2014

Proceedings
EIGHTEENTH
INTERNATIONAL
FLIGHT
INSPECTION
SYMPOSIUM
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, USA
JUNE 16 - 20
 Contents

Session 1 Flight Inspection of VOR

Measurement Effects on VORs 9960 Hz Modulation Depth & Roughness Assessment ..................... 7
Matthew Bruce, AeroPearl Pty., & Maik Ritter, Aerodata
Evolution of Terrestrial Navigation Aids as Consequence of PBN Implementation ............................ 19
Gerhard Berz, Eurocontrol & Valeriu Vitan, Eurocontrol
Recent Issues in Performance Prediction and Flight Inspection Measurements .................................. 29
Dr. Gerhard Greving, NAVCOM Consult, & L. Nelson Spohnheimer, Spohnheimer Consulting

Session 2 Flight Inspection of RFI and Related Concepts

Investigation of VHF Omni-Range (VOR) Signal Interference ............................................................ 41
Todd Bigham, FAA
Aeronautical Interferences Detection, the Spanish Case ........................................................................ 49
David Garca, Aena Internacional, Carlos Gimenez, Aena Internacional, Eduard Marin, Aena Internacional,
& Sajeel Ahmed, Aena Internacional
Advanced Theory and Results of Classical System Simulations and Related Flight Inspection ......... 55
Dr. Gerhard Greving, NAVCOM Consult, Wolf-Dieter Biermann, NAVCOM Consult, & Rolf Mundt,
NAVCOM Consult

Session 3 Flight Inspection of ILS

ILS Simulation for Flight Inspection ........................................................................................................ 67
Bertrand Spitz, ENAC University
An Emitting Reference Antenna Concept for Aircraft Antenna Calibration ....................................... 77
Bjorn Neubauer, Braunschweig University, Dr. Robert Geise, Braunschweig University, Georg Zimmer,
Braunschweig University, & Prof. Dr. Achim Enders, Braunschweig University
New ILS Localizer Ultra-Wide Antenna System Reduces Traffic Restrictions ................................... 83
Alf Bakken, Indra Navia, & Herv Demule, Skyguide
The Algorithm to Accurately Obtain the Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) Elevation in
Flight Inspection ......................................................................................................................................... 97
Ge Mao, CAAC & Xiaoqiang Li, Beijing Sky Aviation Co.
Strategies for Accurate Field Strength Measurement ........................................................................... 105
Andrew Graham, NAV CANADA

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 Session 4 Flight Validation and Related Concepts
Verification of Final Approach Segment Data Prior to SBAS Flight Inspection ................................ 113
Richard Montgomery, FAA
Utilization of ARINC 424 Database in Performing Flight Inspection ................................................. 127
Alex Kwartiroff, NXT, & Pat Allocca, NXT
Flight Inspection of Helicopter Procedures in a Challenging Topographic Environment ................. 137
Markus Schwendener, FCS, Dr. Maurizio Scaramuzza, Skyguide, & Heinz Leibundgut, Swiss Air-Rescue

Session 5 Flight Validation of ADS-B and Datalink

ADS-B A New Mission for Flight Inspection.......................................................................................... 147
Thorsten Heinke, Aerodata
What We Have Learned About ADS-B and How Do We Stay Under the RADAR ........................... 153
Mark Perraut, FAA
Experiences with Inspection of FANS-1/A Data Link ........................................................................... 169
Tom Pinnell, NSM

Session 6 ICAO (IFPP Summary) and Enhanced Vision

State Responsibility for Instrument Flight Procedures: ICAO IFPPs Challenges ............................ 177
Dr. Yoshinobu Nakanishi, ICAO
Enhancement of Flight Inspection System Using Visual Information ................................................. 183
Xiaofeng Shi, Beihang University, & Xiaoqiang Li, Beijing Sky Aviation Co.

Session 7 Flight Validation of SBAS & GBAS

SBAS and its Roles in Flight Inspection ................................................................................................. 191
Frank Musmann, Aerodata
A Flight Inspection Perspective on Satellite Based Augmentation System Performance
Monitoring ................................................................................................................................................ 201
Carl Rieger, FAA
DME and GNSS L5/E5 Compatibility Prediction and Measured Data ............................................... 213
Valeriu Vitan, Eurocontrol & Gerhard Berz, Eurocontrol
GBAS Calibration .................................................................................................................................... 225
Rolf Seide, Aerodata
Experiences and Analysis with Flight Inspection of GBAS ................................................................. 231
Sigurd A. Bjelkary, NSM, & Erling Gronbeck NSM

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 Session 8 SBAS RFI and Related Concepts
Mitigation of an RF interference on GNSS signal observed during Flight Inspection ....................... 241
Vincent Rocchia, DSNA/DTI
GNSS RFI Detection in Switzerland Based on Helicopter Recording Random Flights ..................... 249
Dr. Maurizio Scaramuzza, Skyguide, Heinz Wipf, Skyguide, Dr. Marc Troller, Skyguide, Heinz
Leibundgut, Swiss Air-Rescue, Ren Wittwer, Armasuisse, & Lt. Col. Sergio Rmi, Swiss Air Force

Session 9 Safety Concepts

Common Standards in Flight Inspection Operations The Way Ahead to Improve Safety? ........... 257
Thomas Wede, TransPolar GmbH
Study on Crew Resource Management in Flight Inspection of Localizer ........................................... 265
Song Xitong, CAAC
Efficient and Traceable Configuration Management The Flight Inspection Service Providers
Perspective ................................................................................................................................................ 271
Matthew Bruce, AeroPearl Pty. & Christopher Dean, AeroPearl Pty.
Proactive Flight Safety through FOQA & ASAP .................................................................................. 279
Greg Marino, FAA

Session 10 Training and Certification Issues

Training of DSNA/DTI Flight Inspectors ............................................................................................... 287
Philippe Caisso, DSNA/DTI
Developing an Effective Training System for IFP Flight and Ground Validation of High-
Performance PBN ..................................................................................................................................... 295
Kazui Wakemi, JCAB & Yoshitaka Uno, JCAB
Integrated CRM/TRM Concepts Applied to FIV Flights and Ground Activities............................... 305
Fabrizio Maracich, ENAV, & Nicoletta Lombardo, ENAV

Session 11 Flight Inspection Standards

Recommended Qualification Requirements for Flight Inspection Service Providers ........................ 313
Herve Renouf, DSNA/DTI & Peter Thirkettle, NATS
Comparison of International Flight Inspection Standards and Procedures ....................................... 323
Larry Brady, Airfield Technology

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 Further Publications
A Practical Guide to Datum Transformations ....................................................................................... 331
Gary Flynn, FAA & Dr. Cheng Zhong, FAA
An Automatic Workflow for RNAV Procedures Flight Validation ..................................................... 341
Cpt. Fabrizio Marachich, ENAV, Fabio Pozzi, IDS, Marcello Davide Mannino, IDS, Sigurd Bjelkaroy,
NSM
Investigating Multipath Propagation for Navigation Systems in a Miniaturized Airport Environment
ILS and Extension to VOR ................................................................................................................... 355
Dr. Robert Geise, Braunschweig University, Georg Zimmer, Braunschweig University, Bjorn Neubauer,
Braunschweig University, & Prof. Dr. Achim Enders, Braunschweig University
On Great Circle and Great Ellipse Navigation ...................................................................................... 365
Dr. Cheng Zhong, FAA & Gary Flynn, FAA
Operational Approval for New and Modified Flight Inspection Systems ........................................... 375
Brad Snelling, FAA

Notes:
Note Pages ................................................................................................................................................. 385

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 Session 1
Flight Inspection of VOR
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Measurement Effects on VORs 9960 Hz
Modulation Depth & Roughness Assessment Matthew Bruce, AeroPearl Pty., & Maik Ritter, Aerodata

Matthew Bruce BEng (Avionics)

Chief Technical Services Engineer
AeroPearl Pty Ltd
GPO Box 884
Hamilton Central
Brisbane, QLD 4007
Australia
Phone: +61 7 3860 0608
Fax: +61 7 3216 3164
E-mail: mbruce@aeropearl.com.au
http://www.aeropearl.com.au

Dipl.-Ing. (FH) Maik Ritter

System Engineer
Aerodata AG
Hermann-Blenk-Strae 34-36
D-38108 Braunschweig
Germany
Phone: +49 (0)531-2359-246
Fax: +49 (0)531-2359-222
E-mail: ritter@aerodata.de
http://www.aerodata.de

ABSTRACT considered and presented at previous IFIS, the influence

of the receiver characteristics on the system level
Compared to conventional VORs, Doppler VORs frequency response is analyzed here.
(DVOR) provide a much more stable bearing signal in
multipath environments. However, the technical operation A technical solution to align the results with the concept
principle introduces a flight inspection specific problem: of a typical VOR installation through characterizing the
While measuring the DVOR 9960 Hz amplitude frequency response of a receiver and using post-
modulation depth in flight, it often occurs that the result is processing to consider different filters is presented from a
out of tolerance while the bearing indications are perfect. system level perspective.
The FAA and ICAO have widened the VOR tolerances in
the past caused by this circumstance. MEASUREMENT OF 9960 Hz MODULATION
DEPTH
The paper discusses the physical and electrical
background. It provides examples of real DVOR Introduction
measurements including in-depth signal analysis,
comparison to ideal VOR signals and analyses the effects The DVOR has the advantage that it brings more accurate
on the flight inspection measurement. A technical solution bearing readings to the pilots of commercial and private
for a VOR receiver with improved modulation airplanes in multipath prone areas such as mountains or
measurement uncertainty and reproducibility under cities with man-made reflecting structures.
multipath conditions is presented.
This improved bearing behavior of the DVOR is based on
Additionally, the aspect of receiver internal signal the fact that the free space modulated signal carrying
filtering on the assessment of roughness is considered. bearing information is not the amplitude-modulated 30 Hz
While filter characteristics for bends/roughness have been AM of the signal (like the CVOR operates) but the 30 Hz

7
derived by the frequency modulation on the 9960 Hz
center frequency of the VOR baseband signal.
In simple terms a free space frequency modulation is
attained by a circular antenna array with a number of
single antennas that are electrically switched in a manner
so that the rotation of the antenna switching implements
the frequency modulation for a distant receiver by using
the Doppler shift effect. The source of the signal is
observed by the receiver to be moving away when the
antenna switching occurs on one side of the transmitting
circular antenna array, and approaching when the
switching occurs on the other side of the array causing an
apparent shift in frequency through the Doppler shift.
signal processing. The Honeywell RNZ850 based AD-
RNZ850 is routinely updated with the latest findings
including those presented in this paper.
Receiver Internals
The most important receiver circuit affecting 9960 Hz
modulation depth measurement is the 9960 Hz band-pass
filter. It is used for rejecting signal components such as
ident, audio and 30 Hz AM. An example of such a band-
pass filter is shown in Figure 1.

The mechanical dimensions, switching times and

baseband signals are such that the VOR specifications for
the 9960 Hz FM with a frequency modulation deviation
ratio of 16 (480 Hz frequency deviation / 30 Hz baseband
signal) and a modulation depth of 30% are met.

However, in flight inspection not only the bearing is

interesting but additional parameters such as modulation
depths. In basic terms the modulation depth is determined
by measuring the amplitude of a signal and as experience
shows, the amplitude of a free space modulated signal is
sensitive to multipath effects.
The DVOR introduced some problems for the modulation
depth measurement to the flight inspection community.
These problems were deeply discussed by members of the
International Committee for Airspace Standards and
Calibration (ICASC) [1]. It also lead to new tolerances
for the VOR modulation depth in [2].
This paper approaches the problem by looking at the
flight inspection receivers behavior while measuring the
DVOR and how its internal filters handle the disturbed
amplitude modulated signals. Since the receiver is the
primary measurement device for the flight inspection, it is
important that receivers give consistent results on all
parameters, including the modulation depths, in particular
when two or more receivers are used in the AFIS.
It will show the weak spots in the signal processing
chain that influence the results of the measurements and
that contribute to the ongoing discussion around the
measurement of modulation depth signals.
The receivers discussed in this paper are the Bendix/King
RNA34AF (hereafter referred to as RNA34AF) and the
Aerodata AD-RNZ850-0100 (hereafter referred to as AD-
RNZ850).
While the RNA34AF is superseded by the RNA34BF it is
not thought to be the subject of active development, and
therefore will most likely not see any improvements in its
Figure 1: Analog band-pass filter circuit
This kind of band-pass filter is used both in the
RNA34AF and the AD-RNZ850 flight inspection
receiver. It is of the type 2nd order Multiple Feedback
which is a standard analog bandpass filter circuit.
However, it has two properties that are considered weak
spots for use in a flight inspection receiver:
The first is that it is comprised of analogue components
such as resistors, capacitors and an operational amplifier.
These analogue devices are subject to small but noticeable
deviations from their nominal values which shift the exact
pass through frequency of the filter. These deviations are
based on production limitations, temperature changes
during operation and aging over the life of the receiver.
The second adverse property of this multiple feedback
band pass filter is the filter pass band. Being a 2nd order
filter means that the filter has a narrow, single frequency
pass band and all other frequencies are attenuated. This is
not desirable if one tries to filter a frequency modulated
signal that has a nominal frequency deviation of 480 Hz.
It means that in the best possible scenario only the
9960 Hz center frequency of the frequency modulated
signal is passed through without attenuation while all
other frequencies are attenuated, even the ones that
belong to the signal of interest.
Figure 2 shows the effect of these characteristics on the
possible filter responses of the analog band-pass filters.

8

Figure 2: Analog Filters
An important finding is that in the area around 9960 Hz
where the signal of interest is located, the Low BPF
filter response (based on analogue components at the
lower end of their production/performance tolerance) and
High BPF filter response (based on analogue
components at the high end of their
production/performance tolerance) are not centered on the
nominal frequency, rather on the lower/upper limits of the
FM signal.
As we intend to measure the energy in the filtered signal
and to derive the modulation depth from it, this is not
initially thought of as being critical. After receiver
calibration using a signal generator, producing a signal
similar to that from a CVOR, a look up table (LUT) is
determined that correlates modulation depth values to
energy measurements of the filtered signal.
Figure 3 shows the examination results of the analog
band-pass filters of two flight inspection receivers after
this calibration. The center frequency of the 9960 Hz FM
signal was varied in order to determine the filter
characteristics. One can see that these receivers will show
an accurate modulation depth of an ideal signal.
Analog BPF behavior after Calibration
Modulation Depth
(%)
Centerfrequency Offset (Hz)
Figure 3: Analog band-pass filters of two VOR
receivers after calibration
9
However, these receivers have problems measuring
modulation depth from a DVORs signal, especially under
multipath conditions. In this case both receivers will
show different modulation depths, dependent on their
varying filter characteristics.
Development of a DVOR/Receiver Model
The tools Matlab and Simulink are well known and ideal
for the modeling and simulation of the DVOR, multipath
and the receiver. Hence, they were used to simulate
different effects in both the DVOR signal and the receiver
and to see how these influence the measurement of
modulation depth.
Since the whole system of a DVOR transmitter, the free
space FM modulation, multipath conditions and receiver
characteristics are complex, many simplifications and
assumptions have been used for the simulation in this
case. One important assumption for the simulation is that
the free space FM modulation of the DVOR is sensitive to
multipath - superposition of its own, delayed signal.
Multipath is simulated in the model by simply adding an
attenuated/delayed version of the original signal to itself.
Additionally, only the baseband signal of the VOR is
simulated, as the cause for the 9960 Hz modulation depth
measurement problems were expected to be in the
baseband signal processing of the flight inspection
receivers and not in the RF path.
The Simulink model used for the simulation of the
multipath distortion and the receiver internal baseband
processing is shown in Figure 4.
 Figure 4: Simulink Model of Multipath Transmission Line and Receiver Filters

The multipath distortion can be switched on/off as

required. It is switched off in order to calibrate this
simulation system with a clean VOR baseband signal just
like a real receiver would be calibrated.

The filters themselves are modeled as transfer functions in

the s-domain defined by the resistor and capacitor values
that are within the tolerances of the specified parts is the
flight inspection receivers schematic and parts list. Figure 5: Figure 6:
Nominal VOR Signal Signal after nominal BPF
The FM test signal is generated in a Matlab script based
on the FM formula: The signal after the nominal filter is shown in Figure 6,
the modulation depth of all filters after this test is
processed to:

Where: Low Filter Mod Depth (%) 29.99 %

Nominal Filter Mod Depth (%) 30.00 %
Ac Carrier Amplitude (0.3 for 30% Mod Depth) High Filter Mod Depth (%) 30.00 %
Fc Carrier Frequency (9960 Hz)
beta Modulation Index (FMDR, 16) This result is as expected given an ideal signal without
Fsig Signal Frequency (30 Hz) distortion.

Examination of the Analog Band-Pass Filter
Performance Under Multipath Conditions
To verify the look up table after calibration, an
undistorted nominal FM signal is used. The signal
presented to the filter transfer function is shown as
Figure 5.
However, this test already reveals one of the drawbacks of
the analog filter circuitry - the envelope of the filtered
signal has varying amplitude, which is to be expected
from a filtered FM signal, but which will vary amongst
the different filters that are possible due to the analog
design.

10
Figure 7 shows the envelope of the signal after the high
BPF. The effect is much stronger because the input signal
is on the edge of the filter response where each increment
of frequency change has a much greater effect than it
would in the center of the nominal filter response.
Figure 7: Signal after high BPF
By switching the multipath generator on, the signal is
distorted by its own delayed and attenuated copies and
we can investigate the effect on modulation depth
measurement with a disturbed input signal. Figure 8
shows the signal presented to the filter, where Figure 9
shows the signal after the nominal BPF. The effect of the
filter on the disturbed signal is easily seen in comparison
to the signal shown in Figure 6.
Figure 8: Figure 9:
Multipath Distortion on Baseband Signal after
Baseband Signal nominal Filter
The modulation depths determined by the filters are now:
Low Filter Mod Depth (%) 31.19 %
Nominal Filter Mod Depth (%) 30.77 %
High Filter Mod Depth (%) 30.31 %
These values now vary by 0.9% between the min and max
value. It shows that multipath can change modulation
depth readings if the BPFs of flight inspection receivers
are as presented here. This makes it hard for a flight
inspector to determine which receiver is giving the
correct modulation depth result.
Another aspect of signal distortion is caused by the
multipath effect: The absolute value of the modulation
depth increased because the superposition of the original
signal with its delayed signals is an addition in free space.
Depending on the phase shift and strength of the reflected
signal the value can vary significantly.
11
Experiments with this Simulink model show that there are
many different modulation depth measurements possible
by changing only the parameters of the multipath
generator.
Additionally, it is possible to approximate real world
signals using this model, refer to Figure 10 and Figure 11,
comparing the simulated signal with the oscilloscope
trace of a real DVOR. If modulation depths are
calculated from this signal, then it can be seen that the
simulated variation in modulation depth measurement is
consistent with the observed variation between two
receivers measuring the real signal.
Figure 10: Modeling approach of a Real World Signal
Figure 11: Oscilloscope Trace of a Real World Signal
Low Filter Mod Depth (%) 30.11 %
Nominal Filter Mod Depth (%) 29.98 %
High Filter Mod Depth (%) 29.85 %
The modulation depth difference is not very big, but is
measurable and represents the real world behavior well.
This further confirms in an empirical way - that the
simplified model works well for this analysis. It also
shows that it is not suitable for flight inspection receivers
to use analog band-pass filtering on the 9960 Hz FM base
band signal if consistent results between receivers are
desired.
Implementation of a Digital Band-Pass Filter
The flight inspection VOR receiver is a measurement
device where one can expect consistent readings between
devices. To achieve this it is desirable to change the BPF
behavior such that external influences such as multipath
have the same effect across individual receivers so that all
receivers give similar, if not the same, results.
In order to align the signal processing of the VOR
9960 Hz FM baseband signal one has to change the
following aspects of the filter performance:
1. Remove effects of analogue component tolerances on
the filter response
2. Increase the filter order so that all of the energy
within the signal to be measured is within the filter
response
3. Additionally improve the filter roll-off in order to
ensure that the measurement covers only the defined
range of interest.
With a digital BPF all aspects listed above can be
achieved. Certain prerequisites such as the presence of a
digital signal processor and hardware that performs the
analog to digital conversion of the VOR baseband signal
without affecting the correct behavior of the original
receiver circuitry must be fulfilled.
Both prerequisites are implemented in the AD-RNZ850
flight inspection receiver.
The magnitude response of a digital BPF, like that
implemented in the latest generation AD-RNZ850, is
depicted in Figure 12. It is an 8th order elliptic filter with
the pass-band designed such that all 9960 Hz FM signals
that are valid with respect to the ground station tolerances
in Annex 10 [2] pass through it without attenuation.
Figure 12: Addition of the digital
BPF Magnitude response
The elliptic filter has ripple on both the pass-band and the
stop-band, however it was determined that the minimal
pass-band ripple is acceptable for two reasons:
1. The signal will be calibrated by using the previously
described LUT and as long as the filter parameters do
not differ from device to device they should present
the same behavior under the same conditions.
12
2. The ripple on the pass band is a trade-off for a faster
stop-band attenuation which was one of the desired
improvements over the analog filters.
It is apparent that the improvements with the digital BPF
are significant; the filter response is now designed to pass
the whole FM signal without attenuation and all receivers
can be made to have comparable filter curves as
implementation is independent of the analogue
components in the receivers 9960 Hz band-pass filter.
Figure 13 shows the digital BPF implemented in the same
two VOR receivers that were shown in Figure 3.
Digital BPF behaviour after calibration
Modulation depth (%)
Centerfrequency Offset (Hz)
Figure 13: Digital BPF Behavior of Two
VOR Receivers After Calibration.
There are small differences, traceable to the fact that not
all analogue components in the receiver have been
bypassed with digital means, only the base band
processing, however test flights have shown that these
difference are negligible under real-world conditions.
ASSESSMENT OF ROUGHNESS
Introduction
In a Flight Inspection application it is common and
desirable to use standard/certified receivers as part of the
measurement system. ICAO DOC 8071 makes reference
to a typical VOR receiver and antenna system (3.3.41
of [2]) to be used for VOR assessment. While this is
commonly interpreted to be a TSO approved receiver and
antenna system, the definition should be considered in a
broader sense to ensure that the characteristics of the
typical VOR receiver and antenna system are reflected
in the AFIS performance and measurement results.
Previously in use at AeroPearl was an AFIS equipped
with the RNA34AF navigation receiver for VOR
measurements. In late 2008, the AD-RNZ850 was
introduced for some tasks, later used for all tasks from
late 2012. With the introduction of the new
system/receiver combination it was seen that some VOR
sites previously considered to be radiating within
tolerance were now failing due to out of tolerance
roughness results.
Research and investigation focused on the differences in
receiver performance and differences in software
algorithms. The outcome was a greater understanding of
the system level filtering the combination of the
receiver bearing output frequency response and software
algorithms - and the influence on the calculation of bends
and roughness.
Presented here is the methodology used to investigate the
receiver performance and calculate the system level
frequency response for roughness to understand the
results that were being observed in the field. Additionally
an alternative method for assessing roughness is
considered.
Receiver Frequency Response
When the discrepancies were first identified the focus was
initially on the difference in receiver performance. Lab
testing was completed in an attempt to characterize the
frequency response of the bearing output.
By software control of a signal generator it was possible
to create an input signal with oscillating bearing and vary
this oscillation at rates of 0.1 Hz to 5 Hz. The raw
bearing output from the receivers was recorded and
analyzed, using Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) techniques
to approximate the frequency response of the receiver.
Figure 14: AD-RNZ850 (top) & RNA34AF (bottom)
Raw Bearing Output Frequency Response With
Approximate Filter
The frequency response of the AD-RNZ850 shows a
typical low-pass response, but one that is quite linear. It
can be approximated by a 1st order low-pass filter with
corner frequency of 1.6 Hz as shown with the green trace
in the upper section of Figure 14. The frequency response
13
of the RNA34AF shows a stronger low pass filter
characteristic. It can be approximated by a 1st order low
pass filter with corner frequency of 0.35 Hz as shown
with the green trace in the lower section of Figure 14.
The comparison shows that the AD-RNZ850 has a much
wider frequency response and the ability to see
roughness that would not normally be passed through the
receiver in a typical aircraft installation. Whilst this is a
desirable characteristic in a flight inspection receiver for
reasons such as correlation with simulations and the
ability to see degradation in the VOR guidance before
normal aircraft may, it is important that the roughness
algorithms are designed accordingly to meet the intent of
the typical VOR receiver described in DOC 8071 [2].
Roughness Algorithms
In modern AFIS digital signal processing techniques can
be used to determine roughness. Typically a low pass
filter is used for determination of bends and a high-pass
filter is used to determine the components of the signal
which are un-flyable and hence fall into the category of
roughness.
In both the previous and current AFIS used by AeroPearl
the roughness filter is implemented without any roll-off at
higher frequencies. Without an upper limit on the filter
the upper frequency limit of the roughness result is
defined by the receiver rather than the filter algorithm.
In comparison, the roughness filter proposed by NAV
Canada at the 2012 IFIS [4] uses a high-pass filter
cascaded with a low-pass filter to provide an upper
frequency limit to the roughness result.
The system level frequency response for bends/roughness
can be considered to be the frequency response of the
receiver further filtered by (or cascaded with) the
bends/roughness filter.
System Level Frequency Response for Roughness
The calculated system level frequency response for
roughness in the AD-RNZ850 based AFIS and the
RNA34AF based AFIS are shown in Figure 15.
 3. A system that can be made to accurately measures
roughness in the case of a receiver with a wide
frequency response and a roughness algorithm with a
defined upper frequency limit.

With respect to the ICAO Guidance and consideration of

a typical VOR installation it can be seen that outcomes
1 & 2 are unlikely to give the desired performance.

Outcome 3 gives a good balance between the TSO based

hardware available and the software algorithms to be
implemented in the AFIS or in post-processing.

Impact of System Level Frequency Response for

Roughness

Figure 15: System Level Frequency Response
AD-RNZ850 AFIS (top) vs. RNA34AF AFIS (bottom)
With a system level frequency response such as that in the
AD-RNZ850 based AFIS it is likely that the AFIS is
seeing more roughness than would be observed by a
typical aircraft installation.
During the commissioning of a new VOR using the AD-
RNZ850 based AFIS a roughness issue was observed on
the approach. While the VOR was new, the site was not,
and analysis of previous flight inspection data, recorded
with the RNA34AF based AFIS, did not show severe
roughness. Figure 16 compares the two results.

However in the previously used RNA34AF based AFIS

the response is dominated by the receiver characteristic
and not the filter itself. While this is likely to give a
response similar to a typical aircraft installation, it can not
be guaranteed - any filtering that may exist in the aircraft
CDI/EFIS indications is not considered.

If a receiver with a wide frequency response is combined

with a roughness algorithm with an upper limit, the
outcome is more favorable for flight inspection purposes.
The response is easily controllable through the filter
definition.

For example, the AD-RNZ850s wide frequency response

when combined with the Nav Canada defined roughness
filter gives a result similar to the RNA34AF based AFIS
but one that is tuneable through software to give a
typical VOR response.
It can be seen that the combination of the receiver
frequency response and the software algorithms can lead
to three distinct outcomes with respect to the system level
frequency response for roughness:
1. A system that over-measures roughness in the case of
a receiver with a wide frequency response and a
roughness algorithm with no upper frequency limit
Figure 16: Bearing Error as Measured by
AD-RNZ850 AFIS (top) vs. RNZ34AF AFIS (bottom)
After changes in the environment were excluded the
analysis focused on the receiver/AFIS performance.
Investigation of the roughness signal in the frequency
domain, refer Figure 17, showed the expected outcome
that the new AFIS had a wider system level frequency
response for roughness and as such more roughness was
being seen.

2. A system that under-measures roughness in the case

of a receiver with a damped frequency response
and a roughness algorithm with an upper frequency
limit (that causes the already damped output of the
receiver to be further attenuated)

14

Figure 17: FFT of Roughness as measured by
AD-RNZ850 AFIS (top) vs. RNA34AF AFIS (bottom)
Another parameter that was available for analysis was
bearing data from the primary VOR system. The
parameter recorded by the AFIS is the bearing displayed
to the pilot on the EFIS of a Proline 21 (PL21) King Air,
which could be considered as a typical installation.
A VOR bearing error was calculated on the information
provided, while un-calibrated the parameter is useful for
analysis, after being filtered, to provide roughness data.
A simple roughness filter (high-pass, no upper limit) was
used for comparison purposes as it was considered that
the data had already been subjected to some form of low-
pass filtering before presentation to the pilot on the EFIS.
Figure 18: Roughness as Measured by
AD-RNZ850 AFIS (top) vs. PL21 with HPF (bottom)
The data confirmed that the new AFIS was over-
measuring roughness and that it was very likely that the
previous system was under-measuring roughness. A
solution somewhere between the two was required to
15
bring the roughness result more in-line with that seen
from the primary avionics, refer to Figure 18.
Proposed Solution
Using the Nav Canada defined roughness filter as a basis,
the raw data from the AD-RNZ850 based AFIS was
filtered with a so-called CDI Filter. This filter has the
same form as the Nav Canada filter, HPF cascaded with a
LPF, but the LPF has a corner frequency of 0.375 Hz
instead of 0.125 Hz as proposed by Nav Canada.
By using this filter the system level frequency response
for roughness can be made similar to that from the PL21,
as can be seen in Figure 19.
Figure 19: Roughness as Measured by AD-RNZ850
with CDI filter (top) vs. PL21 with HPF (bottom)
Alternative Solution
An alternative solution, and one that is in use in Australia
in the interim, is based on consideration of VOR
roughness as a measure of structure rather than absolute
performance. With this approach a measure such as
percentage time in tolerance is a more suitable measure.
From the ICAO material on LOC/GP structure assessment
(2.13, 2.14 of ATT-C to [2]) the following tolerance and
post analysis framework has been developed in
conjunction with Airservices Australia:
1. Use the existing roughness parameter to assess
against the 3.0 tolerance, if the tolerance is not
exceeded then no further analysis is required.
2. If the tolerance is exceeded use a 40 second sliding
window to assess the time that the signal is in
tolerance and calculate the minimum percentage in
tolerance. If the aid fails to meet a minimum 95%
in-tolerance criteria it will be classified as restricted.
Note that only the preceding 40 seconds of data is taken
into the analysis, not 20 seconds as recommended by
ICAO. This is based on the thinking that a pilot will
judge the quality of the guidance based on current
performance with respect to previous performance. The
pilot cant see the next 20 seconds of data and as such it is
not appropriate to consider it as part of the analysis.
This leads to a more practical assessment of roughness,
where momentary excursions beyond the tolerance can be
assessed to be of no significance as in Figure 20.
Figure 20: Example of Site, 99.5% in Tolerance After
Sliding Window Analysis
However sites with poor performance are restricted
accordingly, as in Figure 21.
Figure 21 Example of Site, 90.75% in Tolerance After
Sliding Window Analysis
With this approach the existing receiver/software
combination remains (receiver with a wide frequency
response and a roughness algorithm with no upper
frequency limit) and the roughness parameter takes the
role of an engineering parameter.
This method has been used successfully on several
occasions and provides a suitable interim method for
VOR roughness assessment until the desired
characteristics of a roughness filter are more thoroughly
understood, defined and implemented in the AFIS. Once
the filter is defined it is expected that roughness
assessments will be made on the CDI filter based
results, but that the un-damped roughness results will
remain accessible for engineering purposes.
16
CONCLUSIONS
Relating to the investigation into VOR 9960 Hz
Modulation Depth Measurements the following
conclusions are made:
a. It has been shown that for solving signal processing
problems it is always best to fully understand the
cause of the problem. The use of a Simulink model
to simulate and understand the issues associated with
measurement of distorted DVOR signals using
receivers with analog filter circuitry was very
beneficial and allowed initial solutions to be
implemented and tested digitally with
hardware/firmware modification.
b. The exchange of analog filter circuitry with a digital
complement has led to better flight inspection results
and as no fundamental modifications were completed
in receiver circuitry itself this intervention has no
effect on other signals like the VOR Bearing. This is
important as changes in these signals, while maybe
leading to better results, would also remove the
ability to correlate flight inspection results with the
performance observed by aircraft using standard TSO
approved receivers.
Relating to the investigation into VOR Roughness
assessment, the following conclusions are made:
a. Software algorithms used to filter VOR Error to
produce a result for Roughness must consider the
frequency response of the receiver and be adapted to
give the desired typical VOR receiver system level
response for application of the roughness tolerances.
b. A VOR receiver with an un-damped frequency
response is useful for seeing a more complete picture
of the VOR performance for engineering purposes.
c. Further development of a CDI filter is required
such that the system level frequency response for
roughness represents that of a typical VOR receiver
allowing straightforward application of the DOC
8071 roughness tolerances.
FUTURE WORK
Relating to the investigation into VOR Modulation Depth
measurement performance there are some aspects that
warrant further investigation and work:
a. The performance of the 30 Hz AM filter should be
investigated to determine if it also has a response that
is adverse to its use in flight inspection measurements
in a multipath environment and if a digital filter may
 be applied to resolve any identified performance
issues.
b. The in-field performance of the latest generation
AD-RNZ850 with the digital BPF implemented will
be monitored at sites with known multipath issues
and where measurements using previous generations
of the AD-RNZ850 suggested poor VOR
performance.
[3] ICAO, 2000, Manual on Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids, Volume 1, Testing of Ground-Based
Radio Navigation Systems, Doc 8071, 4th Edition
[4] Nav Canada, June 2012, Use of Digital Filtering
Techniques to Assess VOR Accuracy, Proceedings of the
17th International Flight Inspection Symposium

c. The complexity of the DVOR/Receiver Simulink

model should be expanded and simplifications and
assumptions removed to provide a more advanced
theoretical simulation for future analysis. This
should include a more complex model for multipath,
that allows for phase shift in the reflected signal and
more VOR signal components like 30 Hz AM,
Identification and Audio to be added to the test signal
in order to simulate a more complete VOR.

Relating to the investigation into VOR Roughness there

are some aspects that warrant further investigation and
work:

a. Deeper investigation of the RTCA/DO standards on

VOR receiver performance with respect to filtering of
the bearing output and similarly standards on
CDI/EFIS filtering of bearing/deviation indications
towards development of a CDI Filter to better
represent a typical VOR installation when filtering
the bearing error to assess roughness.

b. The system level frequency response of the PL21

VOR/EFIS system should be measured/analyzed for
completeness and for reference in any future
investigations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank Airservices Australia who

provided access to flight inspection data to assist with the
investigation and development of this paper. Additional
acknowledgements are made to Carsten Dietrich
(contractor to AeroPearl) for verifying the real-world
performance of the digital BPF implemented in the
AD-RNZ850.

REFERENCES

[1] ICASC, February 2010, ICASC Commentary on

ICAO VOR Modulation Tolerances.
[2] ICAO, July 2006, Annex 10 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Volume 1, Radio Navigation
Aids, 6th Edition, including amendment 85 (2010).

17
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18
 Evolution of Terrestrial Navigation Aids as
Consequence of PBN Implementation Gerhard Berz, Eurocontrol & Valeriu Vitan, Eurocontrol

Gerhard E. Berz
Focal Point Navigation Infrastructure
EUROCONTROL
Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 729 3734
E-mail: gerhard.berz@eurocontrol.int

Valeriu G. Vitan
Senior Navigation Expert
EUROCONTROL
Brussels, Belgium
Tel: +32 2 729 4758
E-mail: valeriu.vitan@eurocontrol.int

ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION

With the broad implementation of Performance Based When speaking of network management in Air Traffic
Navigation (PBN), GNSS (satellite navigation, e.g., Management circles, the immediate association is with
Global Navigation Satellite System) is becoming an route networks, sector loads and demand / capacity
essential infrastructure. Consequently, the role of balancing. Even if in many parts of Europe and other
terrestrial aids is evolving from supporting conventional places today, the route structure is still supported by VOR
procedures on a primary and exclusive basis to one that stations at most nodes (with station coverage extending to
has a complementary function in the context of PBN. half the length of the supported route plus some buffer),
Current work in various SESAR (Single European Sky the underlying infrastructure has often disappeared from
ATM Research) projects revolves around the use of the general operational conscience. Conversely, in the
DME/DME (Distance Measuring Equipment) as a navigation service provision world, terrestrial facilities
redundant reversionary capability to maintain continuity are normally seen in a very modular fashion, supporting a
of operation and the use of a VOR/DME back-up network particular procedure for a particular airport.
to maintain safety for all airspace users during a GNSS Understandably, current flight inspection is set up to
outage. The paper will present the current thinking on the verify signal in space performance one facility at a time.
future operational roles of terrestrial NAVAIDS and the There is, however, a notion of network that is now
associated expected evolution in Europe. Extensive emerging due to the introduction of PBN, e.g., the notion
simulations have been conducted in order to identify the of a network of terrestrial navigation facilities to support
rationalization potential for conventional NAVAIDS PBN. While this brings potential improvements in the
(especially VOR, VHF Omnidirectional Range) and the efficiency of navigation service provision, it also
expected evolution of the DME/DME network, and how introduces a number of complexities, such as cross-border
these different aspects interact, in particular the mix of aspects, considerations of avionics constraints, and more.
airport / terminal area use and en-route use of facilities. These complexities may thus endanger the required
The paper will discuss open issues and implementation transition of conventional navigation aids to a terrestrial,
challenges that may be useful for flight inspection complementary PBN support network, because business
organizations to understand. A brief overview will also be as usual (meaning a one by one replacement of aging
given on how current NAVAIDS can support some facilities) is typically easier than having to embark on a
aspects of Alternate Positioning, Navigation and Timing coordinated project efforts that pulls together not only
(A-PNT). neighboring states but also the Air Navigation Service

19
Provider (ANSP)-internal disciplines of airspace
planning, procedure design, navigation engineering,
Aeronautical Information Management (AIM) and State-
internal actors such as the Civil Aviation Authority
(CAA) / National Safety Agency (NSA) and airspace
users of all different flavors. This paper explains the
target facility network envisioned to support the future
PBN environment in Europe.
ROLE OF GNSS: FROM SUPPLEMENTAL TO
PRIMARY SERVICE INFRASTRUCTURE
PBN is comprised of several Navigation Specifications.
There are two main groups of these specifications, Area
Navigation (RNAV) and Required Navigation
Performance (RNP). RNP specifications are also based on
the RNAV principles of coordinate-referenced navigation,
except that avionics meeting RNP specifications must
provide On-board Performance Monitoring and Alerting
(OPMA). It is essential to understand that the numbers
that typically identify a particular navigation specification
do not only link to a navigation accuracy performance
requirement, but also to a set of navigation functionalities.
For example, the new Advanced RNP specification
requires not only a 1NM (95%) accuracy performance
for terminal area operations and an OPMA integrity
function, but also the ability for the avionics to execute
Radius-to-Fix (RF) turns. Such specific functionalities
play just as essential of a role in PBN airspace
improvements as do improvements in path keeping
performance.
Amongst the current set of published navigation
specifications in the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) PBN Manual [1], the only
infrastructure that supports all of them is GNSS. With the
inclusion of RNP approaches into the PBN concept, the
type of GNSS sensor can now also have an impact.
Whereas a first generation Technical Standard Order
TSO-C129 [2] avionics receiver met all navigation
specifications, this is no longer the case when wanting to
support RNP approaches to LPV (Lateral performance
with vertical guidance) minima, which requires Space
Based Augmentation System (SBAS)-capable avionics. In
other high-navigation performance areas, such as
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B),
the first generation of TSO C129 avionics is also
encountering some limitations. While it is not the
intention of this paper to enter into these discussions, the
point here is that GNSS in the form of GPS L1 receivers
has already been around for a long time, is implementing
its second generation with broader use of differential
augmentation systems and working towards its third
generation with multi-frequency, multi-constellation
services. Already today, the use of GPS L1 avionics with
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) has
20
become the primary mode of operation for the large
majority of aircraft, even if the avionics box certification
still carries a supplemental label. Given the unique
qualification and positive service record of GNSS, it is
clear that GNSS as the primary enabling infrastructure for
PBN and other operations is here to stay and increase in
the long term.
Addressing GNSS Vulnerabilities
Despite the fantastic navigation utility provided by GNSS,
concerns about vulnerability need to be addressed. In
many ways, conventional terrestrial systems are just as
vulnerable to a targeted attack as GNSS despite higher
signal powers and more diverse frequencies. It can also be
argued that the concerns over disturbances due to solar
activity and the potential impact of unintentional Radio
Frequency Interference (RFI) and intentional RFI not
targeted at aviation are often overstated. The third major
potential vulnerability of GNSS next to solar impacts and
RFI, constellation weakness, does not evoke much
concern either given the potential availability of four core
constellations in the future, some of whose provider states
are contemplating issuing mandates that would then need
to be supported even more firmly by suitable minimum
service commitments. Nonetheless, with GNSS
supporting so many aircraft and multiple applications at
the same time, it is necessary to be able to answer the
question of what happens when GNSS fails? with a
clear, simple and workable plan. Given all the warning
voices about GNSS vulnerability, it would be
irresponsible to not have such a response. To this end, a
number of activities of EUROCONTROL and other
aviation actors aim at reducing and managing
vulnerabilities of GNSS through a whole range of
measures.
When it comes to the impact of solar activity on GNSS,
this can only be mitigated by better performing systems.
Despite the sun having been kind during the current
solar maximum, significant outbursts could still occur
even during periods of low solar activity the ability to
predict such outbursts ahead of time and estimate its
impact accurately is not an easy undertaking, and
comparable to weather forecasting. Luckily, most of the
European region, with the exception of some high latitude
regions and the Canary Islands, is not exposed to a
significant risk even to standard GPS L1 operations.
EUROCONTROL is operating a dedicated monitoring
network to assess vulnerabilities to solar activity [3], and
initial estimations are that risks to operations are tolerable
while awaiting the further robustness that will be provided
by future dual frequency GNSS. When it comes to RFI
mitigation, EUROCONTROL is developing a mitigation
plan [4] that combines a number of preparatory and
reactionary measures with the aim to reduce the
probability of occurrence of RFI, to reduce the impact of
RFI events on operations, and to be able to deal with any
remaining impacts effectively. The catalog of mitigation
activities spans from regulatory measures to public
awareness and the investigation and deployment of
possible ground and airborne monitoring and intervention
systems. One concept that has been but forward, for
example, is to use ADS-B performance indicators (NACp
and NIC parameters) to detect a large scale GNSS outage
in order to support a timely and coordinated reaction by
Air Traffic Control (ATC) services.
The plan of what to do when GNSS fails in a large area is
also being developed from the operational point of view.
Real time, human in the loop simulations are being
carried out in summer 2014 to address these aspects and
develop corresponding operational procedures [5]. The
difficulty to quantify the probability of occurrence with its
associated geographic extent and duration is just as much
a challenge for the operational world as it is for
infrastructure provisions, where the residual level of
vulnerability theoretically should determine the effort to
be expended in providing alternate infrastructure. If a
large area GNSS outage would happen, in a particular
TMA, on a once a year basis, operational staff could
become proficient and familiar with the associated
reversionary procedures. If on the other hand, such an
event is on the order of every ten years or less, then it will
be quite difficult for anyone involved to remember if
there are particular procedures to follow if such an event
would happen. This challenge does provide an additional
argument to ensure that at least in high-density traffic
areas, terrestrial infrastructure should be in place such that
in the event of an area GNSS outage, the large majority of
aircraft will continue navigation normally, with only a
very few of them requiring navigation assistance. Given
the currently envisaged PBN performance requirements in
Europe to remain at the 1NM accuracy level even in
complex TMA airspaces, this naturally points to the
existing and broad base of DME equipage, both air and
ground.
REVERSION SCENARIOS AND ASSOCIATED
INFRASTRUCTURE
Europe is in the process of developing a PBN
Implementing Rule (IR). The IR foresees the broad use of
the Advanced RNP (A-RNP) specification, which
includes turn functionalities which are valuable from an
airspace point of view. An issue that has been raised,
however, is the question of what happens when GNSS is
not available, because it implies a loss of RNP and its
associated OPMA function. If the improved path keeping
performance of RNP is exploited operationally through
reduced route spacing, this could create capacity or even
safety issues if left unaddressed. This has led to a
21
reevaluation of the ability of DME to support RNP [6].
Part of the argumentation is that while GNSS relies on
RAIM to remove faulty satellites which will not stop
broadcasting by themselves, this is not true for DME,
where executive monitors cause the station to stop
radiation if a corresponding monitor is triggered
implying that such fault detection by avionics as is done
in GNSS is not necessary for DME-based RNP. While the
qualification of DME to support RNP requires further
work, the use of DME as a PBN support infrastructure
remains the primary alternate capability to GNSS today
regardless of the outcome. This is because the key benefit
of PBN is to enable airspace organization and route
design free from facility constraints, in line with
operational needs. Once the transition to a PBN-based
route network has occurred, it will no longer be feasible
to provide a conventional-based, non-RNAV route
network as a shadow network behind the normal RNAV
network. Even a partial conventional route structure still
supported by some VOR with RNAV overlay is not
considered advisable in the long term. This is important to
recognize because it means that VOR has only a minor
residual role in a PBN environment. In the near to mid-
term, that leaves DME/DME as the only feasible
alternative to GNSS. Fortunately, equipage levels of
DME both in the air (97% of flights are DME/DME
capable, while some may lack operational approvals) and
on the ground are very high in Europe [6]. Of course,
some state aircraft and general aviation may not ever have
such a capability, and will need to be catered to as well.
When looking at a future PBN environment where all
airspace users will have GNSS, the role of the DME
network will also change. Today, the DME network caters
to airspace users which are not GNSS-equipped, e.g., it
enables a diversity of avionics capabilities. From an
infrastructure robustness point of view, this is inefficient
since two sets of infrastructure are required which are
both single-string for those avionics which base their PBN
capability on either GNSS or DME/DME, but not both.
Once all airspace users will have GNSS and most will
have a DME/DME, then the DME network truly becomes
a redundant reversion infrastructure.
To cater to users not equipped with DME/DME, or to
airspaces where DME network coverage is marginal
(mainly at low altitudes), the use of a VOR/DME back-up
network is proposed. A few states have begun to
proactively rationalize their aging VOR infrastructure. In
doing so, a consensus emerged that going directly to not
having any VOR in a single step would be too ambitious.
Most of these states have identified a reduced VOR/DME
network that comprises about 50% of their current facility
inventory. Those remaining facilities will be renewed and
remain in the system another 20 years by which time a
mature, multi-constellation GNSS should be available to
consider further infrastructure evolutions.
The combination of GNSS with various augmentations, a
DME redundant network as well as a back-up VOR/DME
infrastructure is not necessary or even feasible in all types
of airspace. In low-density, low complexity airspace it
may be perfectly acceptable to rely on GNSS alone as a
navigation infrastructure, while providing ATC assistance
through the classical communications and surveillance
redundant capabilities. The primary objective is to
provide safety by ensuring safe extraction and landing
capabilities, through back-up capabilities that may have a
lower level of performance and capacity. Once that is
achieved, layers of redundant capability providing equal
or similar performance to GNSS can be added to maintain
continuity of operations, as a function of the economic
business risks associated with such an outage. The
VOR/DME back-up network can provide an emergency
back-up capability, while the DME redundant network
can support most airspace applications up to at least a
1NM accuracy requirement. Whether operating in an
RNAV mode or not, having a basic positional awareness,
including navigation map displays that keep updating, is
essential for aircrews to manage their flight, even if they
are receiving vectoring instructions from ATC.
Figure 1: Proposed European VOR/DME Back-Up Network Cumulative Coverage
22
VOR/DME BACK-UP NETWORK AND FACILITY
RATIONALIZATION
As mentioned previously, the role of VOR in PBN is
quite limited. Despite VOR/DME being an eligible sensor
to support RNAV 5 operations as implemented on a broad
scale in all European upper airspace, and a large number
of aircraft having such an RNAV capability, its actual use
for this purpose is very limited. The first reason is that in
most airlines equipped with standard multi-sensor Flight
Management Systems (FMS) that have the all sensor fit
of GNSS, DME/DME and VOR/DME, further supported
by Inertial Navigation Systems (INS), VOR/DME has the
lowest priority and is thus rarely used. The second reason
is that even among those aircraft that use VOR/DME to
support RNAV5, the actual use of it in terms of FMS
tuning criteria is not harmonized. Some systems only use
VOR/DME out to a 25NM distance from the station,
others will only use them in a range from 10 to 60NM.
This makes a consistent infrastructure provision
practically impossible. Consequently, even if VOR/DME
is an eligible sensor for RNAV5, the practical utility of it
is so limited that the VOR cannot really be considered as
having a primary role in PBN. The only PBN role of VOR
that remains is in RNAV1 operations for aircrew cross-
checks as an optional, additional quality control
mechanism.
So what then is the role of VOR in a PBN environment, if
any? If single step down to no VOR stations is too
challenging, then it is necessary to define the interim
operational role of VOR during the transition. The
SESAR 15.3.2 project has investigated the different
approaches to VOR rationalization. Given the resources
required for either a facility replacement or for removing
a facility from the operational environment, it is necessary
to define a target infrastructure. It should not be forgotten
that VOR/DME does provide a relatively quick and
intuitive rho-theta navigation capability, which can be
seen as sort of a manual RNAV. Also, among non-
precision approaches which aviation aims to eliminate
[ICAO Assembly Resolution 37-11], VOR/DME
approaches are certainly better than NDB approaches,
especially if there is no ILS, and the VOR/DME often
supports the ILS in intercept or missed approach
operations. A VOR is typically used in many multiple
ways, terminal and en-route, both documented (in
procedures) and undocumented, including its use by
general aviation outside of controlled airspace. Among
the undocumented uses are aircrew contingency
procedures, or the use of a particular guard-radial by
general aviation to avoid airspace infringements.
In defining the future role of VOR, it is also instructive to
look at the limitations of the DME network. While
DME/DME supports RNAV1, which is used for TMA
operations below MSA (which VOR/DME cannot support
with RNAV-5), this is also where DME/DME coverage is
most difficult to achieve. DME network coverage gets
increasingly better with higher altitude. Meanwhile, the
low altitude TMA or airport environment is also where
vulnerabilities to GNSS RFI are greatest. In light of these
issues related to DME and GNSS, as well as the fact that
most of the residual roles of VOR are in the terminal area,
the recommended approach is to give priority to single
VOR/DME facilities installed at airports. Even if they
may be more difficult to support than off-airport sites in
an evolving airport obstruction environment, they are
normally at least easier to support (shorter maintenance
paths).
The U.S. FAA is pursuing a VOR Minimum Operational
Network or VOR MON [7]. The aim is to provide
coverage to general aviation pilots nationwide to at least
5000ft above terrain, to permit pilots to proceed to the
nearest airfield with a non-GNSS landing capability in
case there is a wide-area GNSS outage. A similar network
is also proposed for Europe, but subject to
implementation decisions by individual States. Obviously,
if a certain VOR is identified for retention, then it makes
sense to also preserve the collocated DME. Even if the
current VOR is a standalone facility, it would make sense
to equip it with a DME as an element of the DME
network. The DME network design can then build on top
23
of the residual VOR/DME back-up network and identify
either existing or new facilities which complement those
locations to provide an efficient DME network.
An optimized VOR/DME back-up network proposed for
Europe is shown in figure 1. The analysis was done at
9500ft AMSL (Above Mean Sea Level). A similar
analysis was done over mountainous regions at 15000ft
AMSL (Alps, Northern Scandinavia, and near-Eastern
regions). Some gaps remain over northern Finland,
Belarus (those navigation aids have not been taken into
account because Belarus is not a member of the European
Civil Aviation Conference, ECAC), as well as the
Ukraine (which has primarily NDB) and some Balkan
States which would need to be addressed in further detail.
What is important to note is not which individual facility
has been retained trade-offs will of course be necessary
based on local conditions. The analysis aims rather to
identify a rationalization potential, e.g., to provide a
target of how many VOR facilities could be eliminated
while still providing a useful back-up network. The study
identified that from the current 754 facilities, a reduction
down to a network of 304 stations should be possible by
using this back-up network approach giving priority to a
single facility at airports, in line with the currently
installed base. This represents a reduction target of 60%.
VOR Rationalization Planning
The first thing that needs to be said about VOR
rationalization is that it is NOT primarily an engineering
project, but rather, an airspace change project. Because
the VOR is linked to many different procedures
(including in some areas procedural control), all uses of
the facility need to be analyzed and replaced with
alternate means in other words, the associated airspace
needs to be PBN-ized. This is best done when the VOR
facility is at the end of its normal service life. Another
important aspect is the need for broad consultation with
airspace users. This is essential to determine the actual
uses of the facility, and to prepare airspace users for the
change such that the transition can be carried out safely.
Finally, early regulatory support and interaction is another
key to make rationalization a success. Detailed guidance
on rationalization planning has been generated by the
SESAR 15.3.2 project [8]. The business case for this
activity is rather simple (which is extremely rare in
aviation): a facility replacement, including the
refurbishment of the site, costs on the order of 1 Million
(in currencies such as the Euro, British Pound or US
Dollar). A small PBN implementation and airspace
change project to avoid this expense supported by expert
staff (procedure design, etc) and associated consultation
and documentation efforts on the other hand should
normally not exceed 0.5 Million, even if that effort is a
complex, multi-year matter. This gives a robust and low
risk 2:1 cost avoidance to project cost ratio, without even
counting the cost avoidance in the post-rationalization
years on maintenance and flight inspection.
Obviously, people involved in the production and
maintenance of VOR facilities may have difficulty in
embracing such changes. Nonetheless, it would be
irresponsible to stand in the way of PBN benefits of
airspace capacity and efficiency, especially since there
remains a minor but still essential role for VOR that will
last another 20 years minimum, and there is no shortage
of other infrastructure work to make those PBN benefits a
reality. Even for an individual involved in turning-off
facilities, this is normally not seen as a very exciting
activity. Building and implementing new stuff is more
attractive. This is why it is important to see VOR
rationalization as one element in a broader transition or
evolution towards a new, optimized and more network-
based infrastructure provision to support PBN that will
help improve the cost base of both the ANSP and airspace
user.
REDUNDANT DME NETWORK
Traditionally, the DME has been an addition to a VOR.
Standards, procedures and even facility design are still
Figure 2: Optimized European DME Network RNAV1 Performance at 9500ft AMSL
24
built around that logic. However, given the changed role
of VOR, the DME takes on a much more standalone role.
Even if the VHF tuning frequency remains an essential
part of making the DME usable, standalone DME are
perfectly feasible even if not collocated with a VOR.
About 150 such stations are already in operation in
Europe, typically with the purpose to fill RNAV coverage
gaps. This new function brings with it new opportunities
for DME sites. While with a VOR, there are significant
challenges to find a good site, the demands of the DME
are simpler to satisfy. From an RNAV geometry point of
view, it is also better located not directly under where the
traffic is, but rather off to the side by some distance. This
leads to potential synergies with existing COM or SUR
facilities, or even non-aviation telecommunication sites. A
number of such installations have been realized without
encountering significant challenges.
The SESAR 15.3.2 project has also carried out extensive
infrastructure assessments of first the individual states and
then the overall European area [9]. The premise of the
work was to optimize DME/DME coverage with
reasonable, small scale changes, without increasing the
count of DME stations dramatically. The result of this
optimized DME network analysis, carried out with the
EUROCONTROL DEMETER tool, is shown in figure 2.
The green and blue colors in figure 2 stand for redundant
and excessively redundant coverage, respectively. Yellow
and red represent either limited or no redundancy,
meaning that critical DME facilities are present. A critical
DME is a facility where RNAV coverage will not be
provided anymore if that station is inoperable. The
acceptability of critical DME is subject to State decisions
and local safety assessments, however it needs to be
remembered that when looking at the DME network as a
redundant capability to GNSS, the failure of a critical
DME represents a double failure scenario of a failure with
already a low probability of occurrence, coupled with
normally the presence of COM and SUR capabilities with
significant inherent redundancies also.
Figure 2 shows the impressive extent of Europe-wide
DME network coverage, based on an optimized network
of 754 facilities instead of the current 793, e.g., a slight
reduction of 5%. Current navigation aid distribution is
highly linked to traffic density, e.g., over-redundancies
only exist in those areas where many conventional
procedures need to be supported. With the transition from
conventional procedures to PBN-based airspace, it will be
feasible to eventually reduce the number of DME stations
in such areas. In other words, as long as no lengthy
transition of both conventional and PBN operations needs
to supported simultaneously for many years, the density
of the current spectrum congestion DME hotspot can be
reduced. The DME hotspot and its compatibility with
future dual frequency GNSS is the subject of another
paper to this conference [10]. Of course, in other, low
traffic density areas of Europe, more gap-filling DME are
needed, which balances out the net effect.
While not shown in the interest of brevity, the same DME
network produces a highly redundant, almost fully
continuous coverage over all of Europe when evaluated at
19500ft AMSL. In other words, for most European En-
Route traffic, the DME network provides a highly reliable
RNAV1 service. On the other hand, when looking at
lower altitudes, DME network coverage is much more
difficult, especially for airports surrounded even by
moderate terrain. A quick look analysis of the 50 busiest
airports in Europe revealed that some DME infrastructure
improvements would be necessary at about half of these
airports to achieve a suitable DME network coverage,
requiring about 30 additional DME stations. When
designing DME network coverage for terminal areas
(TMA), the most important infrastructure aspect is to
determine from which altitude upwards coverage is
required. While normally, coverage provision to the final
approach intercept waypoints on Standard Arrival Routes
(STAR) is quite feasible, it is a lot more difficult for
Standard Instrument Departures (SID) that begin at the
take-off end of the runway. One solution to alleviate the
coverage requirements is to require airspace users to be
25
equipped with Inertial Navigation Systems (INS) capable
of runway updating. In this way, the initial part of the
RNAV SID can be flown on INS coasting until entering
DME network coverage, to allow the FMS to establish an
associated position fix before the RNAV1 accuracy error
budget is exceeded. While there is a need for more
analysis in this area, it is estimated that relaxing the DME
network coverage requirements to a lower limit of about
3000ft above airport elevation should be feasible.
A rather unfortunate aspect of DME network provision is
the fact that Instrument Landing System (ILS)-associated
DME cannot be used. It is common practice in Europe to
use DME to provide a continuous range to threshold
function rather than the discrete markers. ILS-associated
DME cannot be used because some, but not all FMS use
them in RNAV tuning. So from a minimum infrastructure
baseline point of view, these DME should not be used,
even if in some cases they could provide value especially
at low altitude. Some states have re-published ILS DME
as en-route facilities in the AIP, however, as long as the
VHF tuning frequency remains an ILS frequency, the
FMS non-use will not change.
PERSPECTIVE ON NDB
Despite a broad agreement that NDB are no longer
needed in current operations, many are still in operation
and more continue to be procured. The primary problem
of the NDB is that they are too cheap, e.g., since the
facility has a cost which is comparable to a procedure
redesign, it is often easier to just buy an NDB. The
primary current use of NDB is to support non-precision
approach procedures, or as Locators associated with ILS
approaches, often in areas where there may still be low
levels of GNSS equipage. Luckily, the use of NDB as en-
route markers has largely disappeared. To overcome the
financial hurdle in NDB decommissioning, it should be
remembered that the ICAO goal is to provide vertically
guided approaches to all instrument runway ends by 2016.
This favors the introduction of GNSS-based RNP
approaches, especially at runways without ILS. Even in
areas outside of SBAS coverage at airports with user
fleets with limited Baro-VNAV equipage, a regular GPS-
based Non-Precision Approach is considered to provide
better safety for airspace users than an NDB-based
approach.
So how can NDB be rationalized out of the aviation
system? While the low cost of those facilities reduces the
incentive to do so, it also reduces the urgency. It is
unfortunate that the NDB spectrum is not very desirable
for other uses. But even if a stronger motivation can be
found, what will remain as an obstacle is the training
issue. As long as it is a requirement to be able to fly an
NDB approach to obtain an instrument pilot rating, these
facilities standardized in ICAO Annex 10 and referenced
in many other formal publications will remain part of the
system. It is noted that current pilot training is still built
on conventional procedures, with PBN coming as an
addition on top of that. It is likely to still take
considerable time until PBN implementation penetrates to
the training level such that RNP approaches are the first
and core content, whereas conventional procedures would
be trained more as a contingency function.
PERSPECTIVE ON FUTURE ALTERNATE
POSITIONING, NAVIGATION AND TIMING (A-
PNT)
The 12th ICAO Air Navigation Conference recommended
for ICAO and States to assess the need for and feasibility
of an A-PNT system [11]. In this context, alternate
PNT means alternate to GNSS. In the short to medium
term, at least alternate positioning and navigation (e.g.,
not time) is provided by currently established navigation
aids, as explained and proposed in this paper. However,
does it make sense to use these well-established facilities
for the foreseeable future? Both SESAR and NextGen
expect that more advanced airspace and 4D trajectory
based applications will need to be supported, while cost
and spectrum pressures will not go away. Those cost
pressures are also a significant obstacle to any transition
to new technology in aviation, with its lengthy equipment
cycles; however, the evolution of conventional navigation
aids significantly beyond their original purpose to a
complementary PBN support infrastructure does have its
limitations, especially at the low altitudes of terminal
areas where airspace related capacity limitations are the
most significant. Can space-based navigation ever be
made sufficiently reliable to provide navigation
exclusively, even with multi-frequency, multi-
constellation GNSS? For sure, the physics of space based
ranging sources will always provide the most suitable,
cost effective and high performance positioning capability
to support PBN and other CNS/ATM applications,
including ADS-B. But those same physics also dictate
that such signals can easily be overcome by terrestrial RF
sources. Similarly, while the wide-area network aspect of
GNSS provides significant system-of-system redundancy,
that same aspect raises increased concern if ever there are
significant performance issues of such global systems
affecting many airspace users at the same time.
Conducting a reliability analysis at such a scale is
unlikely to be conclusive, given the number of
unquantifiable assumptions and apples versus oranges
comparisons required. Thus the issue is ultimately more
of an emotional or human acceptance kind of decision,
constrained by what is economically supportable.
26
From the above it can be deducted that research on any
future, new terrestrial A-PNT system should meet the
following constraints:
- Overcome the limitations of VOR and DME,
especially at low TMA altitudes while providing
a level of positioning performance similar to
GNSS, including vertical guidance, if possible;
- Provide significantly higher spectrum use
efficiency than DME in particular, while
providing significant robustness against RFI;
- Low facility installation requirements, including
a low number of sites required to provide low
altitude coverage;
- Low overall navigation service provision cost, in
particular to not hinder the introduction of multi-
constellation GNSS;
- Low aircraft integration cost, ideally enabling
implementation together with other CNS/ATM
capability upgrades in a single package, for all
types of airspace users.
A number of technology candidates for A-PNT systems
are being investigated in the U.S. and Europe. These
include enhancements to DME, the use of ground based
ranging sources similar to GNSS but not in the same area
of L-Band spectrum, the use of a future L-Band digital
avionics communication system (LDACS1) to provide a
navigation function, as well as SSR Mode N, where N
stands for navigation using a similar signal structure than
is currently being used by secondary surveillance radar.
Advantages and disadvantages of those and other
candidate systems will have to be evaluated carefully in
light of the above constraints.
In any GNSS-vulnerability related discussion, the topic of
eLORAN is likely to come up as well. While this is
certainly another A-PNT candidate system that should not
be overlooked, it is the private opinion of the authors that
LORAN is a highly recommendable A-PNT system for
the maritime community, but for aviation applications in
Europe, given the current state of implementation its
utility would be limited to niche applications, such as air
traffic in extended overwater areas with limited radar
coverage, for example the North Sea. It will be interesting
to see how all the technology options mentioned in this
section will develop towards meeting stated the high level
objectives and constraints.
Finally, the need for time and time distribution or
synchronization between airspace users and ATM systems
in the context of trajectory based operations is not
addressed in this paper and will be the subject of future
work.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper gave a comprehensive, facility-specific
overview of developments in navigation infrastructure
towards supporting the global implementation of PBN.
The key emphasis is on the evolution from a modular
conventional infrastructure to one that needs to be seen as
a terrestrial, cross-border network. This shift in focus
brings opportunities for rationalization and optimization
that can only be brought about by a proactive cooperation
of all actors as an integral part of PBN implementation
planning. What is proposed is a VOR/DME back-up
network to provide safe extraction and landing for all
users, and a GNSS-redundant DME network providing
business continuity to equipped users supporting at least
RNAV1 operations en-route and in major terminal areas.
The VOR/DME network gives priority to existing airport
VOR/DME installations in line with its residual use,
enables significant VOR rationalization and provides a
basis to build the DME network in a complementary
manner. While this proposal provides a sufficient near
term A-PNT capability, it is also considered a necessary
effort to investigate other long term options taking the
constraints of cost and spectrum into account.
While there is relatively broad acceptance of these plans
through fora such as the EUROCONTROL Navigation
Steering Group (NSG), the key challenge is to reach the
decision makers of individual facility renewals. Many
NDB are probably being renewed simply because the
decision makers are not aware of RNP approach options
available today. Similarly, many ANSP may shy away
from the expert project effort required to realize facility
savings by defining a target terrestrial PBN infrastructure
and engaging in extensive consultation. The goal of this
paper is to help convince decision makers that such
efforts are feasible and worthwhile starting right now,
which is essential especially when considering the fact
that infrastructure optimization is strongly linked to
facility life-cycles, making such an evolution by
definition a slow one.
The hope is that neighboring States will work together to
turn the infrastructure networks described herein into
reality, by making planned and coordinated changes to
individual facilities that will, over the years, add up and
converge towards the desired terrestrial PBN network.
Corresponding guidance has been proposed for inclusion
into ICAO Annex 10 [12]. Finally, it is also hoped that
these proposals will find acceptance in the conventional
navigation infrastructure provision community, e.g.,
equipment manufacturers, ANSP and flight inspection
organizations. Significant work will continue to be
27
required to make these evolutions a reality. Embracing the
additional complexities derived from the PBN-network
perspective described herein will be essential for success
and will continue to require the professional support of
this community.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Significant elements of this paper have been developed
through the SESAR 15.3.2 project, titled Navigation
Infrastructure Rationalization. The authors would like to
thank the project partners, Thales, NATS and ENAV for
their respective contributions.
DISCLAIMER
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors
only. None of the statements contained in this paper
represent an official policy statement of the
EUROCONTROL agency or of the SESAR Joint
Undertaking.
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO Doc 9613, 2013, Performance Based
Navigation (PBN) Manual, AN/937, 4th Edition,
International Civil Aviation Organization, Montreal,
Canada
[2] U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), 20
February 1996, Airborne Supplemental Navigation
Equipment using the Global Positioning System,
Technical Standard Order TSO C129a, Washington DC,
USA
[3] E. Robert, EUROCONTROL, 1 April 2014,
Ionosphere Impact on GNSS Based Civil Aviation
Applications during Maximum Solar Activity, Discussion
Paper 7, 19th Navigation Steering Group Meeting,
Brussels, Belgium
[4] G. Berz, EUROCONTROL, 1 April 2014, GNSS
Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) Mitigation Plan,
Discussion Paper 06B, 19th Navigation Steering Group
Meeting, Brussels, Belgium
[5] B. Rabiller, EUROCONTROL, 28 August 2013, A-
RNP Reversion in Case of GPS Loss, Safety Desk Study
Report, NAV-SAFREP-2013-0101-IR, Edition 0.2,
Brussels, Belgium
[6] G. Berz, V. Vitan, I. Skyrda, ION GNSS+ 2013, 18
September 2013, Can Current DME Support PBN
Operations with Integrity?, Proceedings of the Institute of
Navigation International Satellite Division Meeting,
Nashville, USA
[7] ICAO Navigation Systems Panel (NSP), 9 May 2012,
A VOR Minimum Operational Network (MON),
Information Paper 6 to the Working Group of the Whole,
Montreal, Canada
[8] SESAR, 24 July 2013, Navigation Aids (NAVAIDS)
Roadmap, Deliverable 07, Edition 00.00.10, SESAR Joint
Undertaking, Brussels, Belgium
[9] SESAR, 23 June 2013, ECAC-Wide Navigation
Infrastructure Assessment, Deliverable 06, Edition
00.01.00, SESAR Joint Undertaking, Brussels, Belgium
[10] V. Vitan, G. Berz, 16 June 2014, DME and GNSS
L5/E5 Compatibility Prediction and Measured Data, 18th
International Flight Inspection Symposium, Oklahoma
City, USA
[11] ICAO, 29 November 2012, Report of the Committee
to the Conference on Agenda Item 6, AN-Conf/12-
WP/162, International Civil Aviation Organization,
Montreal, Canada
[12] ICAO Navigation Systems Panel (NSP), 12
November 2013, The Need for Guidance on Navigation
Facility Evolution, Working Paper 37 to the Working
Group of the Whole, Montreal, Canada

18th International Flight Inspection Symposium (IFIS),

Oklahoma City, USA, June 16 20, 2014

28
 Recent Issues in Performance Prediction and
Flight Inspection Measurements Dr. Gerhard Greving, NAVCOM Co ns ult, & L. Nelso n Spo hnheimer, Spo hnheimer Cons ulting

Gerhard. Greving
NAVCOM Consult
Ziegelstr. 43, 71672 Marbach, Germany
Fax: +1 508 526 8273
E-mail: navcom.consult@t-online.de

L. Nelson Spohnheimer
Spohnheimer Consulting
Auburn, WA 98001, USA
Fax: +1 508 526 8273
E-mail: Nelson@SpohnheimerConsulting.com

ABSTRACT GLIDE PATH CASES

This paper continues a series of discussions and papers by Glide Path Facility and Snow - A Practical Example
the authors on flight inspection measurements and facility
issues. It presents investigations into current technical The effects of snow cover on the Glide Path (GP)
problems encountered during simulations and reflection plane have been addressed many times. As a
ground/airborne measurements. very general statement, snow cover will increase the path
angle, although the effects of melting and refreezing can
This paper analyzes recent experiences during flight complicate predicting the results. Most service providers
inspections on a variety of ground-based navaids, using have implemented policies to assure that the depth of an
several current Flight Inspection Systems. The paper accumulated snow cover of the ground plane does not
maintains neutrality by not mentioning location or exceed a specified amount in critical beam-forming areas
equipment manufacturers. The paper addresses common - a common maximum might be 2' or 0.7m.
problems such as measured GS performance in the
presence of unusually deep snow cover on the ground During an indoor training session for the maintainers of a
plane, problems with non-metallic GS masts, recently-installed arctic installation, a user complaint was
CVOR/DVOR performance (predicted and measured received that the "...threshold crossing height is twice
results for on-airport scatterers, many close, large wind what it should be." While that specific claim is not
turbines), and discussion of continued application of technically credible, the crew observation that the aircraft
roughness/scalloping tolerances and the 95% rule. The was "floating 800' beyond the normal touchdown point"
paper concludes with recommendations for more detailed was much more credible. This would suggest a steeper-
guidance material and further harmonization of flight than-normal descent leading to a strong flare maneuver
inspection practices and measurements. near threshold A visit to the site revealed that a snow
drift approximately 10' (~3m) deep immediately in front
INTRODUCTION of the GP mast had accumulated. (The moisture content
of the snow was very low.) Figure 1 is a photo showing
Short case-studies for various ground-based navigation the drift within perhaps 40' of the mast - the snow is
facilities and related issues will be presented. nearly the same level as the lower antenna, which is
normally approximately 14-15' (3m) above the active
reflection surface.

29
 Figure 3 shows at left a non-metallic mast installation.
Near the top, a metallic triangular brace is installed
between the tower legs. For some installations, the brace
height may coincide with an antenna's height, as occurred
recently. At right in Figure 3, the metallic brace (with
two triangular sections) is shown behind the upper
antenna, which is supported by hardware connecting only
the front two tower legs.

Figure 1. Snow Drift and Lower GP Antenna

The GP was promptly removed from service, and efforts

began to remove much of the snow drift using a tracked
vehicle. The area addressed was approximately 250' x
120' (~80m x 35m) immediately in front of the mast.
Figure 2 shows the work in progress, as viewed from the
lower antenna.

Figure 3. Non-Metallic Mast with Metallic Bracing

It is intuitive that asymmetric metallic tower bracing near

only one of the GP antennas can produce pattern
variations between antennas. Rigorous Method-of-
Moment (MoM) Simulation of the metallic bracing
structure, using numerous triangular patches as shown in
Figure 3, resulted in the vertical antenna patterns shown
in Figure 4. The almost-circular patterns for (1) the
Figure 2. Removing Snow Drift antenna only and for (2) the antenna plus its own
mounting hardware nearly overlay one another.
Ultimately, the snow depth was reduced to approximately
3' (1m) and a special flight inspection was requested by
maintenance personnel. The resulting measurement
produced a 3.16 degree path angle (normally 3.00), with
2, 3, and 4 microamperes (A) of roughness in Zones 1,
2, and 3 respectively. While the initial user-experienced
GP angle was likely out of tolerance on the high-angle
side, it was apparently operationally usable although an
abnormal amount of the touchdown zone was used.

Non-Metallic GP Mast and its Effects

The application of a non-metallic GP mast recently

focused attention on the effects of asymmetrical mast
hardware on the antenna patterns, and a corresponding
effect on path angle and achieved Threshold Crossing
Height (ATCH).
Figure 4. Predicted Antenna Patterns

30
However, the more irregular pattern with a larger
maximum at the horizon results from the presence of the
metallic tower brace, introducing approximately 1 dB of
amplitude variations. Similar variations occur in the
azimuth pattern as well. When one antenna in the GP
array has these effects and the other two do not, it can be
expected that parameters sensitive to the differences
between the antennas, such as the Difference in Depth of
Modulation (DDM), will be affected.

Two DDM parameters are GP angle (nominally 3.00

degrees) and TCH. Figure 5 shows flight inspection
measurements on a non-metallic mast GP with the
metallic bracing behind the upper antenna only. Although
the path in the last two miles prior to threshold (THR) is Figure 6. Ideal GP with Upper Antenna Rotation
reasonably straight, it trends downward in the figure (Horizontal - m from THR; Vertical - DDM A)
beginning at approximately 0.5 nautical mile (NM),
followed by a major upward flare near threshold. VOR CASES

CVOR and Control Tower

+50 uA
1 -50 uA 2 approximately 3000' or 915m. Figure 7 depicts the
Thr NM NM
Figure 5. GP Results, Asymmetrical Mast Hardware
Beginning at approximately 0.5 NM, the aircraft is
beginning to move laterally off the antenna bore sight
axis. As this occurs, differences in the azimuth pattern of
the antennas become more visible, resulting in the flare
behavior - i.e., the upper and lower antenna amplitudes no
longer cancel at the nominal path angle.
A new ~100' (30m) Airport Traffic Control Tower
(ATCT) was built on an airport with an existing CVOR
that supported opposite-end approaches to the primary
runway. The distance between the two facilities is
general geometry of the CVOR, ATCT, and approach
radial. Although a study was done to best locate the new
tower, the eventually constructed ATCT was not
positioned in the same way as it was studied. The
approach from the south was removed from service
following a flight inspection not long after the ATCT was
completed.

To partially mitigate this flare, the upper antenna was

rotated in azimuth. Figure 6 illustrates the effects on GP
structure and lists the numerical effects on path angle and
TCH for rotation amounts of 2-7 degrees of the upper
antenna. Variations in GP angle of 0.05 degrees and in
TCH of approximately 3' result. It is clear that as the
rotation angle approaches zero degrees (not shown), the
shape of the structure closely matches that in Figure 5.

Figure 7. Geometry of Existing CVOR & New ATCT

To assure that potential solutions were addressing the

correct problem, the ATCT was modeled for its effect on
the approach, using 3-D techniques. Figure 8 shows the
model and a photograph of the ATCT.

31
 From the high-resolution 3-D model, the scattering
pattern of the ATCT was computed. Figure 9 shows that
a major lobe of the pattern is directed toward the south
such that the primary reflection crosses the approach
radial at a shallow angle. Figure 10 shows the resulting
predicted VOR crosspointer error in an orbit at 10 NM
and 1600' above the site. The maximum error on the 201
degree approach radial is approximately 4-5 degrees.

Figure 8. 3-D Model and Photo of New ATCT

Figure 10. Predicted VOR Bearing Error from ATCT

Figure 11 presents a flight inspection measurement of the

approach radial and the predicted errors from the ATCT,
overlaid from 10 to 2 NM. The measured crosspointer
trace is highlighted; its amplitude is generally 5-6
degrees in the 10-5 NM range and diminishes at closer
ranges. The predicted errors have a similar magnitude
and frequency from 10 to 5 NM. Although the agreement
is reasonable, it is not as good as achievable in many
simulation cases, because the actual descent path of the
aircraft is very likely not flown at a constant rate and also
not known with good resolution.
Figure 9. Scattering Pattern of ATCT

Figure 11. Measured and Predicted VOR Crosspointer Error for ATCT-affected Approach

32
DVOR and Wind Turbines Table 1. Flight Testing of Wind Turbine Development

In late 2008, a developer proposed approximately 125 Number WT Facilities

Date
wind turbines (WT) of 400' (122m) height near a CVOR of WTs Configuration Tested
with TACAN. Figure 12 shows the originally proposed No rotor
5/18/09 22 DVOR
locations with respect to the VOR planned for installation blades
in rows occupying approximately from radial 260 No rotor
7/15/09 66 DVOR
clockwise through radial 120, and ranging in distance blades
from the VOR between 0.6 and 4.8 NM. After initial Rotors
CVOR &
resistance to the plan from the appropriate regulatory 8/4/09 109 present, not
DVOR
authorities, the WT developer indicated willingness to turning
engage in a "build a little, test a little" activity, during Rotors
which the farther WTs would be installed first and their CVOR &
9/2/09 109 present, not
effects flight tested. Then closer WTs would be erected DVOR
turning
and another flight test of the VOR conducted. This would Rotors CVOR &
continue until all the planned WTs were erected, as long 12/3/09 109
turning DVOR
as flight test results continued to be acceptable. This test
activity was based on first converting the VOR to the The following measurement in Figures 13-18 were
Doppler configuration at the developer's expense and the extracted from a report [1] published by the relevant
application of a WT placement algorithm negotiated regulatory authority. Flight inspection results for 10 NM
between the developer and the regulators. The algorithm and 40 NM orbits at 1000', for DVOR and nearby CVOR,
was a simple one (although very difficult to negotiate!): are shown for the various WT configurations. Important
radials were also flown, but for brevity only one is
No WTs within 1 NM of the VOR included here. Vertical scaling is one degree per major
No WTs in the 1.0 to 2.5 NM range if within... horizontal line.
o 5 degrees of an instrument approach radial,
o 10 degrees of a low altitude airway radial
10 NM Orbit, 1K'
No constraints beyond 2.5 NM from the VOR

40 NM Orbit, 1K'

R021

Figure 13. DVOR, 22 WTs, No Rotor Blades

10 NM Orbit, 1K'

Figure 12. Proposed Wind Turbines near VOR

R021, 4-23 NM
Presumably, the WT developer would benefit by
obtaining approval for most of the WTs (if the algorithm
was suitable), while the regulator could not only protect
the airspace uses but also gain detailed flight inspection Figure 14. DVOR, 66 WTs, No Rotor Blades
data with WTs in fairly close proximity to the DVOR.
The plan was implemented, and flight inspections on both
the DVOR and a temporary CVOR nearby (for data
gathering purposes) occurred for the turbine
configurations listed in Table 1.

33
 5 NM CVOR Orbit, 1K'

10 NM Orbit, 1K'

40 NM DVOR Orbit, 1K'

40 NM Orbit, 1K'

Figure 17. 109 WTs, Rotors Turning

R021, CVOR, 4-20 NM

R021, 4-18 NM

R021, DVOR, 4-20 NM

Figure 18. 109 WTs, Rotors Turning

Figure 15. CVOR, 109 WTs with Stationary Rotors
10 NM CVOR Orbit, 1K'
After the DVOR was placed in service with the initial 109
WTs, the developer continued to add outlying turbines, as
allowed by the algorithm. Within two years after the
flight testing, approximately 175 WTs were located
within 8 NM or 15 km of the DVOR. Figure 19 is a late
2011 photo showing the location of the WTs and a few
statistics about their distances. Four of the 400' (122m)
turbines (upper left inset) are within 1 - 1.3 NM or 1.8 -
2.4 KM.

10 NM DVOR Orbit, 1K'

40 NM DVOR Orbit, 1K'

R021, 4-20 NM

Figure 16. 109 WTs, Rotors Stationary

34
 Figure 19. DVOR with 173 Wind Turbines within 8 NM or 15 km

SPECIFICATIONS flight testing results for decades. Although the Standards

and Recommended Practices (SARPS) in ICAO's Annex
Do we Need Roughness and Scalloping Tolerances? 10 do not mention them, they appear in ICAO's Doc 8071
manual [3], at least in part because the current manual
From a conceptual standpoint, guidance errors seen by a during its 1999 rewrite was patterned heavily on the
user from most ground-based navigation stations may be contents of FAA's Order 8200.1C, United States Standard
divided into static or long-term, low-frequency, and high- Flight Inspection Manual [4]. Doc 8071 defines VOR
frequency components. These are often referred to using tolerances of 2 (A), 3.5 (B), and 3 (R/S).
terms such as Alignment (A), Bends (B), and Roughness Figure 20 shows an artificial sample of alignment errors
and Scalloping (R/S), respectively. Often these error (horizontal dashed line), bends errors (sinusoidal dashed
components are collectively referred to as "structure." line), and roughness (irregular) and scalloping (periodic)
high-frequency errors.
This concept of dividing errors by frequency does not
consistently appear in the International Civil Aviation
Organization's (ICAO's) Annex 10 [2]. For example,
tolerances for VOR errors from the ground station are
limited to an overall 2 degrees regardless of frequency.
Similarly, tolerances for Instrument Landing System
(ILS) Localizer and Glide Path facilities are limited to
overall values such as 30 microamperes. In contrast,
Microwave Landing System (MLS) tolerances are
categorized by frequency of error, but use the terms path
following error, path following noise, and control motion
noise in lieu of A, B, and R/S.

Tolerances for A, B, and R/S have been applied Figure 20. Alignment, Bends, and R/S Errors
separately by the flight inspection community to VOR

35
R/S can be described in general terms as high-frequency
errors (from VOR facilities), or as errors that are
sufficiently fast that the aircraft cannot be maneuvered to
follow them - ie, the ground track is unaffected by R/S.
For modern automatic flight inspection systems (AFIS),
however, it is necessary to mathematically define the
frequency content. One system uses four-pole filters to
separate A, B, and R/S, and defines R/S as errors with
periods between 2 and 10 seconds (0.1 to 0.5 Hz) [5].
Errors of longer periods are separated into A and B
components; errors of shorter periods are generally
removed by the navigation receiver, are not sent to the
AFIS, and cannot be seen by the user pilot.
Based on the authors' VOR experiences, both in the field
and multipath simulation environments, many VOR
performance issues relate to R/S errors, typically from
power lines, wind turbines, and other reflectors at some
distance from the ground facility. In other words, many
VOR restrictions that result in the loss of an airway or
approach, or in raising the relevant minimum altitudes,
arise from R/S errors. Since such errors by definition
cannot result in the aircraft changing its ground track,
why is it necessary to restrict or penalize the benefits of
operating the facility solely for R/S reasons?
For many years, the answer usually offered was "...to
protect the autopilot from disconnecting." It very likely
was true that older autopilots (circa 1960s, 1970s) were
prone to disconnect from noisy signals, but this issue has
surely been greatly attenuated by modern systems with
improved filtering, microprocessor-augmented tracking,
etc. But more importantly, taking the position that
autopilot operation must be protected violates a common
principle of flight inspection organizations - that the
mission is to measure the signal-in-space, rather than
addressing equipage, especially the less-elegant avionics.
Perhaps the flight inspection community might again
choose to revisit defining the goal of applying R/S
tolerances, especially when this action results in many
facility restrictions and reductions in usable service,
without the user aircraft's ground track being affected. If
a consensus develops that this is unnecessary, the
appearance of R/S tolerances in Doc 8071 (often used as
the basis for flight inspection contracts) but which do not
appear in Annex 10 can surely be addressed.
Implementation Issues with the 95% Rule
Various ICAO documents address the statistical nature of
measured parameters and state that the signal-in-space
Standards are 95% or 2-sigma values. A few examples
include, from Annex 10, Volume 1:
3.1.3.4 & 3.1.5.4, Localizer & Glide Path Bends
36
3.5.3.1.3, DME System Accuracy
3.7.3.1.1.1, GPS Positioning Accuracy
3.11.4.9, MLS System Accuracy
Annex 10, Volume 1, Attachment C further discusses
Course Bends and states in paragraph 2.1.5, Application
of localizer course/glide bend amplitude Standard, "The
95 per cent maximum amplitude specification is the
allowable percentage of total time interval [emphasis
added] in which the course/path bend amplitude must be
less than the amount specified in Figure C-1 for the
region being evaluated."
Attachment A of Annex 11 states in paragraph 3,
Determination of protected airspace along VOR-defined
routes, "The word "containment" ... is intended to indicate
that the protected airspace provided will contain the
traffic for 95 per cent of the total flying time (i.e.,
accumulated over all aircraft) for which the traffic
operates along the route...it is implicit that for 5 per cent
of the total flying time traffic will be outside the protected
airspace." [emphasis added two places] From this
Annex 11 statement (explicitly about VOR routes), it is
inferred that although the two-sigma concept is defined in
Annex 10 for time (for ILS, DME, GPS, and MLS, but
notably not for VOR), its purpose is related to spatial
deviations of the aircraft from the desired course.
The general application of a two-sigma value is certainly
conceptually helpful for the treatment of some
measurement anomalies, such as outliers in sampled data,
which is commonly processed in today's receivers and
flight inspection systems [5]. However, a number of
unaddressed issues cause questions or debate to arise
when analyzing flight measurements and recordings of
navigational aids.
Bends, specifically their frequency content
characteristics, are not formally defined in the SARPS.
The quoted references in general address only
bends (presumably low frequency error) amplitude, or
they state that structure (presumably A, B, and R/S) is
defined at a two-sigma probability. There is no mention
in any of these documents of applying a two-sigma
analysis process to high frequency errors (R/S).
Localizer and Glide Path structure tolerances do
not make a distinction between bends and R/S. If a 95%
analysis is applied to structure measurements, does it
apply only the bends component (which does not have an
individual tolerance), or to the composite DDM
measurement which generally contains A, B, and R/S
errors?
 There is no mention or definition of bends or R/S
in the VOR SARPS, and Doc 8071 [7] does not mention
two-sigma or 95% in the VOR chapter (only in the ILS
chapter). Yet, many flight inspection organizations apply
two-sigma analysis to VOR recordings (for both bends
and R/S components). Some, for example, apply a sliding
window in which to measure the per cent of time that
signals exceed the tolerance, where the window length (in
feet or NM) varies with the altitude of the measurement
[4].
Collectively, these unaddressed points again, as in the
previous topic (whether R/S tolerances are even needed),
illustrate challenges in the application of tolerances.
CONCLUSIONS
From the case studies presented here, the following
conclusions may be drawn.
a. An extreme example of dry snow accumulation
(within 3-4' of the lower antenna height, directly in front
of the GP mast) resulted in a glide path that, although
abnormally high in angle, was successfully flown by a
user jet aircraft. When the snow depth was reduced by
approximately two thirds, the measured GP angle was
within tolerance at 3.16 (normally 3.00).
b. Service maintainers must remain diligent in
monitoring and limiting the depth of snow accumulation
in the near proximity of the GP mast, since flight
measurements occur too infrequently to serve as any form
of monitoring.
c. Small metallic bracing components in non-metallic
GP masts can affect radiation patterns if the bracing is
near any of the antennas.
d. GP antenna pattern distortions can introduce
undesirable effects near the runway threshold, such as
changes in TCH.
e. TCH can be modified somewhat by small differential
rotations of the GP antennas in a CEGS array.
f. Reflections from a 100' high ATCT ~3000' from a
CVOR can exceed instrument approach procedure flight
inspection tolerances.
g. A DVOR on flat terrain with numerous nearby 400'
(122m) wind turbines was extensively flight tested and
found in tolerance. (At least 173 turbines are located
within 1-8 NM (1-15 km) of the DVOR.)
h. Roughness and Scalloping tolerances do not serve a
safety purpose, given that R/S does not affect the ground
track of the aircraft.
37
i. R/S tolerances should not be used to disqualify
procedural uses of navigational aids.
j. The application of two-sigma values is inconsistent
or poorly addressed in various international documents.
k. While not stated explicitly in the ICAO documents,
the two-sigma concept is intended to address containment
of the aircraft within known or defined boundaries.
l. The two-sigma concept should be applied only to
bends (frequencies), not to R/S (frequencies).
m. If R/S tolerances were deleted, many of the issues
with two-sigma application would disappear.
n. The two-sigma concept should be applied
consistently to all navigational aids types - i.e., ILS, VOR,
DME, MLS, GPS, etc.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are made from the topics
presented.
a. Ensure that snow depth monitoring occurs for GP
facilities in snow-prone areas.
b. Exercise caution when rotating GP antennas to lower
TCH, as this technique causes downward trends in the
flight path close to the runway.
c. Do not include out-of-tolerance time from high
frequency R/S errors when applying the two-sigma
concept.
d. Do not use R/S tolerances to restrict the operational
benefits of navigation facilities.
e. Improve the consistency between various
international documents for definition and application of
the two-sigma concept.
REFERENCES
[1] Source: [Organization Deleted to Retain Neutrality -
contact authors], 2012, ....Signal Interference in VOR
Systems Caused by Wind Turbine Farms
[2] ICAO, July 1996, International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annex 10 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Volume 1, Radio Navigation
Aids, 5th Edition, http://www.icao.int
[3] ICAO, October, 2002, Manual on Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids, Volume 1, Amendment No. 1,
http://www.icao.int
[4] U.S. Federal Aviation Administration, October, 2005,
Order 8200.1, United States Standard Flight Inspection
Manual, Change 8, Order 8200.1
[5] Greving/Spohnheimer, June, 2006, Recent Issues in
Demanding ILS Ground and Flight Measurement
Environments, 2006 IFIS, Toulouse, France
[6] ICAO, July 2001, Air Traffic Services, Annex 11 to
the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 13th
Edition, http://www.icao.int
[7] ICAO, 31/10/02, Manual on Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids, Volume 1, Testing of Ground-based
Radio Navigation Systems, 4th Edition, Amendment 1

38
 Session 2
Flight Inspection of RFI and Related Concepts
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Investigation of VHF Omni-Range (VOR)
Signal Interference
Todd Bigham
Avionics Engineer
FAA
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, USA
Fax: +1 405 954 7329
E-mail: todd.bigham@faa.gov
ABSTRACT
Signal interference is a fairly common occurrence during
flight inspection work. The flight crews first priority
when dealing with interference is to identify its source.
Once found, other helpful pieces of information about the
interference could be measured. This was made evident
in a case study involving interference to a Very High
Frequency Omni-Range (VOR) facility.
This paper presents a case study involving interference to
a VOR facility. This study includes 1) a description of
the interference problem, 2) troubleshooting steps taken
by the flight crew, and 3) lab test procedures used in
hopes of duplicating the problem. An overall analysis is
presented along with conclusions regarding the true
nature of this problem: does the problem stem from
inadequate performance by the flight inspection
equipment or is it a facility performance/interference
issue?
DESCRIPTION OF INTERFERENCE PROBLEM
An aircraft equipped with two RNA-34BF flight
inspection navigation receivers flight inspected the Very
Todd Big ha m, FAA
High Frequency Omni-Range/Tactical Air Navigation
(VORTAC) facility in Hattiesburg, MS. This facility
identifier is LBY and operates at 110.6 MHZ. Large
bearing errors were recorded at 2.1 miles from the facility
on the 355 from radial. The VOR status changed states
from normal to no computed data (NCD) during this time
on at least one run. Figure 1 illustrates the flight
inspection aircraft path using Google Earth. Figure 3
shows the flight inspection recording illustrating the VOR
error and status trace fluctuations during the interference.
The flight inspection crew made radio contact with the
facility maintenance personnel and described the
anomaly. Ground maintenance did not report anything
out of order, but did say that a localizer antenna is located
about 2.1 miles from the VORTAC on the 355 radial.
This localizer uses 109.5 MHZ. Figure 2 shows a close
up view of the interference area with begin and end points
of significant bearing errors taken from the flight
inspection log files for this run.
41
 Figure 1. Flight Inspection Aircraft Path

Figure 2. Close Up View of Interference Area

42
43
VOR SS VOR Status

Figure 3. Flight Inspection Recording

FLIGHT INSPECTION DIAGNOSTIC STEPS
The crew reported that the front-end receivers of this
aircraft did not experience any problems during the same
time period.
The flight inspection crew coordinated with ground
maintenance personnel to temporarily turn off the suspect
localizer. The VOR radial run was repeated, and the
bearing errors were no longer present.
Several days later the VOR radial inspection was repeated
with an aircraft equipped with RNA-34AF flight
inspection receivers. Interference problems were not
experienced with either the front end or the flight
inspection navigation receivers.
SECONDARY RNA-34BF RECEIVER INDICATION
In these aircraft the primary flight inspection navigation
receiver provides the indications to the mission specialist
and also records data to log files. The secondary
navigation receiver records data as well but was not set up
to provide secondary indications on this flight. The data
recorded from the secondary RNA-34BF navigation
receiver was examined later and found to contain the
same interference measurements as displayed in Figure 3
above.
LAB TESTING
With two other models of navigation receivers performing
without interference indications, the investigation turned
to evaluation of the RNA-34BF receiver. Since test
equipment for both the RNA-34BF and RNA-34AF
receivers were available at our repair station, experiments
were performed with each model to try and duplicate the
disparate interference performance for these receivers.
Also, sensitivity and selectivity tests were performed on
the RNA-34BF to help evaluate its performance in the
presence of interference.
RNA-34BF Receiver Interference Testing
Lab tests were performed with the RNA-34BF bench test
equipment to duplicate the problem seen during flight
inspection. To simulate the interference signal, a second
signal generator was used to generate the interfering
localizer signal, and the two signals were combined using
a radio frequency (RF) combiner as in Figure 4.
44
VOR
Signal Gen
RNA-34BF
Localizer
Signal Gen
Figure 4. Interference Testing Block Diagram
Figure 3 shows the LBY VOR signal strength was
approximately 550 uV at the interference area. For a
50 ohm system this is equivalent to
approximately -52 dBm.
The interfering localizer signal strength was not recorded
during the flight inspection runs since VOR mode was in
use. The localizer signal strength was estimated by
obtaining localizer signal strength from a log file recorded
during an inbound low approach maneuver over the RGR
localizer in Oklahoma City. In this log file, the RGR
localizer signal strength over the localizer antenna at
70 feet above ground was 1303.57 uV. The LBY VOR
radial flight path altitude was 300-350 feet above the
interfering localizer antenna. From this data, a worst case
signal strength estimate of 1000 uV was used for the
interfering localizer signal. This is equivalent to -47 dBm
for a 50 ohm system.
During the lab tests, VOR signal strengths stronger and
weaker than -50 dBm were tested. Similarly, a range of
localizer signal strengths around -47 dBm were tested.
The resulting data is presented in a table format shown in
Table 1. For each combination of VOR and localizer
signal strength, bearing and receiver status was
monitored.
The same lab testing procedure was repeated with an
RNA-34AF receiver. See Table 2.
 Table 1. RNA-34BF Interference Lab Test Results
Table 2. RNA-34AF Interference Lab Test Results
In these tables OK means the bearing indication from the
receiver is stable and within one degree of what the lab
equipment was set to transmit, and the receiver indicates
normal status. The colored cell represents the actual VOR
signal strength and the estimated interference signal
strength as calculated above.
Plainly, these lab tests failed to duplicate the interference
problem at the worst case estimated interference signal
strength. More discussion regarding these lab tests will
be presented in the analysis section.
RNA-34BF Receiver Sensitivity Testing
Receiver sensitivity is defined to be the minimum input
signal required to produce a specified output signal with a
certain signal to noise ratio. For the RNA-34BF the
sensitivity is defined as the minimum signal required for
full flag down operation. A lab test was performed to
confirm the RNA-34BF sensitivity figure of 2uV or less.
Again, the RNA-34BF test setup was utilized. The
receiver was allowed to warm up. The signal generator
was set up for VOR mode with a frequency of 110.00
45
MHZ. Additionally, the signal generator was setup with
the chosen heading and a signal identification type set to
tone. Lastly, the signal generator was set to a RF level of
5uV.
The correct bearing and a normal status was observed on
the navigation receiver test set indicator (computer
monitor). The RF level was then gradually decreased
until the status changed from normal to no computed data
(NCD). The signal generator RF level at this point was
1.11uV. The sensitivity specification of 2uV or less was
confirmed.
RNA-34BF Receiver Selectivity Testing
After the sensitivity testing was performed, the RF level
of the signal generator was gradually increased until the
navigation receiver test set indicator showed a 6 dB
stronger signal than the sensitivity threshold.
To gather selectivity curve data, the signal generator
frequency was increased to 110.010 MHZ. The VOR
signal strength reported by the bench test receiver
indicator did not change. The signal generator frequency
was then increased to 110.015 MHZ. The signal
generator RF level was then adjusted to maintain the
VOR signal strength at the center frequency signal
strength. This process of increasing the frequency away
from the center and then adjusting the RF level of the
signal generator was repeated until data points for
+/- 40 KHZ around the center frequency was obtained.
The data obtained is plotted in Figure 5.
The OEM specifies that for +/- 17 KHZ around the center
frequency, the attenuation shall be less than 6 dB. The
data curve confirms this specification.
The OEM specifies that for +/- 31.5 KHZ around the
center frequency, the attenuation shall be greater than
60 dB. Data points at +/- 31.5 KHZ delta around the
center frequency were not collected. The data points at
+/- 35 KHZ were -60.9 dB and -53.2 dB, respectively.
This data indicates that the receiver performance is a little
deficient for that specification.
The OEM specifies that for +/- 40.0 KHZ around the
center frequency, the attenuation shall be greater than
80 dB. The data curve in Figure 5 shows that this
specification is somewhat deficient as well.

Figure 5. Data Curve for Selectivity Experiment
ANALYSIS
Interference Source
The interference signal causing problems for the RNA-
34BF receiver was demonstrated to be the localizer signal
(identification code IPIB) from data collected during
VORTAC flight inspection runs with the localizer on and
off.
RNA-34BF Interference Susceptibility
During the flight inspection runs, the RNA-34BF receiver
was shown to be more susceptible to the localizer
interference signal since neither the front-end receivers
nor the RNA-34AF receiver experienced the interference
problem. The fact that the second RNA-34BF flight
inspection receiver experienced the same bearing and
status problems rules out a problem with one particular
receiver. Both receiver models use the same navigation
antenna mounted at the same location.
However, the lab tests did not duplicate the interference
problem at the estimated localizer signal strength. In fact,
the lab test shows that the RNA-34BF does not lose
normal status until the VOR signal strength is very weak
(-95 dBm) and the interfering localizer signal is very
strong (-15 dBm). This lab test evidence would tend to
indicate that the interfering localizer signal strength
estimation may not be very accurate or that some
unexpected signal is present.
Sensitivity and selectivity lab tests show that the RNA-
34BF is operating within its sensitivity specification, but a
little deficient in its selectivity specification. The
sensitivity and selectivity specifications for the RNA-
34BF and the RNA-34AF receivers are identical.
46
The behavior of the RNA-34BF receiver in the presence
of the strong localizer signal may not simply be due to
insufficient out of channel rejection. Receivers can also
be plagued by front end overload which manifests itself
when the sensitivity of the radio is greatly reduced in the
presence of strong nearby signals. Solid state radios that
operate on small voltages characteristic of transistors may
turn on or saturate in the presence of strong nearby signals
and thus lose its sensitivity for the desired signal. Some
evidence for front end overload may be present in the
flight inspection recording in Figure 3. Notice the signal
strength increase reported by the receiver when the flight
inspection aircraft is over the localizer antenna.
Obviously, the VOR signal strength is not getting
stronger, but the strong localizer signal may be causing
the automatic gain control to reduce sensitivity and thus
lose the intended signal.
Not only will strong nearby signals cause solid state
devices to turn on or saturate and thus reduce sensitivity,
but, in addition, these devices may also operate in their
non-linear regions. Some receivers purposely operate
solid state devices in their non-linear region as a method
of frequency conversion to produce sum and difference
frequencies. Filters are employed immediately after this
type of frequency conversion to eliminate the unwanted
frequencies. However, when devices in the front end of a
receiver operate in this manner, frequency conversion of
nearby unwanted signals occurs causing their modulating
signals to appear in the audio along with the intended
signal. This behavior is known as intermodulation
distortion.
Certainly the 355 radial out path from LBY VORTAC
which positioned the aircraft right over the localizer
antenna could have created conditions for either front end
overload or intermodulation distortion for receivers prone
to those issues.
However, the interference lab tests conducted with both
the RNA-34BF and RNA-34AF showed the two receivers
operate nearly the same in the presence of interference.
Spectrum Planning Concerns
Improper frequency assignment was a concern that was
also checked. Both VOR and Localizer systems use the
same band of frequencies. VOR is assigned 108.0 to
117.95 MHZ. Localizer systems are assigned 108.1 to
111.95 MHZ. In this case, LBY VORTAC uses
110.6 MHZ and the IPIB localizer uses 109.5 MHZ. This
is 1.1 MHZ separation which should be plenty for a VOR
signal using a 9960 subcarrier and localizer carrier
modulated only by 90 and 150 Hz. An engineer at the
Spectrum Testing and Engineering Analysis office
confirmed that the frequency assignments for the LBY
VORTAC and IPIB Localizer were appropriate and that
these frequency assignments had been in use since 1971.
That engineer also stated that some VOR and Localizer
assignments are as close as 500 KHZ apart.

CONCLUSIONS

a. Flight inspection data collected during the LBY

VORTAC inspection shows that the RNA-34BF is
more susceptible to interference than the RNA-34AF
or the front end navigation receivers.

b. Laboratory testing indicates the RNA-34BF receiver

is not operating within its selectivity specifications.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made for the benefit

of flight inspection efficiency.

After the interference source has been identified (a

notable achievement in and of itself sometimes),
measurement of the interference signal strength provides
helpful information. In this situation a good way to do
that would be by tuning the second flight inspection
receiver to the localizer frequency. However, the best
way would be to use a spectrum analyzer to obtain a
complete picture of the signal situation, including any
spurious signals that might be present.

FUTURE WORK

a. Repeat the from radial run for LBY with the RNA-
34BF receivers to confirm the interference issue is
still present. Repeat the from radial run once again
using a spectrum analyzer to measure the signal
strength of the localizer and to identify the existence
of any spurious signals. This data will allow
conclusions to be made regarding proper IPIB
Localizer performance.

b. Perform laboratory selectivity testing of the RNA-

34AF receiver and compare results with the RNA-
34BF selectivity testing.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to acknowledge and thank Dale Rhoads for

passing on his knowledge about laboratory receiver
testing from his past troubleshooting experiences. Dale is
the Branch Manager for the Engineering Group at the
FAAs Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center.

47
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

48
 Aeronautical Interferences Detection, the
Spanish Case David Garca, Aena I nternacional, Carlo s Gime nez, Ae na I nternacio nal, Eduar d Marin, Aena I nternacio nal, & Sajeel Ahme d, Aena Internaciona l

David Garcia
Head of Flight Inspection Unit
Aena Internacional
Madrid, Spain
Fax: +34 91 321 29 55
E-mail: dgasensio@aena.es

Carlos Gimenez
Senior Flight Inspector
Aena Internacional
E-mail: cagimenez@aena.es

Eduard Marin
Senior Flight Inspector
Aena Internacional
E-mail: emarin@aena.es

Sajeel Ahmed
Flight Inspector
Aena Internacional
E-mail: sajeelahmed@aena.es

ABSTRACT Spanish CNS services provider), to find the origin of

some radio frequency interferences, along the year 2013.
Radio Frequency interferences (RFI) are a major concern
for aviation safety, since modern aircraft rely on radio This paper we will present some representative RFI cases
spectrum for navigation and communication in all phases of different nature that were successfully solved as well as
of flight. These interferences affect to the different the equipment and methods used.
services in the aeronautical mobile band (i.e. radio
location, radio navigation, and radio communications). In INTRODUCTION
the case of Spain, in 2013 a total of 100 cases were
officially reported. Since the Flight inspection Unit of Aena Internacional
was established, our aircraft Beechcraft King Air 350 was
Some of these incidents can be solved by the dedicated equipped with a RFI detection system.
ground units of the Telecommunications National
Authority, but many others, given the wide area affected In brief it consists of a "Direction Finder", formed by a
and the fly levels involved, must be addressed from the Cubic receiver 4400, integrated into the AFIS (Automatic
Air. Flight Inspection System). Its sensitivity ranges from 0.1
MHz to 2.0 GHz. This receiver is connected to several
Certain RFI episodes may even lead to the closure of a antenna arrays in L-band (800 MHz to 2000 MHz), VHF
runway which in the case of complex TMA (Terminal (30 to 300 MHz) and UHF (300 MHz to 3 GHz) bands.
Control Area), like Madrid-Barajas may be critical for the These groups of antennae array can be connected in flight
National Airspace Safety. to a spectrum analyzer and/or oscilloscope to allow the
assessment of the spectrum in the affected geographic
In this context the Flight Inspection Unit of Aena area in, the domains of frequency and time.Playing with
International, after several field trials to set up its RFI the phase differences of the signals reaching the arrays,
detection equipment has been requested by AENA (the allows locating the direction of the tuned signal.
Moreover the intersection of successive received courses

49
(DF cross-bearing) on the plane, allows estimating the
distance. The figure below shows the graphical interface
controlling the DF.

1250.000000

Figure 2. Identified origin of RFIs in 2013

Since 2010 Aena Internacional has carried out several RFI

Figure 1. Graphical Interface of Direction Finder
RF Interferences may come from several sources as
electronic and telecommunications systems that are
operating in adjacent bands, such as harmonics of FM,
TV, AM stations and mobile networks that may leak radio
signals.
Interferences in the in the Mobile Aeronautical
Service in Spain
In Spain an average of 100 RFI are reported per year. The
table below shows the statistics for Spain in the last 4
years [1]. It shows that the most frequent events are the
ones related with Radio Communications. However the
interferences affecting navigation and radiolocation
systems although few (only 6 cases in 2013), they are a
priority for the potential risk they pose to the safety of air
navigation and human life.
detection test flights in the L, VHF and UHF bands, using
known sources such as FM radio stations, aeronautical
communications radio stations and L band test emitters.
Once the equipment was properly set up and calibrated
and the operational procedures defined, AENA called the
Unit to intervene in three cases along 2013.
Two of them affected the radio communications and a
third a ILS/DME signal.
INTERFERENCE SEARCH CASES
Interference in the 32 R DME of the Adolfo Suarez-
Madrid Barajas Airport
In early July of 2013 an interference was reported by
several commercial traffics in the localizer of the runway
32R from mile 17 to mile 3 of DME.

Table 1. Mobile Aeronautical Service Interferences in The flight check took place the 3rd of July. The following
Spain manoeuvers were carried out:
2010 2011 2012 2013
Mobile Aeronautical Service 94 109 74 100 Two orbits 35 (one for each TX LOC) at
Radio Navigation 3 4 1 5
Radio Communications 77 104 70 94
15NM DME from THR of RWY 32R (16,6NM
Other 14 1 3 1 DME from Localizer (LOC) at 5000ft MSL.

The following chart represents the distribution of the 3 ILS approaches from 17 NM from THR in
Mobile Aeronautical Service RFIs in Spain in 2013, RWY 32R (18,6NM DME from LOC) at 5000ft
classified by its origin. MSL; two approaches for each TX and a third
approach with the ILS equipment switched off.

A poor Clearance signal below 150A beyond 15 of the

LOC was measured. The nominal width for both TX was
correct

Possible oscillations in the LOC axis were also observed,

as Seem in the two figures below for the LOC course
structure and the coverage orbit.

50
. A Flight was executed 3 days later to verify the signal
was correct again. See figure below showing a correct
LOC signal.

Figure 3. Oscillations in LOC course structure due to

interference

Figure 5. LOC signal after the interfering emissions

were canceled

Interference In The DME IVC Of Valencia Airport

Multiple DME unlocks were reported by commercial

traffics in Valencia airport Runway 30 approach. An
interference seemed to affect the response of ILS/DME
IVC that had been observed in previous calibration
flights.

The origin was suspected by the maintenance staff as

produced by multipath.
Figure 4. LOC coverage 17NM TX1 at 5000ft MSL
The flight tests were conducted the 18th of July in the
By monitoring the LOC-DME frequency 109,1 Mhz Valencia airport, consisting of:
identification codes a commercial radio station was
THR Approach, from 12 to -1 [NM], 3000 [ft]
audible in both TX
IVC DME Orbit 10 [NM] CW, 3500 [ft]
The signal was so low that the direction finder was unable
to provide a clear location. The main purpose of the flight was to monitor with the
oscilloscope the DME answer channel 38X at 999 Mhz
However the audio file provided enough clues as to signal .
identify a radio local FM station situated in the nearby
province of Toledo. As can be seem in the figure below, a replected response
pulse pair is recived, separated just 7 s of the direct one.
The interference was produced by an harmonic of the
107.4 Mhz nominal frequency of the FM station,
superimposed in the 109.1 Mhz LOC frequency.

The FM station was located as far as 45 NM southwest

from the runway 32R.

The information was passed to the Telecommunications

Authority that enforced the cease of emissions until
adequate filters were implemented.

51
 7s
Figure 6. Multipath Pulses in DME IVC response
These values were used by the AENA experts to draw
ellipses of constant delay at 7s to help in finding the
potential sources of multipath [2].
This allowed identifying the responsible new
infrastructures in the approach area.
The implementation of a more directive DME antenna has
been deemed the most reasonable solution.
Interference In The Aeronautical Communications
Band Second of the Alicante Area
A discontinuous interference was detected in the 124.750
MHz operations communications frequency by several
commercial and military traffics since early June of 2013.
It affected a wide area of more than 85 NM in diameter in
west provinces of Alicante, Albacete, Murcia y Valencia
(see figure below), at high altitude, from flight level 120
to 200.
After multiple measurements at various locations at
ground level through mobile units the
Telecommunications Authority could not detect the
source of interference.
52
50 nm
Figure 7. Map with the area of influence of the RFI
Operational approach
In order to search the interference the aircraft was
positioned at Valencia airport the 17th of August. When
the first interference occurrences in 124.75 Mhz
frequency were reported, it stopped to be used for
operations and the three remote stations. (Valencia-
Aitana-Alicante), were switched off to avoid mislead the
search.
Then the aircraft took off and once in the air the RFI was
detected in the KATAL point and tuned in the DF in the
FMW (FM wide) mode. The guiding was past to the
cockpit, leading to an approximate point around which a
orbit was made at 2000ft MSL to refine the result (see
figure bellow)
Figure 8. Orbit around the Suspected Point
The point 38 05 12.5983 N / 00 44 24.0202 W, was Using the same strategy the point 38 05 01.6150 N/ 00
obtained with a positioning error of 0.9NM. 43 56.9963 W, near the previous one) was obtained
with a positioning error of 0.8NM (See figure below).
The same pattern was followed the next day starting again
from Valencia airport, when the interference was noticed
by commercial traffics and flying at FL 170. This time the
RFI was not detected until the Alicante approach.

Figure 9. Map Showing the Trajectory.

The spectrum in the first figure below shows the

operations frequency free of interferences, and the second
one when in presence of the RFI:

Figure 11. Spectrum of Ops frequency in presence of

RFI

The point was situated in an industrial park. Out of band

Figure 10. Spectrum with frequency free of RFI emissions of two radio stations were detected by the
mobile ground units of the Spanish Telecommunications
Authority.

53
CONCLUSIONS

The RFI detection system onboard the Flight Inspection

aircraft has shown to be a powerful tool to detect RF
perturbations in the Aeronautical Mobile Service, when
affecting wide areas. In some cases the audio and
recordings can give us direct clues when the signal comes
from commercial radio stations, in other cases the geo-
location gives a reduced area where the ground mobile
units systems can complete the work at a cheaper cost.

FUTURE WORK

The Division of Communications of the Systems

Direction of AENA Navigation is developing a
collaboration agreement with the Spanish
Telecommunications Authority on interference detection,
in order to offer the services of the Unit. To this end, a
technical report was sent in March 2013 describing the
technical means available in the Unit.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We want to thank Dr. Rolf Seide from Aerodata, for his

advice and support in setting up the DF equipment and
helping us in defining our RFI search procedures.

REFERENCES

[1] Statistics and report on RFI in Spain 2013

http://www.minetur.gob.es/telecomunicaciones/Espectro/
CTER/Estadsticas%20interferencias/Estadisticas-
informes-interferencias-radioelectricas2013.pdf
[2] Berz, G.; Bredemeyer, J.; Qualifying DME for
RNAV Use; Proceedings of the 15th International Flight
Inspection Symposium
http://icasc.co/sites/faa/uploads/documents/resources/15th
_int_flight_inspection_symposium/qualifying_dme.pdf

54
 Advanced Theory and Results of Classical System
Simulations and Related Flight Inspection Dr. Gerhard Greving, NAVCOM Co ns ult, Wo lf-Dieter Biermann, NAVC OM Co nsult, & Rolf M undt, NAVCOM C ons ult

Gerhard Greving, Wolf-Dieter Biermann, Rolf Mundt

NAVCOM Consult
Ziegelstr.43
71672 Marbach/Germany
Fax: +49 7144 862561
E-mail: navcom.consult@t-online.de

ABSTRACT template unique for each system reaching up to 15km for

VOR/DVOR, the building application can be approved
Typical actual tasks of (new) system installations or new directly by non-experts in the first formal step 1. If the
objects close to existing systems are: objects penetrate this template surface, the effects have to
Design, installation and flight check of systems be analyzed in step 2 by an appropriate engineering
(ILS, VOR/DVOR etc.) analysis and experts, i.e. as defined by adequate and real
computer simulations according state-of-the-art SOA
Design and approval, construction and flight
methodology (Fig. 1, Fig. 4). It does not mean explicitly
check of large objects (e.g. terminals, wind
that the application is automatically rejected if the
turbines WTs).
template is penetrated. The approval criteria are the
The system simulations play a major role during the applicable specifications, i.e. ICAO Annex 10 ([1]) and
design phase in both cases, but also in case of detected associated applicable ICAO-documents (i.e. DOC8071
system distortions in flight checks by analyzing and e.g. in case of CVOR/DVOR systems which are mainly
explaining these effects. This cannot be achieved by flight evaluated in this paper).
checks often due to time/cost constraints.

This paper will give first an overview by actual examples

about most modern system simulation techniques, such as
3D-simulations under difficult near-field conditions and
including Doppler effects for VOR/DVOR which cannot
be handled by standard methodology, e.g. effects of large
aircraft taxiing in a distance of 110m only to a terminal
DVOR or large objects such as WTs close to a
VOR/DVOR. The latter are an actual conflicting problem
in many countries. Latest methodology and results will be
shown for the tolerance analysis for parameter variations
(wind, rotor) and large wind-farms. Statistical evaluation
of the bearing errors is shown in the context of ICAO-
specifications. Flight check results are discussed in this
context mainly during the conference itself.

INTRODUCTION; SYSTEM SIMULATIONS

Building applications (Fig. 1) have to be approved when

the locations of the applied objects are in some critical
distance to radiating systems, such as navigation-, Fig. 1: Process of a building application; role of flight inspection
landing- or radar systems. ICAO EUR DOC 015 ([2]) and numerical simulations
describes a scheme how to process such an application
procedure: If the objects do not penetrate a 3D-surface

55
The building applications are plans for future buildings
which are not yet realized and which have each time
unique features and different geometrical and electrical
characteristics, e.g. for the
detailed layout of a taxiway and type of taxiing
aircraft very close to a DVOR/DME (Fig. 2; [4]),
large wind farm of very large WT close to a
DVOR/DME (e.g. example of a layout Fig. 3).
By that, whatever type of measurements cannot help in
principal in the approval process for future developments
because the real field measurements show always the
status quo without the future unique plans. However, the
measurements, e.g. flight check measurements are very
useful in the validation process of the applied simulation
methodology and for the final results (Fig. 1).
Fig. 2: The rapid exit TWY and DVOR system scenario in detail
Fig. 3: Planned wind farm in close distance to a DVOR
Modern numerical systems simulations (Fig. 1, Fig. 4)
integrate the most modern sufficiently proven
56
electromagnetic scattering and wave propagation methods
with the system specific aspects, such as receiving
principles and adapted signal processing schemes. These
general methods comprise the more general complex
near-field capabilities as well as the far-field
approximations for simplicity if justified. The modeling
of the scattering and of the wave propagation is in a way
safely established in the electromagnetics community that
no surprises have to be expected for experts.
The boundary conditions (e.g. antennas, objects,
ground/terrain) are stable and well defined for each field
point to be considered in space on the orbits, radials etc.
The superposition of the direct and the scattered signals at
the distributed objects and at the ground forms the total
interference field where the amplitudes and phases vary
in space accordingly in a well-defined deterministic way.
No undetermined processes, e.g. noise or other
dynamic effects appear in the radiation field itself, but
may appear tentatively in the receivers at low power
levels or in the signal processing as unwanted and
artificial additional bearing errors or spectral
components. The dynamic of the aircraft movement on
the orbits or radials can be sufficiently and well founded
treated as a successive sequence of stationary cases for
different field points. If all these facts would not hold
sufficiently on the field level, a good agreement between
(flight check) measurements and numerical simulations
could not be achieved at all (see Fig. 9, Fig. 10 as
validation examples). The following details of some
decisive practical aspects in the IHSS-simulation-
methodology (Fig. 1, Fig. 4) are listed
3D-modeling of the decisive system components to
the extent required for accurate results , e.g. the
radiating antennas, in case the pattern rotation
3D-modelling of the distorting objects, e.g. aircraft,
WT again to the extent required for sufficiently
accurate results
selection of the adequate scattering and wave
propagation methodology,
application of the adequate signal processing, i.e.
for the bearing error in case of the VOR/DVOR.
If the objects are very close to the VOR/DVOR, i.e. in the
mutual near-field, and if the geometrical extension is
large (Fig. 6), the standard simulation schemes cannot be
applied for these cases. The IHSS (Fig. 4) contains a
highly special and effective scheme, namely the so-called
near-field spectral scheme which is rigorous and which
treats the mutually coupled object as part of the system
antenna resulting finally in the bearing error after an
adapted modern signal processing. The impact of the
objects on the 30Hz-FM is simulated and interpreted as
the bearing error according to the basic DVOR-
definition. Almost arbitrary objects and counterpoises
can be handled above ground.
The validation results in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 have been
obtained with this near-field spectral simulation
scheme.
Fig. 4: Flow chart of the general IHSS simulation tool
VOR-SYSTEM; SPECIFICATIONS, VALIDATIONS
Some VOR Basics for a Multipath Environment
The VOR/DVOR-system is operated satisfactoryy already
since more than 55 years ([5], [6]). It provides the used
relative azimuth angle in the receiver by the phase
comparison of the omni-directional 30Hz-reference to the
variable 30Hz (Fig. 5, Fig. 6).
Fig. 5: General distortion scenario of the VOR/DVOR
The well-known basic conceptual system bearing errors
of the VOR/DVOR are shown in Fig. 7. It shows the
theoretical envelope of the real scalloping bearing errors
for an idealized omni-scatterer of -20dB amplitude
positioned at the azimuth 90.
57
The possible theoretically large improvement of DVOR
compared to VOR can be deducted from Fig. 7 which
depends on the difference angle. It can be seen as well
that in the DVOR-case the bearing error is reduced at
30 already to less than 50% while for the VOR-case an
angular sector of 90 has to be evaluated to find the
maximum bearing error by some scatterer.
Fig. 6: VOR/DVOR Distortion Scenario for very Close and
Extended Objects
Fig. 7: Conceptual system bearing error of the VOR/DVOR for
an idealized -20dB omni-scatterer
Some VOR Specifications; Comments, Interpretations
The applicable VOR-specifications are defined in
principle by ICAO Annex 10 SARPs, but unfortunately
not for the important multipath scattering case. These
missing specifications are defined in DOC8071 for flight
inspection acceptance purposes. The following table
shows the most important spec parameters and some
aspects. DOC8071 can be treated as a quasi-SARP
being referenced throughout many ICAO Annexes and
DOCs, e.g. ICAO Annex 10,ICAO Annex 11.
The ground station error g(except the north alignment n)
is part of the bends in the statistical rss-sense based on
dynamic field characteristics (Fig. 8), namely the
 dynamic movement of the navigating aircraft, the scattering object which is per fundamental VOR-
the electrically wide distribution of the scattering definition the bearing error. An excellent agreement of
objects and of the VOR/DVOR. the IHSS-results with the flight inspection results can be
By that, the error components (g, b) cannot be added or seen despite the challenging scenarios. This applies for
subtracted linearly, but have to be processed by the rss- the larger maximum distortions of up to 4.5 (Fig. 9) as
scheme if not assessed by the simulations directly. well as for the much smaller ones up to 0.9 in Fig. 10.
This good agreement validates as well the modeling and
ICAO DOC Parameter / errors value SARPS verifies the completeness of the simulations and in turn
validates the measurements too by the mutual agreement.
Annex 10 ground station g 2 yes
(incl. north alignment n )
Examples for comparable and clearly identifiable flight
8071 bends b 3.5*) no check measurement results for WTs do not exist for the
8071 R/S (short time, high frequ.) 3 no
VOR/DVOR-system because

8071 Sum: bends + R/S 6.5*) no first, simply, the WTs so far are not located in
sufficiently close effective distances.
Attc.C/8071 Probability 95% ~yes
Annex 11 second, the simulations are done for fully metallic
worst case models as proposed in [1], [2] which
(*) north alignment to be considered
exaggerates the effects.
Approximately, several scatterers can be taken into
account by its components bi in the rss-scheme (1).

2
= + 1 2
+ 2 2
+ + 2
+ 3.5 (1)

If the VOR/DVOR is well adjusted, the north alignment

error is small and gg.
The pure ground station error g of modern VOR-systems
can be kept small as well ([5]), typically around 0.5.

Fig. 9: Validation of Simulations by Flight Inspection (1)

Fig. 8: Superposition of Complex Field Components

Some Validation Results for the VOR-Simulations

Fig. 10: Validation of simulations by flight inspection (2)
Two validation DVOR-examples for the IHSS-
methodology are shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 for very
close and large building complexes which can be
adequately simulated only by the above mentioned near-
field spectral scheme of the IHSS-methodology. This
scheme simulates the change of the 30Hz-FM-phase by

58
WIND TURBINES/FARMS AND DVOR-SYSTEMS
3D-modelling of Wind Turbines
A wind turbine is a widely normal scattering object
within the IHSS and has to be modeled according to the
established simulation rules.
Fig. 11 shows the 3D-model of an extremely large turbine
of the 200m-class; left the standard worst case metallic
3D-model and right the substitution of the mostly
dielectric rotor by the lightning protection system.
The 3D-model (Fig. 11 left) consists of a large number of
metallic triangles (about 51000 triangles)
describing sufficiently the geometry of the turbine
and its 3D-components and also
support sufficiently the induced current on the
surface.
This procedure is modern, but along well established
electromagnetic theory ([3] etc.) for solving boundary
value problems. The wave propagation part assumes in a
first step that a flat ground is effective which is often fully
sufficient for the horizontal polarization of the VOR-
system and the VHF-frequency. If the ground is not flat
by valleys and hills or mountains, the integrated method
of Parabolic Equation PE is applied in a 2nd step (Fig. 4).
Fig. 11: Numerical 3D-models, worst case fully metallic (left);
with lightning protection system (right)
Numerical Results for DVOR and Wind Turbines
The following numerical results (bearing error, statistics)
are presented first for a single turbine in a close distance.
59
It is argued and suspected ([1],[2]) that the maximum
bearing error would depend very sensitively and seriously
on the wind direction and rotor orientation.
Single Wind Turbine and 3D metallic blades
To clarify this aspect, systematic evaluations of a
relatively close large wind turbine (d=2783m) for a
DVOR are carried out. The wind direction and the rotor
orientation are varied systematically in steps of 15, i.e.
192 combinations in total. The bearing error is calculated
for each combination in a 30 sector (Fig. 7, Fig. 13) up
to a distance of 40nm for an operationally relevant height,
i.e. 5100ft MSL for the evaluated DVOR.
Fig. 12 shows the graphical 3D-presentation of the
maximum bearing errors of each of the 192 sector
calculations. The absolute maximum bearing error is
0.46 out of 192*72057=13834944 field points in total. It
is obvious that the numerical effort is very large to
achieve these results.
Fig. 12: Max bearing error for 192 combinations of wind
direction and rotor position; full metallic rotor
Fig. 13: Bearing error in a 30 sector for one large turbine for
the worst case combination of Fig. 12
 Bearing error / 95% 99% 99.9% max
It is important to note that the 30-sector (Fig. 13)
contains the color coded bearing errors of all radials and Single turbine 0.15 0.23 0.33 0.46
orbits in that sector in the analyzed height. Also, it can be
17 turbines 0.36 0.64 0.92 1.32
seen that the bearing errors for the DVOR are negligible
outside the 30 sector by the small figures at the outer ratio 2.4 2.8 2.8 2.9
azimuthal sector borders. The largest bearing errors are
roughly at the region of the DVOR-peaks shown in Fig. 7. Single; lightning 0.15 0.19 0.22 0.25

A related statistical histogram of all the 13834944 Table 1: Statistical bearing errors (rss: 17=4.1)
individual bearing error values is shown in Fig. 14. It can
be clearly seen that the maximum bearing error of 0.46 is
extremely rare. The 95%, 99% and 99.9% error levels are
marked. While in the ICAO-docs a 95% probability is
used, it is suggested to treat the 99% threshold as a safe
representative figure to characterize the bearing
distortions of the simulated scenario. In this case, the
99% error is 0.23 while the 95%-figure is only 0.15.
These small error figures cannot be measured uniquely by
flight inspection. At lower input power levels typical
VOR-receivers show larger random bearing errors even
for a high performance VOR-signal-generator input.

Fig. 15: Bearing error in a 74-sector for 17 large WTs

Fig. 14: Statistics of the max bearing errors (Fig. 12)

Wind farm of 17 Wind Turbine

The bearing error impacts of the total windfarm of 17

WTs (Fig. 3; 200m WTs) has been analyzed for several
scenarios, such as the general wind directions. Fig. 15
shows the case where the closest turbine has been setted
for the worst case determined by the results in Fig. 12 and
Fig. 14. The other 16 WTs are oriented in azimuth 5
random hereto and the rotor position is random. The
resulting maximum worst case extremely rare bearing
error is 1.32 and the 99% error is 0.64 respectively.
Table 1 shows the bearing errors for comparison for the
different probabilities. It can be seen that the rss-
superposition would be clearly result in larger bearing
errors.
Fig. 16: Statistics of the sector bearing errors (Fig. 15)
Single Wind Turbine and lightning protection system
The results in Fig. 17 and Fig. 18 show the bearing errors
for the same single wind turbine if the fully metallic 3D-
blades are substituted by the integrated metallic wire-type
lightning protection system. The resulting bearing errors
are clearly smaller than for the fully metallic voluminous
case as expected.
When comparing Fig. 17 and Fig. 12, clear differences
can be seen. The 3D-metallic blades do have much more

60
impact than the wire-type lightning protection system as
expected. Also, by comparing in addition the statistical
histograms (Fig. 18, Fig. 14) it can be clearly seen that
the maxima are reduced from 0.46 to 0.25, but the 95%
figures are the same (0.15) in both cases.
The real bearing errors in the field will be in between, but
clearly smaller than the worst case figures as requested by
the ICAO recommendations ([1],[2]).
The developed near-field spectral approach within the
IHSS (Fig. 4) enables the numerical simulation of these
effects. Fig. 19 shows some of the discrete rotation steps
of the blades. The radial speed of each of the triangles of
the blades is different, but contributes according to the
scattering pattern to the complex field components
scattered to the field point under consideration on the
orbit or on the radial.
Fig. 20 shows the additional bearing error generated by a
medium sized wind turbine for rotation rates from 0rpm
to 30rpm. The blade circle is assumed to be oriented by
45 relative to the radial from the DVOR to the turbine. It
can be seen that the resulting bearing error depends on the
rotor angle, but its amplitude is negligible.

Fig. 17: Max bearing error for 192 combinations of wind

direction and rotor position; lightning protection system

Fig. 19: Approximate discrete blade rotation

Fig. 18: Statistics of the max bearing errors in Fig. 17

Doppler effect by the rotating blades

The DVOR relies in its variable 30Hz FM phase on the

Doppler frequency effect by the rotating DVOR
sidebands. It is suspected that the rotating blades could
generate 30Hz components which might affect
significantly the bearing error of a DVOR.

While the sidebands are rotating with 30Hz, the blades

rotate in space with its own turning rate. Within a
rotation period of the DVOR (1/30sec) the blades have Fig. 20: Additional DVOR angle bearing error caused by
turned somewhat according to the rotation rate. rotating blades and different rotation rates (0rpm - 30rpm)

61
Some generic results for large close wind farms
Wind farms consist normally of irregularly distributed
WTs. Also often different types of WTs are installed in
the same wind farm. However, it is of relevant for the
approving organizations to have available some
systematic generic simulations of the worst case effects to
be expected. Fig. 21 shows an example of a large number
of WTs in some distance around the DVOR CRP. More
than 130 WTs are installed in a distance up to 10km, more
than 170 up to 15km without compromising the DVOR
performance shown by flight inspection.
Fig. 21: Example of a large number of WTs located on an
irregular pattern around the DVOR CRP
Adequately powerful simulation tools (Fig. 4) allow
systematic simulations of the impact of increasing number
of WTs in some distance assuming certain grid constraints
and illumination conditions.
Fig. 22 shows such an example where up to 9*9 WTs on
a regular grid (dx=dy=300m) are simulated for the
minimum distance of 5000m to a standard DVOR. The
evaluated sector is 30 up to 40nm in the low height of
3000ft. The rotor circle is randomly facing (5) the
DVOR. The orientation of the rotor is random. It can be
seen that the very rare maximum error would be hardly
acceptable for the larger arrays, but the 99%-errors seem
to be acceptable even for 81 WTs (<1.1).
62
Fig. 22: Systematic generic simulation of the DVOR bearing
error for large WTs on a regular grid; random orientation of rotor
and wind direction 5; dmin=5000m
Other relevant generic examples and results will be
presented on the conference.
CONCLUSIONS; RECOMMENDATIONS
The system theory, the general applied electromagnetic
theory and the basics of the numerics of the simulation of
large WTs in some distance to a DVOR have been
outlined. Simulation details of the advanced methodology
and of the advanced new nearfield spectral approach have
been referenced. Validation examples have been shown
with an excellent agreement between the simulations and
the flight check measurements. This mutual agreement
confirms that the 3D-modelling of the DVOR-system, of
the WT and of the propagation channel is correct and
complete and that the presented simulations comprise the
relevant effects.
It can be concluded from the systematic simulations as a
recommendation that the test radius up to 15km ([2]) can
be safely generally reduced for DVOR easily down to
10km. In most cases a distance of 5km is safe for DVOR
or even closer down to 2km. However it depends on the
number and size of the distributed WTs, on the given
performance and on the use of the installed DVOR. A
reliable computer simulation according validated SOA-
methodology has to be applied which is available today.
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO, July 1996, International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annex 10 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Volume 1, Radio Navigation Aids,
5th Edition, http://www.icao.int
[2] ICAO EUR DOC015, European guidance material on
managing building restricted areas, 2009
[3] Lo Y.T., Lee S.W. Antenna Handbook, Vol. I, II; Van
Nostrand, NewYork 1993
[4] G. Greving, W.-D. Biermann, R. Mundt Navigation
System Simulations with Integrated Scattering Analysis and
Advanced Signal Processing; ICEAA, Sept 2013, Torino/Italy
G. Greving, Computer Simulations and 3D-Modelling
of Systems and Objects in Aviation - Methodology and Results
of Distortion Analysis; EMS 2012, Malta Nov 2012
[5] Hurley H.C., Anderson S.R., Keary H.F. The CAA
VHF omnirange, Proc. IRE, vol. 47, No. 5, Dec 1951, pp.
1506-1520
[6] Anderson S. R., and Flint R. B., The CAA Doppler
Omnirange, Proc. IRE, vol. 47, No. 5, May 1959, pp. 808-821
[7] Greving G., Wrth H., A new VOR-antenna in slot
technology, 13th EUMW, Nrnberg Sept 1983, pp. 395-400
[8] Odunaiya S., Gomez F. Doppler VOR performance
when located 125-feet above the ground, 12th IFIS, Toulouse,
June 2002, pp.119-127

63
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

64
 Session 3
Flight Inspection of ILS
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 ILS Simulation for Flight Inspection Bertrand Spitz, ENAC U niversity

Bertrand Spitz
ILS instructor / expert
ENAC
Toulouse, France
Fax: +33 562 17 42 70
E-mail: bertrand.spitz@enac.fr

ABSTRACT understanding of the different problems that can affect the

system.
Flight inspection of the Instrument Landing System (ILS)
can sometimes be quite challenging. ATOLL (Localizer) Over the time a lot of features have been added and the
and LAGON (Glide path) ILS simulation software tool is now well suited for:
packages are designed to help flight inspectors for a better
and quicker analysis of the recorded plots and thus reduce Initial training
the number of flight hours during commissioning and Continuous education
routine flight checks. All important settings on the real Tracking down equipment and antenna errors
equipment can be simulated: Transmitter adjustments, Training for flight inspection crews
antenna positions and feeding, diffraction of the radiated Assessing the impact of buildings and taxiing
signal from surrounding objects, as well as settings in the aircrafts using the method of Physical Optics
Flight Inspection Systems (FIS). All these features are Illustrating errors coming from the Flight
well suited for initial and continuous training for flight Inspection System (FIS) itself
inspectors.
This paper will present some of the features implemented
It is also possible to import plots from different flight in the software packages and how they can be used from
inspection systems as well as from ground inspection the flight inspector point of view.
systems. It is thus very easy to compare plot records with
simulations and determine which maladjustments led to LOCALIER SIMULATION
the errors on the flight inspection records. ATOLL and
LAGON can thus help flight inspectors to track down The localizer simulation program is called ATOLL for
equipment and antenna errors in their daily job. Advanced Training On LocaLizer. It consists of a main
panel from which you can access all features available in
This presentation will show a few examples of plot the software.
analysis using ATOLL and LAGON and how terrain
slopes and FIS settings change the shape of the plots for a Most of the space on this panel is used for the graphical
correctly adjusted GP. representations of the simulations. The graph displays the
simulations in a similar way as what you can see on Flight
INTRODUCTION inspection system screens.

Providing a good understanding of the ILS system to Three simulation modes are available:
technicians, engineers or flight inspection crews proves to
be difficult because a lot of parameters have an impact on Orbit mode
the radiated and measured signal. It is not often possible Approach mode
to play with an ILS station just to provide training to Sensitive area mode
the ground or flight inspection staff. The French Civil
Aviation University (ENAC) decided therefore by the end In this paper we are going to put the focus on the 2 first
of the 90th to develop an ILS simulation tool in order to modes.
help ILS instructors explaining the principles and the
adjustment procedures of the ILS and to facilitate the

67
 Approach flights simulations

On the Approach tab one can set the parameters of the

flight path for an approach

Figure 3. Approach tab

Begin and End distances of the track

Computation step
Figure 1. Main panel of ATOLL Approach azimuth
Vertical approach profile
Orbit flights simulations

On the Orbit tab one can set the parameters of the track
followed by the aircraft.

Runway layout panel

Before starting a simulation one must set the runway

parameters. A click on the Runway button opens the
runway panel.
Figure 2. Orbit tab

Begin and end azimuth of the track

Computation step
Distance and height of the track
Selection of some kind of commercial receivers
showing sometimes non-conventional behavior
of the DDM

Figure 4. Runway panel

Speed of the receiver. This will automatically From this panel one can set:
adjust the low pass filter according ICAO
recommendations Runway length
Localizer setback
A click on the START button will start the simulation and
Sector width, manual or computed from the 2
display the plot on the graph.
above inputs
Antenna array
Transmitter type
Localizer frequency

68
 GP angle for setting point C on the approach
plots
These settings can be saved and recalled later if one wants
to perform new simulations on a given localizer station.
Antenna feeding errors coming for example from bad
soldering or some moisture in the connectors can also be
added.

It is also possible to define a complete layout including

the taxiways. This feature is interesting when computing
sensitive areas.

Figure 7. Electrical settings tab

Figure 5. Runway panel with taxiways layout Example of ground plot analysis

Antenna settings panel In order to analyze and compare measurements with

simulations it is possible to import ground or flight
The antenna setting panel has 2 tabs, one for the inspection measurements.
mechanical setting and the other for the electrical settings.

Figure 6. Mechanical settings tab

From the mechanical settings tab one can select the
antenna type, the spacing between the antennas. It is also
possible to add some antenna placing errors.
The antenna feedings tab permits to set the amplitude and
the phase of the feedings of the signals to the antennas.
Figure 8. Ground inspection plot example
In this imported ground measurement file we can see a
strong offset of the DDM along the runway centerline
(15A). We are now going to analyze this plot in order to
identify the possible origins of this error.

69
DDM Modulation Balance error
The basic transmitter adjustment panel gives access to the
adjustments available on all kind of transmitters and
permits to test some transmitter maladjustments.
If we set the DDM modulation balance to +15A we get
the following plot.
Figure 9. Basic adjustments panel
Figure 9 shows that a wrong DDM mod balance can in
fact bring a similar effect as the recorded one.
For some ILS systems the complete block diagram with
all the adjustments available on the real equipment can be
displayed.
Figure 10. Example of transmitter panel
It is therefore possible to simulate more transmitter
specific maladjustments and see how they can change the
recorded signal in space.
Coming back to the DDM offset from the example we are
looking at, it is easy to check on the ground if the DDM
mod balance is not correctly adjusted and correct it. So
we need to see if some other errors can lead to the same
effect.
70
Sideway shift of the antenna array.
In the antenna panel it is possible to simulate a sideway
shift of all antennas. This could happen if the middle of
the antenna array is not aligned with the runway center
line.
The simulation shows that a sideway shift of 1m (3.3ft)
gives a completely different shape of the DDM as
compared to the measured one.
Figure 11. Sideway shift of antenna array
We can conclude that this error cannot be the cause of the
recorded behavior.
Angular alignment error of antenna array
In the antenna panel it is possible to simulate an angular
alignment error of the antenna array. Lets introduce a
rotation of -0.29.
Figure 12. Rotation of antenna array
One may note that we get a behavior close to the
measurement. This illustrates how accurate an antenna
array has to be setup in order to get a correct radiated
signal. If the mechanical alignment cannot be corrected it
may be necessary to trim the feeding cables to the
antennas. This can also be simulated in the antenna panel.
It can be seen on Figure 12 that the simulated plot is
diverging from the measurement after point E.

A closer look at the antenna array in this case shows a

sideway slope of the terrain in front of the antennas.

Figure 13. Terrain slope in front of antenna array

Introducing this terrain slope in the simulation gives the
following result.
Figure 15. Scattering objects panel
With this feature it is easy to demonstrate what flight
inspectors could expect to see on a measurement if there
is a reflection from the course signal or from the clearance
signal and thus determine the location of the disturbing
object.

Figure 14. Simulation with terrain slope in front of

antenna array

We can now see that the simulation is very similar to the

record and that we found the reason of the strange
behavior of the DDM.

Scattering objects panel

Obstacles, such as taxiing aircrafts, cranes or buildings

present in the vicinity of the runway can produce
unwanted multipath signals, thus degrading the
performance of the ILS.

The method of Physical Optics (PO) on a rectangular

plate is used to simulate the objects that may disturb the
ILS signal.

One can add these objects and set their location and size
from the Scattering objects panel.

Figure 16. Example of a course reflection (top) and a

clearance reflection (bottom)

71
Correlation tests between measurements and simulations
show good agreement.

Here is an example from an airport with 3 major objects:

the control tower, the terminal and a hangar on the
opposite site of the runway.

Figure 19. LAGON main panel

For flight inspection simulation the following modes are

Figure 17. Example of object scattering: the most useful:
Airport layout
Approach mode
On the graph below we can see in green the simulation of Level Approach mode
the field strength recorded along the runway center line Azimuth orbit
and in blue the measurement. The upper plots are related
to the course signal and the bottom plots are related to the GP Layout Panel
clearance signal.
In this panel one can set:

Terrain parameters (slopes and height)

Aiming point height
Antenna positions
Near field monitor position
GP type
Frequency
Published approach angle
Theoretical RDH (Reference Datum Height).
Figure 18. Example of object scattering: This value will be used for computing the
Field strength correlation setback of the GP mast.

We can see quite good agreement between simulations

and measurements.

GLIDE PATH SIMULATION

The glide path simulation program is called LAGON for

Learning About Glide for Overall Needs. It consists of a
main panel from which you can access to all features
available in the software. The user interface is similar to
the one in ATOLL.

They are much more receiver track options available in

LAGON than in ATOLL. Some of them are similar to
flight inspection trajectories and some others are more
useful for training purpose, checking adjustment methods
Figure 20. GP Layout panel (1)
and troubleshooting of the system.

72
It is also possible to display the theoretical approach path
and the real locus of DDM=0A as shown below.
Figure 21. GP Layout panel (2)
From this panel one can open the Topography panel
which can be used to compute the average reflection
plane from terrain survey data.
Figure 22. Topography panel
Example of flight plot analysis
In this example we are going to analyze the impact of the
setting of the aiming point height in the flight inspection
system (FIS) on the measured DDM on an approach at the
nominal GP angle.
First we simulate an approach with all parameters set to
nominal and no terrain slopes.
73
Figure 23. Nominal approach
We see the normal flare of the plot when coming closer to
the antennas because of the hyperbolic shape of the
DDM=0A position points.
Lets now introduce a Forward Slope (FSL) of the terrain
of +0.3 LAGON calculates the height of the theoretical
Aiming Point: -1.83m.
After setting the correct antenna heights and using this
value for the reference flight path we get the following
plot.
Figure 24. Nominal approach with FSL=+0.3
One may note that we get a similar shape as without FSL
if everything is correctly adjusted.
If we set now the Aiming Point to 0.0m with regard to the
threshold we get the following plot.
 Figure 25. FSL=+0.3, Aiming Point height =0.0m

We can see that without any change in the GP parameters

settings we get a completely different picture. The
average approach angle and the Threshold Crossing Figure 27. Monitor Combining Unit
Height (TCH) computed from the recorded data have
This panel simulates accurately the real MCU and
changed even if the signal in space did not change. This is
features the same adjustment devices. It is also possible to
a good illustration on the importance for the flight
add some errors to the probes coupling and cabling. At
inspection crew to find and set correctly the Aiming Point
the bottom the monitor readings are displayed. These
height in the FIS.
values are also available in the signal measurement panel.
Antenna Distribution Unit

This panel gives access to all the adjustments available in

the Antenna Distribution Unit of the real equipment
(phase shifters and power dividers).

Figure 28. GP signal measurements panel

The Signal Measurement panel is very useful because it

displays simultaneously the far field readings as seen by
the flight inspection receiver, the monitor readings and
the near field monitor readings. It is therefore easy to see
how some maladjustments or errors are seen from the
ground in comparison of what is seen from the air.

Scattering objects and terrain panel

This panel features 2 tabs, one for the scattering objects

and the other for adding some terrain unevenness.

Figure 26. Antenna Distribution Unit

It is possible to simulate antenna errors as well as special

settings needed during flight inspection like disconnecting
some signals to given antennas or adding quadrature
stubs. The main adjustments from the transmitter are also
available from this panel. The button on the right opens
the Monitor Combining Unit (MCU).

74
 Figure 31. Imported plot from FIS data

Simulating the aircraft with 2 plates as shown in figure 29

gives the following result.

Figure 29. Scattering objects and terrain panel

The method of Physical Optics on rectangular plates is

used for simulation the scattered signals from objects
around the antenna system.

Even if the model looks very simplified it can give results

quite similar to real measurement. Here is an example.

Example: B737 in front of GP mast

Figure 32. Imported data and simulation
Lest first import the results from the flight inspection
system using the importation panel. We can see a quite good agreement.

Terrain features tab

With this panel it is possible to add some terrain

unevenness in front of the antennas.

The real terrain is approximated by a set of rectangular

plates simulating the terrain profile and the scattered
signal is calculated using the method of Unified Theory of
Diffraction (UTD).

Figure 30. Importation panel

With this panel one can customize the importation of any

data format from different flight inspection systems.

75
 The software packages are already used by some flight
inspection companies, by major ILS manufacturers as
well as major Aviation Navigation Service Providers
(ANSPs) all over the world.

REFERENCES

[1] ICAO, July 1996, International Standards and

Recommended Practices, Annex 10 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Volume 1, Radio Navigation
Aids, 5th Edition, http://www.icao.int
[2] ICAO, Fourth Edition 2000, Manual on testing of
Radio Navigation Aids
[3] FAA, 31 October 1995, Siting Criteria for Instrument
Landing Systems, Order 6750.16C

Figure 33. Terrain features tab

Workshop mode

LAGON features a workshop mode. In this mode it is

possible to introduce some adjustment errors and hide
them to the end user. It is then possible to simulate a
complete flight inspection procedure and realign the GP
in the same way as one would do it on the real equipment.

CONCLUSIONS

This paper gives an overview of the main features

available in the ATOLL and LAGON software packages
and how they can be used for flight inspections.

One may note that following points are of special interest

for flight inspection:

Initial and continuous training of flight

inspection crews
Solving issues arising from wrong settings in the
flight inspection system or from ground
equipment maladjustments
Assess the impact of changes in the surroundings
of the antenna systems

The use of the software packages may help to reduce

flight inspection cost by

Reducing initial setting issues

Playing scenarios to solve some issues before
flying the most relevant ones
Analyzing more quickly the plots featuring some
issues
Improving communication between ground and
flight staff

76
 An Emitting Reference Antenna Concept for
Aircraft Antenna Calibration Bjorn Neuba uer, Braunsc hweig University, Dr. Ro bert Geise, Braunschweig U niversity, Georg Zimmer, Braunschweig University, & Prof. Dr. Achim Enders, Braunschweig U niversity

Bjrn Neubauer
Institute for Electromagnetic Compatibility, TU
Braunschweig
Schleinitzstr. 38
38106 Braunschweig, Germany
Fax: +49(0)531/391-7724
E-mail: b.neubauer@tu-bs.de

Dr. Robert Geise, Georg Zimmer, Prof. Dr. Achim

Enders
Institute for Electromagnetic Compatibility, TU
Braunschweig
Schleinitzstr. 38
38106 Braunschweig, Germany
Fax: +49(0)531/391-7724
E-mail: E-mail: {r.geise, g.zimmer, achim.enders}@tu-
bs.de

ABSTRACT localizer at 108 MHz, which are the most challenging.

Additionally, the antenna placement on a ground is
Navigations systems such as the instrument landing discussed.
system (ILS) or the glide slope (GS) have to be calibrated
after installation and later on on a regular base in order to INTRODUCTION
ensure for instance required absolute field strength values.
Hence measuring the absolute field strength of navigation Since absolute field strength measurements are an
systems is an important task of flight inspection. Within important part of flight inspection, the calibration of
this scope recent advancements of aircraft antenna aircraft mounted antennas is mandatory. At the last IFIS
calibration have been presented at the last IFIS and 2012 this topic was further investigated using calibrated
proved to be a topic of high interest. receiving antennas to determine an absolute field strength
value in free space that is the basis for the actual aircraft
In this contribution we propose the concept of an emitting antenna calibration [1, 2]. Two different approaches were
reference antenna. The radiated field strength of the proposed. On the one hand a calibrated antenna was
former can be calculated analytically and reliably in full obtained with gain measurements that of course imply the
free space. This way a well-known field strength value is assumption of an ideal propagation model. Another
provided and can serve as a calibration normal to aircraft approach was to perform true field strength
in-flight or on ground. measurements. However, both methods require at any rate
two measurements: one with the reference antenna to
Such reference antennas, e.g. standard gain horns and have a known field strength, and a following
open ended waveguides, are well established in near field measurement with the actual measuring aircraft that refers
antenna measurements. Whereas for higher frequencies to the obtained known field strength. These receiving
the dimensions of such reference structures are easy to reference antenna concepts consequently require two
handle, standard gain horns for ILS or VOR frequencies measurements with corresponding larger measurement
are of considerable much larger size. uncertainties.
A design study including manufacturing aspects of such a In this contribution we propose a concept of an emitting
reference antenna is presented. The study can be applied reference antenna which consequently requires only one
for arbitrary frequencies including the ones for the ILS single measurement with the actual measuring aircraft.

77
This however requires that the field strengths in space antennas in comparison to many other radiating elements
emitted by the reference antenna can be calculated which do not allow for such a description of their near
traceable, analytically and to a high degree of accuracy. field: the far-field can be calculated by the Fourier
Such a class of antennas are rectangular waveguide transform of the near-field.
structures comprising both simple open waveguides and
horn antennas. Unlike any other class of antennas
waveguide structures are easy and accurately scalable in
frequency to cover the large frequency spectrum of
navigation systems for flight inspection. Additionally,
they are known to have only a very weak coupling with
the environment that still allows their analytical
description in the later measurement setup.

This contribution is organized as follows. In the first

section the analytical description of rectangular
waveguides is briefly recalled. The second section gives
two measurement examples at glideslope and DME
frequencies that demonstrate the accuracy and scalability
of the emitting reference antenna concept. Finally, we
discuss some issues of the antenna placement in the later
measurement setup and manufacturing aspects.
WAVEGUIDE AND WAVEGUIDE ANTENNAS
Waveguides are used in order to have electromagnetic
fields travel along a predefined path. A well-known
structure to do so is the rectangular waveguide as depicted
in Figure 1. Due to its geometry it allows for describing
the electromagnetic fields by analytical expressions. For
the TE10-mode these expressions take the following form
= (1) respective antennas. According to Huygens principle this
= (2)
= (3) For measurements of the aperture field distribution an
, = (4)
whereas 10 denotes the amplitude constant depending on
the power fed into the waveguide, the angular
frequency, the permeability, the propagation constant
in direction and the waveguides dimension in
direction [3]. The cutoff frequency of the TE10-mode,
which is the lowest cutoff frequency of all modes in a
rectangular waveguide, is given by
= (5)
with the velocity of light.
Figure 3: Rectangular Waveguide with E-Field
Distribution of the TE01-Mode.
In order to improve the radiation of an open-ended
waveguide and to account for impedance mismatch the
cross section of the open end is widened smoothly with
only a slight change of the field distribution. By such a
modification of a rectangular waveguide a horn antenna is
built as shown in Figure 5.
EMITTING REFERENCE ANTENNA EXAMPLES
In the following two measurement examples of emitting
reference antennas are presented. Generally, measurement
results are performed on the two dimensional apertures of
is sufficient for a full description of the antennas far field
which is a simple spatial Fourier transform of the
apertures field distribution.
electro-optical sensor system is used. A detailed
description of the measurement system and its calibration
is given in [4] with first measurement results.
As a first example measurements are done for a
rectangular waveguide, the cross section of which has a
width of 259 mm and a height of 129 mm.
Figure 2 shows a view inside the waveguide structure
with the coaxial feed and additional matching stubs.
Figure 3 depicts the field strength measurement setup
measurement with the waveguide placed in front of an
anechoic environment.

Even though the equations stated above are derived for an

unlimited waveguide they constitute a fairly well
description of the fields on the aperture of an open ended
waveguide. This yields a big advantage of aperture

78
 here 300 MHz. Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the actual
emitting reference antenna as well as the setup for
measuring the aperture field distribution.

Figure 4: Inside View of Rectangular Waveguide.

Figure 7: Double-Ridged Horn Antenna Mounted to a

Mast

Figure 5: Field Strength Measurement Setup with

Electro-Optical Sensor on Aperture of Waveguide.

The following figure shows measurement results for the

electric field distribution at 1 GHz. As a comparison the
analytical expression given in the preceding section of
this contribution is also displayed and emphasizes the
applicability of purely analytical, thus traceable
formulation of fields to this waveguide antenna concept.
Figure 8: Electro-Optical Sensor Placed Along the
1 Aperture of the Horn Antenna on a Sheet of
0,9 Styrofoam.
0,8

0,7 The analytical expressions for the field distribution on the

horns aperture are not given here. It is referred to [5, 6].
rel. field amplitude

0,6
However, like the field distribution of the waveguide
0,5
measured field distribution structure only a sinusoidal shape fulfills the boundary
0,4
analytically calculated field
condition of the tangential electric field to be zero at the
0,3
distribution boundaries of the horn. Figure 7 shows the measured
0,2
electric field at 300 MHz within the antennas aperture.
0,1

0
0 50 100 150 200 250
x-coordinate [mm], width of waveguide

Figure 6: Comparison between Analytically

Calculated and Measured Field Strength Distribution.

As a second example a double-ridged horn antenna is

presented in the following at ILS glide slope frequencies,

79

Figure 9: Sinusoidal Field Distribution at the Horn
Aperture.
Basically, the sinusoidal field distribution on the horn
aperture can be observed. Usually, the exact analytical
description refers to standard gain horns whereas the
double-ridged horn used here is a particular enhancement
of the standard gain horn design with respect to
bandwidth. For a better readability the following figure
shows the field distribution along the middle of the horn
antenna for y equal zero. As a comparison the analytically
calculated values for the sin-function are also displayed.
measured distribution
analytically calculated distribution
rel. amplitude of electric field
-0,60 -0,40
Figure 10: Analytically Exact and Measured Field
Distribution in the Middle of the Horn Aperture.
A good agreement between analytical field solutions and
measured field strength is observed. Though, slight
deviations at the edges of the horn antennas are perceived.
However, for the main lobe of the horn antenna these
effects can be considered to be negligible. Thus, the
analytical expressions for the field distribution are
representative enough as a measure to calculate the
electric field in the far field of the antenna.
Since the concept of waveguide antennas can be
considered to be applicable as emitting reference
antennas, some aspects of antenna placement in a later
setup for aircraft antenna calibration are discussed in the
following.
SCALING, ANTENNA SETUP AND SITE EFFECTS
Since the cutoff frequency as well as the radiation pattern
merely depends on the dimension of the waveguide / horn
measured in the wavelength of the operational frequency,
once designed, antennas of this kind can be scaled
according to the desired frequency. For instance, by
applying a scaling factor of 22.6 on Flann Microwaves
standard gain horn model 08240-10, which is designed to
operate in the frequency band from 1.7 GHz up to 2.6
GHz, one receives a horn with single mode operation
within the frequency band from 75 MHz to 115 MHz.
This range covers the frequency of the marker beacon, 75
MHz, as well as of the localizer, 108 MHz up to 112
MHz. The cross section of the feeding waveguide equals
122 cm by 244 cm and the aperture is the size of 260 cm
by 362 cm.
In order to get a first insight of how a conducting ground
plane influences the radiation pattern of the horn, two sets
of simulations are conducted in CST Microwave Studio
[7]. The horn is orientated so that it emits the electric field
strength horizontally polarized. Figure 9 depicts the
1 scenario schematically.
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,2
0,1
Figure 11: Simulation Scenario to Investigate the
-0,20
0
0,00 0,20 0,40 0,60
Influence of the Position of the Horn with respect to
x-coordinate [m] the Ground Plane.
In the first set the elevation angle of the horn with respect
to the ground plane has been varied from 0 up to 20 in
steps of 1 while keeping the height of the horn above the
ground at 2 cm. In the second the height of the horn above
the ground has been varied from 0 m to 0.5 m, which is a
reasonable range for the placement of the very large horn
antenna. A reasonable height for a good pattern without
too much disturbing influence of the ground is 0.5 m.
However, even the influence of the ground can be taken
into account analytically applying the image theory. The
installed antenna should be considered individually for
later measurements.
The graphs plotted in Figure 10 depict the simulated
directivity versus the elevation angle for different values
of the parameter ThetaH. ThetaH is the elevation angle of
the horn antenna with respect to the ground. The graphs
80
given in Figure 11 show the variation of the antennas
directivity versus the elevation angle for different heights
of the antenna above the ground.
Figure 12: Simulated Directivity for varied Elevation
Angles of the Horn with a constant height.
Figure 13: Simulated Directivity for Various Heights
of the Antenna Placement.
As can be seen from the graphs in Figure 10 and 11 the
beam width of the horn antenna is sufficient to illuminate
the measuring aircraft. In order to check for sufficient link
budget prior to calibration the Friis transmission equation
can be applied:
[5]
= (6),
with the electric field strength, Z0 the impedance of free
space, the power the emitting antenna is supplied with,
the gain of the emitting antenna and the distance
between the emitting antenna and the point of interest.
81
Otherwise or instead the Fourier transform may be used
for this purpose.
MANUFACTURING ASPECTS
Due to the frequencies in question the horn antenna is of
considerable size. Nevertheless it needs to allow for an
easy transportation. Therefore a modular construction
consisting of a supporting wood structure covered on the
inside with chicken wire is suggested. Using chicken wire
instead of solid metal shields reduces the weight
drastically and may be used as long as the mesh size is
sufficiently small with respect to the wavelength. See also
the double-ridged horn depicted in Figure 5.
CONCLUSION
In this contribution the feasibility of the waveguide
antenna concept has been shown with measurement
examples: at DME and glide slope frequency.
Furthermore the down-scaling of a standard gain horn to
frequencies used by the marker beacons and ILS-localizer
has been presented including numerical studies with
respect to the placement of the antenna on ground.
Future work includes building and measuring antennas for
VHF frequencies as for the above shown examples as
well as further studies on the placement of the antenna.
REFERENCES
[1] J. Bredemeyer and T. Schrader, Quasi-stationary
Signal-in-Space Measurements using Traceable
Antennas, 17th International Flight Inspection
Symposium, pp. 125131, 2012.
[2] R. Geise, J. Schr, B. Neubauer, L. Thiele, A.
Enders and V. Logemann, Aircraft Antenna
Calibration: Methods, Accuracy and Results, 17th
International Flight Inspection Symposium, pp.
118124, 2012.
[3] D. M. Pozar, Microwave engineering, 4th ed.
Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2012.
[4] L. Thiele, R. Geise, H. Spieker, J. Schr and A.
Enders, Electro-Optical-Sensor for Near-Field
Measurements of Large Antennas, The 4th
European Conferance on Antennas and
Propagation (EuCAP 2010), 2010.
H.-G. Unger, Hochfrequenztechnik in Funk und
Radar, 4th ed. Stuttgart: Teubner, 1994.
[6] C. A. Balanis, Antenna theory: Analysis and
design, 3rd ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Interscience,
2005.
[7] CST Studio Suite 2013: Microwave Studio: CST
AG.
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82
 New ILS Localizer Ultra-Wide Antenna System
Reduces Traffic Restrictions Alf Ba kke n, I ndra Na via, & Herv Demule, Skyg uide

Alf W. Bakken
Product Advisor
Indra Navia AS
Oslo, Norway
E-mail: alf.bakken@indra.no

Herv Demule
Navigation Engineer, Project Manager
Skyguide, Swiss air navigation services
Geneva, Switzerland
E-mail: herve.demule@skyguide.ch

ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION

The introduction of large aircraft like the Airbus A380 The increased air traffic volume and introduction of very
and Boeing 747-8 could result in air traffic restrictions large aircraft like theA380 or the B747-8 have resulted in
due to the ILS Localizer Critical and Sensitive Area a more demanding situation for handling of the traffic
(CSA) size for the current antenna systems. The flow. However, restrictions given by the ILS Localizer
introduction of the ultra-wide NORMARC 32-element Critical and Sensitive Area (CSA) size could result in
antenna system avoids such restrictions by its smaller traffic constraints, which would be avoided if a smaller
CSA and is an important part of the sustainable ILS. CSA were implemented.

ILS CAT III Zurich runway 14 is such case where traffic The width of the Localizer antenna system is the only
on the de-icing platform else could limit landing aircraft factor, which can be applied to reduce the size of the
using the runway. The paper presents the simulations of CSA. The purpose of this paper is twofold: First, it
the Zurich 14 ILS scenario using the advanced 3D demonstrates that significant improvements in airport
modelling ILS prediction software ELISE developed by operations can be gained by replacing existing Localizer
AIRBUS and ENAC, the antenna systems design with antenna systems with a Ultra-wide antenna system.
suppressed clearance radiation and measurement data, Secondly, it shows that an airport site-specific analysis of
plus the commissioning flight inspection results. the CSA using advanced airport environment simulation
tool like ELISE could also significantly reduce the size of
AIRBUS ProSky has simulated A380 traffic at major the CSA and bring operational benefits.
airports with use of NORMARC 32-element antenna
system compared to other systems on the market. This TYPES OF TRAFFIC LIMITATIONS
demonstrates operational benefits as less separation
between approaching aircraft and holding positions closer Examples of possible traffic and airport restrictions due to
to runway. the CSA are:

Limitations in use of the whole or part of the taxiway

system

83
 Increased separation between approaching aircraft
Autopilot decoupling under CAT I conditions
Restrictions on number of large aircraft to line up for
take-off
Extended taxiing route
Restrictions in new airport constructions and parking
area due to multipath
The introduction of larger aircraft like the A380 and the
B747-8 has resulted in larger ILS Localizer Critical and
Sensitive Areas (CSA). Assessments of the existing
Localizer (LOC) antenna systems CSA show that for
many runways CSA for large aircraft (A380 and B747-8)
could cover parts of runway and taxiways and hence give
restrictions on the air traffic movements.
DEFINITIONS AND SIZE OF CSA
Definitions
The current ICAO Annex 10 definitions of Critical and
Sensitive are [1]:
The ILS critical area is an area of defined dimensions
about the localizer and glide path antennas where
vehicles, including aircraft, are excluded during all ILS
operations. The critical area is protected because the
presence of vehicles and/or aircraft inside its boundaries
will cause unacceptable disturbance to the ILS signal-in-
space.
The ILS sensitive area is an area extending beyond the
critical area where the parking and/or movement of
vehicles, including aircraft, is controlled to prevent the
possibility of unacceptable interference to the ILS signal
during ILS operations. The sensitive area is protected
against interference caused by large moving objects
outside the critical area but still normally within the
airfield boundary.
This paper addresses only the sensitive area. However,
CSA is used in this paper as it is the common
international recognized term.
Normally, the CSA is defined for a specific runway based
on generic calculations. These generic calculations are
based on 2D object modeling and on Physical Optics.
However, this simplified method usually results in an
excessive CSA. To have a more optimized size of CSA it
is necessary accurately model the specific airport site by
taking into account the real airport environment (ground
profile, existing buildings, operational aircraft orientation,
trees, etc.). AIRBUS ProSky in collaboration with ENAC
developed an advanced ILS simulation software namely
84
ELISE using exact methods of resolution of ILS
propagation equations (Method of Moments) applied on
the entire 3D object modeling.
Size of CSA
The size of the CSA for a specific runway is given by the
following parameters:
Width of the antenna system
o A Localizer antenna system with a larger
width (aperture) will give a narrower
radiation beam which gives a narrower
sensitive area than a system with less width
Localizer Course Sector
o A longer runway, resulting in a narrower
Localizer course sector will have a larger
sensitive area than a shorter runway
ILS Category
o The operational category of the runway has
a large impact on the size of the sensitive
area: The higher category, the larger
sensitive area. For the same Localizer
antenna installation, the CAT I sensitive
area will be much smaller than the CAT II
or CAT III sensitive areas. In most cases, the
CAT II and CAT III sensitive areas will be
of approximately the same size.
Maximum aircraft type using the airport
o A larger aircraft will result in a larger
sensitive area than a smaller aircraft.
Consequently, the size of the sensitive area
should be determined by the size of the
largest aircraft operating at the airport in
question.
Taxiway pattern
o The general worst-case sensitive area
calculation is based on the worst-case
orientation of the tailfin of the aircraft
leaving the runway after landing, and
taxiing. The size of the CSA could be
optimized by taking into account the
operational worst-case scenario on each
taxiway.
o The proximity between the LOC and the
runway end might also be a constraint as the
CA might cover a part of the RWY end.
DESIGN GOALS.
The main lateral coverage region, 35 shall be
100% compliant with existing ICAO Annex 10
specifications (e.g. 25NM within 10 2000
and 17NM from 10 to 35 2000).
The Clearance signal shall be radiated from the
same antenna system as the Course signal.
From +/- 15 to +/- 35 the Clearance field
strength shall be mainly constant.
The DDM pattern from 5 to 35 shall be
mainly flat.
The width of the CAT III sensitive area shall be
20% less than for the NORMARC 20-element
Localizer antenna system for an A380 aircraft.

The Clearance CSB field strength shall have a

large negative gradient from +/- 10 to +/- 15
(reduction of field strength by approx. 6dB), in
order to optimally fit the lateral coverage region
and especially the difference in range between 25
NM within 10 and 17 NM within 35.

Figure 1 Example of generic CSA.

Key figures Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory was used for

this purpose.
Number of antenna elements: 32
Physical aperture: 75m The radiation patterns are shown in Figure 3 for CSB and
Course CSB Beam Width: 1.4 Figure 4 for SBO pattern.
Design Course CSB Side lobe level: ~ -50 dB
Design Course SBO Side lob level: -30dB The effect of production tolerances in the antenna
Course SBO first maximum: 1.6 distribution unit is shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6
Course SBO first null: 4.3 Measured values on the distribution unit for Zurich
Localizer 14 are used.
Design of antenna feeding
Calculated DDM/SDM patterns based on the design feeds
A proprietary antenna array design tool developed within and the measured feeds for Zurich RWY 14 are shown in
Indra Navia AS was used for the synthesis phase of the Figure 7 and Figure 8 respectively.
design. The design was finally tested by modeling the
complete array (32 Log-periodic dipole antennas (LPDA))
with the Method of Moments. The NEC 4.1 program from

85
 Figure 2 NORMARC 7232A 32-element Localizer antenna system

NORMARC 7232A calculated CSB radiation patterns, design feeds 110.1 MHZ
0dB

CSB Course
-10dB CSB Clearance
Relative field strength

-20dB

-30dB

-40dB

-50dB

-60dB
-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Azimuth angle (deg.)

Figure 3

86
 NORMARC 7232A calculated SBO radiation patterns, design feeds 110.1 MHZ
0dB

SBO Course
-10dB SBO Clearance
Relative field strength

-20dB

-30dB

-40dB

-50dB

-60dB
-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Azimuth angle

Figure 4

NORMARC 7232A calculated CSB radiation patterns, measured feeds for Zurich RWY 14, 111.75MHZ
0dB

CSB Course
-10dB CSB Clearance
Relative field strength

-20dB

-30dB

-40dB

-50dB

-60dB
-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Azimuth angle

Figure 5

87
 NORMARC 7232A calculated SBO radiation patterns, measured feeds for Zurich RWY 14, 111.75MHZ
0dB

SBO Course
-10dB SBO Clearance
Relative field strength

-20dB

-30dB

-40dB

-50dB

-60dB
-90 -80 -70 -60 -50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
Azimuth angle

Figure 6

NM7232A DDM/SDM %, Design feeds

Freq = 110.1MHz CS= 3.57
100 CLR TX -3dB rel. COU TX

90 SDM%
DDM%
80
Upper Limit SDM
70 Lower limit DDM
Modulation (%)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Azimuth angle (deg.)

Figure 7

88
 NM7232A Zrich 14 DDM/SDM %, Measured feeds
Freq = 111.75MHz, CS = 3.57
100 CLR TX -3dB rel. COU TX

90 SDM%
DDM%
80
Upper Limit SDM
70 Lower Limit DDM
Modulation (%)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
-40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Azimuth angle (deg.)

Figure 8

89
Mechanical and Electrical design

Design based on well-proven technology that complies

with CAT III integrity and continuity of service
requirements:

Same LPDA antenna elements as in other

NORMARC antenna systems

Same Antenna Distribution Unit (ADU)

technology

Same Monitor Combining Unit (MCU)

technology

The ADU is shown in Figure 9 and the MCU in

Figure 10.

Figure 10 MCU

Beam Bend Potential (BBP)

The probably best method for comparing localizer

antenna systems with regard to immunity of course bends
caused by course SBO signal reflected into the course
line, is to compare the Beam Bend Potential (BBP) for the
different systems. The BBP is a measure of how large
bends could be caused by course SBO reflected into the
course line, if 100% of the radiated SBO signal for each
calculated angle was reflected. The smaller the BBP is,
the less sensitive to course SBO reflections the localizer
is.

The BBP for the NORMARC 7232A Localizer antenna

Figure 9 (ADU) system compared to two other common Localizer antenna
systems, the NORMARC 7220A 20-element system and
the FAA standard 20-element system are shown in
Figure 11.

90
 180

160 Beam Bend Potential comparison

CS = 3.0
140 NORMARC 7232A 32-element LOC
Beam Bend Potential (A)

NORMARC 7220A 20-element LOC

120 FAA standard 20-element LOC

100

80

60

40

20

0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Azimuth angle (deg.)
Figure 11

SUPPORTING TECHNICAL VALIDATION
The installation of the NM 7232A in Zurich, RWY 14
In collaboration with AIRBUS ProSky and Indra Navia
AS, Zurich airport (FZAG) and skyguide launched in
2013 a feasibility study in order to assess the size of the
CSA of the new localizer 14 Zurich (in particular the new
NM 7232A), and evaluate the potential gain for airport
operations. Among several localizer types (and different
antenna heights), the results of the ELISE study clearly
showed the benefits of the NM 7232A, with an antenna
height of 3 meters. Thus, the replacement project has been
launched for a realization phase in 2014, according to the
following the schedule:
Building phase in February and March 2014
Mechanical installation in April 2014
Ground commissioning in May 2014
Flight check in June 2014 (till 13.06.14, just
before IFIS 2014)
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show pictures of the brand new
installed localizer NM 7232A in Zurich, RWY 14.

91
 Figure 12 Picture of the NM7232A, seen from the side

Figure 13 Picture of the NM7232A, seen from behind

An ILS replacement with (nearly) no service
interruption
Moreover, the other challenge of this project is to
minimize the ILS service interruption, or even to have
nearly no service interruption (only 2.5 days without ILS
service). Based on the future layout of the airport and the
new taxiways distribution, the new LOC has to be
positioned 120 meters in front of the current one, which
represents a tough configuration with possible multipath
and/or screening effects. Figure 14 and Figure 15
illustrate this situation. In order to assess the impact of the
new LOC on the current one, another ELISE study has
also been conducted by AIRBUS ProSky. According to
these simulations, the influence on course structures and
coverage (orbits) will be marginal and will be CAT III
compatible. These results confirmed skyguide in the
choice of the NM 7232A (with a height of 3 meters) and a
project realization in parallel with the CAT III operations
of the current ILS.
In order to support this special "double ILS" situation
(one operating and one in building phase), the following
conditions have been required and applied:
The new ILS radiates on another (compatible)
frequency.
Only night work for the building, installation,
tuning and ground commissioning phases.
After the mechanical installation of the new ILS,
the flight check from FCS has confirmed on
10.04.2014 the non-impact of the new ILS on the
current one. Thus, the current ILS has been then
released for normal operations, after a 3 day
service interruption. (because of the 3 night
installation phase)

Figure 14 Picture of the current LOC and the NM 7232A, seen from the side

92
 Figure 15 Picture of the current LOC and the NM 7232A, seen from behind

Figure 16 and Figure 17 show the non-impact of the new

ILS on the current operating one.

Figure 16 Picture of the flight check from FCS, confirming the non-impact of the new ILS

93
 Figure 17 Current LOC 14 Course Structure: before and after the installation of the new LOC

Ground commissioning and measurements
Just after the completion of the installation of the new
NM 7232A, the first part of the ground commissioning
phase has been conducted. The following figures of the
ground measurements illustrate the promising results,
produced by the ILS Checker software. Figure 18 shows
the DDM, SDM and RF Level azimuth profiles
(coverage) at a distance of 1300 meters from the LOC.
They correlate very well with simulations. Besides, the
deep analysis of these curves (Course only and Clearance
only), illustrated by Figure 19, also correlates very well
with theory. Finally, the antenna diagrams (Figure 20)
measured on ground in the near field region fit also the
expected / theoretical results.

94
Figure 18 Ground measurements Course + Clearance in the near field (at a distance of 1300 from the LOC)

Figure 19 Ground measurements Course only (in pink) and Clearance only (in light blue) in the near field

95
Figure 20 Ground measurements of the antenna diagrams Course only (in pink) and Clearance only (in light blue) in
the near field

Commissioning flight check The ground measurements correlate very well

As the date of writing this paper (April 2014) is prior to
the commissioning flight check (June 2014), no flight
check result can be shown in this version of the
document. However, the presentation during IFIS will
integrate the detailed analysis of the flight check results:
Signal in space performance confirmation
with the simulations, conducted in the frame of
the feasibility study.
Such good ground results are very encouraging
for the coming commissioning flight check (in
June 2014), which should confirm all the
assumptions about signal in space performance
and CSA.

Correlation between simulations and flight REFERENCES

measurements for DDM, SDM and antenna
diagrams [1] ICAO, July 2006, International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annex 10 to the Convention on
CONCLUSIONS International Civil Aviation, Volume 1, Radio Navigation
Aids, 6th Edition, Attachment C para. 2.1.9.1
Airport operations, especially for very large aircraft like http://www.icao.int
the A380 and the B747-8, could be affected due to the
size of the existing Localizer antenna systems ILS Critical
and Sensitive Areas (CSA).

Indra Navia has designed an Ultra-wide Localizer antenna

system, which has a significant smaller generic CSA.
With advanced ELISE software, AIRBUS ProSky
computed the optimized CSA of Zurich 14 runway taking
into the specific airport environment. The association of
the two competencies therefore results in less restriction
on the air traffic and an increased traffic flow.

The NORMARC 7232A 32-element antenna system is

now installed at Zurich Airport and supports the following
technical validations:

The results of the ELISE study clearly showed

the operational benefits of the NORMARC
7232A 32-element ultra-wide Localizer antenna
system
An ILS replacement with nearly no service
interruption (only 2.5 days) thanks to accurate
and reliable simulations and flight check
confirmation.

96
 The Algorithm to Accurately Obtain the Glide
Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) Elevation
in Flight Inspection Ge Mao, CAAC & Xiao qiang Li, Beijing Sky Aviation Co .

Mr. Ge Mao
Inspection Engineer
Flight Inspection Center of CAAC
No.18, Huoyun North Road, the Capital International
Airport, Beijing, China
Peoples Republic of China
Email: simone_10031@aliyun.com

Mr. Xiaoqiang Li
Software Engineer
Beijing Sky Aviation Co.,Ltd
No.238 Bei Si Huan Zhong Lu,Baiyan Tower,
Beijing, China
Email: xqli552@gmail.com

ABSTRACT (Aiming point) elevation result. On the other hand it can

save the cost of flight inspection.
For the flight inspection of ILS Glide Path, the most
difficult challenge is to correctly determine the Glide Path This article will publish the algorithm in this meeting, and
Reference Point (Commonly known as the Aiming Point) show its actual effect in practice.
elevation by Automatic Flight Inspection System (AFIS).
KEYWORDS
Using the correct Glide Path reference point (Aiming
Point) is critical to get correct results for the Glide Path Flight Inspection, Glide Slope, Best Fit Straight Line,
structure, the Glide Path angle. The ILS Reference Datum Glide Path Reference Point, Aiming Point.
Height (RDH), also referred to as TCH .
INTRODUCTION
Some flight inspection agency use the base of the Glide
Path antenna as Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming The concept of Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming
Point), which is a violation of ICAO Annex 10 definitions Point) is a very critical concept in flight inspection
for ILS Glide Path. And some flight inspection agency theories on Glide Slope of ILS, and has been widely used
use ground simulation supplemented by numerous flight and adopted in the field of international flight inspection.
inspection verification methods. The results determined We can find the detail description about aiming point
by these two methods are often not satisfactory in concept on international standards and literature, like
practice. FAA 6750.16D, FAA 8240.47C, etc.

Flight Inspection Center of China and BUAA have According the description from FAA 8240.47C: Aiming
studied the related algorithm, and have been applied in point is a location which is programmed into the
CFIS fight inspection system (which is made by China). automated flight inspection system (AFIS) from which
Using the algorithm, flight inspector can accurately obtain glide path measurement results are referenced. The
the Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation Aiming point may not be coincident with the Glide Slope
by only one approach, using this algorithm, On the one origination point [1].
hand it can get the accurate Glide Path Reference Point

97
Usually, we call the optimal Aiming Point determined by
flight inspection and use in facility database as Glide Path
Reference Point. The elevation of the Glide Path
Reference Point is usually an important data in facility
database to involve in the calculation on the related
parameter of Glide Path.
In fact, the concept of Aiming Point has been used for a
long time in flight inspection field. As flight inspection
technology advances, and AFIS system appears, it
becomes increasingly important. As shown in Figure 1, it
is a part of flight check drawings which printed from
Sierra 9205 AFIS System (This system has been in
service for over 20 years in China).
Figure 1. Flight Inspection Drawings of AFIS Sierra 9205
The drawings shown in Figure 1 shows the data
associated with BFSL (Best Fit Straight Line) result
during Glide Slope flight inspection practice. We can see
the data of Aiming Pt Elev (Aiming Point Elevation), the
value is 29ft.
Why the data of Aiming Point Elevation appears in BFSL
result? If Aiming Point Elevation is related to BFSL? To
understand these questions, we need to understand how
the data of Aiming Point Elevation is determined.
DETERMINATION OF AIMING POINT
As we know, for image Glide Slope antenna, the Glide
Path zero DDM signal radiates as a cone with the top
point at the base of the Glide Path antenna mast (As
shown in Figure 2)[2].
Figure 2. Glide Path zero DDM cone
Generally, the image glide path antennas are located on
the side of the runway for safety reasons. So the actual
Glide Path is formed as a vertical plane cut through the
98
zero DDM cone along the runway centerline and its
extension, eventually forming a hyperbolic shape of the
Glide Path. (As shown in Figure 3)[3].
Figure 3. Formation Of Glide Path
Affected by factors such as reflection sites, obstructions,
antenna, equipment commissioning status, in many cases,
the Glide Path is not a smooth hyperbolic but a curve with
bend, skew and roughness. Theoretically, we can not
directly depend on the curve configuration to determine
the data such as Glide Path angle in different segments,
RDH and ARDH, etc. So we need to use linear
approximation method to characterize the Glide Path. (As
shown in Figure 4)[4]
In flight inspection theories, Best Fit Straight Line
(BFSL) is used to characterize hyperbolic Glide Path.
According the description from FAA 8240.47C: Best Fit
Straight Line (BFSL) is a straight line segment of the
Glide Path derived by using a least squares mathematical
technique. The slope of this straight line defines the
height of the Glide Path angle relative to the approach
surface baseline and threshold.
Using Best Fit Straight Line (BFSL), AFIS can calculate
some important data such as Glide Path Angle on ILS
Zone2 and Zone3, RDH ARDH, and Aiming Point
Elevation, etc. Flight inspectors often use these data to
assess the quality of Glide Path.
Figure 4. Best Fit Straight Line
Aiming Point is the product calculated by BFSL. Ideally,
correct Aiming Point is a point on the runway, the Best
Fit Straight Line (BFSL) is down toward extending
through this point (As shown in Figure 5, Figure 6).
Figure 5. Aiming Point Top View
Figure 6. Ideal Aiming Point (Lateral view)
Since the Glide Path is not a smooth hyperbolic but a
curve with bend, skew and roughness, the computed Best
Fit Straight Line (BFSL) is often inconsistent with the
ideal Glide Path or designed Glide Path. This will cause
changes in the position of Aiming Point (As shown in
Figure 7).
Figure 7. Best Fit Straight Line
As shown in Figure 8, the actual position of Aiming Point
is below or above the theoretical position of the Aiming
Point. So the Aiming Point is an intersection of BFSL and
99
the plane which contains the base of the Glide Path
antenna mast and perpendicular to the Runway centerline.
Figure 8. The Actual Aiming Point
THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GLIDE
PATH REFERENCE POINT (AIMING POINT)
From the above, we understand the concept of Aiming
Point and Glide Path Reference Point, but what is the
practical significance of Glide Path Reference Point
(Aiming Point)?
In early 2012, a flight inspector from China Flight
Inspection Center (CFIC) was sent to the Duncan
Aviation Inc. in Nebraska, United States, for the
acceptance of modification on new flight inspection
aircraft. In acceptance process, flight inspector used CFIS
flight inspection system to carry out a series of tests to
verify the effect on Glide Path which caused by change of
Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point).
In the tests, flight inspector respectively used 362.38 m,
366.19 m and 363.54m as the elevation of Glide Path
Reference Point (Aiming Point) in ILS facility data base,
and run three approaches along the Glide Path of 05#ILS
in Lincoln airport, and got the results and Glide Path
Deviation Error curve as below.
Figure 9. Results And Glide Path Deviation Error
Curve Using 362.38m as Glide Path Reference Point
Elevation
 cases, it may lead to erroneous conclusion which made by
flight inspector for assessing the quality of Glide Path.

Table 1. The Glide Path Results under different Glide

Path Reference Point elevation

Glide Path Reference

Point Elevation (m) 362.38 366.19 363.53

Glide path Angle() 3.05 2.99 3.03

Structure Zone1(A) 11 8 9
Structure Zone2(A) 15 17 15
Structure Zone3(A) 19 9 4
Figure 10. Results And Glide Path Deviation Error
Curve Using 366.19m as Glide Path Reference Point RDH (m) 19.49 19.47 19.08
Elevation ARDH (m) 17.09 17.26 16.93

In addition, the elevation of Glide Path Reference Point

(Aiming Point) in facility database is used as a necessary
known data to calculate the Best Fit Straight Line (BFSL)
by using a least squares mathematical method. The
calculation results of Best Fit Straight Line (BFSL) will
be directly affected by correctness of Glide Path
Reference Point (Aiming Point).

CURRENT METHODS TO DETERMINE GLIDE

PATH REFERENCE POINT (AIMING POINT)
ELEVATION

Currently, there are two methods to obtain the Glide Path

Figure 11. Results And Glide Path Deviation Error
Curve Using 363.54m as Glide Path Reference Point
Elevation
From Figure 9, we can see the Glide Path Deviation Error
Curve present bend downward shape. From Figure 10,
the Glide Path Deviation Error Curve present bend
upward shape. From Figure 11, the Glide Path Deviation
Error Curve tends to be straight.
Table 1 is an important data summary of Figures 9, 10,
and 11. From Table 1, we can see: with changes on Glide
Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation, the Glide
Path results such as Glide Path angle, structure, RDH and
ARDH changed accordingly. In particular, significant
changes occurred in the value of Glide Path angle, and
structure.
Seen from above, the data of Glide Path Reference Point
(Aiming Point) elevation will produce significant impact
on flight inspection results of Glide Path. If we use
incorrect Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point)
elevation in flight inspection database, we will get
incorrect flight inspection results of Glide Path. In severe
Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation.
One method is to use the base elevation of Glide Path
antenna mast as the original Glide Path Reference Point
elevation in ILS facility database. In commissioning flight
inspection of ILS, flight inspector will continually correct
the elevation of Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming
Point) in facility database, until the acceptable glide path
data and curves are obtained. The final elevation
determined by flight inspector may be different with the
original Glide Path Reference Point elevation, and will be
used in periodic flight inspection in the future. Using this
method, it largely relies on individuals technical ability
and experience of flight inspector, and will spend more
flight inspection costs.
Some flight inspection agency directly using the base
elevation of the Glide Path antenna as Glide Path
Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation in
commissioning and periodic flight inspection practices is
not correct and is a violation of ICAO Annex 10
definitions for ILS Glide Path.
Another method is prior to actual flight inspection using
ground simulation software to calculate the original Glide

100
Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation. In actual 2. After a flight inspection approach, an iteration scope
flight inspection, flight inspector need to adjust the Glide and interval should be set based on the Glide Path
Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation until Reference Point (Aiming Point) information in facility
obtaining ideal glide path data and curves in flight Data.
inspection. This method can improve the accuracy and
cost savings to a certain extent. 3. Flight inspection system automatically iterates the
Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation in
Due to the difference between ground simulation and facility Data in accordance with a predetermined iteration
actual flight inspection conditions, the acquisition of ideal scope and interval, and continually calculates the
Glide Path Reference Point elevation still relies on corresponding the sum of squares of data of Glide Slope
individuals technical ability and experience of flight deviation error from zone2 to zone3.
inspector; The result is still not precise enough; In special
cases, this method can not save the cost of flight 4. Square sum of deviations will be:
inspection.
n
So it is significant to find a method to automatically (X i X )2
calculated by AFIS, with high accuracy, and not relying S2 = i =1
on ability experience of flight inspector. n 1
ALGORITHM Where the X represents the Glide Slope
deviation error sample value;
The flight inspection engineers from China Flight
Inspection Center together with the software engineers X represents mean value of X;
from BUAA have found a method to accurately determine
the Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point), which is n represents the sample number;
called as straighten method.
S represents square sum of Glide Slope
The algorithm of straighten method is based on the deviation error.
square sum of deviations and arithmetic iteration.

As previously mentioned, the Glide Path Reference Point

(Aiming Point) in facility database is used as a necessary
known data for the calculation of Glide Slope parameters.
Different Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) in
facility database will result in different inspection results,
especially for the glide path angle, structure, RDH or
ARDH which are calculated by BFSL.

From above, we know, the Best Fit Straight Line (BFSL)

is used to characterize the actual Glide Path. Since
different Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) in
facility database may result in different Best Fit Straight
Line (BFSL), then which BFSL is correct and has the best
fit of the actual Glide Path?

We think if we can find a Glide Path Reference Point

which can make the square sum of deviations for Glide
Slope deviation error data tends to be minimum, then we
can determine a correct Best Fit Straight Line (BFSL).

In summary, the algorithm will be carried out by the

following steps:

1. Flight inspection aircraft approach along the Glide

path. Flight inspection system gather the Glide Slope
deviation data , combine with precise positioning data
and get the data of Glide Slope Deviation Error.

101
 Set elevation iteration 13), then we calculated the optimal elevation of Glide
scope and interval
Path Reference Point elevation , which is 6.07m.

Compute iteration
During this procedure, 100 times calculation of square
elevation value sum were done automatically by the flight inspection
software.
Get Flight Inspection
Data

Read actual glideslope Compute theoretical

deviation Glideslope deviation

Calculate square sum of

glideslope deviation error

If it the
No minimum value?

Yes
Figure 13. Iteration scope and interval select window
Record current Elevation
Figure 14 shows the relationship between elevation of
Glide Path Reference Point and the square sum of the
No
Glide Slope deviation error, from which the best elevation
If Iteration is
finished?
can be seen clearly.

Yes

Using the record Elevation as

the Aiming Point Elevation

Figure 12. the algorithm flow chart

5. Flight inspection system automatically compare all the

data of square sum of deviations and determine the
minimum value of square sum of deviations.

6. The related Glide Path Reference Point elevation

which make square sum of deviations minimum is the
optimal elevation which will be used to calculate the
correct Best Fit Straight Line (BFSL).

The detail flow-process diagram is shown as Figure 12

EXAMPLES OF APPLICATION
ALGORITHM
In September 2012, Flight Inspection aircraft B-9300
equipped with CFIS system executed 17L ILS (category
III) flight inspection mission in Shanghai PUDONG
International Airport.
The elevation of Glide Path Reference Point in facility
database is 4.07m. After a low pass approach ,we set the
elevation iteration scope as 5m (i.e. 4.07m-5m to
4.07m+5m) and the interval as 0.1 m(as shown on figure
OF THE Figure 14. Square sum vs Aiming Point Elevation
Let us look at the effect of straighten method in flight
inspection practices.
Figure 15 shows the actual Glide Path deviation error
curve and results when the original Glide Path Reference
Point elevation is 4.07m in facility database. We can see
the actual Glide Path deviation curve presents bend
downward shape.

102

Glide Path Reference
4.07 6.07
Point Elevation (m)
Glide path Angle() 2.97 2.95
Structure Zone1(A) 1 3
Structure Zone2(A) 11 3
Structure Zone3(A) 14 7 APPLICATION OF ALGORITHM
Figure 15. Results And Glide Path Deviation Error
Curve Using 4.07m as Glide Path Reference Point
Elevation (17L ILS Of PUDONG Airport )
Using straighten method, CFIS calculated the Glide
Path Reference Point elevation, the value is 6.07m. Flight
inspector corrected the Glide Path Reference Point
elevation to 6.07m in facility database.
Figure 16 shows the actual Glide Path deviation error
curve and results when Glide Path Reference Point
elevation in facility database change to 6.07m.We can see
the actual Glide Path deviation curve has been made a
great improvement. The curve presents ideal straight
shape.
Figure 16. Results And Glide Path Deviation Error
Curve Using 6.07m as Glide Path Reference Point
Elevation (17L ILS Of PUDONG Airport ).
Table 2 shows the comparison between the result of Glide
Path shown on figure15 and figure16.we can see it is
made a great improvement in structure of Glide Path.
103
Table 2 The comparison Between The Result Of Glide Path
shown on figure15 and figure 16
From the above, using straighten method can accurately
obtain elevation of Glide Path Reference Point, and can
improve results of Glide Path significantly.
This algorithm can bring the flight inspector great
convenience.
1. Using this algorithm can accurately obtain the elevation
of Glide Path Reference Point in commissioning and
periodic flight inspection practices ;
2. Using this algorithm can obtain the ideal Best Fit
Straight Line which have consistent with actual glide path
and obtain the correct result of Glide Path.
3. Using this algorithm can find the problems caused by
incorrect determination of Glide Path Reference Point ,
such as the Glide Path angle is not correct, structure is out
of tolerance, RDH or ARDH is out of tolerance, the
shape of Glide Path deviation error curve occurs serious
curved upward or downward, etc.
For example 7 shows 1flight inspection drawings
Figure
of 02#ILS in LIJIANG airport, southwest china. The
elevation of original Glide Path Reference Point is
2226.3m.
Figure 17. Results And Glide Path Deviation Error
Curve Using 2226.3m as Glide Path Reference Point
Elevation (02# ILS Of LIJIANG Airport).
From drawings, we can see the Glide Slope deviation
error curve bend downward severely and the structure of
ZONE 2 is out of tolerance. Maintenance staff considered
it maybe have some trouble happened on equipment of
Glide Slope or reflection site. But after using straighten
method, flight inspector obtained the elevation of Glide
Path Reference Point is 2230.6m. After recalculating the
Glide Slope deviation error curve and flight inspection
results(shown as Figure 18), we can see all the flight
inspection results and configure of curve are particularly
satisfying, it is obvious that the reason resulted in
problems is due to incorrect Glide Path Reference Point in
facility database.
[2] Flight Inspection Practices,Indra , ILS Shop China
2012.
[3] Glide Path Flight Inspection Geometric Reference
Point and Recommendations for International Standards,
Larry Brady, June 2006, 14th IFIS.

[4] Assessment Of The Effectiveness Of The

RDH/ARDH Evaluation Methodology For The ILS Glide
Slope, Jamie S. Edwards /Michael F. Dibenedetto,
PH.D., Ohio University, TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM OU/AEC 08-21TM-15689/0006-1.

Figure 18. Results And Glide Path Deviation Error

Curve Using 2230.6m as Glide Path Reference Point
Elevation (02# ILS Of LIJIANG Airport).

4. Using this algorithm can provide guidance for

equipment commissioning installation and parameters
adjustment on periodic, such as the installation of Glide
Slope antenna, phase adjustment on Glide Slope
equipment.

CONCLUSION

Glide Path Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation is a

critical parameter for ILS Glide slope flight inspection
and it is very difficult to be determined exactly.

The straighten method based on iterative calculation only

needs one approach run to determine the Glide Path
Reference Point (Aiming Point) elevation. Using this
method, amount of problems happened on Glide Path
have been solved in flight inspection practice. It is proved
that the algorithm is accurate and effective.

This algorithm overcomes the shortcomings of existing

methods to determine the Glide Path Reference Point
(Aiming Point) elevation, and significant cost of ILS
flight inspection can be saved in practice.

We hope this algorithm can be promoted, and constantly

be improved, and hope this algorithm may solve more
practical problems in international flight inspection field.

REFERENCES

[1] FAA order 8240.47C, Determination Of Instrument

Landing System (ILS) Glide path Angle, Reference
Datum Heights (RDH), And Ground Point Of Intercept
(GPI) [S] 2001.

104
 Strategies for Accurate Field Strength
Measurement
J.D. Andrew Graham, P.Eng.
Manager, Flight Inspection Engineering
NAV CANADA
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
E-mail: andrew.graham@navcanada.ca
ABSTRACT
The measurement of field strength to assess navigation
aid signal coverage is one of the most challenging tasks
faced by flight inspection organizations. An absolute
accuracy goal of 3 dB is typically set, but in practice is
extremely difficult to achieve. If ground reflections are
not properly controlled when calibrating aircraft antennas,
errors in excess of this target can be introduced.
Furthermore, the gain patterns of aircraft antennas are far
from omnidirectional; failure to account for this in flight
can result in a further inaccuracy of several dB.
NAV CANADA has commissioned mathematical models
to describe the antenna patterns on its aircraft. These
models are being employed to develop and implement
improvements to the ground calibration methodology to
minimize errors. They are also being used to correct
antenna gains as a function of aircraft attitude and the
horizontal and vertical angles to navigation aids.
This paper describes these initiatives and their effect on
RF measurement accuracy.
INTRODUCTION
ICAO requires flight inspection organizations to verify
minimum navigation aid field strengths at specified
locations. For example, Annex 10[1] requires a field
strength of 40 V/m for localizers and 90 V/m for VORs
at the limit of operational coverage.
Two challenges face us:
1. to convert measured power data, usually in terms of
dBm into a 50-ohm device, to an electrical field
strength;
2. to do #1 as accurately as possible.
Andrew Graha m, NAV CANADA
Most of us strive for a target of 3 dB for these
measurements 1, and thats certainly a noble goal.
However, I maintain that the flight inspection community
isnt achieving anywhere close to this. Depending on
how we do our antenna calibrations and compute our field
strengths, the errors could be in the 6-8 dB range. We
perform calibrations and are quite pleased when we
achieve antenna factor 2 repeatability of a couple of dB,
but accurately measuring the absolute magnitude of a
signal in the air is another matter.
The unfortunate reality is that few of us realize how badly
were doing. Or, maybe we suspect that were falling
short of the mark but dont admit it. In this paper, I look
at a couple of significant sources of error and share some
of the strategies that we at NAV CANADA are
implementing to address them.
THE ANTENNA GAIN PROBLEM
The primary issue that affects accuracy is the gain pattern
of the antennas on flight inspection aircraft. The response
of the antenna in a given direction is influenced by nearby
structures, e.g. wings, fuselage, engines, and control
surfaces. The resulting directionality which is often
quite complex manifests itself in two ways: first, errors
in the ground calibration; and second, errors in power
measurements as a result of aircraft attitude and position
relative to the navigation aid.
1
3 dB is the uncertainty specified in Doc 8071[2] for coverage (field
strength) measurements.
2
Antenna factors are essentially measures of gain, where a higher factor
implies a lower gain. Their unit is dB/m.
105
Effect of Antenna Gain on Calibration be seen to roll off at a rate of approximately 0.8 dB per
degree as the vertical angle decreases from the horizontal.
Lets start by looking at the calibration of the aircraft (The different lines on the plot are for various yaw
antennas. For simplicity and cost control, many of us use angles.)
the ground substitution method: one generates an RF
field, measures it using a calibrated reference antenna,
positions the aircraft so that its antenna of interest is
situated in the same place previously occupied by the
reference antenna, and then measures the signal received
by the aircraft antenna. From the two power
measurements and the reference antenna gain, one can
calculate the gain of the aircraft antenna. Typically, the
same procedure is repeated with the aircraft aligned to
give antenna factors in the forward, aft, port, and
starboard orientations.

However, this relatively straightforward procedure and

calculation is complicated by the fact that the field that
were measuring is composed of the sum of the direct
signal and that reflected off the ground. Our studies have
shown that the latter is only a couple of dB lower than the
direct; clearly its effect cannot be ignored.

For most reference antennas, there is no appreciable

difference in gain between the horizontal and the Figure 2 - ILS/VOR Tail Antenna Pattern (113
relatively small (6-12) vertical angles at which the MHz)[3]
reflected signal arrives. Thus, the response to the direct
and reflected signals will be essentially equal (see Figure
).
Revisiting the ground calibration, and referring now to
6-12 typ.
Figure 3, we see that the substitution method is no longer
valid, since the response to the reflected signal arriving
from below is different from the response to the direct
(horizontal) signal.
Figure 1 Direct and Reflected Signals During
Calibration

Provided that the behaviour of the antennas mounted on

aircraft is similar, we may expect to compute the antenna Antenna
under test
factor accurately. Unfortunately, this is not the case. We
have obtained 3-D simulation models for the gain patterns
of the antennas on our flight inspection fleet, and
validated them by cross-checks against anechoic chamber Figure 3 Effect of Antenna Pattern on Calibration
measurements using scale models of the aircraft. The Factors
models show significant gain variation across a small
range of vertical angles above and below the horizon 3.

As an example, consider the tail-mounted VOR/LOC When the aircraft is in flight, ground reflections still
antenna on one of our aircraft, used for most field strength occur, but the direct and reflected paths are so very nearly
measurements on ILS and VOR. Its vertical pattern is parallel that the aircraft sees what appears to be a single
shown in Figure 2. In the forward direction, the gain can signal from a point source.

To get an idea of the magnitude of this effect, consider a

3 range set up to calibrate the tail antenna referred to in
Variations in gain also occur for non-zero roll and yaw angles, but the
Figure 2 in the forward direction. The transmit and
effect in the vertical is of greatest interest to antenna calibration.

106
reference antennas are set to the same height as the
antenna on the aircraft: 4.95 m. The distance between the
transmit and receive antennas is somewhat arbitrarily
selected to be 45.5 m. At mid-band (113 MHz), the direct
and reflected signals arrive at the measurement point 325
out of phase, and the reflected signal arrives at the receive
antenna at an upward angle of 12. (Basic geometry is
used to calculate the path lengths of the direct and
reflected signals while making the assumption that the
incident and reflected angle are the same. We then
convert their difference to degrees of phase at the selected
frequency, keeping in mind that the signal undergoes a
180 phase reversal upon reflection.)
For this phase relationship, and assuming that the ground
signal is 2 dB less than the direct (this was validated
experimentally), the interference between them is
constructive, and by vector addition we can determine
that the combined signal is 1.9 dB higher than the direct
signal alone. This is the level that we would measure
with the reference antenna.
However, the aircraft antenna gain at a vertical angle
of -12 is about 10 dB less than in the horizontal; the
reflected signal will be attenuated by this amount. The
effect is that the aircraft antenna is now in a field that is
only 0.2 dB higher than if there had been no ground-
reflected signal. The difference between the two pairs of
combined signals will result in an antenna factor that is
1.7 dB too high, and all subsequent field strength
measurements will therefore be in error by this amount.
So how do we deal with this? The best way would be to
eliminate the reflected signal altogether. We put some
effort into exploring this option by constructing a fence
measuring 5 x 1.8 metres out of ABS pipe, covering it
with wire mesh having 25-mm hexagonal holes, and
placing it between the transmit antenna and the
measurement area. It was supposed to scatter the
reflected signal while allowing the direct one to pass
unaffected over the top. However, in spite of several
design evolutions, it had no discernable effect in the VHF
band and seemed to act as a re-radiator in the glide path
band. Nevertheless, we believe that the fence concept
still has merit and warrants further investigation.
In the meantime, we decided that if we couldnt prevent
the reflection from the ground, we might be able to
manage it by manipulating the phase relationship between
the direct and reflected signals so that the amplitude of
their sum was the same as the direct signal alone. Thus,
while the reflected signal still existed, it wouldnt affect
the measured amplitude of the combined field. It was
determined that a phase difference of 252 would
accomplish this. For the antenna height on our aircraft,
this would require the aircraft to be situated 91 metres
107
from the transmit antenna for a frequency of 113 MHz.
Unfortunately, the size of our test range did not permit
this, and we were limited to a distance of 85 metres.
Theoretically, this would result in a phase difference of
257 and a field 0.2 dB greater in amplitude than the
direct signal alone. The incident and reflected angle
would be 6.6, and from Figure 2 we can see that the
reflected signal is attenuated a further 3.7 dB as a result of
the vertical pattern of the antenna. Recomputing, we
determine that that combined signal that the aircraft
antenna sees is 0.1 dB weaker than it would have been
had there been no reflected signal. Thus, the resulting
antenna factor, although still in error by 0.3 dB (partly
because of our distance limitation), has improved from
the 1.7 dB error that resulted from ignoring the effect of
the reflection and antenna pattern entirely. (The next time
we perform calibrations, well ensure that the equipment
is set up to avoid space constraints.)
Effect of Gain Pattern on Airborne Measurements
We have now considered the effect of the ground
reflection and gain pattern on the basic antenna factor
computed during ground calibration. Of equal importance
is how the same gain pattern affects airborne field
strength measurements.
Ground calibrations are typically done with a zero-degree
elevation angle, i.e. the signal arrives at the aircraft
antenna on the horizontal. However, this is seldom the
situation encountered during normal flight inspection
operations.
For most ILS inspection runs, the vertical angle is
approximately three degrees below the horizon. For a
VOR used for an instrument approach, this figure may be
even greater.
Consider one of our CRJ aircraft confirming the
Minimum Enroute Altitude (MEA) on an airway where
the vertical angle to the VOR is one degree down. The
CRJ level-flight pitch is approximately 1.7 nose up.
Thus, the combined vertical angle is around 2.7 below
the horizon when flying inbound, resulting in a measured
field strength 2.2 dB too low. By a similar logic, we can
see that the measurement will be about 1.1 dB too high
when travelling outbound 4 (refer again to Figure 2 5).
These differences will be more pronounced as the vertical
angle to the facility increases negatively.
4
This is why we have observed different results depending on which
direction we were flying.
5
Its likely difficult to see in black-and-white, but the trace with the 4
marker on it corresponds to a yaw angle of 0.
If were lucky, the calibration and attitude errors will Freq 113 MHz 118 MHz 115.5 MHz
cancel; more likely, though, these two issues alone could
cause inaccuracies in our field strength measurements that Gain -5 -0.6 dB -4.4 dB -2.5 dB
exceed our target tolerance.
Gain +5 -10.0 dB -6.9 dB -8.5 dB
Evaluation of the New Techniques
Delta Gain -- -- 6 dB
The final consideration in this paper is to assess how well
we have understood the issues, and whether our modified
calibration technique and antenna model will improve the
accuracy of our data. Thus, the measured power is expected to decrease by 6
dB as the vertical angle increases from -5 to +5. The
We flew one of our aircraft past a specific point on a actual measured values are -63 and -71 dBm, for a
VOR airway, inbound and outbound, and measured the difference of 8 dB, comparing reasonably (although not
received signal. The vertical angle to the VOR was -2.0, perfectly) with the expected figure.
and the pitch angle was maintained at 0.1 or less. The
raw received power was -63.8 dBm inbound and -65.5 Finally, we compare actual antenna factors from a recent
dBm outbound. ground calibration with values from the polar plots of
gain.
To determine if these figures are reasonable, we need to
estimate the gains in the forward and aft directions for a Frequency AF, Fwd AF, Aft Delta
vertical angle of -2, at 115.5 MHz, the frequency of the
VOR of interest. We refer to Figure 2 and Figure 4 and 113 MHz 31.6 32.3 -0.7 dB
interpolate for the desired frequency.
118 MHz 31.7 37.6 -5.9 dB
Frequency Rel Gain, Fwd Rel Gain, Aft

113 MHz -2.9 dB -2.8 dB

Frequency Rel Gain, Fwd Rel Gain, Delta
118 MHz -2.8 dB -6.1 dB Aft
115.5 MHz -2.9 dB -4.5 dB 113 MHz -1.5 dB -3.5 dB -2.0 dB

118 MHz -1.5 dB -8.6 dB -7.1 dB

Thus, we should expect the raw signal strength outbound
to be about 1.6 dB lower than inbound, which agrees well
with the 1.7 dB observed. Thus, if we were to incorporate The differences agree within slightly over 1 dB, which
corrections in flight to the signal amplitude as a function gives us a measure of confidence in both the calibration
of the vertical angle, we would compute the same field technique and the antenna model 6.
strength regardless of the direction of flight, as we should
expect from a flight inspection system.

Next, we consider a wider range of vertical angles by

varying the pitch of the aircraft during flight. Figure 5
shows a few seconds of flight on an outbound radial from
the same VOR, during which the aircraft pitch moves
from 5 nose down to 7 nose up. The vertical angle to
the VOR remains at -2; the sum of this and the pitch
angle is shown in the Total Vert Angle trace. The raw
RF power can be seen to decrease as the combined
vertical angle increases.

Taking two points, where the vertical angle is -5 and +5 6

degrees (20.05 NM and 20.35 NM, respectively), and It should be noted that the problem of ground reflection is not resolved
by the management of phase for this aircraft in the aft direction (see
again referring to Figure 2 and Figure 4, we have relative General Observations). Thus, some error in the aft antenna factor
gains as follows: remains.

108
 Figure 4 - ILS/VOR Tail Antenna Pattern (118 MHz)

Figure 5 Variation of Received RF with Vertical Angle

109

Figure 6 - GP Tail Antenna Pattern (329 MHz)
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Sources of error associated with these techniques
include:
o Actual ground reflection coefficients.
These can be estimated empirically by
making field strength measurements over a
range of phase shifts by varying the height
of the transmit or reference antenna.
However, once the reflected signal is
attenuated by more than a few dB, the
amplitude of the combined signal is
relatively insensitive to further reductions;
o Geometry. Generally, antenna calibrations
are done by sweeping a signal generator
across the band of interest. Selection of
antenna heights and separation will only
yield the desired result at one frequency at a
time. A certain error will be introduced as
one moves away from that frequency unless
the geometry is readjusted;
o Limited data points. Our antenna models
were computed for edge and mid-band
frequencies and a limited number of pitch-
roll-yaw combinations. Some of the plots
show significant discontinuities with the
change of a single variable, making
interpolation less than ideal.
We briefly considered the possibility of making
glide path field strength measurements while flying
outbound from the facility as well as inbound,
110
thinking that we might gain some flight efficiency.
However, the model (see Figure 6) showed a very
erratic response aft. Since this instability made it
unlikely that we would obtain accurate
measurements, we abandoned this concept in favour
of one where we collect RF data during an arc,
where the response is much cleaner;
Note that the strategy for managing ground
calibrations by manipulating their relative phase is
valid only when the aircraft antenna gain in the
direction in which the reflected signal arrives is less
than the gain in the horizontal (direct) direction.
Otherwise, the resulting antenna factor would in fact
represent the gain in the below-horizon direction.
Calibration in the aft orientation is an example
where this would not work (refer again to Figure 2);
further pursuit of the fence concept is warranted;
Compensation for antenna response must also be
made to account for non-horizontal incident angles.
Yaw has a similar effect (when crabbing into the
wind, for example) but was not addressed
specifically in this paper;
CONCLUSIONS
a. Flight inspection organizations are likely not
achieving the desired 3 dB absolute accuracy for field
strength measurements;
b. Without proper design to manage reflected signals,
antenna factors obtained on the ground using the
substitution method can be erroneous;
c. If compensation is not made for the response of the
aircraft antenna in the horizontal and vertical planes,
airborne measurements of field strength will be
inaccurate.
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO, July 1996, International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annex 10 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Volume 1, Radio Navigation
Aids, 5th Edition.
[2] ICAO, 2007, Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation
Aids, Volume I: Testing of Ground-Based Radio
Navigation Systems, Document 8071, Fourth Edition,
2000.
[3] Commtel Wireless, CL600-2B (CRJ200) Antenna
Characterization Study, 2007.
 Session 4
Flight Validation and Related Concepts
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Verification of Final Approach Segment Data
Prior to SBAS Flight Inspection
Richard M. Montgomery
Flight Inspection Program Specialist
Federal Aviation Administration
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
E-mail: richard.montgomery@faa.gov
ABSTRACT
Precision Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS)
inflight procedures are becoming a vital part of our
everyday aviation lives. Precision inflight SBAS
procedures consist of multiple data points that help an
aircraft navigate from one point to another along a
specific bearing.
The Final Approach Segment Data Block (FAS Data
Block) contains 20 different data points providing precise
navigational guidance to the runway or a predetermined
point in space. The FAS Data must be aligned with the
Final Approach Course (FAC) within tenths of degrees in
order to provide proper navigation, and prevent unwanted
guidance changes when transitioning from the terminal to
precision approach modes of the approach.
This paper will discuss the importance of FAC and FAS
data alignment and what will happen if the data is not
aligned properly. The paper will also discuss the theory
and method of verifying the FAC is aligned properly with
the FAS Data.
INTRODUCTION
Satellite based approaches or Area Navigation (RNAV)
approaches are becoming increasingly popular for
runways located at airports that are limited on what kind
of instrument approaches can be used.
As stated in the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM),
Area Navigation (RNAV) is a method of navigation that
permits aircraft operation on any desired flight path
within the coverage of ground or space based navigation
aids (Federal Aviaiton Administration, 2014). With these
navigational aids there are large amounts of data located
in the aircraft avionics telling the aircrafts avionics where
to go and how to get there.
Richard Mo ntgo mery, FAA
In late 2011, I helped develop a program called Coding
Preflight Validation (CPV), which is an extensive desktop
review of the ARINC 424 Coding associated with each
instrument flight procedure. CPV compares specific data
provided in the source ARINC 424 coding to the
instrument flight procedures procedural data.
The ARINC 424 Coding is not an avionics database;
rather it is an international standard file format for aircraft
navigation data maintained by Airlines Electronic
Engineering Committee and published by Aeronautical
Radio Inc. The ARINC 424 Coding specification
provides specific guidance on how to arrange each piece
of data in an instrument approach procedure, so the same
data can be made available to any avionics manufacture
for processing into their avionics equipment. Each
dataset of ARINC 424 coding is 132 characters long, each
row and column within the ARINC 424 coding has a
specific meaning. The ARINC 424 coding format
contains information for airport, heliports, airports
navaids, waypoints, runways, arrivals, and departures.
ARINC coding consist of alpha character, numeric
characters, and plus and minus signs. No decimal points
or special characters are allowed within the ARINC
Coding.
The Coding Preflight Validation (CPV) process reviews
any instrument flight procedure developed by the Federal
Aviation Administration, or a Non-FAA developer. Each
applicable instrument flight procedure is manually
reviewed for data accuracy and integrity before it is sent
to flight inspection for validation with an aircraft. There
are numerous data points reviewed in the Coding Preflight
Validation (CPV) process, including but not limited to,
airspeed, altitude, waypoint names, transitions, waypoint
latitude/longitude, Threshold Crossing Height (TCH),
turn direction, and bearing alignment.
If there are any data discrepancies found during the
Coding Preflight Validation (CPV) process, the
113
instrument flight procedure package is returned to the
procedure design specialist for review and correction.
The instrument flight procedure is returned with a
description of the discrepancies and any other information
that may help the procedure design specialist correct the
discrepancies. Once the instrument flight procedure has
been corrected by the procedure design specialist, it is
returned to the flight inspection, rechecked in the Coding
Preflight Validation process, and then either sent on to
flight inspection or returned to the procedure design
specialist for any additional corrections.
EXAMPLES OF CODING PREFLIGHT
VALIDAITON ERRORS
Numerous discrepancies have been identified by the
Coding Preflight Validation (CPV) process. Each
Figure 1. Altitude Discrepancy between Instrument Flight Procedure and ARINC 424 Coding.
ALIGNMENT ISSUE
Within an RNAV instrument flight procedure with
Localizer Performance or Localizer Performance with
Vertical guidance minima, there is Final Approach
Segment (FAS) data associated with those procedures.
The Final Approach Segment as defined in the
114
discrepancy carries the same weight as the next. If a
waypoint is not spelled correctly between the instrument
flight procedure package and the ARINC 424 coding, it is
sent back to the procedure design specialist who created it
for correction. This statement is the same for any other
discrepancy that is found, for example altitude, airspeed,
leg type, and bearing. (Figure 1)
Each discrepancy that is found is recorded, evaluated, and
discussed with the procedure design specialist who
created it. Each discrepancy is also evaluated, and put
into a report to show how much flight time was saved by
finding the errors early, rather than later.
Aeronautical Information Manual is the segment of an
instrument approach in which alignment and descent for
landing are accomplished. The data that is associated
with the Final Approach Segment provides precision
guidance from the instrument flight procedures Precision
Final Approach Fix (PFAF) to the Landing Threshold
Point (LTP) or Fictitious Threshold Point (FTP). Within
this information, there are 20 data points that provides
precise navigation. The Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC) is a method that ensures the Final Approach
Segment data is transmitted correctly from one place to
another.
In 2013, a user flying the RNAV GPS approach into
runway 35 at Salt Lake City, Utah, experienced a full-
scale, left deflection of the Course Deviation Indicator
(CDI) needle. This deflection of the needle occurred just
prior to crossing over the Final Approach Fix (FAF), as
the avionics in the aircraft were switching from terminal
mode to approach mode. Switching from terminal mode
to approach mode triggers the avionics to verify it has
adequate GPS satellite coverage, and change to the Final
Approach Segment data block guidance.
This approach was designed as an offset approach with
Localizer Performance (LP) minima. The Final Approach
Course (FAC) that was designed crosses the extended
centerline of the runway 2999 from the threshold on a
published bearing of 341 degrees. The Final Approach
Segment data block that was attached to the end of the
Final Approach Segment was designed down the
centerline of runway 35, and not on the same 341 degree
bearing as the Final Approach Course. The misalignment
of the Final Approach Course and Final Approach
Segment data block caused the course deviation indicator
to go full scale deflection to the left.
This was most likely one of the first times this approach
had been flown using the Final Approach Segment data
since it was designed and flight validated in 2011. Due to
the limited experience of validating RNAV GPS offsets
with Localizer Performance (LP) minima at the time, the
procedure was commissioned with the misalignment
issue.
The users complaint caused a safety alert to be issued
from the avionics manufacturer. The users complaint
was then forwarded to the Technical Services Division of
the Federal Aviation Administrations Flight Inspection
Operations group, where a NOTAM was issued to not
authorize the approach. This prompted the database
supplier to issue an alert for the approach in their
database.
115
Once the approach was NOTAMed, a process needed to
be designed and put in place to make sure that the Final
Approach Course and the Final Approach Segment data
block for any existing or newly developed WAAS
procedure with Localizer Performance (LP) or Localizer
Performance with Vertical guidance (LPV) minima is
aligned properly.
THE PROCESS
Coming up with a process to verify the Final Approach
Course (FAC) to the Final Approach Segment (FAS) data
alignment was not a simple task. We need to figure out
what data is needed, where the data is located, and a
method on how calculate the data.
The data needed to verify the bearing alignment between
the Final Approach Course and the Final Approach
Segment data block can be found in the ARINC 424
coding record, as well as the procedural data from the
instrument flight procedure package.
It was determined the data that was need was:
1. Precise Final Approach Fix (PFAF) latitude and
longitude
2. Landing Threshold Point (LTP) or the Fictitious
Threshold Point (FTP) latitude and longitude
3. Final Approach Course (FAC) determined by
the procedure designer
4. Magnetic Variation used in the development of
the procedure
5. Flight Path Alignment Point (FPAP) latitude
and longitude
A geodetic calculator that has the ability to calculate the
inverse between two waypoints is also required for this
process.
The table below provides a representation of the steps
associated with the process. (Figure 2)
 Figure 2. FAS Data Alignment Verification Worksheet

Method for Verification of Alignment
The first portion of the verification of Final Approach
Course (FAC) and Final Approach Segment (FAS) data
block alignment is to determine the bearing from the
Precise Final Approach Fix (PFAF) to the Landing
Threshold Point (LTP) or the Fictitious Threshold Point
(FTP).
The latitude and longitude of the Precise Final Approach
Fix (PFAF) or Final Approach Fix (FAF) are located in
the waypoint section of the ARINC 424 Coding. The
latitude and longitude for the Landing Threshold Point
(LTP) or the Fictitious Threshold Point (FTP) are located
in the Path Point Record of the ARINC 424 Coding as
well.
1. Input the PFAF Latitude and Longitude into the
first coordinate section of the geodetic calculator.
Note the bearing from the PFAF/FAF to the
LTP/FTP.
2. Input the LTP/FTP latitude and longitude into
the second coordination section of the geodetic
calculator.
Note the bearing from the LTP/FTP to the
PFAF/FAF.

Figure 3. PFAF/FAF to LTP/FTP Coordinate Calculations

116
 3. Locating the Final Approach Course that was 5.
calculated by the procedure design specialist.
4. Use the Magnetic Variation to calculate the Final 6.
Approach Course to TRUE degrees.
a. Add for a East Magnetic Variation to
the Final Approach Course designed in
the instrument procedure package.
b. Subtract for a West Magnetic Variation 7.
from the Final Approach Course
designed in the instrument procedure
package.
Figure 4. Comparison of data
The second portion of the verification of the Final
Approach Course (FAC) and Final Approach Segment
(FAS) data block alignment is to determine the bearing
from the Landing Threshold Point (LTP) or the Fictitious 2.
Threshold Point (FTP) to the Flight Path Alignment Point
(FPAP).
The latitude and longitude for the Landing Threshold 3.
Point (LTP) or the Fictitious Threshold Point (FTP) are
located in the Path Point Record of the ARINC 424
Coding. The latitude and longitude for the Flight Path
Alignment Point (FPAP) are also in the Path Point Record
of the ARINC 424 Coding.
1. Input the LTP/FTP Latitude and Longitude into
the first coordinate section of the geodetic
calculator.
Figure 5. Final Comparison of Alignment Data
117
Note the Final Approach Course bearing in
TRUE.
Compare the bearing from the PFAF/FAF to the
LTP/FTP to the Final Approach Course Bearing
in TRUE.
This comparison must be within +/- .03
degrees.
Determine the reciprocal of the bearing from the
LTP/FTP to the PFAF.
Note this bearing.
Note the bearing from the LTP/FTP to the
FPAP
Input the FPAP latitude and longitude into the
second coordination section of the geodetic
calculator.
Compare the reciprocal of the bearing from the
LTP/FTP to PFAF to the bearing from the
LTP/FTP to FPAP.
This comparison must be within +/- .10
degrees
CONCLUSION

ARINC 424 data plays a vital part in every instrument

flight procedure that relies on space-based and ground-
based augmentation system. Coding Preflight Validation
(CPV) ensures that all data is accurate prior to any flight
inspection or flight validation mission.

Having a final approach course and final approach

segment data misaligned was a costly discrepancy.
Costly to the point that the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) flight inspection was required to
go back to the same location and evaluate the same
approach multiple times. This not only delayed the
cancelation of the NOTAM that was issued, but it cost
time, money, fuel, and air traffic delays to revisit the same
place

The solution to this issue was to develop a process by

which the Final Approach Course bearing is evaluated
and compared to the Final Approach Segment data block.
This process must be performed prior to any mission that
has a RNAV instrument approach with Localizer
Performance or Localizer Performance with Vertical
guidance minima associated with it. The ultimate
conclusion is no matter how subtle the discrepancy is, the
discrepancy can cause major navigational guidance issues
if not caught.

FUTURE WORK

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Technical

Services Division is working on a way to make the
Coding Preflight Validation process totally automated.
This will eliminate the need for an individual to manually
examine all the required documentation for Coding
Preflight Validation (CPV).

The automation of this process will not only include the

validation of all key items, but will incorporate the Final
Approach Course (FAC) and Final Approach Segment
(FAS) data block alignment check into its process.

REFERENCES

[1] FAA, April 2014, Aeronautical Information Manual,

PPG A 12, Area Navigation, 5th Edition

118
 APPENDIX 1
Final Approach Segment (FAS) data block Alignment Verification Worksheet

119
 APPENDIX 2

Instrument Flight Procedure Package for KSCL

120
121
122
123
124
125
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

126
 Utilization of ARINC 424 Database in
Performing Flight Inspection Alex Kwartiroff, NXT, & Pat A llocca, N XT

Alex Kwartiroff
Manager of Business Development
NXT, Inc.
Ronkonkoma, New York, USA
Fax: +1 631 738 9062
E-mail: alexk@nxt-afis.com

Pat Allocca
Technical Director
NXT, Inc.
Ronkonkoma, New York, USA
Fax: +1 631 738 9062
E-mail: pata@nxt-afis.com

ABSTRACT question of the significance of having the identical flight

plan and database for the pilot and the flight inspector.
It has long been desirable to have the Flight Inspection
System be aware of the flight procedures that are being INTRODUCTION
flown by the flight crew to support a current flight
inspection mission. Flight procedures are displayed to the A few years ago the FAA introduced the term Gold
mission specialist for situational awareness. This has Standard, which is a process of automation in developing
become a requirement for RNAV modes such as non- a flight procedure, validating the procedure, coding the
precision GPS inspection, SBAS/WAAS and procedure in ARINC 424 format, and electronically
GBAS/LAAS inspection modes and for procedure packing the coded procedure into a navigation database
validation by the flight inspection crew. These new flight for use in the Flight Management System (FMS) on the
inspection modes have placed additional demands on flight inspection aircraft[3]. The initiative is to use only
maintaining the integrity of the database from the source ARINC 424 coding for the inspection and
development of the procedure through distribution to the validation of RNAV procedures.
facility and flight inspection aircraft.
Since that time much progress has been made toward
This paper will review the methods used by the Flight achieving this Gold Standard, however a number of
Inspection System to obtain the FMS procedure being issues still need to be addressed. The RNAV precision
flown by the crew. Some problems have arisen with the approach modes require a procedure validation consisting
current FAA aircraft cockpit upgrades that have made it of flying over specified waypoints and verifying the
difficult to obtain accurate procedure information, and in critical data elements that provide the course and glide
some cases, not being able to retrieve FMS procedure path deviations to the pilot. These parameters are
information. contained in the FAS data block that are transmitted by
the GBAS/LAAS station and must be verified by the
Ideally it would be desirable for the flight inspector to flight inspector.
retrieve the database parameters directly from the FMS to
assure that the procedure flown matches what the flight The paper will describe how NXTs flight inspection
inspector is verifying. However, the data available from system currently decodes the FAA's (US) continental
the FMS does not provide in some cases all required Coded Instrument Flight Procedures (CIFP) ARINC 424
parameters and the accuracies needed for flight coded database (or FAAs tailored ARINC 424 coded
inspection. In view of this constraint, the paper raises the

127
procedure database) in performing RNAV inspection
modes including:
GPS-NP
SBAS/WAAS - LNAV/VNAV and LPV approaches
GBAS/LAAS
DME/DME (flight plan is optional but not generally
used)
At this point we need to provide a brief summary of the
database parameters required to perform flight inspection
of the above modes.
This paper first addresses the current mechanism for
loading the flight plan and data base parameters into the
FMS and AFIS. The interface between the FMS and
AFIS is discussed, describing the limitations of the
GAMA (General Aviation Manufacturers Association)
format that the FMS outputs. A brief overview of the
various ARINC 424 versions is discussed below,
describing the increased capability of the latest version.
The final question to be raised is the importance of having
the identical flight plan and database used by the pilot and
flight inspector. Prior to flying a RNAV procedure the
pilot may manually edit the flight plan in the FMS after it
was loaded from the ARINC 424 file. The changes may
include adding waypoints, but this modification to the
flight plan will not be automatically relayed to the flight
inspector. Therefore, what would be the significance of
having the pilots and inspectors flight plans not being
necessarily identical? Any changes to the waypoints
introduced by the pilot may affect the AFIS data
collection starting points, and therefore could lose a
portion of the collected data.
FLIGHT INSPECTION USING ARINC 424
In the flight inspection mission, the primary purpose of
decoding the ARINC 424 database is to retrieve flight
plan waypoints to a runway to support LNAV,
LNAV/VNAV inspections and to retrieve FAS data to
support SBAS/GBAS LPV inspections.
Using information supplied by the operator, such as
airport name and runway, the flight inspection software
interfaces with the ARINC 424 database to decode and
build all possible flight procedures to the runway, and if
available, to retrieve the FAS data associated with the
runway. The operator may select from a list of
procedures. The software then retrieves and builds the
flight plan using all defined waypoints and/or navaids.
The interface to the ARINC 424 database assists the FAA
on aircraft that have FMSs that do not provide the flight
inspection system with flight plan information.
128
The non-precision GPS flight inspection was the first
mode that required waypoint information, typically
starting at the FAF waypoint and continuing to the
runway threshold. The waypoint information may be
entered by the mission specialist by hand. However, this
method is prone to errors. Some FMSs can output the
current flight plan that is being flown in the GAMA
(General Aviation Manufacturers Association) format,
usually on an ARINC 429 data bus. The GAMA flight
plan output from the FMS provides an accurate means of
obtaining flight plan data for the non-precision GPS
inspection and insures that the mission specialists flight
procedure is the same as the cockpit is. The waypoint
information is used by the AFIS to define the start and
stop of data collection as well as defining the course
bearing necessary in the computation of along-track,
cross-track and waypoint displacement errors due to GPS
errors.
While the GAMA flight plan is suitable for non-precision
GPS flight inspection, it does not provide sufficient
waypoint accuracy for SBAS/WAAS and GBAS/LAAS
inspection. These inspection modes require waypoint
accuracy that is beyond the data resolution provided by
the GAMA format. The GAMA format for waypoint
latitude and longitude provides 20 bits of resolution equal
to approximately 0.000172 degrees or about 60 feet of
resolution[4]. This is not enough resolution for
WAAS/LAAS flight inspection, where we typically
require data resolution to 1 foot or better. In addition to
this limitation, GAMA does not provide waypoint
altitude.
Figure 1 was received in 2007 from the Japanese Civil
Aviation Bureau who marked 3 positions in google earth
image. These are:
1) Published
2) FMS indicated
3) AFIS FMS indicated (from GAMA flight plan)
This shows that even the FMS displayed position is off
from the published position, but what is interesting is the
difference between the FMS and the AFIS threshold
position. The AFIS position comes from the GAMA
output and if you were to measure distance, you would
find that it falls within the 62 feet (both in latitude and
longitude). Since both Latitude and Longitude can be off
by up to 62 feet, the total error can be some combination
of latitude error and longitude error, resulting in a total
error of more than 62 feet.
The FAAs flight inspection fleet of Challenger, Learjet
and Beechcraft aircraft is comprised of two types of
FMSs. The FMS on the Beechcraft does not support a
GAMA flight plan output. However, the FMS used on
the Learjet has modified the GAMA 429 output bus to
include three new ARINC 429 labels that extend the
latitude/longitude precision and provide waypoint
altitude. While this is acceptable for the Learjet aircraft, it
did not resolve the issue for the FMS used on the
Figure 1. Difference Between Published, FMS and AFIS Indicated Position
file or files. This file is loaded onto a media, usually a
USB thumb drive. The AFIS reads the file as specified by
the operator, usually on the FACILITY selection page.
AFIS parses the file using the facility and runway
identifiers as input search parameters.
The least desirable method is to manually enter each
required waypoint from the procedure to allow the
mission specialist to conduct procedure validation. This is
always a fallback mode of data entry when no other
129
Beechcraft. A more universal solution across all flight
inspection aircraft would be more desirable.
The ARINC 424 database is supplied to AFIS by a text
means of data acquisition is available, but clearly this is
not desirable.
ARINC 424 BRIEF DESCRIPTION
The ARINC 424 specification was first developed in the
mid 70s to meet the more complex requirements of
embedded navigation systems including FMSs. The first
specification was officially published in 1975 and has
been continuously updated to support the evolving
requirements. The latest specification is ARINC 424-20,
published in 2011[1].
From Wikipedia, ARINC 424 or ARINC 424 Navigation
System Data Base Standard is an international standard
file format for aircraft navigation data maintained by
Airlines Electronic Engineering Committee and published
by Aeronautical Radio, Inc.. The ARINC 424
specifications are not a database, but a "standard for the
preparation and transmission of data for assembly of
airborne navigation system data bases.

ARINC 424 specifies a 132-byte fixed-length record

format. Each record consists of one piece of navigation
information such as an airport, heliport, runway,
waypoints, navaids, airways, arrival routes, and departure
routes. The Appendix shows an extract from an ARINC
424 procedure record for the KOKC approach plate.

ARINC 424 contains several sub-specifications for

different data formats. New formats have been introduced
as capabilities of equipment have increased and new
classes of equipment (such as GPS) have been introduced.
The sub-specifications are indicated by a format number.
The three sub-specifications currently in use are ARINC
424-13, ARINC 424-15, and ARINC 424-18.

The ARINC 424 datasets are assembled by commercial

data suppliers based on the public sources (also named
standard data). Custom data (also named tailored data)
is specific to the end-user. The input ARINC 424 dataset
can be adapted to meet the specific requirements of a
target Flight Management System or flight inspection
system.
Figure 2. Approach Plate for OKC RWY 17L
APPROACH PLATE FOR OKC RWY 17L

As an example, the Oklahoma City Runway 17L, as

depicted in Figure 2, will be used to show the capability
of decoding the ARINC 424 file and display on the AFIS
monitor all information pertinent to this approach. In this
case the facility inspection type is SBAS/WAAS.

There are five (5) approach transitions defined for the

approach into runway 17L. They are:

1) DAROO
2) FLAPP
3) GULLI
4) HIPES
5) DECKK

After loading the ARINC 424 data for RWY 17L into the
AFIS, the information is shown on the console display, Figure 3. Flight Plans 1 to 4
identifying all waypoints for each of the five approaches,
as shown in Figures 3 and 4.

130
 Figure 6. DAROO Approach Flight Plan
Figure 4. Flight Plan 5

The next display identifies the Runway data which is

displayed in Figure 5. Upon selecting the approach to be
inspected, the operator enters in this example the DAROO
approach transition, which is copied to the AFIS facility
page and automatically appears on the console display, as
shown in Figure 6.

Figure 7. Decoded waypoints for DAROO approach

Figure 5. RWY 17L Runway Data

In Figure 7, the approach waypoints have been decoded

displaying the bearing/range, latitude and longitude data.
The facility data as read from the AFIS database is
displayed in Figure 8. Figure 9 shows the FAS data
block, which has been decoded from the ARINC 424 or
FAA binary file for the OKC RWY 17L. Figure 10 is a
graphic representation showing google earth with all the
waypoints of the DAROO procedure and the runway
threshold.
Figure 8. SBAS/WAAS Facility Data

131
 is presented here. For KOKC the FAS data information is
as follows:

Data Field Data

Operation Type 00
SBAS Service Provider ID 00
Airport Identifier KOKC
Runway Number RW17L
Approach Performance Designator 0
Route Indicator Y
Reference Path Data Selector 00
Reference Path Identifier W17B
LTP/FTP Latitude N0352418.5700
LTP/FTP Longitude W0973520.2000
LTP/FTP Ellipsoid Height +0365.4
LTP Orthogonal Height +0392.1
Figure 9. Facility FAS Data Block FPAP Latitude N0352241.6400
FPAP Longitude W0973520.1100
Threshold Crossing Height +00058.7
TCH Unit Selector (Meters or Feet) F
Glide Path Angle 03.00
Course Width at Threshold 106.75
HAL 40.0
VAL 35.0
Length Offset 0000
CRC Remainder B59D8858
ICAO Code K4
FPAP Orthogonal Height +0392.1

For SBAS/WAAS and GBAS/LAAS facilities the FAS

Figure 10. Google Earth image showing DAROO
Procedure
FAS DATA BLOCK
Due to the fact that the FAS data block is a critical
element in performing SBAS/WAAS and GBAS/LAAS
facility inspections, a brief overview on how it is applied
data block is loaded into the AFIS as a binary file
supplied by the FAA. This file is only used to load the
AFIS and its content is derived from ARINC 424. Its
parameters define the precision approach, which include
the critical path elements that provide the course and glide
path deviations to the pilot. When an LPV inspection is
performed the AFIS computes the FAF waypoint at a
distance of five miles from the threshold point. During
the facility inspection after getting a position fix at the
threshold and runway end, the flight inspection data
acquired is back-corrected between the FAF and the
threshold. The FAS data block CRC is used by AFIS to
verify the integrity of the data. AFIS computes its own
CRC on the decoded FAS data and compares it to the file
CRC. This ensures the integrity of the data and a bad
CRC alerts the operator of compromised data.
For a GBAS/LAAS facility, the FAS data block is loaded
into the GBAS facility, which transmits the data to the
aircraft. The same FAS data is loaded into the ground
station, FMS and AFIS. During the flight inspection
several of the FAS data block parameters are measured
and verified. The Landing Threshold Point (LTP) and
Flight Path Alignment Point (FPAP) are stored in the FAS

132
data block as longitude/latitude coordinates. The bearing
from the LTP to the FPAP defines the approach course.
This course must match the runway bearing and final
approach course. GBAS FAS files only contain 38 bytes
of real data while SBAS files have 40 bytes of real data.
The difference being that there is no HAL/VAL data in
the GBAS file.
The LTP ellipsoid height and the threshold crossing
height are parameters that define the GNSS elevation that
the glide path will terminate above the runway threshold.
Corruption of this data will skew the glide path forward or
aft along the inbound course. This condition may lead to
the aircraft being below or above the designated glide
path[2].
CONCLUSIONS
The application of the ARINC 424 database in performing
flight inspection has not been standardized and its future
use raises several questions:
1) Is it necessary to have an exact copy of the procedure
being flown?
a. No. However it is necessary to have the FAF and
RDP/LTP waypoints that are required
starting/stopping points in AFIS. For LPV, it is
necessary to have the FAS data for the runway
being inspected.
2) Is the ARINC 424 database the only solution?
a. No. Any database format may be used. This may
be a simple text based formatted database or a
complex XML formatted database. The ARINC
424 format provides a universally accepted
format that can be shared by the FMS and AFIS.
3) Are there other solutions?
a. Yes, The GAMA format can be expanded to
include the additional information and accuracy
required by the AFIS. However, it may be very
hard to update the GAMA specification and have
it implemented in current FMSs in a timely
fashion.
b. The AFIS database may be expanded to include
the necessary information. However the AFIS
database is a proprietary format.
c. Define a new AFIS database format for
procedures that would supplement the existing
databases.
133
In the future, if there will be plans to standardize the use
of the ARINC 424 database for flight inspection, the
following disadvantages should be considered:
1) Requires verbal coordination with flight deck to
select the same procedure as is entered into the FMS.
No guarantee that the flight plans are the same and it
may be difficult to verify.
2) FMS may insert pseudo waypoints. Different FMSs
may result in different pseudo waypoints or none at
all.
3) Crew may add or delete waypoints. These would not
be seen by the AFIS.
4) The ARINC 424 database may require a significant
coding effort.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Due to the fact that ARINC 424 is a globally accepted
format by most FMSs and GPS receivers, its content and
use could be adopted by the flight inspection community
to achieve the Gold Standard in terms of procedure
accuracy and repeatability.
One possibility is to expand the use of ARINC 424
beyond the RNAV modes to include VOR, ILS, and MLS
inspections, which is currently being supported. With this
approach there would be a possibility to eliminate the
AFIS database and rely only on ARINC 424. Further
expansion could be considered in the future to support
other inspection modes.
For future revisions of the ARINC 424 Specification, it
may be desirable for the flight inspection community to
have inputs for inclusion of specific flight inspection
parameters not normally required for aeronautical
applications.
REFERENCES
[1] Aeronautical Radio, Inc. Navigation System
Database, ARINC 424 Specification.
[2] Flight Inspection Symposium, June 2012, Paper by
Dan Burdette, Flight Inspection of the Ground Based
Augmentation System (GBAS)/ Local Area
Augmentation System (LAAS).
[3] Flight Inspection Symposium, June 2008, Paper by
Dan Burdette, Electronic Coding/Packing Process of
RNAV Approach Procedures for Flight Inspection.
[4] ARINC 424 GAMA Specification, Version 5.0
dated September 19, 2007
 APPENDIX 1
Extract for an ARINC 424 procedure record for KOKC approach plate
HDR KOKC RWY 17L

TUSAEAENRT ADWOW K40 W R N35293496W097423268 E0044 NAR ADWOW 002751202

TUSAEAENRT BECTA K40 W R N35434542W097272011 E0042 NAR BECTA 023251202

TUSAEAENRT BIRDY K40 W R N35231638W097423236 E0044 NAR BIRDY 027181202

TUSAEAENRT DAROO K40 W R N35131701W098130274 E0047 NAR DAROO 072661202

TUSAEAENRT DECKK K40 C RB N34522212W097165192 E0041 NAR DECKK 293181202

TUSAEAENRT FLAPP K40 W R N35320678W097452566 E0044 NAR FLAPP 119071202

TUSAEAENRT GULLI K40 C RL N36004302W097083963 E0040 NAR GULLI 315101202

TUSAEAENRT HANGS K40 C N35285310W097352043 E0043 NAR HANGS 143911202

TUSAEAENRT HIGVO K40 W R N35354775W097352079 E0043 NAR HIGVO 157301202

TUSAEAENRT HIPES K40 W R N35294935W097260916 E0042 NAR HIPES 159041202

TUSAEAENRT ISAKE K40 W R N35271889W097291254 E0043 NAR ISAKE 189801202

TUSAEAENRT JASKA K40 W R N35505407W097192943 E0041 NAR JASKA 198571202

TUSAEAENRT JAVXE K40 W R N35103110W097351949 E0043 NAR JAVXE 199601202

TUSAEAENRT JINTA K40 W R N35320716W097382650 E0044 NAR JINTA 208551202

TUSAEAENRT LEVEE K40 W R N35170793W097462789 E0044 NAR LEVEE 279481202

TUSAEAENRT MERTE K40 W R N35320713W097392690 E0044 NAR MERTE 378721202

TUSAEAENRT OKIES K40 W R N35044756W097253303 E0042 NAR OKIES 402091202

TUSAEAENRT PALMR K40 W R N35231251W097291233 E0043 NAR PALMR 414011202

TUSAEAENRT SCORY K40 W R N35271876W097352035 E0043 NAR SCORY 472511202

TUSAEAENRT SIWHU K40 W R N35293527W097352047 E0043 NAR SIWHU 477221202

TUSAEAENRT WUVMA K40 W R N35294930W097321657 E0043 NAR WUVMA 534351202

TUSAEAENRT WWILL K40 W R N35272576W097423257 E0044 NAR WWILL 534721202

TUSAP KOKCK4AOKC 0 098YHN35233507W097360274 E005001295 1800018000C MNAR WILL ROGERS WORLD 040581109

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 010DAROOK4EA0E A IF 06000 18000 A FS 000251113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 020LEVEEK4EA0E 010TF 07490221 + 06000 A FS 000261113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 030BIRDYK4EA0E 010TF 02260069 + 06000 A FS 000271113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 040WWILLK4EA0E B 010TF 35500042 + 05000 A FS 000281113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 050ADWOWK4EA0E 041TF 35500022 + 04500 180 A-FS 000291113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 060MERTEK4EA0E R041RF 0025303550 08500040 + 04000 DMGPB K4EAA FS 000301113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 070JINTAK4EA0E 041TF 08500008 + 04000 180 A-FS 000311113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 080SIWHUK4EA0E R041RF 0025300850 17500040 + 02900 DNBSB K4EAA FS 000321113

134
TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADAROO 090SCORYK4EA0EE F 041TF 17500023 + 02300 A FS 000331113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADECKK 010DECKKK4EA0E A IF 06000 18000 A FS 000341113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADECKK 020OKIESK4EA0E 010TF 32510143 + 06000 A FS 000351113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADECKK 030PALMRK4EA0E B 010TF 34580186 + 06000 A FS 000361113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADECKK 040ISAKEK4EA0E 010TF 35500041 + 04700 180 A-FS 000371113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADECKK 050WUVMAK4EA0E L010RF 0025003550 26500039 + 03500 180 DNCTB K4EAA-FS 000381113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ ADECKK 060SCORYK4EA0EE FL041RF 0025002650 17500039 + 02300 DNCTB K4EAA FS 000391113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AFLAPP 010FLAPPK4EA0E B IF + 04000 18000225 A-FS 000401113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AFLAPP 020MERTEK4EA0E 041TF 08490049 + 04000 A FS 000411113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AFLAPP 030JINTAK4EA0E 041TF 08500008 + 04000 180 A-FS 000421113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AFLAPP 040SIWHUK4EA0E R041RF 0025300850 17500040 + 02900 DNBSB K4EAA FS 000431113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AFLAPP 050SCORYK4EA0EE F 041TF 17500023 + 02300 A FS 000441113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AGULLI 010GULLIK4EA0E A IF 06000 18000 A FS 000451113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AGULLI 020JASKAK4EA0E 010TF 21700132 + 06000 A FS 000461113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AGULLI 030BECTAK4EA0E 010TF 21690096 + 06000 A FS 000471113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AGULLI 040HIGVOK4EA0E B 010TF 21440103 + 04000 A FS 000481113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AGULLI 050SIWHUK4EA0E 010TF 17500062 + 02900 A FS 000491113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AGULLI 060SCORYK4EA0EE F 041TF 17500023 + 02300 A FS 000501113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AHIPES 010HIPESK4EA0E B IF + 04000 18000230 A-FS 000511113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AHIPES 020WUVMAK4EA0E 041TF 26500050 + 03500 180 A-FS 000521113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ AHIPES 030SCORYK4EA0EE FL041RF 0025002650 17500039 + 02300 180 DNCTB K4EAA-FS 000531113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ H 020SCORYK4EA1E F IF + 02300 18000 RW17L K4PGA FS 000541113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ H 020SCORYK4EA2W A031A021 FS 000551113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ H 030RW17LK4PG0GY M 031TF 17500030 01345 -300 A FS 000561113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ H 040JAVXEK4EA0EYM 010TF 17500138 + 03200 A FS 000571113

TUSAP KOKCK4FH17LZ H 050JAVXEK4EA0EE R HM 35500040 + 03200 A FS 000581113

TUSAP KOKCK4FR17LY R 010RW17LK4PG0GY M 031TF 17500046 01345 -300 A JS 000081110

TUSAP KOKCK4FR17LY R 040 0 M CA 1750 + 01486 A JS 000091110

TUSAP KOKCK4FR17LY R 050JAVXEK4EA0EY DF + 03200 A JS 000101110

TUSAP KOKCK4FR17LY R 060JAVXEK4EA0EE R HM 35500040 + 03200 A JS 000111110

TUSAP KOKCK4GRW17L 0098021750 N35241857W097352020 01286000059150IIEXR1 100301109

TUSAP KOKCK4PR17LY RW17L001Y0000W17B0N3524185700W09735202000+036540300N3522416400W09735201100106750000000587F400350B59D88580M0131110

TUSAP KOKCK4PR17LY RW17L002E +03921+03921LPV 56503 0M0141110

TUSAP KOKCK4SRW17LK4PG 0 18018003825 M 0M0601112

135
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136
 Flight Inspection of Helicopter Procedures in a
Challenging Topographic Environment Markus Schwe nde ner, FCS, Dr. Ma urizio Scaramuzza , Skyg uide, & Heinz Leibundg ut, Swiss Air-Rescue

Markus Schwendener
Technical Director
FCS Flight Calibration Services GmbH
Braunschweig, Germany
Fax: +49 531 237 77 91
E-mail: swe@flightcalibration.de

Maurizio Scaramuzza
Head CNS Expert Group
Skyguide Swiss Air Navigation Services Ltd.
Wangen, Switzerland
Fax: +41 43 931 66 19
E-mail: maurizio.scaramuzza@skyguide.ch

Heinz Leibundgut
Head of Helicopter Procedures and Training
Swiss Air-Rescue
Zrich, Switzerland
Fax: +41 44 654 33 22
E-mail heinz.leibundgut@rega.ch

ABSTRACT system is required to fulfill international and national

standards.
Switzerland will introduce a low flight network (LFN)
in mountainous terrain with Point-in-space (PinS) This presentation will focus on the current installation and
procedures to hospitals. Topographical constraints require operation of an existing fixed wing flight inspection
on the one hand a detailed flight inspection for Global system in an IFR certified helicopter usually used for
Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) interference and Helicopter Emergency Medical Services (HEMS). The
communication coverage but preclude on the other hand description will highlight the different requirements
the flight inspection with a fixed wing flight inspection concerning mechanical installation, certification, the
aircraft. quick install and removal possibilities and the
independent position determination system. Finally, the
Todays demand for flight inspection of helicopter benefits of a high quality helicopter flight inspection
procedures is still limited, requires adapted system system for future applications, such as company mobile
installations, and is therefore costly. An efficient solution radio network calibration or flight guidance system
must be found. The combination of flight inspection and certification, will be discussed.
flight validation is a major requirement for economical
and ecological reasons. A high end flight inspection

137
INTRODUCTION

The special topographic situation in Switzerland often

faces helicopter operators with inversion layers,
especially in winter. While ski resorts have best weather
conditions, hospitals can only be reached in marginal
visual metrological conditions due to the compact cloud
layer.

Since the early seventies of the last century the Swiss

Federal Office for Civil Aviation (FOCA) may approve
helicopter departure in fog (HDF). Technical and
operational requirements for HDF are minimal. Neither a
helicopter full Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) certification
nor an entire IFR pilot qualification is required.

While departure cloud breaking is today routinely

performed, the unavailability of an approach cloud
breaking procedure remains a major problem.
Figure 1. HAF Example
For this reason the Swiss Air Navigation Services
(skyguide), Swiss Air-Rescue (Rega) and the Swiss Air LFN and all PinS procedures are subject to a
Force (SAF) started a project to implement a low flight commissioning flight inspection and a commissioning
network (LFN) with Point-in-Space (PinS) and Helicopter flight validation. Routine flight inspections may be
Approach in Fog (HAF) procedures to hospitals and required due to the special topographic situation.
operational bases.

Once fully implemented, the LFN will cover Switzerland

entirely, including a route crossing the Alps and linking
over 30 PinS procedures. Required Navigation
Performance (RNP) is 0,3NM and PinS procedures are
mainly Approach Procedures with Vertical guidance
(APV) with Space Based Augmentation System (SBAS).

Figure 2. Low Flight Network with PinS to hospitals

FLIGHT INSPECTION OF HELICOPTER

PROCEDURES WITH A KING AIR 350

Background

In 2010 FCS Flight Calibration Services GmbH (FCS)

first started flight inspecting helicopter procedures with a
King Air 350 equipped with an Aerodata AD-AFIS-220
flight inspection system (FIS). FCS King Air 350s are
approved for steep approaches up to 6,65 through a
supplemental type certificate (STC). Of course, a risk
assessment took place prior to each mission, effectively

138
excluding all safety-critical or non-flyable legs from the
inspection mission.
The extent of flight inspection of helicopter procedures in
Switzerland was limited to one or two approach
procedures per year.
The flight inspection was focused on GNSS behavior,
interference detection and communication coverage.
Operational problems encountered with King Air 350
Helicopter procedures can generally not be flown by fixed
wing aircraft mainly due to the limited turn radius and due
to the excessive approach angles. Flight inspection was
only possible with workarounds, e.g. flying each leg
separately one after the other with a new line up in
between, creating additional flight time and costs.
Flight inspection with the King Air on the Berne city
hospital procedure led to massive complaints from the
population despite a prior radio and newspaper
information campaign.
Two other HAF procedures had approach angles of 8,3
and 7 respectively, which are beyond our King Air 350
limitations for approaches.
Flight inspection of the LFN at low levels in valleys and
over mountain passes is not possible for safety reasons
with a King Air 350. Furthermore, the King Air 350 does
not fulfill RNP 0,3 requirements.
For the flight validation task, all procedures were flown in
parallel with an IFR certified helicopter by an approved
helicopter flight validation pilot, thus increasing costs and
environmental impact.
Figure 3. Approach Berne hospital
AeroFIS recording presented in Google Earth
139
GNSS interference
Up to now no GNSS interference was detected on any
helicopter procedures. As expected, the GNSS Space
Vehicles coverage is limited, especially in valleys
oriented in East-West and North-South directions [5]. A
GNSS performance analysis in very narrow valleys and
with possible multipath effects from cliffs was not yet
performed, as a King Air is hardly a suitable platform for
these flights.
Figure 4. Typical mountain valley (Jungfrau Region / Jost von Allmen)
VHF/UHF communication coverage
VHF/UHF communication coverage is generally
calculated prior to the flight inspection. In critical regions
coverage must then be verified by flight inspection.
Experience showed that communication coverage
frequently is a major issue for helicopter procedures.
Normal procedures to airports lead from a marginal to a
nearly perfect communication infrastructure, whereas
helicopter procedures to hospitals typically lead from a
good to a poor communication infrastructure.
INSTALLATION OF A KING AIR FLIGHT
INSPECTION SYSTEM IN A HELICOPTER
Motivation
Safety issues and the increased demand for helicopter
procedure inspections motivated all partners to review the
currently applied practice. Despite increasing demand for
flight inspection of helicopter procedures, the number is
still limited, requires an adapted flight inspection system
and is therefore costly.
Feasibility Study
In 2013 FCS Flight Calibration Services GmbH (FCS)
carried out a feasibility study in close cooperation with
Rega, Aerodata, DFS and skyguide. The goal was to
conceive a flight inspection system fulfilling international
and national requirements while increasing the safety of
the flight operations. The combination of flight inspection
and flight validation was also a major objective for
economical and ecological reasons.
The study showed that the installation of an existing
Aerodata FIS, normally installed in a King Air 350, in an
IFR certified Agusta AW109SP of Rega would be the
best solution regarding fulfillment of requirements and
low costs under the given circumstances.
Requirements
National requirements call for the analysis of the
navigation solution error also for GNSS procedures which
means that the position accuracy must be in the sub-meter
range for APV SBAS.
Beside basic GNSS data such as position information
several additional parameters such as carrier to noise ratio
for each received space vehicle signal are required for
further analysis.
The targeted VHF/UHF field strength measurement
uncertainty was 3dB .
In order to combine the flight validation with the
inspection it was necessary to install the system in an IFR
certified helicopter, preferably equipped with dual
instrumentation and commands. The helicopter must be
capable to fly RNP 0,3 and approach angles up to 9.
For the flight inspection system a GNSS L1/L2 antenna
outside the rotor disk, a VHF/COM antenna, a power
interface and a quick installation and removal unit was
mandatory.
For safety and technical reasons a loose equipment
installation, e.g. with laptop and a mobile GNSS antenna,
was excluded from the beginning.
Selection of helicopter
Rega operates 11 Agusta AW109SP and 6 Eurocopter
EC145 for HEMS in Switzerland. The complete fleet is
IFR equipped.
One of the Agusta AW109SP is completely dual IFR
equipped and normally operated as a backup and training
helicopter. Advantageous for this helicopter was an
existing VHF/UHF antenna interface, the existing mission
power interface with load shedding and the retractable
gear for economical ferry flights. A stretcher base with a
quick locking device for the stretcher is standard
equipment.
140
The helicopter is already equipped with 2 primary GNSS
receivers including data recording with a quick access
recorder. A service bulletin for the installation of a third
GPS antenna (L1/L2 for the flight inspection system)
retaining platform on the vertical stabilizer is currently
implemented by AgustaWestland. The installation of the
antenna, wiring and connecting interface in the cabin is
developed and certified by Rega's own engineering
department under their privileges as an approved
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) design
organization (EASA.21J.489).
Figure 5. Agusta AW109SP (Rega)
Flight inspection system design
Due to the stringent requirements for positioning and field
strength measurements it was decided to use both design
and components of the Aerodata AFIS-220 for the
helicopter flight inspection system.
The AFIS-220 was designed for an installation in King
Air 350s and is equipped with a large number of sensors
not required for a helicopter flight inspection system. The
system was reconfigured to a standard basic helicopter
configuration with
a. a real time computer for the data acquisition and a
display computer with one monitor
b. a hybrid position solution with an inertial navigation
system, a GNSS carrier phase solution and an
Omnistar wide area augmentation system
c. a Novatel OEM3 GNSS receiver, a TSO approved
Collins GPS-4000S GNSS receiver and a
Rohde&Schwarz EB200 monitoring receiver
d. a telemetry link for a local DGPS station.
Additionally the following provisions are integrated
e. an interface for a Collins GNLU-930 GBAS receiver The system allows an online evaluation of all results and
also permits post flight evaluations with a lab system or a
f. an interface for an AD-RNZ-850 NAV/ILS/ King Air system.
DME/MKR flight inspection receiver
The software remains exactly the same as for the FCS
g. an interface for a Rohde&Schwarz EVS300 King Air 350s. Aircraft typical configuration files (e.g.
measuring receiver for lever arms, antenna positions, antenna data and cable
losses) are included in the standard software distribution
h. an interface for FCS SISMOS (Signal in space kits and are automatically detected and applied by a
monitoring system) hardware coding.
i. an interface for LASER tracker positioning update As the helicopter flight inspection system remains
identical with the King Air flight inspection system for
the operation, the effort for documentation, training and
certification remains minimal.

Figure 6. HeliFIS block diagram

141
Mechanical integration

The main difference between the helicopter flight

inspection system (HeliFIS) and the King Air flight
inspection system is the mechanical integration.

The FIS in the King Air 350 is a 3 console system with a

weight of approx. 400kg, 3500W maximum power
consumption and FAR part 23 certified. Figure 8. HeliFIS rack front view

A major requirement was the certification according to

specification CS 27 with respect to crash loads of 16g
forward, 20g downward and 8g sideward, compared to the
crash loads of the King Air with only 8g forward.

Aerodata designed and built a new rack complying with

these requirements. The rack is fixed on a mounting frame
designed by Rega for the existing quick locking device.

Figure 7. Stretcher base Agusta AW109SP (Rega)

To comply with the quick install and removal requirement

we decided to install the helicopter flight inspection
system on the existing stretcher base with the quick
locking device. In fact, the stretcher will be replaced by
the HeliFIS.

Figure 9. HeliFIS rack

The airworthiness certification is performed by Regas in-

house European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) design
organization.
Figure 8. Stretcher base with mounting frame

Subsequently the weight of the HeliFIS was reduced to Commissioning

approximately 80kg. At the same time power Laboratory and ground tests will be completed by end of
consumption was reduced to below the 800W available,
June 2014. The helicopter installation with ground and
and a form factor compatible with emergency exit
flight tests is planned in the beginning of July 2014 with a
clearance requirements was determined.
release to service in August 2014.

142

Figure 10. HeliFIS installed in AW109SP
FUTURE APPLICATIONS
The integration of a high level flight inspection system
with an inertial navigation system and GNSS carrier
phase solution position accuracy offers a wide spectrum
for future applications outside the classical flight
inspection tasks.
Approach lighting systems
The HeliFIS basic capability also covers the calibration of
visual approach slope indicators (VASI), precision
approach indicators (PAPI) or helicopter visual segment
approach lighting systems (HALS).
Precision approach RADAR
Precision approach RADAR (PAR) calibration could be a
future application for the HeliFIS without any additional
modification. This could be of special interest for some
high angle PAR approaches to airports in the mountains.
Verification of flight guidance systems
The HeliFIS may be used for the airworthiness
verification of flight guidance systems. All flight
parameters are available with 10Hz, e.g. angles, position
and acceleration. Position accuracy will be better than
0,2m and angular uncertainty is 0,1.
Verification of mobile land communication system
Rega operates an emergency radio network on 160MHz
covering the whole of Switzerland. Coverage in
mountainous terrain is ensured by over 40 communication
relays. To verify the calculated coverage in critical
regions the HeliFIS may be used to verify the simulations
comparable to VHF/UHF coverage flights for airborne
communication.
143
Signal in space monitoring
For several years FCS has been operating signal-in-space
monitoring system (SISMOS) for RF signal analysis for
PSR/SSR and conventional navaids. Up to know the
SISMOS operation was limited to measurements on King
Air flight profiles and ground measurements. With the
HeliFIS this gap could be closed and measurements close
to terrain or during hover will be possible.
CONCLUSIONS
The installation of a flight inspection system designed for
fixed wing aircraft was successfully adapted for a
combined flight inspection and flight validation
operations in a rotary wing aircraft.
Weight and high crash loads that need to be considered
pose a substantial challenge in the mechanical design that
should not be underestimated.
A HeliFIS was derived from a standard flight inspection
system in order to minimize project risk, certification and
training cost. Despite a limited demand for helicopter
flight inspection, this can be a cost effective solution
while maintaining a high level of safety for flight
operations.
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO, 2007, Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation
Aids, Doc 8071, Volume II Testing of Satellite-based
Radio Navigation Systems
[2] ICAO, 2012, Quality Assurance Manual for Flight
Procedure Design, Doc 9906, Volume 5 Validation of
Instrument Flight Procedures
[3] Skyguide, 2013, GNSS Flight Inspection Guidelines
[4] Skyguide, 2013, Flight Validation Guidelines
[5] Scaramuzza et. al., 2013, GNSS Navigation
Performance versus Aerial Vehicle's Trajectory in
Mountainous Terrain, ISPA 2013.
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144
 Session 5
Flight Validation of ADS-B and Datalink
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 ADS-B
A New Mission for Flight Inspection
Dipl.-Ing.
Thorsten Heinke
Program Manager
Aerodata AG
38108 Braunschweig Germany
Fax: +49 531 2359 222
E-mail: heinke@aerodata.de
Abstract
New technologies in regard to safety requirements are
arising due to expanding capacity in civil air traffic. One
important keystone of new techniques comprised in
SESAR, NextGen or CNS/ATM is Automatic Dependent
Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B). It has been developed
further and has been upgraded in the past years to fulfill
more and more its intended function of supplying
situational awareness for safety reasons. ADS-B is used in
all new commercial air transport and most general
aviation aircraft. The schedule for its mandatory use in
aircraft is defined and the final dates are coming closer.
The worldwide implementation of ADS-B ground stations
for area-wide coverage is steadily increasing and the basic
rules for it are set.
The deadlines for the enforcement of ADS-B integration
are defined, but the rules for necessaries in-flight
verification are not. What needs to be tested and what are
the requirements to flight inspect such data in accordance
to its sensitivity for flight safety during surveillance?
What kind of flight checks have to be performed to
uphold the accuracy, integrity or procedure workflow
resulting out of the ADS-B technology?
This paper summarizes experiences, practices and
requirements regarding the flight inspection of ADS-B
systems. It evaluates hard- and software requirements to
flight inspect the ADS-B service and it discovers new
Thorsten Heinke, Aerodata
potentialities in flight inspection missions in regard to the
ADS-B technology, while considering the importance for
flight safety. The corresponding procedures are examined
in detail and evaluated in regard to accuracy, integrity and
process workflow.
Introduction
All modern commercial airplanes are equipped with
capable transponders using the ADS-B transmission. In
the past three different ADS-B techniques were used,
explored and analyzed in regard to their advantages and
disadvantages.
The first ADS-B technique is the transmission via a
separate VHF data link, which requires special equipped
VHF radios to fulfill the requirements according to MOPS
ED108A. The second technique focuses on the dedicated
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) working in the 978
MHz band. Each aircraft has to be equipped with such
unit which complies with RTCA DO 282B and TSO
C154c. This technique is mainly used for the lower
airspace in the United States. The third method for
transmitting ADS-B signals is the extended squitter
technique in the 1090 MHz band. It complies with RTCA
DO 260B and TSO C166b. The extended squitter method
is suitable for the lower and upper airspace and used by
all commercial airplanes.
147
This paper focuses on the extended squitter method for
ADS-B as the prevailing system and describes in regard
to it new possibilities in flight inspection. It displays the
scheduled implementation in aviation in different
countries around the globe. The necessary diverging
expansion stages are examined in regard to its intended
function. The possible new procedures for flight
inspection are highlighted and discussed.

Regulations for the implementation of ADS-B

The regulations for the implementation of the extended

squitter method for ADS-B are defined and the schedule
for its incorporation in commercial air transport is
announced in most of the countries with frequent regular
commercial air traffic. As an example three
implementation deadlines of different civil aviation
authorities are listed:
EASA: NPA 2012-19 defines the mandatory
extended squitter implementation for all new
aircrafts certified after the 8th of January 2015
FAA: FAR 91.225/91.227 defines the
mandatory extended squitter implementation
and/or universal access transmitter
implementation for all aircrafts until the 1st of
January 2020
Figure 1: AeroFIS capable to perform ADS-B flight
inspection missions
The flight inspection system comprises a latest revision
Rockwell Collins TDR 94 supporting the transmission of
elementary and enhanced surveillance and ADS-B
messages. Therefore the aircraft is equipped with an
additional L-Band antenna for the transponder
transmission. Only the newest revision of this transponder
complies with TSO C166b and due to this to RTCA
DO260B capable for the transmission of ADS-B.

CASA: CAO 20.18 defines the mandatory

extended squitter implementation for all
aircrafts above flight level 290 until December
2013 (only RTCA DO260).

All implementation schedules defining variable stages of

introductory phase but in general all focusing on ADS-B
as one of the key pillar for surveillance safety in
commercial air traffic. This illustrates the important role
of flight inspecting this ADS-B technique. Figure 2: Suitable ADS-B Transponder latest revision

Requirements for ADS-B flight inspection
The general requirement to establish an ADS-B link is to
have an airborne segment, which encodes and transmits
the necessary data in a special format and a ground
segment which receives the data and decodes it. The
newest flight inspection systems, like the AeroFIS, are
equipped with state of the art transponders, which are
capable to transmit the required data to the ground station.
In addition the necessary capable software is included to
comply with the newest changes of the defined signal
type to manipulate individual transmitted data for flight
inspection reasons. The ground stations are equipped with
ADS-B receivers to display such data to the radar or
ADS-B display operator, dependent on the development
stage.
To operate a non primary transponder on an airborne
system special rules have to be followed according to
airworthiness standards. The special and advanced design
of the certified aircraft installation ensures that not two
targets are visible for the ATC controller. The airborne
flight inspection transponder is fully controlled by the
flight inspection operator, which enables him to submit
special test data via the data-link. This assures proper
decoding at the ground segment and/or allows the ground
station to perform fully autonomous checks with such
specialized data. The AFIS computer is connected to the
transponder through a digital data connection. The
computer submits automatically the necessary dataset
required by the transponder for transmitting the desired
and requested ADS-B data.

148
Different stages of expansion
Since the implementation of ADS-B several different
stages have been passed through according to its
specification. The basic specification in RTCA DO260
was update to DO260A, further to Change 1 and 2 of
DO260A and finally to RTCA DO260B, which is now the
current specification. Its deadlines are mentioned above in
this paper.
extensive. The complex design enables future upgrades
and further enhancements. Today the mentioned below
data are transmitted, at which only the most important
datasets are listed. The data list is separated according to
known terms of aircraft implementation stage. The terms
are described in detail in the EASA certification
specification for airborne communication, navigation and
surveillance:
ELS Elementary Surveillance:

Squawk
Altitude
On Ground Status
Aircraft Identification (Flight Plan or
Registration)
Special Position Indication (IDENT)
Emergency Status
Data Link Capability

Figure 3: Changes in stages of expansion Common Usage GCIB Capability

ICAO 24-bit aircraft address
Figure 3 shall highlight the tremendous changes in each
development stage of the specification of ADS-B. The ACAS report
data, which are transmitted via ADS-B in the last
development stage, are grown enormously and EHS Enhanced Surveillance (Data in addition to ELS):
influencing more and more the flight safety segment of
each aircraft. Therefore the data content of ADS-B MCP/FCU Selected Altitude
becomes further critical for the aircraft itself and for the Roll Angle
receiving parties of the signal.
True Tack Angle
In the past flight inspection missions have focused on
three main tasks, while inspecting the receiving ADS-B Ground Speed
ground segment: Magnetic Heading
Coverage Checks Indicated Airspeed or Mach Number
Interference Checks Barometric Altitude Rate or Inertial Altitude
Rate
Data Continuity and Integrity Checks
Barometric Pressure Setting (QNH)
The flight checks were most likely performed together or
in accordance to the regular radar flight inspection tasks. Track Angle Rate or True Airspeed

Nowadays a new mission for flight inspection is
conceivable, which investigates the safety critical nature
of the complete ADS-B system in regard to its future use
in programs like SESAR, NextGen or CNS/ATM.
Dataset transmitted according to ADS-B RTCA
DO260B
ADS-B Out (Data in addition to ELS and EHS):
Horizontal Position (fine and course)
Horizontal Position Quality (NIC, NACP, SIL,
SDA)
Pressure Altitude Quality (NICBARO)

The ADS-B dataset which is transmitted via extended Velocity over Ground (East/West, North/South)
squitter specified according to RTCA DO260B is very Velocity Quality (NACV, SIL, SDA)

149
 Geometric Altitude (WGS84) ADSB

Geometric Altitude Quality, respectively ADSB

Accuracy (GVA)
Extended Squitter Version
Emitter Category
Length and Width of Aircraft
GPS Antenna Offset

Not all aircrafts are capably of transmitting the complete

information. Either this is induced by missing sensors, not
connect sensors or due to an old standard of the
transponder itself. Nowadays only a few of those
transponders in general aviation are fully certified
according to TSO C166b. But of course the availability of
such units is growing as we are coming nearer to each
individually deadline.
Figure 5: Flight track of flight inspection mission with
monitored ADS-B information
In Figure 6 to 10 examples from the AeroFIS of control
pages of the graphical user interface are shown for the
ADS-B management. For testing purposes all values can
be modified to a defined value or to the actual pertinent
value derived from the primary avionic of the aircraft.

Figure 4: Alpha page of the ground receiver with

ADS-B information

This real data example in Figure 4 shows that not all

information is transmitted. This can be caused by reasons
Figure 6: Control page of ADS-B elementary
mentioned earlier in this paper or by intention from the
surveillance
aircraft operator respectively airline operator.

ADS-B and flight inspection

In the past the main aspects for flight inspection was to

fulfill its tasks according to coverage, interference,
continuity and integrity. Modern flight inspection systems
are capable to transmit the complete dataset as listed
above and can modify this critical data set. This data
respectively modified data can be transferred to the
ground station to assure correct decoding of the signal and
to adjust settings during commissioning. An example of
the flight track on which the desired ADS-B check is Figure 7: Control page of ADS-B enhanced
monitored and recorded is shown in Figure 5. This surveillance
graphic and its alphanumeric values are compared
automatically to the graphics and recordings of the ground
station.

150
 traffic management starting with recognizing the error,
initiating dedicated procedures and the required action
can be verified in regard to its correct function.

Conclusion

Because of the required and intended improvements for

the surveillance of aircrafts in aviation regarding air
Figure 8: Control page of ADS-B miscellaneous traffic control, and the growing capability of the ADS-B
parameter and its key function regarding large programs like
SESAR, NextGen or CNS/ATM, it is mandatory to flight
inspect the ADS-B ground segment. Flight check of these
data including simulate special procedures will become
compulsory, if ATC has to relay on these data safety wise
and if this safety relevant data is steadily increasing.

The future development for this surveillance, situation

awareness and information technique is not easily
foreseeable yet. The growing capacity in conjunction with
possibilities for ATC improvement will definitely require
flight inspection for these new procedures in the future.

References

[1] ICAO Annex 10, Vol IV Surveillance and Collision

Avoidance Systems, Fourth Edition, 2007
[2] ICAO Doc 9871 Technical Provisions for Mode
S Services and Extended Squitter, Second Edition, 2012
[3] EASA Web Page http://easa.europa.eu

Figure 9: Alpha page of flight inspection system with [4] FAA Web Page http://www.faa.gov
ADS-B information [5] CASA Web Page http://www.casa.gov.au
Of course modified ADS-B transmission has to be [6] Eurocontrol Web Page
communicated in advance with ATC and has to follow the https://www.eurocontrol.int
regulations of each country. A closer look into the
sensitivity of this data and into the growing influence on
secure air traffic management and surveillance reveals the
growing field of flight inspection regarding ADS-B. All
data sets of the above displayed figures could be easily
modified by the flight inspection operator, either through
a predefined procedure or by simply choosing the typed in
value in the text field. Also position critical data can be
modified in the airborne flight inspection system. This
will allow the receiving ground base to simulate the
procedures which are caused by an integrity problem or
any other problem of an airliner. Not only the value can
be verified, also the routine, the process behind it and the
action, which is required to assure the dedicated safety or
integrity. As visible in Figure 9 the Source Integrity Level
(SIL), the System Design Assurance Level (SDA) in
conjunction with Navigation Accuracy Category (NACP)
for the position can be manipulated in parallel. This
enables air traffic control to cross check the dedicated
recovering procedures. The complete internal path at air

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152
 What We Have Learned About ADS-B and
How Do We Stay Under the RADAR
Mark Perraut
Airspace System Mission Specialist
FAA Flight Inspection Services
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
Fax: +1 405 954 3892
E-mail: mark.c.perraut@faa.gov
ABSTRACT
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B)
is a critical component in successfully implementing the
United States Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA)
Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen)
initiative for addressing the growing concerns of an aging
U.S. National Airspace System (NAS) infrastructure. The
advent of ADS-B provides a necessary stepping stone to
propel the FAA into a new era in aviation, utilizing
Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) as the
foundation for advancement. ADS-B is a satellite based
surveillance technology that employs two separate
broadcast link technologies; 1090 MHz Extended Squitter
(ES) and 978 MHz Universal Access Transceiver (UAT)
along with ground infrastructure technologies to improve
the position accuracy interface between aircraft to aircraft
and aircraft to air traffic control, providing an enhanced
level of safety both airborne and during ground
movement.
This paper presents a descriptive view of the current FAA
flight inspection methodology for evaluating both Critical
and Essential ADS-B services.
This paper also provides an overview of ADS-B concepts,
the interoperability of various components within ADS-B
and the enhanced features ADS-B provides in comparison
to a legacy radar system.
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has been
developing the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen) with the initiative of addressing the
growing concerns of an aging National Airspace System
(NAS) infrastructure.
Mark Perraut, FAA
As part of the NextGen development, the FAA has
determined that it is essential to move from ground-based
surveillance and navigation to a more robustly dynamic
and accurate airborne-based system utilizing GNSS as the
foundation for advancement.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) is
a critical component in the successful implementation of
the FAAs NextGen long-term modernization initiative.
ADS-B equipment is an advanced surveillance technology
that combines an aircrafts positioning source, aircraft
avionics, and a ground infrastructure to create an accurate
surveillance interface between aircraft and Air Traffic
Control (ATC). ADS-B is a performance-based
surveillance technology that provides a more precise
position reference achieved through higher updates rates
and enhanced accuracy of surveillance information over
the current radar-based system consisting of Primary
Radar and Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR).
ADS-B is expected to provide air traffic controllers and
pilots with a more accurate representation of an aircrafts
three-dimensional spatial position; to improve terminal
and en route aircraft separation services and during
ground movement; minimizing potential runway
incursion incidents.
The inclusion of ADS-B into the NAS will inherently
promote an environment of increased safety by enhancing
the situational awareness for the both the airline and
general aviation communities and air traffic operations.
In conjunction to the increased level of safety introduced
by ADS-B, improved efficiency in operations and
enhanced visibility will allow the NAS to be expanded
to contend with current and future airspace congestion
concerns. As a result of ADS-Bs improved position
153
accuracy and increased surveillance services, ATC will be Technical Center in Atlantic City, NJ, and the other one at
able to move aircraft to and from congested airport the FAA Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center in
environments with smaller separation standards; Oklahoma City, OK.2 These SBS monitors receive ADS-
increasing the NAS capacity, reducing delays associated B Reports in FAA All Purpose Structured
with vectoring for spacing, holding times, and reducing EUROCONTROL Surveillance Information Exchange
operating costs with more efficient flight profiles (ASTERIX) CAT033 Report format, TIS-B Reports in
resulting from improved surveillance services into areas ASTERIX FAA CAT033 format, FIS-B in a non-
where none currently exist. With the increased efficiency, ASTERIX or FSPEC format, Service Status Reports in
the economic and environmental impact can be lessened the ASTERIX FAA CAT023 format, ADS-R
by reducing fuel consumption and costs, CO2 emissions, Acknowledgment/ Negative Acknowledgement
and noise. (ACK/NACK) according to field specification (FSPEC)
format, Wide Area Multilateration (WAM) Reports in
ADS-B consists of two differences services: ADS-B Out ASTERIX FAA CAT010 format, and WAM Service
and ADS-B In. ADS-B Out broadcast messages contain Status Reports in ASTERIX FAA CAT019 format. These
specific aircraft information such as; identification, both reports are used to monitor, confirm system performance,
horizontal and vertical Position Velocity & Time (PVT). and validate contractor compliance and system service
The information broadcast by the aircraft is received by status by an FAA Operational Control Center (OCC).
appropriately equipped aircraft within line of sight of the The OCC coordinates with the service providers
broadcast signal and also by the ground infrastructure Network Operations Center (NOC) to report any
network; which will process and provide a target and abnormal facility status indications. The NOC has control
pertinent identifiable information to ATC automation for access to all Surveillance and Broadcast Services
display and tracking. ADS-B In refers to an appropriately Subsystem (SBSS) components to continuously monitor
equipped aircrafts ability to receive and display another the health and performance of the system.
aircrafts ADS-B Out broadcast message as well as the
ADS-B In services provided by the ground system, Table 1. Broadcast Services Data Unit ID Byte Values 3
including Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast
(ADS-R), Traffic Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B),
Application Value Direction
and Flight Information Service-Broadcast (FIS-B).
Elements (decimal) (To/From SBSS)
Although ADS-B technology is being deployed in support ADS-B Reports 033 From
of ground operation surface vehicles in conjunction with TIS-B Reports 033 From
aircraft, the discussions of this paper will primary focus 032
on ADS-B equipage and usage pertaining to aircraft and FIS-B Reports (assigned by From
not include specific references to surface operations. Exelis)
Service Status
BACKGROUND 023 From
Reports
The Federal Aviation Administration maintains a 002
certification process that is an integral quality control ADSR ACK/NACK (assigned by From
method to ensure that air traffic control systems, Reports Exelis)
subsystems, and services directly affecting the flying
public are safe and function as intended. FAA has
historically owned and operated all key air traffic control WAM Reports 010 From
systems in the NAS but has recently been transitioning
more of them to the private sector. Under the contract WAM Service
019 From
terms, the FAA owns the design and configuration of Status Reports
ADS-B and also the ADS-B surveillance data transmitted,
but Exelis maintains ownership of the hardware and
ground infrastructure used by FAAs ATC facilities.2 ADS-B DESCRIPTION

The FAA has adopted a policy of using monitoring rather
than certification to ensure the ADS-B ground
infrastructure meets FAAs standards. The FAA
developed a monitoring system called the Surveillance
and Broadcast Service (SBS) Monitor. Two SBS
monitors have been installed; one is located at the FAA
On May 28th, 2010 the FAA issued a final rule mandating
ADS-B equipage and performance standards, listed in
Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part
91, 91.227, for aircraft usage within the airspace defined
in Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR)
part 91, 91.225. The aircraft equipment must be

154
installed and meet the requirements set forth in TSO-
C166b for the 1090ES broadcast link technology; and
TO-C154c for the 978 MHz UAT broadcast link
technology. Effective January 1st, 2020, any aircraft
operating in current Mode C required airspace, will also
be required to carry an ADS-B Out transmitter. At the
time of this writing, the FAA Final Rule is not mandating
the requirement for ADS-B In.1
ADS-B stands for: Automatic its always on and
requires no operator intervention nor is an interrogation
necessary to activate the system and broadcast.
Dependent the spatial accuracy of the aircrafts position
is reliant upon a valid and accurate GNSS signal, Flight
Management System (FMS), or inertial/multisensory
navigation system for positional updates that are
broadcast to other similarly equipped aircraft and the
ground surveillance infrastructure. Surveillance the
system provides satellite based surveillance radar like
services to determine and aircrafts position. Broadcast
an aircraft will automatically transmit, without
interrogation, squitter messages at a 1 Hz rate; relaying its
calculated PVT and other pertinent aircraft specific
information.4
ADS-B Surveillance service falls under the purview of
Surveillance and Broadcast Services (SBS). The ground-
based portion of ADS-B falls under the Surveillance and
Broadcast Services Subsystem (SBSS). The SBSS
portion contains the ground radio station (RS) that
provides both an uplink and downlink coverage interface
to all ADS-B equipped aircraft in the NAS; receives and
decodes ADS-B Messages while performing reasonable
test and then forwards the messages to the Control
Station. Control Stations process ADS-B reports,
radar/sensor reports and meteorological/aeronautical data,
perform validity checks and provide a low-latency feed of
surveillance information to designated FAA SDPs.
Service Delivery Points (SDP) are the demarcation points
that serve as the interface to ATC Automation and the
FAA SBS monitor that routes received target data and
delivers ADS-B target reports and other data to the
appropriate services, and the associated communications
network that provides the connectivity for the
processing/exchanging of data.
ADS-B is currently divided into two separate service
specifications; Separation/ Critical and Advisory/
Essential. Contained within the two service specifications
there are four distinct services provided; Automatic
Dependent surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Rebroadcast (ADS-R), Traffic
Information Service-Broadcast (TIS-B), and Flight
155
Information Service-Broadcast (FIS-B). The Separation
service specification currently only encompasses ADS-B
services. ADS-R service originally fell under the
Separation service specification, but has since been
relegated to advisory level surveillance only and will be
addressed once the requirements and design for Critical
services mature. TIS-B and FIS-B services fall within
the Essential services specification and are considered as
advisory only. It should be emphasized that there is no
delegation of separation responsibility from controllers to
pilots as a result of SBS Essential Services. Furthermore,
pilot responsibilities for see and avoid and obtaining the
requisite weather and aeronautical information regarding
their flight are unchanged. 5
Operators have two broadcast link technologies for
aircraft equipage used to broadcast the aircrafts State
Vector and other pertinent identifying information; 1090
MHz Extended Squitter (ES) and/or 978 MHz Universal
Access Transceiver (UAT). The 1090ES is an extension
of the Mode S technology and is the internationally
agreed upon broadcast link technology for ADS-B and is
intended to support applications used by carriers and other
high-performance aircraft. 1090ES will be required for
aircraft flying at or above 18,000 feet mean sea level
(MSL). 1090ES will include the ability to obtain ADS-B
In services; ADS-R and TIS-B services but will preclude
receiving FIS-B due to bandwidth congestion. The 1090
MHz broadcast link technology is currently being
employed for other services such as; Mode A/C and S
transponder, Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon System
(ATCRBS) for aircraft replies to an interrogation from the
ATCRBS ground sensor on 1030 MHz and the on-board
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS). The 978
MHz UAT wideband multi-purpose broadcast link
technology will have the capability to receive ADS-B In
services; ADS-R, TIS-B, and FIS-B. The structure of the
UAT frame protocol uses Time Division Multiple Access
(TDMA) in the Time Division Duplex (TDD) mode with
regular time slotted access or random access protocols.
There are two types of transmissions on the UAT
broadcast link; the ADS-B message and the Ground
Uplink Message. The ADS-B message is used to
broadcast the aircrafts State Vector and other identifiable
information to other ADS-B In equipped aircraft and
ground stations within radio line of sight. The ground
uplink message contains the services provided by the
ground station.
 ADS-B Critical Service + TIS-B & FIS-B
ADS-R Service* Essential Service
ADS-B Equipped
ADS-B Equipped
Aircraft & Vehicles
Aircraft & Vehicles

FIS-B TIS-B ADS-B

ADS-B Broadcast Broadcast
ADS-R Broadcast Downlink
Downlink

Downlink Air Interface Uplink Air Interface Uplink Air Interface Downlink Air Interface

UAT TX 1090ES TX UAT RX 1090ES RX

1090ES RX UAT RX 1090ES TX UAT TX

FIS-B TIS-B
Processing Processing
Contractor
Ground Interface & ADS-R
Monitoring
Processing Function
and Control
Contractor
Ground Interface Function Monitoring
and Control

Operational & other Data Boundary of Performance

Specifications #1 & #2 FIS-B Data TIS-B Data
SDP SDP SDP Sources Sources

Other Data ATC SDP SDP

FAA
Users Automation
Monitoring
(e.g. Airlines) & Display Other Data
FAA
Users
Monitoring
(e.g. Airlines)
*Design = Critical, Initial Implementation = Essential

Figure 1. Surveillance and Broadcast Services Partitioning.5

Except for specifically selected operational service areas,
the SBSS automation filters out all broadcast link
technologies that are not RTCA DO-260B and DO-282B
compliant. 1090ES broadcast link versions are 0, 1 or A
spec., 2 or B spec. UAT broadcast link versions are 1 or
A spec. and 2 or B spec. The A or B spec. is synonymous
with the corresponding version of RTCA DO-260 and
DO-282 documents. The RS decodes the broadcast link
technology version from the ADS-B Out payload from
each target. Only link technologies that are version 2 will
be sent to the ATC display as an ADS-B target.
Figure 2. Target Provision to ADS-B In Aircraft 7
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast
ADS-B equipped aircraft broadcast their state vector
(horizontal and vertical position, horizontal and vertical
velocity) and other information through the use of a 24-
Bit address assigned to the aircraft avionics, over either
1090ES or UAT broadcast link technology. This 24-Bit
address may be either an ICAO address or a self-assigned
address (applicable to UAT only). The ADS-B messages
are received by other properly equipped ADS-B In
aircraft with the same link technology and ground stations
within radio line of sight. The ADS-B ground system
processes the ADS-B messages (also referred to as
payloads) and formats them into a common ADS-B
Report format. These ADS-B Reports are delivered to
ATC for use in separation assurance and other services.
Latency is the measurement of the reception of the last bit
of an ADS-B Message containing State Vector to the
receipt of the first bit of the corresponding ADS-B report
at the SDP. The maximum delay or latency must be less
than or equal to 700 ms. ADS-B Reports are output to the
SDPs using FAA CAT033 format. Each specific element
within the FAA CAT033 ADS-B Report is identified with
a Field Reference Number (FRN).5, 6

156
 Table 2. ADS-B Position Update Intervals 7
ADS-B Position Update Intervals
On average; at least 1 per second at
Surface
the SDP
Terminal < 3 seconds at the SDP
En Route < 6 seconds at the SDP
En Route High
< 3 seconds at the SDP
Update (HU)
Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Rebroadcast
ADS-R is a client service provided by the SBSS that
allows aircraft with single link technology ADS-B In the
capability to interact with other aircraft that are
broadcasting on a different broadcast link technology. An
aircraft that is an active ADS-B user and is receiving
ADS-R service is known as an ADS-R Client. An ADS-
B equipped aircraft on the opposite link as the ADS-R
Client that has its messages translated and transmitted by
the SBSS is known as an ADS-R Target. ADS-R service
is not offered in all service volumes, but if the service is
provided the ADS-R Client must be ADS-B Out
equipped, have broadcast a valid position report within
the last 30 seconds and received by a ground RS and must
be ADS-B In on only one link.5 Aircraft that are dual link
technology equipped will not receive an ADS-R uplink
message, they will receive a single ADS-B target. ADS-
R targets for an aircraft are determined by the SBSS
which populates a list of all active ADS-B equipped
aircraft and their respective technologies via received
ADS-B reports. The SBSS determines which ADS-B In
technology the aircraft is requiring and will broadcast an
ADS-R report to the receiving aircraft identifying which
other aircraft are within its client proximity hockey
puck. Each ADS-R target aircraft may have one or more
client aircraft that need to receive an ADS-R report. If
there is more than one client, there could be multiple
service volumes needed to provide the ADS-R report.
The SBSS determines the ADS-R transmission rate
required by the client and also determines which ground
RS or set of RSs are necessary to transmit ADS-R reports.
An aircraft may also be in range of a ground RS that is
transmitting reports required by other aircraft. When this
is the case it will receive reports of aircraft that are
outside the altitude and horizontal range of its vicinity.5
As depicted in Figure 3. ADS-R En Route and Terminal
Airspace Client Proximity Determination, all aircraft
157
within a 15 NM horizontal range and 5000 feet of the
ADS-R client aircraft will have their ADS-R target
reports uplinked.
Figure 3. ADS-R En Route and Terminal Airspace
Client Proximity Determination5
The cumulative number of messages transmitted by all
SBSS RS within reception range of any aircraft in the
NAS will not exceed 1,000 1090ES messages per second.
This limit applies to both the ADS-R and TIS-B services
combined (although ADS-R transmission are prioritized
over TIS-B when approaching capacity limits). The
cumulative maximum number of UAT messages received
by an aircraft will not exceed 400 messages per second.
These limits are achieved through a combination of the
client proximity filter size, the density of radios, radio
transmit power, the required update intervals, and the best
radio selection algorithm.5 The maximum latency delay
between the Time of Message Received (TOMR) of an
ADS-B Message that results in the generation of an ADS-
R uplink message and the transmission of the first bit of
any corresponding broadcast message on the opposite link
technology must be less than 1 second.7
Table 3. ADS-R Position Update Intervals 7
ADS-R Position Update Intervals
Surface 2 seconds for each client
Terminal 5 seconds for each client
En Route 10 seconds for each client
ADS-R and TIS-B Service status shall be provided to a
client with ADS-B In availability; to indicate whether the
services are currently available to each link technology.
The services status provides users with a near real-time
indication of the availability of a complete surveillance
picture. ADS-R Service status will not be provided to
clients that are equipped to receive ADS-B In on both link
technologies.
Traffic Information Service-Broadcast
TIS-B is a client service provided by the SBSS that allows
ADS-B In equipped aircraft to receive ground-based
surveillance systems sensor data in digitized form.5
These ground-based systems include FAA and
Department of Defense (DoD) radar systems and FAA
multilateral systems. The TIS-B service provides a low-
latency stream of position reports from non-ADS-B
equipped aircraft. An aircraft ADS-B user receiving TIS-
B service is known as a TIS-B client. To be considered a
TIS-B client an aircraft must be ADS-B Out, provide a
valid position report within the last 30 seconds received
by a RS, and must be ADS-B In on at least one link.5
TIS-B latency is the difference between the time of
measurement of the source position data and the time of
transmission of the TIS-B message. Latency must be
1.5 seconds; as measured from the SDP to the start of the
TIS-B message transmission.7
As depicted in Figure 4. TIS-B En Route and Terminal
Airspace Client Proximity Determination, all aircraft
within a 15 NM horizontal range and 3500 feet of the
TIS-B client aircraft will have their TIS-B target reports
uplinked.5 7
Figure 4. TIS-B En Route and Terminal Airspace
Client Proximity Determination5
The SBSS fuses multiple surveillance sources into a
singular aircraft tracks. The tracks are then cross matched
with a list of active ADS-B users, if the track does not
correlate to an ADS-B user the track is then handled as a
TIS-B target. TIS-B has a service ceiling of 24,000 feet
MSL, above which TIS-B client will not be provided TIS-
B service (targets will be provided up to 27,500 feet).5
The TIS-B service must assign a unique target address to
each target. The address may come from the 24-Bit
ICAO address included in an ADS-B message or self-
assigned by the TIS-B service. Once a target address has
been assigned, it must remain constant to ensure user
updates can associate the change in state vectors to a
particular target.
Table 4. TIS-B Position Update Intervals 7
TIS-B Position Update Intervals
Surface 2 seconds for each client
Terminal 6 seconds for each client
158
TIS-B Position Update Intervals
En Route 12.1 seconds for each client
TIS-B service updates for target position and velocity data
is dependent on the availability of source sensor input. In
the event an updated sensory input has not been received,
it may be necessary to transmit the same report multiple
times in order to ensure the required update and
probability of detections specifications are met.5
Flight Information Service-Broadcast
FIS-B is a broadcast service and not considered client
based. FIS-B supports the Weather and NAS Status
Information Situational Awareness Application.7 FIS-B
service for weather and aeronautical information is
broadcast over the UAT link technology only, regardless
if there are any SBSS clients within the Service Volume.
Some of the FIS-B services provided: Airmens
Meteorological Information (AIRMET), Significant
Meteorological Information (SIGMET), Convective
SIGMET, METAR, TAF, Continental United States
(CONUS) Next-Generation Radar (NEXRAD), Regional
NEXRAD, Notice To Airmen (NOTAM), Pilot Report
(PIREP) and winds and temperatures aloft.
FIS-B services are not broadcast from every RS, but
rather with the concept that a single radio station within a
service volume will provide a specified set of data
products. Radio stations that provide FIS-B services are
configured in a tiered design and the products received
from the designated RSs will vary depending on the tier
classification assigned to the RS.
Table 5. FIS-B Radio Station Tiers 7
FIS-B is required to work up to FL240, but it is expected
that the services will be available for higher altitudes. In
its current product design station, an estimated 90% of the
areas will have FIS-B coverage up to FL400.7
Table 6. FIS-B Product Transmit Intervals 7
FIS-B Product Transmit Intervals
AIRMET, SIGMET, AND METAR 5 minutes
CONUS NEXRAD 15 minutes
Regional NEXRAD 2.5 minutes
NOTAM, PIREP, and Wind and
10 minutes
Temp Aloft
TIS-B Service Status 10 seconds
Service Volumes and Composite Traffic Volume
A Service Volume (SV) is a defined volume of airspace in
the NAS; which ADS-B Services are provided and the
required performance criteria are met. A Composite
Traffic Volume (CTV) is the aggregation of reports from
multiple SVs. The reports within a CTV are filtered
spatially according to a specified polygon and to eliminate
radio station duplicates. SVs are classified into three
different domains; En Route, Terminal, and Surface. At
the time of this writing, there have been 40 CTVs and 272
SVs inspected; these figures include the deployment of
619 radio stations.
Each SV has an assigned horizontal and vertical
boundary, of which, specific ADS-B services are
provided by the SBSS. SVs and CTVs are designed to
ensure the applicable domain is within the horizontal
boundaries of ADS-B service via software masking.
Radio Stations within each terminal SV are designed to
operate in approximately 60 NM radiuses usually
centered over the ASR or airport and En Route SVs are
directly correlated to the Air Route Traffic Control Center
(ARTCC) Area of Responsibility (AOR) orthogonal
boundaries. SVs and CTVs are independently
configurable with software automation and filtering.
Dependent upon the service domain, the SVs or CTVs are
automated to provide the level of service required and to
define the service volume boundaries. The SBSS
automation software delineates what RSs are associated
with a SV or CTV and only those RSs are used to provide
ADS-B payload information to both ATC and aircraft.
All other RSs within line of sight will be filtered out.
Radio Stations can be used to support multiple SVs or
CTVs. The data that is forwarded on to ATC or aircraft is
derived on the Best Radio concept. The Best Radio
concept is the taking of duplicate reports received by all
the radio stations, and sorting/ranking them in a weighted
ranking list based upon completeness of the report and the
159
Signal Quality Level (SQL). This helps alleviate the large
amount of bandwidth requirements that would be
necessary if all the radio stations information were
processed.
Unless it is needed to clearly distinguish between SV or
CTV, this paper will use SV to imply both SV and CTV
applications.
FLIGHT INSPECTION OF ADS-B
This paper does not cover the ADS-B implementation
processes, such as; Service Integrations Tests (SIT),
Service Acceptance Testing (SAT), Implementation
Service Acceptance Testing (ISAT) and Initial Operating
Capability (IOC). There has been much debate as to the
requirement for flight inspection. The topics of those
debates are not contained within the scope of this paper.
The discussions contained within this paper will focus on
the role of flight inspection and the flight inspection
practices that are being currently employed.
The advent of ADS-B and similar technologies; and their
integration within the NAS has resulted in an enigma of
what role flight inspection plays in the certification
process. There are those who believe the initial testing of
the ADS-B system, the architecture of the ground
infrastructure, SBS monitor capabilities, targets of
opportunity (TOO)s, and math modelling of the service is
sufficient in determining the implementation of ADS-B
without the requirement for flight inspection and
validating the signal in space. FAA Flight Inspection
Services enlisted assistance form academic experts, Ohio
University Avionics Engineering Center (AEC), to help
develop FI requirements for ADS-B. Ohio University
AEC recommended flight inspection of ADS-B services.
The intended use of ADS-B system data in the provision
of aircraft separation services by FAA ATC necessitates
flight inspection of the system to ensure that the ADS-B
signal-in-space (SIS) is present, useable, and safe with
aircraft operating at a minimum transmission power.
Additionally, flight inspection of the SIS can identify
areas in the service volume(s) where: interference sources
may exist, there is SIS blockage by terrain and buildings,
obstacles (new or temporary) exist in the intended flight
operations area, etc. There is no independent monitoring
of the ADS-B SIS (i.e., external sampling of the ADS-B
SIS broadcast by the ground facilities) as have been the
case in previous navigation and landing systems. 9, 12
Because the ground infrastructure is owned and
maintained by a service vendor, the concept of flight
inspection needed to shift to a validation of the Separation
Services reports used by ATC rather than a certification
of the equipment. An Ohio University AEC study
commented a recurring question has arisen regarding
whether the development of flight inspection criteria for
ADS-B needs to be approached in a different fashion
since the service to be tested in not provided by
equipment that the FAA owns. Instead the FAA uses the
service from equipment built and maintained by the ADS-
B service provider. 9
While Service Acceptance Tests (SATs) are performed
for the initial service volumes, and may be performed for
each new service volume, it is important to understand
that they are not a substitute for commissioning flight
inspections as SAT flight test are primarily concerned
with verification that the vendor has met contractual
requirements. Flight Inspection is part of the
Implementation System Test (IST). IST is done after and
separate from the ISAT. This test incorporates the
services delivered by the service provider and the
integration with FAA automation. The purpose of a
commissioning flight inspection is to provide a means
(i.e., data) for FAA Technical Operations Engineering and
air traffic services to verify and quantify the extent to
which the service meets ATC operational requirements. 9
Although within the ADS-B Flight Inspection Order, the
use of TOO(s) are permitted, Flight Inspection Services
(FIS) provides a means to efficiently evaluate and confirm
ADS-B Out reporting for each SV on both broadcast links
simultaneously. Because there are so few aircraft
equipped with the UAT broadcast link, the FI aircraft
provides the only viable means to validate ADS-R
coverage and performance in specific areas and routes.
Additionally, FI aircraft have the capability to data log
and preserve the integrity of ADS-B In services provided
by the ADS-B ground infrastructure. The archived data
log files can be validated through post-flight analysis to
ensure the level of services meet the requirements without
requiring additional flight inspections.
ADS-B Flight Inspection Order
A FAA Order for the Flight Inspection of ADS-B is in the
final review status. In the Order, it is described that the
flight inspection should be used as a means to be an end-
to-end inspection of the ADS-B based ATC Surveillance
and Separation Services.10 As described in previous
paragraphs, the current concept of a commissioning flight
inspection is for certifying ADS-B Out Separation
Services only, but in conjunction with evaluating the
Separation service the Advisory services should be data
logged and evaluated for validity. The objective of the
commissioning inspection is to evaluate system
performance, determine and document whether the
coverage meets Air Traffic requirements, and provide a
baseline for the detection of a deterioration of
performance.10
160
Although the Flight Inspection Order has not been
finalized and is still in a draft status, Engineering Services
and the SBS Program Office have agreed to apply the
Order as a baseline in the development of flight
inspection plans and also as a reference for the type of
conditions that must be documented during the course of
the inspection. The checklist in Figure 6 provides the
conditions and aircraft settings that should be used when
conducting flight inspections. When developing the flight
inspection plan, Engineering Services should ensure that
each condition listed in flight inspection checklist is
incorporated into the flight plan.
At the time of these writings, dedicated periodic flight
inspection of ADS-B is not required. It was agreed upon
during the system design, which after 3-5 years of
operational status a series of special surveillance
inspections will be conducted at select sites. The select
sampling will be representative of the various automation
platforms and SVs.
Flight Inspecting a SV, where do we begin?
The mental model of what needs to be flight inspected
and how the flight inspections plans are compiled has
matured since initial testing. The maturation process has
evolved from the lessons learned and an increased
availability of avionics. Initially flight inspections
entailed flying the boundaries of the SVs and areas of
known gaps in radar coverage and/or areas of predicted
ADS-B coverage gaps based upon math modelling. In
addition, a sampling of airports and approaches were
included to observe how well the ADS-B services were
actually performing as compared to the prediction
modelling tools. During the initial phases of ADS-B,
specialized tests were performed utilizing FAA flight
inspection and Ohio University Avionics Engineering
Center (AEC) aircraft. These initial tests provided Flight
Inspection and Technical Operations Engineering with a
blueprint of what requirements were needed to validate
the ADS-B services.
FAA Technical Operations Engineering creates a flight
inspection plan for each SV to be inspected. Utilizing the
FAA ADS-B Flight Inspection Order as a baseline,
Engineering Services will use information derived from
the ISAT testing and gather specific information from
local air traffic services to compile the flight inspection
plan. The flight plans identify a sampling of routes and
airways along with specific areas requested by ATC for
inclusion. The plans also contain all of the pertinent SV
information such as: predicted coverage, both vertically
and horizontally, for each radio station, all the applicable
radio station identifiers and their respective
latitudes/longitudes. The flight inspection crew reviews
the proposed plan and provides any amendments to the
proposed routing that will maximize the overall
efficiency, while still maintaining the integrity of the
flight inspection plan.

On average, Terminal Radar Approach Control Facilities

(TRACON) will take approximately 3-5 hours to
complete, while En Route and larger TRACON facilities
nominally average 3-4 days.

FLIGHT INSPECTION AIRCRAFT

Flight Inspection Aircraft Equipage

FAA Flight Inspection Services utilizes a fleet of Lear Jet

60s to conduct ADS-B inspections. The LJ60s have been
equipped with dual broadcast link Version 2 capabilities
for both ADS-B Out and ADS-B In data logging
capabilities. Both broadcast link technologies are
equipped with dual antenna diversity (top and bottom
antennas). In addition, each aircraft has been equipped
with a supplemental truth positioning reference system
used in conjunction with the flight inspection system.
The 1090ES equipage is comprised of an ACSS XS-950
Air Transport Data Link transponder and a Honeywell
TPA-100B Surveillance Processor. The 1090ES ADS-B
Out, for flight inspection purposes, is passed through an
attenuator to produce approximately 125 Watts/ A1H
classification as required by the Final Rule, selectable via
an on-board low power switch.
The 978MHz UAT broadcast link equipage is comprised
of a Garmin GDL 88 transceiver and Garmin Touch
Navigation (GTN)-725 Multi-Function Display (MFD).
The GDL 88 transceiver provides ADS-B Out on the 978
MHz broadcast link only and is ADS-B In capable on
both broadcast link technologies. Figure 5, is a screen
view of the GTN-725 MFD. The MFD is a remote
interface to the GDL 88 for configuration changes and
fault monitoring; and also provides the user a display of
ADS-B traffic information, approach information, and
weather and traffic data relative to their position on a
moving map.11
The FI aircraft are configured to operate both broadcast
link technologies independently. Because there isnt a
digital interface between the GDL 88 and the 1090ES
transponder, the GDL 88 is configured to utilize self-
interrogation. The GDL 88 transceiver has a built in low
power 1030 MHz transmitters that interrogates the
1090ES transponder. This interrogation is similar to the
interrogations from the ground based radar systems and
the 1090ES transponder replies with the Mode 3/A codes,
IDENT and emergency statuses. The GDL 88 receives
the replies and sets the corresponding UATADS-B Out
messages to reflect the same data.
Figure 5. GTN-725 Display
UAT Version 2 link technology is comparatively a new
technology and as a result, approved vendor ground test
equipment is not yet available. Because of the
unavailability of ground test equipment, the GDL 88
transceiver output power is not currently being attenuated
to the Final Rule requirement of 16 Watts. Although
discussions with vendors have resulted in assurances the
output power levels meet the required A1H class power
and sensitivity level, an accurate measurement uncertainty
assessment; including line loss values is currently not
available.
In addition to the flight inspection systems truth position
reference system, the ADS-B inspections use a
supplemental Truth Position Reference System, an
Ashtech ProFlex 800 which outputs National Marine
Electronic Association (NMEA) and Ashtech Optimized
Messaging (ATOM) data formats.
The FI aircraft is equipped with multiple VHF radios
which allows for communication and monitoring of
multiple frequencies. The flight deck will monitor and
communicate on the normal ATC frequencies for the area
of operations, while the Mission Specialists will work
directly with Engineering Services and ATC Operations
on dedicated frequencies when performing ADS-B
inspections. This direct communication is essential in
relaying timely information pertaining to the status of the
inspection, coordinating the various checklist conditions,
and maximizing efficiency without causing congestion on
ATC frequencies. It is important to establish
communication between the FI aircraft and Engineering
Services before any maneuvers that deviate from the
flight plan or configuration changes that would cause
results to differ from the expected values. During certain
checklist items, the aircrafts configuration is changed to
conditions that are non-standard. For these configuration
changes it is important that communication with
Engineering Services is established to coordinate the
changes and to confirm system settings. A contingency
plan should also be used if communications with ATC

161
and Engineering Services have been lost. These practices It is important to understand if two separate ADS-B flight
ensure the flight inspections are completed with the inspections are being conducted simultaneously, proper
greatest efficiency and maximum cost savings. coordination must transpire between the crews to ensure
that the same matched pair is not utilized for both aircraft.
Flight Inspection Configuration The SBS Monitor may see the two separate aircraft with
the same ICAO address and disregard reports because of
The flight inspection (FI) aircraft are configured to the conflicting PVT information received in the ADS-B
operate simultaneously on both broadcast link Out messages.
technologies, improving the overall efficiency of the
inspections and allowing for ADS-R Services to be Exelis built a configuration file into the automation
evaluated. Because the FI aircraft are operating on two software, whenever the ground system receives an ADS-B
different links concurrently, special test automation Out message containing one of the designated test ICAO
adaptations are normally utilized to prevent the system addresses and paired Flight IDs, the altitude offset factor
from issuing conflict alerts to the controller; indicating associated with that matched pair will be applied to the
two separate targets are within close proximity to one altitude provided to the ATC automation. The pseudo
another and to allow the FI aircraft to appear as two altitude is only provided to the ATC automation and for
different targets types. the sole purpose of preventing continuous conflict alerts.
The altitude offsets cannot be seen by any other receiving
Flight Inspection Services along with Engineering aircraft; they are specifically designed to be applied to the
Services developed six sets of FI test ICAO addresses and ATC displays only.
correlating Flight IDs, used only with the UAT broadcast
link, which triggers a prescribed altitude offset factor FLIGHT INSPECTION GUIDANCE
applied to the ATC display. As depicted in Table 6, each
pair of ICAO addresses and Flight IDs have a specific The FI crews will adhere to the guidance as described in
resulting altitude offset factor. the ADS-B Flight Inspection Order. The checklist in
Figure 6 provides the conditions and aircraft settings that
The altitude offsets range from plus 1000 feet to minus should be used when conducting flight inspections.
1000 feet. If an altitude offset factor is desired, the GDL
88 must be configured with the ICAO address and Flight
ID from the table that correlates to that specific altitude.
As an example, the flight inspection plan requests a UAT
altitude offset of plus 1000 feet. The user would
configure the GDL 88 to broadcast an ICAO address of
FAAFC1 and a Flight ID of FLTCK1U, the pseudo
altitude seen by ATC would be equivalent to the pressure
altitude plus 1000 feet. Each pseudo altitude offset factor
has two paired ICAO addresses and Flight IDs associated
with it. A user cannot mix an ICAO address and a Flight
ID from a different row in Table 6 to achieve an altitude
offset. Each row in Table 6 is a separate condition and Figure 6. ADS-B Flight Inspection Checklist
the rows cannot be used interchangeably.
The flight inspection aircraft flies the flight profiles pre-
Table 6. 978 MHz UAT Altitude Offset Configuration 10 determined by the flight inspection plan. En Route SVs
should be flown at the floor of radar coverage, but no
ICAO ICAO Altitude Flight ID lower than minimum obstruction clearance altitude
Address Address Offset (MOCA). However, in practice, coverage in En Route
HEX Octal Feet SVs is often verified at altitudes well below radar
FAAFC1 76527701 +1000 FLTCK1U coverage when the ADS-B infrastructure supports it.
FAAFC2 76527702 -1000 FLTCK2U During Visual Flight Rules (VFR) conditions the FI
76527703 -500 FLTCK3U aircraft may go lower than the radar coverage altitude if
FAAFC3
the predicted coverage model of ADS-B indicates
FAAFC4 76527704 +1000 FLTCK4U
reception of the SIS at the lower altitudes, but still
FAAFC5 76527705 -1000 FLTCK5U ensuring not to go below the applicable Obstruction
FAAFC6 76527706 -500 FLTCK6U Clearance Altitude (OCA). In a Terminal SV, coverage
should be flown 500 below the minimum en route

162
altitude (MEA)/ minimum vectoring altitude (MVA), but
no lower than the applicable OCA.
Modes/Codes checks ADS-B Out for proper operation
when changing Mode 3/A codes. The check verifies that
the controller reads the entered code. The flight deck
changes the 1090ES transponder Mode 3/A code to 1200
and another discrete code containing the number 7, (e.g.,
0707, or 7070). There is no requirement to check any of
the emergency codes. Along with the codes, ensure that
the ATC altitude readout is within 125 feet of the
indicated aircraft altitude. 10
Minimum Safe Altitude Warning (MSAW) functionalities
are performed as an end-to-end check of MSAW features
activated solely by an ADS-B only target, thus verifying a
target processed through the ADS-B network will trigger
a low altitude alert correctly. There are two different
components of MSAW: General Terrain Monitor (GTM)
and Approach Path Monitor (APM). An APM check can
be accomplished at any airport with an APM adaptation.
The GTM must be in an area away from any airports and
not in a MSAW inhibited area.10 Because both broadcast
link technologies are independent systems in the FI
aircraft, difficulties were encountered when conducting
MSAW checks. The GDL 88 uses interrogation replies
from the 1090ES to provide the UAT ADS-B Out with a
Mode 3/A squawk code. MSAW checks are performed to
ensure applicable alerts are generated through the ADS-B
system and not induced by the legacy radar system thus it
was important to develop a method that would ensure
only the ADS-B target prompted the alert. The simplest
method to ensure the MSAW alert is generated from an
ADS-B target is to isolate and perform the inspection on
the UAT broadcast link only, but because the GDL 88
sets its Mode 3/A via an interrogation of the 1090ES
system; a method was developed that permitted the
1090ES transponder to remain on and not influence an
MSAW alert from the legacy radar system. The flight
deck switches off the altitude encoding function (Mode C)
of the 1090 transponder while transmitting the proper
Mode 3/A code on UAT. The FI crew should change to
the UAT Flight ID to something other than the Flight ID
listed in Table 6. This will cause the automation to reflect
the actual altitude the aircraft is flying and not introduce
the offset factor. Proper attention to the correct
configuration on the ATC automation system is required,
including selecting the proper Mode-3/A code and
associating the aircraft with an instrument flight rule
(IFR) flight plan.
Data Logging ADS-B Out and ADS-B In Messages
Data logging is a critical component in the flight
inspection of ADS-B. The aircraft must have the ability
to data log both ADS-B Out and ADS-B In messages for
163
both broadcast link technologies and the Truth Position
Reference System. Each broadcast message must also be
accurately time stamped in order for the PVT information
to be used in the post flight analysis to confirm the
latency requirements are met. Additionally, it is
necessary for the data logging software to have
monitoring capabilities so the FI crew can assess the SIS
in real-time. The real-time monitoring indications are
provided by the uplink messages containing the systems
status for the various report types and the individual
message reports. Real-time monitoring provides the flight
crew the ability to discern coverage for ADS-R, TIS-B,
and FIS-B services along with monitoring the ground
radio stations for reception. For every SV flight plan, the
radio stations are included with their SV Identification
and their respective latitudes/longitudes. The FI crews
should track and monitor which radio stations are being
observed to ensure the adaptation files have been
correctly installed in the automation.
Flight Inspection Services solicited Garmin and
Honeywell requesting additional interface capabilities for
each respective processor specifically for flight inspection
data logging capabilities. The additional interfaces
provide the capability to port the unfiltered ADS-B
message directly via Ethernet to a stand-alone device for
data logging and monitoring of the ADS-B services. Each
processor has the capability to filter out messages that are
not within a calculated service area around the aircraft. It
is necessary for the FI aircraft to be able to display and
data log all the incoming ADS-B messages.
The GDL 88 has been modified to accommodate a pass-
through interface utilized for flight inspection services
only. The pass-through interface uses the Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP),
commonly known as TCP/IP, to provide packet routing,
connectivity, and data streaming between a GDL 88 and a
data logging/processing computer. The GDL 88 hosts a
TCP/IP server that listens for a connection over a static IP
address. When a TCP/IP client, only one client permitted
to connect at a time, connects to the server the GDL 88
will begin to pass through the data stream. The pass-
through interface enables all the unfiltered ADS-B Out
and ADS-B In messages to be sent to a peripheral device
to data log and display real-time information. The data
stream from the GDL 88 to the peripheral device is not bi-
directional, i.e.; the user cannot use the connection to
remotely configure the GDL 88.
The Honeywell TPA-100B 1090ES surveillance
processor utilizes a maintenance port to allow the 1090ES
ADS-B Out messages to be data logged by vendor
software called MonTPA. A problem has been identified
with using the maintenance port as a source for data
logging the 1090ES ownship ADS-B Out messages. The
ADS-B Out messages sent to the transmit antennas are
split off and stored in a buffer, this buffer delays sending
the ADS-B Out messages to the recording software.
When the ADS-B Out messages are sent from the buffer
to the recording software; a pseudo time stamp is applied
but it isnt the actual time the ADS-B Out message was
broadcast but the time it was sent to the recording
software. The pseudo time stamp varies approximately
1.5 seconds, resulting in an unknown variable;
preventing the file to be used in determining latency and
using the 1090ES ADS-B Out ownship data as an end-to-
end evaluation of the ADS-B system.
As a result of the limitations imposed by the MonTPA
software and the time stamp skewing, the 1090ES ADS-B
In data received on the GDL 88 transceiver is used in the
post-flight analysis of the 1090ES ownship data. Because
of the close proximity of the GDL88 to the broadcast
antenna of the 1090ES, the amount of time delay in the
received message is very minimal; resulting in a
negligible impact to latency calculation.
Flight Inspection Software Suite
Original testing included using software provided by
vendors to capture and display each broadcast link
technology separately. Problems arose in gaining support
from vendors for modification to the software programs
when the link technologies progressed to Version 2. This
required the FAA to begin development of their own
software suite to use for data logging and displaying the
information in a real-time environment. Flight Inspection
Services with the help of the FAA Technical Center
Office of Advanced Concepts & Technology
Development Surveillance Branch have developed
software which provides the capability to data log and
display ADS-B Out and ADS-B In payloads for both
broadcast links and the truth positioning reference data
into a single source. The FAA software currently has full
data logging and monitoring capability but is still in beta
testing for the development of additional features. Until
such time the FAA software is fully vetted, vendor
supplied software continues to be additionally employed
to ensure data logging redundancy.
The FI crew uses the software suite to monitor the real-
time status of the ground infrastructure and the signal in
space (SIS). The FI crew coordinates with Engineering
Services during the inspection and identifies any SIS
discrepancies. If anomalies are noted by either the FI
crew or observed by the Engineering Services monitoring
the flight inspection on the ATC display, the entities will
discuss a means of resolution. Although the ADS-B In
messages are not considered a Critical Service and some
entities feel they should not be flight inspected, the vast
experience and knowledge of Flight Inspection Services
164
and with the technical assistance from Ohio University
AEC has concluded these services should in fact be
validated for accuracy and SIS during flight inspection of
ADS-B SVs.
The FI crews maintain a Flight Inspection Log for each
SV inspected. Contained within the Flight Inspection
Logs are the applicable details for the facility under
inspection, aircraft equipment configuration, and a
summary of the conditions noted during the inspection.
The logs should contain enough detail for the post flight
analysis to conclude; the corresponding time of the
condition, a general description of the aircrafts location,
any anomalies encountered, and changes in the aircrafts
configuration that would cause an inspection parameter to
vary. Aircraft configuration changes would be
encountered when completing checklist items, such as; an
evaluation of the ADS-B processing of the Minimum Safe
Altitude Warning (MSAW) system and Modes/Codes.
Engineering Services and ATC tracks the ADS-B Out
targets of the flight inspection aircraft on a scope that has
been adapted with the ADS-B automation platform.
Engineering Services will monitor and score the flight
path of the flight inspection aircraft and annotate any
anomalies encountered during the inspection, such as; loss
of one or both of the broadcast links, incorrect aircraft
tracking information, altitude discrepancies, etc. Scoring
is an Engineering Services function that is similar to our
FI inspection log. Scoring is the process of annotating the
results as a Pass/Fail criterion for the various checklist
conditions that are performed during the inspection.
Figure 7 is a screenshot of the FAA data logging software
providing a real-time graphical display of the ADS-B Out
and ADS-B In messages processed by the GDL 88. The
target displayed is the flight inspection aircraft with a tail
number of N55. The gray box to left of the targets is a
pop up window which allows the user to select specific
message fields they want to observe.
The message fields are derived from Field Reference
Numbers (FRN). The FRN establishes the order of the
items in the FSPEC, and along with the Category codes,
serves to uniquely identify each data item.3 The FRNs
included in the payloads vary depending on the context
being reported, but each Service Report is delineated in a
consistent FRN format for simplicity and standardization
processes.
 Figure 7. FI Software Suite Display
The FAA software allows the user to filter out particular
target types, i.e., ADS-B, ADS-R and TIS-B. Figure 7, is
filtered to only display the ADS-B targets. Each target is
displayed graphically, with the ability to view the targets
broadcast information textually.
Figure 8, Data Logging / Traffic Display, provides
another snapshot of the recording software. In this
snapshot, Flight Check 56 is being used for the ADS-B
inspection. For this inspection, the UAT broadcast link is
employing the pseudo altitude offset factor. This is
indicated by the hexadecimal ICAO address of FLTCK4U
and Flight ID of FAAFC4, this combination results in a
plus 1000 offset factor applied to the altitude displayed
on the ATC display. Also included in Figure 8, are
additional ADS-B targets being observed and a ground
radio station. The ground radio station will be shaded
orange when it is providing uplink messages to the FI
aircraft.
The GDL88 has been filtered to include ADS-B and
ADS-R message for display. Notice two targets are being
displayed for each broadcast link, the aircraft is receiving
an ADS-B message and an ADS-R message for each link.
Keep in mind the GDL 88 is a dual link ADS-B In
receiver, so why are we receiving an uplink for the ADS-
R? This example is an indication of the importance of
flight inspection. Without the use flight inspection and
the validation of SIS, this automation flaw could have
possibly gone unnoticed. Without delving further into the
fundamentals of the ground infrastructure, the ground
system is designed to track ICAO addresses and the link
technologies associated for each target and only uplink
messages applicable to the target type. The ground
infrastructure is not properly identifying the targets and
their associated aircraft equipage; and is broadcasting
unnecessary information to the aircraft to process and
display.
165
Figure 8. Data Logging / Traffic Display
POST-FLIGHT ANALYSIS
During the course of the inspection, the FAA Technical
Center in Atlantic City, NJ is parsing hourly reports from
the SBS Monitor. Although the Technical Center does
not yet have the corresponding FI aircraft data to compare
positional information, they can compare reports from the
SBS Monitor pertaining to the FI aircraft and other TOOs
in the area and perform preliminary gap analysis. These
preliminary reports are beneficial during the inspection as
they can provide early identification of coverage
problems while the aircraft is onsite and modifications to
the flight plan can be addressed.
Upon completion of the flight inspection, all of the FI
data files are uploaded to a FAA network. These files
include: flight inspection logs, 1090ES ownship data from
the MonTPA (used solely for ADS-R validation, because
of the time delay), GDL88 transceiver ADS-B Out and
ADS-B In of both broadcast links, and ProFlex 800 truth
position in NMEA and ATOM data formats. FAA
Technical Operations Engineering Services parses all of
the corresponding message reports from the FAA
Technical Centers SDP.
A flight inspection report is generated by the flight crew
for each SV inspected. The flight inspection report will
only reflect a record of what was accomplished during the
inspection and will not list the facility status. Also
included in the report are any abnormal findings
encountered during the inspection. Engineering Services
will document the initial test results of the flight
inspection in a quick look report and the finalized results
in the Flight Inspection Analysis Report. The analysis
reports are used by local Air Traffic and Technical
Operations to determine if the performance of the ADS-B
system is satisfactory
Common Errors Encountered and Areas of Concern
The use of flight inspection in the IST process has
consistently yielded beneficial results and identified areas
that are problematic for future applications. Multiple
flight inspections have discovered errors in the
automation software, such as: the broadcast of ADS-R
messages for an aircraft that is dual linked ADS-B In;
missing radio stations from the adaptation files for a SV;
incorrectly registering an aircraft as an TIS-B target
instead of an ADS-B target; and has confirmed predicted
coverage based upon math modelling shouldnt be the
sole basis for discerning coverage.
Although rare, instances have occurred where flight
inspection has identified problems with the ground
infrastructure and should have been identified in the ISAT
process. Oversights in ensuring the ground system is tied
to and synced with a valid GPS timing source has resulted
in loss of target tracking ability and system failures.
Consideration should be given to barometric pressure
impacts and the effects it poses on the flight inspection
results when evaluating the service volume floor and
ceiling. Altitudes reported over the 1090ES and UAT
data links provided the aircrafts standard day or
uncorrected altitude. The aircrew uses the aircrafts
altimeter, which uses local barometric corrections for
altitudes below 18,000 MSL. In most case, when the
barometric pressure is close to the standard day of 29.92
mb, the difference does not affect the ADS-B ground
system. However, when large enough changes in the
barometric pressure are present due to weather fronts,
there can be significant differences in the aircrafts
displayed and transmitted ADS-B altitudes.9
CONCLUSIONS
The concept of ADS-B and dual link technologies has
proven to be difficult to apply. As expected with each
new technology there will be some difficulties in
transitioning from the design concept to the application
phase. As explained in the initial paragraphs of this
paper, ADS-R is not considered a Critical Service,
something that may change in the future when more
knowledge and experience is gained on the system.
Overall the ADS-B systems coverage has met or
exceeded ATC expectations in many areas and the
additional coverage in areas has added an extra layer of
safety within the NAS. Continued advancements in
technology and aircraft equipage will further enhance the
systems capability and prove to be a formidable
cornerstone in the development of NextGen. Flight
Inspection should continue to be an invaluable component
in the assessment of ADS-B Services. Future work and
expansion of technologies will continue to benefit from
166
the end-to-end performance evaluation and data collection
flight inspection can provide.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Donald A. McGough
Airspace System Inspection Pilot
FAA Flight Inspection Services
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
Email: donald.mcgough@faa.gov
REFERENCES
[1] FAA, May 2010, 14 CFR Part 91, Automatic
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out
Performance Requirements To support Air Traffic
Control (ATC) Service; Final Rule
[2] DOT, Office of Inspector General, August 4th,
2011, FAA Oversight is Key for Contractor-Owned Air
Traffic Control Systems That Are Not Certified, Report
Number: AV-2011-149
[3] FAA, Revision: 1,April 18th, 2012, SBS SDP to
ATC Automation and Service Monitoring User
Subsystems, ICD NAS-IC-82530001-0
[4] DO-282B, December 13th 2011, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for
Universal Access Transceiver (UAT) Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B).
[5] FAA, November 15th, 2013, Surveillance and
Broadcast Services Description Document SRT-047,
Revision 02
[6] FAA, October 3rd, 2012, Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) / ADS-B Rebroadcast
(ADS-R) Critical Services Specification, FAA-E-3011
Version 2.10
[7] FAA, October 3rd, 2012, Traffic Information
Service-Broadcast (TIS-B) / Flight Information Service-
Broadcast (FIS-B) Essential Services Specification, FAA-
E-3006 Version 2.7
[8] DO-260B, December 2nd, 2009, Minimum
Operational Performance Standards (MOPS) for 1090
MHz Extended Squitter Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) and Traffic Information
Services-Broadcast (TIS-B), Corrigendum 1 included
[9] Avionics Engineering Center, School of Electrical
Engineering and Computer Science, Ohio University,
September 2013, Review of the Automatic Dependent
Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) System and
Development of ADS-B Flight Inspection Requirements,
Methodologies, and Procedures, TECHNICAL
MEMORANDUM OU/AEC TM10-10/80000/01-1
[10] FAA, Flight Inspection Services, Automatic
Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Flight
Inspection, Draft Order Number 8200.ADS-B,
[11] GARMIN, July 2012, GTN 725/750 Pilots Guide,
[12] Donald A. McGough and Kevin Hardina,
Methodologies for the Flight Inspection of ADS-B
System,

167
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168
 Experiences with Inspection of
FANS-1/A Data Link
Tom Pinnell
Systems Engineer
Norwegian Special Mission
Oslo,
Norway
Tel: +47 90286588
E-mail: tom.pinnell@nsm.aero
ABSTRACT
As the congestion of air traffic rises, there is a greater
strain put on air traffic control (ATC) to safely manage an
air space.
The Future Air Navigation System (FANS) technology is
implemented in both oceanic and domestic airspace
around the world and the LINK 2000+ programme in
Europe will soon expand the use of domestic Aeronautical
Telecommunication Network (ATN) based data link.
These technologies assist in significantly reducing pilot
and ATC workload whilst increasing safety and
efficiency.
The positioning of an aircraft by ATC is reliant on
messages it receives from the aircraft. Considering that
ATC messages are not given priority over other data link
messages that are delivered by the same path e.g.
Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) flight plan
uplinks, there is a need to verify that the transit time of
ATC messages meet the requirements for current reduced
separation standards. Additionally it should be evaluated
that the data link performance is correct throughout its
service volume.
HISTORY OF FANS
In 1983 the ICAO Council established the Special
Committee on FANS as a strategy to counter global
increases in air traffic and an aging worldwide
infrastructure. The role of the Committee was to study,
identify and assess new technologies, including satellite
technology, and to make recommendations for the future
development of navigation systems for global civil
aviation. The proposal developed by the FANS
Committee came to be known as the Communication
Navigation Surveillance/Air Traffic Management
To m Pinnell, N SM
(CNS/ATM) concept. The CNS/ATM system is based on
global communications systems, global navigation
systems, and Automatic Dependent Surveillance (ADS).
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is a result of these
integrated systems being used to provide a range of Air
Traffic Services (ATS).
The Controller Pilot Data Link Communications
(CPDLC) and Automatic Dependent Surveillance
Contract (ADS-C) data link applications were designed
for transportation across the then future ATN. Until the
ATN became available, Boeing and Honeywell built a
FANS application to run on the existing Aircraft
Communications Addressing and Reporting System
(ACARS). This avionics package became known as
FANS-1. Airbus created an equivalent system known as
FANS-A. Collectively, these systems are known as
FANS-1/A.
CPDLC versus ADS-C
CPDLC is a communications application that allows for
the direct exchange of text-based messages between ATC
and an air crew. The controller is provided with the
capability to issue level assignments, crossing constraints,
lateral deviations, route changes and clearances, speed
assignments, radio frequency assignments, and various
requests for information. The air crew is provided with
the capability to respond to messages, to request
clearances and information, to report information, and to
declare/rescind an emergency. A free text messaging
option is also provided to both parties so that information
not conforming to defined formats may be exchanged.
ADS-C is a surveillance application that provides ATC
with accurate surveillance reports from an aircraft in
remote and oceanic regions. Reports are sent
automatically in accordance with the parameters of a
169
contract that an air traffic controller has set up. Under
normal circumstances ADS-C requires no pilot
interaction: the pilots can turn the ADS-C application on
and off, or when a contract is in place can initiate and
cancel an emergency reporting mode.
CPDLC Necessity
Before CPDLC, the standard method of communication
between ATC and an air crew was voice radio: VHF
bands for line-of-sight or HF bands for long-distance
communication.
A major problem with voice radio communication is that
all pilots being handled by a particular controller are
tuned to the same frequency. This raises the chance that
one pilot will accidentally override another, thus requiring
the transmission to be repeated.
ADS-C Necessity
Before ADS-C, aircraft flying in remote areas were
managed by ATC using procedural control: aircrafts are
separated using generous separation standards based on
inertial or GNSS position that are routed to ATC via HF
relay stations.
The introduction of ADS-C has provided ATC with a
means of managing a whole airspace more efficiently.
Not only can they track an aircraft more accurately whilst
receiving a greater amount of information than was
previously sent via a non-ADS-C equipped aircraft
position report, they can also be alerted immediately if an
aircraft deviates from its predefined flight track.
INTRODUCTION
Norwegian Special Mission (NSM) have been working
with the Brazilian flight inspection organisation - Grupo
Especial de Inspeo em Vo (GEIV), to assist with
improving their role in the application and inspection of
FANS-1/A data link services to meet air traffic projected
demand for the Europe/South America corridor and
improve ATC capacity and efficiency.
The ADS-C functionality in ACC-Atlantic (Brazil) has
been operationally available since 23rd October 2008. The
CPDLC functionality has been operational since 30th July
2009.
170
Figure 1. ACC-Atlantic Airspace
Considering that FANS data links are used for ATM
communication and safety purposes, who makes sure that
the data link is flyable, and who ensures that it is
commissioned and inspected, either routinely or in special
cases of antenna replacement or accidents?
For many years the Brazilian Air Navigation Service
Provider (ANSP) - DECEA - asked questions like these to
the international flight inspection community. The
conclusion was that there were no flight inspection
requirements, there was not much data to get access to,
and very often verification tests of data link performance
are carried out by the data link service providers.
Concluding that this was not by any means compatible
with proper quality aviation ATM safety standards,
DECEA decided to study this and a brief requirement for
flight inspection was discussed. DECEA wanted to verify
that all data messages were transmitted from the ground
station (Air Traffic Services Unit (ATSU)) correctly and
that this could be documented properly.
As the right quality way to do this is always by the flight
inspection organization, their first task was to enable
GEIV to have FANS data link capability on board their
flight inspection aircrafts. A contract was awarded to
NSM in 2008 to outfit four Hawker 800XP aircrafts with
UNIFIS 3000 Flight Inspection Systems (UNIFIS 3000)
equipped with the functionality to access the data received
and transmitted via the FANS data link.
4 x FANS Installations for the Brazilian Air Force.
The following equipment has been installed and is
operational in four Hawker 800XP flight inspection
aircrafts.
Aircraft Components:
VHF Antenna
SATCOM Antenna
Universal NCU Flight Management System (FMS)
Universal Multi-function Control/Display Units (MCDU)
UNIFIS 3000 Components:
Simulated FMS and DM Software
Flight Inspection System Software
Rockwell Collins CMU 900 (CMU)
Rockwell Collins VHF 4000 Data Radio
Rockwell Collins SRT 2100B SATCOM Transceiver
Figure 2. GEIV H800 XP Equipment Configuration
171
Both cockpit MCDUs and the UNIFIS 3000 simulated
MCDU can display and control the CMU. All MCDUs
can view different pages of the CMU application menu
simultaneously.
Figure 3. CPDLC Message from MCDU to ATSU Log
GOLD STANDARD REQUIREMENTS
ICAO has for many years worked for a common global
standard for data links. The Global Operational Data Link
Document (GOLD) is the result of the progressive
evolution of the ICAO Asia-Pacific (APAC) Initial Future
Air Navigation System Operations Manual, the North
Atlantic (NAT) Guidance Material for ATS Data Link
Services in North Atlantic Airspace, and the Eurocontrol
LINK2000+ Guidance Material for the aeronautical
telecommunication network baseline 1 (ATN B1). Each
of these founding documents provided guidance on a
regional basis. However, in recognition of the need to
provide globally harmonized guidance on data link
operations, the GOLD, First Edition, merging initially the
APAC and NAT guidance material, was adopted by the
APAC and NAT Regions in 2010. The Second Edition of
the GOLD enabled integration of the LINK2000+
guidance material. [1]
The GOLD addresses data link service provision, operator
readiness, controller and flight crew, procedures,
performance-based specifications and post-
implementation monitoring and analysis. Although it does
not directly address any kind of flight inspection of FANS
data links, it does make the following recommendations
for monitoring their performance:
1. To enable adequate system performance
monitoring the ANSP should at minimum
perform a monthly analysis of CPDLC Required
Communication Performance (RCP) and ADS-C
performance data. This monitoring will verify
system performance and also enable continuous
performance improvement by detecting where
specific aircraft or fleets are not meeting the
performance standards. [2]
The recommendation for analysis of CPDLC
transit times only states to use uplink messages
that that receive a single DM 0 WILCO
response. The transit times of uplink messages
that receive other responses: DM 1 UNABLE,
DM 2 STANDBY, DM 3 ROGER, DM 4
AFFIRM or DM 5 NEGATIVE are not used as
they will skew the observed data because of the
longer response times from the flight deck. [3]
It should be noted that assessing transit times
does not verify that all uplink and downlink
messages can be sent and received correctly, just
that certain messages are transmitted and a
response is received within an acceptable time
frame.
2. The ANSP should conduct trials with aircraft to
ensure that the system meets the requirements for
interoperability such as is defined for FANS-1/A
in RTCA DO-258A. [4]
RTCA DO-258A defines the requirements for
FANS-1/A ATS applications. It covers the ATS
Facilities Notification (AFN), ADS-C and
CPDLC.
172
Figure 4. ICAO GOLD Document
TEST OF FANS -1/A GROUND STATION
Although the requirement to monitor transit times
according to the GOLD is written as should, not must,
the recommendations for periodic monitoring intervals,
calculations and graphical analysis of RCP are well
defined, as are the procedures and report forms for non-
conformances. In addition to the monitoring of transit
times, SITA, who are the air data service provider in
Brazil, have a support team that continuously monitors
the quality of the air-ground communication.
The GOLD does not define how to fulfill the requirement
that the ANSP should conduct trials with aircraft to
ensure that the system meets the requirements for
interoperability such as is defined for FANS-1/A in
RTCA DO-258A. This scope is quite large and covers the
testing of all possible CPDLC downlink and uplink
messages to assess if they can be sent or received
correctly. It should be noted that an incorrectly configured
ground station can transmit an automatic response to a
received CPDLC downlink that will alert a flight crew
that a service is not available. This message usually takes
the form: MESSAGE NOT SUPPORTED BY THIS
FACILITY.
Figure 5. ADS-C Setup Screen
Flight and ground tests were conducted using VDL Mode
0/A, VDL Mode 2 and SATCOM. During testing, after an
AFN logon was established, both the flight inspector and
an air traffic controller would follow a scripted dialogue
of various CPDLC messages and responses. Additionally,
tests were also performed to verify that all types of ADS-
C contracts could be initiated.

RESULTS

The UNIFIS 3000 contains software that can simulate an

FMS Data Manager (DM). The DM is the FMS
application that generates the Arinc labels that the
ACARS computer - Rockwell Collins CMU 900 -
requires in order to provide FANS services. This software
is capable of generating all possible FANS FMS data
labels. An optional simulated MCDU can also be enabled
which provides a flight inspector the ability to monitor or
participate during FANS-1/A testing.

The DM software provides the option to for the flight Figure 7. Extract of ATSU ADS-C Log
inspector to send static data to the CMU, this allows a
flight inspector the ability to perform a more controlled
test and is particularly useful not to mention timesaving
when analyzing numerous pages of log files that have
been recorded using live data.

The DM software creates a time stamped log of all uplink

and downlink messages. The ATSU creates the following
logs:
1. Report of AFN logon activity.
2. Report of CPDLC activity.
3. Report of ADS-C activity.

Additionally, the UNIFIS 3000 has the ability to decode

the CMU information intended for the aircraft Flight Data
Recorder, and can generate a maintenance log that
contains all raw data messages.
By comparing the ground station logs to the UNIFIS 3000
logs, it is possible to verify with evidence whether or not
all uplink and downlink messages can be received
correctly.
Figure 8. Extract of UNIFIS 3000 Log
During several test periods over 1000 uplink and
downlink messages were exchanged between the UNIFIS
3000 and the FANS ATSU. As these were controlled tests
where the flight inspector was informing ATC of the
required dialogue to be exchanged before an uplink
message was generated, it could be verified in real time
that the ground station was performing correctly. A post-
test analysis of the UNIFIS 3000 logs and the ATSU logs
was performed which also consistently confirmed this.

CONCLUSION

The testing performed so far in Brazil allows the ANSP to

be confident that the FANS communication and
surveillance functionalities are operating correctly. They
can now verify that not only does the FANS ground
station meet the requirements for ADS-C and CPDLC
transit times, but also fulfills the requirement to conduct
trials with aircraft to ensure that the system meets the
requirements defined for FANS-1/A in RTCA DO-
258A. [3]
Figure 6. FANS DM and Simulated MCDU.

173
The flight inspection organization can now produce
reports backed up by evidence that can be used to certify
the following:
ADS-C Periodic, Event and Demand contracts
uplink correctly according to the parameters
stipulated by ATC.
All ADS-C downlink messages are received and
archived in the ATSU logs correctly.
ATC is assured that all CPDLC requests
downlinked to them by an aircraft are received
correctly and that no downlinked message
generates an incorrect automatic response.
Transition of messages between VDL (Mode 0/A
and 2) and SATCOM, and transition of messages
between VDL stations operates correctly.
Testing with ATC is definitely more efficient when both
parties have been fully briefed and have agreed to a
scripted dialogue. Although it is possible to complete all
testing using VHF data links within a relatively short time
frame (circa fifteen minutes), test times for SATCOM can
be significantly longer. With SATCOM in particular it is
beneficial to perform testing in the most efficient manner
possible, as SATCOM data is charged by the byte: this
means that cost is a consideration to keep in mind during
testing.
Since all VHF and SATCOM data link information is
routed to the ATSU via the air data service providers
computer network, it is reasonable to assume that if the
ATSU can correctly uplink and receive downlinks of all
FANS applications via VHF data link without a problem,
then with it will also be able to do the same via a
SATCOM data link. Although further investigation of
this is required, testing of the communication capability
of the ATSU could be achieved by performing the
majority of the testing using a VHF data link, and
concluding it with a basic SATCOM communication
verification test.
It was observed during testing that it was more efficient if
the flight inspector performed the testing as he/she could
visually assess the data that is being both uplinked and
downlinked in real time using the UNIFIS 3000 live data
log. Having the flight inspector perform this testing also
allows the pilot to concentrate on flight operations whilst
still having the ability to monitor the test.
Although the GOLD states that trails by aircraft are
required, is this because the avionic equipment required to
perform this testing is usually found inside an aircraft? It
is of course possible to carry out this testing via a lab
174
setup, or by using a specially configured aircraft on the
ground.
During testing that took place with the aircraft on the
ground, it was agreed beforehand with ATC that a flight
plan did not need to be submitted before initiating an
AFN logon. Also, for all ground tests, the reported
altitude was set to 0ft using the UNIFIS 3000 DM
software.
Testing on the ground can not only save money for a
flight inspection organization, it can also assist in
overcoming the difficulty of scheduling a time that both
testing can take place with ATC, and that a flight crew
can be airborne.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This paper was only possible because of the cooperation
and support from the Brazilian ANSP, DECEA and flight
inspection organization, GEIV. The author would like to
thank them for their continued partnership and hard work
during the implementation and testing of FANS-1/A
equipped flight inspection systems.
The author would like to thank Rockwell Collins,
Universal Avionics, Arinc Direct and SITA for their
continued support and assistance during development and
testing of FANS and ATN (CPDLC) equipped flight
inspection systems.
Also, Craig. J. Roberts of ATC Data Link News hosts a
website that provides detailed and informative content on
the operational use of FANS-1/A data link technology. [5]
REFERENCES
[1] www.eurocontrol.int/publications/regulation
[2] ICAO, 26 April 2013, ICAO Global Operational Data
Link Document (GOLD), D.2.4.1.1
[3] ICAO, 26 April 2013, ICAO Global Operational Data
Link Document (GOLD), D.2.2.2.2.1
[4] ICAO, 26 April 2013, ICAO Global Operational Data
Link Document (GOLD), 3.1.1.5
[5] http://members.optusnet.com.au/~cjr/index.html
 Session 6
ICAO (IFPP Summary) and Enhanced Vision
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 State Responsibility for Instrument Flight
Procedures: ICAO IFPPs Challenges
Dr. Yoshinobu Nakanishi
(Rapporteur, Quality Assurance WG,
ICAO Instrument Flight Procedure Panel (IFPP))
Deputy Senior Manager, Airspace Group
NTT Data i Corporation
Tokyo, Japan
E-mail: nakanishiysn@nttd-i.co.jp
ABSTRACT
The implementation of PBN (Performance-Based
Navigation) means that even small errors in data can lead
to catastrophic results. This significant change in data
quality requirements has led to the need for a systemic
quality assurance process, including flight validation, of
instrument flight procedures. Under such circumstances,
ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization)
developed requirements on quality assurance of
instrument flight procedures and related guidance
material. However, many States are still struggling with
the implementation of the quality assurance process. For
instance, some States have not implemented proper
scheme for flight validation. In a worst case, instrument
flight procedures may be even out of control by States.
Background behind this is the lack of standardized ICAO
regulatory framework for such services. To solve such
problem, ICAO decided to develop SARPs material
governing the responsibility by States on instrument flight
procedures and related guidance material.
This presentation aims at providing latest information on
the activities and challenges by ICAO IFPP (Instrument
Flight Procedure Panel) on the development of the SARPs
(Standards and Recommended Practices) and a guidance
material. Especially, a focus is made on the States
responsibility related to flight validation of instrument
flight procedures, one of the most important tasks for the
safety and quality of instrument flight procedures.
IMPORTNT NOTICE
Note that the intention of this paper is to introduce general
overview of discussions within IFPP, as an opportunity to
encourage the readers to consider the issue. Also note that
conclusion within IFPP has not been reached yet, and that
the contents here are NOT an ICAO formal statement.
Dr. Yoshino bu N a ka nishi, ICAO
INTRODUCTION
PBN (Performance-Based Navigation) is a powerful tool
that can improve airspace safety and efficiency.
Therefore, ICAO developed PBN Manual (Doc 9613) [1]
to support PBN implementation by States. As a result,
PBN has been implemented by many ICAO member
States in these several years [2].
IMPACT BY TRANSITION TO PBN
However, the implementation of PBN means that even
small errors in data can lead to catastrophic consequences
in actual flights.
Transition from conventional navigation to PBN is a
transition from analog navigation to digital (data-
dependent) navigation. Under conventional navigation,
most types of errors of conventional Navaid and onboard
navigation system can be estimated and controlled
through Quality Control like an industrial product. In
addition, these analog (systematic) errors can be regarded
to behave in accordance with Normal Distribution
(Gaussian distribution). Therefore, the probability of
deviation from the tolerance can be estimated
quantitatively.
On the other hand, under PBN, small error in a pilot
action and/or navigation data stored in FMS (Flight
Management system) may make catastrophic
consequences. In addition, it is difficult to estimate the
distribution of error and its consequences statistically. See
Figure 1. If, upon inputting latitude on CDU (Control &
Display Unit), a pilot presses 3 instead of 6 which are
adjacently located, then, the location of the target
waypoint to which aircraft is flying results in the
difference of 3 minutes (approx. 3 NM).
177

Figure 1. Possible consequence by small error in data
input under PBN
It is to be noted that, under PBN, the relationship between
the magnitude of error and that of consequences are not in
linear function. Of course, various mitigations to reduce
such risk have been implemented. For example, avionics
have been designed and crew procedures have been
established to eliminate such possible errors [1].
However, countermeasures in the air are not sufficient.
Such significant change in the impact by error can be
found not only during the flight but also during other
phases. Error in flight procedure design, data processing
and database coding may result in severer consequence as
the impact spread out to all users of such flight procedure
and related data. Hence, it is also necessary to take
appropriate measures to eliminate possible errors during
work processes on ground which may degrade the data
quality.
IMPORTANCE OF QUALITY UNDER PBN
This significant change in data quality requirements has
led to the need for a systemic quality assurance process,
including flight validation, of instrument flight
procedures. Under such circumstances, ICAO developed
requirements on quality assurance of instrument flight
procedures and related guidance material.
ICAO Doc 8168 PANS-OPS vol. II, Part I, Section 2,
Chapter 4 provides basic requirements for quality
assurance process applicable to Instrument Flight
Procedure Design Service (IFPDS) [3]. In addition,
various volumes of ICAO Doc 9906 provide guidelines as
a support for the States and other parties in meeting the
requirements of PANS-OPS. Among these volumes,
Volume l provides guidelines for the establishment of
quality assurance process applicable to IFPDS [4], and,
Volume 5 provide guidelines for the provision of flight
validation [5].
178
CURRENT ISSUES
However, many States are still struggling with the
implementation of the quality assurance process. For
instance, some States have not implemented proper
scheme for flight validation. In a worst case, instrument
flight procedures may be even out of control by States.
Background behind is the lack of standardized ICAO
regulatory framework for such services.
One of the most significant issues is the absence of ICAO
provision on the responsibility by States for instrument
flight procedures in Annex (SARPs) level. PANS-OPS
Vol. II provides some related requirements. However,
most part of PANS-OPS Vol. II is just flight procedure
design criteria [3].
IFPPS CHALLENGE (1): SARPS ON STATE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR IFPDS
Under circumstances mentioned above, ICAO IFPP is
tackling with two challenges. Firstly, ICAO IFPP, as
tasked by ICAO ANC (Air Navigation Commission), is
developing SARPs provisions addressing the
responsibility by ICAO contracting States, etc. (second
challenge is the development of guidance material, which
is discussed in the next section).
Introducing SARPs concerning the responsibility by State
for instrument flight procedure design service will lead to
the improvement of flight safety by the implementation of
instrument flight procedure design service by States in a
uniform way.
While discussions are still under way within IFPP,
general direction of discussion on the contents of SARPs
is as follows.
General Responsibility by States
First of all, as a principle, ICAO contracting States, where
instrument flight procedures exist, have the responsibility
for the provision of Instrument Flight Procedure Design
Service (IFPDS). Provision of this service, or a part of
this service, may be delegated to one or more other
Contracting State(s) as a joint service; and/or to non-
governmental agency(s).
It is to be noted that, in all cases in the paragraph above,
the State concerned shall still remain responsible for all
instrument flight procedures for aerodromes and airspace
under the responsibility of the State. In other words, a
State is responsible for all instrument flight procedures for
aerodromes and airspace under the responsibility of the
State no matter who design or own the flight procedure.
The statement above on the final responsibility by State
looks simple and clear. However, there are some cases
where the situation is complicated. One special case may
be found in the following situation. Imagine which State
is responsible for this RNP AR APCH (Required
Navigation Performance - Authorization Required
Approach) in the following case.
a. RNP AR APCH is established in an aerodrome in
State A.
b. Operator (Airline) in State B flies the procedure
(Sometimes, the operator leads the project for the
implementation of RNP AR APCH).
c. The RNP AR APCH was designed by a design
organization in State C.
Final conclusion has NOT been reached. However,
general direction within IFPP is that State A, which is
responsible for the aerodrome/airspace the flight
procedure serves to, is responsible. This is because State
A is responsible not only for the operation itself, but also
for overall impact caused by the operation on entire
society around the aerodrome.
This philosophy is valid for both of these two cases,
where the RNP AR APCH procedure is published on the
State As AIP (Aeronautical Information Publication) as
public procedure, and, where the procedure is not
published (special procedure).
In reality today, such situation may exist where State A
has NO clue about the design criteria which the design
provider applied. This situation should NOT be left. The
RNP AR APCH must be regulated by State A, no matter
whether it is published on the AIP or not. For this
purpose, State A must have appropriate function to
oversee this operation including the approach procedure
itself in order to complete its responsibility for the overall
safety.
Design Criteria
Instrument flight procedure shall be designed in
accordance with State-approved design criteria. This
State-approved design criteria should be based on
ICAO Doc 8168 (PANS-OPS) [3]. However, deviation is
possible. In case of the deviation, the difference should be
published in the State AIP in accordance with the
provision in ICAO Annex 15 (Appendix 1) [6]. Such
information on the difference will facilitate operators to
know how flight procedures they are going to fly have
been designed.
179
Oversight
States must ensure that an instrument flight procedure
design service provider intending to design an instrument
flight procedure for aerodromes or airspace under the
responsibility of the State meets the requirements
established by an appropriate regulatory framework.
Safety Management
No one will disagree with the idea that IFPDS is a
significantly safety-related activity. Therefore, general
consensus by IFPP is that Safety Management System
(SMS) should be applied to IFPDS in some way.
However, situation is not so simple. This is because of the
fact that there are varieties of schemes for the provision of
IFPDS. Followings are examples of existing scheme.
a. State may design flight procedures for aerodromes
under their responsibility
b. ANSP(s) (Air Navigation Service Provider(s)) may
design flight procedures for aerodromes within
airspace under their service (Note that there exist
multiple ANSPs in some State!)
c. Aerodrome operator(s) may design flight procedures
for their own aerodromes
d. Third party (independent) design organization(s) may
design flight procedures under contract with State,
ANSP, aerodrome operator, airline, etc.
e. Combination of above.
Due to such diversity, and resulting difference in the size
of organization, it is not easy to establish one single
Standard, Recommended Practice, or even guidelines for
SMS by design provider. For example, assume the case d.
above. In some location, the entire risk associated with
aircraft and air traffic management operation may be
better managed by aerodrome or ANSP level than within
single design organization. However, in another location,
this is not true. A State-certified third party design
organization and an ANSP may be competing with each
other for flight procedure design activities. In this case,
SMS at ANSP level will not work well.
Noting the facts such as above, IFPP, coordinating ICAO
Safety Management Panel (SMP), will continue the
discussion on how to implement SMS to IFPDS which is
applicable to various schemes.
Quality Assurance
States shall ensure that an instrument flight procedure
design service provider utilizes a properly organized
quality assurance system at each stage of the instrument
flight procedures design process. This shall be made
demonstrable for each stage of the process, when
required.
Continuous Maintenance
One important aspect of quality assurance of instrument
flight procedures are their continuous maintenance and
periodic review.
Upon continuous maintenance, significant changes to
obstacles, aerodrome, aeronautical and Navaid data are
assessed for their impact on the instrument flight
procedure. Especially, assessment of the impact by
newly-proposed construction on the published procedures
are getting more and more important, as more and more
new construction such as mobile phone antenna, wind
power mill, etc. are planned.
States must ensure that continuous maintenance of
promulgated instrument flight procedures be properly
conducted. This requirement can be, and must be, met
through appropriate oversight system on the sponsor /
owner of the flight procedure. For example, where an
aerodrome operator is responsible for the flight procedure,
requirements for continuous maintenance may be
included in the conditions for an aerodrome certificate.
Periodic Review
Upon periodic review, in addition to continuous
maintenance, all changes to obstacles, aerodrome,
aeronautical and Navaid data are assessed. In addition,
impact by changes to design criteria and user
requirements are assessed upon periodic review. If action
is required, the design activity returns to the start of
process.
State must establish the interval for the periodic review
according to the needs of the State (but, no longer than
five years) [3]. Then, States must ensure that periodic
review of promulgated instrument flight procedures is
properly conducted. This requirement can/must be
enforced through appropriate regulatory framework like
that for continuous maintenance as discussed above.
IFPPS CHALLENGE (2): GUIDANCE MATERIAL
ON THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR
IFPDS
Development of SARPs is not a final goal. Many States
recognize that they need more detailed guidelines to meet
the requirements in SARPs. Therefore, IFPP is also trying
to develop a guidance material which supports States in
meeting the responsibilities mentioned above. This is the
second challenge by ICAO IFPP.
180
Outline of the Manual
IFPP developed the TOR (Terms of Reference) of the
guidance material. The material is titled as Manual on
the Development of Regulatory Framework for Instrument
Flight Procedure Design Service (tentative). Main
points within the TOR are as follows:
[Scope] This manual is a guidance material for the
development of regulatory framework by States,
including legislation, regulations and technical standards
for the oversight and provision of IFPDS (Instrument
Flight Procedure Design Service). It also aims at
providing guidelines for service providers to develop their
process, procedures and organizations, under States
legislation.
[Assumed Reader] Considering the scope above, it is
assumed that the primary reader is State Regulators
responsible for regulating IFPDS. However, this guidance
material also regards IFPDS as assumed readers.
[Harmonization] Harmonization will be made as much as
possible with existing ICAO documentation, such as
PANS-OPS vol. II [3], Doc 9906 [4][5], as well as
proposed SARPs provisions as discussed above.
The guidance material consists of three chapters,
Introduction (Chapter 1), Regulator Issues (Chapter 2),
and Provider Issues (Chapter 3).
Regulator Issues
States shall ensure that an instrument flight procedure
design service provider utilizes a properly organized
quality assurance system at each stage of the instrument
flight procedures design process.
Chapter 2 of the Guidance Material provides guidelines
for regulators (State) on the development of regulatory
framework to oversee IFPDS. Original intention is to
supplement the proposed SARPs as discussed above.
ICAO Safety Oversight Manual (Doc 9734) [7] was
referred to upon developing the basic framework. Based
on the sample legislation in Doc 9734, contents were
supplemented in order to meet the requirement specific to
IFPDS.
In addition, Protocol Questions (PQs) were referenced,
which were asked about by ICAO USAOP (Universal
Safety Oversight Audit Programme) auditors. Some of
current PQs are not directly derived from existing ICAO
regulations (Annex or PANS), but just applied from good
practices in successful States.
In the future, PQs will be revised reflecting the new
Annex provisions and the guidance material which IFPP
is developing.
Provider Issues
Chapter 3 will provides guidelines on the development of
processes and procedures to be established by service
providers. For example, this chapter will include sample
contents of Operations Manual by Instrument Flight
Procedure Design Provider and Flight Validation Service
Provider.
Note that existing ICAO Doc 9906 ([4][5]) focus on the
work process and quality assurance process applicable to
services. The new guidance material rather focuses on the
framework needed to establish and operate the work
process such as described in Doc 9906.
Flight Validation
As widely recognized, Flight Validation (FV) is one of
the most important steps within quality assurance process
of instrument flight procedures. Hence, it is implied that
State must ensure that a flight validation provider
(though not clearly defined) intending to validate an
instrument flight procedure for aerodromes or airspace
under the responsibility of the State meets the
requirements established by an appropriate regulatory
framework.
ICAO IFPP has contributed to the development of
guidance material for FV activities. ICAO Doc 9906, vol.
5 [5] provides guidance for conducting validation of
instrument flight procedures, including safety, flyability
and design accuracy. ICAO Doc 9906, vol. 6 [8] provides
guidance for the establishment of flight procedure
validation pilot training.
Intention of new guidance material is to supplement these
guidelines. Focus by the new guidance material is on the
establishment of organization and working frameworks
within FV provider, while Doc 9906 vol. 5 [5] focuses on
the work process itself. For example, it may provide
sample Table of Contents of an Operations Manual for
FV provider.
The author recognizes that many providers have
established excellent working organizations with good
framework. On the other hand, it is to be noted that the
main target reader of the new guidance material is those
who are going to develop all from scratch. To accomplish
this, the author request input from the audiences on their
good practices, etc.
181
CONCLUSION
For the improvement of safety related to flight operations
with instrument flight procedures, it is important that
State must establish a well-organized regulatory
framework and conduct oversight of providers in
accordance with the framework.
Now, ICAO IFPP is making effort for this purpose, by
developing (draft) SARPs and supporting guidance
material.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that the participants of IFIS 2014
should
a. note the importance of quality assurance process of
instrument flight procedures, including flight
validation,
b. support the activities by ICAO IFPP to develop
SARPs and related guidance material, especially by
providing input to the guidance material.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to thank Mr. Glenn R. Bissonnette
and Mr. Fabrizio Maracich for allowing the opportunity
for this presentation.
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO, 2013, Performance-Based Navigation Manual,
(Doc 9613), 4th Edition.
[2] ICAO, 2012, ICAO Performance Based Navigation
Programme, (URL: http://www.icao.int/safety/pbn/ ,
accessed 28 March 2014)
[3] ICAO, 2011, Procedures for Air Navigation Services
- Aircraft Operations (PANS-OPS) (Doc 8168) Volume
II, Construction of Visual and Instrument Flight
Procedures, 5th Edition, Amendment 4.
[4] ICAO, 2009, Quality Assurance Manual for Flight
Procedure Design (Doc 9906) Volume 1, Flight Procedure
Design Quality Assurance System, 1st Edition.
[5] ICAO, 2012, Quality Assurance Manual for Flight
Procedure Design (Doc 9906) Volume 5, Validation of
Instrument Flight Procedures, 1st Edition.
[6] ICAO, 2013, Annex 15 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Aeronautical Information
Services, 14th Edition.
[7] ICAO, 2006, Safety Oversight Manual (Doc 9734)
Part A, The Establishment and Management of a States
Safety Oversight System, 2nd Edition.
[8] ICAO, 2012, Quality Assurance Manual for Flight
Procedure Design (Doc 9906) Volume 6, Flight
Validation of Pilot Training and Evaluation, 1st Edition.

182
 Enhancement of Flight Inspection System Using
Visual Information Xiaofeng Shi, Beiha ng U niversity, & Xiao qia ng Li, Beijing Sky Av iatio n Co.

Xiaofeng Shi
Associate Professor
Beihang University
Beijing, China
Fax: +86 10 82339078 ext. 8058
E-mail: shixiaofeng@buaa.edu.cn

Xiaoqiang Li
Software Engineer
Beijing Sky Aviation Co., Ltd.
Beijing, China
Fax: +86 10 82339078 ext. 8058
E-mail: xiaoqiang.li@bsac.com.cn

ABSTRACT cabin are seen from different views, while the three-
dimensional geographical feature is visible and aircraft
In conventional flight inspection system (FIS), inspection track is shown in the chart. Inspectors and procedure
conclusion is based on mainly signal data (AGC, angle, designers can evaluate the obstacle clearance and
range, etc.), voice quality (VHF inspection, for example), protection area design more accurately with the repeatable
eye observation (VASI/PAPI), plus pilot/inspectors video, flight track in chart and GIS environment.
intuitive feelings and subjective judgment, especially
during flight procedure validation. Evaluation of The key elements of the special visual post-processing
procedure obstacle clearance and maneuvering area module of FIS are described in this paper and its
design remains some degree of uncertainty under cover, successful application in Collaborative Flight Inspection
on account of different experience/ability level of System is presented in detail.
pilots/inspectors. The paper proposes to use visual
information to enhance flight procedure inspection: three- INTRODUCTION
dimensional virtual environment based GIS technology,
video information from airborne cameras and EVS, digital Flight validation is essential before one flight procedure is
charts. The visual information solution provides published, which should confirm the coded ground track
additional, repeatable, more intuitive, diverse views and the identified lateral/vertical protection boundaries [1]
during inspection flight. It supports procedure inspection at least. Besides, obstacles assessment is a critical part in
with a more convincible, accurate conclusion. flight procedure validation in air, which includes
controlling obstacle verification, obstacle evaluation and
In this solution, flight inspection system collects video missing obstacle identification.
data from airborne nose and tail cameras, as well as EVS
video bus. All the data are recorded real time with Mainly, the obstacle is assessed via the pilots intuitive
epoch tags obtained from GPS receiver. In post- judgment [2, 3, 4] and depends on subjective factors
processing module of FIS, aircraft position and attitude largely. The tool or equipment supporting objective or
information is imported into three-dimensional GIS numerical analysis is lacking, as well as the way to
virtual environment rendered by actual terrain and image record, playback the process of obstacle assessment which
data. Aircraft position is plotted in the digital chart with is a one-time activity in current procedure validation
protection area indication, meanwhile the recorded video work. The assessment result highly relies on the
can be replayed. The visual information from three experience of pilots. This can lead to different
sources is synchronized by GPS UTC time tag, therefore conclusions for a same obstacle. With no any record
by this solution, in the meantime, live scenes outside the support, the result cannot be confirmed by other groups

183
when different opinions appear, unless a new flight is
arranged. All the above concerns expose the potential risk
of present obstacle assessment mode.
The paper presents a way to enhance procedure flight
validation introducing multiple visual information: terrain
and image data in Geographic Information System (GIS),
real-time video data from airborne cameras and Enhanced
Vision System (EVS) and digital chart. The fusion among
multiple visual information, flight track data, procedure
chart and flight inspection outcome provides inspectors
and procedure designers an outstanding panoramic view
of the whole flight, with controllable playback ability.
The projection of actual flight path in the digital chart
makes an accurate evaluation of obstacle clearance.
These improvements offer more reliable validation of
procedure, especially for obstacle assessment.
POSTPROCESSING PLATFORM IN CFIS-G450
Collaborative Flight Inspection System for Gulfstream
450 (CFIS-G450) is designed to perform PBN flight
procedure validation via Gulfstream 450 jet. Onboard data
from ADC, IRS, FMS and HUD etc., are brought into
CFIS-G450 to support procedure validation, plus video
data from onboard cameras and EVS which makes visual
inspection possible.
A special platform are developed to process all the data
further in ground after flight activities. The system block
Multiple Video Module
Images
DEM
data
GIS
Control and Data Processing Module
Module
Inspection Data Module
Figure 1. Postprocessing Platform of CFIS-G450
CORE DESIGN IN POSTPROCESSING
PLATFORM
GIS Module
The classical Pyramid pattern (Figure 2) is applied to
manage and display all the data in this module. In this
184
diagram of this postprocessing platform is shown as
Figure 1. Control and Data Processing Module manages
the whole processing steps, processes the original data
recorded during flight, and synchronizes all the processed
data into GPS UTC system. GIS Module renders a virtual,
3D, full-view scene by rendering terrain data, integrating
images, applying Digital Elevation Model (DEM)
information. Chart Module integrates flight track and
obstacle clearance information, points out relative
position among the actual path and clearance area
intuitively. Multiple Video Module displays the videos
from cameras and EVS synchronously with active flight
path and inspection/validation outputs. Inspection Data
Module outputs inspection/validation results as tables,
curves on the screen, such as Navigation System Error
(NSE), Required Navigation Performance (RNP),
Dilution of Precision (DOP), etc.
All the data, including flight track, video from cameras
and EVS, inspection outcomes, are labeled with GPS
UTC flag to achieve information fusion in time domain.
The operator can pause the playback at any epoch and
check all the information at specific timestamp. When an
obstacle shows in the video clip, GIS Module helps to
check it from multiple views while Chart Module
provides obstacle location.
Recorded video
from cameras and
EVS
Chart
Module
Charts
pattern, a couple of layers are generated by copying the
original data with decreasing levels of resolution, for
example the original layer (No. 0) with the highest
resolution while the coarsest layer (No. n) with the lowest
resolution. The advantage is that drawing speed can be
maintained since fewer pixels are needed to draw a
successively areas as the user zooms in. The coarsest level x2 x x x1 2
f (R2 ) f (Q12 ) + f (Q22 )
of resolution is used to represent the entire area quickly. x 2 x1 x 2 x1

2) Linear interpolation in Y direction:

y2 y y y1 3
f (P ) f (R1 ) + f (R2 )
y 2 y1 y 2 y1

The DEM data tiles are stored in advance, so do the image

data. The real 3D terrain scene is rendered automatically
by loading the sampled data when drawing the flight
track.

Chart Module

The Chart Module is designed to not only use digital chart

Figure 2. Pyramid Pattern in GIS [5]
In this module, bilinear interpolation method is employed
to sample the original dataset (DEM) and obtain data
tiles for various levels in the Pyramid. Taking the DEM
values at points Q11(x1,y1), Q12 (x1,y2), Q21(x2,y1), Q22
(x2,y2) as known, the DEM value of point P (x,y) in the
area of four known points is calculated by two steps [5]:
1) Linear interpolation in X direction
x2 x x x1 1 boundary.
f (R1 ) f (Q11 ) + f (Q21 )
x 2 x1 x 2 x1
directly, but also be able to digitalize the charts in PDF or
image format (jpg, bmp, etc.). Two known position points
in the chart, for example way points or navaid facilities,
are taken as the references. The position of other points in
the chart can be calculated via the map scale, pixels, and
relative location. The position mapping in chart frame and
Earth frame for all the points in the chart is stored in a
XML file which is loaded. The file is loaded with the
chart to match flight track projection.
Figure 3 shows the example to process a chart with PDF
format. Figure 4 displays the 2D map with loaded chart.
Measurement tool can be used to evaluate the distance
between actual flight track and obstacle clearance

185
 Figure 3. Chart Process Example

Figure 4. 2D Map with Chart Loaded

The purple, green and yellow lines refer to the protection
boundaries for different approach procedures. The black
line is the approach path while the red one shows flight
track. This visual mode offers plenty of information for
the protection design assessment.
Multiple Video Module
The videos are introduced from four onboard cameras:
1) two locating on the belly: record the obstacles during
approach

186
2) one on the tail: record the attitude and full view
during flight
3) one camera for EVS: record the view in the nose
direction and information from onboard instruments

A commercial off the shelf (COTS) rugged digital video

recording and distribution system, GRIP DVR is used to
store the videos and process 3D position + time with GPS
receiver output.

Recording
Control

GPS Onboard
GRIP DVR
Receiver Videos

Figure 5. Video Processing

GRIP DVR starts to record videos after receiving control

command, meanwhile GPS receiver outputs position and
time information (4 dimensions, 4D) to DVR via serial
port. The 4D information is overlaid in the original
videos. The video frame for any GPS UTC epoch can be Figure 7. The Validated Procedure
located by the known starting time and frame rate. The
synchronization among videos and other modules is Figure 7 is the flight procedure validated which is actually
achieved at the same time. a published one, but was used for experimental purpose
here. Figure 8 presents the Altitude Wall in GIS visual
APPLICATION IN PROCEDURE VALIDATION scene to describe the variation of altitude. The
hyacinthine track surface provides an intuitive view of
The Postprocessing Platform was used to process flight altitude variation.
procedure validation performed at Palm Spring
International airport, CA, an experiment to test the CFIS-
G450, October 30, 2013. Figure 6 shows an overview of
the platform. The active inspection data, 3D GIS visual
scene, 2D chart and real videos are displayed
simultaneously to provide procedure validation results
with multiform numerical and visual information.

Figure 8. Altitude Wall

Figure 6. Postprocessing Platform Overview

187
 Figure 9. Multiple Video Display

When the 2D chart indicates the deviation of actual flight

track and expected route, Figure 9 offers real views of
altitude, terrain, and instrument information.

CONCLUSIONS

Multiple visual information: 2D charts, 3D GIS virtual

scene, onboard videos are employed to enhance flight
procedure validation, especially provide a controllable
playback platform to support obstacle assessment. All the
visual information is labelled with GPS UTC time flag for
synchronization in temporal domain. The postprocessing
of the experimental flight data in Palm Spring Intl airport
outputs a multiform validation result: numerical and
visual, which supports procedure validation with more
reliability.

REFERENCES

[1] Pate D P. Flight Evaluation and Validation of RNP

AR/SAAAR Instrument Flight Procedures [J].
[2] FAA, October 14 2011, Instrument Flight Procedure
Validation (IFPV) of Satellite-based Instrument Flight
Procedures, AC 90-113.
[3] Doc I. 8071[J]. Volume I, Fourth Edition, 2007.
[4] FAA O. United Statues Standard Flight Inspection
Manual [J]. FAA Order, 2005, 8200.
[5] , . G IS [J]. ,
2002, 38(13): 227-228.

188
 Session 7
Flight Validation of SBAS & GBAS
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 SBAS and its Roles in Flight Inspection Frank M us ma nn, Aerodata

Frank Musmann
Dipl. Ing
Aerodata AG
D-38108 Braunschweig, Germany
Fax: +49 531 2359 222
E-mail: musmann@aerodata.de

ABSTRACT via geostationary satellites. The system comprises a

Space Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) for
GNSS/GPS navigation are operational in many areas in
the world today. Some systems are already fully certified
for approaches with vertical guidance and for Safety of
Life (SoL) applications. Many countries have successfully
implemented SBAS based Localizer Performance
procedures with Vertical guidance (LPV) for approach
already.
network of ground Ranging and Integrity Monitoring
Stations (RIMS), Master Control Centers (MCC) and
Uplink Stations. The RIMS monitor satellite signals and
send the data to the Master Control Centers (MCC) that
collect and process the data and generate SBAS messages.
The Uplink Stations send the SBAS messages to
geostationary satellites that broadcast the SBAS messages
to the SBAS user.

Even if the supporting SBAS itself is fully certified, each

new approach procedure needs to be flight
checked/validated before it is promulgated for public use.
During the flight check, SBAS coverage, accuracy and
integrity along the procedure as well as the final approach
construction data are the central points of interest. SBAS
capable flight inspection equipment provides automatic
evaluation and recording of these parameters.

In addition to SBAS procedure checks, where SBAS is

subject to inspection, SBAS can also serve to improve the
accuracy of the position reference of the flight inspection
system. By this SBAS lead to higher accuracy without
additional costs for ground equipment or service
subscriptions.

This paper describes the requirements for flight inspection SBAS Elements
of SBAS based procedures and shows a procedure
oriented way of in-flight data analysis and evaluation to SBAS PRINCIPLE
comply with these requirements. Further it describes the
Aircraft receivers using SBAS for navigation acquires the
implementation and experience of using SBAS as position
ranging and correction data and applies this data to
reference during flight checks.
determine the integrity and improve the accuracy of the
INTRODUCTION derived position. Four certified satellite augmentation
systems are available today:
An SBAS augments core GNSS satellite constellations by
providing ranging, integrity and correction information WAAS (North America)

191
 EGNOS (Europe) Type Contents
MSAS (Japan) 9 Geo Navigation message (X,Y,Z, time, etc.)
GAGAN (India) 10 Degradation parameters
12 SBAS Network time / UTC offset parameters
Other SBAS services are under construction:
17 Geo satellite almanacs
SDKM (Russia) 18 Ionospheric grid points masks
24 Mixed fast corrections/long term satellite error
25 Long term satellite error corrections
26 Ionospheric delay corrections
27 SBAS Service message
28 Clock Ephemeris Covariance Matrix message
62 Internal test message
63 Null message

SBAS Service Areas

The SBAS corrections and integrity data is transmitted by
a geostationary satellite as a GPS-like signal modulated
with a PRN code and can be received and processed by
any SBAS capable GNSS receiver. A secondary
geostationary SBAS satellite serves as backup.
The SBAS service is specified to provide at least the
following accuracies (conservative 95% limit) within its
service volume:
Horizontal Accuracy: 3m
Vertical Accuracy: 4m
Besides an improved position solution the SBAS also
provides integrity service for detection of e.g.:
The Message Types 2-5 contain the data for fast
correction of each satellite.
Urgent integrity information is transmitted by Message
Type 6 alerting the SBAS using receiver within 6 seconds
after occurrence of an alert condition. The occurrence of
Message Type 6 can be seen as the first indication of a
tendency to integrity loss.
On 2nd March 2011 EGNOS performance (within
EGNOS Service Area) was certified for Safety-of-Life
(SoL) application in aviation. Approach procedures with
vertical guidance (APV) are implemented in many
countries as LPV (Localizer Performance with Vertical
guidance) with descent minima down to 200 feet, today.

GNSS satellite errors

Ionosphere propagation errors
Satellite clock errors
The geostationary satellite broadcasts this information via
different message types. 20 different message types are
defined so far.

Type Contents
0 Dont use for safety applications
1 PRN mask assignments, set up to 51 of 210
2-5 Fast corrections
6 Integrity information
7 Fast correction degradation factor

192
 The airborne GNSS/GPS receiver applies SBAS range
correction data to the GNSS pseudo range data and
calculates a corrected position.

In order to fly an SBAS approach the pilots selects the

approach via the FMS CDU. The nominal geometry of the
approach to be flown is stored in the FMS navigation
database. The Final Approach Segment (FAS) Data Block
for the selected approach contains the coordinate of the
threshold, the flight path alignment point, glide path angle
and threshold crossing height.

Approach Definition by FAS Data Block

Based on the SBAS corrected position the FMS calculates

Example: LPV Approach Braunschweig EDVE
Avionic for SBAS Precision Approach
The main elements of the aircraft navigation equipment
for flying SBAS LPV approaches consist of:
SBAS capable GNSS receiver
SBAS LPV capable FMS
Navigation Database
(with Final Approach Segment (FAS) Data
Block)
ILS-lookalike lateral and vertical deviations that guide the
aircraft on the precision approach. The correctness of the
FAS data block is essential, since all guidance is
calculated according this data. A CRC checksum allows
detection of corrupted FAS Data.
Typical errors in a FAS data block are:
Incorrect LTP height or coordinates:
Typically caused by a wrong coordinate datum
e.g.: NAD-83 instead of WGS-84 or during
conversion between different datums.
Flight path is not aligned with the runway
Incorrect coordinates of FAF or FPAP or by
mixing up these two points.

Integrity on SBAS approach

The availability of integrity information is essential for

applications in aviation in order to minimize the risk of
Hazardous Misleading Information (HMI). The
requirements for integrity and alert limits for particular
operations are laid down in ICAO SARPs:
GNSS/GPS Flight Navigation Database
receiver Management (FAS Data Block)
System
(FMS)

193
 Continuity of primary and secondary SBAS
satellite (Signal to Noise)

Vertical Alert
Limit (VAL)
requirement

Alert Limit
Horizontal
Integrity
Operation

Integrity
(HPL/VPL)

(HAL)
Accuracy
(DOP, Positioning Error)
NPA 1x10-7/h 0,3 NM N/A
Navigation Database
LPV 1-2x10-7/Appr. 40 m 50 m (FAS Data Block)
DH 250ft (per 150 seconds)
Procedures Design
LPV 1-2x10 / Appr.-7
40 m 35 m (Flyability, Obstacle Clearance)
DH < 250ft (per 150 seconds) In the following the implementation of SBAS capability
200ft DH to a flight inspection aircraft and to its flight inspection
system is described.
High Level Integrity Requirements for SBAS
Approaches Flight Inspection Aircraft
The integrity limits for precision approaches are specified Inspection of an SBAS approach procedure with vertical
per approach (per 150 seconds). guidance (LPV) requires an appropriately equipped flight
inspection aircraft. Alternatively, if no LPV capability can
Definition of Integrity Parameters:
be installed to the aircraft avionic the AFIS can provide
HPL/VPL (Horizontal / Vertical Protection Limit): is a the required guidance to fly the LPV approach. AFIS
horizontal/vertical distance around the indicated position guidance can also be used with flight director and
that assesses the risk to be 10-7 for every 150 seconds that autopilot.
true position is outside of that distance. The geometry
described by HPL and VPL is a cylinder around the Note:
indicated position. AFIS guidance can be used to fly the aircraft according to
the desired flight path during flight validation, if the
HAL/VAL (Horizontal / Vertical Alert Limit) is the weather conditions permit flight validation (typical
allowable limits for HPL/VPL depending on the phase of daylight VMC). It does not enable the aircraft to fly
flight. SBAS LPV approaches for navigation in IMC down to
the published minima!
The horizontal and vertical alert limits (HAL/VAL) are
directly specified for the particular operation. During the AFIS Equipment for SBAS Checks
approach the airborne receiver calculates actual Protection
Level (HPL/VPL) based on the actual satellite The implementation of SBAS capability to the AFIS
constellation (DOP), and the remaining differential range followed a simple rule:
error and other error characteristics for residual
troposphere delay and receiver errors. If the computed Any SBAS parameter that may provide an indication of
xPL exceeds the xAL (HPL > HAL or VPL > VAL) for a marginal performance, interference, loss of integrity or
particular operation SBAS integrity is not adequate other anomalies shall be recorded by the AFIS to allow
forcing the navigation system to flag the guidance output. further analysis:

SBAS AS SYSTEM UNDER FLIGHT INSPECTION GNSS Time

For the primary and secondary SBAS satellite(s):
Although EGNOS and WAAS themselves are certified
for Safety-Of-Life applications the GNSS/SBAS system o SBAS PRN being tracked
and the procedures FAS data block needs to be flight
o Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
checked during commissioning of SBAS based
Instrument Procedures. The aim is to check: o Elevation

Continuity of GNSS (Signal to Noise) o Azimuth

SBAS Integrity Alerts
(e.g. occurrence of Message Type 6)

194
 Number of GNSS PRN being tracked
For each individual GNSS satellites:
o GNSS PRN being tracked
o Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
o Elevation
o Azimuth
Position Dilution of Precisions (PDOP)
Horizontal Dilution of Precision (HDOP)
Vertical Protection Level (VPL)
Horizontal Protection Level (HPL)
Vertical Dilution of Precision (VDOP)
For each segment, the maximum and minimum
altitude, ground speed, climb rate, and climb The following data is provided by the different SBAS
gradient receiver:
The flight track flown referenced to the desired Sensor Data
track of the approach procedure, including
procedure fixes AD-GNSS GNSS satellite data (Az, Elev, S/N)
GNSS data (DOP etc.)
To provide the above data the AFIS must be interfaced SBAS satellite data (Az, Elev, S/N)
with suitable SBAS receiver(s) to acquire the relevant SBAS messages (MT 6 etc.)
data. SBAS corrected position
HPL/VPL
Interface Considerations: GPS-4000S GNSS satellite data (Az, Elev, S/N)
It is desirable to interface with the aircraft SBAS receiver GNSS data (DOP)
(TSO C145a) as source of data, however many TSO SBAS corrected position
SBAS receiver do not provide detailed analysis of SBAS HPL/VPL
Messages or detailed access to individual satellite GNLU-930 GNSS satellite data (Az, Elev, S/N)
parameters like Signal to Noise ratio. The AFIS integrated GNSS data (DOP)
GNSS/SBAS receiver (mainly installed as position SBAS satellite data (Az, Elev, S/N)
reference sensor) typically provides all this data and fills SBAS corrected position
this gap. Each SBAS Message received is provided by HPL/VPL
this receiver and can be recorded in fully length together FMS-3000 Lateral deviation
with other flight inspection data. In case of anomalies all Vertical deviation
data required for its analysis can be found in one common Flight Plan (waypoints)
recording.

It has been observed that different receivers sometimes
differ in their behavior during short period anomalies. It
could happen that some anomalies might not be shown by
one of the receivers. Sometimes the one receiver is more
sensitive sometimes the other(s). For that reason every
available SBAS receiver is interfaced by AFIS.
For interference checks the use of a digital Spectrum
Analyzer is required. A typical Spectrum analyzer
installed as part of the AFIS is the Rohde&Schwarz
FSV4:

The AFIS interfaces the following SBAS receivers:

195
 Spectrum Analyzer R&S FSV4 )

User configurable measurement programs are available to

remote control the spectrum analyzer to perform GNSS
measurements. Since the source of interference to Procedure Track in Threshold Coordinates
GNSS/SBAS is likely based on ground, the use of a
The LTP is at the origin of this coordinate system, the x-
GNSS antenna installed on the lower fuselage of the flight
axis represents the desired approach path aligned with the
inspection aircraft is required (instead of a normally
runway. Such plot simplifies to check runway alignment,
installed GNSS antenna on top of the fuselage).
since any waypoint that appears not the x-axis is
Automatic antenna switching according to the selected
obviously not aligned with the runway.
measurement program is provided by the antenna
switching unit: Whenever a procedure fix is passed a vertical event line is
displayed, labeled with the waypoint identifier. By this
each leg switching along the procedure is marked.

This graphic provides a good overview about the resulting

flight track in relation to the nominal procedure. But how
can other data like GNSS Signal to Noise be plotted in a
procedure oriented way? During conventional flight
inspection typical graphics use the distance to the facility
or the azimuth angle as x-axis parameter, but this doesnt
make sense for flight procedure oriented analysis.
Especially if the procedure is complex the proper
selection of the x-axis is essential.

In the initial implementation data was simply plotted

Integrated Antenna Switching Unit AD-ARBO versus time. The event marking with the waypoints allows
correlation with the procedure legs:
The measured spectrum data is recorded time
synchronized with all other flight inspection data. This
allows spectrum analysis during replay of flight
inspection data.

AFIS Software Functions

In order to enable and support the SBAS flight checks the

following features have been implemented to the AFIS
software:

For documentation of the horizontal flight track the AFIS

displays the nominal procedure transformed in a local
threshold coordinate system:

196

Signal to Noise Evaluation vs. Times
The disadvantages of using time as x-axis are:
Every time the measurement is repeated the x-
axis is different
ground speed variation does not allow precise
location of certain points of interest related to the
procedure
Satellite Sky Plot
The position of each GNSS satellite as well as its
movement (trace) during the flight inspection procedure is
displayed. The display also includes the geostationary
primary and secondary SBAS satellite.
The SBAS augmentation status
(healthy/unhealthy/unmonitored) of each GNSS satellite
is displayed in a tabular format:

For solving this dilemma a new parameter Along Track

Distance was defined. This parameter counts the distance
from the first waypoint of the procedure under inspection
along the procedure track to the last waypoint of the
procedure. By this new parameter each point on the
procedure can be precisely addressed. The following
example shows GNSS Signal to Noise versus Along
Track Distance:

Satellite Augmentation Status

The following display allows direct comparison between

Single GNSS and SBAS solution:

Signal to Noise Evaluation vs. Along Track Distance

By the event marking of passed waypoints the correlation

of the plot with each procedure leg becomes obvious.
Comparison GNSS/SBAS Solution
The satellite constellation and the satellite trace are also
visualized by the AFIS in a sky-plot format:

197
For SBAS continuity and coverage checks the AFIS
provides detailed analysis of the primary and secondary
SBAS satellite in alphanumeric and graphical format:

SBAS Continuity/Coverage SBAS Result Page

Any violation of HPL/VPL against HAL/VAL becomes The result page also indicates the following data for each
obvious in the following graphic: leg of the procedure:

Distance to next waypoint

True Course to next waypoint
Vertical Path angle

This data allows easy verification of waypoint correctness

by comparison to the published procedure chart.

Since all navigation during an SBAS LPV approach is

done with reference to the FAS data block the check of its
correctness is imperative.

SBAS Protection Limits The AFIS allows direct import of FAS data block in
electronic format (ARINC424) to avoid errors by manual
The overall evaluation for the SBAS based procedure is database preparation.
summarized in the Result Page:
The contained CRC checksum of the FAS data block is
verified by AFIS, a CRC checksum error is highlighted by
immediate alert.

A first verification of the imported FAS data block is

possible through Google-Earth visualization prior to
flight:

198
 FAS Visualization in Goolge Earth

Errors in the FAS data block that occurred by incorrect or

mixed coordinates of Final Approach Fix (FAF) and
Flight Path Alignment Point (FPAP) would result in a
wrong path that can be easily identified in Google Earth. AD-GNSS Multi GNSS/SBAS Receiver

Other typical error is incorrect height datum of LTP/FTP Features of the AD-GNSS receiver:
resulting in a forward or aft displacement of the intended
Multi GNSS capability
flight path. Such error can likely occur by mixing
(GPS, GLONASS, Galileo)
coordinates with different reference datum (e.g. NAD-83
with WGS-84) or during coordinate conversion. Such 120 channel
FAS data error will be detected during flight check since
the Threshold Crossing Height determined in flight does SBAS capable
not match the TCH in the FAS data block. (WAAS, EGNOS, MSAS, GAGAN )
10 Hz SBAS position output
SBAS AS FLIGHT INSPECTION
REFERENCE POSITION SENSOR Ruggedized for airborne application

Due to the good experience during inspection of SBAS
the idea of using SBAS as Position Reference sensor for
flight inspection came up.
The SBAS receiver for that purpose is the Standard Flight
Inspection GNSS receiver that is an integral part of each
AFIS:
Interfaces: Ethernet, RS232, USB
No additional hardware in AFIS for using SBAS as
Position Reference is required.
The accuracies of the SBAS open position service are
permanently monitored by the Ranging and Integrity
Monitoring Station (RIMS):

SBAS Accuracy in Europe [2]

199
The Horizontal and Vertical Position (95%) Errors
(HPE/VPE) in Berlin were measured over a 6 month
period in the year 2012:

HPE: 0.8 m
VPE: 1.2m

The user directly gains from the benefits of SBAS as

Position Reference:

Improved accuracy during En-route Navaid and

RADAR inspection without PDGPS Ground
Reference Station
Wide Area Coverage
No costs for Service Subscription (Open Service)
Reliable position reference data due to high level
of integrity
Proven availability and accuracy within
Coverage Area

For that reason SBAS Position Reference became a

standard feature for all new AD-AFIS!

All existing AD-AFIS can easily be upgraded.

CONCLUSIONS

a) Many SBAS LPV approaches are in service today

b) The AFIS features described in this paper provide

detailed SBAS LPV inspection of all involved
elements

c) SBAS is an ideal, free of charge Reference Position

Sensor for improved accuracy during En-route and
RADAR flight inspection.

REFERENCES

[1] User Guide for EGNOS Application Developers, ED.

1.1, 07/30/2009
[2] EGNOS Open Service Definition Document, Ref :
EGN SDD OS, V2.0
[3] RTCA, Minimum Operational Performance
Standards for Global Positioning System/Wide Area
Augmentation System Airborne Equipment, RTCA-DO
229 D, 12/13/2006
[4] ICAO Annex 10, Vol. I Radionavigation Aids, Chap
3. 6th Ed. July 2006, Amdt 85

200
 A Flight Inspection Perspective on Satellite
Based Augmentation System Performance
Monitoring Carl Rieger, FAA

Carl J. Rieger
Avionics Engineer
Flight Inspection Services
Federal Aviation Administration
Oklahoma City, OK, United States
Fax: +1 405 954 4740
E-mail: carl.rieger@faa.gov

ABSTRACT WAAS OVERVIEW

The use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and
Satellite Based Augmentation Systems (SBAS) has
become increasingly prevalent within the Airspace
System. Is it the goal of a Flight Inspection Service (FIS)
to inspect the accuracy, availability, continuity, and
integrity of these GPS and SBAS signals?
For the Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) Wide
Area Augmentation System (WAAS), these metrics are
continuously monitored and reported. This paper presents
an overview of WAAS, the monitoring that is performed,
and the resources and reports that are available. In
addition, specific examples are provided that illustrate the
usefulness of WAAS in the application of flight
inspection activities.
Like GPS, WAAS contains three segments; a Ground
Segment, a Space Segment, and a User Segment. An
overview of each of these segments is provided.
WAAS Ground Segment
The Ground Segment consists of thirty-eight Wide-Area
Reference Stations (WRS), three WAAS Master Stations
(WMS), one pair of Ground Uplink Stations (GUS) per
WAAS geostationary (GEO) satellite, and two Operations
and Maintenance (O&M) Stations. The ground segment
also includes a network that enables communication
between the ground stations. Refer to Figure which
shows the distribution of the Ground Segment locations.

INTRODUCTION

This paper is not intended to be an authoritative reference

on the subject of Satellite Based Augmentation System or
Flight Inspection Activities. It is aimed at providing a
general knowledge of SBAS functionality and the data
and tools that are available that can aid in flight inspection
activities.

This paper is limited in presenting the FAAs GPS

WAAS augmentation system. However, many of the
same tools and techniques are applicable to other SBAS
systems, such as the European Geostationary Navigation
Overlay Service (EGNOS), Multi-functional Satellite
Augmentation System (MSAS), GPS and Geo-
Augmented Navigation (GAGAN), etc., that are O&M Location GUS Location WMS Location WRS Location
operational or as they become operational.

Figure 1. WAAS Ground Segment Locations

201
There are thirty-eight WRSs located throughout North
America including Alaska, Canada, the Contiguous
United States (CONUS), Mexico, Puerto Rico, and
Hawaii. A WRS contains three systems, referred to as
Wide-Area Reference Equipment (WRE). A WRE
includes separate antenna, reference clock, receiver, and
processor. Refer to Figure 2 which illustrates the
equipment located at each WRS. Once a second, each
WRE receives and forwards GPS and WAAS GEO
satellite data to each WAAS Master Station, independent
of the co-located WREs.
Each antenna location at a WRS has been precisely
surveyed and is updated on an annual basis as required.
Figure 2. WRS Equipment
There are three WMSs located at FAA Air Route Traffic
Control Centers (ARTCC) in geographically diverse
locations; Washington D.C., Atlanta GA, and Palmdale
CA. Each WMS receives data from every WRE located
at one of the thirty-eight WRS sites. A WMS is
comprised of two Correction Processors, which calculate
clock and ephemeris corrections, and Safety Processors
which calculate ionospheric corrections and integrity data,
which includes error bounds for clock, ephemeris, and
ionospheric corrections. The resulting corrections and
integrity data are sent from the WMS to the GUS.
A GUS is comprised of a Signal Generator Subsystem
(SGS) and a Radio Frequency Uplink (RFU). The SGS
202
receives the calculated corrections and integrity data from
the WMS and creates the WAAS correction message.
Refer to Table 3 which lists the WAAS Correction
Message Types. The WAAS correction message is
uplinked via a C-Band frequency from the SGS to the
GEO satellite by the RFU.
Each GEO satellite is served by two GUS sites. One GUS
serves as the primary uplink and transmits the WAAS
correction message to the GEO satellite. The second
GUS serves as a back-up in the case of a primary failure.
The backup is held in hot standby by transmitting into a
dummy load. This reduces the time required to bring the
backup GUS on-line if the primary GUS faults.
Table 3. WAAS Correction Message Types
Type Title
0 System under test. Do not use for safety
applications
1 PRN mask assignments
2-5 Fast clock corrections
6 Integrity information
7 Fast correction degradation
9 WAAS satellite navigation message
17 WAAS satellite almanac
18 Ionosphere Grid Point (IGP) mask
24 Fast and long term clock corrections
25 Long term clock corrections
26 Ionospheric delay corrections
27 WAAS service message
28 Clock-Ephemeris covariance matrix
WAAS is an automated system that does not require
considerable operator involvement. When periodic
operator interaction is required, it is performed at one of
two O&M locations. A graphical user interface is used by
the operator to perform controlling functions as well as
periodic and corrective maintenance activities. Refer to
Figure 3 which shows a typical graphical topology display
used by the operator. In addition to providing an operator
interface, both O&Ms continuously monitor and record
the status of WAAS.

Figure 3. O&M Graphical Topology Display
Space Segment
The WAAS space segment is comprised of the GEO
satellites. WAAS currently utilizes three GEO satellites
with Pseudo-Random Noise (PRN) codes 133, 135, and
138. Refer to Figure 4 which shows the respective
footprints for the WAAS GEO satellites with five degree
elevation angles.
1. PRN 133 AMR/Inmarsat 4F3, located at 98 W
2. PRN 135 CRW/Galaxy 15, located at 133 W
3. PRN 138 CRE/Anik F1R, located at 107.3 W
Since the WAAS corrections message is transmitted by
the GEO as a GPS-like L1 signal, the GEO may be used
by the users receiver as an additional satellite ranging
source. This increases the number of satellites in view
that may be used by a receiver when computing a position
solution within the footprint of the GEO satellite.
Figure 4. WAAS GEO Footprints
203
User Segment
The User Segment of WAAS is any receiver that is
compliant with FAA Technical Standard Order (TSO)
C145/146. The receiver obtains the WAAS correction
messages from a WAAS GEO satellite. The receiver
applies the correction information to its position solution.
In addition, the integrity data is used by the receiver to
compute a Horizontal Protection Level (HPL) and a
Vertical Protection Level (VPL). These protection levels
are compared to the Horizontal Alert Limit (HAL) and the
Vertical Alert Limit (VAL) and alerts if the limit is
exceeded. The HAL and VAL limits vary depending on
the flight operation. Refer to Table 4 which lists the HAL
and VAL corresponding with the flight operation.
Table 4. Alert Limits for Flight Operation
Flight Operation HAL VAL
En Route 2 nmi N/A
Terminal 1 nmi N/A
LNAV 556 m N/A
LNAV/VNAV 556 m 50 m
LPV 40 m 50 m
LPV200 40 m 35 m
WAAS PERFORMANCE
GPS WAAS is continuously monitored and reports are
available on the performance. The system level
performance requirements are expressed in terms of
accuracy, integrity, continuity, and availability. The
following will provide the definition, as defined by the
WAAS Performance Standard, of each of these
performance requirements and some examples of reports
that are available.
Accuracy
From the WAAS Performance Standard, Accuracy is
defined to be the statistical difference between the
estimate or measurement of a quantity and the true value
of that quantity. For the purposes of this WAAS
Performance Standard, accuracy is expressed as either as
95th percentile (95%) differences or as rms differences.
Accuracy is further divided into Horizontal Accuracy and
Vertical Accuracy requirements, depending on the flight
operation. Refer to Table 5 which lists the accuracy
requirements corresponding with the flight operation.
These accuracies are expressed in terms of 95%
differences. In the case of Horizontal Accuracy for LPV
flight operations, the horizontal accuracy must be less The WAAS Test Team at the William J. Hughes
than or equal to 16 m 95% or the time. Technical Center provides a WAAS Performance
Analysis Report (PAN) on a quarterly basis. In this
Table 5. Horizontal and Vertical Accuracy Requirements report, the accuracy is reported for the WAAS reference
stations and the National Satellite Test Bed (NSTB)
Flight Operation Horizontal Vertical network for that quarter. The current PAN report, in
Accuracy (95%) Accuracy (95%) addition to previous quarterly reports, is available from
the www.nstb.tc.faa.gov website. The executive
En Route 0.4 nmi N/A summary provides a table for a quick reference to the
Terminal 0.4 nmi N/A CONUS/Alaska Site maximum/minimum accuracies for
95% horizontal and 95% vertical. The executive
LNAV 220 m N/A summary table for report #47 is duplicated in Table 6.
LNAV/VNAV 220 m 20m Additional accuracy information, plots, and real time data
for all WAAS reference and NSTB network locations are
LPV 16 m 20 m available in section 2 of the WAAS PAN Report.
LPV200 16 m 4m

Table 6. WAAS PAN Report #47 Executive Summary Accuracy and Availability

Parameter CONUS CONUS Alaska Alaska

Site/Maximum Site/Minimum Site/Maximum Site/Minimum
95% Horizontal Washington D.C. Arcata Juneau Anchorage
Accuracy 1.341 meters 0.582 meters 0.864 meters 0.666 meters
(HPL <= 40 meters)
95% Vertical Accuracy Houston Salt Lake City Barrow Bethel
(VPL <= 50 meters) 1.627 meters 0.888 meters 1.739 meters 0.945 meters
LP Multiple Sites Multiple Sites Bethel Barrow
Availability 100% 100% 100% 99.98%
(HPL <= 40 meters)
LPV Multiple Sites Washington D.C Bethel Barrow
Availability 100% 99.99% 99.99% 99.47%
(HPL <= 40 meters &
VPL <= 50 meters)
LPV 200 Multiple Sites Arcata Anchorage Cold Bay
Availability 100% 98.66% 99.91% 94.38%
(HPL <= 40 meters &
VPL < =35 meters)
99% HPL Oakland Memphis Cold Bay Fairbanks
17.177 meters 11.314 meters 29.399 meters 14.198 meters
99% VPL Arcata Memphis Cold Bay Anchorage
34.311 meters 19.413 meters 37.542 meters 23.875 meters

Availability zones 1 through 4. These zones are depicted in Figure 9

As defined in the WAAS Performance Standard,
Availability is defined as the percentage of time that a
particular WAAS service is available to the WAAS user.
Like accuracy, availability is dependent upon the flight
operation. Availability is further divided into zone
coverages. The zones are defined as; Zone 1 CONUS,
Zone 2 Alaska, Zone 3 Hawaii, Zone 4 Caribbean
Islands, and Zone 5 United States territory excluding
through Figure 13 located in Appendix 1. The
requirements for each of these zones, depending upon the
flight operation, are listed in Table 7. These requirements
are expressed in the percent of time available across a
percentage of the coverage area.
WAAS is determined to be available at a particular point
in time, if the HPL and VPL are within the HAL and
VAL for a particular flight operation. For example, for
Zone 2 LPV availability, the HPL must be <= 40 meters

204
and the VPL <= 50 meters for 95% of the time across
75% of the Zone 2 coverage area.
The WAAS PAN Report availability information is
reported in number of ways. One measure of availability
is reported as the Protection Limit value in meters, which
contains 99% of the Protection Limit values over a given
period. This is shown as the 99% HPL/VPL and can be
referenced in Table 6 Executive Summary table from
WAAS PAN Report #47.
Table 7. Availability Requirements
Section 3 of the WAAS PAN Report also provides
additional information on the number of LP, LPV, and
LPV 200 outages, outage rates, and percent available for
each WAAS reference and NSTB network locations. The
specifics on the calculation of these results are provided
within the report.
Historical and real-time data, plots, and videos are
available on the www.nstb.tc.faa.gov website to include
RNP, LNAV/VNAV, LP, LPV, and LPV 200 service
levels.

Availability (Zone Coverage)

Flight Operation Zone 1 Zone 2 Zone 3 Zone 4 Zone 5
En Route 0.99999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.99999
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Terminal 0.99999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
LNAV 0.99999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
LNAV/ 0.99 0.95 N/A N/A N/A
VNAV (100%) (75%)
LPV 0.99 0.95 N/A N/A N/A
(80-100%) (75%)
LPV200 0.99 N/A N/A N/A N/A
(40-60%)

Continuity

Continuity is defined in the WAAS Performance Standard Table 8. Continuity Requirements

as to be the probability of time that a particular
WAAS service will continue to be available over an hour Flight Operation Zone 1 Continuity
time interval for en route through LNAV operations, over
a 15 second interval for LNAV/VNAV and LPV En Route 1 10-5 per hour
operations, given that it was available at the beginning of Terminal 1 10-5 per hour
the interval and that an outage was not announced in a
prior notice to airmen (NOTAM). LNAV 1 10-5 per hour
LNAV/VNAV 1 5.5 x 10-5 per 15 seconds
The continuity requirement for WAAS is only applicable
to Zone 1 and varies by the flight operation. Refer to LPV 1 8 x 10-6 per 15 seconds
Table 8 which shows the continuity requirements
corresponding with the flight operation. These LPV200 1 8 x 10-6 per 15 seconds
requirements are expressed in the probability that a loss of
continuity will occur within a window of time. For continuity and proper user operation, WAAS
messages must be broadcast and received within a
The WAAS Performance Standard explicitly states the specific time frame. Delay of broadcasting WAAS
Continuity is not tracked. However, monitoring of Late messages can be caused by GEO outages, GUS
Messages are provided within the WAAS PAN Report. switchovers (change from primary to backup GUS), and
Late messages is a possible cause for a loss of continuity. broadcast alerts. Reports on message rates are provided
on a per GEO basis. Table 9 provides an example of Fast
Correction and Degradation Message Rates for CRW
(PRN 135) included in WAAS PAN Report #47.

205
 Table 9. Fast Correction and Degradation Message Rates In order to better understand the integrity monitoring that
is performed within WAAS, a further discussion of the
Message On Time Late Max Late Alarm Limits (HAL/VAL), Protection Levels
Type Length (HPL/VPL), and Position Error (HPE/VPE) and how
(seconds) these interrelate is provided. The WAAS Performance
1 109228 6 131 Standard provides an excellent illustration which is
2 1325724 56 19 reproduced in Figure 5. The figure illustrates four
3 1324376 305 19 important features: 1. The aircrafts calculated position
4 1324599 274 18 which is shown at the center of the cylinders. 2. The
7 100989 30 137 protection level cylinder (shaded) which is centered on
9 93108 0 0 the aircrafts calculated position. The size of this cylinder
10 100947 39 137 is based on the HPL and VPL which are calculated from
the WAAS integrity data. 3. The alert limit cylinder
Integrity (clear) which is also centered on the aircrafts calculated
position. The size of this cylinder is determined by the
The WAAS Performance Standard defines Integrity as, flight operation (LPV 200, LPV, LP, etc.). 4. The
Integrity is a measure of the trust which can be placed in aircrafts true position. The difference between the
the correctness of the information supplied by the total aircrafts true position and the calculated position is
system. Integrity includes the ability of the WAAS Signal comprised of a Horizontal Position Error (HPE) and a
In Space (SIS) to provide timely alerts (alarms and Vertical Position Error (VPE).
warnings) to receivers when the WAAS service HPL or
VPL no longer bound the horizontal position error (HPE) As discussed earlier, WAAS is considered to be available
or vertical position error (VPE) or a GPS satellite should when the protection level cylinder (shaded) is contained
not be used as part of the WAAS augmentation solution. within the alert limit cylinder (clear). In other words,
HPL <= HAL and VPL <= VAL.

Figure 5. Integrity Protection Cylinder

For integrity, the magnitude of the position error is
considered against the size of the protection level
cylinder. Specifically, the protection level cylinder must
encompass the aircrafts true position, HPE <= HPL and
VPE <= VPL. If the aircrafts true position is outside of
the protection level cylinder, and the time that it remains
outside the cylinder exceeds the Time To Alarm (TTA)
requirement, there exists a condition termed Hazardously
Misleading Information (HMI).
Therefore there are two performance requirements for
WAAS associated with integrity, TTA and HMI. These
requirements are listed in Table 10 corresponding with the
flight operation.
In the WAAS PAN report, HMI is reported in terms of a
safety index for each of the WAAS reference and NSTB
network locations. The safety index is the ratio of the
protection limit to the maximum observed error. This
index is calculated for both horizontal and vertical. If the

206
safety index is greater than one, the protection limit
cylinder encompasses the true position. If the safety
index is less than one, the true position is outside the
protection cylinder. However, this condition must persist
for greater than the TTA, 6.2 s, to be deemed an HMI
event.
Table 10. TTA and HMI Performance Requirements
Flight Operation TTA Probability of
HMI
En Route 15 s 10-7 per hour
Terminal 15 s 10-7 per hour
LNAV 10 s 10-7 per hour
LNAV/VNAV 10 s 2 x 10-7 per
approach
LPV 6.2 s 2 x 10-7 per
approach
(150 s)
LPV200 6.2 s 2 x 10-7 per
approach
(150 s)
For the WAAS PAN Report #47, the lowest safety index
reported was 3.12 for the horizontal safety index at
Fairbanks, AK. However, no HMI event occurred for this
site or any other. The report states that since WAAS was
made available to the public in August 2000, there has not
been an HMI event.
FLIGHT INSPECTION AND WAAS
Presented previously was an overview of WAAS and the
WAAS Performance in terms of accuracy, availability,
continuity, and integrity. In addition, the metrics that are
monitored and reported to measure WAAS performance
were given. In terms of flight inspection activities, this
information has little use. So what information or tools
are available that would aid flight inspection activities?
Consider the issue of trying to perform a flight inspection
for a GPS WAAS procedure, and the flight inspection
receiver is incapable of achieving the required protection
levels (HPL and/or VPL) for the flight operation. This is
not an indication of a problem with the GPS WAAS
procedure, but rather an indication of a problem with the
flight inspection equipment or with GPS WAAS.
Considering the flight inspection issue presented, the
problem can be divided into one of four categories;
Intentional fault with advanced notice, Intentional fault
with no advanced notice, Unintentional fault with
advanced notice, or Unintentional fault with no advanced
notice. Refer to Table 11 which presents a fault matrix
207
that categorizes some possible problems into each of these
four categories.
Table 11. Fault Matrix
Advanced Notice No Advanced
Notice
Intentional WAAS issues RFI / Jamming
Fault GPS issues
Unintentional Ionospheric Receiver Fault
Fault Activity RFI
Ionospheric
Activity
Unintentional Fault No Advanced Notice
In this particular category, three possible problems are
listed, Receiver Fault, Radio Frequency Interference
(RFI), and Ionospheric Activity.
If an additional TSO-C145/146 receiver(s) is installed on
the aircraft, and is capable of achieving the required HPL
and VPL for the flight operation, this could indicate that
the flight inspection receiver could have a fault. Another
issue may be not allowing sufficient time for the receiver
to acquire, calculate, and apply the WAAS augmentation.
If RFI is present, it is likely that all TSO-C145/146
receivers on the aircraft would not be capable of
achieving required protection limits for the flight
operation. A quick check of the spectrum centered on the
L1 1575.42 MHz may prove helpful. Since GPS signal
are spread spectrum Code Division Multiple Access
(CDMA) signals, the signals are essentially buried in the
noise floor and will not be discernable within the
spectrum. However, a strong interfering signal may be
present and identifiable.
Ionospheric activity that affects WAAS availability may
occur without advanced notice. If it is believed to be a
WAAS availability problem that prevented a successful
flight inspection, a review of the WAAS availability can
be accomplished. The NSTB website,
www.nstb.tc.faa.gov, provides real-time and historical
data and plots, as well as availability videos for the
previous 24 hour period.
Figure 6 shows an example of a real-time plot for WAAS
LPV Vertical Navigation Service. The color scale
represents the VPL across the coverage areas. Contour
lines are included which indicate the level of service
available. For example, the yellow contour line signifies
a VPL of 35 meters. Any point located within this
contour signifies a VPL < 35 meters, LPV 200 service
available. Outside of the yellow contour line signifies a
VPL > 35 meters, LPV 200 service not available.
Additional contour lines for LPV and LNAV/VNAV are
also included.
Figure 6. WAAS LPV Vertical Navigation Service
This plot is also available in 24 hour video. If the flight
inspector notes that a receiver is incapable of achieving
the required protection levels for a flight inspection, this
video may be reviewed to determine if the level of service
was unavailable at the time of, and the location of, the
inspection.
In addition to the real-time plots, a 24 hour coverage plot
is also available for different levels of service. Figure 7
shows an example of a RNP 0.3 (HPL <= 556 meters,
VPL = N/A) coverage plot. In this plot, the coverage area
(Zone 5) is outlined and the color scale represents the
service level percent available for the previous day.
Similar plots are available for LPV 200, LPV, LP, and
RNP 0.1 service levels.
208
Figure 7. RNP 0.3 Coverage Contours
Unintentional Fault Advanced Notice
The ionization level in the ionosphere depends primarily
on the sun and its solar activity. Since the ionosphere can
affect the availability of WAAS, advanced notice of solar
flares or knowledge of the sunspot cycle may provide an
indication for the availability of the WAAS augmentation.
One source of information regarding solar activity is
http://spaceweather.com/.
Intentional Fault No Advanced Notice
A common concern regarding WAAS reference stations
as well as GBAS installations, has been the use of GPS
jamming devices. While these devices are illegal to
market, sell, or use in the United States, incidents still
have occurred. These have primarily been used by
individuals who operate a commercial vehicle equipped
with a GPS fleet tracking device. The primary intent of
these individuals is tracking prevention of their
movements, not to jam WAAS users or reference stations.
Since the output power of these devices is not high, the
area around the device that prevents GPS WAAS
reception will be quite isolated. Therefore, movement
away from the jamming device and allowing the receiver
to reacquire GPS and the WAAS augmentation will
restore the receivers operation.
Intentional Fault Advanced Notice NOTICE ADVISORY TO NAVSTAR USERS (NANU) 2014018
SUBJ: SVN64 (PRN30) LAUNCH JDAY 052
1. NANU TYPE: LAUNCH
This category contains issues for GPS and/or WAAS that NANU NUMBER: 2014018
are known or planned for in the future. These planned NANU DTG: 210207Z FEB 2014
service interruptions may be caused by testing, training SVN: 64
activities, or military exercises. Refer to Figure 8 which PRN: 30
LAUNCH JDAY: 052
shows planned military GPS testing that could affect GPS LAUNCH TIME ZULU: 0159
WAAS availability.
2. GPS SATELLITE SVN64 (PRN30) WAS LAUNCHED ON JDAY
052.
A USABINIT NANU WILL BE SENT WHEN THE SATELLITE IS
SET ACTIVE TO SERVICE.

3. POC: CIVILIAN - NAVCEN AT 703-313-5900,

HTTP://WWW.NAVCEN.USCG.GOV
MILITARY - GPS OPERATIONS CENTER AT
HTTPS://GPS.AFSPC.AF.MIL/GPSOC, DSN 560-2541,
COMM 719-567-2541,GPSOPERATIONSCENTER@US.AF.MIL ,
HTTPS://GPS.AFSPC.AF.MIL/GPSOC/GPS
MILITARY ALTERNATE - JOINT SPACE OPERATIONS CENTER,
DSN 276-3514. COMM 805-606-3514.
JSPOCCOMBATOPS@VANDENBERG.AF.MIL

Figure 8. GPS Testing

Notification for these types of issues is available through
Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) or Notice Advisory to
NAVSTAR Users (NANU). These notices may be
checked prior to a flight inspection to determine the likely
interference with the flight inspection. In addition, these
should be checked after
CONCLUSION
The FAA employs an extensive monitoring network to
measure the performance of WAAS in terms of Accuracy,
Availability, and Integrity. The data and analyses are
readily available and can be a useful tool in support of
flight inspection activities.

NOTAMs are available through https://pilot.nas.faa.gov. RESOURCES

An example NOTAM for the Albuquerque Air Route
WAAS Resources
Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) ZAB is provided.
William J. Hughes Technical Center WAAS Test Team
http://www.nstb.tc.faa.gov/
ZAB ALBUQUERQUE (ARTCC),NM.

!GPS 04/149 ZAB NAV GPS (INCLUDING WAAS, GBAS, AND EGNOS Resources
ADS-B) MAY NOT BE AVAILABLE WITHIN A 483NM RADIUS http://www.egnos-pro.esa.int/index.html
CENTERED AT 401840N1133428W (BVL 147026) FL400-UNL
Indian Space Research Organisation
DECREASING IN AREA WITH A DECREASE IN ALTITUDE
www.isro.org
DEFINED AS: 429NM RADIUS AT FL250, 348NM RADIUS AT
10000FT, 355NM RADIUS AT 4000FT AGL, 335 NM RADIUS AT Notice to Airmen (NOTAM)
50 FT AGL. 1405031500-1405031730 https://pilotweb.nas.faa.gov/PilotWeb/

Notice Advisory to NAVSTAR Users (NANU)

NANUs are normally issued three day prior to a change in http://www.navcen.uscg.gov/?Do=constellationstatus
the operation of a GPS satellite and are available through
GPS Operations Center
www.navcen.gov, GPS Constellation Status. An example
https://gps.afspc.af.mil/gpsoc/
NANU is provided. This site also provides the status for
the entire GPS constellation including the plane, slot, Solar Activity
Space Vehicle Number (SVN), PRN, Type, and Clock for http://spaceweather.com/
each satellite in the GPS constellation.
2014018 --------------------------
SVN64 (PRN30) LAUNCH JDAY 052

209
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Brad Snelling, Flight Inspection Operations, for his

assistance regarding flight inspection activities.

AJW-14B WAAS Engineering, for their assistance

regarding WAAS.

REFERENCES

[1] Federal Aviation Administration, October 2008,

Global Positioning System Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS) Performance Standard, First Edition,
http://www.gps.gov/technical/ps/2008-WAAS-
performance-standard.pdf

[2] Federal Aviation Administration/William J.

Hughes Technical Center, January 2014, Wide-Area
Augmentation System Performance Analysis Report,
Report 47, www.nstb.tc.faa.gov

[3] FAA/Technical Standard Order, September

2002, Airborne Navigation Sensors Using the Global
Positioning System (GPS) Augmented by the Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS)Airborne Navigation
Sensors Using the Global Positioning System (GPS)
Augmented by the Wide Area Augmentation System
(WAAS), TSO-C145a, www.airweb.faa.gov

[4] FAA/ Technical Standard Order, September

2002, Stand-Alone Airborne Navigation Equipment Using
the Global Positioning System (GPS) Augmented by the
Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), TSO-C146a,
www.airweb.faa.gov

[5] U.S. Department of Transportation/FAA, August

2001, Specification for the Wide Area Augmentation
System (WAAS), FAA-E-2892c Change 2,

[6] FAA, Interactive Electronic Technical Manual

for the Wide Area Augmentation System, TI 6882.1

210
 Appendix 1
WAAS Coverage Area

Figure 9. Zone 1 - CONUS Coverage Area

Figure 12. Zone 4 - Caribbean Islands Coverage

Figure 10. Zone 2 - Alaska Coverage Area

Figure 13. Zone 5 - US Territory Coverage Area

Figure 11. Zone 3 - Hawaii Coverage Area

211
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212
DME and GNSS L5/E5 Compatibility Prediction
and Measured Data Valeriu Vita n, Euroco ntrol & Gerhard Berz, Eurocontrol

Valeriu Vitan
Senior Navigation Infrastructure Specialist
EUROCONTROL
Brussels, Belgium
Phone: +32 272 4758
E-mail: valeriu.vitan@eurocontrol.int

Gerhard Berz
Focal Point Navigation Infrastructure
EUROCONTROL
Brussels, Belgium
Fax: +32 2729 3734
E-mail: gerhard.berz@eurocontrol.int

ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION

The planned modernization of the existing Satellite Regarding the compatibility between DME/TACAN and
Navigation Systems (GPS and GLONASS) and the the GNSS L5 signals, the ICAO GNSS Manual [1] states:
ongoing development of new constellations, GALILEO
(Europe) and BEIDOU (China) will bring more accurate 5.2.5 The additional GNSS signals in the band 1,164-
and robust positioning performance to current and future 1,215 MHz to be broadcast by second-generation core
air navigation applications. While in particular the use of satellites share the band with DME and Tactical Air
dual frequency GNSS signals brings significant benefits, Navigation system (TACAN). ITU rules require that
compatibility with current primary services such as DME DME/TACAN must be protected from interference.
needs to be ensured. Previous theoretical studies have Compatibility studies based on the current DME/TACAN
shown that if the pulse blanking technique is used by infrastructure concluded that the impact of interference
the receiver, the carrier to noise post-correlation on the processing of the new GNSS signals is tolerable.
degradation is within the GNSS link budget margin for The studies also concluded that a high density of
GPS and Galileo even over the European and US DME DME/TACAN facilities operating in or near the new
hotspots. This paper will present the results of a new GNSS band could result in interference with GNSS
theoretical study carried out for the Europe region that signals at high altitudes. States should assess whether an
takes into account the current network of DME stations increase of the DME/TACAN infrastructure is compatible
and terrain screening (not implemented in previous with expanded use of GNSS and if necessary reallocate
simulations). The simulation results will be compared to DME assignments away from GNSS frequencies.
real data measured in a dedicated flight test campaign
conducted by DLR. The paper then describes the issues While the potential to reallocate DME assignments away
involved in ensuring continued compatibility between from GNSS frequencies is quite easily stated as a
GNSS L5/E5/G3 7 and DME in the light of an evolving concept, the practical implementation and feasibility of
DME environment to support PBN.

of E5b, as well as G3 and potentially BeiDou B2 by aviation still

requires the resolution of antenna issues. Consequently, this work has
7
G3 stands for the GLONASS G3 band, extending from 1189 to 1214 focused on the range of 1164 to 1189 MHz supporting GPS L5 and
MHz, e.g., above the range of GPS L5 and Galileo E5a. The future use Galileo E5a.

213
that recommendation has not been tested. While changing
a DME frequency may not be that difficult, the potential
complexities of also changing the paired VOR
frequencies could lead to significant costs. Even if
avionics equipage with dual frequency GNSS receivers
has not yet begun, significant lead time would be needed
to develop associated frequency management processes if
a more proactive assignment practice would be needed to
better accommodate GNSS. Consequently, it is necessary
to verify if such frequency management is required, and if
so, study how this could be implemented. This study
aimed to verify that need and test the methods available to
do so in an evolving DME/DME environment to support
current and future PBN operations. This paper presents
the results of an initial theoretical assessment of the L5
carrier to noise degradation factor, taking into account the
current navaids infrastructure in Europe and the natural
screening (by terrain) of the radiated signals. A discussion
on the need to validate these simulations by flight tests
and the potential validation solution are included as well.
The simulation were performed using the theoretical
model of the RFI caused by DME/TACAN station in
GNSS L5 band that is described in various standards and
guidance materials. The new implementation of the model
was validated by comparing the outputs of the hotspot
analysis with the results of previous studies, using the
same input data (as presented in these reference
documents).
STANDARDS AND GUIDANCE MATERIALS
The issue of the radio frequency interference in L5/E5A
Band is assessed in detail in RTCA DO-292 [2]. This
document identifies all potential sources of interference,
describes theoretical models to estimate the impact on the
GPS receivers and also defines a mitigation technique at
the receiver level in order to minimize the impact. The
document also presents the results of the software
simulations aimed at estimating the interference hotspots
over US and Europe and evaluating the degradation of the
GNSS signals over these hotspots. The same issue is also
addressed in the following ITU documents:
- Report ITU-R M.2220 [3]
- Recommendation ITU-R M.2030 [4]
All these documents are consistent in what regards the
potential sources of interference, the mitigation technique
and the theoretical model of GNSS signal degradation.
These elements are shortly presented below:
Potential sources of interference
L-Band pulsed RFI sources (960-1215 MHz)
geometrically distributed within the radio line-of-sight
(RLoS):
214
- in-band ground DME/TACAN beacon
transponders;
- near-band airborne DME/TACAN interrogators
(on-board and nearby aircraft);
- out-of-band (OoB) ATC surveillance systems
(ground, on-board and nearby aircraft elements);
- CNI 8 (Communication, Navigation and
Identification) system networks (ground and
nearby airborne terminals).
Continuous wideband RFI from:
- intra- and inter-RNSS system satellite signal
cross-correlation;
- unwanted and unintentional wide- and narrow-
band RFI from ground-based sources.
Note that the present report will only analyse the
interference from the DME/TACAN beacon transponders,
the other potential sources are out of the scope of this
analysis, but illustrate the need for extra margin in the
link budget.
Mitigation Technique
The RF interference mitigation solution proposed for next
generation aviation GNSS receivers is called pulse
blanking: the receiver will employ rapid digital pulse
blanking as soon as the signal level exceeds the blanking
threshold the corresponding data and desired signal will
be lost during this limited time while still preserving
enough of the GNSS signal to maintain operations. Given
potential technological progress over the years, other
techniques could also be used but must achieve equivalent
performance in a high pulsed RFI environment.
Figure , (extract from [3]) shows how digital pulse
blanking might be implemented ahead of the signal
correlators in an RNSS receiver.
Theoretical model
The theoretical equation to compute the effective C/N0
for a pulse blanking receiver is:
(1 PDC B ) (1)
(C / N 0, EFF ) = (C / N 0 )
I
1 + 0,WB + RI
N0
where:
C: post-correlator (interference-free) RNSS
satellite carrier power (W);
8
Some administrations authorize a system that utilizes spread spectrum
techniques for terrestrial communication, navigation and identification
(CNI) to operate within the 960-1 215 MHz band. This CNI system,
which is utilized on surface and airborne platforms within a network, is a
frequency-hopping system that operates on 51 different carrier
frequencies (3 MHz increments) between 969 MHz and 1 206 MHz.
N0: receiver system thermal noise density NTACAN: total number of TACAN stations within
(W/Hz); RLoS
I0,WB: total wideband equivalent continuous RFI E{2PWeq}: above-blanker pulse width averaged over
power spectral density (PSD) (W/Hz) (in the total DME and TACAN received pulses.
case that other RNSS interference is 1 N
included, spectral separation coefficient RI =
N 0 BW
( P dc )
i i
(3)
(SSC) should be properly taken into i =1
account);
PDCB: (pulse duty cycle-blanker) is the net where:
aggregate duty cycle of all pulses strong N: total number of pulsed emitters that
enough to activate the blanker (unitless generate received pulses (i.e. pulses or
fraction); and pulse portions) below the blanker
RI: unitless post-correlator ratio of total aggregate threshold;
below-blanker average pulsed RFI power density Pi: peak received power (W) of the i-th
to receiver system thermal noise density N0. pulse emitter (referenced to the passive
receive antenna output) with peak level
PDCB and RI are computed using formulas (2) and (3): below the blanker threshold;
BW: pre-correlator IF bandwidth (for
PDC B , DME / TACAN = 1 e w
= 1 e
( 2700 N DME + 3600 N TACAN ) E {2 PWeq } spreading effect) (Hz); and
dci: duty cycle (unitless fraction) of the i-th
(2) below-blanker pulsed emitter exclusive of
where: pulse collisions.
NDME: total number of DME stations within RLoS

Figure 1. Block Diagram of a Typical Digital Pulse Blanking Receiver

To help streamline the necessary pulsed RFI impact
calculations, an additional term has been defined:
effective noise density ratio, N0,EFF, which combines the
pulsed RFI effects on thermal noise density, wideband
continuous RFI density, and signal loss. This term is
defined algebraically as:
(1 PDCB )
N 0, EFF = (C / N 0 )
I The RTCA and ITU documents mentioned in the previous
1 + 0,WB + RI
N0
Then, using the above formulas, the effective post-
correlation C/N0 degradation (equivalent to N0,EFF
degradation) is computed in logarithmic form as:
I 0,WB
Deg (C / N 0 )[ dB ] = 10 log(1 PDCB ) 10 log(1 +
N0
interference is disregarded (I0,WB = 0) and the final
formula for computing the carrier to noise degradation
becomes:
Deg (C / N 0 )[ dB ] = 10 log(1 PDCB ) 10 log(1 + RI ) (6)
PREVIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(4)
section ([4] and [5]) present also the results of the
software simulation aimed at estimating the L5 carrier to
noise degradation over US CONUS and over Europe.
Two different dedicated software tools were created for
this purpose:
- GREET GPS RFI Environment Evaluation Tool
developed by MITREs Center for Advanced Aviation
+ RI ) (5) Systems Development (CAASD)
- PULSAR PULSe Assessment Routine

For the purposes of the current study, in order to estimate The description of both tools is presented in [4]. Note that
only the impact of the pulsed interference generated by both tools simulate the pulsed environment in the L5
DME/TACAN stations, the wideband continuous

215
band. However, PULSAR also implements a full signal
processing simulation inside the receiver in the presence
of RFI while GREET calculations are based mainly on the
theoretical model.
This compatibility issue has been addressed in many
conferences and PhD thesis in the past. One of the most
comprehensive pieces of work was presented by Frederic
Bastide (et al.) at the ION Conference in 2004, which
compares the PULSAR results with the theoretical model
results [5].
All these simulations estimate the location of the
degradation hotspot in Europe for FL 400 at the
geographical coordinates: 50N/9E. The graphic results of
these simulations are extracted from [2] and presented
below in Figure 2 and Figure 3. Note that the GREET
map presents the overall degradation due to all RFI
sources while the PULSAR map takes into account only
the impact of DME/TACAN. The results related to the
degradation over the hotspot due only to DME/TACAN
are summarized in Table 1, to allow an easy comparison
with our results (blank cells indicate that the data is not
presented in the reference documents).
Figure 2. C/N0 degradation map (GREET)
216
Figure 3. C/N0 degradation map (PULSAR)
NEW ASSESSMENT
By analyzing the previous simulations, several issues are
identified:
- The full list(s) of Navaids that were used for these
simulations are not presented in any document
- Although there is an agreement on the estimated
location of the hotspot at 50N/9E, the optimum
blanking threshold identified is not the same for all
simulations (ranges between -117.1dBW and -
120dBW)
- The carrier to noise degradation estimation over the
hotspot ranges between -7dB and -8.1dB. The
largest discrepancy is noted for a blanking threshold
of -120dBW
- The studies are about 10 years old, while the DME
environment continues to evolve.
In order to clarify the above issues, several attempts were
made to contact the authors of these assessments.
Although some additional information was obtained, this
effort was not completely successful because it was not
possible to identify the Navaids database used for
simulations and find a solution for re-running the
simulations using the initial database or an updated
database. In this context it was concluded that an up to
date analysis of the L5/DME compatibility cannot be
done only based on the previous assessments. One reason
that leads to this conclusion is the recent clean-up of the
ICAO assignments database in L band, i.e. ICAO Table
COM3, on which occasion approx. 30% of the DME
frequency assignments were found to be not in
operational use and consequently, they were deleted. As
such it is expected that the initial simulations returned
conservative results. Taking into account the requirements
of the ICAO GNSS Manual [1], it is considered important
to have the possibility to estimate the L5 C/N0
degradation due to the current and future configurations
of the DME/TACAN network. To meet this need, a new
software application was created (using the LabVIEW From this table it can be observed that in terms of C/N0
program suite). Due to the limited amount of effort degradation, the new results are reasonably close to the
available within the project the main objectives of the previous results, notably to the previous theoretical
new application were to: evaluations presented in [5]. It is also noticed that for all
thresholds considered, the new results estimate a higher
- generate a preliminary analysis of the L5 C/N0
value for the PDCB. This can be explained by the slight
degradation over Europe considering the current
difference in the theoretical models considered in [2]
DME/TACAN infrastructure and taking into account
(implemented in the new application) and [5]. The
terrain shadowing
difference refers to the blanking technique: while in [2]
- assess the complexity of the theoretical model and the
the blanking applies to the envelope of the DME pulse,
potential solutions and issues related to the
[5] considers that a fast digital blanking can be applied at
implementation of the L5/DME compatibility analysis
the A/D sample level. Blanking the individual digital
in existing EUROCONTROL tools e.g. DEMETER
samples leads to a smaller blanking duration but at the
(Distance Measuring Equipment Tracer) [10] or
same time to an increase of the noise power density. Note
MANIF AFM (Advanced Frequency Manager) [11].
that for the purposes of this study it was decided to use
The new application uses only the theoretical model in the model described in [2] (RTCA DO-292).
line with the existing ITU recommendations, whereas a
Considering that the results obtained for the hotspot
Signal-in-Space replica is not generated and the receiver
simulation are reasonably close to the previous
signal processing chain is not modeled.
simulations results it was concluded that the new software
Before proceeding to the actual degradation assessment it application can be used to estimate the C/N0 degradation
was considered important to validate the implementation over Europe in the current ground infrastructure
of the theoretical model by comparing the results with configuration. For this purpose, first a database of the
those generated by the previous simulations. This was DME and TACAN stations currently in operation was
possible only for the hotspot (50N/9E) thanks to the prepared. This database contains only the stations using
availability of the list of received DME/TACAN signals channels between 70X and 126X for which the
on this location, produced by PULSAR. This list which transponder frequency is in or near L5 band (see the
was provided by courtesy of ENAC is also presented DME/TACAN frequency allocation plan in Figure 4 [3]
(with minor differences) in Table B-3 of the EUROCAE and the GNSS frequency bands allocation in Figure 5
GALILEO MOPS v 3.0 [6]. The results returned by the [12]). The database was obtained in the following steps:
LabVIEW application when using this list of signals are
- Export all assignments for 70X to 126X channel from
presented together with the previous simulation results in
SAFIRE database (Table COM 3 assignments)
Error! Reference source not found.1.
- Remove the assignments that are currently not
Table 1. Hotspot simulation results operational (using the information published in States
AIPs)
DO-292 [2] ION [5] New - Replace the coordinates exported from SAFIRE with
the coordinates published in AIP/EAD which are more
PULSAR GREET PULSAR Theory (Theory) accurate (also used by DEMETER tool)
-117.1 dBW - Insert the ground station elevation from DEMETER
PDCB 0.3 0.29 0.28 0.32 database
The above steps were performed in order to:
RI 3.6 3.4
- Optimize the quality of the input data and of the
Deg [dB] -8.1 -7.9 -7.8 -8.1 simulation results
-118.4 dBW - Allow comparison with real data recorded in Flight
PDCB 0.34 0.33 0.38 Inspection campaigns
- Allow using the coverage calculations performed by
RI 2.7 DEMETER, which take into account the terrain
Deg [dB] -7.5 -7.5 -7.7 screening
-120 dBW
PDCB 0.57 0.4 0.4 0.47
RI 1.18 1.8
Deg [dB] -7 -8 -7.4 -7.2

217

Figure 4. DME/TACAN mode and frequency plan
Figure 5. GNSS Frequency Bands Allocation
For the area simulations, the application computes two
main results for a grid of geographic locations:
- Visibility (number of stations in radio line of sight)
- C/N0 degradation [dB]
It is important to note that all previous simulations were
performed in a Flat Earth scenario, meaning that for
determining the ground station visibility only the Earth
curvature was taken into consideration (signal screening
by terrain was disregarded). For the new simulations it
was considered important to take a terrain model into
account, because the work was conducted with more of a
focus on frequency management rather than spectrum
compatibility only, e.g., before deciding on measures to
reallocate DME assignments (and associated
complications for VOR) to improve GNSS compatibility,
a clear need would need to be confirmed.. As such the
simulations were performed in two scenarios:
1. Flat Earth (no terrain) scenario
In this scenario only the Earth curvature is considered
in order to determine the ground stations visibility.
This scenario allows the comparison with the previous
simulations.
2. Radio Line of Sight scenario
This scenario uses a DTED 1 terrain model to
determine the visibility of each ground station, and is
expected to provide more accurate results by
218
excluding the sites for which the radiation towards the
analyzed location/altitude is screened by terrain.
In both scenarios an effective Earth Radius of 4/3 of the
real radius was used (k factor=4/3) to take into account
atmospheric refraction.
The C/N0 degradation is computed by formula (5), using
the following inputs and assumptions:
- Updated Navaids database as described above
- A constant PRF (Pulse Repetition Frequency) of 2700
ppps (pulse pairs per second) for all DMEs and 3600
ppps for all TACAN stations
- A Link Budget based on the standard DME and
TACAN ground stations antenna radiation patterns,
the airborne GPS antenna pattern ([2]) and the FSPL
(Free Space Path Loss) propagation loss. Note that
multipath and diffraction effects are not considered.
- Blanking Threshold at -118.4dBW
All simulations presented in this paper were performed
for an altitude of 40.000 feet AMSL (FL 400), which is
the same altitude as has been considered in the previous
assessments.
The large area simulations (all Europe) were performed in
increments of 1 degree of arc for both latitude and
longitude coordinates. For the hotspots identified in these
large scale simulations the increment was reduced to 0.1
degrees or arc in order to increase the accuracy. The
results are presented in a graphic format using a GIS
software (GlobalMapper) which interpolates the
incremented results and creates a smooth representation.
The same software was used to create contour levels for
both visibility and degradation maps.
Flat Earth Scenario
In this scenario the visibility hotspot is located around
49N/9.6E, where 76 stations are received at FL 400.
Figure 6 presents the C/N0 degradation map which shows
a large area over Central Europe where the estimated
degradation exceeds 5dB. Figure 7 shows detail plots of
this area when using the high resolution increment (0.1
arc deg.). It can be observed that the maximum
degradation level is estimated at -6.53dB for a slightly
different geographical location: 48.5N/8.7E.

Figure 6. C/N0 degradation map Flat Earth
Figure 7. C/N0 degradation map detail Flat Earth
When comparing the above results with the results
obtained in previous simulations it is noted that:
- The degradation hotspot locations are slightly
different 48.5N/8.7E vs. 50N/9E
- The maximum degradation in the new simulation is
approx. 1dB lower than the previous estimations:
6.5dB vs 7.5dB. This difference (and also the
different hotspot locations) appear to be justified by
the lower number of stations in the new database, so
that at the degradation hotspot only 72 stations are in
radio line of sight compared to 117 as determined by
previous simulations. Note that visibility and
degradation hotspots are relatively close but not
identical (justified by the fact that the C/N0 is
computed based on a series of parameters of the
received signals, not only based on the number of
stations in line of sight).
Radio Line of Sight Scenario
In this scenario the visibility of each ground station is
determined based on the results of the coverage
simulations performed with DEMETER (Distance
Measuring Equipment Tracer), the EUROCONTROL tool
for the assessment of DME/DME coverage and
performance.
219
In order to validate that the LabVIEW application reads
the DEMETER coverage plots correctly, the visibility plot
of the hotspot area was created and compared to a
DEMETER cumulative coverage plot. A hotspot detail
that combines both sets of results is shown in Figure 8. In
this plot the visibility level contours and peaks created by
Labview are overlaid with the DEMETER cumulative
plot. It can be seen that the LabVIEW application
contours match well with DEMETER coverage polygons.
There are two peak areas identified by LabVIEW
application where the number of received stations is 47
(50.2N/8.6E and 52N/10.6E). These peak areas match
relatively well with the red polygons generated by
DEMETER, although the received number of stations
estimated by DEMETER appears to be slightly higher
(49). Unfortunately, the current version of DEMETER
does not allow the identification of the stations that cover
each polygon, and as such the list of stations returned by
the LabVIEW application cannot be validated (but such a
capability will be considered in future versions of
DEMETER).
The slight discrepancies identified in this plot can be
explained by:
- The lower resolution of the LabVIEW simulation i.e.
6 arcmin. vs. 0.5arcmin of DEMETER
- The simplified geographical calculation algorithms
used at this stage by the LabVIEW application.
However, the above discrepancies are rather minor and
consequently it is considered that the accuracy of the
visibility calculations achieved by the new application is
fit for the purposes of this study.
Figure 9 presents the C/N0 degradation map for the RLoS
scenario. This plot shows a large potential hotspot area
located over north-east of France, Belgium and west part
of Germany. For a more accurate estimation of the
degradation hotspot(s), the higher resolution simulation
(0.1 arc deg. increments) was performed for the above
areas, see Figure 10. In this plot, four different areas in
which the estimated C/N0 degradation exceeds -5dB are
identified. However, the peak degradation value -5.27dB
is still recorded in the Frankfurt area at the location:
50.5N/8.7E.

Figure 8. Visibility Plot Comparison - RLoS
Figure 9. C/N0 degradation map RLoS
Figure 10. C/N0 degradation map detail RLoS
ASSESSMENT CONCLUSIONS
The results of the theoretical study can be summarized as
follows:
- The maximum L5 postcorrelation C/N0 degradation
due to the DME/TACAN systems currently in
operation in Europe is estimated at:
6.7 dB (48.6N/8.9E) Flat Earth scenario
(no terrain)
220
5.3 dB (50.5N/8.7E) RLoS scenario (DTED
1 terrain model)
- An additional degradation margin of at least 1dB is
predicted compared to the previous assessments which
computed a degradation of 7.5 dB or higher at the
hotspot.
- This difference can be explained by the lower number
of GS received (predicted) that is due to:
the updated Navaids database following the
Table COM3 cleanup
taking into account the terrain screening when
determining the RLoS
- Considering these simulation results it can be
concluded that in the current configuration of the
Navaids infrastructure, a reallocation of the DME
channels in order to ensure the L5 compatibility may
not be required, subject to further validation.
ASSESSMENT LIMITATIONS
We need to stress the fact that the above results are based
on the implementation of a theoretical model of the
impact of the DME/TACAN pulses on the C/N0eff in GPS
L5 band. Although an up to date Navaids database and the
DTED1 terrain model were used for the simulations, there
are a number of assumptions and limitations related to the
parameters input into the model, such as:
- Assume the published EIRP (not measured)
- Assume maximum PRF (DME-2700ppps, TACAN-
3600ppps)
- Simple propagation model: FSPL (propagation effects,
e.g. multipath, diffraction, are not considered)
- Aircraft attitude (which impacts the effective antenna
gain) and the fuselage effects are not considered
All these assumptions and limitations lead to the need for
the validation of the simulation results. From our
perspective the validation refers to the validation of the
parameters input in the degradation model (notably
ground stations received and corresponding power level
and PRF), not to the validation of the model itself.
DME FLIGHT INSPECTION DATA
DEMETER Validation
A flight inspection campaign aimed at validating the
DEMETER coverage prediction (not related to DME/L5
compatibility) showed a good correlation between the
recorded data and the predicted RLoS ([7]). However it
should be noted that in the data analysis process the
recorded signal levels were compared to the minimum
power density required for the DME signal in space i.e.
-89dBW/m2, which roughly corresponds to a level of
-110dBW at the receiver input, when using the DME
dedicated antenna. The minimum power density would estimation). The results of various studies are consistent
produce a power level at the GNSS receiver input close to in what regards the location of the hotspot in the Frankfurt
the blanking threshold (negative GNSS antenna gain is area (although the exact position is not the same) and the
considered in this case). Even if the signals with a power results of the flight measurements confirm the existence
density below this threshold may not trigger the blanking of the hotspot in the same area.
of the GNSS receiver they would still increase the in-band
noise and have an impact on the C/N0 degradation. From the initial analysis of the recorded data performed
Consequently, it might be necessary to also take into by DLR it was seen that the number of stations received
account the ground stations which are out of the radio line may change significantly as a function of aircraft bank
of sight (i.e. consider the diffraction effects). angle. While in a level flight configuration about 57
Furthermore, the DEMETER validation effort did not stations were received, the number increased to 65
make an analysis of the signals above the -89dBW/m2 stations when the aircraft was performing a turn in the
threshold and does not offer any indication on the hotspot area; this worst case situation is illustrated in
correlation to the level predicted using the FSPL model. Figure 12. The DLR analysis also confirms that some of
the stations within the radio horizon range were not
DLR Flight Inspection Campaign received (most likely shadowed by terrain) while signals
from a number of stations beyond the radio horizon were
The lack of real measured data related to DME/TACAN detected. This appears to confirm the need for taking into
interference in L5/E5 band has led to the setup of a account the diffraction effect in the simulations.
dedicated flight inspection campaign over the hotspot
estimated by the initial studies performed by EUROCAE
and RTCA (Frankfurt area). This campaign was organized
and carried out by DLR (German Aerospace Center) and
the details regarding the flight path, the aircraft and the
measuring and recording equipment used are provided in
[8]. The following paragraph describes the setup of the
measurement and data recording equipment:
To record the DME interference two different systems
were used:
An Agilent E4443A Spectrum analyser. This System was
configured so that it recorded 150 ms every 30s to a PC.
The recording bandwidth was set to 80 MHz the centre
frequency was 1188MHz. In this configuration the
spectrum analyser recorded band from 1148 to 1228 MHz
covering the complete E5 band.
Furthermore a data grabber was used to continuously Figure 11. Flight Path and Hotspot Location
record the signal. This system was sampling the E5 band
with 100 Msamples/s and at the same time the L1 and E1
band with 50Msamples/s.
Since this data grabber recorded the signal
continuously, the amount of recorded data is
enormous. This system generates 300 Mbytes/s and
transfers this data stream in real time on 32 hard
disks. In this mode the system records 1TB/hour.
During the whole campaign 18 TB of
data were recorded.

The initial findings of this measurement campaign are

found in the presentation given at the EUROCAE WG 62
meeting held in December 2013 ([9]). Two of the
Figure 12. Ground Stations Received Worst Case
diagrams that summarize the results have found to be of
interest for the purposes of our study. Figure 11 shows the Unfortunately more detailed information regarding the
flight path followed during the recordings, the different DLR recorded data was not yet published. As described in
estimations of the hotspot location and the location of the the above excerpt from [8], an impressive amount of raw
measured hotspot (note that the original source picture data was recorded during the flight tests campaign. In
does not include the EUROCONTROL hotspot

221
order to retrieve the detailed information related to the
individual ground stations in L5/E5 band, an important
post processing effort is needed. Due to unforeseen
events, this effort could not be completed at the time this
paper was written. Consequently, the analysis of the flight
recorded data aiming at validating and refining the
DME/L5(E5) compatibility simulations will be the subject
of further work.
FUTURE WORK
As mentioned in the previous sections, several
assumptions were used in the assessment of the impact of
current DME/TACAN network in EUROPE on the GPS
L5 carrier to noise degradation. These assumptions and
the results of the assessment need to be validated before
any actions (or no actions), such as specific frequency
assignment planning measures, are taken to ensure the
DME/L5 compatibility in the hotspot areas. The main
validation data source identified so far is the measured
data recorded by DLR in the dedicated flight
measurements campaign. The authors of this study are
continuously coordinating with the technical staff
involved in the DLR tests and plan to use the results of
the recorded data post processing in order to:
- Evaluate the impact of the assumptions on the final
C/N0 degradation figures
- Improve the assumptions and the assessment
methodology so that this impact is minimized
Another line of action aimed at improving and refining
the assessment methodology is the cooperation with the
specialists from ENAC France (lEcole Nationale de
lAviation Civile) where a similar study has been started.
The scope of ENAC project is broader and will include
studies on various implementations of the blanking
technique and also on other mitigation techniques
proposed, e.g. Frequency Domain Interference Suppressor
(FDIS).
Depending on the results of the validation exercise, and
after refining the theoretical model implementation and
the input data assumptions in collaboration with ENAC,
the following actions will be considered:
- Extend the assessment to E5 band
- Integrate the assessment model in one of the
EUROCONTROL software tools (AFM-MANIF or
DEMETER).
This integration would support the analysis of the
potential solutions to minimize the RFI impact in the
hotspot area (if found necessary) and would allow
evaluating the impact of new X channel assignments in
the upper DME band in Europe.
222
CONCLUSIONS INCLUDING IMPLICATIONS
FOR FUTURE FLIGHT INSPECTION
CAPABILITIES
EUROCONTROL exercises the role of Network
Manager in Europe, which includes the management of
scarce resources, such as frequencies. This radio
frequency management function is carried out in
coordination with member states and the ICAO European
Region. Prompted by statements in the ICAO GNSS
Manual, the EUROCONTROL network manager asked if
such frequency management is necessary and how it
would be implemented. Consequently, a SESAR project
undertook to investigate this question in further detail,
and the results of this work are presented herein. The
preliminary result, based on updated theoretical studies
that take terrain screening as well as an updated database
of operationally used DME assignments into account, is
that no such measures are needed. In related studies
carried out by SESAR on navigation infrastructure
evolution, it is estimated that the implementation of a
DME/DME network to support PBN alongside GNSS
would lead to a more even distribution of DME compared
to today. Consequently, provided the theoretical studies
can be verified appropriately by actual measurements, it is
estimated that no significant frequency management
mechanisms are needed to ensure the continued
compatibility of DME and dual-frequency GNSS.
While it will remain necessary to keep an eye on the
evolution of the DME hotspots and ensure that
appropriately validated tools are available for that
purposes, it appears to be sufficient to only limit the
assignment of new DME channel assignments in the
GNSS bands as much as possible, e.g., by simply giving
priority to DME assignments that are not in that sub-band,
if such channels are available. This will also reduce the
common mode between GNSS and DME in terms of
vulnerability to interference, even if susceptibility levels
between DME and GNSS are dramatically different.
The larger issue that is relevant for flight inspection
organizations is that navigation service provision in the
PBN context will shift more and more away from an
individual facility assessment logic to more of a network
management function. The theoretical models need to
make many assumptions about the signal in space, and
normally revert to worst case assumptions. Here, flight
inspection data can have a role to ensure that those
conservatisms remain within realistic bound, which is
essential to ensure that aviation can retain credibility in
spectrum defense activities.
Normally, ANSP know quite well how their facilities
operate. However, even there, surprises may appear on for
example, actual pulse pair repetition rates at which
stations operate. Likewise, accurate measurements of
received signal strength, from multiple stations at large
distances (often from cross-border) are another key input
into compatibility models.
It is recommended that flight inspection organizations
develop their capabilities to ensure that frequency
management aspects such as the one discussed in this
paper can be supported in the future PBN environment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
To Christophe Macabiau and Olivier Julien from ENAC
who supported our study with their technical expertise in
GNSS matters and in particular with information on
applicable standards, input data and details of past studies.
[8] DLR (Alexander Steingass et al.), 2013, Airborne
measurements of DME interferers at the European
hotspot, ION NTM 2013
[9] DLR/ESA / EPO (Alexander Steinggass, Jaron
Samson), December 2013, Analysis of DME/TACAN
Interference on Satellite Navigation in the Lower L-Band,
EUROCAE WG 62 meeting
[10] http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/tools
[11] http://www.eurocontrol.int/services/manif-afm-
advanced-frequency-manager
[12] European Space Agency (ESA) Navipedia:
http://www.navipedia.net/index.php/File:GNSS_navigatio
nal_frequency_bands.png

To Alexander Steingass from DLR for providing the

information and preliminary results of the DLR flight
measurements campaign.

To SESAR project 15.1.6 which supported this work.

REFERENCES

[1] ICAO, June 2012, Global Navigation Satellite

System (GNSS) Manual, Doc 9849, Second Edition,
[2] RTCA, 29 July 2004, Assessment of Radio
Frequency Interference Relevant to the GNSS L5/E5A
Frequency Band, DO-292.
[3] ITU, October 2011, Calculation method to
determine aggregate interference parameters of pulsed RF
systems operating in and near the bands 1 164-1 215 MHz
and 1 215-1 300 MHz that may impact radionavigation-
satellite service airborne and ground-based receivers
operating in those frequency bands, ITU-R M.2220
[4] ITU, December 2012, Recommendation Evaluation
method for pulsed interference from relevant radio
sources other than in the radionavigation-satellite service
to the radionavigation-satellite service systems and
networks operating in the 1 164-1 215 MHz, 1 215-1 300
MHz and 1 559-1 610 MHz frequency bands, ITU-R
M.2030
[5] ENAC/STNA ( Frederic Bastide et al.), 2004, GPS
L5 And GALILEO E5a/E5b Signal-to-Noise Density
Ratio Degradation Due to DME/TACAN Signals:
Simulations and Theoretical Derivation, ION NTM 2004
[6] EUROCAE, December 2010, Minimum
Operational Performance Specification For Airborne
Open Service Galileo Satellite Receiving Equipment, v3.0
[7] EUROCONTROL/FCS/IDS (Gerhard Berz and
all), 2012, Accuracy Evaluation of DME Coverage
Predictions Using Software Tools, IFIS 2012

223
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224
 GBAS Calibration Rolf Seide, Aerodata

Rolf Seide
Dipl. Ing
Aerodata AG
D-38108 Braunschweig, Germany
Fax: +49 531 2359 222
E-mail: seide@aerodata.de

ABSTRACT A dedicated ground station provides locally relevant

By flight inspection it shall be ensured that navigation
aids conform to international standards according to their
specification. During flight calibration of Ground Based
Augmentation Systems (GBAS), the VHF Data Broadcast
(VDB) signal in space (power density) needs to be
checked very accurately.
pseudo-range corrections, approach segment data as well
as integrity monitoring information.
One critical path is the data link from ground to the
aircraft. This link is discussed in detail in this paper.
GBAS FLIGHT INSPECTION

The signal in space measurements of the VDB uplink are The following components are subject of flight
depending on aircraft antenna, polarization, bearing of inspection:
aircraft to ground transmitter, frequency, the way the
signal level is detected and the time slot it is transmitted Contents can be checked also on Ground
in. The signal is transmitted in a special digital format,
with differential phase modulation, synchronized to a time Data can be checked also on Ground
standard in short bursts. Several stations can transmit on
GNSS Signal Must be checked in flight
the same frequency (TDMA).
VHF Signal Must be checked in flight
Standard equipment for power level measurements cannot
be used for determination of field strength, since the Coverage of VDB Ground Station (This
measurement depends on parts of data contents of the
paper)
telegram and the time slot in use. A special GBAS
receiver following the standards of RTCA DO-246 has to Additionally the frequency Spectrum of the VDB
be installed in the flight inspection aircraft for measuring Frequency 100 kHz either side in case of suspected
field strength. interference should be checked
The calibration of the GBAS receiver itself has turned out SYSTEM COMPONENTS
to be a critical part in the measurement chain. Various
techniques using laboratory test transmitters and receivers
as well as in-service GBAS ground stations have been
analyzed to develop a calibration procedure for the
airborne GBAS receiver.

This presentation shows the background and technical

solutions.

INTRODUCTION

The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS) is a

system to support approaches, landing, departure and
ground surface operations.
Figure: GBAS System overview

225
REGULATIONS

The main information about GBAS technical details and

operation are found in:

ICAO Aeronautical Telecommunications,

Annex 10, Volume I, Radio Navigation Aids,
Sixth Edition, July 2006
RTCA DO-246C, GNSS-Based Precision
Approach Local Area Augmentation System
(LAAS) Signal-in-Space Interface Control
Document (ICD), April 2005
Figure: Training sequence formats
TECHNICAL DETAILS OF THE DATA LINK
According to [2], DO-246C, 2.1.3, Field Strength:
The VHF data link is a pulsed signal, which cannot be
measured regarding signal level with a standard analog The VDB Field Strength Measurement is averaged over
receiver. the period of the synchronization and ambiguity
resolution segment in the training sequence of the VDB
message

A typical plot showing signal level versus time with x-

axis (time) and y-axis signal level (logarithmic, in dBm)
looks like:

Figure: Analog receiver with analog and digital

readout

Some mechanism is required, to freezethe signal level

readout according to [2].

Figure: Signal level versus time, x-axis set to 600 ms,

showing 10 time slots

To determine this specified signal level in the defined

timing and slot, a time- and/or data synchronized test
system has to be used.

If the Time slot is known (A to H), test equipment can

Figure: Definition of the timing be synchronized with an appropriate system to the UTC
one-second epoch.

226
Figure: Synchronization of the signal level detector to
the UTC one-second-epoch (PPS)

A unit PPS Timer has been developed to be input-

triggered by a GPS PPS pulse and send an output sync
signal to a receiver detecting the averaged signal level
over the period of the synchronization and ambiguity
resolution.
With the synchronization unit the following plot is taken
showing the signal level versus time. The x-axis is set to 2
ms, showing only the synchronization and ambiguity
resolution data field. This shows 48 bits, equivalent to 16
symbols of 8PSK modulation. Each symbol has 8
different possible stages, holding the information of 3 bit.
Figure: Coverage area in approach
A signal in space is not easy to set up in a perfect way, so
one typical problem with transmit antennas close to
ground are multipath effects.
To show this, real flight data of a level-run in 10,000 ft
from 21 NM to 12 NM and a simulation of the same run
show the effect of a null, when the VDB signal is
transmitted by a single antenna, close to ground are
shown.

Definition: A null is an area of an antenna radiation

pattern where the signal cancels out almost entirely.

Figure: only the synchronization and ambiguity

resolution is shown, synchronized to UTC one-second
epoch at relevant time slot number. Figure: Real flight data level run
The field strength of the VDB Signal according to [2] is
the average of all signals between 476 us and 2000 us
after start of the burst.

COVERAGE, SIGNAL IN SPACE

The coverage area to receive a valid signal is defined in

[2] as: Figure: Simulated data level run

A typical signal in space of a single horizontal TX

antenna close to ground with different heights has been

227
simulated to explain this. The results depend on
frequency, height and ground reflections.

Figure: TX antenna installed high above ground

Figure: Typical multi-element TX antenna optimized

to avoid ground illumination.

The specification [2] allows two different polarized

transmissions:

Horizontal polarization (GBAS/H) or

Figure: TX antenna middle height above ground
Elliptical polarization (GBAS/E), consisting of
horizontal (HPOL) and vertical (VPOL)
components

Annex10 (3.7.3.5.4.4.2.1) recommends: An elliptically

polarized signal should be broadcast whenever practical

A note in Annex10 (3.7.5.4.4) states: Aircraft using

VPOL component will not be able to conduct operations
Figure: TX antenna low above ground
with GBAS/H equipment
Low installation height has less Nulls, but lower signal
level. The Signal level limits are:

Min Max
GROUND ANTENNAS, POLARIZATION

ICAO Annex 10, Attachment D, 7.12.4, Use of Horizontal -99 dBW/m2 -35 dBW/m2
multiple transmit antennas to improve VDB coverage
Elliptical
allows more than one antenna for transmitting:
- Vertical -103 dBW/m2 -39dBW/m2
7.12.4.2 One example of the use of multiple antennas is - Horizontal - 99 dBW/m2 -35 dBW/m2
a facility with two antennas at the same location but at
Annex 10, 7.2.5: In order to ensure that an appropriate
different heights above the ground plane. The heights of
received power is maintained throughout the GBAS
the antennas are chosen so that the pattern from one
coverage volume during normal aircraft maneuvers,
antenna fills the nulls in the pattern of the other antenna.
transmitting equipment should be designed to radiate
The GBAS ground subsystem alternates broadcasts
HPOL and VPOL signal components with an RF phase of
between the two antennas, using one or two assigned slots
90 degrees.
of each frame for each antenna
Real-life data from GBAS Station, EDVE, Braunschweig
This leads to a complex measurement in flight,
with antenna Rohde & Schwarz HE300:
synchronizing the switching algorithm of the ground
antenna with the data collected in flight.

A more simple solution is to build a complex antenna,

avoiding ground illumination, but this not always
possible.

228

Figure :Polarization check of real-life data with hand-
held antenna
Readout horizontal: -30.4 dBm
Readout vertical: -35.4 dBm
CHANNEL AND FREQUENCIES
Each GBAS approach transmitted from the ground
subsystem is associated with a channel number in the
range of 20 001 to 39 999. If provided, the GBAS
positioning service is associated with a separate channel
number in the range of 20 001 to 39 999. The channel
number is given by:
Channel number = 20 000 + 40(F 108.0) + 411(S)
where
F = the data broadcast frequency (MHz)
S = RPDS or RSDS
RPDS = reference path data selector for the FAS data
block
RSDS = reference station data selector for the GBAS
ground subsystem.
Figure: Map with GLS channel GBAE 21220
DO-246C [2] explains: RSDS is a numerical identifier
that is unique on a frequency in the broadcast region and
229
used to select the station for the differential positioning
service.
8 bits are used, but only 49 different identifier possible
(0 .. 48).
The formula to determine the frequency of the GBAS
transmitter is:
F= 108.0 MHz + ((Ch# -20000) mod 411) x 0.025 MHz
Examples:
Bremen EDDW Freq. 117.950 MHz, S=2 Ch# 21220
Braunschweig EDVE
Freq. 117.950 MHz, S=21 (G26A) Ch# 29029
Freq. 117.950 MHz, S=23 (G08A) Ch# 29851
This channel number has to be set when tuning the
GBAS-RX in the cockpit or the AFIS
LINK BUDGET
The GBAS Link Budget for the data link from ground
transmitter up to the airborne receiver is:
The aircraft implementation loss is the critical factor in
the aircraft installation.
AVIONIC / TEST EQUIPMENT
To flight check GBAS ground station and detect the exact
signal level the following avionics and test equipment can
be used:
Figure: Collins GNLU-930, spectrum analyzer and
UTC time synchronization box
ABSOLUTE LEVEL MEASUREMENT REFERENCES

The following signal levels have been measured at GBAS
EDVE, using the antenna signal on ground and a
switchable attenuator in line with different receivers:
[1] ICAO Aeronautical Telecommunications,
Annex 10, Volume I, Radio Navigation Aids, Sixth
Edition, July 2006
[2] RTCA DO-246C, GNSS-Based Precision Approach
Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS) Signal-in-
Space Interface Control Document (ICD), April 2005
[3] Guide for Ground Based Augmentation System
Implementation, ICAO, May 2013
[4] Implementation and Operational Use of Ground-
Based Augmentation Systems (GBASs)A
Component of the Future Air Traffic Management
System, Proceedings of the IEEE, December 2008

Which one is correct?

SOFTWARE PRESENTATION

A software screen showing all relevant data in a complex

GBAS environment shows the following information with
an update rate of 500 ms:

Figure: numerical presentation of signal level per slot

and decoded message type

CONCLUSION

Measuring GBAS VDB Signal levels is not a simple task

as in analogue modulation.

To perform a full analysis, special equipment is necessary

to detect a signal level at each time slot.

Absolute calibrations with different available systems

show different results.

Currently only simple ground TX installations are

performed, measuring correct signal levels in a complex
installation with several stations overlapping will be a
challenge in the future.

230
 Experiences and Analysis
with Flight Inspection of GBAS Sig urd A. Bjelkary, NSM, & Erling Gronbec k N SM

Sigurd A. Bjelkary
Director Flight Inspection Systems
Norwegian Special Mission
E-mail: sigurd.bjelkaroy@nsm.aero

Erling Grnbeck
Senior SW Engineer
Norwegian Special Mission
E-mail: erling.gronbeck@nsm.aero

ABSTRACT phase. The Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS)

allows precision approaches to be performed using
The traditional purpose of a flight inspection have been to satellite navigation. GBAS is a safety critical system
calibrate and evaluate the performance of aircraft composed of both hardware and software that improves
navigation and landing aids to ensure conformance to the Standard Positioning Service (SPS) of GNSS
specifications. With the new GNSS augmented landing (currently GPS and GLONASS, but potentially any
systems, the flight inspection is moved from the constellation in the future), providing better service levels
traditional analyses of signal-in-space towards flight and supporting precision approach in the coverage area. It
validation, verification of associated procedures and the uses a VHF data link to broadcast differential GNSS
radio environment in which the navigation signals are corrections, integrity information and approach
received. The only exception is Ground Based definitions to aircrafts. The aircraft combine the
Augmentation System (GBAS), where in additional to differential corrections with their own GNSS
validation and verification, the VDL coverage is also measurements, calculate a corrected position solution and
verified using traditional procedures. determine path deviations based on the selected approach.
In this paper we present the flight testing experience with GBAS SYSTEM
Ground Based Augmentation System. It is focused on
how to best aid the pilot and the FIS-operator during the GBAS is composed of three subsystems: the satellites, the
in-flight inspection. With the right information, at the ground and the aircraft subsystems. The ground
right place, at the right time. Keywords for topics that are subsystem comprises a set of fixed-based reference
covered are; situational awareness, anomaly analysis, receivers that constantly collect data from the GNSS
interference, position fixing, coverage, fault detection and satellites, which form the satellite subsystem. This data is
isolation. afterwards used to compute corrections which are then
transmitted via a VHF Data Broadcast (VDB) link. The
INTRODUCTION VDB operates in the VHF band (108 117.975 MHz) and
uses time-division multiple access (TDMA) to allow the
These days almost all phases of the flight can be operation of multiple VDB transmitters on a single
performed by satellite navigation systems. The most frequency. The separation between channels are 25kHz.
challenging phase of flight is the approach and landing

231
The information transmitted on the VDB that the flight
inspector will mostly care about is the Final Approach
Segment (FAS) data block in Message Type 4 and facility
station and integrity information in Message Type 2.
The FAS data block contains the definition for a single
precision approach. This includes the data elements that
provides the glide path and course deviations. These are
parameters that the flight inspection will be measuring.
FLIGHT INSPECTION
GBAS flight tests are used to confirm procedure design,
final segment alignment, GNSS signal reception and data
link reception within the coverage volume.
The focus of GBAS flight inspection is the coverage of
the VDB correction signal, complementing extensive
measurements on the ground. As typical for all GNSS-
based procedures, commissioning checks only are carried
out.
Some states perform periodic check of GBAS systems
while other only perform commissioning and special
checks.
Typical Flight Inspection procedures for GBAS are:
VDB coverage arc +/- 10 deg @ 20NM.
VDB coverage arc +/- 35 deg @ 15NM.
VDB coverage orbit @ 23NM / Dmax
VDB coverage Level runs from 21NM @
10000ft.
VDB coverage Level runs from 21NM @ 2000ft
Final Approach path.
Missed Approach.
Figure 1. Minimum GBAS coverage (Annex 10, vol. 1,
fig. D-4)
232
FAS DATA VERIFICATION
For GBAS systems the FAS data are uplinked as a type 4
message on the VDB. The received FAS data from the
GBAS ground station is extracted from the GNLU and
logged by the flight inspection system.
The received FAS data block is then compared to the FAS
data stored in the flight inspection facility database and
any mismatch are announced to the flight inspector.
The FAS data should be checked for consistency against
the original procedure design and the calculated CRC
should be checked for consistency with the expected
CRC.
Figure 2. Example of FAS data-block as stored in
Flight Inspection system Facility database.
Like for SBAS procedures the FAS data stored in the
flight inspection facility database can be inserted
manually or automatically.
For manual inserted FAS data the hex code representation
of the data-block and CRC is calculated by the flight
inspection system and presented.
Figure 3. FAS data-block and CRC
Direct automatic ARINC 424 import of the FAS data is
the best solution to prevent data corruption caused by
human manipulation. ARINC 424 is the industry standard
for transmission of navigation data.
If FAS data-block is published in hex format, as we see
done by many states, the hex values can also be cut and
pasted directly into the facility database to automatically
populate the FAS data and calculate correct CRC. The
ease of this procedure will save the operator time and it
will also reduce the risk of inputting wrong data.

The generated facility database including the FAS data-

block can be opened in Google Earth for easy
visualization and as an initial reasonability check. The
accuracy of Google Earth is not at all sufficient for final
assessment of FAS data, but errors in manually input data
can often be eliminated by a quick check in Google Earth.

When the inspection starts, the flight inspector can

validated the FAS data block received on the VDB in
message type 4 and facility information in message type
2.

Errors in the FAS can lead to the aircraft being offset

from the desired path and may provide inadequate
obstacle clearing. A flight inspection system analysis is
required to validate the FAS data for lateral alignment,
threshold crossing height and glide path angles. Since the
flight inspection facility database also contains data for
the runway this analysis can be performed automatically. Figure 4. GBAS interface

Situation awareness is essential to ensure a safe and

GUIDANCE
For flyability checks of GBAS it is required to provide
GBAS guidance to the flight inspection pilot. ICAO DOC
8071 Vol II specifies the requirement to check flyability
and to verify that the defined final approach course
deliver the aircraft to the desired point.
GBAS receivers are so far only available for large air
transport category aircrafts and the smaller aircrafts
typically used for flight inspection does not have this
capability.
In order to provide GBAS flight inspection capabilities
and guidance to pilots the easiest solution certification
wise is to install the GBAS receiver as part of the flight
inspection system and interface the GBAS receiver either
to dedicated FIS guidance displays in cockpit or directly
to aircraft flight displays.
effective execution of any flight inspection mission. This
is especially important for GBAS stations with flight
patterns less common than the well-known flight patterns
of conventional NAVAIDS.
To ensure good situation awareness for the pilots and
crew it is recommended to have a flight inspection system
capable of generating, presenting and exporting the
required flight patterns.
Direct upload of flight patterns from the flight inspection
system to aircraft Flight Management Systems (FMS) will
ensure that each flight profile is flown efficiently as
defined with the lowest crew workload.

Tuning of the GBAS receiver can be performed by the

flight inspection system. The GBAS receiver output ILS
lookalike deviation signals which normally can be shown
on standard EFIS systems with little or no modification.

233

Figure 5. FMS Interface
Graphical presentation of the flight patterns to the system
operator can be shown on the flight inspection system
screen and also to the pilots if a dedicated FIS cockpit
display is installed or interfaced to cockpit MFD video.
Figure 6. Facility map with flight pattern
CALIBRATION
One of the main flight inspection requirements for GBAS
is to check the coverage of the VHF Data Broadcast
Station.
The Rockwell Collins MMR GNLU-930 GBAS receiver
used in the UNIFIS 3000 flight inspection system has a
specialized firmware for flight inspection of GBAS which
will output the signal strength information from the built
in VDB receiver.
234
The signal strength can be calibrated in the flight
inspection system software by the use of special signal
generators capable of simulating a GBAS VDB broadcast.
The calibrated signal strength signal can be used for
accurate signal strength measurements. In order to obtain
correct field strength measurement the antenna gain
pattern and the cable loss for the VDB receiver antenna
must be known.
Flight inspection antennas are far from ideal isotropic
receptors and variation of the antenna gain can be more
than 10dB over various angles and frequencies. Without
advanced antenna gain compensation algorithms the
required measurement accuracy simply cannot be met.
In most cases a horizontally polarized antenna
(VOR/LOC antenna) is used as the VDB receiving
antenna. The GBAS specification allows also vertical
polarized VDB receiving antennas to be used since the
VDB transmission is often performed by an elliptically
polarized antenna.
For cases where vertical polarization is used, VDB
vertical field strength measurements also has to be
verified to be within given tolerances.
Figure 7. GBAS Crossover with VDB field strength
measurement
 Figure 8. Example of GBAS Crossover results

INTEGRITY AND INTERFERENCE TESTING Figure 9. GBAS Integrity parameter recording

The integrity of the GBAS system is good and
abnormalities are normally detected and announced by the
GBAS ground station.
Interference may occur on either the ranging (GNSS) or
VDB frequencies. Excessive ranging signal interference
will therefore affect continuity and availability, rather
than integrity. The loss of GBAS guidance or loss of
GBAS correction signals are indicators of interference
issues. Other indicators of interference are when integrity
parameters are over the expected values.
If interference is suspected, further analysis should be
performed. In this case the use of a spectrum analyzer or
broadband receiver with ability to log data is
recommended.
The spectrum analyzer or broadband receiver installed in
the flight inspection system is able to connect both to the
VDB antenna (NAV) for interference analysis of the VHF
Data broadcast and to be connected to a passive GPS
antenna mounted on the belly of the aircraft for
interference analysis in the GNSS frequency band.

FAA recommends to record and observe the following

GBAS related satellite data:

Parameters Expected values

Horizontal Protection Limit (HPL) < 40m
Vertical Protection Limit (VPL) < 10m
HDOP < 4.0
VDOP < 4.0
Horizontal Integrity Limit (HIL) < 0.3nm
Figure Of Merit (FOM) < 22 meters
Satellites Tracked 5 Minimum
30 dB/ Hz
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
minimum

Figure 10. Interference test equipment.

235
ALIGNMENT WITH ILS

We all know about the importance about accuracy and

verification of the FAS data that is used for GBAS. What
we have also noticed is that the flight inspector sometimes
also wants to see how the GBAS is compared to the ILS.
This is due to that ILS will remain in operations for a long
period (due to fleet renewal etc) and that in the mean time
that precision approaches could be done with both ILS
and GBAS. In addition, the ILS is a technology that is
known, while the GBAS flight inspection is still in a
learning curve.

When an ILS exists at the same approach as GBAS, it is

recommended to align the GBAS with the ILS.

Doc 8168 says:

At runways with an ILS it is generally desirable

to align the GPA with the ILS glide path, both to
ensure alignment with existing lighting systems
and to provide consistency between the two
approach systems.

So based on the feedback we have got, many states wants
to see the GBAS results compared to the already
steablished ILS facility.
The possibility to also see the GBAS results in uA and to
watch the ILS deviation while performing GBAS
inspection has been added to the GBAS flight inspection
procedures of the UNIFIIS 3000. In addition to the
standard GBAS results, this can boost the confidence to
the inspector that both landing systems are aligned.
Figure 11. GBAS vs ILS
In this run we see that the ILS localizer is well aligned to
the GBAS lateral guidance, while the ILS glide-path will
deviate from the GBAS vertical guidance the closer you
get to the threshold due to the position of the glide-path
antenna.
POSITIONING FIXING
GBAS flight inspection can in theory be performed
without a reference system, but optionally the position
accuracy can be checked.

Doc 8071 says:

1.11.4 For inspection of Category I GBAS procedures,

a positioning system is not required, but may be used,
depending upon regulatory requirements of individual
States. Although no accuracy tolerances are defined, if a
GNSS-based positioning system is used its independence
should be demonstrated, i.e. there must be no common-
mode errors between the GBAS and positioning system.
For example, for code-based GBAS, a carrier-based
position-fixing system may be used. Alternatively, a non-
GNSS based position-fixing system may be used.

RTK carrier phase differential GNSS system or camera

based position reference systems with sufficient accuracy
to be used as reference for precision landing systems can
be used for GBAS flight inspections.

236
The benefit of using a position reference system is that a
running compare calculation between GBAS and the
reference source can prove that the recommended
accuracy of 4 m vertical and 16m lateral is met near
decision height. It can also be used to identify periods
where the GBAS accuracy is low.

CONCLUSIONS

(A) Flight inspection of GBAS procedures are more

than just VDB coverage checks. Errors in FAS
data or other issues related to flyability are easily
seen during flight inspection / validation.

(B) Good import functionality of FAS data to the

flight inspection system facility database
increase the integrity.

(C) VDB coverage checks require calibrated

antennas and sensors to achieve required
accuracy.

(D) GBAS Guidance is important for the pilot to

perform procedure validation and flyability
check.

(E) Flying GBAS procedures with high accuracy

reference systems is recommended.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors would like to thank the Brazilian Flight

Inspection division, GEIV for their support of data and
the continued partnership.

REFERENCES

[1] ICAO, 2006, Annex 10 Aeronautical Tele-

communications, Volume 1 Radio Navigation Aids,
Sixth Edition.
[2] ICAO, 2007, Doc 8071, Manual on Testing Radio
Navigation Aids, Volume II Testing of Satellite
Based Radio Navigation Systems.
[3] ICAO, 2008, Doc 8168, Procedures for Air
Navigation Services, Volume II - Construction of
Visual and Instrument Flight Procedures.

237
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238
 Session 8
SBAS RFI and Related Concepts
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
Mitigation of an RF interference on GNSS signal
observed during Flight Inspection
Vincent Rocchia
Flight Inspector
DSNA/DTI
Toulouse, France
Fax: +33 562145327
E-mail: Vincent.Rocchia@aviation-civile.gouv.fr
ABSTRACT
According to the ICAO, assessment that no RFI occurs in
the GNSS band is a mandatory verification that has to be
done during a commissioning flight inspection of an
RNAV procedure.
Through an actual example of an RFI detected thanks to
the flight inspection aircraft during the commissioning of
an LPV procedure, the proposed presentation will show
the effect of the RFI on the guidance signal observed in
real time onboard, the conclusions that were drawn after
this flight on the operational use of the procedure and the
technical means deployed in order to identify and mitigate
the interference.
Thanks to this well documented example of a real case of
RFI, it will be possible to present some solutions and
guidelines that could be used in order to reduce the threat
of RFI on GNSS procedures.
INTRODUCTION
For several years now, the commissioning of procedures
based on RNAV navigation means, especially GNSS, has
become common in many countries. These procedures are
used in addition to or instead of legacy navaids based
procedures.
Flight inspection is the only way to ensure the conformity
of these procedures. However, this activity has changed
significantly from the control of a technical means to the
validation of a complete procedure. In this process, the
evaluation of the accuracy of navigation means is no
longer relevant because of the nature of these means. It is
actually not possible to give any conclusion on the
accuracy of a GNSS system given that this accuracy is
Vincent Rocchia, DSNA /DTI
only related to the satellite constellation at a given time.
Thus, it remains necessary to check appropriate reception
of the GNSS signal all along the procedure and, in case of
failure, identify the reason causing the degradation of the
navigation solution.
It is now well established in the aviation community that
radio interference (RFI) is a potential cause of
degradation of a GNSS means. Several specific cases of
intentional or unintentional interference affecting air
navigation have been reported in different countries and
have contributed to the awareness of the phenomenon by
different actors.
Since then, numerous discussions and studies have been
conducted on the subject. Opinions are divided on the
criticality of RFI phenomenon from the point of view of
air navigation, ranging from " RFI have no impact" to "
GNSS should no longer be considered as navigation
means used by civil aviation !"This is not the point to
discuss here the future strategy even though one might
think that a position between these two extreme views is,
for the moment, desirable. This is, in any case, the
position adopted by DSNA (Direction des Services de la
Navigation Arienne), the French ANSP, which continues
its deployment plan of GNSS procedures while
developing its capacity to fight against interference.
As with conventional navaids, service providing flight
inspection should be a major player in the fight against
interferences. The use of aircraft dedicated to this task
makes it possible to detect these events where they
actually may be encountered by users, and carry the
equipment needed for detection and identification.
ICAO, through its publications, highlights the need to
perform this task in the most relevant way possible.
241
Annex X Attachment D 10 and the document 8071 Vol.
II Chapter 1 Appendix 3 provide elements allowing a
better understanding of the activity that requires good
knowledge of the problems encountered and an adapted
equipment.
GNSS BAND INTERFERENCE
Frequencies that are concerned, at this time and for the
civilian sector, are mainly limited to the L1 band, namely
the frequency 1575.42MHz with a band of 20MHz. The
introduction of new constellations (Galileo among others)
will extend the frequency domain to EHF (Extremely
High Frequency) bands dedicated to GNSS i.e. 1176.45
MHz (L5), 1227.60 MHz (L2), 1381.05 MHz (L3).
Civil aviation has always been confronted with RFI in
most of its assigned frequency bands. The distinctive
feature of the GNSS band is that civil aviation is not the
only user of the systems in this band. GNSS positioning is
used by a wide variety of users for various needs. For this
reason, the interest of intentionally interfering with these
systems is multiplied and no longer only targeting
aviation. That said, the fact remains that many sources of
interference are unintentional and result from dysfunction
of various materials.
No impact. A signal other than the
legitimate signal is present in the received
band but does not disturb the operation of
the receiver.
Obviously, the impact of the same interference can evolve
from one to another of these categories in function of the
time of the day, the geographical position of the receiver
relative to the source, the receiver robustness to
interference and the satellite constellation at a given time
(DOP).
Spoofing is a separate phenomenon, necessarily
intentional, whose impact is obviously critical since the
goal is to distort the position provided by the receiver
without the user's knowledge.
DSNA POINT OF VIEW AND METHODS
DSNA is pursuing a proactive policy of deployment of
GNSS based procedures with stated objective to
eventually equip all IFR airports with at least one LNAV,
LNAV/VNAV or LPV procedure by 2016 (as targeted by
36th ICAO assembly).

We thus find several categories:

RFI due to technical faults : Faults affecting

TV equipment are a good example and may
be frequently encountered.
RFI due to illegal use of the frequency band
normally reserved for GNSS. Here we find
equipment operating without authorization
in L band, however, their purpose is not to
interfere with navigation systems.
RFI due to malicious use. This category
includes equipment that are designed to
intentionally jam GNSS (or spoof the
receiver in the worst case).

The effect on the navigation solution is variable,

ranging from a total loss of navigation means to zero
impact.

Total loss of the solution. The GNSS
receiver is no longer able to calculate a
position since it can no longer receive the
satellites signals.
Performance degradation. The GNSS
receiver continues to provide position but its
operation is degraded; the number of
satellites received decreases while the signal
to noise ratios are degraded.
Figure 1 : Flight inspected RNAV(GNSS) Procedures
on French mainland territory (As of 01/March/2014)
(Red : LNAV+LPV, Blue : LNAV only, Clear Blue : Trials)
Flight Inspection role
DSNA Flight Inspection Service (DTI/CNS/CEV) has an
essential role in this policy by intervening before any
publication or modification of a PBN approach procedure.

242
Its tasks are multiple: checking the consistency of data to
be published, the draft chart, and validation of the
procedure in flight. Verification of non-interference in the
L1 band is systematic and made mandatory by the French
reference document based on ICAO recommendations
describing this activity.
RFI Aspects
Looking for RFI in the GNSS band is not necessarily an
easy task if you want to do it effectively. The selected
equipment must achieve noise levels low enough to allow
detection of any potentially interfering signal to the GNSS
signal received on the ground at about -130dBm. The
noise floor of the measurement system must be of the
same order.
DSNA FI Service, based on the experience gained in the
VHF area, where research of interference is, since long
ago, a recurring activity (refer to previous articles on this
subject), has developed improved detection means in L
band. Each flight inspection aircraft is equipped with a
high performance receiver measurement associated with
low noise preamplified antennas.
AiRFIndeR software allows the operation of the
equipment and data processing.
Figure 2 : L1 band analysis with AiRFIndeR
Those devices and software allow real-time analysis with
a scanning speed high enough to be compatible with use
on board the aircraft in flight.
RFI detected in GNSS Band
During different RNAV procedures flight inspections,
some cases of interference have been met:
Loss of GPS Position (Navigation Solution) on a large
area has been reported by users on SID/STAR RNAV
trajectories near Nice Cte d' Azur airport (LFMN). The
243
use of a flight inspection aircraft helped identify and
locate an RFI caused by an illegal TV transmission in a
private house. It took 2 weeks between the first complaint
and the stop of the transmission (especially because of the
constraints related to international coordination)
RFI causing a degradation of performance of GNSS
receivers (without total loss of solution) has been
identified and localized during an LNAV commissioning
flight inspection at Nimes Garons (LFTW). This RFI was
caused by a malfunction of a TV transmitter. The case has
been solved in a few days.
Two interference without impact on the operation of the
airborne receivers have been identified and located during
LPV commissioning flight inspections in Colmar Houssen
(LFGA) and Le Castellet (LFMQ). In both cases,
interference was due to malfunction of a receiving TV
amplifier. Those cases have been solved in less than a
week, thanks to coordinated actions of both civil aviation
and spectrum management agency.
Finally, an RFI has been observed during the
commissioning of two LPV procedures at Chateauroux
Dols (LFLX) in 2012.
CHATEAUROUX DEOLS (LFLX) EXAMPLE
Presentation
LFLX
Figure 3 : LFLX Situation
At the end of 2012 it was planned to equip this regional
airport with two LPV procedures in addition to the
existing Cat I ILS procedure.

Figure 4 : LFLX RNAV Draft Charts
Figure 5 : Screen capture of the RFI software during the event
During the rest of the flight, the interfering signal was
again seen but at much lower levels due to the increased
distance of the plane from the zone of influence.
At the end of the inspection, a complementary detection
flight failed to find the signal that caused the dead
reckoning on the receivers.
244
After the usual checks (FAS Data Block, Consistency of
WP and path/terminators, etc. ...) flight inspection was
undertaken in December 2012.
Flight Inspection
During the inspection, the CARNAC30 flight inspection
software showed a complete loss of GNSS tracking by the
Ashtech GG24 GNSS receiver. The loss was also seen by
the crew on the receivers (Rockwell Collins GPS4000a)
of the aircraft. At the same time, spectral analysis of the
L1 band showed a spurious signal overlapping the GPS
signal (see Figure 5 ). Loss of tracking due to this
interference was observed over a distance of 2Nm along
the first segment of the missed approach procedure on
runway 21. The tracking was recovered when the signal
disappeared.
Figure 6 clearly shows the sharp decrease in the number
of satellites received and the raise of a receiver RAIM
flag (red part of the curve). The gradual return of the
acquisition of satellites back to normal after the
disappearance of the source or the increasing distance
between the plane and the source can also be seen.
 Finally Figure 7 shows the geographical area in which the
interference was seen with loss of the GNSS solution. The
color of the path is the S/N ratio for a given satellite. We
see that this ratio fells sharply below 30dB/Hz and that
the position was maintained for a few moments before
complete loss (aka dead reckoning).

Figure 6 : Loss of GNSS tracking as seen on the

Carnac30 Flight inspection system

Figure 7 : View of the actual trajectory followed during LPV RWY21 inspection

245
Actions taken after the flight inspection In addition, the maintenance staff of the airport was, at
this moment, only equipped for RFI detection in the VHF
The spectrum observed during the flight is fairly typical, band.
about 10 MHz wide and centered on 1575.42MHz. This
kind of spectrum looks similar to the one radiated by PPD It was therefore decided to quickly design an autonomous
(Personal Privacy Device) equipment used to deliberately 24/7 ground monitoring equipment of the L1 band and to
jam the GPS, GPRS, GSM and UMTS signals. These deploy it on the top of the control tower of Chteauroux.
jammers, although banned for marketing and use in
France, are quite widespread and used, particularly by This site was chosen mainly because of the possibility to
professional drivers who use them to block the tracking easily get a power supply, because it was secure and
systems used by transport companies to monitor their fleet because it was the best location to have an increased
of vehicles. They are also found in theaters, in prisons or radio-horizon
exam rooms. These systems are very diverse in terms of
power, shape and targeted frequencies. However the
principle of generation of signals is frequently the same
and generally consists of a fast frequency sweep in a saw-
tooth law (often called linear chirp).

Figure 8 : GPS Jammers

The spectrum observed on one of these devices is given

for comparison in Figure 9.

Figure 10 : Simulated radio-horizon of the ground

system installed at Chateauroux Airport (Yellow),
Dead reckoning area (Red)

This equipment (called later "PANDORE" Portable

ANalyzer for Detection of Rfi Events) was intended to
check if the signal seen in the flight inspection aircraft
was also received on the ground and if so, with which
recurrence. (see Figure 11 and Figure 12)

Figure 9 : GPS Handheld jammer spectrum

After this flight, Flight Inspection entity issued a negative

conclusion on the procedure FI report due to the presence
of intermittent interference causing loss of GNSS
tracking. The interference case was further processed
through the DSNA Interference Management Process
which leads to the deposal of a complaint to the spectrum
management agency (the ANFr Agence Nationale des
Frquences). A technical team of the agency visited the Figure 11 : Pandore system deployed at Paris Orly
site twice without being able to identify any signal that Airport (for further testing)
may be similar to the one observed on board.

246
This equipment has been assembled from elements
available and already used by the flight inspection
service. Especially the same Airfinder software that is
used on board in real time, also allows to record events
exceeding a given threshold. It was therefore installed in
the laptop included in the detection beacon.
L1/L2 Antenna
LNA and filters are commutable
L1 BPF EB200
+60dB LNA
L2 BPF GNSS
Figure 12 : Pandore system RF Architecture
The system was deployed for a month. The results
revealed that the interference happened again several
times during the observation period.
Figure 13 : RFI observed on top of LFLX TWR.
It has been established that a similar interference to what
was observed onboard was repeated for about 4 hours
(cumulative time) during a period of one month. Figure
14 shows for example the events identified during a single
day the 6/26/2013.
247
3rd period
08h0637
Duration 40 minutes
2nd period
06h4651
Duration 81 minutes
1st period
06h1733
Duration 38 minutes
Figure 14 : RFI detection during the 06/26/13
This equipment has confirmed that the interference was
indeed present regularly and could create the same
problems as those encountered during the RNAV
procedure flight validation. However it has also shown its
relatively low recurrence.
Note also that these records do not say with certainty that
this is the same interference that was causing the loss of
signal onboard and the different detections on the ground.
However, the observed spectra are sufficiently similar to
assume that the signals encountered would have the same
effects onboard GNSS receiver.
Procedure publication
Taking into account the flight inspection report and the
findings of ground recordings, the regulation authority of
the French Civil Aviation (DSAC Direction de la Scurit
de lAviation Civile) finally decided to authorize the
publication of RNAV RWY21 of LFLX (procedures
RWY03 were postponed for environmental reasons).
However, some provisional measures have been set up to
mitigate the impact of this GNSS interference on safety.
The DH (Decision Height) of LPV and
LNAV/VNAV RWY21 has been increased from
250ft to 400ft.
A NOTAM has been issued notifying this
change in minima and the risk of RFI :
LFLX CHATEAUROUX DEOLS
B0138/14 - INSTRUMENTS APP CHART AD2 LFLX IAC 03, RNAV (GNSS)
RWY 21 :
MINIMA PROCEDURES LPV AND LNAV/VNAV CHANGED :
DA(H)=920(400) RVR=1100
GNSS JAMING POSSIBLE. IN CASE OF LOSS OF RNAV/GNSS GUIDANCE
SYSTEM,
USE THE EXTRACTION PROCEDURE DEFINED BY ACFT OPERATING
AGENCIES. 06 FEB 00:00
2014 UNTIL PERM. CREATED: 13 JAN 14:10 201414:10 2014
This is reflected on the final chart by a specific insert.
Figure 15 : LFLX RNAV Procedure RWY21
These measures are, of course, temporary and
investigations continue in order to identify and stop the
interference. The deployment of a specially equipped
vehicle with direction finding capabilities is planned in
the coming months. The Pandore system after several
improvements (including a GNSS receiver and a more
efficient antenna) will be re-installed and will send e-mail
alerts in case of detection directly to the local technical
team which has now been equipped with specific
resources to perform RFI detection in the L-band.
CONCLUSIONS
The example of Chteauroux is currently the only case of
a temporary interference detected in commissioning flight
caused by a PPD in France. It shows how difficult it is to
understand and deal with these phenomena. If continuous
or intermittent interference with high recurrence are
relatively easy to deal with, it is clearly not the same with
248
this type of RFI. Several lessons can be learned from this
example.
From a regulatory perspective, it is necessary to ensure
that the rules are unambiguous and provide a legal tool on
which to rely. The French regulation has been adapted in
this direction, a few years ago, especially thanks to the
intervention of civil aviation.
Below is the text as it appears in the French code of Posts
and Telecommunications
L33 3 -1 I. Importing, advertising, selling or free donating,
commercializing, installing, owning and using devices aiming at
interfering and stopping the use of electronic communication devices of
any kind, in transmission or reception mode, is prohibited
II. By derogation to paragraph I., these activities are authorized when
needed by the forces in charge of maintaining law and order, defense
and national security, or justice public service.
Nevertheless, although necessary, it is insufficient.
Regarding flight inspection, it is very important to be
properly equipped with appropriate means to fight against
interference, particularly in the GNSS band. In the
majority of cases, the spectrum regulation agencies do not
have the appropriate tools to deal with interference
affecting aviation and it is the responsibility of flight
inspection services to provide technical elements to
understand and handle the phenomena on the ground. The
equipment used, in particular the receiver and the antenna,
must be carefully selected and adapted to the frequency
bands and field strength levels that are to be reached.
Besides airborne assets, it is possible and desirable to
enhance the detection means on the ground, at least to
quantify interference that may affect users. In this context,
DSNA has chosen to further develop the 24/7 detection
system prototype presented here. It will be reproduced in
some copies that could be installed on different airports if
the need arises or in different places around the same area
to facilitate the location of an RFI.
Information to the user is also critical and must be taken
into account in the publications even if the drawback is to
frighten users of GNSS approaches. The example of
Chteauroux raised many questions about what to do for
the publication of a procedure under these conditions of
interference at low recurrence. Possibilities were ranging
from outright cancellation of the proposed RNAV
procedure to a publication regardless of the observation of
a temporary interference. Although the choice in this case,
to publish under NOTAM restriction can be discussed, it
remains that this case should be considered and clear
guidelines should be issued for the different actors.
 GNSS RFI Detection in Switzerland Based on
Helicopter Recording Random Flights Dr. Maurizio Scara muzza, Skyg uide, Heinz Wipf, Skyg uide, Dr. Marc Troller, Skyg uide, Heinz Leibundg ut, Sw iss Air-Rescue, Ren Wittwer, Armas uis se, & Lt. Col. Sergio R mi, Swiss Air Force

Maurizio Scaramuzza
Dr. sc. techn.
Head CNS Expert Group
Skyguide - Swiss Air Navigation Services Ltd.
Wangen, Switzerland
Fax: +41 43 931 66 19
E-mail: maurizio.scaramuzza@skyguide.ch

Heinz Wipf and Dr. Marc Troller Ren Wittwer

Skyguide - Swiss Air Navigation Services Ltd. Armasuisse
Wangen, Switzerland Bern, Switzerland

Heinz Leibundgut Lt. Col. Sergio Rmi

Swiss Air-Rescue, Rega Swiss Air Force
Zrich, Switzerland Dbendorf, Switzerland

ABSTRACT measurements or position losses. The additional recorded

data supports more in depth analysis of this kind of
In the framework of establishing Performance Based occurences.
Navigation (PBN) in Switzerland a number of special
issues have been identified. In conjunction with the INTRODUCTION
implementation of Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) based rotary wing approaches, departures and In the near future Switzerlands air space will primarily
low flight routes, special interest is on the probability of be managed by applying the performance based
an aerial vehicle being affected by GNSS Radio navigation concept. Therefore, the Swiss-wide
Frequency Interference (RFI). Implementation Programme for SESAR-oriented
objectives (CHIPS) has been initiated in 2008. In the
A project called Helicopter Recording Random Flights frame of CHIPS a number of applied research and
(HRRF) was launched, which objective is to install quick development efforts are undertaken in order to solve
access recorders on board of three dozen helicopters specific problems related to the peculiarities of Swiss air
operated by the Rega, the main Swiss Helicopter space.
Emergency and Medical Service (HEMS), and the Swiss
Air Force. Global Positioning System (GPS), Flight A major topic is potential RFI impacting GNSS receivers
Management System (FMS) and Attitude and Heading used as primary navigation source. Different research
Reference System (AHRS) data of every flight are studies are currently being conducted in this frame. One
recorded during a period of three years and under daily of them is called Helicopter Recording Random Flights
operation conditions. By this way large parts of (HRRF). Quick access recorders are being installed on
Switzerland will be randomly covered. Common to all of board of roughly three dozen helicopters operated by
these helicopter operations are low flight altitudes. Rega, the main Swiss Helicopter Emergency and Medical
Therefore it is expected, that the probability of them being Service (HEMS), and by the Swiss Air Force. The
exposed to RFI of GPS signal is higher than for fixed objectives of this study are manifold: RFI detection,
wing vehicles. Any exposure of this kind can be detected assessment of GNSS performance within a topographic
through the recorded GPS carrier to noise (CNo) challenging environment [1], assessing the potential of

249
narrowed Required Navigation Performance (RNP)
values and the quality of GPS performance and Receiver
Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) prediction
tools.
It is of major interest that a large number of parameters
from the onboard GPS receiver used for navigation as
well as helicopter attitude and FMS data are recorded.
These data sets allow to identify possible GPS RFI.
Data will be recorded randomly for a period of 3 years at
each flight of each equipped aerial vehicle under normal
operations conditions. Since most flights are carried out
under Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC) and have
different missions, it is expected, that the lower part of the
Swiss airspace will be randomly sampled.
This paper presents a model for RFI detection based on
CNo and aerial vehicle attitude measurements.
TECHNICAL SOLUTION
The entire fleet of helicopters equipped with recording
units consists of 11 AW109SP and 6 EC-145 operated by
Rega, and 18 EC-635 (figure 1) operated by the Swiss Air
Force. Due to the planned period of three years of data
collection it was decided to have fixed installations.
Figure 1 shows one of the Swiss Air Force's EC-635.
Figure 1. EC-635 of the Swiss Air Force ( VBS).
Installation
The technical solution is a mini Quick Access Recorder
(mQAR) connected to the vehicle's ARINC bus,
respectively RS-232 interface, depending on the
architecture. The mQAR is a small size and small weight
unit. Figure 2 depicts an installed mQAR.
As soon as the helicopter is powered up, the mQAR
automatically starts recording the available data until the
power is cut. Therefore no interaction by the pilot or
ground crew is necessary.
250
Storage medium is a SD (Secure Digital) memory card
which during normal operations can record several weeks
of flight data. Ground crews at each helicopter base are
instructed to download the recorded data periodically
every 2 to 4 weeks and upload it to a common data
storage.
Figure 2. Installed mQAR, the gray Box on the Right
Side of the Image.
Recorded Data
A large amount of data is available onboard. Basically,
data from the three sensors GPS, AHRS and FMS are
recorded on the EC-145/635 and GPS, FMS on the
AW109SP.
GPS data on EC145/635 consist on GPS position, satellite
vehicle position, pseudo range and pseudo range rate,
horizontal and vertical integrity limits and figure of
merits, carrier to noise ratio and different status
parameters. Position domain data only is available on the
AW109SP. AHRS data consist on roll, pitch and heading
information. Finally the flight plan as well as the selected
waypoints are available from the FMS. Sampling interval
on GPS and AHRS is 1Hz.
RFI DETECTION
The main parameter used for GNSS RFI detection is the
CNo of each tracked satellite. Any RFI would negatively
affect all CNo.
RFI on a Static GPS Receiver
Assessing the CNo of each tracked satellite could give an
indication on a possible RFI. Such an occurrence would
decrease the CNo by a constant value at each single epoch
because the entire GPS receiving antenna is affected by
the same interference level. Figure 3 shows a real
interference measured by a static GPS receiver. The
interference appeared instantaneously and the CNo
decreased by 5dB for all tracked satellites.
Figure 3. RFI on a Static GPS Receiver.
RFI Detection on a Dynamic GPS Receiver
RFI detection for a GPS receiver under dynamic
conditions can be treated analogously, but two difficulties
have to be taken into account. First a moving vehicle that
approaches a RFI source would usually be gradually
affected and the CNo would smoothly decrease in contrast
to the example shown in figure 3. Second the positions of
the satellites referred to the antenna have an impact on the
CNo. Changes of attitude of vehicle affects the CNo
values as shown as an example in figure 4.
Figure 4. Helicopter Maneuver Affecting GPS
Satellite's CNo.
The CNo alteration at the time of 56702.404, given in
days within MJD (Modified Julian Date) calendar, cannot
be attributed to a RFI as some satellites are negatively and
some positively affected. The observed values of roll and
251
pitch angles indicate that a maneuver has taken place at
this moment (figure 5).
Figure 5. Pitch and Roll Angles Affecting the CNo
Shown in Figure 4.
Following reasons apart from RFI might have an impact
on the CNo measurements:
1. signal fading caused by multipath from environment
outside the airframe
2. signal fading caused by multipath at the airframe
3. signal attenuation caused by the air frame (shadowing)
4. antenna gain pattern
5. variations in attenuation of cabling and gain of
amplifiers (antenna and receiver)
6. troposphere
7. ionosphere
Reason 1 can be brought under control by limiting the
measurements, where the helicopter has a minimum
velocity over ground. By doing that it can be avoided that
the geometry between satellite, reflector and GPS antenna
remains constant over a longer period and therefore signal
fading is very short and averaged.
Reasons 2 to 4 are always present and have to be taken
into account. Common to these reasons is, that the signal
attenuation depends mainly on the satellite position with
respect to the local coordinate system of the antenna.
Reason 5 is neglected as these amplifications and losses
are constant for all tracked satellites.
Reasons 6 and 7 are always present analogously to
reasons 2 to 4, but are independent on the vehicle's
attitude. In this case it is of interest to have an estimation
on the signal attenuation due to troposphere and
ionosphere. A major reason for the selection of the
L-band for GNSS purposes is the low signal attenuation
due to atmosphere. The tropospheric attenuation is far the CNo by only a few dB can be detected with this
below 1dB for signal paths entirely within the troposphere model.
[2], [3]. It is even lower for space-earth signal paths. The
ionospheric attenuation is assumed to be negligible [4].
Particular care should be taken under ionospheric
scintillation conditions, where the attenuation can be
increased at levels over 20dB [5], [6]. Ionospheric
scintillation is maximum near the geomagnetic equator
and smallest in the mid-latitude regions [5]. Despite the
location of Switzerland at mid-latitudes it is advantageous
to avoid RFI detection recordings during ionospheric
scintillation activities.

Finally only causes 2 to 4 are relevant for RFI detection.

These impacts on CNo can be derived empirically by
determining the CNo of the tracked satellites referred to
the antenna over a long period. Figure 6 shows a polar
plot of the mean CNo for bins of the size of 5 by 5
measured during 8 hours of flight for one helicopter type.
Figure 7. Measured CNo.

Figure 6. Polar Plot of Mean CNo Referred to the

Antenna.
A CNo of roughly 50 dB/Hz is measured for satellites at
the antenna zenith. The difference between this 50 dB/Hz
and the measured CNo for satellites at other positions
than the antenna zenith indicates the signal attenuation
depending on the antenna azimuth and zenith distance.
With the knowledge of these differences the measured
CNo can be compensated to a nominal value of 50dB/Hz.
Figures 7 and 8 show the effect of this compensation. The
measured CNo are shown in figure 7 where the
compensated CNo are represented in figure 8 (red lines).
A simple indicator for RFI is the mean value of the
compensated CNo, which is represented as blue line in
figure 8. This mean value is 50 dB/Hz with small noise.
Because a RFI affects the CNo of every satellite signal by
the same level, the mean value of the compensated CNo is
affected by the same level too. Therefore a RFI reducing
Figure 8. Compensated CNo (Red Lines) and Mean of
Compensated CNo (Blue Line).
CONCLUSIONS
A model has been developed, which enables to detect
potential RFI based on measurements of CNo and aerial
vehicle attitude. CNo attenuation due to the antenna
pattern and antenna environment is taken into account.
RFI affecting the CNo by only a few dB can be detected
with this model.
FUTURE WORK
Improvement of this RFI detection model can be achieved
by refining the antenna CNo attenuation pattern. This is
done by assessing a larger amount of data recorded on

252
flight. Further it is expected that additional recorded
parameters are also affected under RFI conditions. Taking
these parameters into account will reduce the probabilities
of missed and false RFI detection.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks go to CHIPS and the Swiss Federal Office

of Civil Aviation for the financial support of this project
within the frame of the applied research and development
programme for implementation of future navigation
applications in Switzerland.

REFERENCES

[1] Scaramuzza et al., 2013, GNSS Navigation

Performance versus Aerial Vehicle's Trajectory in
Mountainous Terrain, ISPA 2013.

[2] Curry, Richard, 2012, Radar Essentials, Scitech

Publishing Inc.

[3] ITU, 2013, Attenuation by atmospheric gases,

Recommendation ITU-R P.676-10, P Series, Radiowave
propagation, 09/2013.

[4] Christie, Jock et al., 1996, The Effects of the

Ionosphere and C/A Frequency on GPS Signal Shape:
Considerations for GNSS-2, Proceedings of the 9th
International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division
of The Institute of Navigation (ION GPS 1996).

[5] ITU, 2013, Propagation data and prediction methods

required for the design of Earth-space telecommunication
systems, Recommendation ITU-R P.618-11, P Series,
Radiowave propagation, 09/2013.

[6] ITU, 2013, Ionospheric propagation data and

prediction methods required for the design of satellite
services and systems, Recommendation ITU-R P.531-12,
P Series, Radiowave propagation, 09/2013

253
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254
 Session 9
Safety Concepts
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Common Standards in Flight Inspection
Operations The Way Ahead to Improve
Safety?
Capt Thomas Wede
TransPolar GmbH
Hermann-Blenk-Str. 17
D - 38108 Braunschweig
Germany
Tel. + 49 - 172 - 430 58 03
e-mail t.wede@transpolar.de
ABSTRACT
The following paper continues from the paper and
presentation given on the last IFIS 2012 in Braunschweig
by the same author, which covered flight safety on flight
inspection missions, and ways to mitigate risks associated
with flying these particular types of missions. The new
paper represents the status of discussions the Operational
Working Group within ICASC reached on this topic to
this day.
After briefly re-visiting the specific risks involved in
flying flight inspection missions, the paper continues with
giving a detailed insight into a proposed structure of a
flight operation dealing with flight inspection / flight
validation. Aspects like the operational environment or
set-up of the flight department, safety and risk mitigation
strategies, equipment and training will be covered.
Although some topics are dealt with rather in detail like
Operation Manuals, Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs), Check Lists and Crew Coordination Concepts
the author is trying to strike a fine balance between over-
regulating and laissez-faire, knowing very well from
experience that a one-size-fits-all-approach simply does
not work in the flight inspection industry.
In closing, the paper continues the discussion towards a
common ground in flight inspection operations, by trying
to establish a minimum standard for a flight inspection /
flight validation department.
INTRODUCTION
Flight Inspection and Flight Validation represents a rather
demanding operational environment in aviation. Its very
Tho ma s Wede, TransPolar G mbH
nature translates into a certain amount of risk elements
which are covered in a following chapter - , that have to
be identified, addressed and subsequently mitigated in
order to achieve a safe and reliable flight operation.
The tools to mitigate these risks are wide and varied. This
paper tries to identify these tools, concentrating on the
organizational set-up and environment of a flight
inspection entity. In each chapter, recommendations are
given how to address certain aspects. The idea is to arrive
at a common set of tools that might be useful in achieving
the goal of a safe flight inspection flight operation. But
prior to start the discussion on this tool-set, let us have a
look at the flight inspection-specific risk elements again:
FLIGHT INSPECTION-RELATED RISKS
REVISITED
International accident data show that a combined 56,6%
of all accidents in aviation happen either on take-off,
approach or landing - the very segments of the flight
envelope the flight inspection community spends between
[5]
70 to 80% of all their flight time.
Further challenges we encounter in our flight inspection /
flight validation work:
We have to fly low, sometimes very low.
We fly in densely populated airspace, seeing and
avoiding other traffic is absolutely paramount.
We fly demanding missions with at times high
crew workload, necessitating to liaise with ATC,
ground engineers and the NavAid Inspector on
board simultaneously.
257
 We might find ourselves in operationally harsh
environments, both with regard to climate /
weather, as well as infrastructure, ATC, etc.
On commissioning flight checks, unknown
terrain and obstacle data might pose a challenge.
Working internationally, language barriers might
hamper communications, both on the ground as
in the air.
Flying demanding missions, maybe on
deployment for several days or even weeks in a
row, ever poses the danger of crew fatigue.
Regardless of working either for a government or
for a private service provider, we most of the
time face a certain commercial pressure, as flight
inspection does tend to interrupt the usual
routine at any airport, which might cause delays
to ( and in turn: generates pressure from) the
airlines.
To keep the aircraft being used for flight
inspection and their respective systems
technically up to date with current requirements
at times poses a challenge, again in the light of
ever present commercial pressure.
All these bullet points mentioned above form the mission
related factors that govern the risk of our work. To put all
this a bit more into perspective, let us re-visited a more
generic risk model as described in the last paper of the
IFIS 2012:
According to the standards of risk research, all aviation
accidents fall under the category of the so-called low
probability / high consequence events (lp/hc), were
The lp/hc problem domains are inherently ill-structured,
multi-layered, and characterized by consequences with
low likelihoods, high severities and numerous, pervasive
uncertainties. Decision making is typically complex,
multitiered and non-transparent with conflicting
[1]
objectives and multiple perspectives (Clement 1996)
Translated into a much more simplified formula, it might
be fair to say that risk is the product of probability
multiplied by severity
Risk = Probability * Severity
To further refine our formula above we might break down
probability into number of (flight) events multiplied by
interfering factors and these are all the things that might
go wrong, like weather, ATC, crew performance,
technical issues with airframe and systems, operational
environment and circumstances, etc.
258
Risk = Probability * Severity
with P = ( Events * Interfering Factors),
= Risk = (E * IF ) * S
We can further break down the Interfering Factors into
being mission-specific all the bullet points above, which
we can only influence to a certain degree and
operational aspects: how we set-up up our flight operation
in terms of training, aircraft, equipment, operating
guidelines, etc.:
with IF = (Mission specific * Operational)
= R = (E * (MS * O) ) * S
= Risk = Probability * Severity
( Events * Interfering Factors)
(Mission specific * Operational)
In the light of this formula, it is quite obvious that the
flight inspection community has to focus on the
operational aspects (O) of our working environment, as
this is the part of the equation we can directly influence;
the other factors like Events (= number of flights) are
dictated by the required flight inspection intervals and the
Mission Specific factors are governed by the very nature
of our mission profile.
How to address these operational aspects is dealt with in
the following chapters.
OPERATIONAL SET-UP: GENERAL
Flight Inspection / Flight Validation organizations come
in wide array of forms and shapes: they can be organized
as a government body or come as a private enterprise.
They might be a big organization with dozens of aircraft
and hundreds of employees, or being a very small
operator with just one aircraft and a handful of staff.
The regulatory oversight imposed on them might be fairly
strict, or might be rather relaxed: in most countries, aerial
work under which domain flight inspection will fall is
governed by appropriate government rules and
regulations, dealing specifically with the requirements of
this specific activity in aviation.
Other countries do not have such a dedicated regulatory
framework. Interesting enough, Germany is such a
country, where aerial work is not subject to specific
regulation.
Most customers, on the other hand, today require their
flight inspection service provider to be subject to some
form of regulatory oversight and to have an appropriate
Air Operator Certificate (AOC).
With flight inspection organizations coming in all forms
and shapes, flying a wide variety of flight inspection
missions, it is quite obvious that a one-size-fit-all-
approach simply will not work. Each organization is
called upon to come up with a set-up and organizational
framework that bests fits its individual work environment
and requirements. In the interest of safety, and on top, a
common standard in the flight inspection community, it is
recommended, though, that whatever the organizational
framework, whatever the size of any flight inspection
organization, to give some consideration to some ele-
mental requirements for a safe operation of the entity:
A clearly defined mission profile:
What kind of missions are expected to be flown?
Where? With what kind of equipment?
A clearly defined organizational set-up of the
entity that reflects the mission profile above and
clearly defines interfaces within the entity:
Who is responsible for doing what within the
organization, requiring what training, reporting
to whom?
A clearly defined set of rules, procedures and
best practices, laid down in an appropriate set of
company documents (best maybe combined in a
single document like an Operation Manual
(OM)):
Who is doing what and when with what
Elements of this organizational set-up will be described
more in detail in the following chapters. Prior embarking
on that endeavor, though, some words on an underlying
principle that should be part of the organizations
philosophy: Keep it simple and stupid (KISS) ! It is very
tempting to try and govern and cover every little detail of
the organization: The result might be arriving at 400
procedures with 1200 related documents the sheer
volume of the work to maintain and support that level of
governance will put even big organizations to the limit,
and even more important: it will overwhelm the front-end
crews, resulting in the end in a unsatisfactory
performance in terms of quality and safety. It should be
remembered that the final product of flight inspection is
generated by a flight crew (cockpit and cabin), flying an
already demanding mission. All aspects of internal
governance and it related documents must therefore
259
reflect that fact and thus be kept concise, clear and
reduced to the maximum.
Safety Philosophy / Safety Management System (SMS)
Safety, as per ICAO, is defined as
the state in which the risk of harm to persons or of
property damage is reduced to, and maintained at or
below, an acceptable level through a continuing process
of hazard identification and risk management
ICAO Doc 9859, 1-1[3]
To arrive at that point, each flight inspection entity should
define its own safety philosophy, identifying risks of its
individual operation and strategies to mitigate them.
The ICAO Doc 9859 Safety Management Manual gives a
very good oversight on the topic and provides valuable
tools and procedures how to arrive at a safety philosophy,
and how to implement it in ones own flight organization.
The Safety Management System (SMS) is the formalized
approach of an organization on how to implement its
safety philosophy, by describing risk identification
methods and tools, risk communication and mitigation
strategies, clearly defining lines of responsibilities and
accountability.
As safety is a very complex topic, and Doc 9859 alone
covers 290 pages, the reader is referred to that document
for details. A number of topics shall be addressed in this
paper, though, in more detail:
An essential part of any safety philosophy and its ensuing
safety management system is the clear and unambiguous
commitment of all stakeholders within the organization to
safety. That always has to be a top-down-commitment:
management of the organization has to encompass and
support the safety concept of the organization with
uncompromised rigor, otherwise it will ultimately fail.
This commitment is easier said than done, as safety, more
often than not, has cost implications these cost
implications notwithstanding, safety has to be
communicated and lived up to! as the number one priority
of any entitys leadership.
As part of the SMS, it is recommended to implement a
Reporting System, allowing each member of the
organization to give feedback on any issues that might be
safety-related. Again, in the light of keeping the
organization lucid, and depending on the size of the
organization in question, a reporting system does not
necessarily have to be formalized with sophisticated
forms and lines of communication, some form of
feedback should be established, though (i.e. in the shape
of regular safety meetings, simple emails, etc.). That form
of communication should, in any case, be encouraged by
management.
An integral and essential part of any reporting system is
the implementation of a so-called Just Culture, which
means that no repercussions or negative effects have to be
expected by those individuals who report any issues, even
when these issues have been caused by omission or error.
Without this just culture, a viable form of feedback on
safety issues cannot be established, and thus an important
loop of communication on safety cannot be closed.
Finally, and again in line with the requirement of keeping
organizational policies and documents light and lucid, it
should be noted that a SMS does not necessarily have to
be published as a stand-alone document; in an ideal
world, the SMS is an integral part of the Operations
Manual of the organization, thus keeping documents to be
maintained, read and understood to a minimum. ICAO in
Doc 9859 supports this approach.
Operating limits
An essential part of any safety philosophy should be the
publication of Operating Limits applying to the individual
organization.
Operating limits should cover all aspects of the flight
operation, addressing topics like:
Weather minima
Minimum Equipment status and requirements
Crew qualification, training and recurrency
standards
Flight and Rest Time Limitations (FTLs)
Airport criteria
Security aspects
These bullet points will be addressed to a certain extent in
the chapters to follow. In general, though, operating
criteria should be realistic in the light of the missions
intended to be flown. Here, a balance between safety and
operational requirements has to be struck: Minima with an
excessively high threshold might enhance safety, but will
limit the operation up to a point where providing a
reliable service to the customer will be impossible.
Again, operating limits have to be accepted by all
stakeholders from top down; raising minima and
expecting the same productivity output, for instance, will
not be a realistic prospect.
260
Therefore, operating limits should be set after careful
study of the operational environment to be expected,
equipment to be used and crew qualification considered.
The limits have to be open, transparent, clearly
communicated and no ambiguities must exist between the
organizations ambitions and targets and its operating
limits.
Again, for ease of operation and reference, the operating
limits should be an integral part of the Operations Manual
of the organization.
Equipment
One of the most important factors affecting safety on
flight inspection / flight validation missions is the choice
of the appropriate aircraft. Again, in the light of the wide
variety of flight calibration missions and theatres of
operation, there is no one-size-fits-all solution in picking
the right aircraft. In general, the aircraft type should be
able to fly the mission required without too many
restrictions (i.e. fuel load, payload), in order not to
pressure crews too much into accepting risks, just to get
the mission done.
Under normal circumstances, the size of the equipment
required to fulfill the role more or less dictates the size of
the aircraft in use. With the advent of very small, low cost
Flight Inspection Systems, using fairly small twin-
engined piston aircraft became a viable option in the
flight inspection world. A prominent example of this new
breed is the Diamond DA42 Twinstar. Under defined
circumstances (limited amount of flying required per year,
moderate climate, moderate terrain, no high top speed
required at busy airports) it is already clear that the
combination of low cost FIS and low cost aircraft do
work; it remains to be seen over the next years, though,
how well this combination fares when pushed harder,
both in terms of flying hours required and harsher
external environments encountered.
With the advent of modern single-engine turboprops, like
the Cessna Caravan, the Pilatus PC12 or the Socata
TBM850, there are even projects envisioned to use these
aircraft for flight inspection missions. It remains to be
seen how the regulatory environment will react to this
proposition; it would further be worthwhile to discuss
within the community the use of single-engine aircraft for
flight inspection work.
The flight inspection aircraft in use should be maintained
and upgraded as best as possible to the current, mission-
specific requirements.
Proper maintenance based on an appropriate maintenance
program, by qualified staff, at the right intervals, is a must
that goes without saying.
Providing a cockpit environment that offers a good
support to achieve situational awareness is highly
desirable. Today, this almost automatically translates into
a glass cockpit with a suitable Flight Management System
FMS, and moving map displays that goes with it.
Being able to depict the calibration mission (desired
tracks, tracks to starting point of a run) as well in one way
or the other to the cockpit crew is highly recommended as
well , either by interfacing the Flight Inspection System
FIS with the existing avionics (preferred option), or by
providing an additional display.
It cannot be stressed enough that keeping situational
awareness is absolutely paramount on flight inspection
missions, any piece of equipment supporting that goal,
therefor, is highly desirable.
When flying Procedure Validation missions, a FMS
commensurate with the task is a must the FMS must be
capable of processing the ARINC424 formats used by the
procedure designer / coder, for instance, and depicting
them properly.
A Traffic Collision Avoiding System TCAS is a highly
desirable piece of equipment to have on board, especially
when flying in densely populated airspace. As TCAS is
not really cheap ( USD 250.00 500.000,- per aircraft),
this might easily collide with the commercial pressures
mentioned above. Nevertheless, as this is a very effective
tool to enhance safety, it should be installed whenever
possible. To benefit from it, proper training should be
supplied; part of that training should be to raise awareness
that TCAS might not be able to see all traffic, as some
other targets might have switched off their transponders
or do not have on to start with like gliders, a major
challenge in Germany at times, for instance. So the
requirement for constant airspace surveillance remains.
There are other, low-cost TCAS-Look-alike solutions out
there on the market. When installed, great care must be
taken that the installation was done properly, otherwise
false / nuisance indications might result, which effectively
do more harm than good, as they distract the crew and
undermine the confidence in the system.
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems EGPWS
are another valuable safety feature. On flight inspection
missions it does have its limitations, though, as it will
cause false alarms when flying low approaches with gear /
flaps up. As repetitive false alarms must be avoided, when
EGPWS is installed on flight inspection aircraft, having a
261
switch available to turn the system off and back on, when
required, is paramount. For turning the EGPWS off and
later back on after mission, an appropriate SOP has to be
devised by the respective flight operation, and that SOP
has to be reflected by the Normal Checklist in use.
In order to reduce stress for the crew as much as possible,
all systems that provide cabin comfort should be
operational and effective (heating in cold climate, air
conditioning in hot climate). Notably an effective air
conditioning is paramount in hot climates, as heat tends to
foster the onset of fatigue considerably. Apart from issues
affecting the crew, a functioning air conditioning in hot
climates are paramount for the integrity of the Flight
Inspection System (FIS) and its respective navigation
receivers.
Crewing
Every operator will have his individual selection and
hiring process. Great care should be spent on finding
pilots that do have a professional attitude towards special
mission flying not too many per the classes that
annually leave the flight schools, by this authors own
experience, as the vast majority of the pilot community is
striving for a job with the big airlines. Emphasis should
be put on adjusting the candidates focus on the aircraft
being merely a tool for a greater purpose; when in
commercial flying the task is to fly safely from A to B, in
our world the real job only starts at B.
ICAO Doc 9906 vol 6 gives a very good insight into
initial qualification requirements for Flight Validation
Pilots (FVPs). By and large, these criteria apply to a
Flight Inspection Pilot as well. For Commanders on a
flight inspection mission they read as follows:
CPL or ATPL with IR
Current type rating for the type to be
flown on mission
Total flight time > 1.500 hrs
Command time > 400 hrs
Flight Inspection Pilot for more than 2
[2]
years
It is recommended to set up policies regarding initial and
recurrent training, recency, and crewing in the light of
mission requirements and individual qualification.
Again, it is recommended to keep this qualification matrix
not overly complex, as it might hamper operations
considerably otherwise.
Operational status
A number of flight inspection missions are outside the
normal operating envelope of the aviation community. In
many case this stipulates a requirement for official
approval of these kinds of operations (i.e. flying below
the Minimum Safety Altitude in some countries, night
flying activities, etc.) Whenever possible, it is
recommended that the affected flight inspection
organization applies for this approval or waiver at the
appropriate authorities, to minimize ambiguities and
potential risk of violating rules and regulations, which in
turn will reduce crew workload considerably.
Quality Management System QMS
A Quality Management System (QMS) should be an
essential part of any flight inspection organization. Most
regulatory frameworks address this requirement an
AOC holder is required to set up a QMS, for instance.
A QMS is highly desirable for tracking the performance
of, and thus providing integrity for, the flight inspection
mission itself.
Again, requirements on the side of the flight inspection
regulator notwithstanding, a QMS can be an integral part
of the overall OM of an organization, thus again reducing
complexity in the organizations documentation.
OPERATIONS MANUAL
The Operations Manual (OM) can be viewed as the
central document of an organization dealing with all
aspects of the flight operation.
Its format, structure and extent, to a certain degree, will
be driven by the individual requirements of the regulator
being in charge of that particular entity.
Numerous layouts and templates for an OM exist with
various regulators; it would be beyond the scope of this
paper to name them in detail.
In general, what an OM should cover, are aspects as
follows:
Organizational set-up
Responsibilities and accountabilities
Aircraft related subjects (Minimum Equipment
List MEL, navigation equipment, etc.)
Limitations and Minima
Crewing
Operational Procedures, Normal and Abnormal
262
All weather operations
Flight and Rest Time Limitations
Training
Security
Again, as reiterated a number of times in this paper, the
OM should be concise and limited to the absolute
minimum necessary, in order to avoid over-complexity,
which would only create a work atmosphere of ambiguity
and double standards. An OM has to be workable under
all operational circumstances the organization is operating
under.
Some content of an OM shall be discussed in more detail
in the following paragraphs.
Crew Resource Management (CRM) / Crew
Coordination Concept (CCC)
Crew Resource Management is an essential part of any
professional flight organization for many years now. It is
highly recommended for any entity in flight inspection
operations to take up the task of defining a workable
CRM system and a Crew Coordination Concept that goes
with it.
A CCC basically defines how a crew on task is to work
together, laying down fairly in detail which crew member
is doing what when and how. It clearly describes the
communication involved in executing these tasks and
should be backed-up by Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) and Checklists (more to that below).
The CRM system, however, does not only define the
cooperation between cockpit members, it also should
encompass procedures and communication between
cockpit and cabin, and it should define the interface
between the flight crew and the rest of the company, like
tasking / scheduling, management, etc. This rather holistic
approach in CRM is of great importance to create a
working environment that takes into account all
requirements to accomplish the organizations mission
profile safely and reliably.
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) describe how
certain aspects of the scope of work are handled by
whom, at what time.
SOPs govern aspects like cockpit work, crew
coordination, checklist philosophy, but also issues like
how to execute certain calibration profiles, how to
schedule tasks, write reports, etc.
Again, SOPs should be commensurate with the task at
hand. They should be concise, transparent, and again, be
an integral part of the OM.
Checklists
Checklists form an enormously important part of the
operating environment. Again, the KISS approach is
highly recommended: it is a well-known fact that the
manufacturers checklists, especially when the aircraft in
question is certified for single pilot operations, are often
useless in a normal aviation environment for reasons of
over-complexity and length. These checklists reflect legal
and liability issues, which might be well required to keep
the manufacturer from harm in legal terms, however,
focusing on these legal aspects unfortunately renders
these checklists almost useless.
So every operator is called upon to design checklists that
do reflect its individual needs. Depending on the
regulatory environment it might be necessary to get the
altered checklist approved by the respective regulator.
The checklists as well should reflect the operational
environment the specific missions are flown in. Again,
avoid over-complexity. The checklists have to be in line
with SOPs and other procedures laid down in the OM, a
very important aspect to keep in mind.
TRAINING
The importance of training in aviation in general, and in
flight inspection in particular, cannot be overestimated.
Every flight inspection organization should set out and
establish a training regime, covering both initial as well as
recurrent training, and then stick to that training regime.
This translates into a certain commitment from all
stakeholders involved including management, as training
inevitably has cost implications.
Again, that training regime shall be written down in a
concise document, with that document being an integral
part on the OM of the organization.
Whenever a suitable simulator for the type operated by
the organization is in reasonable reach, it is strongly
recommended to use that simulator both for initial as well
as recurrent training.
As the standard type rating and recurrent training
provided by the big training houses does not really reflect
the particular aspects of flight inspection missions, it is
further strongly recommended to introduce ones own
training program / syllabus and own SOPs, checklists, etc.
into the training, starting from initial training on. At least
the two biggest training and simulator providers are more
263
than happy to accommodate the individual needs of an
operator, train according to their syllabus, checklists, etc,
or even accept their instructors as co-instructors or even
full-time instructors for that particular organization.
Special emphasis should be laid on the transition training
once the initial training on the simulator has been passed,
as in almost all circumstances the cockpit layout,
interfaces etc. of the calibration aircraft in operation will
differ significantly from the simulators standard layout.
RISK MITIGATION STRATEGY
Every flight inspection organization should embark on
formulating a Risk Mitigation Strategy by identifying
risks associated with specific missions, address them and
come up with solutions how to mitigate these risks.
In an ideal world, this risk mitigation strategy is an
integral part of the overall operating procedures of an
organization and well described in its documents,
preferably its OM and as such, has been covered in this
paper.
Some aspects of the risk mitigation strategy warrant a
closer look, though, and shall be discussed here in more
detail:
Any risk mitigation strategy shall address the external
circumstances of the operation: where do we operate,
doing what with whom? How is the terrain, how is the
infrastructure (fuel / de-icing / hangar available)? How
well is ATC organized, is radar coverage given? Who on
a specific mission will be point of contact for the
company? Who for the crew? How is the security
situation on site / in country?
Giving all this a thorough consideration is even more
important when doing commissioning flight checks at
new airports.
Dealing with these questions effectively constitutes some
sort of risk assessment prior embarking on the mission,
something that is highly recommended. Whenever
possible, these data should be collated prior bidding for a
tender; marketing or management should try to find out as
much information as possible prior committing to a task,
in order to reduce pressure and stress to the crew on site
later.
Avoiding crew fatigue is another major issue: Most AOC
holders are regulated in terms of Flight and Rest Time
Limitations (FTLs) by their respective regulator.
However, as the trend in the regulatory regime goes more
and more in the direction of operator-specific FTLs that
have to be scientifically based and approved by the
authority, and as standard FTL regime do not really
reflect the special needs of a flight inspection REFERENCES
organization, it is highly recommended for each flight
inspection entity to come up with an individual FTL [1] James T.Luxhoj et al, 2006, Modeling Low
regime, reflecting and taking into account the specific Probability / High Consequence Events: An Aviation
operational requirements of that organization. Safety Risk Model
[2] ICAO, July 2011, The Quality Assurance Manual for
At what point fatigue hits will very much depend on the
Flight Procedure Design, Doc 9906, Volume 6 Flight
type of mission flown ( ILS low level work, in general,
Validation Pilot Training and Evaluation,
being more stressful then airway work high up), the
http://www.icao.int
aircraft being used (Cockpit equipment being available,
space available on board, susceptibility to turbulence, [3] ICAO, First Edition 2006, The Safety Management
temperature control) and the environment operated in ( Manual, Doc 9859
poor ATC? Poor infrastructure, i.e. refueling a major http://www.icao.int
undertaking? Night flying involved?). Thus, geographical
[4] EU 295/2012, 05 October 2012, EASA OPS
and climatological conditions of theatre of operation,
length of deployment, transit times and other factors, like [5] Thomas Wede, 2012: Flight Safety on Flight
aircraft and cockpit equipment mentioned above should Inspection Missions Past Statistics and Future Strategies
be taken into account when designing a FTL scheme. Proceedings of the 17th IFIS, Braunschweig, 2012

It is recommended to liaise as closely as possible with the

crews affected when designing FTL schemes, as they
might be able to provide valuable input as to what is both
desirable and practicable as well.

It goes without saying that in the end, the proposed FTL

scheme has to be approved by the authority in charge.

A very important consideration also is accommodation

and transportation for crews, notably when away from
base. It must be assured that a good rest and a good night
sleep can be accomplished at the accommodation picked.
Transits in and out of theatre of operation should be as
efficient as possible, both to save on valuable duty time as
well as avoiding fatigue on crews after a lengthy airline
flight with various connections.

CONCLUSIONS

Managing risk in the very demanding flight inspection

environment is achievable by applying a number of
common standards covered in this paper

Applying these standards to all organizations dealing with

flight inspection not only would provide a level playing
field for all parties involved, it would undoubtedly foster
and enhance safety in this sector of the aviation industry
considerably.

RECOMMENDATIONS / FUTURE WORK

It is therefore recommended to continue the discussion on

common standards in flight operation of our industry,
with the ultimate goal of establishing a common set of
standards that all parties involved could subscribe to.

264
 Study on Crew Resource Management in Flight
Inspection of Localizer
Song Xitong
Flight Inspector
Flight Inspection Center of CAAC
Chaoyang District, Beijing, China
Fax: +0086-010-64542800
E-mail: songyeng2008@aliyun.com
348258176@qq.com
ABSTRACT
Compared with commercial flight, flight inspection has its
own special characteristics. The flight inspection crew
need to cooperate closely, and timely communicate with
the ATC controllers and maintenance technicians, so that
we can complete the flight inspection safely, high-quality,
and efficiently. Because the Localizer (LOC) profiles
need to cross the course, many factors will affect flight
safety, inspection quality and efficiency.
Crew Resource Management (CRM) in LOC flight
inspection is of great significance for improving the safety
and quality of the flight inspection.
In this paper, combined with the actual flight inspection,
the author analyses key factors affecting flight safety and
quality, studies the major factors from CRM aspects, such
as human, equipment, environment, and gives
recommendation and proposal to improve the safety and
quality of the flight inspection.
INTRODUCTION
Flight inspection is to calibrate, test and evaluate spatial
signal quality of navigation, radar, communication and
other facilities. Safe, reliable and accurate flight
inspection is the basic premise of airport operation. Flight
inspection is an important link to ensure the flight safety
of civil aviation.
Compared with commercial flight, flight inspection has its
own special characteristics. The flight inspection crew
need to cooperate closely, and timely communicate with
the ATC controllers and maintenance technicians, so that
we can complete the flight inspection safely, high-quality,
and efficiently.
Song Xito ng, CAAC
Because the Localizer (LOC) profiles need to cross the
final course, many factors will affect flight safety,
inspection quality and efficiency. Therefore, Crew
Resource Management (CRM) in LOC flight inspection
has great significance for improving the flight inspection
safety and quality. In this paper, combined with the actual
flight inspection, the author analyses key factors affecting
flight safety and quality, studies the major factors from
CRM aspects, such as human, equipment, environment,
and gives recommendation and proposal to improve the
safety and quality of the flight inspection.
HUMAN FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY
AND SAFETY OF FLIGHT INSPECTION
During flight inspection, human factors such as
communication process, inquiry and reply, will affect the
quality and safety of flight inspection.
Communication Process
During fight inspection, provided effective
communication process among crew members, the
quality, efficiency and safety have been greatly improved.
In contrast, poor communication can weaken the crew
members technical ability, arise some
misunderstandings, and affect the quality, efficiency and
safety.
The communication process involves the flight inspectors,
pilots, ATC controllers and maintenance technicians. In
order to avoid the misunderstandings and mistakes,
closed-loop mode must be used during the
communication process, as shown in Figure 1.
265

Send Information
Closed-loop
Confirm Receive and Verify
Information Information
Figure 1. Closed-loop Communication mode
Inquiry and Reply
Research shows that inquiry and reply is the weakest link
in modern crew resource management. For example,
during one mission, the flight inspector required the pilot
to perform ILS profile 4 (please see Appendix 1 for
detailed ILS profile classification), but the pilot did not
hear the instruction clearly due to interphone interference.
Whats more, the pilot did not confirm the instruction
with the inspector and then apply for ILS profile 3
directly, which leads to the decrease of the flight
efficiency.
There are many actual flight inspection cases all pointing
to the weakness of inquiry and reply. Even if there are
inquiries, the crew member may not take it through the
end, and the communication process is not a closed-loop.
The pilots checklist is a formal inquiry and response
forms, which contributes to define normal and abnormal
situations. Inquiry and reply may not like to perform the
checklist, but can learn its execution idea.
In addition, the captain has the responsibility to establish
a beneficial inquiry atmosphere. If the captain does not
establish such an environment, the other crew members
should try to establish a beneficial inquiry atmosphere,
and must be confident to inquiry.
EQUIPMENT FACTORS AFFECTING THE
QUALITY AND SAFETY OF FLIGHT
INSPECTION
During flight inspection, equipment factors such as
interphone system, air-ground communication system and
inspection console system, will affect the quality and
safety of flight inspection.
266
Interphone System
Communication between inspectors and pilots is carried
out through interphone system. As the most important
link, communication between inspectors and pilots
determines the flight inspection quality, efficiency and
safety, to a certain extent. If interphone is abnormal,
inspector cannot convey profile arrangement to pilot, and
pilot cannot inform the air traffic situation to the
inspector. Therefore, interphone system is the key factor
to influence the crew resource management.
Air-ground Communication System
Inspectors use air-ground communication system to
release facility adjustment command, confirm facility
status and inform flight inspection data. Clear, accurate
and readable communication is an important guarantee to
convey the intention between the air and the ground
timely and effectively.
Air-ground communication system between the
inspection console and the cockpit should be completely
isolated from each other to avoid mutual interference.
Inspection Console System
Many functions of inspection console system play a
supporting role on flight efficiency and safety.
CAAC has installed a GARMIN200 display system on its
inspection console, as shown in Figure 2. Combining the
terrain database, GPS signal source, the UAT data, it can
display the aircrafts status of selected region. Using this
function, flight inspector can get terrain and all aircraft
status of operation areas, and predict the terrain and other
aircrafts influences on inspection aircraft.
Inspection software can display the flight trajectory,
longitude, latitude, altitude and the relative location of
calibrated facilities by computing the GPS positioning
signal and calibrated facility database. In LOC profile,
inspector can obtain the aircrafts relative location of
LOC, such as distance, azimuth, left/right course, etc. For
some profiles which are far away from the Instrument
Approach Procedure (IAP) protected area, this function
plays a supporting role on flight safety. For example, the
LOC coverage profile must fly a 17 (25) nautical
miles/35 (10) degrees arc to check whether the LOC
power can meet the tolerance in the Standard Service
Volume (SSV) and Expanded Service Volume (ESV).
Using this function, the inspector can accurately grasp the
circumstances that the aircraft comes into marginal area
such as 17 nautical miles/35 degrees and 25 nautical
miles/10 degrees. In this case, the inspector should
reasonably grasp the information resources, timely notify
the pilot and observe the external terrain to grasp the
aircrafts real-time status during maneuver turning.
The flight procedure of LOC clearance in ILS of ZPJZ
RWY20 is shown in Figure 3. There is a 4632-meter
mountain located at the left side, 25 degrees from the
front course line. According to the flight inspection rules,
we need to check the LOC clearance in the QNH 4800
meters, but cannot meet the requirement of 300 meters
Minimum Obstacle Clearance (MOC) in some areas.
Considering the maneuver and turning radius after
sampling, sampling area delineated within the 17 degrees.
The area outside the 17 degrees is annotated as restricted
due to terrain.

Figure 2. GARMIN200 Display System

In addition another important function of the console is

to monitor the cockpit air-ground communication without
tuning any frequency. The monitoring function can reduce
the call volume between pilots and inspector, which will
significantly reduce the crew members workload.

ENVIRONMENT FACTORS AFFECTING THE

QUALITY AND SAFETY OF FLIGHT
INSPECTION

Because the LOC profiles need to cross the course line,

the aircraft may fly beyond the IAPs protect area. The
crew must follow the Visual Flight Rules (VFR) during
LOC flight inspection. Considering the flight procedure
and sample method, the information factors that affect the
quality and safety is LOC course surrounding terrain,
visibility, ceiling, air traffic flow and day-night flight, etc.

LOC Course Surrounding Terrain Figure 3. ZPJZ RWY20 LOC Clearance Flight
Inspection Procedure
LOC width, clearance and coverage inspections need to
cross the course line. LOC course surrounding terrain has
significant effect on the quality and safety of flight Visibility and Ceiling
inspection. China has the most High Plateau Airports
(HPAs) in the world. By April 2014, there are 11 HPAs During LOC flight inspection, a higher weather standard
with elevation over 8,000 feet in operation. Flight is required due to VFR. The ceiling must be higher than
inspections in those HPAs are more difficult and risky. the inspection procedure altitude. The visibility must be
Therefore, flight inspection for HPAs in China is the most high enough to ensure the pilots can see the ground.
difficult and complicated operation all over the world. Flying into the cloud is prohibited during LOC
inspections.
Lets take Jiuzhai Huanglong Airport (Airport Code:
ZPJZ) as the example; around the ILS course of RWY20, Air Traffic and Flight Flow
we can see many mountains. The inspection aircraft
Nowadays, airport traffic and flight flow has increased
cannot fly over the Standard Service Volume (SSV) due
rapidly in China. By the end of 2013, we already have ten
to terrain restriction. The ILS of RWY20 will be
airports with more than twenty million annual passenger
classified as RESTRICTED with the report annotated as
capacities within Chinese Mainland. The conflicts
to the limited coverage flown.1 The published NOTAM
between commercial flights and flight inspection have
will show the ILS of ZPJZ RWY20 as UNUSABLE in the
become more and more prominent. Therefore, how to
areas where cannot be checked.

267
coordinate the conflict of commercial flight and flight
inspection is an urgent research topic.

Flight Inspection at Night

In some high-density airports, conducting flight

inspection in daytime will put more pressure on
controllers and may bring less safety and more delays. So,
more and more flight inspection operators are seeking
ways to conduct the flight inspections at night time to
avoid interfering with normal flight operations. 2

The inspectors should evaluate effect of night condition,

and determine if there are any vital measurement
differences between day and night operations, such as city Figure 4. Flight Inspection Procedure Manuals
background radio noise, reflecting obstacles, etc.
in Our Office
The pilots conducting night fight must operate above the
Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA). Some profiles whose ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
altitudes are lower than MSA should not be taken at night.
The author gratefully acknowledges the Flight Inspection
Center of CAAC for their support. Special thanks go to
CONCLUSIONS
some flight inspectors and Ms. Cuijie for their
In this paper, combined with the actual flight inspection, contributions to my work and paper.
the author analyses key factors affecting flight safety and
quality, studies the major factors from CRM aspects, such REFERENCES
as human, equipment, environment, and gives suggestions
[1] FAA, 01 October 2005, United States Standard Flight
and proposal to improve the flight inspection safety and
Inspection Manual Order 8200.1C
quality.
[2] ICAO, 31 October 2002, Manual on Testing of
a. The latest consoles developed by CAAC can monitor Radio Navigation Aids, Doc 8071, Volume 1, Testing of
the cockpit air-ground communication. This function Ground-based Radio Navigation Systems, 4th Edition,
can reduce the crew members workload http://www.icao.int
significantly.

b. Flight Inspection Center of CAAC has made Flight

Inspection Procedure Manuals for every airports
operating in China Mainland, as shown in Figure 4.
These manuals specify the flight methods of each
profile in different airports. The standard flight
inspection procedures, such as altitude, range and
sector angle, are described on the flight charts or
terrain maps, in which way to improve the CRM
among pilots, inspectors, controllers, and ground
technicians efficiently.

268
 APPENDIX 1

ILS Profiles of China Flight Inspection

In order to improve flight quality, efficiency and safety, Flight Inspection Center of CAAC has classified the ILS inspection
into seven profiles, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. ILS Profiles Classification

Parameters:
Profile 1 LOC: Alignment, Structure, Modulation, Polarization
Approach GP: Angle, Height of reference datum, Structure,

Modulation

Parameters:
Profile 2
GP width/displacement sensitivity, Symmetry, monitor
Level Run

Parameters:

Profile 3 LOC width/displacement sensitivity, Symmetry, monitor

Level Arc

Parameters:

Profile 4 LOC Clearance

Level Arc

Parameters:

LOC Coverage
Profile 5

Level Arc

Profile 6 Parameters:

GP Clearance
Level Run

Parameters:
Profile 7 GP Coverage

269
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270
 Efficient and Traceable Configuration
Management The Flight Inspection Service
Providers Perspective Matthew Bruce, AeroPearl Pty. & Christopher Dean, AeroPearl Pty.

Matthew Bruce BEng (Avionics)

Chief Technical Services Engineer
AeroPearl Pty Ltd
GPO Box 884
Hamilton Central
Brisbane, QLD 4007
Australia
Phone: +61 7 3860 0608
Fax: +61 7 3216 3164
E-mail: mbruce@aeropearl.com.au
http://www.aeropearl.com.au

Christopher Dean BEng (Avionics)

Technical Services Engineer
AeroPearl Pty Ltd
Phone: +61 7 3860 0618
E-mail: cdean@aeropearl.com.au

ABSTRACT Previously the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP)

was responsible for the Configuration Management (CM),
Taking a Systems Engineering approach to managing change management and traceability of the FISy for
complex systems is not a new concept and formal certification purposes. Under the new system these tasks
Configuration Management Systems have been used became the responsibility of AeroPearl. A new approach
successfully by organizations like NASA and Boeing for was required to provide the framework and necessary
many years. Configuration Management and traceability processes and procedures to ensure FISy CM and
to National and International standards is critical in traceability to National and International standards. An
regulated environments like Flight Inspection for Engineering Management System (EMS) was the
Regulatory and Compliance purposes. solution.
Application of the same Configuration Management Typically Engineering Management Systems and formal
principles and processes into a smaller operation presents CM processes exist in organizations like NASA and
some challenges, however the reward is effective Boeing. In this context the procedures are focused on
management of the accuracy, integrity and traceability of large projects and complex systems, simply using an
the flight inspection results. existing framework such as these would not have been
appropriate, the overhead would have been far too great.
This paper will present the approach taken in developing,
implementing and working to a formal Configuration AeroPearl instead chose to develop and implement a
Management System in a growing commercial Flight tailored EMS, firmly based on Systems Engineering
Inspection Service Provider. The benefits, pitfalls and principles and the shared experiences of larger
lessons learned while transitioning to the formal organizations.
Configuration Management System will be presented and
discussed. The benefits of the EMS can now be seen by both
AeroPearl and its customers. They are discussed here for
INTRODUCTION the benefit of other organizations facing similar CM
challenges.
With the introduction of a new Flight Inspection Service
(FIS) contract in 2013 the structure for management of
the Flight Inspection System (FISy) changed.

271
WHAT IS AN ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT
SYSTEM (EMS)?
A simplistic view is that the EMS is a Quality
Management System (QMS) for engineers, but the reality
is that it is much more than that. While a QMS provides
processes and procedures to drive a quality outcome for
the business, the EMS is focused only on providing a
basis for how engineering and CM activities are done in
the organization.
In a way the EMS fills the gaps in the QMS, it is the basis
for engineering authority, defines interfaces for change
management through technical/contractual triggers and
contains processes developed by engineers for engineers.
The EMS must become a way of life for those doing
engineering work and seen as something that makes the
job easier rather than a layer of administration.
The EMS is not a manual, it is a way to do work, a
concept. How the concept is described and documented is
in the Engineering Management Plan (EMP), a general
structure is shown in Figure . The EMP itself provides an
overview of the EMS and how associated Work
Instructions (WI), which define specific processes, are to
be followed for specific activities such as Review of a
design. The Engineering Authority Matrix describes who
is allowed to do what in the EMS.
Figure 1: General Structure of an EMP
272
Formalizing Engineering Work
Formalizing engineering work within AeroPearl has
resulted in better quality outcomes from engineering
investigations and changes. Additionally, as both
AeroPearl and customer confidence and experience in the
EMS grows the customer role transitions to one that is
more hands-off. This reduced level of day-to-day
involvement by the customer in the technical aspects of
the FISy allows the service based Flight Inspection model
to function as intended.
One of the best outcomes is that work can be done once,
something particularly beneficial in engineering
investigations. When an issue is identified, investigated
and resolved, this is fully documented and
archived/catalogued. Should a similar issue develop in
the future the investigation work has already been
completed and the rectification can be implemented
quickly.
Another useful outcome in this regard is that verification
evidence is of high quality and can be re-used to provide
justifications for deviations/dispensations. Taking
existing evidence and re-packaging it ensures that
workload is reduced which is beneficial as approval of
dispensations is usually a time critical task. Furthermore,
the evidence can be provided for audit/approval purposes
to new customers as required for approval/acceptance of
AeroPearls FIS.
DEVELOPMENT & IMPLEMENTATION
Key to developing and implementing the EMS was a clear
understanding of where it would be applied and what its
application was to achieve.
The EMS was envisioned to provide a basis for the
Mission System and Support Systems to provide a
FISworthy Flight Inspection Service. A breakdown of
AeroPearls Flight Inspection System is presented in
Figure 2 and the key elements are defined as follows:
The Mission System is defined as: the aircraft platform
fitted with the Flight Inspection Equipment including the
Deployable Ground Equipment when required/used for
the task.
The Support Systems are defined as something less
tangible: systems, including engineering, configuration
management, maintenance, supply, operations, quality,
finance, information technology, training and facilities
required to support the FISy in delivery of the Services.
 Figure 2: FISy, Mission System and Support System Breakdown.
FISworthiness has been defined by AeroPearl, analogous
with airworthiness but focused on the output of the FISy
(Flight Inspection results/reports), to be: a concept, the
application of which defines the condition of the FISy and
supplies the basis for judgment of the suitability for use of
the FISy in the FIS, in that it has been designed,
constructed, maintained and is expected to be operated to
approved standards and limitations, by competent and
authorized individuals, who are acting as members of an
approved organization and whose work is certified as
correct.
Traceability
The link between FISy performance and the required
standards/requirements is made through verification and
validation activities such as analysis, test, demonstration
and inspection. Verification evidence is linked to the
requirements through the Verification Cross Reference
Matrix (VCRM) providing full traceability and
auditability.
The VCRM exists and evolves for the life of the FISy,
how changes are managed to ensure that the links
273
between performance and requirements are maintained is
the role of Configuration Management.
WHAT IS CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT?
CM is more than keeping a record of which serial number
receiver is installed in which aircraft on which day. A
more complete definition of CM, taken from Military
Handbook -Configuration Management Guidance [1] and
adopted by AeroPearl, is: A management process for
establishing and maintaining consistency of a products
performance, functional, and physical attributes with its
requirements, design and operational information
throughout its life.
In terms of Flight Inspection, maintaining the consistency
of the FISys performance is critical to both the ANSP
and Flight Inspection Service provider. Establishing and
maintaining proper CM of the FISy provides
measurement results with a level of traceable and
guaranteed performance which otherwise may not be
easily achieved.
The traceability provided from the implementation of an
EMS and formal CM processes ensures that the system
state and its ability to produce FISworthy data is
maintained and is auditable at all times.
MANAGING CONFIGURATION CHANGES
Establishment and management of configuration baselines
is fundamental for ensuring continued traceability and
guaranteed system performance.
In the Flight Inspection environment where technology
changes over the life of the system, configuration changes
will always be necessary to maintain the FISy with the
latest technology and measurement capabilities.
Successful management of configuration changes ensures
that baseline performance is maintained (or improved
with the change where relevant), impacts on interfaces are
addressed and that the system remains maintainable,
during and after configuration changes.
Configuration Baselines
In order to manage the FISys performance, functional
and physical attributes, they must first be established.
AeroPearl adopted standard CM methodology in
establishing three configuration baselines, Functional,
Figure 3: Baseline Relationship
274
Allocated and Product, during the implementation of the
new FISy.
The relationship between the three baselines is shown in
Figure 3 (taken from [1]), and they are defined as follows:
1. The Functional Baseline defines the functional
characteristics and performance requirements of the
system. In the case of the FISy this is represented by
the body of performance specifications such as
Customer Requirements, ICAO Doc 8071 etc.
2. The Allocated Baseline defines the allocation of
functional characteristics and requirements to specific
elements/components within the system. It is
typically more important during development stages
to document how the proposed design will fulfill the
requirements.
3. The Product Baseline completely describes the
functional/performance and physical characteristics
of the product. It is the collection of mechanical and
electrical drawings, verification results, parts
catalogues etc.
Configuration Items
Configuration Items (CIs) are generally items which
implement critical capabilities within the system or which
require an exact reference to the items configuration at
any given time. Designation of an item as a CI enhances
the level of control and verification required for the item.
These items are specifically designated for CM, along
with others items that may not fit the definition of CIs but
need to have their configuration formally managed
(ie. cabin layout).
CIs can be defined at a system level where control is
managed with respect to performance or function, or
defined to a lower-level such as a Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU) like a computer, where control is based on part
number, revision number and modification status. Both
hardware and software items can be designated as CIs.
Specifying certain components of the system as CIs
defines the scope of the change management processes to
be applied across the system. This allows for more effort
to be applied in change management of critical items and
less effort for non-critical items within the system. This
allows change control to be applied specifically and
efficiently.
The selection criteria adopted by AeroPearl in identifying
CIs is based on the criticality of the item/system with
regards to the systems objective, FISworthy
measurement results and compliance with
national/international requirements.
By adopting this approach, it allows for appropriate levels
of change management to be applied to various parts of
the system. Importantly, it also allows for maximum
distinction between change management of primary
aircraft equipment, Flight Inspection Equipment and
Support Systems.
Airworthiness/FISworthiness Interface
As part of any change to an aircraft, regardless of whether
the change is to the Flight Inspection Equipment or
primary equipment, airworthiness impacts need to be
addressed and appropriately approved. However not all
changes to the primary aircraft, have an impact on
FISworthiness.
By defining CIs based on their criticality to FISworthiness
the majority of changes to primary equipment are
considered to involve non-critical items and as such can
be completed with reduced involvement of the EMS. In
these cases the EMS typically need only consider the
impact of the change to the Flight Inspection Equipment
and trigger any modifications or re-verification activities
as appropriate.
275
Some items of the primary equipment do have an impact
(or the potential to impact) on FISworthiness (e.g.
Primary Air Data Computer that provides altitude
information to the Flight Inspection Equipment).
AeroPearl has identified these items specifically as CIs to
ensure changes are managed appropriately.
Levels of Change Control
AeroPearl established three different levels of change
control for appropriate application of CM processes:
1. Category A: Any change to an item designated as a
CI. Changes such as a receiver modification (change
to specification, part number, revision number or
modification status) or software update falls into this
category
2. Category B: Any change to Flight Inspection
Equipment related items which do not directly affect
measurement results (such as a printer) but provide a
required system level functionality.
3. Category C: Any change that does not require
engineering approval. Typically this relates to
consumable items such as screws, capacitors,
resistors, relays and cables where system level
functionality is maintained as long as the new item
meets the required specification.
Having varied levels of change control enables AeroPearl
to effect changes with the appropriate amount of rigor,
ensuring configuration baselines are maintained whilst
ensuring the EMS is applied efficiently.
As part of AeroPearls tailored EMS, two formal
configuration change processes were established, a Major
Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) and a Minor ECP.
The Minor ECP process is a scaled down version of the
Major ECP process and involves fewer reviews and
approvals external to the engineering department. Both
processes still address the same CM considerations such
as identification of new CIs and update of relevant CI
documentation and baselines.
Typically a Major ECP is required for Category A
changes, where as a Minor ECP is required for Category
B changes.
Effecting a Change
Figure 4 depicts the main stages within AeroPearls
engineering change process. All proposed changes are
made to a controlled configuration baseline.
Change initiators (such as obsolescence reports, defect
reports or change requests from customers) come into the
engineering department. They are assessed, and if
determined that a change is required, an ECP is raised.
AeroPearl engineering personnel process the change,
using relevant design inputs from customers,
manufacturers/suppliers, regulatory bodies, vendors,
maintenance staff and end users.
The change progresses through various stages, including
definition of requirements, design, verification and
incorporation.
Before progressing to the next stage in the process, the
ECP is presented to the Configuration Control Board
(CCB) for assessment and approval. At the final stage of
the ECP, after the change has been verified, the ECP is
presented to the CCB for Incorporation Approval and
Service Release.
This final gate ensures that all impacted interfaces have
been considered and changes to applicable documents,
such as operations manuals, are ready, training has or will
be provided and that sufficient and correct evidence
confirming that the modified system meets the
requirements is available.
After Incorporation Approval and Service Release is
granted, formal incorporation into the configuration
baselines and any hardware/software changes can be
effected as necessary.

Configuration Baseline
Data Configuration
System Status
Repository
Database

Customer
Change System
OEM Change Required. Updated/ Configuration Status Database
Initiator ECP Raised. Modified and Data Repository Updated
AeroPearl ENGINEERING
CHANGE PROCESS
Other
Engineering Release

Customer
Design Engineering Change is
OEM Change Process the Presented to
Inputs Change the CCB
Vendor

Other

Engineering
Approves
Change

Figure 4: Overview of AeroPearls Change Management Process

Configuration Control Board (CCB)
AeroPearl established a CCB as a means to harmoniously
consider and agree changes to the configuration of the
FISy. Each major business area of AeroPearl is
represented on the CCB.
Additionally, customer representatives are invited to
attend CCB sessions when relevant to them. Feedback
from the customer and the CCB members is captured
within this process, and if the change is not approved this
feedback is considered in the rework cycle.
Changes to the primary aircraft and Flight Inspection
Equipment are presented at the CCB for consideration.
The CCB considers the change and data pack to ensure all
aspects of the proposed change are addressed. This
includes safety, airworthiness, FISworthiness, operations,
maintenance, supply, CM (including such things as

276
variations within the fleet), training and documentation
updates.
LESSONS LEARNED
While AeroPearl can not claim to be experts on
Engineering Management Systems and CM, there are
some lessons that have been learnt whilst implementing
and working to a formal EMS that should be considered if
similar Engineering and CM processes are required to be
implemented.
Getting the Balance Right
When implementing an EMS into a commercial
operation, set the balance correctly. Two approaches are
possible:
1. Start with higher level of control/process until
confidence in the system and experience grows, then
streamline processes as required. This approach was
adopted by AeroPearl.
2. An alternative to be considered, if within the running
system environment already, is to start with less
formalized processes and build these up over time to
increase functionality. This reactive approach
typically requires trigger events (where things didnt
work as expected) which may not be suitable in all
scenarios.
CCB Participation
All key departments involved with the Flight Inspection
Service should be represented in the CCB. The more
people involved (within reason) when considering the
change the more collective knowledge is available. This
is especially important early in the change process or
while the EMS has a low level of maturity/experience.
This reduces the potential for rework when things arent
picked up early in the change process and improves the
outcome.
Even if some people may have minimal involvement in a
CCB, attendance is still important and assists in
communicating changes throughout the change process.
Baseline Management
Actively and formally managing changes and maintaining
the baselines is beneficial for both the Customer and the
Flight Inspection Service Provider - both have an
assurance of system performance at all times.
In cases where discrepancies are found between flight
inspection results and expectations, the focus is on
investigating the issue with the navigation aid rather than
277
finding and excluding any possible faults in the Flight
Inspection Equipment as its performance is thoroughly
understood and documented as part of developing and
maintaining the baseline.
EMS Rollout
Due to limited timeframe, AeroPearl implemented their
EMS in one stage (rather than a progressive rollout)
which was a significant change in how engineering was
previously completed. Due to this, the implementation
was initially met with reluctance, however after further
training and experiencing the benefits of the EMS, the
concept was accepted within the company.
In order reduce the reluctance towards the implementation
of an EMS, a progressive rollout may be beneficial. A
progressive rollout allows specific modules and processes
to be trained/explained up front and as each process is
embedded, another one can be rolled out.
Training
A significant amount of training was required for
AeroPearls engineers when the EMS was implemented.
A small amount of organizational training was also
conducted to make everyone in the company aware of its
implementation and explain the impact on other business
functions.
Recurrent training is also required, ensuring engineers are
kept up-to-date on current practice and changes to the
EMS. It also provides a forum to discuss scenarios
encountered using the EMS, analyze how things were
done and identify where processes can be improved.
Resources
Depending on the complexity and quantity of systems
which are to be managed through the EMS, additional
resources may be required.
AeroPearl found that appointment of a Configuration
Manager was required to ensure that baselines,
documentation and the configuration of the system were
maintained. One of AeroPearls engineers performs this
duty along with normal engineering work. For a larger
number of systems, a dedicated Configuration Manager
may be required.
AeroPearl has also found that in some instances
nominating an engineer to perform independent review
was difficult due to the close working nature of the team
and availability of engineers with appropriate engineering
authority. Depending on how the organization is
structured, additional engineers may be required to ensure
independent reviews are possible. Use of
external/contract resources on occasion to fulfill this which has allowed the system to mature very quickly in a
requirement has proven beneficial to AeroPearl. For short period of time.
critical resources within the company, a level of
redundancy is recommended to ensure coverage in design REFERENCES
reviews or other engineering activities whilst they are not
available. [1] MIL-HDBK-61A(SE), Military Handbook
Configuration Management Guidance, 7 February 2001.
The Golden Rule

Process and procedures are no substitute for knowledge

and creativity.

The original source for this statement cant be located, but

this is a sentiment expressed by many who have worked
within an EMS framework.

Put simply, existence of an EMS will not automatically

guarantee sound engineering design, rigorous review,
fully managed configuration and traceability.

Only knowledgeable engineers, applying the processes,

procedures and principles from an EMS into their
everyday work will give the desired outcome.

CONCLUSIONS

Our experience implementing the EMS and CM processes

into AeroPearl, has led to the following conclusions:

1. Implementation of an EMS is not limited to large

organizations. There are benefits from applying
formal Engineering and CM processes to small
commercial organizations that go beyond the
technical realm. Financial benefits will be seen in
reduced levels of rework after configuration changes.

2. An EMS does not fundamentally change the way that

work is done, it only formalizes processes and
procedures that most likely already existed.

3. If the EMS is scaled appropriately, additional

resources may not be required to achieve the
appropriate amount of rigor and traceability.

FUTURE WORK

AeroPearls EMS is a living system, it is subject to

continuous review and improvement with a focus on
streamlining processes while maintaining the required
level of engineering rigor and CM traceability.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It would be remiss of AeroPearl not to acknowledge

Airservices Australia for providing the catalyst to develop
and implement the EMS and providing the guidance

278
 Proactive Flight Safety through FOQA & ASAP
Gregory J. Marino
Senior Flight Safety Officer
FAA Flight Inspection Services
Mike Monroney Aeronautical Center, Oklahoma City,
OK
Fax: +1 508 526 8273
E-mail: Gregory.J.Marino@faa.gov
ABSTRACT
The flight inspection (FI) mission creates a unique and
challenging flight environment. In addition to the flight
risks associated with a typical air transport operation, FI
crews face the additional risks created by frequent low
altitude flight, operation against normal traffic flow in
high density areas, a high degree of multi-tasking, and
increased exposure to birds and conflicting traffic
Routinely operating in the higher risk FI environment can
lead to a latent, flight crew complacency. A highly
motivated crew may become so fixated on acquiring FI
data that flight safety may be inadvertently compromised.
With the objective to increase safety, Flight Inspection
Services (FIS) implemented the FOQA and ASAP
programs.
FOQA is an onboard data acquisition system that records
a large number of parameters in addition to those
typically available in a flight data recorder. This data is
de-identified and analyzed through post processing.
Mitigating training and/or procedures are then
implemented to improve safety.
ASAP is a voluntary safety reporting program where crew
members can file reports of unsafe conditions or incidents
without fear of retribution. A special committee reviews
each report and then recommends procedures or training
as needed to mitigate the problem in the future.
This presentation will share examples and particularly FI
specific lessons learned since the inception of these
programs in FIS. In addition, the infrastructure that has
led to successful implementation of these programs will
be examined.
INTRODUCTION
The study of many aircraft accidents has shown that it is
not unusual for the cause to be at least partly the result of
a trend of unsafe practices or a compromised safety
279
Greg Marino, FAA
culture. These safety threats may often remain undetected
for long periods of time, sadly being exposed only after
an accident.
Having a way to accumulate objective, safety critical data
provides great insight into identifying unsafe trends
before they become an incident or accident. Flight
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) and the Aviation
Safety Action Program (ASAP) are two programs that are
designed to do just that.
Proper interpretation and use of data from these programs
can uncover safety threats before they become another
link in the accident chain. Recognizing the unique risks
in flight inspection (FI), and with the goal of obtaining the
highest level of safety, Flight Inspection Services (FIS)
implemented both FOQA and ASAP programs in 2006.
REACTIVE VS PROACTIVE DATA COLLECTION
Reactive data is collected after an undesirable event has
occurred. For example, the data obtained from a Flight
Data Recorder (FDR) after an accident is reactive data. It
can show what happened on a particular flight, but reveals
nothing about operational trends that might have led to
the accident. By the time reactive data is received, the
only available action is often damage control.
Sometimes, reactive data can be found where we least
expect or want it. Who hasnt seen newscasts of
surveillance videos that have captured the final seconds of
an aircraft accident? This is certainly not an ideal or
pleasant way to find out that we may have missed an
important unsafe trend that led to a disaster.
Proactive data, on the other hand, allows the methodical
collection of critical data. We can analyze this data for
trends at our convenience. Corrective action can be taken
without having to deal with the pressures associated with
an accident or incident. Most importantly, an unsafe
trend can be broken before an accident/incident occurs.
 Figure 2 - The Process

1. Data Acquisition

FOQA data acquisition is through an onboard digital

Figure 1 Jan. 18, 2014 Challenger Accident at KASE
The FOQA / ASAP PROCESS
system. It records a large and comprehensive set of
parameters. Examples include; acceleration and air data,
autopilot status, flight control positions, electrical
information, engines, fuel, oil temperature/pressure, flight
instruments, landing gear position, navigation systems
and communication status. This is later downloaded for
post processing.

FOQA and ASAP are methods for acquiring and ASAP data acquisition relies on crewmember input.
interpreting safety critical data. FOQA is an onboard data Crewmembers are encouraged to submit a report anytime
acquisition system. It records a large number of an event occurs where a crewmembers actions or
parameters in addition to those typically available in a inactions causes or contributes to an unsafe condition. In
flight data recorder. Post processing software facilitates addition, crew members may report any deviation from
trend analysis. standard operating procedures, non-compliance with any
Federal Aviation Regulation, or any safety of flight
ASAP is a voluntary safety reporting program where crew concern.
members can file reports of unsafe condition or incidents
without fear of retribution. A special committee reviews In FIS, ASAP submission can be made on-line on a
each report and then recommends procedures or training secure server which contains an account for each
as needed to mitigate the problem in the future. crewmember. It is easily accessed through the internet. If
a computer or internet is not available, a Facsimile form is
Both programs share the same process (figure 2) which is: available and may be submitted to a special phone
number. Submission can also be made verbally over the
1. Data Acquisition phone if necessary.
2. Analysis & Validation 2. Analysis and Validation
3. Reporting The FOQA program employs an operation tailored event
set. For FIS, this includes events specific to flight
4. Corrective Action
inspection maneuvers.
5. Monitoring
The voluminous aircraft acquired data is then filtered to
show only the data that fits the event set. The following
chart (figure 3) shows a sampling of these events.

280

Figure 3
ASAP data is accumulated by compiling the user
submitted reports and is held for later review by the Event
Review Committee (ERC). These reports include things
like course deviations, altitude deviations, traffic
conflicts, airspace incursions, limitation exceedances, and
even system failures. The following chart (Figure 4)
shows the typical categories.
Figure 4
3. Reporting
Quarterly, FOQA tabular and graphical reports showing
trends over years and quarters are presented to the FIS
Flight Safety Committee. This committee includes the
FIS Director, Senior Flight Safety Officer, Flight Safety
Officers, Director of Operations, Chief Pilot, Director of
Maintenance, and Principal Operations Inspector (POI).
The FOQA Steering Committee, which includes the
FOQA Program Manager, Chief Pilot, Sr. Flight Safety
Officer, Director of Operations, Maintenance
Representative, and Union Representatives, also reviews
the FOQA data. The committee determines actions like
possible modification, addition, or deletion of events.
281
An ASAP Event Review Committee (ERC) reviews the
submitted ASAP reports quarterly. This committee,
comprised of a management representative, a union
representative, and the principal operations inspector,
meets as needed.
Both FOQA and ASAP data as well as other supporting
information are published quarterly in the FOQA / ASAP
Newsletter (Figure 5). The newsletter contains the same
tabular and graphical FOQA event results that were
provided to the Flight Safety Committee. In addition, it
lists the top five occurring events. Regular safety related
articles, usually based on FOQA results, are also included
in the newsletter.
Figure 5 FOQA/ASAP Newsletter
4. Corrective Action
For both FOQA and ASAP, corrective actions usually
involve amending or adding operational procedures and
training emphasis. For FOQA, these actions are usually
initiated by the Flight Safety Committee. ASAP
corrective actions are generally recommended by the ERC
and reviewed for implementation by the Flight Safety
Committee.
FIS FOQA Events That Invoked Change
1. High Rate of Descent
This was a recurring event where aircraft were descending
at very high rates at altitudes close to the ground. This
will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.
2. Speed Below 10,000 ft.

This was a trend where aircraft were occasionally

exceeding the below 10000 ft., 250 kt. speed limit.
Corrective action was crew education and procedural
training emphasis.

3. Stabilized Approach

FOQA data showed that crews were making aggressive

maneuvers and configuring late for landing. Data
analysis showed that this generally occurred by
continuing to a landing after completion of an FI
maneuver, like an ILS holding pattern. In order to avoid
rejoining the downwind for a stabilized approach, crews
were descending to a landing about 2 miles from the
runway threshold from 1500 agl. Corrective action was to
review the FOQA data with crews, and emphasize the
importance of a stabilized approach.
NOTEWORTHY FIS SUCCESS STORIES
1. High Rate of Descent (ROD)
Figure 6
Corrective action involved educating the crews that a very
high ROD was not necessary to set off the alarm. Figure
7 shows a representative profile of a typical APM flight
check. The chart graphically shows the FOQA event
limits, the APM alarm threshold and that a rate of 2000
fpm will set off the APM alarm without triggering a
FOQA event.

FOQA data revealed some occurrences of descent rates

greater than 2500 fpm below 1200 agl. Study of the data
revealed that the High ROD events were occurring on
Approach Path Monitor (APM) checks.

An APM is designed to generate an alarm to Air Traffic

Control (ATC) if an aircraft descends, or is predicted to
descend, below a safe limit above the ground while on an
Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) clearance. Figure 6 shows
the typical APM coverage area. Conducted in visual
conditions, under Visual Flight Rules (VFR), the flight
inspection maneuver requires a descent that is rapid
enough to trigger the alarm on Air Traffic radar.
Sometimes, ATC inadvertently disables the alarm during
a flight check since it is normal procedure to eliminate
nuisance alarms from VFR aircraft. Not hearing a low
altitude call from ATC, and extremely motivated to
complete the flight check, some FI crews were pushing
over harder, hoping to get the alarm. In fact, we have
seen one data set that shows a rate of descent in excess of
6000 fpm to 400 agl.
Figure 7
Another training aid we were able to derive from the data
in this case was displaying an actual animation of a High
ROD event through the use of X-Plane software loaded
with FOQA data.
Event rates decreased drastically after this kind of
training. It is a perfect example of how FOQA data
uncovered a potential safety issue and facilitated
corrective action. Armed with the data, a logical and
convincing argument can be made for proactive change.
Compare that to standing before an assembly of crews,
with only your opinion that you think there is a high ROD
issue. A positive change in crew behavior is certainly
less likely.

2. BE300 Propeller Anomaly

FI began operating the first of its 18 Beech BE300 King

Air Twin Turboprop aircraft in 1988. Over the years, we
have experienced an intermittent condition where one

282
propeller will move to a flatter position than it is supposed
to in flight. With the opposite side propeller operating
normally, a severe difference in thrust and drag occurs.
This results in the aircraft making a sudden, nasty yaw
towards the side of the malfunctioning propeller. To
make matters worse, it is typical for this to happen during
power reduction in the landing flare.
Once on the ground, the problem clears itself and
maintenance is unable to duplicate the problem.
Depending only on the crews description, maintenance
can only check to see if there is some defect or mis-
adjustment in the configuration. Most of the time there is
not and so much speculation takes place over what the
crew actually experienced.
Over the last few years, FIS has been upgrading its King
Air fleet with new Proline 21 avionics. Included in this
upgrade is installation of FOQA recording equipment.
Now we are able download the data from one of these
events and see exactly what the propeller and engine
parameters were when the event occurred. With this new
information maintenance has been able to zero in on the
problem and a solution is forthcoming.
After analysis of the FOQA data, we have also been able
to provide the crews with better procedures to check for
and deal with this event should it happen. In this case an
Operations Bulletin was used to distribute the
information.
Figure 8 shows an example of how we post processed the
FOQA data to expose the propeller anomaly. It is an
example of how FOQA can be valuable for more than just
trend analysis.
Figure 8
3. Loss of Radio Contact
A good example of an ASAP success story is one where
radio communication with ATC was lost in a busy
283
terminal environment under IFR in instrument
meteorological conditions (IMC).
The flight, en-route to another facility, was not flight
checking at the time. The mission specialist (MS) was at
his station preparing for the next facility. During the
process, the MS decided to check the Spectrum Analyzer,
a device which is rarely used these days. Unfortunately,
due to a peculiarity in the flight inspection package,
enabling the spectrum analyzer disabled the #2
Communications radio on the flight deck. There was no
annunciation on the flight deck nor at the MS station that
showed this had happened. Of course, as luck would have
it, the crew was using Com #2 for primary
communications at that time. Unaware of the total loss of
communication with ATC, the flight proceeded on its
current course. Before long, the crew realized what had
happened and reconnected with ATC. Fortunately the
rerouting of some traffic was the only consequence.
The crew filed an ASAP report. This was a benefit to
them, because it provided protection from a possible
violation. It was a benefit to our operation because their
submission allowed us to identify a safety risk that was
not very obvious due to the infrequent use of the spectrum
analyzer. Training emphasis resulted and the experience
was also considered in the redesign of our later flight
inspection equipment.
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS)
FIS, like most operations these days, has a comprehensive
safety management system. FOQA and ASAP are the
perfect tools to provide measurable data to a SMS. Here
are some key elements of our FIS SMS program. You
can see how perfectly FOQA and ASAP fit into the SMS
philosophy.
1. SMS is a comprehensive process with a focus on
proactive management of safety risks.
2. All personnel will identify and report hazardous
conditions
3. All reported hazardous conditions will be
investigated to determine underlying causes.
4. Safety Promotion: Communication, Lessons
Learned.
5. Performance Measurements.
CONCLUSIONS
FOQA and ASAP are extremely valuable tools in
providing data to help establish and maintain a positive
safety culture. In FIS, FOQA and ASAP have enabled us
to uncover unsafe trends that may not have otherwise
been apparent. We rely on the information provided by
both programs to help us maintain the highest level of
insight into how safely we are operating our aircraft.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Special thanks go to Daniel Andary, FOQA / ASAP

Program Manager. Daniel has been instrumental in the
implementation and maintenance of both programs, since
their inception in FIS. His keen knowledge of the
program has helped us to use the data in the most
effective way. Daniel has contributed to this paper, as
well as the associated presentation.

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 Session 10
Training and Certification Issues
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Training of DSNA/DTI Flight Inspectors
Philippe CAISSO
Flight Inspection Operations Manager
DSNA/DTI
TOULOUSE, France
Fax: +33 5 62 14 53 27
E-mail: philippe.caisso@aviation-civile.gouv.fr
ABSTRACT
Within the French Civil Aviation, it has always been
considered that the flight inspector skills had to go
beyond the use of a Flight Inspection Equipment (FIS) for
the measuring of parameters. They shall obviously be able
to ensure that the radio-navigation aids are working
properly within ICAO tolerances, that new procedures can
be validated. But, above all, they shall also be able to
guide ground maintenance regarding the tuning of their
ILS, VOR , to advise on the adequate corrective action
to take but also to discuss with procedure designer
regarding incorrect implementation
ICAO documents mention that flight inspector shall be
adequately trained but no real recommendations are
provided.
The proposed presentation will describe the training
courses and steps that are required within French DGAC
to be qualified as a flight inspector for different types of
inspection.
INTRODUCTION
The French flight inspection unit was created in 1948, as
air transport was growing rapidly after the Second World
War. Since that date, the technical means (aircraft and
flight inspection equipment), the measurement methods,
and also the radio-navigation means have evolved
tremendously. In parallel, standards, requirements, in
terms of safety and quality, have dramatically increased.
Some of the most significant examples are the mandates
for States to develop standards for the commissioning and
follow-up of radio-navigation equipment, to take into
account the qualification of all personnel working on
operational CNS (Communication, Navigation, and
Surveillance) or ATM (Air Traffic Management) system.
These two documents, at least, have had a major impact
on the various activities conducted by flight inspectors, in
their level of responsibility and therefore their training
methods. In France, another criterion has been taken into
287
Philippe Cais so, D SNA/D TI
account, when developing the training standards.
DSNA.DTI considers that a flight inspector shall not only
validate measurements. He/she should also have the
ability to help the ground maintenance in solving issues
so that the radio-navigation equipment works properly
after the aircraft departure or, at a minimum, appropriate
corrective action has been defined.
REGULATORY ASPECTS
Rules applicable to equipment
In accordance with the rules set out by the European
Commission on system interoperability and on the
provision of air navigation system, France has released, in
2008, decrees for every type of radio-navigation
equipment (ILS, VOR, DME) but also for the
development of procedures (SID/STAR). According to
these regulatory documents, every ANSP (Air Navigation
Service Provider), operating in France, shall develop
safety, performance and interoperability requirements for
radio-navigation equipment. In addition, ANSP shall also
describe:
Adjustments along with ground and flight
inspections to be performed for the
commissioning of equipment,
Routine preventative action to be performed on
equipment, once installed,
Corrective action
Routine ground and flight inspection
Conditions and procedures to shut down the
equipment operations.
As the main ANSP in France, DSNA (Direction des
Services de la Navigation Arienne) has developed
documents, called PROMESS (PROcdures de Mise en
Service et de Suivi PROcedures for the Commissioning
and the Follow-up), for each type of equipment in order to
show compliance to the above mentioned French
regulations. These procedures have been validated by
DTA (Direction du Transport Arien), the French Civil
Aviation Regulator and are now in force on every French
aerodrome (including overseas territories) managed by
DSNA. As an example, the ILS PROMESS complies with
the above mentioned requirements but also describes the
air/ground correlation methods that have been
implemented for most of the French ILS. These methods
have allowed an increase in the flight inspection interval
up to twelve months, with a four month due date window.
Regarding procedures, DSNA is currently developing a
document, equivalent to the PROMESS for equipment, in
order to show compliance with ICAO doc 9906. This
document will be officially released in December 2014
and will describe how the verification and validation tasks
are shared between procedure designers, flight inspectors
and flight crew.
Rules applicable to personnel qualification
In Europe, the ESARR (Eurocontrol SAfety Regulatory
Requirements) 5 was developed in order to complement
and/or supplement requirements included in the ICAO
Annex 1. This document has been validated by the
European Commission and is applicable to every Member
State. France has therefore released, in 2007, a regulatory
material to comply with the European rules. This
concerns each operational or technical civil aviation
personnel, who perform tasks which have a potential
safety impact.
This French decree defines notions such as:
Minimum entry qualifications and requirements
Initial qualification
Qualification for different domains such as
Communication, Navigation, Surveillance, data
processing with criteria to obtain such
qualification
Certification for people performing maintenance,
or technical supervision tasks on operational
equipment.
In order to get such Certification, it is required to have the
minimum entry qualifications and requirements plus the
appropriate field qualification.
This Certification is approved by the Departmental Head
and has a maximum three year duration. It can be
renewed only if the two following conditions are fulfilled:
To be compliant with the Training Plan
requirements and,
288
To have practiced the related tasks during a
minimum period (defined in the training plan).
INITIAL TRAINING ASPECTS
ENAC (Ecole National de lAviation Civile French
Civil Aviation Academy)
The air transport growth after the Second World War has
led to the creation of a school dedicated to the training of
the various aviation players. Initially located at Orly
(Paris second aerodrome), ENAC moved in 1968 to
Toulouse. This school welcomes about two thousands
permanent students, and five thousands short course
trainees per year in the following domains
Flight crews
Air Traffic Controllers
Technicians and Engineers, both private or
public, and working in every aeronautical area.
ENAC is the only French aviation school authorized to
deliver training in accordance with ESARR 5
requirements.
Initial ENAC training
In order to fulfill DSNA needs, ENAC trains three
engineer categories:
Managers
Air Traffic Controllers
Electronic engineers
These last ones work in operational centers where they
are responsible for ground maintenance or technical
monitoring of radio-navigation equipment.
To be recruited by ENAC, future electronic engineer shall
have a minimum level at electronic or data processing.
Their three year training is equally divided into:
Theoretical sessions which include teachings on
data processing, antennas, frequency, micro-
wave, networksSuch sessions obviously
include initial learning on the CNS and ATM
systems they will work on afterwards.
Practical sessions where they start to work on
various minor CNS or ATM related projects
followed by one year on their first appointment.
At the end of these three years, people hold the electronic
engineer grade along with the initial qualification. In the
frame of their professional activities, and thanks to
specific trainings, the electronic engineers will obtain
further qualifications.
One of the main benefit of this initial ENAC training is
that electronic engineers, whatever their future
appointments, learn to know each others and acquire
similar methods and a common working culture. This is
an obvious benefit when working together, ground staff
on one side and flight inspection on the other.
FLIGHT INSPECTION TRAINING
As previously mentioned, flight inspectors shall first hold
a Certification in order to work. Such certification
encompasses all Communication, Navigation and
Certification domains, whereas ground staffs are
specialized in only one domain. For the past few years,
flight inspectors have also had to perform procedure
validation which is another qualification to obtain.
The certification is therefore composed of several degrees
with different levels, which are summarized in the
following table:
Table 1. Flight Inspector Degrees
ILS VOR PBN MLS Other
Routine x x x x
Commissioning x x x x
Corrective x x x to:
Each degree matches specific training and different levels
of experience. In average, a new flight inspector is fully
qualified after a two year period. The objective, within the
French flight inspection unit, is that every flight inspector
shall be fully qualified in order to facilitate the
operational flight inspection program progress.
The following sections describe the required steps in
order to hold every degree. Each of these training courses
is associated to a specific taxonomy, derived from the
Eurocontrol one:
T1: A basic knowledge of the subject. It is the
ability to remember essential points, to
memorize data and retrieve it.
T2: The ability to understand and to discuss the
subject matter intelligently in order to represent
and act upon certain objects and events.
T3: A thorough knowledge of the subject and the
ability to apply it with accuracy. The ability to
289
make use of the repertoire of knowledge to
develop plans and activate them.
T4: Ability to establish a line of action within a
unit of known applications following the correct
chronology and the adequate methods to resolve
a problem situation. This involves the integration
of known applications in a familiar situation.
T5: Ability to analyze new situation in order to
elaborate and apply one or other relevant strategy
to solve a complex problem. The defining feature
is that the situation is qualitatively different to
those previously met, requiring judgment and
evaluation of options.
Module 1: Familiarization with the flight inspection
unit and the technical means
A new flight inspector shall, at first, be familiarized with
the flight inspection unit:
Organization (laboratory, operations)
Technical means (aircraft, flight inspection
equipment)
Other involved organizations (aircraft
maintenance, flight crews)
but shall also undergo medical exams.
He/she will then work with the laboratory staff in order
Learn about the flight inspection system
architecture,
Acquire knowledge on the DGPS (Differential
Global Positioning System) theory and
installation, but also:
o Aerodrome reference points,
o How to install the DGPS ground station
o How to proceed in case of DGPS failure
Taxonomy: T4
At last, and before to start flying with other flight
inspectors, he/she shall follow several further training
courses on:
CNS equipment in order to supplement his/her
knowledge on such system,
Procedure design,
 And eventually obtain an electrical habilitation
in order to be authorized to handle the flight
inspection equipment and the various related
sensors.
Module 2: DME
This module is only a theoretical one. The objectives are
to know:
The functional architecture of a DME ground
station,
How to perform fundamental measures on DME,
The characteristics of a ground station,
The possible tunings of the ground station.
Taxonomy: T3
Module 3: VOR/DME (Routine)
Module 3 starts with a theoretical training whose goals
are to know:
The functional architecture and the
characteristics of a ground station (Taxonomy
T3)
The radiated signals and the potential tuning of
the ground station (Taxonomy T4)
As soon as this training is completed, the flight inspector
spends at least one week with an instructor in order to:
Learn how to use the flight inspection
equipment, for VOR inspection purpose,
Know how to prepare a VOR flight inspection,
Perform VOR simulation on the flight inspection
ground station.
Taxonomy: T4
To validate the Routine VOR/DME degree, the flight
inspection trainee shall then perform successfully and
under the supervision of an instructor, at least five routine
VOR/DME flight inspections.
Module 4: VOR/DME (Commissioning)
This module can only take place when module 3 has been
successfully completed. The flight inspection trainee shall
perform successfully and under the supervision of an
instructor, at least two VOR/DME commissioning flight
inspections.
290
Module 5: ILS/DME (Routine)
Module 5 starts with a theoretical training whose goals
are to learn the functional architecture and the radiated
signals of an ILS ground station (Taxonomy T3).
As soon as this training is completed, the flight inspector
spends several weeks with an instructor in order to:
Learn how to use the flight inspection
equipment,
Know how to prepare a Localizer flight
inspection,
Know how to prepare a Glide flight inspection,
Perform Localizer simulation on the flight
inspection ground station
Perform Glide simulation on the flight inspection
ground station.
To validate the Routine ILS degree, the flight
inspection trainee shall then perform successfully and
under the supervision of an instructor, at least ten routine
ILS/DME flight inspections (or 10 Localizer and 10 Glide
flight inspections).
Module 6: ILS/DME (Commissioning)
This module is the trickiest one in the flight inspector
training and can only take place when module 5 has been
successfully completed.
At first, the flight inspection trainee has to perform
several training courses on:
ILS system (Null ref and Type M)
ILS from different manufacturers (INDRA,
THALES )
Taxonomy: T4
The flight inspector trainee shall then perform
successfully and under the supervision of an instructor, at
least two Localizers and five Glide commissionings
flight inspections.
Module 7: MLS (Routine &Commissioning)
Taking into account that there are a very limited number
of operational MLS equipment in Europe and that no
MLS training exists, this module is fully performed under
the supervision of the DTI MLS specialist and a flight
inspector instructor.
After a theoretical training, where the MLS functional
architecture is described, the flight inspection trainee shall
perform, successfully, one routine and two
commissioning on the Toulouse Blagnac MLS to validate
the MLS (Routine & Commissioning) degree.
Module 8: PBN (Performance Based Navigation) -
Commissioning
Within the PBN module, the flight inspection trainee has
to familiarize with the validation of procedures supported
by different means. He/She shall therefore attend several
trainings dealing with:
LNAV procedures
o LNAV Theory (Taxonomy T3)
o Requirements on data to be validated for
LNAV inspection (Taxonomy T4)
o How to enter the procedure in the flight
inspection system (Taxonomy T4)
Two LNAV procedures commissioning shall then be
performed successfully under the supervision of an
instructor.
LPV procedures
o LPV specificities compared to LNAV
procedures (Taxonomy T3)
o How to enter the procedure in the flight
inspection system and requirements on
data to be validated (Taxonomy T4)
o Validation of FAS Data Block
(Taxonomy T4)
Two LPV procedures commissioning shall then be
performed successfully under the supervision of an
instructor.
DME/DME procedures
o Information on the simulation tool used
in order to define the DME/DME
coverage and to identify critical DME
(Taxonomy T3)
o How to enter the procedure in the flight
inspection system and requirements on
data to be validated (Taxonomy T4)
Two DME/DME procedures commissioning shall then be
performed successfully under the supervision of an
instructor.
291
Module 9: Others
The flight inspector certification only addresses the
previously mentioned equipment routine and
commissioning checks. However, other inspections may
have to be performed such as:
VHF special or commissioning,
Routine VOR high altitude
PAPI routine or commissioning
Direction Finder commissioning
Radar routine or commissioning
Radio Frequency Interference research (even if
this activity is not really part of flight inspection,
it is considered as a full DSNA/DTI flight
inspector duty)
In order to be authorized to perform such flight
inspection, the flight inspection trainee shall successfully
perform one check per type of equipment, under the
supervision of an instructor.
Module 11: Skill refresh
The maximum duration of a Flight inspector Certification
is three years. In order to maintain each of the various
degrees, it is required to perform at least:
A minimum of 50 flight inspection hours per
year,
A minimum of 200 flight inspection hours
between the certification issuance and its
renewal,
A minimum of one ILS commissioning between
the certification issuance and its renewal,
In case of non-compliance with these minimum
requirements, several flight inspections will have to be
performed under the supervision of an instructor who will
eventually decide whether the certification can be
extended or not.
In addition to these minimum requirements, flight
inspectors shall also attend the following trainings or
meetings:
One CRM (Crew Resource Management), per
year, with the flight inspection crews addressing
the importance of human factors during flight
inspection.
 Internal bi annual meeting where return on
experience, new technologies etc. are
discussed for methods harmonization.
Aircraft safety and rescue procedures training
(every two years)
Electrical habilitation training every two year.

Module 10: Instructor qualification

The ESARR 5 only addresses the instructor notion in the

context of Air Traffic Controller. Within DSNA/DTI, this
notion has also been extended to ground technical staff
and flight inspectors.

At first, it should be clearly understood that training a

new electronic engineer can be performed by every
qualified flight inspector. However, the instructor is the
only one who can validate the various degrees and, in
case of doubt, who can decide if a Certification can be
extended or not.

To become a flight inspector instructor, it is therefore

required to:

Hold a valid flight inspector certification,

At least have a five year experience as flight
inspector and have performed 500 flight
inspection hours,
Attend a specific training where the instructor
tasks and responsibilities are defined, but also
the way continuous checks have to be performed
along with specific tests, if felt necessary.

Within the DSNA/DTI flight inspection unit, two flight

inspectors, amongst the seven, hold the instructor
qualification.

Figures 1&2: Example of Flight Inspector

Certification

292
CONCLUSIONS

Having nearly seventy years experience in flight

inspection, the DSNA/DTI flight inspection unit has
always tried to improve its methods and its performances
in terms of equipment, technology. However, this is not
enough if flight inspector training is not performed
adequately. Also taking into account new regulations
from ICAO, European Commission very stringent and
formalized requirements now apply regarding the
qualification process of ground maintenance staff, air
traffic controllers and flight inspectors. This is a major
step towards aviation safety.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There are currently no detailed ICAO requirements or

recommendations on flight inspector training. Taking into
account the influence of flight inspection on air transport
safety, it is recommended to issue minimum requirements
on flight inspector training, qualification and skill refresh.

293
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294
Developing an Effective Training System for IFP
Flight and Ground Validation of High-
Performance PBN Kazui Wa ke mi, JCAB & Yos hita ka Uno, JCAB

Kazui. WAKEMI
Flight Inspector, Radio Engineer
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
Ota-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Fax: +81 3 3747 0568
E-mail: wakemi-k09m9@cab.mlit.go.jp

Yoshitaka. UNO
Flight Inspector, Captain
Japan Civil Aviation Bureau
Ota-ku, Tokyo, Japan
Fax: +81 3 3747 0568
E-mail: uno-y092u@cab.mlit.go.jp

1. ABSTRACT 2. INTRODUCTION

With increasing demand of ever growing air traffic, Japan In 2007, JCAB formulated RNAV Roadmap in
Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) has implemented a large accordance with ICAO Document 9613 PBN Manual
number of PBN Instrument Flight Procedures (IFP) in the as the first step for PBN implementation in Japan.
last decade. Following this roadmap, JCAB began to refurbish pre-
existing RNAV route that had no prescribed RNP values.
Simultaneously JCAB has established the IFP Validation
Process consists of Flight and Ground Validation, in order All outdated routes have been replaced to RNAV5 in
to assure the quality of those implemented PBN IFPs. recent years, and JCAB has been aiming to expand
RNAV5 route to cover furthermore airspace.
IFP Validation requires the profound knowledge on
Quality Assurance and Flight Procedure Design, and high From 2008 to 2012, JCAB has promoted Sky-Highway
skills of Programming and Database for processing Plan to allocate the airspace above FL290 as priority to
Aeronautical Information such as AIXM, Navigation the specified aircrafts approved for RNAV5.
Database and ARINC424. JCAB has therefore established
its own training system and curriculum for IFP Validation. Besides, a large number of PBN Terminal procedures
have been implemented to the congested airports. RNAV1
In recent years, the basic training for IFP Validation has SIDs and STARs for radar-controlled airport, and Basic
been provided several Asian countries corroborating with RNP 1 SIDs, STARs, and RNP Approaches for non-radar
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The aim airport have been established.
of this training is to build up Flight Validation Pilots and
Radio Engineers based on JCAB curriculum. In 2011, JCAB has established a RNP-AR Approach in
Tokyo International Airport (TIA) as the first high-
This paper presents the details of JCAB training performance PBN procedure. After the success in TIA, 19
system, designed to build up the personnel with a certain RNP-AR procedures have been established in 11 airports
level of experience in Flight Inspection to become skilled around Japan.
at Flight/Ground Validation for High-Performance PBN.

295
 Simulator Validation and actual Flight Validation, to the
promulgation.
Above mentioned Validation requires the specialists
having profound knowledge on Quality Assurance and
IFP design, besides high-skill level of aeronautical
information such as AIXM, Navigation Database and
ARINC 424. JCAB has been established and developed
its own training system in order to continuously produce
sophisticated specialists for Flight Validation.

3. DEVELOPMENT OF TRAINING PROGRAM

Flight Validation specialists consist of Pilot and Radio

Engineer are required to assure the safety of all of the
IFPs. Detailed requirements contain some differences
between Pilot and Radio Engineer, but required basic
skills and knowledge are just same and essential.

To conduct Flight Validation, all personnel have to well

understand the new concept added to the conventional
Flight Inspection, such as IFP design (ref. ICAO
Document 8168 PANS-OPS), basis of PBN (ref. ICAO
Document 9613 PBN Manual), ARINC424 and Geodesy
study. JCAB therefore has considered the method of
training and effective curriculum.
Fig. 1 Tokyo INTL (RJTT) RNAV RNP RWY23
3.1 Survey on International Standards
Airports Procedures
At first JCAB initiated the research on overseas situations
Hakodate RNAVRNPZ RWY 30 and activities for High-Performance PBN. Besides, on the
occasion of the first implementation of RNP-AR, JCAB
Yamaguchi-Ube RNAVRNPRWY 07/RWY25
dispatched two well-experienced pilots to FAA. They
Kitakyushu RNAVRNPRWY 18/36 finished Flight Validation of satellite-based performance
navigation IFPs course and were certified as Flight
Kumamoto RNAVRNPRWY Z/Y RWY25
Validation Pilot. They learned following subjects.
Okayama RNAVRNPRWY 07/25
How to evaluate flyability of IFPs.
Kochi RNAVRNPRWY Z/Y RWY14
What kind of tools are used in validation activities
Miyazaki RNAVRNPRWY Z/Y RWY09 The data flow from procedure design to publication
and the contents made by procedure designers
Tottori RNAVRNPRWY 28
How to prepare navigation database for FMS used
Matsuyama RNAVRNPRWY 14/32 in flight validation
Training and check for flight validation pilots(FVPs)
Odate-Noshiro RNAVRNPRWY Z/Y RWY29
TokyoHaneda RNAVRNPRWY 23 Doc.8168 PANS-OPS
ICAO
Table 1. RNP-AR IAP 04/01/2014 Doc.9906 QA Manual

N8260-67 FV of PBN and WAAS

Regarding the establishment of High-Performance PBN IFP
procedure, ICAO Document 9906 Quality Assurance 8240.3B (Certification of Flight
Manual prescribes that state authority should assure the FAA Inspection Personnel
quality for all of the procedures, and the organized 4040.3A(Flight Inspection Proficiency
activities for that quality assurance are indispensable. and Standardization Evaluation
JCAB therefore has a responsibility to protect the whole Program
IFP process by constructing the robust Data-Chain from Table 2. International standards used as reference
the IFP design draft through the IFP Validation, including

296
Based on the FAA curriculum they completed, JCAB has 737-800 Virtual Simulator (VSIM), which is used in the
established its own training system for Flight Validation. actual Simulator Validation.
The syllabus is separated into Initial Training and Periodic
Training. Experienced Pilots and Radio Engineers are After completion of Initial training, pilots with a certain
thought to be already well familiar with IFP and its level of experience in Flight Inspection would be certified
designs. JCAB therefore took account in personnels to conduct Flight Validation for High-Performance PBN.
experience and arranged the curriculum to be matched for Even the certified personnel should take periodic training
individual abilities. to maintain their skills, moreover, to catch up with the
latest IFP design and new CNS/ATM concept.
3.2 Understanding of Quality Assurance
Contents
Based on the preceding research and training in FAA,
JCAB started to develop its own training subjects. The 1 Flight Validation and Inspection
core concept of the training is to understand the 2 AIS
importance of Quality Assurance in Flight Validation
process. This is the prerequisite for both Pilots and Radio 3 WGS84
Engineers. 4 PBN concept
Drawing up the training syllabus especially on Quality 5 Geodesy
Assurance, the undermentioned items as shown in Table 3
6 ATM
were picked up from mainly ICAO Document 9906
Quality Assurance Manual as the required subjects. 7 IFP design
8 Aerodrome
Importance of Quality Assurance in Flight 9 Quality Assurance
1
Validation Process
10 ARINC424 Coding
2 Basis of Quality and Requirement
11 Aeronautical Chart
3 Activities regarding Quality Assurance
12 FOSA
4 Quality Management and its component
Basis of Quality management, Quality Assurance 13 Human Factor
5
and Quality Improvement
14 Aircraft Operation and Performance
6 PDCA Cycle
15 Simulator Evaluation
7 Documentation and Preservation
16 Documentation for the results of flight validation
8 Regulations on Quality Assurance
Table 4. Subjects of Flight Validation for Pilots
9 Flight Procedure Design and ICAO Annex 15
10 ICAO Doc 8168 PANS-OPS
11 ICAO Doc 9906 Quality Assurance Manual
12 ISO/RTCA Standards
13 Roles of Procedure Designer and Flight Inspector
14 Role of AIS
15 Role of Data house
Table3. Subjects for understanding Quality Assurance

3.3 Training Program for Pilots

Both Initial and Periodic training are partially common.

The basic sections of them are practiced in ground school
with Computer-Based Training (CBT). Regarding the
Fig. 2 B737-800 VSIM (Desktop Simulator)
subject Simulator Evaluation, participants use Boeing

297
3.3 Training Program for Radio Engineers Outline of FMS NDB

Government Authority is responsible for quality 1 Standard Data & Company Data
assurance of all of the promulgating IFPs. For that 2 FMS Flight Planned Route
purpose, the Authority also should preserve and manage
3 Old/New Cycle
complete the package including all the considerations
regarding IFP process. Radio Engineers are responsible
for data acquisition and preservation. In the conventional Data Coding of IFP
Flight Inspection scene, they analyzed data of 1 Steps of Data Coding
aeronautical radio facilities with FIS.
2 ARINC424
Even in Flight Validation, their mission is basically same, 3 FIX & Waypoint
i.e. Radio Engineer acquires and analyzes the data to 4 Leg Type
confirm the performance of Navigation aids supporting
5 Path Terminator Coding Rule
IFPs such as GNSS and DME/DME. Besides, for the
integrity of IFPs, Radio Engineer must preserve all related 6 Coding Practice
data they acquired and used. Hence they should learn
following items; Knowledge on XML (Extensible Markup
Language) and analysis AIXM
Quality Assurance
Understanding on surveying various algorithms
Differences in Flight inspection and Flight
Validation Knowledge of flight inspection for GNSS & DME /
DME
Flight inspection is one of the items that are
essential to flight validation, whereas the ICAO Doc.9849 GNSS Manual
evaluation activities of air navigation facility
alone, and flight validation is an evaluation Application knowledge
activities containing aviation security facilities to
be used in IFP, fly ability, and obstacle, Analysis of Tailored NDB
comprehensive to ensure the quality of IFP. Knowledge of decoding ARINC424

Aeronautical Information Method of data verification of validated Tailored

NDB and AIP
Configuration of aviation information
RTCA document DO-200A & 201 Knowledge on AIXM4.5 data handling

Knowledge on Information Technology
Knowledge on the following items that were
based on the knowledge on programming and
general database
Method of calculation for the DOP / protection level
from the geometry of the GPS and determining the
presence or absence of radio interference from the
placement and the actual number

Knowledge on following items; ARINC424 & Potential interference to the wireless device mounted
NDB coding on the aircraft

Quality of FMS NDB 3.4 Tools and Aids for Radio Engineer Training
1 Overall Process All trainees are required to acquire the several new
2 AIRAC Delivery Cycle knowledge and skills during the training. JCAB has
developed some software designed for supplement of
3 Common Error
such new concepts. Those tools have been used for not
4 Quality Management of NDB only training but also actual Flight Inspection and
5 Compliance with DO-200A/201A Validation activity.

a) Training tools for GNSS Flight Inspection

298
FD/FDE Availability Monitor has been developed for
education of GNSS and its Flight Inspection. It can
calculate the availability of GNSS core-constellation
including GPS and SBAS satellites.
Its world-wide coverage enables us the real-time
calculation of GNSS satellite geometry from the present
point to 6 hours into the future. The calculation is based
on TLE (Two-Line Element set) provided by NORAD
(North American Aerospace Defense Command).
FD/FDE Availability Monitor processes this simple plane
text and generates the visualized satellite status at the
specified moment.
Fig.3 FD/FDE Availability Monitor
Trainees can learn how the satellite geometry affects the
accuracy of aircrafts position estimation by this software.
Furthermore, they can compare the actual and the
simulated geometry in the flight, and find out the
existence of the interference. As an indicator of GNSS
Availability and performance, Dilution of Precision
(DOP) is the one of the most important elements. Trainees
are able to learn and understand visually the mathematic
theory of DOP by the software designed for educational
purpose.
JCAB Flight Inspectors are using those software and
RAIM NOTAM provided by ATMC (Air Traffic
Management Centre) as one of the basis for their
decision-making.
b) Tools for Database Validation
For the quality assurance of Aeronautical Information,
JCAB Flight Inspector is provided the Snapshot of Static
Database in Aeronautical Information Service Center
(AISC) every AIRAC. Those provided data are coded in
the AIXM format, which is designed to enable the
management and steady distribution of Aeronautical
Information.
299
AIXM-NDB Parsing Program (ANPP) has been
developed by Flight Inspector for the validation of that
AIXM data. ANPP can decode and extract all of the
information contained in the AIXM format, and display
them visually like web interface. In addition, ANPP has
two calculation methods in order to verify the difference
of IFP design tool and FMS algorithm, and can display
the calculation result on the map.
Not only trainees but also almost all of personnel are
using ANPP routinely for data extraction. They can
therefore understand the importance of IFP Data-Chain
and Database Validation intuitively.
Fig.4 AIXM-NDB Parsing Program
As well as Pilots, Radio Engineers already have enough
knowledge and experience on conventional Flight
Inspection. Therefore, the main subjects of training for
Radio Engineer are focused to the items as follows;
Flight Inspection of Satellite-Based radio
aids
Quality Assurance and Database processing
At first, all trainees have to take 20-hour basic course on
CBT. After completion of CBT, trainees who have basic
knowledge on Quality Assurance would learn more
advanced contents from certified instructors, and conduct
actual Flight Validation to acquire the all requirements.
With enough experience of Flight Validation, they
proceed to final exam including oral test and practical
skill test. After passing all of the examinations, they
would be certified to conduct all activities regarding
Flight Validation.
 Annex 4 Contents
Aeronautical Charts
Annex 6 1 Flight Validation and Inspection
Operation of Aircraft 2 AIS
Annex10
Aeronautical Telecommunication 3 WGS84
Annex14
4 PBN concept
Aerodromes
Annex15 5 Geodesy
Aeronautical Information Services
Doc.8701 6 ATM
Manual on Testing of Radio 7 IFP design
ICAO Navigation Aids
Doc.8697 8 Aerodromes
Aeronautical Charts Manual
9 Quality Assurance
Doc.8168
PANS-OPS 10 ARINC424 Coding
Doc.9137
Airport Services Manual 11 Aeronautical Chart
Doc.9613 12 FOSA
PBN Manual
Doc.9849 13 Aircraft Operation and Performance
GNSS Manual Table 6. Training syllabus for Radio Engineers
Doc.9906
Quality Assurance Manual for 4. ACTIVITY OF FLIGHT VALIDATION PILOTS
Procedure Design AND RADIO ENGINEERS
N8260.67
Flight Validation of Satellite-Based 4.1 Participation for FOSA
Performance Based
Navigation PBN Instrument Flight The certified Pilots and Radio Engineers also take part in
Procedures IFP -Current Guidance
Flight Operational Safety Assessment (FOSA), the
and Criteria
FAA FIM Order 8200.1C technical conference convened to identify all hazards and
Flight Inspection Manual risks of the IFP, and ensure operational safety objectives.
TI 8200-52 The participants are composed of several experts from
Flight Inspection Handbook Safety Department, ATC, ATM, Procedure Designer,
AC90-113 ANSP, Airlines and Flight Inspector.
Instrument Flight Procedure
Validation IFPV of Satellite Based a) Process for Publishing RNP-AR IAP and the
Instrument Flight Procedures IFP Position of FOSA in these sequences
DO-200A
Standard for Processing Aeronautical Fig. 5 shows FOSA basic work flow in Japan. The safety
RTCA
Data of new High-performance PBN IFP should be evaluated
DO-201A from various aspects. After desktop-assessment by FOSA,
Standard for Aeronautical Information
actual Flight Validation would be conducted.
Table 5. Documents referred in training of Radio
Engineers

300
 So far FOSA has been held 16 times in Japan. Among
them, the FOSA for RJFT RNP-AR in 2012 was
Selection of airports to introduce especially good example that Flight Inspector played
RNP AR approach highly important role. During Flight Validation process of
that IFP, an unexpected hazard was detected, and re-
evaluation was requested by Flight Inspector.
Drafting ATC operation procedure
and flight path design b Role of Flight Inspector in FOSA Example of
publishing Kumamoto RNP-AR
Installation of the Kumamoto airport (RJFT) is located at the center of
FOSA WG Kyushu Island, west of Japan. Neighboring Kumamoto
city is the second largest city in Kyushu area, and this
airport has relatively high demand for air transportation.
Creating a prerequisite
Around this area the dense fog is often formed, and
Kumamoto airport has high-category (CAT-IIIa) ILS on
Operational safety Runway 07. On the opposite side (Runway 25), however,
assessment conference any proper conventional approach procedures could not
be established with the present design criteria due to
Adoption of the safety assessment mountain range lies in the east side of the airport. In case
document of westerly wind, airlines had trouble to make landings on
Runway 25, hence airlines had ever requested to JCAB to
solve this problem.
Flight Validation

Determination of IFP

Acquisition of ATC controller

operating permit Training Tokyo

Pilot Training Kumamoto

Kyushu Island
Start of
operations
Safety monitoring after the introduction Fig.6 Location of RJFT in Japan

In 2012, new RNP-AR approach was finally designed and

Evaluation after the introduction
Ongoing safety monitoring
Fig. 5 Process for Publishing RNP-AR IAP and the
Position of FOSA
accordingly FOSA was held for this flight procedure.
During the subsequent Flight Validation process, a critical
hazard was detected. The original design of the RNP-AR
trajectory was considerably close to the specified 4
airspaces for Air-sports, such as hang gliding and
paragliding. Flight Inspector proposed the solution against
this hazard in FOSA, and the re-evaluation was conducted
to analyze the risk in detail.

301
Hazard Existence of sky sports area (2) Aircraft Operator can request this approach procedure
during the specified periods as the condition;
Consequence Closure to paragliding Airspace
Estimated time of arrival to IAF should be
Risk severity Safety factor decrease
Hazardous
within 30 minutes before sunrise

Estimated time of arrival to IAF should be

Risk probability Possibility
Remote
beyond 30 minutes after sunset

Causes Causes mitigation (3) Air Traffic Controller can give the permission
for use this approach procedure during the
Table 7. Risk management of FOSA specified periods as the condition;

Estimated time of arrival to IAF should be

within 30 minutes before sunrise

Estimated time of arrival to IAF should be

beyond 30 minutes after sunset

(4) Government Authority should provide proper

safety instruction and materials including
terrain and altitude information regarding this
procedure.

Night operations
only

RNAV (RNP) Z RWY25

Fig. 8 Finally published RNAV(RNP) Z RWY25

Flight Inspector contributed to FOSA, and played the

Paragliding leading role to solve the problem by the knowledge skills
Area and experiences acquired through the above-mentioned
Below 5000ft training.

Fig. 7 Locational relationship of airspaces for Air-

sports and planning route

As a result of the re-evaluation, this hazard was

categorized as Acceptable, under condition of the
following items;

(1) This approach procedure should be used only in

night hours, and AIP approach chart should mention
Night operations only

302
4.2 Training Cooperation for Neighboring Countries
In recent years, JCAB has been corroborating with Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to offer the
basic program on Flight Validation to the neighboring
countries.
Date of training Contains of training
Sep 2012 Air navigation system
safety and efficiency
improvement projects
New CNS/ATMRNAV
(in Japan)
Jan 2013 Development projects
related to the transition to
the next generation aviation
security system
Flight inspection and
validation training in
accordance with the PBN
IFP
Jan 2013 Aviation safety policy
improvement project
The PBN IFP validation
training for flight inspection
personnel
Aug 2013 Development projects
related to the transition to
the next generation aviation
security system
Flight inspection and
validation training in
accordance with the PBN
IFP
(in Japan)
Oct 2013 Aviation safety policy
improvement project
Flight inspection and
validation training in
accordance with the PBN
Feb 2014 Aviation safety policy
improvement project
Flight inspection and
validation training in
accordance with the PBN
Table 8. Training provided in neighboring countries in
recent years
JCAB has prepared to offer such training program
responding to several requests. It is expected that the
training program will contribute to development of PBN
in several countries arranging their circumstances.
5. CONCLUSIONS
As stated above, JCAB has developed the effective
training system for Flight Validation via various
researches on International Standards. Certified Pilots and
303
Radio Engineers have contributed to the implementation
of the large number of PBN procedures by taking part in
IFP design process. Recently the know-how that JCAB
has accumulated and the training program contributed to
other countries to support their PBN implementation. The
training program is expected to be hereafter demanded by
both internal and external organizations.
The training program is designed to build up the
personnel with a certain level of experience in Flight
Inspection. The instructors are appointed among the
skilled Flight Inspectors, and the personnel are
continuously trained according the above mentioned
syllabus, and stacking skills and experiences step by step.
However, the method of this training contains some
problems.
First, at present, there is no International Standards or
regulations concerning the level of achievement and its
evaluation. The skill levels of each trainees and lecturer
are considered separately, but both of them should be
considered mutually for the proper evaluation of level of
achievement. And the quality of training materials is
critical element for the whole training too. JCAB has
defined the original Goals of training for each subject as
described above by itself.
Second, the proportion of each Flight Validation and
Flight Inspection is changing, and its transition speed is
accelerating. About both airway and terminal flight
procedures, JCAB is planning to deploy high-
performance PBN supported by new facilities e.g. GBAS.
On the other hand, JCAB is also planning to withdraw the
conventional navaids, especially VOR used for airways.
Under these circumstances, it is very necessary to update
the training program to catch up with the latest
technology, e.g. GBAS and the other navaids for PBN
procedures.
And finally, with the progress of the times, the more
operational efficiency has been demanded. Education and
training is no exception, therefore JCAB has ever made
effort to achieve the required level of efficiency.
However, the present training scheme has to take too long
time to grant the required skills and experiences as a
Flight Validation specialist. It is desired to introduce a
new training method that is capable of applying the higher
capacity in more short term, so called Competency-
Based Training method.
JCAB defined the required competency-level
individually, but we have no criteria reflecting the global
aviation industry. So it is necessary to define ideal
figures, i.e. what it should be for Flight Validation
specialists with a concrete description.

Therefore JCAB propose to sort out common definition of

Competency Level for Flight Validation specialists. .
Besides, in order to introduce Competency-Based
Training, it is essential to develop training method and
materials such as Standard Training Package (STP). To
make a scheme for each countries to share those method
can contribute to the standardization of the quality of
Flight Validation specialists of the world.

6. FUTURE WORK

In 1989, ICAO established TRAINAIR Program to

meet the demand for Air transportation and increase in
sophistication. And in 2006, PANS-TRG was published
aiming to optimize the training for Pilots. It regulates all
the required procedure in actual flight. Moreover, the
Competency-Based Training concept was implemented
into the Multi-crew Pilot License (MPL) training. On the
other hand, Next Generation of Aviation Professionals
(NGAP) Task Force was formed in 2009, and one of its
Working Group (ATM-WG) stipulated the training
manuals for Air Traffic Safety Electronics Personnel
(ATSEP). Regulations and Manuals for Pilots and Radio
Engineers have made steady progress.

Under the present circumstances, JCAB should adopt the

concept of Competency-Based method and revise the
Flight Validation training program.

As the long-range view, it is expected that required

competency level of personnel will be considered in
detail, and International Standard for Flight Validation
will also be stipulated by ICAO.

304
 Integrated CRM/TRM Concepts Applied to FIV
Flights and Ground Activities Fabrizio Maracich, ENAV, & N icoletta Lo mbardo, ENAV

Fabrizio Maracich
Flight Crew Training manager
ENAV S.pA.
Rome, Italy
E-mail: fabrizio.maracich@enav.it

Nicoletta Lombardo
Head of the Human Performance Unit
ENAV S.pA.
Forl, Italy
E-mail: nicoletta.lombardo@enav.it

ABSTRACT updating according to the latest Human Factor Concepts

and Management of Just Culture, as foreseen by ICAO,
Safety is paramount in any complex flight operation. and finally providing the required integrated CRM
Flight Inspection Validation (FIV) flying has an increased training to our Flight Inspection Validation Dept.
exposure to potential threats due to environmental factors
(low level, high speed, turbulence, air traffic, birds and INTRODUCTION
other factors). So thereby involving the entire crew to
mitigate risk, not only the pilots, will increase safety and Over the years, the concept of team integration has
have benefits in terms of efficiency and the quality of the become the mainstay of any complex operation. When
final results. Expanding this concept to the whole flight operating in an environment with a high technical content
inspection operations group (Ops, Maintenance and and a low tolerance to errors, it is important to manage all
Administrative personnel) has the potential for even the available resources in the best way possible to
greater benefits. ENAVs implementation of this concept, mitigate risks.
both in the experimental and operational phases are
reviewed to highlight the advantages and discuss how to More than just relying on technology and the efficiency of
correct the drawbacks, if any, of this innovative approach a procedure, the quality of the performance of the crew is
to cooperative interaction of all the players involved. fundamental. Operational performance is a result of
integrating technical training and non-technical training
The project was born to contribute to the achievement of thereby reflecting the ability of the crewmembers to
high safety standards, through a structured training and integrate and collaborate, in other words, CRM Crew
checking method, and a continuous improvement of non- Resource Management.
technical skills (NOTECHS), according to regulatory
provisions. CRM IN AVIATION

Specifically the project has the following operational CRM can be defined as The efficient use of crew
objectives: creation of an internal department that deals resources with the scope of maintaining an elevated level
with CRM and NOTECHS development in order to of safety. It is a flexible and systematic method for
provide training, evaluation and development tailored to optimizing human performance through structured
Flight Inspection and Validation needs. Training and training of NOTECHS (Non-Technical Skills), learning

305
about threat and error management techniques and
promotion of a culture of safety (Just Culture).
The roots of CRM date back to the late 70s as the result
of the investigation of aircraft accidents, which made it
clear that the main cause was due to human error such
as communication, leadership, decision making, etc. From
this, CRM training was born. Its aim is to reduce error by
making better use of human resources in the cockpit.
INTEGRATING CRM AND TRM FOR THE
PURPOSE OF FIV OPS
In any type of flight operation, safety is a function of the
quality of the human performance which comes from
technical training and how it is applied.
It has been known for some time that human error is a
contributing factor in more than 70% of aircraft accidents.
The risk of human error increases in conditions where the
flight operations take place in a complex and ever
changing environment.
Flight Inspection operations take place in high-density
traffic environments where a multi-pilot crew must
integrate and coordinate their activities in order to
complete the mission safely. Therefore, it is necessary for
the crew to be prepared, not just in terms of technical
training but also in the management of non-technical
skills, which are crucial for flight safety.
Having noted how important it was for a full integration
between the various players that are needed to plan,
execute and make a FIV mission successful, ENAV
started a project to develop a specific Integrated CRM
Training Course for such missions. The goal of the 5-year
project was to obtain CAA certification according to a
plan specified below.
The CRM Training objective was to develop the
NOTECHS on a cognitive, organizational, interpersonal
and communicative non-specific technical expertise level,
which are equally important for the success of a mission.
When these standard behaviors are put to use by pilots, it
makes flight operations safer. The behaviors specified in
the NOTECHS training are practiced through the CRM
and are evaluated together with the technical skills during
simulator checks and on missions.
The need to create CRM Training dedicated to FIV Flying
comes from the type of mission and the crew. These are
differentiated from commercial airline flights in the
following aspects:
-CREW: The Flight Inspection Crew is
composed of two pilots and a systems engineer who
works inside the aircraft.
306
-MISSIONS: The activity takes place in an
environment of high density traffic. The performance of
the aircraft, the objectives of the mission and the stress
levels are much more elevated than commercial flight
activities.
-TRAINING: The training of Flight Inspection
Pilots is different compared to airline pilots. They are
different when it comes to professional experience,
previous training and previous profession (some were
ATC, while others were airline pilots or commercial
pilots) as well as experience in different types of aircraft
and the type of operation flown.
-ORGANIZATION: In our case, the Flight
Inspection Group is smaller than most airline companies
and is incorporated within ENAV. The number of
crewmembers is small and therefore there is a close daily
contact between them.
The basic crew to perform a FIV mission is three: a
captain, first officer and systems engineer. They all
contribute to the safe outcome of a flight. They are all
directly involved in the mission so they must contribute to
the overall safety of that flight. Dispatchers are important
and fundamental as well, because they are the first line of
defense against operational errors (underestimation of
weather conditions or airport/facilities status, for
example) and they do an invaluable job in providing
coordination with all the parties involved in a FIV
mission. Furthermore, maintenance technicians are
obvious involved in keeping the aircraft and systems in
perfect condition. Safety and efficiency of the flight is in
their hands as well.
The creation of a CRM and NOTECHS Training Dept.
that is functional and efficient was made possible by
involving the entire organization in an integrated safety
approach. The change in management culture provided
fertile ground for this study, which was approved in 2011,
with the intent of reaching initial independent capability
in providing training by the end of 2013.
THE MASTER PLAN
The ENAV project Contributing Human Factors for the
safety of flight inspection flights was launched in
October 2010 by the Human Factor department. It has the
principle objective to contribute to achieving high
standards of safety for flight inspection operations
through the establishment of a standardized model of
training, checks and continuing improvement of
NOTECHS for the operational crews according to EU-
OPS1.
To best reach the above objective (A), the program
included two other objectives (B and C) as equally
important to achieve the primary objective.
Objective A: Creation of an internal CRM structure
Objective B: Initial and Continuing Training on Human
Factors and Just Culture for Middle Management (ICAO)
Objective C: Building and delivering CRM courses by
integrating relevant professionals.
To achieve each of these objectives, three phases were
laid out; an analysis, supervision and follow-up phase.
1. Development of Internal CRM/NOTECHS Training
This was the starting point for constructing a matrix for
NOTECHS dedicated to flight inspection operations,
which was in line with the standards and consequent
development of a CRM ad hoc.
1.1 Building of NOTECHS
- Building a Matrix:
The NOTECHS Matrix was an integration between a
matrix used for commercial aviation and behavioral
indicators built from scratch based on flight inspection
operations. To discover these indicators, Human
Performance experts from ENAV observed operational
tasks done by the crew inflight and in simulators to
identify crucial NOTECHS. At the same time, pilots were
interviewed singularly and as a group to analyze what
were the distinctive NOTECHS needed for flight
inspection operations. From this study, 4 skills were
identified.
- Communication
- Interpersonal Relationships
- Workload Management
- Situational Awareness and Decision Making
Each of these skills were divided into 3 subcategories and
a list of 20 behavioral indicators was created for each
category. The behavioral indicators were subjected to the
scrutiny of pilots through focus groups. The most
significant indicators were selected. This led to the first
draft of the NOTECHS Matrix which was trialed in 2012
during simulator checks. In 2013, Type Rating Examiner
(TRE) and Human Performance experts validated the
Matrix through validation checks. This led to the final
draft of the matrix.
307
- TRE Training: The proceeding phase was dedicated to
training of the TRE for observation, validation and
feedback of the NOTECHS. The training process
included theory and practical training based on the
evaluation of NOTECHS. In particular, they were given
methodological tools to independently perform the first
evaluations of the NOTECHS in the simulator. ENAV
Human Performance Experts were present during
simulator sessions to supervise the evaluation activities
and to give feedback to the TRE. It was followed by a
debriefing on the NOTECHS and coaching for the TRE
on their evaluation skills.
1.2 Construction of the CRM
The first step in individualizing the NOTECHS for CRM
Training were determined during flight and simulator
observations. A number of CRM discussion points were
identified and submitted to working groups made up of
our pilots. A focus group method was used and
discussions were stimulated by:
-Identifying the consistency of the content with respect to
Flight Inspections;
-Identifying priority areas for intervention;
-Having any needs for CRM not highlighted to come out
The results of the working groups are shown below
Table 1 N=16
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2 PILOTS
0
Pilots Total n= 16
The results showed that communication, teamwork and
stress/workload management were the principle
instructional needs. Other points such as procedure,
organization and flight operations were not chosen as
points to be covered in the CRM but were referred to
management to improve the awareness of the potential
problems perceived by the pilots for possible intervention.
-Case Studies: For effective analysis and reflection of the
CRM, case studies were designed ad hoc based on flight
inspection operations. Through the collaboration of pilots
and ENAV Human Performance Experts, scenarios
consistent with flight inspection operations were built and
presented to the pilots in the flight simulator located at the
ENAV Academy in Forli. The scenarios were videotaped
and are now part of the CRM training.
From this, CRM Training was built reflecting real life
operations of the ENAV Flight Inspection Dept. while
complying with the requirements of the regulations
currently in force.
-CRM Facilators: In line with the regulations, the pilot
CRM facilitators were chosen (2 pilots and 2 captains)
and for better integration in CRM Training, 2 FIOs were
inserted.
The CRM facilitator training has 4 phases:
Participation in a CRM Flight Inspection Course;
presence of the ENAV Human Performance Team at the
flight inspection headquarters and during the various
phases of training in the simulator enabled the
implementation of coaching. Management is currently in
the phase of being supervised.
INTEGRATION OF PROFESSIONS
With the objective of improving effectiveness and
efficiency in organization not only front line personnel
(pilots, technicians, mechanics) were involved in the
project but everyone who contributed indirectly to
producing a quality service and maintaining a high
standard of safety. We proceeded in the first phase of an
organizational analysis through field observation and
personal interviews with them. Once the needs and
critical issues were known, the first steps to integration
were to insert them into the CRM Course along with the
pilots. Successively, TRM Team Resource
Management courses were successfully integrated among
the various professions with the aim of improving the
integration between roles and diverse functions and
improving everyones awareness of how their work fits
into others, affects safety and the final product.

Participation in a Train the Trainer Course for conducting

classes (taught by the ENAV Academy); Pic. 1 P180 Avanti II FIV Aircraft
Participation with the classroom in co-presence of a
Human Performance Instructor;

Conduct CRM Recurrent Training Courses supervised by

ENAV Human Performance Experts.

MANAGEMENT SUPPORT

The training of management personnel for improvement

of the Just Culture is an ICAO request and in our case, it
is needed to support the management in a crucial moment
of change. Human factors is inserted in during
reorganization, recruitment of new resources and
dismissal of others. The involvement of management in
the project has the aim of not only contributing to the
efficiency and effectiveness of the crew but the well-
being, productivity and safety of the entire organization.

The training requirements for management in part was

met through the NOTECHS Training as the role of the
TRE was done by those who held managerial positions.
At the ENAV Academy, we had the chance to get to
know the entire training process, evaluation and the
development of the NOTECHS for pilots and compare
them to the role of management in the development and
aid of the Just Culture. To accomplish this, there were
individual interviews to discuss the points more in-depth
and identify eventual training needs. Furthermore, the

308
RESULTS

Based on the applied methodology and thanks to the open - Building and Delivering a Flight Inspection
collaboration between the various professions involved in CRM Course:
the project, the results are as follows:
The basic CRM Course has the following modules:
- NOTECHS MATRIX
Table 3 Basic CRM Modules
The matrix is dived into 4 areas and each has 3 elements.
Each element is a behavioral indicator. -Introduction
Table 2 NOTECHS Flight Inspection Matrix -Errors

CATEGORY ELEMENTS -TEM-Threats and Error Management Method

(adapted to Flight Inspection)

ATMOSPHERE -Situation Awareness

-Decision Making
COMUNICATION TRANSMIT -Stress, Fatigue, Workload

-NOTECHS for Flight Inspection Operations

MANAGEMENT
-Communication

LEADERSHIP -Teamwork and Leadership

-Safety Culture

INTERPERSONAL TEAMWORK
- CRM facilitators Training:

CONFLICT The CRM Instructors have completed the training for

MANAGEMENT instructors and are in the phase of copresence in the
classroom. In the next step, they will be teaching
autonomously.
TASK
- Integration of Professions:

WORKLOAD TIME The need of an integrated CRM Course, as mentioned in

MANAGEMENT the third objective, to integrate the various professions
includes an integrated CRM course for technicians with
STRESS AND the pilots.
ERROR
- Management Support:

SITUATION Activities were carried out to support and coach

SITUATION AWARENESS management, which contributed to the improvement of
AWARENESS the managerial skills for the new CRM, NOTECHS and
PROBLEM integrated organizational activities. This improvement
& SOLVING was not only determined by the increase in the level of
self-efficacy satisfaction of the managers involved but
DECISION MAKING also above all, by a constant improvement of the overall
DECISION
company performance and the quality of service offered
MAKING
by the ENAV Flight Inspection Group.

309
CERTIFICATION
The entire process was monitored by the national CAA,
with regular meetings and reviewing of the material. The
final stage of the certification involved the modification
of the Operations Manual part D, Training Manual, to
include the CRM training syllabus and the approved CRM
Instructors/Facilitators. The joint effort of the Human
Factor Department and that of the FIV Department was
completed within the allocated timeframe.
ONGOING TASKS
Activities that will take place in the near future:
-CRM/NOTECHS: Building of CRM Recurrent Training
with collaboration between instructors and Human Factor
Experts, supervision of instructors, supervision of the
TRE.
Operations: An increase in mission efficiency has been
noted. There are indications that this result is the natural
byproduct of point number four below. We have metrics
to define mission parameters, and those are closely
monitored for any needed changes.
Working Environment: One the best results obtained and
immediately visible without any need of a specific
metrics, is the change in the general atmosphere. The
possibility to freely express personal thoughts during the
training (in the open) and in the initial interviews
(privately) had the effect of solving some conflicts,
smoothing out corners, lowering the overall stress level
and, in general, made the working environment a more
enjoyable place.
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CAA Civil Aviation Authority

-Management Support: Supervision and coaching CRM Crew resource Management

activities for Middle Management
FIO Flight Inspection Operator
-Integration of Professions: Develop TRM (Team
Resource management) courses for maintenance (Flight Inspection System Engineer)
personnel, operational and administrative office
personnel. Supervision and continuous improvement of FIV Flight Inspection and Validation
safety will be carried out by an Organizational Risk
Assessment that is to say an analysis of organizational ICAO International Civil Aviation
risks perceived by the operators directly (pilots, Organization
technicians, mechanics) rather than middle or upper
management. The objective is to intervene in a focused NOTECHS Non-Technical Skills
and proactive way in the management of real risks. In
TEM Threat and Error Management
addition, develop a method of analysis and error handling
through the application of valid and reliable tools, TRE Type Rating Examiner
utilization of successes in other fields and accredited in
the aviation world TRM Team Resource Management
RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS REFERENCE MATERIAL
There are four major points that we have to look at to ICAO DOC 9683 Human Factor Training manual
trace the results. These points are Safety, Flexibility and
Economics, Operations and Working Environment. ICAO DOC 9824 Human Factors Guidelines for Aircraft
Maintenance Manual
Safety: We are always looking for ways to maintain or
improve the safety level of our operations. How much this UK CAA CAP 1179 A strategy for human factors in civil
will contribute to the overall safety is hard to define in aviation
numerical terms, but statistics are clear across the aviation
industry, that a dedicated, operations specific, and ENAC (Italy) Safety Plan 2012-2015
integrated CRM is the right tool to work with.
EASA European Aviation Safety Plan 2013-2016
Flexibility and Economics: We no longer depend on an
external Training Service Provider since all the resources
to provide the training are "in house" at no additional cost.
This is a budget advantage, although not huge, but visible
(about 2% of the direct training costs, or 1.25% of the
total budget of the Flight Crew Training Office*).

310
 Session 11
Flight Inspection Standards
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 Recommended Qualification Requirements for
Flight Inspection Service Providers Herve Renouf, D SNA/D TI & Peter Thir kettle, NA TS

Herv RENOUF
Head of DSNA / DTI Flight Inspection Unit
Toulouse, France
Tel : +33(0)5 62 14 55 20
E-mail: herve.renouf@aviation-civile.gouv.fr

Chairman of the ICASC Technical Working Group

Peter THIRKETTLE
Senior Safeguarding Engineer
NATS
London, UK
E-mail: peter.thirkettle@nats.co.uk

ABSTRACT some form of self-declaration in the absence of any state

requirement.
ICAO Annex 10 Volume 1 requires that Navigational
Aids are routinely flight inspected. Doc 8071 provides SCOPE
guidance on how to conduct the flight inspection. DOC
8071 also provides some guidance on the make-up of The scope of this paper covers measurement of the Signal
flight inspection organisation. This includes People, in Space of a Navigational Aid. The paper does not
Equipment and Procedures. include Procedure Validation as detailed in Doc 9906
Volume 5.
To date there are no internationally agreed standards for
the oversight of flight inspection service providers, some CAPABILITIES
states do provide oversight of the service providers
through locally produced regulatory material. During the A Flight Inspection Service Provider shall be capable of:
tendering stage for a flight inspection contract the Air
Navigation Service Provider may require that the flight Using flight inspection techniques to measure
inspection service provider is approved by their CAA. accurately the signals in space radiated by those
This may cause problem for states which do not provide navigational aids which they are intending to
oversight of the flight inspection service providers. inspect.
Evaluating the measured signals with respect to
As flight inspection is considered to be a maintenance applicable standards and tolerances which should
activity there is a general requirement that the flight be established by the local regulator.
inspection arrangement should be fit for their intended
purpose. As a result of feedback from several Examples of typical standards are ICAO (Doc
International Flight Inspection Symposia the ICASC has 8071 and Annex 10), or FAA 8200.1, or UK CAP
decided to provide guidance to the industry on the subject 670.
of Requirements for Flight Inspection Service Providers.
Communicating with ground engineers and
PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT technicians to advise if any adjustments are
required to the equipment being inspected.
The purpose of this document is to provide
Recommended Qualification Requirements for Flight NOTE: The extent to which the Flight Inspection Service
Inspection Service Providers for either a state CAA to Provider provides information and guidance regarding
implement into its own regulatory regime or for an the Navaid setting up to the ground engineer varies from
individual flight inspection service provider to use for state to state. This may mean that Flight Inspector

313
competence could be different from one organisation to performance of the Inspection Service. A practical
another. demonstration does not replace the evidence based
demonstration of the requirements. Details of a practical
Providing a flight inspection report to the demonstration can be found in Appendix 1
customer,
The Exposition should include references to associated
APPROVAL PROCEDURE documentation as appropriate.
Applicants shall detail the overall Flight Inspection The exposition should address how the provider uses
operation in an Exposition. The Exposition shall include design, process monitoring, training and procedures to
evidence based demonstration that each of the ensure the quality of the Flight Inspection results.
requirements detailed below or set by the local regulator
are adequately met. The Exposition should be Approval by the Accountable
Manager. Details of the Accountable Manager can be
A practical demonstration of the Flight Inspection found in
Operation may be necessary to demonstrate the
# Facility Flight inspection requirements in
DOC 8071
Appendix 2
and III
Accountable Manager
5 ILS Marker Table I-4-9.Flight inspection
APPLICABLE STANDARDS beacons requirements and tolerances for
ILS marker beacons
Doc 8071
6 Non Table I-5-3.Summary of flight
The flight inspection should comply with the guidance
directional test requirements for non-
and recommendations given in ICAO Doc 8071 to
beacons directional beacons
support the measurement of the parameters in ICAO
Annex 10 Volume 1. Alternative methods may be
proposed in the exposition as long as it is demonstrated
that it meets the specific objective of Doc 8071.or Annex EXPOSITION
10.
Content
ICAO DOC 8071 provides tables with flight inspection
requirements and tolerances for each type of navigation The content of the Exposition should detail the overall
aid and a summary of the table headings is provided in Flight Inspection operation. The following sections
Table 1. provide some headings that would normally be included
in an Exposition. The detail is not exhaustive and may
Table 1. DOC 8071 Flight Inspection Tolerances vary from one flight inspection operator to another.
# Facility Flight inspection requirements in The headings assume that the flight inspection
DOC 8071 organisation does have a Quality Management System.
The most appropriate headings that would normally be
1 VOR Table I-2-3.Summary of flight contained in a Quality Management System have been
inspection requirements VOR included.
2 DME Table I-3-3.Summary of flight SCOPE OF TASKS.
test requirements DME
It is important that the exposition clearly identifies the
3 ILS Localizer Table I-4-7.Flight inspection scope of tasks that the exposition covers. This would
requirements and tolerances for include the types of navigational aids to be inspected,
localizer Category (Cat) I, II and category of operation (For ILS) and the types of
III inspection e.g. routine or commissioning.
4 ILS Glide path Table I-4-8.Flight inspection
requirements and tolerances for
glide path Categories (Cat) I, II

314
ORGANISATION
Organisation name
This should be the name that the flight inspection
organisation trades under. This would normally be the
legal entity.
Contact details
Address and Telephone Contacts.
Flight Inspection Organisational Chart
An organisational Chart should be provided detailing the
roles that make up the flight inspection organisation. This
should show the reporting lines up the accountable
manager or board as appropriate. It is sometimes also
necessary to show functions within the organisation this
typically the case where several people perform the same
task. For example surveying.
Interfaces with other internal departments and
divisions
Where the flight inspection operation is part of a larger
organisation it is important to ensure that all contributing
departments, divisions or other organization involved
directly or indirectly with the flight inspection operation
comply with the flight inspection organisations exposition
or quality management system as appropriate.
PERSONNEL RESPONSIBILITIES
Objective
The Organisation shall ensure that all personnel
concerned with the flight inspection are competent to
conduct their job functions.
Acceptable Mean of Compliance
The organization should establish a written procedure for
determining required job competencies and continued
competence checking of all personnel through regular
assessment.
The procedure should consider all personnel directly
engaged in the flight inspection operation, this includes
but is not limited to the pilot (in terms of flying the
correct flight inspection procedure), flight inspector,
surveyor, documentation controller and auditor.
Flight inspection methods and strategies vary according to
the type of equipment and procedure to be inspected.
Consequently different types of qualification must be
considered such as ILS, VOR, NDB, MLS,
commissioning or routine inspection.
315
The organisation shall maintain records of competency
including any on-going competency checking.
CHANGE PROCESS
Objective
The organisation shall ensure that all changes to the flight
inspections operations are assessed and recorded.
Acceptable Means of Compliance
The organisation shall establish procedures for, assessing
and documenting changes to all areas of the operation,
this would normally include but is not limited to the:
Organisational.
System changes
Procedure changes
Changes shall be identified and records maintained. The
changes shall be reviewed, verified and validated, as
appropriate, and approved before implementation. The
review shall include evaluation of the effect of the
changes on the flight inspection operation.
Records should be established to provide evidence of
conformity to requirements and of the effective operation
of the QM system shall be controlled, identifiable, stored,
retrievable and protected according to procedure
description (9001-4.2.4).
Documents required by the QM system shall be controlled
according to established procedures to ensure proper
handling of revision and changes (9001-4.2.3
Design and development changes shall be identified and
records maintained. The changes shall be reviewed,
verified and approved before implementation (9001-
7.3.7).
Significant equipment modifications and renewal might
still need approval by the principal or the CAA before
implementation.
DOCUMENTATION CONTROL
Objective
The organisation shall ensure that all documents that
support the flight inspection operation should be
controlled so that the correct version of any document
can be easily identified and used.
Acceptable Means of Compliance
A documented procedure shall be established to define the
controls needed
to approve documents for adequacy prior to issue,
to review and update as necessary and re-approve
documents,
to ensure that changes and the current revision
status of documents are identified,
to ensure that relevant versions of applicable
documents are available at points of use,
to ensure that documents remain legible and
readily identifiable,
to ensure that documents of external origin
determined by the organization to be necessary for
the planning and operation of the quality
management system are identified and their
distribution controlled, and
to prevent the unintended use of obsolete
documents, and to apply suitable identification to
them if they are retained for any purpose.
AUDITING
Objective
The organisation shall plan and implement the
monitoring, measurements, analysis and improvement
processed needed to ensure conformity of the QM
system.
Acceptable Means of Compliance
To ensure consistent meeting of customer requirements
and continual improvement of the QM system, the audit
schedule must at least identify the following action items
internal audits,
customer satisfaction monitoring,
management reviews,
audits with independent certification body,
external audits with sub-contractors, CAA and/or
customer as appropriate.
CONTROL OF SUB-CONTRACTORS
Objective
The organisation shall ensure that sub-contractors are
controlled.
316
Acceptable Means of Compliance
The organisation shall evaluate and select sub-contractors
based on their ability to supply products and services in
accordance with the organisation's exposition.
Criteria for selection, evaluation and re-evaluation shall
be established.
Records of the results of evaluations and any necessary
actions arising from the evaluation shall be maintained
The types of organisations that would be considered under
this heading include:
Test equipment calibration company.
Other flight inspection organisations.
Contracted Personal (e.g. Pilots, Flight Inspectors)
The same requirements for documents and records must
be established and maintained by sub-contractors as
appropriate, and verified by auditing. This task will
normally be simplified if the sub-contractors have equal
QM system
Monitoring of Subcontractor performance metrics
covering areas such as reporting, testing and acceptance,
issue resolution and mitigation and documentation version
control.
A clearly written and well managed procedure defining all
of the responsibilities associated with the role of a
subcontractor or supplier will not only result in the
success of the primary organization and their customer,
but it will create a positive relationship with the other
company or individual themself. This procedure must
contain the following key components:
A Source/Selection plan which establishes all
guidelines beginning with first contact and
issuance of initial documentation (eg. proposed
SOW, RFI, etc), continuing through the proposal
evaluation and selection criteria, and terminating
with the communication of the final choice.
Development of a work plan detailing key
organizational reports , negotiation and
management schedule, exit strategy details,
expected milestones and deliverables.
Examples
OTHER FLIGHT INSPECTION ORGANISATIONS
If a service provider has limited recourses, like only one
aircraft, or lack of capability to perform all sorts of
required procedure tasks, it will make sense to establish a
relationship with another such organization to make sure
the inspections can be performed at all times without
disruption. In such a case, the other organization should
be described in the organizational details with adequate
responsibility and performance. It is strongly
recommended that such an addendum is applied for and
approved by the principal, with all roles and
responsibilities described, in due time before it may
become required to use the additional service.
CALIBRATION EQUIPMENT SUPPLIERS
Instruments like Signal Generator need to be calibrated
regularly as described by the instrument supplier. The
service provider must make sure that all calibration tasks
are fully described, like regular calibration intervals of the
equipment as well as calibration of the signal sources.
TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS
Flight Inspection System
Build State
The applicant shall maintain a build state document for
the Flight Inspection System.
The build state document shall include the following for
major components:
Manufacturer
Make
Model
Modification status
The build state document shall also include version
numbers of all software and Firmware.
Details of all uses of software and firmware in the
measurement system. Also details of software and
firmware support.
The design authority for all equipment shall be stated
Doc 8071 Vol I, section 1.12.6 states The build state of
all equipment, including test equipment, should be
recorded and the records should be updated whenever
modifications or changes are made. All modifications
should be accurately documented and cross-referenced to
modification strikes or numbers on the equipment. After
making any modification, tests and analyses should
ensure that the modification fulfils its intended purpose
and that it has no undesired side effects.
317
Functional description
Function block diagram and discussion of that diagram.
Technical specification
e.g. Data processing, storage capability, HMI
System Design
Physical block diagrams and discussion.
Manufacturer's type number for all major items of the
flight inspection system.
Firmware and Software Design Description
Where the software or firmware is used within the system
Process ensuring that the software performs as specified.
Version control.
Algorithms for the measurements being made.
To a level to support the measurement uncertainty.
Listing of source code is not required.
Recordings and Graphs
All recordings shall be time synchronised so that they can
be correlated with the aircraft's position at the time of the
measurement.
If recordings or graphs are used to derive figures for the
inspection report, the scales shall be commensurate with
the permitted measurement uncertainty limits.
All recordings or graphs shall have sufficient resolution.
Environmental Conditions
The operator shall define the environmental conditions
(temperature range, humidity range, etc.). Evidence
may be in the form of test results made by the
operator, or manufacturer's specifications
If the measuring equipment requires any warm-up or
cooling time, this shall be clearly indicated in the
operating instructions.
Temperature dependent equipment may need to be
fitted in a temperature controlled enclosure to maintain
compliance with the performance standard.
An indicator/alarm may need be fitted to inform the
operator of any change in temperature that may affect
the accuracy of the system.
Consider monitoring of all parameter that influence the
measurement uncertainty provide examples.
Aircraft
Details of the aircraft used for flight inspection( make and
type)
The aircraft with the installed flight inspection system
should be airworthy and approved by the airworthiness
authorities for the intended operation in the area it
operates.
NOTE: aircraft type -preference should be given to
multiengine turbine aircraft, for their reliability and
performance. Pressurization and air conditioning should
be available as a mean to reduce crew workload, increase
safety and keep the FIS equipment within the technical
specification. Standard avionics must match the airspace
requirements.
Interference
The navigation aid measuring equipment shall not
interfere with the operation or accuracy of the aircraft's
normal navigation and general avionics equipment.
The Organisation still needs to ensure that all safety or
regulatory requirements associated with the safe operation
of the aircraft are met.
The flight inspection measurements shall be adequately
protected against the prevailing EMC environment
internal or external to the aircraft. Abnormal interference
effects shall be clearly identified on the inspection
Propeller Modulation
It shall be shown how propeller modulation can be
avoided.
The formula below shows the propeller modulation
frequency.
Propeller Modulation Frequency (Hz) =
Shaft Rotation Speed (RPM) x Number of Propeller
Blades / 60
Examples:
3-blade propeller at 1800 RPM: 1800 x 3 / 60 = 90 Hz >
BAD for ILS
4-blade propeller at 1800 RPM: 1800 x 4 / 60 = 120 Hz
> OK for ILS
5-blade propeller at 1800 RPM: 1800 x 5 / 60 = 150 Hz
> BAD for ILS
318
Independence from aircraft's operational avionics fit.
As far as is reasonably possible the flight inspection
equipment, including associated aerials should be totally
independent from the aircraft's operational avionics fit.
This is to protect both the integrity of the FI results and
the operation capability of the aircraft avionics.
If not, show effect on measurement accuracy
If duplicated FIS navigation aid measuring receivers are
used they may use a common aerial.
Location, characteristic and type of all measurement
aerials on the aircraft
Consideration should be made to the aerials being
positioned in such a manner that they are not obscured
from the signal during any normal inspection flight
profiles.
NOTE: To achieve this may require the use of more than
one measuring aerial for one particular function.
Aircraft antennas are far from ideal isotropic receptors
and the antenna gain will vary with both frequency and
received angles (azimuth, elevation and bank).
Antenna characteristics for relevant sectors and
frequencies must be compensated manually or
automatically by the flight inspection system to obtain
necessary accuracy for coverage measurements.
If duplicated navigation aid measuring receivers are used
it may be possible to use a common aerial.
ICAO DOC 8071 Vol I, Attachment 1 to Chapter 1
describes recommended requirements for Flight
Inspection Aircrafts.
Policy on Crew, Training and FTL (Flight Time
Limitations)
Flight Inspection aircraft shall be employed as multicrew
aircraft, with two pilots and a system operator. When a
mission requires seating provision for other technical
persons on board these should be available. E.g. training
or observation.
Training shall be as such that initial and recurrent training
and checking syllabi are approved by the CAA and
clearly specified in the Operations Manual.
Policy on aircraft maintenance
Strict adherence to manufacturer and CAA technical
requirements are mandatory.
MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY
The measurement uncertainty for any parameter must be
small compared with the operational limits for that
parameter.
Doc 8071 Vol I, section 4.3.86 includes a description
of a 5th of the value being measured.
The measurement uncertainty to 95% probability must be
calculated for each of the parameters to be measured. The
method of calculation and any assumptions made must be
clearly shown. This includes all uncertainty contributions.
Where several measurements are combined to
produce a single result, these errors should be added
using a statistical model such as the RSS method (the
square-root of the sum of the squares).
Example
An example could be calculation of localizer
alignment error which is a product of the accuracy of
the receiver, signal generator and position reference
system:
Area of interest (worst case):
ILS point D.
NAV receiver error contribution:
Stated Accuracy: 0,0005DDM = 0,48 A
Nonlinearity of receiver is eliminated in calibration
procedure.
Signal Generator error contribution:
Stated Accuracy: 0,0003DDM + 2% of reading
0,0003DDM + 0,01DDM*2% = 0.0005DDM = 0,48 A
Reference System error contribution
Assume a time stamped high accuracy position reference
system is used with 5cm horizontal accuracy.
This will equivalent to an accuracy of about 0.10 A @
ILS point D.
Total RSS Error:
LLZ _ Alignment _ RSS _ Error =
Re ceiver _ error 2 + Generator _ error 2 + REF _ System _ error 2
= 0 , 48 A 2 + 0 , 48 A 2 + 0 ,10 A 2 = 0 , 68 A
For measurements which can only be derived from
recordings, the accuracy and resolution of the
recording equipment shall be included in calculating
the expected results.
319
Details of statistical methods or interpolative
techniques which may be applied shall be described.
The flight inspection system shall include equipment
which can determine and record the aircraft's position in
space relative to the aircraft reference point.
The provider must clearly indicate the measures taken in
order to reduce the budget errors in the positioning (e.g. :
use of DGPS, geodesic database , care in setting up the
positioning system on the ground,)
The aerials to be used for tracked structure measurements
shall be positioned with due regard to the tracking
reference on the aircraft. If the aerials and the reference
are not in close proximity, this error must be addressed in
the measurement uncertainty calculations and in setting
the operational crosswind limit. Alternatively, the errors
may be corrected using information from attitude and
heading sensors to calculate the true position of the
aerial's phase centre.
MAINTENANCE
Objective
Maintenance on all involved systems and equipment shall
be performed.
Acceptable Means of Compliance
All equipment used in the maintenance and calibration
process shall have traceability to national or international
standards. e.g. ISO standards.
ICAO DOC 8071 Vol 1 describe requirements for
calibration in Chapter 1.12.8 1.12.10. This requirements
should be fulfilled.
Procedure for the control of Equipment used for
calibrating the Flight Inspection system.
Procedures for maintenance and calibration of the
Flight inspection System.
Interval
Description of the procedures
Consider Who Where, What, When.
The flight inspection receivers of the system shall be
calibrated at suitable intervals to maintain the system
uncertainty within allowable tolerances between
calibrations. The calibration interval recommended by the
manufacturer should be monitored and adjusted if
required in order to maintain system accuracy under the
actual operational conditions.
 The purpose of the calibration is the determination and a) Planning and scheduling process
compensation of non-ideal receiver characteristics for
b) The flight profile to be used for each individual
achieving the highest possible accuracy.
measurement.
Reference signals from suitable, calibrated signal c) Pre-flight inspection of measuring equipment.
generator(s) shall be used as reference for the receiver
calibration. d) Siting of any necessary ground tracking or
position fixing equipment.
The receiver error shall be determined throughout the e) Operation of the measuring equipment.
required measurement range of the receiver, in numerous
steps. f) Production of the flight inspection report.
g) The method of calculating all results in the
The connection of the signal generator to the receiver
Flight Inspection Report. g) Pilot operating
under calibration should preferably be automatically (if
procedures
technically feasible).
h) Cross wind limits - to allow measurement
The calibration process shall compensate cable loss accuracies to be within the limits required.
during calibration.
i) ATC coordination
Due to the numerous signal generator settings during the
calibration, the signal generator(s) shall preferably be FLIGHT INSPECTION REPORT
steered automatically by the system.
The minimum information to be provided on the report
Note: Incorrect settings of signal generators during shall be:
calibration can be avoided to the highest extend by a) Station name and facility designation.
automatic control.
b) Category of operation.
The determined receiver error shall be applied for
compensation of receiver output in order to improve the c) Date(s) of inspection.
measurement accuracy of the system during flight d) Serial number of report/Unique Identifier
inspection.
e) Type of inspection. Routine/Annual?
The receiver output errors shall be checked against f) Aircraft registration.
equipment specifications throughout the required
measurement range. Automatic warning shall be given, if g) Manufacturer and type of system being
a receiver error is out of specified tolerance. inspected.
h) Wind conditions.
It is recommended to check the resulting performance of
(To allow cross wind to be established)
the calibrated receivers in the system against independent
signal generator(s). This allows detection of errors during i) Names and functions of all personnel involved in
the calibration process or detection of a defective signal the inspection.
generator used for calibration.
j) Method of making each measurement (where
The check of the calibrated receiver shall preferably also alternatives are available).These may be
be automatically throughout the receivers measurement referenced to the operating instructions.
range. k) Details of associated attachments (recordings,
etc.).
The result of the calibrated receiver check shall be
recorded as evidence for the overall system performance. l) Details of extra flights made necessary by system
adjustments.
Details of inspections, calibration and checks shall be
m) An assessment by the flight crew of the
recorded as evidence.
navigational aid's performance. Comments
Operating Instructions by the navigation aid. inspector/equipment
operator.
The Exposition should at least include concise details of:

320
 n) Details of any immediately notifiable
deficiencies. q) Statement of
conformance/non-conformance.
o) Signatures of appropriate personnel
p) Results and tolerance.
A confirmation of the status of the inspection should be
provided immediately after the inspection.
RETENTION OF FLIGHT INSPECTION DATA
Flight inspection reports and data required to generate
flight Inspection Reports shall be retained.
Sileno Goedicke ENAV
REFERENCES
[1] ICAO, 2006, Annex 10 Aeronautical Tele-
communications, Volume 1 Radio Navigation Aids,
Sixth Edition.
[2] ICAO, 2000, Doc 8071, Manual on Testing Radio
Navigation Aids, Volume 1 Testing of Ground
Based Radio Navigation Systems, Fourth Edition.
[3] ISO 9001, 2008, Quality management systems
Requirements, Fourth edition.

The flight inspection organisation shall have means to

reproduce Flight Inspection Report

ICAO DOC 8071 Vol I, Attachment 2 to Chapter 1

section 5 states:

Each flight inspection organization is responsible for

ensuring that sufficient historical data are retained to
legally establish the trends in facility performance over
a reasonable interval of time. As a minimum, all
commissioning inspection reports and data recordings
should be retained in the facility file along with reports
and data recordings from the last five periodic
inspections. All special flight inspections carried out
during this time period should be retained on file.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The following ICASC members have contributed to this

paper:

Asbjrn Madsen Normarc Flight Inspection Systems

Christo van Straaten South African CAA

Danny E. Hamilton FAA

Egon Koopmann DFS

Fabrizio Maracich ENAV

Frank Mussmann Aerodata

John Heiderstadt Commuter Air Technology

John Mundy NAV Canada

Larry Brady Airfield Technology

Mike DiBenedetto University of Ohio

Sigurd A. Bjelkary Norwegian Special Mission

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 APPENDIX 1
PRACTICAL DEMONSTRATION

In some cases the Regulator or ANSP may wish to The repeatability should be checked for the most sensitive
observe the flight inspection operation first hand either on parameters of the navigation aids under inspection.
board the aircraft or on the ground.
Example: Typical parameters for demonstration of
During practical demonstration or flight inspection repeatability for ILS calibration could be:
observation, repeatability of measurement results shall be
demonstrated. The variation of results, measured by Course alignment accuracy
subsequent flights shall be within the measurement
Glide path angle
uncertainty as stated by the performance analysis. It shall
be demonstrated that results are independent from Displacement sensitivity
external circumstances e.g:
Height of reference datum
Results independent from normal speed variation

Independent from direction to fly (CW/CCW or

inbound/outbound)

APPENDIX 2
ACCOUNTABLE MANAGER

The Accountable Manager has the overall responsibility

to respond to the requirements. He is responsible to
establish a Quality System for ensuring that all flight
inspection activities are carried out according to the
required standards.

In particular, he is responsible for ensuring that adequate

contractual arrangements exist. This includes, amongst
others, provision of facilities and sufficient competent and
qualified personnel in relation to the work to be
undertaken.

All of this with a view to ensure that all flight inspection

activities are performed on time and in accordance with
the applicable requirements, regulations and approved
standards, and that all aircrafts have a valid Certificate of
Airworthiness for all flights undertaken. activities.

322
 Comparison of International Flight Inspection
Standards and Procedures Larry Brady, Airfield Technology

Larry Brady

Airfield Technology, Inc.

Olathe, Kansas USA
E-mail: Lbrady@airfield.com

ABSTRACT SCOPE

ICAO documentation provides recommendations for
flight inspection standards and procedures for the member
states. However, in practice there are differences among
the various states around the world in the way the ICAO
recommendations are interpreted and applied.
This paper examines and compares a few of the more
commonly encountered differences between ICAO and
FAA flight inspection standards and procedures. Certain
specifications from the UK CAA [4] and Australia
Airservices [5] standards are also referenced.

This paper presents a comparison and clarification of
some of the more common differences with the goal of
providing better understanding and improved consistency
among regulators and flight inspection service providers.
INTRODUCTION
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
document Doc 8071, Manual on Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids [1] provides guidance on ground and
flight testing of radio navigation aids. ICAO Annex 10,
Volume 1, Radio Navigation Aids [2] is the reference
standard and contains additional guidance on ground and
flight testing in Attachment C as well as general and
supplemental information in Chapter 3.
This paper is by no means a comprehensive comparison
of the references; it only discusses a very few of the more
common differences. Comprehensive references do exist
in some cases and some from FAA are included in the
References. [6] [7]
DISCLAIMER
The information in this paper is based on reference
documents purchased from ICAO, downloaded from the
FAA and UK CAA websites, and obtained by personal
request. Some of the documents may have changed since
this writing.

All of the ICAO Contracting States agree under Article 38

of the Chicago Convention to notify the Organization of
any differences between their national regulations and
practices and the International Standards contained in this
Annex and any amendments thereto.

In actual practice there are many differences in

interpretation and application among the various states. In
a few cases the local standards may have been developed
prior to the ICAO recommended standards.

Some states have published their own standards that

generally comply with ICAO, some have adopted direct
use of the ICAO documents, and others use the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) Order 8200.1C, United
States Standard Flight Inspection Manual [3].

323
ILS LOCALIZER The Merriam Webster online dictionary [8] defines
vicinity as: the area around or near a particular place.
Course Alignment Does this mean we could measure alignment within some
radius of Point B? Was the word vicinity intended to
One of the most basic ILS flight inspection measurements allow for slight aircraft variations from centerline?
is evaluation of alignment of the localizer zero DDM
course with respect to the runway centerline. ICAO and It is suspected, as someone once said about another ICAO
FAA flight inspection measurement procedures for the flight inspection parameter under discussion, The answer
Instrument Landing System (ILS) localizer course is likely lost to history.
alignment differ as described below.
The FAA specified range from 1 NM to Threshold is
ICAO Procedure certainly in the vicinity of ILS Point B as it roughly
Point B 0.5 nautical mile.
ICAO Doc 8071, paragraph 4.3.26 specifies localizer
course alignment should be measured in the following Different flight inspection service providers and/or
critical region (refer to table below). different flight inspection systems will not get the same
results unless they all use the same calculation range (or
FAA Procedure the LLZ is perfect!).
FAA 8200.1C, 15.20g(4) specifies localizer course CAT II - Course Structure Inside ILS Point B
alignment should be measured in the following areas
(refer to table below). It has been reported that this difference between ICAO
and FAA standards caused a delay in regulatory approval
ILS LLZ Course Alignment for commissioning of a new ILS at a major airport.
Difference in Measurement Ranges
The ICAO and FAA standards are summarized in the
Category ICAO 8071 FAA 8200.1
table below for comparison.
Table I-4-7 15.60a
4.3.26 15.20g(4)
ILS Localizer
CAT I in the vicinity of 1 NM to
ILS Point B Threshold Cat II Course Structure Tolerances
Category ICAO 8071 FAA 8200.1
CAT II ILS Point B to ILS 1 NM to Table I-4-7 15.60(a)
reference datum Threshold CAT I 15 A 15 A
Point B to Point B to
CAT III ILS Point C to 1 NM to Point C Point C
ILS Point D Threshold
CAT II 5 A 5 A
and
Point B to Point B to
Threshold to Reference Datum Point D
Point D
and CAT III 5 A 5 A
Point D to Point B to Point B to
Point E Point D Point D

5 A > 10 A 5 A > 10 A
As the table shows there are differences between FAA Point D to Point D to
and ICAO procedures for ranges from threshold where the Point E Point E
alignment is checked. This is the case for all ILS
categories. For Cat II localizers the ICAO tolerance inside Point B
stops at the Reference Datum while the FAA tolerance
How should we interpret the phrase in the vicinity of ILS continues to ILS Point D.
Point B? A definition for this phrase could not be found
in the ICAO documents. The localizer in question met all ICAO tolerances but had
a short bend between the Reference Datum and Point D
Does in the vicinity mean 1000 m, 100 m, or maybe which exceeded the FAA structure tolerance.
only 10 m?

324
ILS GLIDEPATH
Structure Inside ILS Point B
The analysis of glidepath structure (and other parameters)
which reference the terms mean curved path (ICAO) or
graphical average path (FAA) by computer-based flight
inspection systems has always been troublesome.
The problem is that there is not a clearly defined
mathematical equation published by ICAO or FAA on
which to build a software algorithm.
The author has been advised that FAA began using the
graphical average path method during implementation
of the first generation of Automatic Flight Inspection
System (AFIS-1) to compensate for flare in the glidepath
indications. It is not known when ICAO adopted the
similar term mean curved path.
At that time in history it would have been a normal and
everyday task for an experienced flight inspector to take a
ILS GP Structure Between ILS Point B and C
ICAO 8071 & Annex 10 References to GP Mean
Curved Path
ICAO 8071Table I-4-7, Note 5:
Tolerances are referenced to the mean course path
between Points A and B, and relative to the mean
curved path below Point B.
ICAO Annex 10, Vol 1, 3.1.5.4.2, Note 2:
In regions of the approach where ILS glide path
curvature is significant, bend amplitudes are
calculated from the mean curved path, and not the
downward extended straight line.
325
pencil to the glidepath chart recording, draw a curved line
through what looked like a graphical average path, and
evaluate the structure deviations around the mean curved
path.
The example recording below is taken from FAA 8200.1.
The table below compares the ICAO references and FAA
definition for these terms.
The FAA definition the mean of all crosspointer
deviations seems to indicate the average of the
differential deviations. However that calculation would
not result in the curved path as shown.
Correspondence with FAA around 10 years ago indicated
their AFIS software was using a 6th order polynomial
fitting algorithm to calculate the graphical average path
inside Point B.
It is recommended that ICAO and FAA review this
standard for glidepath and publish a clear, mathematical
definition of these terms.
FAA Definition of
Graphical Average Path
FAA 8200.1: Graphical Average Path. The average
path described by a line drawn through the mean of
all crosspointer deviations. This will usually be a
curved line which follows long-term trends (1,500 ft or
greater) and averages shorter term deviations.
Glidepath Antenna Phasing
Background
While the phasing of a localizer antenna array usually can
be tested and adjusted on the ground with good results,
glidepath antenna phasing must be tested by flight
inspection because the ground in front of the antennas
forms the antenna patterns and therefore the signal in
space. 9
Any variation from an infinite size, perfectly flat, and
perfectly conducting ground plane is detrimental to the
optimum performance of an image-type glidepath.
Adjusting the antenna phasing for actual glidepath
facilities is complicated because of several factors
including:
1. The signals from each antenna reflect from a different
area of the ground.
2. The area of ground which reflects the signals changes
as the aircraft approaches the runway threshold.
In order to achieve the optimum antenna phasing for a
glidepath on an imperfect ground plane it is commonly
necessary to achieve a compromise by measuring the
phasing over a region of the approach and adjusting for an
average reading.
Some Practical Experience
Multipath from buildings, fences, and other objects can
also create problems phasing the system. At one facility a
water tower that seemed from a visual perspective to be
insignificant caused major problems.
A close analysis will show the phasing of a glidepath
antenna array is constantly changing by some amount,
and the goal is keep the changes to a minimum.
One cause of phase change is variation in the length of the
antenna cables with temperature. For best stability a
glidepath installation should have equal lengths of cable
feeding each antenna, especially the parts of the cables
that are exposed to the outside environment. The cables
also should be attached to the antenna mast so that they
receive approximately the same amount of sunshine.
9 been found operating outside of tolerances. In one case
After a flight inspection a ground test point is selected to
use as a phasing reference point to help maintenance
maintain correct antenna phasing between flight
inspections.
326
Another cause of glidepath phasing change can be
changes in the reflecting ground, such as geometry or
shape changes by natural erosion or man-made causes,
conductivity changes, and other factors.
FAA Phase Verification
FAA requires Phase Verification checks which consist
of dephasing the glidepath from its normal settings in
various ways to simulate phase shifts in the antenna
distribution, antenna feed cables and antennas.
However, the ICAO standards do not require these phase
verification checks.
Capture-Effect Glidepath
Phasing is especially critical for a Capture-Effect (CE)
type glidepath, because dephasing from optimum can
cause the angle to decrease and the width to increase
beyond allowable limits.
For a CE glidepath the most critical antenna phasing is
usually for the middle antenna. FAA requires that the
middle antenna can be de-phased by 15 degrees from the
normal setting, and the equipment must still operate
within flight inspection tolerances.
Finding a normal phasing setting which can meet the
dephasing checks is easy when the ground plane is close
to ideal, but can be a very challenging task when it is not.
In some situations there can be so many variables that the
only practical solution is trial and error.
It is also found that 15 degrees of middle antenna
phasing gives less DDM shift in the ILS width monitor
than what will be found when adjusting SBO power for
the wide alarm check. The integral width monitor of the
CE glidepath for wide alarm is then set at the middle
antenna dephasing limits
When the Phase Verification checks are not made it is
possible for a CE Glidepath system to drift between flight
inspections so that the middle antenna is dephased relative
to the other antennas. If the drift is too much the angle can
decrease below tolerances and the width can increase
beyond tolerances... a bad combination.
The ICAO documents do not require the phase
verification checks, and as a result not all regulators or
service providers use the FAA or similar procedures.
There are known cases in which glidepath facilities have
the glidepath angle had decreased so low that users of the
ILS were complaining. The problem was found to be non-
optimum phasing.
It is recommended that ICAO should consider adding If the change of slope exceeds a specified tolerance it is
glidepath phase verification procedures to Doc 8071. called a Reversal and this can require the ILS procedure
to have restrictions for coupled approaches. The details
Glidepath Reference Point are provided in 8200.1, 15.51(b) and an example is shown
in 8200.1 Figure 15-10.
The issue of where to put the glidepath reference point
has been debated for years. It has included theodolites, It is believed this reversal tolerance came about from
laser trackers, and now automatic DGPS based systems problems with one specific aircraft/autopilot combination
for which the reference point is only a set of coordinates. many years ago.
The internationally recognized standards for flight The presence of restrictions on ILS approaches due to
inspection (ICAO Annex 10 and Doc 8071) do not reversals can create economic impacts for the aircraft
specify a geometric reference point for flight inspection of operators at the airport and also adds costs for additional
image-type glide path facilities. flight inspection resources. It is suggested that FAA
should consider making an evaluation as to whether this
DGPS has almost universally replaced theodolites and reversal tolerance is still necessary.
laser trackers as the truth source for ILS flight inspection
because of its accuracy and reliability. DME MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTIES
In DGPS based flight inspection systems the reference DME Range / Distance Accuracy
elevation angle is calculated from the GPS coordinates of
the aircraft glidepath antenna and the coordinates of the A comparison of the ICAO, FAA [11] and CAP 670
glidepath reference point. Therefore it is no longer DME range accuracy measurement uncertainty tolerances
necessary to tie the measurement reference to some point are shown in the table below.
to the ground.
DME Range Accuracy
One proposed method that has been suggested by others Measurement Uncertainty Tolerances
[9] is to calculate the reference point from the reference
ICAO 8071 20 m
datum and the commissioned path angle, as shown below:
Table I-3-3 0.01 NM
FAA 20 m
VN 8200.8 0.01 NM
UK CAP 670 60 m
FLI 02 0.03 NM

The CAP 670 specification of 0.03 NM is considered to

be a more practical tolerance and it is recommended that
With this method the reference point would always define ICAO and FAA consider adopting this tolerance.
a glidepath that passes through the Reference Datum.
DME Coverage
This method could have potential as an acceptable
A comparison of the ICAO, FAA , CAP 670 and
international standard and it is recommended for
Airservices Australia [12] specifications for DME power
consideration by ICAO and other regulatory agencies.
density measurement uncertainty tolerances is shown in
It is recommended that ICAO should establish and the table below.
publish a standard for glidepath reference point as noted
in a paper [10] presented at the IFIS 2006. DME Field Strength / Power Density
Measurement Uncertainty Tolerances
It is also recommended that FAA publish their method for Reference Tolerance Notes from Reference
establishing the glidepath reference point in 8200.1. ICAO 8071 1 dB Note 4: The uncertainty
Table I-3-3 of 1 dB in coverage
Glidepath Reversals refers to repeatability of
equipment calibration,
FAA has a tolerance for rate of change of slope of the not to absolute accuracy.
glidepath for which there is no corresponding ICAO FAA 3 dB Absolute
tolerance. VN 8200.8 Note 1. Approaches state
Appendix 3 of the art

327
 DME Field Strength / Power Density [2] ICAO Annex 10
Measurement Uncertainty Tolerances [3] FAA 8200.1
1 dB 1 dB repeatability
[4] UK CAA CAP 670
UK CAP 670 2 dB The word (relative)
indicates repeatability
[5] Airservices Australia Document AEI-2.1239, Flight
FLI 02 (relative)
Inspection Technical Standards
7.14
Airservices 6 dB [6] FAA Study - Differences Report of Flight Inspection
Australia Guidance Comparison Study
AEI-2.1239
http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/avn/flightinspec
tion/onlineinformation/studies/
Since calculation of the measurement uncertainty for
Field Strength or Power Density must also include the [7] FAA Study - Flight Inspection Guidance Comparison
aircraft antenna pattern effects, a tolerance of 1 dB seems Study
to be a very impractical value. http://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/avn/flightinspec
tion/onlineinformation/studies/
The Airservices Australia requirement of 6 dB seems to
be the most practical and it is recommended that ICAO [8] Merriam Webster Online Dictionary
and FAA consider adopting this tolerance. www.merriam-webster.com

SUMMARY [9] Glide Path Flight Inspection Geometric Reference

Point and Recommendations for International Standards,
This paper has compared only a very few of the common Presentation at ICAO Asia-Pacific Seminar on Flight
differences between international flight inspection Inspection, Bangkok, 2009, Larry Brady
standards and procedures. [10] Glide Path Flight Inspection Geometric Reference
Point IFIS 2006 Proceedings, Toulouse, France, Larry
There are of course many more subjects to be considered,
Brady
including VOR parameters, navaid coverage
measurements (power density/field strength versus [11] FAA VN 8200.8 , Flight Inspection Program
antenna signal level), and PAPI/VASI inspection Standards
procedures and tolerances, to name but a few.
[12] Airservices Australia AEI-2.1239, Flight Inspection
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Technical Standards

The author would like to thank everyone who suggested

topics, provided advice, and assisted in finding supporting .
information. While there was neither time nor space to
consider all of the suggested topics, your input was
valuable and important, and it is appreciated. To the
others who prefer to remain anonymous, and to those I
may have forgotten, thank you as well. Among those who
provided input were:

Gordon McWilliams, Selex International

Nelson Spohnheimer, Spohnheimer Consulting
Fraser Steedman, Cobham Aviation Services
Mike DiBenedetto and Jamie Edwards, Ohio University
Avionics Engineering Center
Carole Thompson, Radiola Aerospace
John Mundy, NavCanada
REFERENCES

[1] ICAO Doc 8071

328
Further Publications
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 A Practical Guide to Datum Transformations Gary Flynn, FAA & Dr. Che ng Zho ng, FAA

Gary A. Flynn, P.E.

Manager, Airborne Computer Applications
Flight Inspection Services Engineering, FAA
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
Fax: +1 405 954 4043
E-mail: gary.a.flynn@faa.gov

Cheng Zhong, Ph.D.

Computer Engineer, Airborne Computer Applications
Flight Inspection Services Engineering, FAA
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
Fax: +1 405 954 4043
E-mail: cheng.zhong@faa.gov

ABSTRACT Local Datum vs. Worldwide Datum

As the role of flight inspection migrates from localized, Two major groups of datums are considered: NAD83-
ground-based guidance systems to global, satellite-based based (local) and WGS84-based (worldwide). Although
systems, we must become more focused upon data the NAD83-based datums are not used worldwide, their
integrity, compatibility, and temporality. Within this corresponding coordinate systems do extend around the
paradigm, one area remains a challenge: relating various globe. Consequently, WGS84 Transit and NAD83 are
locations that have been described using differing survey often considered equivalent.
datums.
When transforming a location among these various
This paper is an attempt to unravel the mystery and datums, there is really no difference in how we deal with
complexities surrounding the datum transformation a NAD83 datum vs. a WGS84 datum. They are
process. Although this paper is based upon a National segregated below simply for convenience.
Geodetic Survey (NGS) tool, primarily focused upon
North America, much of the information and many of the NAD83 Datums
transformation techniques can be applied anywhere.
NAD83 (North America, considered equivalent
INTRODUCTION to WGS84 Transit)

The intent of this document is to add some understanding PACP (Pacific Tectonic)
and clarity with regard to datum transformations, MARP (Mariana Tectonic)
especially as they relate to NGS tool HTDP (Horizontal
Time Dependent Position). [1] WGS84 Datums

BACKGROUND WGS84 datums are typically paired with an ITRF

(International Terrestrial Reference Frame) realization.
Datum vs. Reference Frame
WGS84 Transit (the original WGS84,
Within this document, the terms datum and reference considered equivalent to NAD83)
frame are used interchangeably.
ITRF88 ITRF93

331
 ITRF94 (used as the conduit for transforming
from one datum to another)
ITRF96 ITRF97
ITRF2000
ITRF2005
ITRF2008
Coordinates: Ellipsoidal vs. Cartesian
A location may be described using either of two
coordinate systems: ellipsoidal or Cartesian. When using
ellipsoidal coordinates, a location is described as latitude,
longitude, and height above the ellipsoid. Alternatively,
Cartesian coordinates may be used, relative to the center
of the earth. The Earth-Centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF)
axes are defined as follows.
X: inside the equatorial plane, in direction of 0
longitude (Prime Meridian passes near the
Royal Observatory in Greenwich, England)
Y: inside the equatorial plane, in direction of
E90 longitude
Z: coincident with earths axis of rotation, in
direction of north pole

Figure 1. ECEF Coordinates in Relation to Latitude and Longitude

332
Converting Angular to Rectangular
Throughout the discussion that follows, angular XYZ
displacement (R) will be converted to linear XYZ
displacement (T). In short form:
specify a point in time; the relative location between two
datums changes over time. Fortunately, the rate of
change is considered constant.
Was Einstein Right, is Everything Relative?

= Einstein was right and, when it comes to datums, its also

difficult to come up with any absolutes. Estimates of the
Where, location of the earths center continue to be refined and a
datums location relative to other datums is influenced by
p = XYZ location the corresponding set of landmarks and measurement
techniques used to define it.
Assuming the R angles are oriented such that a positive
angle corresponds to a CCW rotation (as viewed from the If were going to catalog each datum by a standard
axis positive infinity), the formulas for this conversion transformation formula and a datum-specific set of
are: coefficients, we must establish a standard by which all
datums are to be measured. Within the NGS HTDP
= ( ) application, this is WGS84 ITRF94 (see WGS84
Datums). Consequently, all such coefficients for the
= ( ) ( ) ITRF94 datum are equal to zero

Relating One Datum to Another

= ( )
Since these are small angles, if the angles are
expressed in radians, we can use sin (R) R,
simplifying the equations:
When comparing one datum to another, we utilize the
ECEF (Cartesian) coordinate system. Six parameters are
used. 10 As stated within the previous section, these
parameters are all relative to the ITRF94 datum.

Linear Offset (T): the inverted 3D origin offset

=
from that of ITRF94 at datum epoch date 11

= Rate of Change of Offset (): the constant 3D

rate of change of the linear offset
= Rotational Offset (R): the non-inverted 3D origin
CCW rotation from that of ITRF94 at datum
The orientation of this transformation can be epoch date 12
confirmed visually using figure 1.

The same formulas can be used for converting rotation

rate () about XYZ to linear XYZ velocity (v): 10
Within this document, it is assumed that all datums
= utilize the same ellipsoid (size and shape).
11
By inverting the target origin offset (relative to ITRF94
= origin), this vector can be directly added to the ITRF94
location to obtain the location referenced to our target
datum. This is demonstrated in A Location defined by
=
a Datum: ITRF94.
12
DISCUSSION Since the rotational offset is not inverted, we must
subtract the resultant vector from our ITRF94 location
Transforming a Location from One Datum to Another in order to obtain the location referenced to our target
datum. This is demonstrated in A Location defined by
What Time is it? a Datum: ITRF94. Within NGS literature, this fact is
hidden by their use of a non-standard matrix product
If we want to visualize the relative position of the (i.e. inverted from that provided in Converting
ellipsoids associated with two different datums, we must Angular to Rectangular).

333
 Rate of Rotation (): the constant 3D rate of
change of the angular offset
Scale Offset (D): the difference in overall scale
of the Cartesian coordinates as compared to
ITRF94 at datum epoch date (scalar)
Rate of Expansion ( ): the rate of change of
scale offset (scalar)
In order to simplify this discussion, the last two
parameters (scale and expansion rate) are not included
within this discussion. All of these parameters have been
measured and documented by NGS for each datum. As
stated previously, these parameters are all zero for the
ITRF94 datum.
Datum Epoch Date
motion among datums certainly complicates the
transformation process. But what are we trying to
accomplish here? In order to address this one step at a
time, two paradigms are presented: one from a datums
perspective and one from the grounds perspective.
A Location Defined by a Datum: ITRF94
In this paradigm, the location is defined by its coordinates
within the ITRF94 datum. Within the ITRF94 datum
model, time is not an issue (i.e. all velocities equal zero).
Although the location is defined by its ITRF94
coordinates, its likely described using a different datum.
Since coordinates change over time when described in
any datum other than ITRF94, time must also be
specified.

Each datum is assigned an epoch date: the temporal
baseline for applying associated velocities. On this date,
the datums velocity parameters can be ignored when
transforming to ITRF94. No ITRF94 epoch date is used
within this discussion.
Whats Moving: the Location or the Datum, or Both?
As stated earlier, any given datum is moving in relation to
any other datum (slowly yes, but still moving). This
To convert a location from its descriptive datum (at
) to ITRF94, the following formula is used.
Refer to Converting Angular to Rectangular for a
description of the matrix multiplication depicted below.
The sign of the and terms is opposite to that found in
NGS literature; they utilize a non-standard matrix
product, inverted from that documented in referenced
section. As mentioned before, scale differences are not
included within this discussion.

pITRF94 = pfrom Tfrom + T from (Datefrom Epochfrom )

+ R from + R from (Datefrom Epochfrom ) pfrom

pITRF94 = Tfrom T from (Datefrom Epochfrom )

+ I + R from + R from (Datefrom Epochfrom ) pfrom

To convert from ITRF94 to a target datum (at

), the following formula is used.

ptarget = pITRF94 + Ttarget + T target Datetarget Epochtarget

R target + R target Datetarget Epochtarget pITRF94

ptarget = Ttarget + T target Datetarget Epochtarget

+ I R target + R target Datetarget Epochtarget pITRF94

334
Where,
p = location
I = unity matrix (i.e. one)
Note that, for ITRF94, parameters , , , and are all
equal to zero. Also note that no epoch, associated with
ITRF94, is used anywhere within this discussion.
When transforming a location in one datum/time in to
another datum/time, these two methods should be
concatenated:
94 To convert a velocity from its associated datum to
A Location Defined by a Spike in the Ground
Now comes the hard part, defining a location by a spike in
the ground. This is the paradigm used by HTDP. Within
this paradigm, we have a spike in the ground and nobody
is allowed to touch it. How does this differ from the
paradigm previously discussed?
Crustal motion. The basis for the datum paradigm above
is that the location remains constant with respect to
ITRF94. This could be the case if the earths surface
were stationary. Unfortunately, its not and the HTDP
tool takes this into account.
If we hammer a spike into the ground at some point in
time, it will not remain fixed with respect to ITRF94, due
to crustal motion. Except for earthquake effects (not
addressed herein), NGS has measured and documented all
crustal motion as a constant velocity for any given
location. In some regions, this constant velocity is
described as NS and EW. In other regions, it is described
as a constant rate of rotation about the X, Y, and Z axes.
The easiest way to visualize this crustal motion would be
to measure it with respect to our transformation standard,
ITRF94. Unfortunately, it appears NGS elected to
document each region of crustal motion using just about
any datum other than ITRF94. HTDP version 3.1 utilizes
12 regions and 3 datums (ITRF2000, ITRF2005, and
ITRF2008). In version 3.2, all regions are referenced to
ITRF2008.
It should be apparent at this point that velocity plays a
major role within this paradigm. When crustal motion is
included, the simple conversions described in A
Location Defined by a Datum: ITRF94 must be
augmented by intricate, less intuitive transformations.
This process is described below.
Keep in mind that, throughout all of this, were never
moving the spike in the ground (at least as far as the
ground is concerned).
Transforming Velocity
As stated above, within this paradigm, velocity plays a
major role. In this section we provide the basic datum
velocity transformation. In later sections, regional
velocity is handled.
We transform velocity from one datum to another using a
transformation similar to what we did for transforming a
location in A Location Defined by a Datum: ITRF94.
ITRF94, the following formula is used. Since all
velocities are considered constant, we have no need to
include dates. 13
94 = +
To convert velocity from ITRF94 to a target datum, the
following formula is used.
= 94 +
In theory, we should have used 94 in the second
equation rather than . At a radius of about
6.4 million meters, a possible 2-meter offset will produce
a velocity error of about 0.0003% within the term. This
is insignificant. Within HTDP, the same location is used
throughout the concatenation of several velocity datum
transformations.
Combining the two equations:
= + +
= +
Calculating Regional Velocity
In What Time is it? we transformed a location in one
datum/time to another datum/time. In theory, we could
concatenate this process indefinitely. Now weve
introduced a regional velocity to this exercise. If we were
to repeatedly change a location from one datum/time to
13
As previously stated, the sign of the term is opposite
to that found in NGS literature; they utilize a non-
standard matrix product, inverted from that documented
in Converting Angular to Rectangular.
335
another, this regional velocity component would need to Weighted Region, Step 2: Convert XYZ Position to
persist, continuing to influence the results of each Latitude and Longitude
conversion. In other words, since time is a variable
within each conversion, the regional velocity cannot Using a standard ellipsoidal transformation (not shown):
simply be compensated for once then forgotten.
(, , ) (, , )
In A Location Defined by a Datum: ITRF94, we
provide the formulas for location datum transformation Weighted Region, Step 3: Interpolate Velocity
without regional velocity; in Transforming Velocity, we
provide the formulas for velocity datum transformation. Using a two-dimensional linear interpolation (not shown),
The first step in transforming a location with a regional fetch velocity in terms of NS ( ) and EW ( )
velocity is to calculate the regional velocity as referenced components. No vertical information is included
to our source datum. HTDP provides regional velocity ( = 0).
information in two different formats: arbitrarily, using
sample grids (weighted regions) and uniformly, using a = ( , , )
uniform rotation rate (uniform regions). Regardless of
region type, all velocities are presumed to be constant Weighted Region, Step 4: Convert Velocity to XYZ
with respect to time. Values

Weighted Regions Use the standard conversion process, described below.

Within any weighted region, velocity data is provided as = sin() cos() sin()
arbitrary NS and EW values assigned throughout a
+ cos() cos()
rectangular latitude/longitude grid. The grid coordinates
are assumed to be referenced to the regions datum at the
current date. 14, 15 The following steps describe this = sin() sin() + cos()
transformation. + cos() sin()

Weighted Region, Step 1: Transform Location to = cos() + sin()

Regions Datum at Current Date

Using the transformation in A Location Defined by a = ( , , )

Datum: ITRF94:
This velocity is referenced to the datum specified for the
94 region.

Where represents the location referenced to the Weighted Region, Step 5: Convert Velocity to Source
source datum ( ). Datum

Using the velocity transformation in Transforming

Velocity, convert the velocity from the regions datum
back to the original source datum. 16

= +
14
HTDP uses NAD83 for positioning inside a region
instead of the regions reference datum. Per email from
Uniform Regions
NGS Dr. Snay to FAA Dr. Zhong, regions reference
datum would be preferred (and is reflected herein). Within any uniform region, velocity data is provided as a
15
The velocity is presumed to remain constant for each constant rate of rotation about the X, Y, and Z axes:
location within the region. Once time has elapsed and
the spike has moved (with respect to regions datum),
the spikes velocity will change to the velocity assigned 16
As previously stated, the sign of the term is opposite
to the new location. Consequently, for a given location to that found in NGS literature; they utilize a non-
(as described by regions datum), the velocity will standard matrix product, inverted from that documented
remain constant, regardless of the date. in Converting Angular to Rectangular.

336
 . The following steps describe this transfor-
mation.
Uniform Region, Step 1: Transform Location to
Regions Datum at Current Date
This step is identical to the corresponding step (1) in the
weighted region process.
94
Uniform Region, Step 2: Convert to
Convert the rotational velocity about XYX to a linear
XYZ velocity using the velocity formulas in Converting
Angular to Rectangular.
= Although not needed to estimate the new location
Uniform Region, Step 3: Convert Velocity to Source
Datum
This step is identical to the corresponding step (5) in the
weighted region process.
= +
Applying Regional Velocity
So far, all weve done is get the regional velocity (crustal
motion) and transform it to our source datum. What next?
In the most general sense, our goal is to convert a location
described in one datum/time to a location described in
another datum/time, taking regional velocity into account.
In order to accomplish this, were going to break it up into
two major steps.
Step 1: Integrating Regional Velocity
Our first step is to move the spike to its new location as a
result of crustal motion and time. We achieve this by
integrating the velocity over time. Our resultant location
remains referenced to the source datum but corresponds to
the target date.
= + datum/time, taking crustal motion into account. In this
Where,
= location referenced to source datum at start
time ( )
= regional velocity referenced to source datum
(i.e. the output of Calculating Regional Velocity)
= location referenced to source datum at target
time ( )
Step 2: Transforming to Target Datum
The second step is nothing new. We simply transform the
location from its current datum to the target datum using
the formulas in A Location Defined by a Datum:
ITRF94, with no change in date.
94
Where,
= location referenced to target datum at target
time ( )
( ), we would need the target velocity ( ) to
move from our new location to another datum/time. From
Transforming Velocity:
= +
Where,
= regional velocity referenced to target datum
Concatenating Transformations
In Calculating Regional Velocity, we stated that, if we
performed these transformations properly, we should be
able to jump from one datum/time to another without
having to recalculate the regional velocity from scratch
each time. Since Applying Regional Velocity, Step 2
provides us with both location and regional velocity with
respect to our new datum/time, we have all we need to
feed these two values back into the process and derive a
new location and regional velocity referenced to a new
datum/time.
Relating One Position to Another
In A Location Defined by a Spike in the Ground, we
explained how we transform one location to a different
section, we want to transform a location to a local
coordinate system. When using a local coordinate
system, we must take into account the datum and survey
date of the coordinate systems origin. Keep in mind that
the local origin is likely moving due to crustal motion and
at a rate that differs from our location of interest.
The only way we can compare two locations is to
transform them into the same datum, same time. Once
337
both locations are of the same datum/time, we can performed January 1, 2000 and the current date is
calculate the XYZ vector from the origin to the location January 1, 2013.
of interest as follows.
Since our goal is to measure the relative position of these
= two locations as they currently exist, we convert both
locations to the current date.
Where,
Step 1: Convert Airborne GPS ITRF2008 Position to
= location of interest = ( , , ) NAD83

= local origin = ( , , ) This requires a simple datum transformation IAW A

Location Defined by a Datum: ITRF94.
= location of interest in local coordinate system =
( , , ) 08 ( ) 94 83 ( )

We convert this relative location to NS, EW, and vertical Step 2: Convert Ground NAD83 Position to Current
components as follows. Date

This requires calculation of the regional velocity

= +
( ) IAW Calculating Regional Velocity.
=
83 = 83
+
+
= + If the survey date is unknown or precision better than 1
+ + foot is not needed, use the current date. In this case,
83 = 83 .
= ( , , )
Step 3: Subtract Origin from Aircraft Location
Where,
Subtract origin from aircraft location per Relating One
= latitude of q Position to Another.

= longitude of q
Conversion of to , , is not shown
herein.
Using What Weve Learned
How does this relate to aircraft navigation? Does the
location from a GPS receiver have crustal motion? How
could it? The spike is traveling through the air. Three
scenarios are addressed.
Scenario 1, Airborne GPS vs. NAD83 Landmark
In this scenario, the origin on the ground has been
surveyed to NAD83 and the navigation system is
providing GPS positioning referenced to WGS84
ITRF2008. 17 Lets assume that the ground survey was
17
Scenario 1 might occur within the position reference
system (PRS) as well as the system under inspection. It
comes into play when using GPS/WAAS as the PRS
=
Convert XYZ vector to NEU.
Scenario 2, Using the Camera System
In this scenario, the origin on the ground has been
surveyed to NAD83 and the navigation (camera or pilot
fix) is providing positioning referenced to the runway
threshold. 18 Since the navigation system and origin are
for ILS orbit, ILS radial, VORTAC orbit, VORTAC
radial, DME/DME, etc. It also occurs during
inspection of WAAS LPV approach procedures. The
accuracy associated with regional velocity
compensation would likely be required only for the
inspection of WAAS LPV approach procedures.
18
Scenario 2 would exist within the camera system PRS,
typically used during the inspection of ILS and lighting
systems.

338
referenced to the same datum/time, no conversion need be The good news:
done.
Crustal motion impacts only one of the three flight
Step 1: Subtract Origin from Aircraft Location inspection scenarios described in Using What Weve
Learned.
Subtract origin from aircraft location per Relating One
Position to Another. Crustal motion compensation need be performed only
for the ground reference point, not for each sample of
= navigational position.

Convert XYZ vector to NEU. If the ground survey date is unknown or high precision
is not needed (and we use the current date in its stead),
crustal motion is not a factor.

Scenario 3, Using DGPS
In this scenario, the origin on the ground has been
surveyed to NAD83 and the navigation (DGPS) is
providing GPS positioning referenced to some variant of
WGS84. 19 We can assume that the WGS84 positioning
(based upon ground survey) corresponds to the same date
as the origins NAD83 position. Because of this, regional
velocity is not an issue.
Step 1: Convert Airborne GPS WGS84 Position to
NAD83
Based upon the assessment in Using what Weve
Learned, it appears that the only time crustal motion
compensation would be needed would be during the
inspection of WAAS LPV approach procedures. Even
then, compensation can be performed only if the runway
survey date is known or can be estimated.
REFERENCES
[1] National Geodetic Survey, Horizontal Time-
Dependent Positioning,
http://www.ngs.noaa.gov/TOOLS/Htdp/Htdp.shtml

This requires a simple datum transformation IAW A

Location Defined by a Datum: ITRF94. Lets assume
that the WGS84 position is referenced to ITRF2000.

00 94 83

If the survey date is unknown, use current date.

Step 2: Subtract Origin from Aircraft Location

Subtract origin from aircraft location per Relating One

Position to Another.

Convert XYZ vector to NEU.

CONCLUSION

It is my hope that this paper eliminates some of the

mystery surrounding datum transformations. It should
become obvious, after reading this paper, that accounting
for crustal motion involves a much greater effort than
what is required for simple datum/time transformations.

19
Scenario 3 would exist within the DGPS PRS, typically
used during the inspection of ILS.

339
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

340
 An Automatic Workflow for RNAV Procedures
Flight Validation Cpt. Fabr izio Marachic h, ENAV , Fabio Po zzi, ID S, Marcello Da vide Mannino, ID S, Sig urd Bjelkaroy, NSM

Cpt. Fabrizio Marachich

Crew Training Postholder
ENAV - Radiomisure
Rome, RM, Italy
tel: +39 320 5695048
E-mail: fabrizio.marachich@enav.it

Ing. Fabio Pozzi

EMACS Product Manager
IDS Ingegneria Dei Sistemi
Rome, RM, Italy
tel: +39 340 2576785
E-mail: f.pozzi@idscorporation.com

Marcello Davide Mannino

Area Manager
IDS Ingegneria Dei Sistemi
Rome, RM, Italy
Fax: +39-3351359236
E-mail: m.mannino@idscorporation.com

Ing. Sigurd A. Bjelkary

Director Flight Inspection Systems
NSM Norwegian Special Mission
tel: +47 913 96152
E-mail: Sigurd A. Bjelkary sab@nsm.aero

ABSTRACT (flight procedure and/or navaids) stored into an AIXM 5.1

database.
The use of RNAV routes and approaches/departures
increase the challenges of flight inspection teams. ENAV INTRODUCTION
and IDS developed a workflow for the validation of
RNAV procedure (both GNSS and DME-DME). This IDS and ENAV, in collaboration with NSM (Norwegian
workflow is composed of 2 phases: an upstream phase Special Mission) developed a workflow to validate
regarding design and coding of the flight procedure, RNAV procedures (GNSS and DME DME) starting from
calculation of a list of DMEs segment by segment the flight procedure designing phase to the flight
following RNAV criteria (for validation of DME DME inspection itself. The workflow can be summarized as
procedures), and export of a data package ready to be follow:
automatically imported on the onboard NSM (Norwegian
Special Mission) UNIFIS 3000 Console. A downstream Flight procedure designing using a computer
phase regarding the flight check of the RNAV procedure aid design SW.
is foreseen importing the radio-measures into the design
environment to make a direct comparison between flight Creation of a DME DME configuration of
inspection and simulation. This is possible through the equipment (that are in the operational range of
usage of FPDAM (Flight Procedure and Airspace the flight procedure itself).
Management) for the flight procedure designing phase
and EMACS ASUV (Area/Airborne Signal Usability Evaluation of Coverage/Visibility for each
Verification) that is able to export this data package single DME.
maintaining data integrity of the onboard facility
aeronautical database starting from a set of information

341
 Evaluation of the DME DME performances
taking into account the RNAV principles [2],
[7].
Calculation of the data package (optimized list
of DMEs to be flight checked segment by
segment).
Export of the data package to the NSM UNIFIS
3000 Console (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. UNIFIS 3000 Consolle
Automatic loading of the digital data package
through simple plugin of a pen driver.
Flight check and validation of the flight
procedure through the ENAV Radiomisure
P180 (see Figure 2).
Figure 2. ENAV Radiomisure P180
Flight inspection measurement post-processing
and comparison with EMACS ASUV
simulations.
The workflow has been reported in Figure 5.
342
FLIGHT PROCEDURES DESIGN
The proposed workflow starts from the ANSP (Air
Navigation Service Provider) Flight Procedure Designing
Department through the usage of a computer aided design
SW called FPDAM based on a set of aeronautical data
AIXM 5.1 compliant (managed from the AIS department
in a centralized mode). An example of flight procedure
has been reported in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Example of FPDAM Flight Procedure
DME DME configuration of equipment
The second step consists in the creation of a DME DME
configuration starting from published data and cross-
checking them with the onboard database used for the
flight inspections. The data to complete this set of data
can be listed below:
Antenna position (LAT., LONG., ALT.)
Antenna pattern (an example of DME elevation
pattern has been reported in Figure 4)
Figure 4. Example of DME antenna pattern
 Power

Frequency

DOC (Designed Operational Coverage) and

sectorial limitations.

Once these parameters have been collected in a single

equipment configuration, a preliminary
coverage/visibility simulation can be performed.

Evaluation of coverage for each single DME

Coverage and visibility for DME equipment can be

evaluated preliminarily. EMACS permits to evaluate: Figure 6. Example of DME coverage

Optical visibility taking into account earth

curvature (see Figure 7);

Radio electric coverage (see Figure 6) taking into

account the real antenna pattern, power and
frequency of the navaid. EMACS provides a set
of solvers using the following E.M. methods:

o Deygout (see Appendix 1 for details)

o IF77 (see Appendix 1 for details)

o PE Parabolic Equation (see Appendix Figure 7. Example of DME visibility

1 for details)

The user can also set and consider directly operational

range and eventual published limitations for each
equipment.

343
 Figure 5. RNAV (DME DME and GNSS) flight procedures validation workflow.

DME DME Performances evaluation Error model

For the evaluation of DME DME RNAV performances, a Year of installation

set of applicable exclusion logics can be applied (see
Figure 8, 9): MTBF

DME that see some points of the procedure with DOC (AIP)
lower elevation angles to a definable value or
exceeding a definable value Limitations / Extensions to the DOC (AIP)

DME that see some points of the procedure at

distances less than or greater than 160Nm 3NM

DME that see some points of the procedure

outside the service volume stated in AIP

DME and along the procedure are not tunable (in

coverage for a period equal to Acquisition Time)

DME and along the procedure form pairs that do

not guarantee a given accuracy requirement of
RNAV

The user can also: Figure 8. EMACS ASUV logic exclusions for RNAV
performances evaluation.
Exclude any DME
Depending on the performance (see Figure 9) type the
Exclude all co-located DME with ILS following calculations can be performed:
(highlighted in green)
Number of DME in coverage (see Figure 10,13),
Selecting a DME the user can also check the following
data:

344
 Number of DME pairs usable for RNAV (see
Figure 11,12,14),

Number of critical DME and identification of the

critical site,

Min. and max. Position Estimation Error (PEE).

Figure 11. EMACS ASUV number of DME pairs in

coverage and usable on area domain

Figure 9. EMACS ASUV exclusion logics and RNAV

parameters

Figure 12. EMACS ASUV number of DME pairs in

coverage and usable on area domain (Google view)

Figure 10. EMACS ASUV number of DME in

coverage on area domain

Figure 13. EMACS ASUV number of DME in

coverage along a flight procedure

345
Figure 14. EMACS ASUV number of DME pairs in
coverage and usable along a flight procedure

Calculation and export of the data package

Once the RNAV performances have been calculated,

there is the possibility to export the optimized data
package calculating the maximum number of equipment
(DME and/or TACAN) measured simultaneously.
Moreover there is the ability to:
Define the maximum number of DME and the
maximum number of simultaneously measurable
TCN (see Figure 15)
Minimize the number of COP (Change Over
Point) of a flight procedure and reduce the DME
receiver workload (see Figure 15).
Display the result of the computation on a
Cartesian graph or colored map
Export the result of the computation to the
UNIFIS 3000 (through the definition of an
Interexchange Control Document format
.nsmsql) and NXT (.txt file). An example has
been reported in Figure 16.
The export panel has been reported in Figure 15:
Figure 16. EMACS ASUV example of data package
(open format)
In case of exports to the Console UNIFIS 3000, there is
the possibility to automatically prepare a mail with the
data to be sent to the Flight Inspection Department in the
attachment. The data are listed below:
File .nsmdb (data package to be automatically
imported onboard plugging in a pen driver)
File . nsmsql (sql script to populate the UNIFIS
DB schema)
A descriptive PDF file for crew briefing
describing the number of DME to be checked
segment by segment
DB data and examples of files have been reported in
Figure 17:

Figure 15. EMACS ASUV calculation and export of Figure 17. EMACS ASUV export and mail to the
the data package. Flight Inspection department.

346
Loading of the data package and flight procedure
validation

Once received from the Flight Inspection Department, the

data package can be automatically loaded onboard to pilot
the UNIFIS Console (and the DME receivers) and tune up
the right sensors to acquire measurements for tuned DME
(the ones listed segment by segment in the data package).
The procedure validation will be completed and the
measurement data package (for each DME segment by
segment) will be acquired.

Each measurement file is converted into 2 files through a
converter component provided by NSM:
.Txt file with the identification of the number of
the run
.Dat file with the data measured during the run
The flight inspection measurements import panel has been
reported in Figure 18.
The 2 files can be then automatically imported into
EMACS ASUV in order to close the loop and compare
flight inspection measurement vs numerical simulations.
This has a double scope:
Improve the calibration of the simulation
Compare the logics of the aircraft FMS (Flight
Management System) and the simulation results
Figure 19. Data file coming from the flight inspection
validation campaign
This means there is the possibility to compare the
calculated number of DME in coverage segment by
segment and check/correct eventual inconsistencies in the
NSM Console/EMACS ASUV logics.
CONCLUSIONS
This report provides results of distance measuring
equipment area navigation (DME RNAV) flight
inspection requirements, concepts, and implementation
proposed for an automated flight inspection system. The
DME RNAV route/procedures requires the availability of
two or more DMEs although limited gaps in coverage are
tolerated. RNAV route and procedure design is facilitated
by the FPDAM/EMACS ASUV usage. The software
determines if suitable DME coverage exists for the
procedure based on inter-site geometry and predicted
coverage characteristics. Flight inspection of the designed
route/procedure is performed to assess actual DME
coverage. The algorithm used in EMACS ASUV software
is assessed and data is compared with measurements to
ensure compatibility between procedure design/simulation
and AFIS software logics. The final flight procedure
validation workflow is reported below (Figure 20):

Figure 18. Data file coming from the flight inspection

validation campaign (import interface)

Simulation vs Flight Inspection

Once the measures relating to a route/procedure have

been imported into the DB, there is the possibility to
make a comparison between measurement and simulation
Figure 20. Summary of the ENAV flight procedure
in a graphical way like reported below (Figure 19):
validation workflow

347
FUTURE WORK

The presented workflow has been already implemented

and it is in phase of validation. Several activities have
been planned through the Italian territory and abroad to
make it fully operational. The next validation activities
will regard the following airports:

LIRF (Fiumicino Airport)

LIPE (Bologna Borgo Panigale)

LIRN (Napoli Capodichino airport), STAR

RWY 06, 24, SID RWY 06 only

Next technological evolutions will regard integration

between the UNIFIS 3000 and the onboard FMS (Flight
Management System). The goal will be an automatic
flight procedure dataflow from the UNIFIS to the flight
management system.

REFERENCES

[1] International Civil Aviation Organization, July, 2006,

Annex 10, Aeronautical Telecommunications, Volume 1,
Radio Navigation Aids.

[2] International Civil Aviation Organization, 2000,

Manual on Testing of Radio Navigation Aids [Doc 8071],
Volume 1, Testing of Ground-Based Radio Navigation
Systems (10/02 version).

[3] RTCA DO-196 Minimum operational performance

standards for airborne VOR receiving equipment
operating within the radio frequency range of 108-
117.95

[4] RTCA DO-195 Minimum operational performance

standards for airborne ILS localizer receiving equipment
operating with the radio frequency range of 108-112
MHz

[5] RTCA DO-192 Minimum operational performance

standard for airborne ILS glide slope receiving equipment
operating within the radio frequency range of 328.6.335.4
Megahertz

[6] RTCA DO-189 Minimum operational performance

standards for airborne distance measuring equipment
(DME) operating within the radio frequency range of 960-
1215 Megahertz

[7] Eurocontrol Guid 0114 Eurocontrol Guideline for P-

RNAV Infrastructure Assessment

348
 APPENDIX
From Data collection to procedure design and flight check

The entire workflow represented is a commonality of process and product that represent :

An automated and workflow for the AIS data using a data quality controlled process

Develop the flight procedures with current FPDAM

Validate the flight procedures with current FPDAM

SSA ARINC 424 coding with current FPDAM

Electronic Packing the Coded Procedures in the NaV DB

Flight Inspect and Validation using the Navigation DB

Release quickly to the Airlines and DB suppliers

FPDAM covering TERPS .58 ICAO PANS/OPS 8168, DOC 9905,DOC 9906

349
Latest FPDAM version can natively manage the data with the
AIXM5.1 schema model by providing an automatic coding to the IFP
while the procedure gets designed. Procedures, routes, airspaces and all
the features in the AIXM5.1 database can be imported and re-worked.

IDS solution for flight procedure design is the most sold and used in
the world. The level of integration between IDS FPDAM system and
IDS AIM system is strong in the sense that there is no need to define an
exchange ICD format between the different subsystems. De facto, IDS
is the only company in the world capable of offering and deploying a
true and complete AIM solution as a single vendor. FPDAM will be
able to read/write and submit the data changes directly connected to the
central and unique database. There will be no need for any re-projection as
it is done automatically on the fly; full open formats management for
terrain and images will be also extremely easy. Drawing, checking and
assessing more than one procedure will be possible and extremely useful in
terms of procedure maintenance and procedure regulation check in case of
new amendment/new criteria.

In other worlds, FPDAM can automatically:

re-assess the obstacle clearance of archived procedure S
against new obstacles (land-use assessment)
re-assess the IFP vs Airspaces for containment analysis
check consistency on ATS data
re-draw protection areas
re-assess obstacle clearance
of archived procedures against:

new criteria amendments

changes in the ATS scenario (e.g. waypoint displacement)
All of this in batch mode (without any user intervention).

Latest FPDAM version is also minimizing the number of human

operations (often repetitive and without any added value), leaving to the user the responsibility about the most
significant design choices.
CAD/GIS usage will not be any more a mandatory prerequisites because FPDAM uses CAD/GIS software as
additional mere views. It is, as matter of fact, equipped with internal graphic capabilities to visualize the internal
application domain and all the relevant metadata needed for procedure design, validation and verification.
CAD system as Microstation Bentley or GIS system as Intergraph Geomedia can be used for designing new
geometries to be associated to the domain.
FPDAM provides a complete set of user-friendly tools for designing flight procedures either conventional than
RNAV. In particular, the system allows to automatically creating procedures and procedural features in accordance
with ICAO PANS-OPS including PBN approaches, departures and standard arrivals;
It allows to interactively modify the procedure by simply moving a leg or a waypoint in a new position or with a
different track/bearing that the system will draw the relative flight path, the relative protection areas/surfaces the
relative obstacles assessment.
FPDAM allows a user to:
Read Procedure Design information from an AIXM4.5, 5.1, ARINC 424 file or from AIXM5.1 database.
auto-check, validate and adjust ARINC 424 coding; it loads the coding and checks the compliancy of the
above mentioned legs/segments against the ARINC 424 rules in terms of sequence, starting/ending path &
termination, the minimum set of parameters to be provided. Validation parameters settings based on some
rules/checks done automatically by the system to take into account normative compliancy or user defined

350
 compliancy. The checks are typically performed on leg length (according to the type of segment final,
initial, initial missed approach and so on), track angle between two legs (according to the maximum value
foreseen), leg gradient (according to the type e.g. final), minimum distance between waypoints, maximum
ground distance for VOR/DME fixes, fixes tolerance area according to the type of fix (IAF,IF,FAF and so
on). Also the optimum value is suggested by FPDAM system.
Auto-code ARINC 424 while designing; when designing a new procedure, FPDAM assigns to each single
leg/segment the related path & termination without user selection. If the P&T is selected, FPDAM will
consequently draw the relative flight path, the protection areas related to that flight path and minima for
that leg. Waypoints linked to the procedure, OCA/OCH values, MSA, SSA supplementary data can be
maintained and committed at the same time. During the construction of the procedure the SSA data are
automatically saved in the database or in the file AIXM, ARINC424 depending on the configuration. The
user can add attributes to each feature of the working file. Once the coding process is finished and checked
by the designer supervisor, the electronic package can be sent to the AIS for the final validation process.
The final commit in the central AIS database can be carried out by the AIS responsible.
FPDAM allows a user to display in the geospatial based environment all the Aeronautical features coming
from the ARINC file they need to use for the procedure construction and validation together with what-if
data for design purposes. FPDAM can display as information layers as many vectors files as the user may
require. SSA (SID, STAR, Approaches) data can be also displayed in different ways. The user may select to
display the nominal track only, the nominal track and the protection areas at the same time (for lateral /vertical
separation analysis) or the entire design project. Additional information layers such as noise sensitive areas,
populated areas, geographical grids, airports layouts can be added from the user on request and switched
on/off. Once the design has been completed, the user may select to propose top the AIS partial design
projects, (single SSA for a complex SSA design project, for instance) or the whole project. When committing
back to the central AIS database, consistency checks (ARINC IFP coding rules applied and verified) are
performed in order to validate the
data. FPDAM can:

dynamically manipulate
procedure design features in
order to optimize an find the best
OCA/OCH (e.g. FPDAM allows
the user to draw and assess final
protection areas in one step, in
this way the user can just modify
the final track approaching radial
to compare which is the lowest
minima);
modify the design rules;
each single FPDAM construction
provides default values, for the
parameters and equations, taking
into account the most penalizing parameter stated in the reference criteria (indicated air speed, gradient,
length, etc). Because FPDAM has been parametrically developed, the parameters of equations can be
changed by the user (both the default and the single case). In case of great changes such as constructive
equations and obstacle assessment formulas, a customization of the system is required by the IDS
development team;
highlight and display significant/critical changes to a generated procedure resulting from modifications in
the Reference Data; every time one data has been changed, FPDAM will warn the user that the change
affects one or more procedure if the procedure design has been developed using that feature.
The capability of providing automated assessments and reports for the purpose of obstacle assessment i.e. In
FPDAM every obstacle assessment analysis on each specific procedure, leg/segment produce provides a list
of the most penalizing obstruction that can be saved or printed, for legal recording purposes or for personal
storage. link will have the capability of printing/plotting each function using different scales and paper
formats.

EMACS E.M. methods for coverage calculations

351
EMACS description Range, Maximum Elevation Angle and the Cone
of silence).

The radio coverage evaluations have been performed

EMACS is a family of electromagnetic 3D modeling and
simulation tools, able to solve EMC (ElectroMagnetic
Compatibility) and EMI (ElectroMagnetic Interference)
issues in complex airport and air navigation scenarios.
The numerical tools are based on the most sophisticated
and widely known computational electromagnetic
techniques, such as (3-D methods):
Geometrical Theory of Diffraction (GTD/UTD)
Physical Optics (PO/PTD/ITD)
Method Of Moments (MOM)
EMACS supports:
Periodic flight calibrations and checks
Feasibility analysis of new or upgraded
airports/equipments
CAA planning permissions
Support ATC with radars and navaids systems
siting
Interference, PSR/SSR coverage and radar maps.
using a 2D algorithms called Deygout Method.
The radio coverage result is displayed using a 2D map,
with colour contours distinguishing the different strength
signal levels. It is possible to set a threshold level (i.e.
receiver sensitivity) in order to predict the range of
coverage.
The tool also gives the number of Navaids covering each
area on the map using the cumulative coverage. A colour
legend is then used allocating different colours to areas
depending on the number of Navaids covering them.
The purpose of the RNAV performance calculation is to
evaluate multiple performance parameters based on the
available navaids on each point of the analysis domain.
The user is able to select a domain of analysis using the
CAD/GIS tools from EMACS, then select the list of
navaids from their planned or existing position through
locating them on the graphics or via the relevant co-
ordinates. EMACS executes the performance calculation
on the domain specified by the user.
Depending on the performance type (DME-DME or
VOR-DME), some calculations are performed:
Number of navaids in coverage,
Number of DME pairs usable for RNAV,
Number of critical DME and identification of the
critical site,
Min. and max. Position Estimation Error (PEE),

Multi DME continuity of service,

EMACS computes RNAV performances (described in
detail in this article) taking into account the: Compute altitude constraints for waypoints in
order to meet requested precision and continuity
Transmitted power (at the antenna input), goals.

Frequency of the antenna, For the VOR-DME performance, only the Number of
navaids in coverage is calculated. For the DME-DME
Antenna pattern, performance all the calculations are performed.

Free space propagation losses,

Earth Curvature (K-factor), Deygout method description:

Terrain effect,

RNAV constraints specified on the configuration

(Minimum and Maximum VOR and DME

352
The Deygout algorithm is suggested in recommendation
715 from the former CCIR (now ITU), and represents the
solution to the problem of multiple diffraction of radio
waves (f>30 MHz) over knife-edge obstacles. The path
loss is obtained directly and quickly by alignment of
distances and heights adequately selected from a path
profile.
The Deygout algorithm works as follows.
Terrain profile is generated for the path between
transmitter and receiver intersecting the vertical
plane containing the antenna phase centre and
the observation point with the digital terrain
model. The use of digital terrain models with
different resolutions can be used to describe the
terrain within the area of interest.
Terrain heights are then corrected to take into
account the curvature of the earth.
The terrain profile is processed to select the
terrain points which would be touched if a string
was stretched between the transmitter and
receiver (the interfering peaks or knife edges)
The field strength is computed by adding the free
space losses to the extra losses caused by the
interfering peaks.
When more than one knife edge obstacle is present along
the terrain profile, the cumulative effect is evaluated.
propagation of radio energy is affected by the lower, non-
ionized atmosphere (troposphere), specifically by
variations in the refractive index of the atmosphere.
Atmospheric absorption and attenuation or scattering due
to rain become important at SHF (Super High
Frequencies). The terrain along and in the vicinity of the
great circle path between transmitter and receiver also
plays an important part. In this frequency range, time and
space variations of received signal and interference ratius
lend themselves readily to statistical description.
2. GTD-2D method: this method is based on the use of a
2D formulation of the Geometric Theory of Diffraction
(GTD) in its uniform formulation, also known as Uniform
Theory of Diffraction (UTD). This theory is based on an
asymptotic solution of the Maxwell equations which is
obtained under a high frequency approximation. Such a
formulation is applicable in the evaluation of the
interaction between a radiating source and a scattering
structure whose dimensions are much larger than the field
wavelength.
The total scattered field can be described as the
combination of discrete contributions from a number of
hot points distributed over the body according to
relatively simple geometric laws relating to the
propagation of rays.
3. Parabolic Equations method: the PE solution is a full
wave solution (i.e. exact solution). This method is used to
solve the two-dimensional (2-D) Helmholtz equation.

Other algorithms used by EMACS for coverage

simulations:

The radio coverage evaluations are performed using 2D

algorithms (like Deygout already described). Thus, all the
implemented numerical tools execute their computations
taking into account the propagation mechanisms within
the vertical plane passing through the antenna phase
centre and the observation point. EMACS uses other
algorithms for evaluating the signal strength:

1. IF77 method: this method is applicable to air/ground,

air/air, ground/satellite, and air/satellite paths. It can also
be used for ground/ground paths that are line-of-sight or
smooth earth. Model applications are restricted to
telecommunication systems operating at radio frequencies
from about 0. 1 to 20 GHz with antenna heights greater
than 0.5 m. In addition, radio-horizon elevations must be
less than the elevation of the higher antenna. The radio
horizon for the higher antenna is taken either as a
common horizon with the lower antenna or as a smooth
earth horizon with the same elevation as the lower
antenna effective reflecting plane. At 0.1 to 20 GHz,

353
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354
 Investigating Multipath Propagation for
Navigation Systems in a Miniaturized Airport
Environment ILS and Extension to VOR Dr. Robert Geise, Braunschweig U niversity, Georg Zimmer, Braunschweig University, Bjorn Neubauer, Braunschweig University, & Prof. Dr. Achim Enders, Braunschweig University

Dr.-Ing. Robert Geise

University of Braunschweig,
Institute for electromagnetic compatibility
Braunschweig, Germany
Fax: +49 531 7724
E-mail: r.geise@tu-bs.de

Dipl.-Ing. Georg Zimmer, Dipl.-Ing. Bjrn Neubauer,

Prof. Dr. Achim Enders
University of Braunschweig,
Institute for electromagnetic compatibility
Braunschweig, Germany
Fax: +49 531 7724
E-mail: {g.zimmer, b.neubauer, achim.enders}@tu-bs.de

ABSTRACT In this contribution we present progress in the work with a

scaled measurement setup suitable for optimizing ILS-
For various navigation systems, such as the instrument protection areas individually for airports. Additionally, we
landing system (ILS), the VHF omnidirectional radio show how to enhance this scaled measurement concept
range (VOR) or radar, multipath propagation can degrade for the VOR and rotating wind turbines which is a timely
their performances and even crucially disturb their actual topic in Germany.
navigation information. Known scenarios for such
disturbances are reflections from large taxiing aircraft INTRODUCTION
near the runway influencing the localizer of the ILS and
the scattering of signals from VOR or radar due to In ICAO Annex 10 [3] allowed tolerances for navigation
rotating wind turbines. Since such multipath propagation systems are defined. E.g. for the ILS localizer, depending
scenarios have impact both on the safety and on the on the distance to the runway threshold allowed
capacity of an airport as well as the approval of wind tolerances are 5 A. For the VOR a maximum bearing
farms, it is essential to accurately quantify the amount of error of 3 is given. Naturally, these tolerances take into
performance degradation. account non-ideal environment where multipath
propagation affects the ideal navigation signal. Whereas
Since measurements at a real airport are very demanding such tolerances are a reasonable measure for safe air
and expensive, thus hardly can cover all relevant traffic operation, a real physical connection between these
scenarios, we propose to scale down an airports tolerances and the size and shape of reflecting objects is
geometry and correspondingly rebuild scaled versions of not established at all. On the one hand this is due to the
relevant navigation systems to provide a measurement complexity and size of scattering objects like aircraft and
environment with nearly unlimited availability and wind turbines and due to the difficult boundary conditions
flexibility. such as a non-plane wave incidence. Up to now no
validated simulation tools exist that can accurately predict
course tolerances due to multipath propagation. In

355
particular, a full validation of such a simulation tool
cannot be provided with a single good agreement between
measurement and simulation results. Moreover, most
important is a sensitivity analysis, thus a statement on
how do simulation results depend on a slight variation of
input parameters, such as position and heading of an
aircraft on a taxiway, which can hardly be more accurate
as a few meters, respectively degrees. Such an analysis
cannot be obtained by measurements at a real airport,
simply due to the enormous effort.
To validate the scaled measurements technique, results
are compared with those of measurements in real
environments. In a reference study, which was made
because of the introduction of the A380 [1], several
scenarios are presented where the effect of a taxiing A380
or a B747 on the ILS localizer is investigated. Figure
shows how the current overall concept for ILS protection
areas does not take into account fundamental aspects of
the scattering behavior of an aircraft.
Figure 1: Overall Layout for ILS Protection Areas.
Though the current layout for ILS protection areas may be
a pragmatic one, it is quite obvious that relevant
parameters of such scattering scenarios are not taken into
account at all such as the following. In nearly all cases
this is a near-field scattering scenario as the distance of
the aircraft to the ILS localizer is usually smaller than
4000 m. E.g. the so-called antenna foot print gives
variations of more than 10 dB over the whole dimensions
of a large aircraft compared to plane wave illumination
approximations. Thus the illumination of the aircraft
strongly depends on this distance as well as the heading of
the aircraft itself. The latter is the main parameter that
specifies both the incidence and the scattering angles into
the direction of the landing aircraft. Consequently, the
three examples depicted in Figure 1 must physically
considered to be different. In particular, taking a sphere,
the scattering behavior of which can be calculated
analytically exact, gives a mathematical proof, that the
current ILS protection area layout cannot accurately be
valid for all three scenarios, thus does not sufficiently
describe the scattering of aircraft themselves. Similar are
current regulations with respect to rotating wind turbines.
The actual scattering behavior of wind turbines is not
discussed at all in corresponding ICAO documents [4].
The only question addressed is if a quasi-optical ray
356
would reach wind turbines or not. There are no physical
relations between the scattering behavior and existing
tolerances for the VOR bearing error.
One reason for that, of course, is the current lack of data
that describe the scattering behavior of aircraft (with
respect to ILS) or wind turbines (with respect to VOR or
radar) due to the missing validity and sometimes limited
applicability of simulation tools and the enormous
complexity of measurements in a real airport
environment. An overview about that is described in more
detail in [5].
Consequently, the technique of scaled measurements is
proposed in this contribution to flexibly analyze the
impact of reflecting objects on arbitrary navigation
systems. Scaling makes use of the physical fact that the
scattering properties stay the same for dispersion free
objects if the ratio between objects dimension and the
wavelength is kept constant. This actually is empirically
familiar to anyone recalling the function principles of
antennas. A dipole radiating at lower frequency requires a
larger length and vice versa, but once the ratio of dipole
length and wavelength is constant, the radiation
characteristics stay the same.
In a scaled, respectively miniaturized measurement setup
of navigation systems the complex airport environment is
reduced to a compact, well controllable, and flexible
measurement facility with nearly unlimited availability
and manageable costs for operation.
The fundamental concept of scaling navigation systems
and the major high frequency engineering aspects are
described in detail in [2] as it would exceed the scope of
this article. The main focus of this contribution is a
validating comparison between results in the scaled
environment and results obtained in an comprehensive
ICAO study about large taxiing aircraft in ILS protection
areas, conducted at Heathrow, Frankfurt and Toulouse
airport in 2006 [1]. Additionally, the idea of scaled
measurements is enhanced to apply also for the VOR and
rotating wind turbines, a simple measurement example is
given here.
SCALED MEASUREMENT SETUP FOR ILS
For the scaled measurements the ILS itself, the airport
environment, the taxiing aircraft, and the receiver are re-
built in the new scale. For VHF frequencies, where ILS
localizer and VOR are operating at, this leads to a higher
frequency of 16 GHz using a scale of 1:144. Thus a
landing approach in 9 km distance to the ILS corresponds
to a scaled distance of 62 m.
For the taxiing aircraft galvanized resin models are used height of the receiver is successively reduced on the
that are commercially available. The scaled ILS localizer glideslope corresponding to a descent aircraft. It is also
is built with a slotted waveguide antenna array as the key possible to perform measurements for an aircraft after
element of the scaled approach as it provides the same touchdown rolling on the runway with just shifting the
antenna pattern as the real ILS localizer. Moreover, the rails towards the ILS. Consequently, a whole landing
design is reconfigurable to even match arbitrary ILS approach is divided into descent phase and roll-off on the
patterns. The detailed description on that is given in [2]. runway. It is even possible to calibrate the whole mini-
airport environment by simple performing scaled landing
In Figure 2 the measurement open area test site of the approaches without any scattering objects. This is of
national institute of metrology (PTB) in Braunschweig is course hardly feasible at real airport environments.
shown with the layout of Frankfurt airport in Germany
and a taxiing aircraft as reflecting object, the influence of Definition of Tolerance Categories in Real
which on the ILS signal, is measured. At one end of the Measurements
runway the scaled version of the ILS is located. At the
other end, not shown on the picture, the receiver is In the ICAO-study [1] measurement results of each
mounted on a platform which is moveable in vertical landing approach are assessed with respect to allowed
direction. This unit is attached to a wagon that tolerance limits of the respective ILS categories. The
autonomously drives on rails made of PVC, resembling applied classifications are displayed in Table 1.
the actual landing approach. Both units are driven with
electric motors. A microcontroller reads out the data of a Table 1. Tolerance Categories for the Reference
distance measuring laser and controls the two motors in Measurements.
order to realize reproducible approaches with a defined
glideslope angle. Category
IT Fulfills CAT I-III
IT* On CAT III tolerance
ATC3 Outside CAT III tolerances
ATC3* On CAT II tolerance
ATC2 Outside CAT III tolerances
ATC2* On CAT II tolerance
ATC1 Outside CAT I/II/III tolerances

According to that similar classifications are applied for

the scaled airport environment which is explained in the
following.

Definition of Tolerance Categories in Scaled

Measurements

The mentioned ICAO study does not make statements

about the expected positioning accuracy of the scattering
aircraft, but in the scaled measurement setup it turned out
that the resulting landing course disturbances strongly
depend especially on its lateral distance to the middle of
the runway. Thus equivalent categories are defined for the
scaled measurement results referring to a percentage of
measurement points exceeding ILS tolerances.

Figure 2: Mini-Airport Setup at Scale 1:144.

For the scaled approach, the wagon moves at constant

speed of around 0.25 m/s towards the ILS, while the

357
 Table 2. Tolerance Categories Defined for the Scaled into three static positions on the trajectory of the
Measurements. movement allowing a measurement for the whole landing
approach. Therefore the highest disturbance of the three
Allowed percentage of measurement scaled measurements has to be compared with the results
points of the Frankfurt airport measurement.
Category
Outside 5 A Outside 15 A Measurement results at the real Frankfurt airport are not
differentiated into approach (descent phase) and runway
IT 0% 0% (roll-off), therefore only the maximal value from either
IT* 2% 0% configurations is taken for comparison with the scaled
measurement results.
ATC3 10% 0%
As an example Figure 3 shows measurement results
ATC3! 100% 0% obtained in the scaled environment.
ATC3!* 100% 2%
ATC1! 100% 100%

Results demonstrate that the influence of positioning

accuracy becomes larger the closer the landing aircraft
gets to the ILS. This is where the tolerances are narrow.
These narrow tolerances are applied for the whole
measurements. The tolerance limits for CAT I (15 A)
and CAT III (5 A) [3] are used and the category is
determined by the number of points, if any, are exceeding
these limits as it is shown in Table 2. If only 2% points
exceed the tolerance limits, the lower category is used and
marked with an asterisk which corresponds to the on
tolerance categories of the real measurements.

In the following, the scattering scenarios of A380 and Figure 3. Measurement Example of a Scaled Landing
B747 conducted at Frankfurt and Toulouse as presented in Approach for the Movement on the Runway after
mentioned ICAO study are compared. Touchdown.

Measurements on the runway (roll-off) show a higher

COMPARISON OF MEASUREMENT RESULTS
Frankfurt Airport Scenarios
At Frankfurt Airport the positions of the taxiing,
respectively scattering aircraft are shown in Figure 4 as
conducted both in the original ICAO study and in the
scaled measurement setup.
In the ICAO-study positions P1, P1.1 and P8 are realized
by a fixed receiver and a moving taxiing aircraft. In the
scaled measurements each of these positions are split up
disturbance potential than measurements during the
descent phase of the landing aircraft. This is especially
visible at the crossing scenario (P8) which is within the
ILS tolerances. The lower potential for disturbance effects
of the B747 in contrast to the A380 is observed at the
crossing scenario (P8) where only the A380 leads to
severe disturbances as displayed in Figure 3 for the
position P8c. This is likely due to the larger tailfin of the
A380. This effect at this position is higher than at position
8a, as the tailfin is closer to the center of the runway.

358
 Figure 4. Scattering Aircraft Positions for Frankfurt Airport, Real Distances Have to be Multiplied with the Used
Scaling Factor of 144.

Table 3 summarizes the comparison between
measurements in the real and the scaled Frankfurt airport
environment. It can be seen clearly that the scaled airport
environment leads to the same classification with respect
to ILS Cat tolerances.
Measurements on the runway (roll-off) after the threshold
show more disturbances than in the descent phase of the
landing approach. For example this is obvious for the
crossing scenario where there is disturbing influence only
during the movement on the runway after threshold. At
position P1, where the taxiing aircraft leaves the runway,
the disturbances for rolling off on the runway (ATC1!)
are more severe than for the descent phase of the
Table 3. Results for Frankfurt Airport Scenarios in Real and Scaled Measurement Environment.
approach. For this particular scenario P1 the effect of an
A380 is higher than for a B747: ATC1! instead of
ATC3!. For position P1 the CAT I tolerances are
exceeded both in real and in scaled measurements.
In the ICAO study the measured instrument current for
aircraft at position P1 is likely wrong for the B747. The
value is 5 A, but the tolerance class is ATC1. For
position P1.1 the current is 20 A, thus much higher but
the category is only ATC2. With the current for A380 at
P1 being 30 A, the correct current may probably be
25 A for the B747. In addition to the scattering scenarios
at Frankfurt airport measurement results are also shown
for Toulouse airport in the following.

Reference Scaled Measurement

Position A380 B747 A380 B747
Category I (A) Category I (A) Approach Runway Approach Runway
P1a ATC1! ATC1! ATC3! ATC1!
P1b ATC1 30 ATC1 5 IT* IT* IT IT*
P1c IT IT* IT IT
P1.1a N/A N/A ATC3! ATC1!
P1.1b N/A N/A ATC2 20 N/A N/A IT IT*
P1.1c N/A N/A IT IT
P2 IT 3.5 IT 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
PX IT 2.5 N/A N/A IT IT* N/A N/A

359
 Reference Scaled Measurement
Position A380 B747 A380 B747
Category I (A) Category I (A) Approach Runway Approach Runway
P3 IT 2.5 N/A N/A IT N/A N/A N/A
P4 IT 3 N/A N/A IT N/A N/A N/A
P5 IT* 2.5 IT 1.7 IT N/A IT N/A
P5.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A IT N/A
P8a IT IT* IT IT
P8b ATC2 20 ATC3 8 IT* ATC3! IT IT
P8c IT ATC3 IT IT*

Figure 5. Scattering Aircraft Positions for Toulouse Airport.

Toulouse Airport Scenarios
At Toulouse Airport all positions are with a static
scattering aircraft, and taxiing scenarios are already split
into several positions. E. g. the positions P1-P4
correspond to the movement of an aircraft leaving the
runway. Test positions, both in real airport environment
and in the miniaturized airport, are shown in Figure 5.
also divided into descent and roll-of phase with a separate
classification of ILS disturbances.
Measurements in the scaled and the real airport
environment show significant disturbances in the descent
phase of the landing aircraft only for position P2, while at
the other position the results are within allowed ILS CAT
tolerances.

The measurements at the real Toulouse airport as reported
in [1] were done in two different configurations. Both
measurement flights were conducted (for the descent
phase of the landing aircraft) and measurements on the
runway with a car (for the roll-off phase of the aircraft).
Only some of these measurements are differentiated into
these two phases. If not, the worst case of either of them
is summarized in the ICAO study with the maximal value
of the instrument current. The scaled measurements are
At positions P6, P6Bis, P6Ter, P6Quat, P7, P8 and P9
measurements at the real Toulouse airport exceed the
CAT-III tolerances, but not the CAT-II and CAT-I
tolerances. In the scaled airport environment this is also
the case for P6Quat, P7. For the other positions, the
disturbances are either a category lower (IT*: P6Bis,
P6Ter and P9) or in the real measurements the tolerances
are only very slightly exceeded anyway (P8).

360
Furthermore there are contradictions within the real tendency but not as an allocation of a particular
measurement results provided by the study. The values disturbance category.
for the instrument current for the car measurements are
much higher than for the runway measurements The results of the Toulouse measurements are
performed with an aircraft. Although if there are no summarized and compared in Table 4.
disturbances measured these values are similar, for the
more critical scenarios these are far too high. Especially at
position P2 this value is unrealistically high with 90 A.
Therefore the real car measurements can only be used as a
Table 4. Results for Toulouse Airport Scenarios in Real and Scaled Measurement Environment.

Reference Scaled Measurement

Category I (A) Category
Position
Aircraft Aircraft Car
Approach Runway Approach Runway Runway Approach Runway
P1 IT 3 2 IT N/A
P2 ATC1 20 90 ATC3! ATC3!
P3 IT 3 3 IT N/A
P4 IT 3 3 IT N/A
P5 IT 2 3 IT N/A
P6 IT ATC3 2 7 50 IT ATC3
P6 Bis IT ATC3 3 8 30 IT IT*
P6 Ter IT ATC3 3 4 40 IT IT*
P6 Quat IT ATC3 2 8 50 IT ATC3!
P7 IT ATC3 4 10 40 IT ATC3
P8 IT ATC3 2 6 3 IT IT
P9 IT ATC3 2 5 10 IT IT*
P11 IT 2 3 IT N/A
P11 Bis IT IT* 2 5 IT IT*
P12 IT 1 N/A 2.5 IT N/A
P13 IT 2 2.5 IT N/A
P14 IT 2 2.5 IT N/A
P15 IT 2 2.5 IT N/A
P16 IT 3 N/A 2.5 IT N/A
P18 IT 3 3 IT N/A
P19 IT 3 N/A 2.5 IT N/A

361
CONCLUSIONS FOR SCALED ILS SCENARIOS
A comparison is presented between measurements
conducted at real airports and conducted in the scaled
airport environment. It has to be mentioned explicitly that
the presented good agreement between results obtained in
the real and the scaled airport environment is only a part
of the successful validation. Additional measurements
were done with a metallic sphere as a reference scatterer,
the scattering behavior of which can be calculated
analytically exact, unlike any other scattering object such
as an aircraft. These additional validation measurements
are not shown in this contribution as the description
would be beyond its scope. However, taking both the
validation with the ICAO-study results from real airport
environments and mentioned results of the reference
scatterer the scaled airport environment can be considered
fully validated.
turbine is shown. A deeper discussion of additional
measurements will be presented in future work.
Figure 6 shows a simple measurement configuration with
a direct propagation path and a scattered propagation
path. For this feasibility study only an angular section of
the VOR with a generic four antenna arrangement is used.
Measurements are done in an anechoic chamber.
Figure 7 presents resulting spectra of the direct and the
scattered propagation path in the baseband. The scattered
path clearly shows a resulting Doppler spectrum
component due to the motion of the rotating blades. Of
course, the Doppler spectrum is spread due to the
different absolute motion speeds along the radius of the
rotating blade. Additionally, the reflected path also
contains a static component, which belongs to the mast of
the turbine.

Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the identification The interpretation of measured spectra in terms of bearing
of crucial scenarios and especially its relevant parameters errors, like for the ILS the instrument current deviations,
is possible giving the desired physical link between will be dealt with in future work. However, this first
parameter space and CAT-classification measurement example demonstrates the feasibility of
scaled measurements for VOR and rotating wind turbines.
This mini-airport environment provides an individual,
flexible and low-cost tool for optimizing the ILS
protection area layout at airports for more safety and
capacity. Moreover, all measurements can be realized,
reproduced and demonstrated in a live-modus to anyone
with a high degree of transparency and reproducibility.
Especially with respect to transparency and accessibility
this tool is superior to much more limited measurements
in a real airport environment and simulation techniques.

SCALED MEASUREMENTS FOR VOR

Convincing validation results for the scaled ILS

measurement environment were the motivation to adapt
the idea of scaling also to the VOR and rotating wind
turbines. In fact, since the operating frequencies of both
systems are quite the same, nearly the same high
frequency hardware can be used. Consequently, the scaled
VOR operates at 16 GHz, too. For further details about
the used hardware architecture refer to [2].

Like for the ILS it is necessary to individually assess the

properties of the direct propagation path from VOR to a
flying aircraft and the scattered path from VOR to
rotating wind turbines to the aircraft as finally their ratio
is the measure for bearing errors.

For measurements with the scaled VOR the main

difficulty is that both a fast varying amplitude must be
measured as well as a frequency spectrum due to
Doppler-shifts. In the scope of this contribution only a
feasibility of measurements with a scaled VOR and wind

362
 Figure 6. Measurement Configuration of Scaled VOR and a Rotating Wind Turbine.
Figure 7. Measurement Results for the Direct and the
Scattered Propagation Path.
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE SCALED VOR
With the proposed scaled measurement environment first
measurement results demonstrate the feasibility to
measure the relevant quantities for assessing bearing
errors due to rotating wind turbines. Additionally, since
the used high frequency hardware is the same for the
363
scaled ILS and the scaled VOR, the successful validation
of the ILS setup is a promising bases for a validation of
the scaled VOR environment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For assessing multipath propagation issues for navigation
system authors propose a scaled measurement
environment of reduced size that is well controllable and
offers a very flexible and moderate cost tool that could
enhance the current work of flight inspection and traffic
management.
In particular, the miniaturized airport environment is an
ideal tool for assessing planned construction measures at
airports, respectively their impact on the integrity of
involved navigation systems. Especially in the planning
phase, no measurements in the real environment can be
conducted and the scaled environment offers a much
higher degree of transparency and accessibility than
simulation tools.
As nearby application for ILS is the optimization of ILS
protection areas for airports that currently suffer from
insufficient capacity because of e.g. CAT induced taxiing
restrictions. Changing the size of ILS protection areas is
not an actual construction measure but only a repainting
on corresponding taxiways after having analyzed the real
physical scenarios like described here.
FUTURE WORK

Future work of the authors will deal with the direct

application of the scaled ILS system on real airports, in
order to improve their safety and capacity.

For the scaled VOR additional research is planned to

assess the impact of even whole wind farms on the
integrity of the VOR. Unlike for the measurements in a
real environment this allows a detailed investigation of
individual wind park states, with parameters such as
synchronicity, wind direction, wind speed, or even terrain
topology. These parameters for investigating worst case
scenarios can only be varied and adjusted in the scaled
environment but not for a real wind park.

Additionally, the idea of scaled measurements can also be

adapted for other navigation systems, e.g. radar.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported by the German Ministry of

Education and Research under Grant 03V0253. Authors
want to thank the national institute of metrology in
Germany (PTB) for providing their open area test site.

REFERENCES

[1] ICAO, 2006, Assessment of ILS protection areas

impact on large aircraft operations, V1.3.
[2] R. Geise, B. Neubauer, G. Zimmer, A. Enders,
Mehrwegeausbreitung bei Navigationssystemen ein
universeller Ansatz zur EMV-Analyse mit skalierten
Messungen, EMV 2014, pp. 419-426.
[3] ICAO, July 1996, International Standards and
Recommended Practices, Annex 10 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, Volume 1, Radio Navigation
Aids, 5th Edition, http://www.icao.int.
[4] ICAO, EUR DOC 015, 2nd edition.
[5] B. Neubauer, G. Zimmer, R. Geise, VHF
Omnidirectional Radio Range and Rotating Wind
Turbines- A Review on a Timely Topic, EuCAP 2014, 6-
11 April 2014, The Hague, Netherlands.

364
 On Great Circle and Great Ellipse Navigation
Cheng Zhong, Ph.D.
Computer Engineer, Airborne Computer Applications
Flight Inspection Services, FAA
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
Fax: +1 405 954 4043
E-mail: cheng.zhong@faa.gov

Gary A. Flynn, P.E.

Manager, Airborne Computer Applications
Flight Inspection Services, FAA
Oklahoma City, OK, USA
Fax: +1 405 954 4043
E-mail: gary.a.flynn@faa.gov

ABSTRACT and unknowns, there are two geodetic problems direct

Sphere and ellipsoid are two common geometrical models
for the Earth. Although great circle navigation has long
been used, with satellite technology available for
navigation based on the more accurate ellipsoidal model
for the Earth, great ellipse navigation has been proposed.
This paper compares the two types of navigation in terms
of mathematical expressions and numerical results with
the goal of providing guideline in practice.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sphere and ellipsoid 1 are two common geometrical
models for the Earth. In the 17th and 18th centuries,
people began to realize the necessity of using ellipsoid in
geodesy to model the Earth [1]. Computations of the
geodetic coordinates of points on the ellipsoid have a long
history in geodesy. Such coordinates are usually
specified as latitude and longitude 2. Based on the knowns
1
The word ellipsoid used in geodesy is in fact an ellipsoid
of revolution (an ellipsoid with two equal semi-
diameters), which is also called spheroid. In this paper,
we use the words ellipsoid and spheroid interchangeably.
We also imply that the spheroid is oblate.
2 3
In this paper, it is assumed that all points are on the
surface of the Earth such that the ellipsoidal heights are
problem and inverse problem. By direct problem in
geodesy, we mean that given the coordinates of a starting
point, a distance and azimuth to a second point, we wish
to compute the coordinates of the second point, as well as
the azimuth from the second point to the first. On the
other hand, given the ellipsoidal coordinates of two
points, the inverse problem in geodesy is to find the
distance and azimuths between them.
By calculus of variations it can be proved that the shortest
distance between two points on the surface of an ellipsoid
is a unique curve known as geodesic [1]. Except for a
few special cases, in general, a geodesic on an ellipsoid
has double curvature and is not a plane curve. The
solutions for computing distance and longitude
differences between points connected by geodesic are in
the form of elliptic integrals [2]. This comes from the
idea of using a sphere as an auxiliary surface and relating
it to the ellipsoid which models the Earth 3. However,
these elliptic integrals do not have direct solutions, but
instead have been solved by expanding them into
trigonometric series and integrating term by term. This is
the approach which dated back to the work of Bessel [3]
always zero. This practice follows the convention in
geodesy when dealing with direct and inverse problems.
This is different from approximating the ellipsoid by a
sphere to be discussed later in the paper.

365
in the 19th century. Still, the research has been very
active. For the most recent work and tutorial
presentation, the readers may refer to [4] and [2],
respectively.
Because the algorithms for geodesic computation is so
involved, there have been research to approximate
geodesic of ellipsoid in simpler form -- great ellipse (GE)
on the ellipsoid and great circle (GC) on the sphere for
navigation applications. Great elliptic curve 4 and great
circle are plane curves. Although a great elliptic curve
between two points on the surface of ellipsoid does not
give the shortest distance, it is still a good approximation
to geodesic and has less computation.
To lay the foundation for discussion in this paper, in
Section II, we provide the necessary information of the
Earth reference ellipsoid. In Sections III and IV, we
discuss the inverse problem in the context of GE on the
ellipsoid and GC on the sphere, respectively. In Section
V, we give a numerical example to show how close GC
and GE distance are to geodesic. Finally, in Section VI,
the conclusions are presented.
II. THE REFERENCE ELLPSIOD
Z
b geodetic system, where a = 6378137.0m and f =
h Q
P
O Now, we consider the meridian ellipse passing P in Fig. 1,
Y which is shown in Fig. 2. In addition to the (geodetic)
a H
X
a b
f (1)
b
a 2 b2
e (2)
a
A point P in a three-dimension (3D) space may be
described either by Cartesian coordinates ( x, y, z ) or by
the (curvilinear) geodetic coordinates ( , , h) in the
Earth-centered Earth-Fixed (ECEF) reference system.
The origin of the ECEF reference system is at the Earths
center of mass (geocenter). The Z-axis passes through the
Earths axis of rotation, in direction of North Pole. The
X-axis passes through the zero longitude locate on the
equatorial plane. The prime meridian goes through this
point is very near to the meridian of Greenwich although
they are not coincident. The Y-axis forms a right-handed
coordinate frame with the above X-axis and Z-axis.
All the three major 3D terrestrial reference systems, the
North American Datum of 1983 (NAD 83), the World
Geodetic System of 1984 (WGS 84), and International
Terrestrial Reference System (ITRS) have been defined in
this concept. They differ in their realizations. Different
reference ellipsoids have been adopted for the above
reference systems resulting different geodetic coordinates
even with the same 3D Cartesian coordinates. In this
paper, all the numerical examples are based on WGS 84
1/298.257223563 [1].
latitude , which is the angle between the normal to the
ellipsoid at P and the equatorial plane, another type of
latitude to be used in this paper, is the geocentric latitude
, which is the angle between the line (connecting P and
the center of the ellipsoid) and the equatorial plane.

Fig. 1 Coordinate Systems of the Earth Reference

Ellipsoid

The Earth reference ellipsoid is shown in Fig. 1. There

are four commonly used parameters related to the size and
shape of an ellipsoid: a and b are the semi-major and
semi-minor axes, respectively, where a > b. f is the
flattening, and e is the first eccentricity. They are related
as follows

4
In this paper, we use the words great elliptic curve, great
elliptic arc, and great ellipse interchangeably.

366
 Z
III. GREAT ELLIPSE ON ELLPSIOD
Q It can be proved mathematically that the intersection of an
h

P ellipsoid and a plane is an ellipse. When the plane passes

O X
=Geocentric Latitude
H =Geodetic Latitude
through the center of the ellipsoid, the resulting ellipse is
the biggest, i.e., the GE, compared with those obtained by
planes not passing through the center.
The earliest work on GE started in 1984 by Bowring [5].
Recent work, such as [6], focuses on the vector solution
approach initially proposed by Earle [7]. Our
presentation here is also a vector solution approach.

Let P1 = [ x1 , y1 , z1 ]T and P2 = [ x2 , y2 , z2 ]T be two arbitrary

points on the surface of an ellipsoid 5, where T represents
Fig. 2 Geodetic and Geocentric Latitudes in a transpose of a vector. In Fig. 3, the intersection of the
Meridian Ellipse plane containing P1, P2, and the center of the ellipsoid O,
with the surface of the ellipsoid forms the GE while the
arc connecting P1 and P2 is an elliptic curve/arc which is
part of a GE. Clearly, there is only one such curve
Geodetic latitude and geocentric latitude are related between P1 and P2, and thus a unique distance and an
by [1] azimuth.

tan= (1 e 2 ) tan (3) Z

Z
The ECEF coordinates ( x, y, z ) and geodetic coordinates P1
V
( , , h) for an arbitrary point (Q in Fig. 2) in the 3D P2

space is [1] X

x ( N + h) cos cos
= n O P

y ( N + h) cos sin
= (4) O
Y

z = N (1 e ) + h sin
2

Y
a
where N= (5) X
1 e 2 sin 2
Fig. 3. Great Ellipse of an Ellipsoid
shown in Fig. 2 as PH, is the radius of curvature in prime
vertical section of the ellipsoid at P, which is a function of GE Equations
latitude , and / 2 / 2, < . As
mentioned previously, in this paper, we assumed that all Given vectors OP1 and OP2 , the angle between them is
points are on the surface of the Earth such that ellipsoidal

heights h are always zero. In this case, (4) is simplified as P P POP
1 2 1=2 arccos OP1 OP2( ) (7)
x = N cos cos
y = N cos sin (6)
2
=z N (1 e ) sin
5
P1 and P2 can also be represented as P1 = (1 , 1 , h1 ) and
which represents the coordinates of a point on the surface
of the ellipsoid, such as P. P2 = (2 , 2 , h2 ) . The two representations are related by
(4) or (6) when h = 0. We will freely use these two forms
at our own convenience.

367
 T
nx sin V n y cos V =
0 (14)
The unit vector n = nx , n y , nz normal to plane P1O P2 is

But, when implemented algorithmically, V should be

OP1 OP2
n = (8)
| OP1 || OP2 | sin P1P2 =
V atan 2 ( n y , nx ) (15)

where | | is the magnitude of a vector. The equation of where atan 2( y, x) is the four quadrant arctangent.
plane passing the center of the ellipsoid O has the
following form The corresponding latitude is

nx x + n y y + nz z =
0 (9) n2 + n2
x y
V = arctan (16)
where nz

nx Distance

n = ny
nz Given P1 and P2 expressed as P1 = (1 , 1 , h1 ) and
(10)
y1 z2 y2 z1 P2 = (2 , 2 , h2 ) . The distance between them (on the
6

1 z x z x surface of the ellipsoid) is

1 2 2 1
( y1 z2 y2 z1 ) + ( z1 x2 z2 x1 ) + ( x1 y2 x2 y1 )
2 2 2
x1 y2 x2 y1
(1 + tan 2 ) d 2
3
2 1 1 +
=l ( P1 , P2 ) a 2
2 d (17)
Replacing ( x, y, z ) in (9) with geodetic coordinates 1 1 + tan 2
(1 + tan 2
) d

( , , h) in (6), we obtain
2
nx cos + n y sin + nz tan =
0 (11) or l ( P1 , P2 ) = anz f ( )d (18)
1

where = 1 e 2 . Eq. (11) shows that given the longitude where

of a point P on the GE, we can compute its
corresponding latitude , and vice versa, 1
=f ( )
nz2 + (nx cos + n y sin ) 2
nx cos + n y sin 2
= arctan (12) nz2 + (nx cos + n y sin ) 2 + (nx sin n y cos ) 2 nz2 2 + (nx cos + n y sin ) 2
nz nz2 + (nx cos + n y sin ) 2
(19)
n tan n
or arccos z
= + arctan y (13) Obviously, the integral for (18) does not have a close-
nx2 + n y2
nx form expression and is very complicated to compute.

In this paper, we propose an alternative method to

Eq. (13) denoted as 0 is only one of the two solutions of
compute l ( P1 , P2 ) based on the concept of Cartesian
given ; the other solution is one of 0 , such that coordinate frame rotation. First rotate about the Z-axis an
0 ( , ]. The other alternative to (13) of angle Z to obtain X ' Y ' Z ' frame 7, then rotate about the
computing is to solve the nonlinear equation of (11) new Y ' -axis an angle Y ' to obtain X "Y " Z " frame.
using algorithms such as NewtonRaphson method [8]
Therefore, the overall rotation matrix is
when is given.

We are also interested in the highest latitude in North or

South reached by GE, which is a turning point known as 6
h= h= 0
1 2
vertex where d / d = 0 [7]. We thus obtain the 7
A positive rotation is defined by the right-hand rule
longitude as well as the latitude of a vertex, [1].

368

cos Y ' cos Z cos Y ' sin Z sin Y ' towards v in clockwise direction). Then, v can be written
=R sin Z cos Z 0 (20) as
sin Y ' cos Z sin Y ' sin Z cos Y '
=v sin nE + cos nN (25)

And, the coordinates in the X "Y " Z " frame is

where nE = [ sin ,cos ,0]T and nN =
[ sin cos , sin sin ,cos ]T

x " x are the unit meridian tangent vector (in the North
y " = R y (21)
direction) and the unit parallel tangent vector (in the East
z " z direction) at P, respectively. The velocity is vertical to

the normal of the GE (i.e., n ) and the normal to the
In order for the GE to be on the Y " ~ Z " plane, Y " and ellipsoid at P, which is [6].
Z " to be the major and minor axes, respectively,
nP = [cos cos , cos sin ,sin ]T
Z = arctan ( ) and
ny
nx Y' = ( 2 V ) where the geocentric
(26)

latitude V and geodetic V are related by (3). After the v= n nP (27)
above rotations, the x " coordinate of the Cartesian
coordinates of P1 and P2 is zero. Now, the problem of By vector algebra,
computing the arc distance l ( P1 , P2 ) of P1 and P2 on an
n ( n nP ) =
0 (28)
ellipsoid has been transformed to computing the meridian
arc distance l ( P1 , P2 ) of P1 and P2 of an ellipse in the
We have
Y " ~ Z " plane. The formula [1] for the latter is

n v =0 (29)
a (1 )
2"
l ( P1 , P=
2)
2 1
d (22)
1"
(1 )
3
2
sin 2 which leads to

where nz cos (1 + tan 2 )

tan = (30)
2
nx sin n y cos
1 e
= e sin V (23)
1 e 2 sin 2 V Algorithmically, atan 2 ( , ) should be used to obtain
and also [0, 2 ) should be taken into account.
is the first eccentricity of the GE. The other equivalent
expression of is [9]
IV. GREAT CIRCLE ON SPHERE
e sin V The practice of using a sphere to model the Earth in
= (24)
1 e 2 cos 2 V navigation has existed for centuries. As has been
mentioned in Section I, the shortest distance between two
The proof of (23) or (24) is a little bit involved which is points on the surface of an ellipsoid is a geodesic. As a
omitted here. special case, the shortest distance on sphere is a great
circle, which is the intersection of the plane, formed by
Azimuth the above two points and the center of the sphere, with the
sphere. Any other circle formed by the sphere and a plane

At any arbitrary point P there is a velocity unit vector v in parallel with the above plane is called small circle (SC)
indicating the vehicle moving direction. The azimuth in this paper.
is the angle between the meridian through P and the
When using a sphere to model the Earth, the first question
normal plane at P containing v 8 (measured from North
is from which sphere to choose because there are various
spheres to approximate the Earth. The navigation sphere
[9] is used here, which has the radius of
8 RE = 6366707.0m .
The normal plane containing v is slightly different from
the GE plane at P [6].

369
GC Equations Similarly, an arbitrary point P can be expressed as

When two points P1 = [ x1 , y1 , z1 ]T and P2 = [ x2 , y2 , z2 ]T are =OP cos P1P OP1 + sin P1P n (34)
given on the surface of a sphere, the derivation of the
equation of plane is the same as that of the case for GE where
equation except now = 1 in (11) because the first

eccentricity e is zero for sphere. Thus the equation is P P =
1
POP
1 arccos OP1 OP
= ( ) (35)

nx cos + n y sin + nz tan =

0 (31)
and
In order to simplify the discussion, we assume the sphere
OP2 cos P1P2 OP1
has unit radius, and all the vectors from the center O to n = (36)
the sphere are unit vectors. The [ x, y, z ]T in (33) sin P1P2
multiplied by RE will give the coordinates of a point on the
Eq. (34) means that given POP
1 we can obtain the
Earths surface. Similar to (6), on a sphere, the Cartesian
coordinates and the geodetic coordinates 9 are related by position P.

Distance
x cos cos
y = cos sin (32)
The arc distance l ( P1 , P2 ) of P1 and P2 on a sphere is
z sin
l ( P1 , P2 ) = RE P1P2 (37)
From (32) P1 = [cos 1 cos 1 , cos 1 sin 1 ,sin 1 ]
T
and
P2 = [cos 2 cos 2 , cos 2 sin 2 ,sin 2 ] , the normal vector
T where P1P2 is given in (7).

n to the plane formed by vectors OP1 and OP2 is given Azimuth
in (8) as is shown in Fig. 4.
The azimuth can be easily obtained by letting = 1 in
(30),
n
nz
tan = (38)
cos ( nx sin n y cos )

O n
Intersection between Two GCs
P P
1 2

In order to facilitate the following discussions, we use

P1 P2 points A and B to replace the previous notation P1 and P2.
Similar to (8), we can find another GC given another pair
Fig. 4. Orthogonal Vectors of points C and D on the sphere. The normal vector to the

plane formed by vectors OC and OD is
Now there are three mutually perpendicular vectors n ,

OP1 , and n n OP1 making a right-handed Cartesian
nCD , x
coordinate system, and vector OP2 can be expressed as OC OD
nCD =
= nCD , y (39)
sin CD
nCD , z

=OP2 cos P1P2 OP1 + sin P1P2 n (33)
Let E be the intersection point of the two GCs (AOB and
COD) as is shown in Fig. 5.
9
In this case, the geodetic latitude and geocentric latitude
are one and the same. So in some references, they are
called geographic coordinates.

370

nAB When G = [cos G cos G , cos G sin G ,sin G ]T is given,

| OH | can be obtained by

H
I | OH |=OG nAB (47)
F
G nCD Let F is the intersection point of this parallel to the second
K GC COD. The goal is to find the coordinates of F, or
O C L vector
A E
cos F cos F
B J
D OF = cos F sin F (48)
Fig. 5. Intersections of Great Circles and Small sin F
Circles

We find that | OH | can be computed by
Since vector OE is both on the plane AOB and the plane

COD, it is perpendicular to both nAB and nCD ,
OF nAB =
| OH | (49)

OE nAB =
0 (40)
It is noted that OF is also on the GC formed by C and D,
therefore
and OE nCD =
0 (41)

OF nCD =
0 (50)
With OE = [cos E cos E , cos E sin E ,sin E ]T , we obtain

a nonlinear system of equations about (E , E ) With known values of nAB and nCD obtained in eqs. (8)
and (39), from (49), we have
nAB , x cos E cos E + nAB , y cos E sin E + nAB , z sin E =
0
(42) cos F cos F
nCD , x cos E cos E + nCD , y cos E sin E + nCD , z sin E =
0
nAB , x nAB , y nAB , z cos F sin F = | OH |
(51)

Following (34), OE can be expressed sin F

=OE cos AE OA + sin AE nAB , (43) From (50),

Then, plug it to (41), cos F cos F

nCD , x nCD , y nCD , z cos F sin F = 0 (52)

OA nCD sin F
AE = arctan
n (44)
AB , nCD
Putting (51) and (52) together, we obtain a nonlinear
Similarly, we can also express point E relative to point C system of equations about (F , F )
by
nAB , x cos F cos F + nAB , y cos F sin F + nAB , z sin F =| OH |
OC nAB (53)
CE = arctan (45) nCD , x cos F cos F + nCD , y cos F sin F + nCD , z sin F =0
n
CD , nAB
where | OH | can be computed by (47).
Intersection between One GC and One SC in Parallel
to the Second GC Intersection between Two SCs Which Are in Parallel
to Two GCs
Assume G is an arbitrary point on the parallel (the SC
with H being the center) to the GC. Then, Assume J is an arbitrary point on the second parallel (the
second SC with K being the center) to the GC COD,
OH = | OH | nAB (46) where

371
 cos J cos J V. A NUMERICAL EXAMPLE

OJ = cos J sin J (54) Using the same data in [6] (Table 4), e.g.,
sin J =P1 (=1 , 1 ) ( 26 28'01.2",130 ) and P2 (=
= 2 , 2 )

The two parallels (i.e., SCs) intercept at I with the ( 33 21'07.2",140 ) , we obtain l ( P , P ) = 1229761.645 m.

1 2

coordinate The geodesic, which is the shortest distance on the

ellipsoid, is computed to be obtained 1229761.635 m.
cos I cos I This means that the distance along GE is only 0.010m

OI = cos I sin I (55) longer and the relative difference is 8.05 107 % . On the
sin I other hand, the result in [6] gives bigger difference of
4.40m, and the relative difference is 3.58 104 % . Other
The goal is to find (I , I ) . From Fig. 5, we know that numerical results of our method follow similar trend
compared with those in [6]. Using GC in this case gives
832.810m difference compared with the geodesic, the
OI nAB =
| OH | (56)
relative difference is 6.78 102 % . In general, the
difference in using the sphere when compared to the
and OI nCD =
| OK | (57) ellipsoid is near 0.5% [9].

where | OK=| OJ nCD (58) VI. CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, we have presented formulas for computing

and | OH | can be obtained from (47). Putting (56) and the distance and azimuth of two points on the surface of
(57) together, we obtain a nonlinear system of equations the Earth. For the ellipsoid model of the Earth, great
about (I , I ) ellipse distance and azimuth have been discussed and a
new method of computing the distance based on the
concept of Cartesian coordinate frame rotation is
nAB , x cos I cos I + nAB , y cos I sin I + nAB , z sin I =| OH |
(59) proposed. This method avoids computation of a
nCD , x cos I cos I + nCD , y cos I sin I + nCD , z sin I =| OK | complicated integral and is therefore more efficient. For
great circle model of the Earth, we also provide formulas
So far, we assume that G and J are known in advance and algorithms for computing the intersections between
great circles and/or small circles, which have found
such that | OH | and | OK | in (59) can be obtained in
applications in navigation and flight inspection.
advance from (47) and (58), respectively. Sometimes, a
SC may be specified by the arc distance from a GC. For With numerical results we conclude that great ellipse
example, given two GC AOB and COD, and the arc distance has very close approximation to the geodesic
and EL
distance EF , then (true distance of two points on the Earth) than the great
circle distance. However, the sphere model to the Earth
may still be acceptable for navigation purpose as long as
| OH
=| | OF | sin EOF (60)
it will be used consistently.

EF REFERENCES
where EOF = (61)
| OE |
[1] C. Jekeli, Geometric Reference Systems in Geodesy
Similarly, (Class Notes). The Ohio State University, July 2006.

[2] C. Zhong, Flight inspection airborne processor

| OK=| | OL | sin EOL (62) application (FIAPA): Analyses of Selected Formulas
and Algorithms, D09-009 (Release 02), Aviation

EL System Standards, FAA, Feb. 2011.
where EOL = (63)
| OE | [3] F. W. Bessel, On the computation of geographical
longitude and latitude from geodetic measurements,
Astronomical Notes, vol. 4, no. 86, pp. 241-254,
1826.

372
[4] C. F. F. Karney, Algorithms for geodesics, J. Define
Geodesy, vol. 87, no. 1, pp. 43-55, 2013.
[5] B. R. Bowring, The direct and inverse solutions for a1 a2
b b
the great elliptic line on the reference ellipsoid, x1 s
Bulletin Geodesique, vol. 58, pp. 101108, 1984. p1 1 =
= ,p 2 , and
= x = (70)
c1 2 c2 x2 t

[6] W. K. Tseng, et al, The vector solutions for the great d1 d2
ellipse on the spheroid, J. of Applied Geodesy, vol.
6, no. 2, pp. 103-109, 2012. (1 s 2 )(1 t 2 )
[7] M. A. Earle, A vector solution for navigation on a
2(1 s 2 )t
great ellipse, J. of Navigation, vol. 53, no. 3, pp. q( x) = (71)
2 s (1 + t 2 )
473-481, Sept. 2000. 2 2

(1 + s )(1 + t )
[8] S. P. Venkateshan and P. Swaminathan,
Computational Methods in Engineering. Academic then (69) becomes
Press, 2014.

[9] M. A. Earle, Sphere to spheroid comparisons, J. of f1 ( x ) = p1 q ( x ) = 0
(72)
Navigation, vol. 59, no. 3, pp. 491-496, Sept. 2006. f 2 ( x ) = p2 q ( x ) = 0

Solving (72) for x numerically using algorithms such as
APPENDIX Newton-Raphson method, we will obtain ( s, t ) and thus
Solving Nonlinear Systems of Equations (59) ( , ) .

Eq. (59) is the most general form of a nonlinear system of

equations among (42), (53) and (59). In order to simplify
the notation, we rewrite (59) in the following general
format,

a1 cos cos + b1 cos sin + c1 sin =

d1
(64)
a2 cos cos + b2 cos sin + c2 sin =d2

2s
Let sin
= , where | s | 1 (65)
1 + s2

1 s2
then, cos = (66)
1 + s2

Similarly, let

2t
sin
= , where | t | 1 (67)
1+ t2

1 t2
then, cos = (68)
1+ t2

Now, (64) becomes

1 s2 1 t 2 1 s 2 2t 2s
a1 2 2
+ b1 2 2
+ c1 d1
=
1+ s 1+ t 1+ s 1+ t 1 + s2
2 2 2
(69)
a 1 s 1 t + b 1 s 2t + c 2 s = d2
2 1 + s 2 1 + t 2 2
1 + s2 1 + t 2
2
1 + s2

373
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374
 Operational Approval for New and Modified
Flight Inspection Systems
Brad J. Snelling
Flight Inspection / Flight Test Pilot
FAA Flight Inspection Services
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, USA
Phone: +1 405 954 9060
E-mail: brad.snelling@faa.gov
ABSTRACT
Following installation and regulatory certification of a
Flight Inspection System (FIS), the aircraft is flyable, but
what process is followed to obtain approval for
operational flight inspection? Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) has recently instituted a formal
operational test and evaluation (OT&E) program to obtain
Operational Approval for each new or modified FIS. The
OT&E includes detailed objectives and procedures to
evaluate aircraft manuals, human factors, measurement
uncertainty, operational considerations, data archival/
retrieval, and crew training. Following successful
completion of this evaluation, an Operational Approval
letter is signed by the Director of Operations and the
specific flight inspection capabilities are published. This
paper provides an overview of the OT&E and Operational
Approval process for new and modified systems. The
process provides significant benefit to the integration of
standardization, human factors, inspection performance,
training, and policy into the flight inspection operation.
The pace of evolving avionics, airspace changes, and
flight inspection requirements drives constant
modifications. In the last 5 years the FAA installed new
FIS equipment and software in 6 different aircraft types
and over 23 individual aircraft. Each new aircraft and
modification is unique. The King Air 300 modernization
(BE-300PL) project was so comprehensive that it quickly
became more complex than a new aircraft installation.
There came a point where everyone looked at each and
asked who is going to certify the final product for flight
inspection? That was the genesis of what is now an
effective process the FAA uses to approve new and
modified systems for flight inspection. First, the term
Operational Approval will be defined. Then the
Operational Approval process will be described. Finally,
the flight inspection OT&E philosophy will be described
with some representative examples.
Brad Snelling, FAA
DEFINING OPERATIONAL APPROVAL
Regarding the FIS, ICAO Doc 8071 states the importance
of equipment calibration, testing, and analysis [5]. It
further provides specific criteria for FIS measurement
uncertainty. While Doc 8071 recommends certification of
flight inspection personnel, there is no reference for
certification of the FIS. FAA questioned whether
certification was even the correct terminology. Perhaps a
better term can be used to describe when a given
aircraft/FIS configuration is ready for operational flight
inspection? Is the system approved, accepted, certified,
or should we say legal? The FAA now formally uses the
term Operational Approval to identify that a given
aircraft configuration and crew may take credit for its
Operationally Approved flight inspection capabilities.
The term Operational Approval was intentionally chosen
as analogous to FAA Part 135 or 121 Operational
Approval. For example, it is one thing for aircraft
equipment to be certified for RNAV(GPS) approaches.
However, in order for Part 135/121 carriers to legally fly
an RNAV(GPS) approach, an Operational Approval is
required. Tables 1 and 2 show the relationship between
capability, certification, and Operational Approval for
some representative aircraft and flight inspection
capabilities of the BE-300PL. Capability is something the
aircraft or FIS can do, but capability does not define how
well it performs. Certification implies we have met some
required standard of performance. Note that from an
aircraft certification perspective, the chief performance
standard only requires that the FIS not interfere with other
aircraft systems. Operational Approval means that weve
checked everything from a performance, operational, and
training perspective to use the system for its intended
purpose. As in Part 135/121, Operational Approval
simplifies things for everyone in the flight inspection
organization by making the final call on whether or not a
given capability may be used by the flight crew.
375
 Table 1: Aircraft Capability Examples

Answers this question ILS Cat III RNAV(GPS) RNAV(GPS) GLS

LPV LP Approach
CAPABILITY What can it do? X X X
Does it meet any
CERTIFICATION X X
specifications?
OPERATIONAL What is the system
X
APPROVAL approved to do?

Table 2: Flight Inspection System Examples

Answers this question ILS Cat III RNAV(GPS) RNAV(GPS) GLS

LPV LP Approach
CAPABILITY What can it do? X X X X
Does it meet any
CERTIFICATION X X X X
specifications?
OPERATIONAL What is the system
X X X Pending
APPROVAL approved to do?

OPERATIONAL APPROVAL PROCESS Pilot and Flight Inspector Involvment in Development

System Requirements In practical experience with installing and modifying

The importance of establishing clear and specific system
requirements cannot be emphasized enough. In fact,
entire books exist on this topic alone. Hull states simply
Agreed requirements provide the basis for planning the
development of a system and accepting it on completion
[2]. Too often, operations driven requirements are stated
in such generic terms that they are almost useless. For
example, requiring that a new FIS have ILS flight
inspection capability is not nearly specific enough.
Meaningful requirements include specifics such as
Measurement of Zone 2 glideslope angle must have a
95% measurement uncertainty no greater than .02 when
using runway updates. Establishing clear and specific
requirements for ensuring a well performing FIS is a
laborious and specialized task that should not be
overlooked, underestimated, or assigned only to
engineering or only to operations.
most FIS, Developmental Test and Evaluation occurs in
conjunction with OT&E. However, there can be an initial
stage where requirements are worked by engineering
and/or software developers. No matter the detail of
written requirements, questions often arise about the
intent or specific function of most requirements. The
FAA has dramatically improved effectiveness and
efficiency by including pilots and flight inspectors at the
earliest stages of developmental work. The synergy and
communication benefits to this approach are
overwhelming. In one FIS software update, the FAA had
over 70 individual requirements for modification.
Dedicating a flight inspector to work on-site with the
contractor was the best way to get the project completed
correctly and on-time. Flight inspector involvement
resulted in meeting expectations because any questions
about functional intent were immediately answered. In
addition, improvements from the initial request were
implemented including several very useful features not
originally envisioned. An example of one such
improvement was a FIS screenshot tool. This was not
part of the original requirement, but early flight inspector
involvement during testing resulted in a very useful tool.
The ability to quickly take a screenshot, saved with log
files, provides a rapid method for sharing results with

376
facilities maintenance, creating training documents, and technical report, is compiled on the completion of each
documenting FIS issues. OT&E project.

Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) Operational Approval Letter

The major process in preparation for Operational
Approval is completion of an OT&E plan. Regarding
OT&E from a military weapon system perspective,
Giadrosich states:
OT&E is conducted to estimate a system's operational
effectiveness and operational suitability, and to identify
needed modifications. It also includes tests for
compatibility, interoperability, reliability,
maintainability, logistics supportability, software
supportability, and training requirements. In addition,
OT&E provides information on organization, personnel
requirements, doctrine, and tactics, and may result in
changes to operation employment and maintenance
concepts [1].
A key deliverable from the OT&E process is the
Operational Approval letter. The signing authority for
FAA Flight Inspection Services is the Director of
Operations (DO). Depending on the extent of testing
required, there may be one or more briefings to
organization stakeholders (e.g. policy, standards, training)
prior to recommending signature to the DO. The first two
pages of an Operational Approval letter (examples in
Figures 1 and 2) define the exact aircraft and FIS
configuration tested and approved.

This is an excellent description of OT&E on a new or

modified FIS. It does little good to simply fly and test
the FIS alone. A perfectly operating FIS is useless in the
hands of an improperly trained crew, with no procedures
for use, or no policy on how to flight inspect with it. In
addition, it is possible to receive a perfectly operating
FIS but with overly complex human factors issues. The
FAA approach is to take all elements of organizational
coordination and consolidate them into a single OT&E
plan for execution. These elements include manuals, Figure 1: Operational Approval Letter (Page 1)
functional evaluation, measurement uncertainty, training,
data logging, reporting, and any additional requirements
unique to the project. A standardized test plan template
provides ease of creation. Each plan is collaboratively
authored, tracked, and archived on the FAA internal
website.

The introduction of each test plan contains the overall

OT&E objective, aircraft configuration, deliverables,
flight test techniques, risk assessment, references, and
milestones. For sections detailing the actual testing, a
variety of test plan formats were studied to determine
which best suited flight inspection OT&E. To achieve
consistency and simplicity, all test plan sections formally
contain the same four subsections: Objectives,
Procedures, Data Requirements, and Evaluation Criteria.
Objectives are necessary to define the intent of the test.
Procedures provide the specific configuration and
condition to achieve the objective. Data Requirements
define which log files and/or additional information is
required such as video recording of the test. Evaluation
Criteria may identify specific pass/fail criteria or define
when enough data has been collected to meet the
objective. An executive summary and if required, a Figure 2: Operational Approval Letter (Page 2)

377
The third page contains a detailed matrix of specific
Operational Approvals including which Position
Reference Systems (PRS) may be used for each approval.
An example from the current CL-605 Operational
Approval is contained in Appendix 1. The final page
contains limitations associated with the Operational
Approval. Examples of typical limitations include:
How long the previous configuration remains
Operationally Approved
Antenna selection or operational procedures not yet
incorporated into the Flight Inspection Handbook
Specific crew member approvals if training is
incomplete
OT&E TEST PLAN FORMAT
In planning the level of testing for each new or modified
FIS, many factors need to be considered including at a
minimum: Have untested sensors been incorporated?
Have previously tested sensors been added to a new
aircraft type? Is the FIS software change comprehensive
or is it an incremental change? What are the interrelated
effects of multiple modifications including human factors
interaction between the pilots and flight inspector?
Without formal guidance, the OT&E planners must use
their best experience and judgment to integrate all
available information into a plan that is effective,
efficient, and appropriate. Two excellent resources to
learn more are the Defense Acquisition Universitys Test
and Evaluation Management Guide [4] and Guidelines
for Conducting Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E)
For Software-Intensive Increments [3].
When the OT&E is extensive, FAA test plans contain
detailed estimates for office time, ground test time, and
flight time required for completion. A common error in
FAA program management was to evaluate OT&E
progress by tracking flight hours. Flight hours are the
incorrect metric for tracking OT&E progress. Providing
the breakout of ground testing and office time required
helps management visualize the scope of work required in
addition to flight hours.
Following are typical sections of an FAA Operational
Approval OT&E plan, a brief overview of considerations
in each, and some representative examples.
Aircraft and FIS Manuals
It is imperative that all system publications and manuals
be completed, reviewed, and selectively tested under
operational conditions [4]. While this may seem
obvious, ensuring proper documentation is a difficult part
of OT&E that is easy to overlook and undervalue. In a
378
typical OT&E, Aircraft Flight Manual Supplements and
Operators Guides must be obtained and incorporated into
the organizations manual system. In addition, flight
inspection policy manuals must be updated to reflect new
procedures based on the new or modified system. In
many cases, this is a process of refreshing outdated
guidance and changing existing procedures.
Example: During OT&E on the FAAs first graphics FIS,
it became abundantly clear that existing manuals were
insufficient for operational deployment of the system. As
part of the OT&E process, a handbook [8] was created
with operational procedures and diagrams necessary to
successfully use the FIS for operational flight inspection.
The handbook provides much needed standardization and
serves as a primary training resource. The current version
is 550 pages and contains dozens of action oriented
procedures/checklists as in Figure 3 below.
Figure 3: Sample Checklist in FIS Handbook
Operational/Functional Performance
Assessing operational or functional performance of a FIS
requires checking that all modes function as intended and
that the desired flight inspection results are generated.
This is not where the result accuracy is assessed. Result
accuracy is assessed in the measurement uncertainty
section. The operational/functional assessment simply
assures that a reasonable result can be captured.
Development of procedures should emphasize placing the
test crew in the most realistic operational environment
possible. Many times, the FAA OT&E team decided to
accept compromises for efficiency and reduced flight
hours only to realize that a FIS discrepancy was missed
because we didnt do it like a real flight inspection.
Exposing the FIS to the most realistic permutation of
inspection scenarios and facilities with the resources
available is always the goal. During implementation of
the FAAs first graphics system, hundreds of issues were
identified during operational/functional testing. Early
identification of issues provides an opportunity to fix
them. Issues that cannot be fixed can be mitigated by
integration into training.
Example: Rather than installing a dedicated TACAN
flight deck display in the FAA CL-605, the cabin Wi-Fi
system is used to send a FIS generated display to a
portable electronic device on the flight deck. This
required a minor modification to the FIS software. While
extensive testing was conducted on a simulator, it was not
discovered until OT&E flying that a programming error
caused CDI reverse sensing on the missed approach
segment. Coupled with this error was another unintended
programming issue found when the aircraft heading
transitioned between 359 and 001. Detected early in
OT&E, both of these errors were quickly communicated
to the programmers and easily corrected.
Measurement Uncertainty
Measurement uncertainty testing determines how well the
FIS captures, analyzes, and reports the correct result.
Even though a flight inspection system produces
believable results, the flight inspection operator must
know the accuracy and/or measurement uncertainty of
those results. In fact, internal FAA Order 8200.8 states
FAA must document the accuracies achieved by its
measurements, showing that the uncertainties in the
Appendices are not exceeded [7]. While most flight
inspectors are familiar with recommended ICAO Doc
8071 flight inspection tolerances, few are familiar with
the associated measurement uncertainty requirements.
They are different! See Figure 4, excerpt from Doc 8071,
on VOR measurement uncertainty requirements. The
flight inspection tolerances are only valid if the FIS
being used to evaluate them meets the measurement
uncertainty requirements. If the established
measurement uncertainty requirements cannot be met
(and some cannot) then additional analysis and/or
engineering judgment is required. Without an established
measurement uncertainty, application of any tolerance to
a given FIS result cannot be considered meaningful.
There are many benefits realized during the measurement
uncertainty evaluation. This activity undoubtedly results
in greater understanding of the operators FIS, learning
which operational procedures are most effective for
accurate measurement, and what improvements are
needed in the requirements for future systems.
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Figure 4: Sample ICAO Doc 8071 Measurement
Uncertainty Requirements [5]
In preparing for the BE-300PL OT&E project, attempts to
determine methods for previous measurement uncertainty
revealed that in most cases, none existed. Where
estimates of measurement uncertainty did exist they were
either a crude comparison to some previous system or a
theoretical analysis estimate provided by the FIS vendor.
Ideally, individual sensor uncertainties and operational
variables are well known and a mathematical uncertainty
can be derived for each measurand. Presently, the FAA
does not have resources for this method so multiple
measurements are used in an operational environment to
statistically estimate most measurement uncertainties. In
the opinion of the author, a true measurement uncertainty
includes random and systematic errors caused by factors
in addition to just those within the FIS, such as crew skill
and technique. The general method is outlined in
Application of Signal Detection Theory to RNAV Flight
Inspection Tolerances [9]:
All possible error sources are considered and
discussed in the test planning process
An independent truth estimation method is
formulated for each measurand
Following the truth estimation, the system is used
normally for a goal of 30 measurements. Runs
include parametric variations considered normal in
day-to-day operation
Comparison of the OVERALL system performance
against a truth estimate based on a traceable standard
is always the goal
Following the process above for each FIS reported value
with an associated flight inspection tolerance results in
dozens of individual tests. Brainstorming exercises
amongst the subject matter experts are essential in
designing valid, meaningful, and realistic test sequences.
The following examples are representative of less than
2% of the work for a complete FIS measurement
uncertainty. Each example requires extensive detail to
fully describe. However, they are briefly described to
demonstrate the overall nature of the work.
Example #1: Measurement uncertainty of VOR/LOC
signal strength is normally accomplished simultaneously
with establishing the antenna radiation patterns. The
initial results and normalized results for the BE-300PL are
shown in Figure 5 and 6 below.
Figure 5: BE-300PL VOR/LOC Radiation Patter
Figure 6: BE-300PL VOR/LOC Normalized
Once the normalization data is known, the overall gain to
calibrate for true signal strength is needed. This is done
by assessing the true field strength at a point in space and
comparing it to multiple aircraft measurements. Since the
current FAA system can only use a single gain, a complex
analysis is used to determine the most appropriate gain to
match intended uses and objectives for VOR/LOC signal
strength evaluation. On completion of the process, the
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confidence interval is determined and plotted (Figure 7)
using significant V values. This helps flight inspectors
recognize the relationship between varying V confidence
intervals based on a constant dB uncertainty. This test
was repeated on the BE-300PL following addition of
winglets; no change was found.
Figure 7: VOR/LOC Sig Strength Uncertainty (V)
Example #2: In many cases, measurement uncertainty
uncovers clear errors that need to be corrected. During
testing of a major FIS software revision, angle data
collected for measurement uncertainty in the ILS3 and
PAR/VGSI mode showed significant angle measurement
errors and their direct relationship to growing error in an
IRU correction term (see linear relationship in Figure 8).
A lengthy analysis was conducted to determine the source
of error, the software algorithm was fixed, and the error is
no longer observed!
Figure 8: Analysis of IRU Correction Term Error
Example #3: During OT&E to obtain Operational
Approval for GBAS inspection mode on the LR-60, a test
was designed to assure the systems ability to detect
Message Type 4 spatial data errors. Due to a different
definition of the Flight Path Alignment Point (FPAP) in
GBAS data, the results were unexpected. The OT&E
revealed which data errors were detectable, which data
errors were undetectable, and which procedures
maximized the chances of detecting facility error in the
Type 4 message. This activity resulted in defining the
most effective GBAS inspection procedure and assuring
that design requirements for the next FIS are written to
increase spatial data error detection in RNAV approach
modes.
Training
Well trained pilots and flight inspectors are required to
successfully use flight inspection aircraft and the FIS to
get the correct inspection result. While obvious, emphasis
on quality training is difficult to sustain with the volume
of operational inspection requirements. The goal of
including training in the OT&E process is to ensure
training personnel understand new systems, have
developed appropriate training objectives, and developed
acceptable training plans. Operational Approval for a
new system frequently includes a limitation of required
training for crew members.
Example: The BE-300PL differences training program
initiated in OT&E is now a 3-week course that fully
integrates pilot and flight inspector functions. The
support from management, dedication of instructors, and
quality of instruction was only possible through careful
planning that started during OT&E. The course is
frequently rated as the best training in memory within
FAA. One specific set of objectives identified for this
training was unique to RNAV flight inspection. These
objectives were used to develop an 8-hour course
covering ARINC 424 coding as it relates to flight
inspection/validation. In addition to supporting the BE-
300PL training objectives, this course has been
successfully used as refresher training by previously
certified pilots and flight inspectors to increase their
knowledge and effectiveness. By educating crews in
RNAV/ARINC 424 appropriate language, FAA flight
inspectors continue to improve operational effectiveness
during RNAV inspections.
Reports/Data Logging/Archival/Retrieval
In addition to observing the flight inspection result, it is
important to record, report, archive, and later retrieve the
result. This section of OT&E focuses on that process. In
the hustle of getting the operational flying and
measurement uncertainty completed, this can be an easy
381
task to miss or underestimate. It is worth the effort to get
right because missed data causing repeated flight
inspections is costly and inefficient.
Example: During initial measurement uncertainty testing
for the DME/DME inspection mode, analysis revealed
that DME range errors were not recorded anywhere in the
three log files available for that mode. A software
modification was made so that DME range error is now
included.
CONCLUSIONS
A robust OT&E program and Operational Approval
process is working well for FAA Flight Inspection
Services. Management support for standardization of the
OT&E process, the Operational Approval process, and
fleet configuration management has been the key to
success. The current FAA process ensures completion of
all tasks required to integrate a new or modified FIS into
the operational environment. There is synergy in this
method as latent issues are found and corrected, training
is developed and delivered, and improved requirements
for future capabilities are identified.
RECOMMENDATIONS
FAA Flight Inspection Services is benefitting from the
FIS Operational Approval concept and process. Where
States are responsible for determining who or what is
qualified to certify navigational aids and procedures in
their airspace, a formalized process similar to this is
recommended.
FUTURE WORK
The FAA has several legacy aircraft and systems used for
flight inspection that have not completed the new OT&E
for Operational Approval. They will remain in operation
but will not be covered in the new process. The OT&E
process is planned on each new and modified system
operated by FAA. As part of this, the OT&E team strives
to relay all suggestions for improvement to software
developers of the next FIS. Areas of improvement for
continued OT&E include increased collaboration from
internal teams (e.g. training, standards, policy), improved
methods for signal strength calibration, better analysis
methods to decrease flight time for measurement
uncertainty, and better documentation of OT&E results.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author would like to acknowledge FIS Management
for past and future support to complete OT&E and the
Operational Approval process, Tom Clements for
encouragement and support to start a better OT&E
program, Jay Sandwell for his heroic authoring and
execution of OT&E plans, Ric Carrizosa for marathon
testing support and development of the FIS Handbook,
Gary Flynn for meticulous analysis and support in truth
assessment exercises, Aircraft Maintenance and
Engineering for keeping up with never ending
requirements and troubleshooting requests, and all FAA
crew members supporting OT&E projects. Appreciation
goes to Gary Bell, Dave Stanko, and Floyd Badsky for
their involved refinement of the OT&E program and
feedback on this paper.

REFERENCES

[1] Giadrosich, Donald L. Operations Research Analysis

in Test and Evaluation. Washington DC: American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 1995. Web.
[2] Hull, Elizabeth et al. Requirements Engineering.
Springer-Verlag London, 2011. Web.
[3] Guidelines for Conducting Operational Test and
Evaluation (OT&E) For Software-Intensive Increments.
Electronic Document. acc.dau.mil document, Jan 23,
2009.
[4] Test and Evaluation Management Guide. Fort
Belvoir, VA, 2005. Web.
[5] Doc 8071 Vol 1. Manual On Testing of Radio
Navigation Aids, Volume II. International Civil
Aviation Organization, 2000. Electronic.
[6] Doc 8071 Vol 2. Testing of Satellite-based Radio
Navigation Systems. International Civil Aviation
Organization, 2007. Electronic.
[7] Order 8200.8. Flight Inspection Program
Standards. Federal Aviation Administration, 20 August,
2007. Electronic.
[8] Technical Issuance 8200.58. NAFIS Phase I
Handbook. FAA Flight Inspection Operations Group,
July 29, 2012. Electronic.
[9] Snelling, Brad Application of Signal Detection
Theory to RNAV Flight Inspection Tolerances 17th
International Flight Inspection Symposium Material,
2012. Web.
[10] Measurement Uncertainty Analysis Principles and
Methods, NASA Measurement Quality Assurance
Handbook ANNEX 3. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Handbook, July 2010. Electronic.

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Example Operational Approval Matrix (CL-605: Jan 14, 2014)

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