respondents is an intra-corporate controversy over
RENATO REAL VS. SANGU PHILIPPINES, INC. (GR
NO. 168757, JANUARY 19, 2011)
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato Real was the Manager of respondent
corporation Sangu Philippines, Inc., a corporation
engaged in the business of providing manpower for
general services, like janitors, janitresses and other
maintenance personnel, to various clients.
In 2001, petitioner, together with 29 others who were
either janitors, janitresses, leadmen and maintenance
men, all employed by respondent corporation, filed
their respective Complaints for illegal dismissal against
the latter and respondent Kiichi Abe, the corporations
Vice-President and General Manager. These complaints
were later on consolidated.
With regard to petitioner, he was removed from his
position as Manager through Board Resolution 2001-03
adopted by respondent corporations Board of Directors.
Petitioner complained that he was neither notified of
the Board Meeting during which said board resolution
was passed nor formally charged with any infraction. He
just received from respondents a letter dated March 26,
2001 stating that he has been terminated from service
effective March 25, 2001 for the following reasons: (1)
continuous absences at his post at Ogino Philippines Inc.
for several months which was detrimental to the
corporations operation; (2) loss of trust and confidence;
and, (3) to cut down operational expenses to reduce
further losses being experienced by respondent
corporation.
Jurisdiction was not an issue before the Labor Arbiter.
Instead, the issue is whether or not the petitioner with
his co-complainants were illegally dismissed.
LAs RULING: The Labor Arbiter in a Decision dated June
5, 2003 declared petitioner and his co-complainants as
having been illegally dismissed and ordered
respondents to reinstate complainants to their former
positions without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to pay their full backwages from the time
of their dismissal until actually reinstated and
furthermore, to pay them attorneys fees. The Labor
Arbiter found no convincing proof of the causes for
which petitioner was terminated and noted that there
was complete absence of due process in the manner of
his termination.
Respondents thus appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) and raised therein as one
of the issues the lack of jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter
over petitioners complaint. Respondents claimed that
petitioner is both a stockholder and a corporate officer
of respondent corporation, hence, his action against
which the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction.
NLRCs RULING: The NLRC found such contention of
respondents to be meritorious. Aside from petitioners
own admission in the pleadings that he is a stockholder
and at the same time occupying a managerial position,
the NLRC also gave weight to the corporations General
Information Sheet (GIS) dated October 27, 1999 listing
petitioner as one of its stockholders, consequently his
termination had to be effected through a board
resolution. These, the NLRC opined, clearly established
petitioners status as a stockholder and as a corporate
officer and hence, his action against respondent
corporation is an intra-corporate controversy over
which the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction. As to the
other complainants, the NLRC ruled that there was no
dismissal.
Still joined by his co-complainants, petitioner brought
the case to the CA by way of petition for certiorari.
CAs RULING: The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC
in Toto.
Still undeterred, petitioner elevated the case to SC
through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner continues to insist that he is not a corporate
officer. He argues that a corporate officer is one who
holds an elective position as provided in the Articles of
Incorporation or one who is appointed to such other
positions by the Board of Directors as specifically
authorized by its By-Laws. And, since he was neither
elected nor is there any showing that he was appointed
by the Board of Directors to his position as Manager,
petitioner maintains that he is not a corporate officer
contrary to the findings of the NLRC and the CA.
For their part, respondents insist that petitioner who is
undisputedly a stockholder of respondent corporation is
likewise a corporate officer and that his action against
them is an intra-corporate dispute beyond the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is indeed a
corporate officer which renders the dispute an intra-
corporate, whereby the labor tribunals have no
jurisdiction.
RULING:
(Two-Tier Test in determining the existence of Intra-
corporate controversy)
In granting the petition and in ruling that the present
issue is not an intra-corporate controversy, the SC
explained the following. To determine whether a case
involves an intra-corporate controversy, and is to be
heard and decided by the branches of the RTC
specifically designated by the Court to try and decide
such cases, two elements must concur: (a) the status or
relationship of the parties, and (2) the nature of the
question that is the subject of their controversy.
The first element requires that the controversy must
arise out of intra-corporate or partnership relations
between any or all of the parties and the corporation,
partnership, or association of which they are not
stockholders, members or associates, between any or
all of them and the corporation, partnership or
association of which they are stockholders, members or
associates, respectively; and between such corporation,
partnership, or association and the State insofar as it
concerns the individual franchises.
The second element requires that the dispute among
the parties be intrinsically connected with the
regulation of the corporation. If the nature of the
controversy involves matters that are purely civil in
character, necessarily, the case does not involve an
intra-corporate controversy.
Under the first element, the SC found nothing to prove
that petitioners appointment was made pursuant to
the provision of respondent corporations By-Laws
which states that the Board may, from time to time,
appoint such other officers as it may determine to be
necessary or proper. Hence, he is not considered a
corporate officer within the meaning of the law.
Under the second element, the SC held that the issue
does not arise from an intra-corporate dispute but,
instead, from a termination of employment which is
undoubtedly a labor controversy. Hence, within the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.
MATLING INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL
CORPORATION VS COROS
(GR NO. 157802, OCTOBER 13, 2010)
FACTS:
After his dismissal by Matling as its Vice President for
Finance and Administration, the respondent Ricardo R.
Coros filed on August 10, 2000 a complaint for illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal against Matling and
some of its corporate officers (petitioners) in the NLRC,
Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City.
The petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint raising
the ground, among others, that the complaint pertained
to the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) due to the controversy being intra-
corporate inasmuch as the respondent was a member
of Matlings Board of Directors aside from being its Vice-
President for Finance and Administration prior to his
termination.
The respondent opposed the petitioners motion to
dismiss, insisting that his status as a member of
Matlings Board of Directors was doubtful, considering
that he had not been formally elected as such; that he
did not own a single share of stock in Matling,
considering that he had been made to sign in blank an
undated indorsement of the certificate of stock he had
been given in 1992; that Matling had taken back and
retained the certificate of stock in its custody; and that
even assuming that he had been a Director of Matling,
he had been removed as the Vice President for Finance
and Administration, not as a Director, a fact that the
notice of his termination dated April 10, 2000 showed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ricardo Coros is a corporate officer
which divests the labor tribunal of its jurisdiction being
the issue involve is an intra-corporate dispute.
LAs RULING: The LA ruled that the respondent was a
corporate officer because he was occupying the position
of Vice President for Finance and Administration and at
the same time was a Member of the Board of Directors
of Matling; and that, consequently, his removal was a
corporate act of Matling and the controversy resulting
from such removal was under the jurisdiction of the
SEC, pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (c) of Presidential
Decree No. 902.
NLRCs RULING: On March 13, 2001, the NLRC set aside
the dismissal, concluding that the respondents
complaint for illegal dismissal was properly cognizable
by the LA, not by the SEC, because he was not a
corporate officer by virtue of his position in Matling,
albeit high ranking and managerial, not being among
the positions listed in Matlings Constitution and By-
Laws.
CAs RULING: The CA ruled that the position to which
Coros was appointed and later on removed from, is not
a corporate office despite its nomenclature, but an
ordinary office in the corporation. For a position to be
considered as a corporate office, or, for that matter, for
one to be considered as a corporate officer, the position
must, if not listed in the by-laws, have been created by
the corporation's board of directors, and the occupant
thereof appointed or elected by the same board of
directors or stockholders. This is the implication of the
ruling in Tabang v. National Labor Relations
Commission.
The position of vice-president for administration and
finance, which Coros used to hold in the corporation,
was not created by the corporations board of directors
but only by its president or executive vice-president
pursuant to the by-laws of the corporation. Moreover,
Coros appointment to said position was not made
through any act of the board of directors or
stockholders of the corporation.
RULING:
The SC affirmed the decision of the CA. Notwithstanding
the provision in Matlings By-Laws, specifically no. 5
thereof, which grants its president the power to create
new offices and to appoint the officers thereto as he
may deem proper and necessary in the operations of
the corporation, the SC ruled that the Board of Directors
of Matling could not validly delegate the power to
create a corporate office to the President, in light of
Section 25 of the Corporation Coderequiring the Board
of Directors themselves to elect the corporate officers.
Verily, the power to elect the corporate officers was a
discretionary power that the law exclusively vested in
the Board of Directors, and could not be delegated to
subordinate officers or agents. The office of Vice
President for Finance and Administration created by
Matlings President pursuant to By Law No. V was an
ordinary, not a corporate, office.
PIONEER TEXTURIZING CORP. VS. NLRC G.R. No.
118651. October 16, 1997
FACTS:
De Jesus is petitioners reviser/trimmer who based her
assigned work on a paper note posted by petitioners.
The posted paper is identified by its P.O. Number. De
Jesus worked on P.O. No. 3853 by trimming the cloths
ribs and thereafter submitted tickets corresponding to
the work done to her supervisor. Three days later, de
Jesus received a memorandum requiring her to explain
why no disciplinary action should be taken against her
for dishonesty and tampering of official records and
documents with the intention of cheating as P.O. No.
3853 allegedly required no trimming. The memorandum
also placed her under preventive suspension for thirty
days. In her explanation, de Jesus maintained that she
merely committed a mistake in trimming P.O. No. 3853
and admitted that she may have been negligent, but not
for dishonesty or tampering. Nonetheless, she was
terminated from employment.
De Jesus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
petitioners. The Labor Arbiter held petitioners guilty of
illegal dismissal and were ordered to reinstate de Jesus
to her previous position without loss of seniority rights
and with full backwages from the time of her
suspension. On appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) declared that the status quo
between them should be maintained and affirmed the
Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement, but without
backwages. The NLRC further directed petitioner to pay
de Jesus her back salaries from the date she filed her
motion for execution up to the date of the
promulgation of the decision. Petitioners filed their
partial motion for reconsideration which the NLRC
denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an order for reinstatement needs a writ
of execution?
RULING:
No. The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award
for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even
pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the
employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.
To require the application for and issuance of a writ of
execution as prerequisites for the execution of a
reinstatement award would certainly betray and run
counter to the very object and intent of Article 223, i. e.,
the immediate execution of a reinstatement order. The
reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution
and its issuance could be delayed for numerous
reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a
scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the
part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay
the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the
strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article
223. On appeal, however, the appellate tribunal
concerned may enjoin or suspend the reinstatement
order in the exercise of its sound discretion.
Furthermore, the rule is that all doubts in the
interpretation and implementation of labor laws should
be resolved in favor of labor. In ruling that an order or
award for reinstatement does not require a writ of
execution the Court is simply adhering and giving
meaning to this rule. Henceforth, we rule that an award
or order for reinstatement is self-executory. After
receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the
employee's reinstatement, the employer has the right
to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll.
In either instance, the employer has to inform the
employee of his choice. The notification is based on
practical considerations for without notice, the
employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for
work or not.
GARCIA VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 164856 August 29, 2007
Facts:
Petitioners Alberto J. Dumago and Juanito A. Garcia
were employed by respondent PAL as Aircraft
Furnishers Master "C" and Aircraft Inspector,
respectively. They were assigned in the PAL Technical
Center.
A Notice of Administrative Charge was served on
petitioners. They were allegedly "caught in the act of
sniffing shabu inside the Toolroom Section," then
placed under preventive suspension. Petitioners
vehemently denied the allegations.
Petitioners were dismissed for violation of the PAL Code
of Discipline. Both simultaneously filed a case for illegal
dismissal and damages.
In the meantime, the SEC placed PAL under an Interim
Rehabilitation Receiver due to severe financial losses.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in petitioners
favor finding PAL guilty of illegal suspension and illegal
dismissal and ordering them to reinstate complainants
to their former position without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges and to pay jointly and severally
unto the complainants backwages, 13th month pay and
damages and attorneys fees.
Meanwhile, the SEC replaced the Interim Rehabilitation
Receiver with a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver.
The Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution and a
Notice of Garnishment. PAL moved to quash the Writ of
Execution and to lift the Notice of Garnishment. NLRC
declared the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment valid but suspended the said proceedings
and referred the same to the Receiver of PAL for
appropriate action.
Issue:
Whether petitioners are entitled to execution of the
Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement even if PAL is
under receivership?
Ruling:
No, Since petitioners claim against PAL is a money claim
for their wages during the pendency of PALs appeal to
the NLRC, the same should have been suspended
pending the rehabilitation proceedings. The Labor
Arbiter, the NLRC, as well as the Court of Appeals
should have abstained from resolving petitioners case
for illegal dismissal and should instead have directed
them to lodge their claim before PALs receiver.
Upon appointment by the SEC of a rehabilitation
receiver, all actions for claims against the corporation
pending before any court, tribunal or board shall ipso
jure be suspended. The purpose of the automatic stay
of all pending actions for claims is to enable the
rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise its/his
powers free from any judicial or extra-judicial
interference that might unduly hinder or prevent the
rescue of the corporation.
More importantly, the suspension of all actions for
claims against the corporation embraces all phases of
the suit, be it before the trial court or any tribunal or
before this Court. No other action may be taken,
including the rendition of judgment during the state of
suspension. It must be stressed that what are
automatically stayed or suspended are the proceedings
of a suit and not just the payment of claims during the
execution stage after the case had become final and
executory.
Furthermore, the actions that are suspended cover all
claims against the corporation whether for damages
founded on a breach of contract of carriage, labor cases,
collection suits or any other claims of a pecuniary
nature.No exception in favor of labor claims is
mentioned in the law.
ALEJANDRO ROQUERO VS. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 152329| April 22, 2003
FACTS:
Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground
equipment mechanics of respondent PAL. From the
evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo
were caught red-handed possessing and using shabu in
a raid conducted by PAL security officers and NARCOM
personnel.
The two alleged that they did not voluntarily indulge in
the said act but were instigated by a certain Jojie
Alipato who was introduced to them by Joseph Ocul,
Manager of the Airport Maintenance Division of PAL.
Roquero and Pabayo received a notice of
administrative chargefor violating the PAL Code of
Discipline. They were required to answer the charges
and were placed under preventive suspension.
Roquero and Pabayo, in their reply to notice of
administrative charge, assailed their arrest and
asserted that they were instigated by PAL to take the
drugs. They argued that Alipato was not really a trainee
of PAL but was placed in the premises to instigate the
commission of the crime. They based their argument on
the fact that Alipato was not arrested. Moreover,
Alipato has no record of employment with PAL.
Roquero and Pabayo were dismissed by PAL. Thus, they
filed a case for illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter: dismissal of Roquero and Pabayo was
upheld. The Labor Arbiter found both parties at fault
PAL for applying means to entice the complainants into
committing the infraction and the complainants for
giving in to the temptation and eventually indulging in
the prohibited activity. Nonetheless, the Labor Arbiter
awarded separation pay and attorneys fees to the
complainants.
While case was on appeal with NLRC, complainants
were acquitted by the RTC in the criminal case which
charged them with conspiracy for possession and use
of a regulated drug in violation of Section 16, Article III
of Republic Act 6425, on the ground of instigation.
NLRC: ruled in favor of complainants as it likewise found
PAL guilty of instigation. It ordered reinstatement to
their former positions but without backwages.
During the pendency of the case with the CA, PAL and
Pabayo filed a Motion to Withdraw/Dismiss the case
with respect to Pabayo, after they voluntarily entered
into a compromise agreement.
Court of Appeals: VALID DISMISSAL. reversed the
decision of the NLRC and reinstated the decision of the
Labor Arbiter insofar as it upheld the dismissal of
Roquero. However, it denied the award of separation
pay and attorneys fees to Roquero on the ground that
one who has been validly dismissed is not entitled to
those benefits.
Issue:
Can the executory nature of the decision, more so the
reinstatement aspect of a labor tribunals order be
halted by a petition having been filed in higher courts
without any restraining order or preliminary injunction
having been ordered in the meantime?
Ruling:
NO. Article 223 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Section 12 of RA No. 6715, and Section 2 of the NLRC
Interim Rules on Appeals under RA No. 6715, Amending
the Labor Code, provide that an order of reinstatement
by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even
pending appeal.
The order of reinstatement is immediately executory.
The unjustified refusal of the employer to reinstate a
dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his
salaries effective from the time the employer failed to
reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of
execution. Unless there is a restraining order issued, it is
ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the
order of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining
order was granted. Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to
actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate him in the
payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero
the salary he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from
the time of the decision of the NLRC until the finality of
the decision of this Court.
Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago v. PAL
G.R. No. 164856, January 20, 2009
Facts:
Philippine Airlines filed a case against its employees
herein petitioners for allegedly caught in the act of
sniffing shabu when a team of company security
personnel and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical
Centers Toolroom Section.
After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioner for
transgressing companys Code of Discipline prompting
them to file a Complaint for illegal dismissal which the
Labor Arbiter (LA) in its decision ruled on their favor
ordering PAL to immediately comply with the
reinstatement aspect of the decision. Prior to the
judgment, SEC placed PAL under Interim Rehabilitation
Receiver who subsequently replaced by Permanent
Rehabilitation Receiver. On appeal, NLRC reversed said
decision and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of
merit.
Subsequently, LA issued a Writ of Execution respecting
the reinstatement aspect of his decision. Respondent
filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC.
The NLRC affirmed the validity of the Writ and the
Notice issued by LA but suspended and referred the
action to the Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate
action.
On appeal, the appellate court partially granted the
petition and effectively reinstated the NLRC resolution
insofar as it suspended the proceedings. By
manifestation, respondent informed the Court that SEC
issued an Order granting its request to exit from
rehabilitation proceedings.
Issue:
Whether petitioner may collect their wages during the
period between the LAs Order of reinstatement
pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning that
of the LA, now that PAL has exited from rehabilitation
proceedings.
Ruling:
A dismissed employee whose case was favorably
decided by the LA is entitled to receive wages pending
appeal upon reinstatement, which is immediately
executory. Unless there is a restraining order, it is
ministerial upon the LA to implement the order of
reinstatement and it is mandatory on the employer to
comply therewith.
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even if
the order of reinstatement of the LA is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to
reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee
during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
court. It settles the view that the LAs order of
reinstatement is immediately executory and the
employer has to either re-admit them to work under
the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their
dismissal, or to reinstate them in the payroll, and that
filing to exercise the options in the alternative,
employer must pay the employees salaries.

When reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the
continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the
life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does
not contemplate the period when the employer-
corporation itself is similarly in a judicially monitored.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
SUBLAY vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 139194, January 31, 2000
Facts:
Elizabeth Sublay was employed as Chief Accountant for
Euro-Swiss Food Inc. until her termination on December
31, 1994. In filing a case for illegal dismissal, she claimed
that she was unjustly dismissed as there was not just
and valid cause for her dismissal. The Labor Arbiter
ordered private respondent to pay petitioner her
separation pay. She appealed the decision to the NLRC;
however petitioner filed her appeal seven days late. The
NLRC dismissed her appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying the appeal on a mere technicality?
Ruling:
The petition is DISMISSED for failure of petitioner
Elizabeth Sublay to sufficiently establish that public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission, in its
assailed Decision committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the appeal
of petitioner for having been filed beyond the ten (10)-
day reglementary period. No cost.
The members of the legal profession are being
reminded in this case that every case they handle
deserves their full and undivided attention, diligence,
skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether they accept it for a fee or for free keeping in
mind that not only the property but also the life and
liberty of their clients may be at stake.
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that petitioner was
represented by two (2) lawyers, Atty. Marquez as lead
counsel, and Atty. Alikpala as collaborating counsel. She
alleged that Atty. Marquez to whom a copy of the Labor
Arbiter's decision was given, failed to file the appeal and
to notify her of the adverse decision resulting in its late
filing and subsequent dismissal by the NLRC. She
reasoned that had Atty. Alikpala been likewise served a
copy of the decision she would not be in this distressing
situation. The rule is that when a party is represented
by two (2) or more lawyers, notice to one (1) suffices as
a notice to the party represented by him. Hence, the
Labor Arbiter was not in error when he served a copy of
the decision only on Atty. Marquez who after all was
still the counsel of record when the decision was
rendered. Likewise petitioner cannot claim that
although Atty. Marquez was not asked to formally
withdraw he has for all intents and purposes withdrawn
because, by failing to actively represent petitioner, he
virtually relinquished his responsibility over the case to
Atty. Alikpala.
Moreover, a lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring
and keeping track of the period of time left to file an
appeal. He cannot rely on the courts to appraise him of
the developments in his case and warn him against any
possible procedural blunder. Knowing that the lead
counsel was no longer participating actively in the trial
of the case several months before its resolution, Atty.
Alikpala who alone was left to defend petitioner should
have put himself on guard and thus anticipated the
release of the Labor Arbiter's decision. Petitioner's lead
counsel might have been negligent but she was never
really deprived of proper representation. This fact alone
militates against the grant of this petition.
NAVARRO v. NLRC
327 SCRA 22 [2000]
DOCTRINE: Posting of Appeal Bond must be done within
the 10-day reglementary period to appeal the LA
decision.
FACTS:
Rodente Navarro, Antonio Bocabal and Julian De
Guzman were night shift jeepney drivers of Araceli
Cornejo on boundary system, usually working from 5
pm to 4 am. They regularly ply the jeepneys assigned to
them for 11 hrs/day, 5x a week, earning P350/day
On April 20, 1991, Navarro and Bocabal were informed
by Olimpio Breton, the dispatcher that their shift has
been moved to 7 pm to 6 am.
Navarro and Bocabal and 7 other drivers decided not to
ply their routes that day to protest the sudden change
of working hours, expecting that such change would
adversely affect their earnings.
Julian De Guzman reported to work as usual but cut his
trip short because he felt dizzy and suffered stomach
pain. The next day, Breton called all the drivers who
protested and imposed a 1 day suspension on them but
promised to restore old schedule. However, the next
day, Navarro et.al saw that other drivers have already
been assigned to their jeeps. Breton: precautionary
measure in the event that the protest by the jeepney
drivers would continue.
Petitioners then filed before the Regional Arbitration
Branch a complaint for illegal dismissal. The minutes of
the proceedings indicated that counsel for Cornejo,
Breton willing to take petitioners back but the latter
refused since they only wanted separation pay.
LA decided in favor of jeepney drivers; Cornejo held
liable to pay separation pay to each petitioner (Navarro,
Bocabal, De Guzman).
On April 3, 1992, the respondents received a copy of the
LA decision. On April 13 (10 days after), they filed a
memorandum of appeal However, it was only on April
30, 1992 they filed the appeal bond.
Bond was later discovered to be bogus because the
person who signed it was no longer connected with the
insurance company for more than 10 years already.
Substitute bond was issued only on July 20, 1993 (1 year
3 mos),
NLRC ruled in favor of the private respondents, setting
aside the LA decision and directing the petitioners to
report for work.
MR-denied, hence this petition (SCA certiorari)
ISSUE:
WON Appeal filed by respondents was perfected
RULING:
NO.
1. The perfection of an appeal within the
reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by
law is jurisdictional, and noncompliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory.
2. Perfection of an appeal includes the filing,
within the prescribed period, of the memorandum of
appeal containing, among others, the assignment of
error/s, arguments in support thereof, the relief sought
and, in appropriate cases, posting of the appeal bond.
a. In case where the judgment involves a
monetary award, the appeal may be perfected only
upon posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a
reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
NLRC. Amount must be equivalent to the monetary
award, exclusive of moral and exemplary damages and
attorneys fees.
3. In this case, while private respondents filed
their memorandum of appeal on time, they posted
surety bond only on April 30, 1992, which is beyond the
10-day reglementary period, a procedural lapse
admitted by private respondents, which is inexcusable.
4. Worse, the appeal bond was bogus having been
issued by an officer no longer connected for a long time
with the bonding company.
a. Respondents should have ensured that the
bond is genuine, otherwise, the purpose of requiring
the posting of bond - to guarantee the payment of valid
and legal claims against the employer, would not be
served.
5. Although SC has in a number of cases, relaxed
this requirement on grounds of substantial justice and
special circumstances of the case, there is no cogent
reason to apply this same liberal interpretation in this
case where the bond posted was not genuine. No bond
was really posted since a fake or expired bond is in legal
contemplation merely a scrap of paper.
6. may be perfected only upon posting of
cash/surety bond (2a)
The word only makes it perfectly clear that the
lawmakers intended the posting of a cash or surety
bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by
which an employers appeal may be perfected.
Effect of non-perfection of appeal
running of prescriptive period for perfecting an
appeal was not tolled
LA decision became final and executory upon
the lapse of 10 calendar days from receipt of the
decision
Can no longer be amended or altered by labor
tribunal
On NLRC jurisdiction
NLRC has no authority to entertain the appeal, or set
aside the LA decision since the timely posting of appeal
bond is an indispensable and jurisdictional requisite and
not a mere technicality of law. Any amendment or
alteration made which substantially affects the final and
executory judgment is null and void for lack of
jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for
that purpose.
WORKERS OF ANTIQUE ELECTRIC COOP. VS. NLRC G.R.
No. 120062. June 8, 2000
FACTS:
Respondents were found to have underpaid their
employees and did not pay the 13th month pay on a
routine inspection conducted by DOLE. The regional
director ordered the company to pay the deficiency.
Subsequently, the NLRC affirmed the order. A waiver
was signed by 108 of the workers where they reduced
by half the amount that was due. DOLE approved the
waiver saying that it was not contrary to law, good
customs and public policy. Later, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration alleging undue influence,
coercion, intimidation and no assistance of counsel. The
motion was denied. Eduardo Nietes, claiming that he
represented the workers, filed a position paper with the
same argument. The NLRC dismissed the case for failure
to acquire jurisdiction. He again filed anappeal but the
appeal was denied for being filed out of time. The
appeal was filed 9 days late along with the appeal fee
and research fee.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal was filed out of time?
RULING:
The Court ruled that the appeal was filed out of time.
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period and in the manner prescribed by law is
mandatory and jurisdictional. Non-compliance renders
the judgment appealed final and executory. An appeal is
perfected when there is proof of payment of the appeal
fee and in cases of the employerappealing and there is a
monetary award, payment of the appeal bond. A mere
notice of appeal without complying with the other
requisites shall not stop the running of the period for
perfecting as appeal. Sometimes though, in the interest
of justice, late appeals have been allowed. An instance
is a class suit. In this case there is no evidence that there
is no a class suit. There is no evidence that the workers
chose Nietes to represent them. There is no showing
that the workers are joined by a common interest. As
there is no basis to invalidate the waiver the workers
signed, the waiver is valid.
SOLIMAN SECURITY SERVICES, INC. VS. CA
G.R. No. 143215 July 11, 2002
FACTS:
Respondent Eduardo Valenzuela, a security guard, was a
regular employee of petitioner Soliman Security
Services assigned at the BPI-Family Bank, Pasay City. On
09 March 1995, he received a memorandum from
petitioners relieving him from his post at the bank, said
to be upon the latters request, and requiring him to
report to the security agency for reassignment. The
following month, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal on the ground that his services were
terminated without a valid cause and that, during his
tenure at the bank, he was not paid his overtime pay,
13th month pay, and premium pay for services
rendered during holidays and rest days. He averred
that, after receiving the memorandum, he kept on
reporting to the office of petitioners for reassignment
but, except for a brief stint in another post lasting for no
more than a week, he was put on a "floating" status.
Petitioners contended that the relief of respondent
from his post, made upon request of the client, was
merely temporary and that respondent had been
offered a new post but the latter refused to accept it.
Petitioners argued that respondents floating status for
barely 29 days did not constitute constructive dismissal.
Labor Arbiter holds petitioners guilty of constructive
dismissal and ordering the reinstatement of the
complainant to his former position with full backwages
from the date of his "dismissal" until his actual
reinstatement; directing the Research and Information
Unit to compute the various monetary benefits
awarded to the complainant; and adjudging the
payment, by way of attorneys fees, of ten percent
(10%) of all sums owing to the complainant.
Petitioners filed an appeal to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC).
NLRC issued an order directing petitioners to submit an
affidavit to the effect that their appeal bond was
genuine and that it would be in force and effect until
the final disposition of the case. In his reply
memorandum, respondent, asseverating that
petitioners failed to deposit the required bond for the
appeal, sought the appeal to be declared as not having
been validly perfected. Petitioners submitted a
manifestation and affidavit in compliance with the order
of the NLRC. Apparently satisfied, the NLRC, gave due
course to the appeal and rendered the presently
assailed decision, reversing that of the Labor Arbiter
A motion for reconsideration, filed by herein private
respondent Valenzuela, was denied by the NLRC.
Valenzuela forthwith brought the matter up to the
Court of Appeals. On the thesis that the only issue
interposed was whether or not the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion when it took cognizance of the
appeal and reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter
despite the failure of herein petitioners to validly post
the appeal bond, the appellate court responded in the
affirmative, set aside the assailed decision of the NLRC
and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter. A motion to
reconsider the decision was denied.
ISSUE:
WON Court of Appeals has committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring petitioners to have failed in perfecting their
appeal with the NLRC?
RULING:
This Court finds merit in the petition.
Private respondent would posit that the appeal of
petitioners to the NLRC should be considered to have
been made on 19 January 1999 (when petitioner
submitted, pursuant to the NLRC order, a statement
under oath to the effect that the surety bond it had
posted was genuine and confirmed it to be in effect
until the final termination of the case) which was
beyond the ten-day period for perfecting an appeal. The
records before the Court would show, however, that an
appeal bond was posted with the NLRC at the same
time that the appeal memorandum of petitioners was
filed. A certified true copy of the appeal bond would
indicate that it was received by the Commission on 16
October 1998, the date reflected by the stamp-mark
thereon. The surety bond issued by the Philippine
Charter Insurance Corporation bore the date two days
before the appeal memorandum was seasonably filed.
The Order, of the NLRC categorically stated that
"records [would] disclose that the instant appeal [was]
accompanied by a surety bond, as the Decision sought
to be appealed involved a monetary award." The NLRC,
in fact, ordered petitioner to submit an affidavit to
confirm that its appeal bond was genuine and would be
in force and effect until the final disposition of the case.
The Commissions declaration that the appeal was
accompanied by a surety bond indicated that there had
been compliance with Article 223 of the Labor Code.
An appeal to the NLRC is perfected once an appellant
files the memorandum of appeal, pays the required
appeal fee and, where an employer appeals and a
monetary award is involved, the latter posts an appeal
bond or submits a surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company. In line with the desired objective of
labor laws to have controversies promptly resolved on
their merits, the requirements for perfecting appeals
are given liberal interpretation and construction.
NUEVA ECIJA I ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., (NEECO I)
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, vs. NLRC G.R. No. 116066
FACTS:
Petitioners were permanent employees of respondent
NEECO I. They were members of the NEECO I Employees
Association. The Board of Directors adopted Policy No.
3-33, which set the guidelines for NEECO Is retirement
benefits. All regular employees were ordered to
accomplish Form 87, which were applications for either
reinstatement, resignation, or separation from service.
Also, certain union officers were promoted to
supervisory rank.
These events caused apprehension in the labor
organization and deemed as harassment threatening
union members and circumventing employees security
of tenure. The union held a snap election of officers.
Petitioner union passed a resolution withdrawing the
applications for retirement of all its members.
Petitioners Marin, Fajardo and Carilio were compulsory
retired and received their separation pay under protest.
Javate was terminated for allegedly misappropriating
funds and dishonesty.
Petitioners and Javate filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision on
December 21, 1992 declaring NEECO I guilty of illegal
dismissal. Private respondents elevated the case to the
NLRC. They filed their appeal on December 28, and
posted a surety bond on January 5, 1993. Petitioners
were reinstated by NEECO I pending appeal. Javate
withdrew his complaint and opted to receive his
retirement benefits.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appeal was perfected within
the 10 day reglementary period.
2. Whether or not NLRC should have deleted
moral and exemplary damages.
HELD:
1. Yes. Petitioners contend that the appeal should have
been completed with the filing of the supersedeas bond
by January 4, 1993. However, in a number of cases, the
Court has relaxed the rule to resolve controversies on
the merits when there are special circumstances, such
as when there was a substantial compliance with the
rule, so that on balance, technical considerations could
give way to equity and justice. Private respondent filed
their appeal within the reglementary period. The
bonding company issued the bond on January 4, but it
was forwarded to the NLRC only on the following day,
January 5. Since it was the holiday season, The Court
found it equitable to eases the rules and consider there
was substantial compliance. Although as to the bond,
respondent in its resolution of November 7, 1991
deleted the phrase exclusive of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees in determining the
amount of the bond, it provided a safeguard against the
imposition of excessive bonds as the Commission was
given the power to reduce the amount of the bond in
meritorious cases and upon motion of the appellant.
2. No. To warrant an award of moral damages, it must
be shown that the dismissal of the employee was
attended to by bad faith, or constituted an act
oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. As there was
ULP, it was proper to impose moral and exemplary
damages; however the damages awarded by the labor
arbiter were excessive.
MINDANAO TIMES CORP. VS CONFESSOR (GR NO.
183417, FEBRUARY 5, 2010)
FACTS:
Mitchel Confesor (respondent) was employed on May
1998 by petitioner, publisher of a newspaper of general
circulation in Mindanao and Davao City. He became
petitioners Associate Editor in six months.
Respondent resigned from petitioner on June 17, 2003.
On August 28, 2003, he filed a verified complaint before
the Labor Arbiter for payment of separation pay and
pro-rated 13th month pay for 2003. He later amended
his complaint from one of money claims to illegal
dismissal, averring that petitioners President and Chief
Operating Officer forced him to resign after he and
Anthony Allada, a columnist, published separate articles
which appeared in the June 14, 2003 issue of
petitioners newspaper accusing then Presidential
Assistant Dominador Boy Zuo, Jr., Cong. Prospero
Nograles and Cong. Corazon Malanyaon of being
involved in some anomalies; and that he did resign as
he was told that he would be entitled to separation pay
and other benefits, but that the promised benefits were
not forthcoming, hence, his filing of the complaint.
By Decision of January 19, 2004, the Labor Arbiter,
finding that respondent was constructively dismissed,
ordered petitioner to pay him P71,909.77 representing
backwages, as well as separation pay and 10% of the
total award as attorneys fees.
Both parties appealed to the NLRC in Cagayan de Oro
City, respondent contending that, in addition to the
award granted by the Labor Arbiter, he was entitled to
service incentive leave pay and moral and exemplary
damages. Petitioner, on the other hand, questioned the
Labor Arbiters finding of constructive dismissal.
In compliance with the appeal bond requirement,
petitioner deposited the amount of P71,909.77 with the
United Coconut Planters Bank and surrendered to the
NLRC the passbook covering the deposit, along with a
Deed of Assignment it executed assigning the proceeds
of the deposit in favor of respondent and authorizing
the NLRC to release the same in the event that the
Labor Arbiters Decision becomes final and executory.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal to the NLRC is perfected by
the execution of the petitioner of a Deed of Assignment.
NLRCs RULING: By Resolution of November 30, 2004,
the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter and
dismissed respondents complaint, holding that there
was no constructive dismissal since respondent
effectively resigned from his employment.
Respecting the issue raised by respondent of whether
the bank deposit complied with the appeal bond
requirement, the NLRC held that it was in substantial
compliance with Sec. 6, Rule 6 of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure.
CAs RULING: The Court of Appeals, to which
respondent assailed the NLRC resolution via petition for
certiorari, dismissed said petition by Decision of
November 13, 2006.
On respondents Motion for Reconsideration, however,
the appellate court, by the assailed Amended Decision
of November 29, 2007, set aside the NLRC February 28,
2005 Resolution and reinstated the Labor Arbiters
Decision which it declared to have become final and
executory.
In concluding that the Labor Arbiters Decision had
become final and executory, the appellate court held
that the bank deposit of petitioner failed to
substantially comply with the appeal bond requirement,
noting that its Deed of Assignment cannot be a
substitute for the cash or surety bond contemplated
under the Rules for the perfection of appeal as the deed
does not ensure payment of the adjudged monetary
award in case the appeal of [herein petitioner] fails.
RULING:
The Supreme Court likewise dismissed the petition for
want of merit. It dismissing the petition, it cited Article
223 of the Labor Code which provides that an appeal by
the employer to the NLRC from a judgment of a labor
arbiter which involves a monetary award may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly
accredited by the NLRC, in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection
of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from
the decision of the LA. The filing of the bond is not only
mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement that
must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction
upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the
decision of the LA final and executory.
In the present case, the Deed of Assignment, as well as
the passbook, which petitioner submitted to the NLRC is
neither a cash nor a surety bond. Petitioners appeal to
the NLRC was thus not duly perfected, thereby
rendering the Labor Arbiters Decision final and
executory.
CESARIO DEL ROSARIO VS. PHIL. JOURNALISTS (GR NO.
181516, AUGUST 19, 2009)
FACTS:
Cesario L. del Rosario, herein petitioner, claims that he
was hired by PJI as a libel scanner in March 1997 and
was receiving the benefits and privileges of a regular
managerial employee of the newspaper and magazine
company. On April 6, 1999, petitioner received a notice
of termination of employment from respondent.
According to petitioner, the termination of his services
was illegal for want of just or authorized cause and for
non-compliance with procedural requirements prior to
his dismissal.
Respondent, on the other hand, averred that petitioner
was hired only as a consultant whose term of
employment was deemed renewed on a month-to-
month basis, unless either party opted for its
termination by a written notice of at least five (5) days
before the end of any month, based on the contract of
employment issued by the company on April 15, 2007.
On November 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner i.e. finding respondent PJI
guilty of illegally dismissing the petitioner from his
employment.
Respondent elevated its case to the NLRC. On January 6,
2003, it filed its memorandum of appeal together with
the appeal bond issued by Philippine Pryce Assurance
Corporation (PPAC).
On December 15, 2003, the NLRC issued a resolution
dismissing the appeal for failure to perfect the same
due to the posting of the appeal bond from a bonding
company not duly accredited by the Court. The NLRC
stated that PPAC was not authorized by the Supreme
Court to transact business with courts anywhere in the
Philippines since December 2, 2002, per Certification of
the Office of the Court Administrator.
On January 23, 2004, respondent duly filed a motion for
reconsideration and a supplemental motion for
reconsideration, alleging that it had no knowledge that
PPAC was no longer authorized to transact business
with the courts.
Acting on the motion and in a bid of liberality, the NLRC
issued a resolution on February 23, 2004, directing
respondent to post a new bond.
However, respondent failed to comply. Thus, on March
31, 2005, the NLRC issued a resolution dismissing the
appeal for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appeal before the NLRC was
perfected by posting an appeal bond from an insurance
company which was later on declared by the Supreme
Court as unauthorized to transact business with courts.
CAs RULING:
The CA held that the appeal bond posted by the
respondent company was valid. It held that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing PJIs
appeal based on an erroneous finding that the surety
bond respondent posted was void. The CA ratiocinated
that at the time the subject bond was issued, PPAC was
still authorized to issue the same. The CA found that the
Supreme Court placed PPAC on a blacklist only on
October 9, 2003, while the Chairperson of the NLRC
cancelled PPACs accreditation on November 3, 2003.
When PJI obtained the surety bond on January 2, 2003,
PPAC was still existing and duly accredited by the Court.
Thus, there was no legal basis to dismiss PJIs appeal
because it had actually posted a valid bond.
RULING:
The SC affirmed CAs ruling. The SC ruled that the
subsequent revocation of the authority of a bonding
company should not prejudice parties who relied on its
authority.The revocation of authority of a bonding
company is prospective in application.
NAFLU VS. LADRIDO
G.R. Nos. 94540-41 May 8, 1991
FACTS:
On December 1, 1989, then labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of the complainants in consolidated
cases filed by the National Federation of Labor Unions
and others against private respondent Bionic Heavy
Equipment, Inc. and Mr. Spencer Forkner which ordered
respondent to pay the complainants separation, ECOLA,
service incentive leave,13 month pay,overtime pay and
night shift differentials ,premium pay on holidays and
rest days, backwages without deduction and
qualification. LA ordered Corporate Auditing Examiner
to compute the foregoing monetary awards which form
part of this decision.
A copy of the decision was received by private
respondent on January 23, 1990. On February 2, 1990,
within the ten-day reglementary period, an appeal
memorandum was filed by private respondents stating,
among others, that the amount of the monetary award
is still being computed by the corporate auditing
examiner. Petitioners filed an opposition thereto
alleging that the appeal has not been perfected for
failure to file the necessary cash or surety bond and that
the appeal is pro-forma. Replying thereto, private
respondents reiterated that no bond was posted as
there was no computation attached to the decision and
that accordingly, the amount of the bond cannot be
determined.
Petitioner filed a motion for immediate issuance of a
writ of execution alleging therein that the computation
of the award had been accomplished; that the private
respondents failed to perfect their appeal; and that
private respondents are in imminent danger of
insolvency, The motion was granted by labor arbiter
Geofrey P. Villahermosa. After the scheduled hearing,
the labor arbiter approved and adopted the
computation of awards made by the corporate auditing
examiner, SLEO Aurora R. Gorres, in the total amount of
P21,415,486.00.
Private respondents filed their comment to the motion
for issuance of a writ of execution alleging therein that
the said motion is premature and that the allegation of
insolvency is baseless. Labor arbiter issued a special
order for the issuance of a writ of execution. On the
same day said arbiter issued the writ of execution a
copy of which was served on private respondents by the
sheriff. Private respondents filed a motion to lift the
writ of execution and for recomputation of the award
on the ground that the ppeal has been perfected and
private respondents were not given an opportunity to
controvert the award. The Provincial Sheriff was
informed thereof and was advised to hold in abeyance
the execution of the decision.
Nevertheless, the sheriff posted a notice of public
auction of the properties in the notice. Two other
notices of sale of personal properties of private
respondents listed were issued by the sheriff. A notice
of levy on execution of certain personal properties of
private respondents was effected by the sheriff. Labor
arbiter denied private respondents' urgent motion to lift
the writ of execution and for recomputation of awards
on the ground that the decision had become final and
executory and that assuming that private respondents'
appeal has not been perfected pending service of the
computation of the monetary awards, respondents
should have posted the cash or surety bond after
receiving a copy of said recomputation. Private
respondents learned that the public auction of their
property will proceed. Thus, on same day, they filed
with the public respondent NLRC a petition to stay the
execution sale and for quashal of the writ of execution.
On the same day the NLRC issued an order restraining
the scheduled execution sale but the levy on the
properties will remain and private respondents were
required to post a bond in the amount of P100,000.00
to answer for any damages complainants might suffer
by virtue of the stay of the execution sale, if the petition
is found to be without legal or factual basis. Private
respondents promptly posted the bond and the labor
arbiter was required to immediately forward the
records of the case to the NLRC.
The Provincial Sheriff, however, effected the sale of
properties for P3,696,850.00 claiming he received the
radio message after the auction sale was conducted.
The two other auction sale scheduled were cancelled.
Private respondents filed an urgent ex-parte motion to
invalidate the auction sale conducted which was
supported by affidavits, minutes and the report of the
sheriff, all showing alleged irregularities in the conduct
of the auction sale. Petitioners filed an opposition to the
petition alleging therein that the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the injunction case, that there is no
cause of action, that it is barred by prior final judgment
and that it is frivolous.
NLRC issued an order quashing the writ of execution
issued in this case, vacating and setting it aside, and
ordering the return of the properties sold or taken from
the premises of private respondents which, however,
are to remain in custodia legis until the Commission can
determine the amount of the bond to be posted by
private respondents.
ISSUE:
WON public respondent NLRC lacks or has no
jurisdiction or acted in grave abuse of discretion?
RULING:
NO. The labor arbiter clearly erred in issuing a writ of
execution. In said order, the arbiter observed that
private respondents "have not as yet perfected their
appeal for failure to post cash bond or surety bond,"
implying that the decision appealed from has already
become final, thus entitling petitioner to the issuance of
the writ of execution. But precisely, as contended by
private respondents, "the computation of the corporate
auditing examiner was not attached to the decision."
Private respondents cannot be expected to post such
appeal bond equivalent to the amount of the monetary
award when the amount thereof was not included in
the decision of the labor arbiter. Article 223 of the Labor
Code, as amended, which provides
In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.
Presupposes that the amount of the monetary award is
stated in the judgment or at least attached to the
judgment.
Indeed the labor arbiter acknowledged that the appeal
was "never perfected because the final computation of
the monetary award due the complainants herein has
not been accomplished yet." Nevertheless, in the same
order, the labor arbiter stated that "execution pending
appeal is allowed under Section 2, Rule 39 of the
Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines." The same is
thus an admission that the appeal has been perfected
contradicting his earlier finding that it has not been
perfected. What the Court can see here is the undue
haste in effecting the immediate execution of the
judgment.
In the order of public respondent NLRC dated August
10, 1990, it is stated that "(t)he policy of the
Commission in situations like this (and the labor arbiter
should have been aware of this) is for the labor arbiter
to forward the records to the Commission [and that]
thereafter, the Commission will cause the computation
of the awards and issue an order directing the appellant
to file the required bond." This appears to be a practice
of the NLRC to allow a belated filing of the required
appeal bond, in the instance when the decision of the
labor arbiter involves a monetary award that has not
yet been computed, considering that the computation
win still have to be made by that office. It is understood
of course that appellant has flied the appeal on time as
in this case.
In this case, petitioner filed a motion for immediate
issuance of a writ of execution alleging that the
computation of the award had already been
accomplished, among others. The motion was granted
by the labor arbiter when strangely the computation
was and the hearing for its approval was set only for the
following day. This is another clear pattern to railroad
the execution of an enormous award of over P21
million.
Nevertheless although said award appears to have been
approved, it is obvious that private respondents were
not given the opportunity to submit their objections to
the said computation which is an elementary ingredient
of due process. Private respondents filed a comment
alleging therein that the issuance of the writ of
execution is premature and irregular. Nonetheless, the
labor arbiter issued a special order for the immediate
issuance of the writ of execution above discussed.
Private respondent filed a motion to lift the writ of
execution and for a recomputation of the award.
There should be no question that a writ of execution
issued before a judgment has become final and
executory, is invalid, hence, its execution can be
restrained. Such a situation obtains in this case. More so
when as in this case the monetary award which was
subsequently computed was approved by the labor
arbiter without giving the private respondents the
opportunity to be heard and to submit their objections
thereto; and considering further that the final
determination of the correct award had yet to be made
by the public respondent NLRC after hearing the side of
the private respondents, in accordance with its policy;
certainly the precipitate execution of a judgment based
on the gargantuan award aforesaid is such prohibited
and illegal act which under the law public respondent
NLRC may and should restrain.
Public respondent NLRC in fact conducted a hearing on
private respondents' "Urgent Petition to Stop Execution,
etc." What petitioner perhaps means is that it had no
notice of the hearing. The law allows the issuance of a
restraining order ex-parte when the urgency of the
situation so demands. Thus, Article 218(e) of the Labor
Code, as amended, states
. . . That if a complainant shall also allege that, unless a
temporary restraining order shall be issued without
notice, a substantial and irreparable injury to
complainant's property will be unavoidable, such a
temporary restraining order may be issued upon
testimony under oath, sufficient, if sustained, to justify
the Commission in issuing a temporary injunction upon
hearing after notice.
It must be remembered that the labor arbiter denied
private respondents' "motion to lift writ of execution"
on July 18, 1990. July 19, 1990 was the date of the
execution so private respondents filed on the same day
the "Urgent Petition to Stop Execution, etc". Due to the
obvious merit of the petition showing the unlawful
issuance of the writ of execution by the labor arbiter,
the NLRC correctly issued the restraining order pursuant
to the aforequoted provision of the Labor Code.
The private respondent was required to post
P100,000.00 cash as surety bond and they have
complied with the requirement.
Petitioner filed what it called a Vehement Opposition
with Urgent Motion to Dismiss the injunction cases.
Petitioner had the opportunity to be heard.
Moreover, by the restraining order public respondent
NLRC directed the labor arbiter "to immediately forward
the records of the subject cases so that the same can be
resolved by the Commission with dispatch."
Consequently, in the order, the public respondent NLRC
preceded its conclusion with the statement "(t)he
material facts and circumstances necessary for us to
resolve the issues are clearly established by (the)
records . . ."
No doubt petitioner was afforded due process before
public respondent NLRC issued its order dated August
10, 1990.
One last word the plight of labor must always be
considered in any case. However, such a case must be
handled with an even hand. More so when the amount
of the monetary award runs to millions that will
substantially paralyze the employer if not drive it to
penury. The immediate execution of the judgment
should be undertaken only when the monetary award
had been carefully and accurately determined by the
NLRC and only after the employer is given the
opportunity to be heard and to raise objections to the
computation. Any undue haste in the execution of a
judgment without considering these essential elements
of due process would only give rise to a suspicion that
the unusual interest of the public officers concerned in
the enforcement of the judgment even before it
became final and executory is motivated by
questionable objectives other than the interest of the
laborers or employees concerned.
Let the respondent NLRC pass upon the merits of the
appeal and the correctness of the award. Thereafter,
execution may follow, if warranted.
ITALIAN VILLAGE RESTAURANT VS. NLRC
G.R. No. 95594 March 11, 1992
FACTS:
Private respondent Felicisimo Evangelista, a waiter of
petitioner Italian Village Restaurant, had a fight with
another employee, Rodolfo Regala, inside the waiter's
quarter of said restaurant resulting in his termination
for violation of the petitioner's House Rules and
Regulations, which penalizes with dismissal "an act of
initiating an actual fight or indulging in a fight inside the
company's premises."
As a result of his dismissal, private respondent
Felicisimo Evangelista filed a compliant against herein
petitioner on September 9, 1988 with the Arbitration
Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
LA rendered decision ordering the petitioner to
reinstate respondent to his former position with all the
rights, privileges and benefits appertaining thereto and
with backwages until his actual reinstatement.
NLRC order the petitioner to post with the RAB of origin
or direct to Commission a cash or surety bond
equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment to
which he is appealing from and reinstate complainant(s)
under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
his dismissal, or separation or, at APPELLANT's option to
reinstate him in the payroll, and to submit proof of
compliance thereof, otherwise, a Writ of Execution shall
issue.
Instead of complying with the Order, petitioner filed a
motion for extension of ten (10) days and without
waiting for an action on its motion, filed a supersedeas
bond.
For the late filing of its bond, the NLRC issued an Order
dismissing petitioner's appeal.
Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended, provides among others, as follows:
In case of judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company . . .
Since the respondents had not filed any cash or surety
bond within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the
Order of this Commission dated April 25, 1990, its
appeal is deemed not perfected.
ISSUE:
WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing petitioners appeal?
RULING:
NO. Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended by RA
6715 provides:
Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the
Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the
Commission by any or both parties within ten (10)
calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards or
orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of
the following grounds:
(a) If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion
on the part of the Labor Arbiter;
(b) If the decision, order or award was secured through
fraud and coercion, including graft and corruption;
(c) If made purely on questions of law; and
(d) If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised
which would cause grave or irreparable damage or
injury to the appellant.
In case of a judgement involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer mat be perfected only upon the
posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in
the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgement appealed from. (Emphasis ours)
It is clear from the aforementioned provision of the law
that the appeal of any decision, award or order of a
labor arbiter should be made within 10 days from
receipt of said decision, award or order and in cases
where the judgement involves a monetary award, the
appeal is deemed perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond also within 10 days from receipt of
the order. Such mandatory periods are imposed to
prevent needless delays and to insure the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business.
In the case at bar, petitioner received a copy of the
decision of the Labor Arbiter on December 4, 1989.
Immediately thereafter, or on December 5, 1989
petitioners filed their appeal without the necessary
supersedeas bond which should have been filed
simultaneously with the notice of appeal to perfect the
same.
Public respondent instead of dismissing right away the
appeal of petitioner issued an Order directing the
petitioners to file a supersedeas bond within ten (10)
days from receipt of the Order, and which the latter
received on April 26, 1990. Consequently, petitioners
have until May 6, 1990 within which to file the
supersedeas bond. This they did not do. What they did
was to file a motion for extension of ten (10) days from
May 6, 1990 or up to May 16, 1990. No action was
taken on the motion in view of Section 6, Rule VIII of the
Revised Rules of the NLRC which provides:
No extension of period. No motion for extension of the
period within which to perfect an appeal shall be
entertained. (p. 5, Memo of Private Respondent)
Petitioners filed their supersedeas bond only on May
15, 1990 or nineteen (19) days from receipt of the
Order. Aside from the more than four months that the
appeal was pending without the required supersedeas
bond, petitioners were still given a ten day period by
the public respondent in its order of April 25, 1990.
On the contrary, public respondent was more than
lenient to petitioners. Besides, up to this point in time,
private respondent has not been reinstated by the
petitioners to his former position as mandated by
Article 223, paragraph 3 of the Labor Code as amended,
which states:
In any event the decision of the Labor Arbiter
reinstating a dismissed or separated employee insofar
as the reinstatement aspect is concerned shall
immediately be executory, even pending appeal.
The perfection of an appeal within the reglementary
period from the decision is jurisdictional. To extend the
period of the appeal is to delay the case, a circumstance
which would give the employer the chance to wear out
the efforts and meager resources of the worker to the
point that the latter is constrained to give up for less
than what is due him. At any rate, we find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent
which "implies such capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction."
Union of Filipino Workers vs. NLRC
221 SCRA 26 (1993)
FACTS:
Petitioner Union of Filipino Workers (UFW) is the
certified bargaining agent of the rank and file
employees of private respondent Makati Sports Club,
Inc. Private respondent Club is a non-stock, non-profit
and non-commercial private membership club whose
primary objective is to provide athletic facilities.
Petitioner and private respondent were negotiating for
a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) when two
notable events happened. Private respondents
clubhouse burned down on April 1, 1989, resulting in
the threat of retrenchment. The government also
announced the imminent passage of a P25.00 daily
wage increase for the private sector employees. When
negotiations reached a deadlock, petitioner filed a
notice of strike. The National Conciliation and
Mediation Board intervened and conciliation
proceedings went underway.
On June 19, 1989, the proposed CBA based on the
foregoing agreement was approved by private
respondents Board of Directors and signed by the
parties on June 22, 1989. It provides an across the
board salary increase of 300 pesos to all regular
employees.
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6727 took effect. It
provided for a P25.00 daily wage increase across-the-
board to those receiving P100.00 or less daily wages.
Private respondent applied the aforequoted rule in
crediting the P300.00 monthly wage increase per
employee provided in their CBA to the wage increase
provided for by Rep. Act No. 6727. The separation pay
of the retrenched employees was computed on the
basis of their basic pay, which included the P300.00 CBA
wage increase, but did not include the wage increase
granted under Rep. Act No. 6727.
Petitioner protested the crediting of the CBA increases
to the legislated increases. It filed a complaint for
violation of Rep. Act No. 6727 and underpayment of
separation pay.[8] Petitioner claims that under section 4
(d) of Rep. Act No. 6727 and Section 8 (a) of the Rules
and Regulations implementing said law, crediting of CBA
wage increases to the compliance of Rep. Act No. 6727
is allowed where the following conditions are met,
namely: a) the CBA expressly provides for crediting; and
b) the wage increases must have been granted within
three (3) months prior to the effectivity of the Act or
within the period from April 1, 1989 to July 1, 1989.
petitioner claims that the CBA wage increase of P300.00
for the year 1989 cannot be validly credited as in
compliance with the increase prescribed under Rep. Act
No. 6727. The crediting made by private respondent
was therefore illegal, and resulted in an erroneous
computation of the separation pay for the retrenched
employees.
That the CBA wage increases, having been granted on
June 19, 1989, when the same was approved by private
respondents Board of Directors, although made
retroactive to January 1, 1989, still falls within the
period of crediting under Republic Act No. 6727.
Therefore, its act of crediting the CBA increase to the
legislated increase is legal and the computation of
separation pay valid and correct.
LA Ruled in favor of the petitioner union.
NLRC reversed LAs decision.
ISSUE:
WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
NO. The fact that the CBA wage increase was made
effective on January 1, 1989 does not necessarily mean
that the wage increase was granted on that date and
not on the date of its signing.Before the CBA was
signed, there was no wage increase to speak of.
Hence it is only logical that the grant of the wage
increase by the CBA, is considered to have been made
at the time the CBA was signed on June 22, 1989.
As to the issue of of underpayment of separation pay,
NLRC was incorrect. Therefore, Private respondent is
ordered to re-compute the separation pay of the
retrenched employees using the basic pay as of July 22,
1989 as basis, subject to the crediting of the CBA
monthly wage increase of P300.00.
STAR ANGEL HANDICRAFT VS. NLRC
G.R. No. 108914 September 20, 1994
FACTS:
Spouses Helen and Jolito Frivaldos filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against the petitioner for illegal
dismissal, underpayment of wages, overtime pay,
premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest day,
service incentive leave pay and thirteenth-month pay.
By agreement of the parties, private respondents were
allowed to report back for work, leaving only the money
claims for the determination of the Labor Arbiter
Private respondents filed their position paper but
petitioner failed to submit despite several directives.
Therefore, the case was submitted for resolution.
On August 7, petitioner filed a motion to admit its
position paper with the supporting documents.
On August 19, petitioner received a copy of the decision
rendered by the Labor Arbiter dated July 22, 1992. In
the decision, the money claims were resolved in favor of
private respondents with Helen Fribaldos receiving an
award of P45,347.00 and Jolito Fribaldos an award of
P48,125.00, or a total sum of P93,472.00.
Petitioner filed for MR but was denied hence, they
appealed to the NLRC with an Urgent Motion to Reduce
Bond, alleging as grounds grave abuse of discretion
committed by the Labor Arbiter in computing the award
of the claims based on an erroneous applicable, daily-
minimum wage for the handicraft establishment.
NRLC dismissed the appeal without resolving the
motion to reduce bond for their failure to pay the
security bond required.
ISSUE:
WON NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
RULING:
YES. There is a clear distinction between the filing of an
appeal within the reglementary period and its
perfection. The latter may transpire after the end of the
reglementary period for filing the appeal.
the Labor Code nor its implementing rules specifically
provide for a situation where the appellant moves for a
reduction of the appeal bond.
Inasmuch as in practice the NLRC allows the reduction
of the appeal bond upon motion of appellant and on
meritorious grounds, it follows that a motion to that
effect may be filed within the reglementary period for
appealing. Such motion may be filed in lieu of a bond
which amount is being contested. In the meantime, the
appeal is not deemed perfected and the Labor Arbiter
retains jurisdiction over the case until the NLRC has
acted on the motion and appellant has filed the bond as
fixed by the NLRC.
An analogous procedure is the extension of time to file
a record on appeal, provided the motion for such
extension is filed before the expiration of the
reglementary period for filing said record on appeal. If
the order of the trial court granting the motion is issued
only after the expiration of the original period, the
appeal may still be perfected within the period
extended . Likewise, the appeal is deemed perfected
only after the approval of the record on appeal and not
upon the filing of said record on appeal.
Thus, SC set aside NRLCs decision and directed NLRC to
act on the motion for the reduction of the appeal bond
and to accept the appeal of petitioner after the filing of
the appropriate appeal bond.
PANUNCILLO VS. CAP PHILIPPINES
(GR NO. 161305, February 9, 2007)
FACTS:
Milagros Panuncillo was hired as Office Senior Clerk by
CAP Philippines Inc. In order to secure the education of
her son, Panuncillo procured an educational plan which
she had fully paid but which she later sold to Josefina
Pernes for P37,000. Before the actual transfer of the
plan could be effected, however, Panuncillo pledged it
for P50,000 to John Chua who, however, sold it to
Benito Bonghanoy. Bonghanoy in turn sold the plan to
Gaudioso R. Uy for P60,000.
Having gotten wind of the transactions subsequent to
her purchase of the plan, Josefina informed CAP
Philippines Inc. that Panuncillo had "swindled" her but
that she was willing to settle the case amicably as long
as Panuncillo will pay the amount involved and the
interest.
CAP Philippines Inc. subsequently terminated the
services of Panuncillo. Panuncillo sought
reconsideration of her dismissal, but CAP Philippines
Inc. denied the same. Panuncillo thus filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal, 13th month pay, service incentive
leave pay, damages and attorneys fees against CAP
Philippines Inc.
The Labor Arbiter, while finding that the dismissal was
for a valid cause, found the same too harsh. He thus
ordered the reinstatement of Panuncillo to a position
one rank lower than her previous position. On appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It held that
Panuncillos dismissal was illegal and accordingly
ordered her reinstatement to her former position.
CAP Philippines Inc. challenged the NLRC Decision
before the appellate court via Petition for Certiorari.
The appellate court reversed the NLRC Decision and
held that the dismissal was valid and that CAP
Philippines Inc. complied with the procedural
requirements of due process. Hence, the present
petition.
Panuncillo argued that even if the order of
reinstatement of the NLRC was reversed on appeal, it is
still obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate
and pay the wages of a dismissed employee during the
period of appeal, citing Roquero vs. PAL, the 3rd
paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code, and the last
paragraph of Section 16, Rule V of the then 1990 New
Rules of Procedures of NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reinstatement aspect of the NLRCs
decision is immediately executory even pending appeal
before the higher courts.
RULING:
The SC held in negative. As cited in Roquero case, it
reiterated that Article 223 (3rd paragraph) provides that
an order of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is
immediately executory even pending appeal. It likewise
cited the provision in the 6th paragraph of the same
Article which provides that NLRCs decision becomes
final and executory after ten calendar days from receipt
of the decision by the parties for the reinstatement.
In view of Article 224 of the Labor Code which provides,
in part:
(a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or any
Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter,
or med-arbiter or voluntary arbitrator may, motu
proprio or on motion of any interested party, issue a
writ of execution on a judgment within five (5) years
from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring
a sheriff or a duly deputized officer to execute or
enforce final decisions, orders or awards of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment or regional director,
the Commission, the Labor Arbiter or med-arbiter, or
voluntary arbitrators.
The SC held that there was a still a need for the issuance
of a writ of execution of the NRLC decision. It stated in
Pioneer Texturizing Corp. v. NLRC that unlike the order
for reinstatement of a Labor Arbiter which is self-
executory, that of the NLRC is not.
It further discussed that the legislative intent of Article
223 is quite obvious i.e., to make an award of
reinstatement immediately enforceable, even pending
appeal. To require the application for and issuance of a
writ of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a
reinstatement award would certainly betray and run
counter to the very object and intent of said Article. The
reason is simple. An application for a writ of execution
and its issuance could be delayed for numerous
reasons. A mere continuance or postponement of a
scheduled hearing, for instance, or an inaction on the
part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay
the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the
strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article
223. In other words, if the requirements of Article 224
[including the issuance of a writ of execution] were to
govern, as we so declared in Maranaw, then the
executory nature of a reinstatement order or award
contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly
circumscribed and rendered ineffectual.
COURT OF APPEALS
ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES VS. NLRC
(295 SCRA 494 [1998])
FACTS:
Private respondent, BienvenidoAricayos, alleges that he
started working as Operations Manager of petitioner St.
Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However,
there was no contract of employment executed
between him and petitioner nor was his name included
in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he
was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for
payment by petitioner of its value added tax (VAT) to
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of
AmelitaMalabed, the owner of petitioner St. Martins
Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent,
who was formerly working as an overseas contract
worker, asked for financial assistance from the mother
of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of gratitude,
private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of
Amelita in overseeing the business.
In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so
the latter took over the management of the business.
She then discovered that there were arrears in the
payment of taxes and other government fees, although
the records purported to show that the same were
already paid. Amelita then made some changes in the
business operation and private respondent and his wife
were no longer allowed to participate in the
management thereof. As a consequence, the latter filed
a complaint charging that petitioner had illegally
terminated his employment.
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor
arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner on
October 25, 1996 declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and, therefore,
his office had no jurisdiction over the case.
Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent
appealed to the NLRC contending that the labor arbiter
erred (1) in not giving credence to the evidence
submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a
volunteer and not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral
Home from February 6, 1995 to January 23, 1996, or a
period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there
was no employer-employee relationship between him
and petitioner.
On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution
setting aside the questioned decision and remanding
the case to the labor arbiter for immediate appropriate
proceedings.
Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August
18, 1997 for lack of merit, hence the present petition
alleging that the NLRC committed grave abuse of
discretion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the jurisdiction over a petition for
certiorari assailing the decision of the NLRC is conferred
only upon the Supreme Court.
RULING:
The SC ruled that the CA has jurisdiction over a petition
for certiorari concerning the decision of the NLRC. In
holding such, it delved into the legal history of the
NLRC.
The NLRC was first established in the Department of
Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its
decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to
the Secretary of Labor and, ultimately, to the President
of the Philippines.
P.D. No. 442, the Labor Code of the Philippines, created
and regulated the present NLRC which was attached to
the Department of Labor and Employment for program
and policy coordination only. Initially, Article 302 (now,
Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved party the
remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the
Secretary of Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently
amended said provision and abolished such appeals. No
appellate review has since then been provided for.
Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law,
there is no provision for appeals from the decision of
the NLRC. The present Section 223, as last amended by
Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides
that the Commission shall decide all cases within twenty
days from receipt of the answer of the appellee, and
that such decision shall be final and executory after ten
calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.
When the issue was raised in an early case on the
argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to review
the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the Secretary
of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate
review thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that
thesis. It held that there is an underlying power of the
courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right
of review is given by statute; that the purpose of judicial
review is to keep the administrative agency within its
jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the
parties; and that it is that part of the checks and
balances which restricts the separation of powers and
forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.
Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by
subsequent decisions of this Court, the remedy of the
aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy, and then seasonably avail of the
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, for which
said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty
days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although
the 10-day period for finality of the decision of the NLRC
may already have lapsed as contemplated in Section
223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court
may still take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on
jurisdictional and due process considerations if filed
within the reglementary period under Rule 65.
Sec. 9 (3) of B.P. No. 129, as amended, provides that the
Court of Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts
and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, including the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Social Security Commission, the
Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission, except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
This would necessarily contradict what has been ruled
and said all along that appeal does not lie from
decisions of the NLRC. Yet, under such excepting clause
literally construed, the appeal from the NLRC cannot be
brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by
necessary implication. The same exceptive clause
further confuses the situation by declaring that the
Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over
decisions falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the
provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.This is illogical
and impracticable, and Congress could not have
intended that procedural gaffe, since there are no cases
in the Labor Code the decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court or of any other court for that
matter.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that
ever since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court
were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that
the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto
and in the instances we have noted could have been a
lapsusplumae because appeals by certiorari and the
original action for certiorari are both modes of judicial
review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the
Court is particularly concerned here is that the special
civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original
jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals;[23]
whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not
subserve, but would subvert, the intention of Congress
as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill
No. 1495.
Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of
B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the
Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to
mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance
of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired.
ABS-CBN SUPERVISORS EMPLOYEES UNION MEMBERS
VS ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (304 SCRA
489 [1999])
FACTS:
On December 7, 1989, the ABS-CBN Supervisors
Employees Union and ABS-CBN Broadcasting
Corporation signed and concluded a CBA with the
following check-off provision, to wit: "ARTICLE XII The
Company agrees to advance to the Union a sum
equivalent to 10% of the sum total of all the salary
increases and signing bonuses granted to the
Supervisors under this collective Bargaining Agreement
and upon signing hereof to cover the Unions incidental
expenses, including attorneys fees and representation
expenses for its organization and such advance shall be
deducted from the benefits granted herein as they
accrue."
On September 19, 1990, Petitioners filed with the BLR
DOLE-NCR, Quezon City, a Complaint against the Union
Officers and MANAGEMENT, praying that:
1. the special assessment of ten percent (10%) of
the sum total of all salary increases and signing bonuses
granted by respondent Company to the members of the
Union be declared illegal for failure to comply with the
Labor Code, as amended, particularly Article 241,
paragraphs (g), (n), and (o); and in utter violation of the
Constitution and By-Laws of the ABS-CBN Supervisors
Employees Union;
2. Respondent Company be ordered to suspend
further deductions from petitioners salaries for their
shares thereof.
In their Answers, respondent prayed for the dismissal of
the Complaint for lack of merit. They argued that the
check-off provision is in accordance with law as majority
of the Union members individually executed a written
authorization giving the Union officers and the
Company a blanket authority to deduct subject amount.
On January 21, 1991, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah
issued an Order declaring, among others, that the check
off was illegal. On appeal, the DOLE thru Usec.
Laguesma affirmed in toto the decision of the Med-
Arbiter. However, upon Motion for Reconsideration by
the respondent Union, Usec Laguesma on July 31, 1992
reversed its previous decision on July 1, 1991 and
entered a new decision dismissing the
Complaint/Petition for lack of merit.
Hence, the present petition seeking to annul and set
aside the above-cited Order of public respondent
Undersecretary B.E. Laguesma, for being allegedly
tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction.
Petitioners claimed that the Decision of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment dated July 1, 1991, affirming in
toto the Order of Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah dated
January 31, 1991, cannot be a subject of a motion for
reconsideration because it is final and unappealable
pursuant to Section 8, Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rule Implementing the Labor Code. It is further argued
that the only remedy of the respondent Union Officers
is to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court.
Section 8, Rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code, provides:
"The Secretary shall have fifteen (15) calendar days
within which to decide the appeal from receipt of the
records of the case. The decision of the Secretary shall
be final and inappealable."
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Motion for Reconsideration is
necessary before a Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court can be availed of.
RULING:
The SC ruled that the aforecited provision cannot be
construed to mean that the Decision of the public
respondent cannot be reconsidered since the same is
reviewable by writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. As a rule, the law requires a motion for
reconsideration to enable the public respondent to
correct his mistakes, if any.
Citing Pearl S. Buck Foundation, Inc., vs. NLRC, it
declared that before a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court may be availed of, the filing of a
motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non
to afford an opportunity for the correction of the error
or mistake complained of.
So also, considering that a decision of the Secretary of
Labor is subject to judicial review only through a special
civil action of certiorari and, as a rule, cannot be
resorted to without the aggrieved party having
exhausted administrative remedies through a motion
for reconsideration, the aggrieved party, must be
allowed to move for a reconsideration of the same so
that he can bring a special civil action for certiorari
before the Supreme Court.
VELOSO VS CHINA AIRLINES Ltd.
G.R. No. 104302. July 14, 1999
FACTS:
Veloso was employed as supervisor of the ticketing
section at the Manila branch office of respondent China
Airlines Ltd. (CAL). At the ticketing section, petitioner
was assisted by a senior ticketing agent, Eleanor Go;
and two ticketing agents, Julie Chua and Josephine
Lobendino.
On October 29, 1986, private respondent K.Y. Chang,
then district manager of the Manila branch office of
CAL, informed Veloso that management had decided to
temporarily close its ticketing section in order to
prevent further losses. Velosos three assistants were
likewise notified that they too will be temporarily laid
off from employment effective October 30, 1986.
Thereafter, CAL decided to permanently close said
ticketing section. Thus, on November 5, 1986, Veloso
and her staff members were informed that their recent
lay-off from employment will be considered permanent,
effective one month from receipt of such notice. A
notice of said retrenchment was filed with the labor
department on November 11, 1986.
Later, Veloso was advised to claim her retirement pay
and other benefits. Feeling aggrieved, Veloso sent a
letter to private respondent Chang assailing the validity
of her termination from the service.
On July 1, 1987, petitioner filed with the Arbitration
Branch of NLRC a complaint for unfair labor practice and
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement, payment
of backwages, damages and attorney's fees.[1]
In a decision dated June 8, 1990, the labor arbiter ruled
in favor of petitioner and decreed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Declaring respondents China Airlines, Inc. and K. Y.
Chang guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering them
to cease and desist from further committing said acts or
similar acts of unfair labor practice/s;
(2) Declaring the dismissal of complainant Rebecca
Veloso as illegal and ordering respondents China
Airlines, Inc. and K. Y. Chang to reinstate her to her
former position, or to a substantially equivalent
position, without loss of seniority rights and to pay her,
jointly and severally, backwages from the time she was
effectively dismissed on October 29, 1986 until June 8,
1990, the date of this Decision and other benefits which
she would have had received had she not been illegally
dismissed, in the amount as set forth below;
(3) Ordering respondents to pay, jointly and severally,
complainant, within ten (10) days from receipt of this
Decision the total sum of FOUR MILLION THREE
HUNDRED TWENTY SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
TWENTY (P4,326,520.00) PESOS broken as follows:
(a) P731,560.00 - representing her back monthly salary
in the amount of P16,440.00 from October 29, 1986 and
every month thereafter until June 8, 1990, the date of
Decision;
(b) P65,760.00 - representing her 13th month pay in the
amount of P16,440.00 per year for the years 1986,1987,
1988 and 1989;
(c) P24,600.00 - representing her Mid-year bonus in the
amount of P8,200.00 per year for the years 1987, 1988
and 1989;
(d) P8,000.00 - representing the cash equivalent of her
yearly medical hospitalization benefits in the amount of
P2,000.00 per year for the years 1986, 1987 and 1989;
(e) P6,600.00 - representing her monthly transportation
allowance of P150.00 per month beginning October
1986 and every month thereafter until June 6, 1990, the
date of this Decision;
(f) P2,000,000.00 - as moral damages;
(g) P1,000,000.00 - as exemplary damages
(h) P240,000.00 - as attorney's fees, and
(i) P10,000.00 - as litigation expenses.
(4) Further, respondent are hereby directed to show,
within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision, proof
of compliance as to the reinstate aspect of this Decision
as compulsorily mandated under the Labor Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 6715. SO ORDERED."
Dissatisfied with the above judgment, private
respondents appealed to the NLRC which in its
resolution dated January 2, 1992, set aside the decision
of the labor arbiter. According to public respondent, the
charge of unfair labor practice had no factual and legal
basis. It noted that petitioner was not an elective officer
of the union; and she was just an adviser with no formal
designation. The labor tribunal also observed that only
those in the ticketing section were affected by the
retrenchment program and not one of the elective
union officers were laid off. Hence, public respondent
declared that dismissing a union adviser while retaining
all union officers is far from any intent to bust the
union. Accordingly, public respondent ruled that the
retrenchment was validly effected and disposed of the
case as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from dated June 8,
1990, is hereby set aside. The respondent are however
directed to pay the complainant the sum of P428,895.04
as her retrenchment pay. SO ORDERED."
Veloso received copy of the aforesaid resolution of
public respondent on January 7, 1992. However, instead
of filing the required motion for reconsideration,
petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not filing of petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 without first moving for reconsideration of the
assailed resolution warrants the outright dismissal of
this case.
RULING :
A motion for reconsideration is indispensable, for it
affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or
mistakes it might have committed before resort to the
courts can be had.
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law against acts of public
respondent. In this case, the plain and adequate remedy
expressly provided by law is a motion for
reconsideration of the impugned resolution, to be made
under oath and filed within ten (10) days from receipt of
the questioned resolution of the NLRC, a procedure
which is jurisdictional Hence, the filing of the petition
for certiorari in this case is patently violative of
prevailing jurisprudence and will not prosper without
undue damage to the fundamental doctrine that
undergirds the grant of this prerogative writ.
Further, it should be stressed that without a motion for
reconsideration seasonably filed within the ten-day
reglementary period, an order, decision or resolution of
the NLRC, becomes final and executory after ten (10)
calendar days from receipt thereof.
Hence, the resolution of the NLRC had become final and
executory on January 17, 1992, insofar as petitioner is
concerned, because she admits under oath having
received notice thereof on January 7, 1992. The merits
of her case may no longer be reviewed to determine if
the public respondent might be faulted for grave abuse
of discretion, as alleged in her petition dated March 14,
1992. Thus, the court has no recourse but to sustain the
respondent's position on jurisdictional and other
grounds, that the petition ought not be given due
course and the case should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
ESCORPIZO VS UNIVERSITY OF BAGUIO
G.R. No. 121962. April 30, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Esperanza Escorpizo was initially hired by
respondent university on June 13, 1989 as a high school
classroom teacher. Under the rules of the respondent
university, appointment to teach during the first two
years at the university is probationary in nature. During
the probation period, the teacher is observed and
evaluated to determine his competency.Attainment of a
permanent status by a faculty member is conditioned
upon compliance with certain requirements, such as
passing the professional board examination for teachers
(PBET).
On March 18, 1991, respondent university informed
Escorpizo that her employment was being terminated at
the end of the school semester in view of her failure to
pass the PBET. But before the start of the school year
1991-1992, Escorpizo reapplied and pleaded that she be
given another chance. She told the respondent school
that she had just taken the PBET and hoped to pass it.
As Escorpizos appeal was favorably considered, she was
allowed to teach during the school year 1991-1992.
However, her continued employment was conditioned
on her passing the PBET. Unfortunately, Escorpizo failed
again. Undaunted, Escorpizo took the examination a
third time in November 1991. At the end of the school
year 1991-1992, respondent university evaluated the
teachers performance to determine who would be in
the list for the next school year. Escorpizo, not having
passed the PBET yet, was not included.
Much later, on June 8, 1992, the results of the PBET
were released and this time Escorpizo passed said
examination. Nevertheless, on June 15, 1992,
respondent university no longer renewed Escorpizos
contract of employment on the ground that she failed
to qualify as a regular teacher. This prompted Escorpizo
to file on July 16, 1992 a complaint for illegal dismissal,
payment of backwages and reinstatement against
private respondents.
On June 22, 1993, the labor arbiter ruled that
respondent university had a permissible reason in not
renewing the employment contract of Escorpizo.[2]
Nevertheless, the labor official ordered the
reinstatement of Escorpizo and disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE, evidence and law considered, the
respondents are hereby directed to cause the
immediate reinstatement of the complainant but
without backwages, and to extend to her regular status.
Dissatisfied with the decision there being no award of
backwages, Escorpizo appealed to the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC). But in its assailed
Resolution[4] dated May 31, 1995, the NLRC dismissed
said appeal and affirmed the labor arbiters decision.
Instead of filing the required motion for
reconsideration, petitioners filed this instant petition[5]
imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent in affirming the decision of the labor
arbiter.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the outright dismissal of this case does
not constitute grave abuse of discretion.
HELD:
It is settled that certiorari will lie only if there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law against acts of public
respondents. In the case at bar, the plain and adequate
remedy expressly provided by law was a motion for
reconsideration of the impugned resolution, based on
palpable or patent errors, to be made under oath and
filed within ten (10) days from receipt of the questioned
resolution of the NLRC, a procedure which is
jurisdictional. Hence, original action of certiorari, as in
this case, will not prosper.Further, it should be stressed
that without a motion for reconsideration seasonably
filed within the ten-day reglementary period, the
questioned order, resolution or decision of NLRC,
becomes final and executory after ten (10) calendar
days from receipt thereof. Consequently, the merits of
the case can no longer be reviewed to determine if the
public respondent had committed any grave abuse of
discretion.
A motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it
affords the NLRC an opportunity to rectify errors or
mistakes it might have committed before resort to the
courts can be had.
Saldana vs CA
G.R. No. 88889 October 11, 1990
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Saldana was charged with the crime
of estafa under the following information:
That on or about and during the periods comprised of
from April, 1982 to December, 1983 in the Municipality
of Pasig, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being then a Collecting Officer of the Valle
Verde Bagong Lipunan Community Association, Inc.,
represented by Miguel Roberto and Mercedes Tan,
President and Director, respectively, and as such, she
was authorized to collect from the members of the
association payments representing their amortization
dues and other association fees, received from the
members the amount of P642,538.00 with the
obligation on the part of the accused to remit said
collections to the said association, but the accused once
in possession of the said amount, far from complying
with her obligation, with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to her
own personal use and benefit the amount of
P642,538.00 and despite demands to remit and/or turn
over the said collections, she failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice
of the offended party in the aforementioned amount of
P642,538.00. (Emphasis supplied; pp. 4-5, Rollo.)
The petitioner pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
At the trial on May 27, 1986, the prosecution presented
Mercedes Tan, vice-president of the complainant
Association, as its witness. She Identified certain
exhibits, including a Consolidated Financial Report
dated February 24, 1984 allegedly submitted by the
petitioner to the Association. The report showed that
petitioner had collected a total of P2,855,133.93 as
occupancy fees and association dues from members of
the Association and disbursed P1,915,719.50 from April
25, 1982 to December 31, 1983, leaving a balance of
P939,414.43. She issued three (3) checks to cover the
balance, one of which, for P 642,538.86, bounced, and
became the subject of Crim. Case No. 64758.
On June 13, 1986, the trial court, upon request of the
prosecution, issued a subpoena duces tecum and ad
testificandum ordering the Manager of the Citytrust
Banking Corporation, Ortigas Branch, to appear and
testify on June 17, 1986. The Manager was also required
to bring the ledger of Current Account No. 32-00066-9
for the period of March 1, 1982 to March 1, 1984, the
signature card for the account, the Board resolution
authorizing the opening of the account, and the deposit
slips of the account for the period of March 1, 1982 to
March 1, 1984. The People and the Association alleged
that the account was opened by the Association and the
petitioner was instructed to deposit her collections
therein.
The Bank Manager did not come to court on June 17,
1986. The prosecution asked that a show-cause order
be issued to him. In the meantime, the prosecution
called Linel Garcia Cuevas to testify that as a member of
the Association she paid her amortizations and
association dues to the petitioner, and to Identify the
receipts issued to her by the petitioner. The defense
objected to the presentation of Cuevas because she was
not the offended party. The trial judge sustained the
objection, ruling that "granting that she (accused)
received the money from the members and did not give
the amount to the Corporation, it should be the
individual members who will file the necessary
complaint, not the corporation." (p. 8, Rollo.)
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution. Memoranda were submitted by both sides.
The trial was reset. At the prosecution's behest, another
subpoena was served on the Bank Manager to bring the
records of Current Account No. 32-00066-9 for the
hearing on July 29, 1986, but he again failed to appear
in court. The prosecution manifested that it had a ready
witness and other evidence besides. However, the court
reset the trial because the prosecution's motion for
reconsideration of the court's order sustaining the
defense' objection to Cuevas' testimony, was still
unresolved.
On August 8, 1986, the prosecution received a copy of
the accused's "Motion to Consider the Prosecution to
Have Rested Its Case and to Dismiss the Case for
Insufficiency of Evidence." The prosecution promptly
opposed it.
At the hearing of the motion to dismiss, the prosecution
informed the court that it had other witnesses to
present and that it would file a petition for certiorari
should the trial court deny its pending motion for
reconsideration of the order disallowing Cuevas, and
other association members from testifying.
On September 9, 1986, the court denied the
prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the order
barring Cuevas and other members of the Association
from testifying. The court also terminated the
presentation of further evidence for the prosecution
and dismissed the information for insufficiency of
evidence.
The People elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on
a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 10227).
On February 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted the
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in granting the petition for
certiorari despite the failure of the prosecution to file a
motion for reconsideration of the questioned order of
dismissal of September 9, 1986 of the trial court.
Ruling:
The prosecution's failure to file a motion for
reconsideration in the trial court before commencing
certiorari proceedings in the Court of Appeals, was not
fatal to the petition for this rule does not apply "where
the proceeding in which the error occurred is a patent
nullity," or "where the deprivation of petitioner's
fundamental right to due process taints the proceedings
against him in the court below not only with irregularly
but nullity," or "when special circumstances warrant
immediate and more direct action" (Matute vs. CA, 26
SCRA 768). Since the prosecution was deprived of due
process, the case is an exception to the rule requiring a
previous motion for reconsideration before a petition
for certiorari may be filed.
AQUINO VS NLRC
G.R.No.98108.September 3,1993
FACTS:
It appears that petitioner filed before the Labor Arbiter
a complaint for illegal dismissal against private
respondent. He alleged that he was removed from the
payroll in January 1987 and was not paid his salary.
Private respondent answered that petitioner had
abandoned his work after he was held accountable for
advances amounting to P48,921.94.
On May 30, 1990, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision,
finding petitioners dismissal as illegal.
The counsel for private respondent received a copy of
the decision. The counsel, however, filed the appeal two
days beyond the reglementary period. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the appeal and for the issuance of
writ of execution.
Finding that the Labor Arbiter did not abuse his
discretion in rendering his decision and that private
respondent failed to file a cash or surety bond to
perfect its appeal, the NLRC dismissed the appeal in a
Resolution. However, upon motion of private
respondent, the NLRC set aside the aforementioned
resolution. Petitioner, alleging grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
NLRC, filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court. The NLRC, aside from
justifying its reversal of the February 18, Resolution,
questioned the propriety of the filing of the petition for
certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the special civil action for certiorari can
be availed without first filing a motion for
reconsideration in the NLRC.
HELD: On the procedural issues raised, we hold that
where an interlocutory order was allegedly issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, such order may be questioned before this
Court on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. To delay the review of the order
until the appeal from the decision of the main case,
would not afford the party adversely affected by the
said order a speedy, plain and adequate remedy.
Regarding the failure of petitioner to file a motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC, such failure may be
excused where the order sought to be reviewed is a
patent nullity.
ZURBANO VS NLRC
G.R. No. L-103679 December 17, 1993
FACTS:
The records show that petitioner Zurbano worked for
the Legazpi City office of the private respondent
corporation (San Miguel Corporation, or SMC for short)
from 1958 to 1969 as a casual truck helper, and then
from 1969 to 1985, as a regular truck helper. In 1980,
the petitioner was hospitalized a number of times for
the following illnesses and work-related accidents: a
cyst in his right breast which had to be surgically
removed; ruptured surgical stitches arising directly from
his work; flu and coughs; typhoid fever; and, injuries
sustained after being hit on the head by a falling
coconut while performing his work. After that year,
petitioner did not go on sick leave again until 1983,
when he had to be treated for facial injuries which he
sustained during another work-related accident.
As found by Labor Arbiter Fructuoso T. Aurellano
which finding was left undisturbed by public respondent
Commission petitioner Zurbano was summoned by
private respondent Honasan (SMC's Sales Manager in
Legazpi City and petitioner's immediate superior) and
one Mr. Jingco (an SMC personnel officer from Manila)
at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening on May 7, 1985.
During that meeting, the following conversation took
place:
Mr. Jingco: Sa loob ng labing-anim na taon, and naiwan
mong sick leave ay kukunti, nangangahulugang
masakitin ka. Kaya inoobliga ka ng kompanya na mag-
retiro na.
Mr. Zurbano: Paano ang pamilya ko?
Mr. Honasan: Paano ang San Miguel? Ang offer ko sa iyo
kung pipirma ka ngayon para sa retirement, bibigyan ka
ng 150% additional na 50% sa 100%. Kung ayaw mong
mag-retiro, hahanapin kita ng butas, ng kasalanan. Wala
ka pang makukuha, tatanggalin ka pa. Hindi tulad kung
pipirma ka, 150% ang matatanggap mo at ang anak mo
ang papalit sa iyo. Iyon isa mo pang anak na tapos ng
Accounting ay tutulungan namin na makapasok sa San
Miguel.
Allegedly due to his fear of the power and influence of
Honasan and Jingco, and because the meeting was held
inside Honasan's office at 10 o'clock in the evening,
petitioner capitulated to the demand of the two men.
He signed the previously prepared retirement letter
provided by the two SMC officers.
Petitioner then received a total of SEVENTY-SIX
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED ONE PESOS AND EIGHTY-
EIGHT CENTAVOS (P76,501.88) from private respondent
corporation. Thereafter, he signed two quitclaims
entitled "Receipt and Release" in favor of the private
respondent corporation.
Before the lapse of a year, petitioner filed against
private respondents SMC and Honasan an action for
illegal dismissal, unfair labor practice, and damages with
the National Labor Relations Commission Regional
Arbitration Branch No. 5 in Legazpi City. 2 He alleged
that he was intimidated into signing his retirement
letter on the evening of May 7, 1985, and that neither
his son nor his daughter was employed by respondent
SMC after his retirement.
Private respondents mainly set forth the defenses of
denial 3 and estoppel before the Labor Arbiter. They
urged that petitioner was estopped from questioning
the validity of his retirement benefits from the
corporation, and had signed quitclaims in its favor. They
also contended that the harmonious relationship
between the corporation and the petitioner prompted
him to opt for early retirement.
On November 26, 1990, Labor Arbiter Aurellano decided
in favor of petition Zurbano to his former, or to a
substantially equivalent position in Legazpi City, without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and pay
P80,083.00 as backwages, P12,930.00 as cost of living
allowance, P3,260.70 as premium pay for holidays,
P6,673.59 as 13th month pay, P4,891.05 as sick leave,
P20,868.84 as sales commission, and P30,000.00 as
damages." The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner
signed the retirement letter due to force, intimidation,
threats and undue influence.
Private respondents appealed to the respondent
Commission. 4 On September 16, 1991, the respondent
NLRC's Third Division promulgated the impugned
Decision which set aside that of Labor Arbiter Aurellano,
and dismissed herein petitioner's complaint against
SMC for lack of merit. In
a majority decision, the respondent Commission,
through Commissioners Lourdes C. Javier and Ireneo B.
Bernardo, held:
While it appears that complainant (Zurbano) may have
been "pressured" to retire by his immediate supervisor
such pressure could not really vitiate his consent. As a
regular employee for a number of years, complainant
must know that he cannot be dismissed at the whim
and caprice of respondent Honasan. The law provides
him security of tenure. Moreover, it has to be stressed
that complainant was offered, and in fact had accepted
and had received a retirement package consisting of
150% retirement pay plus other benefits which totalled
to P76,501.88 . . . . He even executed quitclaims and
release relative thereto. Comparatively speaking,
respondents' package of retirement was way above the
ordinary retirement benefits granted to workers which
is usually one-half month for every year of service.
Hence, it is no far fetched (sic) that complainant was
enticed by the retirement offered by respondent. Stated
differently, complainant's main consideration for
retirement was respondent's retirement package. For if
not, why then did it take him time to question the
validity of his retirement. As the records show, he had
already received all the retirement benefits before he
instituted the present action.
We likewise see no fraud to have been committed by
respondents when Honasan allegedly promised
complainant to take his son as his replacement in the
company. The non-fulfillment of the same, to Our mind,
does not constitute fraud that would warrant the nullity
of complainant's retirement. It is more of breach of
promise and, the same will not alter the validity of
complainant's retirement. For, it cannot be said that the
aforesaid alleged promise of Honasan was the only
driving force that led complainant to retire. As earlier
stated, the attractive retirement package was the more
compelling reason for complainant's retirement.
The third member of the NLRC's Third Division,
Commissioner Rogelio Rayala, dissented. He opined that
the mere finding of "pressure" exerted on Zurbano by
Honasan and Jingco connotes involuntariness of
Zurbano's consent to his optional retirement.
Furthermore, he held that Honasan's promise to employ
Arsenio, Jr. and his sister further shows that petitioner's
retirement was not voluntary since there was a need to
entice him with such promises.
Thus, Special Civil Action for Certiorari filed on February
10, 1992.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition must fail for failure of the
petitioner to move for reconsideration of the impugned
decision.
RULING:
It is true that the general rule in remedial law is that
before certiorari may be availed of, the petitioner must
first move for reconsideration of the assailed issuance
with the court or agency which rendered the same, in
order to enable said court or agency to pass upon and
correct its mistakes without the intervention of a higher
court. 5 Be that as it may, we allowed the instant
petition first, because it involves the public policy of
providing justice to the poor and uneducated; and
second, because technical rules of procedure should not
be strictly applied to labor cases, especially where the
result will be detrimental to the working man.
JARDIN VS NLRC G.R. No. 119268February 23, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners were taxi drivers of private respondent,
Philjama International, Inc., a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of Goodman Taxi.
Petitioners drive the taxicabs every other day on a 24-
hour work schedule under the boundary system.
Earns an average of P400.00 daily
Private respondents deduct petitioners daily earning by
P30.00 for the washing of the taxi units.
Petitioner believes that such action by the PR is illegal
so they form a labor union to protect their rights and
interests.
In effect, PR upon learning their plans refused to let
petitioners drive their taxicabs whenthey report for
work starting Aug. 6, 1991 and on succeeding days.
Petitioners filed with the labor arbiter a complaint
against PR for unfair labor, illegal dismissal and illegal
deduction of washing fees>>>DENIED lack of merit.
Appeal: NLRC reversed and set aside the decision of
Labor arbiter. That petitioners are employees of PR and
such dismissal must be for just cause and after due
process.
PR 1st motion for recon>>>DENIED.
2nd recon granted: that petitioners and PR have no
employer-employee relationship.
Petitioners sought reconsideration>>>DENIED. Hence
this instant petition.
ISSUE/S:
1.Whether the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion in granting 2nd
reconsideration of privaterespondents? YES
2.Whether employer-employee relationship exists in
boundary system? YES
RULING:
1.Private respondent (corp.) had already exhausted
administrative remedy by filing the 1st motion forrecon
(which was denied) in which the labor tribunal had the
ample opportunity to rectify errors ormistakes before
rendering decision. When the PR filed for 2nd recon the
public respondents shouldhave denied it in accordance
with rule 7 Sec.14 of its New Rules of Procedure, which
allows onlyone motion for reconsideration from the
same party.
a.Rationale for 1 motion of recon: to assist the parties in
obtaining an expeditious and inexpensive settlement of
labor cases.
2. Court used the Four Fold Test:(1) the selection and
engagement of the employees(2) the payment of
wages(3) the power of dismissal(4) the power of control
the employees conduct (most important)
The court ruled that owners/operators and drivers
have employer-employee relationship because the
former exercise supervision and control over the latter.
The management of the business is in the hands of the
owner.
o The owner as the holder of the certificate of public
convenience must see to it that thedriver follows the
route prescribed by the franchising authority and the
rules promulgated as regards its operation.
 The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages
but only excess in boundary is not sufficient to
withdraw employer-employee relationship.
Hence, petitioners as employees of PR can only be
dismissed for just cause and with due process.
Petition is granted. Private respondent were ordered
to reinstate petitioners to their positions and likewise
ordered to pay petitioners their full backwages.
ASSOCIATION OF TRADE UNIONS VS. ABELLA
G.R. No.100518. January 24, 2000]
Facts:
Respondent company is a domestic corporation
engaged in road construction projects of the
government. From 1968 to 1989, it engaged the
services of the following workers to work on various
projects on different dates.
In February 1989, its workers joined petitioner union as
members. They filed a petition for certification election
with the regional office of the labor department.
Respondent company opposed the petition on the
ground that the workers were project employees and
therefore not qualified to form part of the rank and file
collective bargaining unit. The Med-Arbiter dismissed
the petition for certification election. On appeal, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment reversed the Med-
Arbiter's decision and ordered the immediate holding of
a certification election.
Meanwhile, the national president of petitioner union
sent a demand letter to respondent company seeking
the payment of wage differentials to some affected
union members. Petitioner union and the concerned
workers filed a complaint for payment of wage
differentials and other benefits before the Regional
Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment. Thereafter, respondent company
terminated the employment of aforementioned
workers owing to the completion of its FOUR projects or
the expiration of workers' contracts.
The affected workers claimed that they were dismissed
because of their union activities. The workers staged a
strike which Labor Arbiter declared illegal and deemed
lose their employment. The NLRC affirmed said decision
leading to appeal for certiorari. Meanwhile, the
aggrieved workers filed with the Regional Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC their individual complaints against
private respondent. The cases were consolidated and
assigned to Labor Arbiter Nicolas Sayon for arbitration.
However, noting that a similar case had been filed
before the regional office of the labor department, the
labor arbiter refrained from resolving the issue of
underpayment of monetary benefits. He also found the
charge of unfair labor practice untenable. But, on the
charge of illegal dismissal, he ruled on October 31, 1989
that favored at least four petitioners. Others were
dismissed for lack of merit.
Petitioners and private respondents separately
appealed the Labor Arbiters ruling to the NLRC.
Pending appeal, Edgar Juesan, Lordito Tatad and Ramon
Tabada filed their motions claims against private
respondents.
On May 17, 1991, the NLRC promulgated its resolution
modifying the decision of Labor Arbiter Nicolas Sayon. It
held that the labor arbiter erred in not resolving the
issue of underpayment of wages because not all of the
original complainants filed the same money claims with
the labor department. Thus, it awarded monetary
benefits to qualified workers.
Issues:
The private respondents motion for reconsideration
was denied. In their recourse, petitioners impute the
following errors on the part of public respondent:
[I] "THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL OF FIVE COMPLAINANTS
WERE JUSTIFIED IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THEIR
COMPLAINT HAVE BEEN RENDERED MOOT AND
ACADEMIC BY ITS DECISION IN CASE NO. RAB-O5-
00353-89.
[II] THAT HONORABLE COMMISSION AGAIN ERRED IN
DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT OF THE COMPLAINANTS
MACABODBOD AND ASEJO FOR LACK OF MERIT.
[III] THE HONORABLE COMMISSION SERIOUSLY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LABOR ARBITER
DISMISSING PETITIONER'S CHARGE OF UNFAIR
LABOR PRACTICE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
CORPORATION.
Ruling:
As properly stated by the Solicitor General, the point of
inquiry is whether petitioners are regular or project
employees of respondent company.
The contracts of employment of the petitioners attest
to the fact that they had been hired for specific
projects, and their employment was coterminous with
the completion of the project for which they had been
hired. Said contracts expressly provide that the workers'
tenure of employment would depend on the duration of
any phase of the project or the completion of the
awarded government construction projects in any of
their planned phases. Further, petitioners were
informed in advance that said project or undertaking for
which they were hired would end on a stated or
determinable date. Besides, public respondent noted
that respondent company regularly submitted reports
of termination of services of project workers to the
regional office of the labor department as required
under Policy Instruction No. 20. This compliance with
the reportorial requirement confirms that petitioners
were project employees.
Considering that petitioners were project employees,
whose nature of employment they were fully informed
about, at the time of their engagement, related to a
specific project, work or undertaking, their employment
legally ended upon completion of said project. The
termination of their employment could not be regarded
as illegal dismissal.
The petition is DISMISSED, and the assailed
RESOLUTION of respondent NLRC dated May 17, 1991,
is AFFIRMED.
ISETANN VS NLRC
G.R. No. 95080 November 10, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Isetann Department Store, Inc. seeks to annul
and set aside the Resolution issued on August 29, 1990
by the Second Division of the National Labor Relations
Commission 1 in NLRC Case No. 00-01-0071-88, entitled
"Rosita R. Bautista, Complainant-Appellee vs. Isetann
Department Store, Inc., Respondent-Appellant." It is
alleged that the assailed resolution, which dismissed the
appeal of petitioner Isetann from the decision of Labor
Arbiter Felipe P. Pati dated July 31, 1989, was rendered
arbitrarily, capriciously and with grave abuse of
discretion because contrary to law and the
evidence. 2
We agree with this assessment.
Private respondent Rosita Bautista was Floor Supervisor
at the third floor of petitioner's store at Carriedo,
Manila. Her sister, Yolanda Chan, was a regular supplier
of shoes to petitioner. On June 2. 1987, Yolanda Chan
delivered to petitioner assorted styles of ladies shoes
consisting of 1,379 pairs of "Valencia" shoes and 940
pairs of deerskin shoes. The "Valencia" shoes were
priced at P22.00 a pair, or a total of P30,338.00, while
the deerskin shoeswere priced at P25.00 a pair, or a
total of P23,500.00, adding up to P53,838.00 overall.
Because of the difference in price and material, the
shoes had to be sorted out, which task was undertaken
beginning June 13, 1987 under the supervision of Head
of Stock, Connie Capua. Sorting, however, was
completed under another Head of Stock, Iglesia (Liza)
Mangoba, as Capua went on leave. After the shoes had
been sorted out, Mangoba prepared a Purchase Order
erroneously listing the number of "Valencia" shoes at
940 pairs and the deerskin shoes at 1,379 pairs and
giving these a total value of P55,155.00.
The switch in figures was discovered sometime in July,
1987 when the shoes were transferred to petitioner's
Cubao branch. The purchase order was cancelled and a
new check for the correct amount of P53,838.00 was
prepared and paid to Yolanda Chan, who continued to
supply shoes to petitioner until September, 1987. When
confronted with the error by Alice Luro, Buyer, and Mr.
K. C. Tan, Merchandiser, Mangoba admitted her mistake
in sorting out the shoes and in preparing the purchase
order.
Subsequently, however, or on November 28, 1987,
Mangoba executed a written statement, stating inter
alia that when she took over the sorting job from
Connie Capua, she was instructed by the latter to mix
some "Valencia" shoes with the deerskin shoes so that
Yolanda Chan would not lose from the transaction. She
did as instructed, but when she was preparing the
purchase order, private respondent approached her and
seeing that the "Valencia" shoes still outnumbered the
deerskin shoes, told her to interchange the respective
numbers indicated for the Valencia and deerskin shoes.
When subsequently confronted with the switched
figures, she had to own the error and take the blame
because private respondent Bautista was staring at her.
3
On the basis of Mangoba's written statement, petitioner
conducted a preliminary investigation, in the course of
which, Capua likewise executed a written statement on
December 2, 1987 stating that she was instructed by
private respondent to mix the "Valencia" shoes with the
deerskin shoes to avert loss on the part of Chan, and
had given the same instruction to Mangoba when the
latter took over the sorting job. She was given P400.00
and a pair of shoes by respondent Bautista, for her
cooperation. 4
Bautista was asked to explain her alleged participation
in the incident. Hearings were conducted on December
11, 14 and 16, 1987. On December 24, 1987, petitioner
wrote Bautista, terminating her services effective.
December 28, 1987, for:
willful breach of the trust reposed on you by the
Company thru violations you have, committed against
our Company Rules and Regulations as provided below:
Rule XIV Sec, 2. Bribery or offering or accepting
anything of value in exchange for a job, work,
assignment, work location, or favorable condition or
employment.
Rule XIV Sec. 32. Engaging or conniving in anomalous
transactions.
Rule XVIII Sec. 9. Using Company time, or materials
or equipment to do unauthorized work within or
without Company premises for personal gain.
Rule XIV Sec. 17. Causing loss of time and/or money
to the Company because of negligence or inefficiency in
the performance of official duties or persistently doing
unsatisfactory work. 5
Bautista contested her dismissal through a complaint
filed before the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch. No
amicable settlement having been reached, hearing on
the merits ensued.
On July 31, 1989, Labor Arbiter Felipe P. Pati rendered
judgment "ordering the respondent (Isetann) to
reinstate the complainant to her former position
without loss of seniority rights and to pay her full
backwages and other benefits from the time she was
illegally dismissed until actual reinstatement plus ten
(10) percent of the total award as Attorney's fees
payable to counsel." 6 The Labor Arbiter ruled that no
fraud or anomaly attended the accomplishment of the
purchase order of Chan's June 2, 1987 shoe delivery but
only an error in its preparation as admitted by Mangoba
when first confronted therewith. No credence was given
to the testimonies of Capua, and Mangoba that they
were instructed by private respondent to mix, the shoes
to avoid loss on the part of Chan because nobody would
"agree to outrightly transact or enter into a losing
proposition or business" and Chan herself testified that
she would already be getting a marginal profit from the
correct prices of the shoes. Moreover, Arbiter Pati
noted that petitioners own version that the anomaly
was discovered in July, 1987 was irreconcilable with the
fact that Chan was paid the correct amount as early as
June, 1987. In fine the Labor Arbiter concluded that
petitioner Isetann had failed to substantiate the charges
imputed to private respondent and that there was no
basis for her dismissal on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence.
On appeal by petitioner Isetann, the National Labor
Relations Commission sustained the Arbiter's conclusion
hat the fact of payment on June 29, 1987 of the cost of
delivery rendered incredible the testimonies of Capua
and Mangoba that after the anomaly was discovered
either in July or November, the purchase order was
cancelled and a new check for the correct amount was
prepared and their conflicting testimonies that the
anomaly was discovered in July or November, as Chan
was allowed to deliver shoes to petitioner until
September, 1987. The NLRC also considered as grounds
for rejecting the confessions of Mangoba and Capua the
delay in their execution as well as the statement of
Mangoba during her cross-examination that "they were
threatening me," "they" being taken to mean petitioner.
Taking note of the amount involved, the NLRC found the
testimony of respondent Bautista that she had nothing
to do with the alleged fraudulent mixing of shoes easier
to believe since she would not risk her supervisorial job
and seven years of service for a measly sum of
P1,317.00.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC and the Labor Arbiters
decision constitute grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC gravely abused
their discretion in rejecting said testimonies, acting as
they did under gross misapprehension of facts. No
contradiction arises from the fact of payment on June
29, 1987 and petitioner's witnesses' statement that the
anomaly was discovered July or November of the same
year. What was discovered in July was only the switch of
figures in the purchase order then ascribed to nothing
more than inattention or carelessness. It was not until
November, when Mangoba executed her written
statement, that respondent Bautista's hand in said
interchanging was discovered. Only then when what
appeared to be a mere error in the preparation of the
purchase order was revealed to be an aborted
fraudulent scheme involving private respondent. Thus,
it was likewise not logical that Chan continued to supply
shoes to petitioner until September.
REYES & LIM COMPANY, INC.VS. NLRC
G.R. No. 87012-13 September 25, 1991
FACTS:
On August 4, 1986, Pabalinas was dismissed by the
vessel's Chief Engineer. On August 11, 1986, Pabalinas
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the POEA,
docketed as POEA Case No. (M) 8609-791, against R & L
Co., Maguindanao Navigation, Inc. and Oscar
Castaneda, Chief Engineer of MISS Afindanao River. The
complainant alleged that his dismissal was without just
cause and without prior notice and investigation.
On the other hand, R & L Co. filed a report dated August
28, 1986, with the POEA that Pabalinas was
disembarked from the vessel M/V Afindanao River 2 for
disciplinary reasons. The report alleged that Pabalinas
was disembarked because he allegedly committed the
following offenses:
1. Leaving the vessel without permission from
responsible officers during working hour,
2. Repeated failure to report and perform his assigned
duties due to intoxication.
3. Repeated failure to observe regulations on expiration
of shore liberty.
4. Causing through neglect, damage to the gear casing
of the vessel's gear casing of butterfly valve for ballast
tank No. 5 (Rollo, p. 28)
Also, on September 1, 1986, R & L Co. filed a complaint
(Rollo, pp. 30-31), with the POEA against Pabalinas for
absence Without leave, drunkenness, violation of
company policies and negligence causing damage to
property.
The two (2) complaints were consolidated with the
complaint of R & L Co. considered as its answer to the
complaint of Pabalinas.
On December 15, 1987, the POEA Administrator
rendered a decision declaring that the dismissal of
Pabalinas was without just cause and was effected
without due process. It ordered the payment to
Pabalinas of his salary for the unexpired portion of his
contract and attorney's fees.
L & R Co. appealed to the NLRC which rendered a
decision dated November 11, 1988 affirming the POEA
Administrator.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of the NLRC as having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
The rule that judicial review by this Court in labor cases
does not go insofar as to evaluate the sufficiency of the
evidence upon which the labor officials or office based
his or its determination, but are limited to issues of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.
In the absence of any clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion or lack of jurisdiction, we affirm the findings
of the NLRC.
There is no clear and concrete evidence to show that
subject seaman was ever warned at one time or
another of his alleged infractions of company rules and
regulations, nor his attention called to the charges
imputed against Lim after having committed same or
any one of them. Not one of the voluminous documents
presented by Reyes & Lim Co., Inc. shows that subject
crew was ever confronted nor shown any of them. In
cases of this nature, the erring employee is normally
warned thru a letter or memorandum receipt of which
should be recorded. Any investigations require the
presence of the- persons investigated. In the case at
bar, the investigation report fails to show that said crew
was present when the same was made, nor does said
report show his signature if only to prove he was aware
of said report. The foregoing, as well as the favorable
entries made by the master on page 19 of Pabalinas'
SCDB, as regards his conduct and ability, bring us to the
conclusion that he did not commit any of the
accusations labelled (sic) against him. It appearing that
his alleged violations were not made known to him, nor
was he notified thereof, renders his dismissal unlawful
for want of due process. Hence, the case for disciplinary
action filed against him should be dismissed for lack of
merit.
CHUA VS NLRC
G.R. No. 81450 February 15, 1990
FACTS:
City Air International Brokerage Corporation is a family
corporation with the private respondent, Jesus Chua,
serving as its president from October, 1984 up to the
time of his resignation in March, 1985 while the
petitioner, Johnson Chua is the vice-president.
On May 13, 1985, the private respondent filed a
complaint with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) for illegal dismissal and recovery of
unpaid wages for the period November 15, 1984 up to
March 31, 1985.
After the parties had filed their respective position
papers, Labor Arbiter Amelia Guloy rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondent City Air International
Corporation and/or Mr. Johnson Chua is hereby ordered
to pay complainant his unpaid wages of P29,250.00.
(Rollo, p. 9)
On appeal to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), the Third Division affirmed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter in a resolution dated June 30, 1987. A
motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on
December 7, 1987.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT FINDINGS OF FACT OF QUASI-
JUDICIAL AGENCIES ACCORDED FINALITY IF SUCH
FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
AN EXCEPTION TO THE RULE.
RULING:
It is the general rule that findings of fact of quasi-judicial
agencies which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are accorded
not only respect by this Court but at times even finality
if such findings are supported by substantial evidence.
(Arica v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
78210, February 28, 1989). The instant case is not an
exception to the rule. There is substantial evidence to
support the decision.
LOPEZ SUGAR CORP. VS FFW
G.R. Nos. 75700-01 August 30, 1990
FACTS:
In this Petition, petitioner Lopez Sugar Corporation
seeks reversal of the Decision dated 2 July 1986 of
public respondent National labor Relations Commission
("NLRC") which affirmed the decision of the Labor
Arbiter dated 30 September 1983. The Labor Arbiter (a)
had denied petitioner's application to retrench some of
its employees and (b) had ordered the reinstatement of
twenty-seven (27) employees and to pay them full
backwages from the time of termination until actual
reinstatement.
Petitioner, allegedly to prevent losses due to major
economic problems, and exercising its privilege under
Article XI, Section 2 of its 1975-1977 Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") entered into between
petitioner and private respondent Philippine Labor
Union Association ("PLUA-NACUSIP"), caused the
retrenchment and retirement of a number of its
employees.
Thus, on 3 January 1980, petitioner filed with the
Bacolod District Office of the then Ministry of Labor and
Employment ("MOLE") a combined report on
retirement and application for clearance to retrench,
dated 28 December 1979, 1 affecting eighty six (86) of
its employees. This was docketed as NLRC Case Ne. A-
217-80. Of these eighty-six (86) employees, fifty-nine
(59) were retired effective 1 January 1980 and twenty-
eight (27) were to be retrenched effective 16 January
1980 "in order to prevent losses."
Also, on 3 January 1980, private respondent Federation
of Free Workers ("FFW"), as the certified bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of petitioner, filed
with the Bacolod District Office of the MOLE a
complaint dated 27 December 1979 for unfair labor
practices and recovery of union dues docketed as NLRC
Case No. A-198-80. In said complainant, FFW claimed
that the terminations undertaken by petitioner were
violative of the security of tenure of its members and
were intended to "bust" the union and hence
constituted an unfair labor practice. FFW claimed that
after the termination of the services of its members,
petitioner advised 110 casuals to report to its personnel
office. FFW further argued that to justify retrenchment,
serious business reverses must be "actual, real and
amply supported by sufficient and convincing
evidence." FFW prayed for reinstatement of its
members who had been retired or retrenched.
Petitioner denied having hired casuals to replace those
it had retired or retrenched. It explained that the
announcement calling for 110 workers to report to its
personnel office was only for the purpose of organizing
a pool of extra workers which could be tapped
whenever there were temporary vacancies by reason of
leaves of absence of regular workers.
On 22 January 1980, another report on retirement
affecting an additional twenty-five (25) employees
effective 1 February 1980 was filed by petitioner. 2
On 3 March 1980, petitioner filed its Position Paper in
NLRC Case No. A-217-80 contending that certain
economic factors jeopardizing its very existence
rendered the dismissals necessary. Petitioner explained:
As a business firm, the Applicant must earn [a] fair
return of (sic) its investment. Its income is generated
from the sales of the Central's shares of sugar and
molasses production. It has however no control of the
selling price of both products. It is of common
knowledge that for the past years the price of sugar has
been very low. In order to survive, the Applicant has
effected several forms of cost reduction. Now that there
is hope in the price of sugar the applicant is again faced
with two major economic problems, i.e., the stoppage
of its railway operation and the spiralling cost of
production.
The Applicant was forced to stop its railway operation
because the owners of the land upon which the
Applicant's railway lines traverse are no longer willing to
allow the Applicant to make further use of portions of
their lands. . . .
The other economic problem that confronted the
Applicant is the rising cost of labor, materials, supplies,
equipment, etc. These two major economic problems
the rising cost of production and the stoppage of its
railway facilities, put together pose a very serious threat
against the economic survival of the Applicant. In view
of this, the Applicant was constrained to touch on the
last phase of its cost reduction program which is the
reduction of its workforce.
xxx xxx xxx
The Applicant as a business proposition must be
allowed to earn income in order to survive. This is the
essence of private enterprise. Being plagued with two
major economic problems, the applicant is not expected
to remain immobile. It has to react accordingly. As many
other business firms have resorted to reduction of force
in view of the present economic crisis obtaining here
and abroad, the applicant was likewise compelled to do
the same as a last alternative remedy for survival. 3
In a decision dated 30 September 1983, 4 the Labor
Arbiter denied petitioner's application for clearance to
retrench its employees on the ground that for
retrenchment to be valid, the employer's losses must be
serious, actual and real and must be amply supported
by sufficient and convincing evidence. The application
to retire was also denied on the ground that petitioner's
prerogative to so retire its employees was granted by
the 1975-77 collective bargaining agreement which
agreement had long ago expired. Petitioner was,
therefore, ordered to reinstate twenty-seven retired or
retrenched employees represented by private
respondent Philippine Labor Union Association ("PLUA")
and FFW and to pay them full backwages from the time
of termination until actual reinstatement.
Both dissatisfied with the Labor Arbiter's decision,
petitioner and respondent FFW appealed the case to
public respondent NLRC. On appeal, the NLRC, finding
no justifiable reason for disturbing the decision of the
Labor Arbiter, affirmed that decision on 2 July 1986.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the decision rendered by the NLRC
constitute grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction.
RULING:
While Petitioner contends that the NLRC committed
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the ruling of the
Labor Arbiter that the retirements effected by
petitioner were na valid since the basis therefor, i.e.
Article XI Section 2 of the 1975-1977 CBA, had by then
already expired and was thus no longer enforceable or
operative. 14 Article XI, 2 of the CBA provides:
2. Section 2. Any employee may apply for after
having rendered the of at least eighteen (18) year of
service to the COMPANY. The COMPANY, as a right ,
may retire any employee who has rendered twenty (20)
years of service, or has reached the age of sixty (60)
years. Employees who are physically incapacitated to
continue to work in the COMPANY upon certification of
the COMPANY Physician, shall be entitled to a
separation pay equivalent to the retirement benefits
herein provided for that may have accrued. The heirs or
surviving legally married spouse of the deceased
employee shall be granted by the COMPANY the
amount equivalent to the accrued retirement benefit of
the deceased employee at the time of his death." 15
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner argues that the CBA was "extended" not
merely by implication, but by reciprocal acts in the
sense that even after the CBA had expired, petitioner
continued to give, and the workers continued to
receive, the benefits and exercise the prerogatives
provided therein. Under these circumstances, petitioner
urges, the employees are estopped from denying the
extended effectivity of the CBA.
The Solicitor General, as well as private respondents,
argue basically that petitioner's right to retire its
employees was coterminous with the life of the CBA.
On this point, we must find for petitioner. Although the
CBA expired on 31 December 1977, it continued to have
legal effects as between the parties until a new CBA had
been negotiated and entered into. This proposition
finds legal support in Article 253 of the Labor Code,
which provides:
Article 253 Duty to bargain collectively when there
exists a collective bargaining agreement. When there
is a collective bargaining agreement, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that neither party shall
terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. However, either party can serve a written
notice to terminate or modify the agreement at least
sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date. It shall be the
duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to
continue in full force and effect the terms and
conditions of the existing agreement during the 60-day
period and/or until a new agreement is reached by the
parties. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, in the instant case, despite the lapse of the
formal effectivity of the CBA by virtue of its own
provisions, the law considered the same as continuing
in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been
validly executed. Hence, petitioner acted within legal
bounds when it decided to retire several employees in
accordance with the CBA. That the employees
themselves similarly acted in accordance with the CBA is
plain from the record. Even after the expiration of the
CBA, petitioner's employees continued to receive the
benefits and enjoy the privileges granted therein. They
continued to avail of vacation and sick leaves as
computed in accordance with Articles VII and VIII of the
CBA. They also continued to avail of medical and dental
aid under Article IX, death aid and bereavement leave
under Articles X and XIV, insurance coverage under
Article XVI and housing allowance under Article XVIII.
Seventeen (17) employees even availed of Section XI
(dealing with retirement) when they voluntarily retired
between 1 January 1978 and 31 December 1980 and
received retirement pay computed on the basis of
Section 3 of the same article. If the workers chose to
avail of the CBA despite its expiration, equity if not
the law-dictates that the employer should likewise be
able to invoke the CBA.
LIBERTY FLOUR MILLS EMPLOYEES VS LIBERTY FLOUR
MILLS G.R. No. 58768-70 December 29, 1989
FACTS:
On February 6, 1974, respondent Philippine Labor
Alliance Council (PLAC) and respondent Liberty Flour
Mills, Inc. entered into a three-year collective
bargaining agreement effective January 1, 1974,
providing for a daily wage increase of P2.00 for 1974,
Pl.00 for 1975 and another Pl.00 for 1976. The
agreement contained a compliance clause, which will be
explained later in this opinion. Additionally, the parties
agreed to establish a union shop by imposing
"membership in good standing for the duration of the
CBA as a condition for continued employment" of
workers. On October 18, 1974, PLAC filed a complaint
against the respondent company for non-payment of
the emergency cost of living allowance under P.D. No.
525. 2 A similar complaint was filed on March 4, 1975,
this time by the petitioners, who apparently were
already veering away from PLAC.
On March 20, 1975, petitioners Evaristo and Biascan,
after organizing a union caged the Federation of
National Democratic Labor Unions, filed with the
Bureau of Labor Relations a petition for certification
election among the rank-and-file employees of the
respondent company 4 PLAC then expelled the two for
disloyalty and demanded their dismissal by the
respondent company, which complied on May 20, 1975.
The objection of Evaristo and Biascan to their
termination were certified for compulsory arbitration
and assigned to Labor Arbiter Apolinario N. Lomabao, Jr.
Meanwhile, the claims for emergency allowance were
referred for voluntary arbitration to Edmundo Cabal,
who eventually dismissed the same on the ground that
the allowances were already absorbed by the wage
increases. This latter case was ultimately also certified
for compulsory arbitration and consolidated with the
termination case being heard by Lomabao. His decision
was, on appeal, dealt with by the NLRC as above stated,
6 and the motion for reconsideration was denied on
August 26, 1981. 7
At the outset, we note that the petitioners are taking an
ambivalent position concerning the CBA concluded in
1974. While claiming that this was entered into in bad
faith and to forestall the payment of the emergency
allowances expected to be decreed, they nonetheless
invoke the same agreement to support their contention
that their complaint for emergency allowances was
invalidly referred to voluntary arbitrator Cabal rather
than Froilan M. Bacungan.
We find there was no such violation as the choice of the
voluntary arbitrator was not limited to Bacungan
although he was probably the first preference.
Moreover, the petitioners are estopped from raising
this objection now because they did not seasonably
interpose it and instead willingly submitted to Cabal's
jurisdiction when he undertook to hear their complaint.
In sustaining Labor Arbiter Lomabao, the NLRC agreed
that the decision of voluntary Arbiter Cabal was final
and unappealable under Article 262-A of the Labor Code
and so could no longer be reviewed by it.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the decision of voluntary Arbiter
Cabal was final and unappealable.
HELD:
True enough. However, it is equally true that the same
decision is not binding on this Court, as we held in
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero 8 and reiterated in
Mantrade/FMMC Division Employees and Workers
Union v. Bacungan. 9 The rule as announced in these
cases is reflected in the following statements:
In spite of statutory provisions making "final" the
decision of certain administrative agencies, we have
taken cognizance of petitions questioning these
decisions where want of jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion, violation of due process, denial of substantial
justice, or erroneous interpretation of the law were
brought to our attention.
xxx xxx xxx
A voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions
acts in a quasi-judicial capacity. There is no reason why
her decisions involving interpretation of law should be
beyond this Court's review. Administrative officials are
presumed to act in accordance with law and yet we do
not hesitate to pass upon their work where a question
of law is involved or where a showing of abuse of
authority or discretion in their official acts is properly
raised in petitions for certiorari.
PAL, INC. VS NLRC AND PESCANTE
G.R. No. 126805. March 16, 2000
FACTS:
Private respondent, a load controller of petitioner,
reflected a lighter weight of baggage of passenger
cominero by pooling the same with other passengers
with lesser baggage weight or no baggage at all in
violation of petitioners code of discipline. An
administrative charge for fraud against the company
was filed against him wherein he was found guilty
thereof and meted the penalty of dismissal from the
service. His culpability was established by his co-
workers, passenger cominero and a police assistance
officer. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal when
the judgement ordering his dismissal was affirmed by
petitioners step 3 grievance. The labor arbiter rendered
judgement against private respondent. The same was
reverse on appeal by the NLRC ordering the
reinstatement of private respondent with full
backwages. It held that the dismissal cannot be imposed
where petitioner failed to show that it suffered losses as
a consequence of private respondents questioned act.
Petitioner moved for its reconsideration, but the same
was denied, hence, the present recourse. The court
ruled that the testimonies of witnesses, in the absence
of any motive to depose falsely against an employee,
must be given due credence; that assessment and
weight of sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor
arbiter and public respondent NLRC based their
decisions are not subject to review by certiorari
proceedings under rule 65. Thus, the finding of illegal
pooling of baggage duly supported by substantial
evidence is upheld and that a mere attempt to deprive
petitioner of its lawful revenue is sufficient to dismiss an
employee from the service; and that reinstatement,
backwages and financial assistance has no factual and
legal basis in just and valid dismissals.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Special Civil Action; Certiorari;
Limited to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion.
2. Whether or not the exercise of equity jurisdiction;
where findings of NLRC contradict those of labor
arbiter.
RULINGS:
1. In certiorari proceedings under rule 65, this court
does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence
upon which the labor arbiter and public respondent
NLRC based their decisions. Our query is limited to the
determination of whether or not public respondent
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed decisions.
2. When the findings of the NLRC contradict those of
the LABOR ARBITER, this Court, in the exercise of its
equity jurisdiction, must of necessity review the records
of the case to determine which findings should be
preferred as more conformable to the evidentiary facts,
as in this case.
PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORP. VS NLRC
G.R. No. 138826. October 30, 2000
FACTS:
Progressive Development Corporation (PDC) is a
corporation organized and existing under the laws of
the Philippines and its co-petitioners Judy A. Roxas and
Dante P. Verayo are its Senior Vice President and former
Manager of its Human Resources Division, respectively.
In 1980 PDC implemented its Employees' Non-
Contributory Retirement Plan (The Plan) which took
effect on 1 April 1980. Thereafter, a number of
employees was retired pursuant to the optional
retirement provision of The Plan -
Section 3. Optional Retirement. - Any participant with
twenty (20) years of service, regardless of age, may be
retired at his option or at the option of the Company
and shall be entitled to the following benefits x x x x
On 8 October 1990, upon request by PDC, Director
Augusto G. Sanchez of the Bureau of Working
Conditions, Department of Labor and Employment,
confirmed the validity of The Plan, particularly its
provision on optional retirement.
On 28 November 1994 PDC notified its employees who
had rendered more than twenty (20) years of service in
the Company of its decision to retire them effective 31
December 1994. On 7 December 1994, Jose Riego and
private respondent Rholanda Andres, two (2) of those
who were retired, filed a complaint for illegal
retirement and unfair labor practices against
petitioners.
Private respondent Rholanda Andres started in the
employ of petitioner PDC on 22 October 1971 as a
payroll clerk and was billing assistant with a monthly
salary of P5,972.00 when petitioners decided to retire
her from employment. She was then forty-five (45)
years old with twenty-three (23) years of service in the
company.
On 2 January 1995 private respondent Roy Romano also
filed a similar complaint against petitioners. He started
working with PDC as an elevator operator on 2 January
1974 and was a tender mechanic at its maintenance
department with a monthly salary of P4,820.00 when he
was retired. He was then thirty-eight (38) years old with
twenty (20) years of service in the company.
The two (2) cases were consolidated. During the
pendency of these cases, complainant Jose Riego
desisted from pursuing his claim and accepted his
retirement benefits. In addition, he executed a Release
and Quitclaim that effectively relieved PDC and its
officers from obligations under and in connection with
his employment.
Private respondent Andres was Chairman of the Board
of Directors of PDW-LIKHA, a union of rank-and-file
employees of PDC, while private respondent Romano
was a member of the union. They contended that their
retirement from PDC was done by the latter as a
retaliatory measure for their union activities. They
assailed the validity of The Plan under which they were
retired claiming lack of knowledge thereof absent any
collective bargaining agreement and any applicable
employment contract.
On 14 August 1995 petitioners filed a Manifestation and
Motion[3] for the presentation of evidence by both
parties to settle certain factual issues. On 24 August
1995 private respondents, without denying the early
retirement of their co-employees, opposed petitioners'
motion to present evidence and moved to submit the
consolidated cases for resolution on the basis of the
pleadings so far submitted.[4]
On 25 October 1995 the Labor Arbiter upheld the
validity of the retirement of private respondents and
dismissed their consolidated complaints.[5] He ruled
that the retirement plan of PDC was consistent with Art.
287 of the Labor Code as amended which provides that
"[a]ny employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining
agreement or other applicable employment contract."
He explained that the phrase "may be retired" connotes
an option given to an employer to retire an employee
and such option, he further declared, was within the
discretion of the employer to exercise. The Labor
Arbiter also held that the discretion of the employer
extended to the choice of employees to be retired and
choosing private respondents to retire could not be
attributed to their union activities as the other
members of the union who were similarly situated were
not retired by PDC.[6]
On appeal the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) modified the decision of the Labor Arbiter. It
declared private respondents to be constructively
terminated when forced to resign under the retirement
program of PDC, ordered their reinstatement with
payment of their full wages computed from the time
they were forcibly resigned until actually reinstated, but
dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice for
lack of substantial basis.[7]
On 4 July 1997 petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[8] which was denied[9] by the NLRC on
10 July 1997.
On 24 October 1997 petitioners filed with this Court a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.[10] On 25 January 1999, after respondents had
filed their comments, the Court referred the petition to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and
disposition.
On 24 May 1999 the Court of Appeals denied the
petition and affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether private respondents were illegally retired rests
upon the determination of whether the retirement
program of petitioner company is valid.

HELD:
As a general rule, the factual findings and conclusions of
quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC are accorded
great weight and respect upon appeal, and even finality,
as long as they are supported by substantial evidence or
that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
man might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
But this is true only when they do not come under the
established exceptions. One of these is where the
findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter are contrary
to each other, as in the instant case. Consequently,
there is a necessity for this Court to examine the
records and the evidence presented to determine which
findings of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter should be
preferred as more conformable with the evidentiary
facts. Accordingly, a careful examination of the records
shows that the findings of the Labor Arbiter are more in
harmony with the evidence on record. The retirement
plan under which private respondents were retired is
valid for it forms part of the employment contract of
petitioner company. Director Augusto G. Sanchez of the
Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE recognized
and affirmed the validity of The Plan.
Considering therefore the fact that your client's
retirement plan now forms part of the employment
contract since it is made known to the employees and
accepted by them, and such plan has an express
provision that the company has the choice to retire an
employee regardless of age, with twenty (20) years of
service, said policy is within the bounds contemplated
by the Labor Code. Moreover, the manner of
computation of retirement benefits depends on the
stipulation provided in the company retirement plan
This pronouncement made by no less than the DOLE
must be given substantial weight, as what the Labor
Arbiter did, in the absence of any contrary evidence.
Moreover, the undisputed fact that a number of
employees of petitioner company had availed of The
Plan since its effectivity only confirms that The Plan has
already been part of the employment contract of
petitioner company for a long time. Private
respondents, particularly Andres, may not now feign
ignorance of The Plan considering that she was the
chairman of the union of rank-and-file employees of
petitioner company and, as such, was considered to be
familiar with the policies of the company. Obviously,
private respondents failed to substantiate their
allegation that The Plan was invalid. The NLRC was thus
incorrect in ruling in their favor by declaring that they
were illegally retired. Hence, the affirmation by the
Court of Appeals of the Decision of the NLRC must
likewise be declared erroneous. The Court notes that
private respondents, in attacking the validity of The
Plan, might have been motivated by their belief that
they were retired by reason of their union activities.
But, both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC dismissed
their allegation of unfair labor practice for apparent lack
of substantial basis.
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINE
AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY (EMAPALICO)
VS. NLRC G.R. No. 82976 July 26, 1991
FACTS:
In her remarkably well-written decision dated
December 10, 1986, Labor Arbiter Ceferina J. Diosana
ordered the Philippine American Life Insurance Co. to
reinstate Caparas to his original position "as an
Accounting Clerk A or to any equivalent position with
back wages from the date of termination to actual
reinstatement." 1
On appeal by both parties, the decision was affirmed by
the NLRC but with the modification that the private
respondent should pay Caparas P9,650.00 as actual
damages. 2 On February 8, 1988, however, acting on
the motion for reconsideration filed by Philamlife, the
NLRC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the questioned resolution is hereby
modified in that in lieu of reinstatement, respondent is
ordered to pay complainant Caparas backwages from
the date his salary was withheld from him until the
execution hereof plus separation pay computed at one
month's salary for every year of service, a fraction of at
least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole
year. In all other respects, the questioned resolution is
hereby affirmed. 3
Their own motion for reconsideration of the above
resolution having been denied, the petitioners have
come to this Court for relief on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the NLRC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it reversed the original order.
RULING:
As pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General,
assuming that private respondent's position was
abolished, she can be reinstated to a substantially
equivalent position without loss of seniority rights, but
herein petitioner insists that there exists no
substantially equivalent position for private respondent.
The assertion is unmeritorious considering that
petitioner is one of the country's top corporations. 10
If the respondent had been a laborer, clerk, or other
rank and file employee, there would be no problem in
ordering her reinstatement with facility. But she was
Vice President for Marketing of Asiaworld. An officer in
such a key position can work effectively only if she
enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management.
11
The factual findings of administrative bodies are as a
rule binding on this Court, but this is true only when
they do not come under the established exceptions. In
the case at bar, we find that the evidence of record
does not support the conclusion of the NLRC that the
relations of the employee and management have been
so seriously strained as to prevent the former's
reinstatement. We also reject the plea that there is
absolutely no other position in the whole organization
of Philamlife to which Caparas can be appointed to
restore to him his original compensation and seniority.
We do agree that the hiring and firing of personnel is a
management prerogative, but this is not without
limitation. The limitation is embodied in the
constitutional requirement for the protection of labor
and the promotion of social justice, which tilts the
scales of justice, whenever there is doubt, in favor of
the worker.
SUPREME COURT
TANCINCO VS. GSIS
369 SCRA 221 [2001]
FACTS:
At around noon of July 17, 1995, while he was repairing
a service vehicle in front of his house, SPO1 Eddie G.
Tancinco was shot dead by five (5) unidentified armed
men. SPO1 Tancinco was a member of the NCR Security
Protection Group of the Philippine National Police, and
at the time of his death, was assigned as part of the
close-in security detail of then Vice-President Joseph E.
Estrada. SPO1 Tancinco was off-duty at the time
inasmuch as the former Vice-President was in the
United States for medical treatment.
His widow, petitioner RufinaTancinco, filed a claim for
benefits before the GSIS. On February 19, 1996, the
GSIS denied petitioners claim on the ground that there
was no proof that petitioners husbands death was
work-related. Petitioner appealed the denial to the
Employees Compensation Commission (Commission)
which, on December 19, 1996, issued a Resolution
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. As ruled by the
Commission, it is evident that the death of SPO1
Tancinco on July 17, 1995, when he was on off duty
status, did not arise out of and in the course of his
employment as a member of the PNP Security
Command.
Petitioner filed a petition for review from the aforesaid
decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals.
On May 30, 1997, the appellate court issued the first
assailed resolution dismissing the petition for review on
the following grounds: (a) that the certification of non-
forum shopping was defective; (b) that certified true
copies of material portions of the record were not
attached to the petition; and (c) that the petition failed
to state all the material dates which would establish the
timeliness thereof. As admitted by petitioner herself,
she received a copy of the resolution on June 9, 1997,
and yet it was only on January 27, 1998, or seven-and-a-
half (7 1/2) months later, that she filed a motion for
reconsideration. As can be expected, the appellate
court denied her motion in the second assailed
resolution of March 5, 1998.
Petitioner seeks recourse before the Supreme Court via
petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari is in
order.
RULING:
The SC ruled that the instant petition was not timely
filed. Under section 1 of Rule 45 of the former Revised
Rules of Court, which was then still in effect, an appeal
from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals to this
Court must be made within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or the denial of a motion for
reconsideration filed in due time. In the case at bar,
petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration from
receipt of the resolution of dismissal two hundred thirty
one (231) days late, thereby rendering the said
resolution final and executory. The SC stated that the
gap of more than seven (7) months is too large to
ignore. Petitioner did not even offer any explanation to
account for the tardiness. It behoves the party invoking
liberality in the application of procedural rules to at
least explain his non-compliance therewith. We have
held that the period of appeal is not only mandatory,
but more importantly, it is jurisdictional. Even we
cannot ignore the immutable character of a final
judgment.
REGIONAL DIRECTOR
MATERNITY CHILDRENS HOSPITAL VS. SEC. OF LABOR
(G.R. No. 78909 June 30, 1989)
FACTS:
Petitioner is a semi-government hospital, managed by
the Board of Directors of the Cagayan de Oro Women's
Club and Puericulture Center, headed by Mrs. Antera
Dorado, as holdover President. The hospital derives its
finances from the club itself as well as from paying
patients, averaging 130 per month. It is also partly
subsidized by the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office
and the Cagayan De Oro City government.
Petitioner has forty-one (41) employees. Aside from
salary and living allowances, the employees are given
food, but the amount spent therefor is deducted from
their respective salaries. On May 23, 1986, ten (10)
employees of the petitioner employed in different
capacities/positions filed a complaint with the Office of
the Regional Director of Labor and Employment, Region
X, for underpayment of their salaries and ECOLAS,
which was docketed as ROX Case No. CW-71-86.
On June 16, 1986, the Regional Director directed two of
his Labor Standard and Welfare Officers to inspect the
records of the petitioner to ascertain the truth of the
allegations in the complaints. Based on their inspection
report and recommendation, the Regional Director
issued an Order dated August 4, 1986, directing the
payment of P723,888.58, representing underpayment
of wages and ECOLAs to all the petitioner's employees.
Petitioner appealed from this Order to the Minister of
Labor and Employment, Hon. Augusto S. Sanchez, who
rendered a Decision on September 24, 1986, modifying
the said Order in that deficiency wages and ECOLAs
should be computed only from May 23, 1983 to May 23,
1986. On October 24, 1986, the petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration which was denied by the
Secretary of Labor in his Order dated May 13, 1987, for
lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Director had jurisdiction
over the case and if so, the extent of coverage of any
award that should be forthcoming, arising from his
visitorial and enforcement powers under Article 128 of
the Labor Code.
RULING:
This is a labor standards case, and is governed by Art.
128-b of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111.
Under the present rules, a Regional Director exercises
both visitorial and enforcement power over labor
standards cases, and is therefore empowered to
adjudicate money claims, provided there still exists an
employer-employee relationship, and the findings of the
regional office is not contested by the employer
concerned.
Labor standards refer to the minimum requirements
prescribed by existing laws, rules, and regulations
relating to wages, hours of work, cost of living
allowance and other monetary and welfare benefits,
including occupational, safety, and health standards
(Section 7, Rule I, Rules on the Disposition of Labor
Standards Cases in the Regional Office, dated
September 16, 1987).
Hence, the SC held that this petition should be
dismissed as regards all persons still employed in the
Hospital at the time of the filing of the complaint, but
granted as regards those employees no longer
employed at that time.
BROKENSHIRE MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, INC. VS.
MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT 182 SCRA 5
[1990]
FACTS:
This case originated from a complaint filed by private
respondents,Brokenshire Memorial Hospital Employees
and Worker's Union-FFW, represented by Eduardo A.
Afuan, against petitioner on September 21, 1984 with
the Regional Office of the MOLE, Region XI, Davao City
for non-compliance with the provisions of Wage Order
No. 5.
After due hearing the Regional Director rendered a
decision dated November 16, 1984 in favor of private
respondents. Judgment having become final and
executory, the Regional Director issued a Writ of
Execution whereby some movable properties of the
hospital (petitioner herein) were levied upon and its
operating expenses kept with the bank were garnished.
The levy and garnishment were lifted when petitioner
hospital paid the claim of the private respondents (281
hospital employees) directly, in the total amount of
P163,047.50 covering the period from June 16 to
October 15, 1984. After making said payment,
petitioner hospital failed to continue to comply with
Wage Order No. 5 and likewise, failed to comply with
the new Wage Order No. 6 which took effect on
November 1, 1984, prompting private respondents to
file against petitioner another complaint docketed as
ROXI-LSED-14-85, which is now the case at bar.
After the complainants had filed their reply, petitioner
filed a Motion for the Certification of the case to the
National Labor Relations Commission for a full-blown
hearing on the matter, including the counterclaim
interposed that the complainants had unpaid
obligations with the Hospital which might be offset with
the latter's alleged obligation to the former.
Issues having been joined, the Regional Director
rendered a decision on April 12, 1985 in favor of the
complainants (private respondents herein) declaring
that petitioner (respondent therein) is estopped from
questioning the acquisition of jurisdiction because its
appearance in the hearing is in itself submission to
jurisdiction and that this case is merely a continuance of
a previous case where the hospital already willingly paid
its obligations to the workers on orders of the Regional
Office. On the matter of the constitutionality of the
Wage Order Nos. 5 and 6, the Regional Director
declared that only the court can declare a law or order
unconstitutional and until so declared by the court, the
Office of the Regional Director is duly bound to enforce
the law or order.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the Office of the
Minister of Labor, which dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied
by said Office, giving rise to the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction
over money claims of workers concurrent with the
Labor Arbiter.
RULING:
The SC ruled that,in view of the enactment of Republic
Act No. 6715, approved on March 2, 1989, which
amended Art. 129 and Art. 217 of the Labor Code, and
in consonance with the case of Briad Agro Development
Corp., as reconsidered, the instant case falls under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.
It will be observed that what in fact conferred upon
Regional Directors and other hearing officers of the
Department of Labor (aside from the Labor Arbiters)
adjudicative powers, i.e., the power to try and decide,
or hear and determine any claim brought before them
for recovery of wages, simple money claims, and other
benefits, is Republic Act 6715, provided that the
following requisites concur, to wit:
1) The claim is presented by an employee or person
employed in domestic or household service, or
househelper under the code;
2) The claimant, no longer being employed, does not
seek reinstatement; and
3) The aggregate money claim of the employee or
househelper does not exceed five thousand pesos
(P5,000.00).
In the absence of any of the three (3) requisites, the
Labor Arbiters have exclusive original jurisdiction over
all claims arising from employer-employee relations,
other than claims for employee's compensation, social
security, medicare and maternity benefits.
Considering further that the aggregate claims involve an
amount in excess of P5,000.00, the SC finds it more
appropriate that the issue of petitioner hospital's
liability therefor, including the proposal of petitioner
that the obligation of private respondents to the former
in the aggregate amount of P507,237.57 be used to
offset its obligations to them, be ventilated and
resolved, not in a summary proceeding before the
Regional Director under Article 128 of the Labor Code,
as amended, but in accordance with the more formal
and extensive proceeding before the Labor Arbiter.
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that the amount
of the employer's liability is not quite a factor in
determining the jurisdiction of the Regional Director.
However, the power to order compliance with labor
standards provisions may not be exercised where the
employer contends or questions the findings of the
labor regulation officers and raises issues which cannot
be determined without taking into account evidentiary
matters not verifiable in the normal course of
inspection, as in the case at bar.
GUICO VS. QUISUMBING
298 SCRA 666 [1998]
FACTS:
The case started when the Office of the Regional
Director, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
Region I, San Fernando, La Union, received a letter-
complaint dated April 25, 1995, requesting for an
investigation of petitioner's establishment, Copylandia
Services & Trading, for violation of labor standards laws.
Pursuant to the visitorial and enforcement powers of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representative under Article 128 of the
Labor Code, as amended, inspections were conducted
at Copylandia's outlets on April 27 and May 2, 1995. The
inspections yielded the following violations involving
twenty-one (21) employees who are copier operators:
(1) underpayment of wages; (2) underpayment of 13th
month pay; and (3) no service incentive leave with pay.
On October 30, 1995, Regional Director Guerrero N.
Cirilo issued an Order favorable to the 21 employees.
Petitioner received a copy of the Order on November
10, 1995. On November 15, 1995, petitioner filed a
Notice of Appeal. The next day, he filed a Memorandum
of Appeal accompanied by a Motion to Reduce Amount
of Appeal Bond and a Manifestation of an Appeal Bond.
In his appeal memorandum, petitioner questioned the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director citing Article 129 of
the Labor Code, as amended, and Section 1, Rule IX of
the Implementing Rules of Republic Act No. 6715. He
argued that the Regional Director has no jurisdiction
over the complaint of the 21 employees since their
individual monetary claims exceed the P5,000.00 limit.
He alleged that the Regional Director should have
indorsed the case to the Labor Arbiter for proper
adjudication and for a more formal proceeding where
there is ample opportunity for him to present evidence
to contest the claims of the employees.
In the Motion to Reduce Amount of Appeal Bond,
petitioner claimed he was having difficulty in raising the
monetary award which he denounced as exorbitant.
Pending resolution of the motion, he posted an appeal
bond in the amount of P105,000.00 insisting that the
jurisdiction of the Regional Director is limited to claims
of P5,000.00 per employee and there were 21
employees involved in the case.
In a letter dated February 23, 1996, the Regional
Director informed petitioner that he could not give due
course to his appeal since the appeal bond of
P105,000.00 fell short of the amount.
On March 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to Reduce Amount of Appeal Bond but
in an Order dated December 3, 1996, the respondent
Secretary denied the foregoing Motion for
Reconsideration on the ground that the directive from
the Regional Director to post an additional surety bond
is contained in a "mere letter" which cannot be the
proper subject for a Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Appeal before his office. He added that for failure of the
petitioner to post the correct amount of surety or cash
bond, his appeal was not perfected following Article 128
(b) of the Labor Code, as amended.
On December 26, 1996, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. On February 13, 1997, he filed a
Motion to Admit Additional Bond and posted the
amount of P126,841.06 in compliance with the order of
the Regional Director in his letter dated February 13,
1996.
On October 24, 1997, the respondent Secretary denied
the Motion for Reconsideration. He ruled that the
Regional Director has jurisdiction over the case citing
Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended. He
pointed out that Republic Act No. 7730 repealed the
jurisdictional limitations imposed by Article 129 on the
visitorial and enforcement powers of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment or his duly authorized
representatives. In addition, he held that petitioner is
now estopped from questioning the computation made
by the Regional Director as a result of the compromise
agreement he entered into with the employees. Lastly,
he reiterated his ruling that the Receipt, Waiver and
Quitclaim signed by the employees was not valid.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction
over the money claims which exceed P5,000.00 and
whether or not the appeal was perfected.
RULING:
The petition was dismissed. The Court sustained the
jurisdiction of the respondent Secretary. As the
respondent correctly pointed out, this Court's ruling in
Servando case that the visitorial power of the Secretary
of Labor to order and enforce compliance with labor
standard laws cannot be exercised where the individual
claim exceeds P5,000.00, can no longer be applied in
view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7730 amending
Article 128(b) of the Labor Code.
As to the second issue, the SC declared that Article 128
(b) of the Labor Code clearly provides that the appeal
bond must be "in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the order appealed from." The
records show that petitioner failed to post the required
amount of the appeal bond. His appeal was therefore
not perfected.
SECRETARY OF LABOR
TELEFUNKEN SEMICONDUCTORS EMPLOYEES UNION-
FFW VS CA
FACTS:
The labor dispute started when the Company and the
Union reached a deadlock in their negotiations for a
new collective bargaining agreement. The Union filed a
Notice of Strike with the NCMB. The Acting DOLE
Secretary intervened and assumed jurisdiction over the
dispute and thus enjoined any strike or lockout,
whether actual or intended, between the parties.
Despite the assumption Order, the Union struck. Also,
despite the Notice of the Return-to-Work Order, still
some of the striking workers refused to heed the order
and continued with their picket. The Company then
issued letters of termination for cause to the workers
who did not report back to work despite the Notice of
Assumption and Return-to-Work Orders issued by the
Acting DOLE Secretary. However, the Acting DOLE
Secretary issued another Order directing the Company
to reinstate all striking workers except the Union
Officers, shop stewards, and those with pending
criminal charges, x x x while the resolution of the
legality of the strike was pending. The strike was later
declared illegal by the Secretary.
ISSUE:
Whether or not defiance to the assumption and return-
to-work orders of the Secretary of Labor after
assumption of jurisdiction is a valid ground to terminate
the employment of striking members.
RULING:
The SC ruled in positive. It is clear from Art. 263(g) that
the moment the Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction
over a labor dispute in an industry indispensable to
national interest, such assumption shall have the effect
of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike. It was not even necessary for the Secretary of
Labor to issue another order directing them to return to
work. The mere issuance of an assumption order by the
Secretary of Labor automatically carries with it a return-
to-work order, even if the directive to return to work is
not expressly stated in the assumption order. However,
petitioners refused to acknowledge this directive of the
Secretary of Labor thereby necessitating the issuance of
another order expressly directing the striking workers to
cease and desist from their actual strike, and to
immediately return to work but which directive the
herein petitioners opted to ignore.
In this connection, Article 264 provides prohibited
activities. One of which is that No strike or lockout
shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by
the President or the Secretary or after certification or
submission of the dispute to compulsory or voluntary
arbitration. The rationale of this prohibition is that
once jurisdiction over the labor dispute has been
properly acquired by the competent authority, that
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the
application of the coercive processes of a strike. The SC
declared that it has held in a number of cases that
defiance to the assumption and return-to-work orders
of the Secretary of Labor after he has assumed
jurisdiction is a valid ground for loss of the employment
status of any striking union officer or member.
PHIMCO VS.BRILLANTES
(G.R. NO. 120751 MARCH 17, 1999)
FACTS:
On March 9, 1995, the private respondent, Phimco
Industries Labor Association (PILA), duly certified
collective bargaining representative of the daily paid
workers of the petitioner PHIMCO filed a notice of strike
with the NCMB against PHIMCO, a corporation engaged
in the production of matches, after a deadlock in the
collective bargaining and negotiation. Parties failed to
resolve their differences. PILA (during the conciliation
conferences), composed of 352 members, staged a
strike.
PHIMCO sent notice of termination to some 47 workers
including several union officers. Secretary Brillantes
assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute and issued a
return-to-work order.
Hence, petitioner files this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the public respondent acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in assuming jurisdiction over subject labor
dispute.
RULING:
YES, the petition is impressed with merit.
Art. 263, paragraph (g) of the Labor Code, provides:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exist a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume
jurisdiction over the dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration . . .
The Labor Code vests in the Secretary of Labor the
discretion to determine what industries are
indispensable to the national interest. Accordingly,
upon the determination by the Secretary of Labor that
such industry is indispensable to the national interest,
he will assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute in the
said industry. This power, however, is not without any
limitation.
It stressed in the case of Free telephone Workers Union
vs. Honorable Minister of Labor and Employment, et al.,
the limitation set by the legislature on the power of the
Secretary of Labor to assume jurisdiction over a labor
dispute, thus:
xxx cannot be any clearer, the coverage being limited to
strikes or lockouts adversely affecting the national
interest.
In this case at bar, however, the very admission by the
public respondent draws the labor dispute in question
out of the ambit of the Secretarys prerogative, to wit.
While the case at bar appears on its face not to fall
within the strict categorization of cases imbued with
national interest, this office believes that the
obtaining circumstances warrant the exercise of the
powers under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
amended.
The private respondent did not even make any effort to
touch on the indispensability of the match factory to
the national interest. It must have been aware that a
match factory, though of value, can scarcely be
considered as an industry indispensable to the national
interest as it cannot be in the same category as
generation and distribution of energy, or those
undertaken by banks, hospitals, and export-oriented
industries. Yet, the public respondent assumed
jurisdiction thereover.
To uphold the action of the public respondent under the
premises would be stretching too far the power of the
Secretary of Labor as every case of a strike or lockout
where there are inconveniences in the community, or
work disruptions in an industry though not
indispensable to the national interest, would then come
within the Secretarys power. It would be practically
allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in any
Labor dispute at his pleasure.
This is precisely why the law sets and defines the
standard: even in the exercise of his power of
compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the
Labor Code, the Secretary must follow the law.
INTERNATIONAL PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. VS. SEC. OF
LABOR 205 SCRA 59 [1992]
FACTS:
Prior to the expiration on January 1, 1989 of the
collective bargaining agreement between petitioner
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter,
Company) and the Associated Labor Union (Union, for
brevity), the latter submitted to the Company its
economic and political demands. These were not met
by the Company, hence a deadlock ensued.
After all conciliation efforts had failed, the Union went
on strike on August 8, 1989 and the Company's
operations were completely paralyzed.
Subsequently, three other labor cases involving the
same parties were filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), namely:
a. a petition for injunction and damages with
temporary restraining order filed by the Company
against the Union and some of its members for
picketing the Company's establishment, allegedly
without the required majority vote of the employees;
b. a complaint for unfair labor practice with prayer
for damages and attorney's fees filed by the Union
against the Company, its personnel manager, and the
Workers Alliance of Trade Unions (WATU) as a result of
the Company's refusal to include the sales workers in
the bargaining unit resulting in a deadlock in the
bargaining negotiations; for coddling the respondent
WATU as a separate bargaining agent of the sales
workers despite a contrary ruling of the Med-Arbiter;
and
c. a petition to declare the strike illegal with
prayer for damages filed by the Company.
Meanwhile, considering that the Company belongs to
an industry indispensable to national interest, it being
engaged in the manufacture of drugs and
pharmaceuticals and employing around 600 workers,
then Acting Secretary of Labor, Ricardo C. Castro,
invoking Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, issued an
order dated September 26, 1989 assuming jurisdiction
over the aforesaid case and directing the parties to
return to the status quo before the work stoppage.
The union filed a motion to consolidate the three NLRC
cases. Despite the companys objection, the Secretary
ordered the consolidation of the three cases. The
company assails the order on three grounds:
a. That the exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide the three NLRC cases is vested in the Labor
Arbiter;
b. That there is nothing in Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code which directs the Labor Arbiter to hold in
abeyance all proceedings in the NLRC Cases and await
instruction from the Secretary. Section 6, Rule V of the
Revised Rules of the NLRC which is invoked by the
Secretary is null and void for mandating the cessation of
all proceedings before the Labor Arbiter where the
Secretary assumed jurisdiction, thereby amending
Article 263(g) by enlarging the jurisdiction of the
Secretary;
c. That assuming that Sec. 6, Rule V is in
accordance with Article 263(g), still the Secretary should
not have ordered the consolidation of the three cases,
since the Secretary assumed jurisdiction only over the
deadlock in the CBA negotiations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary has the power to assume
jurisdiction over a labor dispute and its incidental
controversies.
RULING:
The SC declared that the issuance of the assailed orders
is within the province of the Secretary as authorized by
Article 263(g) and Article 217(a) (1) and (5), taken jointly
and rationally construed to subserve the objective of
the jurisdiction vested in the Secretary. It is
fundamental that a statute is to be read in a manner
that would breathe life into it, rather than defeat it."
In the present case, however, by virtue of Article 263 (g)
of the Labor Code, the Secretary has been conferred
jurisdiction over cases which would otherwise be under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of labor arbiters.
There was an existing labor dispute as a result of a
deadlock in the negotiation for a collective bargaining
agreement and the consequent strike, over which the
Secretary assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Article 263
(g) of the Labor Code. The three NLRC cases were just
offshoots of the stalemate in the negotiations and the
strike. We, therefore, uphold the Secretary's order to
consolidate the NLRC cases with the labor dispute
pending before him and his subsequent assumption of
jurisdiction over the said NLRC cases for him to be able
to competently and efficiently dispose of the dispute in
its totality.
To uphold petitioner Company's arguments that the
NLRC cases are alien and totally separate and distinct
from the deadlock in the negotiation of the collective
bargaining agreement is to sanction split jurisdiction
which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of
justice.
The Court should help labor authorities provide workers
immediate access to their rights and benefits, without
being hampered by arbitration or litigation processes
that prove to be not only nerve-wracking, but financially
burdensome in the long run.
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR VS LAGUESMA
(304 SCRA 405 [1999])
FACTS:
On December 27, 1994, a petition for certification
election among the rank and file employees of Cebu
Shipyard and Engineering Work, Inc. was filed by the
Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization
(ANGLO-KMU).
On January 9, 1995, forced-intervenor National
Federation of Labor (NFL) moved for the dismissal of the
petition on grounds that ANGLO-KMU failed to comply
with the 25% consent requirement and to submit the
aforesaid requirements necessary for its acquisition of
legal personality within the freedom period. The NFL
also alleged that the documents submitted by ANGLO-
KMU were procured through misrepresentation. On
March 13, 1995, the Med-Arbiter issued the assailed
resolution dismissing the petition, after finding that the
submission of the required documents evidencing the
due creation of a local was made after the lapse of the
freedom period. Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma set aside the Med-Arbiters resolution and
entered in lieu thereof a new order finding petitioner
[ANGL0-KMU] as having complied with the
requirements of registration at the time of filing of the
petition and remanding the records of the case to the
Regional Office of origin.
The NFL thus filed special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proper remedy to question the
decision of the Secretary of Labor and Employment is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
RULING:
Yes. The remedy of an aggrieved party from the
decisions of the NLRC and those of the Secretary of
Labor and Employment is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or
subsequent remedy and then to seasonably file a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. All such petitions should
be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
The propriety of Rule 65 as a remedy was highlighted in
St. Martin Funeral Homes vs. NLRC, where the
legislative history of the pertinent statues on judicial
review of cases decided under the Labor Code was
traced, leading to and supporting the thesis that since
appeals form the NLRC to the Supreme Court were
eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the
special civil action of certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decision of the
NLRC and consequently all references in the amended
Section 9 of B.P No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby
declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari
under Rule 65.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS
Pepsi-Cola Sales & Advertising Union vs. Secretary of
Labor 211 SCRA 843 [1992]
Facts:
Roberto Alisasis was an employee of the Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co.Inc. and a member of Pepsi-Cola Sales &
Advertising Union. During the entire period of his
employment , there were regularly deducted from his
wages the amounts corresponding to union dues as well
as contributions to the Mutual Aid Fund. Because of lost
of trust and confidence he was dismissed by the
company. The NLRC found the dismissal to have a valid
and lawful cause, however, the manner it was effected
was not in accordance with law. Both Alisasis and Pepsi-
Cola,Inc. accepted the NLRCs verdict and complied
therewith. Aliasis thereafter asked his labor
organization, PSAU to pay him monetary benefits in
accordance with their amended by-laws., in an amount
equal to 1.00 per year multiplied by the number of
members. PSAU demurred, invoking section 1 art.12 of
their amended by-laws, declaring as disqualified from
any any entitlement to the PLAN and benefit or return
of contributionsunder any circumstances, inter alia a
member dismissed for cause. Alisasis thereupon filed a
complaint against the union, PSAU, with the Med
Arbitration Unit, National Capital Region, DOLE, to
compel the latter to pay him his claimed benefits. The
principal defenses alleged by PSAU were Alisasis was
disqualified to claim any benefits under the Mutual Aid
Plan and that the Med-Arbiters has no original
jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the case at bar is within the original
jurisdiction of the Med-Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor
Relations.
Ruling:
Yes.The controversy between Alisasis and his
union,PSAU-respecting the formers rights under the
latters Mutual Aid Fund would be an intra-union
conflict under Article 226 of the Labor Code and hence,
within the exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Med-
Arbiter of the Bureau of Labor Relations whose decision,
it may additionally be mentioned, is appealable to the
Secretary of Labor.
Abbot Laboratories Phils. vs. Abbot Lab. Employees
Union (323 SCRA 392, 2000)
Facts:
Abbot Laboratories Employees Union applied for union
registration with the Bureau of Relations (BLR). The
same was approved but was, however, cancelled on
motion of Abbot Laboraties Philippines, Inc., by the
Regional Director of the BLR on the ground of common
interest among the rank and file employees in the
manufacturing unit to justify the formation of a
separate bargaining unit (not 30% who signed, only
10%, there were 286 members, only supported by 30
signatures). An appeal was made by the union to the
Secretary of Labor who referred the same back to the
Director of the BLR. The BLR reversed the order of
cancellation and the motion for reconsideration was
denied. The company elevated the case to the Secretary
of Labor, who in a letter addressed to petitioners
counsel, refused to act thereon on the ground that it
had no jurisdiction over decisions rendered on appeal
by the BLR in cancellation cases. Hence, the instant
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Secretary of Labor has jurisdiction
over decisions rendered on appeal by the BLR.
Ruling:
No. The jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment under rule VIII, Book V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended by
Department Order No.09, on cancellation proceedings,
is limited only to those decided by the BLR in the
exercise of its exclusive and original jurisdiction. It has
no jurisdiction over decisions rendered in the exercise
of its appellate power to review. The decision of the BLR
on cases brought before it on appeal from the Regional
Director are final and executor. The remedy of the
aggrieved party is a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA VS. NATL UNION GR
No. 178296, January 12, 2011
FACTS:
The respondents petition for certification election was
granted. Petitioner then discovered that respondents
had failed to submit to the Bureau of Labor Relations
(BLR) its annual financial report for several yearsand the
list of its members since it filed its registration papers in
1995. Consequently, it filed a Petition for Cancellation
of Registration of respondent, on the ground of the
non-submission of the said documents. Petitioner
prayed tht respondents Certificate of creation of
Local/Chapter becancelled and its name be deleted
from the list of legitimate labor organizations. It further
requested the suspension of the certification election
proceedings. Nevertheless, the certification election
pushed through and the respondent won.
The Regional Director of DOLE-NCR and DOLE Secretary
held that constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
association and right of workers to self-organization
outweighed respondents noncompliance with the
statutory requirements to maintain is status as a
legitimate labor organization.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the failure to comply with the statutory
requirements (filing financial report and the list of its
members) sufficient ground for the cancellation of
registration of the respondent as a labor union.
RULING:
No, the compliance should not be ground for the
cancellation. Articles 238 and 239 of the Labor Code, as
amended, provide that failure to file financial reports
and the list of its members are grounds for the
cancellation of Union Organization. However,
consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights
guaranteed by Article XIII, Section 3 of the Constitution,
that is, the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful
concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear in
mind that registration confers upon a union the status
of legitimacy and the concomitant right and privileges
grate by law to legitimate labor organization particularly
the right to pariticpate in or ask for certification election
in a bargaining unit. Thus, the cancellation of
certification of registration is the equivalent of snuffing
out the life of the labor organization. For without such
registration, it loses-as a rule- its rights under the Labor
Code.
Furthermore, the Labor Codes provision on cancellation
of union registration and on reportorial requirements
have been recently amended by RA No. 9481, which
says that failure to file financial reports and list of union
members hall not be a ground for cancellation of union
registration but shall subject the erring officers or
member to suspension, expulsion from membership, or
any appropriate penalty.
Grievance Machinery
RCPI vs. NLRC
223 SCRA 656 [1993]
Facts:
Respondent Teresita P. Cansino was a teletype clerk of
RCPI. She was terminated by her employer on
November 23, 1985 because of the alleged cash
shortages in the amount of P174, withholding 13
telegrams and altering dates of receipts and the filling
dates of telegrams. Pursuant, however, to the
provisions of an existing collective bargaining
agreement, the matter was first submitted to a
grievance machinery composed of a representative of
the employer and the bargaining representative of the
employee. The union sought the employees
reinstatement for humanitarian considerations.
Consequently, since no favorable action resulted from
the last meeting held on December 14, 1988, the
employee respondent file a complaint for illegal
dismissal against the petitioner RCPI with the NLRC.
RCPI contended that the employee is guilty of laches in
that although she was dismissed on November 23,
1985, she filed her complaint for illegal dismissal only
on January 10, 1989.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent employee is guilty of
laches pending result of his illegal dismissal complaint
with the grievance machinery.
Ruling:
No. The aforementioned referral to the grievance
machinery could be considered as a part of appellate
procedure. Hence, it may be asserted that the pendency
of the matter thus referred may even affect the
ripeness of a cause of action for illegal dismissal in that
when parties submit to the grievance procedure, the
institution of a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
labor arbiter, prior to the grievance machinerys having
resolved the referred matter, would be premature. In
the instant case, it cannot be said that there was delay-
undue or otherwise on the part of the respondent
because she had merely awaited the final outcome of
the grievance machinery. She could have instituted the
complaint for illegal dismissal prior to such final
determination because if she did, her suit would have
been premature.
VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION
Ludu & Luym Corp. vs. Saornido
395 SCRA 451 [2003]
Facts:
Petitioner LUDO & LUYM CORPORATION (LUDO for
brevity) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
manufacture of coconut oil, corn starch, glucose and
related products.In the course of its business
operations, LUDO engaged the arrastre services of
Cresencio Lu Arrastre Services (CLAS) for the loading
and unloading of its finished products at the wharf.
Accordingly, several arrastre workers were deployed by
CLAS to perform the services needed by LUDO.These
arrastre workers were subsequently hired, on different
dates, as regular rank-and-file employees of LUDO every
time the latter needed additional manpower services.
Said employees thereafter joined respondent union, the
LUDO Employees Union (LEU), which acted as the
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file
employees.On April 13, 1992, respondent union entered
into a collective bargaining agreement with LUDO which
provides certain benefits to the employees, the amount
of which vary according to the length of service
rendered by the availing employee.
Thereafter, the union requested LUDO to include in its
members period of service the time during which they
rendered arrastre services to LUDO through the CLAS so
that they could get higher benefits. LUDO failed to act
on the request. Thus, the matter was submitted for
voluntary arbitration.
The parties accordingly executed a submission
agreement raising the sole issue of the date of
regularization of the workers for resolution by the
Voluntary Arbitrator. In its decision, the Voluntary
Arbitrator ruled that a) the 214 complainants shall be
considered regular employees of the respondents six (6)
months from the first day of service at CLAS;b)the said
complainants, being entitled to the CBA benefits during
the regular employment, are awarded a) sick leave, b)
vacation leave & c) annual wage and salary increases
during such period in the amount of FIVE MILLION
SEVEN HUNDRED SEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED
SIXTY ONE PESOS AND SIXTY ONE CENTAVOS
(P5,707,261.61).
Ludo contended that the arbitrator must confine its
adjudication to those issues submitted by the parties for
arbitration, which in this case is the sole issue of the
date of regularization of the workers. Hence, the award
of benefits by the arbitrator was done in excess of
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not a Voluntary Arbitrator can award
benefits not claimed in the submission agreemet.
Ruling:
Yes.In general, the arbitrator is expected to decide
those questions expressly stated and limited in the
submission agreement. However, since arbitration is the
final resort for the adjudication of disputes, the
arbitrator can assume that he has the power to make a
final settlement. Thus, assuming that the submission
empowers the arbitrator to decide whether an
employee was discharged for just cause, the arbitrator
in this instance can reasonable assume that his powers
extended beyond giving a yes-or-no answer and
included the power to reinstate him with or without
back pay.
By the same token, the issue of regularization should be
viewed as two-tiered issue. While the submission
agreement mentioned only the determination of the
date or regularization, law and jurisprudence give the
voluntary arbitrator enough leeway of authority as well
as adequate prerogative to accomplish the reason for
which the law on voluntary arbitration was created
speedy labor justice. It bears stressing that the
underlying reason why this case arose is to settle, once
and for all, the ultimate question of whether
respondent employees are entitled to higher benefits.
To require them to file another action for payment of
such benefits would certainly undermine labor
proceedings and contravene the constitutional mandate
providing full protection to labor.
Landtex Industries vs. CA
529 SCRA 631 [2007]
Facts:
Landtex, a sole proprietorship owned by Alex Go and
managed by William Go, is a business enterprise
engaged in the manufacture of garments. Ayson worked
in Landtex as a knitting operator from 19 May 1979 to 6
July 1996. Ayson was an officer[4] of Landtex Industries
Workers Union Federation of Free Workers (union)
which had an existing collective bargaining agreement
(CBA) with Landtex.Ayson was terminated by Landtex
because of the allegation that he spread rumors about
the personal life of William Go and his family, owner of
Landtex.the union president requested Landtex for a
formal dialogue regarding Aysons case. Landtex
reaffirmed its decision to terminate Ayson in meetings
with the union held on 10 and 16 July 1996. Landtex and
the union agreed to refer the matter to a third party in
accordance with the provisions of law and of the CBA.
Landtex expected Ayson to refer the issue to the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) for
the selection of a voluntary arbitrator. Ayson and the
union, however, filed a complaint before the labor
arbiter.Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of Ayson. Landtex
contended that Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over
the case. NLRC ruled that case falls within the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrators, as
provided in Article 261 of the Labor Code. Landtex
merely imposed a disciplinary measure when it
terminated Aysons employment.CA reinstated the
decision of Labor Arbiter with modification.
Issue:
Whether the NLRC correctly ruled that jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the instant case pertains
exclusively to the voluntary arbitrator considering that:
1. The existing CBA provides that a grievance is one
that arises from the interpretation or implementation of
this agreement, including disciplinary action imposed on
any covered employee; and
2. The parties have undergone the grievance
machinery of the collective bargaining agreement.
Ruling:
No. Article 261 of the Labor Code provides that
voluntary arbitrators shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances
arising from the interpretation or implementation of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from
the interpretation or enforcement of company
personnel policies. On the other hand, a reading of
Article 217 in conjunction with Article 262 shows that
termination disputes fall under the jurisdiction of the
labor arbiter unless the union and the company agree
that termination disputes should be submitted to
voluntary arbitration. Such agreement should be clear
and unequivocal. Existing law is an intrinsic part of a
valid contract without need for the parties to expressly
refer to it. Thus, the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the labor arbiter over unfair labor practices, termination
disputes, and claims for damages cannot be arrogated
into the powers of voluntary arbitrators in the absence
of an express agreement between the union and the
company.
In the present case, the CBA between Landtex and the
union does not clearly state that termination disputes,
as opposed to mere disciplinary actions, are covered by
the CBA.The CBA defined a grievance as one that arises
from the interpretation or implementation of this
Agreement, including disciplinary action imposed on
any covered employee. The CBA did not explicitly state
that termination disputes should be submitted to the
grievance machinery.
Noel Mora vs. Avesco Marketing
GR No. 177414, November 14, 2008
Facts:
Noel Mora was hired as a sales engineer at Avesco
Marketing Corporation (respondent) to supervise and
install sound and communications systems for its
clientele. He was terminated by respondent company
the alleged selling of competitors products. Mora filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) which the labor arbiter
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the dispute falls
within the province of the grievance procedure
provided for by the Collective Bargaining Agreement
between respondent and the workers union.
The case was thus referred to the National Conciliation
and Mediation Board for voluntary arbitration.
Voluntary Arbitrators dismissed the complaint upon the
ground that he had voluntarily resigned. He filed a
petition for certiorari with CA which denied the same.
Issue: Whether or not the case at bar is appealable to
CA after the VA rendered their decision.
Ruling: No. The Court notes that the appellate court
erred in giving due course to petitioners petition for
certiorari, for his proper mode of appeal was for review
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
An independent action for certiorari may of course be
availed of when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, if
the decision of the voluntary arbitrator involves a
question of jurisdiction. What petitioner is contesting,
however, is the finding that he voluntarily resigned.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or
fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy
should be appeal. The appellate court should thus have
dismissed outright the petition for certiorari, as the
decision of the VA had already become final and
executory.
NATIONAL CONCILIATION AND MEDIATION BOARD
Pentagon Steel Corporation vs. CA
GR No. 174141, June 26, 2009
Facts:
Petioner Pentagon Corporation alleged the respondent
Perfecto Balogothat he absented himself from work
without giving prior notice. Thus, considered him on
AWOL.
The respondent filed a complaint with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC for underpayment/nonpayment of
salaries and wages, overtime pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave, 13th month pay, separation pay, and
ECOLA.
Several times the employee reported back to work but
the employer refused to take him back despite of the
medical certificate he submitted. He was thus driven to
file a complaint against the petitioner.During the
conciliation proceedings, the respondent demanded
that he be paid a separation pay but the petitioner
refused to pay for lack of basis. The respondent then
formally amended his complaint to include his claim of
illegal dismissal.
Labor Arbiter rendered his decision dismissing the illegal
dismissal charge.NLRCvacated and set aside the decision
of the labor arbiter.The CA affirmed the NLRCs finding
that the dismissal was illegal, but modified the
challenged decision by adding reinstatement and the
payment of full backwages, inclusive of allowances and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed
from the time his compensation was withheld from him
up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
The petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion against
the CAin basing its decision on the proceedings that
transpired when the parties werenegotiating for a
compromise agreement during the preliminary
conference of the case.
testify in any court or body regarding any matters taken
up at conciliation proceedings conducted by them.
In the present case, we find that the CA did indeed
consider the statements the parties made during
conciliation; thus, the CA erred by considering excluded
materials in arriving at its conclusion. The reasons
behind the exclusion are two-fold.
First, since the law favors the settlement of
controversies out of court, a person is entitled to buy
his or her peace without danger of being prejudiced in
case his or her efforts fail; hence, any communication
made toward that end will be regarded as
privileged.[16] Indeed, if every offer to buy peace could
be used as evidence against a person who presents it,
many settlements would be prevented and unnecessary
litigation would result, since no prudent person would
dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her
compromise position could be exploited as a confession
of weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because
they are not intended as admissions by the parties
making them.A true offer of compromise does not, in
legal contemplation, involve an admission on the part of
a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the
part of a plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or
even doubtful, since it is made with a view to avoid
controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the
distinguishing mark of an offer of compromise that it is
made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation
of mutual concessions.

Issue:
Whether or not the court can use as basis in its decision
information obtained during conciliation proceedings.

Ruling:
No. Article 233 of the Labor Code which states that
information and statements made at conciliation
proceedings shall be treated as privileged
communication and shall not be used as evidence in the
Commission. Conciliators and similar officials shall not