Actors and Venues in Immigration Control Closing The Gap Between Political Demands and Policy Outcomes

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Actors and venues in immigration control: Closing the gap between

political demands and policy outcomes
Gallya Lahav; Virginie Guiraudon
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West European Politics,
Vol. 29, No. 2, 201 223, March 2006
Actors and Venues in Immigration

Control: Closing the Gap between
Political Demands and Policy
Outcomes
Downloaded By: [B-on Consortium - 2007] At: 17:55 3 April 2011
GALLYA LAHAV and VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON
This account reviews the state of the literature on migration since the West European
Politics special issue on migration was published in 1994. Particular attention is
dedicated to the theme of immigration control and the critical question of policy gaps
between immigration policy goals and outcomes. Regarding policy gaps, we identify
three dimensions of this thesis that are addressed in some form by the contributors to
the volume. These include: the disjuncture between public opinion and policy elites at
the decision-making and implementation stages; the relationship between principals
(states) and agents; and the dynamic between international and domestic arenas of
policy-making. Oering a comparative analytical framework to empirically map the
variations that exist across countries and policy stages and levels, this essay
disaggregates the various components and actors involved in migration policy-making.
It suggests that in order to test the gap thesis, a more nuanced empirical analysis of an
expanded migration policy eld composed of multiple actors and venues is warranted.
Scholarship on immigration policy has evolved dramatically since 1994,

when West European Politics published a special issue on The Politics of
Immigration in Western Europe edited by Martin Baldwin-Edwards and
Martin Schain. Noting the emergence of immigration on the political
agenda, the volume identied key trends in the politics of immigration of the
time, which, as noted in a recent review essay in the journal (Luedtke 2005),
have since amplied. Among the themes explored in the 1994 volume were
the supra-nationalisation of policy-making, the transformation of former
emigration countries into receiving states, the conation of immigration and
asylum, and the role of the immigration issue in party politics. To a large
degree, they remain key topics today.
Since 1994, immigration control, asylum and the integration of migrant
minorities have been at the centre of electoral campaigns across European
Correspondence Address: gallya.lahav@sunysb.edu; virginie.guiraudon@iue.it
ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online 2006 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402380500512551
202 G. Lahav and V. Guiraudon
countries and on the agenda of European Union (EU) forums and other
international venues. What has changed most since the Baldwin Edwards/
Schain volume is not so much the nature of immigration politics as the fact
that mainstream political scientists are now analysing its dynamics, its
impact on policy, on migration patterns and migrant incorporation. While
the 1994 collection was the earliest of its kind a broad and fairly
comprehensive survey of national models of both immigration and
immigrant policies in dierent European countries many scholars in the
eld continued to focus on their own national context and remained largely
descriptive and/or normative in their approach.
This bias was particularly agrant when studies focused on policies aimed
at immigrants once they had settled in Europe. As Adrian Favell (2001)
wrote in an incisive survey of that literature, despite the proliferation of
migration studies, many remained descriptive and were produced under

material and/or policy constraints Some were greatly dependent on state
funding whereas those that were not had too little means to generate data.
In both cases, national settings spewed a range of Republican or Marxist
ideological stances that favoured some research questions and ndings while
overlooking others. In the end, these biases made it dicult to generate
cutting edge cross-national comparative research. The paucity of con-
ceptualisation beyond nation-state-centred context-specic cases and the
lack of comparable data sets have created formidable challenges for the next
generation of migration researchers.
As immigration politics has gone from low politics to high politics,
governments and international organisations have invested more in policy-
relevant scholarship. The dangers of skewing the research towards yet another
agenda evoke the need to avoid the pitfalls that research on the integration of
migrants has faced. As Christopher Rudolph (2003: 31) pointed out in a
recent article, migration ha[d] long been considered peripheral to interna-
tional relations scholarship, especially security studies and to a great extent
international political economy. In the post-Cold War, post-9/11 world,
security studies are becoming interested in issue areas such as immigration
that have become linked to security concerns and many are tempted to jump
on this bandwagon. There is thus a risk and an opportunity for migration
scholars. On the one hand, there is more political and academic attention paid
to the issue. On the other hand, more funding and the introduction of
imposed problematiques can be a mixed blessing, as they may bias the research
agenda, and thus compromise the quality of research in this area.
These caveats notwithstanding, the migration eld has matured, producing
its own theoretically-informed and empirically-grounded work. The last
decade has witnessed the development of comparative studies seeking to
systematically test hypotheses about political and policy developments. While
the proliferation of research suggests that migration studies is now a specialisa-
tion in its own right, scholars are increasingly espousing classical questions in
the discipline. As Maarten Vink (2002: 204) well captures, immigration is
Actors and Venues in Immigration Control 203
becoming a distinct eld of study in political science and part of the

mainstream discipline epitomised by his own research on the impact of
European-level decision-making on domestic policies illustrates (Vink 2005).
The papers collected here, while limited mostly to questions of immigration
control, reect this growing interest in theory and a sophistication of the
methods that scholars are using. The ambition of this current collection then is
to take stock of this new scholarship. We want to showcase new contributions
to our understanding of policy choices and variation in policy outcomes.
It is important to underscore that the essays focus on immigration control.
This term has been used in the European literature at least since Tomas
Hammar (1985) distinguished it from immigrant policy: the former regards
the framework that regulates the entry and stay of foreigners whereas the
latter is concerned with their integration into host societies. The very notion
that immigration can be controlled has been at the core of most of the
literature in migration studies. Broadly speaking, countries solicit and/or
stem immigration ows. Yet a popular discourse among migration scholars
as immigration policy-making has become more complex and multi-tiered is
that states have lost control over immigration (Sassen 1996). The notion of
a policy gap (Cornelius et al. 2004) between restrictive goals and liberal or
expansive outcomes has gained credence. There are however dierent
versions of that argument.
For most sociologists in the eld, the gap stems from the irrelevance of
policy in their view when analysing migration dynamics. States are plainly
misguided in their belief that policy can inuence inevitable migration ows.
A notable work in this vein is Douglas Masseys March of Folly (1998)
article in which he argued that when governments such as that of the US
believe that stimulating the development of countries of origin and erecting
borders in the sending countries stem ows they risk increasing them instead.
In this logic, development is seen to increase migration as migrants tend to be
rather educated persons feeling dislocated and relatively deprived. Borders
then make the process uni-directional rather than circular (i.e. immigration
becomes permanent since border-crossing has a high cost). There are in fact
European examples of counterproductive deterrence policies, including the
shift from circular to permanent immigration, exemplied by the case of
EastWest migrants as the Schengen border becomes more of a reality and
strict visa policies are in force in the new member states.
We agree with the premises of such immigration studies that policies are
only one element aecting the dynamics of migration and the destination of
immigrants, and their eects are not always those intended. One could add
that policies in the migrants country of origin and in other domains can
better explain changes in migration ows than measures regulating the entry
and stay of foreigners. Political scientists such as Eiko Thielemann, whose
research is featured in this volume, have also underlined that policies do not
always matter. He reminds us that governments attribute the ebb and ow of
asylum applications to their (restrictive) reforms while changes may depend
on the shift in conict areas and the colonial or kinship ties between the
country from which refugees are eeing and a particular EU member state
(Thielemann 2003). In fact, political scientists take for granted that policies
are not rational solutions based on social science models of migration dynamics
but stem from compromises between various interest groups, mediated by media
pressure and party politics. The complex politics that lead to policy choices are
the nitty-gritty that several articles in this volume seek to disaggregate.
Another strand of the migration policy literature also envisages a gap
between goals and outcomes. Gary Freeman (1995, 2002), in particular, who
contributes an updated version of his theory of migration politics to this
collection, has long pointed out that there has been a discrepancy between
the desires of a largely anti-immigration public and the expansive bias of
policies. In his view, this reects the importance of organised interests in
some but not all aspects of migration policy. Freemans theory is revisited
and tested in several of the contributions to this volume. Furthermore, the
notion of a gap between policy inputs and outcomes stated goals and
migration patterns is examined in a more comprehensive manner by
Freeman here than has been done before.
In addressing the gap hypotheses, scholars represented here examine vari-
ous types of policy demands, as well as a broad range of policy instruments at
the disposal of national governments taking into account the entire policy
process. Several contributions tackle the issue of policy implementation an
oft-missing variable in the public policy literature, especially with respect
to immigration control. Others study policy-making beyond the state at
the supranational level, in intergovernmental forums, and in bilateral and
multilateral contexts whereby states seek to externalise migration control
functions. In these ways, we aim to test the gap hypothesis anew by
contemplating the relationship between policy outputs and policy outcomes.
The need for a more comprehensive analysis of the policy process and a
more nuanced analysis of policy choices derives not only from theoretical
questions about policy gaps. It stems in part from the complexity of the
current demographic situation in Europe with respect to temporary and
permanent migration (see Appendix A for current gures). That is, despite
the widespread fortress Europe rhetoric, the political turn towards
restrictionism, and the securitisation of migration, there are substantial
legal entries each year in Europe. Almost two and half million international
migrants arrived legally in the European Economic Area and Switzerland in
2003, the last year when data were available (OECD 2005). The number is
greater than in the late 1990s when the annual average was 1.9 million.
While most migrants are unsolicited, such as family members of foreign
residents or nationals and asylum-seekers, since the 1990s the demographic
situation has become very nuanced, as the need for foreign workers has
coincided with the decline of the native labour force. Indeed, there has been a
developing trend of labour recruitment including skilled and unskilled,
seasonal, temporary and permanent migrants. European governments have
also been actively recruiting foreign students, the competition for brains having
been accelerated by a drop in foreign student visas in the US following 9/11.
The number of foreign students increased by 30% in the UK and 36% in
France from 2001 to 2003, for example. The number of intra-company
transferees has also become signicant, since the principle of freedom of services
in the European Union allows member state rms to employ foreign workers.
To add to these trends, consider unwanted migrants such as asylum-
seekers, and recall that only 1020% of rejected asylum-seekers are actually
deported. National and EU political leaders alike invoke the need to ght
illegal migration, but they well know in which sectors of the economy these
measures are likely to work and they fear upsetting the boom in those
sectors that are more dependent on foreign labour (e.g. construction
industry, tourism). Several governments hosting large numbers of undocu-
mented migrants have run large-scale regularisation campaigns (e.g. Italy

and Spain). Others such as France have set up a case-by-case regularisation
system that avoids publicity while serving as a proxy for migration
management with as many as 20,000 persons a year obtaining legal status
(Bribosia and Rea 2002; Weil 2004). In any case, one should consider that
rejected asylum-seekers and illegal migrants are part of the immigrant
stocks in Europe although they do not appear in ocial statistics.
After the US, the top countries with respect to migration intake in 2004
were Germany, Spain, the UK and Italy. The mere presence of two Southern
European countries in the top ve immigration countries of the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is not solely the result
of their regularisation campaigns. Europe is now an immigration continent
to the extent that there are many more receiving than sending countries.
Consider, for example, that there are more foreigners relative to the total
population in Ireland (5.9%) now than in France (5.6%) (OECD 2005). This
is striking, given that France was the rst European country to resort to
immigration in the nineteenth century while Ireland at the time and until very
recently was one of Europes traditional emigration countries. EastWest
mobility has also increased and some of the new EU member states in East
and Central Europe are becoming receiving countries (e.g., Hungary, the
Czech Republic, Poland and Slovenia), as they receive co-ethnics, labour
migrants from neighbouring Eastern countries and an increasing share of
third world migrants that are settling rather than transiting in this new EU
buer zone. It should also be underlined that there are signicant shifts in
the destination of asylum-seekers that stem from changes in the crisis regions:
while in the early 1990s Germany welcomed record numbers, today it does
not receive as many as France and the United Kingdom (UNHCR 2005).
The migration picture in Europe has changed dramatically in recent years.
As pointed out by Adrian Favell and Randall Hansen (2002), scholarship
needs to keep apace. Until recently, there has been a tendency to overlook
market dynamics and the new more informal and circular forms of
international mobility. There is a critical need to explain the multiple
dimensions of immigration policies: the continued restriction on conditions

for family reunication, the crack-down on asylum, the return to labour
migration recruitment and the externalisation of control to third states.
To address the empirical puzzles and theoretical questions that we have
just briey outlined, this collection goes beyond traditional analyses that
focus on classical moments of policy-making, such as executive proposals,
legislative debates and judicial decisions. We do so by selecting comparative
studies that can help us understand variation across time, countries, regions
and sectors. The authors in this volume query the role of understudied
actors both before and after policy reforms are enacted and seek to
understand the normative and cognitive context in which they operate. This
is the theoretical and methodological value added of this volume relative to
the 1994 one mentioned above (Baldwin-Edwards and Schain 1994). More
specically, it oers an empirical standpoint to evaluate the extent to which

a policy gap in fact exists with regard to immigration control.
The rst set of articles consider immigration politics and policy contesta-
tion as policy input. This section attempts to establish systematically the role
of domestic input factors that inuence the political construction of the
immigration issue, including public opinion, interest groups, civil liberties
associations, the media, the extreme-right, and party system dynamics. The
next section addresses the fundamental yet neglected issue of policy implemen-
tation by focusing on bureaucrats and non-governmental actors in charge of
controlling migration and the factors that explain their ability and willingness
to comply with restrictive immigration laws. Finally, the last three contribu-
tions assess the new international, trans-governmental, regional, and multi-
lateral venues where policy is elaborated and diused, focusing on policy
transfers and externalisation to third states as well as inter-state burden-
sharing as developing processes. Together, these articles attempt to close the
so-called policy gap between immigration input and policy outcomes that
has preoccupied much of the recent generation of immigration discourse.
Analytical Framework
The State of the Academic Debate: The Gap Hypothesis
A major polemic in the migration eld has been the degree to which liberal
nation-states can control immigration. More than ever, as immigration has
been placed in a security framework, the question of border control has
come to the fore. The debate on how nation-states are responding to
increasing cross-pressures between market and rights-based tenets versus
political and security pressures for limiting migration is unresolved. Soci-
ologists (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996) and political economists (Hollield
1992; Sassen, 1996) have argued that national choices around migration
are constrained by international human rights and market norms. They
challenge more state-centric, neo-realist claims that assume that states have
the power to protect and defend their territorial integrity (Zolberg 1981;
Weiner 1985).
The prevailing scholarship on immigration has been inconclusive with
regard to the role and nature of domestic actors on national immigration
policy-making. An inuential contingent of immigration scholarship has
pointed to exogenous constraints by international structures, such as the EU
and NAFTA, bilateral agreements, and human rights norms (Soysal 1994).
In the 1990s, they were seen to set the parameters of the political debate,
regardless of the presence of restrictionist populist media, public opinion or
the extreme-right (see Gurowitz 1999 and Joppke 1999 for a discussion of
the role of domestic versus international norms). Scholars have also
suggested that liberal immigration policies have emerged because negative
public opinion is not factored into elite decision-making or institutional
developments (Freeman 1995; Hansen 2000; McLaren 2001; Beck and

Camarota 2002). We believe that a more comprehensive analysis of the
actors in migration regulation may provide evidence that immigration
outcomes are more congruous to policy input than traditionally presumed.
There are several reasons to revisit claims of the embedded liberal
state, driven by international human rights norms and limited capabilities.
First, although the role of public opinion on policy remains controversial,
studies have shown that publics are less and elites are more restrictionist
than traditionally presumed (Lahav 2004a,b; Ellermann in this volume).
Furthermore, under certain conditions elites tend to respond to extreme-
right pressures (Thranhardt 1997; Schain in this volume).
Second, various studies based on pluralist models have provided evidence
that a range of actors inuence policy outcomes. They include organised
interest groups (Freeman 1995, 2001, 2002), courts (Guiraudon 1997, 2001;
Joppke 1998), ethnic groups (Abadan-Unat 1997), trade unions (Haus 2002),
law and order bureaucracies (Guiraudon 2000, 2003), police and security agen-
cies (Bigo 1996, 2001; Huysman 2000), local actors and street-level bureaucrats
(van der Leun 2003) and private actors (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000).
Third, while international actors have provided policy frames and enacted
soft and legal norms, we believe that, far from constraining nation-states,
international and supranational agreements sanction national or protectionist
initiatives. International organisations and supranational participation legiti-
mise the role of certain actors in policy-making that defend a logic of control
(Lavenex 2001; Guiraudon 2003). To the extent that dierent domestic con-
texts generate protectionist policy responses throughout the EU (Lahav 1997,
1998; Joppke 1998, 1999; Lavenex 1999; Geddes 2000), policy cooperation
may involve convergence through socialisation (Thouez and Channac in this
volume) and/or burden-sharing (Thielemann and Dewan in this volume).
Finally, while the reasons why immigration poses a challenge to liberal
democracies have been discussed extensively over the last decade, state
responses on the ground remain largely unexplored. Little attention has been
given, for example to the variety of actors and venues where immigration
policy is shaped, elaborated and implemented. Studies often narrowly focus

on national legislative reforms. While these represent the most obvious policy
responses to regulate immigration, administrative decisions, policy implemen-
tation, and the network of actors involved in these processes may provide us
with a more accurate picture of the character of immigration control.
An Analytical Framework of the Enlarged Playing Field: Mapping the Actors

of Immigration Policy-Making
Disaggregating immigration policy into distinct policy components is an
essential task for policy analysts (see Freeman in this volume). Immigration
is a complex policy domain in several respects. First, as is the case for
environmental policy or employment policy, immigration has always been
linked to a number of other policy elds and consequently falls under the
jurisdiction of several administrative competences (e.g., foreign aairs,
home aairs, justice and labour ministries). Second, there has been erce
competition over the construction of the problem in the last decades and, in
particular, over linkages between migration and internal and external
security agendas that blur the contours of the immigration policy eld. Even
Tomas Hammars (1985) classical distinction between immigration control
and immigrant policy (i.e., the incorporation of settled migrants) is dicult
to unpack in empirical terms. Governments that sought to stem migration
ows in the 1990s reformed incorporation policy so as to deter new migrant
entries by rolling back rights and linking benets to legal residence. They
also prevented asylum-seekers from working and lodging them apart from
the local society with allowances in kind rather than cash. Hammar himself
has recently interpreted the shift of immigration control inward as a re-
bordering of the welfare state (Brochmann and Hammar 1999).
Thus, what we propose in this section is not a theory of immigration
politics Gary Freemans piece makes that contribution but rather a map
and an itinerary to guide our readers through this crowded and labyrinthine
eld. The itinerary takes us from the main factors that drive policy to the
main trends in outcomes. The map then identies the main actors in
immigration control at various policy stages. These actors operate at
dierent levels (local, national, international). They are not all state actors
but include private actors and members of civil society.
The Itinerary: Correlating Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes

We assume that policy-makers in liberal democracies need to reconcile
security interests and traditional concerns of publics with those of liberal
norms and free trade. We can therefore make sense of immigration
outcomes by delineating the interests involved in prevalent logics (i.e. the
logic of the labour market, the logic of populism, the logic of control and
security), the bureaucracies that defend these points of view and the actors
that compete in each policy conguration (Guiraudon 2003). Institutions

then play a role in determining which logic and which actor within each
logic will prevail (Guiraudon 1997, Guiraudon and Joppke 2001). We expect
cross-national variation in policy choices, depending on the institutional
make-up of receiving states. For instance, the need to enact strict migration
controls in the face of a hostile public opinion is more urgently felt in
a country like Britain, whose parliamentary system is quick to absorb local
constituency pressure (Money 1999). In a country like Switzerland, direct
democracy can be used successfully to launch anti-immigrant campaigns
(Mahnig and Wimmer 1999). In still other countries, like Germany, an
autonomous judiciary with broad review powers has helped to consolidate
the status of foreigners (Joppke 1999).
Table 1 illustrates the ways in which policy input factors can be linked to
policy outcomes and the intervening variables that come in at various policy
stages. The second column provides some examples of the type of
institutional features that may aect the clout of the actors identied (see
column 1). Policy choices (column 3) are made by governments seeking re-
election in response to cross-pressures. Still, as column 4 reveals, there is
another set of actors at the implementation stage with varying capacity and
willingness to perform in accordance with stated policy goals. Variation may
exist sub-nationally and across the type of actors involved. The table
suggests that policy outcomes are a product of (a) the struggles between
actors in dierent elds (economy, politics, law), (b) the trade-os made by
elected leaders that face varying pressures depending on the institutional
characteristics of each eld, and (c) implementation structures. Any serious
comparative analysis of migration control must factor in these multiple
variables that exist across time and countries.
The Map: Actors in the Multi-level Playing Field

It is critical then to investigate the various levels of policy-making and the
diverse actors and logics that prevail in each (see Table 2). As we have argued
elsewhere (Guiraudon and Lahav 2000), liberal democratic states have
incorporated a plethora of actors to regulate these cross-pressures and
control migration through both immigration and immigrant policies.
Receiving countries have externalised control so that prospective un-
wanted migrants or asylum-seekers do not reach their territory, re-enacting
in spirit the remote control policies of the Ellis Island era (Zolberg 2003;
Lavenex in this volume). This has been achieved through the incorporation
of various actors via visa regimes, carrier sanctions, and bilateral agreements.
In addition, when migration has already occurred, the state has sought to
uncover illegal migrants by internally delegating control to local actors such
as municipalities, regional authorities, employers or other private actors,
through sanctions for instance. As Joanne van der Leuns article (in this
volume) shows in her analysis of the implementation of the Dutch 1998
TAB LE 1
FR OM P OL ICY IN P UT S T O OU TCOM ES: FA C TOR S AN D T RE ND S
Institutional Policy
Input factors lters (vary implementation
and actors X-nationally) Policy choices constraints Policy outcomes
Labour demands Labour market institutions Labour recruitment away Attractiveness of the economy Rise of illegal migration
[business/labour and industrial relations from public eye
actors] system Ties between migrants and Rise of temporary labour
Shifting up to European destination countries migration and
Public opinion Electoral and party systems, level intra-company transfers
[political parties, size of extreme right, Capacity of local state agents
media] government type Externalisation of control Willingness of non-state Family reunion and asylum
to third parties agents to comply remain main legal
Liberal legal norms Protest culture, categories with much
[courts, NGOs, Judicial system cross-national variation
immigration
bureaucracies]
Source: Virginie Guiraudon (2005). Paper on Immigration Policy and Politics presented at the conference on Developments in European Politics, Bologna, 45
March. To appear in Developments in European Politics edited by Paul Heywood, Erik Jones, Martin Rhodes and Uli Sedelmeier (London: Palgrave,
forthcoming 2006).
TAB LE 2
L EV E L S A ND AC T O R S I N E N L A R G E D M I G R A T I O N P O L IC Y - M A K I N G F IE LD
Policy levels Policy venues Policy input Elaboration/diusion Implementation

Domestic . Public opinion . National legislatures . Bureaucracies
. Media . Courts . Public
. Extreme-right and party politics . Interior ministries . Law
. Organised interests . Justice ministries . Civil society
. Elites . Foreign ministers
. Social aairs ministries
. Employment ministries
International/Transgovernmental . National bureaucracies . Global commission . Foreign countries

. Transnational lobbies and . European Union . Consulates (visa policy)
non-governmental organisations . Schengen . Ship/transport carriers
. International organisations . Regional consultation processes . Travel agencies
. Airlines
. Security agencies
Local . Civil society . Jails

. Churches . Mayors
. Public opinion . Schools/universities
. NGOs . Health care
. Migrant associations . Detention centres
. Employers . Employers
. Sponsors . Sponsors
. Families . Families
. Local elected politicians . Hotels
. Police
. Welfare services
Source: Guiraudon and Lahav 2000.

Koppelingswet, governments have sometimes enlisted a range of public

services besides police forces to uncover illegal residents.
The extension of the migration playing eld and the delegation of policy
elaboration and implementation functions to non-central state actors
coincide with the interests of national migration control agencies. In
principalagent theory, which models the dynamics of delegation, the state
would be the principal and the non-state actors the agents (Williamson
1967). The co-opting of non-state actors in the performance of the migration
control function (i.e., security agencies working for airline companies) has
shifted liabilities from the central state to private actors such as employers,
carriers, and travel agencies, services such as universities for foreign
students, and even individuals such as sponsors (Lahav 1998; Guiraudon
2002). Moreover, there has been a shift in the level at which ocials in
charge of migration control operate to nd a favourable context in terms of

procedures and participants (Guiraudon 2000, 2003). We thus need to
understand both the level and the type of agents to which policy elaboration
and implementation has been delegated.
Two questions unfold from this analytical framework: 1) do these arrange-
ments enhance state capacities to meet policy goals? and 2) To what extent
can we reconcile the so-called input/output gap? As some of the contributions
here show, these questions may be answered by the extent that the interests
of principals (states) match those of agents.
The Empirical Puzzles

The overarching empirical questions driving this volume address the disjunc-
ture between general public opinion and elite policy; between policy goals and
outcomes; between international and domestic interests. That is, to what extent
are policy responses commensurate with input factors? How compatible are
mechanisms of policy elaboration and diusion with immigration outcomes?
The essays thus address three aspects of immigration policy: policy
formulation; policy implementation; and international policy-making. Each
of the contributors to this volume has in some way empirically tackled what
we have analytically set out to show. The following section outlines the key
empirical puzzles that each aspect raises.
A PublicPolicy Gap?
The construction of immigration as a public problem highly salient in
public opinion and partisan politics requires us to revisit Gary Freemans
(2002) persuasive client politics model. Accordingly, policy is dominated by
liberal elites who are captured by self-interested bureaucrats and employers,
and alienated from rationally ignorant but restrictionist publics.
Indeed, there have been several reasons for dismissing public opinion.
First, immigration policy-making has long been conducted in the absence of
public debate. Public constituencies in Europe and elsewhere have been

circumvented by traditionally insulated decision-making (Freeman 1995;
Guiraudon 1997; Tichenor 2002). Second, in a global political economy,
where human rights and free circulation are embedded, nation-states have
been seen to be limited in regulating immigration policy (Sassen 1996; Hollield
1992; Soysal 1994). Specically, students of globalisation have assumed that
international regimes or cooperation would thus be inevitable regardless
of the preferences of publics. Finally, those who have espoused attitudinal
perspectives have accepted the foregone conclusion that a gulf exists
between ocial immigration policy and mass public opinion with higher
educated elites being more pro-immigration than their uninformed and
volatile publics (Simon and Alexander 1993; Freeman 1995; Fetzer 2000;
Hansen 2000; Beck and Camarota 2002).
It is dicult to reconcile these conclusions with empirical developments

(Lahav 2004a, b). First, these accounts fail to explain how dierent immigra-
tion discourses and public opinion contexts are generating more restrictive and
protectionist policy responses throughout the EU (Lahav 1998; Joppke 1998;
Lavenex 1999; Money 1999; Geddes 2000). Second, the more recent literature
on the migrationsecurity link has exposed a more restrictive policy that is
driven by state ocials (Bigo 1996, 2001; Guiraudon 2000; Huysman 2000).
Third, the relevance of Gary Freemans (1995) client politics model appears less
able to reect the current European reality, as immigration becomes a highly
salient issue in public opinion and partisan politics, and no longer a matter for
bureaucrats and employers to discuss discreetly. Finally, these dismissive acc-
ounts of public input ignore evidence showing that European elites and publics
hold more similar attitudes than commonly presumed (Lahav 2004a, b).
Elites and publics are not poles apart insofar as elites are more
protectionist and publics may be more sophisticated, and even more tolerant
than traditionally presumed. Several authors in this volume have empirically
bridged this gap by focusing on public opinion, whether diuse or organised.
Gary Freeman in his contribution here underlines that dierent modes of
politics emerge around dierent components of immigration policy. His
analytical model of immigration politics re-emphasises that restrictive or
expansionist politics may be an outcome of policy costs and benets dened
in objective terms or as they are perceived or framed in public discourse.
Furthermore, as Martin Schain shows in this volume, the success of the
extreme-right to impact immigration policy is multi-fold. Geddes and
Statham go further to question the empirical reality of a dominant lobbying
pressure by expansionist organised publics. Counter-intuitively, they argue
that restrictionist immigration policies in the British case are more a top-
down phenomenon rather than a response to mobilised public pressures.
Finally, in addressing the role of public opinion on the implementation
policy stage, Ellermann interestingly unveils a less restrictionist and
humanitarian public that can act to constrain bureaucrats from implement-
ing seemingly harsh deportation orders.
The Match between Principals and Agents: Policy Implementation

Research on immigration has tended to ignore the study of policy
implementation. A rst explanation lies in the fact that there was not much
talk across disciplines (Bretell and Hollield 2000). As Guiraudon and
Joppke (2001) have argued, sociologists studying ows dismissed the role of
state policies while political scientists overlooked migratory dynamics. Few
were those that sought to reconcile the two perspectives (Zolberg 1981;
Hollield 2000). Countries such as the Netherlands where the discipline of
sociology of law is vibrant have generated important studies that alert us to
the need to examine the interaction between ows and policies, between
control bureaucracies and migrant strategies (van der Leun 2003). Yet this
terra incognita deserves further attention in order to assess adequately the
so-called gap between policy goals and outcomes.

While variation in immigration control policies is not the main factor
that explains cross-national dierences in the number of incoming migrants
(Thielemann 2003), few would argue that policy has no eect on the charac-
ter of migration. We need to examine policy categories and the discretionary
exercise of immigration regulations by state bureaucracies in order to
understand such dynamics as why some migrants resort to smuggling (Kyle
and Koslowski 2001), the grounds on which migrants seek admission (study,
family formation, asylum), the capacity that migrants will have to go back
and forth between their home and host country, and the ability of illegal
migrants to avoid deportation. Policy may not explain why people move but
it does aect their individual destinies as migrants. Some migrants never
make it to the border and others are indeed sent back. What we need to
understand is under what conditions immigration control instruments
succeed in preventing arrivals or returning illegal migrants. In other words,
what explains variation in the implementation of immigration laws?
To answer this question, we need to take several possibilities into account.
First, there may be variation in the use that immigration bureaucracies make
of their discretionary power. Second, there may be variation in the autonomy
and insulation of immigration bureaucracies from outside pressures. Third,
immigration bureaucracies may have delegated the role of controlling
migrants to third parties, public services (consulates, local police, welfare
services, etc.) or private actors (airlines, employers, universities) whose
interests may not always coincide with those of immigration bureaucracies.
The rst and second questions lead us to focus on the functioning of state
bureaucracies and reect on their autonomy and the way that they interpret
and apply immigration regulations (circulars, internal instructions, etc.). The
few studies that exist (Noiriel 1991, on the French asylum administration;
Calavita 1992, on the US Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS);
Spire 2005, on the French aliens bureaus) suggest that it is possible to isolate
an independent role of bureaucracies. Typically these works are historical.
Studies that examine the contemporary period such as Antje Ellermanns
(this volume) present more nuanced conclusions on bureaucratic autonomy

and individual regional variations. By the end of the 1970s, bureaucracies in
Europe had been exposed to dierent kinds of outside pressures (pro-migrant
mobilisations, judicial appeals and jurisprudence, political meddling, etc.).
The question remains whether they are able to fend o these pressures or not.
Answers require more detailed study of the organisation of policy-making.
In the case where agencies whose prime function is not migration manage-
ment are called upon as sheris deputies (Torpey 1998), other issues are raised.
As in other principalagent situations, the principal has an informational
disadvantage and may not always be able to monitor compliance and rein in
recalcitrant agents, while agents may not always nd it in their interest to comply.
The key theoretical questions informing this section thus involve the
relative autonomy of agents in relation to their principals, the factors that
explain divergence in levels of compliance and nally the values that guide
the actions of state and non-state law enforcers. As Ellermann shows in her
case of deportation, German bureaucrats latitude in implementation is
highly susceptible to public opposition. In contrast, van der Leuns study of
the Dutch human service sector suggests that autonomous bureaucrats may
have much more discretion in implementing ocial policy goals. Both cases
help account for the substantial variation in policy outcomes that we see not
only nationally, but locally, and across social spheres.
International Constraints on Domestic Politics?

Immigration in the twentieth century has been a prerogative of the nation-
state. In the post-war era, international human rights, more specically the
UN Convention on Refugees and the European Convention on Human
Rights, have had some control over national decisions by protecting
individuals against expulsion. Yet international law also consecrates the idea
that nation-states decide who enters, stays and is naturalised on their
territory. Bilateral and multilateral agreements between sending and
receiving countries have been plentiful in the post-war period during the
so-called Gastarbeiter era in Europe and following de-colonisation when
former subjects and citizens became foreigners in receiving states.
The current period is characterised by increasing trans-governmental
cooperation (see Lavenex, and Thouez and Channac in this volume), the rise of
immigration on the agenda of international organisations (including the UN),
the inclusion of immigration control issues (i.e. readmission agreements) in
international negotiations (also discussed by Thouez and Channac in their
contribution), and the existence of burden-sharing norms (Thielemann and
Dewan in this volume). Some international organisations that deal exclusively
with migration and refugee movements are updating their agendas and are
seeking to inuence trans-governmental debates. One could cite the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and its interest in smuggling
and illegal migration, the International Labour Oce (ILO) and the issue of
discrimination in employment and the way the High Commissioner for

Refugees of the United Nations (UNHCR) is involved in EU debates on a
common asylum policy. Other international organisations are now expanding
their mission to include issues related to illegal migration (Interpol, United
Nations Commission on Crime Prevention, Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe). The OECD and the World Bank also pay attention
to migration developments, albeit with a greater emphasis on its socio-
economic impact in receiving and sending countries respectively.
Recent initiatives suggest that immigration is a priority of international
organisations and is regularly featured in diplomatic activity. In Europe,
several committees of the Council of Europe focus on immigration control,
especially the ad hoc Committee of Experts for Identity Documents and the
Movement of Persons (CAHID) and the Committee of Experts on the Legal
Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees, and Stateless People (CAHAR). At

the global level, an independent global commission on international migra-
tion, launched in December 2003 in Geneva with UN backing presented its
report to the UN secretary-general on managing migration ows and
protecting migrants rights in October 2005 (GCIM 2005).
Multilateral activity to enhance state interests is also developing. In
October 2003, the interior ministers of the G-5 (the EUs ve largest member
states) stated that border police from Italy, France and Spain should
collaborate with their counterparts in the Maghreb to stop illegal entries. The
number of various groupings of states that focus on these issues is dicult to
establish. They include of course the Schengen Group, and Intergovern-
mental Consultations on Asylum, Refugees and Migration Policies (IGC).
One should also mention the initiatives developed after the fall of the Iron
Curtain: the Vienna Club (justice and interior ministers of Germany, Austria,
Switzerland, France and Italy), the Budapest Group, a comparable Central
European initiative. Finally transnational actors such as international
professional organisations like the International Civil Aviation Organization
and think-tanks (e.g. the International Centre for Migration Policy
Development in Vienna) also are focusing on immigration control.
There is a dearth of studies on these various actors and their impact on
immigration control policy. The impact of the increasing trans-govern-
mental character of policy elaboration and the renewed role of international
organisations needs to be assessed (for exceptions, see Groenendijk et al.
2002). What is the added value of investing in the transnational politics of
migration? Does elaboration and diusion of common norms, or power
politics pursued at a regional or global scale, rather than bilaterally, take
precedence? Do international organisations have their own agendas and can
they impose their views? Four hypotheses deserve attention.
First, international cooperation may represent the interests of domestic
actors and their search for new means of action to further a security and
control agenda. As argued by Guiraudon (2000, 2003), the law-and-order
ocials that participate in EU policy-making gain autonomy and avoid
national adversaries when they work with their counterparts at the EU-level.
In the 1980s, when cooperation started, the venues less amenable to
restrictive immigration control policy were situated at the national level
where the judiciary, other ministries and agencies with diering goals and,
to a lesser extent, migrant-aid organisations hampered the enactment of a
restrictive immigration and asylum policy. Seizing opportunities stemming
from pre-existing policy settings and developing policy frames that linked
migration with European-wide security issues, law and order ocials were
able to circumvent national constraints in international cooperation forums
that still remained largely intergovernmental.
Second, the ocial goal of policy cooperation has often been reported to
be the sharing of the cost of hosting asylum-seekers among EU states as well
as the harmonisation of rules to prevent asylum-seekers from shopping for
asylum. Yet, as Thielemann and Dewan argue in their contribution, there is

ample need to question the goal of burden-sharing and policy harmonisation
that international cooperation has hoped to achieve in Europe. Resources,
they argue, could be better spent by a division of labour whereby some
countries engage in peace-keeping and others in refugee protection rather than
the all-out eorts to curtail ows from unstable and poor parts of the world.
Third, international cooperation may result from the diusion of domestic
norms and national models to third states. Experiments in international
cooperation such as that of migration Regional Consultative Processes,
which Thouez and Channac discuss in this volume, suggest that their goal is
the diusion, transfer and imposition of best practices for immigration
control in transit and sending countries. In this regard, particular attention
should be paid to the actors who persuade foreign governments to set up
immigration controls; how they frame and justify their claims; and the types
of technologies that are mobilised in the process. One example of the transfer
of policy models is a case of EUUN cooperation to export immigration
control norms and tools to Africa. The 2002 Spanish Presidency favoured
nancial or trade sanctions against countries that did not readmit their
nationals. The Justice and Home Aairs directorate is cooperating with the
UN International Migration Policy Programme to monitor the compliance
of African countries with the Seville summit conclusions. West African
countries are urged to adopt a common migration regime based on
European norms and formally cooperate with the EU.
Fourth, domestic actors may use international negotiations to force third
countries to cooperate on immigration control. In Europe, the ght against
illegal migration pervades most of EU external relations. Enlargement, trade,
and development policy are policy areas in which immigration has become a
key issue. Immigration control has been taken into account in EU treaty
negotiations, EU programmes and operations towards other regions. The
interior ministers of the member states insisted that the Cotonou Agreement
of 2000, between the EU and 71 African Caribbean and Pacic countries
(a successor to the Lome Convention) include a standard clause whereby
countries commit themselves to taking back their nationals deported from an

EU member state. In June 2003, the Commission announced e250 million in
aid over the next ve years for countries that signed readmission agreements
with the EU. EU programmes such as Med-migrations that encourage
development projects involving North Africans on both sides of the
Mediterranean are already part of strategies to stem immigration ows
from countries such as Morocco. As Sandra Lavenex argues in this volume,
this may imply that new actors will enter the immigration policy debate with
dierent perspectives and that would mean the end of the current monopoly
by Justice and Home Aairs ministries at EU level.
The dynamics of international cooperation raises a number of issues. The
pressure exercised on transit and sending countries is premised on the idea
that policy tools are transferable a questionable hypothesis. In fact,
governments east and south of Europe have complained that they do not
have the means to take on this task. In buer zone countries, where
political stability and liberal democracy have yet to be established, there
may be a great risk for migrants as regimes such as Libya and Morocco are
instructed to prevent migrants from the sub-Sahara arriving in European
states. There have been many deaths at the EU external border, most
notably south of Spain and Italy and in the tunnel linking the UK to
mainland Europe, which shows the limits of the strategy of externalising
immigration control to third states (Lavenex in this volume).
Conclusion: A Summary of the Contributions

In this overview, we have attempted to assess the current characteristics of
immigration policy in Europe in terms of its diverse policy components.
Scholars of immigration have assumed that immigration policy has been a
product of unintended consequences, or an area largely circumscribed by
exogeneous factors. The contemporary migration scholars in this volume all
contemplate in some form or other one of the three dimensions of the
apparent immigration policy gap. These include: the disjuncture between
publics and policy-makers at the decision-making and implementation
stage; the relationship between policy goals and outputs; and, nally, the
dynamic between the international and domestic arenas.
The contributors here document a multi-levelled policy dynamic. At the
national level, policy input leads to policies that seek to restrict immigration.
At the local level, the heavy-handed policies of surveillance and punishment
for illegality can only be enforced under certain conditions. Actors in charge
of tracking or expelling illegal aliens are not always able or willing to do so.
Thus, at the international level, through trans-governmental cooperation or
multilateral negotiations, states seek to prevent arrivals and to enhance their
capacity to reach their policy goals.
Gary Freemans disaggregation of immigration policies helpfully reveals
the number of actors that may emerge within the dierent components of
immigration policy. He stresses the importance of the mobilisation of bias

by modelling and illustrating the attitudes of policy supporters and oppo-
nents in several sub-policy areas. In his view, policy-making dynamics largely
depend on the ability to organise, and thus on the concentration of costs and
benets, real and perceived. The contributions by Statham and Geddes, as
well as Schain, challenge Freemans premise of a liberal elite captured by pro-
migrant groups and policy outcomes. The articles examine the impact of two
types of political actors: organised private and public interest groups and
political parties (Statham and Geddes examine pro-immigration civil society
groups; Schain the anti-immigrant extreme-right group of the Front
National). They suggest that these groups matter in dierent ways than we
might have originally expected. Pro-immigration lobbies may capture elite
policy-makers less, and anti-immigration groups may inuence political
party systems and mainstream political agendas more than presumed by

immigration scholars until now. In the end, they provide some explanations
for the current anti-immigration discourse in Europe today.
Two contributions in this volume suggest that the restrictive bias at the
policy-making stage is dicult to put into practice as policies are enacted.
At the level of implementation, Ellermann reminds us that bureaucrats may
be constrained by practical demands of domestic politics electoral factors
and local mobilisations. Van der Leuns article suggests that sometimes
agents or bureaucrats have dierent interests than principals. While both
authors detail the conditions under which policies will or will not be
implemented as planned, they show that the complexity of the immigration
playing-eld lends to further analysis of the degree to which various policy
actors have convergent interests.
Finally, policy-makers face challenges in implementation. Indeed, states
have multiple avenues available to enforce internal controls of the illegal
population or in deportation policies, more generally to control their
borders better. The study of how states join and cooperate in international
or regional policy groups and, even more so, how they enlist third-countries,
or externalise immigration policy as Lavenex argues, provides empirical
evidence for this point. To the extent that policy cooperation exists, we
might see this as policy learning, as Thouez and Channac argue, or as an
approach to collective action problems, as Thielemann and Dewan argue.
Both of these cases reinforce the trends captured by Lavenex that
international cooperation reinforces national policy goals. Yet they do so
at the expense of the values that characterise liberal democratic states, often
resembling more and more an imperial policy. In this way, Europe is asking
its not very liberal, or very democratic neighbours at the periphery to
manage population movements and prevent the arrival of the huddled
masses, much as the USA did in the 1990s with Cuba and Haiti. The shots
at the border in the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in 2005 may not
have been heard around the world but they are testimony to some of the
extreme eects of delegating policy beyond Europe.
Annex 1
TA BL E A1
F O R E IG N P O P U L A T I O N S A ND RE FU G E E F L O W S I N S E L EC T E D E U R O P E A N C O U N T R I E S
Total asylum Total asylum Kosovar

% of applications applications refugees
foreigners as lodged in 1997 lodged in accepted per
part of total in EU-15 2004 (OECD 100,000
population (Amsterdam European inhabitants
Rank in EU-15 treaty) countries) in the EU-15
1 Luxembourg 35.6 Germany 104,350 France 58,577 Austria 628
2 Austria 9.1 United Kingdom 41,500 United Kingdom 40,620 Denmark 530
3 Germany 8.9 France 21,420 Germany 35,613 Sweden 421
4 Belgium 8.7 Netherlands 34,440 Austria 24,676 Ireland 275
5 France 5.6 Belgium 11,790 Sweden 23,161 Netherlands 257
6 Sweden 5.6 Sweden 9,660 Belgium 15,538 Luxembourg 233
7 Denmark 4.8 Austria 6,720 Switzerland 14,247 Finland 191
8 Netherlands 4.2 Denmark 5,090 Slovakia 11,354 Germany 179
9 UK 3.8 Spain 4,980 Cyprus 9,859 Portugal 127
10 Ireland 3 Greece 4,380 Netherlands 9,782 Belgium 119
11 Greece 2.6 Ireland 3,880 Italy 9,722 France 107
12 Italy 2.1 Italy 1,860 Poland 8,077 Italy 102
13 Finland 2 Finland 970 Norway 7,945 UK 72
14 Spain 1.8 Luxemburg 430 Czech Rep. 5,460 Spain 36
15 Portugal 1.8 Portugal 300 Spain 5,369 Greece 0
Source: UNHCR (www.unhcr.org), OECD (2003, 2005) and Thielemann (2003).

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Actors and Venues in Immigration Control Closing The Gap Between Political Demands and Policy Outcomes

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West European Politics

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Actors and Venues in Immigration

GALLYA LAHAV and VIRGINIE GUIRAUDON

Scholarship on immigration policy has evolved dramatically since 1994,

Correspondence Address: gallya.lahav@sunysb.edu; virginie.guiraudon@iue.it

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online 2006 Taylor & Francis

migration studies, many remained descriptive and were produced under

becoming a distinct eld of study in political science and part of the

mented migrants have run large-scale regularisation campaigns (e.g. Italy

dimensions of immigration policies: the continued restriction on conditions

specically, it oers an empirical standpoint to evaluate the extent to which

developments (Freeman 1995; Hansen 2000; McLaren 2001; Beck and

policy is shaped, elaborated and implemented. Studies often narrowly focus

An Analytical Framework of the Enlarged Playing Field: Mapping the Actors

The Itinerary: Correlating Inputs, Outputs, Outcomes

that compete in each policy conguration (Guiraudon 2003). Institutions

The Map: Actors in the Multi-level Playing Field

Policy levels Policy venues Policy input Elaboration/diusion Implementation

International/Transgovernmental . National bureaucracies . Global commission . Foreign countries

Local . Civil society . Jails

Source: Guiraudon and Lahav 2000.

Koppelingswet, governments have sometimes enlisted a range of public

charge of migration control operate to nd a favourable context in terms of

The Empirical Puzzles

public debate. Public constituencies in Europe and elsewhere have been

It is dicult to reconcile these conclusions with empirical developments

The Match between Principals and Agents: Policy Implementation

so-called gap between policy goals and outcomes.

(this volume) present more nuanced conclusions on bureaucratic autonomy

International Constraints on Domestic Politics?

discrimination in employment and the way the High Commissioner for

Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees, and Stateless People (CAHAR). At

asylum. Yet, as Thielemann and Dewan argue in their contribution, there is

countries commit themselves to taking back their nationals deported from an

Conclusion: A Summary of the Contributions

immigration policy. He stresses the importance of the mobilisation of bias

party systems and mainstream political agendas more than presumed by

Total asylum Total asylum Kosovar

Source: UNHCR (www.unhcr.org), OECD (2003, 2005) and Thielemann (2003).

Theory in Social Science and Law. New York: Routledge.

Guiraudon, Virginie (2003). The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A

Soysal, Yasemine (1994). Limits of Citizenship. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

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