(Sec.
11) : COMMERCIAL FARMS
Commercial farms private agricultural lands devoted to saltbeds, fruit
farms, orchards, vegetable and cut-flower farms and cacao, coffee and
rubber plantations. They are subject to compulsory acquisition and
distribution after 10 years from effectivity.
SIR: I think Del Monte falls under this classification. Im not sure.
LUZ FARMS
Sec. II which includes private agricultural land devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry & swine raising in definition of
commercial farms is invalid.
Adm. Order #01 (2004): rules & regulations governing exclusion of
agricultural land used for cattle raising from CARP. Citing Luz Farms
case private agricultural land or portions thereof actually, exclusively
&directly used for cattle raising as of 15 June 1988 shall be excluded.
Exclusion shall be granted only upon proof of AED prior to 15 June
1988 & continuously utilized for such purpose up to application. Any
act to change or convert ; w/ intent to avoid CARP,shall be invalid.
Only the grazing area & portions of property required for infrastructure
necessary for cattle raising shall be considered for exclusion
Why is there special treatment to commercial farms? Because of
possible effect to company and distribution of lands to farmer
beneficiaries, basin ug mawagtang and kanindot sa yuta na dili unta i-
subdivide or i-distribute. Agricultural production can be better if they
are not distributed or are intact as a whole.
For commercial farms, there is a suspension of 10 years sa pag-
implement. And there are alternative methods available to commercial
farms other than distribution of lands.
DAR A.O #9, S of 1998 allows commercial farms certain options,
subject to approval of DAR & workers: (aside from voluntary &
compulsory coverage)
CLOAs are issued - joint venture
in name of cooperative - growership agreement
of workers - lease back
- direct payment
Please note: in any of these methods, ang yuta ma.adto gihapon sa
farmer beneficiaries, dili lang i-distribute. Intact ang yuta, but the
former landowner can participate in this method.
- For instance, joint venture: kinsa ang mag.joint venture?
Ang farmer beneficiary and former landowner
Beneficiaries will contribute the use of the land, the
investor furnishing the capital and technology.
Note: there has to be approval from DAR
- Lease-back: an owner of the land will now rent his own land
from the farmer beneficiary
Lease may not exceed 10 years. There is a least
rental
Needs approval of DAR
- Growership arrangements: magsabot sila daan na ug
mag.harvest na gani, ako ang mu.palit sa inyohang
products
To be approved by DAR
- Direct payment scheme: if they can agree na ang property
will have to be transferred to the farmer beneficiary and the
farmer beneficiaries will be paying the landowner for the
land.
To be approved by DAR
According to DAR, it requires that CLOA be issued
collectively or under co-ownership under the direct
payment scheme
*NOTE: Former landowner shall be given priority with respect to these
methods.
Contracts are reviewed by DAR Support Services to be submitted to
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM)
and to be endorsed to PARC. PARC is the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council headed by the President of the Philippines.
Please note: these are not the only methods under CARP. Another is
the:
- Stock distribution option: referring to hacienda Luisita
- For how many years, the SDO was perfectly managed, it
was a good method until when the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council headed by GMA revoked the SDO on the
ground that among others, it failed to alleviate the
conditions of the farmer beneficiaries. And which revocation
was upheld by the SC.
- Right now, the lands are being distributed to farmer
beneficiaries consistent with the ruling of the Court.
DAR vs. Sutton, et al., G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005
DAR issued A.O. No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be
retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to place all public
and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform.
Issue:
The constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993.
Held:
Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have
been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian
reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid,
administrative rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a
law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. The
rule-making power of an administrative agency may not be used to
abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution.
Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated
by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations In the
case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it
contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock
farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear
intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock,
swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case
that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do
not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity.
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree
farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
DAR v. SUTTON :
Land devoted to cow & calf breeding. Lands under VOS
before CARP. After CARP & Luz Farms case, Sutton filed withdrawal of
VOS. DAR issued A.O #9 (1993) which provide that only portions of
land used for raising of livestock, poultry & swine shall be excluded.
DAR partially exempted portion but ordered acquisition the rest.
SC: AO is invalid as it contravene Constitution since livestock ,
swine/poultry raising do not fall under agriculture & agricultural
activity
DAR Adm. Order No. 7-2008
Policy Guidelines:
1. Private agricultural lands or portions therof actually, directly or
exclusively used for livestock purposes other than agricultural like
cattle raising as of june 15, 1988 and continuously and exclusively
utilized or devoted for such purpose up until the time of inventory shall
be excluded from CARP coverage.
2. Conversely, landholdings or any portions thereof not actually,
directly and exclusively used for livestock raising are subject to CARP
coverage if one or more of the following conditions apply:
2.1 if there is agricultural activity in the area, i.e cultivation of the soil,
planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, including the harvesting of
such products, and other farm activities and practices, whether done
by a natural or juridical person and regardless of the final use or
destination of such agricultural products
2.2 the land is suitable for agriculture and it is presently occupied and
tilled by farmer/s.
5. in case of any of the conditions under items 2.1 and 2.2 are evident,
the PARO shall immediately proceed with the issuance of NOTICE of
COVERAGE on the subject landholding or portions thereof
8. any act of the landowner to change or convert his agricultural land
for livestock raising shall not affect the coverage of his landholdings
under CARP. Any diversification or change in the agricultural use of the
landholdings, or shift from crop production to livestock raising shall be
subject to the existing guidelines on land use conversion.
Adm. Order #7 (2008)
(Guidelines per Sutton Case (livestock raising)
Lands ADE used for livestock like cattle raising as of 15 June
1988 & continuously devoted shall be excluded.
Those not ADE are subject to CARP provided that the
agricultural activity in land is suitable for agriculture
presently tilled by farmers
Chapter III (IMPROVEMENT OF TENURIAL & LABOR
RELATION)
WHAT ARE THE WAYS IN DISTRIBUTING LANDS TO QUALIFIED
FARMERS?
1. Compulsory acquisition (Sec.16)
2. Voluntary offer to sell/voluntary land transfer
(Sec.20)
3. Non-land transfer schemes stock distribution
option(SDO); production & profit sharing (PPS)-
Sec. 13/32; leasehold operation(Sec.12)
In the case of Hacienda Luisita, CJ Corona was the only one who gave
a dissenting opinion because remember, in the decision of Hacienda
Luisita, while the SC revoked the Stock Distribution Program, the SC
used the Operative Fact Doctrine. Even if the program is null and void,
using that doctrine, we have the consult the farmers whether they
would want to remain as stockholders or they would want the land
distributed.
- CJ Corona dissented saying Sec 31 is void because with
respect to agrarian reform, it is only distribution, there are
no other ways.
Leasehold Operation: (We can understand because) Under sec. 6, if
the area chosen by the landowner is tenanted, and the tenant chooses
to remain on the land. That is a choice personal to the tenant
SDO: different scheme. Thats why some authors are saying, the land
reform of the Philippines is very different:
1. Other asian countries only have 3 hectare retention limit, in
the Phil, why 5?
2. Why do have an SDO as an option?
There is no evidence to prove that this is an
accommodation in favor of Hacienda Luisita during
the time of Aquino. At the same time, there is no
proof that the revocation by the PARC of the program
of Hacienda Luisita headed by GMA was also as a
defense? (dili maklaro seri) against Aquino
Take note: VOS, there is a cut-off date under RA 9700. (Right now you
cannot avail of this)
- Without any notice from DAR, the landowner proposes to
the government.
VLT is not anymore an option under the present law (RA 9700)
- VLT is an option by the landowner that after receiving the
notice of acquisition from DAR, the landowner offers.
Under RA 9700, what will remain is COMPULSORY ACQUISITION.
Note: That is consistent with the thrust of the government, that by
2014, everything should have been offered compulsorily, without
waiting whether the landowner will offer or not.
Under Sec 12, DAR is mandated to determine and fix the lease rentals.
And this is shown in Admin Order No. 02-06.
DAR Adm. Order No. 2-06
RA 6389 automatically converted share tenancy throughout the
country into agricultural leasehold relationship
1. abolition of share tenancy now covers all agricultural landholdings
without exceptions
2. the conversion of share tenancy into leasehold is mandated by law.
3. All share-crop tenants were automatically converted into
agricultural lessees as of june 15, 1988 whether or not a leasehold
agreement has been executed
4. Leaseholders security of tenure shall be respected and guaranteed.
IV. GOVERNING POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES
Pursuant to Section 12 of R.A. No. 6657, and in order to fully
implement the provisions of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, on
agricultural leasehold, the following policies and principles are hereby
issued:
1. Agricultural leasehold shall be based on a tenancy
relationship. The following are essential elements of agricultural
tenancy:
1.1. The parties are the landholder and the tenant;
1.2. The object of the relationship is an agricultural
land;
1.3. There is consent freely given either orally or in
writing, express or implied;
1.4. The purpose of the relationship is agricultural
production;
1.5. There is personal cultivation;
1.6. There is consideration given to the lessor either
in a form of share of the harvest or payment of fixed
amount in money or produce to or both.
2. Agricultural leasehold relation shall not be extinguished
by mere expiration of the term of period in a leasehold contract
nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of
the land. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or
transfers the legal possession of the landholding, purchaser or
transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor as
provided for under Sec. 10, R.A. 3844, as amended.
xxx
4. The consideration for the lease shall not be more than
the equivalent of 25% of the average normal harvest (ANH)
during the three (3) agricultural years immediately preceding
the date the lease was established. If the land has been
cultivated for less than 3 years, the initial consideration shall be
based on the average normal harvest of the preceding year/s
when the land was actually cultivated.
If we talk about leasehold, and there is a determination by DAR on the
lease rentals, the perfect scenario is: there has to be a document
showing the agreement on leasehold between the landowner and the
lessee-tenant.
If you have a document, the tenant can have it annotated, registered
with the registry of deeds and the law itself provides this should be
free from payment of all fees and services.
- point of registration: protect the right of the lessee-tenant,
so that any prospective buyer may be cautioned by simply
looking at the title itself that there is a leasehold
relationship involving that parcel of land.
But even without the document, under AO 02-06, leasehold relation
shall not be extinguished by expiration of term, by sale, in case of
alienation, purchaser-transferee shall be subrogated to rights
obligations of tenancy.
RA 6657 mandates Dar to determine the fix rentals within retained
areas and areas not yet acquired for agrarian reform
- Farmer has a right to elect whether to become a farmer beneficiary
or a leaseholder in the retention are of the landholder.
Sec.12 of 6657 mandates DAR to determine & fix the lease rentals
within the retained areas and areas not yet acquired.
Sec. 6 of 6657 recognizes the right of farmer to elect whether farmer-
beneficiary OR leaseholds in retained area.
Sec.67 of 6657 directs RD to register patents, title & documents
required for implementation of CARP
Pursuant to DARs mandate to protect the rights & improve
tenurial & economic status of farmers in tenanted lands,
DAR issued AO 02-06(REVISED RULES & PROCEDURES
GOVERNING LEASEHOLD IMPLEMENTATION IN
TENANTED AGRICULTURAL LANDS):
-Leasehold is based on tenancy relationship (repeat 6
requisites)
-Leasehold relation shall not be extinguished by expiration at
term nor by sale. In case of alienation, purchaser/transferee
shall be subjugated to rights/obligation of lessor.
- specific provision on the consideration to be given to the
lessor which can either be in a form of share of harvest or
payment of money
-DARAB has jurisdiction to cancel leasehold contract. Why
DARAB?
- DARAB exercises quasi-judicial powers. With
respect to quasi-judicial powers, Leasehold
contract involves rights, obligations and others
terms of the contract
-The consideration of lease shall not be more than 25% of
average normal harvest during 3 agri years
-AO 02-06 states, among others, the rights & obligations of
lessor/lessee.
CHAPTER IV REGISTRATION
Sec. 14 & 15 require the registration of landowners &
beneficiaries w/ DAR. Purpose is to establish databank &
identify actual famer-beneficiaries.
Insofar as beneficiaries are concerned, registration will determine if
you have a standing to intervene in a case. Enunciated in the case of
Fortich vs. Corona:
Fortich, et al. vs. Corona, et al., G.R. 131457, August 19, 1999
This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente,
Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr.
Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the
petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 14371 3 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to
the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc.
(DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years
under the Crop Producer and Grower's Agreement duly annotated in
the certificate of title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare
property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at
P2.38 million. 4
NQSRMDC resisted the DAR's action. In February, 1992, it
sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB),
through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB
Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which
ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives "to desist from pursuing
any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further
orders." 5
On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved
the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution
penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
In seeking the nullification of the "Win-Win" Resolution, the
petitioners claim that the Office of the President was prompted to
issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed hunger strike led
by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring
and/or politically blackmailing the Office of the President to come up
with this purely political decision to appease the 'farmers,' by reviving
and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared
final and executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.
Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory
Decision dated March 29, 1996 can still be substantially modified by
the "Win-Win" Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of
the President of the Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order
No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
Sec. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office
of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after
the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one
party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours).
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of
Court shall apply in a suppletory character whenever
practicable.
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997
declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no
one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no
more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed
by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis
of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order
No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate
that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken
from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for
reconsideration was permitted to be filed in "exceptionally meritorious
cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still
the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the
act of the Office of the President in re-opening the case and
substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already
become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and
basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
Fortich vs. Corona : intervenors claimed that they are farmworkers
& so intervened in case.
SC: There is no ruling yet from DAR whether intervenors are
beneficiaries, so they have no standing yet to intervene in the case.
DAR safeguards the list of ARB & provide IDs as proof of
being bonafide beneficiaries
DARAB has jurisdiction to disqualify an ARB.
Concha vs. Rubio: Not a dispute between LO and tenant. Fight
among tenants
- question: who among them should be considered qualified to become
beneficiaries over a portion of land?
- who determines who is qualified? DAR specifically MARO
- although SC said in this case that it is the Sec. of DAR through the
authorized offices
- What was the finding of MARO?
 - when he was talking about respondents, he was talking
about the parties who were not considered qualified. Why were they
not qualified? According to the MARO they:
-refused to sign the form
-already given disturbance compensation
-Respondents: we returned the money to the
landowners
-But MARO found that they used the money in
building their houses in the lot given to them
-executed the document sinumpaang salaysay that they
already abandoned the landholding in question
-As a matter of principle, the finding of the MARO is to be accorded
respect unless there is a showing of abuse of authority.
CHAPTER V LAND ACQUISITION
Landlessness is acknowledged as the core problem in the
rural areas and the root cause of peasant unrest.
In order to hasten the implementation of the program, the
Department of Agrarian Reform has made compulsory
acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition. To the
same end, the law provides for the steps in acquiring private
lands through administrative instead of judicial proceedings.
This procedure is allowed provided the requirements of due
process as to notice and hearing are complied with.
Compulsory acquisition may be defined as the mandatory
acquisition of agricultural lands including facilities and
improvements necessary for agricultural production, as may
be appropriate, for distribution to qualified beneficiaries
upon payment of just compensation.
The Notice of Coverage (NOC) commences the compulsory
acquisition of private agricultural lands coverable under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Along the
various phases of the CARP proceedings, the process stalls
because of Land Owner (LO) resistance, most of whom
invoke the ground of lack of notice or non-observance of
due process in attacking the proceedings.
Just to show us the amendment by RA 9700, the words added under
section 16. AND DISTRIBUTION
SECTION 6.The title of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657, as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 16.Procedure for Acquisition and Distribution of
Private Lands."
Why was this added? Because Sec. 16 doesnt only talk about
acquisition, it also involves distribution of lands.
LAND ACQUISITION
SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.- For purposes of
acquisition of private lands, the following procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to acquire the land to the
owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the
same in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay
hall of the place where the property is located. Said notice shall
contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in
accordance with the valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other
pertinent provisions hereof.
But it was not clear in the law about how identification is determined
this was filled up by DAR through an Admin Order.
- talks about notice to acquire: In the case of CONFED vs. DAR, SC
talks about two notices
1. Notice of coverage: More or less Preliminary: WHY?
- because while it notifies that the property shall be placed
under CARP, the landowner is entitled to retention.
- notifies the landowner about the public hearing about the
results of field investigation, land evaluation and other
pertinent matters
- the landowner will be informed that the field investigation
of his landholding shall be conducted. After that comes the
notice of acquisition.
2. Notice of acquisition:
- the area subject of compulsory acquisition has to be
stated. WHY? It is based already on the field investigation
- plus the amount of just compensation offered by DAR
How is the notice to be done? Personal delivery, registered mail and
posting
Note in the case of CONFED: Notice shall contain the offer of DAR
- OFFER: offer of the government to the landowner as to how much
the government will pay the landowner corresponding to the land to
be acquired.
- Discuss this in relation to par. (e): It is the deposit that is the key to
the immediate possession and issuance of a title
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by
personal delivery or registered mail, the landowner, his administrator
or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of
the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay
the landowner the purchase price of the land within thirty (30) days
after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other
muniments of title.
If landowner accepts no problem
If landowner rejects or fails to reply summary admin proceedings
Take NOTE: the purpose of this is compensation. With respect to just
compensation, RTC has jurisdiction.
Reiterate: there are only 2 instances where RTC has jurisdiction insofar
as CARP is concerned:
1. just compensation
2. criminal offenses
then why is it that the law in par. (d) talks about determination of just
compensation? It was determined by the SC in CONFED, that this
determination is only PRELIMINARY. Meaning that the landowner (as
also shown in par. (f)) can still resort to court IF he disagrees with the
decision referred in par. (d).
- So they bring the matter to court of proper jurisdiction for
the FINAL determination of just compensation.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation of
the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to summit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it
is submitted for decision.
Notice in par. (e), par (d) would give you 30 days to respond. You
have to inform DAR whether you accept or reject it.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in
case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the
DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the
proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified
beneficiaries.
How do we know the amount to be deposited? Should it be based on
par. (d) after summary admin proceedings or par. (a) that is contained
in the notice to acquire? CONFED CASE

In real scenario: transfer of title may happen before immediate
possession. Why? It is possible that there is resistance here on the
part of the landowner.
ex. Even if the title is already in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines but DAR cannot take possession because gibutangan ug
guard ang agri land, landowner still actually possesses the land while
he is fighting for the acquisition in court.
Take note here: in normal dealings (voluntary dealings), if you have a
sale of land, the seller will execute the Deed of Sale and give the
original copy (owners duplicate copy) to the buyer, so that the buyer
can go to RD, and be issued a new title in favor of the purchaser. But
here it is different.
1. Under par. (e), Registry of Deeds can cancel the title of the
LO on the basis of the deposit, certification from land bank
which will be annotated to the title and RD will issue a new
title in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. The title is cancelled even without the surrender of the
owners copy
3. RDs copy of the LOs title is cancelled even if the owners
copy is subsisting
Probable in case LO rejects offer or does not reply, he
is still in possession of the title
Advise: do not simply rely on the owners copy, you
get a certified true copy from the RD.
4. RD can cancel and issue under CARL even if there is no
payment of taxes and transfer fees (provided in Sec 66 and
67 below)
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to
the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
Sec. 16 outlines the procedure for acquisition of private land
Take note of Sec.16(d) & (e):
(1) practice of having no deed of transfer or conveyance
(2) titles are cancelled w/o owners copy surrendered (in
Torren's System, if there is refusal in involuntary dealings
remedy is file petition in court
(3) RD titles are cancelled while owners copy is subsisting
Sec. 66 (Exemptions from taxes &fees of land transfer)
Sec. 67 (Free Registration of patents, titles & documents required for
implementation of CARP)
Sec. (e) : Once DAR request and LBP makes deposit of initial valuation,
DAR can request RD to cancel title & transfer it to Republic of Phil. So
even if landowners protests valuation, distribution of land will proceed.
CLOAs are issued upon land acquisition: so cancellation of title of
landowner can simultaneously go w/ issuance of CLOA.
In Association of small land owners, SC did not say
automatically. SC said that title and ownership remain w/ LO until full
payment of past conversation.
CONFED vs. DAR
Facts:
Petitioners CONFED, NFSP, UNIFED and PANAYFED claim that their
members own or administer private agricultural lands devoted to
sugarcane. They and their predecessors-in-interest have been planting
sugarcane on their lands allegedly since time immemorial. While their
petition is denominated as one for prohibition and mandamus, the
petitioners likewise seek to nullify paragraphs (d), (e) and (f) of
Section 16 5 of Republic Act No. (RA) 6657, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. In other words, their arguments,
which will be discussed shortly, are anchored on the proposition that
these provisions are unconstitutional.
They allege the following grounds in support of their petition:
It is the principal contention of the petitioners that, in the exercise by
the State of the power of eminent domain, which in the case of RA
6657 is the acquisition of private lands for distribution to farmer-
beneficiaries, expropriation proceedings, as prescribed in Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, must be strictly complied with. The petitioners rely
on the case of Visayas Refining Company v. Camus and Paredes 7
decided by the Court in 1919. In the said case, the Government of the
Philippine Islands, through the Governor-General, instructed the
Attorney-General to initiate condemnation proceedings for the purpose
of expropriating a tract of land containing an area of 1,100,463 square
meters to be used for military and aviation purposes. In compliance
therewith, the Attorney-General filed a complaint with the Court of
First Instance (CFI) and among the defendants impleaded was Visayan
Refining Co. which owned a portion of the property intended to be
expropriated. The CFI provisionally fixed the total value of the subject
property at P600,000 and upon payment thereof as deposit, the CFI
authorized that the Government be placed in possession thereof.
Paragraph (e) is assailed by the petitioners as it authorizes the DAR,
by allegedly merely causing the deposit with the Land Bank of the
compensation, to immediately take possession of the property and to
direct the Register of Deeds to cancel the certificate of title of the
landowner without notice to and consent of the latter. The petitioners
contend that, in contrast, under the Civil Code, if the creditor or
obligee refuses to accept the tender of payment, it is the duty of the
debtor or obligor to make consignation of the thing or amount due.
Under the Civil Code, there is no effective payment without valid
tender of payment and consignation in court. 15 The petitioners
theorize that, in the same manner, the DAR cannot be allowed to take
possession of the property of a landowner, by mere deposit of the
compensation that it has summarily fixed under paragraph (e), without
having to go to court.
Paragraph (f) is characterized by the petitioners as meaningless and
useless to the landowner. It allegedly compels him to file a case, and
in the process incur costs therefor, for the final determination of just
compensation when, in the meantime, he has already been deprived of
possession of his property and his certificate of title cancelled.
The Respondents' Counter-Arguments
The Land Bank urges the Court to dismiss the petition since the
constitutionality of RA 6657 had already been categorically upheld by
the Court in Association of Small Landowners. Further, some of the
grounds relied upon by the petitioners allege matters that require
factual determination. For example, the allegation that the DAR is
subjecting the sugar lands to the coverage of RA 6657 without first
ascertaining whether there are regular farmworkers therein and
whether they are interested to own, directly or collectively, the land
they till, allegedly requires factual determination. Considering that the
Court is not a trier of facts, the Land Bank argues that these matters
are better threshed out in a trial court.
HELD:
DAR's compulsory acquisition procedure is based on Section 16 of RA
6657. It does not, in any way, preclude judicial determination of just
compensation
Contrary to the petitioners' submission that the compulsory acquisition
procedure adopted by the DAR is without legal basis, it is actually
based on Section 16 of RA 6657. Under the said law, there are two
modes of acquisition of private agricultural lands: compulsory and
voluntary. The procedure for compulsory acquisition is that prescribed
under Section 16 of RA 6657. TCDcSE
In Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 41 the Court painstakingly
outlined the procedure for compulsory acquisition, including the
administrative orders issued by the DAR in relation thereto, in this
manner:
In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the
landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After
identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the
landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the
place where the property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of
the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or
representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of
the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of
transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of
title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price.
If the landowner rejects the DAR's offer or fails to make a reply, the
DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just
compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and
other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation
within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the
DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the
amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the
corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response
from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take
possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate
of title in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The land shall
then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may
question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final
determination of just compensation.
The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land
acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Section 16 of the CARL, the
first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the
landowners and the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how
the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR
issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989,
which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands.
The procedure is as follows:
"II.OPERATING PROCEDURE
A.The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the assistance of the
pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall: EDATSI
1.Update the master list of all agricultural lands covered under the
CARP in his area of responsibility. The master list shall include such
information as required under the attached CARP Master List Form
which shall include the name of the landowner, landholding area,
TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number.
2.Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title
(OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP
except those for which the landowners have already filed applications
to avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain
the following duly accomplished forms:
a)CARP CA Form 1 MARO Investigation Report
b)CARP CA Form 2 Summary Investigation Report of Findings and
Evaluation
c)CARP CA Form 3 Applicant's Information Sheet
d)CARP CA Form 4 Beneficiaries Undertaking
e)CARP CA Form 5 Transmittal Report to the PARO
The MARO/BARC shall certify that all information contained in the
above-mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and
that the same are true and correct. IEHTaA
3.Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a
conference/meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case
Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference/meeting shall also
be sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC
representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)
representative and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the
valuation of the property. He shall discuss the MARO/BARC
investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or
suggestions of the participants thereon. The landowner shall also be
asked to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall
be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an
integral part of the CACF.
4.Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO).
B.The PARO shall:
1.Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his
MAROs.
2.Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of
the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988. The valuation
worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified
correct by the PARO and all the personnel who participated in the
accomplishment of these forms. TCASIH
3.In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through
ocular inspection and verification of the property. This ocular
inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the computed
value exceeds 500,000 per estate.
4.Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder,
together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his
recommendations, to the Central Office. The LBP representative and
the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his report.
C.DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall: ECTHIA
1.Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO,
review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property
covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report
shall be prepared and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the
personnel directly participating in the review and final valuation.
2.Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized
representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the
subject property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or
through registered mail within three days from its approval. The Notice
shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory
acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR.
3.Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the BLAD shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order of
Acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR
Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative
hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the
procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13, Series of
1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on just
compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for
approval the required Order of Acquisition.
4.Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or
upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection
or non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent
Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the
property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take
possession of the land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries."
AEDCHc
CONFED vs. DAR
Compulsory Acquisition
Notice of Acquisition
First step: identification of the land, the landowners and the
beneficiaries.
Law is silent
Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989
Valid implementation , two notices
 DAR A.O. No.12, Series of 1989, amended in 1990 by DAR
A.O. No.9, Series of 1990 and in 1993 by DAR A.O No.1,
Series of 1993
Expropriation in Consti Law: two limitations:
1. Public use 2. Payment of just compensation
SC: In this case, there is no more need to prove public use because
this has been settled in the Constitution when it called for Agrarian
Reform. So there is only one limitation remaining: just compensation.
JUST COMPENSATION
1. What are the factors which the court must rely upon to be
able to determine just compensation? (Sec. 17)
2. When shall we reckon the payment of the determination of
just compensation? Time of ACTUAL taking
But it is different in this case, while the SC has
mentioned about date of taking, but it has been
interpreted at the time of the issuance of the title
which may different.
Actual scenario: actual taking may precede issuance
or vice versa
3. Is the landowner entitled to claim interest?
Last issue is the application of Rule 67:
- sec. 58 and rule 67 talks about appointment of commissioners. When
the case is filed in the RTC: in the law itself, it says MAY appoint,
under rule 67, court SHALL appoint Commissioners for the
determination of just compensation.
- who normally opposes commissioners? BIR, city assessor, provincial
assessor (they are more or less knowledgeable on the aspect of just
compensation)
LBP vs Trinidad
Facts:
Private respondent is the registered owner of a parcel of agricultural
land situated in Sampao, Kapalong, Davao del Norte with an
approximate area of 37.1010 hectares covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-49200, 14.999 hectares of which was covered by RA No.
6657 through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) scheme of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).
Private respondent offered to the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) the price of P2,000,000.00 per hectare for said portion of the
land covered by CARP.
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) valued and offered as
just compensation for said 14.999 hectares the amount of
P1,145,806.06 or P76,387.57 per hectare. The offer was rejected by
private respondent.
In accordance with Section 16 of RA No. 6657, petitioner LBP
deposited for the account of private respondent P1,145,806.06 in cash
and in bonds as provisional compensation for the acquisition of the
property.
Thereafter, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through the
Regional Adjudicator (RARAD) for Region XI conducted summary
administrative proceedings under DARAB Case No. LV-XI-0330-DN-
2002 to fix the just compensation.
On June 26, 2002, the DARAB rendered a decision fixing the
compensation of the property at P10,294,721.00 or P686,319.36 per
hectare.
Petitioner LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision
but the same was denied on September 4, 2002.
Petitioner LBP filed a petition against private respondent for judicial
determination of just compensation before the Special Agrarian Court,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum City, docketed as DAR Case No.
78-2002, which is the subject of this petition.
Private respondent, on the other hand, filed a similar petition against
DAR before the same Special Agrarian Court docketed as DAR Case
No. 79-2002, to which petitioner LBP filed its answer and moved for
the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Delivery of the Initial Valuation
praying that petitioner LBP be ordered to deposit the DARAB
determined amount of P10,294,721.00 in accordance with the
Supreme Court ruling in "Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, Pedro L. Yap, Et Al., G.R. No. 118712, October 6, 1995".
EAIcCS
Petitioner LBP filed a Manifestation praying that the amount of the
deposit should only be the initial valuation of the DAR/LBP in the
amount of P1,145,806.06 and not P10,294,721.00 as determined by
the DARAB.
On December 12, 2002, public respondent rendered the assailed
resolution ordering petitioner LBP to deposit for release to the private
respondent the DARAB determined just compensation of
P10,294,721.00.
On December 13, 2002, petitioner LBP filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said order to deposit.
On December 17, 2002, private respondent filed a motion to cite
Romeo Fernando Y. Cabanal and Atty. Isagani Cembrano, manager of
petitioner LBP's Agrarian Operations Office in Region XI and its
handling lawyer, respectively, for contempt for failure to comply with
the order to deposit.
After the filing of private respondent's comment to the motion for
reconsideration and petitioner LBP's explanation and memorandum to
the motion for reconsideration, public respondent rendered the
assailed resolution dated February 17, 2003, denying petitioner LBP's
motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner LBP filed a motion to admit a second motion for
reconsideration which still remains unacted upon by public respondent.
ISSUE:
The lone issue in this controversy is the correct amount of provisional
compensation which the LBP is required to deposit in the name of the
landowner if the latter rejects the DAR/LBP's offer. Petitioner maintains
it should be its initial valuation of the land subject of Voluntary Offer to
Sell (VOS) while respondent claims it pertains to the sum awarded by
the PARAD/RARAD/DARAB in a summary administrative proceeding
pending final determination by the courts.
HELD:
Section 16 of R.A. No. 6657 reads:
(d)In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct
summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation
for the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested
parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land,
within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for
decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it
is submitted for decision.
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in
case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with
the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
We find the foregoing as a strained interpretation of a simple and clear
enough provision on the procedure governing acquisition of lands
under CARP, whether under the compulsory acquisition or VOS
scheme. Indeed, it would make no sense to mention anything about
the provisional deposit in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) the landowner
is sent a notice of valuation to which he should reply within a specified
time, and in sub-paragraph (c) when the landowner accepts the
offer of the DAR/LBP as compensation for his land. Sub-paragraph (d)
provides for the consequence of the landowner's rejection of the initial
valuation of his land, that is, the conduct of a summary administrative
proceeding for a preliminary determination by the DARAB through the
PARAD or RARAD, during which the LBP, landowner and other
interested parties are required to submit evidence to aid the
DARAB/RARAD/PARAD in the valuation of the subject land. Sub-
paragraph (e), on the other hand, states the precondition for the
State's taking of possession of the landowner's property and the
cancellation of the landowner's title, thus paving the way for the
eventual redistribution of the land to qualified beneficiaries: payment
of the compensation (if the landowner already accepts the offer of the
DAR/LBP) or deposit of the provisional compensation (if the landowner
rejects or fails to respond to the offer of the DAR/LBP). Indeed, the
CARP Law conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or the deposit of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank.
Question was on the correct amount of provisional compensation
which LBP was required to deposit.
-is it the amount stated in par. (a) which is supposed to be contained
in the notice of acquisition?
- or is it the amount based on par. (d) after the conduct of summary
proceedings?
- there is a difference there in actual practice
LBP: says that it is our offer under par. (a) which is P1M only.
Respondent: it is the amount after the summary admin proceeding to
be undertaken by PARAD, RARAD and DARAB which is P10M.
SC: subpar. (e) should be related to subpar (a), (b), and (c)
considering that the taking of possession by the state is the next step
after DAR, and LBP supplied with the notice requirements.
In effect the SC is saying: it is the offer of the LBP that will
determine that that is the correct amount to be deposited not the
amount after the determination of just compensation in a summary
administrative proceeding
- reasoning: if the DAR will wait for the summary admin
proceedings this will hamper land redistribution process
Note that: par (a) precedes over par. (d) on the determination of the
correct amount to be deposited.
Reiterated in the case of Pagayatan.
LBP vs Pagayatan
Facts:
On October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286-hectare Suntay Estate,
consisting of irrigated/unirrigated rice and corn lands covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31(1326) located in the Barangays of
Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, Sta. Lucia, and San Nicolas in Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro, was subjected to the operation of Presidential
Decree No. 27, under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with the
farmer-beneficiaries declared as owners of the property. However, a
300-hectare portion of the land was subjected to the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) instead of the OLT. Thus, Certificates
of Landownership Award were issued to the farmer-beneficiaries in
possession of the land. 5 Such application of the CARP to the 300-
hectare land was later the subject of a case before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), which ruled that the
subject land should have been the subject of OLT instead of CARP.
The landowner admitted before the PARAD that said case was pending
with this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 108920, entitled Federico
Suntay v. Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the owner of the land remained unpaid for the property.
Thus, Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as assignee of the owner of
the property, Federico Suntay, filed a Petition for Summary
Determination of Just Compensation with the PARAD, docketed as
Case No. DCN-0405-0022-2002. Thereafter, the PARAD issued its
Decision dated March 21, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ECSHID
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1.Fixing the preliminary just compensation for 431.1407 hectare
property at P166,150.00 per hectare or a total of P71,634,027.30.
2.Directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to immediately pay the
aforestated amount to the Petitioner.
3.Directing the DAR to immediately comply with all applicable
requirements so that the subject property may be formally distributed
and turned over to the farmer beneficiaries thereof, in accordance with
the Decision of the DARAB Central in DARAB Case No. 2846.
The LBP then filed a Petition dated March 4, 2004 with the RTC
docketed as Agrarian Case No. 1390, appealing the PARAD Decision.
In the Petition, the LBP argued that because G.R. No. 108920 was
pending with this Court in relation to the 300-hectare land subject of
the instant case, the Petition for Summary Determination of Just
Compensation filed before the PARAD was premature. The LBP argued
further that the PARAD could only make an award of up to PhP5
million only. The PARAD, therefore, could not award an amount of
PhP71,634,027.30. The LBP also contended that it could not satisfy the
demand for payment of Lubrica, considering that the documents
necessary for it to undertake a preliminary valuation of the property
were still with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
ISSUE:
What is the proper amount to be deposited under Section 16 of
Republic Act No. 6657? Is it the PARAD/DARAB determined valuation
or the preliminary valuation as determined by the DAR/LBP?
HELD:
The LBP posits that under Sec. 16 (e) of RA 6657, and as espoused in
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 18 it is the purchase
price offered by the DAR in its notice of acquisition of the land that
must be deposited in an accessible bank in the name of the landowner
before taking possession of the land, not the valuation of the PARAD.
The Court agrees with the LBP.
Conspicuously, there is no mention of the PARAD in the foregoing Sec.
16 (e) when it speaks of "the deposit with an accessible bank
designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in
accordance with this Act." Moreover, it is only after the DAR has made
its final determination of the initial valuation of the land that the
landowner may resort to the judicial determination of the just
compensation for the land. Clearly, therefore, it is the initial valuation
made by the DAR and LBP that is contained in the letter-offer to the
landowner under Sec. 16 (a), said valuation of which must be
deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking possession of
the property.
It is clear from Sec. 16 of RA 6657 that it is the initial valuation made
by the DAR and the LBP that must be released to the landowner in
order for DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated,
Sec. 16 of RA 6657 does not authorize the release of the PARAD's
determination of just compensation for the land which has not yet
become final and executory.
Compensation in cash or in LBP bonds (Section 16)
Payment of cash and bonds otherwise the government will go
bankrupt if all in cash.
Bonds to give the government time to appropriate in the future
when the bonds will mature
VOS (Voluntary offer to sell): under the law, if you make VOS,
landowner is entitled to 5% payment in cash, additional than that
provided by law.
Land Bank v. CA
 Private respondent challenged the admin order issued by
DAR permitting the opening of trust account by LBP, in lieu
of depositing in cash or in LBP bonds.
SC:
Sec. 16 (e) is explicit that deposit be in cash or in LBP intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes of
bonds;
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred that the
deposit can be made in any other form like a trust account;
There was no basis for issuance of order.
WHY? Because the trust account is under the control of the trustee.
The beneficiary-landowner cannot properly use or control the funds
when the funds is supposed to be given due for land owner. not
sanctioned by law
SIR: ila baya ng yuta, gikuha ra sa gobyerno, di pa jud nimo bayaran
ang just compensation niya?
The same with the case of Honeycomb.
Land Bank v. CA
Facts
Private respondents are landowners whose landholdings were acquired
by the DAR and subjected to transfer schemes to qualified
beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL,
Republic Act No. 6657). Aggrieved by the alleged lapses of the DAR
and the Landbank with respect to the valuation and payment of
compensation for their land pursuant to the provisions of RA 6657,
private respondents filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari and
Mandamus with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction. Private
respondents questioned the validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 6,
Series of 1992 6 and DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990, 7
and sought to compel the DAR to expedite the pending summary
administrative proceedings to finally determine the just compensation
of their properties, and the Landbank to deposit in cash and bonds the
amounts respectively "earmarked," "reserved" and "deposited in trust
accounts" for private respondents, and to allow them to withdraw the
same.
Private respondents argued that Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1990 was issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion because it permits the opening of trust accounts by the
Landbank, in lieu of depositing in cash or bonds in an accessible bank
designated by the DAR, the compensation for the land before it is
taken and the titles are cancelled as provided under Section 16(e) of
RA 6657. 9 Private respondents also assail the fact that the DAR and
the Landbank merely "earmarked," "deposited in trust" or "reserved"
the compensation in their names as landowners despite the clear
mandate that before taking possession of the property, the
compensation must be deposited in cash or in bonds. 10
Petitioner DAR, however, maintained that Administrative Order No. 9 is
a valid exercise of its rule-making power pursuant to Section 49 of RA
6657. 11 Moreover, the DAR maintained that the issuance of the
"Certificate of Deposit" by the Landbank was a substantial compliance
with Section 16(e) of RA 6657.
ISSUE:
Whether the opening of trust accounts for payment of just
compensation is valid.
HELD:
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA 6657 provides as
follows:
"SECTION 16.Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands. . . .
(e)Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in
case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit
with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in
cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take
immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register
of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit must be made only in
"cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor can it be
inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it were the
deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that
a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section
16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit."
LBP vs Honeycomb
Facts:
Honeycomb Farms Corporation (Honeycomb Farms) was the registered
owner of two parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan, Masbate.
The Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), as the agency vested with the
responsibility of determining the land valuation and compensation for
parcels of land acquired pursuant to the CARL, 6 and using the
guidelines set forth in DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 17, series of
1989, as amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed the value of
these parcels of land.
When Honeycomb Farms rejected this valuation for being too low, the
Voluntary Offer to Sell was referred to the DAR Adjudication Board,
Region V, Legaspi City, for a summary determination of the market
value of the properties.
HELD:
As a final point, we have not failed to notice that the LBP in this case
made use of trust accounts to pay Honeycomb Farms. In Land Bank of
the Phil. v. CA, 29 this Court struck down as void DAR Administrative
Circular No. 9, Series of 1990, providing for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in
Section 16 (e) of RA 6657. We said: CSDcTH
It is very explicit . . . [from Section 16(e)] that the deposit must be
made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." Nowhere does it appear nor
can it be inferred that the deposit can be made in any other form. If it
were the intention to include a "trust account" among the valid modes
of deposit, that should have been made express, or at least, qualifying
words ought to have appeared from which it can be fairly deduced that
a "trust account" is allowed. In sum, there is no ambiguity in Section
16(e) of RA 6657 to warrant an expanded construction of the term
"deposit."
xxx xxx xxx
In the present suit, the DAR clearly overstepped the limits of its power
to enact rules and regulations when it issued Administrative Circular
No. 9. There is no basis in allowing the opening of a trust account in
behalf of the landowner as compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA 6657 is very specific that the
deposit must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds." In the same
vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54
because these implementing regulations cannot outweigh the clear
provision of the law. Respondent court therefore did not commit any
error in striking down Administrative Circular No. 9 for being null and
void.
Compulsory acquisition and notice requirements (Section 16)
DLR ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-05
PROCEDURES
1. Commencement
1.1. Commencement by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer
(PARO) After determination by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer (MARO) of the agricultural landholdings coverable under CARP
in his area of jurisdiction, he shall submit the list of these agricultural
landholdings to the PARO who shall prepare and send, through the
MARO, the NOC (CARP-LA Form No. 7) to the concerned LO.
1.2. Commencement by a party Any person may commence the
proceedings herein by filing a petition for coverage before the
Department of Land Reform (DLR) Central Office (DLRCO), DLR
Regional Office (DLRRO), DLR Provincial Office (DLRPO) or DLR
Municipal Office (DLRMO) of the region/province or municipality where
the subject landholding is located. The DLR office which received the
petition for coverage shall transmit or forward the same to the PARO
of the province where the subject landholding is located. The DLRPO,
through the MARO, shall validate the petition and shall issue the NOC,
if warranted. In the event that the result of the validation/evaluation
by the DLRMO/DLRPO is such that an NOC is not warranted, the
DLRPO shall forward its findings or that of the DLRMO to the DLRRO
for evaluation and issuance of an Order, treating the petition as an
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) case.
2. Posting of the NOC
The MARO shall post copies of the NOC for at least seven (7)
days in the bulletin boards or any conspicuous places in the
municipality/city and the barangay where the property is located and
thereafter issue the corresponding Certification of Posting Compliance
(CARP-LA Form No. 5).
3. By Whom the NOC is served
3.1. Upon receipt of a copy of the NOC and upon instruction by the
PARO (CARP-LA Form No. 8), the MARO where the subject landholding
is located or any DLR personnel officially authorized by the PARO shall
cause the service of the NOC to the LO in accordance with these rules.
3.2. If the LO's residence is outside the Philippines or unknown, the
MARO of the place where the subject landholding is located shall
submit a report of such fact or failure to notify the LO through the
regular mode of service to the PARO, and shall request the latter to
cause the publication of the NOC in a newspaper of general circulation.
4. Service of the NOC
4.1. General rule The NOC shall be addressed to and received by
the LO.
4.2. Service upon co-owners In case of co-ownership, the NOC
shall be served upon each and every co-owner, unless one is
specifically authorized to receive for the other co-owners. AHEDaI
4.3. Service upon minors or incompetents When the LO is a
minor, insane or otherwise incompetent, service shall be made upon
him personally and to his legal guardian if he has one, or if none, upon
his guardian ad litem whose appointment shall be applied for by the
DLR. In the case of a minor, service may also be made on his father
and/or mother.
4.4. Service upon entity without juridical personality When the
LOs who are persons associated in an entity without juridical
personality are sued under the name by which they are generally or
commonly known, service may be effected upon all the LOs by serving
upon any one of them, or upon the person in charge of the Office or
place of business maintained in such name. Such service shall not bind
individually any person whose connection with the entity has, upon
due notice, been severed before the proceeding was brought.
4.5. Service upon domestic private juridical entity When the LO
is a corporation, partnership or association organized under the laws of
the Philippines with a juridical personality, service may be made on the
president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, in-house counsel or administrator.
4.6. Service upon LO whose identity or whereabouts is unknown
In any proceeding where the LO is designated as an unknown owner,
or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may be effected upon him by
publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such places and for
such time as the DLR may order.
4.7. Extraterritorial service When the LO does not reside and is
not found in the Philippines, or when the LO ordinarily resides within
the Philippines but is temporarily out of the country, service may be
made by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the DLR may order.
5. Modes of Service:
5.1. Personal Service This is made by handing a copy of the NOC
to the LO in person, or if the LO refuses to receive and sign the NOC
for whatever reason, by tendering the same to him/her.
5.2. Substituted Service If personal service of the NOC cannot
be served directly to the LO within a reasonable time, service may be
made by leaving copies of the NOC at the LO's:
5.2.1. residence with some person of suitable age and discretion
residing therein; or
5.2.2. office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.
5.3. Service by Registered Mail if personal or substituted service
is not practicable, service by registered mail will be made to the last
known address of the LO. The registered mail envelope shall be
marked "DELIVER TO ADDRESSEE ONLY" and "RETURN TO SENDER"
if addressee has: MOVED OUT, UNKNOWN ADDRESS, REFUSED TO
ACCEPT OR INSUFFICIENT ADDRESS.
5.4. Service by publication If any of the preceding three (3)
modes of service fails, the NOC will be published once in a newspaper
of general circulation. A "RETURN TO SENDER" stamped on the
mailing envelope will serve as proof that the NOC was not received by
the LO. The publication need not state the entire contents of the NOC
but only the following essential particulars:
5.4.1. Complete name/s of the LO/all LOs and last known address, if
available;
5.4.2. Address or location of the subject landholding (barangay,
municipality/city, province);
5.4.3. The number of the Original or Transfer Certificate of Title (OCT
or TCT) or latest Tax Declaration (TD) covering the subject
landholding;
5.4.4. A declaration that the Republic of the Philippines shall cover the
subject landholding under CARP;
5.4.5. A reasonable period of thirty (30) days from publication date
within which the LO must file a response to the NOC, with a warning
that failure to do so within the period shall mean waiver of the
right/privilege to: apply for exemption/exclusion or choose the
retention area; nominate child/ren as preferred beneficiaries or submit
evidence for determining just compensation.
6. Proof of Service
6.1 Personal or substituted service The proof of service of the
NOC shall consist of:
6.1.1. Written admission of the LO served, or;
6.1.2. Official Return of the MARO or affidavit of the DLR personnel
serving, stating the following: the date, place and manner of service,
the papers, if any, which have been served with the process and name
of the person who received the same.
6.2 Proof of service by registered mail If service is made by
registered mail, proof may be made by the affidavit of the DLR
personnel effecting the mail and the registry receipt issued by the
mailing office. The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon
its receipt by the sender or in lieu thereof the unclaimed letter marked
"RETURN TO SENDER" stamped by then post office concerned or
together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice given by the
postmaster to the addressee.
6.3 Proof of service by publication If the service has been made
by publication, service may be proved by the following: 1) the
unclaimed or returned/unopened envelope referred to in paragraph 5.4
hereof; and 2) an affidavit of publication by the publisher or authorized
official together with a copy of the newspaper where the NOC
appeared.

7. Voluntary appearance The LO's voluntary appearance in the
proceedings shall be equivalent to service of NOC.
8. Notice of Field Investigation
Upon proof of service of the issuance of NOC, the MARO
sends to the LO an invitation letter for the conduct of field
investigation (CARP-LA Form No. 10).
Assoc. of Small Landowners:
Upheld validity of Sec. 16 RA 6657 (manner of acquisition of
private agricultural lands and ascertainment of just compensation).
Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that: Upon receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment, or in case of rejection or no
response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible
bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds
to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries
Sec. 16, RA 6657
The title of the section states: Procedure for Acquisition of
Private Lands.
Section 6, RA 9700
The title was amended: "SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition
and Distribution of Private Lands."
Confed v. DAR
Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in
compulsory acquisition is the identification of the
land, the landowners and the beneficiaries.
However, the law is silent on how the
identification process must be made.
Identification process in Sec. 16 is silent so DAR
filled gap (AO #12, s. 989)
Situation: Violation on the procedure of compulsory acquisition
proceedings
Roxas case : CLOA was not properly issued, DAR should be given
chance to validate (correct) proceedings.
-the violation does not give the court the power to nullify CLOA already
issued
Fortich case: CLOA was illegal & should be cancelled for being in
violation of law.
SIRs opinion: ROXAS should be controlling because the issue and the
ruling are in point. Fortich, in my opinion, is an obiter dictum because
there was already a judgment that became final and executor and this
was challenged before the SC. They have already reached a win-win
resolution and because of that, there was just one or two sentences
that talked about cancelling the illegal CLOA. But this conclusion was
pursuant to that final judgment.
Notice of Coverage:
Notifies landowner that his property shall be placed under
CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right;
Notifies him that a public hearing shall be conducted where
he and representatives of the concerned sectors of society
may attend to discuss the results of the field investigation,
the land valuation and other pertinent matters.
Also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his
landholding shall be conducted where he and the other
representatives may be present.
Notice of Acquisition:
The Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of
compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just
compensation offered by DAR.
Should the landowner accept the DAR's offered value, the
Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD) shall
prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the Order
of Acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply,
the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a
summary administrative hearing to determine just
compensation.
Immediately upon receipt of the DARAB's decision on just
compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the
Secretary for approval the required Order of Acquisition.
Upon the landowner's receipt of payment, in case of
acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated
bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary
shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to
issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the
property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall
take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified
beneficiaries.
RA 6657: Revolutionary kind of expropriation
affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long in excess of max retention limits;
intended for the benefit not only of a particular community
or of a small segment of the population but of the entire
Filipino nation, from all levels of our society, from the
impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner;
does not cover only the whole territory of this country but
goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future;
Constitution has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling
for "a just distribution" among the farmers of lands that
have heretofore been the prison of their dreams and
deliverance
Despite the revolutionary or non-traditional character of RA
6657, however, the chief limitations on the exercise of the
power of eminent domain, namely: (1) public use; and (2)
payment of just compensation, are embodied therein as well
as in the Constitution.
With respect to "public use, in Association of Small
Landowners declared that the requirement of public use had
already been settled by the Constitution itself as it "calls for
agrarian reform, which is the reason why private
agricultural lands are to be taken from their owners, subject
to the prescribed maximum retention limits.
On just compensation, judicial determination is expressly
prescribed in Section 57 of RA 6657 as it vests on the
Special Agrarian Courts original and exclusive jurisdiction
over all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners. It bears stressing that the determination of
just compensation during the compulsory acquisition
proceedings of Section 16 of RA 6657 is preliminary only,
court can review.
Section 16 (f) clearly provides:
(f)Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the
matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation
Application of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court?
Rules of Court, including Rule 67 thereof, is not completely
disregarded in the implementation of RA 6657 since the
Special Agrarian Courts, in resolving petitions for the
determination of just compensation, are enjoined to apply
the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court.
Section 58 of RA 6657, like Rule 67 of the Rules of Court,
provides for the appointment of commissioners by the
Special Agrarian Courts.
Sec. 58: may; motu proprio or instance of party
Rule 67: shall
Santos v. LBP :
Facts:
RTC required payment of compensation for petitioner's land
taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, to be made
in cash and bonds. According to petitioner, said order illegally
amended the judgment rendered which directs payment of
compensation to be made "in the manner provided in RA 6657.

SC:
Trial court decision directing payment of just compensation
in the manner provided by RA 6657 is not illegally amended but is
merely clarified by an order issued during execution proc that such
amount shall be paid in cash and bonds.
It is a matter of terminology because payment in cash and in bond are
the SAME in the manner provided by law.
Heirs of Deleste vs LBP
HELD:
On the violation of petitioners' right to due process of law
Petitioners contend that DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting
the subject property under the coverage of the agrarian reform
program; hence, their right to due process of law was violated.
We agree with petitioners. The importance of an actual notice in
subjecting a property under the agrarian reform program cannot be
underrated, as non-compliance with it trods roughshod with the
essential requirements of administrative due process of law.
It was incumbent upon the DAR to notify Deleste, being the landowner
of the subject property. It should be noted that the deed of sale
executed by Hilaria in favor of Deleste was registered on March 2,
1954, and such registration serves as a constructive notice to the
whole world that the subject property was already owned by Deleste
by virtue of the said deed of sale. In Naval v. CA, this Court held:
Applying the law, we held in Bautista v. Fule that the registration of an
instrument involving unregistered land in the Registry of Deeds creates
constructive notice and binds third person who may subsequently deal
with the same property.
It bears stressing that the principal purpose of registration is "to notify
other persons not parties to a contract that a transaction involving the
property has been entered into." 64 There was, therefore, no reason
for DAR to feign ignorance of the transfer of ownership over the
subject property.
Moreover, that DAR should have sent the notice to Deleste, and not to
the Nanamans, is bolstered by the fact that the tax declaration in the
name of Virgilio was already canceled and a new one issued in the
name of Deleste. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are
nonetheless "good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for
no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is
not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession."
Petitioners' right to due process of law was, indeed, violated when the
DAR failed to notify them that it is subjecting the subject property
under the coverage of the agrarian reform program.
Failure to notify owners violating section 16.
-Spouses Gregorio and Hilaria, childless. But the husband had a son
name Virgilio by another woman but was raised by the couple.
Gregorio also had two daughters, Esperanza and Caridad by still
another woman. Gregorio died. Hilaria and Virgilio sold the land to
Jose Deleste. Sale was notarized, registered, declaration was cancelled
and tax declaration was issued in the name of Deleste.
-DAR notified the heirs of Gregorio meaning that Deleste was not
notified.
SC: it was incumbent upon DAR to notify Deleste, he was the
landowner, sale was registered and tax declaration was already in the
name of Deleste.
- petitioners right to due process was indeed violated, DAR failed to
notify them.
- There can be no valid transfer of title should the CLTs are void,
cancellation of TCTs and OCTs are clearly warranted.
There was also another case where SC sanctioned the cancellation of
the title for violating Sec. 16.
1
CHAPTER VI COMPENSATION
Just Compensation:
full & fair equivalent of property taken from owner by
expropriation (Assoc. of Small Landowners). The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real,
substantial, full, ample.
Sec. 7, RA 9700:
"SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. In
determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the
value of the standing crop, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the
tax declarations, the assessment made by government assessors, and
seventy percent (70%) of the zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR), translated into a basic formula by the
DAR shall be considered, subject to the final decision of the proper
court. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers
and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well
as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government
financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation."
Assoc. of small landowners vs Hon. Secretary
JUST COMPENSATION; DEFINED. Just compensation is defined as
the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator.
LBP v. Dumlao
Facts:
Respondents are owners of agri lands covered under PD 27;
Determination of just compensation remained pending with
DAR, so they filed complaint with RTC for determination.
SC:
if just compensation was not settled prior to the passage of
RA No. 6657, it should be computed in accordance with said
law, although property was acquired under PD No. 27;
the determination made by the trial court, which relied solely
on the formula prescribed by PD No. 27 and EO No. 228, is
grossly erroneous. The amount of P6,912.50 per hectare,
which is based on the DAR valuation of the properties "at
the time of their taking in the 1970s", does not come close
to a full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
respondents;
CA's act of setting just compensation in the amount of
P109,000.00 would have been a valid exercise of this judicial
function, had it followed the mandatory formula prescribed
by RA No. 6657. However, the appellate court merely chose
the lower of two (2) values specified by the commissioner as
basis for determining just compensation, namely: (a)
P109,000.00 per hectare as the market value of first class
unirrigated rice land in the Municipality of Villaverde; and (b)
P60.00 per square meter as the zonal value of the land in
other barangays in Villaverde. This is likewise erroneous
because it does not adhere to the formula provided by RA
No. 6657.
It cannot be overemphasized that the just compensation to
be given to the owner cannot be assumed and must be
determined with certainty.
Section 17 was converted into a formula by the DAR through
AO No. 6, Series of 1992, as amended by AO No. 11, Series
of 1994:
Basic formula (Voluntary Offer to Sell) or [Compulsory
Acquisition] regardless of the date of offer or coverage of the
claim:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
 CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all the three factors are
present, relevant and applicable.
Note:
1. PD 27: uses average crop harvest as a consideration;
RA 6657: factors for consideration in determining just compensation.
2. RA 6657 for lands covered by PD 27 and just compensation has not
been determined at the time of passage of RA 6657 applies because
PD 27 and EO 228 have only suppletory effect.
Take into account the nature of land (i.e., irrigated), market value,
assessed value at the time of the taking, location (i.e., along
highway) and the volume and value of its produce, like:
(a) prevailing market value of in the area and
adjacent areas;
(b) presence and availability of an irrigation system to
augment and increase agricultural production;
(c) available comparable sales in the area;
(d) average harvests per hectare.
The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of
computing just compensation should be reckoned from the
issuance dates of the emancipation patents.
Why? EP constitutes the conclusive authority for the
issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the
grantee. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent
that the grantee can acquire the vested right of ownership in
the landholding, subject to the payment of just
compensation to the landowner.
However, their issuance dates are not shown. As such, the
trial court should determine the date of issuance of these
emancipation patents in order to ascertain the date of taking
and proceed to compute the just compensation due to
respondents.
Petitioners argument that respondents should not be paid
yet pending determination by DAR is specious.
To wait for the DAR valuation despite its unreasonable
neglect and delay in processing is to violate the elementary
rule that payment of just compensation must be within a
reasonable period from the taking of property;
Citing Cosculluela v. CA, just compensation means not only
the correct determination of the amount to be paid to the
owner of the land but also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered "just" for the property
owner is made to suffer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount
necessary to cope with his loss
PRINCIPLE: If an agri land is acquired under PD 27 but just
compensation has not been paid until RA 6657 took effect, just
compensation will be computed on the basis of the present law, NOT
under PD 27.
REASON: It is inequitable that just compensation should be
determined under PD 27 because just compensation is defined as the
full and ample value of the land to be given to the LO.
Under PD 27: only ONE factor in determining just compensation:
average crop harvest
Under the Present law: FACTORS (Section 17)
1. cost of acquisition
- Under Tax Law: basis either selling price or zonal evaluation
whichever is higher
2. current value of like properties
- case of Dumlao: factors were reduced into a formula by DAR.
Formula upheld by SC as valid
- value described in comparable sales
3. actual use & income & nature;
4. sworn valuation by owner;
5. tax declaration;
- assessed value, market value, and classification of land
6. assessment made by Government assessors.
Additional factors under Sec. 17 because of the amendment:
1. Value of the standing crop
2. Additional 70% of the zonal valuation of the BIR
Other additional factors under the Nable Case:
1. Farming experience
2. Thumb method
EFFECT if just compensation is not based on the factors: NOT VALID
- Even if the findings are based on the factors but not based
on any evidence in relation to the factors: evaluation is
without basis
You have decision from PARAD, do you need to go to RARAD or
DARAB before you can file a case with RTC? NO
- Sec. 57: Special Jurisdiction. The Special Agrarian
Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all
proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts, unless
modified by this Act.
- SAC refers to RTC
- Determination of DAR is only preliminary
- Sec 16 (f): the final determination of just compensation is
vested on the Special Agrarian Courts
Sps. Lee, vs. Land Bank of the Philippines,
Facts:
Petitioner were notified that their land holdings is covered by
Gov't Action Scheme pursuant to CARP. They received a notice of Land
valuation from DAR which offers P315, 307 for 3.195 hec. DAR
Adjudication Board affirmed the compensation and valuation and
declared that LBP fully complied with the criteria set forth by CARP.
Petitioners sought reconsideration but was denied. Petitioner filed a
petition for determination of Just Compensation before RTC. RTC
acting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC), citing appraisal report decided
P7,978,750.00 as just compensation and ordered LBP to pay.
Petition for review by LBP to CA and found that the SAC
made a wholesale adoption of the valuation of the appraisal company
and did not consider the other factors set forth in R.A. No. 6657 even
though the appraisal company admitted that it did not consider as
applicable the CARP valuation of the property. Hence, this petition.
Held:
The Court took note:
These factors have already been incorporated in a basic formula by
the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of R.A.
No. 6657. AO No. 5 precisely filled in the details of Section 17, R. A.
No. 6657 by providing a basic formula by which the factors mentioned
therein may be taken into account. This formula has to be considered
by the SAC in tandem with all the factors referred to in Section 17 of
the law. The administrative order provides:
A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered
by VOS or CA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where:
LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present,
relevant, and applicable.
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable,
the formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is
applicable, the formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed
the lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration or
within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by
LBP within one (1) year from receipt of claimfolder.
---
Where:
CNI=
(AGPxSP) - CO
.12
AGP= Average Gross Production corresponding to the latest available
12 months gross production immediately preceding the date of FI
(field investigation)
SP= Selling Price (the average of the latest available 12 months selling
prices prior to the date of receipt of the CF (claim folder) by LBP for
processing, such prices to be secured from the Department of
Agriculture (DA) and other appropriate regulatory bodies or, in their
absence, from the Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. If possible, SP data
shall be gathered for the barangay or municipality where the property
is located. In the absence thereof, SP may be secured within the
province or region.
CO = Cost of Operations
Whenever the cost of operations could not be obtained or verified, an
assumed net income rate (NIR) of 20% shall be used. Landholdings
planted to coconut which are productive at the time of FI shall
continue to use the assumed NIR of 70 %. DAR and LBP shall continue
to conduct joint industry studies to establish the applicable NIR for
each crop covered under CARP.
0.12 = Capitalization rate
The Court finds that the factors required by the law and
enforced by the DAR Administrative Order were not observed by the
SAC when it adopted wholeheartedly the valuation arrived at in the
appraisal report. The Court repremands the case to the RTC acting as
a Special Agrarian Court for the determination of just compensation in
accordance with Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6657.
Sps. Lee v. LBP
If valuation is based not on the factors, it is not valid .
(Note that in this case, there was admission that valuation
was not based on factors under CARL: a representative of the
company admitted that it did not consider the CARP valuation to be
applicable).
Case remanded.
Land Bank of the Phils. vs. Heirs of Eleuterio Cruz,
Facts:
Landholding of the respondents was placed under the
coverage of the land transfer program of P.D. 27. Petitioner pegged
the value of the acquired landholding at P106,935.76 based on the
guidelines set forth under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. 228. Respondents
petitioned for valuation and determination of just compensation before
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator which fixed it to P80,000.00
per hectare. Motion for Reconsideration was denied so the Petitioner
petition for the determination of just compensation before the RTC
acting as SAC held that the value of P80,000.00 per hectare fixed by
the PARAD should be accorded weight and probative value and that
the SAC is guided by the various factors enumerated in Section 17of
R.A. No. 6657 in determining just compensation. It disregarded
respondents' claim that the valuation should be based on the current
market value of the landholding since no evidence was adduced in
support of the claim and also did not accept petitioner's valuation as it
was based on P.D. No. 27, in which just compensation was determined
at the time of the taking of the property. CA rendered the assailed
decision partly granting petitioner's appeal but affirmed the SAC
decision fixing just compensation at P80,000.00 per hec.
Reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition, arguing that
the formula set forth in P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 should be applied in
fixing just compensation since respondents' landholding was acquired
under P.D. No. 27 in cognizance to a settled rule that just
compensation is the value of the property at the time of the taking, on
21 October 1972.
Held:
The Court citing Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by PD No. 27 and EO 228 considering
the DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a
considerable length of time. That just compensation should be
determined in accordancewithRA6657,and not PD 27 or EO 228, is
especially imperative considering that just compensation should be the
full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
The Court remanded the determination of just compensation
to RTC acting as SAC.
LBP v. Heirs of Cruz
If valuation is not based on any evidence, it is w/o basis, so
determination be remanded.
In this case, decision of PARAD and SAC points to no
evidence, so case was remanded.
Is prior recourse to DARAB necessary before case for determination of
JC may be filed?
No:
(a) because DAR may continue to alienate the lots during
the pendency of protest;
(b) Sec. 57 of RA 6657 states that SAC has orig and
exclusive jurisdiction.
Content and Manner (Section 18)
Sec. 18 speaks of cash or shares of stock, tax credits or LBP
bonds.
Is this not violation of usual way of payment in cash?
No, because revolutionary kind.
Parties involved (Section 18)
LBP vs. Jocson and sons
Facts:
The property was placed under the coverage of the government's
Operation Land Transfer 2 (OLT) pursuant to Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 27 3 and awarded to the tenant-beneficiaries by the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), which valued the compensation
therefor in the total amount of P250,563.80 following the formula
prescribed in P.D. No. 27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228. 4
The valuation was later increased to P903,637.03 after computing the
6% annual interest increment 5 due on the property per DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994, which amount respondent
withdrew in 1997, without prejudice to the outcome of the case it had
filed hereunder to fix just compensation.
Finding the DAR's offer of compensation for the property to be grossly
inadequate, respondent filed a complaint 6 on July 18, 1997 before the
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Br. 46, sitting as a Special
Agrarian Court (SAC), against the Land Bank (petitioner), 7 the DAR,
and the tenant-beneficiaries, for "Determination and Fixing of Just
Compensation for the Acquisition of Land and Payment of Rentals".
In their respective Answers, petitioner and the DAR claimed that the
property was acquired by the government under its OLT program and
their valuation thereof constituted just compensation, having been
made pursuant to the guidelines set by E.O. No. 228 and P.D. No. 27.
In arriving at the just compensation, the SAC adopted a higher
valuation (P93,657.00/hectare) which the DAR had applied to a similar
landholding belonging to one Pablo Estacion adjacent to respondent's.
Issue:
Whether the SAC erred in the valuation the land
HELD:
In the recent case of Land Bank of the Philippines v. Chico, 27 the
Court declared in no uncertain terms that R.A. No. 6657 is the relevant
law for determining just compensation after noting several decided
cases where the Court found it more equitable to determine just
compensation based on the value of the property at the time of
payment. This was a clear departure from the Court's earlier stance in
Gabatin v. Land Bank of the Philippines where it declared that the
reckoning period for the determination of just compensation is the
time when the land was taken applying P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228.
P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228 vis a vis R.A. No. 6657 was applied to cases
involving lands placed under the coverage of P.D. No. 27/E.O. No. 228
where payment of just compensation had not been completed. When
in the interim R.A. No. 6657 was passed before the full payment of
just compensation, as in the case at bar, the provisions of R.A. No.
6657 on just compensation control.
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation based
on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the DAR's
failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable length of
time. That just compensation should be determined in accordance with
RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially imperative considering
that just compensation should be the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator, the equivalent
being real, substantial, full and ample.
LBP vs Livioco
Facts:
Respondent Enrique Livioco (Livioco) was the owner of 30.6329
hectares of sugarland 6 located in Dapdap, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
Sometime between 1987 and 1988, 7 Livioco offered his sugarland to
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for acquisition under the
CARP at P30.00 per square meter, for a total of P9,189,870.00. The
voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) form 8 he submitted to the DAR indicated
that his property is adjacent to residential subdivisions and to an
international paper mill.
The DAR referred Livioco's offer to the LBP for valuation. Following
Section 17 of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 and DAR Administrative
Order No. 17, series of 1989, 11 as amended by Administrative Order
No. 3, series of 1991, 12 the LBP set the price at P3.21 per square
meter or a total of P827,943.48 for 26 hectares. Livioco was then
promptly informed of the valuation 14 and that the cash portion of the
claim proceeds have been "kept in trust pending [his] submission of
the [ownership documentary] requirements." 15 It appears however
that Livioco did not act upon the notice given to him by both
government agencies. On September 20, 1991, LBP issued a
certification to the Register of Deeds of Pampanga that it has
earmarked the amount of P827,943.48 as compensation for Livioco's
26 hectares.
It was only two years later 17 that Livioco requested for a reevaluation
of the compensation on the ground that its value had already
appreciated from the time it was first offered for sale. 18 The request
was denied by Regional Director Antonio Nuesa on the ground that
there was already a perfected sale.
Unable to recover his property but unwilling to accept what he believes
was an outrageously low valuation of his property, Livioco finally filed
a petition for judicial determination of just compensation against DAR,
LBP, and the CLOA holders.
In this Petition before us, LBP assails the CA's assent to the valuation
of Livioco's property as a residential land. It maintains that it is not the
State's policy to purchase residential land. Since the property was
acquired under the CARP, it had to be valued as an agricultural land.
Issue
Was the compensation for respondent's property determined in
accordance with law?
HELD:
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at
the time of taking. 68 There are three important concepts in this
definition the character of the property, its price, and the time of
actual taking.
The lower courts erred in ruling that the character or use of the
property has changed from agricultural to residential, because there is
no allegation or proof that the property was approved for conversion
to other uses by DAR. It is the DAR that is mandated by law to
evaluate and to approve land use conversions 73 so as to prevent
fraudulent evasions from agrarian reform coverage. Even
reclassification 74 and plans for expropriation 75 by local government
units (LGUs) will not ipso facto convert an agricultural property to
residential, industrial or commercial. Thus, in the absence of any DAR
approval for the conversion of respondent's property or an actual
expropriation by an LGU, it cannot be said that the character or use of
said property changed from agricultural to residential. Respondent's
property remains agricultural and should be valued as such. Hence,
the CA and the trial court had no legal basis for considering the subject
property's value as residential.
Respondent's evidence of the value of his land as residential property
(which the lower courts found to be preponderant) could, at most,
refer to the potential use of the property. While the potential use of an
expropriated property is sometimes considered in cases where there is
a great improvement in the general vicinity of the expropriated
property, it should never control the determination of just
compensation (which appears to be what the lower courts have
erroneously done). The potential use of a property should not be the
principal criterion for determining just compensation for this will be
contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair market value of an
expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at
the time of taking, not its potential uses. If at all, the potential use of
the property or its "adaptability for conversion in the future is a factor,
not the ultimate in determining just compensation." 77
The proper approach should have been to value respondent's property
as an agricultural land, which value may be adjusted in light of the
improvements in the Municipality of Mabalacat. Valuing the property as
a residential land (as the lower courts have done) is not the correct
approach, for reasons explained above. It would also be contrary to
the social policy of agrarian reform, which is to free the tillers of the
land from the bondage of the soil without delivering them to the new
oppression of exorbitant land valuations. Note that in lands acquired
under RA 6657, it is the farmer-beneficiaries who will ultimately pay
the valuations paid to the former land owners (LBP merely advances
the payment). 78 If the farmer-beneficiaries are made to pay for lands
valued as residential lands (the valuation for which is substantially
higher than the valuation for agricultural lands), it is not unlikely that
such farmers, unable to keep up with payment amortizations, will be
forced to give up their landholdings in favor of the State or be driven
to sell the property to other parties. This may just bring the State right
back to the starting line where the landless remain landless and the
rich acquire more landholdings from desperate farmers.
LO tried to prove that lot was residential not agricultural for higher just
compensation. There were several evidences presented by owner;
certification from the municipal planning office, zoning, HLURB, etc.
SC: No clearance from DAR. No allegation or proof that there was a
conversion clearance from agri to residential. That means that the land
has to be valued as agricultural land, NOT residential.

DISCUSSION: Do you need conversion clearance? SIR: IMO, no more.
- You need conversion clearance for purposes of real property
tax in LGU
- Or assurance from DAR that your land is not covered under
DAR because the use is not anymore for agricultural activity
- Under sec. 17, no factor of conversion but actual use of the
land
LBP vs Honeycomb
HELD: We reiterated the mandatory application of the formula in the
applicable DAR administrative regulations in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Lim, 24 Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heirs of Eleuterio
Cruz, 25 and Land Bank of the Philippines v. Barrido. 26 In Barrido, we
were explicit in stating that:
While the determination of just compensation is essentially a judicial
function vested in the RTC acting as a Special Agrarian Court, the
judge cannot abuse his discretion by not taking into full consideration
the factors specifically identified by law and implementing rules.
Special Agrarian Courts are not at liberty to disregard the formula laid
down in DAR A.O. No. 5, series of 1998, because unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to
apply it. The courts cannot ignore, without violating the agrarian law,
the formula provided by the DAR for the determination of just
compensation.
Valuation and Payment (Section 18)
FORMS OF PAYMENT
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by
the landowner and the DAR and LBP or as may be finally determined
by the court as just compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes at the
option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage
is concerned - Twenty-five percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid
in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares
- Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance to be paid in government
financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below - Thirty-five percent
(35%) cash, the balance to be paid in government financial
instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled
corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other qualified
investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten
percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds shall mature every year
from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That
should the landowner choose to forego the cash portion, whether in
full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by
the landowner, his successors-in-interest or his assigns, up to the
amount of their face value for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government,
including assets under the Assets Privatization Program and other
assets foreclosed by government financial institution in the same
province or region where the lands for which the bonds were paid are
situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled
corporations or shares or stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of
accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution,
provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested in an economic
enterprise, preferably in a small and medium-scale industry, in the
same province or region as the land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to the government: Provided,
That the use of these bonds for these purposes will be limited to a
certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial
instrument: Provided, further, That the PARC shall determine the
percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government universities, colleges, trade schools and
other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original
bondholder in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
In case of extraordinary inflation, the PARC shall take
appropriate measures to protect the economy.
LO can withdraw
LBP vs Darab
- the valuation made by PARAB was rejected by the
landowners, After re-computation upon order of PARAD, a revaluated
amount was made but Los still found it low. Los appealed to DARAB,.
Pending resolution of their appeal Los interposed a Motion to Withdraw
Amended Valuation seeking the release to tem of the amount
representing the difference between the initial value.
SC- the need to allow the landowners to withdraw immediately the
amount deposited in their behalf, pending final determination of what
is just compensation for their land
- it is a an oppressive exercise of eminent domain if you do
not allow withdraw
- it is unnecessary to distinguish between provisional
compensation under Section 16 (e) and final compensation under
Section 18 for the purposes of exercising the landowners right to
appropriate the same. The immediate effect in other situations in the
same, the landowner is deprived of the use and possession of his
property for which he should be fairly and immediately compensated.
SC invalidated LBPs practice of opening trust accounts in favor of the
landowner.
In case the amount has already been deposited, even if the landowner
questions the accuracy or the validity of the amount deposited and will
thereafter file with the RTC for determination of just compensation,
the LO can withdraw the amount deposited. Part of his right to just
compensation
It should be deposited in the name of the landowner, not trust
accounts (trust accounts not expressly stated in Sec. 18)
Heirs of Lorenzo vs. LBP
- Petitioner are owners of land; first valuation was rejected
but upon re-computation and order of RRAD, the revaluation was
accepted by owners LBP filed MR but denied, LBP filed an opposition
for determination of JC with the RTC
- Petitioner submit that LBP has no legal personality
- SEC 18, clearly states there should be a consensus among
- LBP is an indispensable party in expropriation proceedings
under RA 6657 and thus has the legal personality to question the
determination.

There are cases where LBP is the plaintiff of an RTC Case.
FACTS: LBP did not agree with the computation of RARAD. Landbank
filed the case in RTC. Challenged by the petitioners that LBP has no
legal personality to institute the agrarian case.
Is it possible that LBP and DAR cannot agree with the evaluation? YES
- WHY? Implementation of the program is with DAR in the
EXECUTIVE aspect. There is another aspect of DAR which is
quasi-judicial.
- Probably, LBP coordinates with DAR in the implementation
aspect but LBP cannot dictate the quasi-judicial aspect
SC: these are the parties involving just compensation under Sec. 18.:
Landowner, DAR, and LBP. LBP is not merely a nominal party but is
indispensable, independent of DAR.
DAR vs Heirs of Domingo
Facts:
The late Angel T. Domingo (Domingo) is the registered owner of a
70.3420-hectare rice land situated at Macapabellag, Guimba, Nueva
Ecija, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT-97157.
On October 21, 1972, Presidential Decree No. 27 2 (P.D. No. 27) was
issued, pursuant to which actual tenant farmers of private agricultural
lands devoted to rice and corn were deemed as full owners of the land
they till. The land transfer program under P.D. No. 27 was
subsequently implemented by Executive Order No. 228.
On April 26, 2000, Domingo filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Guimba, Nueva Ecija a complaint for determination and payment of
just compensation against the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and
DAR.
Domingo opposed the said valuation and claimed that the just
compensation for the subject land should be computed using the
parameters set forth under Republic Act No. 6657 4 (R.A. No. 6657).
The LBP and DAR disputed Domingo's valuation and claimed that the
determination of just compensation should be governed by the
provisions of P.D. No. 27 in relation to E.O. No. 228.
ISSUE:
Whether the method set forth under R.A. No. 6657 in the computation
of just compensation may be applied to private agricultural lands taken
by the government under the auspices of P.D. No. 27 in relation to
E.O. No. 228.
HELD:
Under the factual circumstances of this case, the agrarian reform
process is still incomplete as the just compensation to be paid private
respondents has yet to be settled. Considering the passage of Republic
Act No. 6657 (RA 6657) before the completion of this process, the just
compensation should be determined and the process concluded under
the said law. Indeed, RA 6657 is the applicable law, with PD 27 and
EO 228 having only suppletory effect, conformably with our ruling in
Paris v. Alfeche.
xxx xxx xxx
It would certainly be inequitable to determine just compensation
based on the guideline provided by PD 27 and EO 228 considering the
DAR's failure to determine the just compensation for a considerable
length of time. That just compensation should be determined in
accordance with RA 6657, and not PD 27 or EO 228, is especially
imperative considering that just compensation should be the full and
fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator, the equivalent being real, substantial, full and ample.
Same Principle with Dumlao Case: Based on RA 6657 not PD 27: Basis:
Equity
Content and manner of compensation
Sec. 18 speaks of cash or shares of stock, tax credits, or LBP bonds
Is this not violation of usual way of payment in cash?
- No, because revolutionary kind and also practicality (Gov.
will go bankrupt if we rely on the ordinary expropriation
which is all in cash)
- Cash usually only 25-30%
- LBP bonds usually spreads/matures in 10 years. (gives the
Gov time)
Assoc. of small landowners vs Hon. Sec.
We do not deal here with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a
specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the
State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we
deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The
expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever
found and of whatever kind as long as they are in excess of the
maximum retention limits allowed their owners. Such a program will
involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because payment is made in shares
of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other
things of value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Therefore, payment of the just compensation is not always required to
be made fully in money.
Parties Involved (Section 18)
Land Bank v. CA:
The parties are DAR, landowner and LBP. The law does not
mention the participation of farmer-beneficiary.
So consent of farmer-beneficiary is not required in
establishing proper compensation.
Voluntary offer (Section 19)
Section 19 provides for additional 5% cash payment if LO
voluntarily offers land for sale.
Voluntary land transfer (Secs. 20 and 21)
How is VLT made?
Sec. 20 LO may enter into voluntary arrangement for direct transfer
to qualified beneficiaries but subject to guidelines (i.e., all notices for
VLT be submitted to DAR within 1st year of implementation of CARP,
terms and conditions shall not be less favorable to transferee).
Sec. 21 direct payment may be made in cash or kind by ARB under
terms mutually agreed and which shall be binding upon registration
and approval by DAR.
Sec. 44 (2) provides that PARCOM shall recommend to
PARC the adoption of direct payment scheme. So, AO #2, s.
1995 was issued:
Beneficiaries are determined by DAR;
Area to be transferred to ARB should not be less than the
area which the govt would otherwise acquire;
CLOAs should bear proper annotations.
END OF MIDTERM (But take note of SEC. 27 on page 37 apil
sa exam)
Room 405
- Except no. 3 LBP vs. Nable
- Not including payment of interest (3 cases)
- Nable not included
- Sec. 27 (Carper) transferability, how many years is the prohibited
period? 4 exceptions?
- agricultural activity, agrarian dispute, agricultural land (read
all the cases) concentrate here
- ra 3844: focus on in case of death of lessee, who will assume
cultivation; grounds to dispossess lessee; 2 cases (Po and Sta. Ana
cases)
- sec. 10 (c) exceptions and exemptions; esp. Central Mindanao Case
- association of small landowners: revolutionary kind of expro:
justification of the SC
- sec. 16: procedure on compulsory acquisition (heirs of Trinidad:
correct payment of deposit)
- Livioco: Landowner tried to prove that land is residential. There were
several evidences, etc SC: no clearance from DAR. Land is valued as
Agricultural land.
- sec. 6 homestead (note the important qualifications) (cases: Alita and
Paris vs. Alfeche)
- Dumlao case: just compensation PD RA 6657: computed on the
basis of the present law
- landbank of the phil: whether it has legal personality to file a case
before RTC involving just compensation?
- Ways of distribution of lands to qualified beneficiaries (Chapter 3):
voluntary offer (sec.20), compulsory (Sec. 16), non-land transfer
schemes (SDO, Leasehold operation- sec.12)
- type: 60 (mcq) -40
Additional from Francis
- Confed vs. DAR (2 chief limitations)
- 6 requisites of agrarian dispute (know different principles of the case)
- definition of agricultural land (Alangilan case)
- Sec. 16: (heirs of deleste): correct amount to be deposited by
landbank
- preliminary determination of just compensation by DAR vs. RTC as
special agrarian court
- sec. 16: notice of acquisition (who is to be notified): heirs of Trinidad
case
Payment in interest in just compensation
Apo Fruits corp. vs CA
Facts:
On October 12, 1995, AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell the lands
subject of this case pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law, or CARL). The Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) referred their voluntary-offer-to-sell (VOS) applications to Land
Bank for initial valuation. Land Bank fixed the just compensation at
P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and
P164,478,178.14, for HPI. The valuation was rejected, however,
prompting Land Bank, upon the advice of DAR, to open deposit
accounts in the names of the petitioners, and to credit in said accounts
the sums of P26,409,549.86 (AFC) and P45,481,706.76 (HPI). Both
petitioners withdrew the amounts in cash from the accounts, but
afterwards, on February 14, 1997, they filed separate complaints for
determination of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB).
When DARAB did not act on their complaints for determination of just
compensation after more than three years, the petitioners filed
complaints for determination of just compensation with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Tagum City, Branch 2, acting as a special agrarian
court (SAC), docketed as Agrarian Cases No. 54-2000 and No. 55-
2000. Summonses were served on May 23, 2000 to Land Bank and
DAR, which respectively filed their answers on July 26, 2000 and
August 18, 2000. The RTC conducted a pre-trial, and appointed
persons it considered competent, qualified and disinterested as
commissioners to determine the proper valuation of the properties.
The RTC rendered its decision:
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM and/or LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, thru its Land Valuation Office, to pay jointly and
severally the Commissioners' fees herein taxed as part of the costs
pursuant to Section 12, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
equivalent to, and computed at Two and One-Half (2 1/2) percent of
the determined and fixed amount as the fair, reasonable and just
compensation of plaintiffs' land and standing crops plus interest
equivalent to the interest of the 91-Day Treasury Bills from date of
taking until full payment;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the interest was validly imposed.
HELD:
It is true that Land Bank sought to appeal the RTC's decision to the
CA, by filing a notice of appeal; and that Land Bank filed in March
2003 its petition for certiorari in the CA only because the RTC did not
give due course to its appeal. Any intervening delay thereby entailed
could not be attributed to Land Bank, however, considering that
assailing an erroneous order before a higher court is a remedy
afforded by law to every losing party, who cannot thus be considered
to act in bad faith or in an unreasonable manner as to make such
party guilty of unjustified delay. As stated in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Kumassie Plantation: 18 HAcaCS
The mere fact that LBP appealed the decisions of the RTC and the
Court of Appeals does not mean that it deliberately delayed the
payment of just compensation to KPCI. . . . It may disagree with DAR
and the landowner as to the amount of just compensation to be paid
to the latter and may also disagree with them and bring the matter to
court for judicial determination. This makes LBP an indispensable party
in cases involving just compensation for lands taken under the
Agrarian Reform Program, with a right to appeal decisions in such
cases that are unfavorable to it. Having only exercised its right to
appeal in this case, LBP cannot be penalized by making it pay for
interest.
It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest on the just compensation
is imposed only in case of delay in the payment thereof which must be
sufficiently established. Given the foregoing, we find that the
imposition of interest on the award of just compensation is not
justified and should therefore be deleted.
It must be emphasized that "pertinent amounts were deposited in
favor of AFC and HPI within fourteen months after the filing by the
latter of the Complaint for determination of just compensation before
the RTC". It is likewise true that AFC and HPI already collected P149.6
and P262 million, respectively, representing just compensation for the
subject properties. Clearly, there is no unreasonable delay in the
payment of just compensation which should warrant the award of 12%
interest per annum in AFC and HPI's favor.
APO: GR: When it comes to just compensation, there is no interest to
be imposed.
EX: in case of delay on the basis of Art. 2209
- How do you appreciate delay? Depending on the FACTS
Apo: Rate of interest is 12%. in relation to damages (2209) as in
forbearance of money
- Already amended from 12%- 6% per annum (July 2013)
- But per jurisprudence, 12% per annum
Soriano: rate of interest is 6%
- Based on admin order issued by DAR: that the rates of
interest to be imposed on lands acquired under PD 27 is 6%
- Not the issue in the case but is the reckoning point (from
where 6% should be imposed)
- LBP: reckoned from the date of taking (advantageous to
government)
- SC: NO! should be reckoned from the payment of just
compensation.
LBP vs Soriano
Facts:
Domingo and Mamerto Soriano (respondents) are the registered
owners of several parcels of rice land situated in Oas, Albay. Out of the
18.9163 hectares of land 3 owned by the respondents, 18.2820
hectares were placed under the Operations Land Transfer and the
CARP pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 4 and Republic Act No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 5
The LBP 6 pegged the value of 18.0491 hectares of land at
P482,363.95 7 (P133,751.65 as land value plus P348,612.30
incremental interest), while the remaining 0.2329 hectare was
computed at P8,238.94. 8 Not satisfied with the valuation,
respondents, on 23 November 2000, instituted a Complaint 9 for
judicial determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial
Court of Legazpi City, 10 sitting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC).
Respondents alleged that they are entitled to an amount of not less
than P4,500,000.00 as just compensation. 11
On 21 February 2005, the SAC rendered a judgment, ordering LBP to
pay the respondents P894,584.94. The dispositive portion reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the just compensation of the 18.0491 hectares of
irrigated riceland is P133,751.79, plus increment of 6% per annum
computed annually beginning October 21, 1972, until the value is fully
paid, and of the 0.2329 hectare of rain fed riceland is P8,238.94 plus
12% interest per annum, beginning August 17, 1998, until the value is
fully paid or a total of P894,584.94 as of this date. Land Bank is
ordered to pay the landowners Domingo Soriano and Mamerto Soriano
said amount/land value in accordance with law.
Both parties disagreed with the trial court's valuation, prompting them
to file their respective appeals with the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, however, affirmed the judgment of the trial court. It also upheld
the award of compounded interest, thus:
In the case at bar, the subject lands were taken under PD 27 and were
covered by Operation Land Transfer, making the aforecited
Administrative Order applicable.
HELD:
In the instant case, while the subject lands were acquired under
Presidential Decree No. 27, the complaint for just compensation was
only lodged before the court on 23 November 2000 or long after the
passage of Republic Act No. 6657 in 1988. Therefore, Section 17 of
Republic Act No. 6657 should be the principal basis of the computation
for just compensation. As a matter of fact, the factors enumerated
therein had already been translated into a basic formula by the DAR
pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of Republic Act
No. 6657.
The award of interest until full payment of just compensation is to
ensure prompt payment. Moreover, respondents claim that the date
LBP approves the payment of the land transfer claim and deposits the
proceeds in the name of the landowner is not tantamount to actual
payment because on said date, the release of the amount is
conditioned on certain requirements.
Note: RA 6657 12%
PD 27 6%
LBP vs Rivera
Facts:
The respondents are the co-owners of a parcel of agricultural land
embraced by Original Certificate of Title No. P-082, and later
transferred in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
95690 that was placed under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27 in 1972. Only 18.8704 hectares
of the total area of 20.5254 hectares were subject of the coverage.
After the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) directed payment, LBP
approved the payment of P265,494.20, exclusive of the advance
payments made in the form of lease rental amounting to P75,415.88
but inclusive of 6% increment of P191,876.99 pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.
On 1 December 1994, the respondents instituted Civil Case No. 94-03
for determination and payment of just compensation before the
Regional Trial Court.
LBP filed its answer, stating that rice and corn lands placed under the
coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27 7 were governed and valued in
accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 228 8 as
implemented by DAR Administrative Order No. 2, Series of 1987 and
other statutes and administrative issuances; that the administrative
valuation of lands covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 and Executive
Order No. 228 rested solely in DAR and LBP was the only financing
arm; that the funds that LBP would use to pay compensation were
public funds to be disbursed only in accordance with existing laws and
regulations; that the supporting documents were not yet received by
LBP; and that the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 27 and
Executive Order No. 228 was already settled.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 19 we affirmed the award of 12%
interest on just compensation due to the landowner. The court
decreed:
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be
the sum equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly
described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition or the fair
value of the property as between one who receives, and one who
desires to sell, if fixed at the time of the actual taking by the
government. Thus, if property is taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the court having jurisdiction
over the case, the final compensation must include interest on
its just value to be computed from the time the property is
taken to the time when compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine, between the taking of the
property and the actual payment, legal interests accrue in
order to place the owner in a position as good as (but not
better than) the position he was in before the taking occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979 decision, was correct in imposing
interest on the zonal value of the property to be computed from the
time petitioner instituted condemnation proceedings and "took" the
property in September 1969. This allowance of interest on the amount
found to be the value of the property as of the time of the taking
computed, being an effective forbearance, at 12% per annum should
help eliminate the issue of the constant fluctuation and inflation of the
value of the currency over time.
Voluntary Offer for Sale (Section 19)
SEC. 19. Incentives for Voluntary Offers for Sale. - Landowners other
than banks and other financial institutions who voluntarily offer their
lands for sale shall be entitled to an additional five percent (5%) cash
payment.
NOTE: Under CARPER, there is no more voluntary offer. Only
compulsory acquisition
Voluntary Transfer (Section 20 and 21)
SEC. 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. - Landowners of agricultural lands
subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a voluntary
arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries
subject to the following guidelines:
(a) All notices for voluntary land transfer must be submitted to the
DAR within the first year of the implementation of the CARP.
Negotiations between the landowners and qualified beneficiaries
covering any voluntary land transfer which remain unresolved after
one (1) year shall not be recognized and such land shall instead be
acquired by the government and transferred pursuant to this Act.
(b) The terms and conditions of such transfer shall not be less
favorable to the transferee than those of the government's standing
offer to purchase from the landowner and to resell to the beneficiaries,
if such offers have been made and are fully known to both parties.
(c) The voluntary agreement shall include sanctions for non-
compliance by either party and shall be duly recorded and its
implementation monitored by the DAR.
SEC. 21. Payment of Compensation by Beneficiaries Under Voluntary
Land Transfer.- Direct payment in cash or in kind may be made by the
farmer-beneficiary to the landowner under terms to be mutually
agreed upon by both parties, which shall be binding upon them, upon
registration with and approval by the DAR. Said approval shall be
considered given, unless notice of disapproval is received by the
farmer-beneficiary within 30 days from the date of registration. In the
event they cannot agree on the price of the land, the procedure for
compulsory acquisition as provided in Section 16 shall apply. The LBP
shall extend financing to the beneficiaries for purposes of acquiring the
land.
Chapter VII
Distribution of lands to landless residents (will not be included in the
Midterms)
- Defined under Sec. 2: Landless resident does not
necessarily mean that a person does not own a land. One
can be considered landless for purposes of CARP if that
person does not own more than 3 hectares of land.
QUALIFIED BENEFICIARIES
(1) The lands covered by the CARP shall be distributed as much as
possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or in the absence
thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the following
order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land;
Previous law: there is no provision that (a) and (b) should be
prioritized
Amendment: they are prioritized of that same landholding up to a
maximum of 3 hectares each.
(2) The children of landowners who are qualified shall be given
preference in the distribution of the land of their parents.
(3) Actual tenant-tillers in the landholding shall not be ejected or
removed therefrom.
(4) Beneficiaries under Presidential Decree No.27 who have culpably
sold, disposed of, or abandoned their lands are disqualified to become
beneficiaries under the Program.
(5) A basic qualification of a beneficiary shall be his willingness,
aptitude, and ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as
possible.
Presupposing that the beneficiary has registered with the department.
(6) If, due to the landowners retention rights or to the number of
tenants, lessees, or workers on the land, there is not enough land to
accommodate any or some of them, they may be granted ownership of
other lands available for distribution under the Act, at the option of the
beneficiaries.
(8) No qualified beneficiary may own more than three (3) hectares of
agricultural land. (Sec. 23)
Beneficiaries to be awarded with the land of Polo Coconut were
questioned by Polo Coconut.
Polo: these beneficiaries are not tenants of our land thus not qualified.
SC: it is DAR who is mandated to select CARP beneficiaries.
Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants
of the landowners. Thus, the DAR cannot be deemed to have
committed grave abuse of discretion simply because its chosen
beneficiaries were not tenants of PCPCI (DAR vs. Polo Coconut
Plantation Co., In., et al., G.R. 168787, September 3, 2008).
Award Ceiling Limit (Section 23)
SEC. 23. Distribution Limit. - No qualified beneficiary may own more
than three (3) hectares of agricultural land.
AWARD TO BENEFICIARIES
Ownership of the beneficiary shall be evidenced by a
Certificate of Land Ownership Award, which shall contain the
restrictions and conditions provided for in the Act, and shall
be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and
annotated on the Certificate of Title. (Sec. 24)
Same principle of indefeasibility and imprescriptibility after one year
from registration due to the amendment (RA 9700)
If there is certification of deposit, it is the ministerial duty of the RD.
Issuance of CARP Beneficiary Certificate
When certificate issued. Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657
provides that the rights and responsibilities of the beneficiary
shall commence from the time the DAR makes an award of
the land to him, which award shall be completed within 180
days from the time the DAR takes actual possession of the
land. Ownership of the lands by the beneficiary shall be
evidenced by an Emancipation Patent (EP) or a Certificate of
Land Ownership Award (CLOA), which shall contain the
restrictions, and conditions provided by law and which shall
be recorded in the Register of Deeds concerned and
annotated on the Certificate of Title.
If there is no CLOA yet (for any reason), beneficiary will be issued
CARP Beneficiary Certificate.
Beneficiaries are required to pay LBP in 30 annual amortizations with
6% interest per annum.
In several instances, however, the EP or CLOA cannot be immediately
issued pending the fulfillment of certain legal and administrative
requirements. Examples of these are:
(a) The Supreme Court ruling in the case of Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
(G.R. No. 76742, 14,July 1989.) that title to all expropriated properties
shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective landowners;
(b) The conduct of subdivision surveys to define the specific parcel of
land being awarded through the EP or CLOA.
Cont. of Issuance of CARP Beneficiary Certificate (1)
Thus, pending the fulfillment of the said requirements, the
identified beneficiaries may already be in possession of the
land but still have no EP or CLOA therefor. For this reason,
the DAR shall first issue a CARP Beneficiary Certificate (CBC)
to provide the would-be beneficiaries, an intermediate
document to evidence that they have been identified and
have qualified as agrarian reform beneficiaries under the
CARP. Moreover, aside from attesting to the inchoate right
of the identified beneficiary to be awarded the land or
portion thereof, the CBC issued shall entitle the recipient to
receive support services under the CARP.
PAYMENT BY BENEFICIARIES
(1)Lands awarded pursuant to the Act shall be paid for by the
beneficiaries to the LBP in thirty (30) annual amortization at 6%
interest per annum subject to the following rules:
 (a) The payments for the first three (3) years after the award
may be at reduced amounts as established by the PARC.
(b) The first five (5) annual payments may not be more than 5%
of the value of the annual gross production as established by the DAR.
(c) Should the scheduled annual payments after the fifth year
exceed 10% of the annual gross production and the failure to produce
accordingly is not due to the beneficiarys fault, the LBP may reduce
the interest rate or reduce the principal obligation to make the
repayment affordable.
(2) The LBP shall have a lien (i.e., prior right) by way of mortgage on
the land awarded to the beneficiary; and this mortgage may be
foreclosed by the LBP for non-payment of an aggregate of three(3)
annual amortization. The LBP shall advice the DAR of such proceedings
and the latter shall subsequently award the forfeited landholding to
other qualified beneficiaries. A beneficiary whose land has been
foreclosed shall thereafter be permanently disqualified from becoming
a beneficiary under the Act. (Sec. 26.)
TRANSFERABILITY OF AWARDED LANDS (Sec. 27)
(1) Lands acquired by beneficiaries under the Act may not be
sold, transferred or conveyed except through hereditary succession, or
to the government, or to the LBP or to other qualified beneficiaries for
a period of ten (10) years. However, the children of the spouse of
the transferor shall have a right to repurchase the land from the
government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due notice of
the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land
is situated. The Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCCOM) shall, in turn, be given the due notice thereof by the
BARC.
Land titles: one year repurchase from registration; here, it is two years
(2) If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights
to the land may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the
DAR, to any heir of the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as
a condition for such transfer or conveyance, shall cultivate the land
himself.
Lebrudo vs Loyola
Facts:
Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a parcel of land located in
Barangay Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, awarded by the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) under Republic Act No. 6657 4 (RA 6657) or
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. This lot is covered
by Certificate of Land Ownership 5 (CLOA) No. 20210 issued in favor
of Loyola on 27 December 1990 and duly registered on 14 March 1991
under Transfer of Certificate of Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.
On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now
deceased and represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo,
filed with the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
(PARAD) of Trece Martires City, Cavite, an action 6 for the cancellation
of the TCT/CLOA in the name of Loyola and the issuance of another
for the one-half portion of the lot in Lebrudo's favor.
In a Decision 7 dated 18 December 1995, the PARAD dismissed the
case without prejudice on the ground that the case was filed
prematurely. On 11 March 1996, Lebrudo re-filed the same action. 8
Lebrudo alleged that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989
to redeem the lot, which was mortgaged by Loyola's mother, Cristina
Hugo, to Trinidad Barreto. After Lebrudo redeemed the lot for P250.00
and a cavan of palay, Loyola again sought Lebrudo's help in obtaining
title to the lot in her name by shouldering all the expenses for the
transfer of the title of the lot from her mother, Cristina Hugo. In
exchange, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the one-half portion of the
lot. Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in favor of Loyola.
Loyola then allegedly executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay 9 dated 28
December 1989, waiving and transferring her rights over the one-half
portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. To reiterate her commitment,
Loyola allegedly executed two more Sinumpaang Salaysay 10 dated 1
December 1992 and 3 December 1992, committing herself to remove
her house constructed on the corresponding one-half portion to be
allotted to Lebrudo.
Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise.
However, Loyola refused. Lebrudo sought the assistance of the
Sangguniang Barangay of Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite; the Philippine
National Police (PNP) of Carmona, Cavite; and the Department of
Agrarian Reform to mediate. However, despite steps taken to amicably
settle the issue, as evidenced by certifications from the PNP and the
barangay, there was no amicable settlement. Thus, Lebrudo filed an
action against Loyola.
In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who
approached her and offered to redeem the lot and the release of the
CLOA. Loyola denied promising one-half portion of the lot as payment
for the transfer, titling and registration of the lot. Loyola explained that
the lot was her only property and it was already being occupied by her
children and their families.
ISSUE:
The main issue is whether Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion
of the lot covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and transfer
of rights embodied in the two Sinumpaang Salaysay.
HELD:
A Certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing
ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR,
and contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in RA 6657
and other applicable laws. Section 27 of RA 6657, as amended by RA
9700, 20 which provides for the transferability of awarded lands,
states:
SEC. 27.Transferability of Awarded Lands. Lands acquired by
beneficiaries under this ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed
except through hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the
LBP, or to other qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10)
years.
It is clear from the provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries under
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerate
four exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the
government; 3) to the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to
other qualified beneficiaries. In short, during the prohibitory 10-year
period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights is void,
except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a circumvention of
agrarian reform laws.
In the present case, Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half
portion of the lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for
shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from
Loyola's mother, Cristina Hugo, to Loyola's name. Lebrudo used the
two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Loyola alloting to him the one-
half portion of the lot as basis for his claim.
Lebrudo's assertion must fail. The law expressly prohibits any sale,
transfer or conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform
rights within 10 years from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for
four exceptions and Lebrudo does not fall under any of the exceptions.
In Maylem v. Ellano, 21 we held that the waiver of rights and interests
over landholdings awarded by the government is invalid for being
violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and transfer of
rights to the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
Loyola is void for falling under the 10-year prohibitory period specified
in RA 6657.
NON-LAND TRANSFER SCHEMES
(1) Leasehold Operations (LO)- lands within the land owners
retained areas or lands not yet due for distribution are
placed under leasehold to ensure farmers security over the
 land they till and pre-empt their displacement while waiting
for the eventual distribution of the land;
(2) Production Profit Sharing (PPS)- This scheme is an interim
measure while the lands owned or operated by agricultural
entities await coverage under the CARP. There entities are
companies mostly involved in the commercial production of
rubber, banana, and pineapple;
(3) Stock Distribution Option (SDO). - Under this arrangement,
the farmers are entitled to dividends and other financial
benefits and are also assured of at least a representatives at
the Board of Directors, management or executive committee
to protect the rights and interest of shareholders; and
(4) Commercial Farm Deferment (SFD). This scheme provides
corporate landowners of newly-established commercial
plantations enough time to recover their investment before
such agricultural lands are covered by CARP. The deferment
period was up to 1998. Pending final land transfer, however,
these corporations shall implement a production and profit-
sharing scheme in their farms.
The monitoring of non-land transfer activities by the field offices of the
DAR has not been given much priority, as there has been greater
pressure for them to deliver their land acquisition and distribution
(LAD) targets.
LEBRUDO: There was a violation of the prohibited period (sold within
the prohibitory period). There was a waiver, signed by the owner.
Subject is the validity of the waiver
SC: Waiver is void. It violated the law.
Chapter VIII (Corporate Farms)
SEC. 31. Corporate Landowners. - Corporate landowners may
voluntarily transfer ownership over their agricultural landholdings to
the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Section 20 hereof or to
qualified beneficiaries, under such terms and conditions consistent with
this Act, as they may agree upon, subject to confirmation by the DAR.
Upon certification by the DAR, corporations owning agricultural lands
may give their qualified beneficiaries the right to purchase such
proportion of the capital stock of the corporation that the agricultural
land, actually devoted to agricultural activities, bears in relation to the
company's total assets, under such terms and conditions as may be
agreed upon by them. In no case shall the compensation received by
the workers at the time the shares of stocks are distributed be
reduced. The same principle shall be applied to associations, with
respect to their equity or participation.
Corporations or associations which voluntarily divest a proportion of
their capital stock, equity or participation in favor of their workers or
other qualified beneficiaries under this section shall be deemed to have
complied with the provisions of this Act: Provided, That the following
condition are complied with:
(a) In order to safeguard the right of beneficiaries who own shares of
stocks to dividends and other financial benefits, the books of the
corporation or association shall be subject to periodic audit by certified
public accountants chosen by the beneficiaries;
(b) Irrespective of the value of their equity in the corporation or
association, the beneficiaries shall be assured of at least one (1)
representative in the board of directors, or in a management or
executive committee, if one exists, of the corporation or association;
(c) Any shares acquired by such workers and beneficiaries shall have
the same rights and features as all other shares; and
(d) Any transfer of shares of stocks by the original beneficiaries shall
be void ab initio UNLESS said transaction is in favor of a qualified and
registered beneficiary within the same corporation.
If within two (2) years from the approval of this Act, the land or stock
transfer envisioned above is not made or realized or the plan for such
stock distribution approved by the PARC within the same period, the
agricultural land of the corporate owners or corporation shall be
subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act.
HLI vs PRAC
BASIC Facts:
THE HACIENDA COMPRISED 6,443 HAS. IN 1957 TABACALERA SOLD
THE LAND TO TADECO OWNED BY THE COJUANCOS. GSIS FINANCED
THE PURCHASE ON CONDITION THAT THE LAND WILL ULTIMATELY
BE SUBDIVIDED AND SOLD TO THE TENANTS.
IN 1980 GOVT FILED AT RTC MANILA CASE AGAINST TADECO FOR IT
TO SURRENDER THE HACIENDA TO MAR (NOW DAR) SO THE LAND
WILL BE DISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS. MANILA RTC RULED AGAINST
TADECO. TADECO APPEALED TO CA. IN 1988 CA DISMISSED THE
APPEAL SUBJECT TO REVIVAL IF TADECO FAILS TO GET APPROVAL
OF FARMERS OF STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION (SDO) AND IF
OPTED BY FARMERS TADECO FAILS TO IMPLEMENT SDO.
IN 1988 TADECO CREATED HACIENDA LUISITA INC (HLI) AND
TADECO BOUGHT SHARES OF HLI IN EXCHANGE OF THE HACIENDA
LAND. THE TOTAL SHARES WERE 400,000,000 WITH PAR VALUE OF
P400,000,000.00. 150,000,000 SHARES WERE FOR FARMERS AND
250,000,000 SHARES FOR OTHER STOCKHOLDERS. FARMERS AND
HLI ENTERED INTO STOCK DISTRIBUTION OPTION AGREEMENT
(SDOA) WHICH PROVIDES THAT FARMERS AGREE BECAUSE SUCH
SDO WILL IMPROVE THEIR LIVES AND THEY WILL GET GREATER
BENEFITS. DAR APPROVED SDOA.
IN 1995 HLI APPLIED TO CONVERT 500 HAS TO INDUSTRIAL USE.
CONVERSION WS APPROVED. THEN IT TRANSFERRED THE 500 HAS
TO CENTENNARY HOLDINGS INC WHICH TRANSFERRED IT TO
LUISTA INDUSTRIAL PARK CORP OR LIPCO. LIPCO CONVEYED SOME
LANDS TO RCBC AS PAYMENT FOR LOANS. IN ADDITION TO THE 500
HAS SOLD TO LIPCO, 80.51 HAS WAS EXPROPRIATED FOR USE OF
SCTEX.
IN 2003 FARMER GROUPS FILED CASE AT DAR FOR EITHER
RENEGOTIATION OF SDOA OR ITS REVOCATION ON GROUND THAT
THEIR LIVES DID NOT IMPROVE AND THEY DID NOT GET FAIR
SHARES IN THE SALE OF LANDS TO LIPCO AND FOR SCTEX USE. DAR
CREATED TASK FORCE WHICH RECOMMENDED TO PARC
(PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUCIL) THAT THE PREVIOUS
ORDER APPROVING THE SDO BE REVOKED.
IN 2005 PARC REVOKED THE SDO AND ORDERED THE COMPULSORY
ACQUISITION OF THE HACIENDA FOR DISTRIBUTION TO FARMERS.
HLI WENT TO THE SC AND ASKED FOR TRO TO STOP
IMPLEMENTATION OF PARK ORDER. IN 2006 SC ISSUED TRO. HENCE
THE CASE.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
ISSUE:
HLI ARGUES THAT PARC IS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO REVOKE THE
STOCK DISTRIBUTION PLAN (SDP). THE LAW GIVES PARC THE
POWER TO APPROVDE SDP. BUT THE LAW DOES NOT PROVIDE THAT
IT CAN DISAPPROVE THE SDP. IS HLIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. IF PARC WAS GIVEN POWER TO APPROVE SDP, IT HAS THE
POWER TO REVOKE IT BY THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY
IMPLICATION. OTHERWISE PARC WOULD BE A TOOTHLESS AGENCY.
On the postulate that the subject jurisdiction is conferred by law, HLI
maintains that PARC is without authority to revoke an SDP, for neither
RA 6657 nor EO 229 expressly vests PARC with such authority. While,
as HLI argued, EO 229 empowers PARC to approve the plan for stock
distribution in appropriate cases, the empowerment only includes the
power to disapprove, but not to recall its previous approval of the SDP
after it has been implemented by the parties.[13][93] To HLI, it is the
court which has jurisdiction and authority to order the revocation or
rescission of the PARC-approved SDP.
HELD
We disagree.
Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority
to approve the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner
belongs to PARC. However, contrary to petitioner HLIs posture, PARC
also has the power to revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It
may be, as urged, that RA 6657 or other executive issuances on
agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC with the power to
revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority, however, is
deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary
implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as
much a part of it as that which is expressed.[14][94]
We have explained that every statute is understood, by implication, to
contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object
and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its
terms.[15][95] Further, every statutory grant of power, right or
privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or
privilege.[16][96]
Gordon v. Veridiano II is instructive:
The power to approve a license includes by implication, even if not
expressly granted, the power to revoke it. By extension, the power to
revoke is limited by the authority to grant the license, from which it is
derived in the first place. Thus, if the FDA grants a license upon its
finding that the applicant drug store has complied with the
requirements of the general laws and the implementing administrative
rules and regulations, it is only for their violation that the FDA may
revoke the said license. By the same token, having granted the permit
upon his ascertainment that the conditions thereof as applied x x x
have been complied with, it is only for the violation of such conditions
that the mayor may revoke the said permit.[17][97] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may be stated that
the conferment of express power to approve a plan for stock
distribution of the agricultural land of corporate owners necessarily
includes the power to revoke or recall the approval of the plan.
As public respondents aptly observe, to deny PARC such revocatory
power would reduce it into a toothless agency of CARP, because the
very same agency tasked to ensure compliance by the corporate
landowner with the approved SDP would be without authority to
impose sanctions for non-compliance with it.[18][98] With the view
We take of the case, only PARC can effect such revocation. The DAR
Secretary, by his own authority as such, cannot plausibly do so, as the
acceptance and/or approval of the SDP sought to be taken back or
undone is the act of PARC whose official composition includes, no less,
the President as chair, the DAR Secretary as vice-chair, and at least
eleven (11) other department heads.[19][99]
Hacienda Luisita CASE: (binalik na discussion from Chapter 3)
Hacienda Luisita Inc (HLI) was not the original corporation owning the
Hacienda Luisita Estate. But under SDO, one of the requirements is
that there has to be a corporation they will have to make a new
corporation consisting of the old corporation plus the farmer tenants as
stockholders.
There was a program approved by PARC headed by the President of
the Philippines. For a period of time it was valid especially from
Aquino, Ramos and Estrada. Time of Arroyo, there was a complaint
that the standard of living has not improved and there were violations
of the program. Investigated and allegations found to be true, the
program/agreement was cancelled by PARC headed by Arroyo. No
improvement of lives and a violation on the giving of homelots (yuta
para sa balay). HLI did not present any proof that they complied.
SC: annulment or revocation of the program is valid
Confronted with the issue: Previously it was legal but now it was
revoked. What shall we do now? Used Operative fact doctrine: let
tenants choose.
- Plebescite: to remain as stockholders of HLI or distribute
lands
- Chose for distribution of lands
- Right now, DAR is implementing distribution of lands to
6000 farmer beneficiaries
Dissenting of CORONA: Provision on SDO is Unconstitutional. When we
speak of agrarian reform, it is always distribution of lands.
Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
WHAT IS THIS DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION?
WHAT IS IMPLIED IN A STATUTE IS AS MUCH A PART OF IT AS THAT
WHICH IS EXPRESSED.[20][94] EVERY STATUTE IS UNDERSTOOD, BY
IMPLICATION, TO CONTAIN ALL SUCH PROVISIONS AS MAY BE
NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE ITS OBJECT AND PURPOSE, OR TO
MAKE EFFECTIVE RIGHTS, POWERS, PRIVILEGES OR JURISDICTION
WHICH IT GRANTS, INCLUDING ALL SUCH COLLATERAL AND
SUBSIDIARY CONSEQUENCES AS MAY BE FAIRLY AND LOGICALLY
INFERRED FROM ITS TERMS.[21][95]FURTHER, EVERY STATUTORY
GRANT OF POWER, RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE IS DEEMED TO INCLUDE
ALL INCIDENTAL POWER, RIGHT OR PRIVILEGE
ISSUE
RESPONDENT FARM ARGUES THAT SEC 31 OF RA 6657 WHICH
ALLOWS STOCK DISTRIBUTION INSTEAD OF LAND DISTRIBUTION IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS IT CONTRAVENES SECTION 4, ART. X111 OF
THE CONSTITUTION. IS THIS ARGUMENT CORRECT?
NO. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR QUESTIONING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A LAW ARE NOT ALL COMPLIED WITH.
THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE: (1) THERE IS AN ACTUAL CASE OR
CONTROVERSY; (2) THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION IS
RAISED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY BY A PROPER
PARTY OR ONE WITH LOCUS STANDI; AND (3) THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY MUST BE THE VERY LIS MOTA OF THE
CASE.[32][108]
THE FARMERS QUESTIONED THE CONSITUTIONALITY OF R.A. 6657
ONLY AFTER 14 YEARS SINCE THE SDP WAS DRAWN AND
IMPLEMENTED. IT IS TOO LATE. ALSO, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
ISSUE REGARDING THE SDP WAS NOT THE LIST MOTA. IT WAS THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SDP.
FARM asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it
affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to
stock distribution, an arrangement which, to FARM, impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farmworkers under Sec. 4, Art. XIII
of the Constitution.[33][106]
To a more specific, but direct point, FARM argues that Sec. 31 of RA
6657 permits stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land
transfer; in fine, there is stock certificate ownership of the farmers or
farmworkers instead of them owning the land, as envisaged in the
Constitution. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to
be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian
reform ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.[34][107]
Reacting, HLI insists that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of
land ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries. It draws
attention in this regard to Sec. 3(a) of RA 6657 on the concept and
scope of the term agrarian reform. The constitutionality of a law,
HLI added, cannot, as here, be attacked collaterally.
The instant challenge on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657
and necessarily its counterpart provision in EO 229 must fail as
explained below.
When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review
over, and pass upon the constitutionality of, acts of the executive or
legislative departments, it does so only when the following essential
requirements are first met, to wit:
(1) there is an actual case or controversy;
(2) that the constitutional question is raised at the earliest
possible opportunity by a proper party or one with locus standi; and
(3) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.[35][108]
Not all the foregoing requirements are satisfied in the case at bar.
While there is indeed an actual case or controversy, intervenor FARM,
composed of a small minority of 27 farmers, has yet to explain its
failure to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 3l of RA 6657, since as
early as November 21, l989 when PARC approved the SDP of Hacienda
Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter and why its
members received benefits from the SDP without so much of a protest.
It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP
via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said
plan and approving resolution were sought to be revoked, but not, to
stress, by FARM or any of its members, but by petitioner AMBALA.
Furthermore, the AMBALA petition did NOT question the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but concentrated on the
purported flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the
SDP. Even the public respondents, as represented by the Solicitor
General, did not question the constitutionality of the provision. On the
other hand, FARM, whose 27 members formerly belonged to AMBALA,
raised the constitutionality of Sec. 31 only on May 3, 2007 when it filed
its Supplemental Comment with the Court. Thus, it took FARM some
eighteen (18) years from November 21, 1989 before it challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 which is quite too late in the
day. The FARM members slept on their rights and even accepted
benefits from the SDP with nary a complaint on the alleged
unconstitutionality of Sec. 31 upon which the benefits were derived.
The Court cannot now be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue
that FARM failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and
the occurrence of numerous events and activities which resulted from
the application of an alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of
constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is
properly raised and presented in an appropriate case at the first
opportunity.[36][109] FARM is, therefore, remiss in belatedly
questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The second
requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.
The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue
must be the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis
mota aspect is not present, the constitutional issue tendered not being
critical to the resolution of the case. The unyielding rule has been to
avoid, whenever plausible, an issue assailing the constitutionality of a
statute or governmental act.[37][110] If some other grounds exist by
which judgment can be made without touching the constitutionality of
a law, such recourse is favored.[38][111] Garcia v. Executive
Secretary explains why:
Lis Mota the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will
undertake judicial review means that the Court will not pass upon a
question of unconstitutionality, although properly presented, if the
case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application
of the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show
that the case cannot be legally resolved unless the constitutional
question raised is determined. This requirement is based on the rule
that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to
justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or
argumentative.[39][112] (Italics in the original.)
The lis mota in this case, proceeding from the basic positions originally
taken by AMBALA (to which the FARM members previously belonged)
and the Supervisory Group, is the alleged non-compliance by HLI with
the conditions of the SDP to support a plea for its revocation. And
before the Court, the lis mota is whether or not PARC acted in grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered the recall of the SDP for such non-
compliance and the fact that the SDP, as couched and implemented,
offends certain constitutional and statutory provisions. To be sure, any
of these key issues may be resolved without plunging into the
constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Moreover, looking deeply into
the underlying petitions of AMBALA, et al., it is not the said section per
se that is invalid, but rather it is the alleged application of the said
provision in the SDP that is flawed.
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING
JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES
DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL,
[UDK No. 9864 : December 3, 1990.] NARVASA, J.:
FACTS: 1. Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte "an agrarian case
for damages by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was
tenants from the landholding" owned by the Spouses Domingo and
Eugenia Martil.
2. Several persons were also impleaded as defendants, including the
Philippine National Bank, it being alleged by the plaintiff spouses that
said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land involved;
3. ome time later, of portions of the land to the other persons named as
its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel Corporation),
and it being prayed that mortgage and the transactions thereafter
made in relation thereto be annulled and voided;
4. The complaint was dismissed, by virtue of Executive Order No. 229
"providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987"
Executive No. 129-A approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the
Rules of the Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over agrarian cases had been
transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform;
5.The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for Certiorari with this Court,
docketed as UDK-8867, assigned to the Second Division;
6. this Court referred the same to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal
having concurrent jurisdiction to act thereon;
7. The CA dismissed the complaint finding that the jurisdictional
question had been correctly resolved by the Trial Court;
8. The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again
before this Court, contending that the Trial Court's "order of dismissal
re patently illegal and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor
tenant access to courts and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and
Batas Bilang 129.";
ISSUE: WON The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a
special agrarian court, in the light of Executive Orders Numbered 129-
A and 229 and Republic Act No. 665.
HELD: The petition is without merit.
Evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the
Regional Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended
to the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of
agricultural land, and other matters affecting tenant-farmers,
agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators, farms' cooperatives or
organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders, instructions,
Rules and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. 6
Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its
being subsumed in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the Department
of Agrarian Reform. The intention evidently was to transfer original
jurisdiction to the Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition
stressed by the rules formulated and promulgated by the Department
for the implementation of the executive orders just quoted. 7 The rules
included the creation of the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the Department, and
the allocation to it;
The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been
completely divested of jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters.
Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other hand, confers "special jurisdiction"
on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are Regional Trial Courts
designated by the Supreme Court at least one (1) branch within
each province to act as such.
The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in
dismissing Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case concerning the
rights of the plaintiffs as tenants on agricultural land, not involving the
"special jurisdiction" of said Trial Court acting as a Special Agrarian
Court, it clearly came within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly, the Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the
adjudicatory powers of the Department
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED,
and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16725
dated October 23, 1989, AFFIRMED.
NINA M. QUISMUNDO vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. (G.R.
No. 95664 September 13, 1991 REGALADO, J.)
FACTS: 1. Private respondents, as tenants of petitioner, filed a
complaint with the trial court praying that their relationship with
petitioner be changed from share tenancy to a leasehold system,
pursuant to Section 4 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, their
request therefor having been denied by petitioner;
2. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of
action since the law that should allegedly govern the relationship of the
parties is Act No. 4115, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 271,
and not Republic Act No. 3844, as amended. The trial court denied the
motion for lack of merit, the subsequent MR invoking as an additional
ground the lack of jurisdiction of the court over the case under the
authority and by reason of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, specifically Executive Order No. 229 and Republic Act No.
6657. was also been denied by the court a quo;
3. An appeal was made to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision of
the trial court;
ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: We find said contention tenable.
Executive Order No. 229, which provides for the mechanism
for the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program instituted by Proclamation No. 131, dated July 22, 1987,
vests in the Department of Agrarian Reform quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters.
Thus, in the case at bar, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, at
the time private respondents filed their complaint, was already bereft of
authority to act on the same. The allegation of private respondents that
their complaint was filed on November 3, 1987, and not on February
13, 1988 as found by the Court of Appeals, is immaterial since as of
either date Executive Order No. 229 was already in effect.
The foregoing holding is further sustained by the passage of
Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law,
which took effect on June 15, 1988. The said law contains provisions
which evince and support the intention of the legislature to vest in the
Department of Agrarian Reform exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian
reform matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and another judgment is hereby
rendered declaring NULL and VOID the orders of the lower court. The
respondent judge, or whosoever now presides over the court a quo or
to which the case is assigned, is ordered to cease and desist from
further proceeding with AGRA Case No. 5176 which is hereby
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the
refiling of the same with the Department of Agrarian Reform.
LOPE MACHETE, et al vs COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO
VILLALON (G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995) BELLOSILLO, J.:
FACTS: 1. Private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for
collection of back rentals and damages before the Regional Trial Court
of Tagbilaran City against petitioners;
2. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold
agreement with respect to private respondent's landholdings under
which petitioners were to pay private respondent a certain amount or
percentage of their harvests;
3.However, despite repeated demands and with no valid reason,
petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals;
4.Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter. They contended
that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations,
hence, the subject matter of the complaint fell squarely within the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers;
ISSUE: Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases
for collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants?
HELD: The petition is impressed with merit.
R.A. 6657 was passed containing provisions which evince and support
the intention of the legislature to vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction
over all agrarian reform matters. Section 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of
the Revised Rules of the DARAB explicitly provides
Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction.
xxxxxSpecifically, such jurisdiction shall extend over but not be limited
to the following: (a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of
persons engaged in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered
by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other
agrarian laws, (b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and
determination and payment of just compensation, fixing and
collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization
payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land
Bankxxxxxxxxx (emphasis supplied)
Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench
which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The failure of
petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with
private respondent is an issue which is clearly beyond the legal
competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged
with an administrative body of special competence.
Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to
assume jurisdiction over this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as
its resolution denying reconsideration is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmitted
to the appropriate Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) for proper adjudication.
DARAB and Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator FE ARCHE-
MANALANG,DAR vs CA et al (G.R. Nos. 113220-21. January 21,
1997) DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: These cases were consolidated in view of the fact that they
involve the same petitioners and the same issue concerning the right
of BSB Construction and Agricultural Development Corp. (hereafter
BSB Construction) to develop a parcel of land into a housing
subdivision, against the claim of private respondents that they are
tenant-farmers entitled to the benefits of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 (Rep. Act No. 6657).
1. The consolidated case is about the tenanted land and the BSB
construction alleging that the lands in question is residential land.
2. That, however, the petitioner filed for the cease and desist ording in
the DAR for restraining the construction, etch of the said land and to
maintain the status qou betwen the parties;
3. DARAB issued a restraining order;
4.BSB Construction and Carol Baucan, who is one of the registered
owners of the land in question, then filed the petition for certiorari
[under Rule 65] in this case (CA-G.R. SP No. 31179), contending that
the land is not covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
and, therefore, the complaint filed in the DARAB is not within the
latter's jurisdiction;
CONTENTIONS: As to the first, the petitioners argue that: (1) in a
special civil action for certiorari, when a supervisory act is too specific
(i.e., the 10-day period) that noncompliance therewith is proper for
contempt proceedings, the said directive is relieved of the character of
an incident of supervision and becomes a separate remedy in itself; (2)
the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals against the private
respondents was not necessary as the SQO subsisted pending finality
of the ordered nullification of the BEA Case; (3) the directive was
premature and constituted undue interference with quasi-judicial
proceedings governed by a distinct set of rules, especially in light of
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; (4) any delay in the resolution of the
motion for preliminary injunction was attributable to the filing by the
private respondents of CA-G.R. SP No. 30474; and (5) since no writ
was issued in the ABOGNE Case, no occasion arose for the Court of
Appeals to exercise its supervisory power.
RULINGS: The petitioners first grievance is unfounded.
Plainly, the Court of Appeals has certiorari jurisdiction over the PARAD
TRO.[7] Such jurisdiction having been invoked with the parties given
sufficient opportunity to argue for or against its propriety, the Court of
Appeals could, as it did, direct the PARAD to resolve the application for
a writ of preliminary injunction within a specified period.Indisputably,
the 10-day period fixed by the Court of Appeals, counted from PARAD
Manalangs receipt of a copy of the decision, can by no means be
considered arbitrary or hasty.
We likewise wish to state that there was another, more
persuasive reason why CA-G.R. SP No. 30474 should be dismissed,
viz., the prematurity of the petition, which amounted to a lack of cause
of action. It is precisely for this reason that the petitioners herein, as
the respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 30474, asserted in their answer
that exhaustion of administrative remedies was not had below, hence
the petition lacks a cause of action for being evidently premature.
In insisting that the DARAB had jurisdiction over the BEA
Case (DARAB Case No. 0100-93 [Reg. Case No. IV-RI-0075]), the
petitioners posit that the DAR/DARAB was vested by 50 of R.A. No.
6657 with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters, and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, subject to the
exceptions therein provided. Further, the DAR/DARAB never
abdicated, but merely delegated that authority to the RARADs and the
PARADs under the DARAB Revised Rules; thus, the fact that a similar
case was already pending with any of the PARADs (as it relates to
provincial coverage) or RARADs (as to administrative regions of the
DAR) did not, by itself, automatically divest the DARAB of its
jurisdictional competence. The petitioners finally argue that since the
function/authority/jurisdiction of the PARADs/RARADs, is only
DELEGATED ... DAR/DARAB, cannot ... be said to have totally
unloaded the power/responsibility conferred by statute, to the
delegate. As to the DARAB SQO, the petitioners claim that it was
issued under the DARABs original jurisdiction or in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.
It indisputably follows that all actions pursued under the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR, in accordance with 50 of
R.A. No. 6657, must be commenced in the PARAD of the province
where the property is located and that the DARAB only has appellate
jurisdiction to review the PARADs orders, decisions and other
dispositions.
Needless to state, the DARAB was without authority to issue the SQO,
much less the warrant of arrest. Its action was a clear violation of its
DARAB Revised Rules. Any suggestion that it has unfettered
discretion to suspend its own rules is unacceptable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
DOMINGO CELENDRO vs vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LEONILA
VDA. DE GUEVARRA [G.R. No. 131099. July 20, 1999]
PANGANIBAN, J.:
FACTS: The Petition for Review on Certiorari before us assails the
decision of the CA which nullified the decision of the DARAB. DARAB
set aside the final and executory Decision of the RTC of Wao,
Bumbaran Lanao del Sur in a civil case affirming the decision of th
MCTC in the same province.
1. After the death of [private respondents] husband in 1975, [private
respondent] started to demand [petitioners] eviction, but due to the
latters request for extension, [petitioner] was allowed to stay in said
property and till the same. Until finally, on March 15, 1992 [private
respondent] wrote a formal demand to vacate the property and restore
possession to the [private respondent]. When said demand remained
unheeded, a case for unlawful detainer was commenced by petitioner
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Wao, Lanao del Sur against
[petitioner].
2. Upon learning of the issuance of a writ of execution, private
respondent filed a Petition to Quiet Title before the Provincial
Adjudication Board (PACB), which office rendered a decision dated
October 10, 1990 in favor of private respondent;
3. In conclusion, the CA ruled that a quasi-judicial body such as the
PAAB or the DARAB could not reverse the final decision of a judicial
body such as the MCTC or the RTC.
ISSUE: The sole legal issue is whether or not the civil courts
(Municipal Court and Regional Trial Court) or the Court of Agrarian
Relations or the DAR Adjudication Board ha[ve] jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
HELD: The Petition is devoid of merit.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that an administrative
body such as the PAAB or the DARAB cannot reverse a courts ruling
that has long become final.
First, under Rule 39, Section 47 (c) of the Rules of Court,he
courts Decision has become conclusive on the parties. They are
bound by the matters adjudged and those that were actually and
necessarily included therein. Under the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment, which is also known as preclusion of issues or collateral
estoppel, issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot
again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving
a different cause of action.In other words, petitioner is barred from
challenging the pronouncement of the trial court that his alleged lot is
within the property of respondents.
Second, a final judgment cannot be modified by any court,
let alone by a quasi-judicial administrative body. It is immutable and
unalterable, and hence may no longer be modified in any respect
xxx.Petitioners normal recourse should have been to appeal the RTC
Decision to the CA and then, if necessary, to this Court for review.
Because the trial court Decision was already final, it could not, as a
rule, be altered or questioned.More significantly, the Court has held
that a final judgment can no longer be reviewed, or in any way
modified directly or indirectly, by a higher court, not even by the
Supreme Court, much less by any other official, branch or department
of Government.
Finally, petitioner has actively participated in the
proceedings in the MCTC and even appealed to the RTC. He failed,
however, to question either courts jurisdiction over the suit. After
relying on the jurisdiction of the regular courts, he cannot be permitted
to turn around and question it. (ESTOPPEL)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the
assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Centeno v Centeno
Facts:
The parcels of land owned by private respondent were the subject of an earlier
case filed by respondent against petitioners before the DAR for cancellation of
certificates of land transfer. In said case, it was established that petitioners,
through fraud and misrepresentation, obtained CLTs in their names. The DAR
issued an order directing the recall and cancellation of petitioners' CLTs. The
aforesaid order was affirmed by the Office of the President in its decision
dated July 8, 1987, which had become final and executory. Despite the
decision of DAR, petitioners have interfered with and prevented respondent
from exercising acts of possession over the landholdings earlier adjudicated to
her. This prompted the private respondent to file a complaint with the
DARAB for Maintenance of Peaceful Possession with Prayer for Restraining
Order/Preliminary Injunction, Ejectment and Damages. A decision was
rendered by the Provincial Adjudicator in favour of the respondent which was
affirmed by DARAB. On appeal to the CA, the same was affirmed. Petitioners
are contending that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the case.
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
The present case for maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for
restraining order/preliminary injunction is a mere off-shoot of the suit for
cancellation of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLTs) filed by herein respondent
against herein petitioners before the DARAB. That previous case culminated
in a decision upholding respondent's entitlement to an award of the subject
landholdings under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Since the
instant case is related to and is a mere off-shoot of the said previous case for
cancellation of CLTs which was decided in favour of herein respondent, the
Court believes and so hold that the DAR continues to have jurisdiction over
the same.
Nuesa v CA
Facts:
On May 25, 1972, an Order of Award was issued in favour of Jose Verdillo
over two parcels of agricultural land of the Buenavista Estate with the
conditions that within a period of six months from receipt of a copy, the
awardee shall personally cultivate or otherwise develop at least one-fourth of
the area or occupy and construct his/her house in case of residential lot and
pay at least the first installment. On August 26, 1993 private respondent filed
an application with the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian
Reform for the purchase of said lots claiming that he had complied with the
conditions. Petitioner filed a letter of protest against private respondent
claiming it is him who had been in possession of the land and had been
cultivating the same. On January 24, 1994, petitioner, the Regional Director of
DAR, Antonio M. Nuesa, promulgated an Order cancelling the award to
private respondent. Respondent sought relief to the Provincial Adjudicator
which reversed the decision of the Regional Director. On appeal to the
DARAB, the decision of the Provincial Adjudicator was affirmed. The
Petition for Review filed by herein petitioners with the Court of Appeals was
denied due course and ordered dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB can take cognizance of the case
Held:
The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award
by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the
DAR. The DARAB and its adjudicators acted erroneously and with grave abuse
of discretion in taking cognizance of the case. In the case at bar, petitioner
and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that could have brought this controversy between them within
the ambit of the definition of agrarian dispute. Consequently, the DARAB had
no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken cognizance of
private respondents petition in the first place.
SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES
GEORGE GALDIANO and ELIADA GALDIANO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA
VALDEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 seeking to reverse the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 48682 as well as the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals in its assailed
decision affirmed the Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board3 ("DARAB") which reversed the Decision4 of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office ("MARO") in Malaybalay, Bukidnon.
The MARO of Bukidnon ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform
("DAR"), Agusan del Sur, to segregate 2,000 square meters from the
land of the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez. The MARO of
Bukidnon also awarded the same segregated land to the Spouses
Federico and Sarah Atuel and the Spouses George and Eliada
Galdiano.
The Facts
The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a
portion of a property in Poblacion (formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat,
Agusan del Sur.
Atty. Manuel D. Cab ("Cab") is the registered owner of two parcels of
land in Poblacion, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur with an area of 125,804
square meters ("Cab Property"). The Cab Property is covered by OCT
No. P-5638 issued pursuant to Free Patent No. 1318. The Cab
Property is traversed by the Butuan to Davao Road and adjacent to the
municipal building of Sibagat. From the Cab Property, Cab donated the
lot occupied by the municipal building.5
In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel ("Atuel") as administrator of the
Cab Property.
Sometime in 1977, Bernabe Valdez ("Valdez") arrived in Sibagat from
Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte. Valdez is the nephew of Atuel, who
recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property to
Valdez.6 On 9 October 1978, Cab and Valdez entered into a "Lease of
Improved Agricultural Land" under which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare
portion of the Cab Property for 300.00 per year for two years.
In 1982, Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel
("Spouses Atuel") and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano
("Spouses Galdiano") to occupy a 2,000-square meter portion of the
Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
constructed their respective houses on this 2,000-square meter lot
("Subject Lot").
On 27 September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan
del Sur, approved the town plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which
classified the Cab Property as residential, subject to the approval of
the Ministry of Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.
On 25 June 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had
already expired, and demanded that Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-
hectare portion of the Cab Property and vacate the same.
On 2 October 1988, responding to Cabs letter, the MARO of Sibagat,
Agusan del Sur informed Cab that Valdez was properly identified as a
tenant, and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated. The
MARO added that on 14 September 1988, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27, Emancipation Patent No. A-159969 was issued to
Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare portion ("PD 27 Land") of the Cab
Property. The PD 27 Land included the 2,000-square meter Subject
Lot occupied by the houses of the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano.
On 11 May 1989, Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for
cancellation of Valdezs emancipation patent. Cab claimed that his
property is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdez is a civil law
lessee, not a tenant.7Consequently, the DAR ordered the Regional
Director of Cagayan de Oro City to conduct an investigation regarding
the petition.8
On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
("HLURB") approved the Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance of fifty-
eight municipalities, including that of Sibagat. The HLURB classified
the Cab Property as 90 percent residential, and the remaining portion
as institutional and park or open space.
On 27 September 1991, the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez
("Spouses Valdez") filed a complaint9 for "Recovery of Possession with
Damages" with the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the
Spouses Valdez alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano "stealthily and through fraud entered and occupied a portion
of the above-described property with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or
less." The Spouses Valdez claimed that the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano, despite repeated demands, refused "to restore
possession of the said portion of land" to the Spouses Valdez. The
Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the Spouses Valdez
possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also prayed for
payment of litigation expenses, as well as unearned income from the
Subject Lot and moral damages.
In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted
that the Spouses Valdez had no cause of action against them because
Cab is the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is the administrator of
the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
claimed that upon Cabs instruction and consent, they had been
occupying the Cab Property since 1964, long before the Spouses
Valdez leased a portion of the Cab Property in 1978. The Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed out that the Spouses
Valdez never set foot on the Subject Lot nor cultivated the same, thus,
there is no dispossession to speak of.
Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that
the emancipation patent issued to Valdez is null and void. The
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano maintained that the entire
Cab Property, which is covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has
already been classified as residential, hence, no longer covered by PD
No. 27.10
On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the
case, issued a decision which disposed of as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur
is hereby ordered to segregate the TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ.
METERS, more or less, from the land of the complainants, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1261 covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-
159969, and award the same to the respondents; and hereby ordered
this case dismissed.
SO ORDERED.11
Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano appealed to the DARAB Central Office. The DARAB Central
Office reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator,
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1) Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of
intrusion and maintain the possessory rights of the complainants over
the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land; and
(2) Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO
(Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned to assist the parties in
determining the amount to be reimbursed in favor of the respondents
for whatever improvements made on the 2,000 square meter portion to
be paid by the complainants.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano filed a petition for review13 with the Court of Appeals. On 20
May 1999, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB
Central Office and dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. On 14 January
1998, while the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the
Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land to
the Municipality of Sibagat.14
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation patents. The
Court of Appeals held that the DARABs decision should be respected
because it enjoys the presumption of regularity.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied on
Pagtalunan v. Tamayo15 where this Court held that upon issuance of an
emancipation patent, a holder acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the land.
The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in
Teodoro v. Macaraeg16 is applicable. In Teodoro, this Court ruled that a
landowner has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his
property. However, "once a landowner enters into a contract of lease
whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said
landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely
or with the help of labor coming from his immediate farm household,
then such contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement."
Otherwise, the Court added, "it would be easy to subvert, under the
guise of the liberty to contract, the intendment of the law of protecting
the underprivileged and ordinarily credulous farmer from the
unscrupulous schemes and pernicious practices of the landed
gentry."17
The Issue
After a review of the issues raised,18 the question boils down to
whether the Spouses Valdez are entitled to seek redress from the
DARAB in recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject
Lot from the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel
and the Spouses Galdiano but on an entirely different ground. We
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARABs
lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the present controversy.
The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses
Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession of the Subject Lot.
Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the
Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction.19 The Court
has discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired
jurisdiction over the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
conferred only by law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent
or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action.20
In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez
alleged, among others, that they are farmers and beneficiaries of an
emancipation patent. The Spouses Valdez also alleged that the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently
occupied the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez
claimed that despite repeated demands,21 the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano refused to vacate and restore possession of the
Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.22 The Spouses Valdez prayed that
the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate
and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez.
The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy relations,
if any, between them and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 23 this Court ruled:
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint
and the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject
matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are
contained in the decision of the MARO,24 indicate that the nature and
subject matter of the instant case is for recovery of possession or
accion publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who between the
Spouses Valdez on one hand, and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano on the other, have a better right to possession of the 2,000-
square meter Subject Lot forming part of the PD 27 Land. The
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano likewise raise the issue of
ownership by insisting that Cab is the real and lawful owner of the
Subject Lot. In Cruz v. Torres,25 this Court had occasion to discuss the
nature of an action to recover possession or accion publiciana, thus:
xxx This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary
action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of the
title. Accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to
an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual
of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty. In such case, the regional trial court has jurisdiction. xxx26
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a
tenancy relations between the parties.27 This Court held in Morta,28 that
in order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is
essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
xxx 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; 4)
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
xxx29 (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the DARABs jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio
M. Nuesa, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,30 that:
xxx the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program." The DARAB has primary, original and appellate
jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O.
Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D.
No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
CARP Law, an agrarian dispute is defined as follows:
(d) xxx any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing,
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee.
In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are
not and do not claim to be the owners of the 2,000-square meter
Subject Lot where their houses are constructed. They also do not claim
ownership to any other portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the
Spouses Valdez have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations
whatsoever that will bring this controversy within Section 3(d) of RA
No. 6657.31 The instant case is similar to Chico v. CA,32 where this
Court ruled that the DARAB had no jurisdiction over a case which did
not involve any tenurial or agrarian relations between the parties. Since
the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the present controversy, it should
not have taken cognizance of the Spouses Valdezs complaint for
recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over an accion publiciana is
vested in a court of general jurisdiction.33 Specifically, the regional trial
court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil actions which
involve x x x possession of real property."34 However, if the assessed
value of the real property involved does not exceed 50,000.00 in
Metro Manila, and 20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal
trial court exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of
real property.35Moreover, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction
over all cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer.1wphi1
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of registered emancipation patents. However, the
Spouses Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession does not
involve or seek the cancellation of any emancipation patent. It was the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of
the emancipation patent as part of their affirmative defenses in their
answer to the complaint. The rule is well settled that the jurisdiction of
the court (or agency in this case) cannot be made to depend on the
defenses made by the defendant in his answer or motion to dismiss. If
such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost
entirely on the defendant.36
Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or
waived by, any act or omission of the parties.37The active participation
of the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest
jurisdiction on the DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The
courts or the parties cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of
jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over a cause of action.38 The failure of the
parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent this
Court from addressing the issue, as the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is
apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues of jurisdiction are not
subject to the whims of the parties.39
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an
order or decision rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction
is a total nullity.40 Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB
in the instant case is null and void. Consequently, the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the DARAB is likewise
invalid. This Court finds no compelling reason to rule on the other
issues raised by the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 May 1999 and the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
MAROs Decision dated 4 March 1993, and the DARABs Decision
dated 17 June 1998, are declared NULL and VOID for lack of
jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cabral v CA
Facts:
On January 16, 1990, petitioner Victoria Cabral filed a petition before the
BARC for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents and Torrens Titles
issued in favour of private respondents. The patents and titles covered portions
of the property owned and registered in the name of petitioner. On February
11, 1990, Regional Director Eligio Pacis issued an order dismissing the
petition for cancellation of Emancipation Patents. The Regional Director
likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration dated July 11, 1990.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals
questioning the jurisdiction of the Regional Director and claiming denial of
due process. On January 8, 1991, the appellate court dismissed the petition for
lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not the Regional Director has jurisdiction to decide on the petition
Held:
The DAR Regional Office has no jurisdiction over the subject case. It is amply
clear from the provisions of CARL and other pertinent rules that the function
of the Regional Office concerns the implementation of agrarian reform laws
while that of the DARAB/RARAD/PARAD is the adjudication of agrarian
reform cases. The first is essentially executive. It pertains to the enforcement
and administration of the laws, carrying them into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance. Thus, the Regional Director is primarily
tasked with implementing laws, policies, rules and regulations within the
responsibility of the agency, as well as the agency program in the region. The
second is judicial in nature, involving as it does the determination of rights
and obligations of the parties.
Sarne v Maquiling
Facts:
On February 17, 1998, private respondents filed a complaint for redemption
and damages against petitioners before the Office of the Provincial
Adjudicator, Dumaguete City. In their complaint, they alleged that as tenants
of the subject parcel of land, they have the right of pre-emption and
redemption pursuant to Sections 11 and 12 of R.A. No. 3844 otherwise known
as the Code of Agrarian Reform. The Adjudicator ruled in favour of the
respondents. Petitioners alleged that the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction
because the land in question was not under the administration and disposition
of the Department of Agrarian Reform and the Land Bank of the Philippines.
On appeal to the CA, the jurisdiction of DARAB was upheld.
Issue:
Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case
Held:
It is clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB in this case is anchored on
Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedure
covering agrarian disputes involving the sale, alienation, mortgage,
foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural lands under the
coverage of the CARP or other agrarian laws. There is nothing in the
provision from which it can be inferred that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is
limited only to agricultural lands under the administration and disposition of
DAR and LBP. We should not distinguish where the law does not distinguish.
Philippine Veterans Bank v CA
Facts:
Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum,
Davao. The lands were taken by the DAR for distribution to landless farmers
pursuant to R.A. No. 6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land made by
respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the DARAB, petitioner filed a
petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property with the
RTC which dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DARAB.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can still appeal after the 15-day period for filing
appeals
Held:
Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides that the
decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination
and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but
shall be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special
Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof.
The petition in the RTC was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule
XIII, Section 11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, the trial court
correctly dismissed the case.
CESAR MATEO, CANDIDO MATEO, DOMINGO A. SANTOS,
DANILO RIVERA VIRGINIA JARDIN GUPIT, ZENAIDA ARANDA, ET
AL., Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND CASIMIRO DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated
January 25, 1996 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 34039,
which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
which, in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction and restraining order, declared the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court null and void.
In contest in this case is a parcel of registered land situated at Pulang
Lupa I, Las Pias, Metro Manila. Private respondent Casimiro
Development Corporation (CDC) alleged that it was the owner of the
land in question since it acquired the same from the previous owner,
China Banking Corporation. After the sale CDC advised the petitioners
that it was the new owner of the land and that they had failed to pay
the rentals due to it and to its predecessor-in-interest. After demands
were made of the petitioners to settle their obligations and after they
failed to pay, CDC gave them notice to vacate the premises. The
petitioners refused. This prompted CDC to file a complaint for
Unlawful Detainer against the petitioners before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Las Pias.
In an Answer with Counterclaim, petitioners denied the allegations in
the complaint and maintained that the Metropolitan Trial Court has no
jurisdiction over the case since the land was classified as agricultural
and that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) that had jurisdiction over the case. They further claimed that
they were in continuous and open possession of the land even before
World War II and presumed themselves entitled to a government grant.
Petitioners also questioned the validity of the title held by CDC, arguing
that the land was registered before it was declared alienable.
The Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias decided in favor of CDC and
reasoned out as follows:
The Court, after careful consideration of the facts and the
laws applicable to this case[,] hereby resolves:
1. On the issue of jurisdiction.
The defendants alleged that the land in question is an
agricultural land by presenting a Tax Declaration Certificate
classifying the land as "FISHPOND." The classification of
the land in a tax declaration certificate as a "fishpond"
merely refers to the use of the land in question for the
purpose of real property taxation. This alone would not be
sufficient to bring the land in question under the operation of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
2. On the issue of open and adverse possession by the
defendants.
It should be noted that the subject land is covered by a
Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of plaintiffs'
predecessor-in-interest China Banking
Corporation. Certificates of Title under the Torrens System
is indefeasible and imprescriptible. As between two persons
claiming possession, one having a [T]orrens title and the
other has none, the former has a better right.
3. On the issue of the nullity of the Certificate of Title.
The defense of the defendants that the subject property was
a forest land when the same was originally registered in
1967 and hence, the registration is void[,] is not for this Court
to decide[,] for lack of jurisdiction. The certificate of title over
the property must be respected by this Court until it has
been nullified by a competent Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff[,] ordering the defendants
1. [sic] and all persons claiming right[s] under it to vacate
the subject premises located at Pulang Lupa I, Las Pias,
Metro Manila and surrender the possession of the same to
herein plaintiff;
2. to pay the plaintiff reasonable compensation for the
use and occupation of the subject premises hereby fixed at
(P100.00) one hundred pesos a month starting November
22, 1990 (the time when the demand letter to vacate was
given) until defendants actually vacate the property;
No pronouncement as to costs and attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.2
The petitioners raised the Metropolitan Trial Court's decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for a restraining order/preliminary
injunction. The petitioners contended that: (1) The respondent judge
had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case because the controversy
is an agrarian dispute; and (2) the controversy necessarily puts in
issue the ownership of the property and is therefore beyond the
allowable scope of unlawful detainer.3
The RTC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to maintain the status
quo. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a judgment in favor of the
petitioners, reversing the Metropolitan Trial Court. The RTC reasoned
thus:
Since the land is a fishpond, the same is agricultural as
defined under Sec. 3 (b) and (c), RA 6657, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. As an
agricultural land, it is covered under Sec. 4 thereof which
provides:
 "Sec. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture."
Because the land is within the scope of RA 6657, it is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) or the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) to determine whether
petitioners as the occupants-tillers of the said land are
qualified as beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program. Under Sec. 17 of Executive Order No.
129-A which is a repetition of Sec. 50 of RA 6657, the
DARAB is vested with quasi-judicial power to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over matters including implementation of
Agrarian Reform.
Petitioners further contended that they can not be ejected
from the land pursuant to General Order No. 53 issued on
August 21, 1975 declaring [a] moratorium on the ejectment
of tenants or lessees in agricultural and residential lands
converted or to be converted into subdivisions or
commercial centers and establishments and to RA 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing
Act of 1992, approved on March 24, 1992[,] which under
Sec. 44 thereof provides for a moratorium on the eviction of
all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their
houses or dwelling units for a period of three years from the
effectivity of the Act.
RA 7279 being the later law declaring a moratorium on
eviction[, it] shall be deemed to have superseded General
Order No. 53[.] Sec. 44 of said Act provides:
Sec. 44. Moratorium on Eviction and
Demolition. There shall be a moratorium on the
eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the
demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a
period of three (3) years from the effectivity of this
Act: Provided, That the moratorium shall not apply
to those persons who have constructed their
structures after the effectivity of this Act and for
cases enumerated in Section 28 hereof.
On the other hand, Sec. 28 thereof provides:
Sec. 28. Eviction and Demolition. Eviction or
demolition as a practice shall be
discouraged. Eviction or demolition, however,
may be allowed under the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks roads, parks
and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects
with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction and
demolition.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the land in
question is not covered by RA 6657, this Court believes that
the lower court cannot order their eviction pursuant to the
aforesaid provisions of RA 7279. As long time occupants of
the land, they appear to be qualified program beneficiaries
under the law and do not fall under the exceptions provided
therein. The court order for the eviction and demolition
mentioned in Sec. 28 (c) refers to an order issued before the
effectivity of the law and does not include the questioned
judgment which was rendered on October 19, 1992.
In the light of all the foregoing considerations, the court finds
that the respondent judge tried and decided Civil Case No.
3259 for unlawful detainer without jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring null
and void the decision promulgated on October 19, 1992 in
Civil Case No. 3259 by respondent judge.
SO ORDERED.4
Respondent CDC appealed the RTC judgment to the Court of Appeals
and made two assignments of error, to wit:
I. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE UNLAWFUL
DETAINER CASE;
II. THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE
APPLICATION OF R.A. 7279.5
The Court of Appeals found in favor of CDC and held:
On the first assigned error, appellant contends that
jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint
and cannot be made to depend upon the pleas or defenses
in the answer. Accordingly, it argues that its complaint is
one for unlawful detainer because it seeks to recover
physical possession from the appellees and the action was
filed within one year from November 22, 1990 when the last
demand was made under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, it claims that there was no evidence
presented that would prove that a tenancy relationship exists
between the parties.
After an assiduous study of the case, We find that the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias had jurisdiction over
the unlawful detainer case and not the DARAB. The
appellees presented tax declarations (Exhs. "A" and "A-5",
pp. 51-56, Record; and photographs ("D-4" to "D-5", pp. 123-
124, Record) of the property to show that the subject land is
a fishpond and hence an agricultural land within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB. While We may concede that the
property was, in the past[,] a fishpond, it was not anymore a
fishpond at the time the complaint for unlawful detainer was
filed. The tax declarations (Exhs. "A" to "A-5") showing that
the property is a fishpond [are] no longer true. It is worthy to
note that tax declarations are not conclusive proof of the
nature of the property (Vide, Patalinghug vs. Court of
Appeals, 229 SCRA 554) and the photographs show that no
form of fish life can survive in the alleged fishpond since it is
polluted (Exhs. "3" to "3-C", pp. 77-80). Significantly, the
area where the subject property is located was declared as a
low density residential zone (R-1) per MMZO 81-01 dated
March 1981 (Exh. "6", pp. 146-148).
Even assuming that the subject land is a fishpond, and
therefore an agricultural land, still, it is error for the court a
quo to declare void the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
Court on this finding alone. In Isidro vs. Court of
Appeals, 228 SCRA 503, the Honorable Supreme Court
declared that the mere fact that a land is an agricultural land
does not automatically make such case an agrarian dispute
upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The disquisition in
the Isidro case is enlightening, thus:
 "The MTC dismissed the unlawful detainer
complaint primarily on the ground that the subject
land is agricultural and therefore the question at
issue is agrarian. In this connection, it is well to
recall that Section 1, Rule II of the Revised Rules
of Procedure provides that the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic
Act No. 6389[,] Presidential Decree No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over
lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes
concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing or seeking to arrange terms
or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It
includes any controversy relating to compensation
of lands acquired under Republic Act No. 6657
and other terms and conditions of transfer of
ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessees.
...
But a case involving an agricultural land does not
automatically make such case an agrarian dispute,
upon which the DARAB has jurisdiction. The mere
fact that the land is agricultural does not ipso
factomake the possessor an agricultural lessee
[or] tenant. The law provides for conditions or
requisites before he can qualify as one and the
land being agricultural is only one of them. The
law states that an agrarian dispute must be a
controversy relating to a tenurial arrangement over
lands devoted to agriculture. And as previously
mentioned, such arrangement may be leasehold,
tenancy or stewardship.
In the case before Us, the appellees have neither tenurial
arrangement of any kind with the appeallant nor with
appellant's predecessor-in-interest. Verily, there being no
agrarian dispute between the parties, the DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the case and the complaint for unlawful
detainer was properly filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Las Pias (see, De Luna vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA
703).
On the second assigned error, appellant contends that it was
error for the court a quo to nullify the decision of the
Metropolitan Trial Court because the proper thing to do
under RA 7279 is to hold in abeyance or suspend the
execution of the decision as the law speaks of moratorium
and the appellees are not program beneficiaries. Moreover,
it argues that Section 28 (c) is an exception to Section 44,
RA 7279.
We are of the view that RA 7279 does not preclude this court
from rendering a decision affirming the judgment of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias. It is important to
consider that Section 28 of RA 7279 merely discourages
eviction or demolition but allows eviction or demolition under
the following situations:
(a) When persons or entities occupy danger
areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and
other public places such as sidewalks, roads and
parks, and playgrounds;
(b) When government infrastructure projects
with available funding are about to be
implemented; or
(c) When there is a court order for eviction or
demolition.
Contrary to the court a quo's view, the aforecited provisions
of Section 28 (c) which allows eviction or demolition when
there is a court order does not require the court order to
have been issued before the law's effectivity.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed
from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias in Civil
Case No. 3259 is reinstated. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.6
In a Resolution dated February 21, 1997, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, for lack of merit. 7
The petitioners thus filed the present petition for review on certiorari to
question the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The
sole issue raised is whether or not jurisdiction over the subject matter
lies with the DARAB or with the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is provided in Section 50 of Rep. Act No.
6657, which reads:
Sec. 50. Quasi Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR is
hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR).
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases,
disputes or controversies in a most expeditious manner,
employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of
every case in accordance with justice and equity and the
merits of the case. Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform
rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination for every action or proceeding
before it.
Furthermore, it is provided in Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure of 1994 that:
Sec. 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228,
and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic
Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but
not be limited to cases involving the following:
 a) The rights and obligations of persons,
whether natural or juridical, engaged in the
management, cultivation and use of all agricultural
lands covered by the CARP and other agrarian
laws. . . .
The issue is not new. It was held in Duremdes v. Duremdes8 that:
First. For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over the case,
there must be a tenancy relationship between the parties. In
order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it
is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
1) That the parties are the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject
matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3)
that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship
is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that
there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the
harvest is shared between the landowner and the
tenant or agricultural lessee.
These requisites for the jurisdiction of DARAB have been reiterated by
the Court in a number of cases.9
With regard to the first element, the petitioners have tried to prove that
they are tenants or agricultural lessees of the respondent corporation,
CDC, by showing that the land was originally owned by their
grandfather, Isaias Lara, who gave them permission to work the land,
and that CDC is merely a successor-in-interest of their grandfather. It
must be noted that the petitioners failed to adequately prove their
grandfather's ownership of the land. They merely showed six tax
declarations. It has been held by this Court that, as against a transfer
certificate of title, tax declarations or receipts are not adequate proofs
of ownership.10 Granting arguendo that the land was really owned by
the petitioners' grandfather, petitioners did not even attempt to show
how the land went from the patrimony of their grandfather to that of
CDC. Furthermore, petitioners did not prove, but relied on mere
allegation, that they indeed had an agreement with their grandfather to
use the land.
As for the third element, there is apparently no consent between the
parties. Petitioners were unable to show any proof of consent from
CDC to work the land. For the sake of argument, if petitioners were
able to prove that their grandfather owned the land, they nonetheless
failed to show any proof of consent from their grandfather to work the
land. Since the third element was not proven, the fourth element
cannot be present since there can be no purposeto a relationship to
which the parties have not consented.
For the sixth element, there was no proof adduced to show that the
harvest was shared between the parties.
Regarding the classification of the land, covered by the second
element, considering the absence of the first, third, fourth and sixth
elements, the same is not necessary in determining jurisdiction.
With regard to the fifth element, the petitioners alleged and labored to
prove that they have been personally cultivating the subject
land. However, even if such personal cultivation occurred it is not
relevant since there is no showing of consent between the parties.
Since there is no proof of tenancy relationship, and in view of absence
of the necessary elements enumerated in Duremdes v.
Duremdes,11 the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over the present
case. The MTC, therefore, had jurisdiction over the subject matter and
hence properly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Court of Appeals'
Decision and Resolution in CA- G.R. SP No. 34039, dated January 25,
1996 and February 21, 1997 respectively, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM Represented by MR.
VIRGILIO L. ALCOMENDRAS in his capacity as Cebu Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer, MR. JOSEPHUS M. GONZALES in his
capacity as Cebu Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, JUANA
ALFORQUE, FRANCISCO NAVARRO, EDUARDO NAVARRO,
ARSENIO GABISAY, EDILBERTO LABANDERO, LOLITA
DACAYANA, CELESTINO RAMA, NUMERIANO NAVARRO,
BONIFACIO LASTIMOSA, LORETA RAMA, LOURDES ARDA,
LEONARDO GABISAY, and NORMERTA BONTILAO, Petitioners,
vs.
PAULINO FRANCO Represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Mr.
Plaridel Seno, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 20 November 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43917 affirming the
decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
("DARAB") with modification by deleting the disturbance
compensation.
The Facts
In January 1994, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer Patrocinia G.
Mercado ("MARO Mercado")3 of the Department of Agrarian Reform
("DAR") sent a letter to Paulino Franco ("Franco") through Francos
attorney-in-fact, Plaridel Seno ("Seno"). The letter requested Franco to
attend a conference to discuss the terms and conditions of bringing
under the agricultural leasehold system Francos land located in
Babag, Cebu City. Franco failed to attend the meeting and merely sent
a letter-reply to MARO Mercado, objecting to the placement of his land
under the coverage of Republic Act No. 6657 ("RA 6657") or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
MARO Mercado prepared the documentation folders for Provisional
Lease Rentals in favor of the following: Juana Alforque, Francisco
Navarro, Eduardo Navarro, Arsenio Gabisay, Andres Labandero,
Benedicto Gabisay, Edilberto Labandero, Lolita Dacayana, Celestino
Rama, Numeriano Navarro, Bonifacio Lastimosa, Loreta Rama,
Lourdes Arda, Leonardo Gabisay, and Normerta Bontilao ("private
petitioners").4 MARO Mercado found all the private petitioners bona
fide tenants on Francos land. The land, allegedly thus tenanted, had
an aggregate area of 36.8 hectares. The folders contained the
corresponding orders fixing the lease rentals for each occupant. On 7
March 1994, Acting Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Buenaventura
Pomida ("PARO Pomida")5 approved the Provisional Lease Rentals
recommended by MARO Mercado.
Franco filed with the DARAB, Region VII, Cebu City a petition to nullify
the orders of MARO Mercado and PARO Pomida. The case was
docketed as Reg. Case No. VI-516-C-94. Franco alleged that the land
could not be placed under the agricultural leasehold system because
Proclamation No. 20526 dated 30 January 1981 and Letter of
Instruction No. 1256 ("LOI No. 1256") dated 14 July 1982 had already
classified the land as non-agricultural. Proclamation No. 2052 declared
the Barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao, including the
proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu and the Municipalities of
Argao and Dalaguete in the Province of Cebu, as tourist zones.
Further, under Section 12 of RA 6657, in relation to DAR
Administrative Order No. 4, series of 1989, only tenanted agricultural
lands can be brought under the leasehold system. Franco alleged that
since his land is neither agricultural nor tenanted, private petitioners
not having shared any produce of the land with him, the land could not
be placed under the leasehold system.
Moreover, Franco claimed that the procedure under DAR
Administrative Order No. 4 prescribing when the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer may fix provisionally the leasehold rental even without
the landowners participation applies only in cases where the
landowner disagrees with the amount of rental, but not when the
landowner denies that his land is agricultural and tenanted. Thus,
Franco prayed for the nullification of the Provisional Leasehold Rental
Orders.
In their answer, private petitioners asserted that the issuance of the
orders was in accordance with Section 12 of RA 6657, 7 in relation to
Section 34 of Republic Act No. 3844 ("RA 3844"), 8 authorizing the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer to fix the rentals on agricultural land.
Accordingly, MARO Mercado sent notices for Leasehold Conference to
Franco and private petitioners. Since Franco merely sent a letter-reply
to the notice without appearing and presenting evidence to support his
claim that his land is untenanted and is non-agricultural, MARO
Mercado prepared the documentation folders for Provisional Lease
Rentals as mandated by DAR Administrative Order No. 4, series of
1989. PARO Pomida later approved the Provisional Lease Rentals.
Thus, private petitioners assert that whatever acts done by MARO
Mercado and PARO Pomida on the Provisional Lease Rentals on
Francos land were performed in accordance with their official duties
and functions. Private petitioners further alleged that the exemption of
Francos land from the Operation Land Transfer coverage was by
virtue of Proclamation No. 2052 and not because Francos land was
untenanted. Proclamation No. 2052, in placing certain barangays of
Cebu City, including Barangay Babag, within the tourism zone, did not
automatically change the classification of Francos land from
agricultural to non-agricultural.
On 30 June 1994, the Agrarian Reform Adjudicator ("Adjudicator")
ruled in favor of Franco, declaring the assailed orders void.9 Citing
Proclamation No. 2052, LOI No. 1256, and the Order dated 16
September 1992 of then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao ("Secretary
Garilao"), the Adjudicator held that Francos land is excluded from the
coverage of the Operation Land Transfer under Presidential Decree
No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law under RA 6657.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Adjudicator reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the reasons above-cited, Decision is
hereby rendered as follows, to wit:
1. Declaring the challenged Orders (Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F", "G",
"H", "I", "J", "K", "L", "M", "N", "O", "P" and "Q") as null and void for lack
of legal and factual basis;
2. Ordering the recall and cancellation of the aforesaid Orders for the
reasons above-indicated;
3. No pronouncement as to cost and damages.
Serve copies of this Decision to Atty. Hilario Baril, Atty. Florito
Pozon/Mr. Ramon Araneta, Jr., MARO Patrocinia Mercado and all the
parties hereof for their guidance and information.
SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the DARAB rendered its Decision11 dated 23 July 1996
affirming the decision of the Adjudicator. The DARAB held that
Francos land was not agricultural land at the time the questioned
orders were issued. The DARAB cited two reasons: (1) Francos land
is within the tourism zone pursuant to Proclamation No. 2052,
promulgated on 30 January 1981, and which preceded the enactment
of RA 6657 which became effective on 15 June 1988; and (2) the
purpose of Proclamation No. 2052 is manifested in the issuance of LOI
No. 1256 which directed the DAR Secretary12 to exempt the areas
situated within the declared Tourist Zone from the coverage of the
Operation Land Transfer, and to suspend or cancel all processing for
coverage of these areas under the land reform program.
In the Decision, one of the members of the DARAB, Lorenzo R. Reyes
("Reyes"), made a handwritten note under his signature
stating: "Petitioner-appellee [Franco] will still have to apply for
conversion and if granted appellants will be entitled to
disturbance compensation." Secretary Garilao, as Chairperson of
the DARAB, rendered a separate opinion stating that:
I concur, together with the Honorable DARAB Commissioners, with the
outcome of this case.
I would like to reiterate however that the grant of exemption from
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. The decision
of this case should not, in any way, be construed as a grant of
exemption. Petitioner must still comply with the administrative
requirement of applying for exemption or conversion of his
landholding.13
Franco filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 19 August 1996 on the
sole ground:
That the pronouncement therein made that petitioner-appellee will still
apply for conversion, and if granted, appellants will be entitled to
disturbance compensation, is not supported by any factual and legal
basis.14
In a Resolution dated 11 February 1997, however, the DARAB denied
the motion for lack of merit.15
Franco appealed to the Court of Appeals but private petitioners did not.
In a Decision dated 20 November 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the DARAB decision with the modification that private petitioners have
no right to disturbance compensation.
Hence, this petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that Franco did not have to apply for
conversion of his land from agricultural to non-agricultural. However, in
accordance with Section 3(d)16 of DAR Administrative Order No. 01,
series of 1999, Franco should apply for an exemption clearance with
the DAR to exempt his land from the coverage of RA 6657.
On the issue of disturbance compensation, the Court of Appeals held
that private petitioners are not entitled to any disturbance
compensation absent any proof that they are tenants, farmers, or bona
fide occupants of the land. Under Section 16 of DAR Administrative
Order No. 01, series of 1999, disturbance compensation shall be paid
to tenants, farmworkers, or bona fide occupants affected by the
conversion. The Court of Appeals stated that the DARAB itself found
no tenancy relationship between Franco and private petitioners.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. WHETHER PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 2052
DECLARING THE WHOLE BARANGAY OF SIBUGAY, MALUBOG,
BABAG AND SIRAO AND THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ARGAO AND
DALAGUETE [AS TOURIST ZONES] HAS TAKEN OUTSIDE THE
COVERAGE OF AGRARIAN REFORM ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS
INCLUDED WITHIN THE PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION OR
ONLY THOSE THAT ARE ACQUIRED AND DEVELOPED BY THE
PTA FOR TOURISM PURPOSES.
2. WHETHER BARANGAY BABAG WHERE THE LAND SUBJECT OF
THIS CASE IS LOCATED IS NOT ANYMORE COVERABLE UNDER
THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM (CARP).
3. WHETHER THE FINDINGS OF NON-TENANCY AS RULED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS IS PROPER INSPITE OF THE FACT
THAT THE SAME HAS NOT BEEN FACTUALLY DETERMINED IN
THE COURT A QUO.
4. WHETHER THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AS TO
THE NON-PAYMENT OF DISTURBANCE COMPENSATION TO
PRIVATE PETITIONERS-FARMERS IS VALID AND PROPER.17
The Ruling of the Court
The issues in this case originated from an appeal not on the decision
of the DARAB but on the note made by one of the DARAB members.
In the DARAB decision, DARAB member Reyes made a handwritten
note under his signature stating: "Petitioner-Appellee [Franco] will still
have to apply for conversion and if granted appellants will be entitled to
disturbance compensation." This note by DARAB member Reyes is not
part of the dispositive portion of the decision. It appears that Franco
was under the misconception that the note of DARAB member Reyes
formed part of the decision and thus appealed this note to the Court of
Appeals when the DARAB denied his motion for reconsideration.
Section 12, Rule X of the DARAB 2003 Rules of Procedure states the
grounds for reconsideration of the decision of the DARAB:
SECTION 12. Motion for Reconsideration. Within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the notice of order, resolution or decision of the Board or
Adjudicator, a party may move for reconsideration of such order,
resolution, or decision on the grounds that:
12.1 the findings of fact in the said decision, order or resolution are not
supported by substantial evidence, or
12.2 the conclusions stated therein are contrary to law and
jurisprudence.
xxx
In this case, Franco moved for reconsideration, not of the DARAB
decision, but of the one-sentence handwritten note of DARAB member
Reyes. Obviously, the handwritten note of DARAB member Reyes
does not form part of the decision and cannot be the subject of a
motion for reconsideration. Thus, it was proper for the DARAB to
dismiss the motion for reconsideration, albeit the resolution denying
the motion for reconsideration failed to mention the impropriety of the
issue raised in such motion.
An appeal from a decision of the DARAB involving questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law may be taken to the Court of
Appeals.18 If the Court of Appeals finds that the DARAB has committed
errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the
judgment or decision, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise,
it shall dismiss the same.19
The following issues were raised in the Court of Appeals:
1. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER [FRANCO] WILL STILL BE
SADDLED WITH THE RIGORS OF CONVERSION IN THE LIGHT OF
THE RULING OF THE DARAB THAT THE LOT IN QUESTION IS
NOT AN AGRICULTURAL LAND.
2. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER [FRANCO] WILL STILL BE
BURDENED WITH THE OBLIGATION TO PAY DISTURBANCE
COMPENSATION.20
Again, Franco sought for review not the DARAB decision but the one-
sentence handwritten note of DARAB member Reyes, which is a mere
opinion of a lone member of the DARAB and has no binding effect.
The view expressed in the note is not the opinion of the DARAB and
does not form part of the DARAB decision. Certainly, the note does not
form part of the dispositive portion of the DARAB decision which could
be subject to an appeal.
In the recent case of Republic of the Philippines v. Nolasco,21 this
Court reiterated the difference between a judgment and an opinion:
More to the point is another well recognized doctrine, that the final
judgment as rendered is the judgment of the court irrespective of all
seemingly contrary statements in the decision. "A judgment must be
distinguished from an opinion. The latter is the informal
expression of the views of the court and cannot prevail against its
final order or decision. While the two may be combined in one
instrument, the opinion forms no part of the judgment. So, . . .
there is a distinction between the findings of and conclusions of a court
and its Judgment. While they may constitute its decision and amount to
the rendition of a judgment, they are not the judgment itself. They
amount to nothing more than an order for judgment, which must, of
course, be distinguished from the judgment." (1 Freeman on
Judgments, p. 6) At the root of the doctrine that the premises must
yield to the conclusion is perhaps, side by side with the needs of
writing finis to litigations, the recognition of the truth that "the trained
intuition of the judge continually leads him to right results for which he
is puzzled to give unimpeachable legal reasons." "It is an everyday
experience of those who study judicial decisions that the results are
usually sound, whether the reasoning from which the results purport to
flow is sound or not." (The Theory of Judicial Decision, Pound, 36
Harv. Law Review, pp. 9, 51.) It is not infrequent that the grounds
of a decision fail to reflect the exact views of the court, especially
those of concurring justices in a collegiate court. We often
encounter in judicial decisions, lapses, findings, loose statements
and generalities which do not bear on the issues or are
apparently opposed to the otherwise sound and considered result
reached by the court as expressed in the dispositive part, so
called, of the decision. (Emphasis supplied)
A separate opinion cannot be a proper subject of an appeal. More so in
this case where what was appealed in the appellate court was a one-
sentence handwritten note of a DARAB member. It is not even the
opinion of the DARAB but is merely the personal view of a DARAB
member. The appellate court should have dismissed the petition which
appealed not the DARAB decision itself but a mere note of a DARAB
member which is not part of the DARAB decision. As held in Bernas v.
Court of Appeals,22 "courts of justice have no jurisdiction or power to
decide a question not in issue and that a judgment going outside the
issues and purporting to adjudicate something upon which the parties
were not heard is not merely irregular, but extrajudicial and invalid."
Indeed, the ruling of the appellate court that private petitioners have no
right to disturbance compensation because they have not proven that
they are tenants of Francos land went beyond the DARAB decision
being appealed. The determination of entitlement to disturbance
compensation is still premature at this stage since this case originally
involved only the issue of nullity of the Provisional Lease Rental
Orders. Further, it is the DAR that can best determine and identify the
legitimate tenants who have a right to disturbance compensation.
Significantly, on 30 August 1994, then DAR Secretary Garilao issued
an Order setting aside his previous Order dated 16 September 1992.
The Order reads:
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION/EXCLUSION FROM LAND
ACQUISITION AND REDISTRIBUTION UNDER THE CARP
INVOLVING PARCELS OF LAND IN SIRAO, MALUBOG, BABAG
AND SIBUGAY, ALL IN CEBU CITY,
PAULINO B. FRANCO, represented by
PLARIDEL SENO, Administrator,
Applicant.
x--------------------------------------------------
x
MANUEL A. CANTOS
- versus -
REGIONAL DIRECTOR NEVINO CARDENTE, et al.
x-------------------------------------------------x
ORDER
For resolution is a Motion for reconsideration, dated October 5, 1992,
filed by protestants-farmers, from the Order of this Department
(DARCO), dated September 16, 1992, upholding the validity of
Proclamation No. 2052 declaring the Barangays of Sibugay, Malubog,
Babag and Sirao, including the proposed Lusaran Dam, in the City of
Cebu, and the Municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete, in the province
of Cebu as tourist zones, and declaring the landholdings covered by
the Kang-Irag Sports Complex as excluded from Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP).
xxx
However, the bone of contention in the case at bar centers on the
extent of the area declared as exempted from the coverage of the
agrarian reform program. If we are to take the words of the
proclamation at its face value, it would appear that the entire four
barangays, including the areas within the proposed Lusaran Dam and
two other municipalities, would be exempted from CARP by virtue of
this very law.
However, a closer reading of the proclamation would show that the
PTA is mandated to identify well geographic areas within the tourism
zone for purposes of development, to wit:
"NOW THEREFORE I, PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby declare the areas comprising the
Barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag, and Sirao, including the
proposed Lusaran Dam in the City of Cebu, and the municipalities of
Argao and Dalaguete in the Province of Cebu, as tourist zones under
the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
pursuant to Sec. 5 (d) of Presidential Decree No. 564.
The PTA shall identify well defined geographic areas within the zones
with potential tourism value."
In other words, the specific intent of Proclamation No. 2052 is the
identification of the areas for tourism with the implication that the
other areas within the proclamation but no longer necessary for
tourism development as determined by the PTA, in this case,
could be transferred for agrarian reform purposes to the DAR.
In a series of consultations with the PTA, the DAR has requested the
PTA to delineate and identify the areas needed for tourism
development. In a letter dated August 4, 1993, the PTA, through its
General Manager, Eduardo T. Joaquin, identified a total of 1,500
hectares, more or less, which are needed for tourism, 808 hectares of
which are covered by a Master Plan. The said letter is accompanied by
a map delineating these areas.
Though this Department, as an arm of the Executive Branch, supports
the programs being implemented by its partner agencies (in this
particular case, improve our tourism prospects) it remains steadfast on
its commitment to the lowly farmers of the land. Inasmuch as the PTA
has clearly delineated 808 hectares of land for tourism purposes,
backed by a master plan, this Department is inclined to believe that
this is more than enough for the implementation of its project and is
well within its capability to develop.
This office is not inclined to exempt from CARP coverage the entire
1,500 hectares as intimated by the General Manager of the PTA since
a substantial portion of this area is not supported by a master plan that
would show that indeed they need the entire 1,500 hectares for its
purposes. The remaining hectarages would better serve the purposes
of agricultural production and enhancement of the livelihood of the
farmers in the area.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of this Office dated
September 16, 1992, is hereby set aside and a new Order issued,
to wit:
1. The area of 808 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared for
tourism purposes and therefore deemed excluded from OLT or
CARP coverage;
2. The balance of the area which is covered under Proclamation
No. 2052, which is a total of 2,192 hectares, more or less, is
deemed covered under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, either through its land transfer or Integrated Social
Forestry, and Handog Titulo components;
3. DAR Regional Office VII is hereby directed to delineate the 808
hectares for tourism development with the assistance of the PTA,
to determine with exactitude what areas will be covered by CARP;
4. The legitimate farmer-beneficiaries within the 808 hectares
shall be paid disturbance compensation pursuant to Section 36 of
RA 3844, as amended by Sec. 7 of RA 6389;
5. The DAR Regional Office VII is directed further to devise a
comprehensive relocation/resettlement plan for the farmers that stand
to be affected by the tourism development, which may include among
others:
a. Temporary usufructuary agreements for the use of the land pending
actual site development;
b. Permanent relocation sites in the areas outside the 808 hectares;
c. Provision of support services; and
d. Issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award or Certificates of
Stewardship, or other appropriate tenurial instruments, corresponding
to the relocation areas;
6. Directing that any and all development activities, inclusive of
preparatory site development, for the change of the 808 hectares from
agricultural to non-agricultural use shall be suspended until after the
payment of just compensation by the landowners concerned and the
actual relocation of the farmers.
In the light of this Order, we deem the Petition of Mr. Manuel Cantos,
dated December 15, 1992, and the Motion For Intervention, dated May
3, 1993, to be moot and academic, and are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the DAR Regional Office VII, in coordination with the Philippine
Tourism Authority, has to determine precisely which areas are for
tourism development and excluded from the Operation Land Transfer
and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. And suffice it to
state here that the Court has repeatedly ruled that lands already
classified as non-agricultural before the enactment of RA 6657 on 15
June 1988 do not need any conversion clearance.24
New issues raised for the first time on appeal fishponds from the time he received those from the petitioners Oca
brothers until the first week of May 1992, when he requested from
them his share of the harvest. Instead of acceding to his request,
Private petitioners raise for the first time on appeal the first two issues
petitioners demanded that he vacate the ponds.
submitted for resolution. Private petitioners never appealed to the
Court of Appeals the DARAB decision, affirming the Adjudicators
decision nullifying the Provisional Leasehold Rental Orders. A Complaint for Peaceful Possession, Leasehold and Damages, with
Motion for the Issuance of Interlocutory Order,1 was filed by the
respondent against petitioners on July 9, 1999 with the Office of the
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante,25 this
Provincial Adjudicator, Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Court held that the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider
Board (DARAB), Region I, Lingayen, Pangasinan. It prayed for, among
evidence in a petition for certiorari or petition for review
other things, the Adjudicator to "order the (petitioners) to fix with the
on certiorari outside those submitted before the DARAB. Likewise, we
(respondent) the lease rental of the parcels of fishpond, subject of this
cannot consider new issues raised at this very late stage in the
case, in the amount representing 25% of the average net normal
proceedings as this would violate the basic principles of fair play,
harvest of Bangus annually."2
justice and due process.26

In their Answer (with Counterclaim) filed on July 23, 1992, petitioners

In Salafranca v. Philamlife (Pamplona) Village Homeowners
denied that respondent is a tenant/caretaker of the fishponds subject of
Association, Inc.,27 the Court held:
the present controversy. They asserted that as owners or civil law
lessees of the fishponds, they themselves are the cultivators and have
In the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, it is noteworthy that not engaged any caretaker or tenant thereon. From time to time,
private respondent never raised the issue of compulsory retirement, as though, they would hire workers or laborers paid either on a daily or
a cause for terminating petitioners service. In its appeal before the "piece-work" basis.
NLRC, this ground was never discussed. In fact, private respondent, in
justifying the termination of the petitioner, still anchored its claim on the
Petitioners acknowledged that in 1985, respondent became their
applicability of the amended by-laws. This omission is fatal to private
industrial partner over the Salayog property. They insisted, however,
respondents cause, for the rule is well-settled that matters, theories
that he had already waived his right as such, in consideration of the
or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will
sum of P140,000.00. To conclude, they argued that since respondent
ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot
is not their tenant or caretaker, the case is not within the jurisdiction of
be raised for the first time on appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
the Provincial Adjudicator. They prayed for the dismissal of the
Complaint and payment of damages.
Similarly, in this case, private petitioners should have raised the first
two issues during the DARAB proceedings. Matters, theories or
On September 25, 1992, the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator issued
arguments not submitted before the DARAB will not be considered on
a Decision in favor of the respondent, the dispositive portion of which
appeal where they are raised for the first time. Well-settled is the rule
reads:
that a party is not allowed to change his theory of the case or his cause
of action on appeal.28
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision dated 20 November 2000
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43917. 1. Declaring the Plaintiff (herein Respondent) as bona
We REINSTATE the Decision dated 23 July 1996 of the Department of fide tenant of the parcels of fishpond in question.
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board in DARAB Case No. 2811,
affirming fully the decision of the Adjudicator.
2. Making permanent the restraining order for the
Defendants (herein Petitioners) not to disturbed (sic)
SO ORDERED. plaintiffs peaceful possession, work and care of the fishpond
in question.
G.R. No. 144817 March 7, 2002
3. Enforcing the right of the plaintiff to become the
agricultural lessee in the fishpond in question; and
JOSE OCA, ISABELO OCA, RODOLFO O. GUTLAY, and JOSE
ABRAZALDO, petitioners,
vs. 4. Ordering the Municipal Agrarian Officer of Mangaldan,
COURT OF APPEALS and SERGIO O. ABALOS, respondents. Pangasinan to assist the plaintiff and defendants, Jose Oca
and Isabelo Oca, to determine and fix the lease rentals of
the fishpond in question.
PUNO, J.:

SO ORDERED."3
This case arose from a dispute concerning tenancy relations over four
parcels of fishpond property located in the province of Pangasinan.
Petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo Oca are the co-owners of a fishpond The above Decision was appealed by the petitioners to the Department
known in the locality as the "Purong" property, situated in Bolosan, of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board. The Board on April 18, 1996
Dagupan City. The four petitioners are the civil law lessees of another affirmed in toto the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.4
called the "Salayog" property also located at Bolosan. Petitioner Jose
Oca, on the other hand, is the sole and exclusive owner of two
Petitioners then sought relief with the Court of Appeals. They filed a
fishponds commonly called the "Perew" and the "Fabian" properties,
Petition for Review on Certiorari, "pursuant to Section 54 of the
which are located at Bolosan and Angaldan, Pangasinan,
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in relation to Section 1, Rule XIV
respectively.1wphi1.nt
of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB."5 They grounded the
petition on the alleged errors in the Boards finding of facts and
Respondent Sergio O. Abalos claims to be the "share-tenant- conclusion of law, which caused them grave and irreparable damages.
caretaker" of the above fishponds. He allegedly has been performing On August 18, 2000, the Court of Appeals promulgated the presently
all the phases of farm work needed for the production of bangus. The assailed Decision, the pertinent portion of which reads:
only contribution of petitioners Jose and Isabelo Oca are their lands.
Pursuant to the sharing agreement imposed by the petitioners, all
"However, the Court takes exception to the finding of public
the bangus produced from the above fishponds belong to them, while
respondent (DARAB) that private respondent (herein
he gets the sari-sari fishes as his share. He then asserts that he has
respondent) is a tenant with regard to the "Salayog"
been in peaceful possession, cultivation and care of the aforesaid
 property. As per "Agreement" dated October 5, 1985,
petitioners (herein petitioners) and private respondent
became civil law co-lessees with respect to said properties...
And having sold his share and interest on the "Salayog"
property, private respondent consequently waived any
interests he had thereon.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed
from is MODIFIED. Consequently, private respondent is
declared as bonafide tenant only with regard to the parcels
of fishpond property exclusively owned by petitioner Jose
Oca, and that co-owned by petitioners Jose Oca and Isabelo
Oca. In all other respects, the Decision appealed from is
hereby MODIFIED."6
Petitioners elevated the case before us and filed the instant petition.
They advanced a new argument assailing the supposed lack of
jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator over the subject matter of the
action. They raised the following issues:
"1. Are fishponds, like the subject matter of this case,
covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, such
that controversies relative to production or tillage therein
come under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board?
2. Does the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board have jurisdiction over cases involving fishponds?
3. Did the Honorable Court of Appeals err in upholding or
affirming the Decision of the DARAB in this case?
4. Could the issue of jurisdiction be raised for the first time
on Appeal in the Supreme Court, when the same has not
been raised in the DARAB, nor in the Court of Appeals?"7
The petition is bereft of merit.
We begin where petitioners ended. The jugular issue is can they be
permitted to impugn for the first time the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Adjudicator at this stage of the case.
The well-entrenched rule is that jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law.8 It cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties; it cannot be
acquired through, or waived or enlarged or diminished by, their act or
omission; neither is it conferred by acquiescence of the court. 9 Well to
emphasize, it is neither for the courts nor the parties to violate or
disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in character. 10
An error in jurisdiction over the subject matter can be objected to at
any instance,11 as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to
take cognizance of the action.12 This kind of defense can be invoked
even for the first time on appeal13 or after final judgment.14 Such is
understandable as this kind of jurisdiction, to stress, is statutorily
determined.15
This rule on timing, however, is not absolute. In highly meritorious and
exceptional circumstances, estoppel or waiver may operate as a shield
to prevent a party from belatedly resorting to this form of defense.
Thus, we have held in the leading case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy16 that a party may be barred by estoppel by
laches from invoking this plea for the first time on appeal for the
purpose of annulling everything done in the case with the active
participation of said party invoking the plea.17 We defined laches as
"failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have
been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting presumption that the party entitled to
assert it has abandoned it or has declined to assert it." 18
In the case at bar, we find the petitioners guilty of estoppel by laches.
In the first place, they never disputed the jurisdiction of the Provincial
Adjudicator at any stage of the proceeding: whether in the Provincial
Office level, the DARAB, or the Court of Appeals. Notwithstanding the
presence of numerous opportunities in the various stages of this case
to contest the adjudicators exercise of jurisdiction, not once did they
register a hint of protest. Neither can they claim that they were
prevented from contesting its jurisdiction during the eight years this
case was under litigation.19
Instead, petitioners diligently participated in the litigation below. This is
evidenced by the fact that they have tendered responsive pleadings,
attended conferences participated in the hearings and appealed
adverse decisions against them. By their conduct, they voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the adjudicator. Consequently, they
must not be allowed to deny his jurisdiction after submitting to it. The
rule is that the active participation of the party against whom the action
was brought, coupled with his failure to object to the jurisdiction of the
court or administrative body where the action is pending, is tantamount
to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning
the court or bodys jurisdiction.20
It also bears emphasis that petitioners instituted a counterclaim against
the respondent. They prayed not only for the dismissal of the case but
likewise asked for the payment of damages based on the latters
purported bad faith. By filing a counterclaim, they recognized and
expressly invoked the jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator. They
cannot now insist the want of it only after an unfavorable decision was
issued against them. It is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief (by advancing a counterclaim), to afterwards deny that
same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.21 The party is barred from such
conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid but
because such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public
policy.22
But this is not all. In their petition before us, petitioners only impugn the
jurisdiction of the Provincial Adjudicator without arguing a single issue
in respect of the merits of his Decision, as well as the Decisions of the
DARAB and the Court of Appeals, which upheld it in succession. They
failed to question their findings of facts or conclusions of law. The shift
of stance in attacking solely the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the
adjudicator is a flimsy ruse or excuse to delay, if not totally avoid,
compliance with what apparently is an inevitable legal obligation.
The ends of justice and equity require that petitioners should not be
allowed to defeat the tenants right by belatedly raising the issue of
jurisdiction. Permitting petitioners to assail the jurisdiction of the
Provincial Adjudicator at this late stage of the case would mean
rendering useless all the proceedings held below. A great deal of time,
effort and resources would be put to waste both on the part of the
litigants and of the State. This is especially oppressive for the
respondent, a tenant who cannot afford the discomforts of a protracted
litigation.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, finding no cogent reason to reverse or modify
the assailed Decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. Cost
against the petitioners.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Onquit VS. Binamira-Parcia
Facts:
Respondent Judge was assigned a forcible entry case which the
complainant and her two brothers were co-defendants. Complainant raised
the issue of jurisdiction stating that said case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) because it involves
tenancy over an agricultural land. Respondent Judge denied all motions
raised by defendants ruling that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
in the complaint and not those raised by defendants. Moreover, according to
respondent Judge, the claim regarding the nature of the case at bar would
not automatically divest the court its jurisdiction. Subsequently, plaintiff in
the lower court filed an injunction bond which was approved by respondent
Judge and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued against the defendants,
including herein complainant. A seizure order followed which directed
respondent Sheriff to seize the palay from the land in question.
Complainant details several allegations as follows:
(1) That the land subject of the forcible entry case is an agricultural riceland,
thus, it is the Department of Agrarian Reform which has original and
exclusive jurisdiction, and not the respondent Judge's court;
(2) That the plaintiffs injunction bond was approved by respondent Judge
without first serving a copy to the complainant resulting in a violation of due
process. Complainant avers that it left her no opportunity to object to the
sufficiency of the bond. Further, a copy of the writ of injunction was not
served on complainants counsel;
(3) That a notice regarding the Motion for Issuance of Seizure Order was not
served on the complainant thereby depriving her of a chance to oppose it;
(4) That respondent Judge has been heard saying that complainant and his
co-defendants ought to leave the land because it is certain that they will lose
their case;
(5) And that, with regard to respondent Sheriff, upon the issuance of the
seizure order, he seized all the palay harvested without issuing a receipt,
despite demand therefor, and delivered the palay to the plaintiff
Issue(s):
1. Whether or not respondent Judge committed grave abuse of
authority, bias and grave misconduct; and
2. Whether or not the Sheriff committed grave misconduct,
misbehavior in the performance of his official duties, and
collusion.
Ruling:
Considering the Complaint, the Comments, and the Reply as well
as the pleadings and exhibits submitted, we find no grave abuse of authority,
grave misconduct and bias on the part of respondent Judge.
The fact that respondent Judge took cognizance of the forcible
entry case did not taint her action with grave abuse of authority, even if
defendant had alleged that the land in question was under agricultural
tenancy, and that there was an issue of jurisdiction. Well-settled is the
principle that the courts shall not be divested of jurisdiction over a case
merely by what is raised in the answer. What determines the nature of an
action and a court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations set up by the
plaintiff. Basic is the rule that the material averments in the complaint,
which in this case is for ejectment, determine the jurisdiction of the
court. And, jurisprudence dictates that the court does not lose its jurisdiction
over an ejectment case by the simple expedient of a party raising as a
defense therein the alleged existence of a tenancy relationship between the
parties. It is the duty of the court to receive evidence to determine the
veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an Order of respondent Judge dated 09
February 1996, it was ruled that, considering the evidence presented, the
land in question is an irrigated riceland, but not tenanted. This matter was
even brought up on a petition for certiorari with prohibition to the Regional
Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but said petition was denied. These antecedents
are sufficient to convince us that the respondent Judge did not act with
grave abuse of authority in assuming jurisdiction over the case filed in her
sala.
With regard to the allegation of having failed to furnish to the
defendants a copy of the bond and the writ of preliminary injunction, we give
credence to the findings made by the Office of the Court Administrator, as
follows:
However, Section 8, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court in conjunction
with Section 3, Rule 70 thereof provides that the [p]arty filing the bond shall
forthwith served (sic) a copy of such bond on the other party, who may
except to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the surety or sureties thereon.
This means that the plaintiff and not the Court or the respondent Judge for
that matter, who (sic) is duty bound to serve a copy of the injunction bond to
the defendants. x x x Nevertheless, the failure of the plaintiff to serve a copy
of the injunction bond to the defendant is merely a formal defect and not a
reversible error. For in this case the defendant may ask the [c]ourt to order
the plaintiff to serve upon him the copy of the bond.
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the records belie the claim of complainant
that the Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not served to (sic) the
defendants. Records show that said writ was served to (sic) the defendants
on February 16, 1996 at their residence but all refused to acknowledge
receipt therefor, nevertheless the executing Sheriff left each a copy to (sic)
the defendants (Annex H, rollo, p.41).
We also find that there was no impropriety on the part of
respondent Judge when she issued the seizure order. It was apparent that
the complainant and her co-defendants showed defiance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. This was all the more demonstrated when they re-
entered the land and harvested the palay, in direct and open violation of the
writ. The order to seize the harvested palay was issued to preserve
the status quo, and in no way done with grave abuse of authority.
The charges of bias imputed on respondent Judge, specifically,
that she received money from the plaintiffs and that she told complainant
that they will surely lose the case, are only allegations which are not
supported by evidence apart from the self-serving statements made by
complainant. Given no support on the record, we are not persuaded by said
accusations hurled by complainant simply because there is no evidence
thereon to implicate the respondent Judge.
With regard to the charges against respondent Sheriff, we find
that his actuation of immediately implementing the seizure order did not
constitute grave misconduct nor was it an act of collusion with the adverse
party. He did what was expected of any sheriff given charge of enforcing a
court order. When a writ is placed in the hands of a sheriff, it is his
ministerial duty to proceed with reasonable celerity and promptness to
execute it in accordance with its mandates.
Neither are we convinced that respondent Sheriff was remiss in
his duty to issue a receipt for the palay he seized. Admittedly, he did not
issue the receipt on the spot, but we accept the reason stated earlier for
issuing it when the palay was already cleaned and measured, next day. From
the record, complainant made no averment that respondent Sheriff derived
pecuniary benefit in not immediately giving complainant a receipt. It was
reasonable to briefly wait until measurement could be made as to the
volume of the palay after being cleaned and threshed before issuance of the
receipt. In the absence of contrary evidence, the presumption prevails that
the sheriff has regularly performed his official duty.
On the matter of where to deposit the seized palay, however, it was
incumbent on respondent Sheriff to deliver the palay to the court
considering it was still considered property incustodia legis. Deposit
of seized items in litigation is not a discretionary matter. Until the court
had made its decision as to the disposal of the palay, the presumption was
that the seized palay should remain in the court's custody, hence to be
deposited in court. Respondent Sheriff should not have handed them over to
the plaintiff in the absence of a directive to that effect in the seizure
order. However, this Court takes note of the circumstances surrounding
respondent Sheriffs delivery to the plaintiff of what was seized. Although the
palay was already threshed and cleaned, it was still dripping wet from the
previous days heavy rains and respondent Sheriff felt that if not dried
immediately the grains would deteriorate and might just eventually be
rendered useless. This leads us to conclude that there was no bad faith in his
acts. Furthermore, he documented his turnover of the seized grains in the
presence of witnesses from the barangay. His actuation was without malice
and could be deemed not unreasonable under the circumstances obtaining,
although not in strict compliance with official duty concerning a matter
in custodia legis.
G.R. No. 170478 May 22, 2008
SPS. TERESITO Y. VILLACASTIN and LOURDES FUA
VILLACASTIN, petitioners,
vs.
PAUL PELAEZ, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
A conflict of jurisdiction between the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) and the regular trial courts is at the core of the
present case. Petitioners question the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated
February 7, 2005, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83873, which upheld the primary and
exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB in cases involving the use or possession
of lands covered by agrarian laws.
The facts, as culled from the record, are as follows:
On June 29, 1976, respondent Paul Pelaez and his wife mortgaged their
agricultural lands bearing Original Certificates of Title Nos. 0-10343, 0-10344
and 0-10345, situated in Barrio Kodia, Madridejos, Cebu, to the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP) Bogo Branch, Cebu. For failure of the Pelaez
spouses to pay their mortgage obligation, the properties were foreclosed and
subsequently sold at public auction.
The purported tenants of the property, Anastacio Alob, Francisco Alob, Jesus
Cordova, Manuel Sanchez, Elia Giltendez, Flora dela Pea, Eliseo Rayco,
Benjamin Santillan, Pascual Gilbuena, Jesus Alob, Renaldo Grande, and
Julieto Manzueto, filed an action to annul the mortgage, foreclosure and sale
of the properties, claiming that they are the owners thereof under Presidential
Decree No. 27. the case was docketed as Reg. Case No. VII-76-C-90.
In the meantime, on May 10, 1988, petitioners filed a Complaint for Forcible
Entry with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, 2 docketed
as Civil Case No. 79, with the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Bantayan, Cebu, against respondent and a certain Elesio Monteseven. The
complaint averred that plaintiffs (petitioners herein) are the owners and actual
possessors of the subject landholding and that defendants, having entered the
property through stealth and strategy, unlawfully deprived plaintiffs of
possession thereof.
Respondent countered that he is the owner of the subject property, which was
foreclosed by the DBP and later purchased by petitioners at an auction sale.
Petitioners, however, were allegedly never in possession of the subject
property as they failed to apply for a writ of possession therefor. Respondent
further claimed that he had redeemed the property on March 3, 1988 and
accordingly reacquired possession thereof.3
Meanwhile, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator in Cebu rendered a
decision in Reg. Case No. VII-76-C-90 dated February 15, 1993, in favor of
the tenants, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing view, DECISION is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring complainants herein with the exception of Silbino
Arranquez[,] Jr. and Claro Gilbuela who earlier withdraw from this
case as bonafide tenant farmers of the parcels in question covered
by P.D. [No.] 27;
2. Declaring the mortgage executed by Sps. Paul and Elnora Pelaez
to respondent DBP and the subsequent foreclosure and eventual
sale thereof to Sps. Teresito and Lourdes Villacastin as null and
void ab initio as it is contrary to law, public order and public
policy;
3. Declaring complainants herein to properly account their
deposited shares/lease rentals before the DAR office of
Bantayan[,] Cebu and deliver the said deposited [share/lease]
rentals including the forthcoming harvest thereon to respondent
landowners Sps. Paul and Elnora Pelaez with the assistance of the
MARO of Bantayan, Madridejos, Cebu.
4. No pronouncement as to cost.4
This decision was affirmed by the DARAB in a Decision 5 dated February 22,
2000.
On January 6, 2000, the MCTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 79 in
favor of petitioners and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendant is hereby ordered:
a) To return to plaintiffs possession of the parcel of land above-
described and vacate the premises;
b) To pay the costs of litigation;
c) Moral and exemplary damages not recoverable in ejectment suit
is denied;
d) Expenses claimed not duly proven are disallowed;
e) To release in favor of the plaintiffs the cash bond the sum
of P5,000.00 deposited pursuant to the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction.6
In a Decision7 dated March 10, 2004, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dakit, Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, affirmed the MCTC decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that regular courts should respect the
primary jurisdiction vested upon the DARAB in cases involving agricultural
lands such as the property subject of this case. Accordingly, it set aside the
decision rendered by the RTC and the MCTC, and dismissed the complaint
for forcible entry filed by petitioners in this case.
The appellate court denied reconsideration in its Resolution 8 dated November
11, 2005.
Petitioners contend that Civil Case No. 79 did not involve any agrarian matter
and thus, the MCTC correctly exercised jurisdiction over the case.
In his Comment9 dated March 21, 2006, respondent underscores the fact that
the parcels of land subject of this case are tenanted agricultural lands. Before
judgment was rendered in the forcible entry case, the tenants of the property
already filed a suit with the DARAB for the annulment of the real estate
mortgage executed by respondent over the same in favor of DBP and the
subsequent foreclosure and auction sale in favor of petitioners. The DARAB's
decision declaring the mortgage, foreclosure and auction sale null and void
became final as regards petitioners who did not appeal from the decision.
Respondent asserts that the complaint for forcible entry filed by petitioners
had lost its legal basis after the DARAB declared that the foreclosure and
auction sale of the subject property were null and void.
Petitioners filed a Reply10 dated July 28, 2006, insisting that the tenant-
farmers involved in the DARAB case were not parties to the forcible entry
case, the only defendant therein being respondent in this case. Respondent, in
turn, raised the defense of ownership, thereby joining the issues regarding
possession and ownership.
Petitioners further note their argument in their Motion for
Reconsideration11 of the Decision of the Court of Appeals that the subject
property had been declared as wilderness area and the same had been
classified as alienable and disposable on December 22, 1987. In support of
this contention, they submitted a Department of Agrarian Reform
Order12 dated September 12, 1997 to the effect that the subject property falls
within the administrative authority or competence of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The order directed the PARO
of Cebu and the MARO of Bantayan, Cebu to cease and desist from further
activities affecting the subject property under Operation Land Transfer, and to
refer the matter to the DENR.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the
complaint.13 In ascertaining, for instance, whether an action is one for forcible
entry falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be
examined.14
A review of the complaint reveals that the pertinent allegations thereof
sufficiently vest jurisdiction over the action on the MCTC. The complaint
alleges as follows:
III
That the plaintiffs are the owners and legal as well as actual
possessors of a parcel of agricultural land more particularly
described as follows:
xxx
IV
That the defendant, sometime in the second week of March 1988,
by strategy and through stealth entered the above-described land of
the plaintiffs and took possession thereof; thus, depriving said
plaintiffs of the possession thereof;
V
That several demands were made the plaintiffs upon the defendants
to restore to them the possession of the above-described parcel of
land; but, defendants refused and still refuse to restore possession
of said property to the plaintiffs;15
It has not escaped our notice that no landowner-tenant vinculum juris or
juridical tie was alleged between petitioners and respondent, let alone that
which would characterize the relationship as an agrarian dispute. 16 Rule II of
the DARAB Rules17 provides that the DARAB "shall have primary
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all
agrarian disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under
Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, Republic
Act No, 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No.
27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
Petitioners' action is clearly for the recovery of physical or material possession
of the subject property only, a question which both the MCTC and the RTC
ruled petitioners are entitled to. It does not involve the adjudication of an
agrarian reform matter, nor an agrarian dispute falling within the jurisdiction
of the DARAB.
Courts have jurisdiction over possessory actions involving public or private
agricultural lands to determine the issue of physical possession as this issue is
independent of the question of disposition and alienation of such lands which
should be threshed out in the DAR.18 Thus, jurisdiction was rightfully
exercised by the MCTC and the RTC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 83873 dated February 7, 2005, and its Resolution
dated November 11, 2005, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Dakit, Bogo, Cebu, Branch 61, dated March 10,
2004, affirming the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Bantayan,
Cebu, dated June 6, 2000, is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DAR v polo coconut Plantation
In the late 1990s, respondent Polo Coconut Plantation Co., Inc.
(PCPCI) sought to convert 280 hectares of its Polo Coconut
Plantation7 (Polo estate) in Tanjay, Negros Oriental into a special
economic zone (ecozone) under the Philippine Economic Zone
Authority (PEZA). On December 19, 1998, PEZA issued Resolution
No. 98-320 favorably recommending the conversion of the Polo estate
into an ecozone8 subject to certain terms and conditions including the
submission of "all government clearances, endorsements and
documents required under Rule IV, Section 3 of the Rules and
Regulations to Implement Republic Act (RA) 7916."
The following year, PCPCI applied for the reclassification of its
agricultural lands into mixed residential, commercial and industrial
lands with the municipal government of Tanjay. After conducting the
prescribed hearing, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tanjay adopted
Resolution No. 344 granting PCPCI's application on November 3,
1999.
When Tanjay became a city, its Sangguniang Panglungsod adopted
Resolution No. 16 approving Tanjay's Comprehensive Land Use Plan
and Zoning Ordinance where PCPCI's real properties, including the
Polo estate, were reclassified as mixed residential, commercial and
industrial lands.9
Sometime in 2003, petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR),
through Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer Stephen M. Leonidas,
notified PCPCI that 394.9020 hectares of the Polo estate had been
placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP)10 and would be acquired by the government.
Thereafter, Leonidas requested the Registrar of Deeds of Negros
Oriental to cancel PCPCI's certificate of title and to issue a new one in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines. He likewise asked Region
VII Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Arnold C. Arrieta to
determine the just compensation due to PCPCI.11
On January 29, 2004, a new certificate of title was issued in the name
of the Republic of the Philippines.12 The next day, that title was
cancelled and another was issued in the name of petitioners in G.R.
No. 169271 (petitioners-beneficiaries).13
Meanwhile, on March 11, 2004, Arrieta approved the land valuation
(P85,491,784.60)14 of the Land Bank of the Philippines for the Polo
estate. PCPCI moved for reconsideration but it was denied in an order
dated March 30, 2004.
On July 16, 2004, Leonidas informed PCPCI that a relocation survey of
the Polo estate would be conducted. PCPCI moved for the suspension
of the survey but it was denied.15
Aggrieved, PCPCI filed a petition for certiorari16 in the Court of Appeals
(CA) asserting that the DAR acted with grave abuse of discretion in
placing the Polo estate under the CARP. It argued that the Polo estate
should not be subjected to the CARP because Resolution No. 16 had
already designated it as mixed residential, commercial and industrial
land. Moreover, petitioners-beneficiaries were not qualified to receive
land under the CARP.
In its February 16, 2005 decision, the CA found that the Polo estate
was no longer agricultural land when the DAR placed it under the
CARP in view of Resolution No. 16. Furthermore, petitioners-
beneficiaries were not qualified beneficiaries as they were not tenants
of PCPCI. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment
is hereby rendered by us DECLARING as NOT VALID the
acts of the [DAR] of subjecting PCPCI's [Polo estate] to the
coverage of the CARP, of canceling and causing the
cancellation of [PCPCI's] Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
2304 covering such land, of issuing or causing the issuance
 of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36318 for this land in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines by way of transfer to
it, of issuing or causing the issuance of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-802 for the said land in the names of
[petitioner-beneficiaries] in the case at bench by way of
award of them of such land as purported farm beneficiaries
and of doing other things with the end in view of subjecting
[the Polo estate] to CARP coverage, SETTING
ASIDE and ENJOINING such acts and the consequence
thereof, ORDERING the [petitioner-beneficiaries] to vacate
the premises of [the Polo estate] if they had entered such
premises, and ORDERING the respondent Register of
Deeds of Negros Oriental to cancel Transfer Certificate of
Title Nos. T-36318 and T-802 and to reinstate Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-2304 in the name of petitioner
PCPCI.
SO ORDERED.17
Before PCPCI filed its petition for certiorari in the CA, it did not file a
protest or opposition questioning the propriety of subjecting the Polo
estate to the CARP. Neither did it assail the eligibility of petitioners-
beneficiaries before the DAR Secretary. There were available
administrative remedies under the DARAB Rules but PCPCI did not
avail of them.
Moreover, a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court can be availed of only in the absence of an appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law.22 Here, recourse to the DAR Secretary was the plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law contemplated by Rule
65.
Non-Conversion To Mixed
Residential, Commercial and
Industrial Land

In Ros v. DAR,23 we held that reclassified agricultural lands must

Both the DAR and petitioners-beneficiaries moved for reconsideration
undergo the process of conversion in the DAR24 before they may be
but they were denied.18 Hence, this recourse.
used for other purposes.25 Since the DAR never approved the
conversion of the Polo estate from agricultural to another use, the land
The DAR asserts that the reclassification of the Polo estate under was never placed beyond the scope of the CARP.
Resolution No. 16 as mixed residential, commercial and industrial land
did not place it beyond the reach of the CARP. Petitioners-
The approval of the DAR for the conversion of agricultural land into an
beneficiaries, on the other hand, insist that they were qualified
industrial estate is a condition precedent for its conversion into an
beneficiaries. While they were neither farmers nor regular farmworkers
ecozone.26 A proposed ecozone cannot be considered for Presidential
of PCPCI, they were either seasonal or other farmworkers.
Proclamation unless the landowner first submits to PEZA a land use
conversion clearance certificate from the DAR.27 This PCPCI failed to
There is merit in these petitions. do.

Non-Exhaustion of PEZA Resolution No. 98-320 expressly provides:

Administrative Remedies
Recourse to court action will not prosper until all remedies have been
exhausted at the administrative level.19
Section 3, Rule II of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure (DARAB
Rules) provides:
Section 3. Agrarian Law Implementation Cases. The
Adjudicator or Board shall have no jurisdiction over matters
involving the implementation of RA 6657 otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988
and other related agrarian laws enunciated by pertinent rules
and administrative orders, which shall be under
the exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the Office
of the Secretary of the DAR in accordance with his
issuances to wit:
Resolved, that the application of [PCPCI] for (1) declaration
of the 280-hectare property in Brgy. Polo, Municipality of
Tanjay, Province of Negros Oriental as a Special Economic
Zone, subject to Presidential Proclamation, henceforth to be
to be known as POLO ECOCITY- SPECIAL ECONOMIC
ZONE and (2) registration as the Developer/Owner of the
said ECOZONE is hereby APPROVED subject to the
following terms and conditions:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Prior to PEZA's endorsement of the subject area to the
President for proclamation as an ECOZONE, the PCPCI
shall submit all government clearances, endorsements and
documents required under Rule IV, Section 3 of the [Rules
and Regulations to Implement RA 7916];

3.1. Classification and identification of xxx xxx xxx

landholdings for coverage under the agrarian
reform program and the initial issuance of
This condition proves that the favorable recommendation of PEZA did
[certificates of land ownership award] and
not ipso facto change the nature of the Polo estate. The property
[emancipation patents], including protests or
remained as agricultural land and, for this reason, was still subject to
oppositions thereto and petitioners for lifting of
the CARP.
such coverage;

In fact, Resolution No. 16 did not exempt PCPCI's agricultural lands

3.2. Classification, identification, inclusion,
(including the Polo estate) from the CARP. Section 20 of the Local
exclusion, qualification or disqualification of
Government Code28 provides that a city or municipality can reclassify
potential/actual farmer/beneficiaries; (emphasis
land only through the enactment of an ordinance. In this instance,
supplied)
reclassification was undertaken by mere resolution;29 thus, it was
invalid.
xxx xxx xxx
Qualification Of CARP
Protests regarding the implementation of the CARP fall under the Beneficiaries
exclusive jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary. He determines whether a
tract of land is covered by or exempt from CARP.20 Likewise, questions
Section 22 of the CARL provides:
regarding the eligibility of CARP beneficiaries must be addressed to
him. The DAR Secretary decides to whom lands placed under the
CARP shall be distributed.21
 Section 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by
the CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to
landless residents of the same baranggay, or in the absence
thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority:
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers;
(c) seasonal farmworkers;
(d) other farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the
abovementioned beneficiaries and
(g) others directly working on the land.
xxx xxx xxx
A basic qualification of a beneficiary is his willingness,
aptitude and ability to cultivate and make the land as
productive as possible. The DAR shall adopt a system of
monitoring the record or performance of each beneficiary, so
that any beneficiary guilty of negligence or misuse of the
land or any support extended to him shall forfeit his right to
continue as such beneficiary. The DAR shall submit periodic
reports on the performance of the beneficiaries to the
[Presidential Agrarian Reform Council].
xxx xxx xxx
This provision enumerates who are qualified beneficiaries of the
CARP. Determining whether or not one is eligible to receive land
involves the administrative implementation of the program. For this
reason, only the DAR Secretary can identify and select CARP
beneficiaries. Thus, courts cannot substitute their judgment unless
there is a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. 30
Section 22 of the CARL does not limit qualified beneficiaries to tenants
of the landowners. Thus, the DAR cannot be deemed to have
committed grave abuse of discretion simply because its chosen
beneficiaries were not tenants of PCPCI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The February 16,
2005 decision and June 29, 2005 resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00043 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The March 11, 2004, March 30, 2004 and August 30, 2004 orders of
Region VII Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator Arnold C. Arrieta in
RARAD Case No. VII-N-1284-2004 are REINSTATED. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-802 and Certificate of Land Ownership Award
No. 00114438 are declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.
STANFILCO EMPLOYEES AGRARIAN REFORM BENEFICIARIES
MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Petitioner,
vs.
DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC. (STANFILCO DIVISION), ORIBANEX
SERVICES, INC. and SPOUSES ELLY AND MYRNA
ABUJOS, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before this Court is the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by
petitioner Stanfilco Employees Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi-
Purpose Cooperative (SEARBEMCO). It assails:
(a) the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66148 dated November 27, 2001; and
(b) the CAs resolution3 of June 13, 2002 in the same case,
denying SEARBEMCOs motion for reconsideration.
THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On January 29, 1998, SEARBEMCO, as seller, and respondent DOLE
Philippines, Inc. (Stanfilco Division) (DOLE), as buyer, entered into a
Banana Production and Purchase Agreement4 (BPPA). The BPPA
provided that SEARBEMCO shall sell exclusively to DOLE, and the
latter shall buy from the former, all Cavendish bananas of required
specifications to be planted on the land owned by SEARBEMCO. The
BPPA states:
The SELLER agrees to sell exclusively to the BUYER, and the BUYER
agrees to buy all Cavendish Banana of the Specifications and Quality
described in EXHIBIT "A" hereof produced on the SELLERS plantation
covering an area of 351.6367 hectares, more or less, and which is
planted and authorized under letter of instruction no. 790 as amended
on November 6, 1999 under the terms and conditions herein
stipulated. The SELLER shall not increase or decrease the area(s)
stated above without the prior written approval of the BUYER.
However, the SELLER may reduce said area(s) provided that if the
SELLER replaces the reduction by planting bananas on an equivalent
area(s) elsewhere, it is agreed that such replacement area(s) shall be
deemed covered by the Agreement. If the SELLER plants an area(s) in
excess of said 351.6367 hectares, the parties may enter into a
separate agreement regarding the production of said additional
acreage. SELLER will produce banana to the maximum capacity of the
plantation, as much as practicable, consistent with good agricultural
practices designed to produce banana of quality having the standards
hereinafter set forth for the duration of this Banana Production and
Purchase Agreement.
SEARBEMCO bound and obliged itself, inter alia, to do the following:
V. SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS OF THE SELLER
xxx
p.) Sell exclusively to the BUYER all bananas produced from the
subject plantation, except those rejected by the BUYER for failure to
meet the specifications and conditions contained in Exhibit "A"
hereof. In the case of any such rejected bananas, the SELLER
shall have the right to sell such rejected bananas to third parties,
for domestic non-export consumption. The SELLER shall only sell
bananas produced from the plantation and not from any other source.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Any dispute arising from or in connection with the BPPA between the
parties shall be finally settled through arbitration. To quote the BPPA:
IX. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTE
All disputes arising in connection with this Agreement shall be finally
settled under the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitration of the
International Chamber of Commerce by three (3) Arbitrators appointed
in accordance with said Rules. The Arbitration shall be held in a venue
to be agreed by the parties. Judgment upon the award rendered may
be entered in any Philippine Court having jurisdiction or application
may be made to such court for judicial acceptance of the award and as
order of enforcement, as the case may be.
On December 11, 2000, DOLE filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court5 (RTC) against SEARBEMCO, the spouses Elly and Myrna
Abujos (spouses Abujos), and Oribanex Services, Inc. (Oribanex) for
specific performance and damages, with a prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction and of a temporary restraining order.
DOLE alleged that SEARBEMCO sold and delivered to Oribanex,
through the spouses Abujos, the bananas rejected by DOLE, in
violation of paragraph 5(p), Article V of the BPPA which limited the sale
of rejected bananas for "domestic non-export consumption." DOLE
further alleged that Oribanex is likewise an exporter of bananas and is
its direct competitor.
DOLE narrated in its complaint how SEARBEMCO sold and delivered
the rejected bananas to Oribanex through the spouses Abujos:
9.) That, however, on April 12, 2000 at about 5:00 oclock in
the afternoon, [DOLE] through its authorized security
personnel discovered that defendant SEARBEMCO, in
violation of Section 5(p) Article V of the Banana Production
and Purchase Agreement, packed the bananas rejected by
[DOLE] in boxes marked "CONSUL" in Packing Plant 32 in
DAPCO Panabo and sold and delivered them to defendant
Abujos;
10.) That about 373 "CONSUL" marked boxes were packed
and knowingly sold by defendant SEARBEMCO to
ORIBANEX SERVICES, INC. through defendants Abujos
who carried and loaded the same on board a blue Isuzu
Canter bearing plate no. LDM 976 and delivered to
defendant ORIBANEX for export at the TEFASCO Wharf
covered by Abujos Delivery Receipt, a copy of which is
hereto attached as Annex "B";
11.) That the following day, April 13, 2000, again the same
security found that defendant SEARBEMCO continued to
pack the bananas rejected by plaintiff in boxes marked as
"CONSUL" and, in violation of paragraph 5(p) Article V of the
Banana Production and Purchase Agreement, sold and
delivered them to defendant ORIBANEX SERVICES, INC.,
for export, through defendants Abujos;
12.) That about 648 "CONSUL" marked boxes were packed
and knowingly sold by defendant SEARBEMCO to
ORIBANEX SERVICES, INC., through defendants Abujos
who carried and loaded the same on board a red Isuzu
Forwarder, bearing plate no. LCV 918, and delivered to
defendant ORIBANEX for export at the TEFASCO Wharf
covered by Abujos Delivery Receipt, a copy of which is
hereto attached and marked as Annex "C";
13.) That the sale of a total of 712 boxes of rejected bananas
covering April 12 and 13, 2000, or any other dates prior
thereto or made thereafter by defendant SEARBEMCO to
defendant ORIBANEX SERVICES, INC. through defendant
Abujos is in utter violation of the Agreement between plaintiff
[DOLE] and defendant SEARBEMCO that SEARBEMCO
may sell bananas rejected by plaintiff to parties for domestic
non-export consumption only.
SEARBEMCO responded with a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim, lack of cause of
action, failure to submit to arbitration which is a condition precedent to
the filing of a complaint, and the complaints defective verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.6 SEARBEMCO argued that:
1) the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB) has exclusive jurisdiction over the action filed by
DOLE, pursuant to Sections 1 and 3(e) of Administrative
Order No. 09, Series of 19987 (AO No. 9-98) and Section
5(a) and (c) of Administrative Order No. 02, Series of
19998 (AO No. 2-99) of the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), since the dispute between the parties is an agrarian
dispute within the exclusive competence of the DARAB to
resolve;
2) the filing of the complaint is premature, as the dispute
between DOLE and SEARBEMCO has not been referred to
and resolved by arbitration, contrary to Article IX of the
BPPA and Article V, Sec. 30(g)9 of AO No. 9-98 of the DAR;
3) it did not violate Section 5(p), Article V of the BPPA, since
the rejected bananas were sold to the spouses Abujos who
were third-party buyers and not exporters of bananas; and
4) the complaint is fatally defective as the Board of Directors
of DOLE did not approve any resolution authorizing Atty.
Reynaldo Echavez to execute the requisite Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping and, therefore, the
same is fatally defective.
DOLE opposed SEARBEMCOs motion to dismiss alleging, among
others, that:
1) the dispute between the parties is not an agrarian dispute
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB under
Republic Act No. 665710 (RA No. 6657); and
2) the Arbitration Clause of the BPPA is not applicable as,
aside from SEARBEMCO, DOLE impleaded other parties
(i.e., the spouses Abujos and Oribanex who are not parties
to the BPPA) as defendants.11
Subsequently, DOLE filed on February 2, 2001 an amended
complaint,12 the amendment consisting of the Verification and
Certification against forum shopping for DOLE executed by Danilo C.
Quinto, DOLEs Zone Manager.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC denied SEARBEMCOs motion to dismiss in an Order dated
May 16, 2001.13 The trial court stated that the case does not involve an
agrarian conflict and is a judicial matter that it can resolve.
SEARBEMCO moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.14 The
RTC denied the motion for lack of merit in its Order of July 12, 2001.15
THE CA RULING
On July 26, 2001, SEARBEMCO filed a special civil action
for certiorari16 with the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the RTC for denying its motion to dismiss and the subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
SEARBEMCO argued that the BPPA the parties executed is an agri-
business venture agreement contemplated by DARs AO No. 9-98.
Thus, any dispute arising from the interpretation and implementation of
the BPPA is an agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB.
In a decision dated November 27, 2001,17 the CA found that the RTC
did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying SEARBEMCOs motion
to dismiss and motion for reconsideration.1avvphi1
The CA ruled that "the [DAR] has no jurisdiction, under said [AO No. 9-
98], over actions between [SEARBEMCO] and [DOLE] for enforcement
of the said Agreement when one commits a breach thereof and for
redress by way of specific performance and damages inclusive of
injunctive relief."18 It held that the case is not an agrarian dispute within
the purview of Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657,19 but is an action to
compel SEARBEMCO to comply with its obligations under the BPPA; it
called for the application of the provisions of the Civil Code, not RA No.
6657.
The CA likewise disregarded SEARBEMCOs emphatic argument that
DOLEs complaint was prematurely filed because of its failure to first
resort to arbitration. The arbitration clause under the BPPA, said the
CA, applies only when the parties involved are parties to the
agreement; in its complaint, DOLE included the spouses Abujos and
Oribanex as defendants. According to the CA, "if [DOLE] referred its
dispute with [SEARBEMCO] to a Panel of Arbitrators, any judgment
rendered by the latter, whether for or against [DOLE] will not be
binding on the [spouses Abujos] and [Oribanex], as case law has it that
only the parties to a suit, as well as their successors-in-interest, are
bound by the judgment of the Court or quasi-judicial bodies."20
On SEARBEMCOs argument that the Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping under DOLEs amended complaint is
defective for failure to state that this was based on "personal
knowledge," the CA ruled that the omission of the word "personal" did
not render the Verification and Certification defective.
SEARBEMCO moved for reconsideration of the decision, but the CA
denied the motion for lack of merit in its resolution of June 13, 2002. 21
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
In the present petition, SEARBEMCO submits that the CA erred in
ruling that:
1.) the RTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
complaint of DOLE, considering that the case involves an
agrarian dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
DARAB;
2.) the complaint of DOLE states a cause of action, despite
the fact that SEARBEMCO has not violated any provision of
the BPPA; and
3.) the filing of the complaint is not premature, despite
DOLEs failure to submit its claim to arbitration a condition
precedent to any juridical recourse.
THE COURTS RULING
We do not find the petition meritorious.
DOLEs complaint falls within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts, not the DARAB.
SEARBEMCO mainly relies on Section 5022 of RA No. 6657 and the
characterization of the controversy as an agrarian dispute or as an
agrarian reform matter in contending that the present controversy falls
within the competence of the DARAB and not of the regular courts.
The BPPA, SEARBEMCO claims, is a joint venture and a production,
processing and marketing agreement, as defined under Section 5 (c)
(i) and (ii) of DAR AO No. 2-99;23hence, any dispute arising from the
BPPA is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. SEARBEMCO
also asserts that the parties relationship in the present case is not only
that of buyer and seller, but also that of supplier of land covered by the
CARP and of manpower on the part of SEARBEMCO, and supplier of
agricultural inputs, financing and technological expertise on the part of
DOLE. Therefore, SEARBEMCO concludes that the BPPA is not an
ordinary contract, but one that involves an agrarian element and, as
such, is imbued with public interest.
We clarify at the outset that what we are reviewing in this petition is
the legal question of whether the CA correctly ruled that the RTC
committed no grave abuse discretion in denying SEARBEMCOs
motion to dismiss. In ruling for legal correctness, we have to view the
CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled
upon was presented to the appellate court; we have to examine the CA
decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence
or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the RTC ruling before it, not
on the basis of whether the RTC ruling on the merits of the case was
correct. In other words, we have to be keenly aware that the CA
undertook a Rule 65 review, not a review on appeal, of the challenged
RTC ruling. A court acts with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when its action was performed in a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of the
law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason or passion or personal hostility.24
As the CA found, the RTCs action was not attended by any grave
abuse of discretion and the RTC correctly ruled in denying
SEARBEMCOs motion to dismiss. We fully agree with the CA.
Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657 is clear in defining an agrarian dispute:
"any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold,
tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including dispute concerning farm-workers associations or
representations of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing
or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of
lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and
other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and
tenant, or lessor and lessee."25
RA No. 6657 is procedurally implemented through the 2003 DARAB
Rules of Procedure where Section 1, Rule II26enumerates the
instances where the DARAB shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction. A notable feature of RA No. 6657 and its implementing
rules is the focus on agricultural lands and the relationship over this
land that serves as the basis in the determination of whether a matter
falls under DARAB jurisdiction.
In Heirs of the Late Hernan Rey Santos v. Court of Appeals,27 we held
that:
For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a
tenancy relationship between the parties. x x x. In Vda. De Tangub
v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of
the Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a.)
adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
b.) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems;
and c.) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or
readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial,
industrial, and other non-agricultural uses. [Emphasis supplied].
The case of Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals28 lists down the indispensable elements for a tenancy
relationship to exist: "(1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant
or agricultural lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; (3) there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of
the tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between
the landowner and the tenant or the agricultural lessee."
The parties in the present case have no tenurial, leasehold, or any
other agrarian relationship that could bring their controversy within the
ambit of agrarian reform laws and within the jurisdiction of the DARAB.
In fact, SEARBEMCO has no allegation whatsoever in its motion to
dismiss regarding any tenancy relationship between it and DOLE that
gave the present dispute the character of an agrarian dispute.
We have always held that tenancy relations cannot be presumed. The
elements of tenancy must first be proved by substantial evidence
which can be shown through records, documents, and written
agreements between the parties. A principal factor, too, to consider in
determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is the intent of the
parties.29
SEARBEMCO has not shown that the above-mentioned indispensable
elements of tenancy relations are present between it and DOLE. It also
cannot be gleaned from the intention of the parties that they intended
to form a tenancy relationship between them. In the absence of any
such intent and resulting relationship, the DARAB cannot have
jurisdiction. Instead, the present petition is properly cognizable by the
regular courts, as the CA and the RTC correctly ruled.
Notably, the requirement of the existence of tenurial relationship has
been relaxed in the cases of Islanders CARP-Farmers Beneficiaries
Muti-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. v. Lapanday Agricultural and Devt.
Corporation30 and Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative,
Inc.31 The Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Panganiban,
declared in Islanders that:
[The definition of agrarian dispute in RA No. 6657 is] broad enough to
include disputes arising from any tenurial arrangement beyond the
traditional landowner-tenant or lessor-lessee relationship. xxx
[A]grarian reform extends beyond the mere acquisition and
redistribution of land, the law acknowledges other modes of tenurial
arrangements to effect the implementation of CARP. 32
While Islanders and Cubero may seem to serve as precedents to the
present case, a close analysis of these cases, however, leads us to
conclude that significant differences exist in the factual circumstances
between those cases and the present case, thus rendering the rulings
in these cited cases inapplicable.
Islanders questioned (through a petition for declaration of nullity filed
before the RTC of Tagum City) the lack of authority of the farmer-
beneficiaries alleged representative to enter into a Joint Production
Agreement with Lapanday. The farmers-beneficiaries assailed the
validity of the agreement by additionally claiming that its terms
contravened RA No. 6657.
Cubero likewise involved a petition to declare the nullity of a Joint
Venture Agreement between the farmer-beneficiaries and Laguna
West Multi-Purpose Cooporative, Inc. The successors of the farmer-
beneficiaries assailed the agreement before the RTC of Tanauan,
Batangas for having been executed within the 10-year prohibitory
period under Section 27 of RA No. 6657.
In both cases, the Court ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear
the complaint and declared the DARAB as the competent body to
resolve the dispute. The Court declared that when the question
involves the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
management, cultivation, and use of an agricultural land covered by
CARP, the case falls squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of the
DAR.
Carefully analyzed, the principal issue raised in Islanders and Cubero
referred to the management, cultivation, and use of the CARP-covered
agricultural land; the issue of the nullity of the joint economic enterprise
agreements in Islanders and Cubero would directly affect the
agricultural land covered by CARP. Those cases significantly did not
pertain to post-harvest transactions involving the produce from CARP-
covered agricultural lands, as the case before us does now.
Moreover, the resolution of the issue raised in Islanders and Cubero
required the interpretation and application of the provisions of RA No.
6657, considering that the farmer-beneficiaries claimed that the
agreements contravened specific provisions of that law. In the present
case, DOLEs complaint for specific performance and damages before
the RTC did not question the validity of the BPPA that would require
the application of the provisions of RA No. 6657; neither did
SEARBEMCOs motion to dismiss nor its other pleadings assail the
validity of the BPPA on the ground that its provisions violate RA No.
6657. The resolution of the present case would therefore involve, more
than anything else, the application of civil law provisions on breaches
of contract, rather than agrarian reform principles. Indeed, in support of
their arguments, the parties have capitalized and focused on their
relationship as buyer and seller. DOLE, the buyer, filed a complaint
against SEARBEMCO, the seller, to enforce the BPPA between them
and to compel the latter to comply with its obligations. The CA is thus
legally correct in its declaration that "the action before the RTC does
not involve an agrarian dispute, nor does it call for the application of
Agrarian Reform laws. x x x. The action of [DOLE] involves and calls
for the application of the New Civil Code, in tandem with the terms and
conditions of the [BPPA] of [SEARBEMCO] and [DOLE]."33
We find SEARBEMCOs reliance on DAR AO No. 9-98 and AO No. 2-
99 as bases for DARABs alleged expanded jurisdiction over all
disputes arising from the interpretation of agribusiness ventures to be
misplaced. DARABs jurisdiction under Section 50 of RA No. 6657
should be read in conjunction with the coverage of agrarian reform
laws; administrative issuances like DAR AO Nos. 9-98 and 2-99 cannot
validly extend the scope of the jurisdiction set by law. In so ruling,
however, we do not pass upon the validity of these administrative
issuances. We do recognize the possibility that disputes may exist
between parties to joint economic enterprises that directly pertain to
the management, cultivation, and use of CARP-covered agricultural
land. Based on our above discussion, these disputes will fall within
DARABs jurisdiction.
Even assuming that the present case can be classified as an agrarian
dispute involving the interpretation or implementation of agribusiness
venture agreements, DARAB still cannot validly acquire jurisdiction, at
least insofar as DOLEs cause of action against the third parties the
spouses Abujos and Oribanex is concerned. To prevent multiple
actions, we hold that the present case is best resolved by the trial
court.
DOLEs complaint validly states a cause of action
SEARBEMCO asserts that the pleading containing DOLEs claim
against it states no cause of action. It contends that it did not violate
any of the provisions of the BPPA, since the bananas rejected by
DOLE were sold to the spouses Abujos who are third-party buyers and
are not exporters of bananas transactions that the BPPA allows.
Since the sole basis of DOLEs complaint was SEARBEMCOs alleged
violation of the BPPA, which SEARBEMCO insists did not take place,
the complaint therefore did not state a cause of action.
Due consideration of the basic rules on "lack of cause of action" as a
ground for a motion to dismiss weighs against SEARBEMCOs
argument.
In the case of Jimenez, Jr. v. Jordana,34 this Court had the opportunity
to discuss the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint to uphold a
valid cause of action, as follows:
In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of
the material allegations of the plaintiffs complaint. This hypothetical
admission extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and
the inferences fairly deductible from, the complaint. Hence, to
determine whether the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
constitutes a cause of action, the test is as follows: admitting the truth
of the facts alleged, can the court render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer?
To sustain a motion to dismiss, the movant needs to show that the
plaintiffs claim for relief does not exist at all. On the contrary, the
complaint is sufficient "if it contains sufficient notice of the cause of
action even though the allegations may be vague or indefinite, in which
event, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a
motion for a bill of particulars.35
In applying this authoritative test, we must hypothetically assume the
truth of DOLEs allegations, and determine whether the RTC can
render a valid judgment in accordance with its prayer.
We find the allegations in DOLEs complaint to be sufficient basis for
the judgment prayed for. Hypothetically admitting the allegations in
DOLEs complaint that SEARBEMCO sold the rejected bananas to
Oribanex, a competitor of DOLE and also an exporter of bananas,
through the spouses Abujos, a valid judgment may be rendered by the
RTC holding SEARBEMCO liable for breach of contract. That the sale
had been to the spouses Abujos who are not exporters is essentially a
denial of DOLEs allegations and is not therefore a material
consideration in weighing the merits of the alleged "lack of cause of
action." What SEARBEMCO stated is a counter-statement of fact and
conclusion, and is a defense that it will have to prove at the trial. At this
point, the material consideration is merely what the complaint
expressly alleged. Hypothetically assuming DOLEs allegations of
ultimate sale to Oribanex, through the spouses Abujos, to be true, we
hold following the test of sufficiency in Jordana that DOLEs prayer
for specific performance and damages may be validly granted; hence,
a cause of action exists.
The filing of the complaint is not premature since arbitration
proceedings are not necessary in the present case
SEARBEMCO argues that DOLE failed to comply with a condition
precedent before the filing of its complaint with the RTC, i.e., DOLE did
not attempt to settle their controversy through arbitration proceedings.
SEARBEMCO relies on Article V, Section 30(g) of DAR AO No. 9-
9836 and Section 10 of DAR AO No. 2-9937 which provide that "as a
rule, voluntary methods such as mediation or conciliation, shall be
preferred in resolving disputes involving joint economic enterprises."
SEARBEMCO also cites Section IX of the BPPA which provides that
all disputes arising out of or in connection with their agreement shall be
finally settled through arbitration.
Following our conclusion that agrarian laws find no application in the
present case, we find as the CA did that SEARBEMCOs
arguments anchored on these laws are completely baseless.
Furthermore, the cited DAR AO No. 2-99, on its face, only mentions a
"preference," not a strict requirement of referral to arbitration. The
BPPA-based argument deserves more and closer consideration.
would be in the interest of justice if the trial court hears the complaint
against all herein respondents and adjudicates petitioners rights as
against theirs in a single and complete proceeding.41
The case of Del Monte is more direct in stating that the doctrine held in
the Toyota case has already been abandoned:
The Agreement between petitioner DMC-USA and private respondent
MMI is a contract. The provision to submit to arbitration any dispute
arising therefrom and the relationship of the parties is part of that
contract and is itself a contract. As a rule, contracts are respected as
the law between the contracting parties and produce effect as between
them, their assigns and heirs. Clearly, only parties to the
Agreement, i.e., petitioners DMC-USA and its Managing Director for
Export Sales Paul E. Derby, and private respondents MMI and its
Managing Director Lily Sy are bound by the Agreement and its
arbitration clause as they are the only signatories thereto. Petitioners
Daniel Collins and Luis Hidalgo, and private respondent SFI, not
parties to the Agreement and cannot even be considered assigns or
heirs of the parties, are not bound by the Agreement and the arbitration
clause therein. Consequently, referral to arbitration in the State of
California pursuant to the arbitration clause and the suspension of the
proceedings in Civil Case No. 2637-MN pending the return of the
arbitral award could be called for but only as to petitioners DMC-USA
and Paul E. Derby, Jr., and private respondents MMI and Lily Sy, and
not as to other parties in this case, in accordance with the recent case
of Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. v. Laperal Realty Corporation, which
superseded that of [sic] Toyota Motor Philippines Corp. v. Court of
Appeals.

We agree with the CA ruling that the BPPA arbitration clause does not
apply to the present case since third parties are involved. Any
judgment or ruling to be rendered by the panel of arbitrators will be
useless if third parties are included in the case, since the arbitral ruling
will not bind them; they are not parties to the arbitration agreement. In
the present case, DOLE included as parties the spouses Abujos and
Oribanex since they are necessary parties, i.e., they were directly
involved in the BPPA violation DOLE alleged, and their participation
are indispensable for a complete resolution of the dispute. To require
the spouses Abujos and Oribanex to submit themselves to arbitration
and to abide by whatever judgment or ruling the panel of arbitrators
shall make is legally untenable; no law and no agreement made with
their participation can compel them to submit to arbitration.
xxxx
The object of arbitration is to allow the expeditious determination of a
dispute. Clearly, the issue before us could not be speedily and
efficiently resolved in its entirety if we allow simultaneous arbitration
proceedings and trial, or suspension of trial pending arbitration.
Accordingly, the interest of justice would only be served if the trial court
hears and adjudicates the case in a single and complete proceeding.42
Following these precedents, the CA was therefore correct in its
conclusion that the parties agreement to refer their dispute to
arbitration applies only where the parties to the BPPA are solely the
disputing parties.

In support of its position, SEARBEMCO cites the case of Toyota Motor

Additionally, the inclusion of third parties in the complaint supports our
Philippines Corp. v. Court of Appeals38 which holds that, "the
declaration that the present case does not fall under DARABs
contention that the arbitration clause has become dysfunctional
jurisdiction. DARABs quasi-judicial powers under Section 50 of RA No.
because of the presence of third parties is untenable. Contracts are
6657 may be invoked only when there is prior certification from
respected as the law between the contracting parties. As such, the
the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (or BARC) that the dispute
parties are thereby expected to abide with good faith in their
has been submitted to it for mediation and conciliation, without any
contractual commitments." SEARBEMCO argues that the presence of
success of settlement.43 Since the present dispute need not be referred
third parties in the complaint does not affect the validity of the
to arbitration (including mediation or conciliation) because of the
provisions on arbitration.
inclusion of third parties, neither SEARBEMCO nor DOLE will be able
to present the requisite BARC certification that is necessary to invoke
Unfortunately, the ruling in the Toyota case has been superseded by DARABs jurisdiction; hence, there will be no compliance with Section
the more recent cases of Heirs of Augusto L. Salas, Jr. v. Laperal 53 of RA No. 6657.
Realty Corporation39 and Del Monte Corporation-USA v. Court of
Appeals.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 34,
Heirs of Salas involved the same issue now before us: whether or not Panabo City, is hereby directed to proceed with the case in
the complaint of petitioners-heirs in that case should be dismissed for accordance with this Decision. Costs against petitioner SEARBEMCO.
their failure to submit the matter to arbitration before filing their
complaint. The petitioners-heirs included as respondents third persons
SO ORDERED.
who were not parties to the original agreement between the
petitioners-heirs and respondent Laperal Realty. In ruling that prior
resort to arbitration is not necessary, this Court held: SPOUSES TEOFILO CARPIO and TEODORA CARPIO, Petitioners,
vs.
ANA SEBASTIAN, VICENTA PALAO, SANTOS ESTRELLA, and
Respondent Laperal Realty, as a contracting party to the Agreement,
VICENTA ESTRELLA, represented by her guardian ad
has the right to compel petitioners to first arbitrate before seeking
litem VICENTE PALAO, Respondents.
judicial relief. However, to split the proceedings into arbitration for
respondent Laperal Realty and trial for the respondent lot buyers, or to
hold trial in abeyance pending arbitration between petitioners and DECISION
respondent Laperal Realty, would in effect result in multiplicity of suits,
duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay. On the other hand, it
PERALTA, J.:
This resolves the Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated
March 31, 2004, dismissing petitioners' petition for review, and the CA
Resolution2 dated November 12, 2004, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The undisputed facts, as accurately narrated by the CA, are as follows:
On April 24, 1992, Virginia P. Estrella, the mother of the herein
petitioners and respondents, died leaving behind parcels of agricultural
lands covered by Emancipation Patents, to wit:
a. Emancipation Patent No. 445226;
b. Emancipation Patent No. 445227;
c. Emancipation Patent No. 445228;
d. Emancipation Patent No. 445229; and
e. Emancipation Patent No. 445230.
Thereafter, the respondents sought for the partition of the abovecited
real properties. However, the petitioners, Spouses Teodora Carpio and
Teofilo Carpio, refused to agree with the partition of the estate, alleging
that they are the exclusive owners of the parcel of land covered by
Emancipation Patent No. 445229, having purchased the same from
landowner Luis T. Bautista in 1991. Moreover, the petitioners also
claim tenancy right to the exclusion of the respondents over the land
covered by the said emancipation patent.
Efforts toward amicable settlement having proved futile, the
respondents, on February 14, 1995, instituted an action for Annulment
of Sale of Land covered by Emancipation Patent No. 445229, with
Prayer for Declaration of Rights of Tenancy with the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region III, Malolos,
Bulacan.1avvphi1
Consequently, on June 28, 1996, the Provincial Adjudicator, claiming
lack of jurisdiction, dismissed the aforementioned complaint for
annulment of sale filed by the respondents.
Aggrieved, the respondents interposed an appeal from the said
decision of the DAR Provincial Adjudication Board to the DARAB
stationed in Quezon City.
On December 28, 2000, the DARAB rendered the assailed decision
reversing and setting aside the decision of the DAR Provincial
Adjudication Board, the dispositive portion of which provides as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decisions are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new decision is rendered
as follows:
1. Declaring that the Board a quo has jurisdiction over the
issues raised in these twin cases;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale and the Deed of
Conveyance executed by former landowner Luis Bautista in
favor of the herein Respondents-Appellees involving the
landholding covered by the Emancipation Patents issued to
Virginia P. Estrella as null and void;
3. Directing the partition of the subject landholdings with the
assistance of the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO)
concerned, the same to be in accordance with then Ministry
Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1978 and/or other
circulars relevant thereto implementing Presidential Decree
No. 27 on the subject Rules and Regulations in case of
Death of a Tenant-Beneficiary; and
4. Directing that in case of disagreement, the matter must be
decided by the DAR Regional Office, it being purely
administrative function under the Office of the DAR
Secretary.
SO ORDERED.
From this decision, a motion for reconsideration was filed, but the
same was denied. x x x
Petitioners then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. On March 31, 2004, the CA
rendered its Decision affirming the aforequoted DARAB Decision.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied
in a Resolution dated November 12, 2004.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioners raise the
following issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
the dispute between the parties is within the jurisdiction of
the DARAB.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed clear and
palpable errors in not finding that petitioners have been
tenants over the subject landholding; and that the sale of the
subject lot to them is valid, thereby deviating from and
disregarding established Supreme Court decisions enjoining
Courts not to overlook or misinterpret important facts and
circumstances supported by clear and convincing evidence
on record and which are of great weight and value to change
the results of the case and arrive at a just, fair and objective
decision.3
The Court finds the petition unmeritorious.
Jurisdiction over the present case lies with the DARAB. Section 1, Rule
II of the DARAB New Rules of Procedures states, thus:
Section 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. -
The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original
and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes
involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
228, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their
implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall
include but not be limited to cases involving the following:
xxxx
c) The annulment or cancellation of lease contracts or
deeds of sale or their amendments involving lands under
the administration and disposition of the DAR or LBP;
xxxx
e) Those involving the sale, alienation, mortgage,
foreclosure, pre-emption and redemption of agricultural
lands under the coverage of the CARP or other agrarian
laws;
f) Those involving the issuance, correction
and cancellation of x x x Emancipation Patents (EPs)
 which are registered with the Land Registration Authority; x x
x not pronouncing petitioners as tenants of the disputed land who are
The present case clearly involves the annulment of the sale of
agricultural land under the coverage of the CARP, the sale of which is
being contested by respondents who allegedly have tenancy rights
over said land. Although the opposing parties in this case are not the
landlord against his tenants, or vice-versa, the case still falls within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB pursuant to this Court's ruling in Department
of Agrarian Reform v. Abdulwahid,4 where the Court pronounced, thus:
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is
vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters, including all matters involving the
implementation of the agrarian reform program. Thus, when a case is
merely an incident involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), then
jurisdiction remains with the DARAB, and not with the regular
courts.
xxxx
x x x [J]urisdiction should be determined by considering not only
the status or relationship of the parties but also the nature of the
issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy. Thus, if
the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution
of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such
dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.5
Note the allegations in the complaint, to wit:
xxxx
4. That plaintiffs sought for partition of the properties above-
cited however, defendants Sps. Teodora Carpio and Teofilo
Carpio [herein petitioners] refused to agree with [the]
partition of the estate giving reasons thereof that they are the
exclusive owners of the parcels of land covered by
Emancipation Patent No. 445229 (Annex "A"), having
purchased the same from landowner Luis Bautista in the
year 1991;
5. That defendant also claims tenancy right to the exclusion
of the herein plaintiffs over the land covered by EP No.
445229 despite the fact that it was their mother who was the
real tenant of the lands subject matter of this case;
6. That the sale entered into by defendants Spouses
Teodora Carpio and Teofilo Carpio with the landowner Luis
Bautista is null and void because the land was already titled
to [the] deceased mother of both plaintiffs and defendants at
the time of sale and that the owner thereof has been already
divested ownership of the land by operation of law;
7. That defendants cannot claim exclusive right of tenancy
over the land subject matter of this action to the exclusion of
the other heirs because the right to till the lands belong to all
heirs;
x x x x6
It is quite evident from the allegations above that the final resolution of
this case depends on a ruling on the validity of the sale of agricultural
land covered by the CARP from the landlord to herein petitioners - an
issue which is within the jurisdiction and expertise of the DARAB. The
case is merely an incident involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), as it is founded on
the question of who is the actual tenant and eventual beneficiary of the
subject land. Hence, jurisdiction should remain with the DARAB and
not the regular courts.
The second issue raised by petitioners - i.e., whether the CA erred in
entitled to be beneficiaries thereof, making the sale of the land to them
valid - cannot likewise be resolved in their favor. Such issue involves a
question of fact and settled jurisprudence dictates that, subject to a few
exceptions, only questions of law may be brought before the
Court via a petition for review on certiorari. Thus, in Diokno v.
Cacdac,7 the Court held, thus:
x x x It bears stressing that in a petition for review on certiorari, the
scope of this Courts judicial review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals is generally confined only to errors of law, and questions of
fact are not entertained. We elucidated on our fidelity to this rule, and
we said:
Thus, only questions of law may be brought by the parties and
passed upon by this Court in the exercise of its power to review.
Also, judicial review by this Court does not extend to a
reevaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
proper x x x tribunal has based its determination.
It is aphoristic that a re-examination of factual findings cannot be
done through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court because as earlier stated, this Court is not a trier
of facts; it reviews only questions of law. The Supreme Court is not
duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered
in the proceedings below. x x x 8
There is nothing in the petition or in the records to justify bringing the
present case outside the scope of the aforementioned general rule.
The DARAB made the following findings, to wit:
x x x Accordingly, when said Decree took effect on October 21, 1972,
the DAR field office conducted their respective official duties and
responsibilities such as, but not limited to, the classification and
identification of the landholding, identification of tenant-farmers and
landowners and determination of their tenancy relationship; parcellary
mapping; determination of the total production of Certificate of Land
Transfer in cases outside the purview of Presidential Decree No. 816 x
x x. Obviously, therefore, said DAR field personnel concerned had
undergone the process in the determination of the tenancy relationship
between the late Virginia P. Estrella with that of landowner Luis
Bautista. Otherwise, the DAR Regional Office could not have issued
the corresponding Emancipation Patents in the name of Virginia P.
Estrella if the latter was found out (sic) not to be a bona fide tenant in
accordance with DAR Memorandum dated September 15, 1976 on the
subject: Revised and Detailed Operation Procedures on the Issuance
of Emancipation Patents. In fact, the receipt of lease rentals dated
March 30, 1978, March 31, 1979 and March 24, 1980 were issued by
the landowner in the name of Virginia P. Estrella (p. 102, Rollo). In
other words, these evidences (sic) show that Virginia P. Estrella was
really the duly recognized tenant by landowner Luis Bautista. The real
status, therefore, of [herein petitioners] were as immediate members of
the farm household of Virginia P. Estrella x x x. Moreover, this Board
takes note that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 22, 1991
did not indicate any previous agreement to the effect that there was an
agreement to sell by installment. Rather, it was a plain document of a
direct sale effected only in 1991, while the Emancipation Patents
issued to tenant-beneficiary Virginia P. Estrella were dated December
14, 1989. x x x9
Evidence on hand amply supports the foregoing findings of the DARAB
which had been affirmed by the CA. It has been held in Reyes v.
National Labor Relations Commission,10 that:
x x x findings of facts of quasi-judicial bodies x x x affirmed by the
Court of Appeals in due course, are conclusive on this Court, which is
not a trier of facts.
xxxx
x x x Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial
bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction
is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only
respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Such
findings deserve full respect and, without justifiable reason, ought not
to be altered, modified or reversed.11
A close perusal of the records will show that there is no cogent reason
for this Court to deviate from the settled rule that factual findings of an
administrative agency, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
accorded not only respect but finality.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The
Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31,
2004 and November 12, 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 74722,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
vs. GERMINO, GR 165676
FACTS:
THE petitioner fileda complaint with the (MTC) of Sta. Rosa, Nueva
Ecija against respondent Narciso Germino for forcible entry, claiming
that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel of land in
Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija (subject property). On his answer,
respondent claimed, among others, that his brother, was the plaintiffs'
agricultural lessee and he merely helped the latter in the cultivation as
a member of the immediate farm household. After several
postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view
of the tenancy issue raised by respondent Narciso. The MTC issued an
order remanding the case to the DARAB for further proceedings.
PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the subject
property, and ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property,
and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay as actual damages. On
appeal to DARAB, respondent argued that the case should have been
dismissed because the MTC's referral to the DARAB was void with the
enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657. DARAB affirmed the
PARAD decision. CA, however, set aside the DARAB decision and
remanded the case to the MTC for further proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether the MTC or the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD:
The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the DARAB
decision. While we lament the lapse of time this forcible entry case has
been pending resolution, we are not in a position to resolve the dispute
between the parties since the evidence required in courts is different
from that of administrative agencies.
It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined
by the allegations in the complaint. It is determined exclusively by the
Constitution and the law. It cannot be conferred by the voluntary act or
agreement of the parties, or acquired through or waived, enlarged or
diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence
of the court. Well to emphasize, it is neither for the court nor the parties
to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in
character. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691, the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer. Furthermore, allegation of tenancy
does not divest the MTC of jurisdiction.
Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive
Order No. 129-A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction,
both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules
and regulations.
An agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to, among
others, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture. For a case to involve
an agrarian dispute, the following essential requisites of an agricultural
tenancy relationship must be present: (1) the parties are the landowner
and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal
cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental.
ARBA v. Fil-Estate Properties
The Case
Before us are three consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court filed by
members of the Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association
(ARBA).1 G.R. No. 164660 and G.R. No. 164779 were filed
against Kingsville Construction & Development Corporation
(Kingsville) and Johnson Ong.2 G.R. No. 163598 was tiled
against Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI).
G.R. No. 164660 and G.R. No. 164779 question the resolution
of the Sixteenth Division3 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R.
SP No. 82322, which granted Kingsville's and Ong's petition
for certiorari, and its order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. G.R. No. 163598, on the other hand,
questions the decision of the Sixth Division4 of the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 70717, which granted FEPI's
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court, and its resolution denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS
Respondents Kingsville and FEPI are the owner and
developer, respectively, of Forest Hills Residential Estates
Phase I in Brgy. San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of
75.85978 hectares. The land subject of these cases is a
portion thereof, described as Lot No. "E," covered by TCT No.
164298, in the names of Raul Boncan, et al. and having an
area of 136, 501 square meters.5 Respondent Ong is the
President of Kingsville.6
In March 1996, ARBA, as represented by its president,
together with its members,7 (hereafter referred to as
"petitioners") filed before the Office of the Regional Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) Region IV a complaint for
maintenance of peaceful possession with prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order
(TRO) against respondents.8 Petitioners alleged that they
are the actual occupants/farmers of the land. Between the
1950s and the 1980s, they entered the premises, established
residence, and cleared and cultivated the same by virtue of
the Green Revolution Program9 of former President Ferdinand
Marcos. On March 6, 1996, however, petitioners claimed that
respondents caused the bulldozing and leveling of the
mountains in the area and the dumping of earth in the creek.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. They argued that jurisdiction
lies with the civil courts and not with the DARAB because
petitioners are squatters and not agricultural tenants. Since
the land is titled and declared for taxation purposes, the
assertion of petitioners that they have been in possession of it
between the 1950s and 1980s indicated bad faith.
Respondents insisted that nobody installed petitioners as
tenants in the land, as in fact, there was no claim in their
complaint that there was a tenancy relationship between
them and respondents, nor with the previous owners of the
land.10cralawrednad
Respondents also argued that the land is within the Lungsod
Silangan Townsite, which, under Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, is a townsite reservation outside the
coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) pursuant to Presidential Proclamations No. 1283 and
1635.11cralawrednad
Regional Adjudicator Fe Arche-Manalang denied respondents'
motion to dismiss in an order dated September 11,
1997.12 She held that the grounds cited by respondents in
their motion to dismiss, pertaining to the status of
complainants as mere squatters and to the jurisdiction of the
DARAB, were evidentiary in nature better resolved with the
substantive issues of the case.
Respondents moved tor reconsideration, which the
succeeding Regional Adjudicator, Conchita Minas, granted via
an order dated September 8, 1998.13 Regional Adjudicator
Minas held petitioners with their admission that the land is
located within the area reserved as Townsite of Lungsod
Silangan by virtue of Presidential Proclamation No. 1637. She
also cited Natalia Realty Inc. v. DAR,14 which has held that
land located within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite has been
converted to residential use. The land not being agricultural,
Regional Adjudicator Minas held that the DARAB did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners'
complaint.
Petitioners appealed before the DARAB (DARAB Case No.
7829). On January 11, 2001, the DARAB in a decision held
that the land is classified as agricultural, as borne out by the
records and the certification of the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office (MARO) of the Municipality of Antipolo. The DARAB
further held that as actual farmworkers who began occupying
and cultivating the land between the 1950s and 1980s,
petitioners deserve to peacefully maintain their possession as
qualified beneficiaries under Section 22 of CARP. The dispute
between the parties, being agrarian, was therefore within the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.15cralawrednad
The DARAB also declared that while the land ts included in the
reserved townsite, not every inch of it is reserved tor the
construction of houses. A holistic approach must be taken, in
that a townsite would also necessarily include areas classified
as "commercial, residential, forestal [sic], educational, parks
and agricultural." The DARAB reversed the Order of the
PARAD and directed respondents to maintain petitioners in
peaceful possession and cultivation of the land and to cease
from further developing the same. It also directed the MARO
of Antipolo, Rizal to place the land under the coverage of the
CARP and to issue the corresponding Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) to petitioners.16 The fallo of the
DARAB's decision reads:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated
September 8, 1998 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. New
judgment is rendered:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Directing Respondents-Appellees and/or any of their
representatives or agents acting in their behalf to maintain
Complainants-Appellants in peaceful possession and
cultivation of subject landholding.
2. Directing Respondents-Appellees to cease from further
introducing bulldozing or development activities on the
subject landholding; and
3. Directing the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of
Antipolo, Rizal to place the subject landholding under the
coverage of the CARP and to issue the corresponding CLOA to
Complainants-Appellants as prescribed by R.A. 6657 and the
rules and regulations of the DAR.
SO ORDERED.17
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the
DARAB denied in a resolution dated April 23, 2002. The
DARAB ruled that even granting that the land is covered by
the Department of Justice Opinion No. 181 as part of the
Lungsod Silangan Townsite and therefore beyond the
coverage of CARP, respondents must still comply with the
requirement for conversion provided by law. There is no
automatic conversion of an agricultural to non-agricultural
uses absent such exemption or conversion order issued by
DAR.18cralawrednad
On May 31, 2002, respondent FEPI appealed to the Court of
Appeals under Rule 43, in a petition docketed as CA G.R. No.
70717. FEPI prayed for: (1) the reversal of the decision of the
DARAB dated January 11, 2001 and its resolution dated April
23, 2002 and (2) dismissal of petitioners' complaint before
the RARAD.19cralawrednad
On June 2, 2002, respondents Kingsville and Ong filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as
CA G.R. SP No. 71055. Kingsville and Ong also prayed for the
reversal of the decision of the DARAB dated January 11, 2001
and its resolution dated April 23, 2002, and the consequent
dismissal of petitioners' complaint before the
RARAD.20cralawrednad
On June 20, 2002, the Special Seventh Division* of the Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition for being a wrong mode of
appeal and for having a defective verification and certification
against forum-shopping. The Court of Appeals also ruled that
even if it would treat the petition as one under Rule 43, which
was the correct mode of appeal, it would still warrant a
dismissal for having been filed out of time.21 The Court of
Appeals also denied Kingsville's and Ong's motion for
reconsideration in a resolution issued on August 1,
2002.22cralawrednad
On appeal before us (G.R. No.155118), we ordered the
dismissal of CA G.R. SP No. 71055. Our order attained finality
on February 5, 2003.23cralawrednad
On October 22, 2003, the Court of Appeals Sixth Division in
CA G.R. No. 70717 rendered a decision reversing the DARAB's
decision and resolution and reinstating the RARAD's order
dismissing petitioners' complaint. The Court of Appeals ruled
that Letter of Instruction No. 625 issued on November 9,
1977 in relation to Presidential Proclamation No. 1637,
already reclassified the land as residential. It cited Natalia
Realty, Inc. v. DAR, where we found that Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20, 132 hectares of land in
the Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo and Montalban, Rizal
to absorb the population overspill in the metropolis. These
areas were designated as the Lungsod Silangan Townsite in
which the land is located. The Court of Appeals also ruled that
petitioners are not bonafide tenants of the subject property as
there was neither consent from the landowner nor evidence of
sharing of harvests.24cralawrednad
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
FEPI's rights over the land are merely derived from and
dependent on Kingsville's, which is its owner. FEPI's rights
cannot therefore rise higher than the stream, and as such,
the final ruling in CA G.R. SP No. 71055 against Kingsville
should also bind FEPI.25cralawredcralawrednad
On May 6, 2004, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.26cralawrednad
Meanwhile, in view of the finality of G.R. No. 155118,
petitioners filed a motion for execution before the DARAB,
which the Board granted.27 Respondents then filed separate
motions for reconsideration, arguing that the decision of the
DARAB sought to be executed has not yet attained finality
and has, in fact, been reversed and set aside in CA G.R. No.
70717. With the reversal of the DARAB's decision, there was
nothing left to execute. FEPI, in particular, insisted that the
favorable decision in CA G.R. No. 70717 is also applicable to
Kingsville, whose interest is so interwoven with and
inseparable from FEPI's.28cralawrednad
The DARAB denied the twin motions of respondents in a
resolution dated February 6, 2004. The Board cited the
proviso in Section 1, Rule XIV of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure which states that notwithstanding an appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the decision of the Board appealed from
shall be immediately executory pursuant to Section 50 of RA
No. 6657.29 Thus, on February 17, 2004, the DARAB issued a
writ of execution ordering the regional sheriff of the DARAB-
Region IV to carry out the decision of the Board dated
January 11, 2001.30cralawrednad
FEPI thereafter filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a
TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction before the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 70717. FEPI argued that the
impending execution of the DARAB's January II, 200 I
Decision is manifestly illegal, considering that it has already
been reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals. FEPI
emphasized that the cited proviso in the DARAB's Rules of
Procedure pertains to executions pending appeal and does not
apply where an appeal from the Board's decision has already
been resolved and reversed.31cralawrednad
Granting FEPI's motion, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No.
70717 issued a TRO effective for sixty (60) days, enjoining
the DARAB from implementing and enforcing its January 11,
2001 decision in DARAB Case No. 7829. The Court of Appeals
ruled that unless restrained, the DARAB will include the
subject land for CARP coverage despite the Court of Appeals'
express finding in its October 22, 2003 decision that said land
has already been declared and legally classified as
residential.32 The Court of Appeals
stated:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It appearing that the petitioner will suffer grave injustice and
irreparable injury from the DARAB's immediate enforcement
and execution of its Decision dated January 11, 2001 and in
order that the above-entitled case may not be rendered moot
and academic, a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER effective for SIXTY (60) days is hereby issued,
enjoining the DARAB from implementing and enforcing
its Decision dated January 11, 2001 in the said DARAB Case
No. 7829 (Reg. Case No. IV-RI-015-96).33cralawrednad
xxx
Thereafter, in view of the impending expiration of the TRO,
FEPI filed an urgent motion before the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. No. 70717 to resolve its application for writ of
preliminary injunction.34 On May 6, 2004, the Court of
Appeals, as already adverted to above, issued a resolution
denying petitioners' motion tor reconsideration. It also went
on to say:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration, the
resolution of the petitioner's urgent motion for application for
writ of preliminary injunction which was filed pending
resolution of the Motion for Reconsideration, is no longer
necessary.
SO ORDERED.35
On March 14, 2004, Kingsville filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals (CA G.R. No. 82322) seeking to
annul and set aside the writ of execution issued by the DARAB
and its January 11, 2001 decision and April 23, 2002
resolution reversing the dismissal of the Regional Adjudicator
and denying Kingsville's motion for reconsideration,
respectively:16cralawrednad
On June 10, 2004, the Court of Appeals granted the petition.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the DARAB has no jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the suit because it is not an
agrarian dispute, there being no tenancy relationship between
petitioners and respondents. Citing Natalia Realty, Inc. v.
DAR,37 the Court of Appeals also ruled that the inclusion of
the land within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite meant that the
areas therein have been effectively converted from
agricultural to non-agricultural and reclassified into
residential. Though some areas remain undeveloped, these
are still residential or commercial lands by reason of the
conversion prior to June 15, 1998 when the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect. Hence, the subject
property is outside the ambit of CARP. The Court of Appeals
concluded that the DARAB erred in taking cognizance of the
case. In view of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case, its decision is void and the
principle on res judicatadoes not apply.38cralawrednad
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
decision of the Court of Appeals, which was also denied in a
resolution dated July 29, 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled
that there are established principles and case law holding that
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari is always available to
address situations where a judgment rendered by a court
bereft of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case had
attained finality, though the remedy of appeal was lost
through error in the choice of remedies and other procedural
lapses.39cralawrednad
Hence, these consolidated petitions filed by members of
ARBA.
ISSUES
The issues raised by the consolidated petitions can be
summarized as follows:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case between the parties.
A. Whether or not a tenancy relationship
existed between the parties.
B. Whether or not a conversion order from
DAR is still necessary, notwithstanding the
exemption granted over a land from the
coverage of CARP.
C. Whether or not the TRO issued by the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 70717 was
improper.
II. Whether or not the dismissal of CA G.R. No. 71055
constitutes res judicata.
III. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-
shopping in instituting CA G.R. 70717, CA G.R.
71055 and CA G.R. No. 82322.
A. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Sixth
Division was duty bound to dismiss the
petition in CA G.R. No. 70717 after having
been informed of the pendency of CA G.R.
No. 71055.
B. Whether or not FEPI and Kingsville can raise
different appeals independently.
OUR RULING

On the issue of res judicata anti jurisdiction of the
DARAB
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 82322 for
entertaining the petition filed by respondent Kingsville on the
ground that the latter is re-litigating the same issues raised in
CA G.R. No. 71055. CA G.R. No. 71055 was dismissed
because Kingsville availed of a wrong remedy via Rule 65
instead of Rule 43, and because of a defective verification.
Petitioners, citing Bernarte v. Court of Appeals,40 contend that
while this dismissal is grounded on procedural flaws, the
same is an adjudication on the merits constituting res
judicata.
Relatedly, petitioners argue that because of the dismissal of
CA G.R. No. 71055, respondents have lost their right to
appeal the decision of the DARAB. As such, said decision has
become final and conclusive between the parties.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all
later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit.41cralawrednad
The elements of res judicata, which must all exist for the
principle to apply, are as follows: (1) the former judgment or
order must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be on
the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (4) there
must be, between the first and the second action, identity of
parties, of subject matter and cause of action.42cralawrednad
We find, however, that answering the question of whether or
not the filing of CA G.R. No. 82322 is barred by res
judicata will necessarily touch upon the pivotal question of
whether or not the DARAB, in the first place, has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case between the parties. We
rule that it does not. Thus, the principle of res judicata finds
no application in this case.
The jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited under the law. It was
created under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A to assume
powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of
agrarian reform cases under E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-
A.43 Sections 1 and 2, Rule II of the DARAB New Rules of
Procedure, which was adopted and promulgated on May 30,
1994 and came into effect on June 21, 1994, identify the
extent of the DARAB's, the RARAD's and the PARAD's
jurisdiction, as they read:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate
Jurisdiction. - The Board shall have primary and exclusive
jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and
adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under
Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and
129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act
No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws
and their implementing rules and regulations. x x x
SECTION 2. Jurisdiction of the Regional and Provincial
Adjudicator. - The RARAD and the PARAD shall have
concurrent original jurisdiction with the Board to hear,
determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and
incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned
territorial jurisdiction.44
The jurisdiction of the PARAD and the DARAB is only limited
to cases involving agrarian disputes, including incidents
arising from the implementation of agrarian laws. Section 3
(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute in this
wise:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx
(d) Agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining.
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to
compensation of lands acquired under R.A. 6657 and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.45
In order for the DARAB and the RARAD to have jurisdiction
over the case, therefore, a tenurial arrangement or tenancy
relationship between the parties must exist. In determining
tenancy relations between the parties, it is a question of
whether or not a party is a de jure tenant. The essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are: (1) the parties are
the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural
land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural
production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is
sharing of harvests. All these requisites are necessary to
create a tenancy relationship between the parties. The
absence of one does not make an occupant, cultivator, or a
planter, a de jure tenant. Unless a person establishes his
status as a de jure tenant, he is not entitled to security of
tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the
government under existing tenancy laws.46cralawrednad
Petitioners' complaint before the RARAD shows that its
material allegations fail to state a tenurial arrangement or
tenancy relationship between the parties. The complaint reads
in part:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Comes, now complainants by counsels and unto this
Honorable Adjudicator most respectfully states
[sic]:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxx
3. That the subject landholding is an agricultural land as
evidenced by Certification from the Municipal Agricultural
Officer (MAO) of Antipolo, Rizal, which is marked as Annex
"A" and made an integral part of this complaint;
4. That the complainants are the actual occupants/tillers and
or farmers of a certain agricultural landholding consisting an
area of 73 hectares more or less, located at Sitio Inalsan and
Sitio Tagumpay, Brgy. Bagong Nayon, Antipolo, Rizal, which
is now being bulldozed and developed by the respondents,
causing grave and irreparable damgge [sic] on all the
improvements introduced by herein complainants;
5. That complainants entered the premises of said land to
which they caused the clearing out of the area and cultivation
of the same since 1950s and others 1980s by virtue of
General Order No. 34 (Green Revolution Program) during
President Marcos regime;
6. That complainants through laborious efforts have
introduced various improvements on the said land such as
fruit bearing trees and rootcrops, [sic] and had in fact
established their permanent residence on the same, x x x;
7. That in the morning of March 6, 1996 the once peaceful
possession and cultivation of herein complainants has been
disturbed when some unidentified persons have caused the
bulldozing and levelling [sic] the mountain and dumping
bulldozed earth, x x x, which caused irreparable damage and
destruction of about 80% of the existing fruit trees thereon
and other root crops. disregarding completely their peaceful
possession and cultivation x x x;
xxx
16. That due to the unlawful act of the respondent, herein
complainants were greatly deprived of their rightful share in
the fruits of their labor as well as to a just share in the fruits
of the land they had been tilling as enunciated under Section
4 on Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Art. XIII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution.
xxx
WHEREFORE. it is most respectfully prayed that after due
hearing, a Preliminary Injunction and or Temporary
Restraining order be issued and forthwith to restrain the
respondents from doing the act herein complained of, and
aftger (sic] trial said injunction be made permanent with cost
and such further orders that are just and equitable in the
premises.47cralawrednad
xxx
While petitioners alleged themselves as the occupants and
tillers of the subject land, they did not allege that they have a
tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship either with the
respondents or with the registered landowners, and not even
with anyone purporting to be the landowner. Petitioners
invoke General Order No. 34 as their license to enter and
cultivate the subject land. The fact remains, however, that
under General Order No. 34, utilization of empty or idle lots
by an adjoining resident or individual may only be made with
the express consent of the owner, if he is in the area, or his
implied consent, if he cannot be located. Petitioners neither
alleged that the respondents or landowners consented to their
cultivation of the subject land for agricultural production,
either expressly or impliedly; nor was there an allegation of
any arrangement as to how the harvests shall be shared
between them. The conclusion then is that petitioners were
not the tenants of the respondents.
True, in its decision, the DARAB
held:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In as much as [sic] Complainants-Appellants have been
occupying/cultivating the subject landholding since the 1950's
[sic] and 1980's [sic] to the present, they deserve to be
peacefully maintained and continue tilling the subject
agricultural landholding as qualified beneficiaries pursuant to
Section 22 of Republic Act No. 6657, the 1988 Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. As held in the case of Heirs of Segundo
Manuel, represented by Magdalena de Manuel, et al. vs. Hon.
Judge Marcial L. Fernandez, et al,. GR. No. 93743,
promulgated on June 29, 1992, the Hon. Supreme Court held
that "even non-tenant [sic] cannot anymore be ejected and
has to be retained in his possession and cultivation of the
lands as tiller until after the DAR has determined whether said
tiller has rights thereof under the CARP relative to the land he
is tilling."48
Nevertheless, that petitioners may have been actual
occupants or tillers of the land, which may make them
potential CARP beneficiaries, does not give rise to a tenancy
relationship. As we held in Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation v. Gutierrez, et
al.:49cralawrednad
Neither the findings of the courts a quo nor the records
themselves show any factual determination of the third,
fourth, and sixth requisites, namely, consent between the
parties to the relationship, the purpose of the
relationship, which is agricultural production, and sharing of
harvests. The factual findings of the courts a quo at best only
point to the following: 1) respondents have been in
possession of the land in question for more than one year
before the complaint for ejectment was filed; 2) the land in
question is subject to the compulsory acquisition scheme
under existing agrarian reform laws; 3) the respondents are
farmers-tillers of the land; and 4) they are "potential CARP
beneficiaries." Regrettably, these factual findings fall short to
convince this Court of any tenancy relationship, and, hence,
the DARAB does not have jurisdiction over the present case.
Jurisdiction lies with the regular courts.
Even if the respondents are indeed "potential CARP
beneficiaries" as they so claim, it does not follow that a
tenancy relationship arises. Section 22 of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, provides:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the
CARP shall be distributed as much as possible to landless
residents of the same barangay, or in the absence thereof,
landless residents of the same municipality in the following
order of priority:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) agricultural lessees and share tenants;
(b) regular farmworkers; (c) seasonal farmworkers; (d) other
farmworkers;
(e) actual tillers or occupants of public lands;
(f) collectives or cooperatives of the above beneficiaries; and
(g) others directly working on the land.
xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the aforequoted provisions that "agricultural
lessees and share tenants" comprise only one class of
qualified beneficiaries. The petitioner is correct in pointing out
that even those who do not enjoy a tenancy relationship with
the landowner can become qualified beneficiaries.
Moreover, the DARAB overstepped its jurisdictional
boundaries when it declared petitioners as qualified
beneficiaries under CARP. In Lercana v. Jalandoni,50 we ruled
that the identification and selection of CARP beneficiaries are
matters involving strictly the administrative implementation
of the CARP, a matter exclusively cognizable by the Secretary
of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and beyond the
jurisdiction of the DARAB.51cralawrednad
More importantly, there is no tenancy relationship or agrarian
dispute between the parties because the subject land is not
agricultural. It has ceased to be so under Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637. The Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No.
82322 and CA G.R. 70717 and the DARAB found that the land
is included within the Lungsod Silangan Townsite by virtue of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, which took effect on April
18, 1977, thereby reclassifying said land from agricultural to
residential. The interpretation of the DARAB is that the
inclusion of land in the townsite reservation does not mean
that it can be used for residential purposes only.
However, the case of Natalia Realty, Inc., v. DAR,52 has long
held that lots included in the Lungsod Silangan Townsite
Reservation were intended exclusively for residential use.
They ceased to be agricultural lands upon approval of their
inclusion in the Lungsod Silangan Reservation by virtue of
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637.
Contrary to the DARAB's conclusion, therefore, a conversion
or exemption clearance from the DAR would be superfluous.
In Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Associations, Inc.
(CREBA) v. The Secretary of Agrarian Reform,53 we
explained:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is different, however, when through Presidential
Proclamations public agricultural lands have been reserved in
whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school
etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer
necessary. As held in Republic v. Estonilo,54 only a positive
act of the President is needed to segregate or reserve a piece
of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such,
reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or
purpose in effect converted the same to such use without
undergoing any conversion process and that they must be
actually, directly and exclusively used for such public purpose
for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be
segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR
for distribution to qualified beneficiaries under the
CARP.55 More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for
public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.56 Hence, they are outside the coverage of the
CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the
conversion authority of the DAR.
At any rate, the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 82322 has
found that as early as January 1992, respondents have
already been granted an exemption clearance by DAR
Undersecretary Renato B. Padilla. This clearance was granted
on the basis of certifications issued by the Lungsod Silangan
Program Office and the ocular inspection conducted by the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). The ocular
inspection of the HLURB confirmed that respondents'
landholding is within the commercial zone of the said townsite
reservation and within the General Area for Urban Use per the
Land Use Plan of the Lungsod Silangan. It further confirmed
that respondents' landholding is part of the Municipality of
Antipolo's Zoning Ordinance No. 2, which was duly supported
by Resolution No. 4 of the Sangguniang Bayan dated
February 11, 1982. Thus, the Municipality of Antipolo and the
HLURB issued a Development Permit57 and a License to Sell58,
respectively, in favor of respondents.59cralawrednad
Clearly, apart from Presidential Proclamation No. 1637, the
zoning ordinance issued by the Municipality of Antipolo, and
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan and the HLURB, also
effectively reclassified and converted the subject land to non-
agricultural. The zoning ordinance was approved in 1982, way
before the CARL took effect. We have repeatedly ruled that
lands already classified as commercial, industrial or
residential before the effectivity of the CARL, or June 15,
1988, are outside its coverage, and that an order or approval
from DAR converting the subject land from agricultural to
residential is no longer necessary.60 Only land classifications
or reclassifications which occur from June 15, 1988 onwards
require conversion clearance from the DAR.61cralawrednad
Prescinding from the foregoing, the DARAB does not have
jurisdiction over the case and its dismissal by the RARAD was
correct. Consequently, DARAB's January 11, 2001 decision is
null and void, including the writ of execution it issued on
February 17, 2004. The rule is that where there is want of
jurisdiction over a subject matter, the judgment is rendered
null and void. A void judgment is in legal effect no judgment,
by which no rights are divested, from which no right can be
obtained, which neither binds nor bars any one, and under
which all acts performed and all claims flowing out are void. It
is not a decision in contemplation of law and, hence, it can
never become executory. It also follows that such a void
judgment cannot constitute a bar to another case by reason
of res judicata.62cralawrednad
Our decision in G.R. No. 155118 may have long attained
finality and may have, in effect, rendered the DARAB decision
final and executory. But again, considering the lack of
jurisdiction of the DARAB, we hold that the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. No. 82322 did not err in reopening and ruling on
the merits of the case.
In Natividad v. Mariano. et al.,63 we held that the DARAB and
the Court of Appeals did not err in reopening and ruling on
the merits of the case because the PARAD effectively and
gravely abused its discretion and acted without jurisdiction in
denying the petition for relief from judgment.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We cannot blame Ernesto for insisting that the PARAD
decision can no longer be altered. The doctrine of
immutability of final judgments, grounded on the fundamental
principle of public policy and sound practice, is well settled.
Indeed, once a decision has attained finality, it becomes
immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in
any respect, whether the modification is to be made by the
court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The
doctrine holds true even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law. The judgment
of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must, on
some definite date fixed by law, become final even at the risk
of occasional errors. The only accepted exceptions to this
general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire
after the finality of the decision which render its execution
unjust and inequitable.
This doctrine of immutability of judgments notwithstanding,
we are not persuaded that the DARAB and the CA erred in
reopening, and ruling on the merits of the case. The broader
interests of justice and equity demand that we set aside
procedural rules as they are, after all, intended to promote
rather than defeat substantial justice. If the rigid and
pedantic application of procedural norms would frustrate
rather than promote justice, the Court always has the power
to suspend the rules or except a particular case from its
operation, particularly if defects of jurisdiction appear to be
present. This is the precise situation that we presently find
before this Court.
The DARAB's actions outside its jurisdiction cannot produce
legal effects and cannot likewise be justified by the principle
of immutability of final judgment.64cralawrednad
We are also prepared to vacate our ruling in G.R. No. 155118.
In Heirs of Maura So v. Obliosca, et al.,65we departed from
our minute resolution issued previously in a different petition
because it effectively rendered final and executory an
erroneous order of a trial court. We explained
then:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Collantes v. Court of Appeals,66 the Court offered three
options to solve a case of conflicting decisions: the first is tor
the parties to assert their claims anew, the second is to
determine which judgment came first, and the third is to
determine which of the judgments had been rendered by a
court of last resort. In that case, the Court applied the first
option and resolved the conflicting issues anew.

Instead of resorting to the first offered solution as
in Collantes, which would entail disregarding all the three final
and executory decisions, we find it more equitable to apply
the criteria mentioned in the second and third solutions, and
thus, maintain the finality of one of the conflicting judgments.
The principal criterion under the second option is the time
when the decision was rendered and became final and
executory, such that earlier decisions should be sustained
over the current ones since final and executory decisions vest
rights in the winning party. The major criterion under the
third solution is a determination of which court or tribunal
rendered the decision. Decisions of this Court should be
accorded more respect than those made by the lower courts.
The application of these criteria points to the preservation of
the Decision of this Court in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860
dated August 2, 1991, and its Resolution in G.R. No. 110661
dated December 1, 1993. Both judgments were rendered long
before the Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 118050 was issued
on March 1, 1995. In tact, the August 2, 1991 Decision was
executed already - respondents were divested of their title
over the property and a new title, TCT No. T-68370, was
issued in the name of Maura So on July 24, 1992. Further,
while all three judgments actually reached this Court,
only the two previous judgments extensively discussed
the respective cases on the merits. The third judgment
(in G.R. No. 118050) was a Minute Resolution,
dismissing the petition for review on certiorari of the
RTC Resolution in the legal redemption case for failure
to sufficiently show that the questioned resolution was
tainted with grave abuse of discretion and for being the
wrong remedy. In a manner of speaking, therefore, the
third final and executory judgment was substantially a
decision of the trial court.
xxx
The matter is again before this Court, and this time, it
behooves the Court to set things right in order to prevent a
grave injustice from being committed against Maura So who
had, tor 15 years since the first decision was executed,
already considered herself to be the owner of the
property. The Court is not precluded from rectifying
errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to
the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would
involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.
(Emphasis Ours)
On the issue of forum-shopping
Petitioners argue that respondents are guilty of forum
shopping when, in instituting their respective petitions before
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 71055 and CA G.R. No.
82322, respondents did not inform the courts of the pendency
of each petition and of CA G.R. No. 70717.
We note that CA G.R. No. 70717 and CA G.R. No. 71055 were
filed merely days apart by FEPI and Kingsville, together with
Ong, respectively. CA G.R. No. 70717 was filed on May 31,
2002, while CA G.R. No. 71055 was filed on June 2, 2002.
Yet, the supposed verification and certification against forum
shopping in CA G.R. No. 71055, which was incorporated in the
body of the pleading, did not mention the existence of CA
G.R. No. 70717.67 FEPI, on its part, was also duty bound to
inform the Court of Appeals of Kingsville's petition. They
cannot feign ignorance of each other's petition when they
filed their own because they were co-respondents in the
original complaint and had been represented by the same
counsel m the proceedings before the RARAD and the DARAB.
On the other hand, CA G.R. No. 82322 was filed on March 14,
2004, during the pendency of CA G.R. No. 70717 and after CA
G.R. No. 71055 was dismissed. Nevertheless, the certification
in CA G.R. No. 82322 did not mention CA G.R. No. 70717 or
CA G.R. No. 71055.68 Kingsville cannot also feign ignorance of
its own petition in CA G.R. No. 71055 when it filed CA G.R.
No. 82322.
We hold that respondents' certifications against forum-
shopping are inaccurate because they do not disclose the
pendency and/or filing of the other petitions that raise the
same issues and assail the similar decision and order of the
DARAB. Respondents also obviously sought different fora
when they filed similar petitions before the Court of Appeals
separately.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed
of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously
or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances,
and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in
or already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in
one court, then in another.69cralawrednad
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with
the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved
yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by
filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and
with the same prayer, the previous case having been finally
resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and
(3) by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action
but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where
the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res
judicata).70cralawrednad
More particularly, the elements of forum-shopping are: (a)
identity of parties or at least such parties that represent the
same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; (c) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that
any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of
which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.71cralawrednad
Applying the foregoing elements in the case at bar, the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 70717 was in error in finding no
violation of forum shopping on the ground that the
respondents are separate entities with separate interests who
may pursue remedies independently. The rule against forum
shopping does not require absolute identity of parties;
substantial identity of parties is sufficient.72 There is
substantial identity of parties where there is a community of
interest between a party in the first case and a party in the
second case.73 It is beyond quibbling that respondents do
have a common interest in the present case.
In Silahis International Hotel, Inc. v. The National Labor
Relations Commission, et al.,74 we reiterated our consistent
rule that a party should not be allowed to pursue
simultaneous remedies in two different forums. Although
most of the cases that we have ruled upon regarding forum
shopping involved petitions in the courts and administrative
agencies, the rule prohibiting it applies equally to multiple
petitions in the same tribunal or agency. We concluded that
by filing another petition involving the same essential facts
and circumstances in the same agency, i.e. where
respondents filed their appeal and injunction case separately
in the NLRC, respondents approached two different fora in
order to increase their chances obtaining a favorable decision
or action. We affirmed that this practice cannot be tolerated
and should be condemned.
Nevertheless, just like in Silahis International Hotel,
Inc., though we find the action taken by the respondents ill-
advised, this does not mean that the erroneous decision of
the DARAB should be sanctioned and the present petitions
dismissed. Despite our proscription against forum shopping,
the respondents should be allowed to have recourse to the
processes of law and to seek relief from the decision of the
DARAB as this allowance will better serve the ends of justice.
In Barranco, v. Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems,75 we also had the occasion to relax the rule against
forum shopping on the basis of a valid justification.
Thus:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The appellate court however correctly ruled that petitioner is
guilty of torum shopping. Petitioner deliberately sought
another forum, i.e.. the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, to
grant her relief after this Court dismissed her petition
questioning the jurisdiction of COSLAP. What petitioner should
have done after COSLAP dismissed the motion to dismiss and
after this Court dismissed the petition for certiorari for late
filing, was to wait for the final verdict of COSLAP and to
appeal therefrom, instead of seeking recourse from the trial
court through a petition to enjoin the enforcement of
COSLAP's writ of demolition and the order denying the
repudiation of the amicable settlement.
The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be
belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed
procedures insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely
a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to
courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural
rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the
duty to reconcile both the need to put an end to litigation
speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.
In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,76 the Court restated the
reasons which may provide justification for a court to suspend
a strict adherence to procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of
life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or
compelling circumstances, (c) the merits of the case, (d) a
cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and
dilatory, and (t) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby.
Thus, any procedural lapse that may have been committed by
the petitioner should not deter us from resolving the merits of
the instant case considering that the dismissal of the present
appeal would unlawfully deprive the petitioner of her
possessorial right over Lot No. 1611-D-3.
We find that the merits of respondents' case and the lack of
jurisdiction of the DARAB over the subject matter of the case
between the parties are special and compelling reasons that
warrant the suspension of our rules against forum-shopping.
This is not to say, however, that we acquiesce to the
neglectful omissions of respondents' counsels. They, who
have been charged with the knowledge of the law and with
the duty of assisting in the administration of justice, are
sternly reminded to be more circumspect in their professional
concerns. We will not hesitate to impose severe penalties
should they commit similar acts in the future.
Finally, petitioners' contention that the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed CA G.R. No. 70717 upon being
informed of the filing of CA G.R. No. 71055 and its
subsequent dismissal deserves scant consideration. We note
that when the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 701771 was
informed by petitioners about CA G.R. No. 71055, the latter
was already dismissed on technical grounds. Had it still been
pending at that time, the ideal solution would have been to
consolidate the two petitions, as was done here. The dismissal
of CA G.R. No. 71055, however, did not oblige the Court of
Appeals in CA G.R. No. 707 I 7 to likewise dismiss the same,
considering that it was filed first in time and was the correct
mode of appeal. We explained in Cruz, et al. v. Court qf
Appeals, et al.:77cralawrednad
With regard to the second assigned error, petitioners maintain
that in view of its dismissal of the injunction case then
pending before the Regional Trial Court on the ground of
forum shopping, the Court of Appeals should have also
dismissed the unlawful detainer case before the Metropolitan
Trial Court as there was no factual nor legal basis to retain
one and dismiss the other, or to be "selective" as to which of
the two actions involving the same parties, the same causes
of action or issues and the same reliefs, it should dismiss. In
other words, it is petitioners' submission that on the basis of
its finding of forum-shopping, the Court of Appeals should
have dismissed both the injunction case and the ejectment
case.
The issue of who between the petitioners and
respondents spouses could exercise the right of
possession and/or ownership over subject property
stems from an actual controversy brought for
resolution by the court. The court is called upon to
decide an issue which proceeds from a justiciable
controversy. The dismiss of both cases, as petitioners
would want the Court of Appeals to do, would result in
the court's abdication of its judicial function of
resolving controversies which are ripe for adjudication.
Litis pendentia, res judicata and forum shopping arc all based
on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Forum shopping is
sanctioned under Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91
(now Section 5, Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure per
amendments of July 1997) Moreover, forum-shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other.
To determine which action should be dismissed given the
pendency of two actions, relevant considerations such as the
following arc taken into account: (1) the date of filing, with
preference generally given to the first action filed to be
retained; (2) whether the action sought to be dismissed was
filed merely to preempt the latter action or to anticipate its
filing and lay the basis for its dismissal; and (3) whether
the action is the appropriate vehicle for litigating the
issues between the parties. (Emphasis Ours)
Nevertheless, we hold that Kingsville, as the owner of Forest
Hills Residential Estates Phase I, is an indispensable party
without whom no final determination can be had of the
action. It should have been joined as petitioner in CA G.R. No.
70717 either by FEPI or by the Court of Appeals at its own
initiative. We rectify this defect now on the principle that the
omission to include Kingsville "is a mere technical defect
which can be cured at any stage of the proceedings even after
judgment"; and that, particularly in the case of indispensable
parties, since their presence and participation is essential to
the very life of the action, for without them no judgment may
be rendered, amendments of the complaint in order to
implead them should be freely allowed, even on appeal, in
fact even after rendition of judgment by this Court, where it
appears that the complaint otherwise indicates their identity
and character as such indispensable parties."78cralawrednad
On CA G.R. No. 82322, we hold that in view of our earlier
findings that the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case between the parties, the Court of Appeals
in CA G.R. No. 82322 did not err in taking cognizance of the
petition despite respondents' violation on forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are
hereby DENIED. The assailed decisions and resolutions of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 70717 and CA G.R. No.
82322 are affirmed.
SO ORDERED
Caas-Manuel v Egano
FLOR CAAS-MANUEL, Petitioner, v. ANDRES D.
EGANO, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the present petition for review
on certiorari1 assailing the February 18, 2011 Decision2 and
August 31, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Cebu City, in CA-G.R. SP No. 03230.
Factual Antecedents
In 2004, respondent Andres D. Egano, together with his
spouse Tarcelita, filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Regional Office (DARRO), Region VIII, Tacloban City,
a "Petition for Nullification of Coverage and Disqualification of
Farmer-Beneficiary." They contested the issuance of
Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to and
identification as farmer-beneficiaries of petitioner Flor Caas-
Manuel and her sister, Salome D. Caas, of Lot 3595, Csd.
726-D situated in Barangay Palarao, Leyte, Leyte. He alleged
that CLOA No. 00091138 was mistakenly issued to the
petitioner and Salome because a portion (an area of 3,655.50
sq.ms. more or less) of the land covered by the said CLOA
was previously sold to him by the petitioner's father,
Celedonio Caas.4 Also, he alleged that the petitioner and
Salome were not qualified as farmer-beneficiaries because
they were not the actual tillers of the subject portion of land.
In an Order5 dated October 28, 2004, DAR Regional Director
Tiburcio A. Morales, Jr. found merit in the respondent's
petition and issued the following:cralawlawlibrary
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Nullification of Coverage under CARP of the portion of lot
3595, situated in Brgy. Palarao, Leyte, Leyte, and
Disqualification of its identified Farmer-Beneficiary filed by
petitioners (referring to the respondent and his wife) is
hereby GRANTED and Order is hereby issued;
1. DECLARING the award in favor of Flor Caas Manuel and
Salome Dellera Caas of the farmlot embraced by CLOA No.
00091138 null and void ab initio;
2. DIRECTING the Operations Division of DARPO, Leyte, to
conduct delineation survey to determine the specific area
actually owned and cultivated by the herein petitioners and
coordinate with the Bureau of Lands for the correction of the
name of farmer-beneficiary in its approved subdivision plan;
3. ORDERING the MARO, DAR Municipal Office of Leyte,
Leyte, to identify and document petitioners as the rightful
farmer beneficiaries of such portion, subject of this petition;
4. ORDERING the Petitioners to coordinate with the
Legal Division of DARPO, Leyte to file the proper
petition with the Adjudication Board for the
Cancellation of CLOA No. 00091138."6 (Emphasis
supplied)
The petitioner moved to reconsider Dir. Morales's order but
her motion was denied.7cralawrednad
The October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales later became final
and executory as no appeal was filed within the remainder of
the fifteen (15)-day filing period.8cralawrednad
Pursuant to Dir. Morales's order to coordinate his case with
the Legal Division of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Provincial Office (DARPO) Leyte, the respondent, on January
24, 2005, filed a "Petition for Cancellation of CLOA No.
00091138" with the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB)-Region VIII. This was docketed
as DARAB Case No. R-0800-0042-05.
In a decision9 dated February 16, 2006, Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Wilfredo M. Navarra ordered the
cancellation of CLOA No. 00091138 and its corresponding
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 3324 based on Dir.
Morales's October 28, 2004 order. The petitioner moved to
reconsider PARAD Navarra's decision but her motion was
denied in a resolution10 dated May 8, 2006. The petitioner
filed an appeal with the DARAB Central Office in Diliman,
Quezon City. This was docketed as DARAB Case No. 14579.
In a decision11 dated May 29, 2007, the DARAB dismissed the
petitioner's appeal, in this wise:cralawlawlibrary
"The appeal is without merit. The cancellation of CLOA No.
00091138 under Original Certificate of Title No. 3324
was an offshoot of the Decision dated October 28,
2004, rendered by the Regional Director of Region VIII,
in the case entitled "In Re: Petition for Nullification of
Coverage and Disqualification of Farmer-Beneficiary," filed by
petitioner (referring to the present respondent). As correctly
stated by the Adjudicator a quo: "Thus, the declaration of Dir.
Tiburcio A. Morales, Jr., regarding the disqualification of Flor
Manuel Cafias and Salome D. Cafias as farmer-beneficiaries,
is an exercise of an authority of the DAR Secretary that has
been delegated to him. The cancellation of the subject
CLOA is a necessary consequence of that declaration
which binds this office, being an adjunct of the DAR.
xxx And in the meantime that the off-mentioned Order
of Dir. Tiburcio Morales, has not been vacated or
ordered vacated by an appropriate authority, it is
incumbent upon this Office to honor the
same."12 (emphases supplied)
The DARAB, likewise, denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in a resolution13 dated October 9, 2007. The
petitioner appealed her case to the CA through a Petition for
Review filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.
In the decision now assailed before this Court,14 the CA
affirmed in toto the DARAB's decision in DARAB Case No.
14579, stating that:cralawlawlibrary
"As correctly enunciated by DAR Provincial Adjudicator
Wilfredo M. Navarra, the objections of herein petitioner to the
cancellation of the subject CLOA as the same is a violation of
their right to due process, the illegality of the sale of the land,
the irregularity of the certificate of finality, etc., cannot be
entertained by the DARAB because these are questions
related to the administrative implementation of agrarian laws
which are beyond the DARAB's jurisdiction. DARAB has no
appellate jurisdiction over acts of DAR Regional
Directors, thus, petitioners (sic) should have addressed
their concerns to the DAR Secretary. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
xxx it is clear that the DARAB did not err in ruling against
herein petitioner as it has no authority to grant the reliefs she
has prayed for. Moreover, it cannot be argued that Section
1(f) of the Rules vests the DARAB with jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance of Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT)
and the administrative correction thereof, as it has been
ruled that for the DARAB to exercise jurisdiction in
such cases, there must be an agrarian dispute between
the landowner and the tenant which is not so in the
instant case."15 (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)
In its August 31, 2011 resolution, the CA denied the motion
for reconsideration filed by the petitioner; hence, the
petitioner's filing of the present petition for review
on certiorari with this Court.
The Petition
The petitioner assails the CA's decision for denying his
petition for review based on purely technical reasons and
ignoring the crucial, substantive issues she presented in her
appeal. She contends that the CA committed reversible error
when it ruled that the October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales
could no longer be disturbed, and argues that the said order
cannot attain finality because it is illegal, null and void.
The petitioner claims: that, in May 1985, she was identified as
a qualified farmer-beneficiary of a 3,895 sq.m.-farm lot in
Brgy. Palarao, Leyte, Leyte, originally owned by her parents
Celedonio and Floriana Caas, and designated as Lot
No. 3592, Cad. 726-D; that, on November 17, 1986, the
lot's Survey Plan was approved after a survey conducted on
the property in December 1985; that, on May 31, 1993, she
was issued a Certificate of Land Ownership Award No.
00091138 and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No.
OC- 3324, embodied in one (1) document that was
registered with the Register of Deeds, Province of Leyte, on
June 30, 1993; and that she had been cultivating the land
and paying the taxes due on the property ever since.16 Thus,
the petitioner firmly insists that the October 28, 2004 order of
Dir. Morales, which was adopted by the DARAB (Region VIII
and Central Offices) and later sustained by the CA, was
erroneous and patently illegal for the reasons outlined
below:ChanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Procedurally, the filing of the respondent's petition for
nullification of coverage (and disqualification of farmer-
beneficiary) with the DARRO was already barred by
prescription as it was filed after the lapse of eleven (11) years
since the registration of CLOA No. 00091138 with the Register
of Deeds. The respondent's petition too, was a prohibited
collateral attack on her title over the subject property.
On substantive issues, the subject portion of land purportedly
sold by the petitioner's father to the respondent is not the
actual lot referred to in the petitioner's CLOA. CLOA No.
00091138 issued to the petitioner covered Lot No. 3592, and
not Lot No. 3595 as claimed by the respondent.
Also, Dir. Morales exceeded his authority when he ruled that
the respondent had validly acquired ownership over the
subject portion of Lot No. 3595 from the petitioner's parents,
as the authority to rule on the issue of the lot's ownership
rests with the courts of law.
Lastly, even assuming that the alleged sale between the
respondent and the petitioner's father had actually transpired,
the sale of the subject portion of Lot No. 3595 to the
respondent was a prohibited act under Section 73(e)17 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 665718 and, thus, cannot serve as the
basis for the petitioner's disqualification as farmer-beneficiary
and for the cancellation of CLOA No. 00091138 and OCT No.
OC-3324 issued to the petitioner.
The petitioner further contends that even the filing of the
respondent's petition for cancellation of the CLOA with the
DARAB was also time-barred and that said petition, likewise,
constituted a prohibited collateral attack to her certificate of
title.
In a resolution19 dated November 14, 2011, this Court
required the respondent to file his comment.
In his comment,20 the respondent counter-argues that the
present petition for review on certiorarisuffers a procedural
infirmity that warrants its outright dismissal. He claims that
the petitioner failed to furnish him copies of the annexes
mentioned in his petition, particularly pertaining to copies of
the October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales, and the decisions
of PARAD Navarra and the DARAB Central Office.21 He posits
that the October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales is a legal and
binding order, which had already become final and executory
and thus could no longer be reviewed.
The petitioner, in his reply22 to the respondent's comment,
denies that the respondent was not furnished copies of the
annexes of her petition. She alleges that, in any case, the
annexes to the present petition were the same attachments
to her petition for review with the C A, of which the
respondent was previously furnished copies.
OUR RULING
We find MERIT in the petition.
While a Rule 45 petition must generally be confined to
questions of law, we shall resolve the present petition, which
substantially raises questions of fact as we find glaring
procedural and substantive errorscommitted and overlooked
by the DARAB and the CA in this case. Thus, we find it
imperative to review the facts of the case and the
proceedings before the DARAB, including those before the
DARRO.
We recall that the respondent's petition before the DARRO
was denominated as a "petition for nullification of coverage
(from the CARP) and disqualification as farmer-beneficiary" of
the petitioner and her sister Salome over Lot No. 3595, csd.
726-D, and included, in the respondent's prayer for reliefs,
the cancellation of CLOA No. 00091138 for being null and
void.23cralawrednad
In his October 28, 2004 order, Dir. Morales granted the
respondent's petition and declared CLOA No. 00091138 null
and void because:cralawlawlibrary
"From the foregoing, petitioners (referring to the respondent
and his wife), acquired ownership over the 3,655.50 sq.m.
portion of lot 3595 from Sps. Celedonio and Floriana Cafias,
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale. Field verification
revealed that since February 6, 1993, petitioners took
possession of such contested portion, introduced some
permanent improvements thereon, and personally cultivated
the same up to the present. This fact substantially support
petitioners claim that the identification of Flor Cafias Manuel
and Salome Dellera Cafias, as farmer beneficiaries of the
aforesaid portion was erroneous, since they were not the
actual cultivator (sic) of the same. Neither were said FB's be
considered as rightful claimants and owners of said portion,
because the same was sold to the herein petitioners by their
deceased parents, xxx"24
But, instead of ordering the cancellation of CLOA No.
00091138, Dir. Morales ordered the respondent to
coordinate with the DARPO-Leyte Legal Division for the
filing of the "proper petition" for cancellation with the
Adjudication Board.
On January 24, 2005, almost three (3) months after Dir.
Morales's order was issued, the respondent filed a petition to
cancel CLOA No. 00091138 with the DARAB Region VIII. The
petition was referred to and decided upon by PARAD Wilfredo
M. Navarra.
In the proceedings before the PARAD, the petitioner filed
objections to the cancellation of her CLOA, and raised issues
such as the denial of her right to due process, the illegality of
the sale between her father and the respondent, among
others. However, the petitioner's objections were not
addressed because, according to PARAD Navarra, "these are
questions related to the administrative implementation of
agrarian laws which are beyond the DARAB's
jurisdiction."25cralawredcralawrednad
Thus, following the orders of Dir. Morales, PARAD
Navarra cancelled CLOA No. 00091138 and OCT No.
3324. The petitioner appealed to the DARAB Central Office,
which sustained the PARAD's order of cancellation.
Under Section 5026 of R.A. No. 6657 and Section 1727 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229,28 the DAR is vested with
primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate,
to determine and adjudicate all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform.29 Section 2,30 Rule I
of DAR Administrative Order 03 series of 200331 defines, by
enumeration, the nature of Agrarian Law Implementation
(ALI) cases over which the Regional Director exercises
primary jurisdiction,32 and includes cases arising from or
involving the classification and identification of landholdings
for CARP coverage (including protests or oppositions thereto
and petitions for lifting such coverage), and the classification,
identification, inclusion, exclusion, qualification, or
disqualification of potential/actual farmer-beneficiaries.
Without ruling on the merits of the PARAD's decision at this
point, the PARAD already erred in taking cognizance of and
ruling on the respondent's petition for cancellation of CLOA
when, in his opinion, the case before him was an agrarian law
implementation case that rightfully falls under the DAR's
jurisdiction. What PARAD Navarra should have done was to
refer back the case to the DARRO in accordance with Section
6, Rule I of DAR Administrative Order 03 series of
2003,33 which provides:cralawlawlibrary
Section 6. Referral of cases. When a party erroneously
files a case under Section 2 hereof before the DARAB,
the receiving official shall refer the case to the proper
DAR office for appropriate action within five (5) working
days after determination that said case is within the
jurisdiction of the Secretary. Likewise, when a party
erroneously files a case under Section 3 hereof before any
office other than the DARAB or its adjudicators, the receiving
official shall, within five (5) working days, refer the case to
the DARAB or its adjudicators, (Emphasis supplied)
The next question for resolution is whether the PARAD
correctly considered the respondent's case as an agrarian law
implementation case cognizable by the DAR.
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such
tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of
transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers,
tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator
and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and
lessee, (Emphasis supplied)
We have ruled that, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a
case, there must be an agrarian dispute or tenancy
relationship existing between the parties.36cralawrednad
In these lights, we find that the decisions of PARAD
Navarra in DARAB Case No. R-0800-0042-05 and the
DARAB in DARAB Case No. 14579 were rendered without
authority and jurisdiction, hence, null and void.
Lastly, on the procedural issue raised by the respondent in his
comment, we resolve it unfavorably to the respondent by
reason of his failure to prove his allegation that he received
an incomplete copy of the petitioner's petition. The
respondent cannot also argue that he was denied due process
considering that the Annexes allegedly missing from his copy
of the present petition for review on certiorari, i.e., copies of
the October 28, 2004 order of Dir. Morales, and the decisions
of PARAD Navarra and the DARAB Central Office, are readily
available and known to him, as he was the petitioner on the
cases in said annexes.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the present
petition and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the February 18,
2011 Decision and August 31, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Cebu City, in CA-G.R. SP No. 03230.
Accordingly, we NULLIFY the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator's February 16, 2006 decision in DARAB Case No.
R-0800-0042-05 and the DARAB's May 29, 2007 decision in
DARAB Case No. 14579 for want of jurisdiction. The petition
for cancellation of CLOA No. 00091138 filed by the
respondent is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the
filing of a similar petition with the proper forum. Costs against
the respondent Andres D. Egano.
SO ORDERED.chanrobles virtuallawlibrary

Under Section 134 of the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the

Rules applicable to the petition for cancellation of CLOA filed
by the respondent, the DARAB and its Adjudicators have
jurisdiction over cases involving the correction, partition,
cancellation, secondary and subsequent issuances of
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and
Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the
Land Registration Authority.

While it appears that the CLOA subject of this case has been
registered with the Register of Deeds on June 30, 1993,35 the
respondent's petition for cancellation of the petitioner's CLOA
does not fall within the DARAB's jurisdiction due to the
absence of an agrarian dispute or tenancy relationship
between the respondent and the petitioner. Here, both parties
claim to be the owners and actual tillers of the subject lot.

An agrarian dispute is defined under Section 3(d) of R.A. No.

6657 as:cralawlawlibrary
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to
tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture,
including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,