THE

TRANSFORMATION OF NATO AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CSDP:

BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION
Aleksander Siemaszko

North Atlantic Alliance was created, according to the famous quote of Lord Ismay, to
keep Russians out, Americans in and Germans down. The end of Cold War turned out to be
a major geopolitical overhaul: the bipolar confrontation ended, the Soviet block was dissolved
and Germany reunited; those changes created a strategic uncertainty and led to questions
about the future of NATO1. At the same time, the end of bipolar system prompted the
Member States of European Communities to reinvigorate the idea of a common foreign and
security policy, resulting with the creation of CFSP in 1992. It was still a far cry from a
coherent foreign policy lacking institutions, military instruments and a necessary degree of
political coordination2. However, it did acquire certain dynamism, leading to the breakthrough
St. Malo summit, during which France and Britain asserted their support for autonomous
European defence capabilities3. Following this declaration, EU Member States opted for the
creation of European Security and Defence Policy (later transformed into Common Security
and Defence Policy) during the Helsinki European Council in 1999.
How did the challenges and subsequent transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance
influence the creation and development of CSDP? To what degree is the evolution of NATO
and CSDP comparable? This paper will argue that development of European military
capabilities was influenced by the experiences and necessities following the transformation of
the Alliance. In the beginning, the challenges and subsequent NATO transformation will be
presented. In the second part of the paper the influence on the transformation will be
discussed in comparison with the developments of CSDP.

Post-Cold War Challenges

Gabriel Robin underlined a multi-faceted role of NATO: that of military alliance
aimed at deterring the Soviet threat, a political community aimed at strengthening the
transatlantic relations and an integrated military structure intent on binding and containing

1
A. Sens, The Changing Politics of European Security, [in:] S. Gnzle; A. Sens (eds.);The Changing Politics
of European Security. Europe Alone?,Basinstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. 9
2
M.R. Freire, The European Security and Defence Policy: History, Structures and Capabilities, [in:] M.
Merlingen, R. Ostrauskaite, European Security and Defence Policy. An Implementation Perspective, New York,
Routledge, 2008, pp. 10 11
3
Ibidem, p. 12
German military power4. After the end of Cold War, there was no Soviet threat to deter from.
Following the realist paradigm, NATO was bound to whither either disappear or, while
maintaining the bureaucratic structures, loose any significance 5 . Liberal institutionalists
claimed that NATO was in fact closer to a pluralist security community and that it
underlined the importance of shared ideas and values among transatlantic partners, as
reflected in article 2 of the Washington Treaty6. Nevertheless, the necessity of adaptation was
evident if the Alliance was to survive the end of Cold War. Though initially fuelled only by
post-Cold War transformation, this view was further reinforced in the light of the WTC
terrorist attack, highlighting the changing nature of threats NATO members had to face. As
Ivanov argues, NATO has undergone a transformation in three complementary aspects: it
implemented new missions, incorporated new members and gained new capabilities7.

NATO Three-Faceted Transformation

New missions undertaken by NATO unprecedented both in their operational nature
and geographical scope were adopted as a response to adverse consequences of instabilities
that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic
rivalries and territorial disputes 8 . At first, NATO has expanded its security tasks to
peacekeeping and crisis management in its immediate neighbourhood the Balkans.
Consequent peacekeeping of crisis response missions Deliberate Force, NATOs leading
role in IFOR, finally the operation Allied Force and subsequent long-term presence in the
form of KFOR established NATO as much more than just a military alliance and served as a
testimony to the changing perception of Alliances role. In stark contrast to Cold War
concentration on territorial defence, operation Allied Force was explicitly presented as a
humanitarian mission intent on ameliorating situation on the ground, protecting civilians
and restoring stability in the area9. In effect, wars in Yugoslavia and post-9/11 involvement in
operations such as ISAF or Ocean Protector blurred the lines between NATO territory and its
sphere of concern, and allowed it to transform into an organization with a wider role, which

4
G. Robin, A quoi sertlOTAN?, Politiquetrangre no. 1, 1995, p. 172
5
Z. Barany, R. Rauchhaus, Explaining NATO Resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?,
Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 32, no. 2, 2011, pp. 288 290
6
Ibidem, pp. 290 292
7
I.D. Ivanov, Transforming NATO. New Allies, Missions and Capabilities, Plymouth, Lexington Books,
2011,pp. xiv xv
8
North Atlantic Council, The Alliances New Strategic Concept, Rome, 7th November, 1991
9
P. Gallis, Kosovo: Learned Lessons from Operation Allied Force, CRS Report for Congress, 1999, p. 2
included also involvement in non-proliferation initiatives10.To adapt to those missions, the
Alliance had do develop new hard and soft capabilities11.
Shift from territorial defence towards peacekeeping and crisis response missions was
reflected in the NATO capabilities composition. While NATO repeatedly stresses the
importance of article 5 of the Treaty as the cornerstone of the alliance, its members
consequently reduced its Main Defence Forces, in turn strengthening the Immediate Rapid
Reaction Forces as well as Augmentation Forces12. The necessity of sustaining a long-term,
multinational peacekeeping operation led to the creation of Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) a swift, integrated (combining land, air and naval units) multi-purpose force
designed for operations outside NATO territory, mostly humanitarian relief and
peacekeeping 13 . Its creation contributed to further internal specialisation in NATO,
ameliorating the positions of smaller states which could not contribute to a conventional war
effort, but proved indispensable during long-term peacekeeping 14 . This group also
encompassed new Alliance members, admitted in 1999, 2004 and 2009, respectively.
Integration of new and old members was further strengthened after the adoption of Prague
Capabilities Commitment in 2002 and the creation of NATOR Response Force (NRF).
Designed in order to be engaged in operations of varied intensity, they were intent to provide
mobile response to crisis development and were used even in non-combat operations such as
Hurricane Katrina disaster relief mission in 200515.
Finally, NATO incorporated new allies most of them being former members of the
adversary block during the Cold War, the Warsaw Pact. The enlargement served multiple
purposes it reinforced the stability of young democracies; reflected on the new, global
nature of the Alliance and reinforced its newly acquired operational capabilities in the field of
peacekeeping and stabilization operations16. Furthermore, reflecting on the non-military role
of NATO as a transatlantic political community, enlargement can also be perceived as an
introduction to the process of socialisation for Central-Eastern European states: internalisation

10
M. Smith, Afghanistan in Context: NATO Out-of-area Debates in 1990s, UNISCI Discussion Papers, No.
22, 2010, p. 17
11
Ivanov, op.cit., p. 79
12
C. Wallander, Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War, International Organization,
Vol. 54, No. 4, 2000, p. 718
13
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The Combined Joint Task Forces Concept, Press Release, p.1
14
Ivanov, op. cit., p. 121
15
Ibidem, pp. 122 - 125
16
Ibidem,, pp. 155 156
of certain liberal-democratic principles and acknowledgement of their belonging to euro-
Atlantic community17.

NATOs global role and CSDP

One could argue that while the development of EUs Common Foreign and Security
Policy reflected the will to set an autonomous European policy vis--vis United States, the
birth of ESDP/CSDP was more of a result of policy failures on both sides of Atlantic.
Specifically, it was the failure of European states to react to the atrocities of war in
Yugoslavia and the reluctance of Americans to act either through a coalition of willing or
through existing structures of the Alliance that underlined the necessity for the development
of EUs own military capabilities18. While some Member States, notably France, perceived
CSDP as a cornerstone for autonomous lEurope de la defense, most EU members still
referred to US as a territorial security provider. Thus, an autonomous EU capacity would have
to fulfil the role that NATO would not undertake and assume primary responsibility for
ensuring peace, stability and respect of basic humanitarian principles in its neighbourhood19.
In the post-9/11 context, with NATO assuming a role in the global war on terror taking
responsibility for ISAF mission in Afghanistan, engaging in the maritime operation Allied
Protector and shifting a certain amount of its resources to non-proliferation there was a
persistent need for CSDP to fulfil stabilising role in European neighbourhood20. This resulted
in the emerging division of labour both a functional as well as geographical one21. Such a
division albeit a non-pronounced one is consistent with the European focus on asymmetric
threats: state failure, WMD proliferation, organized crime and the emphasis on non-military
aspects of security22. Retaining autonomous EU capacity of action in those areas was deemed
crucial in the face of growing American focus on non-European affairs.

17
F. Schimmelfennig, NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation, Security Studies, Vol.8, No. 2 3,
1998, p. 199
18
Freire, op.cit., p. 12
19
S. Biscop, NATO and the ESDP: Complementing of Competing?, [in:] S. Biscop; J. Lembke (eds.); EU
Enlargement & the Transatlantic Alliance. A Security Relationship in Flux, London, Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2008, p. 17
20
H. Haftendorn, From an Alliance of Commitment to an Alliance of Choice: the Adaption of NATO in a Time
of Uncertainty [in:].Gnzle; Sens (eds.); op. cit., pp. 165 - 166
21
R. Whitman, NATO, the EU and ESDP: an Emerging Division of Labour?, Contemporary Security Policy,
Vol. 25, No. 3, 2004, pp. 440 442
22
European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World.European Security Strategy, Brussels, 2003, pp. 4 7
 Thus, EU undertook a complementary role to NATO, following certain devolution of
missions23. A number CSDP operations followed previous NATO engagements (Concordia,
Althea) or were developed parallel to EUPOL Afghanistan pursuing civilian goals along
NATOs military ones. CSDP NATO cooperation was conducted inside the Berlin Plus
agreement framework assuring EU access to Alliances planning and operational capabilities
as well as establishing the possibility of DSCAUER serving as an operations commander for
CSDP missions24. However, those arrangements gave United States a de facto veto power
over EU military missions eroding the possibility of developing a true two-pillar structure
and rendering EUs comparative advantage in peacekeeping or stabilisation missions
irrelevant without further development of European capabilities25.

Development of European capabilities: following NATO path?

Operation Allied Force exposed the deepening US European capabilities gap and
threatened to diminish European influence in the Alliance 26 . Thus, as Posen argues,
establishing CSDP can initially be perceived as an expression of European soft balancing
against United States, an instrument designed to enable EU Member States operate outside the
constrains of the US-dominated NATO27. While American consent to the development of
EUs security and defence policy rested on Albrights three-Ds: no decoupling, no
duplication and no discrimination, early measures to launch a coordination mechanism along
the Berlin Plus agreement met little success28. This failure can at least be partially attributed
to strained transatlantic relationship at the time of growing divergences on the Iraqi war.
Still, there is an obvious similarity in the development of EU and NATO rapid
reaction capabilities. As Ivanov points out, the evolution of the EFRRF and, to a certain
degree, the EU Battlegroups followed a pattern somewhat similar to NATOs CJTFs and
NRF29. This can be explained, similarly to NATOs capability development, by the evolution
of CSDPs goals. While initially EU missions were primary of policing or peacekeeping
nature, CSDP capabilities evolved along the lines of widening scope of responsibility. The

23
H.Ojanen, EU-NATO Relations After the Cold War, [in:] J. Hanhimakiet. al (eds.), The Routledge
Handbook of Transatlantic Security, New York, Routledge, p. 187
24
J. Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p.
102
25
Biscop, op. cit., p. 19
26
Haftendorn, op.cit., p. 170
27
B.Posen, European Union Defence Policy: A Response to Unipolarity?,Security Studies, Vol. 15, No. 2,
2006, pp. 151 153
28
G. Cascone, ESDP operations and NATO, [in:], Merlingen, Ostrauskaite,op.cit., p. 153
29
I vanov, op. cit., p. 147
Lisbon Treaty states that CSDP tasks, whether pursued by civilian or military means, were to
include humanitarian and rescue operations, crisis management and peacekeeping as well as
an array of security sector reform and disarmament missions30. Those tasks require a high
level of interoperability and the ability to deploy troops swiftly if the need arises. They have
also led to calls for further development of the civilian crisis management instruments.
Development of European capabilities corresponds with the growing American calls
for a fair division of labour and strengthening NATO EU cooperation. Though secretary
Gates warned of a two-tier Alliance, in which members begin to specialise in soft and hard
aspects of security, there also persists an understanding for the need for EU and NATO to
share the stage31. This view is further reinforced by the largely overlapping membership
after the subsequent waves of enlargement 21 of 27 EU Member States are also Alliance
members. Admittance of new members and their subsequent involvement in CSDP agenda
setting strengthened the Atlanticist strain in EU, facilitating NATO CSDP cooperation32.
Arguably, it would not be possible without the precedent being set by the 1999 NATO
enlargement, dissolving the security limbo in Central-Eastern Europe.

Summary: towards division of labour?

Development of North Atlantic Alliance the challenges it had to face and the subsequent
evolution of NATO had influenced the creation and evolution of EUs CSDP. It should
come as no surprise since NATO retains its main role as the forum for transatlantic
consultations and the American question was present in every major debate on the topic of
European autonomous military capabilities. Though the relationship between those two
organisations should not be overestimated, it is possible to argue that a certain division of
labour pattern is emerging. It is visible given the new course of restrained American foreign
policy and the calls for refocusing NATO on territorial defence issues. In that case, CSDP
might further follow the blueprint set by the Alliance transformation incorporation of new
missions and flexible capabilities, as well as strengthening a comprehensive, civilian-military
approach. However, differences would still probably persist especially given the regional

30
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, Luxembourg, Publishing Office of the European
Union 2010, art.43 (1).
31
L. Michel, NATO and the United States, [in:] S. Biscop, R. Whitman, The Routledge Handbook of
European Security, New York, Routledge, 2013, pp. 256 259
32
S. Biscop, J. Lembke, EuropeanEnlargement and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, [in:] Biscop, Sven;
Lembke, Johan (eds.); EU Enlargement & the Transatlantic Alliance. A Security Relationship in Flux, London,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008 p. 177
role played by the EU, as opposed to the global superpower role played by the US, the
American pillar of NATO.
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