioner further alleged:

5. In lieu of the hearing, defendantrespectfully seeks clarification on whether

the Order dated September 17, 2008 granting plaintiffs application for
preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction grant them the power to
close or block the irrigation canal constructed by the defendant. Again, it
should be stressed that the construction of the irrigation canal was already
completed prior to the issuance of the Order dated September 17, 2008.
More importantly, the portion of plaintiffs land where the irrigation canal
was constructed is already owned by the defendant prior to the institution
ofthis case because plaintiffs had already been fully paid for it.

6. Although the import and coverageof the injunction order dated September
17, 2008 is very clear, the said clarification is imperative to put a stop to the
on-and-off threat of the plaintiffs to close or block the irrigation canal, a
government property, on the basis of said injunction order, to the prejudice
of the farmers dependent on it for irrigation services.43

After cautiously reading both pleadings, it appears that petitioner honestly sought
clarification from the trial court the meaning of the writ it issued. To refresh, when
the trial court granted respondents application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatoryinjunction on September 17, 2008 it enjoined petitioner from continuing
further construction works on the irrigation canal located inside Monte Vista and
ordered it to comply with Resolution No. 34, which adopted the GAR
recommendations. As petitioner pointed out, the injunction order does not
authorize respondents to close or block the irrigation canal, the construction of
which was, asalleged, already completed prior to the issuance of the Order. In
filing the Manifestation and Motion, petitioner was just protecting its property
rights, claiming that it is already the owner of the land where the irrigation canal
was constructed by virtue of the negotiated sale that transpired prior to the
institution of this case. According to petitioner, respondents previously blocked the
irrigation canal and it was only through the initiative and efforts of the affected
farmers that the same was removed. Faced with another threat of closure, it only
exercised its legal right to seek affirmative relief from the trial court.

Now, on the substantive merits of the case.

R.A. No. 8975, which took effect on November 26, 2000,44 is the present law that
proscribes lower courts from issuing restraining orders and preliminary injunctions
against government infrastructure projects. In ensuring the expeditious and
efficient implementation and completion of government infrastructure projects, its
twin objectives are: (1) to avoid unnecessary increase in construction, maintenance
and/or repair costs; and (2) to allow the immediate enjoyment ofthe social and
economic benefits of the project.45 Towards these end, Sections3 and 4 of the law
provide:

SEC. 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary

Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions. No court, except the
Supreme Court, shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or any of its
subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether public or private, acting
under the governments direction, to restrain, prohibit or compel the following
acts:

(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way and/or site or

location of any national government project;

(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national government as

defined under Section 2 hereof;

(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation, operation of

any such contract or project;

(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and

(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful activity necessary

for such contract/project.

This prohibition shall apply in all cases, disputes or controversies instituted by a

private party, including but not limited to cases filed by bidders or those claiming
to have rights through such bidders involving such contract/project. This
prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a
constitutional issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued, grave
injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall file a bond, in an
amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall accrue in favor of the
government if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled to
the relief sought.

If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract is null and void,
the court may, if appropriate under the circumstances, award the contract to the
qualified and winning bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to
any liability that the guilty party may incur under existing laws.

SEC. 4. Nullity of Writs and Orders. Any temporary restraining order,

preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction issued in violation of
Section 3 hereof is void and of no force and effect. (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 8975 exclusively reserves to this Court the power to issue injunctive
writs on government infrastructure projects. A judge who violates the prohibition
shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay, in
addition to any civil and criminal liabilities that he or she may incur under existing
laws.46 Through Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, We instructed all judges and
justices of the lower courts to comply with and respect the prohibition.47

In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute that the Banaoang Pump Irrigation
Project is a government infrastructure project within the contemplation of R.A. No.
8975. Instead, the focal issue to be resolved is: Does this case for just
compensation with damages one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue such that unless a preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction is issued
grave injustice and irreparable injury on the part of respondents will arise? We
hold not.

Here, respondents failed to demonstrate that there is a constitutional issue

involved, much less a constitutional issue that is of extreme urgency. The case
aims to compel the Government to acquire more portion of Monte Vista on the
bases of the GAR recommendations, which was espoused by the Sangguniang
Bayanof Bantay, Ilocos Sur, and of the alleged substandard works on the BPIP.
The findings in the GAR, however, are vehemently opposed by petitioner. It
asserted that the 20-meter buffer zone is unnecessary because similar precautionary
measures are already sufficiently installed and that further acquisition of
respondents property would be grossly disadvantageous tothe Government as it
would cost additional 68,370,000.00, more or less.Petitioner also counters that the
claim of substandard works on the BPIP is speculative, since the contractor has not
yet handed over the BPIP as completed and petitioner is yet to inspect and approve
the BPIP according to its design and specifications. Considering that these issues
are very much disputed by the parties, it cannot be said that respondents
constitutional right to just compensation was or has already been breached at the
time the complaint was filed or even during the hearing on their application for
preliminary injunction.

As petitioner consistently argues, it has not taken any property of respondents that
is more than what was the subject matter of the negotiated sale executed in 2006.
Quite the contrary, it is respondents who are obliging it to purchase more than what
it deems as necessary for the implementation of the BPIP. In general, however, a
property-owner like respondents has no right to unilaterally determine the extent of
his or her property that should be acquired by the State or to compel it to acquire
beyond what is needed, the conformity of a higher authority like the Sanggunian
Bayan notwithstanding. Similar to cases of voluntary offer to sell (VOS) a property
to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for coverage under R.A. No. 6657
or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,48 the Government cannot be forced
to buy land which it finds no necessity for considering that, in the ultimate
analysis, an appropriation of limited government funds is involved. Like the DAR,
the NIA has the power todetermine whether a parcel of land is needed for the
BPIP. Truly, due recognition must be madethat the NIA is an administrative body
with expertise on matters within its specific and specialized jurisdiction.
Presumption of regularity in the performance of its official duty should be
accorded. As this Court held in Republic v. Nolasco:49

More importantly, the Court, the parties, and the public at large are bound to
respect the fact that official acts of the Government, including those performed by
governmental agencies such as the DPWH, are clothed with the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty, and cannot be summarily,
prematurely and capriciously set aside. Such presumption is operative not only
upon the courts, but on all persons, especially on those who deal with the
government on a frequent basis. There is perhaps a more cynical attitude fostered
within the popular culture, or even through anecdotal traditions. Yet, such default
pessimism is not embodied in our system of laws, which presumes that the State
and its elements act correctly unless otherwise proven. To infuse within our legal
philosophy a contrary, gloomy pessimism would assure that the State would bog
down, wither and die.
Instead, our legal framework allowsthe pursuit of remedies against errors of the
State or its components available to those entitled by reason of damage or injury
sustained. Such litigation involves demonstration of legal capacity to sue or be
sued, an exhaustive trial on the merits, and adjudication that has basis in duly
proven facts and law. x x x50

While the Court concurs with the trial courts pronouncement that the exercise of
the power of eminent domain does not always result in the taking of property as it
may only result in the imposition of burden upon the owner of the condemned
property without lossof title or possession, We do not agree with its finding, after
the conduct of a one-day hearing relative to the prayer for provisional relief, that
there is real necessity of appropriating more of the respondents property by
petitioner to ensurethe safety and security of operating the open irrigation canal.
The allegation that respondents will stand to suffer damages by NIAs non-
acquisition of additional land in Monte Vista is evidentiary in nature requiring full
blown trial on the merits. In the same vein, the CA likewise erred when it
improperly took judicial notice that "the construction and operation of an irrigation
canal scheme has serious and intricate environmental impact on natural, ecological
and socio-economicconditions, which obviously includes lost of land use that
would most certainly affect the community where it is implemented" so as to
sustain the trial courts ruling.

Respondents cannot conveniently invoke the NAPOCOR cases51 in order to

support their prayer for preliminary injunction. Therein, the Court consistently
ruled that expropriation isnot limited to the acquisition of real property with a
corresponding transferof title or possession and that the right-of-way easement
resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term "expropriation."
Incontrast, this case obviously does not deal with the installation power lines,
which has different nature and effects on private ownership. The perpetual
deprivation of the normal and ordinary use of the complainants proprietary rights,
the danger to life and limbs, and the tax implications which were uniformly
considered in the NAPOCOR cases are relatively not palpable in this case. As
regards petitioners alleged violation of the Local Government Code, the same
does not suffice to grant the prayer for injunctive relief.

Section 2(c) of the Local GovernmentCode declares the policy of the State "to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with
appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations,
and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is
implemented in their respective jurisdictions." This provision applies to national
government projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the
particular community implementing the project.52 Exactly, Sections 26 and 27 of
the Local Government Code requires prior consultations with the concerned
sectors and the prior approval of the Sanggunian. It was said that the Congress
introduced these provisions to emphasize the legislative concern "for the
maintenance of a sound ecology and clean environment."53

Sections 26 and 27 provide:

Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of

Ecological Balance. - It shall be the duty of every national agency or government-
owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in the planning and
implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution, climatic
change, depletion of non-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or
forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local
government units, nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned
and explain the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological balance, and the
measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects
thereof.

Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be

implemented by government authorities unless the consultations mentioned in
Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the
sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where such
projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation
sites have been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

The projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean

projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in Section 26
and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about climatic
change; (3) may cause the depletion of non renewable resources; (4) may result in
loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain animal or
plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or programs that
may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in the locality
where these will be implemented.54 Preliminarily, it appears that the present case
does not fall under any of these instances; ergo, there is neither a need for prior
consultations of concerned sectors nor prior approval of the Sanggunian.
In support of their entitlement to a preliminary injunction, respondents insist that
the non-observance ofthe buffer zones and other GAR recommendations will spell
calamitous consequences to the future occupants of Monte Vista and tragic disaster
tothe community of the Municipality of Bantay. Allegedly, the worst scenario of
such malfeasance, if not immediately enjoined, is the "devastating irreversible
ecological and environmental effects to the community."55According to them,
petitioner "opted to pursue a treacherous task which could well endanger the
community and its people with threats of perishing through inundation or deluge of
mythical proportion, or through avalanche of mud and soil."56 Yet in spite of
advancing these gruesome depictions, it is surprising to note that respondents
apprised the Court that they "never really prevented petitioner from finishing the
construction of the BPIP canal and even allowed its operation in deference to the
broader interests of the farmer-beneficiaries of the irrigation project until the issues
are finally adjudicated."57 This admission only proves that respondents arguments
are mere suppositions which, as of the time the provisional remedy was heard and
granted, are bereft of undisputed factual moorings. Certainly, there is no clear and
material right of respondents to be protected. There are no rights in esse since the
allegations are merely contingent and may never arise at all. These are not rights
clearly founded on or granted by law or is enforceable as a matter of law. There is
no ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in their complaint.

Respondents failed to satisfy even the basic requirements of the Rules for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction.58Therefore, the trial court gravely abused its
discretion whenit granted their application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction. In so doing, it prematurely decided disputed facts and
effectively disposed of the merits of the case without the benefit of a fullblown
trial wherein testimonial and documentary evidence could be fully and
exhaustively presented, heard, and refuted by the parties.

The prevailing rule is that the courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction that would in effect dispose of the main case without trial. Otherwise,
there would be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the
burden of proof since it would assume the proposition which petitioners are
inceptively bound to prove.Indeed, a complaint for injunctive relief must be
construed strictly against the pleader.59

The Court is more inclined to believe that respondents filed the instant complaint
merely to protect their own private interests.1wphi1 The claim of alleged effects
on the environmental or ecological balance of Monte Vista and the Municipality of
Bantay is but a legal tactic to give an impression that the case has urgent
constitutional repercussions. As a matter of fact, their pleadings unfailingly
manifest their true intent. Respondents vigorously contend that the BPIP would
jeopardize the entire development of Monte Vista, which was earmarked for the
development of a residential subdivision; that when the BPIP commenced
construction, the suitability and marketability of Monte Vista already seriously
suffered; and that, in building the BPIP that has substandard specifications,
petitioner and its contractor are likely converting the remaining areas of Monte
Vista not suitable and viable for subdivision project. Respondents admitted that
they are having difficulty selling all the other lots in Monte Vista allegedly because
of the peoples awareness that the irrigation canal is unstable and does not comply
with the GAR recommendations as adopted by the Sangguniang Bayan. They
claim that prospective clients either withdrew from the sale or veered away from
Monte Vista for fear of being considered as part of the statistics if the subdivision
is deluged by the overflow of a substandard irrigation canal. As for those who
already purchased a lot, it is claimed that they now remonstrate to be relocated as
far as possible from the irrigation canal.

Respondents suppose that they deserve additional compensation not only for the
buffer zone to be allocatedfor the stability and safety operation of the irrigation
canal but for the damage it has caused by rendering Monte Vista perceived as less
ideal for residential location.60 The just compensation they are asking is for the
actual area taken by petitioner for the BPIP and those allegedly burdened and
rendered of no use to respondents as a consequence of the required buffer zones
and affected by the purported substandard work of the irrigation canal.
Respondents believe that there is "taking" in the constitutional sense of portions of
Monte Vista which is more than that which petitioner originally declared as
required by BPIP. Again, We do not think so.

Nevertheless, this Court emphasizes that this Decision is limited to the issue of
propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction as an interim relief under the peculiar factual milieu of this case. As the
substantive issues presented and disputed by the parties are not finally resolved,
We leave them to the trial court for resolution after trial on the merits.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The October 22,

2010 Decision and January 31, 2011 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 107962 are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Order dated
September 1 7, 2008 and Supplement to the Order of September 17, 2008 dated
September 19, 2008 of Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Vigan City, Ilocos Sur,
which granted respondents' application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction in Civil Case No. 6798-V for Just Compensation with Damages, are
DECLARED VOID AND OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.

SO ORDERED.