Upasana Sarma

Social Theory - II
M.A Sociology
South Asian University

Norbert Elias: The Civilizing Process

Response paper on "On the Monopoly Mechanism" and "The Social
Constraint Towards Self Constraint"

In "On the Monopoly Mechanism", Elias begins by introducing us to the modern age
(especially the West) as being characterized by a degree of monopolization that is supported
through legal amenities that are available only to members of these monopoly
organizations. Two most prominent features of this kind of monopolization are taxation and
the military, where the former feeds and maintains the latter.
He says that although this kind of monopoly has existed in simpler societies over larger
territories, for such a monopoly to take on a more permanent structure, a certain level of
sophistication and advancement is required. Such a continuing character of monopoly is
what, in Elias' opinion, forms into the state.
He then questions: how is it that this monopoly arose?
He then traces a historical trajectory over the ninth, tenth, eleventh centuries. He speaks of
feudal lords from the 11th century onwards, exercising such an administrative structure
over their lands, partly supported by conquests. Elias feels then it is important to look at this
process of monopolization in both its new and old forms, for the old presupposes the object
it wishes to attain is what changes over time - first land, then money.

He explains the formation of monopoly as the tendency of a particular group or individual,

though this entity might have started off competing with structures of equivalent strength
and merit, to eliminate the competition and thus achieving dominion over an ever
decreasing number of subjects. This could translate into the fight for resources and
opportunities amongst people, a sort of "free competition" where the probability that a
constant state of competition can be maintained is very less, whereas the chances of one
victor emerging is much higher.
Even when overthrowing the hegemonic power of a particular group, chances arise after
overthrowing that particular group that the new victors may struggle for absolute power
amongst themselves. Regardless of the kind of structure that is followed, the end game
remains the same, the purpose and dynamics shifting marginally to suit the actors - that of
power accumulating in the hands of an "ever-diminishing number of people through a series
of elimination contests". (p 270)
He then goes on to talk about a sort of feudal economy, where the landed nobility become
dependent on their dependents, for the more they accumulate, the harder it becomes for
them to keep track and thus they depend on their tenants, on their subjects more to protect
the position they hold. The greater and more comprehensive this web of relations, the
greater the monopolist's dependency. Here, Elias brings up as an example the national
economy in which the economy develops from the "private economy of feudal ruling
houses". He comments on the shift that private expenditure of the king takes into public
expenditure, transforms into the national budget. The same thing is reflected in the
formation of a government where it can be seen as have grown out of the "private" court
and domestic administration of kings or princes. Thus, the private power of individuals over
resources becomes public power in societies with extensive social differentiation, Elias says.
The process of feudalization becomes one such example, for the thicker the web of human
interaction, the higher the dependency of the monopolist. Infact, the monopolist is never
allowed to use the profits of his kingdom for himself alone.
Elias also gives the distinction between free feudal nobility and courtly nobility, where in the
latter, the sources of power and wealth are allocated whereas in the latter, the same
emerge from one victorious actor. Here, the next step becomes seizure of these means of
power by the bourgeoisie - where a redistribution of their responsibilities and duties takes
place. Thus, through centralization and monopolization, control eventually gives way to
planning.

There are consequently two main phases in a monopoly mechanism: the first, the phase of
free competition and elimination and second, where after centralization and redistribution,
power passes from the hands of one individual to many. It begins with resources being
concentrated in the hands of a particular group or class and eventually being scattered
within a network of individuals, resulting from thicker interdependent relations.

In "The Social Constraint towards Self Constraint", Elias talks about the process of
disciplining that has developed - an inner and outer dialogue that work in tandem in
ensuring that there are mannerisms and habits via which the individual functions. The state
being one of the primary agents here - where he points out that state formation in itself was
one of the landmark events that have led to a sort of disciplining.
Elias says that when one observes this process with particular scrutiny, they find that they
are baffled by a series of notes: that "civilization" is no more than rationalization of the
human being - a series of contingencies played out to work in favour of the individual and
his safety. This civilization process, among other things, wishes to avoid embarrassment.
He questions if one could fathom the fact that in the long course of history, isolated
moments, or eras in civilization are in fact unaware of the fact that any junction within this
process is midway through a longer, much more stretched out process of civilization. This
process, he says, did not occur in an unplanned manner. Rather it was unprecedented yet
orderly. He raises an important question then: how is it that no human being ever saw this
process coming? And that events in history are largely unplanned, make an impact and yet,
people hardly foresee it, nor have they intended it.
Elias answers this question himself : by saying that individuals who make the same choices
and are of the same moralistic and rational temperament give rise to a trend that shapes
history then and there. He echoes Durkheim in acknowledging the collective thought
process of people and the power it holds - a social fact, sui generis - "an order more
compelling and stronger than the will and reason of the individual people composing it".

He denies that this order has risen either out of rationalities or irrationalities, neither
through the consensus of people nor through the incoherence of choice. He mentions Hegel
here, whose "cunning of reason" implied that the rationalities of humans give rise to a larger
wave of thought. He connects the "structure of human relations" and the "structure of the
collective psychic habitus". He says that only when we critically look at the elements and
precursors of present civilization do we see that "malleable psychological apparatus", time
and again as a part of the changes that come within humanity's course, and what prompted
the direction of humanity in a specific direction.

Yet, "civilization is no more rational than it is irrational", Elias opines. That change in one's
habitus - collective, personal and psychic is bent into a specific form and pushed in a
direction - the question here is, what are those changes and what is the direction? Here, he
provides for this query by saying that with the progress of societal complexity, the division
of labour has become more intricate and differentiated under the pressure of competition
which forms premeditated patterns of behaviour, "an automatic, blind functioning
apparatus of self control" is formed. He echoes Durkheim, again, in cutting out a sharp
difference between organic and mechanical solidarity, but when picturing the social
relations and formalities associated with simple and complex societies, he assumes a
Hobbesian narrative for mechanical solidarity, pointing to physical violence as the biggest
and most significant threat that individuals may face in such a society. Whereas, in complex,
modern societies, Elias says that "self-control" plays a bigger role in curbing damage than
the threat of unpredictable physical violence from external sources. He says that with the
increasing complexity and intricacy that comes with advancing societies, the 'sociogenetic'
make up of the individual also becomes more rounded, stable and intricately imbibed.

Elias then compares the psychological self-restraint of individuals as standing closest in

comparison with the monopoly of force exerted by central organs of society. He says that
such a functioning is co-dependent, meaning that individuals acquire an understanding of
this kind of restraint when such stable monopoly institutions come into existence and give
way to a conduct that is automated, become "second nature".

Elias points to "economic violence", a kind of monopoly utilised by those possessing force
over others, as characteristic of modern-day monopoly, instead of outright violence, which
occur in "pacified social spaces" where any other form of violence in unacceptable. This is
typified, categorized as a kind of rationalization. He says that the incidence of seeing higher
measures of physical threats in places void of stable monotonies can be seen as
complementary where exists a spontaneity of drives and will, and takes the example of a
warrior class who are driven with an absolute sense of prestige - socially celebrated if they
win and ostracised if defeated. Thus, in such a society, there is a sharp contrast between the
ruler and the ruled and thus a greater threat from one man to another.

Next, Elias meditates on the nature of work given to the free warrior compared to that of
the individual of the present, who now instead of living in constant anticipation of a next
danger now enjoys greater periods of stability and no more unanticipated violence. This
change is what also tones down the fluctuations in personalities, bringing in a mediated
character, filled with lesser extremes. In earlier times, the individual is susceptible to sudden
changes in temperament, environment, sudden attacks but in more advanced stages of
society, this readiness excludes them. "The peaks and abysses are smaller, the changes less
abrupt". (p 372)

Thus, social control changes from a militaristic nature to another kind - that of self
regulation and discipline, much more psychogenetic in nature. The new monopoly
organizations exert another kind of violence on individuals - a violence that is secure,
continuous and normalized - as a part of everyday routine. The threat here is therefore,
indirect and incalculable. Elias is then of the opinion that with the monopolization of
physical violence, a dispassionate self-control is imposed and practiced amongst individuals.
Control is formed as part of the individual's structure and mediated upon by both society
and the individual. This kind of restraint is cultivated from such an early age, that certain
affective reactions are moulded in a way that they shouldn't be acknowledged or felt at all.
Elias compares medieval morale with modern day morale, reflecting on how actions and
reactions were more dependent on the individuals involved who could express more freely
their violent or non-violent behaviour towards one another. Whereas in a post-capital era,
individuals are taught to control themselves with severity and the whimsicalness of a
instinct is taught to be curbed since functioning now is amongst even larger co-dependent
societal structures. A super-ego that controls is consolidated. This, Elias says, makes life less
emotional, less dangerous and less pleasurable and here he brings in the concept of dreams
- where one finds leeway to express freely what one cannot in daily life. Medieval passions
and rages too, find their ways within the mind of the individual.

Just how the threat of violence is now internalized, the battlefield too, is placed within. The
self control that is required of the individual , "does not always lead to a balance between
drive-satisfaction and drive-control" (p 376). Partly, these constraints may lead to perpetual
dissatisfaction as a result of the individual not being able to fully materially manifest his/her
desires - and if gone too far, may result in boredom and solitude, where the individual is
now incapable of fearlessly expressing any of his repressed drives.

Elias then returns to his initial argument, while stressing the importance of childhood
experiences and upbringing, saying that the psychogenetic and sociogenetic habitus that
exists collectively for all members within society, also produces both "mal-adjusted" and
"well-adjusted" individuals. The difference here then is that of individual cases of numbing
of repressed drives - to what extent and in what field have these individuals been
anesthetized - "a relationship between their controlling agencies, super-ego and ego". (p
377)
Yet, even childhood experiences are not decisive for however an individual solidifies while
growing up, his habitus is still impacted throughout life. Then, Elias says, anything can
happen - the "wounds" of the civilizing process may heal or they may fester, making them
worse.

In the end he says that there is no way in telling what lies between a successful and an
unsuccessful civilizing process. These are two ends of the same extreme, where most people
lie midway along the scale and few balance the ends.