A.C. No.

7136 August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment 1 before the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."

In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:

He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene)
introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann")
Tantoco with whom he had three children.

After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene
had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you,"
"I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."

Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the
following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she
replied that she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.

In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the
second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.

On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and
respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left
the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her
personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.

Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on
its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his
wedding to Irene, reading:

My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer
for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.
 Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience
eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a
bigger plan for the two of us?

I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly
possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!

I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we
spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until
the life in me is gone and until we are together again.

Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime.
Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS

. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!

BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!

I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE
YOU'LL BE!"2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New
Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned
still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a
concert, she was pregnant.

In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter
was handwritten.

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as
they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September
2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at
the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their attendance was reported in Section
B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were
photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A
photocopy of the report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original;
CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

 4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as
alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship
was low profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families, and
that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known to be legally married
to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:

15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or
neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to
keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a
"piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the
very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as now
they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),

respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him
unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene
was not under scandalous circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne
as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special
friendship with Irene.

xxxx

5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by
calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted
handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper
was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The
Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family
(Article XV, Sec. 2).9

And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:

19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a
lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's
wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's
 marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied),

respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:

7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason
being thatunder the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and
low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor
tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule
138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene
named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as
Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the
father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's
Hospital.

Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated January 10, 2003 from
respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the
complainant's Reply."15 Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case
filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for adultery
against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.

During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were
adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine
complainant.17

After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently
proven.

The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1
of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading:

Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),

and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:

Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006
briefly reading:
 RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06

CBD Case No. 02-936

Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the
above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original)

Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
13922 of the Rules of Court.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-
word Resolution shows.

Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence
against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:

While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item
published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that
respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces
of evidence on record which support the accusation of complainant against respondent.

It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel
made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an
adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the
matter being [that]their relationship was low profile and known only to immediate members of their
respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the
complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect
to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."

These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a
"special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together
with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1")
sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent and Irene
which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it
should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was
the father of the child. Given the fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with
Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation
regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
 categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene,
"adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married
woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal
knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26 (Italics
supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."

In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,

a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which
are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated
otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of negative expression which carries with it in affirmation
or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an
admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with qualifying or
modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied,
it has been held that thequalifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is
admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter
Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a
"lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired
information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in
the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied
being the father of the child.

Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003
Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the
Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old
and a lawyer.31

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by
more than clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive
and credible than that of the other party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer.

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant
evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not,
under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A

member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme
Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting
cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other
disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a
ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts
hereinabove enumerated.

The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima
facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

under scandalous circumstances.34

The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase
"grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances is, following Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:

ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or,
shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife,
or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods.

an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman
elsewhere.

"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug
v. Rongcal:36

On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with
complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary
sanction. We disagree.

xxxx
 While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between
two unmarriedadults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is
not so with respect tobetrayals of the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital
relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifestsdeliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the
marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a
bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the
findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed
respondent has beencarrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct
and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This
detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor
and privileges which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:

I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do
solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I
will support its Constitution andobey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly
or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the
best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients;
and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:

Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.

In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision,
obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render
mutual help and support."40

Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law."

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP
Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition
for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against respondent and
Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending review before the
Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw
Petition for Review reads:

Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we
are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3,
2000, which provides that "notwithstanding the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may
withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution
shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)

That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a
lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. 44 In carrying on
an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null
and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to
state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the
DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the
Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City Prosecutor's
Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the
Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both
respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje conceded to complainant that she was going out
on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's
frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and
Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew
Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman.
Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home, after complainant had once more
confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit relationship involving both respondents.
This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New
Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange
marital vows with complainant.

It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and
that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said
address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held office. The happenstance that it was in
that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed
smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house,
 for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both
respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few
months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center.
What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of
the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of
the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for
both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the
father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves
the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if
respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in
court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:

x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which
merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in
disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in
trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they
mayproceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his
oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Chief Justice, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,

Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., concur.
A.C. No. 6057 June 27, 2006 A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a
real property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San
PETER T. DONTON, Complainant, Roque, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
vs.
ATTY. EMMANUEL O. TANSINGCO, Respondent. B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier a U.S. citizen
and thereby disqualified to own real property in his
DECISION name agreed that the property be transferred in the name
of Mr. Donton, a Filipino.
CARPIO, J.:
C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to
The Case prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition
of him being the actual owner of the property despite the
This is a disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. transfer of title in the name of Mr. Donton.
Tansingco ("respondent") for serious misconduct and deliberate
violation of Canon 1,1 Rules 1.012 and 1.023 of the Code of D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the
Professional Responsibility ("Code"). OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stiers free and
undisturbed use of the property for his residence and
The Facts business operations. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was
tied up with a loan which Mr. Stier had extended to Mr.
In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant") Donton.6
stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a
public document4 against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay Complainant averred that respondents act of preparing the
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the Occupancy Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign
Occupancy Agreement. national, is disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes
serious misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code.
The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter- Complainant prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to
charge for perjury5 against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit- do something in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a
complaint, stated that: dishonest scheme.

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that
prepared and notarized by me under the following complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the
circumstances: instigation of complainants counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A.
Alentajan,7 because respondent refused to act as complainants
witness in the criminal case against Stier and Maggay. Respondent
admitted that he "prepared and notarized" the Occupancy Agreement
and asserted its genuineness and due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In her Report dated 26 February 2004 ("Report"), Commissioner
Milagros V. San Juan ("Commissioner San Juan") of the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline found respondent liable for taking part
in a "scheme to circumvent the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of land in the Philippines." Commissioner San Juan
recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for
two years and the cancellation of his commission as Notary Public.
In Resolution No. XVI-2004-222 dated 16 April 2004, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted, with modification, the Report and recommended
respondents suspension from the practice of law for six months.
On 28 June 2004, the IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report
to the Court as provided under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B8 of the
Rules of Court.
On 28 July 2004, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before
the IBP. Respondent stated that he was already 76 years old and
would already retire by 2005 after the termination of his pending
cases. He also said that his practice of law is his only means of
support for his family and his six minor children.
In a Resolution dated 7 October 2004, the IBP denied the motion for
reconsideration because the IBP had no more jurisdiction on the case
as the matter had already been referred to the Court.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule
1.02 of the Code.
A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client
which will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold
and obey.9 A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or
who connives in violating the law commits an act which justifies
disciplinary action against the lawyer.10
By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen,
was disqualified from owning real property.11Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration,12 respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware
of the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainants name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents,13including the Occupancy Agreement,
that would guarantee Stiers recognition as the actual owner of the
property despite its transfer in complainants name. In effect,
respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional
prohibition against foreign ownership of lands14 by preparing said
documents.
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated
his oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the
Occupancy Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of
lands. Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an
unlawful end. Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for
which he may be suspended.15

In Balinon v. De Leon,16 respondent Atty. De Leon was suspended

from the practice of law for three years for preparing an affidavit that
virtually permitted him to commit concubinage. In In re:
Santiago,17 respondent Atty. Santiago was suspended from the
practice of law for one year for preparing a contract which declared
the spouses to be single again after nine years of separation and
allowed them to contract separately subsequent marriages.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.

Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

SECOND DIVISION
 FIDELA BENGCO AND TERESITA BENGCO, A.C. No. 6368 That sometime on or about the period from April 15,
Complainants, 1997 to July 22, 1997, Atty. Pablo Bernardo with the
-versus- help and in connivance and collusion with a certain
ATTY. PABLO S. BERNARDO, Andres Magat [wilfully] and illegally committed
Respondent. fraudulent act with intent to defraud herein
complainants Fidela G. Bengco and Teresita N.
Bengco by using false pretenses, deceitful words to
the effect that he would expedite the titling of the land
belonging to the Miranda family of Tagaytay City who
are the acquaintance of complainants herein and
they convinced herein complainant[s] that if they will
finance and deliver to him the amount of
[P]495,000.00 as advance money he would expedite
the titling of the subject land and further by means of
other similar deceit like misrepresenting himself as
lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer
of the subject land, who is the owner of Plastic City at
Canomay Street, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and he is
DECISION the one handling William Gatchalians business
transaction and that he has contracts at NAMREA,
DENR, CENRO and REGISTER OF DEEDS which
REYES, J.: representation he well knew were false, fraudulent
and were only made to induce the complainant[s] to
This is a complaint[1] for disbarment filed by complainants Fidela G. give and deliver the said amount ([P]495,000.00) and
Bengco (Fidela) and Teresita N. Bengco (Teresita) against once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with his obligation to expedite and cause
respondent Atty. Pablo Bernardo (Atty. Bernardo) for deceit, the titling of the subject land, [wilfully], unlawfully and
malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and violation illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted
of his duties and oath as a lawyer. the said amount to his personal use and benefit and
despite demand upon him to return the said amount,
The acts of the respondent which gave rise to the he failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute
deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member
instant complaint are as follows:
 of the Bar and Violation of Duties and Oath as a
lawyer.[2]
In support of their complaint, the complainants attached
thereto Resolutions dated December 7, 1998[3] and June 22, 1999[4] of
the Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sto. Tomas and
Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga and the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor of San Fernando, Pampanga, respectively, finding
probable cause for the filing of the criminal information[5] against both
Atty. Bernardo and Andres Magat (Magat) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 48, charging them
with the crime of Estafa punishable under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.
The respondent was required to file his Comment.[6] On September
24, 2004, the respondent filed an undated Comment, [7] wherein he
denied the allegations against him and averred the following:
2. He had not deceived both complainants between
the period from April 15, 1997 to July 22, 1997 for
purposes of getting from them the amount of
[P]495,000.00. It was Andy Magat whom they
contacted and who in turn sought the legal services
of the respondent. It was Andy Magat who received
the said money from them.
3. There was no connivance made and entered into
by Andy Magat and respondent. The arrangement for
titling of the land was made by Teresita N. Bengco
and Andy Magat with no participation of respondent.
4. The acceptance of the respondent to render his
legal service is legal and allowed in law practice.[8]
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.
On February 16, 2005, the IBP ordered the respondent to submit a
verified comment pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 6 of the Rules of
Court as it appeared that the respondents undated comment filed with
the Court was not verified.[9]
On March 15, 2005, respondent through counsel requested for an
additional fifteen (15) days from March 17, 2005, or until April 1, 2005,
within which to comply due to his medical confinement.[10]
Thereafter, on April 4, 2005, the respondent filed a second
motion[11] for extension praying for another 20 days, or until April 22,
2005, alleging that he was still recovering from his illness.
On August 3, 2005, the case was set for mandatory
conference.[12] The respondent failed to appear; thus, the IBP
considered the respondent in default for his failure to appear and for
not filing an answer despite extensions granted. The case was then
submitted for report and recommendation.[13]
 Based on the records of the case, Investigating
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala made the following
findings:
[O]n or before the period from 15 April 1997 to 22
July 1997, respondent with the help and in
connivance and collusion with a certain Andres
Magat (Magat), by using false pretenses and
deceitful words, [wilfully] and illegally committed
fraudulent acts to the effect that respondent would
expedite the titling of the land belonging to the
Miranda family of Tagaytay City, who were the
acquaintance of complainants.
Respondent and Magat convinced
complainants that if they finance and deliver to them
the amount of [P]495,000.00 as advance money, they
would expedite the titling of the subject
land. Respondent represented himself to be the
lawyer of William Gatchalian, the owner
of Plastic City located at Canomay Street,
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, who was allegedly the
buyer of the subject land once it has been
titled. Respondent and Magat also represented that
they have contacts at NAMREA, DENR, CENRO and
the Register of Deeds which representation they
knew to be false, fraudulent and were only made to
induce complainants to give and deliver to them the
amount of [P]495,000.00. Once in possession of the
said amount, far from complying with their obligation
to expedite and cause the titling of the subject land,
respondent and Magat [wilfully], unlawfully and
illegally misappropriated, misapplied and converted
the said amount to their personal use and benefit and
despite demand upon them to return the said
amount, they failed and refused to do so.
In view of the deceit committed by
respondent and Magat, complainants filed a
complaint for Estafa against the former before the
Third Municipal Circuit Trial Court, of Sto. Tomas and
Minalin, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. In the preliminary
investigation conducted by the said court, it finds
sufficient grounds to hold respondent and Magat for
trial for the crime of Estafa defined under par. 2(a) of
Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. The case was transmitted to the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga for
appropriate action as per Order dated 7 December
1998.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga conducted a
re-investigation of the case. During the re-
investigation thereof, Magat was willing to reimburse
to complainants the amount of [P]200,000.00
because according to him the amount of
[P]295,000.00 should be reimbursed by respondent
considering that the said amount was turned over to
respondent for expenses incurred in the
documentation prior to the titling of the subject
land. Both respondent and Magat requested for
several extensions for time to pay back their
obligations to the complainants. However, despite
extensions of time granted to them, respondent and
Magat failed to fulfil their promise to pay back their
obligation. Hence, it was resolved that the offer of
compromise was construed to be an implied
admission of guilt. The Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
believes that there was no reason to disturb the
findings of the investigating judge and an Information
for Estafa was filed against respondent and Magat on
8 July 1999 before the Regional Trial Court, San
Fernando, Pampanga.
The failure of the lawyer to answer the complaint for
disbarment despite due notice on several occasions
and appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his
flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and
illustrates his despiciency for his oath of office as a
lawyer which deserves disciplinary sanction x x x.
Resolution No. XVII-2007-065, viz:
From the facts and evidence presented, it could not
be denied that respondent committed a crime that
import deceit and violation of his attorneys oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility under both of
which he was bound to obey the laws of the
land. The commission of unlawful acts, specially
crimes involving moral turpitude, acts of dishonesty in
violation of the attorneys oath, grossly immoral
conduct and deceit are grounds for suspension or
disbarment of lawyers (Rule 138, Section 27, RRC).
The misconduct complained of took place in 1997
and complainants filed the case only on 16 April
2004. As provided for by the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission of Bar Discipline, as amended,
dated 24 March 2004, A complaint for disbarment,
suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in
two (2) years from the date of the professional
misconduct (Section 1, Rule VIII).[14]
The Investigating Commissioner recommended that:
x x x [R]espondent ATTY. PABLO A.
BERNARDO be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO
YEARS from receipt hereof from the practice of his
profession as a lawyer and as a member of the
Bar. [15]
On February 1, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors issued
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is
hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex
A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo is hereby
ordered, the restitution of the amount
of [P]200,000.00 within sixty (60) days from receipt
of notice with Warning that if he does not return the
amount with in sixty days from receipt of this Order
then he will be meted the penalty of Suspension
from the practice of law for one (1) year.[16]
On May 16, 2007, the respondent promptly filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[17] of the aforesaid Resolution of the IBP. The
respondent averred that: (1) the IBP resolution is not in accord with
the rules considering that the complaint was filed more than two (2)
years from the alleged misconduct and therefore, must have been
dismissed outright; (2) he did not commit any misrepresentation in
convincing Fidela to give him money to finance the titling of the land;
(3) he was hired as a lawyer through Magat who transacted with
Teresita as evidenced by a Memorandum of Agreement[18] signed by
the latter; (4) he was denied due process when the Investigating
Commissioner considered him as in default after having ignored the
representative he sent during the hearing on August 3, 2005; and (5)
he long restituted the amount of P225,000.00 not as an offer of
compromise but based on his moral obligation as a lawyer due to
Teresitas declaration that he had to stop acting as her legal counsel
sometime in the third quarter of 1997. The respondent pointed out the
admission made by Fidela in her direct testimony before the RTC that
she received the amount, as evidenced by photocopies of receipts.
In an Order[19] dated May 17, 2007 issued by the IBP, the complainant
was required to comment within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof.
In herComment,[20] Fidela explained that it took them quite some time
in filing the administrative case because they took into consideration
the possibility of an amicable settlement instead of a judicial
proceeding since it would stain the respondents reputation as a
lawyer; that the respondent went into hiding which prompted them to
seek the assistance of CIDG agents from Camp Olivas in order to
trace the respondents whereabouts; that the respondent was duly
accorded the opportunity to be heard; and finally, that no restitution of
the P200,000.00 plus corresponding interest has yet been made by
the respondent.
On June 21, 2008, Fidela filed a Manifestation [21] stating that the RTC
rendered a decision in the criminal case for Estafa finding the
accused, Atty. Bernardo and Magat guilty of conspiracy in the
commission of Estafa under Article 315 par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code and both are sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day
of Prision Mayoras minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of Reclusion Temporal as maximum.[22]
In a Letter[23] dated March 23, 2009, addressed to the IBP, Fidela
sought the resolution of the present action as she was already 86
years of age. Later, an Ex-parte Motion to Resolve the Case[24] dated
September 1, 2010 was filed by the complainants. In another Letter
dated October 26, 2011, Fidela, being 88 years old, sought for Atty.
Bernardos restitution of the amount of P200,000.00 so she can use
the money to buy her medicine and other needs.
The Court adopts and agrees with the findings and conclusions of the
IBP.
It is first worth mentioning that the respondents defense of
prescription is untenable. The Court has held that administrative
cases against lawyers do not prescribe. The lapse of considerable
time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of
a lawyer.Otherwise, members of the bar would only be emboldened to
disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact
that as long as no private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from
whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for.[25]
Further, consistent with his failure to file his answer after he
himself pleaded for several extensions of time to file the same, the
respondent failed to appear during the mandatory conference, as
ordered by the IBP. As a lawyer, the respondent is considered as an
officer of the court who is called upon to obey and respect court
processes. Such acts of the respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the courts authority which can not be
countenanced.
It can not be overstressed that lawyers are instruments in the
administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high
standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. In so doing,
the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is
ensured. Lawyers may be disciplined whether in their professional or
in their private capacity for any conduct that is wanting in morality,
honesty, probity and good demeanor.[26]
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to
be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal
business.
Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit
the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading,
deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or
legal services.
There is no question that the respondent committed the acts
complained of. He himself admitted in his answer that his legal
services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the
purported titling of land supposedly purchased. While he begs for the
Courts indulgence, his contrition is shallow considering the fact that
he used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants
into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject
properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money
given by the complainants in the amount of P495,000.00.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty
to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering
is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law
advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of
a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice should be the primary
consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.[27]
 conduct as an officer of the court.[30] (Citations
It is likewise settled that a disbarment proceeding is separate and omitted)
distinct from a criminal action filed against a lawyer despite having
involved the same set of facts. Jurisprudence has it that a finding of
As the records reveal, the RTC eventually convicted the
guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of
respondent for the crime of Estafa for which he was meted the penalty
liability in the administrative case. Conversely, the respondents
of sentenced to suffer six (6) years and one (1) day
acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively.[28]
of Prision Mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day
In Yu v. Palaa,[29] the Court held that: of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. Such criminal conviction clearly
undermines the respondents moral fitness to be a member of the
Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note Bar. Rule 138, Section 27 provides that:
that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a
class of their own. They are distinct from and they
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of
may proceed independently of criminal cases. A
attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A
criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial
member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
question even if the same facts and circumstances
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
are attendant in the administrative
any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in
proceedings. Besides, it is not sound judicial policy to
such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of
await the final resolution of a criminal case before a
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
complaint against a lawyer may be acted upon;
for any violation of the oath which he is required to
otherwise, this Court will be rendered helpless to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful
apply the rules on admission to, and continuing
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
membership in, the legal profession during the whole
without authority to do so.
period that the criminal case is pending final
disposition, when the objectives of the two
proceedings are vastly disparate. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no In view of the foregoing, this Court has no option but to
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken accord him the punishment commensurate to all his acts and to
and prosecuted solely for the public welfare and for accord the complainants, especially the 88-year old Fidela, with the
preserving courts of justice from the official
ministration of persons unfit to practice law. The justice they utmost deserve.
attorney is called to answer to the court for his
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty.
Pablo S. Bernardo is found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he isSUSPENDED from the practice of
law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon notice hereof.

Further, the Court ORDERS Atty. Pablo S.

Bernardo (1) to RETURN the amount of P200,000.00 to Fidela
Bengco and Teresita Bengco within TEN (10) DAYS from receipt of
this Decision and (2) to SUBMIT his proof of compliance thereof to the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant within TEN (10)
DAYS therefrom; with aSTERN WARNING that failure to do so shall
merit him the additional penalty of suspension from the practice of law
for one (1) year.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in his record as attorney and be

furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.