International Phenomenological Society

Basic Issues of Philosophy. Experience, Reality, and Human Values by Marvin Farber
Review by: Roy Wood Sellars
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 29, No. 4 (Jun., 1969), pp. 602-604
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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 REVIEWS

Basic Issues of Philosophy. Experience, Reality, and Human Values.

MARVINFARBER. New York: Harperand Row, 1968. Pp. 290.

This book is a systematicpresentationof Professor Farber's philo-

sophical outlook. And, in so doing, it covers a wide range of topics,
alreadyhinted at in his supplementarytitle. I enumeratea few of them.
There is the discussion of The Nature and Function of Philosophy,
Philosophy and the Methods of Inquiry, Experience and the Problems
of Philosophy,Monism and Pluralism,Approachesto a Philosophy of
Values, Problemsof the Philosophyof Religion.
Professor Farber is a systematic thinker who, while a specialist in
Husserl's phenomenology,has kept his eye on movements in French,
British and Americanphilosophy.Nor is this all. He has been a student
of Marxisttheory as well. The result is that he has a wide perspective.
This is clearly evident in the way he seeks to do justice to Husserl's
methodogenic attempt at establishing "a clean slate out of items of
experience."This, one knows, involves the method of bracketingcom-
monsenseand scientificbeliefs. This distinctivemethodis contrastedwith
the logico-semanticalmethodsof currentAnglo-Americanphilosophyand
the dialecticalmethod of Marxism.
I could not help reflectingon this summaryof methodsand wondering
how my own approachcould be best formulated.As I looked back on it,
it consistedlargelyof concentrationon perennialproblemsand tryingto
get clues which would help to solve them. And I have been led to enter-
tain the suspicionthat stress on methods was, in some measure, an in-
dication of failures. I have great respect for Husserl's acumen but did
he not end as an idealist?Farber,on the other hand, is, like me, a realist
and a materialist.It has been suggestedto me that phenomenologyhas
something in common with linguistic analysis. Both are analytic and
reflectivebut with no clear leads to reality. As Farber later shows, an
able and somewhatdevious man like Scheler was able to play fast and
loose in the field.
Chapterthree is an interestingone and summarizesvery well facts
aboutperceivingand traditionalattitudes.It was a hard nut to crack and

602

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 REVIEWS 603

problemsgalorearose, such as the problemof universalsand the problem

of permanenceand change.As Farberpoints out, both Plato and Hegel
turned away from perceivingto abstractthought. Locke got shelved in
ideas as the primary objects of knowledge, just as Russell later got
enmeshedin knowledgeof acquaintance.There is good materialin this
chapterfor a competentteacher. It has always amusedme that Dewey,
insteadof facing up to the difficultiesinherentin the level of perceptual
knowing,turnedaside to castigatethe social attitudeshe found at work.
Radicalismfavoredthe stresson sensations,while conservatismsupported
the reason. Surely, all too simple a dichotomy. Was not eighteenth-
centuryrationalismratherradical?This externalapproachappearsagain
in the Bentley-Deweyresort to "transactions"as a cure-all.But I must
hurryon.
In ChapterFive, Farberconcentrateson knowledgeand judgmentand
their categories.The problemof the "Given"is explored,as well as that
of "Certainty."This chaptershows wide reading and awarenessof cur-
rent discussions.For instance,C. I. Lewis'shandlingof "contrary-to-fact
statements"is explored.Surely,the emphasishere is upon laws. Were I
to throw a penny down, it would fall. The question of the relation of
judgmentto reality is broached.What I like about the book is its com-
prehensiveness.The readeris not asked to choose betweencontemporary
fashions.I remembera book by a Princetonprofessorwho just assumed
that one had to be either a logical positivist,a pragmatist,or a linguistic
analyst.There was no fourth. This is what I call journalisticphilosophy.
ProfessorFarberbelongs to an older and soundertradition.
And now we come to ontology. Here the author deals with the old
opposition between monism and pluralismof which Royce and James
made so much. Royce, it will be recalled, founded his system on a
primaryknower. James, on the other hand, stuck to a variety of expe-
riencerswith truthsomethingincompletebetweenthem. Farbergoes back
to Parmenidesand his changelessOne. But he also glances at the ques-
tion of internaland externalrelations.Whiteheadand events come into
the picture.Farberseems to take a mediatingview here. Unity and parts
are both required.I am not quite certain of the role played by Carnap
and Sheffer. He distinguishesbetween formal unity, which is a sort of
ideal, and existentialunitywhich science explores.His remarkson White-
head's method of extensive abstractioninterested me. I have myself
tended to build on Einstein'scontrastbetween pure and applied mathe-
matics. I quite agree with Farber that real instants must be protensive.
One cannotget time out of the timeless.But may I be allowed to inter-
ject that I regardWhitehead'sepistemologyas a mess.
In chapterSeven, our authorexploresexistencefarther.He raises the

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604 PHYLOSOPHY RESEARCH
ANDPHENOMENOLOGICAL

questionof the meaningof existence.Here his wide readingis apparent.

McTaggartand Hoernle are given their say, as they should be. The
questionof essence is raised. As I see it, the questionof existence stands
out in such queriesas Russell's, "Do lions exist?"If we answeraffirma-
tively, we are giving status to a claim. But the realm of existence is
presupposed.Farber'srealism begins to stand out in his aside on "The
destructionof the world in phenomenology."He has always insistedthat
the bracketingwas an affair of method.
And now we have his commentson Germanexistentialismand philo-
sophical anthropology.He is not impressedby it. In a previous book,
Naturalismand Subjectivism,which I had the honor of reviewing, he
brought out his aversion to much of recent German philosophy to
empiricismand naturalism.Nationaltraditionshere play theirpart. I have
always admiredhis wide acquaintancewith Germanphilosophicallitera-
ture. I fear I have been ratherimpatient.But Farberhas been scholarly
in this domain.
We come now to the human scene with value, ethics, and religion.He
raises the question of objectivity in ethics. Here his stress is on the
satisfactionof humanneeds and interest.I sense the influenceof Ralph
Barton Perry. I would, in a measure, agree but would emphasizethe
objective import of value ascriptionsor appraisals.These differ from
cognitionsand yet are objectivelyreferentialand concernthe role of the
object in the human economy.
In the final chapter,Ten, the Marxist ingredientin Farber'soutlook
comes to the front. As is well known, Feuerbachplayed a guidingrole.
The idea of God is a projection.Farberrightlygoes back to that pioneer,
Xenophanes. And he also pays attentionto the mystics in the Middle
Ages, such as Meister Ecklhart. He also agrees with most scholars that
the traditionalproofs of God's existencehave logical weakness.Thus he
comes out along the lines of humanism.
As I said in the beginning,this is philosophy in the grand manner
without apologies. It is solid and comprehensiveand has no particular
nostrum.These are its virtues. It may not be journalisticand with an
eye on the latest fashionand sloganbut it is well-groundedand scholarly.

ROY WOOD SELLARS.

OF MICHIGAN.
UNIVERSITY

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