LLAMAS vs.

CA
G.R. No. 149588
September 29, 2009

FACTS:

The petitioners were charged with the crime of other forms of swindling penalized under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code.
They were subsequently found guilty beyond reasonable ground, which was affirmed by the CA. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration that was also denied. Later on, they questioned for the first time the jurisdiction of the Court. There being no action
taken by the trial court on the said motion, the petitioners instituted the respective decisions of the trial and appellate court.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioners can institute an annulment of the RTC and CA since the Courts did not take any action when the petitioners
raise the issue of jurisdiction

HELD: The Court answered in the negative.

The Court cannot allow such recourse, there being no basis in law or in the rules. It explained that the remedy of annulment of
judgement cannot be availed in criminal cases. Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court limits the scope of the remedy of annulment
of judgement. It cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgement being questioned was rendered in a criminal case.

HIPOS SR VS BAY

Facts: Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners
Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others before RTC presided by Judge Bay. Private complainants AAA and BBB filed
a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to order the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had
been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases. Hipos
and other filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. City Prosecutor affirmed the Informations
filed against them. However, 2nd Asst. City Prosecutor reversed the Resolution holding that there was lack of probable cause. City
Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the motion hence the petition.

Issue: WON the Hon. Supreme compel Judge Bay to dismiss the case through a writ of mandamus by virtue of the resolution of the
office of the city prosecutor of QC finding no probable cause against the accused and subsequently filing a motion to withdraw
information.

Decision: Petition bereft of merit.

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary
one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the court.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus,
for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the
exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.
While a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot
be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the
Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore.
If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to
Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order
of Judge Bay.

PEOPLE VS LORENZO

In August 1994, four accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape with homicide committed against a seven year old
girl. The Presiding judge was Lorenzo Veneracion.

Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which treats of the crime of Rape with Homicide, the penalty imposable shall be death.
However, Judge Veneracion refused to impose the death penalty but instead he sentenced the four accused to reclusion perpetua.
The city prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the penalty of death be imposed upon the four accused but the
judge refused to act.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Veneracion has the discretion to impose a lesser penalty than that imposed by law.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the law mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose the proper
penalty provided for by the law on the accused regardless of his own religious or moral beliefs. In this case, the judge must impose
the death penalty. This is consistent in the rule laid down in the Civil Code (Article 9 thereof) which provides that no judge or court
shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity, or insufficiency of the laws.

ABELLANA V PEOPLE

Facts: In 1985, Petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia to which was secured by a Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage, two parcel of land located in Cebu City.

On 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him to which was signed by the private respondent
spouses in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu without the presence of private respondents.

On August 12, 1999, an information was files charging the petitioner with Estafa through falsification of Public Document.

Petitioner pleaded not guilty, the trial court rendered the decision finding the petitioner guilty of Falsification of a Public Document
and not of the crime charge under the information. He was directed to return the properties to the spouses and to pay a sum of P
130,000 with legal interests, nominal damages, attorney's fees, litigation expense and exemplary damages, plus cost of the suit.

Petitioner upon appeal raised the issue whether an accused acquitted of the crime charged may nevertheless convicted of another
crime or offense not specifically charged in the information. CA reversed the decision that it violated the constitutional right of the
petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. However, the CA affirmed the trial courts decision
with respect to the civil liability. Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether of not the CA erred in finding the petitioner civilly liable nothwithstanding his acquittal by the RTC and CA.

Held: Civil liability arises when one, by reason of is own act or ommission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another.
Hence, for the petitioner to be held civillly liable it must be proven that he had caused damage to the spouses. The Supreme Court
ruled that no damages was inflicted upon the the spouses. The evidence showed that the signature of the spouses was genuine and
not forged. The non-appearance before a notary public does not render the Deed of Absolute Sale void, and is not sufficient to
overcome the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. There mus be a clear and convincing evidence as to exclude alll
reasonable controversy as to the falsity of the deed.
Supreme court finds no basis on the imposition of the actual and other kinds of damages upon the petitioner. Sentences should not
be in the alternative, a judge may have a discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. He
must fix positively and with certainty the particular penalty.

Petion is granted. SC Affirmed the CA and the Civil Liabilities are likewise deleted.

Topic: ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES (WARRANTLESS SEARCHES - Valid Waiver)

PEOPLE vs ASIS

FACTS

Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in an Information; the information stating "That on or about
February 10, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and by means of force and violence upon person,
to wit: by then and there stabbing one YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING with a bladed instrument on the different parts of the body
thereafter take, rob and carry away the following, to wit: Cash money in the amount of P20,000.00; 1 wristwatch' 1 gold necklace; and
undetermined items; or all in the total amount of P20,000.00 more or less, belonging to said YU HING GUAN @ ROY CHING against his
will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount more or less of P20,000.00, Philippine Currency, and as a
result thereof, he sustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death." When arraigned, both
accused pleaded not guilty. Found to be deaf-mutes, they were assisted, not only by a counsel de oficio, but also by an interpreter
from the Calvary Baptist Church. The prosecution presented 9 witnesses. Although none of them had actually seen the crime
committed, strong and substantial circumstantial evidence presented by them attempted to link both accused to the crime.

After due trial, both accused were found guilty and sentenced to death. RTC of Manila held that the "crime charged and proved is
robbery with homicide under Article 294, No. 1 of the RPC," ruled that "although no witnesses to the actual killing and robbery were
presented, the circumstantial evidence including the recovery of bloodstained clothing from both accused definitely proved that the
two (2) committed the crime," and appreciated the aggravating circumstances of abuse of confidence, superior strength and treachery
and thus sentenced both accused to the supreme penalty of death.

Hence, the automatic review before the Supreme Court. Both the accused do not question the legality of their arrest, as they made
no objection thereto before the arraignment, but object to the introduction of the bloodstained pair of shorts allegedly recovered
from the bag of Formento; arguing that the search was illegally done, making the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and taints
them

as inadmissible. The prosecution, on the other hand, contends that it was Formento's wife who voluntarily surrendered the bag that
contained the bloodstained trousers of the victim, and thus claims that her act constituted a valid consent to the search without a
warrant.

ISSUES

Whether or not Formento, a deaf-mute, has given consent to the recovery of the bloodstained pair of short, in his possession during
the warrantless search?

RULINGS

NO. Primarily, the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures, being a personal one, cannot be waived by anyone
except the person whose rights are invaded or who is expressly authorized to do so on his or her behalf. In the present case, the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that at the time the bloodstained pair of shorts was recovered, Formento, together
with his wife and mother, was present.

Being the very subject of the search, necessarily, he himself should have given consent. Since he was physically present, the waiver
could not have come from any other person. Lopez vs. Commissioner of Customs does not apply as the accused therein was not
present when the search was made.

Further, to constitute a valid waiver, it must be shown that first, the right exists; second, the person involved had knowledge, actual
or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and third, the person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. Herein, Formento
could not have consented to a warrantless search when, in the first place, he did not understand what was happening at that moment.
There was no interpreter to assist him -- a deaf-mute -- during the arrest, search and seizure. The point in the case Pasion vda. de
Garcia v. Locsin, i.e. "as the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place
the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold
that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law," becomes even more pronounced in the present case, in which Formento is a deaf-mute, and there was no
interpreter to explain to him what was happening. His seeming acquiescence to the search without a warrant may be attributed to
plain and simple confusion and ignorance. The bloodstained pair of shorts was a piece of evidence seized on the occasion of an
unlawful search and seizure. Thus, it is tainted and should thus be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. Lastly, as to evidence vis-a-is
the case in its totality, circumstantial evidence that merely arouses suspicions or gives room for conjecture is not sufficient to convict.
It must do more than just raise the possibility, or even the probability, of guilt. It must engender moral certainty. Otherwise, the
constitutional presumption of innocence prevails, and the accused deserves acquittal.

ESTINO vs PEOPLE

FACTS:

For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14, 2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the
consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 26192 and 26193 entitled People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera.

In G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their conviction of violation of Section 3(e),
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11, petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his
conviction of malversation of public funds under Article 217 Of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the provincial government employees amounting to PhP 4,820,365.30.

In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for their acquittal.

ISSUE:

Whether a new trial is proper in the determination the guilt of the petitioners in non-payment of RATA in violation of Sec 3(e) of RA
3019.

RULING:

YES. Petitioners defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they submitted documents which allegedly show
that they paid the RATA under the 1998 reenacted budget. They also claim that the COA Report did not sufficiently prove that they
did not pay the RATA because the alleged disbursement vouchers, which were supposed to be annexed to the COA Report as proof of
nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with said report. Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a
judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the
judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were
mistaken in their belief that its production during

Rule 121 of the Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes final when new and material
evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and
which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by petitioners are strictly
not newly discovered, it appears to us that petitioners were mistaken in their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary.

ROMMEL C. BRIONES, petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

FACTS:
A criminal information was filed against Briones for crime of robbery. Briones allegedly took the service firearm of S/G Gual while the
latter approached the group where the former is involved in a mauling. S/G Gual positively identified Briones. RTC found Briones guilty
of the crime of simple theft (Art. 309 Par. 3 of RPC) after giving weight to prosecutions positive testimony as against the defenses of
denial and alibi. On his appeal, he raised the issue of self-defense. The Court of Appeals found Briones guilty of robbery under Article
293 in relation to par.5 of Art. 294 of RPC, and not of theft.

ISSUES:

Criminal Law

(1) Whether or not the robbery is the proper felony.

Remedial Law

(1) Whether or not a new trial may be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence.

RULINGS:

Criminal Law

(1) No. Briones is found guilty of theft. The SC agrees with the RTC that only the crime of theft was committed in the case as S/G Guals
testimony does not show that violence or intimidation attended the taking of the firearm; S/G Gual only testified that Briones merely
grabbed the firearm and ran away with it. Thus, the Court can only convict Briones for the crime of theft for taking S/G Molinas
firearm without his consent. Theft is produced the moment there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking with intent to
gain. However, since there was no evidence presented as to the value of stolen firearm, he can only be sentenced to the lightest
penalty prescribed by law applicable to the facts of the case. The lightest penalty that applies to theft, where the value of the thing
stolen does not exceed five pesos, is found in paragraph 6 of Article 309.

Remedial Law

(1) No. The for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the concurrence of the following conditions
must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or
impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and produce a different result if admitted. In this case,
although the firearm surfaced after the trial, the other conditions were not established.

SALUDAGA AND GENIO VS SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Saludaga and Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of Barangay Day Care Centers without conducting a
competitive public bidding as required by law, which caused damage and prejudice to the government. An information was filed for
violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the
actual damage, hence a new information was filed, now for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private
person. The accused moved for a new preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or
substantial amendment of the first information.

Issue:

Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would warrant an new preliminary
investigation.

uling:

No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the
following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

That there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by causing undue injury or by giving private person
unwarranted benefit. That accused may be charged under either mode or under both. Hence a new preliminary investigation is
unnecessary.

LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;

FACTS:

These cases were consolidated. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals convicting Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna
and De Jesus of the crime of murder for the death of Col. Rolando Abadilla. Lumanog and Santos separately filed their motions for
reconsideration seeking the reversal of their conviction. They assailed the weight and credence accorded to the identification of the
accused by the lone eyewitness presented by the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo.

Fortuna submitted an Affidavit executed by a certain Orencio Jurado, Jr. who claimed to be one of the police officers initially assigned
to investigate the case. Fortuna contended that said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by
the police authorities in the apprehension of the likely perpetrators.

ISSUE:

Whether or not introduction of additional evidence after the trial is valid to justify new trial

HELD:

No. Introduction of additional evidence after the trial is not valid to justify new trial.

Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense argument that there was no positive
identification of Abadillas killers. To justify a new trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it
must be shown that the evidence was newly discovered pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
as amended. Evidence, to be considered newly discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered before the trial in the court below.

Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies from police officers like Jurado, or other
persons involved in the investigation, who questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly
executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the
judgment. In any case, we have ruled that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the accused,
the same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.

PAYUMO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

654 SCRA 277, July 25, 2011

Facts: The petitions stem from the facts of Criminal Case No. 4219 involving a shooting incident that occurred on February 26, 1980 at
around 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara, Iba, Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary
(PC) and Integrated National Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing one and wounding several others.
The accused were indicted for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder before the Sandiganbayan.

After four (4) years of trial, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision[4] dated October 5, 1984, penned by
Justice Romeo M. Escareal, convicting the accused as co-principals in the crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted
Murder. On January' 11, 1985, the accused filed their Motion for New Trial, which was denied. The accused elevated the case to the
Supreme Court, which set aside the October 5, 1984 Decision of the Sandiganbayan and remanding the case for a new trial. Thus,
Criminal Case No. 4219 was remanded to the Sandiganbayan and was raffled to the First Division. Accordingly, the First Division
received anew all the evidence of the parties, both testimonial and documentary.

Later, with the creation of the Fourth and Fifth divisions, Criminal Case No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth Division. On February 23,
1999, the Fifth Division promulgated judgment, penned by Justice Godofredo T. Legaspi, convicting the accused of the crime of Murder
with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial. Since the Fifth
Division could not reach unanimity in resolving the aforesaid omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division was constituted pursuant to
Section 1 (b) of Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan. On September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-2,
issued the subject Resolution promulgated on October 24, 2001, setting aside the November 27, 1998 Decision and granting a second
new trial of the case. The Special Fifth Division pronounced among others that a second new trial would enable it to allow the accused
to adduce pertinent evidence including the records of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
shed light on the "serious allegations"

Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new trial of Criminal Case No. 4219.

Held: On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in Criminal Case No. 4219, the Court finds
the same to be devoid of any legal and factual basis.

Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that: new and material evidence has been discovered which
the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial.

The records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the criteria for newly discovered evidence that would
merit a new trial. A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering party exercised
reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however,
such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been presented during the trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There was nothing that prevented
the accused from using these records during the trial to substantiate their position that the shooting incident was a result of a military
operation.

The Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it nullified the
November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219. There is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent
court, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by law. Accordingly, the assailed
Resolution dated October 24, 2001 must be set aside.

IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA (detained at the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City) REYNALDO DE
VILLA, petitioner, JUNE DE VILLA, petitioner-relator, vs. THE DIRECTOR, NEW BILIBID PRISONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 158802. November 17, 2004

Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

CRIME INVOLVED: Qualified Rape

FACTS: At about 10 in the morning, 12-year old Aileen Mendoza woke up to find De Villa on top of her. She was unable to call for help
because De Villa covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. He then proceeded to rape her and eventually Aileen
became pregnant. Her mother noticed the pregnancy and confronted her about it, and Aileen eventually admitted that she was raped
by De Villa. A criminal complaint was then filed against the petitioner by Aileens parents. Aileen was examined by Dr. Cosidon, who
confirmed her pregnancy (she was already 8 months pregnant at that time), and found healed lacerations in her hymen. During the
trial, De Villa pleaded not guilty because at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old, and was incapable of an erection.
He also interposed an alibi that he was not in the scene of the crime at the time of the rape. De Villa was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt by the trial court for the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, as well as the payment of civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for Leahlyn Corales
Mendoza the putative child born of the rape. Three years after the decision, June (the son of Reynaldo) alleged that during the trial
of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine whether Reynaldo was Leahlyns father. They sought
for DNA testing to resolve the issue of paternity, but the same was denied. At the petitioners insistence, they gathered samples from
Leahlyn, from the grandchildren of Reynaldo, and from Reynaldo himself and was submitted to the DNA Laboratory. The DNA
Laboratory rendered a preliminary report showing that there was no match between the DNA samples.

ISSUE: Was the DNA result a valid basis for habeas corpus, new trial, and acquittal?

RULING: NO TO ALL COUNTS. (1) As to Habeas Corpus: The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that the
individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of
Appeals, the court ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. This Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus
is not a writ of error, and should not be thus used.

As to new trial: A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are met:
(a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even
with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware"
of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of
DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however,
this negligence is binding upon petitioner.

As to acquittal: Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not
convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen
Mendozas testimony and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that the pregnancy of
the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to conclusively prove to this Court
that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of
the child Leahlyn, this is not the case. The courts conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim,
which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.