Federalism has been deeply embedded in a variety of ways in different

federal countries specifically in its political institutions. There is a

certain set of institutions that are enough or adequately common to be
identified as normal by the known writers about federalism. First, a
written constitution that is strenuous or laborious to amend, revise or
repeal; second, a bicameral legislature with a powerful federal chamber
to represent the constituent regions of their respective jurisdictions; third,
one Supreme Court created and mandated by the Constitution to protect
the constitution itself though the power of judicial review; and fourth,
intergovernmental institutions and processes to facilitate collaboration in
areas of shared or overlapping jurisdiction in addition to the system of
checks and balances. (Watts 1999, 7; Lijphart 1999, 4, 187 lists only the
former three).

Written Constitution
The very essence of federalism is that there are two spheres of the
government and neither of which is sovereign but each respective
chamber has a defined and limited powers which is solicited by their
Constitution itself. The written constitution is the institutional and
political means of achieving this. By having a written and formal
Constitution which serves as a framework for the government of a state
and by adopting a federal form of government which will be consented
by the people, federalism will be at hand.
The most significant role of the written constitution is that there is a clear
statement of the respective division of powers or competencies between
the national and state governments which will serve as the instruments
of the State in its government.
According to Dietmar Braun (2004, 47), with respect to an interstate
model jurisdictional authority is separated between territorial actors
and competition and bipolarity predominate, whereas in intrastate
federalism most of the decisions are taken at the federal level where
subgovernments and the federal government have their say and
implementation is almost completely in the hands of
subgovernments.
Difficult to Amend
The purpose of having a tough and burdensome-to-amend constitutions
is give the prime protection to the higher law character of the constitution
which serves as the fundamental law of the land to which all laws must
adhere and that controls the other institutions of government. This serves
as a prime security of the fundamental law in order to preserve the basic
law of the land. As Donald Lutz puts it, constitutional amendment should
be neither too easy nor too diYcult and successful constitutions
should have a moderate amendment rate (Lutz 1994, 357).

Judicial Review
Within federations, constitutional adjudication and interpretation are
essentially paramount because they affect governmental powers as well
as individual rights and obligations, group interests which may directly
affect the people to whom the laws are established.

Legislative Bicameralism
Within federal systems, bicameralism has become a foremost
governmental institution for representing subnational governments or
groupings of peoples in the national legislature in a variety of ways. The
representation of more people specially the lower class and the sectoral
and the marginalized groups benefits better the public. There is a great
difference because the representatives in the lower house are more expert
in their respective jurisdictions from which they come. They better know
the needs and necessities of their respective constituents and the
problems in the domestic or local sphere are better heard and resolved
through such bicameral representation.