SOCIAL THOUGHT & COMMENTARY

Cultural Relativism:
Interpretations of a Concept
Thomas H. Johnson
University of Wisconsin, Stevens Point

A n undergraduate anthropology student came to me with an assigned

reading in a philosophy course at the University of Wisconsin, Stevens
Point. The student was confused. What he was learning in his philosophy
class challenged what he had learned about cultural relativism as a core con-
cept in anthropology and he was surprised to find it examined negatively by
a philosopher. The article in his Ethics textbook was The Challenge of
Cultural Relativism by philosopher James Rachels (Rachels 1993). As we dis-
cussed the position James Rachels took in the article assigned to the ethics
class, it became clear that Rachels understanding of cultural relativism dif-
fered from that of most anthropologists: that cultural relativism is the atti-
tude of objectivity (left undefined) toward another culture, the opposite of
ethnocentrism. Rachels rejects cultural relativism because, in his view, cul-
tural relativism is identical to ethical relativism, and this equation leads to
an inability to criticize any societys beliefs and practices, including our own.
The student had learned, however, that the anthropologist is a participant
and an observer at the same time, and that our task is to faithfully portray
a culture. Cultural relativism is part of our training as social scientists as well
as humanistswe participate and learn to understand and appreciate

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another culture, inevitably returning to our own culture to write and teach
about what we have learned.
Thats part of what I told my student as we discussed Rachels essay.
However, several things soon became clear. Rachels essay was chosen to
represent the ethical issue of cultural relativism in an introductory text-
book on ethics. His essay does not pretend to be an exhaustive treatment
of the subject, nor does he indicate anything but a nodding acquaintance
with what anthropologists have said about the subject. Rachels is only one
voice among many philosophers. It would have been helpful if another
philosopher had presented an anthropologists view of cultural rela-
tivism, but fairness was not the textbooks objective.
What, exactly, was wrong with what James Rachels said about cultural
relativism? From an anthropologists point of view, the most serious flaw
in Rachels notion that cultural relativism presents a challenge to phi-
losophy is that he simply hasnt done his homework, and knows little
about anthropology or its central purposeto understand and learn
about the variety of human cultures, past and present. Rachels says noth-
ing about the objectives of anthropology in his essay. His main criticism
of cultural relativism is simple: relativism contains no idea of universal
morality, only various cultural codes and nothing more (Rachels
1993:15). As a result, for Rachels, cultural relativism leads to moral rela-
tivism. Finally, having cited several well known examples of customs our
society would never condone, such as sharing of wives among some
Eskimo, Rachels has one generous thing to say about cultural relativism:
even though the concept is flawed, it promotes tolerance of other cultures
(Rachels 1993). Questions about why certain customs continue to be prac-
ticed and transmitted to each generation, or even whether those customs
fit into the fabric of the society are never discussed. Rachels is not a social
scientist. For Rachels, however, differences in the morality or value of
customsthe relativity of moral valuesbecome the central problem of
cultural relativism (Rachels 1993:15).
An anthropologist would have asked different kinds of questions: what
function those customs might have served, or how they fit into the struc-
ture of the society. Finally, from the anthropologists point of view,
Rachels fails to understand that ethnocentrism governs his understanding
of morality. It is the philosophers from our culturepeople like
Rachelsnot the philosophers of other cultureswho assume the right
to pass judgment on other cultures, and decide that some universal stan-

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dard of morality, yet to be determined, is the real goal. Thus, cultural and
moral relativism stand in the way of discovering those universals.
But it is not just the misunderstanding of the objectives and the igno-
rance of the methods of anthropology that concern me about Rachels
essay. Underlying his ideas is the suspicion that cultural and moral rela-
tivism are a threat, and that there is the danger of cultural relativism
becoming so widespread that it destroys any sense of moral behavior
anything, goes, depending on the culture. Even though Rachels feels con-
fortable with the contribution that cultural relativism allegedly makes to
tolerance, for many, too much tolerance of certain practices in other
cultures is not desirable. Amid this quandary, perhaps it is time that
anthropologists explained themselves.
Let me first give an example of how a popular journal read by many
educators can give a negative slant to cultural relativism. Not long after
my encounter with the student, I happened to read a recent issue of the
national journal, Liberal Education. An Iranian, Azar Nafisi, a visiting pro-
fessor and director of the Dialogue Project at the Foreign Policy Institute
of Johns Hopkins Universitys School of Advanced International Studies
and the author of the much-acclaimed Reading Lolita in Tehran: A Memoir
in Books, had an article, Liberal Education and the Republic of the
Imagination (Nafisi 2006:6-13). As Nafisi relates, no amount of political
correctness can make us empathize with a woman who is taken to a foot-
ball stadium in Kabul, has a gun put to her head, and is executed because
she does not look the way the state wants her to look (Nafisi 2006:6). No
amount of cultural relativism can make us tolerate that kind of treat-
ment, she says (Nafisi 2006:8). Cultural relativism, Nafisi says, is sup-
posed to be a progressive idea and to make us celebrate and learn from
cultures that are different from our own(and) make us more tolerant (my
emphasis) of those with whom we disagree (2006:6). However, it
became politicized because we did not treat it as a focus for gaining
knowledge (2006:6). Instead, Nafisi writes, cultural relativism has come
to mean nothing more than the idea of tolerance, which simply discour-
ages active criticism of practices that would offend almost anyone, like
the murder of the woman in the stadium (2006:6).
Nafisis frustration with cultural relativism leapt off the page. As a
western-educated Iranian, she recognized the value of not passing judg-
ment on another culture, but she could not suppress passing judgment on
practices condoned by some of her fellow Iranians. Her frustration is sim-

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ilar to the horror many might feel in our culture if they heard about mob
violence that resulted in a lynching in their own city or town. Her
response is the same as ours would be if we were to assume that because
of cultural relativism enlightened people must tolerate any kind of
crime against humanity, and cannot or should not speak out against injus-
tice. Obviously, Nafisi does not agree with that interpretation of cultural
relativism, and she makes a good point.
But Nafisis comments do raise an important question. Does cultural
relativism prevent an educated person from taking a stand on a variety
of moral issues, or is the unwillingness to take a stand a more complex
issue? Does cultural relativism equate with moral relativism?
Unfortunately, for some philosophers, it does. But it should not.
Lets take a closer look at anthropologys understanding of cultural rel-
ativism. Franz Boas provides an example of cultural relativism as first and
foremost a method of investigation. Trained in natural science, his com-
mitment to objective research is clear from the earliest part of his career,
his work among the Eskimo of Baffin Island in 1883. Of the Eskimo, Boas
says, We have no right to blame them for their forms and superstitions
which may seem ridiculous to us. We highly educated people are much
worse, relatively speaking (italics mine). The fear of traditions and old cus-
toms is deeply implanted in mankind, and in the same way as it regulates
life here, it halts all progress for us (quoted in Stocking:1983:33). In
Boass own notes we see his ability to reflect on his (our) culture without
passing judgment on the Eskimo. Boas would continue his commitment to
accurate, unbiased reporting of the cultures he studied for the rest of his
life, and encouraged his students to do the same, influencing several gen-
erations of anthropologists. Yet, Boas and many of his students were also
passionate advocates of social justice. Boas lifelong personal commit-
ment to those ideas that went against the racism and imperialism of
Western culture is well known, and set a new level of ethical and moral
standards for the profession (Lewis 2001). For Boas, it was possible to be
a cultural relativist without becoming an ethical or moral relativist. If this
seems contradictory, it shouldnt, for Boas had the ability to cultivate an
attitude of objectivity toward his research. Yet, he could also apply the
knowledge he gained to practical, everyday affairs in his own culture.
Is it, then, possible to practice cultural relativism as a field-worker and
anthropologist, and also at the same time maintain a commitment to larg-
er issues of morality? Certainly. Cultural relativism does not equate with

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moral relativism in the negative sense that James Rachels assumes. While
it might seem as though there is a contradiction between cultivating
objectivity toward one culture but acting subjectively toward ones own,
that assumption does not take into account the knowledge the observer
gains from studying another culture and how that knowledge inevitably
affects the observers evaluation of his own culture. Commitment to social
issues may also be affected by the anthropologists enculturation, but
those positions are surely also affected by the knowledge s/he gains of the
studying another culture. Perhaps this knowledge produces a more tol-
erant view of other cultures. It may also be true that this knowledge is
in itself more important than the attitude of tolerance that may follow
from it, as indicated by Azar Nafisi, above. As Nafisi indicates, simple tol-
erance may neutralize action, while better knowledge of the culture
could galvanize action. I will argue in this essay that the attitude of objec-
tivity (cultural relativism) toward other cultures leads not to something as
bland or neutral as moral relativism, but instead to a much stronger
notion of moral values, values that can and should be acted upon by the
anthropologist. This happens because of the insights gained from field
studies, which build upon the values that the anthropologist has learned
from his own enculturation.
One of Boas outstanding students, Melville Herskovitz, was a staunch
defender of cultural relativism as a scientific method and as a practical
means of obtaining a wider understanding of the variation in human cul-
tures (Fernandez 1990:141). He saw cultural relativism as a posture one
should adopt regarding the facts of the world and our relation to those
facts (Fernandez 1990:142). Herskovits took issue with a philosopher at
Northwestern University, Eliseo Vivas, who, like James Rachels, insisted on
equating cultural relativism with moral relativism (Fernandez 1990:145).
Like Boas, Herskovitz resisted any philosophical universalizing of the
idea of relativism in order to countenance injustices at home or abroad
(Fernandez 1990:142). Like Boas and other anthropologists, Herskovitz
took issue with the ethnocentrism of his own society, believing that the
expansionist thrust of Western societies created an attitude of cultural,
economic and political superiority toward other cultures that discounted
a shared humanity. Fascism was only one example of that attitude of cul-
tural (and racial) superiority, but the colonial expansion of the West into
every continent contained elements of it. By contrast, anthropologists
often took the side of the dispossessed, and in their studies consciously

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pushed aside the ethnocentrism of their own culture. Philosophers like

Vivas and Rachels who proclaimed that cultural relativism equated with
moral relativism and believed that relativism stood in the way of arriving
at universal ethical standards were basing their standard on their own cul-
tural values. What they saw as relative could be seen as positive in
another culture, or as a cultural adaptation by an anthropologist. For
anthropologists like Herskovits, cultural relativism is a practical means or
method of discovery, not an ethical disaster. It also could acknowledge
that other cultures might not agree with cultural or moral standards
imposed by the West or any other colonizing society, and that they had a
right to be what they were. Put in this way, philosophy and anthropology
seem to have diametrically opposite goals and objectives with regard to
how they assess the value of cultural relativism. For anthropologists, phi-
losophys understanding of ethics is ethnocentric. For philosophers,
anthropology is too relativistic. But what the philosophers do not under-
stand, and what anthropologists have been unable to articulate, is that
objective study of another culture leads not to moral relativism, but to
an even stronger realization of moral and social problems and issues,
inciting many anthropologists to take actions that would never have
occurred to them (or to philosophers) if they had not studied another cul-
ture. This point is, unfortunately, missed by Elvin Hatch in his book
Culture and Morality (1983:144). Hatch takes cultural relativism and its
offspring, moral relativism, to the same level as does James Rachels: both
say they have contributed to increasing our level of tolerance of other cul-
tures. But tolerance clearly has its limitations, and is subject to criticism,
as we shall see. I maintain that cultural relativism creates a heightened,
perhaps new and even different understanding of morality that could
eventually lead to a clearer understanding of ethical universals than
Western philosophy has been able to articulate.
The West has a long history of brutal wars that in the 20th century alone
were responsible for the deaths of millions of innocent people, it is not
surprising that anthropology would germinate as a counter-culture within
that huge and powerful entity known as the West. The West, we should
remember, is really a more recent manifestation of the Roman Empire. It
has taken courage to present non-Western societies as worthy of interest,
praise, and admiration. Anthropologists can take pride in the progress that
seems to be have been made, but it is too soon to congratulate ourselves,
as our recent adventures in the Middle East bear witness.

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As we have already seen, Rachels, Nafisi, and Hatch suggest that toler-
ance is, after all a good thing. But it does not logically flow from cultural
relativism. Despite James Rachels positive spin on the contribution of cul-
tural relativism to greater tolerance, Fernandez points out a flaw in this
kind of thinking, suggesting that philosophers have been quick to point
outthe contradiction implied in advocating tolerance as a world-rele-
vant moral position while at the same time advocating relativism of morals
to cultures (Fernandez 1990:145). Here Fernandez is referring to philoso-
pher Frank Hartung, who talks about the surreptitious morality of cul-
tural relativism (Fernandez 1990:145). Cultural relativism may contribute
to tolerance of other cultures, but it is not the same thing, nor is there
any guarantee that cultural relativism necessarily contributes to tolerance.
More importantly, there is no reason why cultural relativism ought to
contribute to either moral relativism or tolerance. Oughtness implies a
judgment, and while writings about another culture might inform, the
result of that information cannot be predicted, and could just as easily
lead to a condemnation of the practices of that culture as it would to an
appreciation of them.
Herskovits, one of the most passionate students of African cultures,
was certainly aware of how knowledge of another culture could promote
understanding, and even tolerance of that culture. Like Boas, he was a
very public advocate for anthropology, but at the same time distinguished
between three aspects of cultural relativism: the methodological, the
philosophical and the practical Fernandez 1990:146). Of course, bias
could enter any of the areas of research done by anthropologists. But it
seems that the main thrust of Herskovits defense of cultural relativism
had to do with the kind of reflexivity that the researcher needed in order
to avoid ethnocentric bias (Fernandez 1990:147). That is what made cul-
tural relativism, for anthropologists, a practical activity of search and dis-
covery. That brings us back to Boas early comments made while on his
first research expedition in 1883. The practical collection of information
leads to knowledge of a culture, which contributes to comparisons and
reflexivity in the mind of the anthropologist, which may lead to practical
applications of that knowledge in the form of actions and policies that
contribute to the welfare of people like the Eskimo, who will be faced
with many difficult choices as they confront the West.
This is not to say that even the most systematic field work is free from
bias. Bias begins with the selection of the human beings to be observed,

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and continues into the writing up of a book or monograph. No two

anthropologists who study the same tribe or village are likely to come up
with a similar set of findings. Yet, cultural relativism and the reflexivity it
involves remains the methodological ideal. As a physicist once put it, the
laws of physics, too, begin with the impossible ideal of a frictionless uni-
verse. There must be a starting point; there is no total objectivity in
ethnographic research, but to deny it leads only to greater subjectivity
and compounds the possibility of error.
In my research on cultural relativism and its several interpretations, I
discovered at least one philosopher who has taken cultural relativism far-
ther than James Rachels. There must be others, too. Kai Nielsen argues that
agreement in the universality of moral belief does not establish the sound-
ness of the belief (Nielsen 1966:538). Nielsen builds a defense of cultural
relativism that penetrates more deeply into whether or not cultural rela-
tivism implies an absence of ethical standards. For Nielsen, a lack of con-
sensus of what is rational ethical behavior becomes a matter for serious
debate. He explains that the soundness of a moral belief does not depend
simply on the number of people who believe it but on whether adequate
justifying reasons can be given for holding it (Nielsen 1966:539). This sim-
ple statement makes sense. Anthropologists may not always have had the
luxury of determining the attitudes, values or customs that have the
approval and support of everyone in a society. Obviously, they may not.
That does not mean that a more rational, or as we might say, a more suc-
cessful adaptation of the practice in the culture might not some day
emerge. Nielsen says the same thing with different words. He adds, if rea-
sonable people assent to it, we have some reason for assenting to it, but
whether a person is either a reasonable or a rational moral agent is not
dependent on whether or not his beliefs, attitudes and actions are in accor-
dance with majority rule of some consensus gentium (Nielsen 1966:538).
The relativist, Nielsen says, can still claim that the moral belief or attitude
does not rest on rational grounds but on a contingent and fortuitous sim-
ilarity or uniformity in what is approved(1966:539).
What is rational (or adaptive) may be hidden, disguised by social fac-
tors, power relations, and fear. Since the power wielded by authority, be
it political, religious or kin-based, may determine the outcome of what is
deemed ethical or approved, the weight of authority and power rela-
tions must be factored into any objective understanding of the culture.
How many people have been forced into behavioral patterns out of fear?

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In no way does this negate the concept of cultural relativism as a more

truly objective understanding of a cultural system. Human behavior may
be held in place by factors that could easily change as the social or cultur-
al environment holding them in place changes. A charismatic liberator, a
revolution, or even climatic change, could result in the emergence of
totally different standards and lead to very different practices. While
enculturation assures a strong degree of cultural continuity, innovations
take place regularly in many cultures. The causes of those changes are
also part of the task of an active social science. But pure knowledge has
not always been used to take a stand. We might add that knowledge can
only be applied rationally if conditions allow for its emergence, and if
fear does not lessen its impact.
The existential philosophers could not have agreed more. Taking no
action when the occasion demands action and when conscience knows
better is to live inauthentically, a theme repeated by Sartre at a time
when the irrationality of fascism threatened civilization (Sartre 1956). As
anthropologists, we have a responsibility to faithfully report and repro-
duce what people in the culture we study tell us. This is true even if we
personally disagree with them. But there are also occasions when what
we know and see must not only be faithfully told but also faithfully acted
on. At those times we penetrate beyond conventional cultural relativism
and our goal of evaluating ethical behavior merges with the best goals of
existential philosophy.
Alison Dundes Renteln, in a 1988 essay carries this discussion a step far-
ther. She holds that the theory of ethical relativism as descriptive hypoth-
esis is not a value theory but rather a theory about value judgments
(Renteln 1988:62). Cultural relativism is a general attitude of faithful
adherence to the canons of objectivity in studying another culture. How it
is practiced depends on the individual and that individuals enculturation
(my italics). This is close to the heart of the decisions researchers make
regarding field work, the presentation of data, and what is published. All
decisions and any interest in learning about another culture are based on
our own cultural background, our enculturation, our significant others,
our curiosity about the other. For most anthropologists, it was other peo-
ple, cultures and societies that excited interest. But it was our own people,
perhaps our own sub-culture that moved us in that direction. Field work
then moved us to learn more about another culture, heightening our own
sense of morality. If our enculturation had taught us to merely tolerate,

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describe, then walk away and write a book about the exotic other, that is
part of who we were and are and how we understand our work. If it led us
to taking politically risky and even dangerous stands, that, too, was part of
our enculturation and part of who we were or became. Beyond that, we
are individuals not totally determined by fate. A personal experience that
changed our lifeoften experiences we had during field-workmoved us
to act, or confronted us with difficult choices that would move us in a more
controversial or risk-taking direction.
Philosopher Kai Nielsen comes very close to stating the conflict between
the individual and society, a concern prominent among several of Boas
students in the 1930s and 1940s. Whole cultures, Nielsen tells us, could
be in radical disagreement about what they ought to do, and yet ethical
relativism would not be established. But if it were shown that a consider-
able number of contradictory moral claims were equally sound and that
whole moral codes were in logical conflict but were still equally well justi-
fied, then conventionalism or ethical relativism would be established
(Nielsen 1966:539). But, says Nielsen, the rather common assumption that
if men share moral beliefs then conventionalism and ethical relativism is
false is itself false (Nielsen 1966:539).
What does this mean? My interpretation is that Nielsen seems to be say-
ing that one lone radical in a society or culture can be morally or ethical-
ly right because his claims may be more rational (Nielsen 1966:540). While
human beings may not always act rationally, rational decisions and judg-
ments are possible. Given enough time and attention, rational choices
may emerge from the discourse. The breakdown of rational discourse is
war, genocide or ecocide.
The decisions that are most rational under the circumstances, given the
interplay of many factors, may uphold a custom or practice that seems
indefensible at first glance. Or they may not. Cultural relativism equates
with in-depth study of as many dimensions of a culture as can be discov-
ered by the researcherconflict, aggression, even stoning. It tries to
maintain objectivity because ethnocentrism negates the value of the
activity itself. But anthropologists also need to remember that factional-
ism and mob violence is part of our heritage as human animals. We are
often not very rational at all, and customs and practices remain in place
long after their usefulness is exhausted. We call it cultural lag.
Nielsens arguments dispose of Rachels contention that cultural rela-
tivism cannot be supported because it has no room for cultural universals.

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At its core, cultural relativism is the attitude of objectivity toward anoth-

er culture. It is an approach to understanding culture that took root in the
spirit of science and came into its own with the romanticism that followed
the Enlightenment. That objectivity must have room for rational discourse
and criticism. If objectivityor relativism, if you wishis abandoned,
ethnocentrism results. Any meaningful attempt to understand and inter-
pret another culture is abolished. It is unfortunate that cultural relativism
has been panned as morally relativistic, contributing if anything at all
only to a greater tolerance of other cultures. This misunderstanding
must be corrected, as I said above. Objective researchhowever we
define itis still the core of the anthropological enterprise, and it may
certainly lead to a much greater understanding of morality than the
moral relativism that philosophers and some anthropologists complain
about, and try to convince us is the main result of this research method.
Success in the anthropological enterprise really comes down to the indi-
vidual and the decisions s/he makes. The heart of that enterprise is field-
work, always an existential challenge involving psychological risk-taking,
hard decisions, and courageous action. It may involve admission of having
been wrong or having taken the wrong course of action. But with it, we
gain valuable understanding and insight into another culture. We are
reflexive, in a dialog with ourselves. As with all risk-taking endeavors,
field-work also involves moral and ethical choices about how to present
information, what to do with that information, and how it will affect oth-
ers. As we translate another culture, the accuracy and sensitivity of what
we do is a reflection of ourselves and how we choose to present ourselves
to others. Inevitably, I argue, it leads to a much stronger sense of moral-
ity and should contribute to a broader understanding of universal stan-
dards of human conduct. Ultimately, cultural relativism depends on the
training and actions of the anthropologist. What we do with cultural rela-
tivism as praxis depends on the kind of field-work we do, how we deal with
the many challenges posed by field work, and the quality of that work. All
this depends on our training, but also leads us inevitably to a new or
heightened sense of morality. Our characterization of another culture can
be shallow and incomplete or it can be rich, nuanced and so accurate that
people in the culture will tell us that it is the way we are. Because our
work has allowed us to make a contribution to knowledge and enabled us
to grow intellectually and morally, the net result could never be moral
relativism. My impression is that there is a dialectical process of growth

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that could never be characterized as flat or static. Anthropologists need to

take advantage of what we have learned and how it has enabled us to grow
as ethical beings. Thats the best result of cultural relativism.

REFERENCES
Fernandez, James W. 1990. Tolerance in a Repugnant World and Other Dilemmas in the
Cultural Relativism of Melville J. Herskovits. Ethos 18:2, June 1990, pp. 140-164.
Hatch, Elvin. 1983. Culture and Morality. New York: Columbia University Press.
Lewis, Herbert S. 2001. The Passion of Franz Boas. American Anthropologist, 103:2,
June 2001, pp. 447-467.
Nafisi, Azar. 2006. Liberal Education and the Republic of the Imagination. Liberal
Education 92:3, Summer pp.6-13.
Nielsen, Kai. 1966. Ethical Relativism and the Facts of Cultural Relativism. Social
Research 33, pp. 531-551.
Rachels, James. 1993. The Challenge of Cultural Relativism in James Rachels, The
Elements of Moral Philosophy, pp. 22-36. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Renteln, Alison Dundas. 1988. Relativism and the Search for Human Rights. American
Anthropologist 90:56-72.
Sartre, Jean Paul. 1956. Being and Nothingness. New York: Philosophical Library.
Stocking, G.W. 1983. Observers Observed: Essays on Anthropological Fieldwork. Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press.

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