CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No.

70615 October 28, 1986

FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent dismissed the
petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal dismissal case with claim for
reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the judgment
based on the contention that the action by the petitioner has already prescribed, since Art. 291 &
292 of the Labor Code is expressed that offenses penalized under the Code and all money claims
arising from employer-employee relationships shall be filed within 3 years from when such cause
of action arises, otherwise it will be barred.

ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?

HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's employment, profession,
trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong.
The right is considered to be property within the protection of the Constitutional guarantee of due
process of law.

Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however,
does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad
sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law,
but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment
of a crime. The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the
impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be
noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the prohibited activities during strikes
or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal
recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be
unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an
unlawful practice.
PINES CITY EDUCATIONAL CENTER VS NLRC, GR. NO. 96779, NOVEMBER 10, 1993
Nature: PETITION for certiorari to reverse a resolution of the NLRC.
Facts: Private respondents were all employed as teachers on probationary basis by petitioner Pines
City Educational Center, represented in this proceedings by its President, Eugenio Baltao. With
the exception of Jane Bentrez who was hired as a grade school teacher, the remaining private
respondents were hired as college instructors. All the private respondents, except Picart and Chan,
signed contracts of employment with petitioner for a fixed duration. On March 31, 1989, due to
the expiration of private respondents' contracts and their poor performance as teachers, they were
notified of petitioners' decision not to renew their contracts anymore.
Issue: that there is prima facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor arbiter
by wantonly, capriciously and maliciously disregarding provisions of the law and jurisprudence
laid down in decisions of the honorable supreme court.
Ruling:
In the present case, however, We have to make a distinction.
Insofar as the private respondents who knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods
of employment are concerned, their services were lawfully terminated by reason of the
expiration of the periods of their respective contracts. These are Dangwa Bentrez, Apollo
Ribaya, Sr., Ruperta Ribaya, Virginia Boado, Cecilia Emocling, Jose Bentrez, Leila
Dominguez and Rose Ann Bermudez. Thus, public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter ordering the reinstatement and
payment of full backwages and other benefits and privileges.
With respect to private respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan, both of whom did not sign
any contract fixing the periods of their employment nor to have knowingly and voluntarily
agreed upon fixed periods of employment, petitioners had the burden of proving that the
termination of their services was legal. As probationary employees, they are likewise protected
by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution. Consequently, they cannot be removed
from their positions unless for cause.
We concur with these factual findings, there being no showing that they were resolved
arbitrarily. Thus, the order for their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other
benefits and privileges from the time they were dismissed up to their actual reinstatement is
proper, conformably with Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989. It should be noted that private
respondents Roland Picart and Lucia Chan were dismissed illegally on March 31, 1989, or
after the effectivity of said amendatory law.
However, in ascertaining the total amount of backwages payable to them, we go back to the rule
prior to the mercury drug rule that the total amount derived from employment elsewhere by the
employee from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, if any, should be deducted
therefrom. We restate the underlying reason that employees should not be permitted to enrich
themselves at the expense of their employer. In addition, the law abhors double compensation. 19
to this extent, our ruling in Alex Ferrer, et al., v. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 100898, promulgated on
July 5, 1993, is hereby modified.
BUENVIAJE VS COURT OF APPEALS [GR NO. 147806, November 12, 2002]
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Facts: Petitioners were former employees of Cottonway Marketing Corp. (Cottonway), hired as
promo girls for their garment products. In October, 1994, after their services were terminated as
the company was allegedly suffering business losses, petitioners filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, and non-
payment of premium pay for rest day, service incentive leave pay and thirteenth month pay against
Cottonway Marketing Corp. and Network Fashion Inc./JCT International Trading.
LABOR ARBITER: Labor Arbiter issued a Decision finding petitioners' retrenchment valid and
ordering Cottonway to pay petitioners' separation pay and their proportionate thirteenth month
pay.
On appeal to NLRC: It reversed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter and ordered the reinstatement
of petitioners without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. It also ordered Cottonway to
pay petitioners their proportionate thirteenth month pay and their full backwages inclusive of
allowances and other benefits, or their monetary equivalent computed from the time their salaries
were withheld from them up to the date of their actual reinstatement.
Cottonway filed MR: Denied.
Court of Appeals: Cottonway filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking the
reversal of the ruling of the NLRC and the reinstatement of the Order issued by Labor Arbiter.
The appellate court granted the petition
Itruled that petitioners' reinstatement was no longer possible as they deliberately refused to
return to work despite the notice given by Cottonway.
The Court of Appeals thus held that the amount of backwages due them should be
computed only up to the time they received their notice of termination.

Court of appeals DENIED Petitioners MR.

Issue: CENTRAL ISSUE: Whether it should be limited from the time they were illegally
dismissed until they received the notice of termination sent by Cottonway on August 1, 1996 as
argued by respondent company, or whether it should be computed from the time of their illegal
dismissal until their actual reinstatement as argued by the petitioners.
RULING: We agree with the petitioners.
Under R.A. 6715, employees who are illegally dismissed are entitled to full backwages,
inclusive of allowances and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the
time their actual compensation was withheld from them up to the time of their actual
reinstatement. If reinstatement is no longer possible, the backwages shall be computed from
the time of their illegal termination up to the finality of the decision.
Full back wages means without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by
the concerned employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. Thus, a closer adherence to
 the legislative policy behind RA 6715 points to full backwages as meaning exactly that, i.e.
without deducting from backwages the earnings derived elsewhere by the concerned
employee during the period of his illegal dismissal. In other words, the provision calling for
"full backwages" to illegally dismissed employees is clear, plain and free from ambiguity
and, therefore, must be applied without attempted or strained interpretation. Index animi
sermo est."
Petitioners' alleged failure to return to work cannot be made the basis for their termination. Such
failure does not amount to abandonment which would justify the severance of their employment.
To warrant a valid dismissal on the ground of abandonment, the employer must prove the
concurrence of two elements: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or
justifiable reason, and (2) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
BUSTAMANTE ET AL VS. NLRC DIGEST

G.R. No. 111651 March 15, 1996

OSMALIK S. BUSTAMANTE, PAULINO A. BANTAYAN, FERNANDO L.

BUSTAMANTE, MARIO D. SUMONOD, and SABU J. LAMARAN v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FIFTH DIVISION and EVERGREEN FARMS,
INC.

PADILLA, J.:

FACTS: Respondent company is engaged in the business of producing high grade bananas in its
plantation in Davao del Norte. Petitioners Paulino Bantayan, Fernando Bustamante, Mario
Sumonod and Osmalik Bustamante were employed as laborers and harvesters while petitioner
Sabu Lamaran was employed as a laborer and sprayer in respondent companys plantation. All the
petitioners signed contracts of employment for a period of six (6) months from 2 January 1990 to
2 July 1990, but they had started working sometime in September 1989. Previously, they were
hired to do the same work for periods lasting a month or more, from 1985 to 1989. Before the
contracts of employment expired on 2 July 1990, petitioners employments were terminated on 25
June 1990 on the ground of poor performance on account of age, as not one of them was allegedly
below forty (40) years old.

Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent exercises its power to terminate in good faith so as to
make the award of back wages improper in this case.

RULING: We do not sustain public respondents theory that private respondent should not be
made to compensate petitioners for back wages because its termination of their employment was
not made in bad faith. The act of hiring and re-hiring the petitioners over a period of time without
considering them as regular employees evidences bad faith on the part of private respondent. The
public respondent made a finding to this effect when it stated that the subsequent rehiring of
petitioners on a probationary status clearly appears to be a convenient subterfuge on the part of
management to prevent complainants (petitioners) from becoming regular employees.

In the case at bar, there is no valid cause for dismissal. The employees (petitioners) have not
performed any act to warrant termination of their employment. Consequently, petitioners
are entitled to their full back wages and other benefits from the time their compensation was
withheld from them up to the time of their actual reinstatement.
Sunio vs. NLRC [GR no. L-57767, January 31, 1984]
Nature: Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to review
the resolution of the NLRC.
Facts:
On July 30, 1973, EM Ramos & Company, Inc. (EMRACO) and Cabugao Ice Plant, Inc.
(CIPI), sold an ice plant to Rizal Development and Finance Corporation (RDFC). With a
mortgage in favor of EMRACO-CIPi to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase
price. By virtue of that sale, EMRACO-CIPI terminated the services of all their employees and
paid them their separation pay. RDFC hired its own employees and operated the plant.
Months thereafter, RDFC sold the ice plant to petitioner, ILOCOS COMMERCIAL CORP.
(ICC), headed by its president and General manager, Petitioner Alberto Sunio. Petitioner also
hired their own employees as private respondent were no longer in the plant. The sale was
subject to the mortgage in favor of EMRACO-CIPI.
Both RDFC-ICC failed to pay the balance of the purchase price. Subsequently, EMRACO-
CIPI instituted extra judicial foreclosure proceedings.
The properties were sold at public auction and the highest bidder being EMRACO-CIPI. Then
EMRACO-CIPI sold the ice plant to NILO VILLANUEVA, subject to right of redemption of
RDFC. NILO rehired then private respondents.
RDFC redeemed the ice plant and EMRACO-CIPI unable to turn over possession to RDFC
which made the latter to file a recovery of possession against EMRACO-CIPI with the CFI.
CFI ordered placing RDFC in possession of the ice plant. EMRACO-CIPI appealed to CA
which denied the petition for lack of merit.
RDFC and Petitioners finally obtained possession of the ice plant. Which also ordered
defendants or any person found in the premises to vacate and surrender the property in
litigation. Petitioner did not re-employ private respondent.

PRIVATE RESPONDENTs filed complaints against petitioners for illegal dismissal with the
Regional Office, Ministry of Labor and Employment.
REGIONAL DIRECTORS DECISION: ICC and alberto sunio are directed to reinstate the
complainants to their former positions without loss of seniority privilege and to pay their
backwages .
Sunio appealed to NLRC.
NLRCs Decision: affirmed the Regional Directors decision and dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit. Reason: when the RDFC took possession of the property and private respondents were
terminated in 1973 the latter already had a vested right to their security of tenure and when they
were rehired those rights continued.
Hence this petition before SC.
Issue: whether public respondent act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the reinstatement of private respondents and the payment of their
backwages?
RULING: YES.
While a change of ownership or management is not a valid cause for termination of
employment this rule does not apply where petitioner company took over ownership of a
business after the respondents had already accepted their separation pay from erstwhile owner
of business without protest.
It cannot be justifiably said that the plant together with its staff and personnel from one
ownership to another. No succession of employment rights and obligations can be said to have
taken place between EMRACO-CIPI-VILLANUEVA, on one hand, and petitioners on the
other.
Petitioners eventually acquired possession by virtue of the exercise of their right of redemption
and of a mandatory injunction in their favor which ordered Villanueva and any person found
in the premises to vacate. What is more, when EMRACO-CIPI sold ice plant to RDFC in 1973,
private respondents employment was terminated by Emraco-Cipi and they were given their
separation pay.
During the 13 months, RDFC and petitioners were in possession and operating the plant and
hired their own employees, not the private respondents.
Further, Villanueva rehired private respondents which are subject to a resolutory condition.
The condition having arisen, the rights of private respondents who claim under him must be
deemed to have also ceased.

Private respondents can neither successfully invoke security of tenure in their favor. Their
tenure should not be reckoned from 1967 because they were already terminated in 1973.
Private respondents were only rehired in 1974 by Villanueva.
Petitioners took over by judicial process in 1978 so that private respondents had actually only
four years of rehired employment with Villanueva, during which period, petitioners fought
hard against Villanueva to recover possession of the plant.

Insofar as petitioners are concerned, there was n tenurial security to speak of that would entitle
would entitle private respondents to reinstatement and backwages.
BRENT SCHOOL, INC. VS ZAMORA
NATURE: Petition to review the decision of the Office of the President.
Facts:
The root of the controversy at bar is an employment contract in virtue of which Doroteo R.
Alegre was engaged as athletic director by Brent School, Inc. at a yearly compensation of
P20,000.00. The contract fixed a specific term for its existence, five (5) years.
There is a subsequent agreement made which reiterated the same terms and conditions,
including the expiry date, as those contained in the original contract.
Some three months before the expiration of the stipulated period Alegre was given a copy
of the report filed by Brent School with the Department of Labor advising of the
termination of his services effective on July 16, 1976. The stated ground for the termination
was "completion of contract, expiration of the definite period of employment." And on
May 26, 1976, Alegre accepted the amount of P3,177.71, and signed a receipt therefor
containing the phrase, "in full payment of services for the period May 16, to July 17, 1976
as full payment of contract."
at the investigation conducted by a Labor Conciliator of said report of termination of his
services, Alegre protested the announced termination of his employment. He argued that
although his contract did stipulate that the same would terminate on July 17, 1976, since
his services were necessary and desirable in the usual business of his employer, and his
employment had lasted for five years, he had acquired the status of a regular employee and
could not be removed except for valid cause.
REGIONAL DIRECTOR considered Brent School's report as an application for clearance
to terminate employment (not a report of termination), and accepting the recommendation
of the Labor Conciliator, refused to give such clearance and instead required the
reinstatement of Alegre, as a "permanent employee," to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and with full back wages.
The Director pronounced "the ground relied upon by the respondent (Brent) in terminating
the services of the complainant (Alegre) . . . (as) not sanctioned by P.D. 442," and, quite
oddly, as prohibited by Circular No. 8, series of 1969, of the Bureau of Private Schools.
BRENT SCHOOL FILED MR: REGIONAL DIRECTOR = DENIED MR
Forwarded the case of SECRETARY OF LABOR for review which sustained the decision
of the Regional Director.
Brent appealed to the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT. That Office dismissed its appeal for
lack of merit and affirmed the Labor Secretary's decision, ruling that Alegre was a
permanent employee who could not be dismissed except for just cause, and expiration of
the employment contract was not one of the just causes provided in the Labor Code for
termination of services.
the employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971,
at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated.
Issue: whether or not the provisions of the Labor Code, as amended, have anathematized "fixed
period employment" or employment for a term?
Ruling:
Respondent Alegre's contract of employment with Brent School having lawfully
terminated with and by reason of the expiration of the agreed term of period thereof, he is
declared not entitled to reinstatement.
The employment contract between Brent School and Alegre was executed on July 18, 1971,
at a time when the Labor Code of the Philippines (P.D. 442) had not yet been promulgated.
At that time, the validity of term employment was impliedly recognized by the Termination
Pay Law, R.A. 1052, as amended by R.A. 1787. Prior, thereto, it was the Code of
Commerce (Article 302) which governed employment without a fixed period, and also
implicitly acknowledged the propriety of employment with a fixed period. The Civil Code
of the Philippines, which was approved on June 18, 1949 and became effective on August
30,1950, itself deals with obligations with a period. No prohibition against term-or fixed-
period employment is contained in any of its articles or is otherwise deducible therefrom.
It is plain then that when the employment contract was signed between Brent School and
Alegre, it was perfectly legitimate for them to include in it a stipulation fixing the duration
thereof Stipulations for a term were explicitly recognized as valid by this Court.
The status of legitimacy continued to be enjoyed by fixed-period employment contracts
under the Labor Code (PD 442), which went into effect on November 1, 1974. The Code
contained explicit references to fixed period employment, or employment with a fixed or
definite period. Nevertheless, obscuration of the principle of licitness of term employment
began to take place at about this time.
Article 320 originally stated that the "termination of employment of probationary
employees and those employed WITH A FIXED PERIOD shall be subject to such
regulations as the Secretary of Labor may prescribe." Article 321 prescribed the just causes
for which an employer could terminate "an employment without a definite period." And
Article 319 undertook to define "employment without a fixed period" in the following
manner: where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually
necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the
employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or
termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee
or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season.
Subsequently, the foregoing articles regarding employment with "a definite period" and
"regular" employment were amended by Presidential Decree No. 850, effective December
16, 1975.
Article 320, dealing with "Probationary and fixed period employment," was altered by
eliminating the reference to persons "employed with a fixed period," and was renumbered
(becoming Article 271).
 As it is evident that Article 280 of the Labor Code, under a narrow and literal interpretation,
not only fails to exhaust the gamut of employment contracts to which the lack of a fixed
period would be an anomaly, but would also appear to restrict, without reasonable
distinctions, the right of an employee to freely stipulate with his employer the duration of
his engagement, it logically follows that such a literal interpretation should be eschewed or
avoided. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its
application. Outlawing the whole concept of term employment and subverting to boot the
principle of freedom of contract to remedy the evil of employer's using it as a means to
prevent their employees from obtaining security of tenure is like cutting off the nose to
spite the face or, more relevantly, curing a headache by lopping off the head.
Such interpretation puts the seal on Bibiso upon the effect of the expiry of an agreed period
of employment as still good rulea rule reaffirmed in the recent case of Escudero vs.
Office of the President (G.R. No. 57822, April 26, 1989) where, in the fairly analogous
case of a teacher being served by her school a notice of termination following the expiration
of the last of three successive fixed-term employment contracts, the Court held:
Reyes (the teacher's) argument is not persuasive. It loses sight of the fact that her
employment was probationary, contractual in nature, and one with a definitive
period. At the expiration of the period stipulated in the contract, her appointment
was deemed terminated and the letter informing her of the non-renewal of her
contract is not a condition sine qua non before Reyes may be deemed to have
ceased in the employ of petitioner UST. The notice is a mere reminder that
Reyes' contract of employment was due to expire and that the contract would no
longer be renewed. It is not a letter of termination.

Paraphrasing Escudero, respondent Alegre's employment was terminated upon the expiration of
his last contract with Brent School on July 16, 1976 without the necessity of any notice. The
advance written advice given the Department of Labor with copy to said petitioner was a mere
reminder of the impending expiration of his contract, not a letter of termination, nor an application
for clearance to terminate which needed the approval of the Department of Labor to make the
termination of his services effective. In any case, such clearance should properly have been given,
not denied.
MERCADO, SR. VS NLRC [GR 79869, September 5, 1991]
NATURE: Petition for certiorari to review the decision the NLRC.
FACTS: This petition originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages,
non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, service incentive leave benefits, emergency cost of
living allowances and 13th month pay, filed by above-named petitioners against private
respondents.
ISSUE before LA: Whether or not petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers and
therefore entitled to the benefits which they pray for? Whether or not said petitioners were illegally
dismissed by private respondents?
LABOR ARBITERS DECISION:
Respondent Labor Arbiter Luciano P. Aquino ruled in favor of private respondents and
held that petitioners were not regular and permanent workers of the private respondents,
for the nature of the terms and conditions of their hiring reveal that they were required to
perform phases of agricultural work for a definite period of time after which their
services would be available to any other farm owner.
Respondent Labor Arbiter further held that only money claims from years 1976-1977,
1977-1978 and 1978-1979 may be properly considered since all the other money claims
have prescribed for having accrued beyond the three (3) year period prescribed by law.

Parties filed their appeal with the NLRC.

NLRCS DECISION:
The NLRC ruled in favor of private respondents affirming the decision of the respondent
Labor Arbiter, with the modification of the deletion of the award for financial assistance
to petitioners.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the Decision however, the NLRC denied
this motion.

ISSUE before SC: Whether respondent Labor Arbiter and respondent NLRC erred when
both ruled that petitioners are not regular and permanent employees of private
respondents based on the terms and conditions of their hiring, for said findings are
contrary to the provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code?
Contention: They submit that petitioners' employment, even assuming said employment were
seasonal, continued for so many years such that, by express provision of Article 280 of the Labor
Code as amended, petitioners have become regular and permanent employees.
Ruling: The petition is not impressed with merit.
The invariable rule set by the Court in reviewing administrative decisions of the Executive
Branch of the Government is that the findings of fact made therein are respected, so long
as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant;
22 that it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the
credibility of the witnesses or otherwise substitute its own judgment for that of the
administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence; 23 that the administrative
decision in matters within the executive's jurisdiction can only be set aside upon proof of
gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.
That the Court finds that the decision of Labor Arbiter in the case is well supported by
evidence. There is, therefore, no circumstance that would warrant a reversal of the
questioned decision of the Labor Arbiter as affirmed by the National Labor Relations
Commission.
The contention of petitioners that the second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code
should have been applied in their case presents an opportunity to clarify the afore-
mentioned provision of law.
The first paragraph of Article 280 of labor code, answers the question of who are
employees. It states that, regardless of any written or oral agreement to the contrary, an
employee is deemed regular where he is engaged in necessary or desirable activities in the
usual business or trade of the employer, except for project employees.
A project employee has been defined to be one whose employment has been fixed for a
specific project or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been
determined at the time of the engagement of the employee, or where the work or service
to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the
season 26 as in the present case.
The second paragraph of Art. 280 demarcates as "casual" employees, all other employees
who do not fan under the definition of the preceding paragraph. The proviso, in said second
paragraph, deems as regular employees those "casual" employees who have rendered at
least one year of service regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or
broken.
Petitioners, in effect, contend that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 is
applicable to their case and that the Labor Arbiter should have considered them regular by
virtue of said proviso.
The contention is without merit.
The general rule is that the office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase
immediately preceding it or restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows. Thus, it has been held that a proviso is to be construed with reference to the
immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to the statute
itself or to other sections thereof. The only exception to this rule is where the clear
 legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it (the
proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.
Policy Instruction No. 12 of the Department of Labor and Employment discloses that the
concept of regular and casual employees was designed to put an end to casual employment
in regular jobs, which has been abused by many employers to prevent called casuals from
enjoying the benefits of regular employees or to prevent casuals from joining unions. The
same instructions show that the proviso in the second paragraph of Art. 280 was not
designed to stifle small-scale businesses nor to oppress agricultural land owners to further
the interests of laborers, whether agricultural or industrial. What it seeks to eliminate are
abuses of employers against their employees and not, as petitioners would have us believe,
to prevent small-scale businesses from engaging in legitimate methods to realize profit.
Hence, the proviso is applicable only to the employees who are deemed "casuals" but not
to the "project" employees nor the regular employees treated in paragraph one of Art. 280.

Clearly, therefore, petitioners being project employees, or, to use the correct term, seasonal
employees, their employment legally ends upon completion of the project or the season. The
termination of their employment cannot and should not constitute an illegal dismissal.