Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 903
as God's power to create two or more angels in the same species, the place and
Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277
in Later Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
P,MAHONEY
EDWARD (Durham)
Stephen Tempier's Condemnation of 219 propositions on March 7, 1277 has
been treated by some as one of the most dramatic and influential events in the
history of medieval philosophy1. Although the events that led up to the 1277
Condemnation and the nature of that Condemnation have received the attention
of various historians of medieval philosophy, fewer have spent their efforts in
chronicling and evaluating the notice taken of the Condemnation and the influ-
ence that the Condemnation did in fact have on the course of later philosophy.
My aim in this paper will be a modest one. It is simply to chronicle references
to the Condemnation found in later philosophers, that is, from the late thir-
teenth to the late sixteenth century. Some measured and tentative remarks will
be made about the possible effect of the Condemnation on the intellectual
outlook and activities of these various philosophers. One thing does seem sure,
namely, that the significance of the Condemnation will not be fully established
until further investigation is carried out regarding those who later cited it. This
present essay is meant to be a step in that direction.
Let us now turn to the Condemnation of 1277 and trace the early use made
of it. Toward the end of 1279 the Franciscan William de La Mare ( t ca. 1290)
published his ,,Correctorium fratris Thomae", which was officially adopted by
the Francisca,n Order in 1282 and required of all friars who read Thomas'
,,Summa theologiae". William frequently cites the Condemnation on such topics
For the text see Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, edd. H. 1)enifle / A. Chatelain, vol. I
(Paris 1889), 543-558. \Xre shall follow the numbering of the propos~tionscontained therein.
There are other editions. One is that of Picrre Mandonnet, l'ropositions condamnees par
~ t i e n n eTempier, Cvcque de I'aris, 1277, in: id., Sigcr de Brabant et averroisme latin au XIlIe
sieclc, I"" partie: Tcxtcs intdits, 2"" ed., 1.ouva1n 1911, 175-191. Another is that of R. Hissette,
Enquetc sur les 219 articles condamnts a Paris lc 7 Mars 1277 (Philosophes m&di&raux22),
Louvain-Paris 1977. The most recent one, which preserves like El. lleniflc and A. Chatelail1 the
original order of Tempier's Syllabus, is that of 11. lJiche, 1.a condamnation parisienne de 1277.
Tcxte latin, traduction et commentaire (Sic ct Non), Paris 1999.
motion of angels, whether all human intellects are on the same grade, the rela-
tion of intellect and will in human self-determination, and whether God can
do by his power what is a contradiction in the present course of things. The
Condemnation is not cited in William's discussion regarding the unity of form2.
In the reply ,,Correctorium corruptorii ,Quare'", Richard Knapwell ( t ca.
1288), an Fhglish Dominican, shows respect for the Condemnation, though at
one point he simply rejects as untrue the contention that God could make two
angels of the same species (proposition 81), arguing that all the doctores agree
that things specifically different cannot belong to the same species3.
Another defense of Thomas is to be found in the anonymous ,,Correctorium
corruptorii ,QuaestioneC". When discussing Thomas' position on the motion of
angel, the author declares it to be false. Among other things it means that when
an angel is at rest it cannot be in place. But the very opposite has been con-
demned, namely that the angel is nowhere (propositions 21 8 - 219)4. And when
dicussing whether angels merit some accidental reward, the critic takes a denial
to involve favoring three condemned articles, namely 71, 76 and 78, all of which
he quotes5.
Thomas' view on the relation of sense cognition to the appetitive power leads
the critic to judge that that view involves the determinism of the will and is an
error that was condemned at Paris? Thomas is also considered to have main-
tained determinism of the will of an angel7. And finally in a discussion regarding
a place of punishment for angels and disembodied souls, the critic judges Aqui-
nas to stand opposed to condemned article 19, namely that the soul separated
after death does not suffer bodily fire8.
John Quidort of Paris (* ca. 1250/t 1306), another Dominican defender of
Thomas, authored the ,,Correctorium corruptorii ,Circag",in w h c h he cites and
quotes the Condemnation in discussions concerning the plurality of angels in a
species, how an angel is in place, the unity of form in humans, whether all
human intellects are on the same grade, and whether man determines himself
to willing through reason. (>n occasion, he attempts to get around the Condem-
nation by his interpretation of Thomas, and at one point he cites the Condem-
For Willlam's C:orrectorium see Richard I(nap\\~ell, C:orrectorium corruptor~i,cited in the
following footnote. For citations to thc Condemnation see pp. 60, 73, 95 - 96, 99, 111, 195-
196, 232, 376, 395. Glorieus supplics rcfcrcnccs to articles in the Condemnation: pp. 106 and
232.
Richard Knapwcll, Correctorium corruptorii ,,Quare", ed. 1.' Gloricux, in: TRS premieres pole-
miclues Thomistes: I , 1.e Correctorium corruptorli ,,Quare'' (Hibliothtque thomiste 9), Kain
1927, 62.
J.-1'. hluller, (ed.), Le Corrcctorium corruptorii ,,Quaestionc", ch. 16 (Studia hsclmiana 35),
Rome 1954, 83.
Ihid., ch. 21 (ed. Muller (Studia Anselm~ana351), 110- 111.
Ibid., ch. 24 (ed. Muller), 120. The article In question is 159.
' Ibid., ch. 25 (ed. hfuller), 121. The art~clcin cluestion is 71.
Ibid., ch. 26 (ed. hluller), 126.
904 Edward P. Mahoney
nation against those who hold to plurality of forms9. John of Paris also makes
several references to the Condemnation in his Commentary on the Sentences,
probably written at Paris from 1291- 1294. In Book I, he cites the Condemna-
tion (proposition 123) in order to establish against Avicenna that the agent
intellect is not a separate substance but a power of the soul. In two other
passages he cites condemned articles 204,219, and 77 which touch on the mode
of an angel's motion and presence in In Book 11, he takes up the
question of the plurality of angels in the same species. Although he presents the
Condemnation (propositions 81 and 96) as holding that God could create many
angels in the same species, he attempts to interpret this away. However, he adds
cautiously that if what he says is in fact against the condemned article, then it
should count as saying nothing (habeatzlrpro non dicto)". In his discussion of the
question as to which power of the soul is higher and more perfect, namely the
intellect or the will, he does not cite the Condemnation12. Nor does he cite it
in h s discussion of why an act of the intellect must precede an act of the willI3.
But he does cite it in the following question when discussing whether the will
can choose something contrary to reason. He insists that he does not fall into
a condemned article (non cad0 in articzllum), presumably having in mind proposi-
tions 158, 159 and 16314. He also defends the position that all souls are equal
against the seemingly condemned article that they are not (proposition 124),
since otherwise Christ's soul would not be nobler than that of Judas. He argues
somewhat implausibly that the article in fact means to say that all souls are equal
in respect to their essence but unequal in respect to the variety of the bodily
dispositions of human beings1".
In h s attack on the ,,Correctorium" of William de La Mare, which is entitled
,,Apologeticurn veritatis contra corruptorium" and was written at Paris some-
time before 1299, Ramberto dei Primadizzi (b. ca. 1250/d. 1308), another Do-
minican, also shows concern with Tempier's Condemnation. In the Prologue,
he accuses William de La Mare of jealousy or ignorance of Thomas' writings16.
When he takes up the question of a plurality of angels in the same species, he
admits that to deny this is to say that God could not do this, which was con-
demned by the bishop of Paris, that is, Tempier, and the magistri (proposition
John of Paris, Le Correctorium corruptoni ,,Circac', ed. J.-P. Muller (Studia Anselmiana, 12- 13),
Rome 1941, 63, 78-89, 184, 236 and 263. The article in question is 19.
I U John of Paris, Commentaire sur les Sentences: Reportation, Iivre I, d. 3, q. 12 (ed. J.-P. Muller
[Studia Anselmiana 471), 84- 85; ibid., d. 37, q. 4 (q. 126), 390 - 391.
" John of Paris, Commentarium sur les Sentences: Reportation, T.ivre 11, d. 3, q. 2 (q. 14) (ed. J:P.
Muller [Studia Anselmiana 52]), 60-61, 70-71.
l 2 Ibid., d. 24, q. 3 (q. 65), 168-174.
l 3 Ibid., q. 4 (q. 66), 174- 175.
l 4 Ibid., q. 5 (q. 67), 176- 181.
'"bid., d. 32, q. 2 (q. 83), 204-205.
'"ambert de Primamzzi de Bolognc, Apologeticum veritatis contra corruptorium, ed. J.-P. MuUer
(Studi e testi 108), Vatican 1943, 3.
Reverberations of the Condcmnation of 1277 905
81)17. He goes on to quote the three articles condemned by the bishop from
which the condemned position follows, namely, propositions 96, 191 and 81 18.
Since he believes that he would be excommunicated for maintaining the con-
demned proposition, he insists that he is not doing so. Nonetheless, he would
say that it is impossible in itself for there to be many angels in the same species,
though it could happen in relation to divine power, just as it is impossible for
a man of himself to fly, though it is not impossible in relation to divine power19.
Accordingly, the power of multiplying angels lies not in their nature considered
in itself, but only in the divine power. Ramberto sees no prejudice to divine
omnipotence in saying that in respect to the angelic nature itself, it is impossible
for there to be many angels of the same species2().Ramberto makes similar
contorted moves to save Thomas' position on how an angel is in place from
being reduced to two of the condemned articles, namely, 218 and 21921. He
admits that he is unconcerned whether he has accurately given the true mind
(intentio) of Brother Thomas himself, as long as he has prevented Thomas'
words from being distorted by those calumniating him22. Ramberto also turns
the Condemnation against the Franciscans' own position regarding the hylemor-
phic composition of angels by appealing to propositions 96 and 81, the very
articles used against the Thomist position that there cannot be a plurality of
angels within one species23. And in article 16, he uses propositions 204 and 77
against Giles of Rome's position on the location of angels24.
Besides William de 1,a Mare, other Franciscans of the late thirteenth century
made use of the Condemnation as a weapon to argue for their doctrinal posi-
tions. Matthew of Aquasparta (* ca. 1240/t 1302) repeatedly refers to the Con-
demnation in his ,,Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata" when discussing
the motion and place of the separated soul and whether souls differ in nobilityz5.
In his ,,Quaestiones de anima beata", he again makes use of it when he Qscusses
the plurality and individuation of angels in a species, the individuation of the
Qsembodied soul, and whether one soul is better than another by reason of
" Ibid. (a. l l ) , 137.
Ibid. (a. l l ) , 141.
'"bid., 146.
20 Ibid.. 149.
21 Ibid., 186-188. See p. 191 for quotes of proposiuons 77 and 204.
22 Ibld.. 196.
2 V b i d . (a. lo), 122.
24 Ibid. (a. 16), 191.
25 See Matthew of Aquasparta, Quaestiones disputatae de anima separata, ed. G. Gal (Bibliothcca
Franciscana Scholastics Medii Aevi 18), Quaracchi 1959. H e cites prop. 8 in q. 1 (pp. 10- 11);
prop. 219 in q. 2 @. 23) as well as props. 204, 218 and 219 @. 26).
906 Edward 1.' Mahoney
bodily difference. Both in his Quodlibets and also in his ,,Quaestiones disputatae
de anima", Roger hfarston (* ca. 1245/t ca. 1303) gives quotations from and
citations to the Condemnation to establish various points. In the former work,
he denies in Quodlibet I against Thomas Aquinas that there can be a plurality
of immaterial things within the same species. He makes use of propositions 96
and 191 to make his case2? And in the ,,Quaestiones disputatae" he establishes
that the will is self-determining over against the intellect and sense appetite. To
help make his case he uses propositions 194, 173, 159, 158, and 136. He openly
states that he declares with sureness (secure dim) that the will can reject what
reason shows to be necessary means to its final end precisely because the
contrary position has been damned (contrarizlm damnaturn est) - he then quotes
proposition 16327.
Gonsalvus I-Iispanus ( t 1313), another Franciscan and perhaps Scotus' teacher,
also cites the Condemnation in his ,,Quaestiones disputatae". In his Quaestio
disputata, 8, he quotes and discusses propositions 129 and 131 to show that the
will can move itself against the judgment of reason. Propositions 163 and 134
are also used in the d i ~ c u s s i o nThe
~ ~ . Condemnation is again used by Gonsalvus
in Quaestio disputata, 13, regarding the question whether God is the agent
intellect. He admits that the opinion of the moderni who hold that both the
potential intellect and the agent intellect are intrinsic to the soul - Saint Thomas
seems to be meant - must be upheld because of the condemned article (propo-
sition 123) which says that the agent intellect does not belong to the soul.
Gonsalvus himself would seem to allow for God as a separate agent intellect (a
view he attributes to Aristotle), but he considers as probabilis the opinion that
there is one power of the soul that functions both as potential intellect and also
as agent intellect29.
Similar use is made of the Condemnation by Petrus Falcus, a Franciscan who
taught at Paris around 1280 and reveals in his llisputed questions a close knowl-
edge of Thomas' writings. He also makes frequent appeal to the Condemnation
of 1277. In question 6, he cites article 63, that God cannot bring about the
effect of a secondary cause without that secondary cause3". In question 15,
whether the will of the spiritual creature is free by its own power or by virtue
of reason, he gves quotations from propositions 173, 163, 144, 135 and 130 to
argue that the-will has its own liberty, one which it does not owe to the intel-
j6 Roger hfarston, Quodlibcta quatuor, Quodl. I, q. 3 (cdd. G. Ltzkorn / I. Brady [Hibliotheca
Franciscana Scholastica hledii nevi 26]), Quaracchi 1968, 12- 13.
'' Roger Marston, Quaestiones disputatae dc anima, (q. lo), 439, 447-448. Propositions 134 and
164 arc quoted on pp. 449-450 to develop furthcr the autonomy of the will.
28 See Gonsalvus Hispanus, Quaestioncs dtsputatac et de cluol~bet,q. 8 (ed. L. Xmorhs [Bibliotheca
Franciscana Scholastica Mcdii Xevi 91), Quaracchi 1935, 124- 126.
" lhid., (q. 13), 256-265 and 271. For other references to the Conden~nation,see (q. 3), pp. 31,
36, 41, 49; (q. 6), p. 98; (q. 8), pp. 124- 126.
3" Petrus Falcus, Questions disputkes orditla~res,q. 6, a. 5 (ed. X . J . Gondras, 3 vols., V'ol. I [Ana-
lecta hlediaevalia Nanlurcensla 22]), 240.
Reverberations of thr Condemnation of 1277
lect31. Later in question 20 he cites the Condemnation against the view that
immaterial forms could not be mulnplied numerically (cf. propositions 27, 81
and 96)j2. Finally, in quesuon 21, whether an angel can after sin do something
good, he invoke5 condemned article 159, taking it to mean that the intellect
would determine the will. Since it destrovs free choice it destroys reward and
*"
1 8 purushment. Moreover, it is against experience and the teachlng of sanctz like
I $
, Bernard and Anselmzz.
5
Among the branciscans who drew from the Condemnation, special attenuon
must be given to one in particular, kchard of Middleton (* ca. 1249/t 1302)34.
3 He appears to have studied at Paris under William de La Mare, Petrus balcus
and matth hew of Aquasparta. In his commentary on the Sentences, he specifically
cites articles from the Condemnation regarding angels being in place only by
operation (proposition 204)'j, that God cannot create many angels of the same
species (propositions 81 and 96)36,that the heavenly bodies are animated (prop-
osition 92) ??, that the agent intellect is a separate substance (proposition 123)38,
that an angel by its own will moves the heaven (proposition 212)': that God
could not make another universe (proposition 34), and that God could move
the outermost sphere (propositions 49 and 212). Miss Sharp claims: ,,Richard
seems to have Tempier's Condemnation constantly in Although he
does not cite it specifically in some other contexts, the Condemnation may have
strengthened Middleton's views on a variety of other topics: differences in nobil-
ity of human souls, the primacy of the will, and the impossibility of a world
created from eternity
hfiddleton's reference to condemned articles 34 and 49, namely, that God
could not make other worlds and that God could not move the heaven with a
rectilinear motion, since a vacuum would result, have both interested historians
of science41. This is especially the case since Pierre Duhem saw in the 1277
Condemnation of these two articles a major step toward the birth of modern
science". Duhem considers the Aristotelian world-view thereby rejected and
" Ibid., Vol. 11, q. 15 (Analeeta Mediaevalia Namurcensla 23), 545-551.
" Ibid., Val. TIT, q. 20 ( i\nalecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia 24), 708.
" Ibid. (q. 23), 798.
'4 See E. H o c e d e ~ ,Richard de Rlicidleton, sa vie, ses oeuvres, sa doctrine, 1,oubain 1925, 93-97,
204-205, 212-220, 242-245, 257-258 and 285.
95 Richard Middleton, Super quatuor libros Scntentiarum quaestiones subtilissirnae, I, ci. 37, a. 2,
q. 1, Rrescia 1591, 326 b. Cf. D. L. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at C).rbrd In the 'Thirteenth
C e n t u r ~Oxford 1930, 269.
i"bid., 11, d. 14, a. 1, q. 6 (Arescia 1591), 172. Cf. Sharp, 264.
" lbid., 11, d. 14, a. 3, q. 4 (Arescia 1591), 187a. Cf. Sharp, 268.
" Ibid., 11, d. 24, a. 2, q. 1 (Brcscia 1591), 301.
'' Ibid., 11, d. 14, a. 1, q. 6 (Brescia 1591), 172. Cf. Sharp, 268.
40 Sharp, Franc~scanPhilosophy, 213, note 4.
41 P. Duhem, ctudes sur Ikonard de Vinci, 11, Paris 1955, 37-49.
42 ,,... on peut dire que les cxcommunications prononcees a Paris, le 7 mars 1277, par 1' eveque
~ t i e n n eTernpier et par les docteurs en Thiologie furent l'acte de naissance de la Physique
modernc". l? lluhem, 1.e systeme du monde, VII, Paris 1956, 4.
908 Edward P. Mahoney
the concepts of an omnipotent or infinite God, an infinite void and a plurality
of worlds imposed as orthodoxy43. However, Alexandre Koyrt has questioned
whether the concepts of the void and the infinite would not have developed in
the Christian West even without the Condemnation, and he attacks Duhem in
particular for making of Middleton a scientific hero when he was, at least in
~ ~ . I do not
Koyrt's judgment, a timid conformist of dubious ~ r i g i n a l i t y While
wish to adjudicate this dspute, I must chide ICoyri. for saying that Middleton
cites the Condemnation at every turn and without purpose. The actual citations
are far fewer than Miss Sharp's book would have us believe and the citations,
when given, usually seem quite appropriate to the point at issue45.
The Condemnation appears in fact to have had a somewhat stultifying effect
on the intellectual life of the university. Giles of Rome (* ca. 1247/t 1316) was
condemned and exiled from the Theological Faculty at Paris from 1278- 1285.
He commented years later when he was the Archbishop of Bourges that not all
the articles were correctly condemned46. In his questions on Book I1 of the
Sentences he takes up the question whether souls are equal from their creation.
He first sets out to prove that all human souls belong to the same species and
then to investigate their equality and inequality. After giving arguments to prove
that human souls all belong to the same species, he turns to the issue whether
they are also equal in regard to their natural abilities. After indicating that the
issue is taken up by an article condemned at Paris, he immediately adds that
although many believe that the topic is open to discussion (opinabile) not all the
articles were rightly condemned. He recounts that he was in Paris at the time
and will offer testimony about the matter being touched upon. His testimony is
that many thngs took place regarding these articles not by reason of the counsel
of the magist7z' but by reason of the deceit (capitositas) of a certain few. He adds
that since this article is itself doubtful, it is not good to be of such a singular
opinion on such issues. O n the contrary, what is good is to recite what others
have said. Giles then notes that some important people (magni) who have writ-
ten on the ~Entencessince the time of the Condemnation have set forth the
following words on the matter: All souls are equal in essence and consequently
in the natural properties that accompany the whole species. However, Giles
41 See Duhem, ~ t u d e ssur Leonard de Vinci, 11, 72-78, 403 and 411 -412.
44 A. IGyri, Le vide et I'espace infini au XIVe sikcle, in: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littiraire
du moyen ige 17 (1949), 45-70.
45 However, it must be noted that Miss Sharp's approach is to connect discussions in \Villiam with
particular articles though the Condemnation is not explicitly cited or quoted by William.
4"f. E. Hocedez, La condamnation de Gilles de Rome, in: Richerches de Theologie ancienne et
medievale 4 (1932), 34-58. See now Giles of Rome, Apologia, ed. R. Wielockx (Oper omnia
111.1), Florence 1985.
Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 909
himself objects that this is not true regarding individual natural properties. Fi-
nally he sets forth the position that he approves, namely, that souls are equal as
regards those things that belong to the species but not as regards those things
that belong to individuals4'.
And in 1295, almost twenty years after the Condemnation, Godfrey of Fon-
taines (* ca. 1250/t 1306) asked in his Quodlibet XII, q. 5, whether the Bishop
of Paris would sin if he failed to correct some errors condemned by his prede-
cessor. The question was raised in regard to Simon de Bucy, who had become
bishop of Paris in 129248.Godfrey starts off by denouncing many of the articles
as unintehgible, obviously false, impossible, and as demanding correction49. He
deplores the harm that has been done to the search for truth, since men are
now immovably held to one side of a topic and prevented from disputing prop-
erly debatable issues. He considers some of the articles to imply contradictions
and this to be unteachable, whereas others seem so impossible or irrational at
first reading that they demand an almost violent and forced exposition if any
sense is to be made of them. Moreover, there are articles, such as proposition
81 (regarding God being unable to create many separated substances of the
same species) and proposition 124 (regarding intellects being more or less noble
according to differences in the bodies to which they are related) which seem to
be open to licit discussion since they have in fact been declared and written by
many Catholic teachers (doctores). Godfrey now proceeds to show that proposi-
tions 204 and 219, regarding the motion and location of angels, contradict one
another. His complaint then is that the Condemnation is an impediment to
scholarship and an occasion of scandal. He especially deplores the harm done
to the students, since the useful and solemn teaching of ,,excellentissimzls doctor,
fratr Thomas", has been made to appear erroneous when it should be judged
most useful and praiseworthy. Godfrey's other complaints are that the simpler
students believe their professors to be excommunicated for discussing certain
topics and denounce them to the Bishop, thus creating factions among the
47 Giles of Rome, In secundum librum sententiarum quaestiones (d. 32, q. 2, a. 3), 470b-472a.
48 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XII, q. 5, in: Les Quodliibets onze-quatorze de Godefroid de
Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans (Les Philosophes Belges, t. V, fasc. I-2), Louvain 1932, 100-105.
For discussion see M. de Wulf, ktudes sur la vie, les oeuvres et l'influence de Godefroid de
Fontaines, Brussels 1906, 33 - 37. He found allusions to the Condemnation in Quodl. V1, q. 13
and 16; Quodl. VII, q. 11; Quodl. V111, q. 16; Quodl. IX, q. 5; Quodl. XIII, q. 4. See also M.-H.
Laurent, Godefroid de Fontaines et la condamnation de 1277, in: Revue thomiste 35 (1930),
273 - 281; N. F. Gaughan, Godfrey of Fontaines. An Independent Thinker, in: American Ecclesi-
astical Review 157 (1967), 43-54. For a basic study of Godfrey's metaphysics see the informa-
tive work of J. F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines: 11 Study in Late
Thirteenth-Century Philosophy, Washington D. C. 1981. O n Godfrey and the Condemnation,
see Wippel's remarks in his book (especially pp. 366-369 and 381 -385) and also in his article
on Godfrep in this volume.
49 ,,Contrariclm a ~ n i t u os~endendo
r quod sunt corniendi; quia articuli qui sunt non intelligibih , et qui manfefle
videnfurfalsi el impossibiles, sunt merito corrigendi. Sed infer praedictos articulos suuf pbres tales, UL patet
inspirienti. Ergo. I 3 cetera". Ibid., 100.
910 Edward P. Mahoney
students. O n the other hand, he has scorn for a professor who attempts to
determine a difficult question and appeals to the Condemnation as a substitute
for sound arguments5". It is surely reveahng that in a question written the
following year (1296), namely, Quodlibet XIII, q. 4 , Godfrey again states that
the articles concerning the place and motion of an angel seem to contradict one
another, but he now adds: ,,I do not intend to say anything against them because
of the danger of excomm~nication"~~.
Godfrey asks a question regarding a professor of theology similar to that
which he had asked of the bishop. It is whether a master (nqiister) in theology
should speak against an article of a bishop if he believes the opposite is true.
Godfrey rejects the argument that one should not do anything that incurs ex-
communication. While he agrees that falsehood should never be taught, the
same does not hold for truth, but only in terms of the circumstances of place
and time. His way out is to counsel that as long as the question does not touch
on something required for salvation the master in question should assert neither
side of the question. He goes on to state that the prelate, that is the bishop,
should revoke the condemnation and e x c o m m ~ n i c a t i o n ~ ~ .
There are yet other passages in which Godfrey refers to the Condemnation.
When discussing the nature of the body as it lacks quantity after the resurrection
and the related problem of the indviduation of the disembodied soul, he points
out that no matter how difficult it is to understand the problem of individuation
as it regards souls, it is more difficult to understand how there can be many
angels differing numerically. But he is quick to add that in no way must this
possibility be denied, since there is an article that condemns the opposite. God-
frey apparently has in mind either proposition 81 or proposition 96'?.
Another topic discussed by Godfrey that involves the angels is whether there
is some active principle in the angels other than the intellect and the will. If the
angels were in fact movers of the orbs as the philosophers hold, there would
be such an active principle. However, they are spiritual and intellectual sub-
stances and therefore do not perform such a role. Nor can it be said that they
move the heaven by their will alone, since that has been been rejected (reproba-
turn) among the condemned articles, that is, in the Condemnation of 1277.
Godfrey goes-on to state clearly that he does not intend to say anything against
5" Ibid., 100- 103.
51 Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet XIII, q. 4, in: Godfrey of Fontaines, Les Quodlibets treize et
quatorie, ed. J. Hoffmans (12e l'hilosvphes Bclges \', fasc. 3-4), Louvain 1935, 213-221. God-
frey's closing words in t h ~ syuesuon merit cluotation: ,,EIuc rtiam est dz@ciie &terminare proptrr
articulos circa hoc condemnator, quia contrarii ~~iciPntur
ad int~icem;rt contra quos nihil inlendo direr? propter
pericul~mexcommunicatio~ris"@. 221). The articles in question seem to be 212, 224 and 219.
52 Ibld., Quodl. VII, q. 18, in: Godfrey of Fontaines, Lcs quodlibet cinq, six et sept, edd. M. De
Khlf / J. Hoffmans (Les Philosophes Uelges 3), Lvuvan 1914, 402-405.
" Thid., Quodl. V1, q. 16, in: ibid., 254-260; see 259: ,,. . . sed maxis est ddficile intelL&ere qnuntodo
possunt essr plurer ungeli rinniero durrrntrs; quod tumrn huc .rrt po.r.rii7ilr non r.rt omninu ngu~rdumsecuntlum
quod dicit quidmi articn1u.r quo contrarium cowtlemna/ur"
Revcrbcrations of the Condemnation of 1277 91 1
the article54. In a quite different discussion he asks whether the appetite of a
brute animal is free and could thus be called ,,willc'.In the long examination of
the issues involved, he cites ,,quidam articuIi ab epircopo reprobati", presumably
propositions 130 and 131 55.
Finally, in an extended discussion of whether one knows by the same cogni-
tion about God whether he exists and what he is, Godfrey quotes both proposi-
tions 36 and 215". Fear of ecclesiastical sanction for comments on the proposi-
tions regarding the location and motion of angels even affected Henry of Ghent
(* ca. 1 2 1 7 / t 1293), presumed to be one of the conservative theologians who
had collaborated with Tempier in compiling the list of articles. In his Quodli-
bet 11, q. 9, he cites both articles 204 and 219 and also quotes from Stephen's
preface the threat of excommunication facing anyone who taught or defended
the articless7. Henry confesses himself personally unable to understand why the
power of an angel should not be the reason for its being in place. But since this
is contrary to the Bishop's position, namely, that the angel is in place by its
substance, he is quick to add that he neither sustains nor determines what it is
that makes an angel to be in place58.What is of course astonishing is that Henry
reveals that he together with all the masters of theology, when gathered to
discuss this master, had unanimously agreed that the substance of the angel is
not the reason for its being in place. However, this does not at all mean that
Henry rejected the validity and force of the Condemnationso. In Quodlibet 11,
q. 8, Henry gives precise quotations of propositions 81 and 96 against those
s4 Ibid., Quodl. \', q. 6, in: Les quodlibet cinq, six et sept, 21 -23. The article in question is 212.
55 Ibid., Quodl. VIII, q. 16, in: Le huitikmc quodlibet, ed. J. Hoffnlans (Les Philosophes Relges
I\< fasc. I), Louvan 1924, pp. 140 and 165- 166.
56 lbid., Quudl. V11, cl. 11, in T.cs quodlibet cinq, six et sept, edd. &I. de K'ulf / J. Hoffmans (Les
Philosophes Relges Ill), Louvain 1914, 386
57 ,,(>~m eTEu error est .rubstantiam sine operationr non essr in loco, nt dzcii u n w articulus ex damnatis lulis,
quiu su/?stantiae sepurutae surrl alicubi prr operalionem el quod non possunt moueti uli extremo in extrrmrdni,
nrc in medium, nisi quiu posmnt uelle uperari uut in m~dzouut in extrentir. /:rror: .si infellicatur sine uprrutione
substantiam rron esse in loco, nec transirr de lucu ad locum. I:'t ne incuuta loqriritio simp/ices protrahut in
errorem pontificalis sententiu distincte taliu,tieri prohibrt, et tales artrcuhr loiuliter condemnat excommurzicun.s
omnes ilhs qui dicto.r errorps 1x1aliquem de eisden~dqmuti7ul~erin~ nut su.rlinrrr el defendere praesuntpsmri~~t
quoquo moh". Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta, (repr.) Louvain 1961, Quodl. 2, q. 9, f. 36v.
,,Dice icitur secundum lam propositam determinationem pontijcaleut ur;gelum sine opemtiorre else in locu. .Sd
tamen ut dictum e.rt eadem sententia pon~l/calir dicit quod 18erumest quod su/istaniiar .reparutae nusquam sunt.
.Si intell&atur quod su6s1anlia sit rat~oessendi in loco. /:t hoc gitt~rquia suhstuntia non est rutio essendi
suhrtantiani argpli in loco, rlsi sit in loco. . .. [pitur si forte pot err tic^ urgeli non s ~ ratio
/ $sun/ essendi in loco,
quod udpraesens nec delermirio, nec sustineo, nec defendo, oportet quaerere aliquod aliud quod est ratio ersrndi
.$sum in LOCO. In quo mallem alios u~direguant aliquid cilcere. /:I eft mihi tutius pr~fitetiin propo.silo quid
iknorern quid dicant quam quud ahquid de meu indiscrrte irzgerum. Quid enim ilhdsit wescio ...". Tbid, f. 36b:
I,\n' hoc eninz corrcora'ubant omrrrs ruqiriri Theolqplau cogrrxati suprr hoc, qriorum q o cram unus, unanimiter
concedentes quod substantia ar;celi non est ratio u ~ ~ t ' l nesie
u i in loco sect,ndt~~u s~~bstarzntium.
A/ constmili rutione
ut'rum est Grdubitunter quod si urgelus prr potrrrtium suunz scilicrt per intellectum /,elper uoluntatem ~ ' i r t ~ ~ t e m
.ruam nun appliccll ad locum oprrant/o circa $rum, quod simihtrr pote~tiae i ~ ~int~llectu.r s, scilicet et volwnfas,
11or1 esf ratio rssendi $sum in loco d dictmlm ?st, nzsifortr potentia eiu.r .sit minori~abstractioms quam sil ei11.r
substirntiu. Quod si r~erumsit, in hoc intelljcendo d&io sicut et iw pl/~libusaliir". Ibid., f. 36v.
912 Edward P. Mahoney
who deny the plurality of angels in a species and who also maintain that matter
is the principle of inlviduation, referring to them - apparently with disap-
proval - as nostri philasophante~~~.
In Quodlibet 4, question 17, Henry turns directly to the question whether an
angel moves from place to place. As evidence that it does do so, Henry refers
to Jacob's dream (Genesis 28: 10 - 12) of a ladder on which angels are ascending
and descending; this would appear to involve local motions. He considers the
question whether angels move from place to place as dependent on the question
whether and how they are in place. He raises the issue whether it should be said
that an angel is nowhere and so in no way moves from place to place. He clearly
states that he does not say this (,,Hal non dim''), immediately provilng exact
quotations of articles 219 and 204. But he sets out his difficulq in understanding
all this by citing his earlier discussion in Quodlibet 11, q. 8, regarding how an
angel can be in place. He ends this present question by borrowing Tempier7s
language in the prologue of the Condemnation to declare that he does not set
forth a doctrine (dogmati~are),sustain (szrstinere) or defend (dfendere) what the
episcopal prohibition (pont@zks interdictio) prohibits teaching, sustaining or de-
fending. He answers the objection from Jacob's dream in several ways. One is
to state that according to the bishop's opinion these angels ascend and descend
accordtng to their very substance. Another answer that he considers is that these
angels move only by reason of bodies that they have assumed. A third possibility
that Henry entertains is that the dream did not present anything that took place
in truth but rather involved Jacob being shown in such an imaginative vision
the mystery of some future event"'.
Giles of Rome's successor as Augustinian magister regens, James of Viterbo (* ca.
1255/t 1308), reveals knowledge of the Condemnation in his ,,Disputationes de
quolibet". In the seventh question of ,,Disputatio prima de quolibet", he takes
up the question whether the motion of the will toward an end is an act of the
intellect or o f ~ h willm.
e He interprets the question to be whether the motion of
the will is from the will as from a mover and agent that has an act in itself or
6" Ibid., Quocil. 11, q. 8, ff. 32v-35r. For discussion see S. t! Brown, Godfrey of Fontaines and
Henry of Ghent: Individuation and the Condemnation of 1277, in: SocietC et Cglise (Rencontres
de philosophie mtditvale 4), ed. S. Wlodek, Turnhout 1995, 193-207; id., Henry of Ghent
(* ca. 1217/t 1293), in: Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-
Reformation 1150- 1650, ed. J. J. E. Gracia, Albany 1994, 194-219. In the latter article @. 199),
Brown takes the philosophantes to be the nonnulli I-'arisius studentes in czrtibus mentioned in the
prologue to the Condemnation. Cf. also p. 195.
" Ibid., IV, cl. 17, ff. 131~-132v.
" James of Viterbo, llisputatio prima de cluolibct, q. 7, (ed. E. Ypma [Cassiciacum, Supplement-
band I]), Wurzburg 1968, 79.
Reverberauons of the Condemnation of 1277 913
whether it is from the intellect. Or to put it more simply, whether the will is
moved to the act of willing from itself or from the intellect63.James states his
own position as that the will moves of itself to willing whatever it is that is willed
(volitzrm), whether it be an end or something that is toward an end, in such
fashion that the will is related to the act of willing not in a wholly passive manner
(pzrrepassive) but actively (active).Not surprisingly James quotes Augustine's state-
ment in the ,,De libero arbitrio", chapter 3, that nothing is in our power as is
the willw. He also uses as authorities Hugh of Saint Victor and Anselm". The
will's free motion to an end is an operation that is free by the proper liberty of
the will itself. And while the will is especially in our power, the intellect is not
free of itself, since it is not in our power6%Although James never refers explicitly
to the Condemnation In this question, Kuello has made a fairly plausible case for
considering the Condemnation as standing in the background of the question,
namely that it is false to say that the soul wills by itself6'.
James presents full quotes of propositions 204 and 219 in his ,,Disputatio
prima de quolibet", question 10 which concerns whether if an angel were pro-
duced from the necessity of nature it would be a necessary existence. He
attempts to get around these articles by various distinctions. One is that sub-
stance considered in relation to operation, that is, as the principle of operation,
is the reason (ratio) for a thing being in place. However, James is careful to add
that whatever be the correct way to understand these two articles, he does not
intend to assert anything that has been condemned in the articles6$.
In question 3 of his ,,Disputatio secunda de quolibet", James presents inge-
nious interpretations to get around article 124, namely, that some intellects are
nobler than others. However, he immediately adds that if the article has another
meaning, then he affirms nothing in prejudice of the article and assents to every
sound meaning which can be given to it6'. I n question 4 of the same Quodlibet
he faces propositions 96 and 81 concerning the plurality of immaterial beings
within the same species. While he admits the possibility of such numerical plural-
ity occurring through the causality of God's power, he also adds, quite rightly,
that any certitude regarding an actual plurality within the same species of such
substances can be gained only by revelation, since we have no knowledge about
angels as to whether they are in their substance equal or different from one
another7().
6Vbid., 81.
64 Ibid., 82-83. See Augustine, l>e libero arbitrio, ch. 3, in: Opera, I'ars 11, 2 (Corpus Christia-
norum, Series Latina 29), Turnhout 1970, 279: onenim posses abud sentire e.rre inpotestate nostra,
nisi quod cum uolumusfa~ims.Quaprupter nihil tam in nostra potvstatr quam c,ohntas est".
" Ibid., 85-86.
Ibid., 87.
67 F. Ruello, Les fondements de la liberte humaine sclon Jacques de Viterbe OltSA Disputatio 1"
de quolibet, q. V11 (1293), in: Augustiniana 24 (1974), 291 -292 and 298-2957,
68 Ibid. (q. lo), 140- 149.
'"James of Viterbo, Disputatio secunda de quolibct, q. 3 (ed. E. Ypma [Cassiacicum, Supplement-
band 21), Wurzburg 1969, 49 - 50.
7U Ibid. (q. 4), 53-55.
 Edward P. Mahoney
The intellectual world that we have been describing is also the world of John
Duns Scotus (* ca. 1266/t 1308), who studied at Paris in the 1290's. He neither
finds reason for embarrassment in any of the articles (as had Henry of Ghent)
nor does he see need for their withdrawal (as did Godfrey of Fontaines). O n
the contrary, in the Opus oxoniense, 11, d. 2, q. 5- 6, after citing the vexsome
condemned article 204 against those who would say that the angel is in place
through its operation, Scotus rejects the objection that an excommunication
cannot cross over the sea or over a diocese. He declares that an article solemnly
condemned in a university as heretical is thereby condemned as heretical every-
where, not only by episcopal authority but also by the authority of the Pope
himselP1. Father Ralic has well underscored the role of the church as the norm
of faith for Scotus, and he has pointed out that a General Chapter of the
Franciscans held in 1292 forbade any friar from contradicting the teaching of
the Bishop of Paris and the common teaching of the masters of Paris. The
Condemnation, the ,,Correctorium" of William de La Mare, and related works
thus served as starting-points of Scotus' t h o ~ g h t ' ~htienne
. Gilson has well
delineated the striking influence that the Condemnation had on some of Scotus'
most characteristic doctrines, namely, those relating to the nature of philosophy
and theology, the infinity and freedom of God, and indi~iduation'~.
In the Prologue to the ,,Ordination, Scotus speaks of a controversy between
the philosophers and theologians. While the philosophers hold to the perfection
of nature, the theologians know its defect (dfictzis nuturae), the necessity of grace,
and a perfection that is supernatural, not natural. Natural reason cannot establish
the supernatural end of man, nor the means required to achieve that end. Be-
sides, since the philosophers think that all that comes from God occurs neces-
sarily, they fail to recognize the contingency of the acceptutio by the divine will'4.
In these remarks we surely can discern Scotus' concern with such condemned
John Duns Scotus, Opus Oxoniense, 11, d. 2, q. 6 (Opera \'I, I), Lyons 1639, 187.
72 See C. Balic, Johannes Duns Scotus und die I~chrentscheidungvon 1277, in: Wissenschaft und
K'eisheit 29 @966),210-229; id., I1 decreto dcl 7 marzo 1277 del Vescovo di Parigi e l'origine
dello scotismo, in: '1i)mmaso d'i2quino nella storia del pensiero 11, Naples 1976, 279-285. But
see also E. Uettoni, The Originality o i t h e Scotistic Synthesis, in: John Duns Scotus: 1265- 1965
(Studies in Philosophy and the History of l'hilosophy 3), Washington 11. C. 1965, 30-38. E \'an
Steenberghen considers Scotus' thought to have bccn formed in the atmosphere resulting from
the Condemnations at Oxford and Paris. Cf. id., Introduction a 1' Ctude de la philosoph~e
mCdii-vale (I'hilosophes mtdievaux la), Louvain-IJaris 1974, 571 -579.
'' See k.Gilson, Jean Iluns Scot (llaris 1952), 33 - 34, 365 - 366, 398, 483 - 484 and 646. However,
Gilson states elsewhere: ,,One should not imagine Scotus writing with the text of the con-
demned pn~positionsat hand and calculating his doctrine in vicw o f avoiding them". Cf. id.,
IIistory of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New l i ~ r k1955, 465.
74 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, part 1, q. 1 (Opera I), Vatican 1950, 1-58. See now hl. E. Ingham,
The Condemnation of 1277: Another Light on Scotist Ethics, in: Freiburger Zeitschrlft fiir
lJhilosophic und Theologie 37 (1900), 91 - 103.
Reverberat~onsof the Condemnation of 1277 915
propositions as that the philosophers are the only wise men in the world (propo-
sition 154), that the man whose intellect and will are ordered according to the
intellectual and moral virtues spoken of in Aristotle's ,,Nicomachean Ethics" is
sufficiently disposed for eternal beatitude (proposition 157), that whatever God
does directly he does by necessity (proposition 53), and that all events occur
necessarily and none occur contingently (proposition 21).
Later in Book I of the ,,Ordinatio" Scotus asks whether God's omnipotence
can be proven by natural reason. He explains that the proposition ,,whatever
the first efficient cause can d o with a secondary cause it can d o per se directlyc'
is not self-evident nor known by natural reason, but is only believed. The philo-
sophers are thus unable, following their own principles, to reach the concept of
a free and infinite God. The philosqdu' whom Scotus has in mind would appear
to be those whose views are to be found in the condemned articles of 1277'j.
Some of the central articles have been characterized as reflecting Greco-Arab
necessitarianism.
Scotus cites the Condemnation in two discussions regarding the angels. In
his ,,Quaestiones quodlibetales", Scotus alludes to Thomas' doctrine that there
cannot be a plurality of angels within the same species, since individuation is
through matter. Mentioning Tempier by name (Dominus Stepbanus), he quotes
propositions 81, 96, and 191, all of which stand opposed to the Thomistic
position on individuation and the plurality of angels within the same speciesy6.
The other discussion regarding the angels is found in the ,,Ordinatio", namely
whether an angel requires a determinate place, no bigger, no smaller. Scotus
rejects Thomas' view that the angel is in place by reason of its operation. He
indicates that he considers this position to be damned just like one of the articles
condemned by the Bishop of Paris. But what is significant is that he rejects the
escape attempted by some, namely that an excommunication cannot cross the
sea or a diocese. He argues that if an article has been condemned as an heretical
article it is condemned everywhere as heretical and the declaration is not merely
by a diocesan authority but also by the authority of the Pope. At the very least
an opinion is suspect when it has been solemnly damned in some university7'.
It is surely no exaggeration to conclude that Scotus' close study of the Con-
demnation and his religious obedience to it as the expression of the mind of
the Church led him to attack the concept of an autonomous philosophy and
to exalt the position of theology. It also inclined him to such characteristic
doctrines as the centrality of Divine infinity and freedom and the need to reject
individuation through matter. The Condemnation in many ways served as a
barrier between Scotus and Saint Thomas.
'"ohn Iluns Scotus, Ordinatio, Booli I, d. 42, q. 1 (Opera VI), Vatican 1963, 341 -349.
'"ohn Duns Scotus, (2uacstiones quodlibetales, q. 2 (Opera Xll), Iqons 1639, 36.
77
Iohn Iluns Scotus, Ordinatio, Book 11, d. 2, q. 6 (Upera VII) Vatican 1973, 243-245. One
unusual reference to the Condemnation is found in the I>ectura, 11b. 11, d. 18, q. 1-2, (Clpera,
XIX), 17atican 1993, 163-164, where he is discussing seminal rcasons and the source of the
rational soul. Hc cites Article 30.
 Edward P. Mahoney
VJ.
O n the other hand, the Condemnation continued to nettle Dominican de-
fenders of Saint Thomas. It is no surprise that they continued to make efforts
to get around it. Thus Hervaeus Natalis Brito (d. 1323) refers to it on occasion
in his commentary on the Sentences, written around 1302. He openly argues
against the thesis that an angel is in place by its essence, but also says that if he
says anything repugnant to the articles of the bishop of Paris, it should count
as saying nothing (,,habeaturpro non d i t ~ " ) ' ~At
. the very start of a discussion
regarding the question whether there could be many angels that differ within
the same species Hervaeus cites article 81, namely, that God could not create
many separate Intelligences in the same species since there is no matter in
them79. He interprets the bishop to have meant that it is erroneous to say that
God is unable to bring this about. He presents involved interpretations of article
81 to show that of their own nature angels cannot be multiplied, though by
God's power this may be possible8". And although he cites article 212, namely
that angels cannot move the orbs by their will alone, he then tries to defend
precisely that thesis, arguing that what is condemned is that the will act of the
angel is sufficient for it to move any mobile whatever8'.
One of the most interesting references to the Condemnation is that found in
Nicholas of Autrecourt's ,,Figit ordo" or ,,Tractatus universahs ad videndum
an sermones peripateticorum fuerint demonstrativi". In investigating the teach-
ing of Aristotle and Averroes he found some arguments that held against their
conclusions. He also realized that many of the reverend fathers in the university
at Paris had spent much of their lives studying Aristotle and Averroes rather
than working for the common good. They are given over to rivalries rather than
to charity and to studying Aristotle and Averroes rather than teaching revelation
to the people. He is careful to declare that he wishes to say nothing against the
articles of faith or against the correct articles that stand opposed to those that
were condemned at l ' a r i ~ ~Indeed
~. the editor of Nicholas' ,,Exigit ordo" con-
siders one element of Autrecourt's technique to be showing that Aristotle taught
doctrines condemned in 1277 which were therefore in opposition to the teach-
ing of the Church. One example is that Aristotle seems to teach in the Ethics
that there is neither good nor bad in a dead man. However, this would mean
78 Hervaeus Natalis Brito, In cluatuor libros Sententiarum commentaria, 1, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, Paris
1547 (repr. \Westmean 1966), 145ab. See also P. Piccari (ed.), La Opinio de difficultatibus contra
doctrinam 1:ratris Thome di llr\.eo di Nedellec, in: Memorie Domenicane, n.s. 26 (1995), 14-
193.
'"bid., I1 (d. 3, q. 2), 209 b. Also relevant is the related article 96.
'" Ibid.,II (d. 3,q.,a.2),210b-211a.
" Ihid., (d. 14, q. 2, a. 3-4), 245 a-246a.
Nicholas of Autrecourt, hxigit ordo, ed. J. R. O'Donnell, in: Mediaeval Studies 1 (1939), 181 -
182.
Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 917
that a man would lose all goodness after death and also that a substance could
not return numerically the same after deatha3.Such an outcome stands opposed
to propositions 15 and 1784.
Two early-fourteenth century discussions regarding the issues raised by the
Condemnation merit special attention. In a disputation dated 1306, William
Peter of Godin (* 1260/t 1326), argues against Scotus on the nature of individu-
ation. After citing articles 81 and 96, he argues that these articles concern not
the power of God but the nature of form and the cause of multiplication. What
Thomas says is not opposed to the articles, provided that they be properly
understood. William appeals to article 32 to argue that the occasion of these
two articles was the error regarding the unity of the intellect. He thus takes
article 81 to be aimed at the error that disembodied rational souls could not
remain many in number since they lack matter85. The issue of individuation
along with many other issues is taken up by John of Naples ( t ca. 1350) in a
quodlibetal question, written at Paris around 1317, and entitled ,,Whether the
Doctrine of Brother Thomas Could Licitly Be Taught at Paris in regard to All
Its Conclusions". Like William Peter of GoQn, John of Naples argues in regard
to article 81 and also articles 27, 96 and 97 that they are directed against the
upholders of the unity of the intellect, namely the Auerroistae. It is perhaps
revealing that John believes it necessary to defend Thomas' views on freedom
and the will from the seeming criticism of article 129. Although the tone of
John's work is generally respectful toward the Condemnation, he does allow
himself to remark sharply at one point that some magi.& (surely Godfrey is
meant) say that the articles, especially 204 and 219, contradict one another. He
then observes, both guardedly and pointedly: ,,If this is true, it is no wonder -
if any of [the articles] contradict any of the statements of Brother Thomas".
When examining the thirteen (or fourteen) articles which seem to be Thomas'
opinions, John gives ingenious, though at times forced, interpretations both of
the articles themselves and also of Saint Thomas in order to argue that they are
not really opposed. Especially interesting are the two passages where he says
that a particular article was aimed not at Thomas but at ,,aliqui a r t h e or Aver-
roistae" 86.
Tbid., 187 and 191.
84 See J. R. O'l)onnell, The Philosophy of Nicholas of Autrecourt and His Appraisal of Aristotle,
in: Mediaeval Studies 4 (1942), 104; cf. also 121.
See Clemens Stroick, Eine lJariser Disputation vom Jahre 1306. Die Verteidigung des thomis-
tischen Tndividuationsprinzips gegen Johannes Duns Scotus durch Guillelmus Petri de Godino
in: Thomas von Xquino: Interpretation und Rezeption, ed. IV P. Lckert, Mainz 1974, 559-609.
The article contains an edition of William's ,,Utrum materia sit principium individuationis". See
also M. Crabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben 11, Miinchen 1936, 559-576.
86 See C. Jellouschek, Quaestio magistri Ioannis de Neapoli, 0.I?, Utrum licite possit docen Par-
isius doctrina fratris Thomae quantum ad omnes conclusiones eius hic primum in luce edita,
in: Xenia thomistica 111, ed. L. Theissling, Rome 1925, 73-104.
 Edward l? ~Mahonev
VII.
Although the Condemnatioil has frequently been seen as directed against the
Averroists, it is interesting to note that one of the most celebrated of the so-
called Averroists himself refers to the Condemnation. That figure is John of
Jandun (* ca. 1275/t 1328), who alludes at least once to the Condemnation in
his questions on the ,,De anima". The context is a discussion regarding whether
appetite and the practical intellect are principles of local motion. However, it is
not wholly clear to which proposition he is alluding8'. And while the Condem-
nation is not explicitly mentioned in Jandun's discussion of whether a plurality
of worlds is possible, it seems highly likely that it stands in the background. He
holds that it is not possible for there to be many worlds. However, he shows
noteworthy caution regarding the matter, insisting that the stated impossibility
in no way prejudices divine power, since there always remains in that power the
infinite freedom of creating other worlds. Even though this cannot be proven
from the sensible things from which Aristotle's reasoning takes its start, none-
theless it must be firmly believed, respectfully assenting to the sacred teachers
of the faith88.
The same statement of deference to the theologians is found in Jandun's
discussion of whether there can be many individuals separated from matter in
the same species. We must speak differently from Aristotle, who could not
demonstrate this starting from sensible things, and hold that God can do this".
Whatever hindrance to the development of the Thomist tradition that the
Condemnation enjoyed was removed, or at least substantiaUy reduced, both by
Thomas' canonization by Pope John XXll on 18 July 1323 and also by the
revocation of the Condemnation, at least as it affected Thomas, by ~ t i e n n e
Bourret, bishop of Paris, on 14 February 1.325"'. Given the powerful weapon
that the Condemnation had provided their Franciscan opponents, the Domin-
cans were no doubt relieved to have achieved success in their efforts to bring
about each of these happy events.
Resides references to the Condemnation in the late thirteenth and early four-
teenth century that have already been pointed out, there are others that merit
mention. First of all, we should note Raymond Lull's (* ca. 1290/t ca. 1348)
,,Declaratio", finished in 1297, which is a dialogue between Stephen Tempier
87 John of Jandun, Super libros Aristotelis D e anima subtilissrmae quaestiones (Venice 1587), 111,
q. 39, col. 434. He refers to articmlnr Parisztt.r.
'\,led irtud Ron praei~tdicatpotenhe dirinar qnia semper in ea srrzlatw lihrrtas inJinita jacicndi pl~tresmur~d~.f.
qziia licet nun posset canvinci a sensihilihrcs a qaihtcs accipitiir ratio Aristotelir, tamen credendnm est hocjirmjter
sacrir doct~nbt~sfidei re~prrntrrasrrsrllhendo";John of Jandun, In libros De coelo ct hfundo quacstiones
subdlissimae (Venice 1552), 1, q. 24, f. lhva.
8" Ibid., I, q. 25, f. 17va. It should be noted that both these questions involve condemned articles.
")See 1.' Mandonnct, 1.a canonisation de Saint Thomas d'hquin, in: Melanges Thomistes publies
il'occasion du Vie centcnaire dc la canonisation dc Saint Thomas-d'hquin Ol;ibliotht.que thon~i-
ste Ill), Paris 1934, 1-48.
Reverberations of thc Condemnation of 1277 919
and Socrates on the 219 condemned articles. But unlike the Socrates of Plato's
dialogues, this time Socrates is bested by his interlocuter9'. Others who mention
(t
the Condemnation include Thomas Bajlly 1328) and Taddeo Alderotti 1295). (t
Durandus of Saint-I'ourqain (* 1275/t 1334) refers to the Condemnation very
briefly in regard to the question whether there can be many angels in one
species. He states that to deny that God could create many angels under one
species would be to derogate from his power".
John Baconthorpe (* ca. 1290/t ca. 1348) pays particular attention to the
Condemnation on at least two occasions. In one case he takes up the question
whether a will wholly lacking infused grace is limited to following the judgment
of reason. He proposes to maintain the view that it belongs to the will to move
against the determination of reason. He explicitly announces that he will relate
the opinion to the Condemnation. Despite the Fall, he considers free choice
still to have the same nature as it had in the state of innocence. Though its
liberty has been weakened through sin, this in no way changed the species of
free choice. Baconthorpe engages in rather subtle discussion of the relation
between the judgment of reason and will and the possiblity of error in the
former and malice (malitia) in the latter. He points to those who say that as long
as right reason in particular is present the will must consent to it and cannot
oppose it unless the intellect forms some new judgment. However, he considers
t h s understanding of things to be completely opposed to the Condemnation
(,,hie intellectus, ut zidetur, proprit. est omnino cuntru articulos parisiense.r"). He singles
out in particular article 129, which maintains that as long as there is present a
passion or knowledge in particular the will cannot do the opposite. This would
mean that having a right reason (ratio rfcta) would suffice for having a right will
(uolzmtas recta) and no grace would be required. But he is quick to insist that this
is contrary to article 131. He also considers those articles concerning the liberty
of the will that had been set forth against Saint Thomas now to be licitly open
to disputation, since the Bishop of Paris, that is, ~ t i e n n eBourret, had suspended
judgment on them in 1324. His own view is that there can be simultaneously in
the intellect both a right judgment and also knowledge of some apparent good
to which the will can be borne. Regarding the latter, the intellect does not have
to judge that it must be done; it suffices that it be known to the will. Indeed it
is by the will's own desire and iniquity (concupiscentid e t iniquitas) that it can be
borne to that apparent good contrary to right reason. He claims to be following
the common view that the malice (malitia) found in the will precedes that in the
" Rajrnlond Lull, Dcclaratio Raymundi per modum dialogi edita, in: P. 0.
Ikicher, Raymundus
12ullusund seine Stellung zur arabischen Philosophie (HGl'hhfX VIT, 4-5), hldnstcr 1909. Cf.
G. Bonafcde, 1.a condanna cii Stefano Tempier e la ,,Declaratio" di Raimondo 12ullo,in: Estudios
I.ullianos 4 (1960), 21 - 44.
" Durandus of Saint-l'ourpin, in: Petri 1.ombardi Sententias theolopcas commenrarivrum libri
IV (Venice 1571), Rk. 11, d. 3, q. 3, no. 15, ff. 137rb- 138rb.
920 Edward P. Mahoney
intellect". Baconthorpe also refers to the Condemnation when he takes up the
question of whether Christ's soul is more perfect in some substantial grade than
is the soul of Judas. After announcing that article 124 of the Condemnation
(articulus Paririensis 124) stands opposed to such a view, he quotes it word for
word. It states that it is inconvenient to posit that some souls are nobler than
others. Since such a diversity cannot be on the part of bodies it must be from
the part of Intelligences. This would mean that noble and ignoble souls would
belong to different species, just as do the Intelligences. This is an error because
then the soul of Christ would not be nobler than the soul of Judas. Baconthorpe
maintains that the soul of Christ is more perfect by reason of good dispositions
that are accidental".
Let us look briefly at the question of the possible influence of the Condem-
nation on the development of the thought of William of Ockham (* ca. 1285,'
t 1347) and the major changes in scientific conceptions that took place during
the fourteenth century. There are some scholars who appear to suggest that
there was an influence of the Condemnation on Ockham, e. g. Lkon Baudry.
However, it might be wondered whether Ockham was in fact directly influenced
by the Condemnation and not simply by tendencies operative during the period.
While it is true that the notion of God as intensively infinite was of central
interest with Henry of Ghent and Scotus, were there no discussions prior to
1277 that might also be seen as sources for the topic? It is perhaps noteworthy
that Ernst Moody does not appear to connect Ockham and the Condemnation
in any of h s studies gn the Venerable Inceptor.
Whether or not Ockham's thought was influenced by the Condemnation, it
remains that he did indeed allude to it in his ,,Dialogus". However, in the text
that we shall briefly examine he does not reveal knowledge of much of its
content nor does he appear to be wholly accurate as to what he says regarding
Thomas and the Condemnation. He states clearly the position of those who
maintain that no one inferior to the Pope can determine a question moved
regardng the 4aith especially when the learned have doubts and think in oppo-
site ways regarding the matter". He then goes on to present considerations
denying such a viewpoint. The first concerns the University of Paris, which
excommunicated and condemned as errors many opinions of many people, even
of Thomas while he was &ve. As an answer to this consideration Ockham
" John Baconthorpe, Super quatuor Sententiarum libros opus, 11, d. 29, q. 1, ff. 187va-188va.
Baconthorpc's major target is Godfrey of Fontaines.
94 Ibid., 111, d. 15, q. 1, f. 29ra-29va.
" W i a m of Ockham, Dialogus de imperio et pontificia potestate, in: Opera plurima, London
1962, Pars 1, Jiber 11, cap. 19, ff. 12va- 13ra.
Reverberations of the Condcmnauon of 1277 921
sets forth different replies. One is that the University rashly condemned many
assertions, thereby harming the truth, for in no way can truth be solemnly
condemned without rashness, although someone could and has the strength to
think what is contrary to a truth open to condemnation and to have doubts
about the truth. Nevertheless, a truth can never be solemnly and publicly con-
demned without there being some condemnable rashness. And since in the
judgment of many there are among the Parisian condemned articles a great
many truths it follows that the University of Paris has condemned rashly a
great many propositions. Those who agree with this judgment are those who
maintained both publicly and secretly Thomas' condemned views before the
revocation. Ockham takes notice of a Dominican professor (doctor) who stated
that the Paris Condemnation (damnatio) never crossed the sea (mare). He adds
that Godfrey of Fontaines shared this view and maintained in his writings that
the condemned articles should be corrected".
The different reactions to the Condemnation that Ockham then lists includes
those who thought that if the aforementioned excommunication was evil, then
it could not bind anyone who maintained a condemned truth. Nor should such
a person judge himself to be so bound9'. O n the other hand, he presents the
view of those who think Thomas was correctly condemned, but he appears to
make Thomas' doctrine of the unity of form the justification for such a condem-
nation of Thomas. That doctrine is not however part of the Condemnation of
1277".
Despite Koyrk's attack on Duhem's exaggerated claims regarding the Con-
demnation and the origins of modern science, it does seem safe to say at the
least that ,,it was one of the contributing fa~tors''~?Edward Grant has argued
with some plausibility for an influence on the scientific conceptions of John
Buridan (* ca. 1295/t ca. 1358), Nicole Oresme (t 1382), Thomas Bradwardine,
(* ca. 1295/t 1349) pointing to their citations from such articles as 34, 49 and
52. The development of the concept of an infinite extramundane void leads him
to state: ,,. . . by the fourteenth century the God of IdatinChristianity has filtered
through the outermost celestial sphere of the Aristotelian universe to wholly
occupy and constitute an infinite surrounding ~ o i d ' ' ~ We
~~shall
. turn now to a
prime figure in Grant's analysis of the significance of the Condemnation for the
history of science.
John Buridan makes reference to the Condemnation in his various writings.
In his questions on the ,,De caelo", he asks whether it is possible that a body
" Ibid., ch. 19, f. 13rab.
" Ibid., cap. 20, f, l3ra.
" Ibid., cap. 22, f. 13vb.
'9 See J. Wcinberg, A Short History of Medieval Philosophy, Princeton 1964, 238.
loo E,. Grant, Medieval and Seventeenth Century Conceptions of an Infinite Void Space Beyond
the Cosmos, in: Isis 60 (1969). 39-60. For explicit reference by Orcsme to the Condemnation
of 1277, see Nicolc Oresme, 1.e livre du ciel et du monde, Hook 11, ch. 8 (article 49), edd. A. D.
Menut / A. J. Denomy, Madison 1968, 369.
922 Edward P. Mahoney
moved to the right is infinite. He invokes the notion of a supernatural power
and a motion coming from a supernatural, divine power. He recounts that the
Bishop of Paris has determined regarding divine power that it would be an error
to say that God could not move the whole world all at once by a movement to
the right (proposition 49). FIowever, the whole world cannot at the same time
be in place, since there is no body outside containing it1()'.
Buridan pursues a related topic in his questions on the Physics. It is whether
there exists some infinite magnitude. For Buridan this comes down to the ques-
tion whether there is some infinite space beyond the heavens. He rules out
discussion of any scriptural passages that would suggest there is in fact some-
thing beyond the heavens. Nonetheless, he himself postulates that God could
form two other worlds beyond this world that would touch one another. When
he goes on to cite Aristotle as maintaining in De caelo I, that beyond the
heavens there is neither place, vacuum, space, or dimension, he observes that if
thts is true then there is no infinite magnitude. But he immediately adds that it
should be believed by faith that God could form and create beyond this world
other spheres and other worlds and wholly other finite magnitudes ever greater
in proportion. Nonetheless, he observes that it is perhaps not necessary to
believe that God could create an actually infinite magnitude. He goes on to
declare that he leaves to the theologians (domini theologi) determination of all
matters involved in this question and that he wishes to rest in their determina-
tion. However, he does think it unlikely that God would make other worlds
rather than making the present world larger. In the ensuing discussion, which
cannot be recounted here, he declares that in asserting or not asserting these
things he submits himself wholIy to the decree and regulation of the holy church
and the theologians (doctores smpturae sanctae). In the final lines of the question,
he protests yet again !hat all that has been said previously he neither states nor
has stated by way of 'assertion (assen'iz.'e)but by way of disputation (dirputative),
moving doubts in order that he might be taught by others the truth on these
matters. Although Buridan does not explicitly cite the Condemnation in this
discussion, it seems obvious that he has in mind proposition 34: ,,Quodprima
causa non posset pbres mundos facere". Buridan also makes frequent use of the
Condemnation in his questions on the Ethics, citing among other articles several
concerned with volition, namely propositions 129, 130, 131, 134 and 2081m2.It
has been noted by Faral that Buridan states in regard to propositions 131 and
134 that a famous doctor of theology had once remarked that they could be
maintained outside the diocese of Parislo3.
I"' John Ruridan, Quaestiones super libris quattuor De caelo et mundo, I, q. 17 (ed. E.A. bloody
[Thc Mediaeval Academy of America: Publication 6]), Cambridge, Mass. 1942, 75-76.
' 0 2 John Buridan, Quaestiones in decem lihros cthicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum, (Oxford
1637), 111, q. 1, p. 149; 111, '1.2, p. 157; Ill, q. 3, pp. 170-171; 111, q. 5, p. 176; X, q. 1-2,
pp. 840 - 860. For relevant discussion see b. J. Monahan, Human Liberty and Free Will accorcl-
ing to John Ruridan, in: Mediaeval Studics 16 (1954), 72-86.
"'"ee E.Faral, Jean Buridan, maitre es arts de I'Universiti. de Paris, in: Histoire litteraire de la
France 38 (1949), 582- 586.
Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 923
Thomas Bradwardine, in his ,,De causa Dei", frequently refers to the Con-
demnation in his struggle against determinism. He states quite clearly that the
will of the human rational creature is active, not passive. He lists a series of
errors condemned by Tempier that includes the following: that the intellectual
appetite is necessarily moved by the appetible (proposition 194), that after a
conclusion has been reached about something to be done, the will does not
remain free (proposition 158), that the will of man is necessitated by its cogfi-
tion just as is the appetite of an animal (proposition 159), that the will necessarily
follows what is accepted by reason such that it cannot abstain from what reason
dctates (163), and that in all his actions man always follows the greater appetite
(proposition 164). He adds that there are many other such articleslo4.Through-
out the work he identifies articles condemned by Tempier (,Ytephanus Episcopus
Paririensis). For example, Rradwardine remarks that Tempier rightly condemned
and excommunicated two articles, namely, that in efficient causes the second
cause has an action which it does not receive from the first cause (proposition
198), and that in efficient causes when the first cause ceases the second does
not cease its operation (proposition 199). Almost immediately thereafter he lists
two other erroneous articles that Tempier rightly condemned, namely, that hu-
man acts are not ruled by divine providence (propositions 3, 42, 56), and that
it is false that all things are preordained by the first cause since then they would
occur of necessity (proposition 197)lU5.In the chapter on the distinction be-
tween necessity and liberty, Bradwardine cites Tempier as having condemned
the error that free choice (liberam arbitrium) is a passive power, not active, and
that it is moved by necessity by the appetible (proposition 194)lo6. He makes a
good number of other allusions to specific articles in the Condemnationlo'.
They are for the most part articles concerned with issues regarding volition and
freedom.
IX.
Several Parisian masters of the fifteenth century allude to the Condemnation.
In his ,,Contra curiositatem studentium", John Gerson (t
1429) deplores the
fact that philosophers have not stayed within proper limits, since they have
raised unanswerable questions about the beginning of the world. Such things
belong to God's free will, a secret no philosophers can penetrate. Gerson pres-
ents his case in part by citing the Condemnation, presumably the preface,
"I4 'Thomas Hradwardine, De causa Ilei contra Pelagium, 11, ch. 3 (London 1618), 467-468.
"I5 lbid. I1 (ch. 20), 542-543. For informative discussion see Gordon Leff, Hradwardine and the
Pelagians: A Study o f his ,,De causa Dei" and its Opponents, Cambridge 1957.
'nVbid., I11 (ch. lo), 682.
lo' See De causa Dei, 111, ch. 3 @p. 467-468); 111, ch. 6 (pp. 660-661); 111, ch. 5 (pp. 653 , 655-
657); 111, ch. 10 (p. 682); 111, ch. 19 (p. 695); 111, ch. 23 (p. 697); 111, ch. 27 (pp. 713-714); 111,
ch. 29 (pp. 742- 743).
924 Edward IJ. Mahoney
arguing that the articles of faith are in no way opposed to natural philosophy.
He also adds that the philosophers have gone from the concept of God as an
unmoved mover to the concept of a necessitated God"'R. In 1426, Gerson again
alludes to the Condemnation. In a letter addressed to a Franciscan in 1426, he
praises Bonaventure and then attacks the position of Hus and Jerome of Prague
on real and eternal universals, marshalling proposition 52 as part of his case"'".
And in the ,,De modis significandi" of the same year, he again attacks the
doctrine of real universals, once more quoting proposition 52. But he then
follows it with condemned proposition 53, namely that God makes by necessity
whatever comes from him directlyllO.The worry that Gerson reveals in these
texts regarding God's freedom, his praise of Bonaventure, and his suspicion in
regard to the philosophers are all striking. Gilson has emphasized the revival by
Gerson of ,,the Bonaventurian spirit which had inspired the Condemnation of
1277""'.
Besides Gerson, Monsignor Grabmann drew attention to another Parisian
fifteenth-century master of theology who refers to the Condemnation. Indeed,
this anonymous master wrote a commentary on the Condemnation that was
completed in 1447. He shows knowledge of Thomas' canonization and his vin-
dication by Bishop Bourret's decree112.Another fifteenth-century philosopher
who referred to the Condemnation was William of Vaurouillon (* ca. 1390/
t 1463), a French Franciscan who taught at Paris and held posts within the
Order113.
In his ,,Opus super quattuor libros sententiarum", Vaurouillon raises the
question whether an angel produced in eternity exists in a place in the empyreum
when created. He characterizes Thomas' teaching that angels are in place only
by way of an operation as an exceedingly great failing krandir valde dejectus).
Rejection of Thomas' position is confirmed according to William by reason of
the article condemned at Paris by the bishop of Paris, namely that angels are only
in place through an operation. Some say that the excommunication imposed on
those who teach the condemned article does not cross bridges. To them William
replies that they most imprudently open their mouths against so great a univer-
sity, holding that the power of this university reaches only to the bridges of the
'('"ohn Gerson, Contra curiositatem studentiurn (C)euvres complktes 3), Paris 1962, 231 - 232.
"'"ee John Gerson, Oeuvres complktes 1, Paris 1960, 278.
11" John Gerson, De modis significandi (Oeuvres complktes 9), Paris 1973, 638. Threre is also a
reference to the Condemnation in Gerson's ,,Notulae super quaedam verba Dionysii de Coelesti
hierarchia" (Oevres complktes 3), Paris 1962,210. The issue regards Avicenna, the agent intellect
and its influence o n bodies and souls. Articles 30, 65 and 74 appear to be at issue.
'1' See G.. Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages, New York 1955, 532.
hl. Grabrnann, Ein spatmittelalterlicher Pariser TGmmentar zur Verurteilung des lateinischen
Averroismus durch Bischof Stephan Ternpier von Paris (1277) und zu anderen Irrtumslisten, in:
id., Mittelalterliches Geistesleben 11, Miinchen 1936, 272-286.
' I i See I. Brady, W i a m of Vaurouillon, 0. F. M. a Fifteenth-Century Scotist in :John Duns Scotus,
edd. J. K. Ryan / U. M. Bonansea (Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 3),
W'ashington D. C. 1965, 291 -310.
Keverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 925
city. A second group says that the excommunication does not cross a diocese,
whle a third group says that it does not cross the sea and so cannot go to
England. Against all of them he cites decretals, insisting that such a condemna-
tion and excommmunication was made on the authority of the Pope and so
should cause fear and terror. Moreover, whatever has been condemned by most
famous men in the most famous university in the whole world should not be
recalled, being put into doubt1'4.
Wdliam goes on to state that angels are composed of matter and form, but
he considers any being limited quidditatively to have prime matter. He notes
that Alexander of Hales and Honaventure uphold this position and that Scotus
refers to metaphysical matter. He rejects Thomas' authority on the issue, insist-
ing that it is not necessary to turn from a great sea, as is the University of
Paris, to a contracted river, such as was Saint Thomas. He also denies that the
Condemnation contained any condemned article stating that angels do not have
matter. Indeed he recounts that he has not seen such an article though he has
dligently searched for it115.Finally, turning again to the issue of the plurality of
angels within a species, he states that Saint Thomas failed gravely when he said
that in each species of angels there is necessarily only one individual. William
invokes as directly opposed to this opinion the Parisian condemned article that
in each species there should be placed numerically many individuals. The article
that he has in mind seems to be proposition 42116.
Late in the fifteenth century, three Italian philosophers took note of the
Parisian Condemnation of 1277, namely Antonio Trombetta 1518), Tommaso (t
de Vio (* 1468/t 1534) and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (* 1463/t 1494). The
earlier confict between Franciscans and Dominicans and their opposed attitudes
toward the Condemnation find echo in an exchange at the University of Padua
between the Franciscan Antonio Trombetta and the young Dominican Tom-
maso de Vio, later to be known as Cardinal Cajetan. In his ,,Opus doctrinae
Scoticae Patavii in thomistas discussum", finished and published in 1493, Trom-
betta attacks Thomas's doctrine of individuation through matter, citing proposi-
tions 96 and 191 against Thomas. Evidently borrowing from Scotus on the
binding force of the Condemnation, he insists that Thomas' view is condemned
everjwhere both by episcopal and Papal authority117. Cajetan answers in his
'I4 William of Vaurouillon, (-)pus super quattuor libris sententiarum, 11, d. 2, a. 2 (Ven~ce1507), ff.
86ra and 87rb - 8 7 ~ ~ .
"5 Ibid., ff. 888va-XOra. But in fact both proposition 72 and proposition 81 do state that separate
substances, Intelligences, do not have matter.
"6 Ibid., f. 9 0 ~ b .
"' See Antonio Trombetta, Opus doctrinae Scoticae l'atavii in Thomistas discussum, Venice 1493.
926 Edward P. Mahoney
commentary on Thomas' ,,De ente et essentia", which was finished in 1495'ls.
In question 10, he asks whether each species of separate substances has only
one individualll". Trombetta's objection and the Paris Condemnation are cited.
Scotus' objection in the Quaestiones quoclhbetales, q. 2, to Thomas' position is
presented along with the three condemned articles that Scotus had quoted
against ~ h o m a s namely
, propositions 81, 96 and 191. Trombetta's claim about
the universal binding force of the Condemnation is also repeated12". However,
Cajetan replies, first of all, that the three condemned articles are really directed
against the Avrrroistae. He adds, secondly, that the Condemnation was revoked
in 1425 by Bishop Bourret as far as it concerned Thomas. And thirdly, he cites
and quotes the letter of Pope Urban V to the University of Toulouse in 1368
praising the doctrine of Thomas as true and Catholic and bidding the professors
there to study it with all their strength. Cajetan expresses his amazement that his
opponents would dare appeal to the Paris Condemnation against the approval of
Thomas by the Roman Church121. However, it is my own suspicion that Trom-
betta did not really know the Condemnation of 1277 at first-hand. However, it
must be admitted that he does allude to it at least once in his treatise on the
unity of the intellect, which was completed at Padua in 1497. He presents propo-
sition 204 in the following form: an immaterial substance is in place precisely
through its operation'22. There is also a striking similarity between the scene at
Padua at the end of the fifteenth century and the historical situation of the late
thirteenth century which saw the issuance of the 1277 Condemnation. Trom-
betta, a Franciscan, appears-to have played a key role in Bishop Barozzi's con-
demnation in 1489 of the doctrine of the unity of the intellect. Ronaventure
had himself singled out for attack the key doctrines condemned by Tempier in
his 1270 Condemnation. Neither Barozzi nor Trombetta seems aware of the
parallel, or if they are, they chose not to mention it.
The validity of the Condemnation as a touchstone of orthodoxy was also
effectively challenged by Giovanni Pico della la Mirandola (1463- 1494) in his
,,Apologia" (1487). That Christ descended into Hell only by an operation was
one of the thirteen theses taken from his ,,Conclusiones" that was challenged
by a theological commission appointed by Pope Innocent VI11. In defending his
position, P i c ~ c l a i m sas authorities Thomas in his work on the Sentences, Book
I, John of Paris in his ,,Correctorium corruptorii" as well as countless doctorts
who lecture openly in the universities. He then proceeds to present ,,for the sake
"'See Thomas de Vio, In de ente et essentia 1).Thomae Xquinatis commcntaria, ed. M. Laurent,
Turin 1934. O n Cajetan see my article in: Koutledge Encyclopedia of I'hilosophy, vol. 2, London
1998, 171 -175.
'I" Thomas de Vio, In de cnte et essentla, c. 5, q. 10, nn. 86-93 (ed. M. Laurent), 136- 137.
''" Tbid., n. 87 (cd. Laurent), 137.
12' Ibid., n. 89 (ed. l.aurent), 140-141.
articulum dicenten~suh.rtan~iamtmmaierialem esse irr ioco prrreci.rr
122 ,,Ltprupt?r hocpaTiSiensfs excumn~nnicarnnt
pcr opcra/iunem"; Antonio 'Trombetta, Tractatus singularis contra rlverroistas de humanarum an-
imarum pluriticatione ad carholice fidci obsequium Patavii ed~tus,Venice 1498, f. 14rb- 14va.
Reverberations of the Condemnatlon of 1277 927
of exercise" arguments which he has heard against this position. He sketches out
discussions of relevant articles, propositions 77 and perhaps also 204, 218, 219.
He also cites Godfrey's complaint that the articles stand in need of correction
because some are false and others contradict one another, recalls Henry of
Ghent's revelation that the masters of theology had agreed that the reason for
an angel being in a place is not its substance, and repeats Giles of Rome's
complaint that the articles were put together not by all the Parisian doctores
but as a result of an examination by a few sophistical people (,,ad requisitionem
quorundam capitosorm"). As far as propositions 204 and 218 are concerned, they
do not bind all the faithful and they must be believed only as they are based on
Scripture and the declarations of the universal Church. Despite the gravity of
his situation, Pico allows himself a jibe: it is that as the English say that the
articles do not cross the sea, so he can say that the articles do not cross the
Alps. Unfortunately Pico then succumbs to temptation and interprets the two
articles to show that they are not really opposed to his position123.
Much of the force of the Condemnation of 1277, though not the spirit that
motivated it, was lost by this point. Nonetheless, a Church declaration at the
Fifth Lateran Council demanded that the professors must give arguments against
the unity and mortality of the soul and also the eternity of the world. One of
those opposed to the decree was Cardinal CajetanlZ4.
One celebrated philosopher of the Jtalian Renaissance who knew of and re-
fers to the Condemnation of 1277 was Tommaso Campanella (* 1568/t 1639).
In his ,,A Defense of Galileo" (,,Apologia di Galileo") he attempts to undercut
the authority of Aristotle and the use of his thought in theology. One of his
tactics is to show that Thomas Aquinas was rebuked in the condemnation by
hls fellow theologians at Paris. Indeed Campanella mentions n o one else as
targeted by the Condemnation. He attacks those who say that true sciences are
forbidden by the Christian religion (Lrx L;IJTirtid~a),and he lists the Parisian
condemned articles as one of the sources for learning that it is not the sciences
that oppose religion but rather the fantasies of vain philosophers (,,phantasiae
philosophorm vanornm") 125. He goes on to declare as heretical the view that theol-
ogy is based on Aristotle or that it needs the teachings of the philosophers for
securing approval of itself. Jt was because Saint Thomas seemed to violate his
own rule by referring too much to Aristotle when he wrote theology that he
12' See Giovann~Pico della hfirandola, Apologia (Opcra I), Base1 1557, for his ,,De dcscensu Christi
ad infcros disputatio" (pp. 125-150). Cf. G. Di Napoli, Giovanni Pico della Mirandola e la
problematica dottrinale del suo tempo, Rome 1965; A. Dulles, Princeps Concordiae: Pico della
Mirandola and the Scholastic Tradition, Cambridge, Mass. 1941.
'24 Cardinal Cajetan is rccorded in the records of the Council as objecting: ,,.. . non place/ secunriil
pars hnl/aepraecipiensp/iiLu.rophis utpuhbce permadendo doceant uenta/em/idei". See G. D. Mansi, vol. 32,
cols. 842 - 843.
12' Tommaso Campanella, Apologia di Galilco, ch. 3, Franlcfurt 1622, 23-24. For a recent highly
informauve study o f Campanella, see J. hl. Headlcy, 'Tommaso Campanella and the Transhrma-
tion of the World. l'rinceton 1997.
928 Edward P. Mahoney
was censured about this in the Parisian condemned articles, that is, the Condem-
nation of 1277. Campanella states his wonder that there are some Dominican
Friars who force on Saint Thomas the view that theology is based on Aristotle
and praise him for such a view. While the theologians at Paris also attributed this
view to him they censured him for it. Campanella himself insists that Thomas in
fact held the very opposite point of view12% Finally, when he turns to the
question of the plurality of worlds, Campanella notes that the University of Paris
set forth among the articles in Saint Thomas that were worthy of correction
that there could not be another world (terra). He insists that Saint Thomas did
at one point hold for the possiblity of many worlds127. His final reference to
the Condemnation also concerns Saint Thomas. He argues that just as a Pope
can approve the teaching of a theologian so that it may be published, since it is
useful and worthy of study, and yet not approve the whole of it as of the faith,
so did the doctores teach in those articles which they noted down against Saint
Thomas128.Presumably while Campanella wished to use the Condemnation to
discredit drawing on Aristotle and h s philosophy in theology, he was also con-
cerned not to attribute to Saint Thomas denying a proposition that was defide.
While the Condemnation thus held the attention of a rather famous Renais-
sance Dominican and served his philosophical and theological purposes, it does
not seem to have enjoyed like authority among some of the early members of
the new Society of Jesus. In his commentary on the ,,De anima", the Jesuit
Franciscus Toletus (* 1532/t 1596) takes up the question whether intellectual
souls are all equal among.themselves. One of the arguments for the negative is
an argument of the theologians, namely that it seems absurd to say that the soul
of Christ and the soul of a rustic are equal in substantial perfection. Toletus
then adds the consideration that it appears to have been defined in one of the
Parisian articles that it is an error to say that the soul of Christ is not nobler
than the soul of Judas. The conclusion of this argument for the negative is of
course that all souls are not equal129.
The reply that Toletus offers is that it is in fact not inconvenient to say that
the soul of Christ is equal to other souls as regards its substance, since it is
certain that in regard to its substance the soul of Christ is inferior to the angels
although by grace it exceeds every creature, including the angels, and does so
even in glory. As to the citation from the Condemnation of 1277, Toletus notes
that it is customary to reply that these articles do not pass over the Seine
(Sequana), which is the river of the Parisians. Moreover, it can be replied that
nothing was defined in this article regarding the soul of Christ and the soul of
Judas. As is clear from the article itself, only something in general (in genere) was
""bid. (ch. 4), 32-33.
12' h i d . (ch. 4), 51.
"8 Ibid. (ch. S), 54-55.
12V7ranciscusToletus, Commentaria in tres libros Aristotelis de anima, 111, q. 18 (Venice 1592),
f. 161vb.
Reverberations of the Condemnation of 1277 929
settled in the article. Moreover, in Toletus's judgment arguments (rat20ne.r)in the
articles from this university (presumably Paris), especially those stated obiter dicta,
are not part of the Catholic Faith. He also proposes that some souls are indeed
nobler than others not substantially but in accidental natural gifts like genius,
memory, judgment and the excellent proportion of the body on which these
gifts partly depend. But some souls are simply nobler by supernatural gifts that
also perfect nature1").
Toletus also makes reference to the Condemnation in his commentary on the
Pcimapars of the ,,Summa theologiae" of Aquinas. He presents as one argument
in favor of the view that there can be many angels under one species the fact
that the outstanding meeting of the dactores condemned by article 81 as error
that someone would state that angels could not be numerically many under the
same species since they are immaterial. He rejects any appeal to the authority
of great doctores like Saint Thomas. Indeed he holds a position on this topic that
is clearly opposed to that of Aquinasl".
And in the Coimbra commentaries on the ,,De anima", written during the
same period, the Jesuit authors take up the same question regarding the equality
of souls, a topic on which Toletus had commented. They quote the same con-
demned article, but do so at second-hand from Henry of Ghent and Durandus
of Saint-Pourqain. They then pretty much ignore it as a serious objection1". No
doubt Tempier would have been piqued at the indifference of the Jesuits in
regard to his solemn declaration.
Conclusion
We have presented here a collection of references to the Condemnation of
1277 by some thirty philosophers and theologians in the period from the issu-
ance of the Condemnation by Stephen Tempier to the end of the sixteenth
century. No claim has been made that this collection has mentioned all possible
authors I"'. In some cases the reference given appears to be the unique mention
of the Condemnation by the particular author in question. In other cases the
author uses the Condemnation with some frequency. Further study is of course
required to determine in a more nuanced fashion the actual usage of the Con-
demnation by individual philosophers and theologians. Although it would seem
imprudent to make any sweeping generalizations about the results of the present
survey, it is surely safe enough to note that particular topics recur in a wide
Ibid., f. 163va.
'" Franciscus Toletus, In Summam Theologiae S. Thomae Aquinatis enarratio, I, q. 50, a. 4 (Rome
1869), 437. See also q. 9, a. 2, where the Condemnation is again mentioned.
See Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu in tres libros de anima, 11, q. 5, a. 1
(Lyons 1604), 87 - 88.
""hose not include Taddeo Alderotti, Thomas BailIy, Joannes Capreolus, John of St. Thomas,
Thomas of Strasburg and Robert Holcot.
930 Edward I? hIahone!-

range of authors, for example, that of the ,,local presence" of angels. It is also
safe to say that the different authors appear to have differing motives for citing
the Condemnation, ranging from believing that they must do so for safety sake
to citing the Condemnation more as a ritual than as a respected authority un-
derpinning one's position. Noteworthy are the determination of the Franciscans
to have the Condemnation cover Saint Thomas even after Bishop Bourret with-
drew it as it touched on hlm and the equal determination of the Llomtnicans
to defend t h e ~ rsplrltual Brother. However ~t should be understood that the
Condemnation was also cited bv philosophers and theologians who were nelther
Dominicans nor Franciscans. Perhaps the most Interesting examples were H e n r ~ ,
Godfre~,Baconthorpe and P1coli4

"' T h ~ paper
s \\-as given in an earlier form at the S. I. R.P.AI. congress in Bonn in lc1--. It seetned
to he the only paper oil the Condemnation presented there. It \\-as gi\en again In an expanded
i i ~ r t nat a conference o n rhr Condernnar~onat Rrandeis Univers~t!. in the 1970's. The othcr
speakers werc Ldward GI-ant, ,Arthur HI man and John LIurdoch.