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2016 CRITICAL AREAS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Atty. Christian KIT Villasis

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION MEANS ANY QUESTIONING INITITAED BY LAW


ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITIES AFTER A PERSON IS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY OR
OTHERWISE DEPRIVED OF HIS FREEDOM OF ACTION IN ANY SIGNIFICANT MANNER.
(Tanenggee vs. People, {2013})

2. REQUIREMENTS OF A VALID EXTRA-JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF GUILT DURING A


CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION (W-A-V-E) (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in
writing. (PEOPLE vs. REYES, {2009})

2.1. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IS DEEMED TO HAVE ARISEN AT THE PRECISE MOMENT
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION BEGINS AND BEING MADE TO STAND IN A POLICE
LINE-UP IS NOT THE STARTING POINT OR A PART OF CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION. (PEOPLE VS. LARA {2012})
2.2. EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION: In REMOLONA V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ,
THE SC DECLARED THAT THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL APPLIES ONLY TO ADMISSIONS
MADE IN A CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION BUT NOT TO THOSE MADE IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION. In other words, the constitutional
proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained
in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, is applicable only in
custodial interrogation. (Tanengge vs. People, {2013}).
2.3. IN PEOPLE V. RAPEZA, THE SUPREME COURT EXPLAINED THAT THE LAWYER CALLED
O BE PRESENT DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION SHOULD, AS FAR AS
REASONABLY POSSIBLE, BE THE CHOICE OF THE INDIVIDUAL UNDERGOING
QUESTIONING. If the lawyer is furnished by the police for the accused, it is
important that the lawyer should be competent, independent and prepared to fully
safeguard the constitutional rights of the accused, as distinguished from one who merely be
giving a routine, peremptory and meaningless recital of the individuals constitutional rights.
(People vs. Cachuela, {2013})
2.4. THE INFRACTIONS OF THE SO-CALLED MIRANDA RIGHTS RENDER
INADMISSIBLE ONLY THE EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION OR ADMISSION MADE
DURING CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION. The admissibility of other evidence, provided
they are relevant to the issue and are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not
affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. (HO WAI PANG VS.
PEOPLE {2011})

RULE 113 ARREST

1. ARREST IS THE TAKING OF A PERSON INTO CUSTODY THAT HE MAY BE BOUND TO


ANSWER FOR THE COMMISSION OF AN OFFENSE. An arrest is effected by an actual restraint
of the person to be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the
arrest. (SANCHEZ VS. PEOPLE {2014}).

2. ONCE THE INFORMATION IS FILED WITH THE COURT AND THE JUDGE PROCEEDS WITH
HIS PRIMORDIAL TASK OF EVALUATING THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. HE MAY EITHER: (a)
issue a warrant of arrest, if he finds probable cause; (b) immediately dismiss the case, if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; and (c) order the prosecutor to submit additional
evidence, in case he doubts the existence of probable cause. (People vs. Desmond {2013})

2.1 As a general rule, if the information is valid on its face and there is no showing of manifest error,
grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the court should not
dismiss it for lack of probable cause, because evidentiary matters should first be presented and
heard during the trial. The functions and duties of both the trial court be clearly and the public
prosecutor in the proper scheme of things in our criminal justice system should be clearly
understood. (PEOPLE VS. ENGR. YECYEC {2014}).

3. IN THE ISSUANCE OF A WARRANT OF ARREST, THE MANDATE OF THE CONSTITUTION IS


FOR THE JUDGE TO PERSONALLY DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE.

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The words personal determination, was interpreted by the Supreme Court in Soliven vs.
Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585, 14 November 1988, 167 SCRA 393, 406)

- the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself as to the
existence of probable cause.

(a) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or

(b) if on the basis thereof, he finds no probable cause, disregard the prosecutors report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in determining its
existence.

3.1 WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES AS PERSONAL DETERMINATION ON THE PART OF A


JUDGE IS THAT HE SHOULD NOT RELY SOLELY ON THE REPORT OF THE
INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR. Thus, personal examination of the complainant and his
witnesses is not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrant of arrest. (PEOPLE vs. JOSEPH JOJO V. GREY, {2010}).
3.2 THE RTC JUDGES DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ONLY
LIMITED PRIOR TO THE ISSUANCE OF A WARARANT OF ARREST AND NOT AFTER THE
ARRAIGNMENT. ONCE THE INFORMATION HAS BEEN FILED, THE JUDGE SHALL THEN
PERSONALLY EVALUATE THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROSECUTOR AND ITS
SUPPORTING EVIDENCE TO DETERINE WHETHER THERE IS PROBABLE CAUSE TO
ISSUE A WARRANT OF ARREST. While it is within the trial courts discretion to make an
independent assessment of the evidence on hand, it is only for the purpose of determining
whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The judge does not act as an appellate court
of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutors determination of
probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause
independent of the prosecutors finding. (PEOPLE VS. ANDRADE {2014}).
3.3 UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, A
JUDGE IS MANDATED TO PERSONALLY DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE
CAUSE AFTER HIS PERSONAL EVALUATION OF THE PROSECUTORS RESOLUTION AND
THE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE FOR THE CRIME CHARGED. These provisions command the
judge to refrain from making a mindless acquiescence to the prosecutors findings and to conduct
his own examination of the facts and circumstances presented by both parties. Section 5(a) of
Rule 112, grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint or
information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish
probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or c) order the prosecutor
to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of
probable cause.

TO BE VALID, THESE WARRANTS MUST HAVE BEEN ISSUED AFTER COMPLIANCE


WITH THE REQUIREMENT THAT PROBABLE CAUSE BE PERSONALLY DETERMINED BY
THE JUDGE. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not
the certainty, of guilt of the accused. In doing so, he need not to conduct a de novo hearing; he
only needs to personally review the prosecutors initial determination and see if it is supported by
substantial evidence.

In a criminal prosecution, probable cause is determined at two stages, the first is at the
executive level, where determination is made by the prosecutor during the preliminary
investigation, before the filing of the criminal information. The second is at the judicial level,
undertaken by the judge before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

A warrant of arrest should be issued if the judge after personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances is convinced that probable cause exists that an offense was committed. Probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an
offense was committed by the person sought to be arrested. This must be distinguished from the
prosecutors finding of probable cause which is for the filing of the proper criminal information.
Probable cause for warrant of arrest is determined to address the necessity of placing the
accused under custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. (HAO VS. PEOPLE {2014}).

4. BENCH WARRANT: AS A CONSEQUENCE OF FAILING TO ATTEND THE TRIAL WHEN SO


REQUIRED, A BENCH WARRANT MAY BE ISSUED AGAINST THE ACCUSED. A BENCH
WARRANT IS A WRIT ISSUED DIRECTLY BY A JUDGE TO A LAW-ENFORCEMENT OFFICER,
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ESPECIALLY FOR THE ARREST OF A PERSON WHO HAS BEEN HELD IN CONTEMPT, HAS
DISOBEYED A SUBPOENA, OR HAS FAILED TO APPEAR FOR A HEARING OR TRIAL. The
provision on bench warrant is expressed under Section 9, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court which states
that [w]hen a respondent released on bail fails to appear on the day fixed for the hearing, the court
may issue another order of arrest or may order the bond for his appearance to be forfeited and
confiscated, or both.

Jurisprudence dictates that the primary requisite before a bench warrant shall be issued is that the
absent-party was duly informed of the hearing date but unjustifiably failed to attend so. There is
nothing n the Rules which mandates a judge to motu proprio lift the bench warrant once
the accused expresses his intent to be released on bail. Without any provision to the contrary,
Section 1, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court governs such that a motion must be filed to seek
affirmative relief. (MAGLEO VS. PRESIDING JUDGE ROWENA DE JUAN-QUINAGORAN {2014}).

5. RIGHT AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE: NO ARREST, SEARCH OR


SEIZURE CAN BE MADE WITHOUT A VALID WARRANT ISSUED BY A COMPETENT
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY. THE CONSTITUTION GUARANTEES THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS AND EFFECTS AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. IT FURTHER DECRESS THAT ANY EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF SAID RIGHT SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE
IN ANY PROCEEDING.

Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of
certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search;
(5) custom search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

On the other hand. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawful arrest without
a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following
circumstances (i) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (ii) When an offense has just been committed,
and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (iii) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (PEOPLE VS. DEQUINA, {2011}).

5.1 THE LEGITIMATE WARRANTLESS ARREST ALSO CLOAKS THE ARRESTING POLICE
OFFICER WITH THE AUTHORITY TO VALIDLY SEARCH AND SEIZE FROM THE
OFFENDER THOSE THAT MAY BE USED TO PROVE THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE. (PEOPLE VS. USMAN, {2015}).

6. ARREST INFLAGRANTE DELICTO: Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his
presence, the presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. This is known an arrest in flagrante delicto,. For a warrantless
arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. (PEOPLE VS. EDANO, {2014}).

6.1 WHEN A POLICE OFFICER SEES THE OFFENSE, ALTHOUGH AT A DISTANCE, OR HEARS
THE DISTURBANCE CREATED THEREBY, AND PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE, HE
MAY EFFECT AN ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT ON THE BASIS OF SEC. 5(A), RULE
113 OF THE RULES OF COURT, AS THE OFFENSE IS DEEMED COMMITTED IN HIS
PRESENCE OR WITHIN HIS VIEW. (People vs. Ng Yik Bun {2011}).
6.2 IN A BUY-BUST OPERATION, THE POLICE OPERATIVES ARE NOT REQUIRED TO
SECURE A SEARCH WARRANT BECAUSE THE VIOLATOR IS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO AND THE POLICE OFFICERS, IN THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION, ARE NOT
ONLY AUTHORIZED BUT DUTY-BOUND TO APPREHEND THE VIOLATOR AND TO
SEARCH HIM FOR ANYTHING THAT MAY HAVE BEEN PARTY OF OR USED IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. (PEOPLE VS. ANESLAG, {2012}).
6.3 THE ABSENCE OF A PRIOR SURVEILLANCE OR TEST BUY DOES NOT AFFECT THE
LEGALILTY OF THE BUY-BUST OPERATION AND THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO. (People v. Manlangit, {2011})
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7. HOT PURSUIT: The elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer
has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
that the person to be arrested has committed it.

In determining the existence of probable cause, the arresting officer should make a thorough
investigation and exercise reasonable judgment. The standards for evaluating the factual basis
supporting a probable cause assessment are not less stringent in warrantless arrest situation than in
a case where a warrant is sought from a judicial officer. The probable cause determination of a
warrantless arrest is based on information that the arresting officer possesses at the time of the
arrest and not on the information acquired later.

In People v. del Rosario, the Supreme Court held that the requirement than an offense has just
been committed means that there must be a large measure of immediacy between the time the
offense was committed and the time of the arrest. If there was an appreciable lapse of time between
the arrest and the commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

In other words, the clincher in the element of personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
is the required element of immediacy within which those facts or circumstances should be gathered.
This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the
facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police
officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained
after an exhaustive investigation. The reason for the element of the immediacy is this as the
time gap from the commission of the crime to the arrest widens, the pieces of information gathered
are prone to become contaminated and subjected to external factors, interpretations and hearsay.
(PESTILOS vs. GENEROSO {2014}).

8. AN ACCUSED IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING ANY IRREGULARITY OF HIS ARREST IF HE


FAILS TO RAISE THIS ISSUE OR TO MOVE FOR THE QUASHAL OF THE INFORMATION
AGAINST HIM ON THIS GROUND BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THUS, ANY OBJECTION
INVOLVING A WARRANT OF ARREST OR THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE COURT
ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OF THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE MADE BEFORE HE
ENTERS HIS PLEAS; OTHERWISE, THE OBJECTION IS DEEMED WAIVED. Nevertheless, even
if accuseds warrantless arrest were proven to be indeed invalid, such a scenario would still not
provide salvation to the accuseds cause because jurisprudence also instructs us that the illegal arrest
of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error. (PEOPLE vs. VELASCO {2013}).

9. A WAIVER OF AN ILLEGAL ARREST, IS NOT A WAIVER OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH. RECORDS


HAVE ESTABLISHED THAT BOTH THE ARREST AND THE SEARCH WERE MADE WITHOUT A
WARRANT. While the accused has already waived his right to contest the legality of his arrest, he is
not deemed to have equally waived his right to contest the legality of the search. (VILLANUEVA VS.
PEOPLE {2014}).

RULE 126 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

1. THE 1987 CONSTITUTION STATES THAT A SEARCH AND CONSEQUENT SEIZURE MUST BE
CARRIED OUT WITH A JUDICIAL WARRANT; OTHERWISE, IT BECOMES UNREASONABLE
AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY
PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING. (SY VS. PEOPLE, {2011}).

1.1. AS A GENERAL RULE, SEARCHES CONDUCTED WITH A WARRANT THAT MEETS ALL
THE REQUIREMENTS ARE REASONABLE. THIS WARRANT REQUIRES THE
EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE THAT CAN ONLY BE DETERMINED BY A JUDGE.
THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE MUST BE ESTABLISHED BY THE JUDGE
AFTER ASKING SEARCHING QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. PROBABLE CAUSE AT
THIS STAGE CAN ONLY EXIST IF THERE IS AN OFFENSE ALLEGED TO BE
COMMITTED. ALSO, THE WARRANT FRAMES THE SEARCHES DONE BY THE LAW
ENFORCERS. THERE MUST BE A PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE AND
THE THINGS TO BE SEARCHED. (PEOPLE VS. COGAED, {2014}).
1.2. REQUISITES FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A SEARCH WARRANT: The Supreme Court has
consistently held that the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following
factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the

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complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must
particularly describe the place to be searched and persons and things to be seized.

Probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons
supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. It requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonable prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be
searched.

In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., Supreme Court held that the quantum of evidence
required to prove probable cause is not the same quantum of evidence needed to establish
proof beyond reasonable doubt which is required in a criminal case that may be subsequently
filed.

Taken together all the pieces of evidence presented by PLDT, these are more than sufficient
to support the issuance of the search warrants. To reiterate, the evidence to show probable
cause to issue a search warrant must be distinguished from proof beyond reasonable doubt
which, at this juncture of the criminal case, is not required. (HPS SOFTWARE AND
COMMUNICATION CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT),
{2012}).

1.3. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED IS SUFFICIENT IF THE OFFICER


SERVING THE WARRANT CAN, WITH REASONABLE EFFORT, ASCERTAIN AND
IDENTIFY THE PLACE INTENDED AND DISTINGUISH IT FROM OTHER PLACES IN
THE COMMUNITY. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to
the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies
the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description
of the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There was only one
house located at the stated address, which was accused-appelllants residence, consisting of
a structure with two floors and composed of several rooms. A magistrates determination of
probable cause for the issuance of search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing
court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means
that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the
place sought to be searched. (PEOPLE VS. TUAN, {2010}).
1.4. FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE DOCTRINE: Otherwise known as the exclusionary
rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this constitutional provision originated from
Stonehill v. Diokno. This rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law
enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should
be excluded as evidence because it is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. It ensures that the
fundamental rights to ones person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon
and are upheld. (PEOPLE VS. COGAED, {2014}).
1.5. GENERAL WARRANT: A SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED MUST PARTICULARLY
DESCRIBE THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHD AND PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED
IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE VALID, OTHERWISE, IT IS CONSIDERED AS A GENERAL
WARRANT WHICH IS PROSCRIBED BY BOTH JURISPRUDENCE AND THE 1987
Constitution. However, the Supreme Court held that, among other things, it is only
required that a search warrant be specific as far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.
The Supreme Court finds that the subject search warrants are not general warrants because
the items to be seized were sufficiently identified physically and were also specifically
identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged. (HPS SOFTWARE AND
COMMUNICATION CORPORATION VS. PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT)
[2012]).

2. APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT: Under paragraph (b) of Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the application for search warrant in this case should have
stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga
City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial search warrant was enforced. The
wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling
reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction
over the place of commission of the crim e. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search
warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of

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Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the
search warrants. x x x x x (PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL
GASES CORPORATION [2015]).

2.1. ADDITIONAL VENUE IN THE APPLICATION FOR SEARCH WARRANT: In case of


search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act
of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code , the Executive Judges and, whenever they are on
official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive
Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City shall have authority to act on application filed
by the NBI, PNP and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Task Force (PAOC-TF), and the Reaction Against Crime Task Force (REACT-TF). (A.M. No. 99-
10-09-SC DATED JANUARY 25, 2000)
2.2. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the enforceability of search warrants
provided therein shall continue until further orders from the Supreme Court. In fact, the
guidelines in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC entitled Guidelines
On The Selection And Designation Of Executive Judges And Defining Their Powers,
Prerogatives And Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of search
warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall be an
exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA
MARIMLA VS. PEOPLE [2009]).
2.3. Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of
search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These
special criminal cases pertain to those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act
of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court. Search
warrant applications for such cases may be filed by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF), and
personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies. As in ordinary search warrant
applications, they shall particularly describe therein the places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges
[of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically
present in the station, the Vice-Executive Judges are authorized to act on such applications
and shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts. x x x x x x.

As explicitly mentioned in Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, the rule on search
warrant applications before the Manila and Quezon City RTCs for the above-mentioned
special criminal cases shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Perceptibly, the fact that a search warrant is being applied for in connection with a special
criminal case already presumes the existence of a compelling reason; hence, any statement
to this effect would be superfluous and therefore should be dispensed with. By all
indications, Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC allows the Manila and
Quezon City RTCs to issue warrants to be served in places outside their territorial
jurisdiction for as long as the parameters under the said section have been
complied with.

[A] description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish if from other
places in the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out
the place to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it,
satifies the constitutional requirement. (RETIRED SPO4 BIENVENIDO LAUD VS. PEOPLE [2014]).

3. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES: Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence
obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful
arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situation. (PEOPLE VS. DELOS REYES [2011]).

4. CONSENT: Consent must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal search; that is, the
consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. (VILLANUEVA VS. PEOPLE [2014]).

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5. PLAINVIEW: Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer, who has
a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence. It applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search
of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadverted; and (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object
must be open to eye and hand, and its discovery inadvertent. (PEOPLE VS.CHI CHAN LIU [2015]).

5.1. PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE: The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside
the suspects person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because [o]bjects
in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The doctrine is usually applied where
a police officer is not searching for evidence againsts the accused, but nonethelesss
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x . [It] serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to
lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search
directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. (PEOPLE VS. CALANTIAO
[2014].
5.2. In Abelita vs. Doria, the police authorities were in the area because that was where they
caught up with petitioner after the chase. They saw the firearms inside the vehicle when
petitioner opened the door. Since a shooting incident just took place and it was reported that
petitioner was involved in the incident, it was apparent to the police officers that the firearms
may be evidence of a crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms. (ABELITA III
VS. DORIA, [2009]).

6. SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST. Under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court,
[a] person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search
warrant. (People vs. Collado, [2013])

6.1 SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL ARREST: Searches and seizures incident to a lawful
arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect
the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a
concealed weapon , and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is
therefore a reasonable exercise of the States police power to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to
prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. It is therefore a reasonable exercise of
the States police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be be inflicted on
them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence
under the control and within the reach of the arrestee. (PEOPLE VS. CALANTIAO (2014).
6.2 IN THE SEARCHES INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST, THE ARREST MUST PRECEDE
THE SEARCH; GENERALLY, THE PROCESS CANNOT BE REVERSED. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. (SY VS. PEOPLE, 2011,
PERALTA , J.).
6.3 THE PARAMETERS OF A VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURES AS AN
INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.
The phrase within the area of his immediate control means the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. A gun on a table or in a drawer in
front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the
clothing of the person arrested. x x x x x
It is worthy to note that the purpose of the exception (warrantless search as an incident to a
lawful arrest) is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. The exception, therefore, should not be strained beyond what is needed to serve its
purpose.
In the case before us, search was made in the locked cabinet which cannot be said to
have been within Valerosos immediate control. Thus, the search exceeded the bounds of
what may be considered as an incident to a lawful arrest. x x x x x Clearly, the search made was
illegal, a violation of Valerosos right against unreasonable search and seizure. Consequently, the

7
evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible in evidence against him . (VALEROSO
VS. COURT OF APPEALS [2009).
7. STOP AND FRISK SITUATION: A STOP AND FRISK SITUATION MUST PRECEDE A
WARRANTLESS ARREST, BE LIMITED TO THE PERSONS OUTER CLOTHING, AND SHOULD
BE GROUNDED UPON A GENUINED REASON, IN THE LIGHT OF THE POLICE OFFICERS
EXPERIENCE AND SURROUNDING CONDITIONS, TO WARRANT THE BELIEF THAT THE
PERSON DETAINED HAS WEAPONS CONCEALED ABOUT HIM (VALDEZ VS. PEOPLE, [2007]).

7.1. Stop and frisk searches are often confused with searches incidental to lawful arrests
under the Rules of Court. Searches incidental to a lawful arrest require that a crime be
committed in flagrante delicto, and the search conducted within the vicinity and within reach by
the person arrested is done to ensure that there are no weapons, as well as to preserve the
evidence. On the other hand, stop and frisk searches are conducted to prevent the
occurrence of a crime.
The Supreme court stated that the stop and frisk search should be used [when dealing with a
rapidly unfolding and potentially criminal situation in the city streets where unarguably there is
no time to secure a search warrant. Stop and frisk searches (sometimes referred to as Terry
searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal
arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need
to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
(PEOPLE VS. COGAED [2014]).
7.2. TERRY SEARCH VS. SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST: It is necessary
to remind the RTC and the CA that the Terry stop and frisk search is entirely different from and
should not be confused with the search incidental to a lawful arrest envisioned under Section 13,
Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The distinctions have been made clear in Malacat v.
Court of Appeals.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of
the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance,
the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process
cannot be reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the
person of the arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for
evidence to destroy, and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission
of the crime, or the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might
furnish the arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a stop-and-frisk as a limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons, as laid down in Terry, thus: We merely hold
today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to
conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be a foot and that the persons with
whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating
this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons
which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment x x x x.
Other notable points of Terry are that while probable cause is not required to conduct a stop-
and-frisk, it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a stop-and-
frisk. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officers experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.
Finally, a stop-and-frisk serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure
himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. x x x x x
A search as an incident to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It bears
emphasis that the law requires that the search be incidental to a lawful arrest. Therefore it is
beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his belongings; the
process cannot be reversed. (SANCHEZ VS. PEOPLE [2014]).
RULE 114 BAIL
1. CUSTODY OF THE LAW IS NOT REQUIRED FOR THE ADJUTICATION OF RELIEFS OTHER
THAN AN APPLICATION FOR BAIL. (DAVID VS. AGBAY [2015]).

8
1.1 Miranda v. Tuliao, which involved a motion to quash warrant of arrest, the Supreme Court
discussed the distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person, and held
that jurisdiction over the person of the accused is deemed waived when he files any pleading
seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court
by impugning such jurisdiction over his person. (DAVID VS. AGBAY [2015]).

2. THE GRANT OF BAIL OR ITS DENIAL HAS NO IMPACT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
ACCUSED THAT DEPENDS ON CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT. [BURGOS VS. CA, [2010])

3. THE POWER TO ORDER THE RELEASE OR TRANSFER OF A PERSON UNDER DETENTION


BY LEGAL PROCESS IS VESTED IN THE COURT, NOT IN THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT,
MUCH LESS THE GOVERNOR. [AMBIL, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2011]).

4. THE DENIAL OF BAIL PENDING APPEAL IS A MATTER OF WISE DISCRETION SINCE


AFTER CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
TERMINATES AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL ENDS.
(LEVISTE VS. COURT OF APPEALS [2010]).

5. WHILE OUR EXTRADITION LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR THE GRANT OF THE BAIL TO
AN EXTRADITEE, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO PROVISION PROHIBITING HIM OR HER FROM
FILING A MOTION. The prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or
she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail (GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG, SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION V. OLALIA, [2007]).

6. AN APPLICATION FOR OR ADMISSION TO BAIL SHALL NOT BAR THE ACCUSED FROM
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF HIS ARREST OR THE LEGALITY OF THE WARRANT
ISSUED THEREFOR, OR FROM ASSAILING THE REGULARITY OR QUESTIONING THE
ABSENCE OF A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM,
PROVIDED THAT HE RAISES THEM BEFORE ENTERING HIS PLEA. THE COURT SHALL
RESOLVE THE MATTER AS EARLY AS PRACTICABLE BUT NOT LATER THAN THE START OF
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE (Section 26, Rule 114, Rules of Criminal Procedure) (BORLONGAN, JR.
ET AL. VS. PEa, [2010]).

RULE 112 PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION


1. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION: A preliminary investigation must first be conducted to
determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that the crime has
been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial, in
accordance with Rule 112, Section 1 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. At this stage, the conduct of
the preliminary investigation and the subsequent determination of the existence of probable cause lie
solely within the discretion of the public prosecutor. If upon evaluation of the evidence, the
prosecutor finds sufficient basis to find probable cause, he or she shall the cause the filing of the
information with the court.

Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then personally evaluate the resolution of the
prosecutor and its supporting evidence to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists.

The executive determination of probable cause concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence
to support an Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other
hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued.

While it is within the trial courts discretion to make an independent assessment of the evidence on
hand, it is only for the purpose of determining whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. The
judge does not act as an appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
prosecutors determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable
cause independent of the prosecutors finding. (MENDOZA VS. PEOPLE [2014])

1.1 A FINDING OF PROBABLE CAUSE NEEDS ONLY TO REST ON EVIDENCE SHOWING


THAT, MORE LIKELY THAN NOT, A CRIME HAS BEEN COMMITTED AND THAT IT WAS
COMMITTED BY THE ACCUSED. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less
than evidence that would justify conviction. (SANTOS VS. ORDA, JR. [2010]).
1.2 FOUR (4) KINDS OF PROBABLE CAUSE: In the Philippines, there are four instances in the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure where probable cause is needed to be established:

(1) In Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 112: By the investigating officer, to determine whether there
is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and
9
the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A preliminary
investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four years, two months and one day without regard
to the fine;
(2) In sections 6 and 9 of Rule 112: By the judge, to determine whether a warrant of arrest
or a commitment order, if the accused has already been arrested, shall be issued and that
there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice;
(3) In Section 5(b) of Rule 113: By a peace officer or a private person making a warrantless
arrest when an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(4) In Section 4 Rule 126: By the judge, to determine whether a search warrant shall be
issued, and only upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. In all these
instances, the evidence necessary to establish probable cause is based only on the likelihood,
or probability, of guilt. (SENATOR JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. OMBUDSMAN [2015]).

1.3 PROBABLE CAUSE CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH HEARSAY EVIDENCE, AS LONG AS


THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR CREDITING THE HEARSAY. Hearsay evidence is
admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigation because such investigation
is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However,
in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is
substantial evidence which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes
hearsay evidence while substantial basis can include hearsay evidence. (SENATOR JINGGOY
EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. OMBUDSMAN [2015]).

2. THE ACCUSED IN A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION HAS NO RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE


THE WITNESSES WHICH THE COMPLAINANT MAY PRESENT. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court expressly provides that the respondent shall only have the right to submit a counter-
affidavit, to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a
hearing to propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witness, to be afforded an
opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine.
It should be underscored that the conduct of preliminary investigation is only for the determination of
probable cause, and probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should determined in a
summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine
his accusers to establish his innocence. Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
The purpose in determining probable cause is to make sure that the courts are not clogged with
weak cases that will only be dismissed, as well as to spare a person from the travails of a needless
prosecution service under the control and supervision of the Secretary of the Department of Justice
are inherently the fact-finder, investigator, hearing officer, judge of the respondent in preliminary
investigations.
A person under preliminary investigation, as Sen. Estrada is in the present case when he filed his
Request, is not yet an accused person, and hence cannot demand the full exercise of the rights of an
accused person the right to a preliminary investigation is statutory, not constitutional. In short, the
rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are merely statutory rights, are not constitutional
due process rights. An investigation to determine probable cause for the filing of an information does
not initiate a criminal action so as to trigger into operation Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution. It is the filing of a complaint or information in court that initiates a criminal action.
Thus, a preliminary investigation can be taken away by legislation. The constitutional right of an
accused to confront the witnesses against him does not apply in preliminary investigations; nor will
the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of his rights to confront the witnesses
against him. A preliminary investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing the
constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause to a fair trial. (SENATOR JINGGOY
EJERCITO ESTRADA VS. OMBUDSMAN [2015])
3. WAIVER OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION: THE NEW RULES ON CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE DOES NOT REQUIRE AS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON TO THE VALIDITY OF
THE PROCEEDINGS [IN THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION] THE PRESENCE OF THE
ACCUSED FOR AS LONG AS EFFORTS TO REACH HIM WERE MADE, AND AN
OPPORTUNITY TO CONTROVERT THE EVIDENCE OF THE COMPLAINANT IS ACCORDED
HIM. (ROMUALDEZ VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2010])
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4. PRELIMINARY INEVTIGATION CONDUCETED BY THE OMBUDSMAN: As far as crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable cause during the
preliminary investigation, reinvestigation for that matter, is a function that belongs to the Office of
the Ombudsman, which is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion, whether
probable cause exists, and to charge the person believe to have committed the crime as defined by
law.
It was settled that courts do not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the
presence or absence of probable cause believing that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof necessitating the filing of the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts. This rule is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutor powers
granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practically as well. It is were
otherwise, the functions of the Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing
the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to
complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with
cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by
a private complainant. (PEOPLE VS. BORJE, JR. [2014]).
5. PROSECUTOR IS NOT MANDATED TO REQUIRE THE RESPONDENT TO SUBMIT HIS
COUNTER-AFFIDAVITS TO OPPOSE THE COMPLAINT (BORLONGAN, JR. ET AL. VS. PEA,
2010]).

6. WHEN CONFRONTED WITH MOTION TO WIDRAW AN INFORMATION (ON THE GROUND


OF LACK OF PROBABLE CAUSE TO HOLD THE ACCUSED FOR TRIALBASED OJ A
RESOLUTION OF THE DPJ SECRETARY), THE TRIAL COURT HAS THE DUTY TO MAKE AN
INDEPENDENT TO MAKE AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT OF THE MERITS OF THE
MTION. IT MAY EITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE
SECRETARY.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and
jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed
no sufficient evidence against the accused. (TAMARGO VS. AWINGAN [2010]).
6.1. THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUNDS TO ADOPT THE RESOLUTION OF THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE IT IS MANDATED TO INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE OF ASSESS
THE MERITS OF THECASE; IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS DISCRETION, IT MAY AGREE OR
DISAGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE.
Once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition for the case
(whether it be dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests within the
exclusive jurisdiction, competence and the discretion of the trial court; it is the best
and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
In resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw the information filed by the
public prosecutor (on his own initiative or pursuant to the directive of the Secretary of Justice),
either for insufficiency or evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of probable
cause, the trial court shall merely rely on the findings of the public prosecutor or of the Secretary
of Justice that no crime had been committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public
prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction of the accused. To do so is to
surrender a power constitutionally vested in the Judiciary to the Executive. (JUNIO VS. JUDGE
MARIVIC A. CACATIAN-BELTRAN, [2014])
6.2. UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CRICUMSTANCES, A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ASSAILING THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE (INVOLVING AN
APPEAL OF THE PROSECUTORS RULING ON PROBABLE CAUSE) MAY BE ALLOWED,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FILING OF AN INFORMATION WITH THE TRIAL COURT.
(YAMBOT VS.HON. ARTEMIO TUQUERO [2011]), LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.)

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. JURISDICTION: Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear, try and decide
a particular case or mater before it. That power and capacity includes a competence to pronounce a
judgment, impose a punishment, and enforce or suspend the execution of a sentence in accordance
with law.

Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the criminal action has been properly
instituted. If a party appeals a trial courts judgment or final order, jurisdiction is transferred to the
appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is
concerned. The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other
partys time to appeal has expired. Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease
11
including the authority to order execution pending appeal the moment complete records of the case
are transmitted to the appellate court. Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the
authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to enforce its
decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority shall remain with the
appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent
event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first
place. (ARTEMIO VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 151258, DECEMBER 1,
2014, SERENO, CJ)

1.1 JURISDICTION OF A COURT OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER IS VESTED BY LAW. IN


CRIMINAL CASES, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY OF TH CRIME CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION DETERMINES THE COURT THAT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
The trial courts lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties silence on the matter. The
failure of the parties to raise the matter of jurisdiction also cannot be construed as a waiver of
the parties. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and cannot be waived by the parties. (GARCIA VS.
FERRO CHEMICALS, INC. [2014]).
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS NOE JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIMINAL ORDERS
DIRECTIVES AND DECISIONS OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY CASES ONLY. (DUYON vs. COURT OF APPEALS [2014]).

3. JURISDICTION OVER THE ACCUSED: JURISDICTION OVER AN ACCUSED IS ACQUIRED


WHEN THE WARRANT F ARREST IS SERVED. ABSENT THIS, THE COURT CANNOT HOLD
THE ACCUSED FOR ARRAIGNEMNT AND TRIAL. (MENDOZA VS. PEOPLE [2014]).

3.1. JURISPRUDENCE REQUIRES THAT A SURRENDER, TO BE VOLUNTARY, MUST


BE SPONTANEOUS AND MUST CLEARLY INDICATETHE INTENT OF THE ACCUSED TO
SUBMIT HIMSELF UNCONDITIONALLY TO THE AUTHORITIES EITHER BECAUSE HE
ACKNOWLEDGES HIS GUILT OR HE WISHES TO SAVE THE AUTHORITIES THE
TROUBLE AND EXPENSE INCIDENTAL TO HIS SEARCH AND CAPTURE. The following
requisites should likewise be present: (1) the offended had not been actually arrested; (2) the
offender surrender himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; (3) the surrender was
voluntary; and (4) there is no pending warrant of arrestor information filed. In this case, the
accused surrendered only after having been informed of the charge of rape against him or upon
two months from the commission of the alleged crime. He even denied the said charge upon his
purported surrender. The alleged surrender, therefore, does not qualify as a mitigating
circumstance. (PEOPLE VS. SOBUSA [2010]).

4. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES: VENUE IS JURISDICTIONAL IN CRIMINAL CASES. IT CAN


NEITHER BE WAIVED NOR SUBJECTED TO STIPULATION. THE RIGHT VENUE MUST EXIST
AS A MATTER OF LAW. Thus, for territorial jurisdiction to attach, the criminal action must be
instituted and tried in the proper court of the municipality, city, or province where the offense was
committed or where any of its essential ingredients took place (PEOPLE VS. TAROY, [2011]).

4.1. VENUE IN LIBEL CASES: Under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic
Act No. 4363, libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is either (1) where
the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or (2) where the
alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

If the private complainant opts for the second, the Information (formal indictment) must
specifically state where the libelous article was printed and first published. If the libelous article
appears on a website, there is no way of finding out of the location of its printing and first
publication. It is not enough for the complainant to lay the venue where the article was
accessed, as this will open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where
the website is also accessed or capable of being accessed, and spawn the very ills the
amendment sought to prevent. Thus, in cases where the libelous articles appears on a website,
the private complainant has the option to file the case in his/her place of residence,
which will not necessitate finding out exactly where the libelous matter was printed and first
published. (Bonifacio vs. RTC of Makati, Br. 129 [2010])

4.2. VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES UNDER MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS


FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995: THERE IS NOTHING ARBITRARY OR UNCONSTITUTIONAL
IN CONGRESS FIXING AN ALTERNATIVE VENUE FOR VIOLATIONS OF SECTION 6 OF
R.A. 8042 OR OTHERWISE KNOWN AS MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS
FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995 (ALLOWING THE FILING OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS AT THE
PLACE OF RESIDENCE OF THE OFFENDED PARTIES) THAT DIFFERS FROM THE VENUE

12
ESTABLISHED BY THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. (HON. PATRICIA A. STO.
TOMAS VS. SALAC [2012])

5. WHEN INJUNCTION MAY BE ISSUED TO RESTRAIN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION: It is an


established doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public
interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of
society. (Asutilla v. PNB, (1986). However, it is also true and prosecuted for the protection of society
(Asutilla v. PNB, (1986). However, it is also true that various decisions in this Court have laid down
exceptions to this rule, among which are: a. To afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused; b. When necessary for the ordely administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiciplicity of actions; c. When there is a prejudicial
question which is sub[-]judice; d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority; e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; f.
When trouble jeopardy is clearly apparent; g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over
the offense; h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; i. Where the
charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; j. Where there is
clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has
been denied; and] [k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to
prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners. (PEOPLE VS. GREY, [2010])

RULE 110 PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

1. SUFFICIENCY OF AN INFORMATION: [U]nder Section 6, the Information of sufficient if it


contains the full name of the accused , the designation of the offense given by the statute, the acts
or omissions constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and the
place of the offense.

The rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the Information in order not
to violate the accuseds constitutional right to be properly informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. However, accused never claimed that he was deprived of his right to be fully
apprised of the nature of the charges against him due to insufficiency of the Information. Also an
Information which lacks essential allegations may still sustain a conviction when the accused fails to
object to its sufficiency during the trial, and the trial, and the deficiency was cured by competent
evidence presented therein. (PEOPLE VS. ASILAN [2012])

1.1. WHAT IS CONTROLLING IN AN INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE TITLE OF THE


COMPLAINT, NOR THE DESIGNATYION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED OR THE
PARTICULAR LAW OR PART KTHEREOF ALLEGEDLY VIOLATED, THESE BEING, BY AND
LARGE, MERE CONCLUSIONS OF LAW MADE BY THE PROSECUTOR, BUT THE
DESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME CHARGED AND THE PARTICULAR FACTS THEREIN
RECITED. In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in stating the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required is that the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense are stated in ordinary and concise language
sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know the offense charged (PEROPLE
VS. AMISTOSO [2013]).
1.2. AN INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT WHEN THE ACCUSED IS FULLY APPRISED
OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HIM TO ENABLE HIM TO PREPARE HIS DEFENSE. ALL THAT
IS NEEDED FOR THE INFORMAITON TO BE SUFFICIENT IS THAT THE ELEMENTS JOF
THE CRIME HAVE BEEN ALLEPGED AND THAT THERE ARE SUFFICIENT DETAILS AS TO
THE TIME, PLACE, AND PERSONS INVOLVED IN THE OFFENSE. (PEOPLE VS. FELICIANO,
JR. [2014]).
1.3. THE REAL NATURE OF THE CRIMINAL CHARGE IS DETERMINED NOT FROM
THE CAPTION OR PREAMBLE OF THE INFORMATION, OR FROM THE SPECIFICAITON
OF THE PROVISION OF LAW ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN VIOLATED, WHICH ARE MERE
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, BUT BY THE ACTUAL RECITEAL OF THE FACTS IN THE
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. (LCONSIGNA VS. PEOPLE [2014]).
1.4. THE SUPREME COURT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD NO LONGER
ENTERTAIN THE ACCUSEDS CHALLENGE AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
INFORMATION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE AFTER SHE HA ENTERED HER PLEA. In other
words, her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information
through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to
the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of
the challenge. (ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE [2014]).

2. A GENERIC AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE WILL NOT BE APPRECIATED BY THE COURT


UNLESS ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. (PEOPLE VS. REBUCAN, [2011])
13
2.1. QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES: EVEN AFTER THE RECENT AMENDMENTS TO
THE RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES NEED NOT BE
PRECEDED BY DESCRIPTIVE WORDS SUCH AS QUALIFYING OR QUALIFIED BY TO
PROPERLY QUALIFY AN OFFENSE. Section 8 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
require the use of such of the words qualifying or qualified by that raises a crime to a higher
category, but the specific allegation of an attendant circumstance which adds the essential
element raising the crime to a higher category. It is sufficient that the qualifying circumstances
be specified in the Information to apprise the accused of the charges against him to enable him
to prepare fully for his defense, thus precluding surprises during trial. (PEOPLE VS. ROSAS
[2008])
2.2. RELATIONSHIP IN RAPE CASES: The information in the case only mentioned
appellant as AAAs uncle, without specifically stating that he is a relative within the
third civil degree, either by affinity or consanguinity. Even granting that during trial it
was proved that the relationship was within the third civil degree, either by
consanguinity or affinity, still such proof cannot be appreciated because appellant
would thereby be denied of his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. Appellant cannot be charged with committing the crime of rape in it
simple form and then be tried and convicted of rape in its qualified form. Thus, the Court
of Appeals correctly disregarded the qualifying circumstances of relationship. (People vs. Ubina
[2007]).

3. THE REQUIREMENT OF INDICATING IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION THE DATE


OF THE COMMISSION OF THE APPLIES ONLY WHEN SUCH DATE IS A MATERIAL
INGREDIENT OF THE OFFENSE. (PEOPLE VS. DION [2011]).

3.1. DATE OF COMMISSION: IN CRIMES WHERE THE DATE OF COMMISSION IS


NOT AMTERIAL ELEMENT, LIKE MURDER, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO ALLEGE SUCH
DATE WITH ABSOLUTE SPECIFICITY OR CERTAINTY IN THE INFORMATION. The Rules
of Court merely requires, for the sake of properly informing an accused, that the date of
commission be approximated. Since the date of commission of the offense is not required with
exactitude, the allegation in an information is just deemed supplanted by the evidence presented
during the trial or may even be corrected by a formal amendment if the information.

Variance in the date of commission of the offense as alleged in the information and as
established in evidence becomes fatal when such discrepancy is so great that it induces the
perception that the information and the evidence are no longer pertaining t one and the same
offense. In this event, the defective allegation in the information is not deemed supplanted by
the evidence nor can it be amended but must be struck down for being violative of the right of
the accused to be informed of the specific charge against him. (PEOPLE VS. DELFIN [2014]).

3.2. SECTION 11 OF THE SAME TULE ALSO PROVIDES THAT IT IS NOT NECESSARY
TO STATE IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION THE PRECISE DATE THE OFFENSE
WAS COMMITTED EXCEPT WHEN THE DATE OF COMMISSION IS A MATERIAL
ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE. THE OFFENSE MAY THUS B ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN
COMMITTED ON A DATE AS NEAR AS POSSIBLE TO THE ACTUAL DATE OF ITS
COMMISSION. (PEOPLE VS. CANARES, [2009]).
3.3. CONFORMABLY WITH THE RULES, THE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT
BECAUSE IT STATED THE APPROXIMATE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFNSE
THROUGH THE WORDS ON OR ABOUT THE 2 ND OF JANUARY, 1996, and the accused
could reasonably deduce the nature of the criminal act with which she was charged from a
reading of its contents as well as gather by such reading whatever she needed to know about the
charge to enable her to prepare her defense. (PEOPLE VS. [2011])

4. DUPLICITOUS OFFENSES: In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information
charging more than one offense, but with more than one information, each charging a
different offense violation of DOSRI Rules in one, and estafa through falsification of commercial
documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa through falsification
of commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of
charges as a ground to quash the Informations (SORIANO VS. PEOPLE, [2009]).

5. THE OFFENDED PARTY, EVEN IS A MINOR, HAS THE RIGHT TO INITIATE THE
PROSECUTION OF THE OFFENSES OF SEDUCTION, BDUCTIONK AND ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS INDEPENDENTLY OF HER PARENTS, GRANPARENTS, OR GUARDIAN,
UNLESS SHE INCOMPETENT OR INCAPABLE IN DOING SO. (2000 BAR)

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6. WHEN A PRIVATE PROSECUTOR MAY PROSECUTRE A CASE EVEN IN THE ABSENCE FO
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: A private prosecutor may prosecute the criminal action up to the end
of the trial even in the absence of the public prosecutor if he authorized to do so in writing. This
written authorization shall be given by either the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State
Prosecutor. The written authorization in order to be given effect must however, be appointed by the
court (Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of court; A.M. No. 02-2-07-SC, April 10, 2002 effective May 1, 2002).
The written authorization to the private prosecutor shall be given because of either of the following
of the following reasons: (a) the public prosecutor has a heavy work load or, (b) there is a lack of
public prosecutor (SEC. 5, RULE 110, RULES OF COURT; A.M. NO. 02-2-07-SC, APRIL 10, 2002
EFFECTIVE MAY 1, 2002).

7. SINCE A SEARCH WARRANT PROCEEDING IS NOT A CRIMINAL ACTION, IT


NECESSARILY FOLOWS THAT THE REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN SECTION 5, RULE 110
OF THE RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WHICH STATES THAT ALL CRIMINAL
ACTIONS EITHER COMMENCED BY COMPLAINT KOR BY INFORMATION SHALL BE
PROSECUTED UNDER THE DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF A PUBLIC PROSECUTOR DOES
NOT APPLY. (HPS SOFTWARE AND COMMUNICATION CORPOERATION VS. PHILIPPINE LONG
DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) [2013]).

8. AMENDMENTS: There is no precise definition of what constitutes a substantial amendment.


According to jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint or information consist of the
recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court.
Under Sect5ion 14, however, the prosecution is given the right to amend the information, regardless
of the nature of the amendment, so long as the amendment is sought before the accused enters his
plea, subject to the qualification under the second paragraph of Section 14.

Once the accused is arraigned and enter his plea, however, Section 14 prohibits the prosecution
from seeking a substantial amendment, particularly mentioning those that may prejudice the rights of
the accused. One of these rights is the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him, a right which is given life during the arraignment of the
accused of the charge of against him. The theory in law is that since the accused officially begins to
prepare his defense his defense against the accused officially begins to prepare his defense against
the accusation on the basis of the recitals in the information read to him during arraignment, then
the prosecution must establish its case on the basis of the same information.
Amendments that do not charge another offense different from that charged in the original one; or
do not alter the prosecutions theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the
form of defense he has or will assume are considered merely as formal amendments.
As to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by an amendment made after he had pleaded to
the original information, Montenegro ruled that prejudice exists when a defense under the original
information would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Information as amended.
To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an
information pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence that the accused
previously had under the original information. This test, however, must be read together with the
characteristic thread of formal amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or the
essence of the offense charged. (DR. MENDES VS. PEOPLE [2014]).

RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION

1. EVERY PERSON CRIMINALLY LIABLE FOR A FELONY IS ALSO CIVILLY LIABLE, THE
ACQUITTAL OF AN ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED, HOWEVER, DOES NOT
NECESSARILY EXTINGUISH HIS CIVIL LIABILITY.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted .
However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state whether the evidence of
the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused more merely failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (DALURAYA VS. OLIVA [2014]).

15
1.1 When the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is instituted with the criminal
action, whether by choice of private complainant (i.e., no reservation is made or prior filing of a
separate civil action) or as required by the law or rules, the case will be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the public prosecutor. The civil action cannot proceed independently of
the criminal case. This includes subsequent proceedings on the criminal action such as an appeal.
The Supreme Court clarified, however, that private complainants in criminal cases are not
precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect
of a decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can
bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is when the
private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court. However, if the
state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting the
accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action,
the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed . The
appeal of the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the petition for certiorari assailing
the acquittal of the accused. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal form
that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping.
On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to institute
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the Regional Trial Court or
institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111
of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeal as to the civil aspect of the case
cannot be considered as forum shopping. This is not the situation here. (GARCIA VS. FERRO
CHEMICALS, INC. [2014]).
2. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION: In Torres v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 153666, December 27,
2002, 394 SCRA 494, 508-509, the Supreme Court stated that under the amendment, a prejudicial
question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a
decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is
closely connected. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal
action.
In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case
No. 7160 filed by the State with the RTC in Civil Case No. 7160. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
Clearly, the civil action must precede the filing of the criminal action for a Prejudicial
Question to exist. (DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION INC VS. JANIOLA, [2009]).
2.1. EVEN IF THE TRIAL COURT IN THE CIVIL CASE DECLARES THAT THE CONSTRUCTION
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES IS VOID FOR LACK OF CONSIDERATION, THIS
WOULD NOT AFFECT THE PROSECUTION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
CRIMINAL CASE. The fact of the matter is that private respondent indeed issued checks which
were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution
under BP 22. Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a
prejudicial question, that the resolution of the issue in the civil action would determine whether
the criminal action may proceed, is absent in the instant case. Thus, no prejudicial question
exists and the rules on it are inapplicable to the case. (DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION,
INC. VS. JANIOLA, [2009]).
2.2. THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE WAS NOVATION OF THE CREDIT LINE AGREEMENT
OR NOT IS NOT DETERMINATIVE OF WHETHER JACINTO SHOULD BE PROSECUTED
FOR VIOLATION OF THE BOUNCING CHECKS LAW. (LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.
JACINTO, [2010])

RULE 117 - MOTION TO QUASH


1. A motion to quash is the mode by which an accused assails, before entering his plea, the validity of
the criminal complaint or the criminal information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in
point of law, or for defect apparent on the face of the Information . The motion, as a rule,
hypothetically admits the truth of the facts spelled ot in the complaint or information. (LOS BANOS
vs. PEDRO [2009]).

2. GROUNDS IN FILING A MOTION TO QUASH: The motion to quash is the mode by which an
accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face
in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information, as follows: (a) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; (b) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the accused; (d)
the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so; (e) the complaint or information does
not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (f) more than one offense is charged except when
a single punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law; (g) the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished; (h) the complaint or information contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (i) the accused has been previously convicted or

16
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent. (ENRILE VS. HON. MANALASTAS [2014]).

3. FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE: At any time before entering a plea, an
accused may assail the information filed with the court based on the grounds enumerated in Section
3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, one of which is the claim that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense. In assessing whether an information must be quashed on that ground, the basic test is
to determine if the facts averred would establish the presence of the essential elements of the crime
as defined in the law. The information is examined without consideration of the truth or veracity of
the claims therein, as these are more properly prove or controverted during the trial. In the appraisal
of the information, matters aliunde are not taken into account.
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is based on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the prosecution a
chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if the
prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. This does not mean,
however, that the Special Prosecutor is now precluded from filing another information. Section 6,
Rule 117, specifically states that an order sustaining a motion to quash would not bar another
prosecution. That is, of course, unless respondents are able to prove that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished, or that double jeopardy has already attached. (PEOPLE VS. LTSG.
DOMINADOR BAYABOS ET. AL. [2015]).
4. DUPLICITY OF CHARGES: AS A GENERAL RULE, A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION MUST
CHARGE ONLY ONE OFFENSE, OTHERWISE, THE SAME IS DEFECTIVE. The rationale behind
this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused the necessary
knolwedge of the charge against hi and and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The
State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his
defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or
information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same
in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. (PEOPLE vs.
COURT OF APPEALS [2015]).

5. DOUBLE JEOPARDY: To substantiate a claim for double jeopardy, the following must be
demonstrated (1) |A| first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy
must have been validly terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is
an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. [People v. Espinosa, 456 Phil. 507, 518
(2003)]
Legal jeopardy attaches only: (a) upon a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) [when] a valid plea [has] been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Consequently, given that Justice
Narios verbal order dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 25922-25939 is null and void, and does not exist
at all in contemplation of law, it follows that petitioners cannot invoke the constitutional right against
double jeopardy. (JACOB VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2010]).
5.1. PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BARS
SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME QUASI-OFFENSE REGARDLESS OF ITS
VARIOUS RESULTING ACTS (IVLER VS. HON. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO [2010]).
Following a collision, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged with two offenses: (i) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries (Crim. Case No. 82367) for injuries suffered by
Evangeline Ponce; and (ii) Recless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide for the death of Nestor
Ponce (Crim. Case No. 82366).
Petitioner pleaded guilt to Crim. Case Nno. 82367 and was meted the penalty of
public censure. Invoking this conviction, Petitioner moeved to quash Criminal Case No. 82366.
The Supreme Court held that Criminal Case 82366 should be quashed since it relates to
the same offense. In other words, Recless Imprudence is a single crime and that its
consequences on persons and property are material only to determine the penalty.
5.2. An appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case)
by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if: (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with express consent, of the defendant, (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based
upon consideration of the evidence of the evidence or of the merits of the case ; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that should the dismissal be
found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (PEOPLE vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN [2010])

6. THE DEFENSE OF EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY, E.G.,


PRESCRIPTION, IS NOT DEEMED WAIVED EVEN IF THE ACCUSED HAD NOT RAISED THE
SAME IN A MOTION TO QUASH. (SYHUNLIONG VS RIVERA [2014]).
17
7. REMEDY AGAINST THE DENIAL OF A MOTION TO QUASH: The remedy against the denial of a
motion to quash is for the movant accused to enter a plea, go to trial, and should the decision be
adverse, reiterate on appeal from the final judgment and assign as error the denial of the motion to
quash. The denial, being an interlocutory order, is not appealable, and may not be the subject of a
petition for certiorari because of the availability of other remedies in the ordinary course of law.
(ENRILE VS. HON. MANALASTAS [2014]).

7.1. When a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for
certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special
defenses invoked in their motion to quash. The above general rule, however admits of
several exceptions, one of which is when the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then
certiorari or prohibition lies. (JAVIER VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, [2009]).

8. PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL: The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117
of the Rules, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the
accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion
for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and
dismissing the case provisionally; and (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of
provisional dismissal of the case. (WILLIAM CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS [2014]).

8.1. NATURE OF TIME BAR RULE: The time-bar is a special procedural limitation qualifying
the right of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an
inherent part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the
State to prosecute the accused. (LOS BANOS vs. SAN PEDRO [2009])
8.2. ORDER GRANTING A MOTION TO QUASH ON THE GROUND THAT THE FACTS
CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE IS NOT GOVERNED BY SECTION 8 OF
RULE 117. WHILE THE PROVISION ON PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL IS FOUND WITHIN
RULE 117 (MOTION TO QUASH), IT DOES NOT FOLLOW THAT A MOTION TO QUASH
RESULTS IN A PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL TO WHICH SECTION 8, RULE 117 APPLIES.
HENCE, THE TIME-BAR RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE
INFORMATION AND THE CASE MAY BE RE-OPENED IF THE TRIAL COURT FINDS THAT
THE QUASHAL WAS IMPROPER. (LOS BANOS vs. PEDRO [2009]).
8.3. DISTINCTION BETWEEN MOTION TO QUASH AND PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL:
A first notable feature of SEction 8, Rule 117 is that is does not exactly state what a
provisional dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly suggests that the dismissals which
Section 8 essentially refers to are those that are temporary in character (i.e., to dismissals that
are without prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the dismissals that are permanent
(i.e., those that bar the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules, and jurisprudence,
permanent dismissals are those barred by the (i) principle of double jeopardy; (ii) by the
previous extinction of criminal liability; (iii) by the rule on speedy trial; and (iv) the dismissals
after plea without the express consent of the accused. Section 8, by its own terms, cannot cover
these dismissals because they are not provisional.
A second feature is that Section 8 does not state the grounds that lead to a provisional
dismissaal. This is in marked contrast with a motion to quash whose grounds are specified under
Section 3. The delimitation of the grounds available in a motion to quash suggests that a motion
to quash is a class in itself, with specific and closely-defined characteristics under the Rules of
Court. A necessary consequence is that where the grounds cited are those listed under Section 3,
then appropriate remedy is to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy. Conversely, where a
ground does not appear under Section 3, ten a motion to quash is not a proper remedy. A
motion for provisional dismissal may then apply if the conditions required by Section 8 obtain.
A third feature, closely related to the second, focuses on the consequences of a meritorious
motion to quash. This feature also answers the question of whether the quashal of an
information can be treated as provisional dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117
unmistakably provide for the consequences of a meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of
an amendment for the complaint or information, if the motion to quash relates to a defect
curable by amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of sustaining the motion to quash - the
complaint or information may be re-filed, except for the instances mentioned under Section 6.
The latter section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of the re-filing that Section 5 allows - it
cannot be done where the dismissal is based on extinction of criminal liability or double jeopardy.
Section 7 defines double jeopardy and complements the ground provided under Section 3(i) and
the exception stated in Section 6. Rather than going into specifics, Section 8 simply states when
a provisional dismissal can be made, i.e., when the accused expressly consents and the
18
offended party is given notice. The consent of the accused to a dismissals that lead to double
jeopardy. This immediately suggests that a dismissal under Section 8 - i.e., one with the express
consent of the accused - is not intended to lead to double jeopardy as provided under Section 7,
but nevertheless creates a bar to further prosecution under the special terms of Section 8. This
feature must be read with Section 6 which provides for the effects of sustainig a motion to quash
- the dismissal is not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense - unless the basis for the
dismissal is the extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy. These unique terms, read in
relation with Sections 3(i) and 7 and compared with the consequences of Section 8, carry
unavoidable implications that cannot but lead to distinctions between a quashal and a provisional
dismissal under Section 8. They stress in no uncertain terms that, save only for what has been
provided under Sections 4 and 5, the governing rule when a motion to quash is meritorious are
the terms of Section 6. The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6 that a Section 8
provisional dismissal is a bar to further prosecution shows that the framers did not intend a
dismissal based on a motion to quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused with one
another; Section 8 operated in a world of its own separate from motion to quash, and merely
provides a time-bar that uniquely applies to dismissals other than those grounded on Section 3.
Conversely, when a dismissed is pursuant to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8 and its
time-bar does not apply.

Other than the above, we note also the following differences stressing that a motion to
quash and its resulting dismissal is a unique class that should not be confused with other
dismissals:
First, a motion to quash is invariably filed by the accused to question the efficacy of teh
complaint or information filed against him or her (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 117); in contrast, a case
may be provisionally dismissed at the instance of either the prosecution or the accused, or both,
subject to the conditions enumerated under Section 8, Rule 117 (In People v. Tagle, (105 Phil
126, 127, [1959]), the defense moved for the provisional dismissal of the case because of the
inability of the prosecution to present important witnesses. In Baesa v. Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur (G.R. No. L-30363, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 437), the provisional dismissal was
made by the accused via motion. Further, in People v. Oliva (G.R. No. 106826, January 18, 2001,
349 SCRA 435, 438) and People v. Hinaut (105 Phil. 303 [1959]), the case was provisionally
dismissed by the prosecution with the consent of the accused; in the later case, the accused
manifested his consent by writing with with conformity in the motion).
Second, the form and content of a motion to quash are as stated under Section 2 of rule 117;
these requirements do not apply to a provisional dismissal.
Third, a motion to quash assails the validity of the criminal complaint or the criminal information
for defects or defenses apparent on face of the information; a provisional dismissal may be
grounded on reasons other than the defects found in the information.
Fourth, a motion to quash is allowed before the arraignment (Section 1, Rule 117); there may
be a provisional dismissal of the case even when the trial proper of the case is already underway
provided that the required consents are present.
Fifth, a provisional dismissal is, by its own terms, impermanent until the time-bar applies, at
which time it becomes a permanent dismissal. In contrast, an information that is quashed stays
quashed until revived; the grant of a motion to quash does not per se carry any connotation of
impermanence, and becomes so only as provided by law or by the Rules. In refiling the case,
what is important is the question of whether the action can still be brought, i.e., whether the
prescription of action or of the offense has set in. In a provisional dismissal, there can be no re-
filing after the time-bar, and prescription is not an immediate consideration.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal are different concepts whose respective rules
refer to different situations that should not be confused with one another. If the problem relates
to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the complaint or information, as shown on its face, the
remedy is a motion to quash under the terms of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for
seeking the dismissal of the complaint or information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined n Section 8, fall under provisional dismissal. (LOS BANOS vs. SAN
PEDRO [2009]).
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA (RULE 116)

1. ARRAIGNMENT: Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may
be informed of the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the
corresponding penalty that could be possibly meted against him. It is at this stage that the accused,
for the first time, is given the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him.
Arraignment is indispensable in bringing the accused to be informed. (KUMMER vs. PEOPLE [2013])

2. GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION: The grounds for suspension of arraignment are provided under
Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, which provides: (a) The accused appears to be suffering
from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully understand the
19
charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose; (b) There exists a prejudicial
question; and (c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at
either the Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; Provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office.
In Samson v. Daway, G.R. Nos. 160054-55, July 21, 2004, 434 SCRA 612, the Court explained that
while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment,
the aforecited provision limits the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days
reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that
after the expiration of said period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion to defer arraignment.
In the present case, the petitioners filed their petition for review with the DOJ on October 10, 2007.
When the RTC set the arraignment of the petitioners on August 10, 2009, 1 year and 10 months
had already lapsed. This period was way beyond the 60-day limit provided for by the Rules. In
addition, the cases cited by the petitioners - Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. How, G.R. No.
140863, August 22, 2000, 338 SCRA 511, Roberts, Jr. v. CA, G.R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996, 254
SCRA 307, and Dimatulac v. Villon G.R. No. 127107, October 12, 1998, 297 SCRA 679 - were all
decided prior to the amendment to Section 11 of Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
which took effect on December 1, 2000. At the time these cases were decided, there was no 60-day
limit on the suspension of arraignment. (TRINIDAD VS. VICTOR ANG [2011]).
2.1 UNDER SECTION 11(C), RULE 116 THE RULES OF COURT, AN ARRAIGNMENT MAY BE
SESPENDED IF THERE IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE
PROSECUTOR PENDING AT EITHER THE DOJ, OR THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.
However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of
the petition with the reviewing office. The Supreme Court emphasized that the right of an
accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right. In Spouses Trinidad v.
Ang, it explained that while the pending of a petition for review is aground for suspension of the
arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the
expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the
motion of defer arraignment. (HAO VS. PEOPLE OF THE [2014]).

3. CAPITAL OFFENSE: WHEN THE ACCUSED PLEADS GUILTY TO A CAPITAL OFFENSE,


THE COURT SHALL CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS AND
FULL COMPREHENSION OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA AND REQUIRE THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT AND THE PRECISE DEGREE OF HIS CULPABILITY.
The accused may also present evidence on his behalf. Under the foregoing Rule, three things are
enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must
conduct a researching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accuseds full comprehension
of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove
the guilt of the accused and precise degree of his culpability; and (3) the court must ask the accused
if he desire to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. (PEOPLE VS.
LOPIT [2008]).
RULE 118 PRE-TRIAL

1. PRE-TRIAL IS MANDATORY IN CHARACTER: The mandatory character of pre-trial is embodied


in Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999, and found its way in Section 2, Rule 18 of
the Rules of Court, which imposes a duty upon the plaintiff to promptly move ex parte that the case
be set for pre-trial. x x x x To further show that the court is serious in implementing the rules of
pre-trial, in Alviola v. Avelino, A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC. x x x Here, respondent judge failed to
conduct the pre-trial conference itself. It is elementary and plain that the holding of such a pre-trial
conference is mandatory and failure to do so is inexcusable. When the law or procedure is so
elementary, such as the provisions of the Rules of Court, not to know it or act as if one does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. (NPC VS. ADIONG, [2011])

2. AM No. 03-1-09-SC: After arraignment, the court shall set the pre-trial conference within 30 days
from the date of arraignment.
In mediatable cases, the judge shall refer the parties and their counsel to the Philippine Mediation
Center unit for purposes of mediation if available.
1. The following are under the mandatory coverage for court-annexed mediation (Cam) and judicial
dispute resolution (JDR):

a) all civil cases and the civil liability of criminal cases covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure, including the civil liability for violation of B.P. 22, except those which bylaw may
not be compromised;
20
b) special proceeding for the settlement of estates;
c) all civil and criminal cases filed with a certificate to file action issued by the Punong Barangay
or the pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo under the revised katarungang Pambarangay Law;
d) the civil aspect of Quasi-offenses under title 14 of the revised Penal code;
e) the civil aspect of less grave felonies punishable correctional penalties not exceeding 6 years
imprisonment, where the offended party is a private person;
f) the civil aspect of estafa, theft and libel;
g) All civil cases and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, brought on appeal from the
exclusive and original jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under section 33, par. (1) of
the judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980;
h) all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer brought on appeal from the exclusive and
original jurisdiction granted to the first level court under Section 33, par. (2) of the judiciary
reorganization Act of 1980;
i) all civil cases involving title to or possession of real property or an interest therein brought on
appeal from exclusive and original jurisdiction granted to the first level court under Section
33, par. (3) of the judiciary reorganization Act of 1980; and
j) all habeas corpus cases decided by the first level courts in the absence of the Regional Trial
Court judge, that brought up on appeal from the special jurisdiction granted to the first level
courts under Section 35 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (A-114. No, 11-1-6-SC-
PHILJA).

RULE 119-TRIAL

1. INSTANCES WHEN PRESENCE OF ACCUSED IS REQUIRED BY LAW: Section 14(2), Article III
of the Constitution, authorizing trials in absentia, allows the accused to be absent at the trial but not
at certain stages of the proceedings, to wit; (a) at arraignment and plea, whether of innocence or of
guilt; (b) during trial, whenever necessary for identification purposes; and (c) at the promulgation of
sentence, unless it is for a light offence, in which case, the accused may appear by counsel or
representative. At such stages of the proceeding, his presence is required and cannot be waived
(PEOPLE VS. DE GRANO [2009]).

2. ONE-DAY EXAMINATION OF WITNESS RULE: Par. 5(i) of Supreme Court A.M. No. 03-1-09-CS
requires that a witness has to be fully examined in one (1) day only. This rule shall be strictly to
subject to the courts discretion during trial on whether or not to extend the direct and/or cross-
examination for justifiable reasons. On the last hearing day allotted for each party, he, is required to
make his formal offer of evidence after the presentation of his witness and the opposing party is
required to immediately interpose his objection thereto. Thereafter, the judge shall make the ruling
on the offer of evidence in open court. However, the judge has the discretion to allow the offer of
evidence in writing in conformity with section 35, rule 132.

3. BURDEN OF PROOF: it is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the state carries the
ones probandi establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a
consequence of the tenet ei incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he
who asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a means of respecting the presumption of
innocence in favor of the man or woman on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the
burden of proof to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2) the
actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of the accused.
All these fact s must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence
and without solace from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts up may be
weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has failed to discharge the onus of his identity
and culpability. The presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the prosecution to
demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish innocence. Indeed, the
accused, being presumed innocent, carries no burden of proof on his or her shoulder. For
this reason, the first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the
criminal. For even if the commission of the crime can be established, without competent proof of the
identity of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, there can be no conviction. (PEOPLE vs. WAGAS,
[2013])
4. SECTION 1, RULE 115 OF THE RULES OF COURT ENUMERATES THE RIGHT OF THE
ACCUSED AT THE TRIAL. It provides that In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:(a) to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved: (b) to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him; (c) to be present and defend in person
and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the
judgement; (d) to testify as witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters
covered by direct examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him; (e) to be exempt
from being compelled to be a witness against himself; (f) to confront and cross-examine the witness
against him at the trial; (g) to have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of the
21
witnesses and production of other evidence in his behalf; (h) to have speedy, imperial, and public
trial; (i) to appeal in all cases allowed and in a manner prescribed by law.

5. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: The law presumes that an accused in a criminal prosecution is


innocent until the contrary is proves. This basic constitutional principle is fleshed out by procedural
rules which place on the prosecution the burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offence
charge by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Whether the degree of proof has been met is largely left
for the trial courts to determine. However, an appeal throws the whole case open for review such
that the court may, and generally does, look into the entire records if only to ensure that no fact of
weight or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended, or misapplied by the trial court. (PEOPLE
VS. ULAT [2011}, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.)

6. AN ACCUSEDS RIGHT TO HAVE A SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, AND PUBLIC TRIAL S


GUARANTEED IN CRIMINAL CASES BY SECTION 14(2) OF ARTITLE III OF THE
CONSTITUTION. This right to a speedy trial may be defined as one free from vexatious, capricious
and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free
from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatsoever
legitimate defense he may interpose. (Cosculluela vs. Sandiganbayan, [2013]).

6.1. FACTORS: In determining whether the accused has been deprives of his right to a
speedy disposition of the case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a)
length of delay; (b) the reason for delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d)
prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice should be assessed in the light of the interest of the
defendant that the speedy trial was designed to protect, namely: to prevent oppressive pre-trial
incarceration; to minimize anxiety and concerns of the accused to trial; and to limit the possibility
that his defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of the entire system. There is also
prejudice if the defense witnesses are unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past.
Even if the accused is not imprisoned prior to trial, he is still disadvantaged by restraints on his
liberty and by living under a cloud of anxiety, suspicion and often, hostility. His financial
resources may be drained, his association is curtailed, and he is subject to public obloquy (JACOB
VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2010]).
6.2. A DISMISSAL GROUNDED ON THE DENIAL OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO
SPEEDY TRAIL HAS THE EFFECT OF ACQUITAL THAT WOULD BAR THE FURTHER
PROSECUTION OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. (ATTY. BONSUBRE, JR VS.
YERRO [2015])

7. DISCHARGE OF AN ACCUSED TO BECOME S STATE WITNESS: Sec. 17. Discharge of


accused to be state witness.- When two or more persons are jointly charge with the commission
of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution before resting its case, the court may direct one or
more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state
when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed
state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;
(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed, except the testimony of said accused;
(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and
(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the
court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall
be inadmissible i evidence. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The court is not unaware that as an exception to the general rule requiring corroboration, the
uncorroborated testimony of a state witness may be sufficient when it is show to be
sincere in itself because it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and full of
details which, by their nature, could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought . This
exception, however, applies only if the state witness is an eyewitness since the testimony
would then be direct evidence. Section 17 of rule 119 actually assumes that the testimony of the
accused sought to be discharge as a state witness would constitute direct evidence (i.e., that he
or she is an eyewitness) in that it requires that there is no other direct evidence, except the
testimony of the said accused. (PEOPLE VS. ANABE [2010])
7.1. ABSOLUTE NECESSITY EXISTS FOR THE TESTIMONY OF AN ACCUSED SOUGHT
TO BE DISCHARGED WHEN HE OR SHE ALONE HAS KNOWLEDGE OF THE CRIME. In
more concrete terms, necessity is not there when the testimony would simply corroborate or
22
otherwise strengthen the prosecutions evidence. The requirement of absolute necessity for the
testimony of a state witness depends on the circumstances of each case regardless of the
number of the participating conspirators.
The prosecutions right to prosecute gives it a wide range of discretion- the discretion of
whether what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors
which are best appreciated by prosecutors. Under section 17, rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
criminal procedure, the court is given the power to discharge a state witness only after it has
already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the accused.
The Supreme Court emphasized that to resolve a motion to discharge under Section17, rule 119
of the Revised Rules of criminal procedure, the Rules only require that the testimony of the
accused sought to be discharged be substantially corroborated in its material points, not on all
points. This rule is based on jurisprudential line that in resolving a motion to discharge under
section 17, Rule 119, a trial judge cannot be expected or required, at the start of the trial, to
inform himself with absolute certainly of everything that may develop in the course of the trial
with respect to the guilty participation of the accused. If that were practicable or possible, there
would be little need for the formality of a trial.
By jurisprudence, most guilty refers to the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation
in the commission of the offense and does not necessarily mean the severity of the penalty
imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason of conspiracy, yet one
may be considered to have lesser or the least guilt taking into account his degree of participation
in the commission of the offense. What the rule avoids is the possibility that the most guilty
would be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty in terms of participation would be
penalized.

Thus, as a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to discharge an accused as a state witness,
what are controlling are the specific acts of the accused in relation to the crime committed. The
procedural remedy of the discharge of an accused is based on other consideration, such as the
need for giving immunity to one of several accused in order that Not all shall escape, and the
judicial experience that the candid admission of an accused regarding his participation is a
guaranty that he will testify truthfully.
The Supreme Court also stated that it is still the trial court that determines whether the
prosecutions preliminary assessment of the accused witness qualifications to be a state witness
satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the trial court, by
the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its prerogative based
on the prosecutors findings and evaluation.
In requiring a hearing in support of the discharge, the essential objective of the law is for the
court to receive evidence for or against the discharge, which evidence shall serve as the courts
tangible and concrete basis independently of the fiscals or prosecutions persuasions in
granting or denying the motion for discharge. The Supreme Court emphasized that actual hearing
is not required provided that the parties have both presented their sides on the merits of the
motion. (JIMENEZ, JR. VS. PEOPLE [2014]).
8. DEMURER TO THE EVIDENCE IS AN OBJECTION BY ONE OF THE PARTIES IN AN ACTION,
TO THE EFFECT THAT THE EVIDENCE WHICH HIS ADVERSARY PRODUCED IS
INSUFFICIENT IN POINT OF LAW, WHETHER TRUE OR NOT, TO MAKE OUT A CASE OR
SUSTAIN THE ISSUE. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to
sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is
merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. xxx Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a
demurrer there to is such evidence in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or
official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient therefore, the
evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation
therein by the accused. Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the court must evaluate whether
the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. xxxxx
The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. As
to effect, the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be appealed
because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. When grave
abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void. (PEOPLE VS.
GO, ET AL. [2014]).
8.1. IN CRIMINAL CASES, THE GRANT OF DEMURRER IS TANTAMOUNT TO AN
ACQUITAL AND THE DISMISSAL ORDER MAY NOT BE APPEALED BECAUSE THIS
WOULD PLACE THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY. ALTHOUGH THE DISMISSAL
ORDER IS NOT SUBJECT TO APPEAL, IT IS STILL REVIEWABLE BUT ONLY THROUGH
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT. (PEOPLE VS. ATIENZA, [2012]).
23
8.2. AN ORDER GRANTING AN ACCUSEDS DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE IS A
RESOLUTION OF THE CASE ON THE MERITS, AND IT AMOUNTS TO AN ACQUITTAL.
Generally, any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. A judgment of acquittal cannot be recalled
or withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case, nor can it be
modified except to eliminate something which is civil or administrative in nature. One
exception to the rule is when the prosecution is denied due process of law; Another
exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion in dismissing a criminal case
by granting the accuseds demurrer to evidence (GOODLAND VS. ABRAHAM [2011]).

RULE 120 JUDGMENT

1. IN A CRIMINAL CASE, FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE GENERALLY


ACCORDED GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT ON APPEAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH
FINDINGS ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD. It is only in
exceptional circumstances, such as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant
matters, that this Court will re-calibrate and evaluate the factual findings of the court below.
(ROALLO VS. PEOPLE [2013])

2. VARIANCE BETWEEN OFFENSE CHARGED AND PROVEN: When there is a variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence,
and the offense as charged necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of
the offense proved included in that which is charged. An offense charged necessarily includes that
which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged
in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. (PEOPLE VS. LIU [2015]).

2.1 WHILE IT IS SETTLED THAT A PRIVATE COMPLAINANT, IN HIS OR HER OWN NAME,
HAS THE RIGHT OR PERSONALITY TO FILE THROUGH A PRIVATE PROSECUTOR A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI QUESTIONING THE DISMISSAL OF A CRIMINAL CASE,
SUCH RIGHT OR PERSONALITY IS PREMISED ON HIS OR HER INTEREST IN THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF THE CASE. (PADILLO VS. APAS, [2006])

3. ALL THE AGGRAVATING AS WELL AS THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES BE EXPRESSLY


AND SPECIFICALLY ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. OTHERWISE, THEY
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN THEIR JUDGMENT, EVEN, IF THEY
ARE SUBSEQUENTLY PROVED DURING TRIAL. (CATIIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS, [2006])

4. FINALTY OF A JUDGMENT: A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the


offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others: after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied
or served; or when the accused applies probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or
final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments. If the case was previously appealed to the
CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which
shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. The court of origin
then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that the court
of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the suspension of the execution
thereof, including the convicts applications for probation. (VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE [2014]).

5. THE PEOPLE MAY ASSAIL A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ONLY VIA PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES. IF THE PETITION, REGARDLESS OF ITS
NOMENCLATURE, MERELY CALLS FOR AN ORDINARY REVIEW OF THE FINDINGS OF THE
COURT A QUO, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED AGAINST DOUBLE
JEOPARDY WOULD BE VIOLATED. (VILLAREAL VS. ALIGA [2014]).

6. JUDGMENT OF AQUITTAL: A JUDGMENT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED IS FINAL AND


IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON ITS PROMULGATION, AND THAT ACCORDINGLY, THE
STATE MAY NOT SEEK ITS REVIEW WITHOUT PLACING THE ACCUSED IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY. Such acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy whether it
happens at the trial court or on appeal at the Court of Appeals. (PEOPLE VS. BALUNSAT [2010],
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.)

6.1 IT IS WELL-SETTLED THAT IN CRIMINAL CASES WHERE THE OFFENDED PARTY IS


THE STATE, THE INTEREST OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT OR THE PRIVATE
OFFENDED PARTY IS LIMITED TO THE CIVIL LIABILITY. Thus, in the prosecution of the
offense, the complainants role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal trerefrom on the criminal
24
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. (PEOPLE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[2015]).
6.2 AN ACQUITAL IS CONSIDERED TAINTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT IS SHOWN THAT THE PROSECUTIONS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS
VIOLATED OR THAT THE TRIAL CONDUCTED WAS A SHAM. The burden is on the
petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its
authority such as to deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice. (PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 183652, February 25, 2015, PERALTA,J.)
6.3 WHEN THE EXONERATION IS MERELY DUE TO THE FAILURE TO PROVE THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE COURT SHOULD AWARD THE
CIVIL LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IN THE SAME CRIMINAL
ACTION. (ABVELLANA VS. [2011]).

6.4 THE EXTINCTION OF THE PENAL ACTION DOES NOT NECESSARILY CARRY WITH IT
THE EXTINCTION OF THE CIVIL ACTION, WHETHER THE LATTER IS INSTITUTED
WITH OR SEPARATELY FROM THE CRIMINAL ACTION. The offended party may still
claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action
that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence ha enumerated
three instances when, notwithstanding the accuseds acquittal, the offended party
may still claim civil liability ex delicto: (a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) if the court declared that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and (c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. (CO VS. MUOZ, JR. [2013])
6.5 A VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL. HOWEVER, THE ACQUITTAL OF
HIS CO-ACCUSED DOES NOT NECESSARILY BENEFIT APPELANT. In People vs.
Uganap, G.R. No. 130605 June 19, 2001, appellant questioned the trial courts decision which
convicted him alone of murder and acquitted the rest of the accused. The Court ruled that
appellant may not invoke the acquittal of the other conspirators to merit the
reversal of his conviction. (People vs. Dulay [2007])
6.6 A DISMISSAL ON THE GROUND OF THE DENIAL OF THE ACCUSEDS RIGHT TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL WILL HAVE THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL THAT WOULD BAR FURTHER
PROSECUTION OF THE ACCUSED FOR THE SAME OFFENSE. (DIMARUCOT VS. PEOPLE
[2010])
6.7 THE SERVICE OF A COPY OF THE PETITION ON THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH THE PROSECUTOR WOULD BE INEFFICACIOUS FOR THE REASON THAT
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE SOLE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES IN APPEALS BEFORE THE CA AND THE SUPREME COURT. The
respondents failure to have a copy of his petition served on the People of the Philippines,
through the OSG, is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided as provided
in Section 3, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. (PEOPLE VS. DUCA [2009], LEONARDO DE
CASTRO, J.)

7. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT, GRANTING THE MOTION OF THE PROSECUTION TO
WITHDRAW THE INFORMATIONS AND ORDEREING THE CASE DISMISSED, IS FINAL
BECAUSE IT DISPOSED OF THE CASE AND TERMINATED THE PROCEEDINGS THEREIN,
LEAVING NOTHING TO BE DONE BY THE COURT. (SANTOS VS. ORDA, [2010])

8. DEATH BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT: Accused died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for
reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Supreme Court. As such, it therefore becomes
necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been
extinguished by his death prior to final judgment. (PEOPLE VS. CONSORTE [2014]).

9. AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE: THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE PURPORTEDLY EXECUTED


BY PRIVATE COMPLAINTS DOES NOT EXONERATE ACCUSED FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY
WHEN THE PROSECUTION HAD SUCCESSFULLY PROVED HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. (PEOPLE VS. OCDEN [2011],LEONARDO-DECASTRO,J.)

10. PROMULGATION OF JUDGMENT: Except when the conviction is for a light offense, in which case
the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of the counsel for the accused or the latters
representative, the accused is required to be present at the scheduled date of promulgation of
judgment. Notice of the schedule of promulgation shall be made to the accused personally or through
the bondman or warden and counsel. The promulgation of judgment shall proceed even in the
absence of the accused despite notice. The promulgation in absentia shall be made by recording the
25
judgment in the criminal docket and serving a copy thereof to the accused at their last known
address or through counsel. The court shall also order the arrest of the accused if the judgment is for
conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the accused
shall lose the remedies available in the Rules of Court against the judgment. Thus, it is incumbent
upon the accused to appear on the scheduled date of promulgation, because it determines the
availability of their possible remedies against the judgment of conviction. The reason is simple. When
the accused on bail fail to present themselves at the promulgation of a judgment of conviction, they
are considered to have lost their standing in court. Without any standing in court, the accused cannot
invoke its jurisdiction to seek relief. (JAYLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2015]).
10.1 SECTION 6, RULE 120, OF THE RULES OF COURT, DOES NOT TAKE AWAY PER SE
THE RIGHT OF THE CONVICTED ACCUSED TO AVAIL OF THE REMEDIES UNDER THE
RULES. IT IS THE FAILURE OF THE ACCUSED TO APPEAR WITHOUT JUSTIFIABLE
CAUSE ON THE SCHEDULED DATE OF PROMULGATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION THAT FORFEITS THEIR RIGHT TO AVAIL THEMSELVES OF THE
REMEDIES AGAINST THE JUDGMENT. It is not correct to say that Section 6, Rule 120, of
the Rules of Court diminishes or modifies the substantive rights of petitioners. It only works in
pursuance of the power of the Supreme Court to provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. This provision protects the courts from delay in
the speedy disposition of criminal cases delay arising from the simple expediency of
nonappearance of the accused on the scheduled promulgation of the judgment of conviction.
It is well to note that Section 6, Rule 120, of the Rules of Court also provides the remedy by
which the accused who were absent during the promulgation may reverse the forfeiture of the
remedies available to them against the judgment of conviction. In order to regain their
standing in court, the accused must do as follows: 1) surrender and 2) file a motion for leave
of court to avail of the remedies, stating the reasons for their absence, within 15 days from the
date of the promulgation of judgment. (JAYLO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2015]).
10.2 HERE IS NOTHING IN THE RULES THAT REQUIRE THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL FOR
THE PROMULGATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION TO BE VALID. (ICDANG
VS. PEOPLE [2012]).
10.3 THE ACCUSED WHO FAILED TO APPEAR AT THE PROMULGATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION SHALL LOSE THE REMEDIES AVAILABLE UNDER THE RULES OF COURT
AGAINST THE JUDGMENT (a) the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration
(Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122.) However, the
Rules allow the accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a)
his surrender, and (b) his filing of a motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating
therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from the date of promulgation of judgment.
(VILLENA VS. PEOPLE [2011])

POST JUDGMENT REMEDIES

1. Motion for Reconsideration

1. UNDER THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, A MOTION FOR


RECONSIDERATION OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION MAYBE FILED WITHIN 15 DAYS
FROM THE PROMULGATION OF THE JUDGMENT OR FROM NOTICE OF THE FINAL ORDER
APPEALED FROM. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period
renders the subject decision final and executory. (MAPAGAY VS. PEOPLE 2009).

2. A second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited pleading. Nonetheless, it is
within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is filed with prior leave
whenever substantive justice maybe better served thereby. (Astorga v. People, 2004).

3. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan (326, Phil. 182, 1996) despite the denial of De Guzmans motion for
reconsideration, the Supreme Court still entertained his Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second
motion for reconsideration. Eventually, the Supreme Court reconsidered its earlier decision and
remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioners evidence. In
that case, the Supreme Court said that if we would not compassionately bend backwards and flex
technicalities, petitioner would surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime
which he might not have committed after all.

4. A Letter-Appeal was treated as a second motion for reconsideration. (Valeroso vs. Court of Appeals,
2009).

2. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

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1. New Trial is a remedy that seeks to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent failure of justice.
Thus, the Rules allows the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities
prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists
newly discovered evidence. (Ybiernas vs. Gabaldon, 2011).

2. An erroneous admission or rejection of evidence by the Trial Court is not a ground for a new trial or
reversal of the decision. (Payumo vs. Sandiganbayan, 2011).

3. For an affidavit of desistance to warrant a new trial, it must deny the truth of the complaint, not
merely seek the withdrawal of the prosecution. The presentation of an affidavit of desistance after
judgment of conviction is frowned upon by the Court (People vs. Antonio, 2009).

3. MOTION FOR REOPENING OF THE PROCEEDINGS

1. A Motion to reopen a case to receive further proofs was not in the old rules but it was nonetheless a
recognized procedural recourse, deriving validity and acceptance from long established usage. This
lack of a specific provision covering motions to reopen was remedied by the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure which took effect on December 1, 2000. (Cabarles vs. Maceda, 2007)

2. Admission of additional evidence is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In the
furtherance of justice, the Court may grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence
bearing upon the main issue in question. The remedy of reopening a case for presenting further
proofs was meant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, 2010).

4. MOTION FOR MODIFICATION OF JUDGMENT

1. A judgment of conviction may be modified or set aside only if the judgment in not yet final. A
judgment becomes final when no appeal is seasonably perfected. (Tamayo vs. People, 2008).

APPLICATION OF NEYPES DOCTRINE IN CRIMINAL CASES

1. While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the Courts pronouncement of a fresh
period to appeal should equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, for the following reasons:
First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules of Court is based makes no
distinction between the periods to appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129
categorically states that the period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments or
decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final
order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from.
Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we (this
court), also ought not to recognize any distinction.
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 6 of
Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the
same. There is no substantial difference between the two provisions insofar as legal results are
concerned the appeal period stops running upon the filing of the motion for new trial or
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or
reconsideration. It was this situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists why this
situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed.
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil case, it
did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on petitions for review from the RTCs to the
Court of Appeals and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing appeals to this court,
both of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Yu vs. Hon. Rosa Samson-Tatad, (2011).

5. APPEALS

1. The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory
privilege, and may be exercised only in accordance with the law. The party who seeks to avail of the
same must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost. In
exceptional cases, the Supreme Court has in fact relaxed the period for perfecting an appeal on
grounds of substantial justice or when there are other special and meritorious circumstances and
issues.
In Remulla vs. Manlongat, the Supreme Court considered the one-day late filing of the prosecutions
notice of appeal as excusable given the diligent efforts exerted by the private prosecutor in following
up its filing with the public prosecutor. (Ramirez vs. People, 2013).
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2. APPEALS: As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a
judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of
acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is barred from appealing lest the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated.
Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with
respect to the civil aspect of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby rendering
the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioners prayer
is not a tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy, (People vs. Court of Appeals,
2015).
3. An Appeal in Criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not raised
by the parties. When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she waives the
constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of
the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate. An
appeal confers upon the appellate court jurisdiction to examine the records, revise the judgment
appealed from, increase (or reduce) the penalty and cite the proper provision of the penal law. The
appellate court, may and generally does, look into the entire records to ensure that in fact or weight
or substance has been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied by the trial court (Geroche vs.
People, 2014).

4. An appeal by the prosecution from a judgment of acquittal necessarily places the accused in double
jeopardy. The rule barring an appeal from judgment of acquittal is, however, not absolute. The
following are the recognized exceptions thereto (i) when the prosecution is denied due process of law
(Galman vs. Sandiganbayan), (ii) when the trial court commits grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused demurrer to
evidence (People vs. Sandiganbayan, 2010).

5. In Criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the Supreme Court, the authority to
represent the people is vested solely in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478,
among the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to represent the government in the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings. This provision has been carried
over to the Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 thereof. Without
doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
Here although the petition for review before the Court of Appeals was filed with the conformity of the
Assistant City Prosecutor, such conformity is insufficient, as the rules and jurisprudence mandate that
the same should be filed by the Solicitor General. While a private prosecutor may be allowed to
intervene in criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, his
participation is subordinate to the interest of the People, hence he cannot be permitted to adopt a
position contrary to that of the Solicitor General. To do so would be tantamount to giving the private
prosecutor the direction and control of the criminal proceeding, contrary to the provisions of law
(Cario vs. de Castro, 2008).
5.1. While it is true that only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions in behalf
of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings before
the Supreme Court and in the Court of Appeals. However, jurisprudence lays down two
exceptions where a private complainant or offended party in a criminal case may file petition
directly with this Court. These are : (i) when there is denial of due process of law to the
prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State and
the private offended party, and (ii) when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of
a decision of a lower court (Heirs of Federico C. Delgado vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 184337, August
7, 2009, First Division, Carpio, J.)
5.2. Who May Appeal? Jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by
the trial court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an
appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefore is rooted in the
principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the
petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason, The People are therefore
deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and therefore, only the OSG can
represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in the Supreme Court. In view of the
corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real-
party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the
party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal in criminal case not filed by the People as
represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party
may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only insofar as the civil
liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil action for certiorari even

28
without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his interest in the civil
aspect of the case. (Malayan Insurance Company Inc. Vs. Philip Piccio, et al, 2014).

6. THE REMEDY OF ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT UNDER RULE 47 CANNOT BE AVAILED OF IN


CRIMINAL CASES: (Llamas vs. Court of Appeals, 2007).

7. Review by the Court of Appeals of the Trial Courts judgment imposing the death penalty is now
automatic and mandatory. The power to automatically review a decision imposing the death penalty
cannot be waived either by the accused or by the other courts (People vs. Flores, 2006).

8. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 122 and Section 9 Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the review on appeal of
a decision in a criminal case, wherein the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty other than death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, is by Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petition
for review on certiorari should raise only errors committed by the CA as the appellate court, not the
errors of the RTC (Batistis vs. People (2009).

9. Also affecting the rules on appeal is the enactment of Republic Act no. (RA) 9346 or an Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of the death penalty is prohibited, and in lieu thereof, it imposes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); or life imprisonment when the law violated does not make use of
the nomenclature of the penalties of the RPC (People vs. Abon, 2008).
10. The issue of whether or not the accused acted in self-defense is undoubtedly a question of fact, and
it is well entrenched in jurisprudence that findings of fact of the trial court command great weight
and respect unless patent inconsistencies are committed or where the conclusions reached are clearly
unsupported by evidence (People vs. Mortera, 2010).

11. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well
as his civil liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished in as much as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil are
concerned, the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, or
reinvestigation for liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.
(PEOPLE vs. AMISTOSO [2013]).

11.1 The accuseds death during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal
liabilities for the rape and acts of lasciviousness committed against his daughters, but
also his civil liabilities solely arising from or based on said crimes (PEOPLE VS. PANITERCE
[2010]).
11.2 The accuseds death during the pendency of his appeal, extinguished not only his criminal
liability for the crime of murder committed but also his civil liability solely arising from or
based on said crime, Moreover, because accuseds appeal was still pending and no final
judgment of conviction had been rendered against him when he died, his civil liability arising
from the crime, being civil liability ex delicto, was likewise extinguished by his death.
(PEOPLE VS. AYOCHOK [2010]).
11.3 Accuseds death during the pendency of her appeal, extinguished not only her criminal
liability for qualified theft committed against private complainant, but also her civil liability ,
particularly the award for actual damages, solely arising from or based on said crime.
(PEOPLE VS. OLACO [2010]).

6.CERTIORARI (RULE 65)

1. CERTIORARI IS SUBJECT TO THE PRINCIPLE OF JUDICIAL HEIRARCHY OF COURTS.


GENERALLY, A DIRECT RESORT TO THE SUPREME COURT IN A PETITION FOR CETIORARI
IS INCORRECT FOR IT VIOLATES THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS. (MIAQUE VS. PATAG, G.R.
NOS. 170609-13, JANUARY 30, 2009, FIRST DIVISION, CORONA J.)

2. NOTICE OF APPEAL IS THE PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE RTC IN
A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65. (BF CITILAND VS. OTAKE, [2010])

3. CERTIORARI: Though the Supreme Court has recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be
challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion, certiorari would lie if it is convincingly
established that the CAs Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious
exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed judgment
constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of
power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of
authority to a point so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense
29
justice, Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence. x x x x x x
PROBATION: Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once the
accused applies for probation.
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 117 and Section 1 of Rule 122, it can be culled from the foregoing
provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal case, especially if the
relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in
order to give life to the constitutional edict against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy
if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order the reverse an acquittal or even to increase
criminal liability. Thus, the accuseds waiver of the right to appeal as when applying for probation
makes the criminal judgment immediately final and executory.
It must be clarified , however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120 does not
confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. The Supreme Court has already explained in our
Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in
which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.
(VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE [2014]).
While this Courts Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal
judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, the Supreme Court pointed out that what the
state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition.
A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While
in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the
crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b)
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking ,
there is no modification of judgment in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a
re-evaluation of the merits of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the
accused. In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence
of the finding of lack of jurisdiction . (VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE [2014]).

7.HABEAS CORPUS

1. As a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any


of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction
to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the
sentence as to such excess. (GO VS. DIMAGIBA, [2005]).

2. FINALITY OF JUDGEMENT CANNOT OPERATE TO DIVEST A COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION


TO EXECUTE AND ENFORCE THE JUDGEMENT . (ECHAGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
[1999]).

DOCTRINE OF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGEMENT

ONCE A JUDGEMENT ATTAINS FINALITY, IT BECOMES IMMUTABLE AND UNALTERABLE. IT


MAY NO LONGER BE MODIFIED IN ANY RESPECT, EVEN IF THE MODIFICATION IS MEANT TO
CORRECT WHAT IS PERCEIVED TO BE AN ERRONEOUS CONCLUSION OF FACT OR LAW, AND
REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE MODIFICATION IS ATTEMPTED TO BE MADE BY THE COURT
RENDERING IT OR BY THIS COURT (MAPAGAY VS. PEOPLE, [2009])

SANDIGANBAYAN

1. SECTION 7 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECRESS 1606, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT 8249,


PROVIDES THAT [D]ECISIONS AND FINAL ORDERS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN SHALL BE
APPEALABLE TO THE SUPREME COURT BY PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
RAISING PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW IN ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 45 OF THE RULES OF
COURT. (LUBRICA VS. PEOPLE [2007])

2. THE MERE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF
COURT DOES NOT BY ITSELF MERIT A SUSPENSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, UNLESS A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HAS BEEN ISSUED AGAINST THE SANDIGANBAYAN. (BRIG.
GEN. (RET.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR. VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2010])

30
3. FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN ARE CONCLUSIVE UPON THE SUPREME
COURT SAVE IN THE FOLLOWING CASES: 1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmise and conjecture; 2) the inference made is manifestly an error or founded on a
mistake; 3) there is grave abuse of discretion; 4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are contradicted by evidence on
record; and 6) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based. Between the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court, the former was
concededly in a better position to determine whether or not a witness was telling the
truth (GUADINES VS. SANDIGANBAYAN [2011])

4. Verily, as far as crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan the matter, is a function that belongs to the
Office of the Ombudsman, which is empowered to determine, in the exercise of its discretion,
whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as
defined by law. (PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MAXIMO A. BORJE, JR., G.R. No. 170046,
December 10, 2014, PERALTA, J.)

5. JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN: The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over


the following cases (see PD 1606, R.A. No. 7975, and R.A. No. 8249):

1. Violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices), RA 1379 (unlawfully acquired property),
and the Revised Penal Code (Book II, Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2), where one of the accused
is an official occupying the following positions (permanent or interim) at the time of the
commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguiniang Panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, city treasurer,
assessors, engineers and other city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundation;

(2) Members of Congress and Officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

2. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, committed by the
abovementioned public officials and employees mentioned in relation to their office.

3. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986. 23

NOTE: The officials enumerated in Section (4) (A) (i) of R.A. No. 8249, i.e. city
treasurers, assessors, etc., are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
regardless of salary grade (Inding v. Sandiganbayan, 434 SCRA 388). Thus, if the accused
does not belong to the national and local officials enumerated, in order for the Sandiganbayan to
acquire jurisdiction over the offense, the same must be committed by officials classified as Grade 27
and higher, aside from other officials, expressly covered.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

31
1. APPEALS FROM DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
CASES ARE TO BE TAKEN TO THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 43 OF THE 1997
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE WHILE THE REMEDY IN CRIMINAL OR NON-
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES IS THE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER THE
RULE 65. (FRANCISCO, JR. VS. DESIERTO [2009]).

2. THE REMEDY OF AN AGGRIEVED PARTY IN CRIMINAL COMPLAINTS BEFORE THE PUBLIC


RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN WHERE THE LATTER FOUND PROBABLE CAUSE IS TO FILE
WITH THIS COURT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65. (DE CHAVEZ VS. OFFICE
OF THE OMBUDSMAN [2007])

3. POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE OMBUDSMANS EXERCISE OF DISCRETION: THE


COURT RESPECTS THE RELATIVE AUTONOMY OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO INVESTIGATE
AND PROSECUTE, AND REFRAINS FROM INTERFERING WHEN THE LATTER EXERCISES
SUCH POWERS EITHER DIRECTLY OR THROUGH THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN, EXCEPT
WHEN THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. (M.A. JIMENEZ ENTERPRISES, INC, VS.
OMBUDSMAN, [2011])

3.1. INSTANCES WHERE THE COURTS MAY INTERFERE WITH THE OMBUDSMANS
INVESTIGATORY POWERS: (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice; (d) When the
acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an
invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the
court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution; (i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.
(VERGARA VA. OMBUDSMAN [2009])

4. THE OMBUDSMANS DECISION IMPOSING THE PENALTY OF SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR
IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY PENDING APPEAL. IT CANNOT BE STAYED BY THE MERE
FILING OF AN APPEAL TO THE CA. (OMBUDSMAN VS. SAMANIEGO [2010])

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