Introduction

Honorary and informal recognition can be powerful tools to promote organizational and team
goals and objectives. Frequently overlooked as options, these forms of nonmonetary recognition
can often be more effective than cash awards.

Jerry McAdams, co-author of the American Compensation Association's report, Organizational

Performance and Rewards, observes that nonmonetary awards have four major advantages over
cash awards. This article discusses those types of awards.

Importance of considering non-monetary benefits and costs of a policy

Memory Value

The value of an honorary or informal recognition award, whether it's a plaque, a mug, or a
similar item, is longer-lasting than cash since cash is spent and gone, whereas the recognition
items remain on employees' desks or in their homes.

Trophy Value

Nonmonetary awards can often be shown to co-workers and friends as a trophy given in
appreciation of good work. A check or a bank statement is generally something that employees
don't display.

Flexibility

The type of nonmonetary recognition given can be designed to emphasize particular

organizational or team goals. For example, a mug or a tee-shirt with the team's logo could be
awarded to a team that has accomplished a short-term goal on time. The award recognizes good
performance and promotes teamwork.

Cash Awards Cost More

A study of private sector awards found that employers spent less money on nonmonetary awards
than cash awards. However, the survey also found that employers reported about the same level

1
of performance improvement with cash and nonmonetary awards and that the awards held
approximately the same perceived value

Obstacles to rational policy making

The public administration select committee is attempting a valuable task: trying to understand
what is wrong with strategic thinking in government, and what could help it be done better.
Looking back at my experience, particularly of political-military decision-making over
Afghanistan, a number of problems emerge.

The most obvious, and the one for which there is the least excuse, is the lack of clear objectives.

Secondly there is short-termism: everyone knows the adage about a week being a long time in
politics, but the civil service tends to be short-termist too, with individuals moving too quickly
through posts to have an incentive to think long term, or the opportunity to build up expertise. In
Afghanistan, the military have been limited to six-month tours: the human and institutional
reasons for this are understandable, but it reinforces the wider issue.

The third problem is the lack of coherence across government. There is a narrative in the media
that the British state is too strong, operates from the top down, is over centralised, and so on.
There are truths in this, but that story obscures another important truth: that in terms of the
relationship between the centre and the departments, the centre is weak. And yet this narrative
has been influential enough for the last two prime ministers to make concessions to it, attempting
to win favour with the media by talking about cutting Downing Street down to size. Those who
want more strategic thinking have to put themselves on the other side of this argument. There is
no guarantee, of course, that a stronger centre will be more strategic, but it's one necessary
condition.

The fourth problem is the lack of time and space and support to think strategically. Ultimately
this is the responsibility of politicians, who should insist on freeing up more time, and demand
the right support. But you don't just need time and space: you need a supportive structure, and
advice which encourages and facilitates strategic thinking. Too often, in my experience, this was
not provided.

2
Conclusion

Advice was often inconsistent, and suffered from a lack of genuine options, a lack of flexibility
and an inability to break out of familiar patterns of thinking. Some might suggest that civil
servants prefer that their ministers don't have time to think the gently cynical view of Yes,
Minister. Less cynically, it might reflect a shared failing among both ministers and officials.

3
References:

Mller, Pierre; Surel, Yves (1998). L'analyse des politiques publiques (in French). Paris:
Montchrestien.

Paquette, Laure (2002). Analyzing National and International Policy. Rowman Littlefield.

Jenkins, William (1978). Policy Analysis: A Political and Organizational Perspective. London:
Martin Robertson.