STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DIGEST FOR Sept 23, 2017
Power to Construe; Limitations
Endencia v. David, G.R. Nos. L-6355-56, 31 August 1953, 93 Phil. 696
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO vs. SATURNINO DAVID
G.R. No. L-6355-56, August 31, 1953
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:
Whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the
courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution.
FACTS:
The RTC of Manila declared Sec. 13 of R.A. 590 as unconstitutional and
ordered defendant-appellant Saturnino David, Collector of Internal
Revenue, to re-fund the income taxes collected on the salaries of
Justice Pastor M. Endencia and Justice Fernando Jugo
ISSUE:
Whether or not the salaries of judicial officers are subject to taxation by
virtue of Sec. 13 of R.A. 590?
HELD:
As it was declared in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer (1950), the
taxes of judicial officers are not subject to taxation. On the
construction and application done of Sec. 9, Art. 8, of the Constitution
on the aforementioned case, which states thatThe members of the
Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts xxx shall
receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress
shall provide otherwise, xxx, the court had declare that taxing on the
salary of a judicial officer is a diminution of such salary and so violates
the Constitution. However, in this case, the Congress provided,
through R.A. 590, that No salary xx by any public officer xx shall be
considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be diminution of his compensation fixed
by the Constitution or by law, which violated the principle of
separation of powers as it, being a legislative branch, tried to usurp the
authority of the judiciary to define and interpret when it passed
such declaratory act. Whenever a statute is in violation of the
fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give
effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the
destruction of the Constitution.
A. How must Legislative intent be ascertained?
Aisporna v. CA, G.R. No. L-39419, 12 April 1982, 113 SCRA 459
MAPALAD AISPORNA vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-39419, April 12, 1982
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
whole statute; words and phrases and clauses should not be studied in
isolation or detached from the rest.
FACTS:
Rodolfo Aisporna is an authorized insurance agent of Perla
Compania de Seguros. Rodolfo's wife named Mapalad, in his
absence, issued a Personal Accident Policy to Eugenio S. Isidro. Later
on, the insured died during the lifetime of the policy.
Subsequently, an information for violation of Section 189 of
Insurance Law against Mapalad Aiporna was filed before the Court
of Cabatuan City. It was alleged therein that Mapalad Aisporna acted
as insurance agent without previously obtaining a certificate of
authority from the Insurance Commissioner as required by Section 189
of the Insurance Act. In her defense, Mapalad Aisporna averred that
she merely assisted her husband and that she did not received any
compensation in issuing the policy. The trial court of Cabanatuan,
nonetheless, convicted Mapalad Aisporna and both the Court of First
Instance and the Court of Appeals affirmed said decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not receipt of compensation is an element of violation of
Section 189 as to warrant the acquittal of Mapalad Aisporna?
HELD:
Yes, to receive compensation by the agent is an essential element for
violation of paragraph 1 of Section 189 of the Insurance Code. The
definition of an agent under paragraph 2 is intended to define the
word agent in paragraph 1. Therefore, paragraph 2 provides
that any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent
within the intent of Section 189 of the Insurance Code. The
information does not allege that the negotiation of an insurance
contract by Mapalad Aisporna was one for compensation. Every
element of the crime must be alleged and proved to warrant a
conviction
A. How must Legislative intent be ascertained?
China Bank v. Ortega, G.R. No. L-34964, 31 January 1973, 49 SCRA 355
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION AND TAN KIM LIONG vs.HON.
WENCESLAO ORTEGA ANDVICENTE ACABAN G.R. No. L-34964,
JANUARY 31, 1973
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:
In construing a law, the court can look into the discussions of the
conference committee report in order to ascertain the framers' intent in
creating it.
FACTS:
Vicente Acaban filed a complaint against Bautista Logging Co., Inc., B &
B Forest Development Corporation and Marino Bautista for the
collection of a sum of money. Judgment by default was rendered
against the defendants in that case. To satisfy the judgment, the
plaintiff sought the garnishment of the bank deposit of the defendant
B & B Forest Development Corporation with the China Banking
Corporation. A notice of garnishment was issued and served on the
Bank through its cashier, Tan Kim Liong. The cashier refused to
comply, citing Republic Act No. 1405 or the Bank Secrecy Law, which
he claims prohibits the disclosure of any information pertaining to
bank deposits.The Bank and Tan Kim Liong thus filed this petition
for certiorari with the Supreme Court assailing the orders directing
the disclosure under threat of holding them in contempt of court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the bank can be compelled to make the disclosure
pursuant to a valid notice of garnishment, considering the provisions of
the Bank Secrecy Law?
HELD:
Yes, it can. The lower court did not order an examination of or
inquiry into the deposit of B & B Forest Development Corporation, as
contemplated in the law. It merely required Tan Kim Liong to inform
the court whether or not the defendant B & B Forest Development
Corporation had a deposit in the China Banking Corporation only for
purposes of the garnishment issued by it, so that the bank would hold
the same intact and not allow any withdrawal until further order.
In construing the law, the Court looked at the discussions of the
conference committee report on Senate Bill No. 351 and House Bill No.
3977, which later became Republic Act 1405, which stated that it was
not the intention of the lawmakers to place bank deposits beyond the
reach of execution to satisfy a final judgment
A. How must Legislative intent be ascertained?
Board of Administrators of the P.V.A. v. Bautista, G.R. No. L-37867, 22
February 1982, 112 SCRA 59
BOARD OF ADMINISTRATORS, PHILIPPINES VETE
RANS ADMINISTRATION vs. HON. JOSE G. BAUTISTA, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of the CFI Manila, Branch III, and CALIXTO V.
GASILAO G.R. No. L-37867 February 22, 1982
FACTS:
Calixto Gasilao was a war veteran in good standing during the World
War II. On October 19, 1955, he filed a claim for disability pension
under Section 9, Republic Act No. 65. The claim was disapproved
by the Philippine Veterans Board (now Board of Administrators,
Philippine Veterans Administration). Fortunately, on August 8,
1968, the claim of the petitioner which was disapproved in
December, 1955 was reconsidered and his claim was finally approved at
the rate of P100.00 a month, life pension, and the additional P10.00 for
each of his ten unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the
approval of the claim of petitioner, he requested respondents that his
claim is made retroactive as of the date when his original
application was filed or disapproved in 1955. Respondents did not
act on his request. On June 22, 1969, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 65
was amended by Republic Act No. 5753 which increased the life
pension of the veteran to P200.00 a month and granted besides
P30.00 a month for the wife and P30.00 a month each for his
unmarried minor children below 18. In view of the new law, respondents
increased the monthly pension of petitioner to P125.00 effective
January 15, 1971 due to insufficient funds to cover full implementation.
His wife was given a monthly pension of P7.50 until January 1, 1972
when Republic Act 5753 was fully implemented. Petitioner now claims
that he was deprived of his right to the pension from October 19,
1955 to June 21, 1957 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus P10.00
a month each for his six (6) unmarried minor children below 18. He also
alleges that from June 22, 1957 to August 7, 1968 he is entitled to the
difference of P100.00 per month plus P10.00 a month each for his
seven (7) unmarried nor children below 18. Again, petitioner asserts
the difference of P100.00 per month, plus P30.00 a month for his wife
and the difference of P20.00 a month each for his four (4)
unmarried minor children below 18 from June 22, 1969 up to
January 14, 1971 and finally, the difference of P75.00 per month
plus P30.00 a month for his wife and the difference of P20.00 a
month for his three (3) unmarried minor children below 18 from
January 15, 1971 to December 31, 1971.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gasilao is entitled to the pension from 1955
instead of 1968?
HELD:
The Supreme Court modified the judgment of the court a quo, ordering
the Board of Administrators of the Philippine Veterans Administration
(now the Philippine Veterans Affairs Office) to make Gasilaospension
effective 18 December 1955 at the rate of P50.00 per month plus
P10.00 per month for each of his then unmarried minor children below
18, and the former amount increased to P100.00 from 22June 1957 to 7
August 1968; and declaring the differentials in pension to which said
Gasilao, his wife and his unmarried minor children below 18 are
entitled for the period from 22 June 1969 to 14 January 1972 by
virtue of Republic Act 5753 subject to the availability of Government
funds appropriated for the purpose. It is said that purpose of Congress
in granting veteran pensions is to compensate the people who
suffered in the service while in line of duty. The law is therefore,
an expression of gratitude to and recognition of those who rendered
service for the country. For this reason, it is the general rule that a
liberal construction is given to pension statutes in favor of those
entitled to pension. Courts tend to favor the pensioner, but such
constructional preference is to be considered with other guides to
interpretation, and a construction of pension laws must depend on its
own particular language.
2.4.Power to Construe
The Supreme Court construes the applicable law in controversies which
are ripe for judicial resolution. It refrains from doing so where the
case has become moot and academic and it will instead dismiss the
case. A case or question is moot and academic when its purpose has
become stale or where no particular relief can be granted or which
can have no practical effect. However, notwithstanding its
mootness, the Court may nonetheless resolve the case and construe
the applicable law if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review,
specially where public interest requires its resolution or where rendering
a decision on the merits would be of practical value.
2.5.Limitations of Power to Construe
2.5.1. Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes.
Courts may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of
a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the
lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether
careless or calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however later
wisdom may recommend the inclusion. Courts are not authorized to
insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what
they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention had been
called to the omission.
They should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and
unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with
what they think
should be the law. Neither should courts construe statutes which are
perfectly vague.
2.5.2. Courts not to be influenced by questions of wisdom.
Courts do not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice, or
expediency of legislation, for it is not within their province
tosupervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety
and common sens
e. Hence, as long as laws do not violate the Constitution, the
courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of whether or
not they are wise or salutary.
3.Aids in Construction
3.1 Intrinsic Aids elements found in the law itself which are used in
construing a statute. (i.e. title; preamble; words, phrases, and
sentences; context; punctuation; headings and marginal notes; and
legislative definitions and interpretation clauses)
3.2 Extrinsic Aids aids not found in the language of the law (i.e.
contemporaneous circumstances; policy; legislative history of a
statute; contemporaneous or practical construction; executive
construction; legislative construction; judicial construction; and
construction by the bar and legal commentators)
B. Construction v. Judicial Legislation
Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, G.R. No. L-30642, 30 April 1985,
136 SCRA 142 (Note: read dissenting opinions)
PERFECTO S. FLORESCA, E vs. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION and
HON. JESUS P. MORFE, Presiding Judge of Branch XIII, Court of First
Instance of Manila G.R. No. L-30642, APRIL 30, 1985
FACTS:
Floresca et.al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex
Mining Corporation, who, while at its copper mines underground
operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28,1967, died as a result of the
cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of mine. Specifically the
complaint alleges that Philex Mining Corp, in violation of the
government rules and regulation, negligently and deliberately failed to
take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men
working underground. Floresca et.al moved to claim their benefits
pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the workmens
Compensation Commission. They also petition before the regular
courts and sue Philex for additional damages and it invoked that
they can no longer be sued because the petitioner have already
claimed benefits under the WCA.
ISSUE: Whether or not Floresca et.al can claim be
nefits and at the same time sue?
HELD: Under the law, Floresca et.al could only do either one. If
they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from
proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if
they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped
from claiming benefits under the WCA. The SC however ruled that
Floresca et.al is excuse from this deficiency due to ignorance of the
fact. The SC emphasized that they would go strictly by the book in the
case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence
for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law
insures mens survival and enables him.
B. Construction v. Judicial Legislation
Tanada v. Yulo, G.R No. 43575, 31 May 1935
Tanada v. Yulo Case No. 288 No. 43575 (May 31, 1935)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.11
FACTS:
Petitioner is a Justice of Peace appointed by the Gov. Gen. with the
consent by the Philippine Commission, assigned to Alabat, Tayabas.
Later in his service, he was transferred to
Perez, Tayabas. He reached his 65 th birthday on October 35, 1934,
subsequent to the approval of Act No. 3899 which makes mandatory
the retirement of all justices who have reached 65 years of age at the
time said Act takes effect on January 1, 1933. The judge of First
instance, acting upon the directive of the Secretary of Respondent
Justice, directed Petitioner to cease holding office pursuant to Act No.
3899.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Petitioner should cease to hold office.
2. W/N his transfer is considered a new transfer and requires
confirmation by the Philippine Commission.
HELD:
No, Petitioner should not cease to hold office as Act No. 3899 clearly
states that those who will cease to hold office are those 65 yrs of age at
the time the Act takes effect, not thereafter.
Therefore, Petitioner shall be a Justice of Peace for life as long as he
stays in good behavior or does not become incapacitated.
No, his transfer is not a new appointment. Hence, no confirmation is
required as it is just an enlargement of the jurisdiction grounded on
original appointment.
LATIN MAXIM:
6c, 7a
B. Construction v. Judicial Legislation
Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, 3 February 1997, 267 SCRA
408 (Note: read Justice Panganibans dissenting opinion)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL G.R. No. 122156, FEBRUARY 3, 1997
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION DOCTRINE:
Under the doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy, if a law or contract
violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract, whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered
into by private persons for private purposes, is null and void and
without any force and effect. And as constitutional provisions are
self-executing, it does not require any legislation to put it in
operation except when the provisions themselves expressly require
legislations to implement them.
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of
the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8
December 1986, decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51%
of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent Manila Hotel
Corporation. In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only
two (2) bidders participated: petitioner Manila Prince Hotel
Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the
MHC
or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid
for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than
the bid of petitioner. Pending the declaration of Reno ng Berhad as the
winning bidder/strategic partner and the execution of the necessary
contracts, matched the
bid price of P44.00 per share tendered by Renong Berhad. On 17
October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has
disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of
the MHC may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with
Renong Berhad, petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and
mandamus. In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par.,
Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel
has been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically
become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of Philippine
heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential
of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a
part of the national patrimony. Petitioner also argues that since 51%
of the shares of the MHC carry with it the ownership of the business of
the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS
being a part of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the
national economy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale of Manila Hotel to Renong Berhad
is in violation of the Constitutional provision of Filipino First policy
and is therefore null and void?
HELD: Yes. The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the
MHC, is not just any commodity to be sold to the highest bidder
solely for the sake of privatization. The Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. This is the plain
and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of
the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the
sanctity of the Constitution. It was thus ordered that GSIS accepts
the matching bid of petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation to
purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for purpose.
5.2. Statute
5.2.1. Requirements for the publication of laws
As stated in Article 2 of the New Civil Code, all laws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
Aids to Interpretation and Construction
A. Intrinsic Aids - i. Title
Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. L-33628, 29 December 1987, 156 SCRA 803
Ebarle v. Sucaldito, G.R. No. L-33628. December 29, 1987
FACTS:
The petitioner, then provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Sur and
a candidate for reelection in the local elections of 1971, seeks
injunctive relief in two separate petitions, to enjoin further proceedings
of his criminal cases, as well as I.S. Nos. 1-70, 2-71, 4-71, 5-71, 6-71,
and 7-71 of the respondent Fiscal's office of the said city, all in the
nature of prosecutions for violation of certain provisions of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and various provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. Principally, the petitioner relies on the failure
of the respondents City Fiscal and the Anti-Graft League to comply
with the provisions of Executive Order No. 264, "OUTLINING
THE PROCEDUE BY WHICH COMPLAINANTS CHARGING
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES WITH COMMISSION OF
IRREGULARITIES SHOULD BE GUIDED,"preliminary to their criminal
recourses.
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 264 is applicable in the case at bar.
HELD:
No. It is plain from the very wording of the Order that it has exclusive
application to administrative, not criminal complaints. The very title
speaks of "COMMISSION OF IRREGULARITIES." There is no
mention, not even by implication, of criminal "offenses," that is to
say, "crimes." While "crimes" amount to "irregularities," the
Executive Order could have very well referred to the more specific
term had it intended to make itself applicable thereto. Clearly, the
Executive Order simply consolidates these existing rules and
streamlines the administrative apparatus in the matter of
complaints against public officials. It is moreover significant that the
Executive Order in question makes specific reference to "erring
officials or employees removed or otherwise vindicated.If it were
intended to apply to criminal prosecutions, it would have employed
such technical terms as "accused", "convicted," or "acquitted." While
this is not necessarily a controlling parameter for all cases, it is
here material in construing theintent of the measure.
Aids to Interpretation and Construction
A. Intrinsic Aids - i. Title
City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, 28 February 1969, 27 SCRA
342
City of Baguio v. Marcos G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
FACTS:
On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First Instance of
Baguio in stituted the reopening of the cadastral proceedings under
Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the land here involved was
amongst those declared public lands by final decision rendered in
that case on November 13, 1922. Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned
the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the
parcel of land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his
name. On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G.
Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J. Buchholz
registered opposition to the reopening. The petitioners questioned
the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the petition to reopen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40
year period preceding the approval of Republic Act 931.
HELD:
Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were
instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on November
13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be
noted that the title of R.A. 931 authorizes "the filing in the proper
court, under certain conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels
of land that have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its
Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are about to be
declared land of the public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings
instituted within the forty years next preceding the approval of this
Act." There thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title
and body. It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is
adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act itself.
R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it should receive
blessings of liberal construction. The court says that lingual
imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never be permitted to
hamstring judicial search for legislative intent, which can otherwise
be discovered. Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed
thereunder embrace those parcels of land that have been declared
public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the forty
years next preceding the approval of this Act." Therefore, by that
statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to
reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the
cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered on
November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period
Aids to Interpretation and Construction
A. Intrinsic Aids - ii. Preamble
People v. Purisima, G.R. Nos. 402050-66, 20 November 1978, 86 SCRA
542
People v. Purisima G.R. No. L-42050, Nov. 20, 1978
FACTS:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were filed by the People
of the Philippines charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges issued an
Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground,
viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the
offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to
state one essential element of the crime.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Informations filed by the petitioners are
sufficient inform and substance to constitute the offense of illegal
possession of deadly weapon penalized under PD No. 9.
HELD:
No. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective. The two
elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the
Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the
facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey
the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order. In
the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the
primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter
would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. Because of the
problem of determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it
becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree
and this can be found among others in the preamble or, whereas"
clauses. It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there
exists a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and
that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is
favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences.
Aids to Interpretation and Construction
A. Intrinsic Aids - iii. Punctuation Marks
People v. Subido, G.R. No. 21734, 5 September 1975, 66 SCRA 545
People v. SubidoG.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975.
FACTS:
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion praying
that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his appeal bond be
cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that although he could not
pay the fine and the indemnity prescribed in the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, he could not be required to serve the amount of
fine and indemnity in the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said
judgment did not expressly and specifically provide that he should
serve the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.On December 10, 1959, the offended party
registered its opposition to accused-appellant's motion for
cancellation of appeal bond and asked the lower court to require
accused-appellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of
P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The
lower court issued an order denying the accused-appellant's motion
and declared in accordance with the terms of the judgment of the
Court of Appeals that the accused-appellant has to suffer
subsidiary imprisonment in case he could not pay the fine and
indemnity prescribed in the decision.
may be brought by the offended party". It is evident from the
foregoing provision that the court is given the discretion to impose
the penalty of imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will
be noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused:
three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00;
indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00;
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the payment of
the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
discretion decided to eliminate the penalty of three (3)
monthsarresto mayorand to reduce the indemnity of P10,000.00 to
P5,000.00.A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals
that the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency" is
separated by a comma from the preceding clause" is hereby sentenced
to three months ofarresto mayorwith the accessory penalties of the
law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00) pesos, to indemnify the
offended party, Mayor Arsenio Lacson, in the sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) pesos." The use of a comma in the
part of the sentence is to make "the subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency" refer not only to non-payment of the
indemnity, but also to non-payment of the fine.Fortunately, however,
accused-appellant is favored by the retroactive force of Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 which
exempts an accused person from subsidiary imprisonment in caseof
insolvency to pay his civil liability.It is a well known rule of legal
hermeneutics that penal statutes are to be strictly construed against
the government and liberally in favor of the accused.In the
interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to give it careful
scrutiny, and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the
rights of the defendant. Considering that Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, is favorable to the accused-appellant, the
same should be made applicable to him. Thus applying Article 39 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, to the accused-appellant, he cannot
also be required to serve his civil liability to the offended party in form
of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency because this is no
longer required by the aforesaid articl

ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve the
fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

HELD:
No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel
committed by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving,
radio, phonograph, paintings, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic
exhibition or any similar means, shall be punished byprision
correccionalin its minimum and medium period or a fine ranging from
200 to 6000 pesos or both, in addition to the civil action which
Aids to Interpretation and Construction

A. Intrinsic Aids - iii. Punctuation Marks

Florentino v. PNB, G.R. No. L-8782, 28 April 1956, 98 Phil. 959

FACTS:
The petitioners and appellants filed a petition formandamusagainst
Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the backpay certificate
of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness in the sum
of P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest. The debt
incurred on January 2, 1953, which is due on January 2, 1954.
Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated
October 6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic
Act No. 897 approved on June 20,1953. Petitioners offered to pay
their loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate, but
the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to accept the
latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of Republic Act No. 879,
respondent-appellee contends that the qualifying clause refers to all
the antecedents, whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers
only to the last antecedent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the clause who may be willing to accept the same for
settlement refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of
section 2 of Republic Act No. 879

HELD:
No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last
antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association
or corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines." It should
be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen,
etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones. But even
disregarding the grammatical construction, to make the acceptance of
the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or
corporation, which are not government entities or owned or
controlled by the government, would render section 2 of Republic
Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would amount to an impairment
of the obligation of contracts by compelling private creditors to
accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten years with interest
at a rate very much lower than the current or even the legal one. It
was also found out in the Congressional Record that the
amendatory bill to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay
certificates as payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of
the government. Another reason is that it is matter of general
knowledge that many officials and employees of the Philippine
Government, who had served during the Japanese Occupation, have
already received their backpay certificates and used them for the
payment of the obligations to the Government and its entities for debts
incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.Florentino
incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953. Hence, the obligation
was subsisting when theAmendatory Act No. 897was approved.
Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions of
section 2 of theAmendatory Act No. 897