[G.R. No. 133917. February 19, 2001] Precinct No.
Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City, received an information
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMAT @ BOBONG
and GREGORIO MULA y MALAGURA @
BOBOY, accused-appellants.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the
Constitution in the name of protecting the society from
lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and
to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom
and liberty depend.[1]
For automatic review is the Decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No.
37,264-96, finding accused-appellants Nasario Molina y
Manamat alias Bobong and Gregorio Mula
Malagura alias Boboy, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Section 8,[3] of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972
(Republic Act No. 6425), as amended by Republic Act No.
7659,[4] and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty
of death.
The information against accused-appellants reads:
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, in conspiracy with each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grams of
dried marijuana which are prohibited.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-
appellants pleaded not guilty to the accusation against
them.[6] Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented
Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y.
Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as
witnesses.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon,
then a member of the Philippine National Police detailed at
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the
regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in assailed decision,[18] the decretal portion of which reads:
Davao City.[7] The first time he came to see the said
marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone
July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer
without any evidence from both accused who waived
when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the
presentation of their own evidence through their counsels,
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the
more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused of
pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon
the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to
had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover,
Sec. 20, sub. par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO
the names and addresses of the accused-appellants came
MOLINA and GREGORIO MULA, are sentenced to suffer a
to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were
SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through lethal injection under
arrested.[8]
Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as
therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep.
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1
Paguidopon received an information that the alleged Act 7659.
pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City any time
that morning.[9] Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to
same day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. immediately elevate the entire records of this case with
3, Matina, Davao City, which immediately dispatched the the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, for the
team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team leader), SPO2 automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and
Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1 its appropriate action as the case may be.
Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon where they would wait for the alleged pusher
to pass by.[10] SO ORDERED.[19]
y
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996,
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code and
while the team were positioned in the house of SPO1
Rule 122, Section 10 of the Rules of Court, the case was
Paguidopon, a trisikad carrying the accused-appellants
elevated to this Court on automatic review. Accused-
passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to
appellants contend:
the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the
team boarded their vehicle and overtook the trisikad. I.
[11]
SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters
from where the accused-appellants were accosted.[12]
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
The police officers then ordered the trisikad to FOR HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF
stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was APPELLANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AGAINST
holding a black bag handed the same to accused-appellant UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself
as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to
II.
open the bag.[13] Molina replied, Boss, if possible we will
settle this.[14] SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag,
which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE
accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by GOVERNMENT HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR
the police officers.[15] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through
counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to Evidence, contending III.
that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is
inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, THE
searches and seizures.[16] The demurrer was denied by the IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF SEC. 8 OF RA
trial court.[17] A motion for reconsideration was filed by No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY
accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused- AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE
appellants waived presentation of evidence and opted to IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.[20]
file a joint memorandum.
 The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion
(In Lieu of Brief), wherein he prayed for the acquittal of
both accused-appellants.
The fundamental law of the land mandates that
searches and seizures be carried out in a reasonable
fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search
warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable
cause. The pertinent provision of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.[21]
Complementary to the foregoing provision is the
exclusionary rule enshrined under Article III, Section 3,
paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures.[22] Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a
form of words, valueless and undeserving of mention in a
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties; so too,
without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from
its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Courts high
regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.[23]
The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is
not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom
may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search
incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure
of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself
waives his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures;[24] and (6) stop and frisk situations (Terry search).
[25]
The first exception (search incidental to a lawful
arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure
pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must
precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made
--- the process cannot be reversed. [26] As a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible
warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just
been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that
the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected
in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest
of escaped prisoners).[27]
In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its
judgment of conviction on a finding that the warrantless
arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search
conducted by the peace officers, are valid because
accused-appellants were caught in flagrante delicto in
possession of prohibited drugs.[28] This brings us to the issue
of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and
seizure in the present case fall within the recognized
exceptions to the warrant requirement.
In People v. Chua Ho San,[29] the Court held that in
cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person
when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must
have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case
law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. As discussed in People v. Doria,[30]probable
cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the
suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty
of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled
that reliable information alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and
within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient
to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People v. Aminnudin,[31] it
was held that the accused-appellant was not, at the
moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown
that he was about to do so or that he had just done
so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the
M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that
called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of
the other passengers innocently disembarking from the
vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the
carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension.
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,[32] the Court did not
consider eyes... darting from side to side ... [while] holding
... [ones] abdomen, in a crowded street at 11:30 in the
morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to
arouse suspicion and indicative of probable
cause. According to the Court, [b]y no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts
that an offense had just been committed, or was actually
being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the
arresting officers] presence. So also, in People v. Encinada,
[33]
the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from
the act of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby
chairs.
Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,[34] the trial
court concluded that petitioner was attempting to commit
a crime as he was standing at the corner of Plaza Miranda
and Quezon Boulevard with his eyes moving very fast and
looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to
them.[35] In declaring the warrantless arrest therein illegal,
the Court said:
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante
delicto ... arrest preceding the search in light of the lack of
personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer,
or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.[36]
It went on to state that -
Second, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or
conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere
suspicion other than that his eyes were moving very fast -
an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his
teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was
already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his
companions were merely standing at the corner and were
not creating any commotion or trouble...
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to
believe that petitioner was armed with a deadly
weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the
alleged grenade was discovered inside the front waistline
of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance
between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming
that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not
have been visible to Yu.[37]
 Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he
has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.[38]
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no
outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could
not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or
have committed a crime. It matters not that accused-
appellant Molina responded Boss, if possible we will settle
this to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag. Such
response which allegedly reinforced the suspicion of the
arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing
a crime, is an equivocal statement which standing alone
will not constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante
delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but
merely pointed accused-appellants to the arresting
officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of
any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his
informer conducted a surveillance of accused-appellant
Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, admitted that he only
learned Mulas name and address after the arrest. What is
more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized
accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before
the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once,
pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on the
side of the road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-
appellant Mula, considering that the latter was then driving
a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of
him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before
the arrest.
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew
the name of accused-appellants even before the arrest, to
wit -
Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag
to another person and how did you know that it
was Mula who handed the black bag to another
person?
A- Because I have already information from
Paguidopon, regarding Mula and Molina, when
they pass by through the street near the
residence of Paguidopon. He told that the one
who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the thin
one is Nazario Molina[39]
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona,
therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1 Pamplona could not
have learned the name of accused-appellants from SPO1
Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly
conducted the surveillance, was not even aware of
accused-appellants name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer
of the arresting officers, more so the arresting officers
themselves, could not have been certain of accused-
appellants identity, and were, from all indications, merely
fishing for evidence at the time of the arrest.
Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting
officer in the said case knew appellant Encinada even
before the arrest because of the latters illegal gambling
activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on
the arrest effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the
Court declared in said case that the warrantless arrest and
the consequent search were illegal, holding that [t]he
prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious behavior
when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he
rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a
felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under
such bare circumstances.[40]
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-
appellants waived their right against unreasonable searches
and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the search, if there
was any, could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or coercive
circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all
within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.[41]
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-
appellants does not fall under the exceptions allowed by
the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the
peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against
accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with no
choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of
the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this drive,
all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must
not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of
individuals as guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which
protection extends even to the basest of criminals.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Davao City, Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack of evidence to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias Bobong and
Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias Boboy, are ACQUITTED and
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless they are validly
detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1]
Dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067, 1105
[1976].
[2]
Dated April 25, 1997, Rollo, pp. 11-24.
[3]
Sec. 8. - Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the
provisions of Section 20 hereof.
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and
Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. -
The penalties for offenses under Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is
in any of the following quantities:
5) 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;
xxxxxxxxx
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the forgoing
quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua depending
upon the quantity.
[4]
An Act Imposing the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous
Crimes.4
[5]
Filed on August 10, 1996; Rollo, p. 7.
[6]
Records, p. 14.
[7]
TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 2-4.
[8]
TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 7-9.
[9]
Id., pp. 10 and 18.
[10]
TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 4-5 (Direct examination of
SPO1 Pamplona).
[11]
TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 5-6.
[12]
TSN, November 14, 1996, pp. 14-15
[13]
TSN, November 26, 1996, pp. 6-8.
[14]
Id., p. 14.14
[15] [31]
Id., p. 9. 163 SCRA 402, 409-410 [1988].
[16] [32]
Records, pp. 32-37. 210 SCRA 174, 179-180 [1992]
[17] [33]
Records, pp. 39-43. 280 SCRA 72, 86-87 [1997].
[18] [34]
Penned by Judge Renato A. Fuentes. 283 SCRA 159 [1997].
[19] [35]
Decision, Rollo, p. 24 Id., at 169.
[20] [36]
Rollo, p. 40. Id., at 175
[21] [37]
Constitution, Article III, Section 2. Id., at 178.
[22] [38]
People v. Chua Ho San, 308 SCRA 432, 443 [1999]. Concurring Opinion of Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 720 (1999).
[23]
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. ed. 2d
[39]
1081, 1090 [1961]. TSN, November 26, 1996, p. 7.
[24] [40]
People v. Doria, 301 SCRA 668, 705 [1999]; citing People v. Encinada, supra.
Hizon v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 517, 527 [1996]; [41]
People v. Fernandez, 239 SCRA 174, 182-183 [1994]; Id., at 91; citing Aniag v. Commission on Elections, 237
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687, 697 [1986]; Bernas, The SCRA 424, 436-437 [1994].
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, p. 169
[1996]; Cruz, Constitutional Law, pp. 147-153 [1986];
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 126, Section 12,
and Rule 113, Section 5; People v. Bagista, 214 SCRA 63, 69
[1992]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA 122, 126-128
[1991]; Roldan, Jr. v. Arca, 65 SCRA 336, 348 [1975];
Papa v. Mago, 22 SCRA 857, 871-874 [1968];
People v. Tabar, 222 SCRA 144, 153 [1993]; Alvarez v. CFI,
64 Phil. 33, 48 [1937]; and People v. Kagui Malasugui, 63
Phil. 221, 226 [1936].
[25]
People v. Chua Ho San, supra.; citing Terry v. Ohio, 20 L
Ed 2d, 896 adopted in Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188
SCRA 288 [1990]; and People v. Ramos, 222 SCRA 557
[1993].
[26]
Id., at 449; citing Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA
159 , 175 [1997].
[27]
Id., at 444; and the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure (as amended), Rule 113, Section 5.
[28]
Decision, Rollo, p. 22.
[29]
People v. Chua Ho San, supra.; citing People v. Burgos,
144 SCRA 1 [1986]; People v. Encinada, 280 SCRA 72
[1997]; People v. Montilla, 285 SCRA 703 [1998];
People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 646 [1988]; People v. Maspil,
Jr., 188 SCRA 751 [1988]; People v. Lo Ho Wing, 193 SCRA
122 [1991]; People v. Tangliben 184 SCRA 220 [1990];
Posadas v. Court of Appeals, 188 SCRA 288 [1990];
People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 [1991].
[30]
People v. Doria, supra.; citing Umil v. Ramos, 202 SCRA
251, 263 [1991]; United States v. Santos, 36 Phil. 851
[1917]; People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 97 [1990];
People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388 [1990] and People v. Ramos
186 SCRA 184 [1990].