Cosnti

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES
ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW
BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

LAWYERS LEAGUE V. AQUINO
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1
announcing that she and Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino
government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the
New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs
to the realm of politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:

The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the
entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
IN RE:BERMUDEZ
Facts:
In a petition for declaratory relief with no respondents, petitioner asked the court if
the provision of the Section 5 Article XVIII of the 1986 Constitution, to wit: The six-
year term of the incumbent President and Vice-President elected in the February 7,
1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of elections, hereby extended to
noon of June 30, 1992, refers to the then-incumbent President Corazon Aquino and
Vice-President Salvador Laurel or the previously-elected President Ferdinand E.
Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino.
After the election of February 7, 1986 where Marcos and Tolentino were declared the
winners, Aquino and Laurel were installed into the position last February 25, 1986
after the infamous People Power Revolution. The next regular election for the
President and Vice-President was held last May 2, 1992.
Issue:
Whether the aforecited article applies to the then-incumbent President and Vice-
President, or the previously elected President and Vice-President.
1 - SANCHEZ ROMAN 17 - 18 1
Held:
The petition was hereby dismissed outright for:
1. Lack of jurisdiction. Court has no jurisdiction over petition for declaratory relief.
Rules of Court states that it is the RTC (Regional Trial Courts) who has the
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief. Also, incumbent Presidents are
immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure.
2. Lack of cause of action on the part of petitioner. Petitioner had no personality to
use, and his allegation was manifestly gratuitous. The legitimacy of the Aquino
government was not a justiciable matter. It belongs to the realm of politics where only
the people of the Philippines are the judge, and the people have made judgment.
DE LEON V. ESGUERRA
Facts: On May 17, 1982, petitioner Alfredo M. De Leon was elected Barangay
Captain together with the other petitioners as Barangay Councilmen of Barangay
Dolores, Muncipality of Taytay, Province of Rizal in a Barangay election held under
Batas PambansaBlg. 222, otherwise known as Barangay Election Act of 1982.
On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated

December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on
February 8, 1987 designating respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain
of Barangay Dolores and the other respondents as members of Barangay Council of
the same Barangay and Municipality.
Petitoners prayed to the Supreme Court that the subject Memoranda of February 8,
1987 be declared null and void and that respondents be prohibited by taking over their
positions of Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen.
Petitioners maintain that pursuant to Section 3 of the Barangay Election Act of 1982
(BP Blg. 222), their terms of office shall be six years which shall commence on June
7, 1988 and shall continue until their successors shall have elected and shall have
qualified. It was also their position that with the ratification of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, respondent OIC Governor no longer has the authority to replace them
and to designate their successors.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the terms of office of elective and
appointive officials were abolished and that petitioners continued in office by virtue
of Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution and not because their term of six years
had not yet expired; and that the provision in the Barangay Election Act fixing the
term of office of Barangay officials to six years must be deemed to have been
repealed for being inconsistent with Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the Provisional Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the designation of respondents to replace petitioners was validly
made during the one-year period which ended on Feb 25, 1987.
Ruling: Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov
on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay
Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.
The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the
Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become
inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to
designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly,
Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:
"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years x xx."
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore,
the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should
still govern.
TAADA VS. TUVERA
FACTS:
Petitioners invoked the people's right to be informed on matters of public

concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine
Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that for laws to be valid and enforceable, it
must be published in the Official Gazette. Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the
Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Respondents contend that petitioners have no legal personality or standing and

that the publication in the Official Gazette is not a requirement for the laws to be
effective when the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not laws or statutes are required to be published in the Official

Gazette before it becomes valid and enforceable.
RULING:
Yes, publication is necessary. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity.
Also, the clear object of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions
and conduct as citizens.
The very first clause of above provision reads, there shall be published in the Official
Gazette... The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general

applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official

Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
JUDICIAL ELABORATION OF THE CONSTITUTION
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM
FACTS:
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government, decided
to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of
respondent Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC). The winning bidder, or the eventual
strategic partner, will provide management expertise or an international
marketing/reservation system, and financial support to strengthen the profitability and
performance of the Manila Hotel.
In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and RenongBerhad, a
Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Prior to
the declaration of RenongBerhard as the winning bidder, petitioner Manila Prince
Hotel matched the bid price and sent a managers check as bid security, which GSIS
refused to accept.
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the
sale may be consummated with RenongBerhad, petitioner filed a petition before the
Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
RULING:
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision which lays down
a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative
without the aid of supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies
sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is
self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right

conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can
be determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. Unless it is
expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-
executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead
of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically
nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing
laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require
any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that in the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,
it means just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be
maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the
subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a
right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibiremedium.
PAMATONG VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
GR No. 161872
April 13, 2004
FACTS
When the petitioner, Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong, filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for Presidency, the Commision on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give
the petition its due course. Pamatong requested a case for reconsideration. However,
the COMELEC again denied his request. The COMELEC declared Pamatong, along
with 35 other people, as nuisance candidates, as stated in the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC noted that such candidates could not wage a nationwide campaign
and/or are either not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered
political party with national constituency.
Pamatong argued that this was against his right to equal access to
opportunities for public service, citing Article 2, Section 26 of the Constitution, and
that the COMELEC was indirectly amending the Constitution in this manner.
Pamatong also stated that he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates and supported the statement with his legal qualifications, his alleged
capacity to wage national and international campaigns, and his government platform.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not COMELECs refusal of Pamatongs request for

presidential candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the
right to equal access to opportunities for public service.
HELD
1. Whether or not COMELECs refusal of Pamatongs request for presidential

candidacy, along with the grounds for such refusal, violate the right to equal
access to opportunities for public service. NO
The Court noted that the provisions under Article 2 are generally considered
not-self executing. As such, the provision in section 26, along with the other policies
in the article, does not convey any judicially enforceable rights. Article 2 merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action by presenting
ideals/standards through the policies presented.
Article 2, Section 26 recognizes a privilege to run for public office, one that is
subject to limitations provided by law. As long as these limitations are enforced
without discrimination, then the equal access clause is not violated. The Court
justified the COMELECs need for limitations on electoral candidates given the
interest of ensuring rational, objective, and orderly elections. In the absence of any
limitations, the election process becomes a mockery if anyone, including those who
are clearly unqualified to hold a government position, is allowed to run.
Note:
Pamatong presented other evidence that he claims makes him eligible for
candidacy. The Court however stated that it is not within their power to make such
assessments.
TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT

OF APPEALS
527 SCRA 746 G.R. No. 167324
Facts:
1. In 1999, the DOH launched the Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA). It
provided for five general areas of reform:
A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;
B. Secure funding for priority public health programs;
C. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its

effective performance;
D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;
E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program

(NHIP)
F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued

Executive Order No. 102, entitled Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health, which provided for the
changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the
DOH. Under the assailed executive order, the DOH refocused its
mandate from being the sole provider of health services to being a
provider of specific health services and technical assistance, as a result
of the devolution of basic services to local government units.
G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda

(HSRA) Philippines 1999-2004 of the Department of Health (DOH);
and Executive Order No. 102, Redirecting the Functions and
Operations of the Department of Health,
H. The Court of Appeals ruled that the HSRA cannot be declared void for
violating Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II; Section 1 of
Article III; Sections 11 and 14 of Article XIII; and Sections 1 and 3(2)
of Article XV, all of the 1987 Constitution, which directly or indirectly
pertain to the duty of the State to protect and promote the peoples
right to health and well-being. It reasoned that the aforementioned
provisions of the Constitution are not self-executing; they are not
judicially enforceable constitutional rights and can only provide
guidelines for legislation.
I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is

detrimental to the health of the people cannot be made a justiciable
issue. The question of whether the HSRA will bring about the
development or disintegration of the health sector is within the realm
of the political department.
Issue:
Whether or not the HSRA and EO NO. 102 violates the constitution?
Held:
The Court finds the present petition to be without merit.
1. As a general rule, the provisions of the Constitution are considered self-
executing, and do not require future legislation for their enforcement. For if
they are not treated as self-executing, the mandate of the fundamental law can
be easily nullified by the inaction of Congress. However, some provisions
have already been categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing.
Some of the constitutional provisions invoked in the present case were taken
from Article II of the Constitution specifically, Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15
and 18 the provisions of which the Court categorically ruled to be non self-
executing in the aforecited case of Taada v. Angara, wherein the Court
specifically set apart the sections as non self-executing and ruled that such
broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented.
Moreover, the records are devoid of any explanation of how the HSRA
supposedly violated the equal protection and due process clauses that are
embodied in Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. There were no
allegations of discrimination or of the lack of due process in connection with
the HSRA. Since they failed to substantiate how these constitutional
guarantees were breached, petitioners are unsuccessful in establishing the
relevance of this provision to the petition, and consequently, in annulling the
HSRA.
2. Even granting that these alleged errors were adequately proven by the
petitioners, they would still not invalidate Executive Order No. 102. Any
serious legal errors in laying down the compensation of the DOH employees
concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular

No. 312, Series of 2000. Likewise, any questionable appointments or transfers
are properly addressed by an appeal process provided under Administrative
Order No. 94, series of 2000; and if the appeal is meritorious, such
appointment or transfer may be invalidated. The validity of Executive Order
No. 102 would, nevertheless, remain unaffected. Settled is the rule that courts
are not at liberty to declare statutes invalid, although they may be abused or
disabused, and may afford an opportunity for abuse in the manner of
application. The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its
general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the end desired, not from its
effects in a particular case. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
clearly states: [T]he president shall have control of all executive departments,
bureaus and offices. Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10 of Executive Order No.
292, also known as the Administrative Code of 1987. It is an exercise of the
Presidents constitutional power of control over the executive department,
supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other
statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court.
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE

NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the
date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract
for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance
and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April.
However, respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on May.
Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19,
1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served
only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of nine
(9) months and twenty-three (23) days.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to the NLRC to
question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole
issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.
Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying
the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he
questioned the constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari
with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge against the subject clause. CA affirmed the
NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to
wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x xx In case of termination of overseas

employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of
petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the
unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract or a total of
US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in

addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23
more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire nine months and 23
days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00
Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the
entire unexpired portion of his 12-month employment contract, and not just for a
period of three months?
2.) Should petitioners overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the
computation of his monetary award, because these are fixed benefits that have been
stipulated into his contract?
Held:
1.) Yes.Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at the rate of
US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042
is declared unconstitutional.
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment
who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of the computation of their money
claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their
contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject
clause, illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their
employment contract have since been differently treated in that their money claims are subject
to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-term
employment.
The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that,
in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally
discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of
one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers
with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and
burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive
due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any
existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is
entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his
employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No.
8042.
2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a
Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as the basic wage,
exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for
all work performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for
any work performed on designated rest days and holidays.
By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of
overtime and holiday pay in the computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is
evidence that he performed work during those periods.
JOSE ANGARA VS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,

MIGUEL CASTILLO, AND DIONISIO MAYOR
September 23, 2011
Facts:In the elections of Sept 17, 1935, Angara, and the respondents, Pedro Ynsua et
al. were candidates voted for the position of member of the National Assembly for the
first district of the Province of Tayabas. On Oct 7, 1935, Angara was proclaimed as
member-elect of the NA for the said district. On November 15, 1935, he took his oath
of office. On Dec 3, 1935, the NA in session assembled, passed Resolution No. 8
confirming the election of the members of the National Assembly against whom no
protest had thus far been filed. On Dec 8, 1935, Ynsua, filed before the Electoral
Commission a Motion of Protest against the election of Angara. On Dec 9, 1935,
the EC adopted a resolution, par. 6 of which fixed said date as the last day for the
filing of protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
NA, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the NA. Angara filed a
Motion to Dismiss arguing that by virtue of the NA proclamation, Ynsua can no
longer protest. Ynsua argued back by claiming that EC proclamation governs and that
the EC can take cognizance of the election protest and that the EC cannot be subject
to a writ of prohibition from the SC.
ISSUES: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction over such matter.
Whether or not EC acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
the election protest.
HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Angara. The SC emphasized that in cases of conflict
between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary, with
the SC as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to
resolve the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate
cases and controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency
of the government transcends the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific
powers and functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to
the legislative than to any of the other two departments of the government.
That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
COCOFED V. REPUBLIC
Case Digest GR 177857-58 Jan 24 2012
Facts:
In 1971, RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The
copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed at
the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers having
the largest membership.
When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to improve
the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and declared
the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of
coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance the
operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
In 1973, PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the
growth and development of the coconut and palm oil industry.
Then came P.D. No. 755 in July 1975, providing under its Section 1 the policy to
provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates.
Towards achieving this, Section 2 of PD 755 authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and
the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy
collections in said bank, interest free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank
has attained a certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. It also decreed that all
levies PCA is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or
fiduciary funds or form part of the general funds of the government.
Both P.D. Nos. 961 and 1468 also provide that the CCSF shall not be construed by
any law as a special and/or trust fund, the stated intention being that actual
ownership of the said fund shall pertain to coconut farmers in their private
capacities.
Shortly before the issuance of PD 755 however, PCA had already bought from
PepingCojuangco 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB / UCPB. In that
contract, it was also stipulated that DandingCojuanco shall receive equity in FUB
amounting to 10%, or 7.22 % of the 72.2%, as consideration for PCAs buy-out of
what DandingConjuanco claim as his exclusive and personal option to buy the FUB
shares.
The PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount for the purchase of the said
72.2% equity. It later reimbursed itself from the coconut levy fund.
While the 64.98% (72.2 % 7.22%) portion of the option shares ostensibly pertained
to the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing the
farmers equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however,
shares forming part of the 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of non-
farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of
the agreements.
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to
various projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments. Of
particular relevance to this was their use to acquire the FUB / UCPB, and the
acquisition by UCPB, through the CIIF and holding companies, of a large block of
San Miguel Corporation (SMC) shares.
Issue 1: W/N the mandate provided under PD 755, 961 and 1468 that the CCSF shall
not be construed by any law as a special and/or trust fund is valid
No. The coconut levy funds can only be used for the special purpose and the balance
thereof should revert back to the general fund.
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution provides that all money collected on
any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund and paid out
for such purpose only, and if the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general
funds of the Government. Here, the CCSF were sourced from forced exactions with
the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry. Therefore, the subsequent
reclassification of the CCSF as a private fund to be owned by private individuals in
their private capacities under P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 is unconstitutional.
Not only is it unconstitutional, but the mandate is contrary to the purpose or policy for
which the coco levy fund was created.
Issue 2:
W/N the coco levy fund may be owned by the coconut farmers in their private
capacities
No. The coconut levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose. They cannot be used to purchase shares of stocks to be given for free
to private individuals. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised
by special means, it is still public in character.
Accordingly, the presidential issuances which authorized the PCA to distribute, for
free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers under such
rules and regulations the PCA may promulgate is unconstitutional.
It is unconstitutional because first, it have unduly delegated legislative power to the
PCA, and second, it allowed the use of the CCSF to benefit directly private interest by
the outright and unconditional grant of absolute ownership of the FUB/UCPB shares
paid for by PCA entirely with the CCSF to the undefined coconut farmers, which
negated or circumvented the national policy or public purpose declared by P.D. No.
755.
Hence, the so-called Farmers shares do not belong to the coconut farmers in their
private capacities, but to the Government. The coconut levy funds are special public
funds and any property purchased by means of the coconut levy funds should likewise
be treated as public funds or public property, subject to burdens and restrictions
attached by law to such property.
TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Petitioner, v. LA TRINIDAD

WATER DISTRICT, Respondent.
FACTS:
On 9 October 2000, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the

National Water Resources Board (NWRB) an application for a certificate of public
convenience (CPC) to operate and maintain a waterworks system in Barangay
Tawang. La Trinidad Water District (LTWD), a local water utility, opposed TMPC's
application. LTWD claimed that, under Section 47 of PD No. 198, as amended, its
franchise is exclusive.
The NWRB approved TMPC's application for a CPC. In its 15 August 2002
Decision, the NWRB held that LTWD's franchise cannot be exclusive since exclusive
franchises are unconstitutional and found that TMPC is legally and financially
qualified to operate and maintain a waterworks system. The RTC set aside the
NWRB's decision and cancelled TMPC's CPC, stating that "the Constitution does not
necessarily prohibit a franchise that is exclusive on its face, meaning, that the grantee
shall be allowed to exercise this present right or privilege to the exclusion of all
others. Nonetheless, the grantee cannot set up its exclusive franchise against the
ultimate authority of the State."
ISSUE: Whether or not a public utility franchise may be exclusive in character
RULING: No. The 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitution expressly and clearly prohibit
the creation of franchise that are exclusive in character. The President, Congress and
the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by
allowing the Board of Directors of a water district and the Local Water Utilities
Administration to create franchises that are exclusive in character. Section 47 of PD
No. 198, as amended, allows the Board of Directors of La Trinidad Water District and
Local Water Utilities Administration to create franchises that are xclusive in character.
Clearly, Section 47 is patently unconstitutional.
CASE DIGEST: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK),

represented by ROSELLA A. SANTIAGO,Petitioner,v. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS
III, Respondent.
FACTS: Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam
Merchandising, his frozen meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan
from METROBANK, which in due course conducted trade and credit verification of
Tobias that resulted in negative findings. The property consisted of four parcels of
land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila.
His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again
defaulted. Thus, the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to
METROBANK as the lone bidder.
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of
Malabon, no corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the
registry vault. Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) concluded
that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations submitted by Tobias were fictitious.
PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in
relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa
through falsification of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation,
which was granted. Nonetheless, on December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of
Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and recommended his being
charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Tobias appealed to the
DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a
resolution directing the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. On
November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's
motion for reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK challenged the adverse
resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to
determine the innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the
preliminary investigation; and that the CA disregarded such lapse.
ISSUE:
Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition?
The appeal has no merit.

Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts have no right to directly decide
matters over which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Executive
Branch of the Government, or to substitute their own judgments for that of the
Executive Branch,represented in this case by the Department of Justice. The settled
policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion.That abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to
act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. For instance, in Balanganan v.
Court of Appeals, Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City,the Court ruled that the
Secretary of Justice exceeded his jurisdiction when he required hard facts and solid
evidence in order to hold the defendant liable for criminal prosecution when such
requirement should have been left to the court after the conduct of a trial.
CSC V RAMONEDA-PITA
Facts:
On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter 4 informed the CSC of an alleged irregularity
in the civil service eligibility of Ramoneda-Pita. The letter stated that the irregularity
concerned Ramoneda-Pitas taking of the Career Service Sub-Professional
Examination held in Cebu City on July 26, 1987.
The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987 examinations and compared the
pictures and signatures of Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat Plan
(PSP) for the exam and her PDS dated October 17, 1990. As the pictures and
signatures did not match, the CSC required Ramoneda-Pita to explain why it seemed
that another person took the civil service examination on her behalf.
Ramoneda-Pita denied that someone else took the civil service examinations in her
stead. She averred that she took the civil service examinations on July 30, 1986 and
not July 26, 1987. She explained that there were dissimilarities in the pictures in the
PSP and the PDS because these were not taken on the same year and might have
deteriorated in quality over the years. On the other hand, she accounted for the
difference in her signatures to her low educational attainment leading to her non-
development and non-maintenance of a usual signature.5
In its Investigation Report6 dated May 3, 1999, the CSC made the following
observations and recommendation:
The person who actually took the Career Service Subprofessional Examination on
July 26, 1987 in Cebu City, was the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and
signature were affixed in the Admission Slip/Notice of Admission and in the Picture
Seat Plan, is NOT the "Merle C. Ramoneda" whose picture and signature appear in
the Personal Data Sheet dated October 17, 1990 of the real Merle C. Ramoneda.
Issue: Should respondent Ramoneda-Pita be dismissed?
Ruling:
A careful review of the documents submitted before the CSC and a perusal of its
investigation reports in the present case, convince us that Ramoneda-Pita was not the
one who took the Civil Service Sub-Professional Examinations conducted on July 26,
1987. Specimen signatures in the various PDS she had submitted over the years to the
Court do not resemble the signature which appeared in the seat plan of the CSC.
Moreover, no substantive evidence was presented by Ramoneda-Pita to bolster her
defense that she was not able to develop a settled signature. Nor did she substantiate
her claim that the difference between the pictures in the PSP and the PDS is due to the
aging process.
This Court cannot stress enough that its employees should hold the highest standard
of integrity for they are a reflection of this esteemed institution which they serve. It
certainly cannot countenance any form of dishonesty perpetrated by its employees. As
we have stated in the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel
In this case, Ramoneda-Pita's length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The

CSC's discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her
insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her PDS when she had been
already found guilty of an administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC
Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell this Court that Ramoneda-Pita
has not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. As
the Court has previously stated it will not hesitate to rid the ranks of undesirables
WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found GUlLTY of dishonesty.

She is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits,
except the value of her accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudicto re-
employment in the government or any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities or
agencies including government-owned and controlled corporations. Let a copy of this
Decision be attached to her records with this Court.
JESUS C. GARCIA vs. HON. RAY ALAN T. DRILON
G.R. No. 179267
June 25, 2013
Art. III, Section 1: Equal Protection
FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) and petitioner were married in
2002. They have three children namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17, who is a natural child
of the petitioner and adopted by private respondent; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph EduardJ. Garcia, 3 years old. Petitioner is 11 years older than private
respondent. Respondent describes petitioner to be dominant, controlling and demands
absolute obedience from his wife and children. He isolated her from her friends and
forbade her to pray. He trivialized her ambitions to become a lawyer. He was often
jealous because his wife still caught the eye of other men. Things grew worse when he
started having an affair with a bank manager in Robinsons Bank, who is a godmother
to one of their boys. The affair started numerous fights wherein petitioner physically
hurt respondent. Sometimes, petitioner beat his daughter, Jo-Ann, whohad seen the
text messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for telling on him. All
this brought respondent to emotional despair. She tried to leave once, but Jo-Ann
begged her not to. Then she tried to kill herself but she was saved by her son.
Petitioner only left when he saw her. After that incident, respondent informed the
management of Robinsons Bank that she will be filing charges against the paramour.
Petitioner was enraged at respondent for endangering the job of his paramour. She
wanted to leave but she was afraid that he would take the children and cut her off
from support. Petitioner controls all three of the family businesses. She receives only
a monthly salary of Php20,000.00.
On March 23, 2006, private respondent filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minorchildren, a petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod Cityfor
the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against petitioner,pursuant to
R.A. 9262 entitled An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children,
Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes (VAWC). She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse, emotional,
psychological, andeconomic violence. RTC granted the TPO effective for 30 days
starting March 24, 2006. On April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the
Urgent Ex-ParteMotion forRenewal of the TPO. Subsequently, he also requested that
he be allowed visitation rights to his children. On May 24, 2006, the TPO was
renewed and extended subject to modifications.
Petitioner failed to provide for support, as required by the TPOso respondent
applied for a TPO Ex-Parte. Petitioner tried to take away the car used by the
respondents. Also, he tried to kidnap one of the boys and, on another occasion,
allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann,by the arm and threatened her. She filed
against her father in violation of R.A. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation andDiscrimination Act.) The TPO was granted on August
23, 2006 and was renewed for another 30 days when it was found that the hearing
could not yet be finally terminated.
Petitioner filed a petition before the CA for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporaryrestraining order (TRO), challenging (1) the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process andthe equal protection clauses,
and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being
"anunwanted product of an invalid law. Initially, the CA granted the TRO against the
enforcement of the TPO. Subsequently, however, the CA dismissed the petition for
failure of the petitioner to raise the issue on constitutionality. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the court of appeals committed serious error in failing to conclude that
R.A. 9262 is discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection
clause.
HELD:
1. No.
Petitioner contends that limiting the protection given by the law to a specific
kind of a gender violates the equal protection clause. Victims and abusers could be
either husband or wife. The Court retrieved the Senate deliberations on the bill and
has confirmed that it was the legislatures intent to limit the protection of VAWC to
women and children. In line with the separation of powers, the Court cannot comment
on whether the decision of the senate was right or wrong. But, it is the Courts duty to
determine if the law violates the Constitution.
Equal protection of the laws does not require that all persons be treated alike
under a single law. It guarantees that a class of people be treated alike as long as there
is a valid classification. In order for there to be a valid classification, the following
must concur: (a) it must rest on substantial distinction, (b) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law, (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (d) must
apply equally to all members of the same class. Given the foregoing requirements, the
Court opines that VAWC has a valid classification.
Substantial distinction as to men and women are seen in the unequal power
relationship between them and in the fact that women are the usual and most likely
victims of abuse, and, finally, the widespread gender bias against women.
The classification is germane to the purpose of the law. Section 2 of VAWC
provides that the State values the dignity of women andchildren and guarantees full
respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect thefamily and
its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security. With this policy, the State shall exert more efforts to
address the violence that violates the fundamental rights of abused women and
children.
The classification is not limited to existing conditions only, and applies
equally to all members. This law was enacted for as long as safety and security of
women and children are endangered. Also, the law applies to all women and children.
The kinds of actions punished in the law leaves no room for vagueness. The
petitioners contention that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simplemarital tiffs is tenuous. The acts
described in the law are also found in the U.N.Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women.
Also the contention that VAWC singles out men, husbands, or fathers is
without merit because VAWC may also be committed "against a woman with whom
the person has or had asexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of word
"person" who has or had a sexualor dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 179987
April 29, 2009
Ponente: J. Tinga
FACTS:
Feb 20 1998: Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before
theRTC of Cavite-Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite.
Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property fromEduardo Velazco, and
that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious,and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than 30 years.
At the hearing, AristedesVelazco testified that the property was originally
belonged to a 22 hectare propertyowned by his great-grandfather, LinoVelazco.
Lino had 4 sons Benedicto, Gregorio,Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being
Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his 4 sons inherited the property and
divided it among themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife,Magdalena, had
become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sonsfrom
their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son
Virgiliosucceeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
which originallybelonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that
was sold by EduardoVelazco to Malabanan.
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine
AristedesVelazco. Instead, he manifested that he "also [knew] the property and I
affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr. Velazco." The Republic of the
Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification
dated June 11, 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources
Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR),
which stated that the subject propertywas verified to be within the Alienable or
Disposable land per Land Classification Map No.3013 established under Project
No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March15, 1982.
December 3, 2002: the RTC approved the application for registration. The
Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in
possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by
law for confirmation of imperfect title.
February 23, 2007: the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed
the application of Malabanan.
o Republic v. Herbieto: under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation
of the period of possession.
o Since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was
declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the
period of possession.
Petitioners contention:
o Republic v. Naguit: with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to
the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act
and the Property Registration Decree.
ISSUES:
1. WON the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 in
order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered
under Section 14(1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree. NO. [MAIN]
2. WON a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private
land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code [For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree]. YES.
3. WON petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both? NO under both.
HELD:
1. It is sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the
applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
2. Public domain lands do not become patrimonial (private) without express
declaration. Thus, the period of possession before the public domain land becomes
patrimonial CANNOT be counted for the purpose of completing the prescriptive
period under Section 14(2).
3. Petitioners are NOT entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names.
RATIONALE:
# 1MAIN!
Contentions: [with respect to Section 14(1) of Property Registration Decree]
OSG:
o Republic v. Herbieto: for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been
classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945
Petitioners:
o Reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Republic v. Naguit is the correct
interpretation of the provision: such classification can occur at any time prior
to the filing of the applicant for registration.
o The preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd.
The Applicable LAW

The Public Land Act [Commonwealth Act No. 141] has, since its enactment,
governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain.
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified
according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial,
or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or other similar
purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public uses.
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain? YES.
o Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable
for agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial legalization. Section
48(b) of the Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and
unmistakably grants that right:
SECTION 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
titletherefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure.
These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is virtually the same as Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to
the registration of property, including lands of the public domain. Section 14(1)
operationalizes the registration of such lands of the public domain.
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion
of Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws
commonly refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who "have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier." The difference is that Section 48 of the Public
Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor
than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the
pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time.
o It is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January
1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who has
been "in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to
perfect or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the
confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
HOWEVER, Section 47 limits the right granted under Sec 48(b), that is, the
period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section
48.
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to
avail of the benefits of this Chapter
INTERPRETATION of the law

Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and
Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the
position that for one to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, IT IS NOT ENOUGH that the applicant and
his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945.
o BUT the alienable and disposable character of the property MUST have been
declared ALSO as of June 12, 1945.
o Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable
after June 12, 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as
amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed in Naguit.
o All lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original
registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14
virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it
effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable.
Thus, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.
o If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith.
o However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and
disposable, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to
abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
Now, to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is
alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the
government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and
a legislative act or a statute.
o In the case at bar, respondents presented a certification dated November 25,
1994, issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be within the
alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A,
per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to
show the real character of the land subject of private respondents application.
o Furthermore, no opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to
contest the application of appellees on the ground that the property still forms
part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the lots in question
are forestal land.
o Private respondents were ALSO able to prove their open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year
1927.
#2
Contentions: [with respect to Section 14(2) of Property Registration Decree]
OSG:
o Under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties
of the State refers to "patrimonial property," while Section 14(2) speaks of
"private lands."
o It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2)
as a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession
period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code.
o Assuming that the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands,
said period should be reckoned from the time the public land was declared
alienable and disposable.
Petitioners:
o Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of an alienable land of
the public domain for more than 30 years ipso jure converts the land into
private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2).
o It would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously
classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of
the application, the property had already been "converted" into private
property through prescription.
Framework of Analysis
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to
land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory
P.D. No. 1073 prevent the application for registration of alienable lands of the
public domain, possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945?
NO.
o Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
o There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open,
continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.
o With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
"private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by
those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if
possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June
12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive,
then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides
that persons "who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws," it unmistakably refers to
the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands.
Article 1113. All things which are within the commerce of men are
susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided. Property of the
State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of [acquisitive] prescription.
Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does
encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the
State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
Article 422 of the Civil Code states that there must be an express declaration
by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the
public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition
by prescription.
o Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by
law.
o This reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree limits its
scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already
declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors
or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord with
the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by
the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought
to be used only by the Government.
o Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to
apply the Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and
intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is the province of the
legislative branch.
Prescriptive Period: where to start?

Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial
(private) cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As
the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classified as public
dominion property can be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription and justify registration.
[not needed in the case, but for notes]

Sec 14 (1) Sec 14 (2)
mandates registration on the basis of entitles registration on the basis of
possession prescription
Registration is extended under the aegis of registration is made available both by

the Property Registration Decree and the the Property Registration Decree and
Public Land Act the Civil Code
30 yr period under Section 48(b) of 30 yr period available through Section 14(2) of

the Public Land Act, as amended by the Property Registration Decree in relation to
Rep. Act No. 1472 Article 1137 of the Civil Code
thirty-year period of possession thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription
Registration is based on 30 years of registration is founded on extraordinary
possession alone without regard to prescription under the Civil Code
the Civil Code
#3
Doctrines laid down from the discussions above
1. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by
themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and registrable title
to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
a. Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the
entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial
confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land
Act.
b. The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
2. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider
that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring
ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only
patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only
when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the
acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
a. Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil
Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.
b. There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
Application to the case at bar

The evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession,
according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in
particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration
under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration.
While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there
is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for
the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the
Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.
DECISION: The Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals and
Resolution are AFFIRMED.
ZENON R. PEREZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and

SANDIGANBAYAN
On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin,
conducted a cash examination on the account of petitioner, who was then the acting
municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. The following day, the audit team counted the
cash contained in the safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of the audit, the
amount of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner. Based on the said audit,
petitioner was supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of
the P21,331.79, incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.
When asked as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner verbally explained that
part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late brother, another portion was
spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his medicine. As a result, Mandin
prepared a memorandum dated recommending the filing of the appropriate criminal
case against petitioner.
When the case was filed with the Sandiganbayan, petitioner retracted his previous statement claiming
that he was mentally and physically weak at that time and entered a plea of not guilty.
In 2003, petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for malversation of public

funds and was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years (14) and eight (8) months of
reclusion temporal as maximum plus perpetual special disqualification.
Issue: WON the penalty is cruel and therefore unconstitutional since petitioner returned the money.
Ruling:
Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation. An accountable public officer may

be found guilty of malversation even if there is no direct evidence of malversation
because the law establishes a presumption that mere failure of an accountable officer
to produce public funds which have come into his hands on demand by an officer duly
authorized to examine his accounts is prima facie case of conversion.
Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may

only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an
element of malversation.
Also, there is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes. It is

established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in harmony
with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the
legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which operates no
further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the law. It is
presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So, it is the
generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or
should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such
law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of
petitioner, must fail.
Due to mitigating circumstances attending the commission, petitioners sentence has

been lowered to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification.
Judicial Review
CASE: HACIENDA LUISITA VS PARC
GR 171101 July 5 2011 Nov 22 2011
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public
and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are landless. One of the lands
covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-
residential expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in
1958 from the Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is
owned and/or controlled by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law
administration filed an expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the
then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers
at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the
MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the governments case against TADECO. The CA
dismissed it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the
approval of FWB (farm worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to
ensure its implementation.
Sec 31 of the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes
in distributing land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the
preferred option of TADECO, it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc.
(HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock acquisition by the farmers.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC),
led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI
through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the farmworkers.
Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the interests of the
farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them wrote letter
petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the SDOA.
They claimed that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the
terms, and that their lives havent really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the
SDOA.
The DAR created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the
SDOA and the Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task
Force, the DAR Sec recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-
2 and (2) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme.
Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands
covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition scheme under the CARP law. These
acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657,
insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock
transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is
an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform
ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Issue: W/N the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the constitutionality of
Sec 31 of RA 6657
Held:
No. First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec 31 at
the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21, 1989,
when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before the SC,
the lis mota of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original positions of the
groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is the non-compliance of
the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked. Such issues can be resolved
without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the
executive or legislative departments have not been met in this case.
II. REASON AND APPLICATION
The constitutional validity of the stock distribution option under the CARL was not timely
raised and is not the lis mota in this case.
Respondent-intervenor FARM questioned the validity of the stock distribution option of a

corporate landowner under Section 31 of the CARL on the ground that it is in violation of the
constitutional provision on agrarian reform, specifically the distribution of land to the
farmers.160 Respondent-intervenor argued that the stock distribution option was not one of the
modes intended by the agrarian reform policy in giving "land to the landless." In response,
petitioner HLI countered that the issue of the CARLs constitutionality cannot be collaterally
attacked.161
Before the Court can exercise its power to pass upon the issue of constitutionality, the
following requisites must be present:
1. There must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power;
2. The person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement;
3. The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
4. The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.162
Although the first two requisites are present, FARM has not shown compliance with the
remaining two requisites.
With respect to the timeliness of the issue, respondent-intervenor FARM did not raise the
constitutional question at the earliest possible time. The petitions filed in the PARC, which
precipitated the present case, did not contain any constitutional challenge against the stock
distribution option under the CARL. As previous members of private respondent AMBALA,
nothing prevented respondent-intervenor FARM from arguing on the purported constitutional
infirmity of a stock distribution option as opposed to a direct land transfer, in the AMBALA
Petition in the PARC proceedings below.
Respondent-intervenor FARM would argue that it raised the constitutionality issue in its
position paper at the level of the PARC. 163 However, this is a late attempt on its part to remedy

the situation and comply with the foregoing requisite on timeliness in the exercise of judicial
review. Nothing in the initiatory petitions of private respondents Supervisory Group and
AMBALA assailed the inherent invalidity of stock distribution options as provided in Section 31
of the CARL.
Respondent-intervenor FARM posits that it fully complied with the requirement of timeliness
under the doctrine of judicial review since the earliest possible opportunity to raise the issue
must be with a court with the competence to resolve the constitutional question, citing as
basis Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.164 This case is significantly different from
Serrano as to render the latters legal conclusions inapplicable to the present situation.
In Serrano, the question of the validity of the money claims clause of the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995165 was timely raised at the very first instance in a competent
court, namely in Antonio Serranos petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals. 166 In
sharp contrast, the question of the constitutionality of the CARL in this case was belatedly
included in respondent-intervenor FARMs supplemental comment 167 after an earlier
manifestation and motion had already been filed. Thus, respondent-intervenors earliest
opportunity to raise the constitutionality of Section 31 of the CARL was in the very first
pleading it filed in this Court, and not in a supplemental comment.
Even assuming arguendo that the rule requiring the timeliness of the constitutional question
can be relaxed, the Court must refrain from making a final determination on the constitutional
validity of a stock distribution option at this time because it is not the lis mota of the present
controversy and the case can be disposed of on some other ground.
The Court will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota or crux of the controversy. 168 In the seminal case of Garcia v. Executive
Secretary, the Court explained the concept of lis mota as a requirement of judicial review in
this wise:
Lis mota - the fourth requirement to satisfy before this Court will undertake judicial review -
means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although properly
presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the application of
the statute or the general law. The petitioner must be able to show that the case cannot be
legally resolved unless the constitutional question raised is determined. This requirement is
based on the rule that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality; to justify
its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one
that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.169
Courts rule and explanation of the concept
A court should not pass upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional
or invalid unless such question is raised by the parties; when raised, if the record presents
some other ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, the latter course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration until a case arises
wherein a decision upon such question will be unavoidable. 170 The Court will not shirk its duty
of wielding the power of judicial review in the face of gross and blatant acts committed by
other branches of government in direct violation of the Constitution; but neither will it be overly
eager to brandish it when there are other available grounds that would avoid a constitutional
clash.
It will be recalled that what the qualified beneficiaries assailed in the PARC proceedings was
the failure on the part of petitioner HLI to fulfill its obligations under the SDOA, and what they
prayed for was for the lands to be the subject of direct land transfer. The question of
constitutionality of a stock distribution option can be avoided simply by limiting the present
inquiry on the provisions of the SDOA and its implementation. Whether the PARC committed
grave abuse of discretion in recalling or revoking the approval of the SDOA need not involve a
declaration of unconstitutionality of the provisions of the CARL on stock distribution.

There is no "paramount public interest" that compels this Court to rule on the question of
constitutionality. As a legislative act, the CARL enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality.171 Absent any glaring constitutional violation or evident proof thereof, the
Court must uphold the CARL. Indeed, paramount public interest is better served by precluding
a finding on the CARL at this point, since such finding could unfairly impact other corporate
landowners and farmer beneficiaries under a stock distribution option in other parts of the
country172 who are not parties to the instant case.
While we do not rule on the constitutionality of stock distribution option, we also need to state
that there appears to be no clear and unequivocal prohibition under the Constitution that
expressly disallows stock distribution option under the provisions on agrarian reform:
The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers
and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they
till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To
this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands,
subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the
payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right
of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. 173
The primary constitutional principle is to allow the tiller to exercise rights of ownership over
the lands, but it does not confine this right to absolute direct ownership. Farmworkers are
even allowed to simply have a share in the fruits of the land they till for as long as what they
receive is just and fair. The framers of the Constitution established the right of landless
farmers and regular farmworkers to own the lands they till directly or collectively, but left the
identification of the means of ownership to Congress. This was an important decision,
considering that Congress has the better facilities and faculties to adjudge the most
appropriate and beneficial methods for the exercise of the constitutional right in cases where
dividing a small landholding among a multitude of qualified FWBs would result in parceling out
patches of land not viable for individual farming. Whether stock distribution is a valid method
identified by Congress for lands owned by a corporation, or whether it is a "loophole" in the
CARL to evade land distribution in contravention of the intent of the Constitution, is a question
that need not be answered now.
Decision
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, I vote to AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS PARC Resolution

No. 2005-32-01 dated 22 December 2005 and Resolution No. 2006-34-01 dated 03 May
2006. I dissent from the majoritys position with respect to how they modified the questioned
PARC Resolutions. I would direct the modifications of the PARC Resolutions in the following
manner.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 14 June 2006, enjoining the implementation of
the questioned PARC Resolution and Notices of Coverage, is hereby LIFTED.
CASE:GUALBERTO J. DELA LLANA V. THE CHAIRPERSON, COMMISSION ON AUDIT,

et al.
G.R. No. 180989, 7 February 2012,
EN BANC
(Sereno, J .)

Facts:
Petitioner Gualberto Dela Llana, as a taxpayer, wrote to the Commission on Audit (COA)
regarding the recommendation of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food that the
Department of Agriculture set up an internal pre-audit service. The COA replied to Dela Llana
informing him of the prior issuance of Circular No. 89-299 which provides that whenever the
circumstances warrant, the COA may reinstitute pre-audit or adopt such other control
measures as necessary and appropriate to protect the funds and property of an agency.
Dela Llana filed a petition for certiorari alleging that the pre-audit duty on the part of the COA
cannot be lifted by a mere circular, considering that the pre-audit is a constitutional mandate
enshrined in Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not it is the constitutional duty of COA to conduct a pre- audit before the
consummation of government transaction
HELD:
It is not the constitutional duty of the COA to conduct a pre-audit
Dela Llana claimed that the constitutional duty of COA includes the duty to conduct
pre-audit. A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their consumption or
payment. It seeks to determine whether the following conditions are present: (1) the proposed
expenditure complies with an appropriation law or other specific statutory authority; (2)
sufficient funds are available for the purpose; (3) the proposed expenditure is not
unreasonable or extravagant, and the unexpended balance of appropriations to which it will
be charged is sufficient to cover the entire amount of the expenditure; and (4) the transaction
is approved by the proper authority and the claim is duly supported by authentic underlying
evidence. It could, among others, identify government agency transactions that are suspicious
on their face prior to their implementation and prior to the disbursement of funds.
Dela Llanas allegations and no support in the Section 2 of Article IX-D of the 1987
Constitution. There is nothing in the said provision that requires the COA to conduct a pre-
audit of all government transactions and for all government agencies. The only clear
reference to a pre-audit requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that a
post-audit is mandated for certain government or private entities with state subsidy or equity
and only when the internal control system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a
situation, the COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-audit, to correct
the deficiencies.
Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this Court may
compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part is in line with the constitutional
pronouncement that the COA has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit, there is no room for
interpretation, only application. Neither can the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by
this Court.
CASE: CANDARI VS DONASCO
Facts:
Respondents were members of the board of directors of Dolefil Agrarian Reform

Beneficiaries Cooperative, Incorporated (DARBCI).They were elected into office on July 12
1998 and their terms ended on July 2000. But they continued to occupy their positions in a
holdover capacity.

Petitioners sought to elect new members of the board of directors through a General
assembly. Respondents instituted a civil case to enjoin petitioners from holding the general
assembly. The RTC issued a 72- hour TRO to block the planned GA. Despite of this 78% of
the members of the cooperative went through with the GA and elected petitioners as new
members of the board.
Respondents filed an amended complaint seeking to enjoin petitioners from assuming office.
The RTC dismissed amended complaint for lack of cause of action, because it had become
moot. Respondents thereafter filed a petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA
found that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it dismissed the case for lack of cause
of action.
Issue:
Did CA err in allowing the petition for certiorari?
Held: Yes. For the court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an actual case or
controversy-one which involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims
susceptible of judicial resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extra-
legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. It is clear that it
dismissed the amended complaint because the supervening events (The GA and elections)
had rendered the case moot through the voluntary act of the GA-as the highest policy making
body of the cooperative- to declare the contested positions vacant and to elect a new set of
officers. As a consequence, respondents no longer had the personality or the cause of action
to maintain the case against the petitioners. Thus, the RTC committed no error when it
dismissed the case. The decision of the CA was reversed and set aside. The Order of the
RTC to dismiss amended complaint was affirmed and reinstated.
Justice Sereno
CASE: Galicto vs. Aquino III

Facts:
Petitioner Jelbert B. Galicto filed a petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify Executive
Order No. (EO) 7 issued by the Office of the President on September 8, 2010. Petitioner
asserts that EO 7 is unconstitutional for having been issued beyond the powers of the
President and for being in breach of existing laws.
The Senate conducted an inquiry on the reported excessive salaries, allowances, and
other benefits of government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs) and government
financial institutions (GFIs). After confirming such allegations through its findings, Senate
passed Resolution No. 17 urging the President to suspend excessive and unusually large
perks of members of the governing board. Thus President Aquino issued EO7 to control
grants and order a moratorium on salary increases, bonuses, incentives and other benefits
until December 31, 2010.
In his capacity as a lawyer and an employee of PhilHealth, petitioner asserts the

unconstitutionality of EO 7 which was issued with grave abuse of discretion for having been

issued beyond the powers of the President and claims that he is affected by its
implementation.
Issues:
1. WON Petitioner has legal standing
2. Mootness of the petition
Ruling:
We resolve to DISMISS the petition for its patent formal and procedural infirmities, and for
having been mooted by subsequent events.
Petitioner has no locus standi (legal standing).

- Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
resulting from the governmental act being challenged.
- As a general rule, a party is allowed to raise a constitutional question only when: 1.
He can show that he will personally suffer some actual or threatened injury; 2. Injury
is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and 3. Injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.
- Real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
- In the case at bar, petitioner contends that as an employee of PhilHealth, the
implementation of EO7 curtails the prerogative of those officers who are to fix and
determine his compensation.
- Respondents have pointed out that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest since
future increases in salaries and other benefits are mere expectancies.
Petition has been mooted by supervening events.

- Present case has been rendered moot by the following supervening events:
1. The issuance of suspension under Sec. 10 of EO7 dated until December 31, 2010
has lapsed.
2. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 10149 otherwise known as the GOCC
Governance Act of 2011. Section 11 of RA 10149 expressly authorizes the President
to fix the compensation framework of GOCCs and GFIs.
- With the present situation, Congress, thru R.A 10149 has expressly empowered the
President to establish the compensation systems of GOCCs and GFIs and for the
Court to still rule upon the supposed unconstitutionality of EO7 will merely be an
academic exercise.
CASE: Lamp vs Secretary of DBM

FACTS:
For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the
constitutionality and legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for
2004 (GAA of 2004). Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP), a group of
lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of political,
economic or social monopoly in the country, also sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and, thereafter, releasing budgetary allocations
to individual members of Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF. LAMP likewise aimed to
stop the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit (COA) from enforcing the
questioned provision.
The GAA of 2004 contains the following provision subject of this petition:
PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND
For fund requirements of priority development programs and projects, as indicated hereunder
8,327,000,000.00
Special Provision
1. Use and Release of the Fund. The amount herein appropriated shall be used to
fund priority programs and projects or to fund the required counterpart for foreign-
assisted programs and projects: PROVIDED, That such amount shall be released
directly to the implementing agency or Local Government Unit concerned:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the allocations authorized herein may be realigned
to any expense class, if deemed necessary: PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, That
a maximum of ten percent (10%) of the authorized allocations by district may be
used for procurement of rice and other basic commodities which shall be
purchased from the National Food Authority.
According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and, therefore, prohibits an

automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for the
funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select
and identify programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF. LAMP insists that the silence in
the law of direct or even indirect participation by members of Congress betrays a deliberate
intent on the part of the Executive and the Congress to scrap and do away with the pork
barrel system.
For LAMP, this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members
of Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. In other words, they cannot directly
spend the funds, the appropriation for which was made by them. Further, the authority to
propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is, in fact, a non-legislative

function devoid of constitutional sanction, and, therefore, impermissible and must be
considered nothing less than malfeasance.
By allowing the Members of Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to
propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform the actual spending of the fund, the
implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and constitutionally repugnant.
In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged

unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. According to LAMP, the practice of direct
allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the authority given to them
to propose and select projects is the core of the laws flawed execution resulting in a serious
constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as
taxpayers, LAMP would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of
unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount to a misapplication of public funds which,
in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords ripeness to the present controversy.
Further, the allegations in the petition do not aim to obtain sheer legal opinion in the
nature of advice concerning legislative or executive action. The possibility of constitutional
violations in the implementation of PDAF surely involves the interplay of legal rights
susceptible of judicial resolution. For LAMP, this is the right to recover public funds possibly
misapplied by no less than the Members of Congress. Hence, without prejudice to other
recourse against erring public officials, allegations of illegal expenditure of public funds reflect
a concrete injury that may have been committed by other branches of government before the
court intervenes. The possibility that this injury was indeed committed cannot be discounted.
The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is
sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial
controversy before the Court.
RESPONDENTS POSITION: the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of

PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the
evils of pork barrel.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case
RULING:
A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. In this case, the petitioner contested the
implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and taxpayers. The petition
complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is sufficient
reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy
before the Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The essence of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient interest
preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers suits is
established. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.
Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with
paramount public interest. The ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending
of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court, warranting the assumption of jurisdiction
over the petition.
FUNA VS VILLAR
PETITIONER: Dennis A. B. Funa
RESPONDENTS: The Chairman, Commission on Audit, Reynaldo A. Villar
FACTS:
Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year
of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from
February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and
appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly
indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as
COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious
bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA
Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine,
that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from
February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position.
Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011
addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office
upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when
President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA
Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein
moot and academic.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the issue is moot and academic.

2.) Whether or not a promotional appointment from the position of Commissioner to
Chairman is constitutionally permissible and does NOT constitute reappointment as
barred by the Article IX (D), Sec 1 (2) of the Constitution.
3.) Whether or not the appointment of Villar to the position of COA Chairman which is made
vacant by the expiration of term of the predecessor is valid.
RULING:
1.) A case is considered moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, or
when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy owing to the onset of supervening

events, so that a resolution of the case or a declaration on the issue would be of no
practical value or use. In such instance, there is no actual substantial relief which a
petitioner would be entitled to, and which will anyway be negated by the dismissal of
the basic petition. As a general rule, it is not within Our charge and function to act
upon and decide a moot case. However, in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, We
acknowledged and accepted certain exceptions to the issue of mootness, thus: The
"moot and academic" principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution, second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved,
third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition
yet evading review. Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of
Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling
within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at
least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David, namely: there is a
grave violation of the Constitution; the case involves a situation of exceptional
character and is of paramount public interest; the constitutional issue raised requires
the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public;
and the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The situation presently
obtaining is definitely of such exceptional nature as to necessarily call for the
promulgation of principles that will henceforth "guide the bench, the bar and the
public" should like circumstance arise. Confusion in similar future situations would be
smoothed out if the contentious issues advanced in the instant case are resolved
straightaway and settled definitely.
2.) Yes. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven
years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired
portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the
ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as
commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not
exceed 7 years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman
resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment.
Reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the
same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other
hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office
(Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in
the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution.
3.) No. The Constitution clearly provides that if the vacancy results from the expiration of
the term of the predecessor, the appointment of a COA member shall be for a fixed 7-
year term.
Here, the vacancy in the position of COA chairman left by Carague in February 2,
2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term. Under that circumstance, there
can be no unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor to speak of. Hence, in
light of the 7-year aggregate rule, Villars appointment to a full term is not valid as he
will be allowed to serve more than seven 7 years under the constitutional ban.
Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter
term, however, to comply with the 7-year aggregate rule would also be invalid as the
corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the
Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of
commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years.
CASE:CHAVEZ VS. JBC
FACTS:
The petitioner (Francisco Chavez), seeks judicial intervention, in questioning the

composition of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)(Respondent). However, respondent claims
that the petitioner has no legal standing for filing the petition because he was not included in

the official list of applicants for the post and he also failed to manifest his acceptance of his
recommendation to the position.
ISSUE:
WON the petitioner has legal standing to file for the petition.
HELD:
The requisite for legal standing (Locus standi) summarized by the court (culled from
jurisprudence) are as follows:
1. Cases involving constitutional issues

2. For taxpayers, there must be claim for illegal disbursement of public funds, or an
unconstitutional tax measure
3. For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest of the election in question
4. For concerned citizens, the issue must be of transcendental importance.
5. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as legislators
In this case, petitioner seeks judicial intervention as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a
nominee to the position of chief justice of the supreme court.
As taxpayer- since JBC is derives financial support from taxes paid, petitioner possess both
right and legal standing to demand that the JBCs proceedings are not tainted with illegality
and that its composition and actions do not violate the constitution.
As nominee- the court disagrees with the respondents contention that petitioner lost his
standing to sue because he is not an official nominee for the post of Chief justice. The legality
of the very process of nominations to the positions in the judiciary is the very nucleus of the
controversy. The court considers this a constitutional issue that must be passed upon lest a
constitutional process be plagued with misgiving, doubts, and mistrust. Hence, a citizen has a
right to bring this question to the court, clothed with legal standing and armed with
transcendental importance to society. The claim that the JBC is illegal and unconstitutional
is an object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal blunders.
As concerned citizen- it is not difficult to perceive that determinants (established by

jurisprudence) for transcendental importance are present in this case.
1. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case

2. The presence of clear disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the
public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government
3. Lack of any party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being
raised.
The allegations in this cases are not empty attacks on the wisdom of the other branches
of the government but rather, solid allegations substantiated by facts and , therefore,
deserve an evaluation from the court and it cannot be denied that the judicial and bar
council is a constitutional innovation crucial in the selection of the magistrates in our
judicial system.
Therefore, the petitioner has legal standing to file for the petition.
Additional important infos for facts:
*Petitioner alleged that respondent (JBC) is in violation of article 8 section 8 (1) of the
constitution:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as
ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law,
a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private
sector.
*In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only
seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2)
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of
Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.7
Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001,
decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.8 At present, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in
the JBC as representatives of the legislature.
*Does the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allow more
than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC? Is the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each house of Congress with one (1) vote each sanctioned by
the Constitution? These are the pivotal questions to be resolved in this original action
for prohibition and injunction.
*RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the
Judicial and Bar Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8
(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
CASE: ADVOCATES FOR TRUTH IN LENDING, INC. VS. BANGKO SENTRAL

MONETARY BOARD, ET.AL.
FACTS- Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. (AFTIL) is a non-profit, non-stock corporation
organized to engage in pro bono concerns and activities relating to money lending issues. It
was incorporated on July 9, 2010,and a month later, it filed this petition, joined by its founder
and president, Eduardo B. Olaguer, suing as a taxpayer and a citizen.
HISTORY OF CENTRAL BANKS POWER TO FIX MAX INTEREST RATES
1. R.A. No. 265, which created the Central Bank on June 15, 1948, empowered the CB-
MB to set the maximum interest rates which banks may charge for all types of loans and other
credit operations.
2. The Usury Law was amended by P.D.1684, giving the CB-MB authority to prescribe
different maximum rates of interest which may be imposed for a loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits, provided that the changes are effected gradually
and announced in advance. Section 1-a of Act No. 2655 now reads:
Sec. 1-a. The Monetary Board is hereby authorized to prescribe the

maximum rate or rate of interest for the loan or renewal thereof or the
forbearance of any money, goods or credits and to change such rate or rates
whenever warranted by prevailing economic and social conditions: Provided,
That changes in such rate or rates may be affected gradually on scheduled
dates announced in advance.

3. In its Resolution No. 2224 dated December 3, 1982, the CB-MB issued CB Circular
No. 905, Series of 1982, effective on January 1, 1983. It removed the ceilings on interest
rates on loans or forbearance of any money, goods or credits:
Sec. 1. The rate of interest, including commissions, premiums, fees and

other charges, on a loan or forbearance of any money, goods, or credits,
regardless of maturity and whether secured or unsecured, that may be
charged or collected by any person, whether natural or juridical, shall not be
subject to any ceiling prescribed under or pursuant to the Usury Law, as
amended.
4. R.A. No. 7653 establishing the BSP replaced the CB:
Sec. 135. Repealing Clause. Except as may be provided for in Sections

46 and 132 of this Act, Republic Act No. 265, as amended, the provisions of
any other law, special charters, rule or regulation issued pursuant to said
Republic Act No. 265, as amended, or parts thereof, which may be
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Presidential
Decree No. 1792 is likewise repealed.
Note: R.A. 7653 the law that created BSP to replace CB Note: this law did not retain the
same provision as that of Section 109 in RA 265.
ISSUES
1) Whether under R.A. No. 265 and/or P.D No. 1684, the CB-MB had statutory or
constitutional authority to prescribe the maximum rates of interest for all kinds of
credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit beyond the limits
prescribed in the Usury Law;
2) If so, whether the CB-MB exceeded its authority when it issued CB Circular No. 905,
which removed all interest ceilings and thus suspended Act No. 2655 as regards
usurious interest rates;
3) Whether under R.A. No. 7653, the new BSP-MB may continue to enforce CB Circular
No. 905.
RULLING
1.) CB-MB has the statutory or constitutional authority to prescribe the max rates of
interest for all kinds of credit transactions and forbearance of money, goods or credit
beyond limits prescribed in the Usury Law both under RA 265 and PD 1684.
2.) The CB-MB merely suspended the effectivity of the Usury Law when it issued BC
Circular No. 905.
a. The power of the CB to effectively suspend the Usury Law pursuant to P.D.
1684 has long been recognized and upheld in many cases. As the Court
explained in the landmark case of Medel vs. CA, citing several cases, CB
Circular No. 905 : did not repeal nor in anyway amend the Usury Law but
simply suspended the latters effectivity. Thus, according to the Court, by
lifting the interest ceiling, CB Circular No. 905 merely upheld the parties
freedom of contract to agree freely on the rate of interest. It cited Art. 1306 of
the New Civil Code, under which the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations. Clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient,
provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.
3.) The BSP-MB has authority to enforce CB Circular No. 905
Moreover, the rule is settled that repeals by implication are not favored,
because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all
laws existing pertaining to the subject. An implied repeal is predicted upon the
condition that a substancial conflict or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and

old laws. We find no such conflict between the provisions of Act 2655 and RA NO.
7653.
The lifting of the ceilings for interest rates does not authorize stipluations charging
excessive, unconscionable, and iniquitous interest.
With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and

compensatory damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is
imposed, as follows:
The 12% per annum rate under CB Circular No. 416 shall apply only to loans or
forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as to judgments involving such loan
or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, while the 6% per annum under Art 2209
of the Civil Code applies when the transactions involves the payment of indemnities
in the concepts of damage arising from the breach or a delay in the performance of
obligations in general with the application of both rates reckoned from the time the
complaint was filed until the amount is fully paid. In either instance, the reckoning
period for the commencement of the running of the legal interest shall be subject to
the condition that the courts are vested with discretion, depending on the equities of
each case, on the award of interest.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
CASE: FUNA V AGRA
GR NO. 191644
FEB 19, 2013
TOPIC: JUDICIAL REVIEW
FACTS:
Agra, respondent herein, has admitted to holding two offices concurrently in acting or
temporary capacities: ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND AS
ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL.
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Agras concurrent appointments or designations

claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which
expressly prohibits the President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution. Complementing the prohibition is Section 7, paragraph
(2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, which bans any appointive official from holding any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position.
ISSUE:
WON the case at bar is subject for judicial review
RULING:
YES.

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to assail the validity of the subject act or issuance, that is, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
Here, the OSG does not dispute the justiciability and ripeness for consideration and resolution
by the Court of the matter raised by the petitioner. Also, the locus standi of the petitioner as a
taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer to bring a suit of this nature has already been
settled in his favor in rulings by the Court on several other public law litigations he brought.
To have legal standing, therefore, a suitor must show that he has sustained or will
sustain a "direct injury" as a result of a government action, or have a "material
interest" in the issue affected by the challenged official act. However, the Court has
time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirements and has
accorded certain individuals, not otherwise directly injured, or with material
interest affected, by a Government act, standing to sue provided a
constitutional issue of critical significance is at stake. The rule on locus
standi is after all a mere procedural technicality in relation to which the Court,
in a catena of cases involving a subject of transcendental import, has waived,
or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may
not have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act.
This case before Us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has "far-

reaching implications," and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the
bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance
and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition.
The constitutionality of the concurrent holding by Agra of the two positions in the Cabinet,
albeit in acting capacities, was an issue that comes under all the recognized exceptions. The
issue involves a probable violation of the Constitution, and relates to a situation of exceptional
character and of paramount public interest by reason of its transcendental importance to the
people. The resolution of the issue will also be of the greatest value to the Bench and the Bar
in view of the broad powers wielded through said positions. The situation further calls for the
review because the situation is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In other words,
many important and practical benefits are still to be gained were the Court to proceed to the
ultimate resolution of the constitutional issue posed.
CASE:EVELIO B. JAVIER, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and

ARTURO F. PACIFICADOR, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner and respondent were rivals to be members in the Batasang Pambansa during the
1984 elections in Antique. Their rivalry turned sour when several followers of the petitioner
were allegedly ambushed and killed by the latters men. Petitioner went to the COMELEC to
question the canvass of election returns owing to what he claimed to railroad the respondents
proclamation but was dismissed. Respondent was proclaimed as the winner by the Second
Division of the said body. Petitioner thereupon came to the Supreme Court arguing that the
proclamation was void because it was made only by a decision by a decision and not by the
COMELEC en banc as required by the Constitution. In 1986, petitioner was gunned down.

The former Solicitor General argued that the preproclamation controversy between the
petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest and therefore could be validly
heard by a mere division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The
issue was at this stage still administrative and so was resoluble by the Commission under its
power to administer all laws relative to the conduct to elections, not its authority as a sole
judge of the election contest.
On the other hand, the new Solicitor General has moved to dismiss this petition on the ground
that as a result of supervening events it has become moot and academic.
Issue: Whether or not, the case should be dismissed for having become moot and academic.
Ruling:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office between the
petitioner and the private respondent could be a convenient justification for dismissing the
case. But there are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not
only to dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in
the clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on
the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the conscience
of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also give him justice.
The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot grant the latter because
the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible according to the law. But there
are also times when although the dispute has disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless
cries out to be resolved. Justice demands that we act then, not only for the vindication of the
outraged right, though gone, but also for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
The petition would have been granted were it not for the supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic.
CASE:ABS-CBN, petitioner vs. COMELEC, respondent
GR No. 133486 323 SCRA 811 (January 28, 2000)
Topic : Functions of Judicial Review
Facts : Commission on Elections in its en banc Resolution No. 98-1419 dated April
21, 1998 issued a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups
from conducting exit survey. The electoral body believed that such project
might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick
count of the National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL). ABS-CBN
filed for petition for review assailing COMELECs resolution.
Issue : Whether or not the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998
election has already been held and done with, and there is no longer any
actual controversy before us.
Ruling : The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed resolution referred
specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implication on the peoples
fundamental freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding
of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its

very nature, exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution
of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in the
future elections.
In any event, in Salonga vs. Pao, the court had occasion to reiterate that it
also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees. Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press
are being invoked here, we have to resolve to settle, for the guidance of
posterity, whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the
dissemination of data derived therefrom.
The SC resolved the issue to grant the petitioners motion in symbolic

function, because of the important question of constitutionality being raised
stating that the election in the Philippines is a continuing democratic process
done in every 3 years, there is a need for the courts to lay down the rules or
principles which would serve as a guide for the bench and bar for the future
elections.
CASE: CENTRAL BANK vs BSP
Facts:
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old
Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central
Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and
the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further
implementing the last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it
is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to
establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance
with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to
the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall
make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation
and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall
be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758.
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes
an unconstitutional cut between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the
BSP officers or those exempted from the coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL)
(exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not
exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It is contended that this
classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on substantial

distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article
II of R.A. No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP.1 Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear
in the original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of
Senate Bill No. 1235; 2
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by
the SSL actually defeats the purpose of the law 3 of establishing professionalism and
excellence at all levels in the BSP; 4 (emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of
Senate Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even
admitted by one senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP; 5
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus
within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP
rank-and-file are also discriminated upon;6 and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and
resulted in the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'. 7
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious,
and violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. 8 Petitioner also stresses: (a) that
R.A. No. 7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the proviso in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the
urgency and propriety of the petition, as some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have
been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1)
since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of law, respondents' implementation of
such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for prohibition, which this
Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of the legal issue
involved.9
Respondent BSP, in its comment,10 contends that the provision does not violate the equal
protection clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony
with other provisions of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP,"
and the mandate of the Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all
levels in accordance with sound principles of management."
Issue:
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last
paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional
mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."
Ruling:
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the
classification created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no
constitutional infirmities.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG
20 and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in
terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate
against the rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between
the officers and the rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or
distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the
legislative sense.

That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the
Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent
cases,20 this Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse
invalidating a provision of law, on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no
such provision and was merely inserted by the bicameral conference committee of both
Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. To justify the nullification of a
law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
equivocal breach.
IN RE: JUDGE CARBONELL

Facts:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted a judicial audit on
March 3 and 4, 2008 in the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
27, in view of the disability retirement of Presiding Judge Antonio A. Carbonell on
December 31, 2007. They found out that Branch 27 had a total caseload of 231 cases
consisting of 14 7 criminal cases and 84 civil cases, and Judge Carbonell failed to
decide 41 criminal cases (one inherited) and 22 civil cases. It was also reported that
Judge Carbonell failed to resolve pending motions or incidents in four criminal cases
and 12 civil cases.
In a Memorandum dated May 15, 2008, the OCA recommended to the Court
that a fine of P50, 000.00 be imposed upon Judge Carbonell for gross inefficiency for
failing to promptly decide the cases and to resolve pending motions and incidents.
Not having received the comment from Judge Carbonell despite the lapse of the
time given, the Court resolved on September 21, 2010 to require him to show cause
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt.
Issue: Whether or not JusgeCarbonell should be penalized with a fine of 50,000

for the failure of deciding the cases.
Ruling:Yes, the recommendation of the OCA is well-taken, subject to the
modification of the penalty to be imposed.
The Court cannot overstress its policy on prompt disposition or resolution of
cases.12 Delay in the disposition of cases is a major culprit in the erosion of public
faith and confidence in the judicial system, as judges have the sworn duty to
administer justice without undue delay.13 Thus, judges have been constantly
reminded to strictly adhere to the rule on the speedy disposition of cases and observe
the periods prescribed by the Constitution for deciding cases, which is three months
from the filing of thelast pleading, brief or memorandum for lower courts.14 To
further impress upon judges such mandate, the Court has issued guidelines
(Administrative Circular No. 3-99 dated January 15, 1999) that would insure the
speedy disposition of cases and has therein reminded judges to scrupulously observe
the periods prescribed in the Constitution.
Nonetheless, the Court has been mindful of the plight of our judges and
understanding of circumstances that may hinder them from promptly disposing of
their businesses. Hence, the Court has allowed extensions of time to decide cases
beyond the 90-day period. All that a judge needs to do is to request and justify an
extension of time to decide the cases, and the Court has almost invariably granted
such request. Judge Carbonell failed to decide a total of 63 cases and to resolve 16
pending motions or incidents within the 90-day reglementary period. He intimated
that his poor health affected his pace in deciding the cases. Had such been the case,
then he should have explained his predicament to the Court and asked for an
extension of time to decide the cases. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
Without a doubt, Judge Carbonell's failure to decide several cases within the
reglementary period, without justifiable and credible reasons, constituted gross
inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions, 15 like fines. The
fines imposed have varied in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not
decided within the reglementary period and other factors, including the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances like the damage suffered by the parties from
the delay, the health condition and age of the judge, etc. 16 Thus, in one case, the
Court mitigated the liability of a Judge who had been suffering from illnesses and
who had later retired due to disability, and imposed upon him a fine of P20,000.00 for
failure to decide 31 cases.
Considering that Judge Carbonell similarly retired due to disability, the Comi
believes that his poor health condition greatly contributed to his inability to efficiently
perform his duties as a trial judge. That mitigated his administrative liability, for
which reason the Court reduces the recommended penalty of fine from P50,000.00 to
P20,000.00.
CASE: YNOT VS IAC
Facts:
- Executive Order No. 626 issued and prohibits interprovincial movement of carabaos and
slaughtering of carabaos. Violation of this Executive Order shall be subject to
confiscation.
- Ynot transported carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo through pump boat and was
confiscated by the police by the means of violation of EO No. 626
- Petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC); IAC upheld
the TC.
- Petitioner appeals to the constitutionality of said EO.
Issues:
- Does the lower courts also have power of judicial review and not only the Supreme
Court?
- Is EO No. 626 constitutional?
Ruling:
Power of Judicial Review Ruling:

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts
in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. This simply
means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts.
Justice Laurel's said, Courts should not follow the path of least resistance by simply
presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.
Constitutionality:
Thee SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A ctreated a
presumption based on the judgment of the executive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
E. All courts can exercise judicial review
CASE: Ongsuco (Stall holders) v. Malones(Mayor of Maasin, Iloilo)
Facts:
Petitioners are stall holders in the Municipal Public Market. Aug. 6, 1998, the Mayor
informed the petitioners about a meeting to be held on Aug. 11 about the increase of rentals
and imposition of goodwill fees. On Aug. 17 the Municipal Ordinance 98-01 was approved.
The ordinance authorized the respondent to enter lease contracts, and incorporated contract
of lease for the stall holders. Due to the imposition of the Ordinance, on June 9, 1999, the
respondent wrote a letter to petitioners informing them that they were occupying stalls without
lease contracts, the stalls were considered vacant and open for interested applicants.
The petitioners filed a case in the RTC, but the trial court dismissed the case on the
ground of non-exhaustion of Administrative Remedy. Also, because the petitioners failed to
show a legal right to the use of market stalls without paying the goodwill fees.
The court of appeals affirmed the prior decision.
Issues: Whether or not there was a need for the exhaustion of administrative remedy (main)
Whether or not the imposition of goodwill fees is valid (sub issue)(incase mangutana si
sir)
Held:
(1) No, there is no need for the exhaustion of administrative remedy because in this
case the issue raised by the petitioner is purely a legal question merely about the validity
and enforceability of the Municipal Ordinance, within the competence and jurisdiction of
the court and not the administrative agency to resolve. Resolving questions of law, which
involve the interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial
power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts. (pag refer sa
paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the constitution, naa sa pinaka ilalom)
(2) No, the imposition of goodwill fees is not valid due to lack of public hearings.
There are requisites to enact ordinances imposing charges, there must be a public hearing
conducted prior to the enactment. Initial public hearing shall be held not earlier than 10 days
from the sending of notices. In the case the respondent sent a notice on Aug, 6, 1998 and the
meeting was held on Aug. 11, 1998 only 5 days later instead of 10.
This contravenes Article 277 (b) (3) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of the Local Government Code which requires that the public hearing be held no less than
ten days from the time the notices were sent out, posted, or published.
Decision of the court:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision dated 28 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 is DECLARED void and ineffective, and a writ of
prohibition is ISSUED commanding the Mayor of the Municipality of Maasin, Iloilo, to
permanently desist from enforcing the said ordinance. Petitioners are also DECLARED as
lawful occupants of the market stalls they occupied at the time they filed the Petition for
Mandamus/Prohibition docketed as Civil Case No. 25843. In the event that they were
deprived of possession of the said market stalls, petitioners are entitled to recover possession
of these stalls.
NOTES!!!!!!
Exhaustion of Administrative remedy In the rule of administrative law, before a party is

allowed to seek intervention of the courts, it is a precondition to exhaust administrative
processes for legal and practical reasons.
Example in the case: The petitioners failed to question the legality of the ordinance before the
Secretary of Justice.)
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction of lower
courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari,

as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any

treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
CASE: DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB
G.R. No. L-23127 April 29, 1971
FACTS:
Agbayani obtained a loan of P450 from PNB dated July 19, 1939, maturing on July 19, 1944,
secured by real estate mortgage. On March 10, 1945, Pres. Osmena signed EO No. 32 or the
Debt Moratorium Law suspending the payment of loans for four years due to the ravages of
war. In 1948, RA No. 342 extended the Debt Moratorium Law for another eight years.
In 1953, the SC declared RA No. 342 as unconstitutional in the case of Rutter vs. Esteban.
On July 13, 1959 or 15 years after maturity of the loan, PNB instituted extra-judicial
foreclosure proceedings for the recovery of the balance of the unpaid loan.
Agbayani countered with suit against PNB alleging that the mortgage sought to be foreclosed
had long prescribed, fifteen years having elapsed from the date of maturity. PNB on the other
hand claims that the defense of prescription would not be available if the period from March
10, 1945, when EO No. 32 was issued, to July 26, 1948, when the RA No. 342 was declared
unconstitutional, were to be deducted from the computation of the time during which the bank
took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. The lower court did not find the contention of
PNB to be persuasive and decided the suit in favor of De Agbayani
Issue: Whether or not the period of the effectivity of EO No. 32 and RA No. 342 should be
counted in the period of prescription?
No. It should not be counted. The decision of the SC on appeal reflects the orthodox view that
an unconstitutional act, in this case an executive order which was ruled to be unconstitutional,
cannot be the source of any legal rights or duties. Nor can it justify any official act taken under
it. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws of the Constitution. It is understandable why it should be so, the
Constitution being supreme and paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its
terms cannot survive.
The period from 1945 when EO No. 32 was issued, to 1953 when it was declared
unconstitutional should not be counted for the purpose of prescription since the Debt
Moratorium Law was operative during this time. In effect, only 7 years had elapsed
(1944-45, 1953-59). Indeed, it would be unjust to punish the creditor who could not
collect prior to 1953 because the Debt Moratorium Law was effective, only to be told
later that his respect for an apparently valid law made him lose his right to collect.
CASE: FLORES VS DRILON (223 SCRA 568)

FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227, otherwise known as the
"Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992,which states that "(d) Chairman
administrator The President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator of the
Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of the Board and who shall
serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first
year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be
appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority (emphasis
supplied).
Under which respondent Mayor Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is
challenged in this original petition with prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary expenditures of public funds
by way of salaries and other operational expenses attached to the office by Petitioners, who
claim to be taxpayers, employees of the U.S. Facility at the Subic, Zambales, and officers and
members of the Filipino Civilian Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines,
maintain that the proviso in par. (d) of Sec. 13 infringes on the following constitutional and
statutory provisions: (a) Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states that "no
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public
officer or position during his tenure. And since the City Mayor of Olongapo City is an elective
official and the subject posts are public offices; (b) Sec. 16, Art. VII, of the Constitution, which
provides that "the President shall appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint", since it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the proviso in Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227 which states, "Provided,
however, That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Authority," violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of
elective officials to other government posts.
HELD:
The court ruled that Sec. 13, of R.A. 7227 is declared unconstitutional; consequently,
the appointment pursuant thereto of the Mayor of Olongapo City, respondent Richard J.
Gordon, is INVALID, hence NULL and VOID.
Because in the case at bar, while Congress willed that the subject posts be filled with
a presidential appointee for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of R.A. 7227, the
proviso nevertheless limits the appointing authority to only one eligible, i.e., the incumbent
Mayor of Olongapo City. Since only one can qualify for the posts in question, the President is
precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to appoint.
In addition to that, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution provides: No elective official
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure.Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position,
no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any

subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries.The section expresses the policy against the concentration
of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-
time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation
that a public office is a full-time job..
Hence, respondent Gordon being the incumbent elective official, is ineligible for
appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of SBMA;
therefore, his appointment thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained.
CASE: Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (HLI) vs Philippine Agrarian Reform Council

(PARC)
FACTS:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law1 was passed. One of the case covered by this is
Hacienda Luisita, once a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential expanse
owned by Compaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas (TABACALERA). It was in 1957, that the
Spanish owners of TABACALERA offered to sell Hacienda Luisita as well as their controlling
interest in the sugar mill within the hacienda, the Central Azucarera de Tarlac (CAT), as an
indivisible transaction. The Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), then owned by the
Jose Cojuangco, Sr. Group, was willing to buy. As agreed upon, Tadeco undertook to pay the
purchase price for Hacienda Luisita.
As of March 31, 1958, Tadeco had fully paid the purchase price for the acquisition of
Hacienda Luisita and Tabacaleras interest in CAT.
In 1980, during Martial Law, the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC) filed an
expropriation suit against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian
Reform (now DAR) so that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. Therefrom,
Tadeco appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
On March 17, 1988, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved to withdraw the
governments case against TADECO by Resolution of May 18, 1988, the CA dismissed the
case. The dismissal action was, however, made subject to the obtention by TADECO of the
PARCs approval of a stock distribution plan (SDP) that must initially be implemented after
such approval have been secured.
On August 23, 1988, it organized a spin-off corporation2, HLI, as vehicle to facilitate

stock acquisition by the farmworkers. For this purpose, TADECO assigned and conveyed to
HLI the agricultural land portion (4,915.75 hectares) and other farm-related properties of
Hacienda Luisita in exchange for HLI shares of stock.
On May 9, 1989, some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs)

complement of Hacienda Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed
HLIs Stock Distribution Option Plan. On May 11, 1989, the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA), styled as a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered into by
TADECO. The SDOA embodied the basis and mechanics of the SDP, which would eventually
be submitted to the PARC for approval.
1 It is a program aimed at redistributing public and private agricultural lands to farmers and farmworkers who are
landless.
2 The creation of an independent company through the sale or distribution of new shares of an existing business or
division of a parent company.

Subsequently, HLI submitted to DAR its SDP, designated as "Proposal for Stock
Distribution under CARP, which was substantially based on the SDOA.
After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock

Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian
Reform Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of
TADECO/HLI through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989.
From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended those benefits to the
farmworkers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing the
interests of the farmers the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them
wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of
the SDOA. They claimed that they havent actually received those benefits in full, that HLI
violated the terms, and that their lives havent really improved contrary to the promise and
rationale of the SDOA.
Meanwhile, the DAR constituted a Special Task Force to attend to issues relating to
the SDP of HLI. Among other duties, the Special Task Force was mandated to review the
terms and conditions of the SDOA and PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 relative to HLIs SDP;
evaluate HLIs compliance reports; evaluate the merits of the petitions for the revocation of
the SDP; conduct ocular inspections or field investigations; and recommend appropriate
remedial measures for approval of the Secretary.
After investigation and evaluation, the Special Task Force submitted its "Terminal
Report: Hacienda Luisita, Incorporated (HLI) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) Conflict" dated
September 22, 2005 (Terminal Report), finding that HLI has not complied with its obligations
under RA 6657 despite the implementation of the SDP.
Subsequently, Sec. Pangandaman recommended to the PARC Executive Committee

(Excom) (a) the recall/revocation of PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989
approving HLIs SDP; and (b) the acquisition of Hacienda Luisita through the compulsory
acquisition scheme. Following review, the PARC Validation Committee favorably endorsed the
DAR Secretarys recommendation afore-stated.
On the other hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, insofar as it affords the corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock
transfer in lieu of outright agricultural land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is
an anomaly to be annulled for being inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform
ingrained in Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
1. Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?

2. Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
HELD:
1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.
Contrary to the stance of the RES, the operative act doctrine squarely applies to
executive acts in this case- the approval by PARC of the HLI proposal for stock
distributions well-settled in our jurisprudence.
This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied liberally and in a
broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In keeping with
the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact doctrine to acts and
consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act which

is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch
which were later nullified.
Prior to the nullification or recall of said decision, it may have produced acts and
consequences in conformity to and in reliance of said decision, which must be
respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts
and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution
approving the SDP of HLI.
More importantly, respondents, and even the minority, failed to clearly explain how the
option to remain in HLI granted to individual farmers would result in inequity and
prejudice.
The application of the operative fact doctrine to the FWBs (Farm Worker
Beneficiaries) is not iniquitous and prejudicial to their interests but is actually
beneficial and fair to them.
First, they are granted the right to remain in HLI as stockholders and they acquired
said shares without paying their value to the corporation.
And second, with the application of the operative fact doctrine, said benefits
(homelots and the 3% production share and 3% share from the sale of the 500-
hectare and SCTEX lots) shall be respected with no obligation to refund or return to
HLI by FWBs. The receipt of these things is an operative fact that can no longer be
disturbed or simply ignored.
2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is not unconstitutional.
First, the intervenor FARM failed to challenge the constitutionality of RA 6657, Sec
31 at the earliest possible opportunity. It should have been raised as early as Nov 21,
1989, when PARC approved the SDP of HLI or at least within a reasonable time
thereafter.
Second, the constitutionality of RA 6657 is not the very lis mota of this case. Before
the SC, the lis mota3 of the petitions filed by the HLI is whether or not the PARC acted
with grave abuse of discretion in revoking the SDP of HLI. With regards to the original
positions of the groups representing the interests of the farmers, their very lis mota is
the non-compliance of the HLI with the SDP so that the the SDP may be revoked.
Such issues can be resolved without delving into the constitutionality of RA 6657.
Hence, the essential requirements in passing upon the constitutionality of acts of the
executive or legislative departments have not been met in this case.
3 Means that the Court will not pass upon a question of unconstitutionality, although
properly presented, if the case can be disposed of on some other ground, such as the
application of the statute or the general law.
CASE:COCOFED VS. REPUBLIC 663 SCRA 514
Topic: Operative Fact Doctrine
Operative Fact Doctrine refers to acts done pursuant to a law which was
subsequently declared unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done
after the declaration of unconstitutionality.
Operative Fact Doctrine- But a law declared unconstitutional is only voidable if, on
its face, it enjoys the presumption of validity. In this case, it becomes inoperative only
upon the judicial declaration of its invalidity. And even so, the invalidation produces no
retroactive effect, since it would be unjust to hold that the law did not produce any
effect at all prior to its nullification.
Facts of the Case:
1971: RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer the
Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of copra. The
copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The fund was placed
at the disposition of COCOFED, (meaning, the COCOFED would be in-charge for the
funds) the national association of coconut producers having the largest membership.
1972: When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were issued to
improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund:
PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) and

declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to
subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of
edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to finance

the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
1973: PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate the
growth and development of the coconut and oil industry.
The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 section 2, which permitted the use of
the Fund by PCA for the acquisition of commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut
farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it acquired free to
the coconut farmers. Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed
United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
(Parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects
and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the years.)
After EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1 which
created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The PCGG
aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the
Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to file cases for sequestration in
the Sadiganbayan.
Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB registered
in the name of over a million coconut farmers held trust by the PCA. The
Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial Summary Judgment
that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 2 of PD
No. 755 was unconstitutional.
The COCOFED representing the over a million coconut farmers via Petition for
review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among others that
the sequestration amounted to the taking of private property without just
compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership.
Issues:
Whether or not the COCO Levy Fund belongs to the government.

Whether or not the Operative Fact Doctrine applies to this case.
Ruling:
Coconut levy funds are special public funds of the government.
Issue No. 1:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Republic, the Coconut Levy was imposed in the
exercise of the States inherent power of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake
the nature of Taxes. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments by the
proper legislative authorities and for public purpose.
Issue No. 2:
No. Applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve
injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly
or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their Government
would take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose.
It is highly inappropriate to apply the operative fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public
funds, which were supposedly given utmost safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to
private individuals based on statutory provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on
not only one but on a variety of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may
not actually be the intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact
Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the
coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the
public funds, and therefore expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and
that they would be used no less, than for public purpose.
CASE: BELGICA v OCHOA
FACTS:
Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members
of the Congress. It underwent several legal destinations from Congressional Pork Barrel,
now known as Priority Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation of the Pork
Barrel is merged in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Allocation of the PDAF since 2011:
a. 70 Million Php for each member of the lower house; 40 million for hard
projects, 30 million for soft projects
b. 200 Million Php- for each senator; 100 million for hard projects, 100 million for
soft projects
c. 200 Million Php- for the Vice President; 100M for hard projects, 100M for soft
projects

Certain Cabinet members may realign the funds into their department, provided that
the realignment is approved by the legislator concerned.
The president also has his own pork barrel (Presidential Pork Barrel), from 2 sources:
a. Malampaya funds from the Malampaya Gas Project, b. Presidential Social Fund derived
from the earnings of PAGCOR.
Probing PDAF Allocation Allegations
In July 2013, the NBI began its probe in the corruption allegations regarding the
PDAF. It was alleged that the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the
past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various
government agencies for scores of ghost projects. JLN Corporation (JLN stands for Janet Lim
Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos to fund ghost projects using 20 dummy NGOs for a
decade.
On September 3, 2013 Greco Belgica and several others filed petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Systems.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not the presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.
HELD:
I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional as it violates

the following principles:
a. Separation of powers- as a rule, Congress has the budgeting

power. It regulates the release of funds. Only the executive can implement
the law however, under the pork barrel systems, the legislators themselves
dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to a clear
act of implementing the law they enacted a violation of the principle of
separation of powers.
b. Principle of checks and balances- Under this principle, the

president may deny items on the GAA which he may deem inappropriate.
This power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the
GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will
appropriate his PDAF. Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which
effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President useless.
II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel system is constitutional. The main issue raised by
Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is unconstitutional because it violates
Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which provides: No money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya
Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCORs charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected
from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya
Fund) which shall be used to further finance energy resource development and for
other purposes which the President may direct;
(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of
PAGCORs earnings shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social
Fund) which shall be used in government infrastructure projects.
These are sufficient laws, which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.
CASE:ARAULLO VS. AQUINO III
FACT: DAP (DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM) was created as a remedy to

speed up funding of government projects because there was sluggish growth in the economy.
In 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada claimed that he and other Senators received P50M from
President for voting in favor of impeachment of Corona. Budget Secretary Abad claimed that
money was taken from DAP and was released upon the request of the Senators. Turns out
that DAP not only realigned funds within the Executive but also non-Executive projects.
According to Araullo, DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. Abad argued that DAP is based on certain laws.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the DAP violates the no money shall be paid out on the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
Executive.
3. Whether or not the DAP realignments are constitutional.
4. Whether or not the sourcing of funds to DAP is constitutional.
RULING:
1. No, the DAP did not violate the Constitution because it was just a program by the
Executive and is not a fund or an appropriation. The funds, already appropriated for
the GAA (General Appropriations Act), were just realigned via DAP.
2. No, there is no Executive impoundment. Impoundment of funds refers to Presidents

power to refuse to spend the appropriations or retain/deduct appropriations.
3. No, the transfers made through DAP were unconstitutional. Although it is true that the
President and other heads of the other branches of the government are allowed by
the Constitution to make realignments of funds, such transfer or realignments should
only be made within their respective offices. But under the DAP, this was violated
because the funds appropriated by GAA for the Executive were being transferred to
the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
4. No, uprogrammed funds from GAA cannot be used as money source of DAP because
under the law, funds may only be used if there is certification from the National
Treasurer. In this case, no certification was issued before uprogrammed funds were
used.
Notes:
DBM- Department of Budget and Management
Unprogrammed funds excess funds
Savings- when estimated expenditures are not spent
Power of Augmentation- President, President of Senate, Speaker of the House of
Representatives Chief Justice of Supreme Court and heads of Constitutional Commissions
may by law, be authorized to augment any item in the GAA for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective approppriations
Operative Fact Doctrine- Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of
unconstitutionality.
CASE:Brother MARIANO "MIKE" Z. VELARDE, petitioner, vs.SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY,

respondent.
FACTS:
On January 28, 2003, SJS filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief before the RTC-Manila
against herein petitioner Velarde with His Eminence, Jaime Cardinal Sin, Executive Minister
Erao Manalo, Brother Eddie Villanueva and Brother Eliseo F. Soriano.
SJS, a registered political party, sought the interpretation of several constitutional

provisions, specifically on the separation of church and state; and a declaratory judgment on
the constitutionality of the acts of religious leaders endorsing a candidate for an elective
office, or urging or requiring the members of their flock to vote for a specified candidate.
The herein petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss before the trial court on the common grounds
that the questioned SJS Petition did not state a cause of action and that there was no
justiciable controversy.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss under certain reasons:
1. The Trial Court said that it had jurisdiction over the SJS petition, because in praying for a
determination as to whether the actions imputed to the respondents were violative of Article II,
Section 6 of the Fundamental Law, the petition has raised only a question of law.
2. It then proceeded to a lengthy discussion of the issue raised in the Petition the
separation of church and state even tracing, to some extent, the historical background of
the principle. Through its discourse, the court quipped at some point that the "endorsement of
specific candidates in an election to any public office is a clear violation of the separation
clause."
However, the trial court failed to include a dispositive portion in its assailed Decision. Thus,
Velarde and Soriano filed separate Motions for Reconsideration which, as mentioned earlier,
were denied by the lower court.

Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1. WON the Petition for Declaratory Relief raise a justiciable controversy?
2.WON respondent have any legal standing to file the Petition for Declaratory Relief and
3. WON it stated a cause of action?
HOLDING:
Procedural Issues:
1. No, it did not raise a justiciable controversy. A justiciable controversy refers to an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not one that is
speculative or merely anticipatory. A petition filed with the trial court should contain a plain,
concise and direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his
claim.
The SJS Petition fell short of the requirements to constitute a justiciable controversy
because:
a. It did not state ultimate facts. The petition simply theorized that the people elected who
were endorsed by these religious leaders might become beholden to the latter.
b. It did not sufficiently state a declaration of its rights and duties, what specific legal right
of the petitioner was violated by the respondents therein, and what particular act or acts of the
latter were in breach of its rights, the law or the constitution,
c. The petition did not pray for a stoppage of violated rights, it merely sought an opinion of the
trial court on whether the speculated acts of religious leaders endorsing elective candidates
for political offices violated the constitutional principle on the separation of church and state.
SJS did not ask for a declaration of its rights and duties; neither did it pray for the stoppage
of any threatened violation of its declared rights. Courts, however, are prohibited from
rendering an advisory opinion.
2. No. SJS has no legal standing in the controversy and has failed to establish how the
resolution of the proffered question would benefit or injure it.
Parties bringing suits challenging the constitutionality of a law, an act or a statute must
demonstrate that they have been, or are about to be, denied some right or privilege to
which they are lawfully entitled, or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens
or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of. There was no showing in the
Petition for Declaratory Relief that SJS as a political party or its members as registered voters
would be adversely affected by the alleged acts of the respondents below, such as the
deprivation of votes or barring of suffrage to its constituents.
Furthermore, the allegedly keen interest of its "thousands of members who are citizens-
taxpayers-registered voters" is too general and beyond the contemplation of the standards set
by our jurisprudence. Not only is the presumed interest impersonal in character; it is likewise
too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing.
3. A cause of action is an act or an omission of one party in violation of the legal right or
rights of another, causing injury to the latter. Its essential elements are the following: (1) a right
in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not
to violate such right; and (3) such defendants act or omission that is violative of the right of
the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the former to the latter.

Since a perusal of the Petition filed by SJS before the RTC discloses no explicit allegation
that the former had any legal right in its favor that it sought to protect, it can only be concluded
that there was no cause of action.
The Court finds in the Petition for Declaratory Relief no single allegation of fact upon
which SJS could base a right of relief from the named respondents. In any event, even
granting that it sufficiently asserted a legal right it sought to protect, there was nevertheless
no certainty that such right would be invaded by the said respondents.
CASE: VINUYA VS. ROMULO

G.R. No. 162230 August 13, 2014
Facts:
During the Second World War, the Japanese military established the comfort women
system to appease the sexual appetites of the soldiers and to contain their activities
within a regulated environment.
Daily life for comfort women was unmitigated misery as they were forced to endure
degradation and humiliation. The military forced them into the system against their
wills and placed them into barracks-style stations divided into tiny cubicles where they
were forced to live, sleep, and have sex with as many as 30 soldiers per day. They
suffered physical, emotional, and psychological scarring as a result.
In the case at bar, the PETs are members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-
profit organization established to provide aid to the victims of rape by Japanese
military forces in the Philippines during the Second World War.
PETs claim that since 1998, they have requested the Executive Department, through
the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, for assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials
and military officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in
the Philippines.
However, officials of the Executive Department declined to assist, stating that all
claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of
1956. RESPOs also argue that the apologies made by Japan have been satisfactory,
and that Japan had addressed the individual claims of the women through the
atonement money paid by the Japanese-established Asian Womens Fund.
Dissatisfied, PETs have petitioned for an application for the issuance of a writ of
prelimanry mandatory injunction against the office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Secretary of the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
Issue/s:
1. WoN the petition poses a political question?

2. WoN the RESPOs committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against humanity and
war crimes committed against them?
3. WoN the SC can compel the RESPOs to espouse the claims of PETs for official
apology and other forms of reparations against Japan against the ICJ?
Ruling:
From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
In Tanada v. Cuenco, we held that political questions refer "to those

questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in
their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure."
Certain types of cases often have been found to present political questions.
One such category involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established
that "[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by
the Constitution to the executive and legislative--'the political'--departments of
the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the exercise of this
political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision."
To be sure, not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive
agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine government should
espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign relations
matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to
the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its
nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom
of such decision is not for the courts to question. Neither could petitioners
herein assail the said determination by the Executive Department via the
instant petition for certiorari.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause

would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt
our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For us to overturn the Executive Departments determination would
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political
branch to which authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally
committed.
THE PHILIPPINES AS A STATE
CASE: Collector of Internal Revenue, petitioner vs. Antonio Campus Rueda, respondent
Facts: Antonio Campus Rueda-respondent, was the administrator of the estate of the late
Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. The deceased, is a Spanish national
having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. At
the time of her demise, she left intangible personal properties in the Philippines. On
September 29, 1955, respondent filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all
the properties of the late Doa Cerdeira. But the PetitionerCollector of Internal Revenue
denied the request for exemption claimed on the ground that the law of Tangier is not
reciprocal to Sec. 122 and alleging that Tangier is a mere principality, not a foreign country
within the meaning of the said provision. With that, the petitioner assessed and demanded
against the petitioner the sum P161, 874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes,
including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in
the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be
necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign
country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code?
Ruling: No. It was held by the court that the expression "foreign country", used in the last
provision of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of
that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international
law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not
residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not

necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government in order to entitle
the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the provision of Section 122 of our Tax Code.
Section 122: That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal
property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which
at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect
of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the
laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow
a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of
intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign
country.
CASE: NICOLAS VS ROMULO
FACTS
Lance Corporal Daniel Smith, member of the US Armed Forces, was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against Suzette Nicolas (petitioner) in the RTC. The
court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City.
Pursuant to Article V, paragraph No. 10, of the Visiting Forces Agreement entered into
by the Philippines and the United States, accused shall serve his sentence in the facilities that
shall be agreed upon by appropriate Philippine and United States authorities. Pending
agreement on such facilities, he is temporarily committed to the Makati City Jail.
However, Smith was taken out of the Makati jail and brought to a facility for detention under
the control of the United States government, provided for under new agreements between the
Philippines and the United States, referred to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreements which
states:
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement
signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States
Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy in Manila.
Petitioners contend that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because the VFA is
void and unconstitutional since it violates Art. XVlll, Sec. 25 of the constitution which states:
Sec. 25. After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Philippines and
the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty
duly concurred in by the Senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a
majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum held for that
purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.
ISSUE
Whether or not the presence of US Armed Forces in Philippine territory pursuant to the VFA is
allowed under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State.
HELD
Yes.

Firstly, as held in Bayan v. Zamora, the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate
and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly
authorized representative of the United States government.
The fact that the VFA was not submitted for advice and consent of the United States
Senate does not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or treaty
recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal United States law. Notice can
be taken of the internationally known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate
for advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature, whereas those that carry
out or further implement these policy making agreements are merely submitted to Congress,
under the provisions of the so-called CaseZablocki Act, within sixty days from ratification.
The second reason has to do with the relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. The joint RP-US military exercises for the purpose of developing the
capability to resist an armed attack fall squarely under the provisions of the RP-US Mutual
Defense Treaty. The VFA, which is the instrument agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US
military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement to the main RP-US Mutual Defense
Treaty.
The provision of Art. XVIII, Sec. 25of the Constitution, is complied with by virtue of the
fact that the presence of the US Armed Forces through the VFA is a presence allowed
under the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty. Since the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty itself
has been ratified and concurred in by both the Philippine Senate and the US Senate,
there is no violation of the Constitutional provision resulting from such presence.
The VFA being a valid and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of
international law to abide by its terms and provisions.
CASE: QUA CHEE GAN V. DEPORTATION BOARD, GR L-10280

September 30, 1983
Ponente: J. Barrera
Facts:
- May 12, 1952, Special Prosecutor Emilo Galang charged petitioners before the
Deportation Board, having purchased US dollars in the sum of $130,000.00, without
the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, which was then
secretly remitted to Hong Kong
- Petitioners Qua Chee Gan and Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua and Basilio King
attempted to bribe officers of the PHL and US governments (Antonio Laforteza, Chief
of the Intelligence Division of the Central Bank, Capt. A.P. Charak of the OSI, US Air
Force) to evade prosecution for the unauthorized purchase.
- A warrant of arrest of petitioners was issued by the Deportation Board. They filed a
surety bond of P10,000.00 and cash bond for P10,000.00, thereby provisionally
setting them at liberty
- Petitioners-appellants filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board for the
reason that the same does not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens, and
that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. Motion was denied by
the Board on Feb. 9, 1953
- Petitioners then filed a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition to the Court, but
made returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. After securing and filing a
bond for P5,000.00 each, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the lower
court, restraining the DB from hearing deportation charges against petitioners
pending termination of the habeas corpus and/or prohibition proceedings.
- The DB then filed its answer to the original petition, saying as an authorized agent of
the President, it has jurisdiction over the charges filed, and the authority to order their
arrest. The Court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the

Deportation Board of his power to conduct the investigations. It also sustained the
power of the DB to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the aliens temporary
release pending investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative
Code.
- Hence this appeal.
Issues:
1. WON the President has powers to deport aliens and, consequently,
2. WON the delegation to the DB of the ancillary power to investigate, carries with it the
power to order the arrest of the alien complained of
Held:
1. Yes. As stated in Sec 69 of Act 2711 of the Revised Administrative Code
SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. A subject of a foreign power

residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said
Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except
upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the
ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned
shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not
less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to
be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-
examine the opposing witnesses."
While it does not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport these
aliens, the fact that such a procedure was provided for before the President is a clear
indication of such power. SC stated petitioners committed the act of profiteering
which is a ground for deportation. The President may then order their deportation if
after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged.
2. No. President Quirinos EO 398 authorizes the DB to issue the warrant for the arrest
of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation
unless he files a bond for his provisional release. The exercise of the power to order
the arrest of an individual demands the exercise of discretion by the one issuing the
same. Such conditions are dependent/personal to the one upon whom the authority
devolves. It is an implied grant of power that would serve as curtailment on the
fundamental right of security to life and liberty, which equally applies to both citizens
and foreigners in this country. The guarantees of human rights, then, must not rest on
such a shaky foundation.
EO 398, as it empowers the DB to issue warrant of arrest and to fix bond and
prescribe the conditions for his temporary release, is therefore declared as illegal.
Order of arrest of DB upon petitioners is declared null and void.
CASE: TECSON V COMELEC 424 SCRA 277 (2004) - CITIZENSHIP
Consolidated Petitions for Disqualification against Fernando Poe, Jr.
Facts of the case:
Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) (Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, born Aug 20, 1939) submits his
certificate of candidacy for the office of the President on May 10, 2004
Petitioners Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., as well as Zoilo
Antonio Velez, filed separate petitions, seeking the disqualification of respondent FPJ
from the presidential elections on the grounds that he is not a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines.

o Contention: (1) respondent FPJ is an illegitimate child as he was born out of
wedlock, i.e., he was born before the marriage of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelly;
(2) as an illegitimate child, he follows the American citizenship of his mother,
Bessie Kelly; therefore, (3) he is not a natural-born citizen. Petitioners cite the
marriage certificate of FPJs parents which shows that they were married in
1940, while FPJ was born in 1939. They contend that it does not appear that
FPJ has been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents as he
had not been acknowledged by his father. The same arguments were
advanced by petitioner Velez.
Petitioner Victorino Fornier also files for the disqualification of FPJ, claiming that his
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a
Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Petitioner Fornier also provides evidence (1) the alleged birth certificate of Allan
Fernando Poe; (2) the alleged marriage certificate between Allan Fernando Poe and
Paulita Gomez; and (3) the alleged bigamy charge filed by Paulita Gomez against
Allan Fernando Poe. Respondent FPJ submits Senate Committee Report No. 517,
indicating the falsification of said documents. COMELEC later dismisses Forniers
petition for disqualification for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, so
to be allowed to run for the Office of the President.
Held:
While not conclusively established by evidence, the principle of Jus Sanguinis qualifies
Fernando Poe, Jr. as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, recognized as the son of Allan
F. Poe, Sr., a citizen of the Philippines.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected
President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, where the term "natural-born
citizens" is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
At the time of FPJs birth, under the regime of the 1935 Constitution, the principle of Jus
Sanguinis confers Filipino citizenship to all children born from Filipino fathers, without
distinction for legitimate or illegitimate children. Allan F. Poe (father) would have been a
Filipino citizen at this time, as Lorenzo Pou (grandfather, 1870-1954) was granted Filipino
citizenship under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Additionally:
SC maintains that Forniers petition is denied for lack of merit. The documents
presented as evidence appear to be manufactured, and fails to prove that FPJ
deliberately misrepresented his status as a natural-born citizen. Forniers evidence
does show that FPJ has always conducted himself as a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner Fornier never alleged that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving
his case around the illegitimacy of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or
filiation as a nonissue.
Petitioner Tecsons contention which stresses FPJs status as an illegitimate child is a

nonissue under the 1935 Constitution, and also runs contrary to the trend in civil law
equalizing the rights of illegitimate and legitimate children (Convention on the Rights
of the Child), referring to FPJs right to run for office.
CARLOS T. GO, SR. V. LUIS T. RAMOS
Luis T. Ramos filed a complaint for deportation against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the
latter is an illegal and undesirable alien presenting the birth certificate of Jimmy
which indicates his citizenship as FChinese. He also argued that although it appears
from Jimmys birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos,
the document seems to be tampered, his citizenship being the only one handwritten.
And Jimmys acquisition therefore of a Philippine Passport was fraudulent.
Jimmy refuted the allegations. He insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino; that his
father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected
Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625 as evidenced
by his having taken the Oath of Allegiance on July 11, 1950 and having executed an
Affidavit of Election of Philippine citizenship on July 12, 1950. Jimmy added that he
had even voted in the 1952 and 1955 elections.
Issue:
WON the evidence adduced by Carlos and Jimmy to prove their claim to Philippine
citizenship is substantial and sufficient.
Ruling:
After a careful evaluation of the evidence, the appellate court was not convinced that
the same was sufficient to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the
deportation proceedings considering that what were presented particularly the birth
certificates of Jimmy, as well as those of his siblings, Juliet Go and Carlos Go, Jr.
indicate that they are Chinese citizens. Like the Board, it found the election of Carlos
of Philippine citizenship, which was offered as additional proof of his claim, irregular
as it was not made on time.
One of the arguments raised to sustain Carlos claim to Philippine citizenship is the
doctrine of jus soli, or the doctrine or principle of citizenship by place of birth. We
agree with the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the doctrine of jus soli was
never extended to the Philippines. Neither will the Philippine Bill of 1902 nor the
Jones Law of 1916 make Carlos a citizen of the Philippines. His bare claim that his
father, Go Yin An, was a resident of the Philippines at the time of the passage of the
said laws, without any supporting evidence whatsoever will not suffice.
It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father and
that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother and follow her
nationality. Moreover, we have also ruled that an illegitimate child of a Filipina need
not perform any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to
citizens of the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. However, it is
our considered view that absent any evidence proving that Carlos is indeed an
illegitimate son of a Filipina, the aforestated established rule could not be applied to
him.
As to whether the election of Philippine citizenship conferred on Carlos Filipino

citizenship, we find that the appellate court correctly found that it did not. Com. Act
No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935
Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a
valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children

born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry
together with the Oath of Allegiance. The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted
to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age
of majority.
It is true that we said that the 3-year period for electing Philippine citizenship may be
extended as when the person has always regarded himself as a Filipino. Be that as it
may, it is our considered view that not a single circumstance was sufficiently shown
meriting the extension of the 3-year period. Further, the exercise of the rights and
privileges granted only to Filipinos is not conclusive proof of citizenship, because a
person may misrepresent himself to be a Filipino and thus enjoy the rights and
privileges of citizens of this country.
It is incumbent upon one who claims Philippine citizenship to prove to the satisfaction
of the court that he is really a Filipino. No presumption can be indulged in favor of the
claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt regarding citizenship must be
resolved in favor of the state.
CASE: IN RE: CHING
316 SCRA 1 (1999)
Topic: Election of Philippine Citizenship
FACTS: Vicente Ching finished his law degree at the Saint Louis University in Baguio City on
July 17, 1998. Vicente Ching is legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese Citizen,
and Prescila Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on April 11, 1964.
After he finished his law degree he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In
a resolution of this Court, he was allowed to take the Bar in a condition that he must submit to
the Court proof of his Philippine Citizenship. He eventually passed the bar but he was advised
that he needs to show proof that he is a Filipino citizen before he be allowed to take his oath.
Apparently, Chings father was a Chinese citizen but his mother was a Filipino citizen. His
parents were married before he was born in 1963. Under the 1935 Constitution, a legitimate
child, whose one parent is a foreigner, acquires the foreign citizenship of the foreign parent.
Ching maintained that he has always considered himself as a Filipino; that he is a certified
public accountant a profession reserved for Filipinos; that he even served as a councilor in
a municipality in La Union. The Solicitor-General commented on the case by saying that as a
legitimate child of a Chinese and a Filipino, Ching should have elected Filipino citizenship
upon reaching the age of majority; that under prevailing jurisprudence, upon reaching the
age of majority is construed as within 7 years after reaching the age of majority (in his case
21 years old because he was born in 1964 while the 1935 Constitution was in place). Ching
did elect Filipino citizenship but he only did so when he was preparing for the bar in 1998 or
14 years after reaching the age of majority.
ISSUE: Whether a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and
an alien validly elect Philippine citizenship 14 years after he reached the age of majority?
RULING: Ching validly failed to elect Philippine Citizenship.
1. When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under
Article IV, Sec 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected the Philippine citizenship. ( Ching has inchoate

Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching the age of majority.)
CA No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid
election.
2. However, the 1935 Constitution and CA No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within
which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. Jurisprudence dictates that this
must be done within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority. In the case of
Cuenco Vs. Secretary of Justice it was rule that 3 years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision, which period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has alaways considered himself a
Filipino. In this case Cuenco was allowed to elect 7 years after attaining the age of majority.
3. The span of 14 years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he
finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the
contemplation of the requirement of electing upon reaching the age of majority. Moreover,
Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship.
4. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and
painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Chings
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
5. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect
Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he
should avail the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly in this case,
Ching has slept his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this
golden privilege slipped away from his grasped.
6. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y.
LIM, respondent.
7.
8. This case stemmed from a petition for correction of entries filed by herein
respondent. In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October
29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte but the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred
her record of birth to Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and
Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be
corrected.
9.
10. During the hearing, respondent claimed that: first, her surname Yu was
misspelled as Yo; second, her fathers name in her birth record was written as
Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian); third, her
nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino
considering that her father and mother never got married and that only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina; fourth, it was
erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a legitimate child
when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her
parents were never married.
11.
12. Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as her
parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her
daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting
marriage contracted in China. Respondent thereby presented a certification
attested by officials of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan,
Lanao del Norte that there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and
Yu Dio To from 1948 to the present.
13.
14. The Trial Court granted respondents petition and directed the Civil Registrar
of Iligan City to make such corrections. The Republic of the Philippines
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
decision.
15.
16. Issue:
17. WON respondent is a Filipino citizen.
18.
19. Ruling:
20.
21. The Republic avers that respondent did not comply with the constitutional
requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of
majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, which
provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and
an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. Likewise, the
Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625,
that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine
citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn
to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths,
and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines.
22. Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing
Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in
the case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering
that her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she
was not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements
to become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino
mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated
differently, she is a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino
citizenship when she reached the age of majority.
23. BALGAMELO CABILING MA V. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F.
FERNANDEZ, JR.
24.
25. Balgamelo, Felix Jr., Valeriano, Lechi Ann, Arceli, Nicolas, and Isidro, all
surnamed Ma are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese, and
Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr.,
Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively.
26.
27. They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for
almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their
primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor
understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not
know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they
have already raised their respective families in the Philippines.
28.
29. During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration
their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). Immediately upon reaching the
age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with
Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that (t)hose
whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Thus,
on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L.
Gonzalez. On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty.
Patrocinio C. Filoteo. In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before
then Judge Salvador C. Sering.
30.
31. Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners,
however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil
registry. It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they
elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so. On the
other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration
requirement.
32.
33. Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim to
Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, and for failure to submit any
document to support their claim that they are Philippine citizens, respondents
concluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano Lechi Ann, Nicolas and
Isidro are undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.
34.
35.
36. Issue:
37. WON petitioner/s is/are undocumented or improperly documented alien/s.
38.
39. Ruling:
40.
41. The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement
of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
42.
43. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the
age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with
the civil registry that was belatedly done.
44.
45. We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect
Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to
complete the statutory requirements for such election.
46.
47. We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected
public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other
similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of
election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners case,

the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the
constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts
of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The
actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein
petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to
formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
48.
49. Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant
case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the
registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under
Commonwealth Act No. 625 that will confer Philippine citizenship on the
petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been
claimed.
CASE: REPUBLIC VS. SAGUN
Petitioner: Republic of the Philippines thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
Respondent: Nora Fe Sagun
FACTS: -Nora Fe Sagun was the legitimate child of Albert Chan (a Chinese national) and
Marta Borromeo (Filipino citizen) and was born on Aug. 8, 1959.
- She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
- In 1992, at the age of 33 and after getting married to Alex Sagun, she executed
an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
- This document, however, was notarized but was not recorded and registered with
the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio City.
- Problem arose when in September 2005 Nora Fe applied for a Philippine
passport but her application was denied due to the citizenship of her father and
there being no annotation on her birth certificate that she has elected Philippine
citizenship.
- So, she sought a judicial declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship
and prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Baguio be ordered to annotate the
same on her birth certificate
- Respondents contentions: Nora Fe contended that by virtue of her positive acts,
she has effectively elected Philippine citizenship, and contended that she was
raised as a Filipino and was a registered voter. (the RTC granted her petition)
- Petitioners contentions: Petitioner contended that Nora Fes petition before the
RTC was improper because (1) law and jurisprudence clearly contemplate no
judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship and (2)
the pleaded registration of the oath of allegiance and its annotation on
respondents birth certificate are duties of the local civil registrar and they require
no court order.
ISSUES: (1) Whether respondents petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship
is sanction by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence,
(2) Whether respondent has effectively elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law
RULING: -The Court held that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules for
the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.
-There is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry.
-Take note, Nora Fe was born on Aug. 8, 1959 and the governing charter was the 1935
Constitution, which declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of

the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority (Sec. 1, Art.
IV of the 1935 Constitution) Under this article, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
-The right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution was
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that those born before January 17, 1987 of
Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority are
Philippine citizens.
-In Nora Fes case, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
-Note: Commonwealth Act No. 625 prescribes the procedure that should be followed in
order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship:
1. A statement of election under oath
2. An oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines
3. Registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the
nearest civil registry
- It should be stressed however that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule
which authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts.
- Nora Fe failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid election
- She had not executed a sworn statement of her election of Philippine citizenship.
- The only documentary evidence she presented was her oath of allegiance
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered.
- And, its execution of the oath was not within reasonable time after the
respondent reached the age of majority.
- The phrase reasonable time has been interpreted to mean that the election
should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.
- Petition Granted and Nora Fes petition for judicial declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship is DISMISSED.
- KILOSBAYAN FOUNDATION AND BANTAY KATARUNGAN

FOUNDATION, V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R.
ERMITA; SANDIGANBAYAN JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG
- On May 16, 2007, respondent Executive Secretary, in representation of the
Office of the President, announced an appointment in favor of respondent
Gregory S. Ong as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court to fill up the
vacancy created by the retirement of Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo,
Sr.
- Petitioners contend that the appointment extended to respondent Ong is
patently unconstitutional, arbitrary, whimsical and issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
- Petitioners claim that respondent Ong is a Chinese citizen, that this fact is
plain and incontestable, and that his own birth certificate indicates his
Chinese citizenship. The birth certificate, petitioners add, reveals that at
the time of respondent Ongs birth on May 25, 1953, his father was
Chinese and his mother was also Chinese. That even if it were granted that
eleven years after respondent Ongs birth his father was finally granted
Filipino citizenship by naturalization, that, by itself, would not make
respondent Ong a natural-born Filipino citizen.
- Respondent Ong maintained that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen and

obtained from the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ a certification and
an identification that he is a natural-born Filipino citizen under Article IV,

Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution, since his mother was a Filipino
citizen when he was born.
- Issue:
- WON Ong is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
-
- Ruling:
- The Court takes judicial notice of the records of respondent Ongs petition
to be admitted to the Philippine bar.
- In his petition to be admitted to the Philippine bar, respondent Ong alleged

that he is qualified to be admitted to the Philippine bar because, among
others, he is a Filipino citizen; and that he is a Filipino citizen because his
father, Eugenio Ong Han Seng, a Chinese citizen, was naturalized in 1964
when he, respondent Ong, was a minor of eleven years and thus he, too,
thereby became a Filipino citizen. As part of his evidence, in support of his
petition, be submitted his birth certificate and the naturalization papers of
his father. His birth certificate states that he was a Chinese citizen at birth
and that his mother, Dy Guiok Santos, was a Chinese citizen and his father,
Eugenio Ong Han Seng, was also a Chinese citizen.
- It was on the basis of these allegations under oath and the submitted
evidence of naturalization that this Court allowed respondent Ong to take
the oath as a lawyer.
- It is clear, therefore, that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is
a naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent recognition of his
natural-born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot
amend the final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and
his mother were naturalized along with his father.
- The series of events and long string of alleged changes in the nationalities
of respondent Ongs ancestors, by various births, marriages and deaths, all
entail factual assertions that need to be threshed out in proper judicial
proceedings so as to correct the existing records on his birth and
citizenship. The chain of evidence would have to show that Dy Guiok
Santos, respondent Ongs mother, was a Filipino citizen, contrary to what
still appears in the records of this Court.
- Respondent Ong has the burden of proving in court his alleged ancestral
tree as well as his citizenship under the time-line of three
Constitutions. Until this is done, respondent Ong cannot accept an
appointment to this Court as that would be a violation of the Constitution.
For this reason, he can be prevented by injunction from doing so.
- REPUBLIC V. LI CHING CHUNG
- G.R. No. 197450; March 20, 2013

- REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LI CHING CHUNG,
a.k.a. BERNABE LUNA LI, a.k.a. STEPHEN LEE KENG, Respondent.
- FACTS:
- On August 22, 2007, respondent, otherwise known as Bernabe Luna Li or
Stephen Lee Keng, a Chinese national, filed his Declaration of Intention to
Become a Citizen of the Philippines before the OSG. On March 12, 2008
or almost seven months after filing his declaration of intention, respondent
filed his Petition for Naturalization before the RTC.
- On June 3, 2009, the RTC granted respondents application for
naturalization as a Filipino citizen. The OSG appealed the RTC decision to
the CA. The OSG argues that the petition for naturalization should not be
granted in view of its patent jurisdictional infirmities, particularly because:
1) it was filed within the one (1) year proscribed period from the filing of
declaration of intention; 2) no certificate of arrival, which is indispensable
to the validity of the Declaration of Intention, was attached to the petition;
and 3) respondents failure to comply with the publication and posting
requirements set under CA 473.
- The CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA held that although the petition
for naturalization was filed less than one (1) year from the time of the
declaration of intent before the OSG, this defect was not fatal. Moreover,
contrary to the allegation of the OSG that respondent did not present his
Certificate of Arrival, the fact of his arrival could be easily confirmed from
the Certification, dated August 21, 2007, issued by the Bureau of
Immigration, and from the stamp in the passport of respondent indicating
his arrival on January 26, 1981. The CA further stated that the Republic
participated in every stage of the proceedings below. It was accorded due
process which it vigorously exercised from beginning to end. Whatever
procedural defects, if at all they existed, did not taint the proceedings, let
alone the Republics meaningful exercise of its right to due process.
- ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTC decision and
denying the appeal by the OSG
- HELD: Yes. CA decision reversed and set aside
- Political Law - declaration of intention must be filed one year prior to the
filing of the petition for naturalization
- As held in Tan v. Republic, "the period of one year required therein is the
time fixed for the State to make inquiries as to the qualifications of the
applicant. If this period of time is not given to it, the State will have no
sufficient opportunity to investigate the qualifications of the applicants and
gather evidence thereon. An applicant may then impose upon the courts, as
the State would have no opportunity to gather evidence that it may present
to contradict whatever evidence that the applicant may adduce on behalf of
his petition." The period is designed to give the government ample time to
screen and examine the qualifications of an applicant and to measure the
latters good intention and sincerity of purpose.
- Stated otherwise, the waiting period will unmask the true intentions of
those who seek Philippine citizenship for selfish reasons alone, such as,
but not limited to, those who are merely interested in protecting their
wealth, as distinguished from those who have truly come to love the
Philippines and its culture and who wish to become genuine partners in
nation building.
- The law is explicit that the declaration of intention must be filed one year
prior to the filing of the petition for naturalization. Republic v. Go Bon
Leelikewise decreed that substantial compliance with the requirement is
inadequate. In that case, Go filed his declaration of intention to become a
citizen of the Philippines on May 23, 1940. After eleven months, he filed
his petition for naturalization on April 18, 1941.
- The only exception to the mandatory filing of a declaration of intention is
specifically stated in Section 6 of CA No. 473, to wit: Section 6. Persons
exempt from requirement to make a declaration of intention. Persons born
in the Philippines and have received their primary and secondary education
in public schools or those recognized by the Government and not limited
to any race or nationality, and those who have resided continuously in the
Philippines for a period of thirty years or more before filing their
application, may be naturalized without having to make a declaration of
intention upon complying with the other requirements of this Act. To such
requirements shall be added that which establishes that the applicant has
given primary and secondary education to all his children in the public
schools or in private schools recognized by the Government and not
limited to any race or nationality. The same shall be understood applicable
with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien who has declared
his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines, and dies before he is
actually naturalized.
- Unquestionably, respondent does not fall into the category of such exempt
individuals that would excuse him from filing a declaration of intention
one year prior to the filing of a petition for naturalization. Contrary to the
CA finding, respondents premature filing of his petition for naturalization
before the expiration of the one-year period is fatal.
- In naturalization proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the applicant to
show full and complete compliance with the requirements of the law. The
opportunity of a foreigner to become a citizen by naturalization is a mere
matter of grace, favor or privilege extended to him by the State; the
applicant does not possess any natural, inherent, existing or vested right to
be admitted to Philippine citizenship. The only right that a foreigner has, to
be given the chance to become a Filipino citizen, is that which the statute
confers upon him; and to acquire such right, he must strictly comply with
all the statutory conditions and requirements. The absence of one

jurisdictional requirement is fatal to the petition as this necessarily results
in the dismissal or severance of the naturalization process.
- Petition granted.
CASE: CO VS CIVIL REGISTRAR OF MANILA
FACTS:
Hubert Tan Co was born on March 23, 1974. His sister, Arlene Tan Co, was born on May 19,
1975. In their respective certificates of birth, it is stated that their parents Co Boon Peng and
Lourdes Vihong K. Tan are Chinese citizens.
Co Boon Peng filed an application for his naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines with the
Special Committee on Naturalization under Letter of Instruction no. 270. His application was
granted and he was conferred Philippine citizenship under PD 1055. He was issued a
certificate of naturalization and consequently took an oath as Philippine citizen on February
15,1977.
On August 27, 1998, they filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a petition under Rule
108 of Rules of Court for correction of entries in the certificate of birth which was denied on
the following grounds:
a) Although CA 473 and LOI 270 are statutes relating to the same subject matter, they do not
provide the same beneficial effects with respect to the minor children of the applicant; Sec.
15: Effects of naturalization on the wife and the children
b) LOI 270: Refers to qualified individuals only;
c) Section 15 CA no. 473 should not be deemed and incorporated in and applied to LOI 270;
d) Application of the pari material rule of construction is misplaced.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are Filipino citizens on the account of the
naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng.

HELD:
It is not enough that the petitioners adduce or cite in evidence the Certificate of Naturalization
of their father, Co Boon Peng, to entitle them to a Philippine citizenship. They are likewise
mandated to prove the following material allegations in their petition:
1) They were born in the Philippines;
2) They are the legitimate children of Co Boon Peng;
3) Co Boon Peng was conferred Philippine citizenship and had taken his oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines;
4) Their father was still a Chinese citizen at their time of birth;
5) The petitioner were minors during their fathers naturalization;
6) The change in nationality is recorded in the Civil Register.
Ruling:
Yes. Hubert Tan Co and Arlene Tan Co are Filipino citizens on the account of the
naturalization of their father, Co Boon Peng. According to Section 15 of CA No. 473, which
extends the grant of Philippine citizenship to the minor children of those naturalized there
under, should be similarly applied to the minor children of those naturalized under LOI No.
270, like the petitioners in this case. The petitioners recourse to the procedure in Rule 108 of
the Rules of Court, as amended, being appropriate, it behooved the trial court to do its duty
under Section 4, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
REPUBLIC V. LAO ONG

G.R. No. 175430; June 18, 2012
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. KERRY LAO ONG, Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Ong, then 38 years old, filed a Petition for Naturalization. Ong alleged in
his petition that he has been a "businessman/business manager" since 1989, earning
an average annual income of P150,000.00. When he testified, however, he said that he
has been a businessman since he graduated from college in 1978. Moreover, Ong did
not specify or describe the nature of his business.
As proof of his income, Ong presented four tax returns for the years 1994 to 1997.
Based on these returns, Ongs gross annual income was P60,000.00 for 1994;
P118,000.00 for 1995; P118,000.00 for 1996; and P128,000.00 for 1997. On
November 23, 2001, the trial court granted Ongs petition.
The Republic, through the Solicitor General, appealed to the CA. The Republic
faulted the trial court for granting Ong's petition despite his failure to prove that he
possesses a known lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation as required under
Section 2, fourth paragraph of the Revised Naturalization Law.
The Republic posited that, contrary to the trial courts finding, respondent Ong did not
prove his allegation that he is a businessman/business manager earning an average
income of P150,000.00 since 1989. His income tax returns belie the value of his
income. Moreover, he failed to present evidence on the nature of his profession or
trade, which is the source of his income. Considering that he has four minor children
(all attending exclusive private schools), he has declared no other property and/or
bank deposits, and he has not declared owning a family home, his alleged income
cannot be considered lucrative. Under the circumstances, the Republic maintained that
respondent Ong is not qualified as he does not possess a definite and existing business
or trade.
The appellate court dismissed the Republic's appeal. The appellate court denied the
Republic's motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Ong has proved that he has some known lucrative
trade, profession or lawful occupation in accordance with Section 2, fourth paragraph
of the Revised Naturalization Law?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed and set aside.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: naturalization
The courts must always be mindful that naturalization proceedings are imbued with
the highest public interest.Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. The burden of proof
rests upon the applicant to show full and complete compliance with the requirements
of law.
Based on jurisprudence, the qualification of "some known lucrative trade, profession,

or lawful occupation" means "not only that the person having the employment gets
enough for his ordinary necessities in life. It must be shown that the employment
gives one an income such that there is an appreciable margin of his income over his
expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid ones becoming the
object of charity or a public charge." His income should permit "him and the members
of his family to live with reasonable comfort, in accordance with the prevailing
standard of living, and consistently with the demands of human dignity, at this stage
of our civilization."
It has been held that in determining the existence of a lucrative income, the courts
should consider only the applicant's income; his or her spouses income should not be
included in the assessment. The spouses additional income is immaterial "for under
the law the petitioner should be the one to possess some known lucrative trade,
profession or lawful occupation to qualify him to become a Filipino citizen." Lastly,
the Court has consistently held that the applicant's qualifications must be determined
as of the time of the filing of his petition.
A review of the decisions involving petitions for naturalization shows that the Court is
not precluded from reviewing the factual existence of the applicant's qualifications. In
fact, jurisprudence holds that the entire records of the naturalization case are open for
consideration in an appeal to this Court. Indeed, "A naturalization proceeding is so
infused with public interest that it has been differently categorized and given special
treatment. Unlike in ordinary judicial contest, the granting of a petition for
naturalization does not preclude the reopening of that case and giving the government
another opportunity to present new evidence. A decision or order granting citizenship
will not even constitute res judicata to any matter or reason supporting a subsequent
judgment cancelling the certification of naturalization already granted, on the ground
that it had been illegally or fraudulently procured. For the same reason, issues even if
not raised in the lower court may be entertained on appeal. As the matters brought to
the attention of this Court involve facts contained in the disputed decision of the lower
court and admitted by the parties in their pleadings, the present proceeding may be
considered adequate for the purpose of determining the correctness or incorrectness of
said decision, in the light of the law and extant jurisprudence." In the case at bar, there
is even no need to present new evidence. A careful review of the extant records
suffices to hold that respondent Ong has not proven his possession of a "known
lucrative trade, profession or lawful occupation" to qualify for naturalization.
Republic won the case.
REPUBLIC V BATUIGAS
G.R. No. 183110
FACTS:
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. The case was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001 and
raffled to Branch 29 of said court.
Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in the principles underlying the
Philippine Constitution; that she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable
manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as in her relations with
the constituted Government and with the community in which she is living; that she
has mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a sincere desire to learn and
embrace their customs, traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications
required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 473 (CA 473); that she is not opposed to organized
government nor is affiliated with any association or group of persons that uphold and
teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; that she is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for

the success and predominance of men's ideas; that she is neither a polygamist nor
believes in polygamy; that the nation of which she is a subject is not at war with the
Philippines; that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and
to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that she will reside
continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of her Petition up to the
time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated by Section 9of CA 473 had been
complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to
Dismisson the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful
occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor appeared on the day of
the hearing. Hence, Azucena's counsel moved that the evidence be presented ex-parte,
which the RTC granted. Accordingly, the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as
Commissioner to receive Azucena's evidence. During the November 5, 2004 ex-parte
hearing, no representative from the OSG appeared despite due notice.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents,
Azucena has never departed the Philippines since birth. She has resided in Malangas,
Zamboanga del Sur from 1941-1942; in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from
1942-1968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur from 1969-
1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from 1972-1976; and, in Margosatubig,
Zamboanga del Sur, thereafter, up to the filing of her Petition.
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools, i.e., Margosatubig
Central Elementary School in 1955,[14] Margosatubig Academy in 1959,[15] and the
Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963, graduating with a degree in Bachelor of Science in
Education. She then practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School for five
years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years, and in Talisayan High School in
Misamis Oriental for another two years.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-
born Filipino citizen. They have five children, namely Cynthia, Brenda, Aileen,
Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel James. All of them studied in Philippine public and
private schools and are all professionals, three of whom are now working abroad.
After her stint in Talisayan High School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal
partners, engaged in the retail business of and later on in milling/ distributing rice,
corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax
returns and balance sheets from 2000-2002and from 2004-2005. The business name
and the business permits issued to the spouses' store, 'Azucena's General
Merchandising,' are registered in Santiago's name, and he is also the National Food
Authority licensee for their rice and corn business. During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
To prove that she has no criminal record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the
Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur Provincial Office and by the
National Bureau of Investigation. She also presented her Health Examination
Recorddeclaring her as physically and mentally fit.
To further support Azucena's Petition, Santiago and witnesses EufemioMiniao and
Irineo Alfaro testified.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On January 31, 2005, the RTC found that Azucena has amply supported the
allegations in her Petition. Among these are her lack of a derogatory record, her
support for an organized government, that she is in perfect health, that she has
mingled with Filipinos since birth and can speak their language, that she has never
had any transgressions and has been a law abiding citizen, that she has complied with
her obligations to the government involving her business operations, and that the
business and real properties she and Santiago own provide sufficient income for her
and her family. Thus, the RTC ruled:
In sum, the petitioner has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications to be
admitted as citizen of the Philippines in accordance with the provisions of the
Naturalization Law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby granted.

SO ORDERED.
In its Omnibus Motion, the OSG argued that the ex-parte presentation of evidence
before the Branch Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473, as the law mandates
public hearing in naturalization cases.
Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005 Order, the RTC held that the public has
been fully apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free to intervene. The
OSG and its delegate, the Provincial Prosecutor, are the only officers authorized by
law to appear on behalf of the State, which represents the public. Thus, when the OSG
was furnished with a copy of the notice of hearing for the reception of evidence ex-
parte, there was already a sufficient compliance with the requirement of a public
hearing.
The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the CA, contending that Azucena failed
to comply with the income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained that
Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to
engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly meet the
income requirement. And even if she is allowed, her business is not a "lucrative trade"
within the contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable margin of
income over expenses in order to provide for adequate support in the event of
unemployment, sickness, or disability to work. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena's
claim that she owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in
the country.
The OSG further asserted that the ex-parte proceeding before the commissioner is not
a "public hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done in chambers, without the
public in attendance. It claimed that the State was denied its day in court because the
RTC, during the May 18, 2004 initial hearing, immediately allowed the proceeding to
be conducted ex-parte without even giving the State ample opportunity to be present.
Azucena countered that although she is a teacher by profession, she had to quit to help
in the retail business of her husband, and they were able to send all their children to
school. It is highly unlikely that she will become a public charge as she and her
spouse have enough savings and could even be given sufficient support by their
children. She contended that the definition of "lucrative trade/income" should not be
strictly applied to her. Being the wife and following Filipino tradition, she should not
be treated like male applicants for naturalization who are required to have their own
"lucrative trade."
Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition was not made public, as the hearing
before the Clerk of Court was conducted in the court's session hall. Besides, the OSG
cannot claim that it was denied its day in court as notices have always been sent to it.
Hence, its failure to attend is not the fault of the RTC.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In dismissing the OSG's appeal, the CA found that Azucena's financial condition
permits her and her family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with the
prevailing standard of living and consistent with the demands of human dignity. It
said:
Considering the present high cost of living, which cost of living tends to increase
rather than decrease, and the low purchasing power of the Philippine currency,
petitioner-appellee, together with her Filipino husband, nonetheless, was able to send
all her children to college, pursue a lucrative business and maintain a decent
existence. The Supreme Court, in recent decisions, adopted a higher standard in
determining whether a petitioner for Philippine citizenship has a lucrative trade or
profession that would qualify him/her for admission to Philippine citizenship and to
which petitioner has successfully convinced this Court of her ability to provide for
herself and avoid becoming a public charge or a financial burden to her community.
As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held that the RTC had complied with
the mandate of the law requiring notice to the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor of
its scheduled hearing for the Petition.
Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG recapitulates the same arguments it raised
before the CA, i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income and public
hearing requirements of CA 473.
Our Ruling
The Petition lacks merit.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option,
called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:
"Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that
they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do
they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws
in the United States which has since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained
Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to
the alien wife thru derivative naturalization.
Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of

Immigration:
Accordingly, we now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman
marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same
law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4.
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an alien wife to formalize the
conferment of Filipino citizenship is as follows:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino
citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that
she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her
husband's citizenship pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported
by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the
petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from
becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an
investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the
petition.
Records however show that in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. 030705 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino
citizen. The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside
the ruling of the CID as it found no sufficient evidence that Azucena's husband is a
Filipino citizenas only their marriage certificate was presented to establish his
citizenship.
Having been denied of the process in the CID, Azucena was constrained to file a
Petition for judicial naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have been
unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted in her favor, there is nothing that
prevents her from seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through regular
naturalization proceedings available to all qualified foreign nationals. The choice of
what option to take in order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the applicant.
In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA
473. The fact that her application for derivative naturalization under Section 15 of CA
473 was denied should not prevent her from seeking judicial naturalization under the
same law. It is to be remembered that her application at the CID was denied not
because she was found to be disqualified, but because her husband's citizenship was
not proven. Even if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a judicial
naturalization proceeding, for the courts to determine whether there are in fact
grounds to deny her of Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial naturalization
proceedings.
As the records before this Court show, Santiago's Filipino citizenship has been
adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter's
registration, land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino citizen, an operative fact that
should have enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA 473. On the submitted
evidence, nothing would show that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications
under Section 4 of the same Act.
However, the case before us is a Petition for judicial naturalization and is not based on
Section 15 of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of Justice. The lower
court which heard the petition and received evidence of her qualifications and absence
of disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has granted the Petition, which
was affirmed by the CA. We will not disturb the findings of the lower court which had
the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the evidence presented during the hearings on
the Petition, as well as determine, based on Azucena's testimony and deportment
during the hearings, that she indeed possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the ground that Azucena does not have the
qualification required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not have any
lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the lower court was not in the nature of a
public hearing. The OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications of Azucena
during the initial hearing scheduled on May 18, 2004. However, the OSG or the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing, prompting the
lower court to order ex parte presentation of evidence before the Clerk of Court on
November 5, 2004. The OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but despite
notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had raised this same issue at the CA and was
denied for the reasons stated in its Decision. We find no reason to disturb the findings
of the CA on this issue. Neither should this issue further delay the grant of Philippine
citizenship to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the Philippines, and
devoted all her life to the care of her Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated,
under judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen. On the second issue,
we also affirm the findings of the CA that since the government who has an interest
in, and the only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was duly notified
through the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor's office, the proceedings have
complied with the public hearing requirement under CA 473.
No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification to become a Philippine citizen:
He must own real estate in the Philippines worth not less than five thousand pesos,
Philippine currency, or must have known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually exercised her profession before
she had to quit her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on her role as
joint provider, together with her husband, in order to support her family. Together,
husband and wife were able to raise all their five children, provided them with
education, and have all become professionals and responsible citizens of this country.
Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife's lucrative trade. Azucena
herself is a professional and can resume teaching at any time. Her profession never
leaves her, and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a charge to
the only country she has known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main objective of extending the
citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family
members, thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national
treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the
husband's interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens
should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that
she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership,
acquire such interests. Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife
be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should
only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in
Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law.
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect that there is no proceeding
authorized by the law or by the Rules of Court, for the judicial declaration of the
citizenship of an individual. "Such judicial declaration of citizenship cannot even be
decreed pursuant to an alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization proceeding."
This case however is not a Petition for judicial declaration of Philippine citizenship
but rather a Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the
petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court to declare or confirm his
status as a Philippine citizen. In the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an
alien, and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of becoming a Philippine
citizen based on requirements required under CA 473. Azucena has clearly proven,
under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and
this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00523 which affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for
Naturalization, is hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period and the
requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the Revised
Naturalization Law, let a Certificate of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA
SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
AASJS VS DATUMANONG
G.R. No. 160869; May 11, 2007
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL
TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER - HECTOR GUMANGAN
CALILUNG, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice, Respondent.
FACTS:
Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent from
implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship of
Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship Permanent, Amending for the
Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As Amended, and for Other Purposes."
Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5,
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical
to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225 unconstitutional?
HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it
is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual
allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned
with dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress
was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what really
constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial
department, including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
LOPEZ VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
A Filipino-American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in
the Philippinesunless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign
citizenship at the time of filing thecertificate of candidacy.
FACTS:
Civil Procedure assailing the (1) Resolutionand (2) Omnibus Order of theCommission
on Elections(COMELEC), Second Division, disqualifying petitioner from running as
BarangayChairman.Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a candidate for the
position of Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, SanDionisio, IloiloCity in the
synchronized Barangay and SangguniangKabataan Elections held on October
29,2007.On October 25, 2007, respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition before
the Provincial ElectionSupervisor of the Province of Iloilo, praying for the
disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is anAmerican citizen, hence,
ineligible from running for any public office. In his Answer,petitioner argued thathe is
a dual citizen, a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9225,otherwise known as theCitizenship Retention and Re- acquisition Act
of 2003.He returned to the Philippinesand resided in Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he
said, he possessed all the qualifications to run for BarangayChairman.After the votes
for BarangayChairman were canvassed, petitioner emerged as the winner.On February
6, 2008,COMELECissued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for
disqualification.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners filing of a certificate of candidacy operated as an
effectiverenunciation of foreign citizenship.
HELD:
R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired
Filipino citizenshipmay run for a public office in the Philippines. Section 5 of the said
law states:Section 5.
Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.
-
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenshipunder this Act shall enjoy full
civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities andresponsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(2)Those seeking elective public office in thePhilippines shall meet the qualification
for holding suchpublic office as required by theConstitution and existing laws and, at
the time of the filing of the certificateof candidacy,make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before anypublic officer authorized to
administer an oath.
(Emphasis added)Petitioner re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under the cited law.
This new law explicitly provides that shouldone seek elective public office, he should
first "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and allforeign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.Petitioner failed to comply with
this requirement. We quote with approval theCOMELECobservation on thispoint:
While respondent was able to regain his FilipinoCitizenship by virtue of the

DualCitizenship Law when he took hisoath of allegiance before the ViceConsul of the
PhilippineConsulate General's Office in Los Angeles,California, thesame is not
enough to allow him to run for a public office. The above-quoted provision of law
mandates that acandidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenshipbefore any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.
There is no evidence presented that will show thatrespondent complied with the
provision of R.A. No. 9225. Absent such proof we cannot allow respondent torun for
BarangayChairman of Barangay Bagacay.For the renunciation to be valid, it must be
contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who isauthorized to
administer an oath.
The affiant must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he isrenouncing all foreign
citizenship for it to be effective. In the instant case, respondent Lopez's failureto
renounce hisAmerican citizenship as proven by the absence of an affidavit that will
prove thecontrary leads this Commission to believe that he failed to comply with the
positive mandate of law. Forfailure of respondent to prove that he abandoned his
allegiance to the United States, thisCommission holds himdisqualified from running
for an elective position in the Philippines.While it is true that petitioner won the
elections, took his oath and began to discharge the functions of BarangayChairman,
his victory cannot cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of
votes does not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application
of the constitutionaland statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
JACOT vs DAL
Facts:
Petitioner Nestor A. Jacot assails the Resolution of the Commission on Elections
En Banc in SPA No. 07-361, affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC
disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he
failed to make a personal renouncement of his US citizenship. Petitioner was a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13
December1989. Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the administration of his Oath of Allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine Consulate General (PCG) of Los
Angeles, California. The Los Angeles PCG issued on 19 June 2006 an Order of
Approval of petitioners request, and on the same day, petitioner took his Oath of
Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. On
27 September2006, the Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate No.
06-12019 recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines. Six months after, on
26 March 2007, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of Vice-
Mayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin.
In the meantime, the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections were held.
Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. On 12
June 2007, the COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution
disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007
local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship.
Ruling:
Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of
Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn
renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be
complied with for different purposes. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires
that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a
foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship. By the oath dictated in
the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there
is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation
might arise under Republic Act No.9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by
also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship.
The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the
Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for
public office in Philippine elections. The law categorically requires persons seeking
elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with
or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225compels natural-born Filipinos,
who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3
of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the
Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the
filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine
elections.
DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and
temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of the First Division
of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN from running as vice-mayor
in the May 14, 2007 elections. Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on
January 25, 2006, he applied for dual citizenship under RA9225. Upon approval of his
application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on
September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine citizenship, he is entitled to exercise
full civil and political rights. As such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor of Guimba,
Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 elections for having failed to renounce his American
Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
Ruling:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in view of
his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was enacted to allow
reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for:
1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;
2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of the law,
becomes citizens of a foreign country.
The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or retained their
Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. Petitioners oath of
allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225
which further requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce
his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for vice mayor.
SOBEJANA-CONDON vs COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner, a natural-born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon. In 2005, she filed an
application to re-acquire Philippine citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in
Canberra, Australia pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225 otherwise known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. It was approved and the
petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. In 2006,
petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship
before the Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia,
which in turn issued the Order certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen. Petitioner sought elective office during the May 10, 2010 elections this time
for the position of Vice-Mayor. She obtained the highest numbers of votes and was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. Separate petitions for quo warranto questioning
the petitioners eligibility were filed before the RTC. The petitions similarly sought
the petitioners disqualification from holding her elective post on the ground that she
is a dual citizen and that she failed to executea "personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an
oath" as imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225. Petitioner argues that a sworn
renunciation is a mere formal and not a mandatory requirement.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is qualified to hold her elective post.
Ruling:
Yes. R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippinecitizenship18 by taking an oath
of allegiance to the Republic. The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that
restores ones Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations
concomitant therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5. Under the
provisions of the aforementioned law, the petitioner has validly re-acquired her
Filipino citizenship when she took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on December 5, 2005. At that point, she held dual citizenship, i.e.,
Australian and Philippine. Before she initially sought elective public office, she filed a
renunciation of Australian citizenship in Canberra, Australia, which was not under
oath, contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5(2) that the renunciation of foreign
citizenship must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer oath. When the
law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or
interpretation; there is only room for application. Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 is one
such instance. In Lopez v. COMELEC, we declared its categorical and single
meaning: a Filipino American or any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public
position in the Philippines unless he or she personally swears to a renunciation of all
foreign citizenship at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. We also
expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that to be valid, the renunciation
must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of the law who is
authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is
renouncing all foreign citizenship. Failure to renounce foreign citizenship in
accordance with the exact tenor of Section 5(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225
renders a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold any elective public office.
MAQUILING vs COMELEC
Facts:
Rommel Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen. However, as a consequence of
his subsequent naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America, he lost his
Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA and took
the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on 10 July 2008. On the
same day an Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition was
issued in his favor. On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship. On 28
April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), another mayoralty candidate, filed
a petition to disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in connection with the 10 May 2010
local and national elections. Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a resident
of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a foreigner, attaching thereto a

certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
nationality of Arnado as USA-American. The COMELEC First Division ruled that
the petition for disqualification be granted because he is still using his US passport
after his renunciation of his US citizenship which negates his Affidavit of
Renunciation. Arnado filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En
Banc. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who
garnered the second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervened in the
case and filed before the COMELEC En Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together
with an Opposition to Arnados Amended Motion for Reconsideration. The
COMELEC En Banc granted the Motion for Reconsideration of Arnado on the ground
that the use of a US passport does not operate to revert back his status as a dual citizen
prior to his renunciation as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of a
US passport does not operate to unrenounce what he has earlier on renounced.
Maquiling files a petition before the Supreme Court to assail the decision of the
COMELEC En Banc.
Issue:
Whether or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
affects ones qualifications to run for public office.
Ruling:
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, Arnado was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the foreign
country. However, this legal presumption does not operate permanently and is open to
attack when after renouncing the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
showing his continued possession of a foreign citizenship.
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in C.A.
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position.
The Court agrees with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of using a foreign
passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado
voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such a
reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant Arnada represented himself as
an American citizen by using his US passport.
Thus, by the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, Arnado was a dual
citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship. He
was qualified to vote, but by the express disqualification under Sec 40(d) of the LGC,
he was not qualified to run for a local elective position.
REPUBLIC vs DELA ROSA
Facts:
Frivaldo filed a petition for naturalization under the Commonwealth Act No. 63
before the RTC Manila. Judge Dela Rosa set the petition for hearing on March 16,
1992, and directed the publication of the said order and petition in the Official Gazette
and a newspaper of general circulation, for 3 consecutive weeks, the last publication
of which should be at least 6 months before the date of the said hearing. Frivaldo
asked the Judge to cancel the March 16 hearing and move it to January 24, 1992,
citing his intention to run for public office in the May 1992 elections. Judge granted
the motion and the hearing was moved to February 21. No publication or copy was
issued about the order. The hearing proceeded and on February 27, 1992 - Judge
rendered the assailed Decision and held that Frivaldo is readmitted as a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines by naturalization.
Republic of the Philippines filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court in relation to R.A. No. 5440 and Section 25 of the Interim Rules, to
annul the decision made on February 27, 1992 and to nullify the oath of allegiance
taken by Frivaldo on same date.
Issue:
Whether or not Frivaldo was duly re-admitted to his citizenship as a Filipino.
Ruling:
No. The supreme court ruled that Private respondent is declared NOT a citizen of the
Philippines and therefore disqualified from continuing to serve as governor of the
Province of Sorsogon. He is ordered to vacate his office and to surrender the same to
the Vice-Governor of the Province of Sorsogon once this decision becomes final and
executory. The proceedings of the trial court was marred by the following
irregularities:
(1) the hearing of the petition was set ahead of the scheduled date of hearing, without
a publication of the order advancing the date of hearing, and the petition itself;
(2) the petition was heard within six months from the last publication of the petition;
(3) petitioner was allowed to take his oath of allegiance before the finality of the
judgment; and
(4) petitioner took his oath of allegiance without observing the two-year waiting
period.
GERALDINE GAW GUY and GRACE GUY CHEU, Petitioners,
vs.
ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO, Respondent.
Facts: The father of petitioners Geraldine Gaw Guy and Grace Guy Cheu became a
naturalized7 Filipino citizen sometime in 1959. The said petitioners, being minors at
that time, were also recognized8 as Filipino citizens. Respondent Atty. Alvin Agustin
T. Ignacio, filed a Complaint9 dated March 5, 2004 for blacklisting and deportation
against petitioners Geraldine and Grace before the Bureau of Immigration (BI) on the
basis that the latter two are Canadian citizens who are illegally working in the
Philippines, petitioners having been issued Canadian passports. Acting upon the
Complaint, respondent Maricel U. Salcedo, Special Prosecutor, Special Task Force of
the BI Commissioner, directed the petitioners, through the issuance of a subpoenae,10
to appear before her and to bring pertinent documents relative to their current
immigration status, to which the petitioners objected by filing with the Special Task
Force of the BI Commissioner a Comment/Opposition with Motion Ad Cautelam to
Quash Re: Subpoena11 dated 30 April 2004 (DucesTecum/Ad Testificandum), which
was eventually denied by respondent Salcedo in an Order12 dated May 14, 2004.
Issue: W/N judicial intervention is allowed amidst deportation proceedings.
Ruling:Yes.Basically, petitioners argue that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, relied
upon by the CA in its decision, does not apply in the present case because it falls
under an exception. Citing Board of Commissioners (CID) v. Dela Rosa, petitioners
assert that immediate judicial intervention in deportation proceedings is allowed
where the claim of citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the claim is correct. In connection therewith, petitioners assail the
applicability of Dwikarna v. Domingo in the present case, which the CA relied upon
in ruling against the same petitioners
In BOC v. Dela Rosa, it is required that before judicial intervention is sought, the
claim of citizenship of a respondent in a deportation proceeding must be so substantial
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that such claim is correct. In the said case,
the proof adduced by the respondent therein was so substantial and conclusive as to
his citizenship that it warranted a judicial intervention. In the present case, there is a
substantial or conclusive evidence that petitioners are Filipino citizens. Without
necessarily judging the case on its merits, as to whether petitioners had lost their
Filipino citizenship by having a Canadian passport, the fact still remains, through the
evidence adduced and undisputed by the respondents, that they are naturalized
Filipinos, unless proven otherwise. However, this Court cannot pass upon the issue of
petitioners' citizenship as this was not raised as an issue. The issue in this petition is
on the matter of jurisdiction, and as discussed above, the trial court has jurisdiction to
pass upon the issue whether petitioners have abandoned their Filipino citizenship or
have acquired dual citizenship within the confines of the law.
YU, petitioner vs. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, respondent
GR No. L-83882, January 24, 1989
FACTS:Petitioner Yu was originally issued a Portuguese passport in 1971. On

February 10, 1978, he acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization. Despite his
naturalization, he applied for and was issued a Portuguese Passport by the Consular
Section of the Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo on July 21, 1981. Said Consular Office
certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. Moreover, the
Petitioner though a naturalized Filipino signed documents stating his citizenship as
Portuguese without the authentication of the Philippine Consul, specifically, the
Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April
1980. Consequently, the CID detained Yu pending his deportation case. Yu, in turn,
filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Meanwhile, respondents argue that the petitioner was in full knowledge and
legal capacity when he applied Philippine citizenship through naturalization. He
consequently recognizes, identifies and agrees to the oath taken which states to
renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state or sovereignty and pledged to maintain true faith and allegiance to
the republic of the Philippines. Hence, petitioner then knows the limitations or
restrictions once solemnizing said oath and its succeeding consequences should they
be violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acts constitute renunciation of his

Philippine citizenship?
RULING:Yes, the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express
renunciation of petitioners Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In
a related jurisprudence, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is
made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication.
Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced
Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or
reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his
Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after
he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of
Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of
Philippine citizenship.
Hence it must be stressed that, Philippine Citizenahip is not a commodity or were to
be displayed when required and suppressed when convenient.
AZNAR V. COMELEC
Topic: Loss of Citizenship; Express Renunciation or Expatriation
Facts:
Private respondent Emilio Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the
COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the local
elections. Cebu PDP-Laban Provincial Council, as represented by petitioner Jose B.
Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman, filed with the
COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that
he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen, being a citizen of the United States of America.
Private respondent maintained that he is a Filipino citizen alleging that he is the

legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, that he is a holder of a valid and subsisting
Philippine Passport, that he has been continuously residing in the Philippines since
birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months, and that he has
been a registered voter in the Philippines since 1965.
Issue:
Whether or not Osmea is disqualified to run as Provincial Governor of Cebu

Province for not being a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
No. In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct
proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided for under C.A. No. 63 which are:
(1) by naturalization in a foreign country
(2) by express renunciation of citizenship
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a
foreign country.
From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his
Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other
mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
In concluding that private respondent had been naturalized as a citizen of the United
States of America, the petitioner merely relied on the fact that private respondent was
issued alien certificate of registration and was given clearance and permit to re-enter
the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and Deportation. Petitioner
assumed that because of the foregoing, the respondent is an American and "being an
American", Osmea "must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required
by the U.S. Naturalization Laws.
Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino. There is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When
the Supreme Court considers that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine
citizenship must be "express", it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of
Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".
RENALD F. VILLANDO V. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, JOCELYN SYLIMKAICHONG AND
HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES, GR 192147 & 192149
August 23, 2011
Ponente: J. Mendoza
Facts:
Limkaichong ran as a representative in the 1st District of Negros Oriental.
Her opponent, Paras and some other concerned citizens filed disqualification
cases against Limkaichong. They alleged that Limkaichong was not a natural
born citizen of the Philippines because when she was born her father was still
a Chinese and that her mother, lost her Filipino citizenship by virtue of her
marriage to Limkaichongs father.
During the pendency of the case, Limkaichong won over her rival Paras in the
election.
COMELEC after due hearing declared Limkaichong as disqualified. On the

following days however, notwithstanding their proclamation disqualifying
Limkaichong, the COMELEC issued a proclamation announcing Limkaichong
as the winner of the recently conducted elections.
This is in compliance withResolution No. 8062 adopting the policy-guidelines
of not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending
disqualification cases which shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.
Paras countered the proclamation and she filed a petition before the
COMELEC. LimkaichongasailedParas petition arguing that since she is now
the proclaimed winner, it should be the HRET which has the jurisdiction over
the matter and not the COMELEC. COMELEC agreed with Limkaichong.
Issues:
WON Limkaichong is a citizen of the Philippines.
Held:
Yes, Limkaichong is a citizen of the Philippines. Records disclose that
Limkaichong was born in Dumaguete City on November 9, 1959. The
governing law is the citizenship provision of the 1935 Constitution.
Respondent Limkaichong falls under the category of those persons whose
fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (Section 1(3), Article IV, 1935
Constitution) It matters not whether the father acquired citizenship by birth or
by naturalization. Therefore, following the line of transmission through the
father under the 1935 Constitution, the respondent has satisfactorily complied
with the requirement for candidacy and for holding office, as she is a natural-
born Filipino citizen.
CASE: SOBEJANA-CONDON V COMELEC - EXPRESS RENUNCIATION AND

REPATRIATION
G.R. No. 198742 Aug 10, 2012
FACTS OF THE CASE:
The petitioner (Condon) is a natural-born Filipino citizen having been born of Filipino parents
on August 8, 1944. On December 13, 1984, she became a naturalized Australian citizen
owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin Thomas Condon.
Condon files for a reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on Dec. 2, 2005, under R.A. No. 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), which was accepted and she took
oath on Dec. 5, 2005.
Condon files for an unsworn Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship before the
Department of Immigration and Indigenous Affairs on Sept. 18, 2006. On Sept 27, 2006, the
DIIA certifies that she is no longer and Australian citizen.
Condon runs for the position of mayor in Caba, La Union in 2007. She lost her bid, and again
ran in 2010, this time as vice mayor, winning by majority and taking oath on May 13, 2010.
Afterwards, separate petitions were filed by private respondents questioning her eligibility as a
dual citizen.


Petitioner Condon contends that she ceased to be an Australian citizen in 2007, stating that
she complied with the requirements of R.A. No. 9225. The RTC found that Condon was
ineligible and thus disqualified, and this decision was confirmed by the COMELEC.
Petitioner contends she was only a Filipino citizen when she first ran for office in 2007, so the
personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship imposed by Section 5(2) of R.A. No.
9225 to dual citizens seeking elective office does not apply to her; and that a sworn
renunciation was merely a formal requirement, not a mandatory one.
ISSUE: Whether or not Condon has successfully renounced her foreign citizenship, so as to
be allowed to run for office.
HELD:
Petitioner Condon failed to renounce foreign citizenship in accordance with the exact tenor of
Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225, rendering her a dual citizen ineligible to run for and thus hold
any elective public office
Condon had successfully reacquired her Filipino citizenship in2005, effectively becoming a
dual citizen. However, Condon was not under oath while filing for renunciation of her
Australian citizenship, as mandated in Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225, which requires that the
foreign citizenship must be formally rejected through an affidavit duly sworn before an officer
authorized to administer oath. Petitioner also failed to prove the existence of the Australian
Citizenship Act, cited by Condon as the basis for losing her foreign citizenship.
The Supreme Court states that there is no ambiguity in the provision of R.A. No. 9225 about
the mandatory nature of an explicit and sworn renunciation, as opposed to the formal
requirement argued by Condon, which would reduce an oath of allegiance to a merely
ceremonial purpose.
Petition is dismissed and the resolution of the COMELEC en banc is affirmed in toto.
CASE:ZENON R. PEREZ, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND

SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT
GR 164763
Topic : Presumption of Constitutionality
Facts : Zenon Perez, the acting Municipal Treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol was found
Guilty by the Sandiganbayan for the crime of Malversation of Public Funds as

defined and penalized in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, and was
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from Ten (10) years
and One (1) day of prision mayor as the minimum to Fourteen (14) years and
Eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer
perpetual special disqualification. He is also likewise ordered to pay a fine
equal to the total amount of the funds malversed, which is Seventy-two
thousand seven hundred eighty-four pesos and fifty-seven centavos
(P72,784.57). In an appeal, the petitioner argued that the sentence imposed
is cruel and therefore unconstitutional as it violates Section 19 of Article III or
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution.
Issue : Whether or not the penalty is unconstitutional for it violates Sec 19


of Article III of the constitution.
Ruling : The penalty is not unconstitutional.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a

public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for
public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take and
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence shall
permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for
exoneration in malversation; it may only be considered as a mitigating
circumstance. This is because damage is not an element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality

accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever

possible in harmony with, rather than in violation of the Constitution. The
presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just
law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate
the specific purpose of law. It is presumed that the legislature has acted
within its constitutional powers. So, it is the generally accepted rule that
every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will be, or should be, presumed
to be valid and constitutional.
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to

show why such law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its
presumption of Constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or
inhuman, like the stance of petitioner, must fail.
In the case at bar, the decision of SANDIGANBAYAN was affirmed by

SC with the modification that petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prison correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor, as maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification. He
is likewise ordered to pay a fine of P72,784.57, the amount equal to the funds
malversed.
VALLES V COMELEC
Facts:
The citizenship of private respondent was raised as an issue when she ran for re-
election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy
was questioned by the petitioner Cirilo Valles.

The COMELEC, however, dismissed the petition, ruling that Lopez is a Filipino
citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because (1) her father,
TelesforoYbasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis
she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married
to a Filipino, thereby making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of
Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the
Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC
Resolutions in EPC No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino
citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental governor.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, maintaining
that the Lopez is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that: a)
In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an
Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated
September 19, 1988; b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant
Certificate of Residence (ICR), and c) She was issued Australian Passport No.
H700888 on March 3, 1988.
ISSUE:
1. Whether respondent is a Filipino
2. If she is, whether she renounced her citizenship by applying for ACR and ICR and
being issued an Australian passport.
3. Whether private respondent is disqualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental
under Section 40 of Republic Act 7160
HELD:
Yes. The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of
the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines
nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Private respondent was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western
Australia. Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect
and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916,
also known as the Jones Law.
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Jones Law, all inhabitants of the Philippines
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their
children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father,
TelesforoYbasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly
evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, TelesforoYbasco was deemed to be a
Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the

time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines.
The principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue

of bloodrelationship, was subsequently retained under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a
Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in
Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
2. No. Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a

foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of age or more;
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the

Philippinearmed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary pardon or
amnesty has been granted: and
(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in
force in her husbands country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be

express. The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder
of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts
constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her
claim of Filipino citizenship.
3. In the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified dual citizenship as used
in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of
the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court
explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual
allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced:
xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No.
7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically
disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for
candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship
upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons
with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is
so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the
herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone
terminated her Australian citizenship.
ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however,
respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As
a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering
service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was
naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for
and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May
11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.
Issue:
Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of
the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.
Held:
Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the
lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior
status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a
natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his
former status as a natural-born Filipino.
GERARDO ANGAT, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

FACTS:
Gerardo Angat, a natural born Filipino citizen, asked to regain his status as a
Philippine citizen before the RTC Marikina. RTC allowed him to take his Oath of
Allegiance on October 3, 1996 and the following day, the RTC declared him as citizen
of the Philippines pursuant to R.A. No. 8171.
OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion in March 1997, asserting that the petition
should have been dismissed by the court for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction in deciding over repatriation case.
RULING:
No. A petition for repatriation should be filed with the Special Committee on
Naturalization and not with the RTC which has no jurisdiction.Therefore, the court's
order was null and void.
RA No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on October 23 1995, is an act providing for
repatriation of Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens and of natural-born Filipinos who have lost the Philippine citizenship on
account of political or economic necessity.
Moreover, petitioner was incorrect when he initially invoked RA 965 and RA 2630,
since these laws could only apply to persons who had lost their Philippine citizenship
by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of an allied
country or the armed forces of the US, a factual matter not alleged in his petition.
Parenthetically, under these statutes, the person desiring to reacquire his Philippine
citizenship would not even required to file a petition in court; all he had to do is to
take an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the said
oath with the proper civil registry.
ALTAREJOS VS COMELEC
Facts:
-Petitioner Altarejos was a candidate for mayor in the Municipality of San Jacinto,
Masbate in the May 2004 elections.
-On January, 2004 respondents Jose Altiche and Vernon Versoza, filed with the
COMELEC to disqualify and deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy
ofAltarejos, on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false
representation in his COC, that he was not a permanent resident of the Municipality of
San Jacinto, Masbate, the town he's running for as mayor.

-Petitioner answered that he did not commit false representation in his COC because
he was issued on Dec. 17, 2017 1997 a Certificate of Repatriation by the Special
Committee on Naturalization pursuant to RA No. 8171.
-Altarejos was disqualified by the COMELEC First Division for having failed to
prove that he had fully complied with the requirements to perfect his repatriation and
reacquire his Filipino Citizenship (Registration of repatration with the proper civil
registry an B.I.), and his subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the
COMELEC en banc.
-The supplementary pieces of evidence he presented in his motion for reconsideration
were belated and should have been introduced earlier.
Issue:
1.) Whether or not the registration of petitioners repatriation with the proper civil
registry and with the Bureau of Immigration is a prerequisite in effecting
repatriation?
2.) Whether or not Altejaros is qualified to run for mayor during the 2005?
3.) Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in affirming the Resolution of the Comelec,
First Division?
Held:
1.) Yes. The law is clear under Section 2 of RA No. 8171 that repatriation is
effected by taking the oath of allegiance to the RP and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau of Immigration.
2.) In this case petitioner completed all the requirements of repatriation only after
he filed his certificate of candidacy for a mayoralty position, but before the
elections. In Frivaldo v COmission on elections the court ruled that the
citizenship qualification must be construed as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official and at the start of his term. Moreover, the
court ruled that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the
filing of his application. Accordingly, petitioners repatriation retroacted to the
date he filed his application in 1997, qualifying him to run for a mayoralty
position in the May, 2004 elections.

3.) No. Petitioner submitted the necessary documents proving compliance with
the requirements of repatriation only during his motion for reconsideration,
when the COMELEC en banc could no longer consider said evidence.
TABASA V CA (RE: CITIZENSHIP RA8171)
Facts:
Petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In
1968, when petitioner was seven years old, his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a
naturalized citizen of the United States. By derivative naturalization ,petitioner also
acquired American citizenship.
The U.S. Department of State has revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued on June
10, 1994 in San Francisco, California under the respondents name, born on February
21, 1959 in the Philippines, because he is the subject of an outstanding federal warrant
of arrest.
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic, 81461
should be 86461], 30 May 1989), the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign embassy
cancels the passport of an alien, or does not reissue a valid passport to him, the alien
loses the privilege to remain in the country. Further, under Office Memorandum Order
No. 34 issued on 21 August 1989, summary deportation proceedings lie where the
passport of the alien has expired.
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child
of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative
naturalization when he was still a minor.
Issue:
WON Tabasa would qualify as a natural-born Filipino who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171
Ruling:
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is
available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of
political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born
Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship
due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his
repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a
situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a

naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will
allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine
citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: the children acquire
the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit
of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for
repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so because a child does not have the legal
capacity for all acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a political act like
the election of citizenship. On their own, the minor children cannot apply for
repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner was a Filipino at birth. In 1968,
while he was still a minor, his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by
derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S. citizenship. Petitioner now wants us
to believe that he is entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born
Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic necessity. This is absurd.
Petitioner was no longer a minor at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996.
The privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of
the filing of the petition for repatriation.
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino who left the country due to political
or economic necessity. Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by operation of law
and not due to political or economic exigencies. It was his father who could have been
motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to apply for naturalization.
The decision was his parents and not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171
is extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could prove that they acquired
citizenship of a foreign country due to political and economic reasons, and extended
indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
MERCADO VS MANZANO (DUAL ALLEGIANCE BASED ON ART 4 OF THE

CONSTITUTION)
Facts:
- Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano are both candidates for being vice
mayors in the 1998 elections, Manzano won the election
- Proclamation of Manzano is suspended due to filing of petition of
disqualification against Manzano done by a certain Ernesto Mamaril stating
that Manzano is a citizen of the US
- Mamarils petition is granted by the Second Division of COMELEC on the
grounds that dual citizens are not allowed to run for public office/elective
position.
- Manzano has ACR certificate on Bureau of Immigration yet he conteded that
he is a natural born as his parents are both Filipinos yet he was born on the US
which follows the law of jus soli making him a dual citizen. He was born on
Sept 14, 1955 making him under the 1935 Constitution that he is a natural
born having a Filipino father.
- Petition for disqualification was granted, later on reversed in motion for
consideration, thus making Manzano qualified for vice mayor.

ISSUE: W/N Manzano is disqualified for having dual citizenship or dual allegiance?
RULING:
- Manzano and Solicitor General invoked dura lexsedlex contended that through
Section 40 of the Local Government Code Congress has "command[ed] in
explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold
local elective office."
- Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance are two things that are entirely different.
Dual citizenship is acquired involuntarily while dual allegiance refers to the
situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states.
- Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible
for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their father's' country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to
have renounced Philippine citizenship.
- Manzano is qualified as he may be a dual citizen not a citizen that has dual
allegiance, he elected his Philippine Citizenship by means of voting for elections,
living here in the Philippines majority of his life and the fact that he filed for
certificate of candidacy here in the Philippines, thus the law of this country is aware
he is a repudiates his American Citizenship. There is already on oath of allegiance in
the Certificate of Candidacy it is implied he repudiates his other citizenship as based
on the US Law voting in a US citizen shall lose his nationality if he/she votes in a
foreign state and participate in the election.
( No need mag renounce if dual citizen nainvolountary act pero if volountary act
namaka gain ug dual allegiance kailangannimoirenounce especially katong under RA
9225.)
CASE: REPUBLIC VS VILLASOR
FACTS:

A decision was rendered in Special Proceedings No. 2156-R in favor of respondents P.

J. Kiener Co., Ltd., GavinoUnchuan, and International Construction Corporation, and
against the petitioner herein, confirming the arbitration award in the amount of
P1,712,396.40, subject of Special Proceedings. On June 24, 1969, respondent
Honorable Guillermo P. Villasor, issued an Order declaring the aforestated decision of
July 3, 1961 final and executory, directing the Sheriffs of Rizal Province, Quezon City
as well as Manila to execute the said decision. Pursuant to the said Order, the
corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued dated June 26, 1969. On the
strength of the afore-mentioned Alias Writ of Execution, the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal served notices of garnishment with several Banks, especially on the "monies
due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits sufficient to cover the
amount mentioned in the said Writ of Execution"; The funds of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines on deposit with the Banks, particularly, with the Philippine Veterans
Bank and the Philippine National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly
appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of retirees, pay and
allowances of military and civilian personnel and for maintenance and operations of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Petitioner, filed prohibition proceedings against
respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of
Execution against the properties of the AFP, hence, the Alias Writ of Execution and
notices of garnishment issued pursuant thereto are null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the state can be sued without its consent.
RULING:
It is a fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the juristic concept of
sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from suit unless it gives
its consent. A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right
as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends. A continued
adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the
inconvenience that may cause private parties, the loss of government efficiency and
the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious c4rfd functions are far greater is
such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy
were not thus restricted.
What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the
Constitution. From a logical and sound sense from the basic concept of the non-
suability of the State, public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding
even if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liability
adjudged. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding
appropriation as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the
State cannot be allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds
from their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.

PROFESSIONAL VIDEO, INC. V. TESDA
G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009
Facts:
PROVI is an entity engaged in the sale of high technology equipment,

information technology products and broadcast devices, including the supply of
plastic card printing and security facilities.
TESDA is an instrumentality of the government established under Republic

Act (R.A.) No. 7796 (the TESDA Act of 1994) and attached to the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE) to develop and establish a national system of skills
standardization, testing, and certification in the country. To fulfill this mandate, it
sought to issue security-printed certification and/or identification polyvinyl (PVC)
cards to trainees who have passed the certification process.
On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed a Contract Agreement

Project: PVC ID Card Issuance (the Contract Agreement) for the provision of goods
and services in the printing and encoding of PVC cards. Under this Contract
Agreement, PROVI was to provide TESDA with the system and equipment compliant
with the specifications defined in the Technical Proposal. In return, TESDA would
pay PROVI the amount of Thirty-Nine Million Four Hundred and Seventy-Five
Thousand Pesos (P39,475,000) within fifteen (15) days after TESDAs acceptance of
the contracted goods and services.
On August 24, 2000, TESDA and PROVI executed an Addendum to the

Contract Agreement Project: PVC ID Card Issuance (Addendum),[8] whose terms
bound PROVI to deliver one hundred percent (100%) of the enumerated supplies to
TESDA consisting of five hundred thousand (500,000) pieces of security foil; five (5)
pieces of security die with TESDA seal; five hundred thousand (500,000) pieces of
pre-printed and customized identification cards; one hundred thousand (100,000)
pieces of scannable answer sheets; and five hundred thousand (500,000) customized
TESDA holographic laminate. In addition, PROVI would install and maintain the
following equipment: one (1) unit of Micropoise, two (2) units of card printer, three
(3) units of flatbed scanner, one (1) unit of OMR scanner, one (1) unit of Server, and
seven (7) units of personal computer.
TESDA in turn undertook to pay PROVI thirty percent (30%) of the total cost
of the supplies within thirty (30) days after receipt and acceptance of the contracted
supplies, with the balance payable within thirty (30) days after the initial payment.

According to PROVI, it delivered the following items to TESDA on the dates

indicated:
Date Particulars Amount
26 April 2000 48,500 pre-printed cards P 2,764,500.00

07 June 2000 330,000 pre-printed cards 18,810,000.00
07 August 2000 121,500 pre-printed cards 6,925,500.00
26 April 2000 100,000 scannable answer sheets 600,000.00
06 June 2000 5 Micro-Poise customized die 375,000.00
13 June 2000 35 boxes @ 15,000 imp/box 10,000,000.00
Custom hologram Foil
Total P 39,475,000.00
PROVI further alleged that out of TESDAs liability of P39,475,000.00,

TESDA paid PROVI only P3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of
P35,735,500.00, as evidenced by PROVIs Statement of Account. Despite the two
demand letters dated March 8 and April 27, 2001 that PROVI sent TESDA, the
outstanding balance remained unpaid.
On July 11, 2001, PROVI filed with the RTC a complaint for sum of money
with damages against TESDA. PROVI additionally prayed for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment/garnishment against TESDA. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 68527. In an Order dated July 16, 2001, the RTC granted PROVIs
prayer and issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the properties of TESDA
not exempt from execution in the amount of P35,000,000.00.
TESDA responded on July 24, 2001 by filing a Motion to Discharge/Quash

the Writ of Attachment, arguing mainly that public funds cannot be the subject of
garnishment. The RTC denied TESDAs motion, and subsequently ordered the
manager of the Land Bank of the Philippines to produce TESDAs bank statement for
the garnishment of the covered amount.
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision after finding
that: (a) TESDAs funds are public in nature and, therefore, exempt from garnishment;

and (b) TESDAs purchase of the PVC cards was a necessary incident of its
governmental function; consequently, it ruled that there was no legal basis for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment/garnishment.
Issue:WoN the writ of attachment against TESDA and its funds, to cover PROVIs
claim against TESDA, is valid.
Ruling:
No, it is not valid.
TESDA is an instrumentality
of the government undertaking
governmental functions.
R.A. No. 7796 created the Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority or TESDA under the declared policy of the State to provide relevant,
accessible, high quality and efficient technical education and skills development in
support of the development of high quality Filipino middle-level manpower
responsive to and in accordance with Philippine development goals and priorities.
The measures that the law enables TESDA to carry out are undertaken
pursuant to the constitutional command that [T]he State affirms labor as a primary
social economic force, and shall protect the rights of workers and promote their
welfare; that [T]he State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all; in order to afford protection to labor and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Under both constitutional and statutory terms, we do not believe that the role
and status of TESDA can seriously be contested: it is an unincorporated
instrumentality of the government, directly attached to the DOLE through the
participation of the Secretary of Labor as its Chairman. As an unincorporated
instrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is equipped with both express and
implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.
TESDA, as an agency of the
State, cannot be sued without its
consent.

The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent is embodied in
Section 3, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution and has been an established principle
that antedates this Constitution.
It rests on reasons of public policy that public service would be hindered, and
the public endangered, if the sovereign authority could be subjected to law suits at the
instance of every citizen and, consequently, controlled in the uses and dispositions of
the means required for the proper administration of the government.
As discussed above, TESDA performs governmental functions, and the

issuance of certifications is a task within its function of developing and establishing a
system of skills standardization, testing, and certification in the country. From the
perspective of this function, the core reason for the existence of state immunity
applies i.e., the public policy reason that the performance of governmental function
cannot be hindered or delayed by suits, nor can these suits control the use and
disposition of the means for the performance of governmental functions.
TESDAs funds are public in

character, hence exempt from
attachment or garnishment.
Even assuming that TESDA entered into a proprietary contract with PROVI
and thereby gave its implied consent to be sued, TESDAs funds are still public in
nature and, thus, cannot be the valid subject of a writ of garnishment or
attachment. Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, the TESDA budget for the
implementation of the Act shall be included in the annual General Appropriation Act;
hence, TESDA funds, being sourced from the Treasury, is money belonging to the
government, or any of its departments, in the hands of public officials.
PROVI has not shown that it is

entitled to the writ of
attachment.
Even without the benefit of any immunity from suit, the attachment of TESDA
funds should not have been granted, as PROVI failed to prove that TESDA
fraudulently misapplied or converted funds allocated under the Certificate as to
Availability of Funds.
Section 1(b), Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, that PROVI relied upon, applies
only where money or property has been embezzled or converted by a public officer,
an officer of a corporation, or some other person who took advantage of his fiduciary
position or who willfully violated his duty.

PROVI, in this case, never entrusted any money or property to TESDA. While
the Contract Agreement is supported by a Certificate as to Availability of Funds
(Certificate) issued by the Chief of TESDAs Accounting Division, this Certificate
does not automatically confer ownership over the funds to PROVI. Absent any actual
disbursement, these funds form part of TESDAs public funds, and TESDAs failure to
pay PROVI the amount stated in the Certificate cannot be construed as an act of
fraudulent misapplication or embezzlement.
HEIRS OF MATEO PIDACAN V. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO)

PETs: PacitaPidacan and Adela Pidacan (heirs of Mateo Pidacan)
RESPO: Air Transportation Office (ATO)
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Principle involved: When a suit is against the state
In 1935, petitioners acquired a parcel of land with an area of about 22

hectares, situated in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (the property). Thereafter, Original
Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2204 was issued in favor of said spouses.
However, in 1948, respondent ATOused a portion of the property as an airport.
In 1974, the ATO constructed a perimeter fence and a new terminal building on the
property. They also lengthened, widened, and cemented the airport's runway.
Petitioners demanded from ATO the payment of the value of the property as well as
the rentals for the use thereof but ATO refused. Eventually in 1988, OCT No. 2204
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7160 was issued in favor of
petitioners. Despite this development, ATO still refused to pay petitioners.
Petitioners filed a complaint with the RTC against ATO for payment of the value
of the property and rentals due thereon. In 1994, the RTC promulgated a decision,
ordering ATO to pay rentals and the value of the land at P89.00 per square meter. In
line with this, the petitioners filed a Motion for Execution before the RTC, which was
denied by the RTC on the ground that the prosecution, enforcement, or
satisfaction of State liability must be pursued in accordance with the rules and
procedures laid down in Commonwealth Act No. 327,as amended by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration by the PETs.
Issue:
Whether or not the doctrine of state non-suability applies.

Held:
No. In the case of EPG Construction Co. v. Hon. Vigilar, the Court held that:
Under these circumstances, respondent may not validly invoke the
Royal Prerogative of Dishonesty and conveniently hide under the
State's cloak of invincibility against suit, considering that this
principle yields to certain settled exceptions. True enough, the rule, in
any case, is not absolute for it does not say that the state may not be sued
under any circumstance.
Thus, in Amigable v. Cuenca, this Court, in effect, shred the protective
shroud which shields the State from suit, reiterating our decree in the
landmark case of Ministerio v. CFI of Cebu that "the doctrine of
governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for
perpetrating an injustice on a citizen." It is just as important, if not
more so, that there be fidelity to legal norms on the part of officialdom if
the rule of law were to be maintained.
Thus, the Courts Decision that the property be expropriated in favor of ATO, and
ordering them to pay the petitioners just compensation is already final and executory.
Petitioners have been deprived of the beneficial use and enjoyment of their property
for a considerable length of time. Now that they prevailed before the Court, it would
be highly unjust and inequitable under the particular circumstances that payment of
just compensation be withheld from them.
ATO VS. RAMOS
Petitioner: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO)

Respondents: SPOUSES DAVID and ELISEA RAMOS
Ponente:BERSAMIN, J.
Topic: When suit is against the state
Facts:
Spouses David and Elisea Ramos discovered that a portion of their land
registered under Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-58894 of the Baguio City
land records, was being used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the
Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner ATO.
On August 11, 1995, the respondents agreed to convey the affected portion by
deed of sale to the ATO in for P778,150. However, the ATO failed to pay
despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, on April 29, 1998, the respondents filed an action for collection against
the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In their answer, the ATO and its
co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of Proclamation
No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that
included the respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport.

ATO asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action without
the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into in
the performance of governmental functions.
Issue: WON ATO could be sued without the States consent.
Ruling:
Yes, ATO can be sued without the States consent. Not all government entities,
whether corporate or non-corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from
suits is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was
organized.
Suits against State agencies with relation to matters in which they have
assumed to act in private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the state for public purposes, but to
engage in matters partaking more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not regarded as suits
against the state.
The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an

agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign
function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the
Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State
in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the States immunity
from suit.
We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully

invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking
without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings
being first resorted to of the plaintiffs property.
Finally, the issue of WON the ATO could be sued without the States consent
has been rendered moot by the passage of R.A. No. 9497, otherwise known as
the Civil Aviation Authority Act (CAAP) of 2008. The obligations that the
ATO had incurred by virtue of the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might
now be enforced against the CAAP.
CHINA NATIONAL VS SANTAMARIA
Petition: Petition for review on certiorari

Petitioner: China National Machinery & Equipment Corp.
Respondent: Hon. Cesar Santamaria, et al.
Ponencia: Sereno, J.

DOCTRINE:
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject are
presumed to be the same as those in the Philippines.
Thus, when a foreign GOCC has failed to adduce evidence that it has not consented to
be sued under its national law, it will be presumed to be a GOCC without an original
charter which by virtue of the Corporation Code, has the capacity to sue and be sued.
FACTS:
-In 2002, petitioner CNMEG entered into a memorandum of understanding with

the North Luzon Railways Corp. (Northrail) for the conduct of a feasibility study
on a possible railway from Manila to La Union (Northrail Project).
-In 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM bank) and the Dept. of
Finance entered into a memorandum of understanding wherein China agreed to
extend Preferential Buyers Credit to the Philippine Government to finance the
Northrail project.
-The Chinese Ambassador to the PhilipppinesAmb. Wang wrote a letter to DOF

Sec. informing him of CNMEGs designation as the Prime Contractor for the
Northrail project.
-Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of

Sec. 1 Phase 1 of the Northrail project.
a. The Phil. government and EXIM bank entered into a loan agreement in
the amount of US$400M to finance the construction of the Northrail
project.
-Respondents filed a complaint for annulment of contract for being contrary to

the Constitution and the Government Procurement Reform Act.
ISSUE:
1. W/N CNMEG is entitled to immunity from suit
RULING + RATIO:
1. NO. CNMEG is not entitled to immunity from suit
CNMEG is engaged in proprietary/commercial activity

- The Philippines adheres to the restrictive application of State immunity,

such that:
Immunity from suit is restricted to sovereign or governmental
activities, and cannot be extended to commercial or private acts.
- In this case, CNMEG is engaged in proprietary or commercial activity.
The content and tenor of the contract agreement and the loan
agreement reveal the desire of CNMEG to construct the railways in
pursuit of a purely commercial activity.
Also, it was CNMEG, and not the Chinese government which initiated
the Northrail project as confirmed by Amb. Wang in his letter.
Even though it is a GOCC, it does not imply that it was acting on
behalf of China.
CNMEG failed to adduce evidence that it immune from suit under Chinese law.
- CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it performs
- Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity.
- Although it is a GOCC, it failed to adduce evidence that it has not
consented to be sued under Chinese law.
- In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject
are presumed to be the same as those in the Philippines.
- Thus, CNMEG is presumed to be a GOCC without an original charter which
by virtue of the Corporation Code, has the capacity to sue and be sued.
DOH V PHIL PHARMA (RE: WHEN SUIT IS AGAINST THE STATE)
Facts:
On December 22, 1998, then Secretary of Health Alberto G. Romualdez, Jr. issued
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 27, Series of 1998, outlining the guidelines and
procedures on the accreditation of government suppliers for pharmaceutical products
On May 9, 2000 and May 29, 2000, respondent submitted to petitioner DOH a request
for the inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited drug products, including
the antibiotic "Penicillin G Benzathine." Based on the schedule provided by petitioner
DOH, it appears that processing of and release of the result of respondents request
were due on September 2000, the last month of the quarter following the date of its
filing.
Sometime in September 2000, petitioner DOH, through petitioner Antonio M. Lopez,

chairperson of the pre-qualifications, bids and awards committee, issued an Invitation
for Bids for the procurement of 1.2 million units vials of Penicillin G Benzathine
(Penicillin G Benzathine contract).
Despite the lack of response from petitioner DOH regarding respondents request for
inclusion of additional items in its list of accredited products, respondent submitted its

bid for the Penicillin G Benzathine contract. When the bids were opened on October
11, 2000, only two companies participated, with respondent submitting the lower bid
at P82.24 per unit, compared to Cathay/YSS Laboratories (YSS) bid of P95.00 per
unit. In view, however, of the non-accreditation of respondents Penicillin G
Benzathine product, the contract was awarded to YSS.
Respondent thus filed a complaint for injunction, mandamus and damages. Petitioners
subsequently filed a Manifestation and Motion (motion to dismiss) praying for the
outright dismissal of the complaint based on the doctrine of state immunity. By Order
of December 8, 2003, the trial court denied petitionersmotion to dismiss.
Issue:WON Petitioner may successfully invoke state immunity
Ruling:
The petition fails. The suability of a government official depends on whether the
official concerned was acting within his official or jurisdictional capacity, and whether
the acts done in the performance of official functions will result in a charge or
financial liability against the government. In the first case, the Constitution itself
assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official concerned who should
be impleaded as the proper party.
In its complaint, respondent sufficiently imputes grave abuse of discretion against
petitioners in their official capacity. Since judicial review of acts alleged to have been
tainted with grave abuse of discretion is guaranteed by the Constitution, it necessarily
follows that it is the official concerned who should be impleaded as defendant or
respondent in an appropriate suit.
As regards petitioner DOH, the defense of immunity from suit will not avail despite
its being an unincorporated agency of the government, for the only causes of action
directed against it are preliminary injunction and mandamus. Under Section 1, Rule
58 of the Rules of Court, preliminary injunction may be directed against a party or a
court, agency or a person. Moreover, the defense of state immunity from suit does not
apply in causes of action which do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability
against the State
The rule that a state may not be sued without its consent, now embodied in Section 3,
Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law, which we have now adopted as part of the law of the land.
While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state
without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the
state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The suit is
regarded as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the
officials will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such as the appropriation
of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded against them.
The rule, however, is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all

circumstances. Shauf v. Court of Appeals elucidates: It is a different matter where the
public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and
injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in

Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.,

Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the
officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts,
for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at
law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the
ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal
and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within
the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The
rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
Hence, the rule does not apply where the public official is charged in his official
capacity for acts that are unauthorized or unlawful and injurious to the rights of
others. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued not in his
official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may
have been committed while he occupied a public position.
In the present case, suing individual petitioners in their personal capacities for
damages in connection with their alleged act of "illegal[ly] abus[ing] their official
positions to make sure that plaintiff Pharmawealth would not be awarded the
Benzathine contract [which act was] done in bad faith and with full knowledge of the
limits and breadth of their powers given by law" is permissible, in consonance with
the foregoing principles. For an officer who exceeds the power conferred on him by
law cannot hide behind the plea of sovereign immunity and must bear the liability
personally.
VETERANS MANPOWER VS CA CONSENT TO BE SUED
Facts:
- Veterans Manpower alleges that RA No. 5487 Private Security Agency Law
violate the provision of the Constitution against monopolies and unfair competition.
- VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of
the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in
restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of
Detective and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic
because it has an interest in more than one security agency.
- On May 12 1968, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the
PC Chief, which fixed the monthly contract rate per guard of 8 hours of security
service each day. Resulting for PADPAO to find Verterans Manpower Guilty of cut
throat competition (pababaaynajudugpresyo) as their standard minimum rates is lower
that what is in the MOA.

-Veterans Manpower filed a civil case against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA Philippine
Constabulary Supervisory Unit for Security andInvestigation Agencies).
- PC Chief and PC-SUSIA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the case
isagainst the State which had not given consent thereto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Veterans Manpowers complaint against the PC Chief and
PC-SUSIA is a suit against the Statewithout its consent.
Ruling:
- Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution).
- Invoking this rule, the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being
instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily
governmental function of regulating the organization and operation of private
detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief)
and agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Governments consent,
especially in this case because VMPSIs complaint seeks not only to compel
the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI
seeks actual and compensatory damages.
- While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against
officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of
their duties.
- The Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO
was intended to professionalize the industry and to standardize the salaries of
security guards as well as the current rates of security services, clearly, a
governmental function.
- A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private
capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his authority or
jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC SUSIA are
being called to account in this case, were performed by them as part of their
official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may
be had against them in their private capacities.
CASE: DA VS NLRC
FACTS:
Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental
entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security
Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a
complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform
allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for
damages against the DA and the security agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a

decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the
payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the
security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the
judgment against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City
Sheriff levied on execution the vehicles of the DA. The petitioner charged the NLRC
with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The
petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money claim against the
Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission
on Audit. More importantly, the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the
cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other
hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by
concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.
RULING:
In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is
found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or
implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between private parties." Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation,
thus opening itself to a counterclaim or when it enters into a contract. In this situation,
the government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting
party and to have divested itself of its sovereign immunity. This rule, relied upon by
the NLRC and the private respondents, is not, however, without qualification. Not all
contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its
sovereign function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. In the
instant case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could
have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
SAYON V. SINGSON
G.R. No. L-30044, December 19, 1973

Facts:
The Office of the District Engineer requested various parts for the repair of a
bulldozer. In response to this, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
Antonio V. Raquiza approved the request, and thus a canvass or public bidding was
held on May 5, 1967 to determine who will be the supplier.

Singkier Motor Service, owned by the respondent Singson, was awarded the
bid for the sum of Php 43, 530.00. Subsequently, it was approved by the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications; and on May 16, 1967 the Secretary sent a letter-
order to the Singkier Motor Service, Mandaue, Cebu requesting it to immediately
deliver the items listed therein for the lot price of P43,530.00.
In due course, Highway Auditor Singson conducted a pre-audit to determine the
reasonableness of the price. After finding from the indorsements of the Division
Engineer and the Commissioner of Public Highways that the prices of the various
spare parts are just and reasonable and that the requisition was also approved by no
less than the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, he approved it for
payment in the sum of P34,824.00, with the retention of 20% equivalent to P8,706.00.
His reason for withholding the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00 was to submit the
voucher with the supporting papers to the Supervising Auditor.
The voucher was paid on June 9, 1967 in the amount of P34,824.00 to

Singson. However, Highway Auditor Sayson received a telegram from Supervising
Auditor Fornier quoting a telegraphic message of the General Auditing Office which
states:
"In view of excessive prices charge for purchase of spare parts and equipment shown
by vouchers already submitted this Office direct all highway auditors refer General
Office payment similar nature for appropriate action."
In the interim it would appear that when the voucher and the supporting papers
reached the GAO, a canvass was made of the spare parts among the suppliers in
Manila, particularly, the USI (Phil.), which is the exclusive dealer of the spare parts of
the caterpillar tractors in the Philippines. Said firm thus submitted its quotations at
P2,529.64 only which is P40,000.00 less than the price given by Singson.
As a result of this, Singson did not receive the 20% equivalent to P8,706.00.
He then filed a suit for the collection of the remaining amount at the RTC which was
granted. Hence this current appeal by certiorari.
Issue:WoN the suit filed against the petitioners was valid.
Ruling:
No, it is not.

1. To state the facts is to make clear the solidity of the stand taken by the
Republic. The lower court was unmindful of the fundamental doctrine of non-
suability. So, it was stressed in the petition of the then Solicitor General
Makasiar.
Thus: "It is apparent that respondent Singson's cause of action is a money

claim against the government, for the payment of the alleged balance of
the cost of spare parts supplied by him to the Bureau of Public Highways.
Assuming momentarily the validity of such claim, although as will be
shown hereunder, the claim is void for the cause or consideration is
contrary to law, morals or public policy, mandamus is not the remedy to
enforce the collection of such claim against the State but an ordinary
action for specific performance ... Actually, the suit disguised as one for
mandamus to compel the Auditors to approve the vouchers for payment,
is a suit against the State, which cannot prosper or be entertained by the
Court except with the consent of the State ... In other words, the respondent
should have filed his claim with the General Auditing Office, under the
provisions of Com. Act 327 ... which prescribe the conditions under which
money claim against the government may be filed ...."
Commonwealth Act No. 327 is quite explicit. It is therein provided: "In all
cases involving the settlement of accounts or claims, other than those of
accountable officers, the Auditor General shall act and decide the same within
sixty days, exclusive of Sundays and holidays, after their presentation. If said
accounts or claims need reference to other persons, office or offices, or to a
party interested, the period aforesaid shall be counted from the time the last
comment necessary to a proper decision is received by him.
"Thereafter, the procedure for appeal is indicated: "The party aggrieved by the
final decision of the Auditor General in the settlement of an account or claim
may, within thirty days from receipt of the decision, take an appeal in writing:
(a) To the President of the United States, pending the final and complete
withdrawal of her sovereignty over the Philippines, or (b) To the President of
the Philippines, or (c) To the Supreme Court of the Philippines if the appellant
is a private person or entity."
2. With the facts undisputed and the statute far from indefinite or ambiguous, the
appealed decision defies explanation. It would be to disregard a basic corollary
of the cardinal postulate of non-suability. It is true that once consent is
secured, an action may be filed. There is nothing to prevent the State,
however, in such statutory grant, to require that certain administrative
proceedings be had and be exhausted. Also, the proper forum in the
judicial hierarchy can be specified if thereafter an appeal would be taken
by the party aggrieved. Here, there was no ruling of the Auditor General.

Even had there been such, the court to which the matter should have been
elevated is this Tribunal; the lower court could not legally act on the matter.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY (NHA) V. HEIRS OF GUIVELONDO

PETs: National Housing Authority (NHA)
RESPO:
Heirs of Isidro Guivelondo (owner of Cadastral Lot No. 1613-D located at
Carreta, Mabolo, Cebu City)
Pascual Y. Abordo (Sheriff, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Cebu City)
Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.
Principle involved: Express consent - Incorporation of GOCCs
Petitioner, on July 16, 2001, filed with the trial court a Motion to Dismiss
Civil Case No. CEB-23386, complaint for eminent domain, alleging that the
implementation of its socialized housing project was rendered impossible by the
unconscionable value of the land sought to be expropriated, which the intended
beneficiaries can not afford. The Motion was denied on September 17, 2001, on the
ground that the Partial Judgment, which adopted the recommendation of the
Commissioners and fixing the just compensation of the lands of respondent Heirs of
Isidro Guivelondo at P11,200.00 per square meter, had already become final and
executory and there was no just and equitable reason to warrant the dismissal of the
case.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying
for the annulment of the Order of the trial court denying its Motion to Dismiss and its
Motion for Reconsideration, which was dismissed by the CA. A Notice of Levy
pursuant to the Writ of Execution was then served to the PET to enforce the Partial
Judgment.
On May 27, 2002, respondent sheriff served on the Landbank of the
Philippines a Notice of Third Garnishment against the deposits, moneys and interests
of petitioner therein.Subsequently, respondent sheriff levied on funds and personal
properties of petitioner.
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for review,
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT WRITS OF EXECUTION AND GARNISHMENT MAY
BE ISSUED AGAINST THE STATE IN AN EXPROPRIATION WHEREIN
THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN WILL NOT
SERVE PUBLIC USE OR PURPOSE

Held:
Yes. If the funds belong to a public corporation or a government-owned or
controlled corporation which is clothed with a personality of its own, separate and
distinct from that of the government, then its funds are not exempt from garnishment.
This is so because when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons
its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
In the case of petitioner NHA, the matter of whether its funds and properties
are exempt from garnishment has already been resolved squarely against its
predecessor, the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC), to wit:
The premise that the funds cold be spoken of as public in character
may be accepted in the sense that the Peoples Homesite and Housing
Corporation was a government-owned entity. It does not follow though
that they were exempt from garnishment.
This was reiterated in the subsequent case of Philippine Rock Industries, Inc. v. Board
of Liquidators:
Having a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government, the funds of such government-owned and controlled
corporations and non-corporate agency, although considered public in
character, are not exempt from garnishment.
Hence, it is clear that the funds of petitioner NHA are not exempt from
garnishment or execution.
Note: Garnishment - The seizing of a person's property, credit or salary, on the basis
of a law which allows it, and for the purposes of paying off a debt.
PTA vs. PGDEI
Petitioner: PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY (PTA)

Respondents: PHILIPPINE GOLF DEVELOPMENT & EQUIPMENT, INC.(PGDEI
or PHILGOLF)
Ponente:CARPIO, J.
Topic: Implied Consent-Government enters into Business Contracts
Facts:
PTA, an agency of the Department of Tourism, whose main function is to
bolster and promote tourism, entered into a contract with Atlantic Erectors,

Inc. (AEI) for the construction of the Intramuros Golf Course Expansion
Projects amounting to P57,954,648.
Since AEI was incapable of constructing the golf course aspect of the project,
it entered into a sub-contract agreement with PHILGOLF, a duly organized
domestic corporation, to build the golf course.
The sub-contract agreement also provides that PHILGOLF shall submit its
progress billings directly to PTA and, in turn, PTA shall directly pay
PHILGOLF.
PHILGOLF filed a collection suit against PTA plus interest amounting to
P11,820,551 for the construction of the golf course.
PTA failed to answer the complaint. Hence, the RTC rendered a judgment of
default.
Issue: WON PTA is immune from the suit.
Ruling:
No, the PTA is not immune from suit.
PTA erred in invoking state immunity simply because it is a government
entity. The application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings
arise out of sovereign transactions and not in cases of commercial activities or
economic affairs.
The State, in entering into a business contract, descends to the level of an
individual and is deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued. Since the
Intramuros Golf Course Expansion Projects partakes of a proprietary character
entered into between PTA and PHILGOLF, PTA cannot avoid its financial
liability by merely invoking immunity from suit.
REPUBLIC V. UNIMEX
Petition: Appeal
Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
Respondent: UNIMEX MICRO-ELECTRONICS
Ponencia: CORONA, J.
DOCTRINE: The doctrine must be fairly observed and the State should not avail
itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties
FACTS:
-Unimex Micro-Electronics GmBH (Unimex) shipped a 40-foot container and
171 cartons of Atari game computer cartridges, duplicators, expanders, remote
controllers, parts and accessories to HandywarePhils., Inc. (Handyware).

-The Bureau of Customs (BOC) agents discovered that it did not tally with the
description appearing on the cargo manifest.
-Thus, BOC instituted seizure proceedings against Handyware and later issued
a warrant of seizure and detention.
-Respondent filed a petition for review against petitioner Commissioner of
Customs (BOC Commissioner) in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
-CTA reversed the forfeiture decree and ordered the release of the subject
shipment to respondent subject to the payment of customs duties.
-BOC informed the court that the subject shipment could no longer be found at
its warehouses.
-The CTA declared that its decision could no longer be executed due to the
loss of respondents shipment so it ordered the BOC Commissioner to pay
respondent the commercial value of the goods.
-BOC was ordered to pay the amount of P8,675,200.22 representing the
commercial value of the shipment at the time of importation subject.
-The BOC Commissioner and respondent filed their respective motions for
reconsideration (MRs) of the above decision.
-The CA held that the BOC Commissioner was liable for the value of the
subject shipment as the same was lost while in its custody.
ISSUES:
1. WON The Bureau of Customs is exempt to pay for damages due to state
immunity.
PROVISION:
Article 16 Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.
RULING + RATIO:
1. No.Although it may be gainsaid that the satisfaction of respondents demand

will ultimately fall on the government, and that, under the political doctrine of
"state immunity," it cannot be held liable for governmental acts (jus imperii),
The Court cannot turn a blind eye to BOCs ineptitude and gross negligence in
the safekeeping of respondents goods. The situation does not allow us to
reject respondents claim on the mere invocation of the doctrine of state
immunity. Succinctly, the doctrine must be fairly observed and the State
should not avail itself of this prerogative to take undue advantage of parties
that may have legitimate claims against it.
DISPOSITION: Petition GRANTED

REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBYAN (RE: GOVT INITIATE A COMPLAIN. OPEN TO

COUNTERCLAIM)
Facts: On November 3, 1990, petitioner Republic and private respondent Benedicto

entered into a Compromise Agreement in Civil Case No. 0034. The agreement
contained a general release clause whereunder petitioner Republic agreed and bound
itself to lift the sequestration on the 227 NOGCCI(Negros Occidental Golf and
Country Club, Inc.)shares, among other Benedictos properties, petitioner Republic
acknowledging that it was within private respondent Benedictos capacity to acquire
the same shares out of his income from business and the exercise of his
profession.Implied in this undertaking is the recognition by petitioner Republic that
the subject shares of stock could not have been ill-gotten.
In a decision dated October 2, 1992, the Sandiganbayan approved the Compromise

Agreement and accordingly rendered judgment in accordance with its terms.
In the process of implementing the Compromise Agreement, either of the parties

would, from time to time, move for a ruling by the Sandiganbayan on the proper
manner of implementing or interpreting a specific provision therein.
On February 22, 1994, Benedicto filed in Civil Case No. 0034 a "Motion for Release
from Sequestration and Return of Sequestered Shares/Dividends" praying, inter alia,
that his NOGCCI shares of stock be specifically released from sequestration and
returned, delivered or paid to him as part of the parties Compromise Agreement in
that case.
Issue:WON the state opened itself for counterclaim in the case at bar
Ruling:
Petitioner Republic, through the PCGG, invokes state immunity from suit. As argued,
the order for it to pay the value of the delinquent shares would fix monetary liability
on a government agency, thus necessitating the appropriation of public funds to
satisfy the judgment claim. But, as private respondent Benedicto correctly countered,
the PCGG fails to take stock of one of the exceptions to the state immunity principle,
i.e., when the government itself is the suitor, as in Civil Case No. 0034. Where, as
here, the State itself is no less the plaintiff in the main case, immunity from suit
cannot be effectively invoked. For, as jurisprudence teaches, when the State, through
its duly authorized officers, takes the initiative in a suit against a private party, it
thereby descends to the level of a private individual and thus opens itself to whatever
counterclaims or defenses the latter may have against it. Petitioner Republics act of
filing its complaint in Civil Case No. 0034 constitutes a waiver of its immunity from

suit. Being itself the plaintiff in that case, petitioner Republic cannot set up its
immunity against private respondent Benedictos prayers in the same case.
In fact, by entering into a Compromise Agreement with private respondent Benedicto,

petitioner Republic thereby stripped itself of its immunity from suit and placed itself
in the same level of its adversary. When the State enters into contract, through its
officers or agents, in furtherance of a legitimate aim and purpose and pursuant to
constitutional legislative authority, whereby mutual or reciprocal benefits accrue and
rights and obligations arise therefrom, the State may be sued even without its express
consent, precisely because by entering into a contract the sovereign descends to the
level of the citizen. Its consent to be sued is implied from the very act of entering into
such contract, breach of which on its part gives the corresponding right to the other
party to the agreement.
COMMISSIONER VS SAN DIEGO (SCOPE OF CONSENT) ACT NO 3083
Facts:
- On November 20 1940 the Government of the PH filed a complaint for for
eminent domain for the expropriation of a parcel of land belonging to a certain
Hashim for a public road (EDSA) 14 Pesos per Square meter.
- Nov 25 1940 government took possession of the land however record and files
of expropriation case were destroyed and lost during WW II. The Government
took possession of the property upon deposit with the City Treasurer of the
sum of P23,413.64 fixed by the Court therein as the provisional value of all
the lots needed to construct the road, including Hashim's property.
- In 1958 Hashim (Deceased) Tomas N. Hashim filed a money claim with the
Quezon City Engineers Office alleging said amount to be fair market value of
the property in question.
- The parties entered into a compromise agreement wherein the Bureau shall
pay almost half of the amount claimed. The bureau failed to pay so Hashim
filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. Respondent judge
granted the motion. The sheriff served the writ with a Notice of Garnishment
to PNB against the Bureau's funds. Hashim further filed a motion for issuance
of an order ordering the release of the amount. It was granted. PNB released
the amount. Petitioner filed this petition for certiorari with mandatory
injunction to reimburse the amount released.
- ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
-
Issue:
1. Whether or not the State may invoke its immunity from suit
Ruling:
- No they cannot invoke immunity from suit as they are obliged to give just
compensation in cases of expropriation. Exercise of imminent domain is
included in the grounds for suing the government. They are obliged to give

just compensation for the land they took for public purposes. Immunity is not
available for the State in this case.
- Notes lang: Immunity is used as not to waste resources of the government and
the governments main task is to serve the public not to answer the questions
as if it happens significant resources and time would be wasted in answering
questions of the public in the works of government.
- ACT NO. 3083 - AN ACT DEFINING THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS MAY BE SUED
- Section 1. Complaint against Government. Subject to the provisions of this

Act, the Government of the Philippine Islands hereby consents and submits to
be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract,
expressed or implied, which could serve as a basis of civil action between
private parties.
PNB v. CIR
G.R. No. L-32667 January 31, 1978
Facts:
The now defunct Court Industrial Relations, through Gilbert P. Lorenzo as its
appointed deputy sheriff, served a notice of garnishment. What was sought to be
garnished was the money of the Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation
deposited at the petitioners branch in Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to quash the notice of garnishment. However, the respondent

court denied it. The petitioner then challenged the validity of the denial on two
grounds: (1) that the appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized
deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law and (2) that the funds
subject of the garnishment "may be public in character."
The subject of the certiorari proceeding filed by the petitioner is the allegation
that the CIR committed a grave abuse of discretion by denying the motion to quash.
Issue: WoN the funds which were subject to garnishment were of public character.
Ruling:

No, they are not.
The plea for setting aside the notice of garnishment was promised on the funds
of the People's Homesite and Housing Corporation deposited with petitioner being
"public in character." There was not even a categorical assertion to that effect. It is
only the possibility of its being "public in character." The premise that the funds could
be spoken of as public in character may be accepted in the sense that the People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation was a government-owned entity.
It does not follow though that they were exempt from garnishment. National
Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. Court of Industrial Relations is squarely in point.
As was explicitly stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the NASSCO are
public funds of the government, and that, as such, the same may not be
garnished, attached or levied upon, is untenable for, as a government owned and
controlled corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct and
separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to Section 2 of Executive
Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950 ..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has
been established 'all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation
Law ...' Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to court
processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act No. 1459), as
amended."
The similarities between the aforesaid case and the present litigation are
patent. Petitioner was similarly a government-owned corporation. The principal
respondent was the Court of Industrial Relations. The prevailing parties were the
employees of petitioner. There was likewise a writ of execution and thereafter notices
of garnishment served on several banks. There was an objection to such a move and
the ruling was adverse to the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation. Hence the
filing of a petition for certiorari. To repeat, the ruling was quite categorical.
Garnishment was the appropriate remedy for the prevailing party which could proceed
against the funds of a corporate entity even if owned or controlled by the government.
In a 1941 decision, Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel

Company, this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On the other hand, it is well
settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it abandons
its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation. (Bank of
the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging in a
particular business thru the instrumentality of a corporation, the government
divests itself pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private corporations."

Side note: (On the issue of the appointment of the sheriff)
The other objection raised, namely that respondent Court acted erroneously in
having a special sheriff serve to the writ of execution, hardly needs any extensive
decision. It is true that in the aforesaid Commissioner of Public Highways opinion,
this Court held that there is no authorization in law for the appointment of special
sheriffs for the service of writs of execution. The petitioner banked on the provision
in Section 11 of Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads: 'All writs and
processes issued by the Court shall be served and executed free of charge by
provincial or city sheriffs, or by any person authorized by this Court, in the same
manner as writs and processes of Courts of First Instance.' In the order sought to be
nullified, the then Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of respondent Court pointed out
that under a later Act, the Court of Industrial Relations Act was amended with
the proviso that its Clerk of Court was the ex-oficio sheriff. The point raised in the
petition that it should be the sheriff of Quezon City that ought to have served the writ
of execution would thus clearly appear to be inconclusive. There is to be sure no
thought of deviating from the principle announced in the Commissioner of Public
Highways case. That is as it ought to be.
Even if, however, there is sufficient justification for the infirmity attributed to
respondent Court by virtue of such a ruling, still considering all the circumstances of
this case, it clearly does not call for the nullification of the order in question. What
cannot be denied is that the writ of execution was issued as far back as May 5, 1970
by the then Clerk of Court of respondent Tribunal as the authorized sheriff. It would
be, to say the least, unfair and unequitable if, on the assumption that such Clerk
of Court lacked such competence, a new writ of execution had to be issued by the
proper official. At any rate, what is important is that the judgment be executed.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION
PETs: Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
RESPO:
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
Jose C. Magnayi (private respondent)
Ponente: Vitug, J.
Principle involved: Scope of Consent - Execution

On 27 January 1993, private respondent initiated NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-

01-0690-93 for his alleged illegal dismissal by ADB and the latter's violation of the
"labor-only" contracting law.Two summonses were served, one sent directly to the
ADB and the other through the Department of Foreign Affairs ("DFA"), both with a
copy of the complaint. Forthwith, the ADB and the DFA notified respondent Labor
Arbiter that the ADB, as well as its President and Officers, were covered by an
immunity from legal process except for borrowings, guaranties or the sale of
securities pursuant to Article 50(1) and Article 55 of the Agreement Establishing the
Asian Development Bank (the "Charter") in relation to Section 5 and Section 44 of
the Agreement Between The Bank And The Government Of The Philippines
Regarding The Bank's Headquarters (the "Headquarters Agreement").
The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the complaint on the impression that the
ADB had waived its diplomatic immunity from suit and, in time, rendered a decision
in favor of Magnayi. The ADB did not appeal the decision. Instead, on 03 November
1993, the DFA referred the matter to the NLRC. In its referral, the DFA sought a
"formal vacation of the void judgment." When DFA failed to obtain a favorable
decision from the NLRC, which stated that the DFA should file a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman, if ever it feels that the action of the Labor Arbiter Nieves
de Castro constitutes misconduct, malfeasance, or misfeasance, it filed a petition for
certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not ADB is immune from suit
Held:
Yes. The stipulations of both the Charter and Headquarters Agreement outlined below
should be able, nay well enough, to establish that, except in the specified cases of
borrowing and guarantee operations, as well as the purchase, sale and
underwriting of securities, the ADB enjoys immunity from legal process of every
form. The Banks officers, on their part, enjoy immunity in respect of all acts
performed by them in their official capacity. The Charter and the Headquarters
Agreement granting these immunities and privileges are treaty covenants and
commitments voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government which must be
respected.
Article 50(1) of the Charter provides:

The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process,
except in cases arising out of or in connection with the exercise of its
powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or
underwrite the sale of securities.
Under Article 55 thereof -

All Governors, Directors, alternates, officers and employees of the

Bank, including experts performing missions for the Bank:
(1) Shall be immune from legal process with respect of acts performed
by them in their official capacity, except when the Bank waives the
immunity.
Like provisions are found in the Headquarters Agreement. Thus, its Section 5 reads:
"The Bank shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process,
except in cases arising out of, or in connection with, the exercise of its
powers to borrow money, to guarantee obligations, or to buy and sell or
underwrite the sale of securities.
And, with respect to certain officials of the bank, Section 44 of the agreement states:
Governors, other representatives of Members, Directors, the President,
Vice-President and executive officers as may be agreed upon between
the Government and the Bank shall enjoy, during their stay in the
Republic of the Philippines in connection with their official duties with
the Bank:
x xxxxxxxx
(b) Immunity from legal process of every kind in respect of words
spoken or written and all acts done by them in their official capacity.
Additionally, being an international organization that has been extended a diplomatic

status, the ADB is independent of the municipal law. In Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center vs. Acosta, the Court has cited with approval the opinion of the
then Minister of Justice; thus -
"One of the basic immunities of an international organization is
immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal
writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is
found.(See Jenks, Id., pp. 37-44). The obvious reason for this is that the
subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts
would afford a convenient medium thru which the host government may
interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such subjection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states."
REPUBLIC VS. HIDALGO

Petitioner: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

Respondents: HON. VICENTE A. HIDALGO
Ponente:GARCIA , J.
Topic: Scope of Consent-Execution
Facts:
On June 2, 1999, Mendoza filed an action for the annulment or declaration of
nullity of the title and deed of sale, reconveyance and/or recovery of
ownership and possession of a 4,924 sq. m. property against the Republic of
the Philippines (in whose name the title to the property was transferred and
registered).
Mendoza essentially alleged that she is the owner of the disputed Arlegui
property which the Republic forcibly dispossessed her of.
The property in question is located at 1440 Arlegui Street, San Miguel,
Manila.
Mendoza prayed for the Republic to pay a reasonable compensation or rental
for the use or occupancy of the subject property and other relief, just and
equitable under the premises.
Eventually, the trial court rendered a judgment by default for Mendoza and
against the Republic. On August 27, 2003, Judge Hidalgo rendered a decision
in favor of plaintiff Mendoza. A certificate of finality of judgment was issued
by the Branch Clerk of Courton November 27, 2003.
On December 19, 2003, Judge Hidalgo issued an order directing the issuance
of a writ of execution.
Subsequently, the Republic moved for its dismissal, but was denied.
Denied also was its subsequent plea for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Issue:WON the writ of execution can be enforced against the state.
Ruling:
No, the writ of execution cannot be enforced against the state.
The respondent Judge patently committed two inexcusable procedural errors,
the pronouncement of costs against the government and the subsequent
issuance of the writ of execution, in violation of settled rules and
jurisprudence.
The Order of the respondent court dated December 19, 2003 for the issuance
of a writ of execution and the Writ of Execution dated December 22, 2003
against government funds are hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the
presiding judge of the respondent court, the private respondent, their agents
and persons acting for and in their behalves are permanently enjoined from
enforcing said writ of execution.
However, consistent with the basic tenets of justice, fairness and equity,
petitioner Republic, thru the Office of the President, is hereby strongly
enjoined to take the necessary steps, and, with reasonable dispatch, make the

appropriate budgetary arrangements to pay private respondent Mendoza or her

assigns the amount adjudged due her under this disposition.
MERRITT V GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

March 21, 1916
G.R. No. L-11154
TRENT, J.
FACTS:
RESPO Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was
bumped by an ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries
rendering him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457
authorizing Merritt to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the
responsibility for the collision between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the
General Hospital, and to determine the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is
entitled. After trial, the lower court held that the collision was due to the negligence of
the driver of the ambulance. It then determined the amount of damages and ordered
the government to pay the same.
ISSUE:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity
from suit or did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the
ambulance?
RULING:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It
does not thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action
in his favor, or extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to
the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent,
but not when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom
properly it pertained to do the act performed. A special agent is one who
receives a definite and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of
the duties of his office if he is a special official. This concept does not apply to
any executive agent who is an employee of the acting administration and who
on his own responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the

regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a
special agent; thus the Government is not liable.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO VS JUDGE FIRME
April 8, 1991
G.R. No. L-52179; 195 SCRA 692
Petitioner: Municipality Of San Fernando, La Union
Respondents: Hon. Judge Romeo N. Firme, Juana Rimando-Bania,

IaureanoBania, Jr., SorMarietaBania, Montano Bania, OrjaBania, And Lydia R.
Bania
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing

under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of

MacarioNieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump
truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.
Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including LaureanoBania Sr.
died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four others suffered varying degrees
of physical injuries.
The heirs of Bania Sr., private respondents, instituted a complaint for

damages against the Estate of MacarioNieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and
driver, respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the defendants filed a Third
Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.
Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of
action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action and the negligence of
the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.
Judge Firme in its decision rendered the Municipality of San Fernando and
Bislig jointly and severally liable to pa funeral expenses, lot expected earnings, moral
damages and attorneys fees..
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not petitioner was liable.

2) Whether or not the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion when it
deferred and failed to resolve the defense of non-suability of the State amounting
to lack of jurisdiction in a motion to dismiss.
DISCUSSIONS:
The test of liability of the municipality depends on whether or not the driver
acting in behalf of the municipality is performing governmental or proprietary
functions. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In
permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to
show that the defendant was not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury
was committed or that the case comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing
this, the claimant cannot recover.
RULINGS:
1) The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of the State.
The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to
be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent may be embodied
in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of the State to be sued in case
of money claims involving liability arising from contracts is found in Act No. 3083.
Consent is implied when the government enters into business contracts and also when
the State files a complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it
is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be
sued. Liability is not conceded by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be
sued. When the state does waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff
the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts
committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity
Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that he was on his way
to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernandos
municipal streets. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the

performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or
tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be held liable for the torts
committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of
2) Yes. In the case at bar, the judge deferred the resolution of the defense of
non-suability of the State until trial. However, the respondent judge failed to resolve
such defense, proceeded with the trial and thereafter rendered a decision against the
municipality and its driver.
The respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion when in the exercise
of its judgment it arbitrarily failed to resolve the vital issue of non-suability of the
State in the guise of the municipality. However, the judge acted in excess of his
jurisdiction when in his decision, he held the municipality liable for the quasi-delict
committed by its regular employee.
MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY V. DUMDUM
March 22, 2010
G.R. No. 168289, 616 SCRA 1
Petitioner: THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN,

represented by the HON. FELIX V. OPLE, Municipal
Mayor, and FELIX V. OPLE, in his personal capacity
Respondents: HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., in his
capacity as the Presiding Judge of the REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF
COURT & EXOFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT of CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT
& EXOFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT of BULACAN and his DEPUTIES; and EMILY
ROSE GO KO LIM CHAO, doing business under the name
and style KD SURPLUS
PERALTA, J.
FACTS:

A complaint was filed by Lim Chao against the Municipality of Hagonoy,Bulacan for
collection of sum of money and damages. The complaint alleged that acontract was
entered into by Lim Chao and the Municipality for the delivery of motor vehicles,
which supposedly were needed to carry out certain developmentalundertakings in the
municipality. Lim Chao then delivered to the Municipality of Hagonoy 21 motor
vehicles amounting to P5,820,000.00. However, despite havingmade several
deliveries, the Municipality allegedly did not heed Lim Chaos claim for payment.
Thus, she filed a complaint for full payment of the said amount, with interestand
damages and prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment againstthe
Municipality. The trial court issued the Writ of Preliminary Attachment directing
thesheriff "to attach the estate, real and personal properties" of the Municipality.The
Municipality filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the claim on which
theaction had been brought was unenforceable under the statute of frauds, pointing
outthat there was no written contract or document that would evince the
supposedagreement they entered into with respondent. It also filed a Motion to
Dissolve and/or Discharge the Writ of Preliminary Attachment already issued,
invoking, among others,immunity of the state from suit. The Municipality argued that
as a municipal corporation,it is immune from suit, and that its properties are by law
exempt from execution andgarnishment. Lim Chao on her part, counters that,
Municipalitysclaim of immunityfrom suit is negated by the Local Government Code,
which vests municipal corporationswith the power to sue and be sued.The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial courts order.
ISSUE
WON the issuance of the Writ of Preliminary Attachment against the Municipality of
Hagonoy is valid?
RULING
No.The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the Constitution is that
the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent.
Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it. Consent is
implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then descends to
the level of the other contracting party; or it may be embodied in a general or special
law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate
powers one of them is the power to sue and be sued.

Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. As held in City of
Caloocan v. Allarde, where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability
is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to satisfy
the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment, because statutes
waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to satisfy judgments
recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full
satisfaction. Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the
implication thereof is limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before
execution of the judgment.
THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF THE GOVERNMENT

SABILI v. COMELEC
April 24, 2012
G.R. No. 193261
Petitioner: Meynardo Sabili

Respondents: Commission on Elections and Florencios Librea
Sereno, J:
FACTS:
Sabili filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for mayor of Lipa City for the
2010 elections, and stated that he had been a resident of Lipa for 2 years and 8
months.
Prior to 2010 elections, he had been twice elected in 1995 and in 1998 as
Provincial Board Member of the 4th District of Batangas and during the 2007
elections, Sabili also ran for representative of the 4th District of Batangas but
lost. (note that 4th district includes Lipa city)
However, when Sabili filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his
family were then staying at his ancestral home in Brgy. San Jose, Batangas.
Now, private respondent Librea filed a "Petition to deny due course and to
cancel COC and to disqualify Sabili for possessing some grounds for
disqualification."
Respondent Librea asserted that:
o Sabili made material misrepresentations of fact in his
COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year
residency requirement under Sec. 39 of the Local
Government Code (Sec. 39. Qualifications - ......a
resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceeding the day of the election...)
o that Sabili falsely declared under oath in his COC that
he had already been a resident of Lipa for 2 years and 8
months prior to the scheduled May 10, 2010 elections.

Comelec issued its Resolution (dated Jan. 26, 2010) disqualifying Sabili from
seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa and cancelled his COC for his not being a
resident of Lipa and for his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency
requirement under the law.
Now, Sabili moved for reconsideration of the COMELEC Resolution during
the pendency of which the May 10, 2010 local elections were held.
Dawbe, the next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa after
garnering the highest number of votes cast for the position.
He accordingly filed a Manifestation with the COMELEC to reflect this fact.
ISSUE: Whether Sabili had complied with the one-year residency requirement for
local elective official.
RULING: YES.
Note that parties here are in agreement that Sabili's domicile of origin was Brgy.
Sico, San Juan, Batangas and Sabili claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin
and established his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be
coupled with conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent
place of abode.
Petitioner's actual physical presence in Lipa is established not only by the
presence of a place he actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in
Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its Brgy.captain.
Petitoner Sabili's substantial and real interest in establishing his domicile of
choice in Lipa is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition of additional
property in the area but also his participation in the community's socio-civic and
religious life as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.
EVIDENCE BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENT COURT'S ANSWER
This evidence is immaterial for the purpose of
Various tax certificates and tax determining Sabili's residence. We have long
declarations showed that the Lipa held that it is not required that a candidate
1 property was soley registered in the should have his own house in order to establish
name of Sabili's common-law-wife, his residence or domicile in a place. It is
Palomares enough that he should live in the locality, even
in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.
What is of central concern then is that Sabili
identified and established a place in Lipa City
where he intended to live in and return to for
an indefinite period of time
Certifications regarding the family Note that the issue her is Sabili's residence and
2
members of Sabili not that of his children.
In fact, Sec.11 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that transfer of residence to any other
place by reason of one's occupation,
profession, employment in private and public

service, educational activities....in accordance

with law is not deemed as loss of residence.
It is well-established that property ownership
in the locality where one intends to run for
3 Property ownership
local elective post is not requirement of the
Constitution
There is nothing wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an
4 Changing residences elective post, for as long as he is able to prove
with reasonable certainty that he has effected a
change of residence for election law purposes
the law does not require a person to be in his
5 Rarely seen in the area home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week to fulfill
the residency requirement
And, the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own judgment regarding the
qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding, that the issue of
his residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections. Sabili has garnered
the highest number of votes legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and
has consequently proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of Lipa City.
In this regard, to successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the

petition must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to
constitutional and legal principles.
Court grants Sabili's Petition not only because he sufficiently established his
compliance with the one-year residency requirement but court also recognizes that the
determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount - it is their voice
that must prevail.
Petiton Granted.
ALDOVINO v. COMELEC
December 23, 2009
GR No. 184386
Petitioners: Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong

Respondents: Commission on Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo
FACTS:
The respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor
of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-
2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office,
the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal
case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans

suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and
finished his term.
In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same
position. The petitioners sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy
or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms;
his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160.
Comelec ruled in favour of Asilo and reasoned out that the three-term limit rule
did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term
because of the preventive suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON there was an interruption of term.
RULING:NO. Preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term
for purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code (RA 7160).
The Court held that in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended
official is only barred from performing the functions of his office and does not receive
salary in the meanwhile, but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability.Thus,
Asilos 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension in 2005, as preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective officials
term.
Asilos candidacy for a fourth term in the 2007 elections therefore was in
contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the Constitution which
provides:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials,
except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be
three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term for which he was elected.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition and

accordingly NULLIFY the assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent
Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED to run, and perforce to serve, as
Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term.
TALAGA V CASTILLO
Facts:
On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M.
Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010
national and local elections.
On December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as

In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3)
Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing
that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena
City, still filed his CoC.
On May 4, 2010 he filed an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal. on the same date,

Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon.
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots
but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute
candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as
against Castillos 39,615 votes.
On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation alleging
that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled
and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate
because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the
elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara Ruby

maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En
Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramons COC, despite a declaration of his
disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed
misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No.
9006 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her
favor.
Issue: The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as
candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.
Ruling: NO

Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be
no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be
validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate.
Declaration of Ramons disqualificationrendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was

nota valid candidate to be properly substituted
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a
finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation
with Motion to Resolve. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for
all intents and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his disqualification had the
effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As
Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it:
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the
concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for
how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was.
The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of
candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate
of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a
valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at
all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the
Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and
"original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be
a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our
Constitution.
TALAGA V CASTILLO
Facts:

On November 26, 2009 and December 1, 2009, Ramon Talaga (Ramon) and Philip M.
Castillo (Castillo) respectively filed their certificates of candidacy (CoCs) for the
position of Mayor of Lucena City to be contested in the scheduled May 10, 2010
national and local elections.
On December 5, 2009, Castillo filed with the COMELEC a petition denominated as

In the Matter of the Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of
Candidacy of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. as Mayor for Having Already Served Three (3)
Consecutive Terms as a City Mayor. He alleged therein that Ramon, despite knowing
that he had been elected and had served three consecutive terms as Mayor of Lucena
City, still filed his CoC.
On May 4, 2010 he filed an Ex-parte Manifestation of Withdrawal. on the same date,

Barbara Ruby filed her own CoC for Mayor of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon.
On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots
but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara Ruby as his substitute
candidate, resulting in Barbara Ruby being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as
against Castillos 39,615 votes.
On May 20, 2010, Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation alleging
that Barbara Ruby could not substitute Ramon because his CoC had been cancelled
and denied due course; and Barbara Ruby could not be considered a candidate
because the COMELEC En Banc had approved her substitution three days after the
elections; hence, the votes cast for Ramon should be considered stray.
In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara Ruby

maintained the validity of her substitution. She countered that the COMELEC En
Banc did not deny due course to or cancel Ramons COC, despite a declaration of his
disqualification, because there was no finding that he had committed
misrepresentation, the ground for the denial of due course to or cancellation of his
COC. She prayed that with her valid substitution, Section 12 of Republic Act No.
9006 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon were properly counted in her
favor.
Issue: The core issue involves the validity of the substitution by Barbara Ruby as
candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City in lieu of Ramon, her husband.
Ruling: NO
Existence of a valid CoC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution
Considering that a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be
no valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code.
It should be clear, too, that a candidate who does not file a valid CoC may not be
validly substituted, because a person without a valid CoC is not considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed a CoC is not at all a
candidate.

Declaration of Ramons disqualificationrendered his CoC invalid; hence, he was

nota valid candidate to be properly substituted
The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 involves a
finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false.
Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation
with Motion to Resolve. That sufficed to render his CoC invalid, considering that for
all intents and purposes the COMELECs declaration of his disqualification had the
effect of announcing that he was no candidate at all.
We stress that a non-candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As
Miranda v. Abaya aptly put it:
Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily understood that the
concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for
how can a person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was.
The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code, the existence of a valid certificate of
candidacy seasonably filed is a requisite sine qua non.
All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate
of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a
valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at
all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the
Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and
"original" certificate of candidacy beyond the period for the filing thereof, it would be
a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an act abhorred by our
Constitution.
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Facts:
- The rule in elections, as people know it, is that an appointed official is deemed
automatically resigned from their positions once he/she files the Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) for any elective position. This rule on automatic resignation
does not apply to elected officials. There is now a new rule. Appointed
officials are NO longer deemed resigned upon the filing of the CoC.

- In preparation for the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 8678 stating that : Effects of Filing
Certificates of Candidacy.
a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and
employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered

resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other elective office or position.
- Two appointive officers of the government who were planning to run in the
2010 elections sought the nullification of Section 4(a) on the ground, among
others, that it is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Issue: Does Resolution No. 8678 of the COMELEC violate RA 9006?

Ruling:
There used to be a similar provision in the Election Code and R.A. 8436 relating to
the automatic resignation of elective officials upon the filing of their CoCs, but this
was repealed by R.A. 9006, also known as the Fair Election Act. There was, thus,
created a situation of obvious discrimination against appointive officials who were
deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their CoCs, while
elective officials were not.
Four (4) requisites of valid classification must be complied with in order that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil
servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first
class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold
appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not justify such
differential treatment. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be
germane to the purposes of the law.

While it may be admitted that most appointive officials who seek public elective
office are those who occupy relatively high positions in government, laws cannot be
legislated for them alone, or with them alone in mind. For the right to seek public
elective office is universal, open and unrestrained, subject only to the qualification
standards prescribed in the Constitution and in the laws. These qualifications are, as
we all know, general and basic so as to allow the widest participation of the citizenry
and to give free rein for the pursuit of ones highest aspirations to public office. Such
is the essence of democracy.
MITRA V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010
Facts:
In the present case, the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC)

canceled the certificate of candidacy (COC) of petitioner Abraham Kahlil B. Mitra for
allegedly misrepresenting that he is a resident of the Municipality of Aborlan,
Province of Palawan where he ran for the position of Governor. Mitra came to this
Court to seek the reversal of the cancellation.
When PuetroPincesa was reclassified as a highly urbanized city in 2007, it

ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. The result of this
reclassification was that PutroPincesa residents were no longer legible to vote for
candidates for elective provincial offices.
Because of this, on March 2009, Mitra, a domiciliary of Puerto Princesa and

the incumbent Representative of the Second District of Palawan at the time, was
prompted to apply for the transfer of his Voters Registration Record from Brgy. Sta.
Monica, Puerto Princesa City, to SitioMaligaya, Brgy. Isaub, Municipality of Aborlan,
Province of Palawan. He subsequently filed his COC for the position of Governor of
Palawan as a resident of Aborlan.
Soon thereafter, respondents Antonio V. Gonzales and Orlando R. Balbon, Jr.

(the respondents) filed a petition to deny due course or to cancel Mitras COC. They
essentially argued that Mitra remains a resident of Puerto Princesa City who has not
yet established residence in Aborlan, and is therefore not qualified to run for Governor
of Palawan.
Mitra insisted in his Answer that he has successfully abandoned Puerto

Princesa City as his domicile of origin, and has established a new domicile in Aborlan
since 2008.
The respondents petition before the COMELEC claimed that Mitras COC
should be cancelled under the following factual premises:
(a) Mitra bought, in June 2009, a parcel of land in Aborlan where he began to
construct a house, but up to the time of the filing of the petition to deny due
course or to cancel Mitras COC, the house had yet to be completed;
(b) in the document of sale, Puerto Princesa City was stated as Mitras
residence;

(c) Mitras Puerto Princesa City residence was similarly stated in his
application for a building permit; and
(d) Mitras community tax certificate states that his residence was Puerto
Princesa City. The respondents presented several affidavits attesting to the
non-completion of the construction of the house, and asserted that without a
fully constructed house, Mitra could not claim residence in Aborlan.
Mitra denied the respondents allegations in his Answer. He claimed that the
respondents misled the COMELEC by presenting photographs of his unfinished house
on the land he purchased from a certain Rexter Temple. He claimed, on the contrary,
that his residence is located inside the premises of the MaligayaFeedmill and Farm
(MaligayaFeedmill) which the owner, Carme Caspe, leased to him; and that he
purchased a farm and presently has an experimental pineapple plantation and a cock
farm. The transfer of his residence, he claimed, began in 2008.
He submitted the following:
(a) the SinumpaangSalaysay of Ricardo Temple; Florame T. Gabrillo, the

Punong Barangay of Isaub, Aborlan; Marissa U. Zumarraga, Councilor of
Aborlan; Virginia J. Agpao and Elsa M. Dalisay, both Sangguniang Barangay
members of Isaub, Aborlan, attesting that Mitra resides in their locality;
(b) photographs of the residential portion of the MaligayaFeedmill where he
claims to reside, and of his Aborlan experimental pineapple plantation, farm,
farmhouse and cock farm;
(c) the lease contract over the MaligayaFeedmill;
(d) the community tax certificate he claims he himself secured, stating that
Aborlan is his residence; and
(e) an updated identification card issued by the House of Representatives
stating that Aborlan is his residence.
The COMELECs First Division subsequently ruled in favor of the respondents

and cancelled MitrasCertiface of Candidacy on the following grounds:
a. The photographs of the room Mitra claimed to be his residence appears hastily
set-up, cold, and utterly devoid of any indication of Mitras personality such as
old family photographs and memorabilia collected through the years. What the
supposed residence lacks, in the First Divisions perception, are the loving
attention and details inherent in every home to make it ones residence;
perhaps, at most, this small room could have served as Mitras resting area
whenever he visited the locality, but nothing more than this.
b. The room is not the home that a residence is supposed to be because,
according to former employees and customers of the MaligayaFeedmill, it is
located in an unsavory location
c. The fact that Mitra registered as a voter in Aborlan, has a cock farm, a farm, a
rest house and an experimental pineapple plantation in MaligayaFeedmill, was
occasionally seen staying in Aborlan, and held meetings with Aborlan
constituents does not necessarily establish Mitras status as an Aborlan
resident, or prove his abandonment of his domicile of origin in Puerto Princesa
City. Mere absence from ones residence or domicile of origin to pursue
studies, engage in business, or practice ones vocation is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment or loss of domicile

The COMELEC en banc concurred with the First Divisions ruling.
Issue: Whether or not Mitra misrepresented that he is a resident of Aborlan.
Held: No, he did not.
Section 74, in relation to Section 78, of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) governs
the cancellation of, and grant or denial of due course to, COCs. The combined
application of these sections provides that unless all the facts in their COCs are true,
their COCs will be denied or cancelled.
SEC. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. The certificate of candidacy

shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of the
BatasangPambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy are
true to the best of his knowledge.
x xxx
SEC. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days
from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing not later than fifteen days before the election.
The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a deliberate

attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible. Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidates qualifications for public office.
Based on these standards, the Court found that Mitra did not commit any
deliberate material misrepresentation in his COC. The COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in its appreciation of the evidence by using subjective and non-legal
standards. The COMELEC, too, failed to critically consider whether Mitra
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a fact that would otherwise
render him ineligible for the position of Governor of Palawan.

From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his residence from
Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement of a
candidate for an elective provincial office. Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known
as the Local Government Code, does not abhor this intended transfer of
residence, as its Section 39 merely requires an elective local official to be a
resident of the local government unit where he intends to run for at least one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election. In other words, the law itself
recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes
only the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year. Of
course, as a continuing requirement or qualification, the elected official must remain a
resident there for the rest of his term.
Mitras domicile of origin is undisputedly Puerto Princesa City. For him to

qualify as Governor in light of the relatively recent change of status of Puerto
Princesa City from a component city to a highly urbanized city whose residents can
no longer vote for provincial officials he had to abandon his domicile of origin and
acquire a new one within the local government unit where he intended to run; this
would be his domicile of choice. To acquire a domicile of choice, jurisprudence,
which the COMELEC correctly invoked, requires the following:
(1) residence or bodily presence in a new locality;

(2) an intention to remain there; and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile
On this, the Supreme Court took into consideration the following:(1)

hisexpressed intentto transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to
make him eligible for a provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting
in early 2008; (3) the transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his
initial transfer through a leased dwelling at MaligayaFeedmill; (5) the
purchase of a lot for his permanent home; and (6) the construction of a house
on the said lot which is adjacent to the premises he was leasing pending the
completion ofhis house. Based on these findings, the Court found that under
the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer
that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or
deliberately, in claiming residence in Aborlan. These were also considered to
be the gradual moves he made to establish his new residence there.
ASISTIO VS. AGUIRRE
Petitioner:LUIS A. ASISTIO
Respondents: HON. THELMA CANLAS TRINIDAD-PE AGUIRRE, ENRICO R.
ECHIVERRI
Ponente:Nachura
Topic: Composition, Qualification, and Term of Office-Fair Elections Act R.A. 9006
Facts:
Echiverri filed against Asistio a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the
Permanent List of Voters of Caloocan City. He alleged that Asistio is not a

resident of Caloocan City, specifically not of 123 Interior P. Zamora St.,

Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
Echiverri found out that Asistio's address is non-existent.
Judge Aguirre ordered the exclusion of Asistio.
Important doctrines:
Under Section 117 of The Omnibus Election Code and Section 9 of The Voters
Registration Act of 1996 or R.A. 8189, the residency requirement of a voter is
at least 1 year residence in the Philippines and at least 6 months in the place
where the person proposes or intends to vote.
"Residence", as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, is doctrinally settled to mean "domicile, importing not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention inferable from a
person's acts, activities, and utterances.
Three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a person must have a
residence or domicile somewhere; (2) once established, it remains until a new
one is acquired; and (3) that a person can have but one residence or domicile
at a time.
Domicile is not easily lost.To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must
demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one; and (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. The purpose to remain
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
Issue: WONAsistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan
City for failure to comply with the residency required by law.
Ruling:
No, Luis A. Asistio remains a registered voter of Precinct No. 1811A,
Barangay 15, Caloocan City.
Asistio has always been a resident of Caloocan City since his birth. His family
is known to be among the prominent political families in Caloocan City. In
fact, Asistio served in public office as Caloocan City Second District
representative in the House of Representatives.
In 2007, he also sought election as City Mayor. In all of these occasions,
Asistio cast his vote in the same city. Taking these circumstances into
consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified, and continues to
qualify, as a voter of Caloocan City. There is no showing that he has
established domicile elsewhere, or that he had consciously and voluntarily
abandoned his residence in Caloocan City.
That Asistio allegedly indicated in his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor,
both for the 2007 and 2010 elections, a non-existent or false address, or that he
could not be physically found in the address he indicated when he registered
as a voter, should not operate to exclude him as a voter of Caloocan City.
These purported misrepresentations in Asistio's COC, if true, might serve as basis for
an election offense under the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), or an action to deny due

course to the COC. But to our mind, they do not serve as proof that Asistio has
abandoned his domicile in Caloocan City.
SEMA V COMELEC
G.R. No. 178628, July 16, 2008
Carpio, J. En Banc
Facts:
The Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) was created under Republic
Act No. 6734, as amended by Republic Act No. 9054. The Province of Maguindanao
is part of ARMM. Cotabato City, on the other hand, voted against inclusion in the
ARMM during the plebiscite in November 1989.
There are two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first
legislative district of Maguindanao consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.
However, for the reason noted above, Cotabato City is not part of the ARMM but of
Region XII.
On 28 August 2006, the ARMMs legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,

exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of ShariffKabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district
of Maguindanao. The voters of Maguindanao ratified ShariffKabunsuans creation in
a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, renaming the first legislative district in question as ShariffKabunsuan
Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato
City).
Sema, who was a candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections for Representative of
ShariffKabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato
City for that office.
Sema contended that ShariffKabunsuan is entitled to one representative in Congress.
Issue:
Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 - delegating to the ARMM Regional

Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays - is
constitutional.
Decision:
The power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays was delegated by
Congress to the ARMM Regional Assembly under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054.

However, pursuant to the Constitution, the power to create a province is with

Congress and may not be validly delegated.
We rule that (1) Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional insofar as it

grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities;
(2) MMA Act 201 creating the Province of ShariffKabunsuan is void; and (3)
COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is valid.The creation of ShariffKabunsuan is
invalid.
The creation of local government units (LGUs) is governed by Section 10, Article
X of the Constitution. There are three conditions that must be complied with in
creating any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or
barangay to wit:
1. The creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria

fixed in the Local Government Code.
2. Such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution.
3. There must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
In this case, the creation of a province by the Regional Assembly is contrary to the
Constitution.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the

Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power
to create LGUs. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate
to local legislative bodies the power to create LGUs, subject to reasonable standards
and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution.
When it comes to the creation of municipalities and barangays, there is no provision

in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies
(like the ARMM Regional Assembly) of the power to create such LGUs. The creation
of provinces and cities is another matter.
The power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district. This is clear under Section 5 (3), Article VI of
the Constitution (Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one representative in the House of
Representatives) and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution (Any
province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x.)
In other words, for Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city,
it must also validly delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.
However, Congress CANNOT validly delegate the power to create legislative

districts. The power to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in
Congress.

Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in Congress the power to

increase, through a law, the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress to reapportion legislative
districts. The power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes the
power to create legislative districts out of existing ones. Congress exercises these
powers through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not through a law that
regional or local legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the House
of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative districts of Congress can
be created, only through a national law passed by Congress. In Montejo v.
COMELEC,we held that the power of redistricting x xx is traditionally regarded
as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is vested exclusively in
Congress.
The exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts is logical. Congress

is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied
in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for
regional or local legislative bodies to create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior
legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative body.
Indeed, the office of a legislative district representative to Congress is a national

office, and its occupant, a Member of the House of Representatives, is a national
official. It would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the ARMM
Regional Assembly to create a national office when its legislative powers extend only
to its regional territory. The office of a district representative is maintained by
national funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national funds. It is a self-
evident inherent limitation on the legislative powers of every local or regional
legislative body that it can only create local or regional offices, respectively, and it
can never create a national office.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its
legislative powers to operate outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This
violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly limits the
coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative powers [w]ithin its territorial
jurisdiction x xx.
ALDABA VS. COMELEC

January 25, 2010
G.R. No. 188078; 611 SCRA 137 (2009)
CARPIO, J.
FACTS:
This case is an original act of prohibition to declare unconstitutional RA 9591
which creates a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan.

On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City Charter by
creating a separate legislative district for the city.
At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007,
namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill
No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to
Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO
that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this
petition contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as
provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
contended that Congress use of projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a
determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by the legislature to determine
compliance with [a constitutional requirement].
ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 9591, n act creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos, Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned.
RULING:
It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for
being violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by
the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with
this, Regional Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the
demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because the Regional
Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the
following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel
V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are
declared official by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not
stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is
unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case,
the Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.

It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if
compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of
legislative reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among
districts.
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET. AL. VS. EXEC. SECRETARY EDUARDO

ERMITA, ET. AL.
An Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment filed by the Movant-Intervenors

Petitioners: Rodolfo G. Navaro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina
Respondents and Intervenors: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, representing the
President
of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the Senate President;
House of
Representatives, represented by the House Speaker; Governor Robert Ace S. Barbers,
representing the mother province of Surigao del Norte; Governor Geraldine
EcleoVillaroman,
representing the new Province of Dinagat Islands, as respondents; Congressman
Francisco T.
Matugas, Hon. Arturo Carlos A. Egay, Jr., Hon. Simeon Vicente G. Castrence, Hon.
Margarito
M. Longos, and Hon. Cesar M. Bagundol, as intervenors
Ponente: Nachura, J.
Date: April 12, 2011
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands) was
approved
into law by the president. With a mandatory plebiscite by the COMELEC, the creation
of the
province was ratified under the Local Government Code. The interim set of provincial
officials

were appointed by the President. The Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene
O. Medina
who were former political leaders of Surigao del Norte filed a petition for certiorari
and
prohibition challenging the constitutionality of RA 9355. The court dismissed their
petition on
technical grounds. They alleged that the creation of Dinagat as a new province, if left
unchecked,
would perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly deprive the people of
Surigao
del Norte of a large chunk of the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation
(IRA), and
resources from the area. They also argued that the land area and population of Dinagat
failed to
comply with the requirements of being a province as indicated in Section 10, Article
10 of the
Constitution and Section 461 of the Local Government Code (LGC). The Supreme
Court granted
the petition and declared RA 9355 unconstitutional for failure to comply with the
criteria for the
creation of a province as outlined in the Constitution and the LGC. It likewise
declared null and
void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC (LGC-
IRR) stating that the land area requirement should not apply were the proposed
province is
composed of one or more islands. Meanwhile, the SC denied subsequent motions for
reconsideration from the respondents and movant-intervenors. With the Supreme
Courts
decision deemed final and executory, the movant-intervenors filed an Urgent Motion
to Recall
Entry of Judgment.
Issues:

w/nRA 9355 is constitutional on the ground that it creates a province of Dinagat

which
territory and population fails to comply with Sec 461 of the LGC
Held:
No, RA 9355 is not unconstitutional. The Rules and Regulations Implementing the
LGC
(LGC-IRR) explicitly provides the exception to the requirement that the land area of
provinces be 2,000 square kilometers at the minimum. This requirement legislated by
Congress was present in the creation of municipalities and cities yet non-existent in
the
section pertaining to the creation of provinces. Thus, it can be said that such exception
was inadvertently omitted from Section 461 in the section for provinces. The missing
detail was later filled in by the Oversight Committee in the LGC-IRR. The true
legislative intent of Congress is one that can be found in the principles of local
autonomy
(as provided by the Local Government Code of 1991).
The Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment by movant-intervenors is granted.
The
May 12, 2010 Resolution is considered reconsidered and set aside. RA 9355 is
declared valid
and constitutional and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the
election of the
officials thereof are declared valid. The petition is dismissed.
AQUINO III VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793
April 7, 2010
Facts:
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed R.A. 9716, which reapportioned the First
(1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur to create
an additional legislative district. The first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second
district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative district.

- Sen. Aquino III and Naga Mayor Robredo filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition. Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic
Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) for the creation of a
legislative district. The petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by republic act
no. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional,
because the proposed frst district will end up with a population of less than
250,00 or only 176,383
Section 5(3), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution

Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province shall have at least one representative
ISSUES
1. Whether or not R.A. 9716 was unconstitutional because the newly apportioned first
district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the population requirement for the creation of
the legislative district as explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraph (1)
and (3) of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto; and
Ruling:
No.
Section 5(3) of Art VI clearly distinguished a province from a city. Meaning a
province is automatically entitled to one representative while a city has to meet the
250,000 population requirement first.
The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of 1,693,821 in
2007 is- based on the formula and constant number of 250,000 used by the
Constitutional Commission in nationally apportioning legislative districts among
provinces and cities- entitled to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was
given in the 1986 apportionment.
Population is not the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district (i.e Local Government Codes requisite for
creating a province not less than Php 20,000.00 annual income, plus at least 2,000 sq.
m. or least 250,000 inhabitants).
BANAT vs COMELEC
FACTS:
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers,
made a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held
in May 2007. In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC
considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);

2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which
garners at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to
one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least
6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than
6% of the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a
party-list candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used.
BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because
its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least
2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list
seat prescribed by the Constitution. BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere
ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying vote, there
would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of
party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall
be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the
validity of the 3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether
or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is
the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling
Whether or not the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is
constitutional
Whether or not the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 to qualify for one seat is constitutional
How shall the party-list representatives be allocated?
Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?
RULING:
The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House
of Representatives.
Yes, it is constitutional. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of
seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid

statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R. A. 7941 those garnering more than
two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion
to their total number of votes is unconstitutional. The two percent threshold
only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of
the Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives."
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to
the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent
(2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in
paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three
(3) seats.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties
from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the
Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list
elections through their sectoral wings. Also, in defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also
clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941.
However, by the vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in
Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.

ABAYON V HRET
FACTS:
Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the AangatTayo party-list
organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections. Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list
group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives.
Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner
Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she
did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of
an incumbent congressional district representative.
Respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition
against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparanalleging that Palparan was
ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
Petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the
petition for quo warranto. It was AangatTayo that was taking a seat in the House of
Representatives, and not Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving
her eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of AangatTayo.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since
it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed
membership in the House of Representatives. Such question must be brought, he said,
before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as nominees of AangatTayo and Bantay party-list
organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that
such organizations won in the 2007 elections.
RULING:
Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941,
the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which
parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of
Representatives during the elections.

Members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x xx who shall
be elected from legislative districts" and "those who x xx shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations." This means that, from the Constitutions point of view, it is the party-
list representatives who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds
for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the
Constitution, states:
Sec. 9. Qualification of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as

party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a
registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1)
year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least
ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25)
years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but
not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth
sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be
allowed to continue until the expiration of his term.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners
Abayon and Palparan claim that the two do not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System Act
provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent."
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a

nomineethe need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his
party-list organization.
The right to examine the fitness of aspiring nominees and, eventually, to choose five
from among them after all belongs to the party or organization that nominates
them. But where an allegation is made that the party or organization had chosen and
allowed a disqualified nominee to become its party-list representative in the lower
House and enjoy the secured tenure that goes with the position, the resolution of the
dispute is taken out of its hand.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the
HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out
above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no
less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass
upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once
the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the
nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to
his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against AangatTayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
ANGLADLAD VS COMELEC
Facts:
- Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list
organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter
denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain
biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their
ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuisance.
In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its
Article 201.
- AngLadlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech
and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of
the Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
- In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue: W/N AngLadlad is disqualified by the provision of RA 7941 (Party List
System Act of 1995)
Sub Issue: Is religion a basis for refusal to accept for party list?
Ruling:
1.) Petition is granted.We find that AngLadlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence,
nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that AngLadlad is
not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any of the requisites
under RA 7941 or the guidelines in AngBagongBayani.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented,
or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission

into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the

moral fabric of society.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of AngLadlads registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal

and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
2.) Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
AngLadlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
LOKIN V. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
Facts:
The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) was one of the organized
groups duly registered under the party-list system of representation that manifested
their intent to participate in the May 14, 2007 synchronized national and local
elections.
Together with its manifestation of intent to participate, CIBAC, through its

president, Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva, submitted a list of five nominees from which
its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the required number of
qualifying votes. The nominees, in the order that their names appeared in the
certificate of nomination dated March 29, 2007, were: (1) Emmanuel Joel J.

Villanueva; (2) herein petitioner Luis K. Lokin, Jr.; (3) Cinchona C. Cruz-Gonzales;
(4) Sherwin Tugna; and (5) Emil L. Galang. The nominees certificates of acceptance
were attached to the certificate of nomination filed by CIBAC. The list of nominees
was later published in two newspapers of general circulation, The Philippine Star
News (sic) and The Philippine Daily Inquirer.
Prior to the elections, however, CIBAC, still through Villanueva, filed a

certificate of nomination, substitution and amendment of the list of nominees dated
May 7, 2007, whereby it withdrew the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang and
substituted Armi Jane R. Borje as one of the nominees. The amended list of nominees
of CIBAC thus included: (1) Villanueva, (2) Cruz-Gonzales, and (3) Borje.
The withdrawal of the nominations was done pursuant to Section 13 of

Resolution No. 7804, which the COMELEC promulgated on January 12, 2007. The
said provision provides to wit:
Section 13. Substitution of nominees. A party-list nominee may be

substituted only when he dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he
becomes incapacitated to continue as such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a
nomination. In any of these cases, the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed
last in the list of nominees.
In response, Lokin assailed Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804. He alleged that

Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941.the law that
the COMELEC seeks to thereby implement.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and
violates the Party-List System Act
2. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the
nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of
CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of the polls, and in
ruling on matters that were intra-corporate in nature.
Held:
The answer to both issues is yes.
The authority to make rules and regulations (IRRs)in order to carry out an
express legislative purpose, or to effect the operation and enforcement of a law is not
a power exclusively legislative in character, but is rather administrative in nature. The
rules and regulations adopted and promulgated must not, however, subvert or be
contrary to existing statutes. The function of promulgating IRRs may be legitimately
exercised only for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of a law.
To be valid, therefore, the administrative IRRs must comply with the

following requisites to be valid:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;

3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and

4. It must be reasonable.
The COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7804 pursuant to its powers under the
Constitution, Batas PambansaBlg. 881, and the Party-List System Act. Hence, the
COMELEC met the first requisite.
The COMELEC also met the third requisite. There is no question that
Resolution No. 7804 underwent the procedural necessities of publication and
dissemination in accordance with the procedure prescribed in the resolution itself.
Whether Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was valid or not is thus to be

tested on the basis of whether the second and fourth requisites were met. It is in this
respect that the challenge of Lokin against Section 13 succeeds.
This is because Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 enumerates only three instances in
which the party-list organization can substitute another person in place of the nominee
whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC, namely: (a) when the nominee
dies; (b) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (c) when the
nominee becomes incapacitated.
Meanwhile, Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 provides four instances, the

fourth being when the "nomination is withdrawn by the party."
Lokin insists that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in expanding to
four the three statutory grounds for substituting a nominee. The Court agrees with
him. The enumeration in R.A No. 7941 is exclusive, for, necessarily, the general rule
applies to all cases not falling under any of the three exceptions.
LOKIN V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 193808, June 26, 2012
Facts:
On 20 November 2009, two different entities, both purporting to represent CIBAC,

submitted to the COMELEC a Manifestation of Intent to Participate in the Party-List
System of Representation in the May 10, 2010 Elections.
The first Manifestation was signed by a certain Pia B. Derla, who claimed to be the
partys acting secretary-general. At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, another Manifestation6
was submitted by herein respondents Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales and Virginia Jose as
the partys vice-president and secretary-general, respectively.
Claiming that the nomination of petitioners Lokin, Jr. and Planas was unauthorized,
respondents filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Expunge From The Records
And/Or For Disqualification, seeking to nullify the Certificate filed by Derla.
Respondents contended that Derla had misrepresented herself as acting secretary-
general, when she was not evena member of CIBAC; that the Certificate of
Nomination and other documents she submitted were unauthorized by the party and

therefore invalid; and that it was Villanueva who was duly authorized to file the
Certificate of Nomination on its behalf.
In the Resolution dated 5 July 2010, the COMELEC First Division granted the
Petition, ordered the Certificate filed by Derla to be expunged from the records, and
declared respondents faction as the true nominees of CIBAC. Upon Motion for
Reconsideration separately filed by the adverse parties, the COMELEC en banc
affirmed the Divisions findings.
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court in accordance with Rules 64 and 65 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether the authority of Secretary General Virginia Jose to file the partys
Certificate of Nomination is an intra-corporate matter, exclusively cognizable by
special commercial courts, and over which the COMELEC has no jurisdiction; and
2) Whether the COMELEC erred in granting the Petition for Disqualification and
recognizing respondents as the properly authorized nominees of CIBAC party-list.
Held:
(Note: The Supreme Court ruled that the fact that the petition was filed beyond the
allowed period pursuant to SEC. 3 of Rule 64: Time to file petition. The petition shall
be filed within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution
sought to be reviewed, the case ought to be dismissed on the said basis alone.
However, it still proceeded to discuss the facts of the case.)
1. Yes, it is.
The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party leadership disputes has already

been settled by the Court. The Court ruled in Kalaw v. Commission on
Elections that the COMELECs powers and functions under Section 2, Article
IX-C of the Constitution, include the ascertainment of the identity of the
political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts. The Court
also declared in another case that the COMELECs power to register political
parties necessarily involved the determination of the persons who must act on
its behalf. Thus, the COMELEC may resolve an intra-party leadership dispute,
in a proper case brought before it, as an incident of its power to register
political parties.
2. No, it did not err in granting the petition.
Matters regarding the nomination of party-list representatives, as well as their

individual qualifications, are outlined in the Party-List System Law. Sections 8
states:
Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each registered party,

organization or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-
five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from

which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required

number of votes.
xxxx
Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated
as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than one (1)year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to
read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the
election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
By virtue of the aforesaid mandate of the Party-List Law vesting the

COMELEC with jurisdiction over the nomination of party-list representatives
and prescribing the qualifications of each nominee, the COMELEC
promulgated its Rules on Disqualification Cases Against Nominees of
Party-List Groups/ Organizations Participating in the 10 May 2010
Automated National and Local Elections. Adopting the same qualifications of
party-list nominees listed above, Section 6 of these Rules also required that:
The party-list group and the nominees must submit documentary evidence in
consonance with the Constitution, R.A. 7941 and other laws to duly prove that
the nominees truly belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector/s,
the sectoral party, organization, political party or coalition they seek to
represent, which may include but not limited to the following:
a. Track record of the party-list group/organization showing active

participation of the nominee/s in the undertakings of the party-list
group/organization for the advancement of the marginalized and
underrepresented sector/s, the sectoral party, organization, political party or
coalition they seek to represent;
b. Proofs that the nominee/s truly adheres to the advocacies of the party-list
group/organizations (prior declarations, speeches, written articles, and such
other positive actions on the part of the nominee/showing his/her adherence to
the advocacies of the party-list group/organizations);
c. Certification that the nominee/s is/are a bona fide member of the party-list
group/ organization for at least ninety (90) days prior to the election; and
d. In case of a party-list group/organization seeking representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented sector/s, proof that the nominee/s is not
only an advocate of the party-list/organization but is/are also a bona fide
member/s of said marginalized and underrepresented sector.
The Law Department shall require party-list group and nominees to submit the
foregoing documentary evidence if not complied with prior to the effectivity
of this resolution not later than three (3) days from the last day of filing of the
list of nominees.

Contrary to petitioners stance, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to

the COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC en banc.
The tribunal correctly found that Pia Derlas alleged authority as acting
secretary-general was an unsubstantiated allegation devoid of any supporting
evidence. Petitioners did not submit any documentary evidence that Derla was
a member of CIBAC, let alone the representative authorized by the party to
submit its Certificate of Nomination.
AMORES VS. HRET
Petitioner: MILAGROS E. AMORES

Respondents: HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and
EMMANUEL JOEL J. VILLANUEVA
Ponente:Carpio Morales
Topic:Composition, Qualification, and Term of Office-Party List System Act RA
7941
Facts:
Petitioner alleged that, among other things, private respondent assumed office
without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC); he was disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of
Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) since, at the time of the filing of
his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was already 31 years old or
beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act;
and his change of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to its overseas
Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months
prior to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new
sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
Important doctrines:
Section 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be
nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not
less than 1year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and
write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to
represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of the election, and is at least
25 years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be 25 but not more
than 30 years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral
representative who attains the age of 30 during his term shall be allowed to
continue in office until the expiration of his term.

Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative

who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office
shall forfeit his seat: Provided, that if he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliationwithin 6 months before an election, he shall not be eligible for
nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization.
Issue:WON Mr. Villanuevas assumption of office is legal.
Ruling:
No, the Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee
of either the youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector in the May, 2007 elections.
As petitioner points out, RA No. 7941 was enacted only in March, 1995. There
is thus no reason to apply Section 9 thereof only to youth sector nominees
nominated during the first three congressional terms after the ratification of
the Constitution in 1987. Under this interpretation, the last elections where
Section 9 applied were held in May, 1995 or two months after the law was
enacted. This is certainly not sound legislative intent, and could not have been
the objective of RA No. 7941.
Respecting Section 15 of RA No. 7941, the Court fails to find even an iota of
textual support for public respondents ratiocination that the provision did not
apply to private respondents shift of affiliation from CIBACs youth sector to
its overseas Filipino workers and their families sector as there was no resultant
change in party-list affiliation.
What is clear is that the wording of Section 15 covers changes in both political
party and sectoral affiliation. And the latter may occur within the same party
since multi-sectoral party-list organizations are qualified to participate in the
Philippine party-list system.
Hence, a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same party
will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the
change has been effected at least six months before the elections. Again, since
the statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation.
It is, therefore, beyond cavil that Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to
private respondent.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of
age in May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August,
1975. Moreover, he did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months
before May, 2007, public respondent itself having found that he shifted to
CIBACs overseas Filipino workers and their families sector only on March
17, 2007.
ATONGPAGLAUM V COMELEC
G.R. No. 203766, April 2, 2013

Carpio, J. En Banc
These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions
issued by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying them from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their petitions
for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
This Court resolved to consolidate the 54 petitions in the Resolutions dated 13

November 2012, 20 November 2012, 27 November 2012, 4 December 2012, 11
December 2012, and 19 February 2013.
Facts:
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations
registered and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the
Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race.
The COMELEC, in its assailed resolutions issued in October, November and

December of 2012, ruled, among others, that these party-list groups and organizations
failed to represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their nominees do not
come from a marginalized and underrepresented sector, and/or some of the
organizations or groups are not truly representative of the sector they intend to
represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from
participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new
petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their
existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether
the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in cases of
AngBagongBayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Issues:
1. Whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May
2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration
under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations
2. Whether the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down
in AngBagongBayani and Barangay Association for National Advancement and

Transparency v. Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the

COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Decision:
No, The COMELEC did not commit a grave abuse of discretion. It merely followed
the guidelines set in the cases of AngBagongBayani and BANAT. However, the
Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme Court
now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the
two aforestated cases.
The 1987 Constitution provides the basis for the party-list system of representation.
Simply put, the party-list system is intended to democratize political power by giving
political parties that cannot win in legislative district elections a chance to win seats
in the House of Representatives.
Political Law- Party-list system
Commissioner Christian S. Monsod, the main sponsor of the party-list system,

stressed that "the party-list system is not synonymous with that of the sectoral
representation." The framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system
to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended
the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system.As
explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the
party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different
marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution."
Republic Act No. 7941 or the Party-List System Act is the law that implements the
party-list system prescribed in the Constitution.
Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7941 defines a "party" as"either a political party or a sectoral
partyor a coalition of parties." Therefore, a political party is different from a sectoral
party.
Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 7941 further provides that a"political partyrefers to
anorganized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and
policies for the general conduct of government."On the other hand, Section 3(d) of
R.A. No. 7941 provides that a "sectoral partyrefers to an organized group of citizens
belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereofwhose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector."R.A. No. 7941
provides different definitions for a political and a sectoral party. Obviously, they are
separate and distinct from each other.
Under the party-list system, an ideology-based or cause-oriented political party is

clearly different from a sectoral party. A political party need not be organized as a
sectoral party and need not represent any particular sector. There is no requirement in
R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a
"marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party
consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same
governance principles and policies,regardless of their economic status as citizens.

Political Law- parameters in qualifying party- lists
The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections
those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral
groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented"
sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC
because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and
do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented."
Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have
been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors.
Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they
do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because
one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one
remaining qualified nominee.
In determining who may participate in the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent
party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties
or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need

to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under
the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A
political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district
elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can
separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and

underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their
sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political
constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of
sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who

lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective

sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The
nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members
of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified.
This Court is sworn to uphold the 1987 Constitution, apply its provisions
faithfully, and desist from engaging in socio-economic or political
experimentations contrary to what the Constitution has ordained. Judicial power
does not include the power to re-write the Constitution. Thus, the present
petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because
petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013
party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court.
ABANG LINGKOD PARTYLIST V. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

(COMELEC)
ABANG LINGKOD is a sectoral organization that represents the interests of
peasant fanners and fisherfolks, and was registered under the partylist system on
December 22, 2009. It participated in the May 2010 elections, but failed to obtain the
number of votes needed for a seat in the House of Representatives.
On May 31, 2012, ABANG LINGKOD manifested before the COMELEC its
intent to participate in the May 2013 elections. On August 2, 2012, the COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 9513, which, required previously registered partylist groups
that have filed their respective Manifestations of Intent to undergo summary
evidentiary hearing for purposes of determining their continuing compliance with the
requirements under Republic Act No. 79413 and the guidelines set forth in
AngBagongBayani OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
After due proceedings, the COMELEC En Banc in a Resolution dated November
7, 2012, cancelled ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a partylist group. The
COMELEC En Banc pointed out that ABANG LINGKOD failed to establish its track
record in uplifting the cause of the marginalized and underrepresented; that it merely
offered edited photographs of some alleged activities it conducted after the May 2010
elections. The COMELEC En Banc further opined that ABANG LINGKOD failed to
show that its nominees are themselves marginalized and underrepresented or that they
have been involved in activities aimed at improving the plight of the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors it claims to represent.
Additionally, according to the COMELEC En Banc, under the Partylist System
Act, a groups registration may be cancelled for declaring unlawful statements in its
petition. Photoshopping images to establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to
declaring unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission cancels
ABANG LINGKODs registration.

In support of the instant petition, ABANG LINGKOD claims that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion when it affirmed the cancellation of its registration,
asserting that the COMELEC should have allowed it to present evidence to prove its
qualification as a partylist group, pursuant to AtongPaglaum. It claims that there was
no valid justification for the COMELEC to cancel its registration considering that it
complied with the sixpoint parameters in screening partylist groups laid down in
AtongPaglaum
Issues:
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it insisted on
requiring ABANG LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding that a groups
track record is no longer required pursuant to the Courts pronouncement in
AtongPaglaum
2. Whether or not the digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG
LINGKOD constitutes a ground for disqualification under R.A. No. 7941
Ruling:
1.Yes. After a careful perusal of the factual antecedents of this case, pinned against the
new parameters in screening party-list groups laid down in AtongPaglaum, the Court
finds that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the registration
of ABANG LINGKOD under the party-list system.
The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the fact that it insists on requiring
party-list groups to present evidence showing that they have a track record in
representing the marginalized and underrepresented.
Track record is a record of past performance often taken as an indicator of likely
future performance.As a requirement imposed by AngBagongBayani for groups
intending to participate in the party-list elections, track record pertains to the actual
activities undertaken by groups to uplift the cause of the sector/s, which they
represent.
Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 however provides:
Sec. 5 Registration. Any organized group of persons may register as a

party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government list
of officers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.

Thus, contrary to the COMELEC's claim, sectoral parties or organizations, such as

ABANG LINGKOD, are no longer required to adduce evidence showing their track
record, proof of activities that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector
they represent. Indeed, it is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. Otherwise stated, it is sufficient that the
ideals represented by the sectoral organizations are geared towards the cause of the
sector/s, which they represent.
2. Nevertheless, considering that track record is no longer a requirement, a groups

misrepresentation as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to deny or cancel
its registration, it is no longer material to its qualification under the party-list system.
In this case, ABANG LINGKODs submission of digitally altered photographs cannot
be considered material to its qualification as a party-list group. Section 6 of R.A. No.
7941, in part, reads:
Sec. 6 Refusal and/or Cancellation o Registration The COMELEC may,

motupropio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national,
regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds:
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
The digitally altered photographs of activities submitted by ABANG LINGKOD to

prove its continuing qualification under R.A. No. 7941 only pertain to its track record,
which, as already discussed, is no longer a requirement under the new parameters laid
down in AtongPaglaum.
ALDOVINO vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Lucena City councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected to the said office for three
consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. In September 2005,
during his third term of office, the Sandiganbayan issued an order of 90-day
preventive suspension against him in relation to a criminal case. The said suspension
order was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo resumed the performance of the
functions of his office.
Asilo then filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in 2007. His
disqualification was sought by herein petitioners on the ground that he had been
elected and had served for three consecutive terms, in violation of the three-term
Constitutional limit.
ISSUE:
WON the suspensive condition interrupts the three-term limitation rule of
COMELEC?
RULING:

NO. The preventive suspension of public officials does not interrupt their term for
purposes of the three-term limit rule under the Constitution and the Local Government
Code (RA 7160).
The candidacy of Lucena City Councilor Wilfredo F. Asilo for a fourth term in the
2007 elections was in contravention of the three-term limit rule of Art. X, sec. 8 of the
Constitution since his 2004-2007 term was not interrupted by the preventive
suspension imposed on him, the SC granted the petition of Simon B. Aldovino, Danilo
B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong seeking Asilos disqualification.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of
service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the three-term
limitation, held the Court. It noted that preventive suspension can pose as a threat
more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the Constitution itself disallows to
evade the three-term limit as it is easier to undertake and merely requires an easily
fabricated administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed.
Note:
As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and
limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This
is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this
provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official
has title to office and can serve.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the
law describes that an officer may hold an office. According to Mechem, the term of
office is the period during which an office may be held. Upon expiration of the
officers term, unless he is authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and
authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the
most and natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by the
expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed. A later case, Gaminde
v. Commission on Audit, reiterated that "[T]he term means the time during which the
officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another."
Notably in all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from
performing the functions of his office and does not receive salary in the meanwhile,
but does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office is a consequence that only
results upon an eventual finding of guilt or liability. Preventive suspension is a
remedial measure that operates under closely-controlled conditions and gives a
premium to the protection of the service rather than to the interests of the individual
office holder. Even then, protection of the service goes only as far as a temporary
prohibition on the exercise of the functions of the officials office; the official is
reinstated to the exercise of his position as soon as the preventive suspension is lifted.
Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is
vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. This was what exactly
happened to Asilo.
Term limitation and preventive suspension are two vastly different aspects of an
elective officials service in office and they do not overlap. As already mentioned
above, preventive suspension involves protection of the service and of the people

being served, and prevents the office holder from temporarily exercising the power of
his office. Term limitation, on the other hand, is triggered after an elective official has
served his three terms in office without any break. Its companion concept
interruption of a term on the other hand, requires loss of title to office. If preventive
suspension and term limitation or interruption have any commonality at all, this
common point may be with respect to the discontinuity of service that may occur in
both. But even on this point, they merely run parallel to each other and never
intersect; preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render
service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of
service occurs after there has been a break in the term.
Voluntary renunciation, while involving loss of office and the total incapacity to
render service, is disallowed by the Constitution as an effective interruption of a term.
It is therefore not allowed as a mode of circumventing the three-term limit rule.
Preventive suspension, by its nature, does not involve an effective interruption of a
term and should therefore not be a reason to avoid the threeterm limitation. It can pose
as a threat, however, if we shall disregard its nature and consider it an effective
interruption of a term.
ABUNDO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 201716
January 8, 2013
Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In

both the2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and as proclaimed as the winning mayoralty
candidateand accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed
the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres' election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty
electoral contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006
until the end of the 2004+2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over
one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again
opposed each other. When Abundofiled his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty
seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking the former's
disqualification to run, the corresponding petition, predicated on the three-consecutive
term limit rule.
ISSUE #1
Is the service of a term less than the full three years by Mayor Abundo, in view of an
election protest, considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application
of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials?
RULING:
No. Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold officeof
the mayor as a matterof right during the period of one year and ten months, or from
June 30, 2004 until May 3, 2006. Neither can heassert title to the same nor serve the
functionsof the said elective office.

TOLENTINO V COMELEC
G.R. No. 148334, January 21, 2004
Carpio, J. En Banc
This is a petition for prohibition to set aside Resolution No. NBC 01-005 dated 5 June
2001 (Resolution No. 01-005) and Resolution No. NBC 01-006 dated 20 July 2001
(Resolution No. 01-006) of respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
Resolution No. 01-005 proclaimed the 13 candidates elected as Senators in the 14
May 2001 elections while Resolution No. 01-006 declared official and final the
ranking of the 13 Senators proclaimed in Resolution No. 01-005.
Facts:
Following Senator Guingonas confirmation as Vice-President, the Senate on 8

February 2001 passed Resolution No. 84 ("Resolution No. 84") certifying to the
existence of a vacancy in the Senate. Resolution No. 84 called on COMELEC to fill
the vacancy through a special election to be held simultaneously with the regular
elections on 14 May 2001.
Twelve Senators, with a 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election.
Resolution No. 84 further provided that the "Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th
highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of former Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.," which ends on 30 June 2004.
Respondents Ralph Recto and Gregorio Honasan ranked 12th and 13th, respectively.
Petitioners sought to enjoin COMELEC from proclaiming with finality the candidate
for Senator receiving the 13th highest number of votes as the winner in the special
election for a single three-year term seat. Accordingly, petitioners prayed for the
nullification of Resolution No. 01-005 in so far as it makes a proclamation to such
effect. Petitioners claim that if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election
must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their
results.
Issue:
Whether a special election to fill a vacant three-year term Senate seat was validly held
on 14 May 2001.
Decision:

The petition has no merit.
Under Section 9, Article VI of the Constitution, a special election may be called to fill
any vacancy in the Senate in the manner prescribed by law. Under RA No. 6645
which implements the provision provides:
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 7166 subsequently amended Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645,
as follows:
Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. x xx In
case a permanent vacancy shall occur in the Senate or House of
Representatives at least one (1) year before the expiration of the term,
the Commission shall call and hold a special election to fill the
vacancy not earlier than sixty (60) days nor longer than ninety (90)
days after the occurrence of the vacancy. However, in case of such
vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held
simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.
Thus, in case a vacancy arises in Congress at least one year before the expiration of
the term, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645, as amended, requires COMELEC: (1) to call a
special election by fixing the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier
than sixty (60) days nor later than ninety (90) after the occurrence of the vacancy but
in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election; and (2) to give notice to the voters of,
among other things, the office or offices to be voted for.
While a survey of COMELECs resolution reveals that it gave no notice that it would
hold a special election for a single three-year term in the Senate simultaneously with
the general elections, the election is valid.
Consequently, an election held at the time thus prescribed is not

invalidated by the fact that the body charged by law with the duty of
calling the election failed to do so. This is because the right and duty
to hold the election emanate from the statute and not from any call for
the election by some authority and the law thus charges voters with
knowledge of the time and place of the election.
In the instant case, Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy
in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular election. Accordingly, the special election to fill the

vacancy in the Senate arising from Senator Guingonas appointment as Vice-President

in February 2001 could not be held at any other time but must be held simultaneously
with the next succeeding regular elections on 14 May 2001. The law charges the
voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELECs failure to give the
additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less
invalidate it.
PHILCONSA V. MATHAY
Facts:
The PHILCONSA, an association whose members are Filipino citizens and
taxpayers, questioned the constitutionality of the law RA 4134, implementing the
increase of salaries as violative of Art. VI, Sec. 14 of the Constitution which provides:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. On June 10 1964, Congress passed RA 4134 providing for
the increase of the annual salary of the Senate President and of the Speaker of the
house; and of Senators and members of the House. Sec. 1 of the Act provides that the
salary increases herein fixed shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the
constitution and Section 7 provides that the increase of the salary increase of the
President of the Senate and Speaker of the House shall take effect on the effectivity of
the salary increase of Congressman and Senators. In 1965, RA 4642 implemented the
increase pursuant to RA 4134, approved just the preceding year. According to
petitioner, the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the
approval of RA 4134, will expire only on Dec. 30, 1969, while the term of the
members of the House who participated in the approval of the Act expired on Dec.
300, 1965. Petitioner seeks to permanently enjoin the respondent officials from
authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries before Dec. 30,
1969.
Issues:
(1) WON the term of all the Senators and members of the House who approved
the increase must have fully expire before the increase becomes effective.
(2) WON the members of the House who were elected after the expiration of term
of the members of the House who approved the increase be subject to the payment of
the increased compensation, regardless of the non-expiration of the terms of the
Senator who also participated in the approval of the increase.
Held:
The court agrees with the petitioner that the increased compensation provided by
RA 4134 is not operative until Dec. 30, 1969, when the full term of all the members of
the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. As RA
4642 authorizes the disbursement of the increase compensation prior to the date of
Dec. 30, 1969, it also violates the Constitution and shall be null and void. The

expiration of terms of ALL the members approving the increase is required before
such increase will take effect, despite the difference in the terms of office.
LIGOT V. MATHAY
Facts:
Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the
Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-
year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and
certain other officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary of the members
of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the increases "shall take effect
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."
When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary
increase by virtue of the Courts unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay
"that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue
of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution..
Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186,
section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity.
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum
ofP122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of
P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending
resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T.
Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and
its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue of the Auditor-
Generals adverse decision to Singsons claim
On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligots request for
reconsideration.
Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that
at the time of his retirement, the salary for members of Congess as provided by law was already
P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary increase.
ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the memberof
Congress
HELD:
The petition was dismissed.
There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth
Act186, section 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is whether or not he can claim in based on
theP32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant retirement
gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis
of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution
from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally
allowed.
Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.
The ruling of the court was on retirement pay. Even in retirement benefits, you are supposed to
receive retirement benefits based on your last salary, not on the salary increased by law during your
term.
PEOPLE V. JALOSJOS
Facts:
The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress

who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and
acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking
that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including
attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been
convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular
sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be represented
Issue:
Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as

member of House of Representatives
Held:
Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However,

inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House
of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has
always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a

special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may
not be extended by intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely authorized by law, it has
constitutional foundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will virtually make
him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant
situation not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also
would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV v. HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT- BRANCH
148, MAKATI CITY, et al.
FACTS:
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily armed soldiers led by junior officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati City and publicly demanded the resignation of the President
and key national officials. After a series of negotiations, military soldiers surrendered
that evening.
In the aftermath of such event dubbed as the Oakwood Incident, petitioner Antonio F.
Trillanes IV was charged with coup dtat before the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
Four years later, Trillanes remained in detention and won a seat in the Senate. Before
starting his term, Trillanes filed with RTC an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to
be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.
Trillanes requested to be allowed to attend senate sessions and fulfill his functions as
senator. The RTC however denied his motion. Thus, he filed Petition for Certiorari
with the Supreme Court to set aside orders of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not Trillanes election as senator provides legal justification to allow him
to work and serve his mandate as senator.
Held:
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term"
to speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election
to office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only
signifies pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with
full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x xx with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could
accomplish within the confines of prison.

It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred
by the voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in
the Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be
harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the
Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule of law.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never
been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate
of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate
ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of
250 members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 membersof the
Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in
the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x xx Never has the call of a
particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who
are validly restrained by law.
NICANOR T. JIMENEZ, petitioner vs. Bartolome Cabngbang, respondent.
Facts:
Cabangbang was a congressman when he wrote an open letter to the president and
caused the same to be published in several newspapers of general circulation. The
letter allegedly maligned several officials of the AFP, including Col. Jimenez,
associating them in purported operational plans for a coup detat. Petitioners instituted
this present action for recovery of damages for libel against Cabangbang. In his
defense, Cabangbang invoked parliamentary immunity averring the letter is a
privileged communication under Art VI, Sec 15 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the letter in question a privileged communication protected by Art VI,
Sec 15 of the Constitution
Held:
The court ruled in the negative. Speech or debate therein used in Art VI Sec 15 of
the Constitution, refers to utterances made by Congressman in the performance of
their official functions while Congress is in session. Cabangbang made the open letter
to the president when Congress was not in session. And in causing the communication
to be so published, Cabangbang was not performing his official duty as a Member of
Congress. Hence, the communication is not absolutely privileged.
SERGIO OSMEA, JR., petitioner, vs.SALIPADA K. PENDATUN, LEON Z.
GUINTO, JR., VICENTE L. PERALTA, FAUSTINO TOBIA, LORENZO G.
TEVES, JOPSE J. ROY, FAUSTINO DUGENIO, ANTONIO Y. DE PIO,
BENJAMIN T. LIGOT, PEDRO G. TRONO, FELIPE ABRIGO, FELIPE S.
ABELEDA, TECLA SAN ANDRES ZIGA, ANGEL B. FERNADEZ, and
EUGENIO S. BALTAO, in their capacity as members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59, respondents.

FACTS:
Congressman Osmea took the floor on the one-hour privilege to deliver a speech,
entitled A Message to Garcia wherein said speech contained serious imputations of
bribery against the President. Being unable to produce evidence thereof, Osmea was
then found to be guilty of serious disorderly behavior by the House of
Representatives. Osmea argues that the Constitution gave him complete
parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be
questioned.
ISSUE:
Whether said disciplinary action by the House is in violation of Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution.
RULING:
Said disciplinary action is not in violation of the Constitution. Section 15, Article VI
of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representative shall not be questioned in any other
place. Although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself. Observe that they shall not be questioned in any other place in Congress.
LIBAN VS GORDON G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009 593 SCRA 68
CASE: This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having

forfeited his seat in the Senate.
FACTS: Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari

(petitioners) filed with this Court a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having
Forfeited His Seat in the Senate. Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is Chairman of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.During respondents incumbency as
a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman of the PNRC
during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors. Petitioners
allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article
VI of the Constitution, which reads: SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his
seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected. Petitioners
cite Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a governmentowned or
controlled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of

Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited

his seat in the Senate, pursuant to Flores v. Drilon, which held that incumbent national
legislators lose their elective posts upon their appointment to another government
office. Among others, Respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this
petition which appears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that
respondent committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for
forfeiture of his public office and further insists that the PNRC is not a
governmentowned or controlled corporation and that the prohibition under Section 13,
Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present case since volunteer
service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.
ISSUES:
1. W/n petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or
controlled corporation;
3. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case of
respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the
senate
HELD:
We find the petition without merit
(1) Petitioners Have No Standing to File this Petition.
A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto.
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate.
In short, petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against
respondent, a publicofficer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo
warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court. The
person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be
able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage. In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled
to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the
present petition. Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and
treats it as a taxpayers suit, the petition would still fail on the merits.
(2) PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public Functions

On 22 March 1947, President Manuel A. Roxas signed Republic Act No. 95,
otherwise known as the PNRC Charter. The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded,
voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose mission is to bring timely, effective,
and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the most vulnerable without
consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or political
affiliation. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the
duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement. In order
to be recognized as a National Society, the PNRC has to be autonomous and must
operate in conformity with the Fundamental Principles of the Movement. The
reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents
as neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC
volunteers must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the
Philippines where there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist
rebellion, the PNRC cannot be seen as government-owned or controlled, and
neither can the PNRC volunteers be identified as government personnel or as
instruments of government policy. Otherwise, the insurgents or separatists will
treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers tend to the wounded in the
battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas. Thus, the PNRC must not
only be, but must also be seen to be, autonomous, neutral and independent in
order to conduct its activities in accordance with the Fundamental Principles. The
PNRC must not appear to be an instrument or agency that implements government
policy; otherwise, it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out
its mission as a National Red Cross Society. It is imperative that the PNRC must
be autonomous, neutral, and independent in relation to the State. To ensure and
maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be owned
or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not own
the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress.An overwhelming four-fifths majority
of the PNRC Board are private sector individuals elected to the PNRC Board by
the private sector members of the PNRC. The PNRC Board exercises all corporate
powers of the PNRC. The PNRC is controlled by private sector individuals.
Decisions or actions of the PNRC Board are not reviewable by the President. The
President cannot reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC Board.
Neither can the President reverse or modify the decisions or actions of the PNRC
Chairman. It is the PNRC Board that can review, reverse or modify the decisions
or actions of the PNRC Chairman. This proves again that the office of the PNRC
Chairman is a private office, not a government office.
(3) The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the
Creation of Private Corporations by Special Law
The 1935 Constitution, as amended, was in force when the PNRC was created by
special charter on 22 March 1947. Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935
Constitution, as amended, reads: SEC. 7. The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private

corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the Government

or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. Congress cannot enact a law
creating a private corporation with a special charter. Such legislation would be
unconstitutional. Private corporations may exist only under a general law. If the
corporation is private, it must necessarily exist under a general law. Stated
differently, only corporations created under a general law can qualify as private
corporations. Under existing laws, the general law is the Corporation Code, except
that the Cooperative Code governs the incorporation of cooperatives. Although
PNRC is created by a special charter, it cannot be considered a government-owned
or controlled corporation in the absence of the essential elements of ownership
and control by the government. In creating the PNRC as a corporate entity,
Congress was in fact creating a private corporation. However, the constitutional
prohibition against the creation of private corporations by special charters
provides no exception even for non-profit or charitable corporations.
Consequently, the PNRC Charter, insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and grants it corporate powers, is void for being unconstitutional.
Thus, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the PNRC Charter,
as amended, are void. In sum, we hold that the office of the PNRC Chairman is
not a government office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. However, since the PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the
PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should incorporate under the
Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it
wants to be a private corporation.
PUYAT VS DE GUZMAN G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982 113 SCRA
31
FACTS:In May 1979, Eugenio Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the
International Pipe Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by
EustaquioAcero (Puyats rival) claiming that the votes were not properly counted
hence he filed a quo warranto case before the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) on May 25, 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case, Estanislao Fernandez, then
a member of the Interim BatasangPambansa purchased ten shares of stock of IPI from
a member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by SEC Commissioner
Sixto de Guzman, Jr. (from May 25-31, 1979) to have the parties confer with each
other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat
objected as he argued that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as
counsel (to anyone) before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being
cleared, Fernandez inhibited himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead
filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the said SEC case for him to intervene, not
as a counsel, but as a legal owner of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC Commissioner granted the motion and in
effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene.

ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and
intervene in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an
assemblyman must not appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is
not appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal
interest in the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the
stocks before the litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as
counsel but because it is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he
instead presented himself as a party of interest which is clearly a workaround and is
clearly an act after the fact. A mere workaround to get himself involved in the
litigation. What could not be done directly could not likewise be done indirectly.
Election of Officers
SANTIAGO VS GUINGONA 298 SCRA 756 (1998)
Facts: During the election of officers of the Senate, Senator Santiago nominated
Senator Tatad as Senate President. Senator Ople, on the other hand, nominated
Senator Fernan for the same position. Senator Fernan was voted Senate President with
a vote of 20-2. Senator Ople was voted president pro tempore while Senator Drilon
was voted majority leader. Senator Tatad manifested that, as the only ones who voted
for him were himself and Senator Santiago, the two of them comprised the minority
and that an agreement was entered into between them that he will be the minority
leader. The Senate was grouped as follows: 10 members Laban ngMasang Pilipino
(LAMP) 7 members Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim
Democrats of the Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP) 1 member Liberal Party (LP)
1 member AksyonDemokrasya 1 member People's Reform Party (PRP) 1
member Gabay Bayan 2 members Independent 23 total number of
senators (The last six members are all classified by petitioners as "independent".)
According to Senator Flavier, the members of the Lakas NUCD-UMDP is also a
minority since there are only 7 members and that they had chosen Senator Guingona
as the minority leader. Senator Guingona was thereafter formally recognized by the
Senate President as the minority leader. A petition for quo warranto was filed by
Senators Tatad and Santiago alleging that Senator Guingona had been
usurping,unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a
position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issue: Whether or not it was proper for the Senate President to recognize Senator
Guingona as the minority leader.
Held: History would also show that the "majority" in either house of Congress has
referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged, while
the "minority" normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members. Let us
go back to the definitions of the terms "majority" and "minority." Majority may also
refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes," not necessarily
more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is
"a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the

greater number would obviously be the majority while the lesserwould be the
minority. But where there are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to
say which is the minority entitled to select the leader representing all the minorities.
In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out
by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has
to be indentified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the
general elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either
belong to different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory
provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader. While the Constitution
is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of
Congress. All that the Charter says is that "[e]ach House shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary." 43 To our mind, the method of choosing who will
be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must
be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
The Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority
leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof, At any
rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But, in the
absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid
of any basis upon which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative
thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic concept of separation of powers, courts
may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not within the province
of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
Legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they "are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them." Being merely
matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of
a majority.
Quorum
AVELINO VS CUENCO 83 PHIL 17 (1949)
Facts: In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada
requested that his right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to
formulate charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His
request was approved. However, on the day of the session, the opening of the session
was delayed. He was not given the chance to speak despite his attempts to claim his
right to speak. A commotion broke outside the Senate gallery which prompted them to
adjourn. Nevertheless, Senator Tanada opposed the motion to adjourn. This led Senate
President Avelino and seven of his followers to leave and abandon the session.
Theremaining senators continued the session which was then chaired by the Senate
President Pro-Tempore. Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then

finally able to deliver his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the
complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and submitted his motion for approval
thereof and the same was unanimously approved. With Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had yielded it to him, Senator
Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant the
position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was
unanimously approved. Senator Cuenco took the oath. The next day the President of
the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the Philippines
Senate. Note: Except for Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator
Confesor who is in the United States, all the Senator were present. 22 Senators were
present at the opening of session.
Issue: Whether or not there was quorum?
Held: The session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session
and that a minority of ten senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other
twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement.
The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less. If
the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly
constituted? In other words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for
the transaction of the business of the Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon
say there was, firstly because the minute say so, secondly, because at the beginning of
such session there were at least fourteen senators including Senators Pendatun and
Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of Senator Tomas
Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty-three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a
quorum, "the House does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the
members constitute "the House". (Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p.
239). There is a difference between a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less
number than the first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the
Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose
of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not
constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent
members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and
Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be
eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained. In fine, all the four justice agree
that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the twenty three
senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after
this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the
rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends
exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about
tenure of the President of that body beingamenable at any time by that majority. And
at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the
benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein

involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a
doubt.
ARROYO VS DE VENECIA 277 SCRA 258 (1997)

Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of
the House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House
which petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is
tantamount to a violation of the Constitution. The law originated in the House of
Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments. A bicameral
conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report
to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved
to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of
a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to
the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time
the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The
Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair. On the same day,
the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress.
The enrolled bill was assigned into law by President Ramos.
Issue: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of
the rules of the House
Held: Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction to be given to a rule affects
person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented
isnecessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where
private rights are involved. In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved
but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to
transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of concerns a matter of
internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned. The
claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyos earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll call established the
existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially

when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the
House.
GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
FACTS:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the
President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello
Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC
Commissioner VirgilioGarcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004
presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated
legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
IntervenerSagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights
therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and
in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which
the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication
by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public
at the Senates internet web page.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation through the Senates website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.
HELD:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet
form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which
requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take effect seven
(7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation," precluding
any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to
comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a
persons liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be
arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium
for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
DE LA PAZ VS THE SENATE COMMITTEE
G.R. NO.2204 SEPTEMBER 11, 1924
FACTS:
In October 2008, Gen. De La Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of
8 to attendan Interpol GA. De La Paz brought with him his wife and 3 days after the
scheduled GA, de laPaz is also scheduled to retire. After the GA, De La Paz was
apprehended in the departure areafor he was carrying with him 105,000.00
(P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him 45,000.00 (P2,970,000.00). He
failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amountand this is in violation of
the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. De La Paz and his group was
later released but the s were confiscated by the Russians. Upon arrival to the
Philippines, De La Pazwas issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations for the investigation it wasto conduct involving the Moscow incident. De La
Paz averred that the said committee does nothave jurisdiction of the case. De La Paz
argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdictionto investigate the Moscow
incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph
12, Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules).They further
claim that respondent Committee violated the same Senate Rules when it issued
thewarrant of arrest without the required signatures of the majority of the members of
respondentCommittee. They likewise assail the very same Senate Rules because the
same were not published as required by the Constitution, and thus, cannot be used as
the basis of anyinvestigation involving them relative to the Moscow incident.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD:
The SC ruled against De La Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine
Constitutionstates:Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings. This
provision has beentraditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to
the Houses of Congress in theformulation, adoption and promulgation of its own

rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee,

raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks thisCourt to inquire into a
matter that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature
of a political question. Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by
theapproval of the Senate president and it is shown that the gathering of the signatures
is inaccordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries inAid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of
general circulation.
ALEJANDRINO V. QUEZON
46 PHIL. 83 (1924)
FACTS:
The petitioner in this original petition for mandamus andinjunction is Jose
Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by theGovernor General. to represent the 12th
Senatorial District. Thecasus belli is a resolution adopted by the Philippine
Senatecomposed of the respondent Senators, On February 5,1924,depriving
Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, andemoluments of his office for the
period of 1 yr from 1/24 havingbeen declared guilty of disorderly conduct and
flagrant violationof the privileges of the Senate for having treacherouslyassaulted Sen.
de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases beinguttered by the latter in the course of
the debate regarding thecredentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of
petitioner'scomplaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirelyof no effect.
ISSUE:
WON the Supreme Court by mandamus and injunctionmay annul the suspension of
Senator Alejandrino and compelthe Philippine Senate to reinstate him in his official
position?
HELD:
The general rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the gov't to a
coordinate branch, for the very obvious reasonthat neither is inferior to the other.
Mandamus will not lieagainst the legislative body, its members, or its officers,
tocompel the performance of duties purely legislative in theircharacter w/c therefore
pertains to their legislative functionsand over w/c they have exclusive control.The
courts cannotdictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of
power.Precedents have held that where a member has been expelledby the legislative
body, the courts have no power, irrespectiveof whether the expulsion was right or
wrong, to issue amandate to compel his reinstatement
MIRIAM SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 128055 April 18, 2001
FACTS:
The case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In Oct 1988, Santiago approved
the application for legalization of the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be

illegal and was tainted with bad faith. Two other criminal cases, one for violation of
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were also filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Pursuant to the information filed with the
Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena issued an order for the
arrest of petitioner, fixing the bail at Fifteen Thousand Pesos. Petitioner posted a cash
bail without need for physical appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries
sustained in a vehicular accident. The Sandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty
until 05 June 1991 or until her physical condition would warrant her physical
appearance in court. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago
and Sandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago from
office who was already a senator by then,.Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president
(Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
without violating the Constitution.
HELD:
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively
excluded members of Congress from Republic Act No. 3019 nor from its sanctions.
The maxim simply recognizes each of the three co-equal and independent, albeit
coordinate, branches of the government the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judiciary has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of
influence and effectively prevents one branch from unduly intruding into the internal
affairs of either branch. It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court
to issue an order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information
filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance,
the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and there
seems to be "no ifs and buts about it.
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered
to the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which
the Court has, more than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the
suspension of public officials and employees indicted before it. Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with
which he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office
would indicate that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding,
and not only the particular office under which he stands accused. Attention might be
called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the First Division
of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court,
nevertheless, deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the
significant issue raised by petitioner.
FARIAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. 147387 December 10 2003

In 2001, Republic Act No. 9006 or the Fair Election Act was signed into law. Section
14 thereof repealed Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code which states that an
elective official, except the President and the Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Hence,
under RA 9006, an elective official shall no longer be deemed resigned if he files his
certificate of candidacy for an elective office while he is still in office.
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, which provides that an appointive official
hall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate
of candidacy, was however retained by the Fair Election Act.
Rodolfo Farias, then a Congressman belonging to the minority group, questioned the
constitutionality of Section 14 on the ground that it violates the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. He averred that the repeal of Section 67 gave elective
officials undue advantage over appointive officials (discrimination).
The Farias group also questioned the validity of RA 9006 in its entirety. They
contend that irregularities attended to the creation of the said law. Farias explained
that RA 9006 originated as House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1741; that there
were contrasting provisions between the two bills hence a Bicameral Conference
Committee was created; that in fact two subsequent BCCs were convened which is
irregular already in itself; that only the 1st BCC had its record and the compromise
bill from said 1st BCC was never subjected to a conference with the lower house; that
in the 2nd BCC, it appeared that another compromised bill was agreed upon even
though there was no meeting at all and that the Report as to how said compromise bill
was reached was instantly made and made to be passed around for signing all these
irregularities made the law unconstitutional for being procedurally infirm.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9006 is constitutional.
HELD: Yes, RA 9006 is constitutional.
On Equal Protection
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from the other.
In this case, substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and
appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the
electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be removed
therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some
appointive officials hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.
Further, appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly
prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election
except to vote; while elective officials, or officers or employees holding political
offices, are obviously expressly allowed to take part in political and electoral
activities.

On the Enrolled Bill Doctrine

The contention that irregularities attended the creation of RA 9006 is overridden by
the enrolled bill doctrine. Under this doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of
the House and the Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both
Houses of Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. The
Supreme Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and
with their observance the courts have no concern. Whatever irregularities there may
have been in the Bicameral Conference Committee involve internal rules which
cannot be inquired into by the Court.
ABAKADA V PURISIMA
Facts:
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of

the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law
intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a
Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board
(Board). It covers all officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six
months of service, regardless of employment status.
The Fund is sourced from the collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their
revenue targets for the year, as determined by the Development Budget and
Coordinating Committee (DBCC). Any incentive or reward is taken from the fund and
allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess
collection of the targeted amount of tax revenue.
The Boards in the BIR and the BOC are composed of the Secretary of the Department
of Finance (DOF) or his/her Undersecretary, the Secretary of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) or his/her Undersecretary, the Director General of
the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA) or his/her Deputy Director
General, the Commissioners of the BIR and the BOC or their Deputy Commissioners,
two representatives from the rank-and-file employees and a representative from the
officials nominated by their recognized organization.
Each Board has the duty to (1) prescribe the rules and guidelines for the allocation,
distribution and release of the Fund; (2) set criteria and procedures for removing from
the service officials and employees whose revenue collection falls short of the target;
(3) terminate personnel in accordance with the criteria adopted by the Board; (4)
prescribe a system for performance evaluation; (5) perform other functions, including
the issuance of rules and regulations and (6) submit an annual report to Congress.
The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were
tasked to promulgate and issue the implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to
be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for such purpose.

Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed this petition challenging the
constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that, by
establishing a system of rewards and incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they
will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus, the system of rewards
and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty
of these officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.
Petitioners also claim that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives
only to officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or distinction
as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other
government agencies.
In addition, petitioners assert that the law unduly delegates the power to fix revenue
targets to the President as it lacks a sufficient standard on that matter. While Section
7(b) and (c) of RA 9335 provides that BIR and BOC officials may be dismissed from
the service if their revenue collections fall short of the target by at least 7.5%, the law
does not, however, fix the revenue targets to be achieved. Instead, the fixing of
revenue targets has been delegated to the President without sufficient standards. It will
therefore be easy for the President to fix an unrealistic and unattainable target in order
to dismiss BIR or BOC personnel.
Finally, petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the

ground that it violates the doctrine of separation of powers. While the legislative
function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and approval of
the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative
participation in the implementation and enforcement of the law.
In their comment, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, question
the petition for being premature as there is no actual case or controversy yet.
Petitioners have not asserted any right or claim that will necessitate the exercise of
this Courts jurisdiction. Nevertheless, respondents acknowledge that public policy
requires the resolution of the constitutional issues involved in this case. They assert
that the allegation that the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation
and does not suffice to invalidate the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared
objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the
functions they perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient standard that will guide the
executive in the implementation of its provisions. Lastly, the creation of the
congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates,
separation of powers. It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a
check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of the executive and the
implementing agencies.
After a careful consideration of the conflicting contentions of the parties, the Court
finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in
favor of RA 9335, except as shall hereafter be discussed.

Issue: WON RA 9335 is constitutional.
Ruling:
Section 1, Article 11 of the Constitution states:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all
times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility,
integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism, and justice, and lead
modest lives.
Public office is a public trust. It must be discharged by its holder not for his own
personal gain but for the benefit of the public for whom he holds it in trust. By
demanding accountability and service with responsibility, integrity, loyalty, efficiency,
patriotism and justice, all government officials and employees have the duty to be
responsive to the needs of the people they are called upon to serve.
Public officers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties.
This presumption necessarily obtains in favor of BIR and BOC officials and
employees. RA 9335 operates on the basis thereof and reinforces it by providing a
system of rewards and sanctions for the purpose of encouraging the officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC to exceed their revenue targets and optimize their
revenue-generation capability and collection.
The presumption is disputable but proof to the contrary is required to rebut it. It
cannot be overturned by mere conjecture or denied in advance (as petitioners would
have the Court do) specially in this case where it is an underlying principle to advance
a declared public policy.
Petitioners claim that the implementation of RA 9335 will turn BIR and BOC
officials and employees into "bounty hunters and mercenaries" is not only without any
factual and legal basis; it is also purely speculative.
A law enacted by Congress enjoys the strong presumption of constitutionality. To

justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal one.To invalidate RA 9335 based on
petitioners baseless supposition is an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature
that passed it but also of the executive which approved it.
Public service is its own reward. Nevertheless, public officers may by law be
rewarded for exemplary and exceptional performance. A system of incentives for
exceeding the set expectations of a public office is not anathema to the concept of
public accountability. In fact, it recognizes and reinforces dedication to duty, industry,
efficiency and loyalty to public service of deserving government personnel.

In United States v. Matthews,the U.S. Supreme Court validated a law which awards to
officers of the customs as well as other parties an amount not exceeding one-half of
the net proceeds of forfeitures in violation of the laws against smuggling.
Citing Dorsheimer v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court said:
The offer of a portion of such penalties to the collectors is to stimulate and

reward their zeal and industry in detecting fraudulent attempts to evade
payment of duties and taxes.
In the same vein, employees of the BIR and the BOC may by law be entitled to a
reward when, as a consequence of their zeal in the enforcement of tax and customs
laws, they exceed their revenue targets. In addition, RA 9335 establishes safeguards to
ensure that the reward will not be claimed if it will be either the fruit of "bounty
hunting or mercenary activity" or the product of the irregular performance of official
duties. One of these precautionary measures is embodied in Section 8 of the law:
SEC. 8. Liability of Officials, Examiners and Employees of the BIR and the
BOC. The officials, examiners, and employees of the [BIR] and the [BOC]
who violate this Act or who are guilty of negligence, abuses or acts of
malfeasance or misfeasance or fail to exercise extraordinary diligence in the
performance of their duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered
by any business establishment or taxpayer as a result of such violation,
negligence, abuse, malfeasance, misfeasance or failure to exercise
extraordinary diligence.
US V PONS
Facts:
That on or about the 10th day of April, 1915, the said accused, conspiring together
and plotting among themselves, did, knowingly, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
fraudulently, bring from a foreign country, to wit, that of Spain, on board the
steamer Lopez y Lopez, and import and introduce into the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, 520 tins containing 125 kilograms of
opium of the value of P62,400, Philippine currency; and that, then and there, the said
accused, also conspiring together and plotting among themselves, did receive and
conceal the said quantity of opium and aided each other in the transportation, receipt
and concealment of the same after the said opium had been imported, knowing that
said drug had been unlawfully brought, imported and illegally introduced into the
Philippine Islands from a foreign country; an act committed in violation of law."
Issue: WON the court can take judicial notice of the journals.

Ruling:
While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question
whether the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled
in the United States that such journals may be noticed by the courts in determining the
question whether a particular bill became a law or not. (The State ex rel. Herron vs.
Smith, 44 Ohio, 348, and cases cited therein.) The result is that the law and the
adjudicated cases make it our duty to take judicial notice of the legislative journals of
the special session of the Philippine Legislature of 1914. These journals are not
ambiguous or contradictory as to the actual time of the adjournment. They show, with
absolute certainty, that the Legislature adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock midnight on
February 28, 1914.
Counsel for the appellant, in order to establish his contention, must necessarily
depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals
are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. From their very nature and object
the records of the Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquiry
into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as we
have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and the spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere
with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. But counsel in his
argument says that the public knows that the Assembly's clock was stopped on
February 28, 1914, at midnight and left so until the determination of the discussion of
all pending matters. Or, in other words, the hands of the clock were stayed in order to
enable the Assembly to effect an adjournment apparently within the time fixed by the
Governor's proclamation for the expiration of the special session, in direct violation of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. If the clock was, in fact, stopped, as here
suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared with that of altering the
probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of
legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or
absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory. Long, long
centuries ago, these considerations of public policy led to the adoption of the rule
giving verity and unimpeachability to legislative records. If that character is to be
taken away for one purpose, it must be taken away for all, and the evidence of the
laws of the state must rest upon a foundation less certain and durable than that
afforded by the law to many contracts between private individuals concerning
comparatively trifling matters."
ASTORGA V VILLEGAS
Facts:
On March 30, 1964 House Bill No. 9266, a bill of local application, was filed in the
House of Representatives. It was there passed on third reading without amendments

on April 21, 1964. Forthwith the bill was sent to the Senate for its concurrence. It was
referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and
Cities headed by Senator Gerardo M. Roxas. The committee favorably recommended
approval with a minor amendment, suggested by Senator Roxas, that instead of the
City Engineer it be the President Protempore of the Municipal Board who should
succeed the Vice-Mayor in case of the latter's incapacity to act as Mayor.
When the bill was discussed on the floor of the Senate on second reading on May 20,
1964, substantial amendments to Section 1 were introduced by Senator Arturo
Tolentino. Those amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. The amendment
recommended by Senator Roxas does not appear in the journal of the Senate
proceedings as having been acted upon.
On May 21, 1964 the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the House of
Representatives that House Bill No. 9266 had been passed by the Senate on May 20,
1964 "with amendments." Attached to the letter was a certification of the amendment,
which was the one recommended by Senator Roxas and not the Tolentino
amendments which were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The House of
Representatives thereafter signified its approval of House Bill No. 9266 as sent back
to it, and copies thereof were caused to be printed. The printed copies were then
certified and attested by the Secretary of the House of Representatives, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Secretary of the Senate and the Senate President.
On June 16, 1964 the Secretary of the House transmitted four printed copies of the bill
to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures thereto by way of
approval on June 18, 1964. The bill thereupon became Republic Act No. 4065.
Respondents' position is that the so-called Republic Act 4065 never became law since
it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of
that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the
issue.
Issue: WON the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry" rule should be adhered
to in this jurisdiction.
Ruling:
The rationale of the enrolled bill theory is set forth in the said case of Field vs.
Clark as follows:
The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and, by

the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an
official attestation by the two houses of such bill as one that has passed
Congress. It is a declaration by the two houses, through their presiding
officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due
form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that
it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement
that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when

a bill, thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the

public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress
should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has
no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act
in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the
President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States,
carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The
respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having
passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving
the courts to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the
Act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the Constitution.
t may be noted that the enrolled bill theory is based mainly on "the respect due to
coequal and independent departments," which requires the judicial department "to
accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated." Thus
it has also been stated in other cases that if the attestation is absent and the same is
not required for the validity of a statute, the courts may resort to the journals and other
records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. This was the logical conclusion
reached in a number of decisions, although they are silent as to whether the journals
may still be resorted to if the attestation of the presiding officers is present.
Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the
disclaimer thereof by the Senate President, granting it to have been validly made,
would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity
of the statute. Hence, it is pointed out, Republic Act No. 4065 would remain valid and
binding. This argument begs the issue. It would limit the court's inquiry to the
presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity
of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of
the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what
evidence is there to determine whether or not the bill had been duly enacted? In such a
case the entries in the journal should be consulted.
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record. The
Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant in this case.
This Court is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed
by the Chief Executive was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under
the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this Court can do this and resort to
the Senate journal for the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President and signed by him. This Court is
not asked to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which admittedly is a
risky undertaking, but to declare that the bill was not duly enacted and therefore did
not become law. This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and the Chief
Executive did, when they withdrew their signatures therein. In the face of the manifest

error committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the Senate and by the
Chief Executive, for this Court to perpetuate that error by disregarding such
rectification and holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to sacrifice
truth to fiction and bring about mischievous consequences not intended by the law-
making body.
GUEVARA V INOCENTES
Facts:
The petition is predicated on the following grounds: (1) under Article VII, Section
10(4) of the Constitution, petitioner's ad interim appointment is valid and permanent
and may only become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the Commission
on Appointments or upon the adjournment of the regular session of Congress of 1966;
(2) here there has been no express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments
because the same has never been constituted during the special session called by
President Marcos in his Proclamation No. 2, series of 1966; and (3) there has been no
adjournment of the Congress as contemplated in the Constitution because (a) the
aforesaid special session was suspended by the House on Saturday, January 22, 1966
at 10:55 p.m. to be resumed on Monday, January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m.; (b) the
resolution approved by the Senate on January 23, 1966 at past 2:00 a.m. for
adjournment sine die is not the adjournment contemplated in Article VII, Section
10(a) of our Constitution; (c) the suspension by the House or the adjournment by the
Senate to resume the session on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 a.m. meant the end of the
special session and the start of the regular session as a continuous session without any
interruption; and (d) the phrase "until the next adjournment of the Congress" must be
related with the phrase "until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments" so
that the adjournment contemplated should refer to a regular session during which the
Commission on Appointments may be organized and allowed to discharge its
functions as such.
Respondent, on the other hand, set up the following defenses: (1) petitioner's ad
interim appointment lapsed when Congress adjourned its last special session called
under Proclamation No. 2 of President Marcos; (2) an ad interim appointment ceases
to be valid after each term of Congress and so petitioner's appointment must have
lapsed as early as December 30, 1965; (3) petitioner's ad interim appointment as well
as others made under similar conditions, is contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy, and hence null and void; and (4) petitioner's appointment is void in the
light of the doctrine laid down in Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Quirino, G.R. No. L-19800
October 28, 1953.
Issue:WON the petitioners contention regarding the next adjournment of Congress

specifically provides for regular session only

Ruling:
It is true that the provision of the Constitution we are now considering in speaking of
the mode of termination epitomized in the phrase "until the next adjournment of the
Congress" does not make any reference to any specific session of the Congress,
whether regular or special, but such silence is of no moment, for it is a well-known
maxim in statutory construction that when the law does not distinguish we should not
distinguish. UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS
(Robles vs. Zambales Chromite Mining Company, et al., G. R. No. L-12560,
September 30, 1958). Consequently, it is safe to conclude that the framers of our
Constitution in employing merely the word adjournment as a mode of terminating an
appointment made during the recess of Congress had in mind either the regular or
special session, and not simply the regular one as contended by petitioner.
REPRESENTATIVE DANILO RAMON S. FERNANDEZ, PETITIONER, VS.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND JESUS L.
VICENTE, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Petitioner filed for candidacy on May 14, 2007 elections as Representative of
the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. In his Certificate of
Candidacy, he indicated Sta. Rosa, Laguna as his residence. Private respondent sought
the cancellation of the petitioners COC and the latters disqualification on the ground
of material misrepresentation in his COC regarding his residence, because in the past
elections, he declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address which is the Fourth
Legislative District of Laguna. Private respondent likewise claimed that petitioner
maintained a house in Cabuyao, Laguna which is outside of the First District. The
COMELEC dismissed petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner won the elections and proclaimed as the Representative of the First
District of Laguna. Private respondent filed a petition to declare petitioners election
and proclamation as null and void on the ground that petitioner lack one-year
residency requirement under Article VI, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution. In support
of his petition, private respondent argued that petitioner falsely declared under oath:
(1) his alleged Sta. Rosa residence; (2) the period of his residence in the legislative
district before May 14, 2007, which he indicated as one year and two months; and (3)
his eligibility for the office where he is seeking to be elected.
In order to buttress his claim that he and his family actually resided in Sta.
Rosa , Laguna beginning at least February 2006, petitioners evidence included,
among others: (a) original and extended lease contracts for a townhouse in Villa de
Toledo, Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, Laguna; (b) certification issued by the
President of Villa de Toledo Homeowners Association, Inc. that petitioner has been a
resident of said subdivision since February 2006; (c) affidavits of petitioners
neighbors in Villa de Toledo attesting that petitioner has been a resident of said
subdivision since February 2006; (d) certification of the barangay chairman of
Barangay Balibago, Sta. Rosa, laguna that petitioner is a resident of Villa de Toledo

within the said barangay; (e) certificates of attendance of petitioners children in

schools located in Sta. Rosa, Laguna; and (f) DTI certificates of business issued in the
name of petitioner and his wife to show that they own and operate businesses in Sta.
Rosa, Laguna since 2003.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner sufficiently complied with the one-year residency
requirement to be a Member of the House of Representative, as provided in the 1987
Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes. The SC found the interpretation of HRET of the residency requirement under
the Constitution to be overly restrictive and unwarranted under the factual
circumstances of the case.
Neither does the SC find anything wrong if petitioner sometimes transacted
business or received visitors in his Cabuyao house, instead of the alleged Sta. Rosa
residence. The Constitution also does not require a congressional candidate to be a
property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that
district for at least a year prior to Election Day. To use ownership of property in the
district as the determinative indicum of permanence of domicile or residence implies
that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This
Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public
office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
In the case at bar, there are real and substantial reasons for petitioner to establish
Sta. Rosa as his domicile of choice and abandon his domicile of origin and/or any
other previous domicile. To begin with, petitioner and his wife have owned and
operated businesses in Sta. Rosa since 2003. Their children have attended schools in
Sta. Rosa at least since 2005. Although the ownership of property should never be
considered a requirement for any candidacy, petitioner had sufficiently confirmed his
intention to permanently reside in Sta. Rosa by purchasing residential properties in
that city prior to the May 2007 election, as evidenced by certificates of titles issued in
the name of petitioner and his wife.
In all, petitioner had adequately shown that his transfer of residence to Sta. Rosa
was bona fide and was not merely for complying with the residency requirement
under election laws.
JOSELITO R. MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
AND ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent Leonardo B. Roman held the post of Governor of Bataan province a
number of times:
a) 1986 1988 Appointed OIC Governor of Bataan by former Pres. Aquino and
served up to 1988

b) 1988 1992 Elected Governor and served up to 1992

c) 1994 1995 Elected Governor during the recall election in 1993, assumed office
on 28 June 1994 and served up to 1995
d) 1995 1998 Elected Governor and served up to 1998
e) 1998 2001 Elected Governor and served up to 2001.
In 2001, private respondent Roman again filed a certificate of candidacy for the same
post in the May 2001 regular elections. On 16 May 2001, Leonardo Roman was
proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Bataan.
Petitioners Melanio L. Mendoza and Mario E. Ibarra seek to declare respondent
Romans election as governor of Bataan as null and void for allegedly being contrary
to Art. X, 8 of the Constitution.
Issue:
Should Roman's incumbency to the post of Governor following the recall elections be
included in determining the three-consecutive term limit fixed by law?
Held:
No. A winner who dislodges in a recall election an incumbent elective local official
merely serves the balance of the latter's term of office; it is not a full three-year term.
The law contemplates a continuous full three-year term before the proscription can
apply, providing for only one exception, i.e., when an incumbent voluntarily gives up
the office. If involuntary severance from the service which results in the incumbents
being unable to finish his term of office because of his ouster through valid recall
proceedings negates one term for purposes of applying the three-term limit, it
stands to reason that the balance of the term assumed by the newly elected local
official in a recall election should not also be held to be one term in reckoning the
three-term limit.
In both situations, neither the elective local official who is unable to finish his term
nor the elected local official who only assumes the balance of the term of the ousted
local official following the recall election could be considered to have served a full
three--year term set by the Constitution.
The Constitution does not prohibit elective local officials from serving for more than
three consecutive terms because, in fact, it excludes from the three-term limit
interruptions in the continuity of service, so long as such interruptions are not due to
the voluntary renunciation of the office by an incumbent. Hence, the period from
June 28, 1994 to June 30, 1995, during which respondent Leonardo B. Roman served
as governor of Bataan by virtue of a recall election held in 1993, should not be
counted. Since on May 14, 2001 respondent had previously served as governor of
Bataan for only two consecutive terms (1995-1998 and 1998-2001), his election on
that day was actually only his third term for the same position.

A recall term should not be considered as one full term, because a contrary
interpretation would in effect cut short the elected officials service to less than nine
years and shortchange his constituents. The desire to prevent monopoly of political
power should be balanced against the need to uphold the voters obvious preference
who, in the present case, is Roman who received 97 percent of the votes cast
HARLIN C. ABAYON, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and RAUL A. DAZA, respondents.
FACTS:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat
Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the
2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with respondent HRET
against petitioner Abayon. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-
list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized
and underrepresented sectors since she did not belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative.
It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not
Abayon who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first
nominee, said Abayon, were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R.
189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list
group that won a seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House of
Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in
the House of Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the
victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs),
former rebels, and security guards.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since
it was actually the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed
membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just
Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first
nominee was an internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said,
before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications
of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
HELD:
Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the
organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.

Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,5 identifies who the members of that

House are:
Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan
Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be
elected through a partylist system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties
or organizations. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members
of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are
elected members of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or
organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken
his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the
COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and
the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.10
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay
party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
MARIA LOURDES LOCSIN, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) and MONIQUE YAZMIN MARIA O.
LAGDAMEO, respondents.
FACTS:
Locsin and Lagdameo are candidates for Representative of 1st District of
Makati in the 2010 Elections, Lagdameo was proclaimed winner and Locsin
came in 2nd.
Locsin filed a protest before the HRET assailing the results in all precincts.
Locsin and Lagdameo designated precincts for ther respective protest and
counter-protest.
In the recounts, Lagdameos winning margin even increased but HRET still
continued revisions to prove her victory.
HRET denied Locsins petition and motion for reconsideration.
Locsin filed present petition on the ground that HRET committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it dismissed
protest, denied motion for reconsideration, admitted ballots of Lagdameo
despite Locsins objection and denied the latters ballots despite bona fide
grounds for admission.
ISSUE:

Whether or not HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing

petitioners election protest.
Held:
NO. There is no grave abuse of discretion on HRETs part when it dismissed
Locsins election protest.
Ratio:
On the jurisdiction of SC on this case (despite HRET being the sole judge in
election contests): SC has jurisdiction only when it is shown that HRET acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
HRET took pains in reviewing the validity or invalidity of each contested
ballot (ballot enumeration). Results were explained sufficiently. It applied
meticulously the existing rules and rulings on ballot appreciation for the
objected and claimed ballots of the parties. THERE IS NO GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION.
LIWAYWAY-VINZONSCHATO, PETITIONER
VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND RENATO J. UNICO, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 172131 (April 2, 2007)
FACTS :
Petitioner Chato and respondent Renato J. Unico were among the candidates for the
lone congressional district of Camarines Norte during the May 10, 2004 elections.
Petitioner alleged that during the canvassing of the election returns before the
Municioal Board of Canvassers of Labo from May 10 to 12, 2004, her counsel raised
several objections and pointed to manifest errors or obvious discrepancies in the
election returns from various precincts of the Municipality of Labo.
Chato petitioned to correct/nullify the election returns in the Municipality of Labo,

Camarines Norte, due to illegality of the proceedings before the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Labo and for manifest errors in the election returns; to declare null and
void and without legal effect the proclamation of respondent candidate; and to declare
and proclaim petitioner as the candidate with the highest number of votes received for
the lone congressional district of te Province of Camarines Norte.
The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition on the ground that respondent
Unicos proclamation and taking oath of office had not only divested the Commission

of any jurisdiction to pass upon his election, returns and qualifications, but also
automatically conferred jurisdiction to another electoral tribunal. The COMELEC en
banc through a resolution dated March 17, 2006 denied petitioner Chatos motion for
reconsideration ruling that the Commission already lost jurisdiction over the case in
view of the fact that respondent Unico had already taken his oath as a Member of the
Thirteenth (13th) Congress.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in promulgating the Resolution dated March 17, 2006.
HELD :
Article VI, Section 17 of the Constitution provides:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualification of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal
shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme
Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members
of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the
parties or organization registered under the party-list system therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Court also held, construing the above provision in Pangilinan v. Comelec that:
The Senate and the House shall now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which
are the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members, thereby divesting the Comelec of its jurisdiction under the
1973 Constitution over the election cases pertaining to the election members of the
BatasangPambansa (Congress).
With respect to the House of Representatives, it is the House of Representatives

Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that has the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of its members. The Court has

invariably held that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath,
and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs
jurisdiction ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.
In the present case, it is not disputed that respondent Unico has already been
proclaimed and taken his oath of office, hence, the COMELEC correctly ruled that it
had already lost jurisdiction over Chatos petition.
The COMELEC En Banc, clearly did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the assailed Resolution dated March 17, 2006 holding that it had lost
jurisdiction upon respondent Unicos proclamation and oath-taking as member of the
House of Representatives.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, PETITIONER
Vs. COMELEC and Joseph Socorro Tan, Respondents

GR 207264 (June 25, 2013)
FACTS :
On October 31, 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan filed before the Comelec a
petition to deny due course or to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of
petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is married to
Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas; (2) that she is a resident of Brgy.
Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the
residence of her husband; (3) that her date of birth is July 3, 1964 when other
documents show that her birthdate is either July 8, 1959 or July 3, 1960; (4) that she is
not a permanent resident of another country when she is a permanent resident or an
immigrant of the United States of America; and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen when
she is, in fact an American citizen.
The Comelec First Division issued a resolution on March 27, 2013 cancelling the
petitioners COC on the grounds that she is not a Filipino citizen because of her failure
to comply with the requirements of RA 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003 and she did not have the one-year residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus rendering her ineligible to
run as Representative of Marinduque.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and was denied by the COMELEC en
banc for lack of merit on May 14, 2013. Four days thereafter, or on May 18, 2013
petitioner was proclaimed winner of the May 13, 2013 elections. On June 5, 2013,
the COMELEC en banc issued with finality declaring the May 14, 2013 resolution
final and executory. On the same day, she took her oath of office before the Speaker
of the House Feliciano Belmonte. Petitioner has yet to assume office which officially
starts on June 30. 2013.
Hence, Reyes filed this petition with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE :
Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack

or excess of jurisdiction in cancelling the COC of petitioner Reyes.
HELD :
The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
excess of jurisdiction. It retains its jurisdiction for the following reasons; First, the
HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners qualifications, as
well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly filed with
the said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is considered a
Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which states that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members.
To be considered as Member of the House of Representatives, the following requisites

must occur: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of office.

In some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a proclamation has
been made, COMELECs jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its jurisdiction over
contests relating to elections, returns, and qualification ends, and the HRETs own
jurisdiction begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal
pronouncement was made in the context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only
taken an oath of office, but who had also assumed office.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy, that before the
proclamation of petitioner on May 18, 2013, the COMELC en banc had finally
disposed of the issue of petitioners lack of Filipino citizenship and residency via its
Resolution on May 14, 2013. After May 14, 2013, there was no longer any pending
case on petitioners qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the argument of
the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was
proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC en banc decision. The Board
of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render
nugatory a decision of the COMELEC en banc which affirmed a decision of the
COMELEC First Division.
The Court dismissed the petition and finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of COMELEC, affirmed the COMELEC en bancs decision which upheld the
COMELEC First Divisions decision.
WIGBERTO R. TAADA, JR., PETITIONER

VS. COMELEC, ANGELINA TAN, ALVIN JOHN S. TAADA, RESPONDENTS
GR Nos. 207199-200 (October 22, 2013)
FACTS :
Petitioner WigbertoTaada (Liberal Party) and respondents Angelina Tan (Nationalist

Peoples Coalition) and Alvin John S. Taada were contenders for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in the
May 13, 2013 elections.
On October 10, 2012, Wigberto filed before the COMELEC two separate petitions:
first, to cancel Alvin Johns COC and to declare him as a nuisance candidate. The
COMELEC First Division dismissed both petitions for lack of merit in a resolution
dated January 29, 2013. On Wigbertos motion for reconsideration, the COMELEC

en banc upheld the COMELEC First Divisions ruling that Alvin John was not a
nuisance candidate. However, it granted the motion for reconsideration on the first
petition and cancelled Alvin Johns COC for having committed false material
representation concerning his residency in accordance with Section 78 of the OEC.
On May 15, 2013, Wigberto filed a 2nd Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the
COMELEC en bans ruling on the ground of newly discovered evidence. He alleged
that Alvin Johns candidacy was not bona fide because: (a) Alvin John was merely
forced by this father to file his COC; (b) he had no election paraphernalia posted in
official COMELEC posting areas in several barangays of Gumaca, Quezon Province;
(c) he did not even vote during the May 13, 2013 National elections; and (d) his legal
representation appeared to have been in collusion with the lawyers of Angelina.
Despite the cancellation of Alvin Johns COC due to his material representations, his
name was not deleted and remained printed on the ballot prompting Wigberto to file a
motion with the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Quezon Province (PBOC) asking
that the votes cast in the name of Alvin John be credited to him instead. The PBOC
however denied Wigbertos motion holding that the votes of Alvin John could not be
counted in favor of Wigberto because the cancellation of the formers COC was on
the basis of his material misrepresentations under Section 78 of the OEC and not on
being a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of the same law. Consequently, the
PBOC canvassed the votes of all three contenders separately and on May 16, 2013,
proclaimed Angelina as the winning candidate for the position of Member of House of
Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province.
However, Wigberto had already filed with the COMELEC a Petition to Annul the
Proclamation of Angelina (Petition to Annul), asseting that had the PBOC followed
pertinent rulings, the votes cast for Alvin John would have been counted in his favor
which could have resulted in his victor. While the Petition to Annul was still pending
resolution, Wigberto initiated the instance certiorari case against the Comelec en banc
Resolution dated April 25, 2013 declaring Alvin John not a nuisance candidate.
On July 3. 2013, Wigberto filed a Manifestation informing the Court that he had cause
the filing of an Election Protest Ad Cautelam entitled Wigberto R. Taada, jr. v.
Angelina Helen D. Tan, before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of public respondent

COMELEC, affirmed in its Comment dated August 18, 2013, that an Election Protest
Ad Cautelam had been filed by Wigberto against Angelina before the HRET, praying
that he be declared the winner in the 2013 congressional race in the 4 th District of
Quezon Province. It also alleged that on June 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second
Division issued a Resolution annulling the proclamation of Angelina as Member of

the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province. The propriety of
this ruling is now pending before the COMELEC En Banc.
ISSUE :
Whether or not COMELEC or the Court has jurisdiction over the pending case.
HELD :
The petition must fail. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution
provides that the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of its respective members:
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal, shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The Senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Case law states that the proclamation of a congressional candidate following the
election divests the COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed representative in favor of the HRET.
In the case at bar, considering that Angelina had already been proclaimed as Member
of the House of Representatives for the 4th District of Quezon Province in May 16,
2013, as she has in fact taken her oath and assumed office past noon time of June 30,
2013, the Court is now withoud jurisdiction to resolve the case at bar. As they stand,
the issues concerning the conduct of the canvass and the resulting proclamation of
Angelina as herein discussed are matters which fall under the of the terms election
and returns, properly fall under the HRETs sole jurisdiction.

TAADA V. CUENCO
103 Phil. 1051 (Feb. 28, 1957)
FACTS :
The Senate chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez, and CiprianoPrimicias as
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Sen.
Taada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said petitioner was next chosen by the Senate
as member of said tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias on behalf of
the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Taada and
Sumulong, the Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco
A. Delgado as members of the same Electoral Tribunal. Soon thereafter, Senator
Lorenzo M. Taada and Cong. DiosdadoMacapagal instituted the case at bar to
declare null and void and in violation of the Constitution the election of respondents
Cuenco and Delgado who were not nominated by the party having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate but by Sen. Primicias, in his capacity as Chairman of
the Committee in Rules.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as
members of the Electoral Tribunal valid and lawful?
HELD :
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by
each House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes

and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The Senior
Justice in each shall be its Chairman.
The most vital feature of the Electoral Tribunal is the equal presentation of political
parties and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained by the Justices of the Supreme
Court as members of the said Tribunal. It is true that the choice of the Senators or
members of the House as the case may be, to compose the Electoral Tribunals is
vested in each House. However, each House does not have full discretionary power
or authority because the Constitution prescribes the manner of choosing them. Such
manner of the selection of members of the Electoral Tribunal is vital to the role they
are called upon to play. Compliance with such procedure is mandatory and acts
performed in violation thereof are null and void.
The Senate may not elect, as members of the SET, those Senators who have not been
nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having
the largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three members
to the Electoral Tribunal, that the party having the second largest number of votes in
the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate the other three Senators who shall sit as
members; that neither these three Senators may be nominated by a person or party
other than the one having the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The
Committee on Rules for the Senate has no standing to validly make such nomination
of Sen. Cuenco and Delgado by Sen. Primicias, and the election of said respondents
by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal are null and void ab initio.
ABBAS v. SET
166 SCRA 651 (October 27, 1988)
FACTS :
On October 9, 1987, the petitioners filed before the respondent Tribunal an election
contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-
elect in the May 11, 1987 congressional elections by the COMELEC. The respondent
Tribunal was at the time compose of three Justices of the Supreme Court and six
Senators. The petitioners then filed with the respondent Tribunal a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and
resolution of SET on the ground that all of them are interested parties to said case as
respondents.
The petitioners argued that considerations of public policy and the norms of fair play
and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought and proposed to

an amendment of the Tribunals rules of procedure so as to permit the contest being

decided by only three Members of the Tribunal.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the Tribunal can leave the resolution of the contest to the only three
Members as proposed by the petitioner.
HELD :
The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain terms and intent of
the Constitution of the Constitution itself which, in Article VI, Section 17, creates the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and defines its jurisdiction and
powers.
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and
legislative components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative
component herein cannot be totally excluded from participation in the resolution of
senatorial election contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-Member of the
SET may inhibit of disqualify himself from sitting in judgment on any case before
said Tribunal. Every member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain
from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal
interest or biases would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment.
What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of
its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid
adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
PIMENTEL V HRET
FACTS:
During the May 11, 1998 elections, 14 party-lists representatives from 13
organizations were proclaimed winners. Subsequently, the House of Representatives
constituted the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and also named 12
members to represent it in the Commission on Appointments. No one from the
partylist was named to either constitutional body. Petitioner now seeks the inclusion
of party-list representatives to the two bodies arguing that under the Constitution,

party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET and 2.4 seats
in the CA based on proportional representation.
ISSUES:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-
list representatives in the hret.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include
party-list representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
RULING:
[1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district
and party-list representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in
the HRET and the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on
the Senate and on the House the authority to elect among their members those who
would fill the 12 seats for Senators and 12 seats for House members in the
Commission on Appointments. Under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each
chamber of Congress exercises the power to choose, within constitutionally defined
limits, who among their members would occupy the allotted 6 seats of each chambers
respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional provisions are reiterated in Rules 3
and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The
discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is not
absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court
may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated
duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, the doctrine of separation
of powers calls for each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties
as it sees fit.[28] Neither can the Court speculate on what action the House may take
if party-list representatives are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the
CA. The petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET and
the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections, the House barred
the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the HRET or the CA.
Rather, it appears from the available facts that the party-list groups in the House at
that time simply refrained from participating in the election process. The party-list
representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time they filed the
petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any party-list
representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the
party-list representatives lies with the House of Representatives, the Court cannot
resolve the issues presented by petitioners at this time.

[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any
power to reconstitute themselves.
BONDOC V PINEDA
FACTS:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio
Bondoc of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth
District of Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9
members, 3 of whom are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the
House of Representatives (5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the
NP). Thereafter, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman
Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura

received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for
allegedly helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for
allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the
day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter
informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of
Representatives decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of
Congressman Camasura to the HRET.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant political
party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest
pending therein.
RULING:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was
to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party
and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of

the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination
and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation
of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the
Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his
death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party
disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
LIBANAN V HRET
FACTS:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was
to provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge
their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even
independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party
and breach of party discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of
the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the HRET for having cast a
conscience vote in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination
and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House
of Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation
of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is,
therefore, null and void.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of
Representatives is that it violates Congressman Camasuras right to security of tenure.
Members of the HRET, as sole judge of congressional election contests, are entitled to
security of tenure just as members of the Judiciary enjoy security of tenure under the
Constitution. Therefore, membership in the HRET may not be terminated except for a
just cause, such as, the expiration of the members congressional term of office, his

death, permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for party
disloyalty, short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ballots without the BEI Chairmans signature are valid.
RULING:
A ballot without BEI chairmans signature at the back is valid and not spurious,
provided that it bears any one of these other authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the
COMELEC watermark; and (b) in those cases where the COMELEC watermarks are
blurred or not readily apparent, the presence of red and blue fibers in the ballots. What
should, instead, be given weight is the consistent rule laid down by the HRET that a
ballot is considered valid and genuine for as long as it bears any one of these
authenticating marks, to wit: (a) the COMELEC watermark, or (b) the signature or
initials, or thumbprint of the Chairman of the BEI; and (c) in those cases where the
COMELEC watermarks are blurred or not readily apparent to the naked eye, the
presence of red or blue fibers in the ballots. It is only when none of these marks
appears extant that the ballot can be considered spurious and subject to rejection.
GARCIA V HRET
FACTS:
Harry Angpin was elected as the representative for the 3rd district of Manila.
However, there has been a petition for quo warranto filed before the HRET against
Congress man Harry Angping. Petitioners questioned the eligibility of Congressman
Angping to hold office in the House of Representatives claiming that the latter was
not a natural born citizen of the Philippines, which is a constitutional requirement.
Upon the petitioners filing of their petition, they have paid the required 5,000php
filing fee. However, HRET issued a resolution dismissing the petition for failure to
pay 5,000 php as deposit. The petitioners then filed the cash deposit and filed for a
motion for reconsideration with a receipt attached. However, it was denied.
ISSUE:Whether or not the HRET has committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the petition for quo warranto of petitioners even after the payment of
deposit fee
RULING:
No, the HRET did not commit grave abuse in dismissing the petition. The HRET has
a judgment call and has the authority to implement its rules. As long as the exercise of
such discretion is based on a well-founded factual and legal basis, as in this case, no
abuse of discretion can be imputed to the Tribunal. In view of the delicate nature of
the charge against Congressman Angpin, the observance of the HRET Rules of

Procedure must be taken seriously if they are to obtain their objective. The petitioners
are duty bound to know and are expected to properly comply with the procedural
requirements laid down by the tribunal without being formally orered to do so.
Imperative justice requires the proper observance of technicalities precisely designed
to ensure its proper and swift dispensation.
MARTINEZ V HRET
FACTS:
In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent
Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative
District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of
Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the
same position.
On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance

candidate. However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its
Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007
or almost one (1) month after the elections.
On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections

for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that
he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as
against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three
(67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.
Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or
less with only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for
Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on
the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who
had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the
BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus
Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official
list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand
four hundred one (5,401) ballots with MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ only
written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there
was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. The HRET dismissed the
election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the
duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by
a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision,
but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009. Hence, this petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET dismissing the
election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the

Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration thereof.
ISSUE:
1. What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final
judgment after the elections?
2. Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be
considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate?
RULING:
1. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes
governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with
public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the
real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance
candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in
ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the
case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively
cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day.
Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process
into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying
resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are
held and the votes counted and canvassed.
2. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same
position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate
and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance
candidate by final judgment after the elections.
SANDOVAL VS HRET
Facts:
- 19 May 2007, after the canvass of votes, as evidenced by the Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for the Member
of the House of Representatives, the Board of Canvassers of the Legislative
District of Malabon City-Navotas proclaimed protestee Sandoval [herein
petitioner] the winning candidate for the Office of the Member of the House of
Representatives with Seventy-one Thousand Four Hundred Ninety (71,490)
votes as against protestant Lacson-Noel who obtained the second highest
number of votes with Seventy Thousand Three Hundred Thirty-One (70,331)
votes; or a winning margin of One Thousand One Hundred Fifty-Nine (1,159)
votes. Per the Summary Statement of Votes.

- Refusing to concede defeat, protestant Lacson-Noel filed the instant Petition

of Protest on 29 May 2007, and alleged in substance that the results [of the
election] do not reflect the true will of the voters as they are but products of
various fraudulent and illegal acts, schemes and machinations employed by
[protestee] Sandoval, his agents and supporters, with the connivance or
conspiracy of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEIs), which defrauded and
deprived [her] of lawful votes cast at the precinct level. Specifically, protestant
Lacson-Noel assails the results of election in 623 precincts of the 1,437 total
number of precincts in the Lone Legislative District of Malabon City-Navotas.
- Sandoval filed his Answer wherein he specifically denied the material

allegations of the protest regarding the number of contested precincts, grounds
for protest, commission of frauds and irregularities, and the necessity of
recount and revision, for being self-serving and unsupported by evidence. By
way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, protestee Sandoval contends that it
is protestant Lacson-Noel who is guilty of violating election laws, rules and
regulations and which, on the other hand, resulted to (sic) the loss of legal and
valid votes in [his] favor. He narrates that during the crucial hours of voting,
counting, recording of the votes cast and transmittal of the records of the votes
cast, most of his poll watchers were unable to effectively keep an eye on the
proceedings and secure his votes because the latter were supposedly prevented
from entering the Navotas polling precincts unlike protestant Lacson-Noel's
poll watchers who were readily accommodated. As a result of the illegal
schemes and machinations employed by protestant Lacson-Noel and her
supporters, protestee Sandoval maintains that protestant Lacson-Noel was able
to garner a substantial number of illegal and undeserved votes from the
Municipality of Navotas. With respect to Malabon City, protestee Sandoval
similarly claims that massive fraud and illegal electoral practices were
committed all through the election process which tarnished the results of
several identified precincts in Malabon City.
Issue:
W/N HRET committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction by not admitting petitioner's formal offer of evidence, thereby denying
him due process.
Ruling:
- It is hornbook principle that this Court's jurisdiction to review decisions and
orders of electoral tribunals is exercised only upon a showing of grave abuse
of discretion committed by the tribunal. Absent such grave abuse of discretion,
this Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its
discretion or jurisdiction.
- Petitioner mainly assails the Tribunal's denial of his pleas for an additional
period of time within which to make his formal offer of evidence. However, a
review of the proceedings will reveal that the HRET acted in accordance with
its rules of procedure and well within its jurisdiction.

- Petitioner commenced presentation of his evidence on September 2, 2008.

Further hearings were scheduled for September 15, 18, 23 and 25, 2008. He
was able to present evidence on September 15, 18, and 25, 2008, but the
hearing set for September 23, 2008 was canceled upon motion of petitioner.
On September 29, 2008, the Hearing Commissioner set additional hearings for
October 2, 13, 27, 28, 29 and 31, 2008 and November 3, 2008, for reception of
petitioner's evidence. However, due to unavailability of petitioner's counsel, no
hearings were held on the dates set for the whole month of October. Hearings
only resumed on November 3 and 11, 2008 and, on the latter date, petitioner
moved that he be allowed more time to present additional witnesses. Despite
opposition from respondent Lacson-Noel, the Tribunal issued Resolution No.
08-342 dated November 24, 2008, granting petitioner an additional period of
ten (10) days within which to present evidence, with the warning that no
further extension shall be given. The Hearing Commissioner notified the
parties that further hearings will be held on December 10 and 11, 2008. Said
hearing dates were utilized by petitioner.
- Nevertheless, in utter disregard of the Tribunal's warning, petitioner again
filed on December 18, 2008 a Manifestation and Motion (with Prayer for
Suspension of the Period to File Protestee's Formal Offer of Evidence),
praying for more time to present more witnesses, and that he be allowed to file
his Formal Offer of Evidence upon completion of presentation of his evidence.
Respondent Lacson-Noel opposed said motion, pointing out that the additional
period of ten (10) days granted to petitioner lapsed on December 24, 2008.
Thus, on January 22, 2009, the Tribunal issued Resolution No. 09-009,
pointing out that despite the additional period of ten days granted to him and
the lapse of more than three (3) months reckoned from September 2, 2008,
petitioner had not completed the presentation of his evidence. Since the last
day of the extension granted to him was on December 23, 2008 and said
period lapsed without petitioner completing presentation of his evidence
including formal offer thereof, he was deemed to have waived the same.
GUINGONA VS GONZALEZ
Facts: The mathematical representation of each of the political parties represented in
the Senate for the Commission on Appointments (CA) is as follows: LDP7.5; LP-
PDP-LABAN--.5; NPC2.5; LAKAS-NUCD1.5. The LDP majority in the Senate
converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one Senator by
adding one-half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect respondent Senator Romulo. In so
doing, one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving
the latters representation in the CA to less than their proportional representation in
the Senate.
Issue: Whether or not there is a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18

Held: The respondents claim to membership in the CA by nomination and election of

the LDP majority in the Senate is not in accordance with Sec. 18 of Art. VI of the
Constitution and therefore violative of the same because it is not in compliance with
the requirement that 12 senators shall be elected on the basis of proportional
representation of the political parties represented therein. To disturb the resulting
fractional membership of the political parties in the CA by adding together 2 halves to
make a whole is a breach of the rule on proportional representation because it will
give the LDP an added member in the CA by utilizing the fractional membership of
the minority political party, who is deprived of half a representation. The provision of
Sec. 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave
any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on
proportional representation.
The Constitution does not require that the full complement of 12 senators be elected
to the membership in the CA before it can discharge its functions and that it is not
mandatory to elect 12 senators to the CA. The overriding directive of Art. VI, Sec. 18
is that there must be a proportional representation of the political parties in the
membership of the CA and that the specification of 12 members to constitute its
membership is merely an indication of the maximum complement allowable under the
Constitution. The act of filling up the membership thereof cannot disregard the
mandate of proportional representation of the parties even if it results in fractional
membership in unusual situations. Even if the composition of the CA is fixed by the
Constitution, it can perform its functions even if not fully constituted, so long as it has
the required quorum.
City of Davao Vs RTC

FACTS:
GSIS Davao City branch office received a Notice of Public Auction, scheduling
public bidding of its properties for non-payment of realty taxes from 1992-1994,
amounting to the sum total of Php 295, 721.61. The auction was, however,
subsequently reset by virtue of a deadline extension given by Davao City.
On July 28, 1994, GSIS received Warrants of Levy and Notices of Levy on three
parcels of land it owned and another Notice of Public Auction. In September of that
same year, GSIS filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus and/or
Declaratory Relief with the Davao City RTC.

During pre-trial, the only issue raised was whether sec. 234 and 534 of the Local
Government Code, which have withdrawn real property tax from GOCCs, have also
withdrawn from the GSIS its right to be exempted from payment of realty tax.
RTC rendered decision in favor of GSIS. Hence this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the LGC
W/N sec. 33 of P.D. 1146 has been repealed by the LGC
HELD:
Reading together sec. 133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing
powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted to
natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said section, are
withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily follows
that its exemption has been withdrawn.
Regarding P.D. 1146 which laid down requisites for repeal on the laws granting
exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental flaw in Sec. 33, particularly the
amendatory second paragraph.
Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the competency of the Congress to

enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This places an undue restraint on the
plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal laws.
Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the amendment
or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored, have the
precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.

Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second
paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous
means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a
subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear
relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.
Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax
exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this
Code shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.
The GSIS tax-exempt stats, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored
by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 1992-
1994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may
be collected by the City of Davao.
NAZARETH VS VILLAR
Facts:
- Being assailed by petition for certiorari on the ground of its being issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction is the
decision rendered on June 4, 2009 by the Commission on Audit (COA) in
COA Case No. 2009-045 entitled Petition of Ms. Brenda L. Nazareth,
Regional Director, Department of Science and Technology, Regional Office
No. IX, Zamboanga City, for review of Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO)-
National Decision No. 2005-308 dated September 15, 2005 and LAO-National
Resolution No. 2006-308A dated May 12, 2006 on disallowances of
subsistence, laundry, hazard and other benefits in the total amount of
P3,591,130.36,2 affirming the issuance of notices of disallowance (NDs) by
the Audit Team Leader of COA Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City
against the payment of benefits to covered officials and employees of the
Department of Science and Technology (DOST) for calendar year (CY) 2001
out of the savings of the DOST.
- The petitioner DOST Regional Director hereby seeks to declare the decision
dated June 4, 2009 "null and void," and prays for the lifting of the
disallowance of the payment of the benefits for CY2001 for being within the
ambit of Republic Act No. 8439 (R.A. No. 8439), otherwise known as the
Magna Carta for Scientists, Engineers, Researchers, and other Science and
Technology Personnel in the Government (Magna Carta, for short), and on the
strength of the Memorandum of Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora
dated April 12, 2000 authorizing the use of the savings for the purpose.
Issue:

1. Whether or not the "approval" made by the Executive Secretary on April 12, 2000
on the request for authority to use savings of the agency to pay the benefits, was valid;
and
2. Whether or not the payments of the benefits made by the agency using its savings
for the years 1998 and 1999 based on Section 56 of RA 8522 (General Appropriations
Act of 1998 [GAA]) were legal and valid.
Ruling:
- In Nazareth v. Villar, there must be an existing item, project or activity,
purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may
be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there
is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of
public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes.
This interpretation is consistent not only with the Constitution and the GAAs,
but also with the degree of flexibility allowed to the Executive during budget
execution in responding to unforeseeable contingencies.
- No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law. A violation of this constitutional edict warrants the
disallowance of the payment. However, the refund of the disallowed payment
of a... benefit granted by law to a covered person, agency or office of the
Government may be barred by the good faith of the approving official and of
the recipient.
- Under these provisions, the authority granted to the President was subject to
two essential requisites in order that a transfer of appropriation from the
agency's savings would be validly effected. The first required that there must
be savings from the authorized appropriation... of the agency. The second
demanded that there must be an existing item, project, activity, purpose or
object of expenditure with an appropriation to which the savings would be
transferred for augmentation purposes only.

ARAULLO VS AQUINO
Facts:
- When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the
sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy
needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came
up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
- The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. So
what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is being
undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor
will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared
as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other
priority projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as
economic growth was in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP
- Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos
claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as
an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then Chief Justice
Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken from the
DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
- This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not
only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera
Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation
Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for certain Senators
each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
Issues:
Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art.
VI, Constitution).
Held:
- No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP
was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As such, it
did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), Art. VI of
the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the
Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required.
Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being
realigned via the DAP.

- No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds

refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or
deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is actually
prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, theres no
impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
- No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that
the President (and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are
allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of funds, however, such
transfer or realignment should only be made within their respective offices.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the
DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for the
Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
FLORES V. MONTEMAYOR
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor was appointed by the President as Regional

Director II of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Region IV, in San Fernando,
Pampanga.
On January 30, 2003, the Office of the President received a letter from a concerned
citizen dated January 20, 2003 relating Montemayors ostentatious lifestyle which is
apparently disproportionate to his income as a public official.
The Investigating Office of the PAGC immediately conducted a fact-finding inquiry

into the matter and issued subpoenas ducestecum to the responsible personnel of the
BIR and the Land Transportation Office (LTO). In compliance with the subpoena,
BIR Personnel Division Chief EstelitaDatu submitted to the PAGC a copy of
Montemayors appointment papers along with a certified true copy of the latters
Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) for the year 2002. Meanwhile, the

LTO, through its Records Section Chief, Ms. Arabelle O. Petilla, furnished the PAGC
with a record of vehicles registered to Montemayor.
During the pendency of the investigation, the Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism submitted to the PAGC copies of Montemayors SSAL for the years 1999,
2000 and 2001.On the basis of the said documents, the PAGC issued a Formal
Chargeagainst Montemayor on May 19, 2003 for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713due to his failure to declare
the 2001 Ford Expedition with a value ranging from 1.7 million to 1.9 million pesos, and
the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser with an estimated value of 1 million to 1.2 million pesos in
his 2001 and 2002 SSAL. The charge was docketed as PAGC-ADM-0149-03.
On the same date, the PAGC issued an Order directing Montemayor to file his counter-
affidavit or verified answer to the formal charge against him within ten (10) days from the
receipt of the Order.
On June 4, 2003, during the preliminary conference, Montemayor, through counsel,

moved for the deferment of the administrative proceedings explaining that he has filed
a petition for certiorari before the CAquestioning the PAGCs jurisdiction to conduct
the administrative investigation against him. The PAGC denied Montemayors motion
for lack of merit. Still, no answer was filed.
On June 23, 2003, the CA issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 77285 enjoining the PAGC from proceeding with the investigation for sixty
(60) days. On September 12, 2003, shortly after the expiration of the sixty (60)-day
TRO, the PAGC issued a Resolutionfinding Montemayor administratively liable as
charged and recommending to the Office of the President Montemayors dismissal
from the service.
Montemayor sought reconsideration of the said decision and he argued that he was
denied his right to due process when the PAGC proceeded to investigate his case

notwithstanding the pendency of his petition for certiorari before the CA, and its
subsequent elevation to the Supreme Court. The motion was eventually denied.
Aggrieved, Montemayor brought the matter to the CA via a petition for reviewunder
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. He made the following
assertions: first, that the PAGC exceeded its authority when it recommended that he
be dismissed from government service since the power to investigate does not
necessarily carry with it the power to impose penalty unless the same was expressly
granted; second, that the PAGC grossly violated his right to due process of law when
it did not give him the opportunity to present his countervailing evidence to the
charges against him; third, that the PAGC cannot validly proceed with the
investigation of the charges against him on the basis of an unverified anonymous
letter-complaint without any supporting documents attached thereto, contrary to the
requirement of Section 4 (c) of Executive Order (EO) No. 12; fourth, that it was an
error for the Office of the President to hold him liable for violation of Section 7 of RA
No. 3019 and Section 8 (A) of RA No. 6713 since the SSAL should reflect assets and
liabilities acquired in the preceding year; and fifth, that the assailed PAGC Resolution
was not supported by substantial evidence.
As aforesaid, the CA in its assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005, ruled in favor of
Montemayor. The CA concluded that Montemayor was deprived of an opportunity to
present controverting evidence amounting to a brazen denial of his right to due
process.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent was deprived of his right to due process when it
proceeded to investigate him on the basis of an anonymous complaint, and
allegedly without an opportunity to present evidence in his defense;
2. Whether or not the PAGC has the authority to recommend respondents dismissal
from the service;

3. Whether or not the assumption by the office of the ombudsman of its jurisdiction
to investigate respondent for the same offense deprived the the PAGC from
proceeding with its investigation; and
4. Whether or not the PAGCs recommendation was supported by substantial
evidence.
HELD:
The PAGC was created by virtue of EO No. 12, signed on April 16, 2001 to speedily
address the problem on corruption and abuses committed in the government,
particularly by officials appointed by the President. Under Section 4 (b) of EO No. 12,
the PAGC has the power to investigate and hear administrative complaints provided
(1) that the official to be investigated must be a presidential appointee in the
government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities, and (2) that the said official
must be occupying the position of assistant regional director, or an equivalent rank, or
higher.
Section 4 (c) of EO No. 12, however, states that the PAGC has the power to give due
course to anonymous complaints against presidential appointees if there appears on the
face of the complaint or based on the supporting documents attached to the anonymous
complaint a probable cause to engender a belief that the allegations may be true. The use
of the conjunctive word or in the said provision is determinative since it empowers the
PAGC to exercise discretion in giving due course to anonymous complaints. Because of
the said provision, an anonymous complaint may be given due course even if the same is
without supporting documents, so long as it appears from the face of the complaint that
there is probable cause. The clear implication of the said provision is intent to empower
the PAGC in line with the Presidents objective of eradicating corruption among a
particular line of government officials, i.e., those directly appointed by her. Absent the
conjunctive word or, the PAGCs authority to conduct investigations based on anonymous
complaints will be very limited. It will decimate the said administrative body into a
toothless anti-corruption agency and will inevitably undermine the Chief Executives
disciplinary power.

Respondent also assails the PAGCs decision to proceed with the investigation process
without giving him the opportunity to present controverting evidence.
The argument is without merit.
The filing of a petition for certiorari with the CA did not divest the PAGC of its
jurisdiction validly acquired over the case before it. Elementary is the rule that the
mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a case
pending before a lower court or an administrative body such as the PAGC, does not
interrupt the course of the latter where there is no writ of injunction restraining it. For
as long as no writ of injunction or restraining order is issued in the special civil action
for certiorari, no impediment exists, and nothing prevents the PAGC from exercising
its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending before its office. And even if
such injunctive writ or order is issued, the PAGC continues to retain jurisdiction over
the principal action until the question on jurisdiction is finally determined.
In the case at bar, a sixty (60)-day TRO was issued by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
77285. However, barely a week after the lapse of the TRO, the PAGC issued its
resolution finding Montemayor administratively liable and recommending to the
Office of the President his dismissal from government service. The CA believes that
there has been undue haste and apparent precipitation in the PAGCs investigation
proceedings. It notes with disapproval the fact that it was barely eight (8) days after
the TRO had lapsed that the PAGC issued the said resolution and explains that
respondent should have been given a second chance to present evidence prior to
proceeding with the issuance of the said resolution.
We beg to disagree with the appellate courts observation.
First, it must be remembered that the PAGCs act of issuing the assailed resolution
enjoys the presumption of regularity particularly since it was done in the performance

of its official duties. Mere surmises and conjectures, absent any proof whatsoever,
will not tilt the balance against the presumption, if only to provide constancy in the
official acts of authorized government personnel and officials. Simply put, the timing
of the issuance of the assailed PAGC resolution by itself cannot be used to discredit,
much less nullify, what appears on its face to be a regular performance of the PAGCs
duties.
Second, Montemayors argument, as well as the CAs observation that respondent was
not afforded a second opportunity to present controverting evidence, does not hold
water. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to
explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to explain his side, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with.
Significantly, the records show that the PAGC issued an order informing Montemayor
of the formal charge filed against him and gave him ten (10) days within which to
present a counter-affidavit or verified answer. When the said period lapsed without
respondent asking for an extension, the PAGC gave Montemayor a fresh ten (10)-day
period to file his answer, but the latter chose to await the decision of the CA in his
petition for certiorari. During the preliminary conference, Montemayor was again
informed that he is given a new ten (10)-day period, or until June 19, 2003 within
which to file his memorandum/position paper as well as supporting evidence with a
warning that if he still fails to do so, the complaint shall be deemed submitted for
resolution on the basis of available documentary evidence on record. Again, the
deadline lapsed without any evidence being presented by Montemayor in his defense.
Montemayor, therefore, had two (2) choices upon the issuance of the PAGC
resolution: to move for a reconsideration thereof, or to ask for another opportunity
before the Office of the President to present his side particularly since the assailed
resolution is merely recommendatory in nature. Having failed to exercise any of these

two (2) options, Montemayor cannot now be allowed to seek recourse before this
Court for the consequences of his own shortcomings.
Desperately, Montemayor contends that the authority of the PAGC to investigate him
administratively, as well as the power of the Office of the President to act on the PAGCs
recommendation, had already ceased following the initiation and filing of the
administrative and criminal cases against him by the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman). He points out that the Ombudsman is mandated by Section 15,
paragraph (1) of RA No. 6770 to take over the investigation and prosecution of the
charges filed
against him.
We are still not persuaded.
The cases filed against respondent before the Ombudsman were initiated after the
Office of the President decided to dismiss Montemayor.More importantly, the
proceedings before the PAGC were already finished even prior to the initiation and
filing of cases against him by the Ombudsman.
In fact, it was the PAGCs findings and recommendations which served as the basis in
the Office of the Presidents decision to dismiss Montemayor from government
service. Clearly then, the exercise by the Office of the President of its concurrent
investigatory and prosecutorial power over Montemayor had already been terminated
even before the Ombudsman could take cognizance over the matter. The Ombudsman,
therefore, cannot take over a task that is already a fait accompli.
As to the substantive aspect, i.e., whether the PAGCs recommendation to dismiss

Montemayor from government service is supported by substantial evidence, we find in
favor of petitioners.

Montemayors argument that he did not deliberately omit to declare the 2001 Ford
Expedition in his 2001 SSAL and the 1997 Toyota Land Cruiser in his 2001 and 2002
SSAL fails to persuade us. Even if a motor vehicle was acquired through chattel
mortgage, it is a government employees ethical and legal obligation to declare and
include the same in his SSAL. Montemayor cannot wiggle his way out of the mess he has
himself created since he knows for a fact that every asset acquired by a civil servant must
be declared in the SSAL. The law requires that the SSAL be accomplished truthfully and
in detail without distinction as to how the property was acquired. Montemayor, therefore,
cannot escape liability by arguing that the ownership of the 2001 Ford Expedition has not
yet passed to him on the basis of a lame excuse that the said vehicle was acquired only on
installment basis sometime on July 3, 2001.
Montemayor also argues that even if ownership of the said vehicle had been transferred to
him upon acquisition, the vehicle was sold to another person on December 15,
2002;hence, there is no need to declare it in his 2001 SSAL. Respondents reasoning is
anemic and convoluted. It is evasive of the fact that the said vehicle was not reported in
his 2001 SSAL..
Respondent apparently fails to understand that the SSAL is not a mere scrap of
paper. The law requires that the SSAL must be accomplished as truthfully, as detailed
and as accurately as possible. The filing thereof not later than the first fifteen (15)
days of April at the close of every calendar year must not be treated as a simple and
trivial routine, but as an obligation that is part and parcel of every civil servants duty
to the people. It serves as the basis of the government and the people in monitoring
the income and lifestyle of officials and employees in the government in compliance
with the Constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, promote transparency in
government, and ensure that all government employees and officials lead just and
modest lives. It is for this reason that the SSAL must be sworn to and is made
accessible to the public, subject to reasonable administrative regulations.

Montemayors repeated and consistent failure to reflect truthfully and adequately all
his assets and liabilities in his SSAL betrays his claim of innocence and good faith.
Accordingly, we find that the penalty of dismissal from government service, as
sanctioned by Section 11 (a) and (b) of RA No. 6713, meted by the Office of the
President against him, is proper.
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated October 19, 2005 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 84254 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the March 23, 2004 Decision and the May 13, 2004 Resolution of the
Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581 are REINSTATEDand UPHELD.
Respondent Atty. Antonio F. Montemayor is hereby DISMISSED from government

service.
REVIEW CENTER ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES V. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA
FACTS:
There was a report that handwritten copies of two sets of 2006 Nursing Board
examination were circulated during the examination period among examinees
reviewing at the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center. The
examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and answers in two of the
examinations five subjects, particularly Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V
(Medical-Surgical Nursing). The PRC later admitted the leakage and traced it to two
Board of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of Appeals restrained
the PRC from proceeding with the oath-taking of the successful examinees.
President GMA ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which authorized
the CHED to supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers and
similar entities in the Philippines. CHED Chairman Puno approved CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing Rules and Regulations).

Review Center Association of the Philippines (petitioner), an organization of

independent review centers, asked the CHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR
arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers. CHED Chairman Puno however
believed that suspending the implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with
the mandate of EO 566.
A dialogue between the petitioner and CHED took place. Revised IRR was
approved. Petitioner filed before the CHED a Petition to Clarify/Amend RIRR
praying to exclude independent review center from the coverage of the CHED; to
clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers to tie-up with HEIs;
to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs coverage to
public and private institutions of higher education.
In 2007, then CHED Chairman Neri responded to the petitioner that: to exclude the
operation of independent review centers from the coverage of CHED would clearly
contradict the intention of the said Executive Order No.566; As to the request to
clarify what is meant by tie-up/be integrated with an HEI, tie-up/be integrated simply
means, to be in partner with an HEI.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before this Court praying
for the annulment of the RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and
unconstitutional exercise of legislative power, and the prohibition against CHED from
implementing the RIRR. Motion to intervene filed by other organizations/institutions
were granted by the Court.
On 21 May 2008, CHED issued CHED Memorandum Order No. 21, Series of 2008
(CMO 21, s. 2008) extending the deadline for six months from 27 May 2008 for all

existing independent review centers to tie-up or be integrated with HEIs in accordance

with the RIRR. On 25 November 2008 Resolution, SC resolved torequire the parties
to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of EO 566, the RIRR, and
CMO 21, s.2008.
ISSUES:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative

power as it expands theCHEDs jurisdiction; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
HELD:
1. Yes, it expands CHEDs jurisdiction, hence unconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566

and the RIRR clearly expand the CHEDs coverage under RA 7722. The CHEDs
coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private institutions of higher
education and degree-granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the
regulation of review centers and similar entities. The definition of a review center
under EO 566 shows that it refers to one which offers "a program or course of study
that is intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies and skills of
reviewees obtained in the formal school setting in preparation for the licensure
examinations" given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree-granting program that
would put it under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
A review course is only intended to "refresh and enhance the knowledge or

competencies and skills of reviewees." Thus, programs given by review centers could
not be considered "programs x xx of higher learning" that would put them under the
jurisdiction of the CHED. "Higher education," is defined as "education beyond the
secondary level or "education provided by a college or university." Further, the
"similar entities" in EO 566 cover centers providing "review or tutorial services" in
areas not covered by licensure examinations given by the PRC, which include,

although not limited to, college entrance examinations, Civil Services examinations,
and tutorial services. These review and tutorial services hardly qualify as programs of
higher learning.
2. Yes, it is invalid. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers under Section 20,
Title I of Book III of EO (invoked by theOSG to justify GMAs action) requires
legislation; as the provision clearly states that the exercise of the Presidents other
powers and functions has to be "provided for under the law."There is no law granting
the President the power to amend the functions of the CHED. The President has no
inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA
7722. The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct.
Legislative power is "the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter
and repeal them."
The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original, sovereign and unlimited
capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines. Any power, deemed
to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed by Congress, unless
the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.The President has control over the executive
department, bureaus and offices. Meaning, he has the authority to assume directly the
functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the
discretion of itsofficials. Corollary to the power of control, he is granted
administrative power. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables
the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules
and regulations.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to

specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony
with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying
out the legislative policy. Since EO 566 is an invalid exercise of legislative power, the
RIRR is also an invalid exercise of the CHEDs quasi-legislative power.

Administrative agencies exercise their quasi-legislative or rule-making power through

the promulgation of rules and regulations. The CHED may only exercise its
rulemaking power within the confines of its jurisdiction under RA 7722. But The
RIRR covers review centers and similar entities.
GUITIERREZ V. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
FACTS:
These consolidated cases question the inclusion of certain allowances and fringe
benefits into the standardized salary rates for offices in the national government, state
universities and colleges, and local government units as required by the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 and implemented through the challenged
National Compensation Circular 59 (NCC 59).
Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government
employees. Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional
compensation already being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary
rates. But it exempted certain additional compensations that the employees may be
receiving from such consolidation.
Pursuant thereto, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued NCC
59 dated September 30, 1989, covering the offices of the national government, state
universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the
specific allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in
the basic salaries and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and
Inflation Connected Allowance (ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on
May 3, 2004.

The DBM also issued Corporate Compensation Circular (CCC) 10 dated October 2,
1989, covering all government-owned or controlled corporations and government
financial institutions. The DBM re-issued this circular on February 15, 1999 and
published it on March 16, 1999. Accordingly, the Commission on Audit (COA)
disallowed the payments of honoraria and other allowances which were deemed
integrated into the standardized salary rates. Employees of governmentowned or
controlled corporations questioned the validity of CCC 10 due to its non-publication.
Meanwhile, the DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12,
2001, clarifying that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may
continue to be granted the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the
standardized salary rates. Thus, the payment of allowances and compensation such as
COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA, among others, which were already deemed
integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.
On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus in G.R. 153266, questioning the propriety of integrating
their COLA into their standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the
national government followed suit. In addition, petitioners in G.R. 159007 questioned
the disallowance of the allowances and fringe benefits that the COA auditing
personnel assigned to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) used to get.
Petitioners in G.R. 173119 questioned the disallowance of the ICA that used to be
paid to the officials and employees of the Insurance Commission.
On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which
provided that all Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including
COLA, of government employees under R.A. 6758 applied only to specific
government-owned or controlled corporations since the consolidated cases covering
the national government employees are still pending with this Court. Consequently,
the payment of allowances and other benefits to them, such as COLA and ICA,
remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this Court. The
circular further said that all agency heads and other responsible officials and
employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and

benefits already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such
payment.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the non-publication of NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 in the
Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation nullifies the integration of the
COLA into the standardized salary rates.
HELD:
Petitioners argue that since CCC 10 dated October 2, 1989 covering all government-
owned or controlled corporations and government financial institutions was
ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on March 16, 1999, its counterpart,
NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989 covering the offices of the national government,
state universities and colleges, and local government units should also be regarded as
ineffective until its re-issuance and publication on May 3, 2004. Thus, the COLA
should not be deemed integrated into the standardized salary rates from 1989 to 2004.
Respondents counter that the fact that NCC 59 was not published should not be
considered as an obstacle to the integration of COLA into the standardized salary
rates. Accordingly, Budget Circular 2001-03, insofar as it reiterates NCC 59, should
not be treated as ineffective since it merely reaffirms the fact of consolidation of
COLA into the employees salary as mandated by Section 12 of R.A. 6758.
It is a settled rule that publication is required as a condition precedent to the

effectivity of a law to inform the public of its contents before their rights and interests
are affected by the same. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published
if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Nonetheless, as previously discussed, the integration of COLA into the standardized

salary rates is not dependent on the publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59. This benefit

is deemed included in the standardized salary rates of government employees since it

falls under the general rule of integrationall allowances.
More importantly, the integration was not by mere legal fiction since it was factually
integrated into the employees salaries. Records show that the government employees
were informed by their respective offices of their new position titles and their
corresponding salary grades when they were furnished with the Notices of Position
Allocation and Salary Adjustment (NPASA). The NPASA provided the breakdown of
the employees gross monthly salary as of June 30, 1989 and the composition of his
standardized pay under R.A. 6758. Notably, the COLA was considered part of the
employees monthly income.
In truth, petitioners never really suffered any diminution in pay as a consequence of

the consolidation of COLA into their standardized salary rates. There is thus nothing
in these cases which can be the subject of a back pay since the amount corresponding
to COLA was never withheld from petitioners in the first place.
Consequently, the non-publication of CCC 10 and NCC 59 in the Official Gazette or

newspaper of general circulation does not nullify the integration of COLA into the
standardized salary rates upon the effectivity of R.A. 6758. The validity of R.A. 6758
should not be made to depend on the validity of its implementing rules.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS AND THE DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF

THE PORT OF SUBIC V.HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION
FACTS:
The Commissioner of Customs issued CM 27-2003 classifying wheat as (1)importer

or consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge and depending on these
factors, wheat would be classified further as either food grade with a tariff rate of 3%
or feed grade with a tariff rate of 7%.

The regulation also provides for an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge,
commodity descriptions and countries of origin. On December 19, 2003, the
respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court of Las
Pinas contending the following: (1) the regulation was issued without following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code, (2) that the regulation classified them to
be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and examination, (3)the equal
protection clause of the Constitution was violated when the regulation treated the non-
flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all, and(4) the retroactive
application of the regulation is confiscatory. The petitioners thereafter filed a motion
to dismiss contending that: (1) the RTC does not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter, (2) an action for declaratory relief was improper,(3) CM 27-2003 was an
internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of the
respondent were speculative and premature.
On March10, 2005, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision ruling in favour of
the respondent. It held that, on matters relating to the validity of the regulation, the
court held that the regulation is invalid because the basic requirements of hearing and
publication were not complied with. The petitioners then appealed to Court of
Appeals but it was, however, dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issuance of CMO 27-2003 is valid?
HELD:
Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2003 (CMO 23-2007) is invalid. The

Commissioner of Customs (1) violated the right to due process in the issuance of
CMO 27-2003 when he failed to observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code, (2) violated the right to equal protection of laws when he
provided for an unreasonable classification in the application of the regulation, and

(3) went beyond his powers of delegated authority when the regulation limited the
powers of the customs officer to examine and assess imported articles.
CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the mandate of the Revised
Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law Center. For tariff purposes,
CMO 27-2003 classified wheat according to the following: (1) importer or consignee;
(2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. This is a violation of the equal
protection clause under the Constitution. The Court does not see how the quality of
wheat is affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or which country it came
from.
Thus, on the one hand, even if other millers excluded from CMO 27-2003 have
imported food grade wheat, the product would still be declared as feed grade wheat, a
classification subjecting them to 7% tariff. On the other hand, even if the importers
listed under CMO 27-2003 have imported feed grade wheat, they would only be made
to pay 3% tariff, thus depriving the state of the taxes due. The regulation, therefore,
does not become disadvantageous to respondent only, but even to the state. Section
1403 of the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended mandates that the customs officer
must first assess and determine the classification of the imported article before tariff
may be imposed.
Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even before the
customs officer had the chance to examine it. Finally, Commissioner of Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to wheat
importation when it no longer required the customs officers prior examination and
assessment of the proper classification of the wheat.
VIVAS V. MONETARY BOARD OF BSP
FACTS:

The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking
institution that the corporate life expired on May 2005. Vivas and the new
management team conducted internal audit and introduced measures to revitalize the
dismal operation of the bank. BSP on December 2006 extended RBFI corporate life
for another 50 years and approve the change of its name to EuroCredit Community
Bank, Incorporated (ECBI).
Pursuant to Section 28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653, otherwise known as The
New Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II) of the BSP
conducted a general examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31,
2007. Shortly after the completion of the general examination, an exit conference was
held on March 27, 2008 at the BSP during which the BSP officials and examiners
apprised Vivas, the Chairman and President of ECBI, as well as the other bank
officers and members of its BOD, of the advance findings noted during the said
examination. The ECBI submitted its comments on BSPs consolidated findings and
risk asset classification through a letter, dated April 8, 2008.
The MB issued Resolution No. 823 on June 2009, approving the issuance of a cease
and desist order against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and
transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from
doing such other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the
dissipation of its assets. It was also prohibited from doing business in the Philippines
and to place its assets and affairs under receivership through OSI recommendation.
Vivas filed petition for prohibition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for
prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under
receivership.

ISSUE:
Whether or not ECBI was entitled to due and prior hearing before its being placed
under receivership.
HELD:
Yes.In the case of BangkoSentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-

Valenzuela, the Court reiterated the doctrine of close now, hear later, stating that it
was justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:
The close now, hear later doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the
protection of the public interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when
it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless adequate and determined efforts are taken
by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks, public faith in the
banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself,
not to mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders,
who all deserve the protection of the government.
In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the Court also wrote that
xxx due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an
opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the
dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day,
resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and
disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
The doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted

dissipation of the banks assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the

depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and
determined actions must be taken against financially distressed and mismanaged
banks by government agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate
to the prejudice of the national economy.
SENATE V ERMITA
Facts:
Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by
the President. Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that
said law be declared null and void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain
the consent of the President before they can validly appear before investigations
including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive privilege on all
classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers
covered by the EO.
The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of
the Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail
project. Said public hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen. Enrile urging
the Senate to investigate the alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the
contract covering the said project. The Senate Committee on National Defense and
Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.
Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing.
On the same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464. Despite this
development, the investigation pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen.
Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending. Both were subsequently
relieved for defying the Presidents order.
Issue:
Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress
Held:
YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it
deprives it of the information in possession of these officials.
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the
Constitution. This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry
with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the
absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must
be had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the
executive branch.The operation of the government is a proper subject for
investigation, as held in Arnault case.

Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to
the power of inquiry, which fall under the rubric of executive privilege. It is defined
by Schwartz as the power of the government to withhold information from the
public, the courts and the Congress. (e.g. state secret privilege, informers privilege,
generic privilege).
The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section
21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot
frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands
for information. The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory
process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is
consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission.
Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever
it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on
the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and
why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade
congressional requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do
so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said
provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated. That is impermissible.
Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is
recognized only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character.
While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or
not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is made.
Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty
to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the
extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines
heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)
A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was
compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. These are two distinctfunctions of the
legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related does not pertain to the same power of
the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while
the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to
obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Hence, the oversight
function of Congress may only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads
to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere

fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted
from this power the president on whom the executive power is vested, hence beyond
the reach of the Congress except by the power of impeachment. Members of SC are
likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of separation of
powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the
judiciary.
SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE VS. MAJADUCON

Facts:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry
into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces
Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings
by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS purchased a lot from
Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of sale filed
with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000
per square meter. The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano,
directing him to appear and testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed a
petition for prohibition and preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary
restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court issued a TRO
directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The
Committee filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure
to state a valid cause of action. The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence,
this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge Majaducon committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of
discretion when he dismissed the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of
preliminary injunction.
Held:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal
basis. The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs
to Congress, execution to the Executive, and settlement of legal controversies to the
Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. When the Senate
Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and
mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the
1987 Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.

Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority
to prohibit the Committee from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does
not apply in this case. The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the
case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended legislation was involved and the subject matter of
the inquiry was more within the province of the courts rather than the legislature. On
the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is to look
into the reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, withthe
intention of enacting appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the
officers and members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
GUDANI V SENGA
Facts:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004
election fraud and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464
enjoining officials of the executive department including the military establishment
from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff
Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the
two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to
them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating
the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of Command. Gen.
Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for
willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the
AFP preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
Held:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of
Congress which seeks the appearance before it of a military officer against the consent
of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any
military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be compelled to do
so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty
to faithfully execute.

SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of
prior consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a
congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on
specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military officers
from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to
appear before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself
recognizes as one of the legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents
power as commander-in-chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly
interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not
come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential
prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement today that the
President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed forces, the
clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize

the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has
earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to
testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of
the courts.
IN RE: SABIO
Facts:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG
Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public
meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same
time invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission
shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by
exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding.
Held:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not
only to the Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their

respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory

power to the committees and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take
in order to effectively perform its investigative functions are also available to the
committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more
evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry
is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court
reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that
the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with
Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from
the Congress power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the
Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress power of
inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within
the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish. PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative
power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe
constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its
basic principles.
Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art.
VI, Sec. 21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full
disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III,
Sec. 7).
Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.
NERI V SENATE COMMITTEE

Facts:
On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for
the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The
Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18,
2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and

power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by
the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which
he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for
his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused
to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate
averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the
jurisprudence laid down in Senate vsErmita be applied. He was cited in contempt of
respondent committees and an order for his arrest and detention until such time that he
would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege?
Held:
The communications are covered by executive privilege.
The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others,
the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of
legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is
because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the
President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the
information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications
privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.

2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor

of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive
privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions
fall under conversation and correspondence between the President and public
officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making process and, that
the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are
presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.
Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege.
First, the communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the
President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries.
This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of
executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such
contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself
available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for
eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer
more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his
claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7
of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as
basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations
as may be provided by law.
DAVID V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a
plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be
implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same
time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by
the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still,
another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same
day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a
warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His
supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and
GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is
an over breadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an over breadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue
has become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the
presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to
the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at
bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time some
provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP
1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape
of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in
the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from
the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the
NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,

absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified
in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the
incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent
or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However,
the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing
on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not
primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is
not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call
upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover,
the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects
legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful,
constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct. Thus,
claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws
that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact
remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is
manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether such
power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA
has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred
that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated
legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the
clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such
provision is similar to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative
powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate decrees.
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be

sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify
GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take
care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the
president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of emergency
powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs authority from
Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared
by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to
it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
CORONA V. SENATE
Facts
-Former Chief Justice Renato Corona Filed a petition for certiorari and and
prohibition with the prayer to issue an immediate temporary restraining order (TRO)
and writ of preliminary injunction. (Filed in the Supreme Court)^This is against the
impeachment case initiatedby the Members of the House of Representatives (HOR)
and the trial being conducted by the Senate of the Philippines.
-A caucus during which a verified complaintagainst petitioner was submitted by the
leadership of the Committee on Justice.-On the same day (Dec12, 2011), the
complaint was voted in session and 188 Members signed and endorsed it, way
abovethe one-third vote required by the Constitution.
-The next day, the complaint was transmitted tothe Senate(which is convened as the
impeachment court)-Dec. 15, 2011. Petitioner received a copy of the
complaintcharging him with culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public
trust and graft and corruption,allegedly committed as follows: ARTICLES OF
IMPEACHMENT Respondent betrayed the public trust throughhis track record
marked by partialityand subservience in cases involving the arroyo
administrationfrom the time of his appointment as supreme court justice and until his
dubious appointment as a midnight chief justice to the present (ARTICLE
I)^Respondent committed culpable violation of the constitution and/or betrayed the
public trustwhen he failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities
and net worthas required under sec. 17, art. xi of the 1987 constitutiona public

officer or employee shall, uponassumption of office and as often thereafter as maybe

required by law, submit a declaration under oathof his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the caseof the President, the Vice-President, the Membersof the Cabinet, and
other constitutional offices, andofficers of the armed forces with general or flagrank,
the declaration shall be disclosed to the publicin the manner provided by law.
(ARTICLE II)-It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not
included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the
anti-graft and corrupt practices act. - PLUS, he wasaccused of having accumulated ill-
gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge
deposits. (ARTICLE III)
Issue: 1. WON the Senator Judges are entitled to propound questions on the
witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial
2. WON the issue of the case became moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justifiable controversy
Ruling:
1. By the nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment
Court, Senator-Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the witnesses,
prosecutors and counsel during trial. Petitioner thus failed to prove any semblance of
partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But whether the Senate Impeachment
Rules were followed or not, is a political question that is not within this Courts power
of expanded judicial review.
2. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use
and value. In such case, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner
would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN V. MOJICA

The case had its inception on 29 December 1999, when twenty-two officials and
employees of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas, led by its
two directors, filed a formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman requesting
an investigation on the basis of allegations that then Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, private respondent Arturo Mojica, committed the following: 1. Sexual
harassment against Rayvi Padua-Varona; 2. Mulcting money from confidential
employees James Alueta and Eden Kiamco; and 3. Oppression against all employees
in not releasing the P7,200.00 benefits of OMB-Visayas employees. The complaints
in Criminal Case No.OMB-0-00-0615 and Administrative Case No. OMB-ADM-0-
00-0316, were dismissed.
Thereupon, on 15 January 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before this Court
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and alternatively, an original special civil action for certiorari under Sec. 1,
Rule 65 of the same rules,

ISSUE: Is the Deputy Ombudsman an impeachable officer under Section 2, Article XI

of the 1987 Constitution?
RULING: The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions of
constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an
impeachable officer. The court has likewise taken into account the commentaries of
the leading legal luminaries on the Constitution as to their opinion on whether or not
the Deputy Ombudsman is impeachable. All of them agree in unison that the
impeachable officers enumerated in Section 2, Article XI of the 1986 Constitution is
exclusive. In their belief, only the Ombudsman, not his deputies, is impeachable. The
impeachable officers are the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President, the
members of the Supreme Court, the members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman. (see Art. XI, Sec. 2) The list is exclusive and may not be increased
or reduced by legislative enactment.
The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally prosecuted for the same
offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment presupposes his continuance in
office.Hence, the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal,
resignation, or permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in
the courts. Nor does retirement bar an administrative investigation from proceeding
against the private respondent, given that, as pointed out by the petitioner, the
formers retirement benefits have been placed on hold in view of the provisions of
Sections 12 and 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
GONZALES V. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

There are two petitions that have been consolidated because they raise a common
thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office
herein petitioners who claim the protective cloak of independence of the
constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.
1stcase -> G.R. No. 19623: Petition for Certiorari which assails on jurisdictional
grounds the Decision dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the dismissing
petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other
Law Enforcement Offices, upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of
Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a Betrayal of Public Trust.
The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives
the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of the
Ombudsman
2ndcase -> G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking to
annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order requiring petitioner Wendell
Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or
omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation to the Plea Bargaining

Agreement entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7,
2011 Notice of Preliminary Investigation, both issued by the Office of the President
the administrative case initiated against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Cause of 1st case: Hostage Drama involving Rolando Mendoza and Hong Kong
nationals in a tourist bus. Rolando Mendoza demanded his reinstatement. Sometime
in 2008, a formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was filed against him and other police officers.
Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission turned over, upon
the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence
in relation to said case to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate
administrative adjudication
The administrative case against Mendoza was dismissed upon a finding that the
material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated "by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged.
However, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision

finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave
Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman
They filed a Motion for Reconsideration followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration. The pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned
for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis
L. Garcia, who released a draft Order for appropriate action by his immediate
superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order
to petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after,
more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed the Order, together with the
case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose
office it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza
hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a
desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.
FRANCISCO V. NMMP, INC.

Facts:

On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted

and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress.
On 22 July 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed
the Committee on Justice to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the
manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF).
On 2 June 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint
(first impeachment complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes. The complaint was endorsed by
House Representatives, and was referred to the House Committee on Justice on 5
August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. The
House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first impeachment
complaint was sufficient in form, but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October 2003
for being insufficient in substance.
The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second impeachment complaint was
filed with the Secretary General of the House by House Representatives against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry
initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second impeachment complaint
was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least
1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives.
Various petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the
Supreme Court against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions
contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that [n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year.
Issues:
Whether or not the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment complaint constitute
valid impeachable offenses under the Constitution.
Whether or not Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on Impeachment adopted
by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3,
Article XI of the Constitution.
Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI
of the Constitution.
Rulings:

This issue is a non-justiciable political question which is beyond the scope of the
judicial power of the Supreme Court under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Any discussion of this issue would require the Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question
which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an
intent is clear from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is
the very lismota or crux of the controversy.
The Rule of Impeachment adopted by the House of Congress is unconstitutional.
Section 3 of Article XI provides that The Congress shall promulgate its rules on
impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section. Clearly, its power to
promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the phrase to effectively carry out
the purpose of this section. Hence, these rules cannot contravene the very purpose of
the Constitution which said rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover,
Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to
make rules.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the fundamental
law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power, then it would by
necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the meaning of the
Constitution without need of referendum.
It falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial
action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once
an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may
not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,
Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by former President
Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice
on August 5, 2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives
Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on
October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition against the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer within a one-year
period.
Hence, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment

Proceedings which were approved by the House of Representatives on November 28,
2001 are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by Representatives Gilberto C.

Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
GUTIERREZ v. HR COMMITTEE
FACTS:Before the 15th Congress opened for its first session, private respondents
known as the Baraquel group filed an impeachment complaint against petitioner.
A day after the opening of the 15th Congress, the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives transmitted the impeachment complaint to House Speaker Feliciano
Belmonte, Jr. who directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of
Business.
Private respondents collectively known as the Reyes group filed another impeachment
complaint against petitioner.
The Secretary General transmitted the Reyes groups complaint to Speaker Belmonte
who also directed the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
After hearing, public respondent, by Resolution, found the two complaints, which
both allege culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust,
sufficient in substance.
Petitioner filed with this Court the present petition with application for injunctive
reliefs. The Court En Banc RESOLVED to direct the issuance of a status quo
ante order and to require respondents to comment on the petition in 10 days.
Respondents raise the impropriety of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition. They
argue that public respondent was not exercising any judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial function in taking cognizance of the two impeachment complaints as it
was exercising a political act that is discretionary in nature, and that its function is
inquisitorial that is akin to a preliminary investigation.
Petitioner invokes the Courts expanded certiorari jurisdiction, using the special civil
actions of certiorari and prohibition as procedural vehicles.

ISSUES:
1. Is petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
2. Do the simultaneous complaints violate the one-year bar rule?
HELD:The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two

impeachment complaints presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power.
Petitioner cannot thus be considered to have acted prematurely when she took the cue
from the constitutional limitation that only one impeachment proceeding should be
initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of one year.
Article XI, Section 3, paragraph (5) of the Constitution reads: No impeachment

proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period
of one year. However, the term initiate means to file the complaint and take initial
action on it. The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress taking initial action of said
complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the complaint is the referral of
the complaint to the Committee on Justice.
ESTRADA V. DISIERTO,
356 SCRA 108
FACTS:On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph
Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while respondent Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are
important enough but more transcendental are the constitutional issues embedded on
the parties' dispute.
Following the termination of the impeachment trial and the resignation of majority of
the members of the Cabinet and the defection of the military and the police, around
noon of January 20, 2001, Vice President Arroyo has sworn into office as President of
the Philippines, while President Estrada and his family left Malacanang.
On the same day, however, President Estrada wrote a letter to the Senate stating that
he was unable to exercise the powers of the office of the Presidency & the operation

of the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is deemed resigned as President as of January

20, 2001 when respondent too her oath as the 14th President of the Republic.
RULING: YES. The petitioner resigned as President.
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its
elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be
coupled by acts of relinquishment. 78The validity of a resignation is not governed by
any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express.
It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts show that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantialevidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President. His actions
dispelled all the doubts about his resignation. (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake
of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he
was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-
assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his
gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was
referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the
same service of our country. Petitioner's reference is to a future challenge after
occupying the office of the president which he has given up, and (5) he called on this
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release
was petitioner's valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past
tense.|||
PHIL. JUDGES ASSOCIATION V. PRADO

FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the validity of Sec 35 R.A. No. 7354 which withdraw the franking
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts,
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration
Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its
title embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not
pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in
its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is
discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
ISSUE:Whether or not Section 35 of RA 7354 is constitutional.
RULING:No. Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is unconstitutional.
1. Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution provides that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if
the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of
the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient
compliance with the constitutional requirement.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is
the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that,
by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly
included in the title of the said law.
2. The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of
the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882
and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House
Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report,
its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. The petitioners also
invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon
may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers.
Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals
like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the bill). The journals are themselves
also binding on the Supreme Court.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an

amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A.
No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the
members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that
the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department
of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
3. SC annuls Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution

providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-

controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of
promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private
gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the
public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter. Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the
franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
CRUZ V. PARAS
Vicente De La Cruz, et al were club and cabaret operators. They assail the
constitutionality of Ord. No. 84, Ser. of 1975 or the Prohibition and Closure
Ordinance of Bocaue, Bulacan. De la Cruz averred that the said Ordinance violates
their right to engage in a lawful business for the said ordinance would close out their
business. That the hospitality girls they employed are healthy and are not allowed to
go out with customers. Judge Paras however lifted the TRO he earlier issued against
Ordinance 84 after due hearing declaring that Ordinance 84 is constitutional for it is
pursuant to RA 938 which reads AN ACT GRANTING MUNICIPAL OR CITY
BOARDS AND COUNCILS THE POWER TO REGULATE THE
ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES
OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS. Paras ruled that the prohibition is a valid exercise of police power
to promote general welfare. De la Cruz then appealed citing that they were deprived
of due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal corporation, Bocaue, Bulacan can, prohibit the
exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, such clubs employing hostesses pursuant to Ordinance 84 which is further
in pursuant to RA 938.
HELD:If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the
assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. SC had stressed reasonableness,
consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal corporations, as well as
consistency with the laws or policy of the State. It cannot be said that such a sweeping

exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable.
The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained
by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its
face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose sought to be achieved could have
been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
Pursuant to the title of the Ordinance, Bocaue should and can only regulate not
prohibit the business of cabarets.
TATAD v. SECRETARY
FACTS: The petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled An

Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The
deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the
(b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the

President and the Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a determinate or
determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in determining when to
implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry, and the law does not
provide any specific standard to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world
market are considered to be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the
US dollar is considered stable.
Issues:
Whether or not the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.
sub issues:
a) Whether or not Section 15 of RA No. 8180 violates the constitutional

prohibition on undue delegation of power,
b) Whether or not the Executive department misapplied RA No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in fully deregulating
the downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.
HELD/RULING:
a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
RA No. 8180 provided that the full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation.
Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment of the Presidenthe is to
time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the
world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso to the US
dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or perform,

decline as meaning to take a downward direction, and stable as meaning
firmly established.

b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be
given weight by the Executive before ordering full deregulation. The Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the standards set by RA No. 8180 when it
co0nsidered the extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive is
bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition the standards set in RA
No. 8180 for it has no powers to make laws.
ABAKADAGURO PARTY LIST V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 168056 (2005)
Facts:
Petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List challenged the constitutionality of R.A. No.
9337 particularly Sections 4, 5 and 6, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). These questioned
provisions contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President, upon recommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006,
after any of the following conditions have been satisfied, to wit:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve percent (12%),
after any of the following conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of
the previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1 %).
Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by
Congress of its exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. They further argue that VAT is a tax levied
on the sale or exchange of goods and services and cannot be included within the
purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that
any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily be brushed aside by the
President since the former is a mere alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is
the President who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions in Article VI,
Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the Constitution.

2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of legislative power in violation

of Article VI Sec 28 Par 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process and equal protection
under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Ruling:
1. R.A. No. 9337 has not violated the provisions. The revenue bill exclusively
originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes,
percentage, excise and franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the
Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the
amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as
to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress does
not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what job
must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our
complex economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative
process can go forward.
3. Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The power of the State to
make reasonable and natural classifications for the purposes of taxation has
long been established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the kind of
property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be raised, the methods of
assessment, valuation and collection, the States power is entitled to
presumption of validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such
power absent a clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.
ATITIW V. ZAMORA
G.R. No. 143374 471 scra 329 (2005)
Facts:
The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of autonomous regions
in MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating the Congress to enact organic
acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the
residual powers of President Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating
CAR. Then the congress enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organicact for the
cordillera autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the
people. Thecourt declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until properly

repealed or amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President Estrada signed the
General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000) whichincludes the assailed special
provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to extend the implementation of thewinding up of
operations of the CAR and extended it by virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the
declaration of nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000)
directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its activities and
pay theseparation and retirement benefits of all the affected members and employees.
Issues:
1.Whether the assailed special provisions in RA 8760 is a rider and as such is
unconstitutional.
2.Whether the Philippine Government, through Congress, can unilaterally
amend/repeal EO 220.
3.Whether the Republic should be ordered to honor its commitments as spelled out in
EO.220
Ruling:
In relation to article VI section 25(2) and section 26 the court said that xxx an
appropriations bill covers abroader range of subject matter and therefore includes
more details compared to an ordinary bill. Thetitle of an appropriations bill cannot be
any broader as it is since it is not feasible to come out with a titlethat embraces all the
details included in an appropriations bill xxx. The assailed paragraph 1 of theRA8760
does not constitute a rider; it follows the standard that a provision in an appropriations
bill mustrelate specifically to some particular appropriations.On the other hand, the
contention that Congress cannot amend or repeal E.O 220 is rejected, there is nosuch
thing as an irrepealable law. And nothing could prevent the Congress from amending
or repealingthe E.O. 220 because it is no different from any other law.The last issue,
the court ruled that, the concept of separations of powers presupposes mutual
respect.Therefore, the implementation of E.O. 220 is an executive prerogative while
the sourcing of funds iswithin the powers of the legislature. In the absence of any
grave abuse of discretion, the court cannotcorrect the acts of either the Executive or
the Legislative in respect to policies concerning CAR.
CIR v. CA & YMCA

G.R No. 124043 (1998)
Facts:
In 1980, YMCA earned an income of 676,829.80 from leasing out a portion of its
premises to small shop owners, like restaurants and canteen operators and 44,259

from parking fees collected from non-members. On July 2, 1984, the CIR issued an
assessment to YMCA for deficiency taxes which included the income from lease of
YMCAs real property. YMCA formally protested the assessment but the CIR denied
the claims of YMCA. On appeal, the CTA ruled in favor of YMCA and excluded
income from lease to small shop owners and parking fees. However, the CA reversed
the CTA but affirmed the CTA upon motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the rental income of YMCA is taxable
Ruling:
Yes. The exemption claimed by YMCA is expressly disallowed by the very wording
of then Section 27 of the NIRC which mandates that the income of exempt
organizations (such as the YMCA) from any of their properties, real or personal, be
subject to the tax imposed by the same Code. While the income received by the
organizations enumerated in Section 26 of the NIRC is, as a rule, exempted from the
payment of tax in respect to income received by them as such, the exemption does not
apply to income derived from any of their properties, real or personal or from any of
their activities conducted for profit, regardless of the disposition made of such
income.
CHAVEZ V. PCGG
299 scra 744 (1998)
Facts:
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, in his capacity as taxpayer, citizen and a former
government official asked the court to prohibit and enjoin respondents [PCGG and its
chairman] from privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any agreement
with the heirs of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos . . . relating to and concerning
the properties and assets of Ferdinand Marcos located in the Philippines and/or abroad
including the so-called Marcos gold hoard.
Chavez assailed the validity of the General and Supplemental Agreement executed by
the government (through PCGG) and the Marcos heirs on December 28,1993.
Item No. 2 of the General Agreement states that the assets of the PRIVATE PARTY
(Marcos heirs) shall be net of and exempt from, any form of taxes due the Republic of
the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by the PCGG and the Marcos
heirs which committing to exempt from all forms of taxes the properties to be retained
by the Marcos heirs is valid.

Ruling:
The petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
violation of the Construction. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is vested
in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies. Section 28 (4),
Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting any tax
exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the Member of
the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax exemptions, even
under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying taxes
on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal protection
clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor only of
the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the constitutional
rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable."
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner
of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only when
(1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer, and
(2) the taxpayer's financial position demonstrates a clear inability to pay. Definitely,
neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because under the Agreement
they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims against their properties, part
of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the PCGG grant of tax exemption fall
within the power of the commissioner to abate or cancel a tax liability. This power can
be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to be unjustly or excessively assessed, or
(2) the administration and collection costs involved do not justify the collection of the
tax due. In this instance, the cancellation of tax liability is done even before the
determination of the amount due. In any event, criminal violations of the Tax Code,
for which legal actions have been filed in court or in which fraud is involved, cannot
be compromised.
LUNG CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES V. QUEZON CITY AND CONSTANTINO

ROSAS
G.R. No. 144104 433 scra 119 (2004)
Facts:
The Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit entity which owns a parcel of land in Quezon
City. Erected in the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center

of the Philippines. The ground floor is being leased to a canteen, medical

professionals whom use the same as their private clinics, as well as to other private
parties. The right portion of the lot is being leased for commercial purposes to the
Elliptical Orchids and Garden Center. The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying
patients. It also renders medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying.
Aside from its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies
from the government.
Petitioner filed a Claim for Exemption from realty taxes amounting to about Php4.5
million, predicating its claim as a charitable institution. The city assessor denied the
Claim. When appealed to the QC-Local Board of Assessment, the same was
dismissed. The decision of the QC-LBAA was affirmed by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals, despite the Petitioners claim that 60% of its hospital beds are
used exclusively for charity.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petitioner is entitled to exemption from realty taxes
notwithstanding the fact that it admits paying clients and leases out a portion of its
property for commercial purposes.
Ruling:
The Court held that the petitioner is indeed a charitable institution based on its charter
and articles of incorporation. As a general principle, a charitable institution does not
lose its character as such and its exemption from taxes simply because it derives
income from paying patients, whether out-patient or confined in the hospital, or
receives subsidies from the government, so long as the money received is devoted or
used altogether to the charitable object which it is intended to achieve; and no money
inures to the private benefit of the persons managing or operating the institution.
Despite this, the Court held that the portions of real property that are leased to private
entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly and
exclusively used for charitable purposes. (strictissimijuris) Moreover, P.D. No. 1823
only speaks of tax exemptions as regards to:
income and gift taxes for all donations, contributions, endowments and
equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and
by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines for the actual
use and benefit of the Lung Center; and
taxes, charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases
(expression uniusest exclusion alterius/expressiumfacitcessaretacitum).

EXECUTIVE VS. SOUTHWING

Facts:
On December 2002, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued executive order 156
entitled providing for a comprehensive industrial policy and directions for the motor
vehicle development program and its implementing guidelines . The said provision
prohibits the importation of all types of used motor vehicles I the country including
the Subic bay Freeport zone, subject to a few exceptions.
Consequently, three separate actions for the declaratory relief were filed by
Southwing Heavy Industries Incorporated. Praying that judgement be rendered
declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of Executive order 156 unconstitutional and illegal.
The RTC rendered a summary judgement declaring Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156
constitutes an unlawful usurpation of legislative power vested by the Constitution
with Congress and that the Proviso is contrary to the mandate of RA 7227 or the
Bases conversion and development act of 1992 which allows the free flow of goods
and capital within the Freeport.
The petitioner appealed in the Court of appeals but was denied on the ground of lack
of statutory basis for the President to issue the same. It held that the prohibition on
the importation of use motor vehicles is an exercise of police power vested on the
legislature and absent any enabling law, the exercise thereof by the President through
an executive issuance is void.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 2, Section 3.1 of EO 156 is a valid exercise of the Presidents
quasi-legislative power.
Held: Yes.
The Supreme court ruled that police power is inherent in a government to enact laws,
within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general
welfare of society. It is lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercise by the president and
administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of the municipal levels,
including the barangay. Such delegation confers upon the president quasi-legislative
power which maybe defined as the authority delegated by the lawmaking body to the
administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions
of the law and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the
following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure
3. It must be within the scope of authority given by the legislature
4. It must be reasonable
In the case at bar, the first requisite was satisfied since EO156 has both
constitutional and statutory bases.

Anent to the second requisites that the order must be issued or promulgated in
accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is that the said
executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed
by law.
To the third and fourth requisite, it was reasonable and it does not violate the
constitution or the law in which its implementation are within the scope of the
legislatures commands.
ALVAREZ VS GUINGONA
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into
an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in
the House of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB
8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the
Senate conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee
on Local Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it
was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law
on the ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and
that City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per
annum in order for it to be a city. That in the computation of the reported average
income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs
income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record
shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB
was on its 1st, 2nd and 3rdreading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing
on the said SB one month after the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation
of the said HB as well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average
annual income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because
they form part of the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any
further action on the part of the local government unit. They thus constitute income
which the local government can invariably rely upon as the source of much needed
funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to
classify the same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition
and meaning all its own as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally
makes it distinct from special funds or transfers referred to when the Code speaks of
funding support from the national government, its instrumentalities and government-
owned-or-controlled corporations.

TOLENTINO VS. SECRETARY v. Secretary of Finance
Facts:
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and
properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in
fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the
Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution
Held:
The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process
culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House
bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also
to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the
public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members
of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as
a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings
were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No.
1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only
of printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
certification of a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days

and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of
legislative practice.
GONZALES VS MACARAIG
Facts:
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the constitutionality of Corys veto
of Section 55 of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY 89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16 FY 90). Gonzalez
averred the following: (1) the Presidents line-veto power as regards appropriation
bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her
authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are
provision; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she
cannot exercise the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto
power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that
would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the
power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987 Constitution, has to
be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the prerogative to
impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded by the
Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto `provisions of an
Appropriations Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general appropriations bill matters
that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as item, which can be vetoed
by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power. The SC went one step further
and rules that even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive
power to veto, and Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) were not
provisions in the budgetary sense of the term, they are inappropriate provisions
that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power
BENGZON VS DRILON
FACTS: On 15 Jan 1992, some provisions of the Special Provision for the Supreme
Court and the Lower Courts General Appropriations were vetoed by the President
because a resolution by the Court providing for appropriations for retired justices has
been enacted. The vetoed bill provided for the increase of the pensions of the retired
justices of the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeals as well as members of the
Constitutional Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General
Appropriations bill is constitutional.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due
to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797. The president has no power to set aside
and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the
power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the
repeal of existing laws. The veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president

to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority
to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item.
NOTES: Pocket Veto Not Allowed
Under the Constitution, the President does not have the so-called pocket-veto power,
i.e., disapproval of a bill by inaction on his part. The failure of the President to
communicate his veto of any bill represented to him within 30 days after the receipt
thereof automatically causes the bill to become a law.
This rule corrects the Presidential practice under the 1935 Constitution of releasing
veto messages long after he should have acted on the bill. It also avoids uncertainty as
to what new laws are in force.
When is it allowed?
The exception is provided in par (2),Sec 27 of Art 6 of the Constitution which grants
the President power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue
or tariff bill. The veto in such case shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.
3 ways how a bill becomes a law.
1. When the President signs it

2. When the President vetoes it but the veto is overridden by 2/3 vote of all the
members of each House; and
3. When the president does not act upon the measure within 30 days after it shall
have been presented to him.
TECSON VS. COMELEC

G.R. NO. 161434 | MARCH 3, 2004
FACTS:
In 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed
his COC for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his
name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and
his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, filed a petition to disqualify FPJ and to
deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a
material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born
Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother,
Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being
the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe
was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter
being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the

illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior
marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of respondent.
ISSUES:
Whether FPJ is a natural born citizen

Whether he made a material misrepresentation in his COC
HELD:
FPJs direct ascendant is his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou whose death certificate
identified him to be Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having
died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when
the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of
residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been
his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the en
masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe (date of birth: May
17, 1915), father of respondent FPJ.
The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage
to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five
years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old,
unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was
born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie
Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.
The 1935
Constitution is applicable to determine FPJs citizenship. The applicable provision is
Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this
Constitution adoption of this Constitution,
(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of
majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor
enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in
his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the

Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court,
notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and
evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so
ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate
and willful.
POE VS. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

454 SCRA 242 | MARCH 29, 2005
FACTS:
On June 24, 2004, the Congress as the representatives of the sovereign people and acting as
the National Board of Canvassers, in a near-unanimous roll-call vote, proclaimed Mrs. Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) as the duly elected President of the Philippines. She obtained the
highest votes, followed by the second-placer, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ). She then took her Oath
of Office before the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on June 30, 2004.
Refusing to concede defeat, Mr. FPJ, filed an election protest before the Electoral Tribunal.
Both parties exchanged motions to rush the presentation of their respective positions on the
controversy. Together with the formal Notice of the Death of Protestant on December 14,
2004, his counsel has submitted to the Tribunal, dated January 10, 2005, a
"MANIFESTATION with URGENT PETITION/MOTION to INTERVENE AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DECEASED PROTESTANT FPJ," by the widow, Mrs.Jesusa Sonora
Poe. She claims that because of the untimely demise of her husband and in representation not
only of her deceased husband but more so because of the paramount interest of the Filipino
people, there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late husband in the
election protest initiated by him to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the
2004 elections.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Protestants widow could intervene and/or substitute for the
deceased party.
HELD:
Rule 14. Election Protest:
Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who
received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President
or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.
Since in this case, no real parties such as the vice-presidential aspirants in the 2004 elections,
have come forward to intervene, or to be substituted for the deceased protestant, the petition
must be dismissed.

The court even held in Vda. deDe Mesa that while the right to a public office is personal and
exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the
protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority
to continue the protest proceedings. Hence, substitution and intervention is allowed but only
by a real party in interest. A real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment, and the party who is entitled to the avails of the suit. Herein
movant/intervenor, Mrs. FPJ, herself denies any claim to the august office of President. Thus,
given the circumstances of this case, we can conclude that protestants widow is not a real
party in interest to this election protest.
AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO

G.R. No. 170516 | July 16, 2008
FACTS:
The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the

sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter
of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).
JPEPA which has been referred to as a mega treaty is a comprehensive plan for opening up
of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments.
It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.
The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the
Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator
Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee
heard Governments rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other
hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised their very serious concerns
about the country being turned into Japans toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate
showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan
but one that touches on broader national development concerns.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in
their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the
Congress
Whether or not this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and
take cognizance of the instant petition.
Whether or not the documents and information being requested in relation to the
JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure
such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.
RULINGS:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of Akbayan

Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest
Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel
respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to
furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement
(JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation
process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the
public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said
document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily
discussed the substantive issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to
the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
The Court held: Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while
the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential since there should be
'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' the offers exchanged by the
parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It
is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty
negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their
views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally
involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an
area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national
interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S.
Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to
protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal
that we fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of
executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point
that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

194 SCRA 317 | FEBRUARY 22, 1991
FACTS:
The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing
cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the
executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and
to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision
provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their
deputies to hold any other office or employment.

Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the
primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries."
In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is
valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated unless otherwise allowed by law
which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as
in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member
and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII,

Section 13 of the constitution.
RULING:
The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional
provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the
government for self-enrichment which a betrayal of public trust.
Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants. Thus the phrase unless otherwise provided by the Constitution in
Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-
B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is
only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a
cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

437 SCRA 655 | SEPTEMBER 8, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March

25, 1994 by then President Fidel V. Ramos through Proclamation No. 347. The NAC is tasked
to receive, process and review amnesty applications. It is composed of seven members: a
Chairperson, three regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice,
National Defense and Interior and Local Government as ex officio members.
It appears that after personally attending the initial NAC meetings, the three ex officio
members turned over said responsibility to their representatives who were paid honoraria
beginning December 12, 1994. However, on October 15, 1997, NAC resident auditor Eulalia
disallowed on audit the payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750
for the period December 12, 1994 to June 27, 1997, pursuant to COA Memorandum No. 97-
038.

ISSUE:
Whether representatives can be entitled to payment intended for ex-officio members
RULING:
We hold that the position of petitioner NAC is against the law and jurisprudence. The COA is
correct that there is no legal basis to grant per diem, honoraria or any allowance whatsoever to
the NAC ex officio members' official representatives.
In Civil Liberties Union, we elucidated on the two constitutional prohibitions against holding
multiple positions in the government and receiving double compensation: (1) the blanket
prohibition of paragraph 2, Section 7, Article IX-B on all government employees against
holding multiple government offices, unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of their positions, and (2) the stricter prohibition under
Section 13, Article VII on the President and his official family from holding any other office,
profession, business or financial interest, whether government or private, unless allowed by
the Constitution.
The NAC ex officio members representatives who were all appointive officials with ranks
below Assistant Secretary are covered by the two constitutional prohibitions.
The NAC ex officio members representatives are not exempt from the general prohibition
because there is no law or administrative order creating a new office or position and
authorizing additional compensation therefor.
BITONIO v. COA
425 SCCRA 437 (2004)
FACTS:
Benedicto Ernesto R. Bitonio Jr., petitioner, was appointed Director IV of the
Bureau of Labor Relations in the Department of Labor and Employment. He was
designated by Acting Secretary Jose S. Brillantes of the Department of Labor and
Employment to be the DOLE representative to the Board of Directors of Philippine
Economic Zone Authority. Due to his designation, he receives per diems from PEZA
for every meeting he attended. #n July 31, 1998, COA, the respondent, disallowed the
payment due to the principle established in Civil Liberties case stating
that Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants holding other offices in addition to
their primary office and to receive compensation therefore is unconstitutional.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the COA correctly disallowed the per diems received by the
petitioner for his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors meetings as
representative of the Secretary of Labor.
RULING: YES.
The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board meetings is solely by Virtue of
his capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor. Since the Secretary is
prohibited from receiving compensation for his additional office or employment, such
prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner who sat on behalf of the Secretary. We
cannot allow the petitioner who sat as representative of the Secretary of Labor in
PEZA to have a better right than his principal. The contention that R.A. 7916 as a
legal basis has no merit since such law was amended by RA 8748where provisions in
conflict with the law, specifically the payment of per diem, was deleted.
PUBLIC INTEREST V. ELMA

494 SCRA 53 (2006)
517 SCRA 336 (2007)
FACTS:
This is an original action for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus, with a
Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction that seeks to
declare as null and void the concurrent appointments of respondent Magdangal B.
Elma as Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and
as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) for being contrary to Section 13,Article
VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution
On 30 October 1998, respondent Elma was appointed and took his oath of
office as Chairman of the PCGG. Thereafter, on 11 January 1999, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, respondent Elma was appointed CPLC. He took his oath of office
as CPLC the following day, but he waived any remuneration that he may receive as
CPLC.[5]
However, the respondents allege that the strict prohibition against holding
multiple positions provided under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
applies only to heads of executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries; it does not cover other public officials given the rank of Secretary,
Undersecretary, or Assistant Secretary.
Respondents claim that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987
Constitution that should be applied in their case. This provision, according to the

respondents, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law
allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary functions
of either position allows such concurrent appointment. Respondents also alleged that
since there exists a close relation between the two positions and there is no
incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow
respondent Elmsas concurrent appointments to both positions. Respondents further
add that the appointment of the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an
accepted practice.
However, this case was rendered moot due to supervening events. In 2001, the
appointees of former President Joseph Estrada were replaced by the appointees of the
incumbent president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. There no longer exists an actual
controversy that needs to be resolved. However, this case raises a significant legal
question as yet unresolved - whether the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold
the position of CPLC.
The resolution of this question requires the exercise of the Courts judicial
power, more specifically its exclusive and final authority to interpret laws.
Supervening events, whether intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court
from rendering a decision if there is a grave violation of the Constitution. Even in
cases where supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate
to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling principles
to guide the bench, bar, and public.
Issues:
(2006 case)
1. Can the PCGG Chairman concurrently hold the position of Chief Presidential
Legal Counsel? Does the position of the PCGG Chairman or that of the CPLC
fall under the prohibition against multiple offices imposed by Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution?
2. What is the Standard Compatibility under Section 7, Article IX-B?
(2007 case)
3. What is the effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality? Did it render the
appointments to both positions void?
Ruling:
1. No, he cannot hold both offices

While the strict prohibition under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution is not applicable to thhe PCGG Chairman nor the CPLC, as
neityher of them is secretary, undersecretary, nor an assistant secretary, even if
the former may have the same rank as the latter positions, it must be
emphasized, however, that despite the non-applicability of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution to respondent, Elma, he remains covered by the
general prohibition under Section 7, Article IX-B and his appointmenmts must
stillm comply with the standard of compatibility of officers laid down therein;
falling which, his appointments are hereby pronounced in violation of the
Constitution.
2. Section 7, Article IX-B permits an appointive appointive official to hold
more than one office only if allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position.
The crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two
offices is: whether one office is subordinate to the other, in the sense that one
office has the right to interfere with the other.
In this case, an incompatibility exists between the positions of PCGG
Chairman and CPLC, the duties of CPLC include giving independent and
impartial legal advice on the actions of the heads of various executive
departments and agencies and to review investigations involving heads of
executive departments as well as other Presidential appointees. The PCGG is,
without question, an agency under the Excutive department. Thus, actions of
the PCGG Chairman are subject to the review of the CPLC.
3. The earlier ruling did not render both appointments void. Following the
common-law rule on incompatibility of offices, Elma had, in effect,
vacated his first office as PCGG Chairman when he accepted the second
office as CPLC.
Marcos v. Manglapus
177 SCRA 668 (1989)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via
the non-violent people power revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a
time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the
economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision
to bar the return of Marcos and his family.

Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following
supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a
Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasans failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
a. accumulated foreign debt
b. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents
to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President
Aquinos decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines. Petitioner
questions Aquinos power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the
claim of the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security,
public safety and health. Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty,
property without due process and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it
deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6, Article 3 of the
constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issues:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Ruling:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers.
According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the
executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it does
not define what is meant by executive power although in the same article it touches
on exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons (art VII secfs. 14-
23). Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution

which include the power to protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged to
protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-
5 of the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that
the President can do anything which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin,
supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President (Hyman,
American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of
emergency but also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. Theyre flexible depending
on the circumstances. The request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions
guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or
of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the
present one. It must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to the
paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
context, such request or demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion
on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not
there exist factual basis for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is proven that there are
factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her
decision are factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-
preservation of the country & protection of the people. She has to uphold the
Constitution.
Borja v. COMELEC
295 SCRA 157 (1998)
Facts:
Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected as Vice-Mayor of Pateros on January 18,

1988 for a term ending on June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became Mayor,
by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. Thereafter, Capco
was elected and served as Mayor for two more terms, from 1992 to 1998. On March
27, 1998, Capco filed a Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Pateros in the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capcos disqualification on the ground that Capco would have already served
as Mayor for 3 consecutive terms by June 30, 1998; hence, he would be ineligible to
serve for another term. The Second Division of the Comelec declared Capco
disqualified but the Comelec en banc reversed the decision and declared Capco
eligible to run for mayor. Capco was subsequently voted and proclaimed as mayor.

Issue:
Whether or not a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of mayor by
operation of law and serves the remainder of the term is considered to have served a
term in that office for the purpose of the three-term limit.
Ruling:
No. The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in
an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply. Capco was qualified to
run again as mayor in the next election because he was not elected to the office of
mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of law.
Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted
by the death, of the deceased mayor. The vice-mayors assumption of the mayorship
in the event of the vacancy is more a matter of chance than of design. Hence, his
service in that office should not be counted in the application of any term limit.
The policy embodied in the constitutional provision (Art. X, 8) is not

only to prevent the establishment of political dynasties but also to enhance
the freedom of choice of the people. A consideration of the historical
background of Art. X, 8 of the Constitution reveals that the members of
the Constitutional Commission were as much concerned with preserving
the freedom of choice of the people as they were with preventing the
monopolization of political power. In discussing term limits, the drafters of
the Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were
serving by reason of election. To consider Capco to have served the first
term in full and therefore ineligible to run a third time for reelection would
be not only to falsify reality but also to unduly restrict the right of the
people to choose whom they wish to govern them.
Ople v. Torres
23 SCRA 141 (1998)
Facts:
Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress
to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of

privacy. We grant he petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner
need stronger barriers against further erosion.
A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January
22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant
petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of
the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997,
we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Issue:
Is the issuance of A.O. No. 308 within the scope of the executive or
administrative powers of the President?
Ruling:
The executive power is vested in the President. It is the power of carrying
laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance. The President is
likewise granted administrative power over offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties. Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by the proper governmental organs. To
this end, he can issue administrative orders.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which
relates to specific aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy.
Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and

enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the
President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official
conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and
regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is
not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to

particular aspects of governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."
Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and
hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308

establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life

and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and more particularly,
violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the

lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation
line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the
Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be
allowed.
DENR V. DENR EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
DENR Region XII Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum
order issued by the Regional Executive Director of DENR, directing the immediate
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The
Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued
by then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR
Region 12 Office
RULING:
The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative

organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries
of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as
provided for under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall
have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed."

In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as
an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly
repudiated the same.
CONSTANTINO V. CUISA
FACTS:
During the Aquino regime, the administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce
the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three
restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts they are
basically buyback programs & bond-conversion programs). Constantino as a taxpayer
and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens, together w/ FFDC
averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are onerous and they do not
constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the
Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers
which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is
expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that
the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires
that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of
prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary
Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and
personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop
acting pursuant to the scheme.
ISSUE: Whether or not the president can validly delegate her debt power to the
respondents.
HELD:
There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the
president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact
that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can
delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the
Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief
contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a
strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise
of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding,
achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management
goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign
borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough
to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of

incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that
may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to
negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending
the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of
execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would
negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the
holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in
running the government. The act of the respondents are not unconstitutional.
Exception:
There are certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated by subsequent
approval or ratification by the President. There are certain constitutional powers and
prerogatives of the Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in
person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of
those powers by any other person. Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law and the exercise by him of the benign
prerogative of pardon (mercy).
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances,
and if exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least
call for the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal
branches of government. The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power notwithstanding the judicial
determination of guilt of the accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally vested power. The list is by
no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that the executive power in question
is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
RUFINO V. ENDRIGA
Facts:
Petitioners in GR No. 139565, led by Baltazar N. Endriga (the Endriga
group),were appointed members of the board of trustees of the Cultural Center of
thePhilippines (CCP) by President Fidel V. Ramos in 1995, with the qualification
thattheir appointments would extend only until December 31, 1998. On December
22,1998, then President Joseph Estrada advised petitioners that they were being
replacedby seven new appointees to the CCP board, led by Armita B. Rufino (the
Rufinogroup). Having been dislodged from the CCP, Endriga filed quo warranto
proceedingsquestioning the Presidents authority to appoint new members in the CCP
board.
It was alleged that under Section 6(b)[1] of Presidential Decree No. 15,
vacancies in the board shall be filled by election by a vote of a majority of the
trustees held at the next regular meeting x xx. The Endriga group claimed that it was
only when the board was entirely vacant that the President of the Philippines may fill
the vacancies, in consultation with the ranking officers of the CCP. The members of

the group believed that since only one seat was vacant, President Estrada could not
appoint a new board. They averred that presidential appointment was unjustified,
since the CCP board still had 10 incumbent trustees who had the statutory power to
fill any vacancy in the board by election. On May 14, 1999, the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted the quo warranto Petition. It declared the Endriga group lawfully
entitled to hold office and ousted respondents from the CCP board. The CA held that
Section 6(b) of Presidential Decree (PD) 15 had clearly vested in the remaining
members of the board the power to elect new trustees. It ruled that the President could
exercise the power to appoint only when the board was entirely vacant. In its appeal
before this Court, the Rufino group asserted that Section 6(b) of PD 15, which
authorized the CCP trustees to elect their fellow trustees, should be declared
unconstitutional. The provision was allegedly repugnant to Section 16 of Article VII
of the Constitution, which allowed the appointment only of officers lower in rank
than the appointing power.
Issue:
The lone issue was whether Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was unconstitutional in

the light of Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
Ruling:
At the outset, the Court recognized the occurrence of a supervening event that
could have rendered the case moot the resignation of the Rufino group and the
appointment of new CCP trustees by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The Court,
however, deemed it best to pass upon the merits of the case, in order to prevent a
repeat of this regrettable controversy and to protect the CCP from being periodically
wracked by internecine politics. Moreover, the Court brushed aside procedural
barriers, in view of the paramount importance of the constitutional issues involved.
By a vote of 10-3,[2] the Court held that Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was
irreconcilable with Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.
The clear and categorical language of Section 6 (b) of PD 15 states that
vacancies in the CCP board shall be filled by a majority vote of the remaining
trustees. It is only when the board becomes entirely vacant that the vacancies shall be
filled by the President of the Philippines, acting in consultation with the same ranking
officers of the CCP. Thus, Section 6 (b) empowers the remaining trustees of the board
to fill the vacancies by electing their fellow trustees. Simply put, this provision
authorizes the appointing officer to appoint an officer who will be equal in rank to the
former.

In its Decision, the Court held that the power of appointment granted in
Section 6 (b) of PD 15 transgressed Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution.[3] It
explained that the power to appoint vested by Section 16 in the President; or the
heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards was restricted only to
officers lower in rank. This constitutional provision clearly excluded a situation in
which the appointing officers appointed an officer who would be equal to them in
rank.
This latter situation, however, was present in the CCP, whose trustees were
appointing new co-trustees who would be equal in rank to the former. Thus, Section 6
(b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional, insofar as it violated the
constitutional mandate that the head of the board may be authorized to appoint lower-
ranking officers only.
Further, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution authorized Congress to
vest specifically in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards and
in no other person the power to appoint lower-ranked officers. The word heads
referred to the chairpersons of the commissions or boards, not to their members, for
several reasons.
First, the 1935, the 1973, and the 1987 Constitutions made a clear distinction
whenever the power to appoint lower-ranked officers was granted to the members of
or the head of a collegial body. When conferring the power of appointment to the
members of that collegial body, our past and present Constitutions used the phrases
in the courts, courts, the Supreme Court,members of the Cabinet, and the
Constitutional Commissions.
Thus, if the intention was to grant to members of a commission or board the
power to appoint lower-ranked officials, Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution
should have used the phrase in the commissions or boards. But in sharp contrast,
this provision vested the power in the heads of the departments, agencies,
commissions or boards.
Second, the deliberations of the present Constitution revealed that the framers
had intended the phrase in the heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or
boards to be an enumeration of offices whose heads may be vested by law with the
power to appoint lower-ranked officers. Thus, in the enumeration, what applied to the
first office applied also to the succeeding offices mentioned.
Third, all commissions or boards had chief executives who were their heads.
Since the Constitution spoke of heads of office, and all commissions or boards had
chief executives or heads, that word could have referred only to the chief executives
or heads of the commissions or boards.
Given that the word heads referred to the commission or board chairpersons,
not members, the Court ruled that the head of the CCP was the chairperson of the
CCP board of trustees. This conclusion was further supported by the fact that Section
8 of PD 15 and Section 3 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the CCP
recognized that its board chairperson as the head of the CCP had the power to
appoint, remove, and discipline all officers, staff and personnel of the CCP.

Pursuant to Section 16 of Article VII of the Constitution, the chairperson of

the CCP board, as the head of the CCP, was the only officer who could be vested by
law with the power to appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP. Section 6 (b) of PD
15 could not validly grant this power of appointment to the members of the CCP
board, as they were not the head of the CCP.
Moreover, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15 was found to be unconstitutional,
because it ran afoul of the Presidents power of control under Section 17 of Article
VII of the Constitution. It was noted that the CCP was an agency that fell under the
Executive Branch.
Under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, any agency not placed by
law or order creating them under any specific department fell under the Office of
the President.[12] Since the CCP did not fall under the Legislative or the Judicial
Branch of government and was not an independent constitutional or quasi-judicial
body or local government unit, then the CCP necessarily fell under the Executive
Branch and should be subject to the Presidents control.
However, Section 6 (b and c) of PD 15, by authorizing the trustees of the CCP
board to fill its vacancies, insulated the CCP from political influence and pressure,
specifically from the President. This authority made the CCP a self-perpetuating
entity, virtually outside the control of the Chief Executive. Such public office or board
could not legally exist under the present Constitution.
The legislature could not have validly enacted a law that would put a
government office in the Executive Branch outside the control of the President. While
the charter of the CCP vested it with autonomy of policy and operation, this charter
did not free it from the Presidents control. As part of the Executive Branch, the CCP
could not be cut off from that control in the guise of insulating the latter from
presidential influence.
MMDA V VIRON TRANSPORT G.R. NO. 170656 AUGUST 15, 2007

J. Carpio Morales
Facts:
GMA declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179 operational, thereby creating
the MMDA in 2003. Due to traffic congestion, the MMDA recommended a plan to
decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro
Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass
transport system. The MMC gave a go signal for the project. Viron Transit, a bus
company assailed the move. They alleged that the MMDA didnt have the power to
direct operators to abandon their terminals. In doing so they asked the court to
interpret the extent and scope of MMDAs power under RA 7924. They also asked if
the MMDA law contravened the Public Service Act.

Another bus operator, Mencorp, prayed for a TRO for the implementation in a
trial court. In the Pre-Trial Order17 issued by the trial court, the issues were narrowed
down to whether (1) the MMDAs power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included
the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly
established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in
a common terminal; (2) the E.O. is consistent with the Public Service Act and the
Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their real
properties without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus
terminals. The trial court sustained the constitutionality.
Both bus lines filed for a MFR in the trial court. It, on September 8, 2005,
reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of
police power"; that the authority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924
does not include the power to order the closure of Virons and Mencorps existing bus
terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service
Act.
MMDA filed a petition in the Supreme Court. Petitioners contend that there is
no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body of
the E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the
major thoroughfares of Metro Manila. To them, Viron and Mencorp failed to produce
any letter or communication from the Executive Department apprising them of an
immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.
And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to
government agencies to coordinate with the MMDA and to make available for use
government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They add that the
only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the
implementing officials, but not between third persons.
Issues:
1. Is there a justiciable controversy?
2. Is the elimination of bus terminals unconstitutional?
Held: Yes to both. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
1. Requisites: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy
must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking

declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue
invoked must be ripe for judicial determination
It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The
closure of their bus terminals would mean, among other things, the loss of income
from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely, respondents claim a
deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.
Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial
interest in the case such that [they have] sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of [the E.O.s] enforcement." Consequently, the established rule that the
constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who
will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by
respondents.
2. Under E.O. 125 A, the DOTC was given the objective of guiding government and
private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation and
communications systems. It was also tasked to administer all laws, rules and
regulations in the field of transportation and communications.
It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is
the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although
authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the
authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary
implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation
of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a
project such as the Project in question.
By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the
President clearly overstepped the limits of the authority conferred by law, rendering
E.O. No. 179 ultra vires. There was no grant of authority to MMDA. It was delegated
only to set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and
regulate the implementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic
management, specifically pertaining to enforcement, engineering and education.
In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is
devoid of authority to implement the Project as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could
not have been validly designated by the President to undertake the Project.
MMDAs move didnt satisfy police power requirements such as that (1) the interest
of the public generally, as distinguished from that of a particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for
the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public
interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the
means.
As early as Calalang v. Williams, this Court recognized that traffic congestion
is a public, not merely a private, concern. The Court therein held that public welfare

underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of Public Works to promulgate
rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.
Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the
bottom of any regulatory measure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is,
to say the least, a menace to public safety." As such, measures calculated to promote
the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation of
vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.
Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern
that needs to be addressed immediately. Are the means employed appropriate and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they not duly
oppressive?
De la Cruz v. Paras- Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the
flow of traffic. How the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals,
apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to
solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened.
In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the
maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide
facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all.
Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with
the provisions of the Public Service Act.
Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC (now the ltfrb)was
empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction, equipment, maintenance,
service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require"
in approving any franchise or privilege. The law mandates the ltfrb to require any
public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension
of its existing facilities.
GANZON V. CA
FACTS:
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10 complaints were filed
against him on grounds of misconduct and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of
Local Government issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on the
merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon was facing about 600 days of
suspension. Ganzon appealed the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension
order by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution does not authorize
the President nor any of his alter ego to suspend and remove local officials; this is

because the 1987 Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the same.
What was given by the present Constitution was mere supervisory power.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the Presidents alter
ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.
HELD:
Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the Constitution has left the
President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of
investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority.
It is a mistaken impression because legally, supervision is not incompatible with
disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the power of
supervision by the President over local government officials in contrast to the power
of control given to him over executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are two different things which
differ one from the other in meaning and extent. In administration law supervision
means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may
take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or
nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of the
President over local government officials does not include the power of investigation
when in his opinion the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the president, in
suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power. He however overstepped by imposing
a 600 day suspension.
JOSON V TORRES
FACTS: Privaterespondents filed a letter-complaint charging petitioner with grave
misconduct and abuse of authority because they alleged that they were at the
provincial capitol for SangguniangPanlalawigan when petitioner barged in, kicked the
door and chairs and uttered threatening words at them; close behind petitioner were
several men with long and short firearms who encircled the area. Private respondents
claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative
measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecijaobtain a loan from
the Philippine National Bank. Private respondents prayed for the suspension or
removal of petitioner; for an emergency audit of the provincial treasury of Nueva
Ecija; and for the review of the proposed loan in light of the financial condition of the
province.
Acting upon the instructions of the President, Secretary Barbers notified petitioner of
the case against him and attached to the notice a copy of the complaint and its
annexes. In the same notice, Secretary Barbers directed petitioner "to submit [his]
verified/sworn answer thereto, not a motion to dismiss, together with such

documentary evidence that [he] has in support thereof, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt."
Immediately thereafter, Secretary Barbers proceeded to Nueva Ecija and summoned

petitioner and private respondents to a conference to settle the controversy. The
parties entered into an agreement whereby petitioner promised to maintain peace and
order in the province while private respondents promised to refrain from filing cases
that would adversely affect their peaceful co-existence.
The peace agreement was not respected by the parties and the private respondents
reiterated their letter-complaint. Petitioner was again ordered to file his answer to the
letter-complaint. For failure to file an answer after three extensions, in which the
DILG also informed him that his "failure to submit answer will be considered a
waiver and that the plaintiff [shall] be allowed to present his evidence ex-parte," the
petitioner was declared in default and ordered the petitioner 60-day preventive
suspension.
Petitioner later filed Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation and prayed that a
formal investigation of his case be conducted pursuant to the provisions of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23 and submitted
a "Manifestation and Motion" before the DILG reiterating his right to a formal
investigation; DILG denied the motion declaring that the submission of position
papers substantially complies with the requirements of procedural due process in
administrative proceedings. Later, the Executive Secretary, by authority of the
President, adopted the findings and recommendation of the DILG Secretary. He
imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for six (6) months
without pay.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that rules of
procedure and evidence should not be strictly applied in the Administrative
Disciplinary;
2. Whether or not the resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of
undue delegation; that it is the President who is the Disciplining Authority, not
the Secretary of DILG;
RULING:
1. Section 60 of Chapter 4, Title II, Book I of the Local Government Code

enumerates the grounds for which an elective local official may be disciplined,
suspended or removed from office. An administrative complaint against an
erring elective official must be verified and filed with the proper government
office.
In the instant case, petitioner Joson is an elective official of the province of

Nueva Ecija. The letter-complaint against him was therefore properly filed
with the Office of the President. According to petitioner, however, the letter-
complaint failed to conform with the formal requirements set by the Code. He
alleges that the complaint was not verified by private respondents and was not
supported by the joint affidavit of the two witnesses named therein; that

private respondents later realized these defects and surreptitiously inserted the
verification and sworn statement while the complaint was still pending with
the Office of the President. To prove his allegations, petitioner submitted: (a)
the sworn statement of private respondent attesting to the alleged fact that after
the letter-complaint was filed, Vice-Governor Tinio made her and the other
members of the SangguniangPanlalawigan sign an additional page which he
had later notarized; and (b) the fact that the verification of the letter-complaint
and the joint affidavit of the witnesses do not indicate the document, page or
book number of the notarial register of the notary public before whom they
were made.
We find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The absence of the

document, page or book number of the notarial register of the subscribing
officer is insufficient to prove petitioner's claim. The lack of these entries may
constitute proof of neglect on the part of the subscribing officer in complying
with the requirements for notarization and proper verification. They may give
grounds for the revocation of his notarial commission. But they do not
indubitably prove that the verification was inserted or intercalated after the
letter-complaint was filed with the Office of the President.
Nor is the fact of intercalation sufficiently established by the affidavit of Solita

C. Santos. Private respondent Santos was one of the signatories to the letter-
complaint. In her affidavit, she prayed that she be dropped as one of the
complainants since she had just joined the political party of petitioner
Joson. She decided to reveal the intercalation because she was disillusioned
with the "dirty tactics" of Vice-Governor Tinio to grab power from petitioner
Joson. Private respondent Santos cannot in any way be considered an unbiased
witness. Her motive and change of heart render her affidavit suspect.
Assuming, nonetheless, that the letter-complaint was unverified when
submitted to the Office of the President, the defect was not fatal. The
requirement of verification was deemed waived by the President himself when
he acted on the complaint.
Verification is a formal, not jurisdictional requisite. Verification is mainly

intended to secure an assurance that the allegations therein made are done in
good faith or are true and correct and not mere speculation. The lack of
verification is a mere formal defect. The court may order the correction of the
pleading, if not verified, or act on the unverified pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that a strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed
with in order that the ends of justice may be served.
2. The DILG resolution is valid. The President remains the Disciplining

Authority. What is delegated is the power to investigate, not the power to
discipline. As the Disciplining Authority, the President has the power derived
from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local government
officials. A. O. No. 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the
DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the
Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner
Josons claim.

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency which recognizes the

establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the
various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand
that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions
of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President provided in the
Constitution. Control is said to be the very heart of the power of the
presidency. As head of the Executive Department, the President, however, may
delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is
required by the Constitution to act in person or the exigencies of the situation
demand that he acts personally. The members of Cabinet may act for and in
behalf of the President in certain matters because the President cannot be
expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally all the
time. Each head of a department is, and must be, the Presidents alter ego in
the matters of that department where the President is required by law to
exercise authority.
PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE
FACTS:On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372 which
is the ADOPTION OF ECONOMY MEASURES IN GOVERNMENT FOR FY
1998. Subsequently, on December 10, 1998, President Joseph E. Estrada issued AO
43, amending Section 4 of AO 372, by reducing to five percent (5%) the amount of
internal revenue allotment (IRA) to be withheld from the LGUs.
Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in effect exercising the
power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests in the President, however, only
the power of general supervision over LGUs, consistent with the principle of local
autonomy. Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of
their IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to each of
these units its share in the national internal revenue.
The solicitor general, on behalf of the respondents, claims on the other hand that AO
372 was issued to alleviate the "economic difficulties brought about by the peso
devaluation" and constituted merely an exercise of the President's power of
supervision over LGUs. It allegedly does not violate local fiscal autonomy, because it
merely directs local governments to identify measures that will reduce their total
expenditures for non-personal services by at least 25 percent. Likewise, the
withholding of 10 percent of the LGUs IRA does not violate the statutory prohibition
on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the
Development Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce
their expenditures by 25 percent is valid;
2. Whether or not Section 4of AO 372, which withholds 10 percent of their
internal revenue allotments, is valid;
RULING:
1. Valid. The provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to
recognize the need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic
difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would do well to heed the President's call to
unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the crisis. It is understood,
however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials
who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the solicitor
general's contention in regard to Section 1.
2. Invalid. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the
shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. The LGUs IRA shall not be
subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national
government for whatever purpose. Sec. 4 of AO 372 which orders the
withholding of 10% of the LGUs IRA in the country clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback,
which means something held back or withheld, often temporarily. Hence,
the temporary nature of the retention by the national government does not
matter. Any retention is prohibited. Sec. 4 of AO 372 effectively encroaches
on the fiscal autonomy of local governments.
BITO-ONON V FERNANDEZ
FACTS:Bito-Onon is the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Tacras, Narra Palawan
and is the Municipal LigaChapter President for the Municipality of Narra, Palawan.
Respondent Quejano Jr., on the other hand, is theduly elected Barangay Chairman of
Rizal, Magsaysay, Palawan and is the Municipal Liga Chapter President ofMagsaysay,
Palawan. Both Bito-Onon and Quejano were candidates for the position of Executive
Vice-President in the August 23, 1997 election for the LigangmgaBarangay Provincial
Chapter in the province of Palawan.Bito-Onon was the proclaimed winner prompting
Quejano to file a post proclamation protest with the Boardof Election Supervisors
(BES), which was decided against him. Not satisfied with the decision of BES,
Quejano filed a petition for review of the decision of BES. On 1999, Onon filed a
petition to dismiss thereview raising the issue of jurisdiction. The latter claimed that
RTC has no jurisdiction to review the BESdecision in any post proclamation electoral
protest in connection with the 1997 Ligangmga Barangay Election ofOfficers and
Directors . In his motion to dismiss, Bito-Onon claimed that the Supplemental
Guidelines for the1997 guidelines for the Ligangmga Barangay Election issued by the
DILG in its Memorandum Circular No. 97-193, providing for review of decisions
or resolutions of the BES by the regular courts of law is an Ultra Vires actand is void
for being issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, as its issuance is not a mere act of
supervision but rather an exercise of control over the Ligas Internal Organization.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the questioned provision in Memorandum Circular 97-193

was issued by the DILG Secretary in excess of his authority;
2. Does the Presidents power of general supervision extend to the ligangmga
barangay, which is not a local government unit?
RULING:
1. Memorandum Circular No. 97-193 was issued by the DILG Secretary
pursuant to the power of general supervision of the President over all
local government units which were delegated to the DILG Secretary by
virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated February 18, 1992. The
Presidents power of general supervision over local government units is
conferred upon him by the Constitution. The power of supervision is
defined as the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law. This is distinguished from
the power of control or the power of an officer to alter or modify or set
aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter.
2. We rule in the affirmative. In Opinion No. 41, Series of 1995, the Department
of Justice ruled that the ligangmga barangay is a government organization,
being an association, federation, league or union created by law or by
authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government
officials. The Local Government Code[21] defines the ligangmga barangay as
an organization of all barangays for the primary purpose of determining the
representation of the liga in the sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating
and crystallizing issues affecting barangay government administration and
securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.[22] The liga shall
have chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and metropolitan political
subdivision levels. The municipal and city chapters of the liga shall be
composed of the barangay representatives of the municipal and city barangays
respectively. The duly elected presidents of the component municipal and city
chapters shall constitute the provincial chapter or the metropolitan political
subdivision chapter. The duly elected presidents of highly urbanized cities,
provincial chapters, the Metropolitan Manila chapter and metropolitan
political subdivision chapters shall constitute the National Ligangmga
Barangay.
NATIONAL LIGA V PAREDES

FACTS: Manuel A. Rayos, Punong Barangay in Caloocan City, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order and damages against Alex L. David then president of
the Liga Chapter of Caloocan City and of the Ligangmga Barangay National Chapter,
after David allegedly committed certain irregularities in the notice, venue and conduct
of the proposed synchronized Ligangmga Barangay elections in 1997. One of these
irregularities was that the deadline of the filig of the Certificate of Candidacy was set
on the third day prior to the election day and Rayos failed to meet the deadline
because he failed to obtain a certified true copy of the COMELEC Certificate of
Canvas and Proclamation of Winning Candidate, which were needed to be a delegate,

to vote and be voted for in the Liga election. On 13 June 1997, the Executive Judge
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), effective for seventy-two (72) hours,
enjoining the holding of the general membership and election meeting
of Liga Chapter of Caloocan City on 14 June 1975.[5
Respondent Rayos filed a second petition, this time for quo warranto, mandamus and
prohibition, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order and damages, against David, Nancy Quimpo, Presiding Officer of
the SangguniangPanlungsod of Caloocan City, and Secretary Barbers.[7] Rayos
alleged that he was elected President of the Liga Caloocan Chapter in the elections
held on 14 June 1997. Before the consolidation of the cases, on 25 July 1997, the
DILG through respondent Secretary Barbers, filed in SCA No. C-512 an Urgent
Motion,[11] invoking the Presidents power of general supervision over all local
government units and seeking the following reliefs:
The prayer for injunctive reliefs was anchored on the following grounds: (1) the
DILG Secretary exercises the power of general supervision over all government units
by virtue of Administrative Order No. 267 dated 18 February 1992; (2) the
Ligangmga Barangay is a government organization; (3) undue interference by some
local elective officials during the Municipal and City Chapter elections of
the Ligangmga Barangay; (4) improper issuance of confirmations of the
elected Liga Chapter officers by petitioner David and the National LigaBoard; (5) the
need for the DILG to provide remedies measured in view of the confusion and chaos
sweeping the LigangmgaBarangayand the incapacity of the National Liga Board to
address the problems properly.
Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez, issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-176.[15] It cited
the reported violations of the Ligangmga Barangay Constitution and By-Laws by
David and widespread chaos and confusion among local government officials as to
who were the qualified ex-officio Liga members in their respective sangunians.
[16]
Pending the appointment of the DILG as the Interim Caretaker of the Ligangmga
Barangay by the court and until the officers and board members of the
national Liga Chapter have been elected and have assumed office, the Memorandum
Circular directed all provincial governors, vice governors, city mayors, city vice
mayors, members of the sangguniangpanlalawigan and panlungsod, DILG regional
directors and other concerned officers,
ISSUE: Whether or not the Liga is a government organization subject to the DILG
Secretarys power of supervision over local governments as the alter ego of the
President;
RULING: Yes. The barangay is positioned to influence and direct the development of
the entire country. The Liga is the vehicle assigned to make this new development
approach materialize and produce results. The presidents of the Liga at the municipal,
city, and provincial levels, automatically become ex-officio members of the
Sangguniang Bayan, SangguniangPanlungsod and SangguniangPanlalawigan,
respectively.
In the Bita-onon case, theDOJ ruled that the Ligangmga Barangay is a government
organization, being an association, federation, league, or union created by law or by

authority of law, whose members are either appointed or elected government officials.
The primary purpose of determining the representation of the Liga in the
Sanggunians, and for ventilating, articulating and crystalizing issues affecting
barangay government administration and securing, through proper and legal means,
solutions thereto.
MANALO V SISTOZA
FACTS: On December 13, 1990, Republic Act 6975 creating the Department of
Interior and Local Government was signed into law by former President Corazon C.
Aquino. Said law, under Sections 26 and 31 thereof, also provided on the manner as to
how officers of the Philippine National Police are to be appointed. It was provided
that the PNP Chief as well as certain police officers including Directors and Chief
Superintendents, after being appointed by the President, must be confirmed by the
Commission on Appointments before said officers can take their office. Pursuant
thereto, Pres. Aquino, through Executive Secretary Franklin S. Drilon, promoted 15
police officers to permanent positions in the Philippine National Police with the rank
of Chief Superintendent to Director. The said police officers took their oath of office
and assumed their respective positions. Thereafter, the Department of Budget and
Management, under the then Secretary Salvador M. Enriquez III, authorized
disbursements for their salaries and other emoluments.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, as a taxpayer suit, to assail the legality of
subject appointments and disbursements made therefor. He contends that: (1) RA
6975 requires confirmation of the appointments of officers from the rank of senior
superintendent and higher by the CA; (2) The PNP is akin to the Armed Forces where
the Constitution specifically requires confirmation by the CA, and (3) Respondent
Secretary in allowing and/or effecting disbursements in favor of respondent officers
despite the unconstitutionality and illegality of their appointments is acting without or
in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appointment PNP officers need CA confirmation;

2. Whether or not Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 are constitutional;
RULINGS:
1. Under Section 16, Article VII, of the Constitution, there are four groups of
officers of the government to be appointed by the President:
First, the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public

ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;

Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law
vest in the President alone.
It is well-settled that only presidential appointments belonging to the first

group require the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The
appointments of respondent officers who are not within the first category, need
not be confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. As held in the case of
Tarrosa vs. Singson, Congress cannot by law expand the power of
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments and require confirmation of
appointments of other government officials not mentioned in the first sentence
of Section 16 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Sections 26 and 31 of Republic Act 6975 which empower the Commission on

Appointments to confirm the appointments of public officials whose
appointments are not required by the Constitution to be confirmed are
unconstitutional. The rest of Republic Act 6975 stands. It is well-settled that
when provisions of law declared void are severable from the main statute and
the removal of the unconstitutional provisions would not affect the validity
and enforceability of the other provisions, the statute remains valid without its
voided sections.
MATIBAG V. BENIPAYO
380 SCRA 49
Facts:
The COMELEC En Banc appointed petitioner as the Acting Director IV of the EID.
Sometime after, President Arroyo appointed, ad interim, the respondents herein as
Comelec Chairman and Comelec Commissioners. The Office of the President
submitted to the Commission on Appointments of the respondents for confirmation.
However, the commissions did not act on said appointments. Once more, President
Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments for the respondents and made them took
their oaths for the second time. Again, the Office transmitted their appointments to the
Commission for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the Commission could act
on their appointments. Thus, the President renewed against the ad interim
appointments of the respondents to the same positions. The Office submitted their
appointments for confirmation to the Commission. They took their oaths of office
anew.
In his capacity as Comelec Chairman, the respondent issued a memorandum

addressed to petitioner to be reassigned to the Law Department. The petitioner asked
for a reconsideration of her reassignment but was denied of it. Hence, the petition
herein questioning the validity of the appointment of the respondents.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the ad interim appointment to the Comelec is a temporary
appointment that is prohibited by Sec. 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution.

(2) Assuming the first ad interim appointment is valid, whether or not the renewal of
the ad interim appointments of the respondents is a violation of Section1 (2), Article
IX-C of the Constitution
Holding:
(1) No. An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect
immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an
ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution uses
the word effective only until.
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective until such disapproval or next
adjournment, signifying that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the
President. Thus, the term "ad interim appointment", as used in letters of appointment
signed by the President, means a permanent appointment made by the President in the
meantime that Congress is in recess.
(2) A by-passed appointment is one that has not been finally acted upon on the merits
by the Commission on Appointments at the close of the session of Congress. There is
no final decision by the Commission on Appointments to give or withhold its consent
to the appointment as required by the Constitution. Absent such decision, the
President is free to renew the ad interim appointment of a by-passed appointee. This is
recognized in Section 17 of the Rules of the Commission on Appointments, which
provides as follows:
"Section 17. Unacted Nominations or Appointments Returned to the President.

Nominations or appointments submitted by the President of the Philippines which are
not finally acted upon at the close of the session of Congress shall be returned to the
President and, unless new nominations or appointments are made, shall not again be
considered by the Commission." Hence, under the Rules of the Commission on
Appointments, a by-passed appointment can be considered again if the President
renews the appointment.
SORIANO VS. LISTA

399 S 437
Facts:
Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to
Vice Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office
without confirmation by the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a
taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of
their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the COA.

Held:
Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality
of an act or statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he
has sustained, or is in immediate or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite
way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayers suit because
petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by
Congress of its taxing power.
Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the
Department of National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC).
PIMENTEL VS ERMITA
472 S 587
Facts:
This is a petition for mandamus filed by petitioners to compel the Office of the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence
in accordance with Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
It is the theory of the petitioners that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic law and
international law, is a function of the Senate. Hence, it is the duty of the executive department
to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the Senate to allow it to exercise its
discretion with respect to ratification of treaties. Moreover, petitioners submit that the
Philippines has a ministerial duty to ratify the Rome Statute under treaty law and customary
international law. Petitioners invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties enjoining
the states to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when
they have signed the treaty prior to ratification unless they have made their intention clear not
to become parties to the treaty
Issue:
whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial
duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President.
Holding:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole
organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign
nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the
authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition,
maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of
foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.
Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "no treaty or international agreement shall be valid
and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential
to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the
concurrence of the legislature in the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution
ensures a healthy system of checks and balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political
maturity and growth
Justice Isagani Cruz, in his book on International Law, describes the treatymaking process in
this wise:
The usual steps in the treaty-making process are: negotiation, signature, ratification, and
exchange of the instruments of ratification. The treaty may then be submitted for registration
and publication under the U.N. Charter, although this step is not essential to the validity of
the agreement as between the parties.
Negotiation may be undertaken directly by the head of state but he now usually assigns this
task to his authorized representatives. These representatives are provided with credentials
known as full powers, which they exhibit to the other negotiators at the start of the formal
discussions. It is standard practice for one of the parties to submit a draft of the proposed
treaty which, together with the counter-proposals, becomes the basis of the subsequent
negotiations. The negotiations may be brief or protracted, depending on the issues involved,
and may even "collapse" in case the parties are unable to come to an agreement on the points
under consideration.
If and when the negotiators finally decide on the terms of the treaty, the same is opened for
signature. This step is primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and for

the purpose of symbolizing the good faith of the parties; but, significantly, it does not indicate
the final consent of the state in cases where ratification of the treaty is required. The
document is ordinarily signed in accordance with the alternat, that is, each of the several
negotiators is allowed to sign first on the copy which he will bring home to his own state.
Ratification, which is the next step, is the formal act by which a state confirms and accepts
the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representatives. The purpose of ratification is to
enable the contracting states to examine the treaty more closely and to give them an
opportunity to refuse to be bound by it should they find it inimical to their interests. It is for
this reason that most treaties are made subject to the scrutiny and consent of a department of
the government other than that which negotiated them.
The last step in the treaty-making process is the exchange of the instruments of ratification,
which usually also signifies the effectivity of the treaty unless a different date has been
agreed upon by the parties. Where ratification is dispensed with and no effectivity clause is
embodied in the treaty, the instrument is deemed effective upon its signature.
Petitioners arguments equate the signing of the treaty by the Philippine representative with
ratification. It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two
separate and distinct steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is
primarily intended as a means of authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good
faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the states authorized representative in the
diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state
confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally
held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the government.
Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to
ratify the treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final
consent of the state to the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions
thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the
states be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is
the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally confirmed and approved by a State.
By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its willingness to be bound by the
provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states representative, the President,
being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and the duty to carefully
study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest of the state
and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by
the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of
states. If that were so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile.
It has been held that a state has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been
signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes

without saying that the refusal must be based on substantial grounds and not on superficial or
whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be justified in taking offense.
It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is
limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it
is within the authority of the President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having
secured its consent for its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to
ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a serious step that should not be taken
lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President alone, which cannot be
encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction over actions
seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court, therefore,
cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction
to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute
to the Senate.
QUINTOS-DELES VS THE COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISSIONS
177 S 259
Facts:
Due to the opposition of some congressmen-member of the Commission on
Appointments, the Petitioner and three others were unable to take their seats as
Sectoral Representatives, as appointed by the President.
Issue:
The issue is, whether the Constitution requires the appointment of sectoral
representatives to the House of Representatives to be confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments.
Holding:
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution enumerates among others, the officers who
may be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, as follows:
SEC. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of
other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.

The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the
Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective
only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.
In Sarmiento vs. Mison, et al. (156 SCRA 549 [19871), we construed Section 16,
Article VII of the Constitution to mean that only appointments to offices mentioned in
the first sentence of the said Section 16, Article VII require confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments,
Since the seats reserved for sectoral representatives in paragraph 2, Section 5, Art. VI
may be filled by appointment by the President by express provision of Section 7, Art.
XVIII of the Constitution, it is undubitable that sectoral representatives to the House
of Representatives are among the "other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President in this Constitution," referred to in the first sentence of Section 16, Art. VII
whose appointments are subject to confirmation by the
BERMUDEZ VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RUBEN TORRES

311 S 733
Facts:
The validity and legality of the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit to the post of
Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac by then President Fidel V. Ramos is assailed in this petition on
the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice
prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987.
Issue:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President
can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
Holding:
An "appointment" to a public office is the unequivocal act of designating or selecting by one
having the authority therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the duties and
functions of an office or trust. The appointment is deemed complete once the last act
required of the appointing authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by
the appointee in order to render it effective. Appointment necessarily calls for an exercise of
discretion on the part of the appointing authority. In Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, reiterated in Flores vs.Drilon, this Court has held:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of
choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is
best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a
prerogative of the appointing power . .
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to appoint. In
the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint a
subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying with it an

ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here pertinent to state that the President is
the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all "executive
departments, bureaus and offices." Control means the authority of an empowered officer to
alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the
former deems it to be appropriate. Expressed in another way, the President has the power to
assume directly the functions of an executive department, bureau and office. It can
accordingly be inferred therefrom that the President can interfere in the exercise of discretion
of officials under him or altogether ignore their recommendations.
It is the considered view of the Court, given the above disquisition, that the phrase "upon
recommendation of the Secretary," found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the
Revised Administrative Code, should be interpreted, as it is normally so understood, to be a
mere advise, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not
binding or obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here
nothing really more than advisory in nature. The President, being the head of the Executive
Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action of the departments, bureaus
or offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said
as having acted beyond the scope of his authority.
CONCEPCION-BAUTISTA V SALONGA
FACTS:On 27 August 1987, the President of the Philippines designated herein
petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman, Commission on Human
Rights. Realizing perhaps the need for a permanent chairman and members of the
Commission on Human Rights, befitting an independent office, as mandated by the
Constitution, the President of the Philippines extended to petitioner Bautista a
permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. It is to be noted that by
virtue of such appointment, petitioner Bautista was advised by the President that she
could qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the office of Chairman
of the Commission on Human Rights, requiring her to furnish the office of the
President and the Civil Service Commission with copies of her oath of office.
On 22 December 1988, before the Chief Justice of this Court, petitioner Bautista took
her oath of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights.
Immediately, after taking her oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights, petitioner Bautista discharged the functions and duties of the Office of
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights which, as previously stated, she had
originally held merely in an acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987.
On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a letter from the Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments requesting her to submit to the Commission certain
information and documents as required by its rules in connection with the
confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission on Appointments' Secretary again wrote petitioner Bautista
requesting her presence at a meeting of the Commission on Appointments Committee

on Justice, Judicial and Bar Council and Human Rights set for 19 January 1989 at 9
A.M. at the Conference Room, 8th Floor, Kanlaon Tower I, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay
City that would deliberate on her appointment as Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights. 8
On 13 January 1989, petitioner Bautista wrote to the Chairman of the Commission on
Appointments stating, for the reasons therein given, why she considered the
Commission on Appointments as having no jurisdiction to review her appointment as
Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights. Notwithstanding that, the
Commission on Appointments disapproved petitioner Bautistas ad interim
appointment as Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights in view of her
refusal to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner requires the confirmation of
the Commission of Appointments;
2. Whether or not the appointment of the petitioner is an ad interim appointment;
RULING:
1. No. Since the position of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is
not among the positions mentioned in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the 1987 Constitution, appointments to which are to be made with the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments, it follows that the
appointment by the President of the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, is to be made without the review or participation of the Commission
on Appointments.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on

Human Rights pursuant to the second sentence in Sec. 16, Art. VII, that is,
without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments because they
are among the officers of government whom he (the President) may be
authorized by la to appoint.
2. No. Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the 1987
Constitution, extend only to appointments where the review of the
Commission on Appointments is needed. That is why ad interim appointments
are to remain valid until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or
until the next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for the
President solely to make, that is, without the participation of the Commission
on Appointments, cannot be ad interim appointments.
IN RE: WILFREDO SUMULONG TORRES, 251 SCRA 709, G.R. NO. 122338
DECEMBER 29, 1995
Facts: Wilfredo Sumulong Torres was convicted by final judgement of two counts of
estafa some time before 1979. The maximum sentence would expire on November 2,

2000. On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to Torres by the President
on the condition that petitioner would not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines, which he accepted. He was released from confinement.
On May 21, 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to Torres because Torres
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa before, and convicted of sedition by,
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 8, 1986, the President
cancelled the conditional pardon of Torres. On October 10, 1986, then Minister of
Justice Neptali A. Gonzales issued by authority of the President an Order of Arrest
and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly arrested and
confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
A petition for habeas corpus was filed by the wife and children of convicted felon,
Wilfredo Sumulong Torres, praying for his immediate release from prison on the
ground that the exercise of the Presidents prerogative under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code to determine the occurrence, if any, of a breach of a
condition of a pardon in violation of the pardonees right to due process and the
constitutional presumption of innocence, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the petition for habeas corpus meritorious.
Held: There is no adequate basis for the Court to oblige the petition.
A conditional pardon is in the nature of a contract between the sovereign power or the
Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the effect that the former will release
the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the terms of the
pardon, he will be recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the
sentence or an additional one. Under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code, the Chief Executive is authorized to order the arrest and re-incarceration of
any such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition, or
conditions of his pardon, parole, or suspension of sentence. It is now a well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction that this exercise of presidential judgment is
beyond judicial scrutiny. The determination of the violation of the conditional pardon
rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the Chief Executive, and the pardonee,
having consented to place his liberty on conditional pardon upon the judgment of the
power that has granted it, cannot invoke the aid of the courts, however erroneous the
findings may be upon which his recommitment was ordered.
Habeas corpus lies only where the restraint of a persons liberty has been judicially
adjudged as illegal or unlawful. In the instant petition, the incarceration of Torres
remains legal considering that, were it not for the grant of conditional pardon which
had been revoked because of a breach thereof, the determination of which is beyond
judicial scrutiny, he would have served his final sentence for his first conviction until
November 2, 2000.
Courts have no authority to interfere with the grant by the President of a pardon to a
convicted criminal. It has been our fortified ruling that a final judicial pronouncement
as to the guilt of a pardonee is not a requirement for the President to determine

whether or not there has been a breach of the terms of a conditional pardon. There is
likewise no basis for the courts to effectuate the reinstatement of a conditional pardon
revoked by the President in the exercise of powers undisputedly solely and absolutely
lodged in his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
PEOPLE VS. CASIDO, 269 SCRA 360, G.R. NO. 116512 MARCH 7, 1997
Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest possible time, accused-
appellants William Casido and Franklin Alcorin applied for conditional pardon before
the Presidential Committee on the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as
well as for amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC), while their
appeals were pending before the Supreme Court. The PCGBRP was constituted in line
with the confidence-building measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-
appellants were granted conditional pardon. After their release, they filed for a Motion
to Withdraw Appeal before the Supreme Court which the latter denied. The Court
ruled in resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-appellants is void
for having been extended during the pendency of their appeal. Prior to the resolution,
the NAC favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.
Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is valid.
Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely on the ground of the
amnesty granted them and not by the pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by the Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of
Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial
notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or
after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after
conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of
an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration of the rights to hold
public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon, and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While amnesty looks backward
and abolishes and puts in o oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates
the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended during the pendency
of the appeal or before conviction by final judgment and, therefore, in violation of the
first paragraph of Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for which
accused-appellants voluntarily applied under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This
Proclamation was concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby resolved that the release of
accused-appellants William O. Casido and Franklin A. Alcorin was valid solely on the
ground of the amnesty granted them and this case is dismissed with costs de oficio.
The Members of the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon
and of its Secretariat are admonished to exercise utmost care and diligence in the
performance of their duty to save the President from any embarrassment in the
exercise of his power to grant pardon or parole.
PEOPLE VS. PARIARCA, JR., 341 SCRA 464, G.R. NO. 135457 SEPTEMBER
29, 2000
Facts: Patriarca was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Alfredo
Arevalo before RTC Sorsogon docketed as Criminal Case No. 2773. He was also
charged with murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a certain Elmer Cadag
under Informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.
The RTC found him guilty in Criminal Case No. 2773 and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. Patriarca appealed the decision to the SC.
Patriarca applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty
to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed
Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political
Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty
Commission." In 1999, his application was favorably granted by the National
Amnesty Board concluding that his activities were done in pursuit of his political
beliefs.
Issue: What is the effect of the grant of amnesty to the conviction of the accused-
appellant?
Held: Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or
other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the
subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty
looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so
overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is
totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.
This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose
N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the
appeal.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 in Criminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of murder.

Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683,11 Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664, which
are both filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon,12 are
ordered DISMISSED.
MAGDALO PARA SA PAGBABAGO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
673 SCRA 651, G.R. NO. 190793 JUNE 19, 2012
Facts: Petitioner Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for
Registration with the COMELEC, seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a
regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation
in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections.
COMELEC issued its Resolution denying the Petition for Registration filed by
MAGDALO where it held that Magdalo Para sa Pagbabago should be refused
registration in accordance with Art. IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution. It is
common knowledge that the partys organizer and Chairman, Senator Antonio F.
Trillanes IV, and some members participated in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003, wherein several innocent
civilian personnel were held hostage. This and the fact that they were in full battle
gear at the time of the mutiny clearly show their purpose in employing violence and
using unlawful means to achieve their goals in the process defying the laws of
organized societies.
MAGDALO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was elevated to the
COMELEC En Banc for resolution. MAGDALO filed a Manifestation and Motion for
Early Resolution dated 23 December 2009, in which it clarified its intention to
participate in the 10 May 2010 National and Local Elections as a party-list group.
COMELEC En Banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by MAGDALO.
Issue:Whether or not COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it denied the
Petition for Registration filed by MAGDALO on the ground that the latter seeks to
achieve its goals through violent or unlawful means?
Held: COMELECs Resolutions are sustained. To join electoral contests, a party or
organization must undergo the two-step process of registration and accreditation, as
this Court explained in Liberal Party v. COMELEC:
x x x Registration is the act that bestows juridical personality for purposes of our
election laws; accreditation, on the other hand, relates to the privileged participation
that our election laws grant to qualified registered parties.
x x x Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or
coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for
accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the
next natural step to follow.
Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations and
coalitions that "seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means" shall
be denied registration. This disqualification is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881,
which provides that "no political party which seeks to achieve its goal through
violence shall be entitled to accreditation."

Violence is the unjust or unwarranted exercise of force, usually with the

accompaniment of vehemence, outrage or fury. It also denotes physical force
unlawfully exercised; abuse of force; that force which is employed against common
right, against the laws, and against public liberty. On the other hand, an unlawful act
is one that is contrary to law and need not be a crime, considering that the latter must
still unite with evil intent for it to exist.
The power vested by Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the Constitution and Section 61 of
BP 881 in the COMELEC to register political parties and ascertain the eligibility of
groups to participate in the elections is purely administrative in character. In
exercising this authority, the COMELEC only has to assess whether the party or
organization seeking registration or accreditation pursues its goals by employing acts
considered as violent or unlawful, and not necessarily criminal in nature. Although
this process does not entail any determination of administrative liability, as it is only
limited to the evaluation of qualifications for registration, the ruling of this Court in
Quarto v. Marcelo is nonetheless analogously applicable.
DISMISSED
BARRIOQUINTO ET AL. VS. FERNANDEZ ET AL., 82 PHIL. 642, NO. L-
1278 JANUARY 21, 1949
Facts: Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made
during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was
nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the
period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of
Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the
proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However,
Commissioner Fernandez of the 14thAmnesty Commission refused to process the
amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as
charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged to them.
Issue: Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty.
Held: Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress,
and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted
to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities
who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does
nor work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage,
unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence (art 36, RPC). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into

oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though
he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not
necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine qua non, admit having
committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the
amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the
accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused
does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the
Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he
admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the
Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct
summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on
whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is
entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have
rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in accordance with the terms of the
Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as
well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of
said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their
province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such
offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said
benefits.
CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR
Facts:
The CFI of Rizal found respondent Santos guilty of estafa and was confined in the
provincial jail for 6 months. However, he continued to be a registered elector in the
city of Malabon, Rizal and was seated as the municipal president from 1934 to 1937.
On 1938, Commonwealth Act No 357 or the Election Code, was approved by the
National Assembly. Section 94, paragraph (b) of which disqualifies the respondent
from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against
property. In view of this provision, the respondent applied to the President for an
absolute pardon. Upon favorable recommendation of the Sec of Justice, the President
granted the petition on 1939, restoring the respondent to his full civil and political
rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment, he
will be eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property responsibility.
On 1940, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of the name of Santos from the
list of voters in precinct no. 11 of Malabon, Rizal on the ground that the latter is

disqualified under par (b) of Sec 94 of the Election Code. After hearing, the court
denied the petition for exclusion and declared that the pardon extended in favor of
respondent has had the effect pf excluding him from the disqualification created by
the Election Code.
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari in which he impugns the decision of
the court.
Issue:
Whether or not the pardoning power of the President applies to legislative
prohibitions? And consequently, whether or not the pardoning power exercised here
would amount to an unlawful exercise of the President of a legislative function?
Held:
It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise of this
constitutional prerogative of the President: (a) that the power be exercised after
conviction and (b) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action. It must remain where the sovereign
authority has placed it and must be exercised by the highest authority to whom it is
entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction. In this case, the disability is the result of the
conviction without which there would no basis for disqualification from voting.
Imprisonment is not the only punishment, which the law imposes upon those who
violates its command. There are accessory and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning
power likewise extends to such left of the consequences of conviction. While the
pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the sense that he will be
eligible for appointment only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature
involving no money or property responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores the
respondent to full civil and political rights.
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed in the Election Code, does not fall
within the purview of the pardoning power of the Chief Executive, would lead to the
impairment of his pardoning power not contemplated in the Constitution and would
lead furthermore to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political

privilege in a case of this nature except through legislative action.Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.
PELOBELLO V. PALATINO
Facts:
Respondent-appellee, having been convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atendado
contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to imprisonment for two years, four
months and one day of prision correccional, was disqualified from voting and being
voted upon for the contested municipal office, such disqualification not having been
removed by plenary pardon. The fact of conviction as above set forth is admitted; so
is the election and consequent proclamation of the respondent-appellee for the office
of municipal mayor. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by
the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven that
on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the
respondent-appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil
and political rights
Issue:
Whether or not Palatino is eligible for public office.
Held:
Yes, Palatino was granted a conditional pardon by the then Gov-Gen but such pardon
was converted into an absolute pardon by President Quezon who succeeded the Gov-
Gen. The pardon was already after Palatinos election but prior to him assuming
office. The SC then held that since there is an absolute pardon, all the former
disabilities imposed and attached to the prior conviction had been removed and that
Palatino is therefore eligible for the public office in question.
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant
treasurer of Calbayog City) of the crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. She was sentenced to jail and to indemnify the government in the sum of
P4,892.50.The SC affirmed the decision. She then filed a motion for reconsideration
but while said motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos
absolute pardon which she accepted (at that time, the rule was that clemency could be
given even before conviction). By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as assistant
city treasurer since the same was still vacant. Her letter was referred to the Minister of
Finance who ruled that she may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon.

Petitioner wrote the Ministry stressing that the full pardon bestowed on her has wiped
out the crime which implies that her service in the government has never been
interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date
of her preventive suspension; that she is entitled to backpay for the entire period of
her suspension; and that she should not be required to pay the proportionate share of
the amount of P4,892.50
The Ministry referred the issue to the Office of the President. Deputy Executive
Secretary Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first seek
appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
Issues:
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay?
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief
Executive, entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment?
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon
her by the sentence?
Held:
1. Pardon is defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the
execution of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though
official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it
is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
While a pardon has generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never committed the
offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very essence of a pardon is
forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender. It does not impose upon
the government any obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. Since
the offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or
suffered while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why

petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings
and benefits.
2. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as
assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
3. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists
notwithstanding service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence is not served by
pardon, amnesty or commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss
of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
TORRES V. GONZALES
Facts:
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the
president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982,
Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the
Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon.
Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the
Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges against him were not
yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of
his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the

proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject

to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may
be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to
proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction
therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the
conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section
64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has
two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict
who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate
any of the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed
against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
LLAMAS V. EXECUTIVE
Facts:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for
office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30
days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence
he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in criminal
cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final judgment applies
solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of executive clemency or
pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an administrative case, allegedly
because the word conviction refers only to criminal cases.
Issue:

WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases.
Held:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under criminal
or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not distinguish.
The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may
be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. By the
same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would
indeed be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the
coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are
automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not necessarily involve criminal
offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view that
if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal
offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is proof
beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the quantum of
evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.
LANSANG V. GARCIA
42 SCRA 448; L-33964; 11 Dec 1971
Facts:
Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing
the death of 8 people, Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation 889 which suspended
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged that there is a need to curtail
the growth of Maoist groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by the PC
headed by Garcia for interrogation and investigation. Lansang et al questioned the
validity of the suspension of the writ averring that the suspension does not meet the
constitutional requisites.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension is constitutional.
Held:

The doctrine established in Barcelon and Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in

this case where the Supreme Court declared that it had the power to inquire into the
factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos
in August 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established.
Accordingly, hearings were conducted to receive evidence on this matter, including
two closed-door sessions in which relevant classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3 selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the
end, after satisfying itself that there was actually a massive and systematic
Communist-oriented campaign to overthrow the government by force, as claimed by
Marcos, the Supreme Court unanimously decided to uphold the suspension of the
privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus.
GARCIA-PADILLA V. ENRILE
121 SCRA 472
Facts:
The case is an application for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14
detainees. Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees were then having a
conference in the dining room at Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14
detainees were under surveillance as they were then identified as members of the
Communist Party of the Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They were
arrested and later transferred to a facility only the PC/INP raiding team know.
It is alleged in the herein petition that the arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful
and illegal since it was effected without any warrant of arrest and further alleged that
respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel, averring
that the detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during their
period of detention.Hence, the present petition of Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ
of habeas corpus.
Issue:Whether or not the arrests done to the present detainees are valid?
Held:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus raises a political, not a
judicial, question and that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such a period.
The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus was once again held as discretionary in the president. The Supreme Court
again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved
solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if
the governments campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered
effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion,
and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they
would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing
the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or
insurrection.

IBP V. ZAMORA
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts:
In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies,
kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and
the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and
suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (the AFP), the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order.
In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief
Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000(the LOI)
which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan, would be conducted.Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership
of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
On 17 January 2000, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (the IBP) filed the instant
petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine
Marines, null and void and unconstitutional, arguing that the deployment of the
Philippine marines in Metro Manila is violative of the Constitution, in that no
emergency situation obtains in Metro Manila as would justify, even only remotely, the
deployment of soldiers for law enforcement work; hence, said deployment is in
derogation of Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution.
Issue:Whether or not the President committed grace abuse of discretion in calling out
the marines?
Ruling:
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in
his wisdom. Under Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, Congress may revoke such
proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual basis thereof. However, there
is no such equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of the
Presidents action to call out the armed forces. The distinction places the calling out
power in a different category from the power to declare martial law and power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, otherwise, the framers of the
Constitution would have simply lumped together the 3 powers and provided for their
revocation and review
without any qualification.
The reason for the difference in the treatment of the said powers highlights the intent
to grant the President the widest leeway and broadest discretion in using the power to
call out because it is considered as the lesser and more benign power compared to the
power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and the power to impose
martial law, both of which involve the curtailment and suppression of certain basic
civil rights and individual freedoms, and thus necessitating safeguards by Congress
and review by the Court.

LACSON VS PEREZ
GR No 147780, 10 May 2001
Facts:
On May 1, 2001, President Macapagal-Arroyo, faced by an "angry and violent mob

armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly
weapons" assaulting and attempting to break into Malacaang, issued Proclamation
No. 38 declaring that there was a state of rebellion in the National Capital Region.
She likewise issued General Order No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress the rebellion in the
National Capital Region. Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters
of the "rebellion" were thereafter effected. The petition assails the declaration of a
state of rebellion by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both in fact and in law.
Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests
and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Ruling:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006,

accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic.
In quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may only resort to warrantless
arrests of persons suspected of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, if the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a "state of rebellion."
Moreover, petitioners' contention that they are under imminent danger of being
arrested without warrant do not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies
of mandamus and prohibition, since an individual subjected to warrantless arrest is
not without adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law. Such an individual may
ask for a preliminary investigation under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, where he
may adduce evidence in his defense, or he may submit himself to inquest proceedings
to determine whether or not he should remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court. Further, a person subject of a warrantless arrest must be delivered to
the proper judicial authorities within the periods provided in Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, otherwise the arresting officer could be held liable for delay in
the delivery of detained persons. Should the detention be without legal ground, the
person arrested can charge the arresting officer with arbitrary detention. All this is
without prejudice to his filing an action for damages against the arresting officer
under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Verily, petitioners have a surfeit of other remedies
which they can avail themselves of, thereby making the prayer for prohibition
and mandamus improper at this time (Section 2 and 3, Rule 65, Rules of Court).
SANLAKAS V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. No. 159085, 3 Feb 2004

Facts:
During the early hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of known
and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati. Publicly, they
complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their withdrawal of support for
the government, demanding the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and
the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal
Code, and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the
officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. On August 1,
2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No.
435, declaring the Cessation of the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners
contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration
of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual basis for such
proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners
contending that the proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under
the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend
that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency
powers as Congress has not delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep.
Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo,
petitioners contending that there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by
Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner
fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
Issues: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?
Ruling:
The Court rendered that both Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit declaring state or
rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief powers is conferred by
the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that the President has full
discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of
discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their
assertion that the President acted without factual basis. The issue of the circumvention
of the report is of no merit as there was no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts or that military authorities have taken over the functions of Civil
Courts. The issue of usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no
moment since the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the
armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the

President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative
powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is
unreasonable, since any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not
as this is a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
BAYAN V EXECUTIVE
342 SCRA 449
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the
possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of
conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998.
Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed
by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard.Pres. On the
other hand, Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999,
the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.Following the argument of the petitioner,
under the provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be
allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in
a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that,
what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at
least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent

and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find
applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the
number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find

nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be
stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty.
PIMENTEL V. OFFICE OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

462 SCRA 449
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of

the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to
transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence
pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome
Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction
over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity,
war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The
Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of
the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval of the signatory state. Petitioners contend that ratification
of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of
the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit
the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion.

Issue: Whether or not the Exec. Secretary and the DFA have the ministerial duty to
transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the
Philippine mission to the U.N. even without the signature of the President?
Held:
No, the President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external
relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the
mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs. In treaty-making, the
President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties
but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the
members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII). The legislative
branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign
relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.
QUA CHEE GAN V. THE DEPORTATION BOARD | BARRERA, J.

9 SCRA 27
Facts:
Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian,
Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King were charged before the Deportation
Board with having purchased $130,000.00 without the necessary licensing from the
Central Bank and having clandestinely remitted the same to Hong Kong. After the
filing of the deportation charges, a warrant of arrest was issued for Qua Chee Gan, et
al. pending investigation. They were granted provisional liberty upon their filing of a
surely bond for P10,000.00 and a cash bond for P10,000.00. Qua Chee Gan, et al.
filed a joint motion to dismiss the charges on the ground, among others, that such
charges are not legal grounds for deportation ad that the Board has not jurisdiction
over such charges. The motion to dismiss was denied. Qua Chee Gan, et al. then filed
a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition.
Triial Court then upheld the validity of the delegation by the President to the
Deportation Board the power to conduct investigations for the purpose of determining
whether the stay of an alien in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare
and interest of the State.
The court also sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest
and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation on the theory

that the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential
to and complement the power to deport aliens.
Issues:
1) WoN the President has the power to deport aliens and if such power is validly
delegated to the Deportation Board.?
2) WoN the authority to deport aliens includes the power to order the arrest of such
aliens?
Held:
1)Yes, Although CA No. 613 expressly grants the Commissioner of Immigration the
power to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by
the Board of Commissioners, but such power was not intended to be delimited to the
Immigration Commissioner as Sec. 69 of the Administrative Code, although not
expressly conferring such power, lays down the procedure for such deportation
proceedings for the President.
Therefore, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in 2 ways:
By order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section
69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and
By the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by the
Board of
Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. And although the
charges against Qua Chee Gan are not enumerated in CA No. 613, the act of
profiteering, hoarding or black marketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central
Bank regulations, which is tantamount to economic sabotage, is a ground for
deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.
2)Yes, but only to the deportation order. Under EO No. 69, it is required that the alien
charged in deportation proceedings shall file a bond with the Commissioner of
Immigration in order to secure their appearance.
However, the same did not authorize the arrest of the alien pending investigation.
It was in EO No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing
of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the

arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the
investigation unless he files a bond for his provisional release in such amount and
under such conditions as may be prescribed by the Chairman of the Board. However,
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon whose authority the President's
power to deport is predicated, does NOT provide for the exercise of the power to
arrest.
Moreover, the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by Sec. 1
Art III of the Constitution: ...no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce...
Rodriguez, et al. v. Villamiel, et al. expands the requirement "to be determined by
the judge" to any public officer who may be authorized by the Legislature to make
such determination, and thereafter issue the warrant of arrest. Therefore, the arrest of
a foreigner, which is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid
only when there is already an order of deportation.
However, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested. It
is enough that a bond be required to insure the appearance of the alien during the
investigation, as was authorized in EO69.
Dispositive Position
Executive Order No. 398 insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to

issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or
aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of
said aliens, is declared illegal.
The order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared
null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed
cancelled.
GO TEK V DEPORTATION BOARD

79 SCRA 17
Facts:
On March 3, 1964 the chief prosecutor of the Deportation Board filed a complaint
against Go Tek, a chinaman, praying that the board recommend his immediate

deportation to the President because he was an undesirable alien on the basis of these
allegations:
Go Tek was a sector commander and intelligence and record officer of a guerilla unit
of the Emergency Intelligence Section, Army of the United States; And he was in
possession of fake dollar checks in violation of Art. 168 of the RPC. Go Tek filed a
motion to dismiss. The complaint was premature as he had a pending case in the city
fiscals office for violation of Art. 168. The board had no jurisdiction over the case
because the board may only deport aliens on the grounds expressly specified by law
citing an obiter in Qua Chee Gan. The Board denied the motion ruling that a
conviction is not required before the State may deport an undesirable alien and that
the Board is only a fact finding body whose function is to make a report and
recommendation to the President. Go Tek filed an action for prohibition with the CFI.
The CFI granted the petition by upholding the obiter in the Qua Chee Gan case. It
held that Sec. 37(3) of the Immigration Law requires conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude and, thus, the complaint was premature since mere possession of
forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law.
Issues:
1) Can the Deportation Board entertain a deportation proceeding based on a

ground which is not specified in section 37 of the Immigration Law?
2) Is prior conviction of the offense imputed to Go Tek necessary to allow the
board to continue its investigation?
Ruling:
1) Yes, under existing law, the deportation of an undesirable alien may be
effected (1) by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to
section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by the Commissioner
of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners of the
existence of the ground for deportation, as charged against the alien, under
Sec. 37 of the Immigration Law.
2) No, when deportation is effected by the President in the exercise of his
powers, it need not be under any ground specified in Sec. 37 of the
Immigration Law; such a requirement is relevant only when the deportation is
4

effect by the Commissioner of Immigration.

Sec. 69 of the RAC and E.O. No. 398, creating the Deportation Board, do not
specify the grounds for deportation.There is no legal nor constitutional
provision defining the power to deport aliens because the intention of the law
is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an alien's
residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security
welfare or interest of the state.The Chief Executive is the sole and exclusive
judge of the existence of facts which warrant the deportation of aliens as
disclosed in an investigation conducted in accordance with Sec. 69 of the
RAC. After all, the inherent right of a country to expel or deport aliens
because their continued presence is rental to public welfare is absolute and
unqualified. As the President is granted full discretion as regards deportation,
it is fundamental that an executive order for deportation is not dependent on a
prior judicial conviction in a case.
DOMINGO V. SCHEER
GR. No. 154745
Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45, of the decision of the Court of Appeals
granting the respondent's petition for certiorari and prohibition annulling the order of
arrest issued by petitioner, and permanently enjoining her from deporting the
respondent from the Philippines. The appellate court reversed the Summary
Deportation Order of the Board of Commissioners.
Respondent Scheer is a native of Germany, who was eventually granted a permanent

resident status in the Philippines. He eventually married here and started a family as
well as a business in Palawan. Vice Consul Hippelein informed the Philippine
Ambassador to Germany that the respondent had police records and financial
liabilities in Germany. The DFA receive from the German Embassy in Manila that the
respondent is wanted in Germany, and requested to turn over his German passport to
the Embassy. Thereafter BOC issued a Summary Deportation Order dated September
27, 1997. It was stated that the deportation shall be held in abeyance pending
respondents case and he shall remain in the custody of the bureau. In issuing this the
BOC relied on the statement of the German Vice Consul on the speculation that it is
improbable that the respondent will be issued a new passport, the warrant of arrest for

insurance fraud and alleged illegal activities in Palawan. Respondent nevertheless

stayed in the Philippines after airing his side to then BID Commissioner Verceles, the
latter giving him time to apply for a clearance and a new passport. Scheer eventually
filed in Urgent Motion for Reconsideration stating that his right to due process was
violated, for there was no notice or chance to be heard before the issuance of the
deportation order. Eventually the criminal case for physical injuries against the
respondents was dismissed, and he was issued a passport. He informed Commissioner
Verceles about this matter and reiterated the cancellation of the order, but the
Commissioner did not respond. Thereafter Commissioner Domingo assumed office
and on June 6, 2002, she ordered the apprehension of the respondent who was held in
custody awaiting deportation. Shocked, respondent sough remedy with the CA, during
the hearing of which the Solicitor General suggested that the respondent leave the
country first then just re-apply. A decision was reached in favor of Scheer,
permanently enjoining Domingo from continuing the deportation, thus this petition.
ISSUE(S):
1. Whether or not the BOC was an indispensable party to the case?
2. Whether or not respondent's arrest and detention was premature, unwarranted and
arbitrary?
HELD:
1) Yes- but not enough to invalidate the petition. Petitioner argues that the respondent
must have impleaded BOC as the respondent, and not Commissioner Domingo alone.
The Summary Deportation Order was issued by the BOC as a whole and Domingo is
just but on Commissioner so the petitioner argues that the action may be dismissed.
The court ruled that it agrees with the petitioner that the BOC was an indispensable
party to the respondent's petition in the CA. However, the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be
added as ordered by the court and if the petition refuses to implead an indispensable
party, then the petition may be dismissed. In the case at bar, CA did not require to
implead BOC as the respondent so it does not warrant the dismissal of respondent's
petition. The court may choose to ament the processes and the pleadings by
substituting as party- plaintiff the real party- interest, but the court also has the power
to avoid delay in the disposition of cases and it may just be unnecessary to still choose
to implead BOC. The OSG has already represented the petitioner in instant
proceedings thus the BOC cannot claim that it was not afforded the opportunity to be

in court. Proceedings may be to facilitate justice but they do not constitute the thing
itself and they may be relaxed in certain cases.
2. Yes. The Court ruled the BOC committed grave abuse of discretion in causing the
arrest and detention of the respondent. Aliens may be deported from the Philippines
only on grounds and in the proper manner provided by the Constitution. The United
Nations Declaration on Human Rights grants every person rights, and that no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile. BOC ordered respondent's
deportation without even conducting summary deportation proceedings, but merely
relied on the speculation of the German Embassy and the Vice Consul that is
improbable that the respondent will be issued a new passport, warranting the
deportation. The respondent was no afforded any hearing at all, and not given the
opportunity to put up a defense for himself, thus violating his right to due process. A
deportation proceeding may not be a criminal action, but since it affects the liberty of
a person, the right to due process of a respondent must be respected. Even six years
after the motion for reconsideration of the respondent which was still not attended to,
out of nowhere and arbitrarily the agents were ordered to arrest him. Even after being
issued a new passport and even securing clearance from the PNP and NPA, the BOC
still proceeded with the deportation. BOC is required to resolve the motion of the
respondent first, giving him the chance to be heard and present his evidence. The
petitioner put up the defense that they cannot review cased decided before the change
of members, but since it is the same government entity, they have the authority to
review past cases. In addition, the court finds the contention of the OSG for the
respondent to leave the country then just re-apply again ridiculous when there is no
legal impediment for the respondent to continue his stay in the country.
SOUTHERN CROSS CEMENT CORPORATION v. CEMENT

MANUFACTURERS, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF TRADE, et al.
PRINCIPLE/FACTS: Nowhere in the SMA does it state that the DTI Secretary may
impose general safeguard measures without a positive final determination by the
Tariff Commission, or that the DTI Secretary may reverse or even review the factual
determination made by the Tariff Commission. Congress has the putative authority to
abolish the Tariff Commission or the DTI. It is similarly empowered to alter or
expand its functions through modalities which do not align with established norms in
the bureaucratic structure. The Court is bound to recognize the legislative prerogative

to prescribe such modalities, no matter how atypical they may be, in a nation of the
legislative power to restructure the executive branch of government.
ISSUE: Positive Final Determination By the Tariff Commission an Indispensable

Requisite to the Imposition of General Safeguard Measures
HELD: The second core ruling in the Decision was that contrary to the holding of the
Court of Appeals, the DTI Secretary was barred from imposing a general safeguard
measure absent a positive final determination rendered by the Tariff Commission. The
fundamental premise rooted in this ruling is based on the acknowledgment that the
required positive final determination of the Tariff Commission exists as a properly
enacted constitutional limitation imposed on the delegation of the legislative power to
impose tariffs and imposts to the President under Section 28(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.
Congressional Limitations Pursuant To Constitutional Authority on the Delegated

Power to Impose Safeguard Measures
The safeguard measures imposable under the SMA generally involve duties on
imported products, tariff rate quotas, or quantitative restrictions on the importation of
a product into the country. Concerning as they do the foreign importation of products
into the Philippines, these safeguard measures fall within the ambit of Section 28(2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which states:
The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government.
The Court acknowledges the basic postulates ingrained in the provision, and, hence,
governing in this case. They are:
(1) It is Congress which authorizes the President to impose tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts. Thus, the
authority cannot come from the Finance Department, the National Economic
Development Authority, or the World Trade Organization, no matter how insistent or
persistent these bodies may be.

(2) The authorization granted to the President must be embodied in a law. Hence, the
justification cannot be supplied simply by inherent executive powers. It cannot arise
from administrative or executive orders promulgated by the executive branch or from
the wisdom or whim of the President.
(3) The authorization to the President can be exercised only within the specified limits
set in the law and is further subject to limitations and restrictions which Congress may
impose. Consequently, if Congress specifies that the tariff rates should not exceed a
given amount, the President cannot impose a tariff rate that exceeds such amount. If
Congress stipulates that no duties may be imposed on the importation of corn, the
President cannot impose duties on corn, no matter how actively the local corn
producers lobby the President. Even the most picayune of limits or restrictions
imposed by Congress must be observed by the President.
There is one fundamental principle that animates these constitutional postulates.

These impositions under Section 28(2), Article VI fall within the realm of the power
of taxation, a power which is within the sole province of the legislature under the
Constitution.
Without Section 28(2), Article VI, the executive branch has no authority to impose
tariffs and other similar tax levies involving the importation of foreign goods.
Assuming that Section 28(2) Article VI did not exist, the enactment of the SMA by
Congress would be voided on the ground that it would constitute an undue delegation
of the legislative power to tax. The constitutional provision shields such delegation
from constitutional infirmity, and should be recognized as an exceptional grant of
legislative power to the President, rather than the affirmation of an inherent executive
power.
This being the case, the qualifiers mandated by the Constitution on this presidential
authority attain primordial consideration. First, there must be a law, such as the SMA.
Second, there must be specified limits, a detail which would be filled in by the law.
And further, Congress is further empowered to impose limitations and restrictions on
this presidential authority. On this last power, the provision does not provide for
specified conditions, such as that the limitations and restrictions must conform to
prior statutes, internationally accepted practices, accepted jurisprudence, or the
considered opinion of members of the executive branch.
The Court recognizes that the authority delegated to the President under Section
28(2), Article VI may be exercised, in accordance with legislative sanction, by the
alter egos of the President, such as department secretaries. Indeed, for purposes of the
Presidents exercise of power to impose tariffs under Article VI, Section 28(2), it is

generally the Secretary of Finance who acts as alter ego of the President. The SMA
provides an exceptional instance wherein it is the DTI or Agriculture Secretary who is
tasked by Congress, in their capacities as alter egos of the President, to impose such
measures. Certainly, the DTI Secretary has no inherent power, even as alter ego of the
President, to levy tariffs and imports.
Concurrently, the tasking of the Tariff Commission under the SMA should be likewise
construed within the same context as part and parcel of the legislative delegation of its
inherent power to impose tari(s and imposts to the executive branch, subject to
limitations and restrictions. In that regard, both the Tariff Commission and the DTI
Secretary may be regarded as agents of Congress within their limited respective
spheres, as ordained in the SMA, in the implementation of the said law which
significantly draws its strength from the plenary legislative power of taxation. Indeed,
even the President may be considered as an agent of Congress for the purpose of
imposing safeguard measures. It is Congress, not the President, which possesses
inherent powers to impose tariffs and imposts. Without legislative authorization
through statute, the President has no power, authority or right to impose such
safeguard measures because taxation is inherently legislative, not executive.
When Congress tasks the President or his/her alter egos to impose safeguard measures
under the delineated conditions, the President or the alter egos may be properly
deemed as agents of Congress to perform an act that inherently belongs as a matter of
right to the legislature. It is basic agency law that the agent may not act beyond the
specifically delegated powers or disregard the restrictions imposed by the principal. In
short, Congress may establish the procedural framework under which such safeguard
measures may be imposed, and assign the various o ces in the government
bureaucracy respective tasks pursuant to the imposition of such measures, the task
assignment including the factual determination of whether the necessary conditions
exists to warrant such impositions. Under the SMA, Congress assigned the DTI
Secretary and the Tariff Commission their respective functions in the legislatures
scheme of things.
There is only one viable ground for challenging the legality of the limitations and
restrictions imposed by Congress under Section 28(2) Article VI, and that is such
limitations and restrictions are themselves violative of the Constitution. Thus, no
matter how distasteful or noxious these limitations and restrictions may seem, the
Court has no choice but to uphold their validity unless their constitutional in#rmity
can be demonstrated.
What are these limitations and restrictions that are material to the present case? The
entire SMA provides for a limited framework under which the President, through the
DTI and Agriculture Secretaries, may impose safeguard measures in the form of
tariffs and similar imposts. The limitation most relevant to this case is contained in

Section 5 of the SMA, captioned Conditions for the Application of General

Safeguard Measures, and stating:
The Secretary shall apply a general safeguard measure upon a positive final
determination of the Tariffs Commission that a product is being imported into the
country in increased quantities, whether absolute or relative to the domestic
production, as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or threat thereof to the
domestic industry; however, in the case of non-agricultural products, the Secretary
shall first establish that the application of such safeguard measures will be in the
public interest.
GLORIA v. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Dr. Bienvenido Icasiano was appointed by President Aquino as Schools

Division Superintendent, Division of City Schools in Quezon City. He was reassigned
as a superintendent of the Marikina Institute of Science and Technology as
recommended by DECS Secretary Ricardo Gloria on June 17, 1994. In October 1994
Director Roxas informed Icasiano of the reassignment but Icasiano requested
reconsideration of the assignment. Request was denied and the Court of Appeals
granted a Temporary Restraining Order. The Court of Appeals found that the
reassignment as violative of Icasianos security of tenure. However, Secretary Gloria
and Director Roxas contend that the prohibition is improper because it attacks as act
of the President in violation of the doctrine of presidential immunity from suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said act is in violation of the doctrine of presidential
Immunity from suit?
HELD: The contention is untenable for the simple reason that the petition is directed
against the petitioners and not against the President.
The questioned acts are those of the petitioners and not of the President. Furthermore,
Presidential decisions may be questioned before the courts where there is grave abuse
of discretion or that the President has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
RODRIQUEZ V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti

Cagayan, an organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP).
He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan
Bantay Laya, making its members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced

disappearances.Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly

when he refused to confess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a
Petition for the Writ of Amparo andand Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with
Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and
Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, etal. The
writs were granted but the Court of Appeals dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent,
as she may not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual incumbency.
ISSUE: Whether or not former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo should be dropped
as respondent on the basis of presidential immunity from suit.
HELD: No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative,

civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go
as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance
or extrajudicial killing. As was held in the case of Estrada v Desierto, a non-sitting
President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts committed during the
latters tenure; that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of
immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of
a right. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission also reveal that the intent
of the framers is clear that presidential immunity from suit is concurrent only with his
tenure and not his term. Therefore, former President Arroyo cannot use such
immunity to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the
context of amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable for the abduction
of Rodriguez.
LOZADA V. ARROYO
The instant Petition stems from the alleged corruption scandal precipitated by a
transaction between the Philippine government, represented by the National
Broadband Network (NBN), and ZTE Corporation, a Chinese manufacturer of
telecommunications equipment. Former NEDA Secretary Neri sought the services of
Lozada as an unofficial consultant in the ZTE-NBN deal. The latter avers that during
the course of his engagement, he discovered several anomalies in the said transaction
involving certain public officials. These events impelled the Senate of the Philippines
Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct an investigation thereon, for which it issued a
subpoena directing Lozada to appear and testify. Lozada did not appear at the Blue
Ribbon Committee. Because of this, Senate issued an order (1) citing Lozada in
contempt; (2) ordering his arrest and detention; (3) directing the sergeant-at-arms to
implement such order and make a return.
In Lozadas petition, he claims that upon disembarking, several men held his arms and
took his bag. He allegedly insisted on joining his family but realized that it would be

wiser to go with the men when he heard them say in their handheld radio Huwag
kayong dumaan diyan sir nandyan ang mga taga senado.
Along the way, the men asked Lozada to draft an antedated letter requesting police
protection. Lozada asked to be brought to his home in Pasig, but was refused due to
security risks. They stopped at a restaurant to meet with Atty. Antonio Bautista and
Col. Mascarinas, Lozada claimed that he was made to fill in the blanks of an affidavit.
He was then brought to LSGH per his request. He observed that policemen,
purportedly restraining his liberty and threatening the security of his, his family and
the LS brothers, guarded the perimeter of LSGH.
Col. Mascarinas supposedly brought Lozada to the office of Atty. Bautista to finalize
and sign an affidavit. On the same day his wife petitioned for Habeas Corpus and his
brother petitioned for a Writ of Amparo with the Supreme Court, and prayed for the
issuance of (a) the writ of amparo; (b) a Temporary Protection Order (TPO); and (c)
Inspection and Production Orders as regards documents related to the authority
ordering custody over Lozada, as well as any other document that would show
responsibility for his alleged abduction.
Respondents claim that Lozada had knowledge and control of what happened from
the time of his arrival, he voluntarily entrusted himself to their company and was
never deprived of his liberty and that Lozada has been in the custody of the Senate.
The Court of Appeals rules dropped President Arroyo as a respondent because she
enjoys immunity from suit as president.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dropping as respondent Pres.
Gloria Arroyo despite her failure to submit a verified return and personally claim
presidential immunity in a way not in accord with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo
It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys immunity from suit during his or
her tenure of o ce or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential privilege of
immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed
during his or her tenure.
In the case at bar, the events that gave rise to the present action, as well as the filing of
the original Petition and the issuance of the Court of Appeals Decision, occurred
during the incumbency of former President Arroyo. In that respect, it was proper for

the court a quo to have dropped her as a respondent on account of her presidential
immunity from suit.
It must be underscored, however, that since her tenure of office has already ended,
former President Arroyo can no longer invoke the privilege of presidential immunity
as a defense to evade judicial determination of her responsibility or accountability for
the alleged violation or threatened violation of the right to life, liberty and security of
Lozada.
SAEZ V. MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
FACTS: The petitioner sought to be granted the privilege of the Writs of Amparo
and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place
and production of documents. He expressed his fear of being abducted and killed
which is why he sought that he be placed in a sanctuary appointed by the Court. He
likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and
monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order
of battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party
of the Philippines (CPP).
During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he
noticed that he was always being followed by a certain oel, a former colleague at
Bayan Muna. Joel pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioners
store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, Joel approached and
informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro
Oriental. Joel inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When
asked by the Court of Appeals justices during the hearing if the petitioner had
gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative
explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. The court A
denied the petition for writ of amparo because he failed to allege how the
supposed threat or violation of petitioners right to life, liberty and security is
committed. Neither is there any narration of any circumstances attendant to said
supposed violation or threat to violate petitioners right to life, liberty or
security to warrant entitlement to the privilege of the writs prayed for.
Application for writ of habeas data is likewise denied because allegations

therein do not comply with the aforestated requirements of Section 6 on the
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data. The petition is bereft of any allegation
stating with specific definiteness as to how petitioners right to privacy was
violated or threatened to be violated. The court also dropped Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo as a party respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in

dismissing the petition and dropping Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a party respondent.
HELD: No. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of
proving by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the
latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and
security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the Presidents name as a
party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latters actual involvement
in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the
petition, there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought
to the Presidents attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely
dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo
and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the
petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as
commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility.
CITY OF TAGAYTAY V. GUERRERO
Topic: Composition of Supreme Court
Facts:
Tagaytay-Taal Tourist Development Corporation (TTTDC) is the registered owner of
two (2) parcels of land situated in the Province of Batanggas. TTTDC incurred real
estate tax liabilities on the said properties for the tax years 1976 to 1983. the City
Government of Tagaytay (City of Tagaytay) offered the properties for sale at public
auction. Being the only bidder, a certificate of sale was executed in favor of the City
of Tagaytay and was correspondingly inscribed on the titles of the properties. It then
filed an unnumbered petition for entry of new certificates of title in its favor before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch XVIII, Tagaytay City.
Subsequently, these lands were sold to Melencios.
TTTDC filed a petition for nullification of the public auction involving the disputed
properties on the ground that the properties were not within the jurisdiction of the City
of Tagaytay and, thus, beyond its taxing authority. The case, docketed as Civil Case
No. TG-1196 before the RTC of Cavite. The auction sale was nullified. Said decision
became final and executor. Petitioners filed an MR. denied.
Issue: Whether the RTC of Cavite had jurisdiction to settle the alleged boundary
dispute.
Ruling:
The subject properties that are situated in Barrio Birinayan, Municipality of Talisay,
are within the territorial jurisdiction of the Province of Batangas. This factual finding
binds this Court and is no longer subject to review
There is no boundary dispute in the case at bar. The RTC did not amend the existing
territorial limits of the City of Tagaytay and the Province of Batangas. The entire

Barrio Birinayan was transferred to the Municipality of Talisay, Province of Batangas,

by virtue of R.A. No. 1418. At present, Barrio Birinayan forms part of the
Municipality of Laurel, also in the Province of Batangas, pursuant to R.A. No. 5689.
The RTC acted well within its powers when it passed judgment on the nullification of
the auction sale of the contested properties, considering that the City of Tagaytay has
no right to collect real estate taxes on properties that are not within its territorial
jurisdiction.
IN RE: VILLANUEVA
Topic: Appointment and Qualifications
Facts:
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela
Valley Province. He applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the
following Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Tagum City; Davao City; and Prosperidad,
Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and
Nomination, informed the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates
for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic
mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants
and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter dated
February 3, 2014, that his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en
banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of applicants was
upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to
second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their
current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only
for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take
recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the
qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-
year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the constitutional
provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment.
The petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program
mandated by Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8557 should not be merely
directory and should be fully implemented. He further alleged that he has all the
qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by Congress, since
he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
Issue:
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-
level courts is constitutional.

Ruling:
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and
selecting applicants relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has
the authority to determine how best to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant
to this authority, the JBC issues various policies setting forth the guidelines to be
observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and guidelines in order
to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its discretion
is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is
shielded from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified
applicants in this case to those judges with five years of experience was an exercise of
discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants, however, should have been informed
of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could properly prepare for
and comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do so,
the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will
respect the initiative and independence inherent in the latter.
RE: SENIORITY AMONG THE FOUR (4) MOST RECENT APPOINTMENTS

TO THE POSITION OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS.
Topic: Appointments and Qualifications
Facts:
On March 10, 2010, the Office of the President transmitted to the SC the appointments of
Court of Appeals Justices:
Appointees Positions
5 Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela Associate Justice, CA
6 Hon. Myra G. Fernandez Associate Justice, CA
7 Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. Associate Justice, CA
8 Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando Associate Justice, CA
The appointment papers of the Justices bore the following dates:
Name of Associate Justice Date of Appointment
Hon. Myra G. Fernandez February 16, 2010
Hon. Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. February 16, 2010
Hon. Ramon Paul L. Hernando February 16, 2010
Hon. Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela February 24, 2010
The four Justices were finally listed in the roster of the CA Justices in the following
order of seniority: Justice Fernandez (as most senior), Justice Peralta, Jr., Justice
Hernando and Justice Antonio-Valenzuela (as most junior).
The conflict stems from certain provisions of the 2009 Internal Rues of the CA
(IRCA). Rule 1, Sec.1 provides: The date and sequence of the appointment of
the Justices determine their seniority courtwide.. On the other hand, Rule 2, Sec.
1 provides: The Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the
order of their appointments as officially transmitted to the Supreme Court.
According to the CA Committee on Rules, Rule 2, Sec.1 should prevail as the conflict
should be reckoned with BP 129 (Sec 3. Organization) which states that: There is

hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a Presiding Justice and sixty-
eight (68) Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his appointment, and the
Associate Justices shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same
date, according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the
President."
Judge Antonio-Valenzuela (ranked most junior) insisted that she is the most senior
among the four newly appointed CA Associate Justice pursuant to Rule2, Sec.1 IRCA.
." She argued that "the final act in the process of appointing a member of the Judiciary
is the transmittal of the appointment to the Supreme Court."
Issue: Whether or not Judge Antonio-Valenzuelas contention is correct.
Ruling: No.
For purposes of appointments to the judiciary, the date the commission has been
signed by the President (which is the date appearing on the face of such document) is
the date of the appointment. Such date will determine the seniority of the members of
the Court of Appeals in connection with Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended
by RA 8246. In other words, the earlier the date of the commission of an appointee,
the more senior he/she is over the other subsequent appointees. It is only when the
appointments of two or more appointees bear the same date that the order of issuance
of the appointments by the President becomes material. This provision of statutory
law (Section 3, Chapter I of BP 129, as amended by RA 8246) controls over the
provisions of the 2009 IRCA which gives premium to the order of appointments as
transmitted to this Court.
PERFECTO VS. MEER
Topic: Salary
Facts:
Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income
tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the
amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance
contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because
the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their
salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the
Constitution
ENDENCIA VS. DAVID
Topic: Salary
Facts:

Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that
decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salaries of judicial officers. section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:
SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the
Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is
hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or
by law.
A joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring
section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant
Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M.
Endencia representing the income tax collected on his salary and to Justice Fernando
Jugo.
Ruling:
When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the
Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because
they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the
courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative
and unceasing.
When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from
payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege. It is already attached to his office,
provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based
on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and
action. The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was
grounded on public policy
NITAFAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, GR L-78780, 23

JULY 1987
Facts: Petitioners David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo and Maximo Savellano Jr., were
duly appointed and qualified Judges of the RTC National Capital Judicial Region.
They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin respondents, CIR and the Financial
Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from
their salaries. Petitioners submit that any tax withheld from their emoluments or
compensation as judicial officers constitutes a decrease or diminution of their salaries,
contrary to Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue: Whether the deduction of withholding tax constitutes a diminution of the

salaries of Judges and Justices?
Held: The Supreme Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling
in Perfecto v. Meer and Endencia v. David, that declared the salaries of members of
the Judiciary exempt from payment of the income tax and considered such payment as
a diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office. The Court hereby

reiterates that the salaries of Justices and Judges are property subject to general
income tax applicable to all income earners and that the payment of such income tax
by Justices and Judges does not fall within the constitutional protection against
decrease of their salaries during their continuance in office.
The debates, interpellations and opinions expressed regarding the constitutional

provision in question until it was finally approved by the Commission disclosed that
the true intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, in adopting it, was to make the
salaries of members of the Judiciary taxable. The ascertainment of that intent is but in
keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.
The ruling that the imposition of income tax upon the salary of judges is a
diminution thereof, and so violates the Constitution in Perfecto v. Meer, as affirmed
in Endencia v. David, must be deemed discarded.
We accord due respect to the intent of the people, through the discussions and
deliberations of their representatives, in the spirit that all citizens should bear their
aliquot part of the cost of maintaining the government and should share the burden of
general income taxation equitably.

GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, ET. AL. V MANUEL ALBA, ET. AL., GR NO.

L-57883, 12 MARCH 1982
Facts: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for
Prohibition, seeking to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the
Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action
implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs,
except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the
inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the
judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit
of this character, it being alleged that the security of tenure provision of the
Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
Issues: Whether BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the
justices and judges in this case?
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that the Court is empowered:
To discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order
their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges. Under the
Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power. Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question
of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the
incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation.
As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In
the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance
with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent
justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be
accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to
accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions.
No question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not
have its say prior to the action taken by either of the two departments.

Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has
been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the
vacant positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried
and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal
interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the
present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded.
The challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not
readily discernible except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover,
such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice
of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred.
IN RE: RAUL M. GONZALEZ DATED 16 MARCH 1988 REQUESTING
HONORABLE JUSTICE MARCELO B. FERNAN TO COMMENT ON AN
ANONYMOUS LETTER-COMPLAINT, A.M. NO. 88-4-5433, APRIL 15, 1988
Facts: Tanodbayan Special Prosecutor, Raul M. Gonzales, endorsed an anonymous

letter complaint with enclosure dated 14 December 1987, against Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan. The mentioned 1st Indorsement has two (2) attachments. First, an anonymous
letter by "Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court" addressed to Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez referring to charges for disbarment brought by Mr. Miguel Cuenco against
Justice Marcelo B. Fernan. The second attachment is a copy of a telegram from Mr.
Miguel Cuenco addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, where Mr. Cuenco refers to
pleadings he apparently filed on 29 February 1988 with the Supreme Court in
Administrative Case No. 3135 against Justice Fernan.
Issue: Whether disbarment proceedings will prosper against a Justice of the Supreme
Court whose position is constitutionally classified as impeachable?
Held: The Court dealt with this matter in its Resolution of 17 February 1988 in
Administrative Case No. 3135 in the following terms:
There is another reason why the complaint for disbarment must be dismissed.
Members of the Supreme Court must, under Article VIII (7) (1) of the Constitution, be
members of the Philippine Bar and may be removed from office only by impeachment
(Article XI (2), Constitution). To grant a complaint for disbarment of a Member of the
Court during the Member's incumbency, would in effect be to circumvent and hence
to run afoul of the constitutional mandate that Members of the Court may be removed

from office only by impeachment for and conviction of certain offenses listed in
Article XI (2) of the Constitution.
The provisions of the 1973 Constitution quoted in Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayanare

substantially reproduced in Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution:
Sec. 2 The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme

Court, may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and
conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery,
graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. All
other public officers and employees may be removed from office as
provided by law, but not by impeachment.
It is important to make clear that the Court is not saying that Members of the other
constitutional offices we referred to above are entitled to immunity from liability for
possible criminal acts or for alleged violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics or other
supposed misbehavior. What the Court is saying is that there is a fundamental
procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined
and enforced.
A Member of the Supreme Court must first be removed from office via the
constitutional route of impeachment under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution. Should the tenure of the Supreme Court Justice be thus terminated by
impeachment, he may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively, by
disbarment proceedings, for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against
him in appropriate proceedings.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT,GR NO. 158791, 10 FEBRUARY 2006
Facts: Automatic Release of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service

Commission (CSC), a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal
autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it
may be imposed. The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002
(GAA) for CSC was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby
leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were
intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of their no report, no release policy.

Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the
balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination
by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy.
Issue: Whether the DBMs no report, no release policy is not unconstitutional.
Held: the DBMs act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue
shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional.
The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested
with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against
offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the
Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and
that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
The Court held in the case of Batangas v. Romulo, Automatic Release in Section 6,
Article X of the Constitution is defined as an automatic manner; without thought or
conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical,
spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to
receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of
construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a
constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be
construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed.
This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively
prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the Judiciary
which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the
Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the
Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman.
To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the
event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities
vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the
same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the
Constitution.

EVELYN ONGSUCO AND ANTONIA SALAYA V HON. MARIANO M.

MALONES, GR NO. 182065, 27 OCTOBER 2009
Facts: Petitioners Evelyn Ongsuco and Antonia Salaya are stall holders of the newly
renovated Maasin Public Market, which imposes an increased goodwill fee of
P20,000.00/month in contrast with the previous P45.00/month rent prior to the
renovation, as sanctioned by the Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01, approved on 17
August 1998.
Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 or the Municipal Revised Revenue Code" contained
a provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the imposition of goodwill fees for
stalls. The same Code authorized respondent to enter into lease contracts over the said
market stalls, and incorporated a standard contract of lease for the stall holders at the
municipal public market.
On 18 September 1998, the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin passed a Resolution No.

68 declaring the public hearing dated 11 August 1988 inoperative because majority of
the persons affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed to agree to the said
measure. However, the respondent Mayor vetoed the resolution. Thereafter,
respondent Mayor sent a letter to the petitioners informing them that the stalls were
considered vacant and open for any qualified and interested applicants, due to the fact
that they did not have a new lease contract required by the new ordinance.
Issue: Whether there was a need to exhaust administrative remedies before involving
the Courts?
Held: The rule on the exhaustion of administrative remedies is intended to preclude a

court from arrogating unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction
over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence. Thus, a case where the issue raised is a purely legal question, well within
the competence; and the jurisdiction of the court and not the administrative agency,
would clearly constitute an exception. Resolving questions of law, which involve the
interpretation and application of laws, constitutes essentially an exercise of judicial
power that is exclusively allocated to the Supreme Court and such lower courts the
Legislature may establish.
In this case, the parties are not disputing any factual matter on which they still need to
present evidence. The sole issue petitioners raised before the RTC in Civil Case No.
25843 was whether Municipal Ordinance No. 98-01 was valid and enforceable despite

the absence, prior to its enactment, of a public hearing held in accordance with Article
276 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Local Government Code. This
is undoubtedly a pure question of law, within the competence and jurisdiction of the
RTC to resolve.
Paragraph 2(a) of Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution, expressly establishes the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court, and impliedly recognizes the original jurisdiction
of lower courts over cases involving the constitutionality or validity of an ordinance:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxxx
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as

the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,

international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question. (Emphases ours.)
In J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Santos, the Court has affirmed the
jurisdiction of the RTC to resolve questions of constitutionality and validity of laws
(deemed to include local ordinances) in the first instance, without deciding questions
which pertain to legislative policy.
TAN JR. V MATSUURA

Facts:
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati
City a Complaint-Affidavitcharging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura),
Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco) and Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of
falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).

Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution dated July 1,

2004 granted the petition, indicting both Tanjutco and Matsuura for violation of Art.
172 (2) in relation to Art. 171 (6) RPC and another information for violation of Art.
171 (2), RPC against respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and
Atty. Julie Cua.
The respondents moved for reconsideration. On April 4, 2005, then DOJ
Undersecretary Ernesto L. Pineda, signing on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued
a resolution affirming the presence of probable cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco,
but ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of information. The DOJ later
reversed its decision to exclude Cua and has ordered the OCP of Makati to include
Atty. Julie O. Cua in the information for violation of Article 171 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code filed against respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina
Tanjutco.
The respondents filed with the CA the petition for certiorari separately docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 and CA-G.R. SP No. 95263 respectively. The CA granted
both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justices resolutions.
Unsatisfied, Tan separately filed with this Court two petitions for review. G.R. No.
179003 assails the CAs disposition of Matsuura and Tanjutcos petition, while G.R.
No. 195816 assails the CAs decision in the petition filed by Cua.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it,
assuming the role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice
Ruling:
Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary
investigations.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of
probable cause is essentially an executive function that is lodged with the public
prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice. However, equally settled is the rule that courts
retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations,
although in a mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the
courts power to determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction committed by any branch or
instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its functions. Although policy
considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings,
courts should not shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant,
to determine whether the prosecutors findings are supported by the facts or by the
law. In so doing, courts do not act as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are
exercising their mandate under the Constitution, relevant statutes, and remedial rules
to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of the courts review power
ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted and, on the other
hand, the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution.

We then ruled in Tan v. Ballena 34 that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable
by the DOJ, this does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own
powers of review with respect to the DOJs findings. In the exceptional case in which
grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear sufficiency or insufficiency of
evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the CA may take
cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
GIRON VS COMELEC
Facts:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition assailing the
constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing
Clause) of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act.
On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the insertion of
Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, which specifically requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress
shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
Petitioner avers that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair
Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the treatment of
the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official ballots have been printed,
while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of Section 67 (Candidates holding elective
office) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 67 of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials
immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for an office other
than that which they are currently holding in a permanent capacity.
On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the COMELEC,
opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that this Court has already resolved the
matter in Farias v. Executive Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may decide on the wisdom, soundness or
expediency of a statute.
Ruling:
On a final note, we observe that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention raise various

arguments that we deem are matters of policy. Whether or not those ratiocinations are
valid, we reiterate that the power of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the
law. Judicial power does not include the determination of the wisdom, fairness,
soundness, or expediency of a statute. Otherwise, the Court may be accused of
engaging in judicial legislation. As it is Congress that is empowered by the
Constitution to determine state policies and to enact laws, we feel that petitioner's
reasoning would be best addressed by the legislature.
CMU VS EXECUTIVE
Facts:

Petitioner Central Mindanao University (CMU) is a chartered educational institution

owned and run by the State.1 In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation
476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as
school site for CMU.
Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered
lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay
Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.
CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary,

Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and
Commissioner of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead
Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (collectively, NCIP, et al) before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared
unconstitutional.
The NCIP, et al moved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined
relates to an official act of the Executive Department done in Manila, jurisdiction lies
with the Manila RTC. The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and
proceeded to hear CMUs application for preliminary injunction. Meanwhile,
respondents NCIP, et al moved for partial reconsideration of the RTCs order denying
their motion to dismiss.
After hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution
granting NCIP, et als motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action
for lack of jurisdiction. Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was
constitutional, being a valid State act.
CMU appealed to the CA raising two issues: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of
its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not
Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional. CA dismissed CMUs appeal for
lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review
on certiorari filed directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions law
bearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310.
CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal but it denied
the same,5 prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised
purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with this
Court.
Ruling:

Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 6 vests in the CA appellate
jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies.
But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be
by a petition for review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The question in this
case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal raises purely
questions of law.
As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal: 1) the RTC deprived it of
its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation
310 was constitutional. Did these grounds raise factual issues that are proper for the
CA to hear and adjudicate?
Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the
implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands
from the university. The fact that the President issued this proclamation in Manila and
that it was being enforced in Malaybalay City where the lands were located were facts
that were not in issue. These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true by
the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the correctness
of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed lies with this Court.
As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its
right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential
Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional. CMU points out that the
issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been properly raised and
heard. NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU on that score.
What NCIP, et al filed was merely a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case. Whether the RTC in fact
prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial
of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA
Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the parties. Consequently, the CA erred
in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of law.
Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310 has been
raised and amply argued before this Court, it would serve no useful purpose to have
the case remanded to the CA Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further
proceedings.
ABALOS VS DARAPA
Facts:
On 25 June 1962, petitioner DBP, Ozamis Branch, granted a 31,000.00 loan to

respondent spouses Lomantong Darapa and Sinab Dimakuta (spouses) who executed
therefore a real and chattel mortgage contract, which covered, among others, the
following:
A warehouse to house the rice and corn mill, constructed on a 357 square meter lot
situated at poblacion, Linamon, Lanao del Norte which lot is covered by Tax
Declaration No. A-148 of Linamon, Lanao del Norte..

In 1970, the spouses applied for the renewal and increase of their loan using Sinab
Dimakutas (Dimakuta) Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1,997 as additional
collateral. The DBP disapproved the loan application without returning, however,
Dimakutas TCT. When the spouses failed to pay their loan, DBP extrajudicially
foreclosed the mortgages on 16 September 1971, which, unknown to the spouses,
included the TCT No. T-1,997. The spouses failed to redeem the land under TCT No.
T-1,997 which led to its cancellation, and, the eventual issuance of TCT No. T-7746 in
DBPs name.
In 1984, the spouses discovered all these and they immediately consulted a lawyer
who forthwith sent a demand letter to the bank for the reconveyance of the land. The
bank assured them of the return of the land. In 1994, however, a bank officer told
them that such is no longer possible as the land has already been bought by Abalos,
daughter of the then provincial governor.
On 12 May 1994, the DBP sold the land to its co-petitioner Josefa Abalos (Abalos).
The TCT No. T-7746 (originally TCT No. T-1,997) was cancelled.
On 20 August 1994,the spouses filed with the RTC of Iligan City, a Complaint for
Annulment of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages, against DBP and Abalos.
The RTC, in a Decision dated 29 November 2000, annulled the DBPs foreclosure
sale of the land under TCT No. T-1,997 and its sale to Abalos; further, it declared
Dimakuta as the lands lawful owner.
The DBP and Abalos assailed the RTC decision before the Court of Appeals; Abalos,
however, later abandoned her appeal.
The Court of Appeals denied the petition in a Decision dated 26 September 2003. It
ratiocinated that DBP had no right to foreclose the land under TCT No. T-1,997, it not
having been mortgaged.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
In the main, DBP wants to convince this Court that the land covered by Tax
Declaration No. A-148 mortgaged in 1962, then untitled, is the same land now
covered by TCT No. T-1,997
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may review said decision.
Ruling:
We find the petition unmeritorious, and thus, affirm the Court of Appeals.
It is fundamental procedural law that a petition for review on certiorari filed with this
Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure shall, as a general rule, raise only
questions of law.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts- this is in contradistinction from a question of fact which arises from doubt as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. A question of law does not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them and the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances.
The Court of Appeals factual findings, affirming that of the trial court, are final and
conclusive on this Court and may not be reviewed on appeal, except for the most
compelling of reasons, such as when: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no
citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings
of absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the
Court of Appeals are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are
contrary to the admissions of both parties. None of the exceptions is present in this
petition.
REPUBLIC VS DE GUZMAN
Facts:
Petitioner had accredited respondent (Proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise)

as the PNPs supplier of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the
delivery of various services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment,
and renovation of buildings, facilities, vehicles, tires, and spare parts.
Respondent averred that on December 11, 1995, MGM and petitioner, represented by
the PNP, through its chief, executed a Contract of Agreement (the Contract) wherein
MGM, for the price of 2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and deliver to the PNP
the construction materials itemized in the purchase orderattached to the Contract.
Respondent claimed that after the PNP Chief approved the Contract and purchase
order, MGM, on March 1, 1996, proceeded with the delivery of the construction
materials, as evidenced by Delivery Receipt Nos. 151-153, Sales Invoice Nos. 038
and 041, and the "Report of Public Property Purchase"issued by the PNPs Receiving
and Accounting Officers to their Internal Auditor Chief. Respondent asseverated that
following the PNPs inspection of the delivered materials on March 4, 1996, the PNP
issued two Disbursement Vouchers; one in the amount of 2,226,147.26 in favor of
MGM, and the other, in the amount of 62,415.34, representing the three percent
(3%) withholding tax, in favor of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
Respondent later demanded payment from the PNP amounting to 2,288,562.60 as

agreed upon their December 1995 Contract. The PNP, through its Officer-in-Charge,
repliedto respondents counsel, informing her of the payment made to MGM via Land
Bank of the Philippines (LBP) Check No. 0000530631, as evidenced by Receipt No.
001, issued by the respondent to the PNP on April 23, 1996. Respondent denied

having ever received the LBP check.She also claimed that Receipt No. 001, a copy of
which was attached to the PNPs November 17, 1997 letter, could not support the
PNPs claim of payment as the aforesaid receipt belonged to Montaguz Builders, her
other company, which was also doing business with the PNP, and not to MGM, with
which the contract was made.
Respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the petitioner before the
RTC, Branch 222 of Quezon City. The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 5,
1999, on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in respondents complaint had
already been paid or extinguished. After conducting hearings on the Motion to
Dismiss, the RTC issued an Order on May 4, 2001, denying the petitioners motion
for lack of merit. The petitioner thereafter filed its Answer, wherein it restated the
same allegations in its Motion to Dismiss.On September 8, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of

[respondent] and against [petitioner] ordering the latter to pay [respondent] the
following sums:
(1) 2,226,147.26 representing the principal sum plus interest at 14% per
annum from April 18, 1996 until the same shall have been fully paid;
(2) 20% of the sum to be collected as attorneys fees; and,
(3) Costs of suit.
The petitioner appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
modification the RTCs ruling on September 27, 2006.
The petitioner is now before this Court, praying for the reversal of the lower courts
decisions on the ground that "the Court of Appeals committed a serious error in law
by affirming the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may review said decision.
Ruling:
It is a well-settled rule that in a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of
law may be raised by the parties and passed upon by this Court.
This Court has, on many occasions, distinguished between a question of law and a
question of fact. We held that when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain

state of facts, then it is a question of law; but when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts, then it is a question of fact. "Simply put, when there is no
dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is
correct, is a question of law."To elucidate further, this Court, in Hko Ah Pao v.
Ting said:
One test to determine if there exists a question of fact or law in a given case is
whether the Court can resolve the issue that was raised without having to review or
evaluate the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it will be a
question of fact. Thus, the petition must not involve the calibration of the probative
value of the evidence presented. In addition, the facts of the case must be undisputed,
and the only issue that should be left for the Court to decide is whether or not the
conclusion drawn by the CA from a certain set of facts was appropriate.
Since this is an appeal via certiorari, questions of fact are not reviewable. As a rule,
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and this Court
will only review them under the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a
grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the
Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Although petitioners sole ground to support this petition was stated in such a manner
as to impress upon this Court that the Court of Appeals committed an error in law,
what the petitioner actually wants us to do is to review and re-examine the factual
findings of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Since the petitioner has not shown this Court that this case falls under any of the
enumerated exceptions to the rule, we are constrained to uphold the facts as
established by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and, consequently, the
conclusions reached in the appealed decision.
GUILLERMO CUA V. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Guillermo Cua is a Revenue Collection Agent of the BIR in Olongapo City.

He was charged with Malversation of Public Funds after an audit disclosed that he

incurred a cash shortage amounting to P291,783. Initially he admitted his cash

shortage purportedly to get even with the BIR which failed to promote him but
promised to pay the amount as soon as possible. A special arrangement was made
between the BIR and him wherein the BIR would withhold his salary and apply the
same to the shortage incurred until full payment of the accountability was made.
Nonetheless, an Information for Malversation of public funds was filed against him.
Cua did not testify and instead adduced documentary evidence showing that he had
paid for the shortage by means of deductions from his salary. The RTC convicted him.
The CA affirmed his conviction. Now before the SC, Cua claims among others that he
is not criminally liable because the PNB confirmed the authenticity of the pertinent
documents and that his payment of the shortage was involuntary and without his
consent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can review questions of fact.
RULING: NO.
At the outset, it should be stressed that in a petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised. Thus, questions of fact are
not reviewable. It is not the Courts function to analyze or weigh all over again the
evidence already considered in the proceedings below, its jurisdiction being limited to
reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the lower court. As
such, a question of law must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants.
The resolution of factual issues is the function of lower courts, whose findings
on these matters are accorded respect. A question of law exists when the doubt centers
on what the law is on a certain set of facts. A question of fact exists when the doubt
centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. There is a question of law if the
issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative
value of the evidence. Thus, the issue to be resolved must be limited to determining
what the law is on a certain set of facts. Once the issue invites a review of the
evidence, the question posed is one of fact.
The resolution of the issue raised by petitioner necessarily requires the re-
evaluation of the evidence presented by both parties. This is precisely a question of
fact proscribed under Rule 45. Petitioner has failed to establish that the present case
falls under any of the exceptions to said rule. On the other hand, the factual findings
of the RTC were affirmed by the CA, and as such, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal. On this ground alone, the petition must be denied.

LORZANO V. TABAYAG
FACTS :
The petitioner and the respondent are two of the children of the late Juan
Tabayag. Tabayag owned a parcel of land situated in Iriga City. Right after the burial
of their father, the petitioner allegedly requested from her siblings that she be allowed
to take possession of and receive the income generated by the subject property until
after her eldest son could graduate from college. The petitioners siblings acceded to
the said request. After the petitioners eldest son finished college, her siblings asked
her to return to them the possession of the subject property so that they could partition
it among themselves. However, the petitioner refused to relinquish her possession of
the subject property claiming that she purchased the subject property from their father
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property. Respondent filed an action
for annulment of the sale on the ground that the signature of their father was forged.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It also awarded moral damages and attorneys
fees in favor of respondent. CA affirmed this decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question of the petitioner regarding the award of moral
damages and attorneys fees are questions of fact.
RULING : YES.
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the
petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A
question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the
given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the
evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
That the signature of Tabayag in the deed of sale was a forgery is a conclusion
derived by the RTC and the CA on a question of fact. The same is conclusive upon
this Court as it involves the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, which is a matter not
for this Court to resolve. Where a petitioner casts doubt on the findings of the lower
court as affirmed by the CA regarding the existence of forgery is a question of fact.
For the same reason, we would ordinarily disregard the petitioners allegation as to
the propriety of the award of moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of the

respondent as it is a question of fact. Thus, questions on whether or not there was a

preponderance of evidence to justify the award of damages or whether or not there
was a causal connection between the given set of facts and the damage suffered by the
private complainant or whether or not the act from which civil liability might arise
exists are questions of fact.
Essentially, the petitioner is questioning the award of moral damages and

attorneys fees in favor of the respondent as the same is supposedly not fully
supported by evidence. However, in the final analysis, the question of whether the
said award is fully supported by evidence is a factual question as it would necessitate
whether the evidence adduced in support of the same has any probative value. For a
question to be one of law, it must involve no examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them.
BASES CONVERSION AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY V.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT
FACTS:
On 13 March 1992, Congress approved Republic Act No. 7227 creating the
Bases Conversion And Development Authority (BCDA). Sec 9 of RA No. 7227 states
that the BCDA Board of Directors shall exercise the power and functions of the
BCDA under Sec 10, the functions of the Board include the determination of the
organizational structure and the adoption of a compensation and benefit scheme at
least equivalent to that of the BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP). Accordingly, the
Board determined the organizational structure of the BCDA and adopted a
compensation and benefit scheme for its officials and employees.
On 20 December 1996, the Board adopted a new compensation and benefit

scheme which included a P10,000 year-end benefit granted to each contractual
employee, regular permanent employee, and Board member. In a memorandum dated
25 August 1997, Board Chairman Victoriano A. Basco (Chairman Basco)
recommended to President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) the approval of the new
compensation and benefit scheme. In a memorandum dated 9 October 1997, President
Ramos approved the new compensation and benefit scheme.
In 1999, the BSP gave a P30,000 year-end benefit to its officials and
employees. In 2000, the BSP increased the year-end benefit from P30,000 to P35,000.
Pursuant to Section 10 of RA No. 7227 which states that the compensation and benefit
scheme of the BCDA shall be at least equivalent to that of the BSP, the Board

increased the year-end benefit of BCDA officials and employees from P10,000 to
P30,000. Thus in 2000 and 2001, BCDA officials and employees received a P30,000
year-end benefit, and, on 1 October 2002, the Board passed Resolution No. 2002-10-
193 approving the release of a P30,000 year-end benefit for 2002.
Aside from the contractual employees, regular permanent employees, and

Board members, the full-time consultants of the BCDA also received the year-end
benefit.
ISSUE:Whether or not the members of the Board of Directors are entitled to the year-
end benefit.
RULING: NO.
Clearly, as stated above, the members and ex-officio members of the Board of
Directors are not entitled to YEB, they being not salaried officials of the government.
The same goes with full time consultants wherein no employer-employee
relationships exist between them and the BCDA. Thus, the whole amount paid to
them totaling P342,000 is properly disallowed in audit.
The Board members and full-time consultants of the BCDA are not entitled to
the year-end benefit.
The BCDA claims that the Board can grant the year-end benefit to its members
and full-time consultants because, under Section 10 of RA No. 7227, the functions of
the Board include the adoption of compensation and benefit scheme.
The Court is not impressed. The Board's power to adopt compensation and
benefit scheme is not unlimited. Section 9 of RA No. 7227 states that Board members
are entitled to a per diem: Members of the Board shall receive a per diem of not
more than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) for every board meeting: Provided, however,
That the per diem collected per month does not exceed the equivalent of four (4)
meetings: Provided, further, That the amount of per diem for every board meeting
may be increased by the President but such amount shall not be increased within two
(2) years after its last increase.
CHAVEZ V. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL

FACTS :
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant
seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to

create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the
President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the
judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of
Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector. In compliance therewith, Congress, from the
moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one representative from the Congress
to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.
In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.

Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the
JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC one from the
House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of
a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as
representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the representative of Congress referred to in Article VIII,

Section of the 1987 Constitution refers to two members from the Congress, one from
the Senate and one from the House of Representatives.
RULING : NO.
The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to

perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is
unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of

constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be

given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it
can be clearly and unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of
the singular letter a preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and
leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1)
representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers could have, in no
uncertain terms, so provided.
LEGARDA V. DE CASTRO
FACTS:
Loren B. Legarda filed an election protest against Noli L. de Castro before the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). De Castro filed a motion for its outright
dismissal but the PET confirmed its jurisdiction over the protest. De Castro filed a
motion for reconsideration assailing the PET resolution. He argues that where the
correctness of the number of votes is the issue, the best evidence are the ballots; that
the process of correcting the manifest errors in the certificates of canvass or election
returns is a function of the canvassing bodies; that once the canvassing bodies had
done their functions, no alteration or correction of manifest errors can be made; that
since the authority of the Tribunal involves an exercise of judicial power to determine
the facts based on the evidence presented and to apply the law based on the
established facts, it cannot perform the ministerial function of canvassing election
returns; that the averments contained in the protest are mere conclusions of law which
are inadequate to form a valid cause of action; and that the allegations are not
supported by facts. He also contends that the Tribunal cannot correct the manifest
errors on the statements of votes (SOV) and certificates of canvass (COC).
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential Electoral Tribunal can correct the manifest
errors in the SOV and COC.
RULING: YES.
The constitutional function as well as the power and the duty to be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the President
and Vice-President is expressly vested in the PET, in Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution. Included therein is the duty to correct manifest errors in the SOVs and
COCs.

MACALINTAL vs. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

G.R. No. 191618 (November 23, 2010)
NACHURA, J.:
FACTS:
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution provides: The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for
the purpose. Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to any
agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. Macalintal questions the
constitutionality of the PET. He chafes at the creation of a purportedly separate
tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a seal, a set personnel and
confidential employees, to effect the constitutional mandate. Petitioner argues that
PET is unconstitutional on the ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not
provide for the creation of the PET. According to him, the designation of the justices
of the SC as members of the PET violates Sec 12, Art VIII of the Constitution since
the PET exercises quasi-judicial powers. The Solicitor General maintains that the
constitution of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of authority to the
Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all election contests for the President or Vice-
President under par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
ISSUES and RULING:
Is the PET unconstitutional?

No. The explicit reference of the Members of the Constitutional Commission
to a Presidential Electoral Tribunal, with Fr. Joaquin Bernas categorically declaring
that in crafting the last paragraph of Sec. 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution, they
constitutionalized what was statutory. Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court
by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of necessary implication,
the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of
the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.
Does the PET exercise quasi judicial powers?

No. The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution which provides that the power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. The set up embodied in
the Constitution and statutes characterize the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a
judicial power.

FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and

MARIWASA MANUFACTURING, INC.
G.R. No. 110571 (March 10, 1994)
NOCON, J.:
Facts:
BOI granted First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed
floor tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Eventually, Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration
of the said BOI decision while FilHispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider
the same nor appeal therefrom. Mariwasa filed a petition for review with respondent
Court of Appeals pursuant to Circular 1-91. CA required the BOI and First to
comment on Mariwasa's petition and to show cause why no injunction should issue.
On February 17, 1993, respondent court temporarily restrained the BOI from
implementing its decision. This temporary restraining order lapsed by its own terms
on March 9, 1993, twenty (20) days after its issuance, without respondent court
issuing any preliminary injunction. On February 24, 1993, petitioner filed a "Motion
to Dismiss Petition and to Lift Restraining Order" on the ground that respondent court
has no appellate jurisdiction over BOI Case No. 92-005, the same being exclusively
vested with the Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987. On May 25, 1993, respondent court denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss. Upon receipt of a copy of the resolution on June 4, 1993, First Lepanto
decided not to file any motion for reconsideration as the question involved is
essentially legal in nature and immediately filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition before the SC.
Held:
Under this contextual backdrop, this Court, pursuant to its Constitutional
power under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and by way of
implementation of B.P. 129, issued Circular 1-91 prescribing the rules governing
appeals to the Court of Appeals from final orders or decisions of the Court of Tax
Appeals and quasi-judicial agencies to eliminate unnecessary contradictions and
confusing rules of procedure.
Contrary to petitioner's contention, although a circular is not strictly a statute

or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence.
In Inciong v. de Guia, a circular of this Court was treated as law. In adopting the
recommendation of the Investigating Judge to impose a sanction on a judge who
violated Circular No. 7 of this Court dated September 23, 1974, as amended by
Circular No. 3 dated April 24, 1975 and Circular No. 20 dated October 4, 1979,
requiring raffling of cases, this Court quoted the ratiocination of the Investigating
Judge, brushing aside the contention of respondent judge that assigning cases instead
of raffling is a common practice and holding that respondent could not go against the

circular of this Court until it is repealed or otherwise modified, as "(L)aws are

repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or customs or practice to the contrary."
The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by

Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which, under the
Constitution cannot be modified, diminished or increased by this Court in the exercise
of its rule-making powers is not entirely defensible as it seems. Respondent correctly
argued that Article 82 of E.O. 226 grants the right of appeal from decisions or final
orders of the BOI and in granting such right, it also provided where and in what
manner such appeal can be brought. These latter portions simply deal with procedural
aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-
making powers.
Indeed, the question of where and in what manner appeals from decisions of
the BOI should be brought pertains only to procedure or the method of enforcing the
substantive right to appeal granted by E.O. 226. In other words, the right to appeal
from decisions or final orders of the BOI under E.O. 226 remains and continues to be
respected. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this
agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e.,
fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to
appeal.
The fact that BOI is not expressly included in the list of quasi-judicial
agencies found in the third sentence of Section 1 of Circular 1-91 does not mean that
said circular does not apply to appeals from final orders or decision of the BOI.
Since in DBP v. CA , we upheld the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of

Appeals over the Court of Tax Appeals despite the fact that the same is not among the
agencies reorganized by B.P. 129, on the ground that B.P. 129 is broad and
comprehensive, there is no reason why BOI should be excluded from Circular 1-91,
which is but implementary of said law.
Clearly, Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O.

226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions
of the BOI are concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court, should now be
brought to the Court of Appeals.
TERESITA G. FABIAN vs. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as

ombudsman; HON. JESUS F. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon; and NESTOR V. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 129742 (September 16, 1998)
REGALADO, J:

Facts:
Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business w/ Agustin. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District
(FMED) when he allegedly committed the offenses for which he was administratively
charged in the Office in the office of the Ombudsman. Misunderstanding and
unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when Fabian tried to
terminate their relationship, Agustin refused and resisted her attempts to do so to the
extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She eventually filed
the aforementioned administrative case against him. A case ensued which eventually
led an appeal to the Ombudsman who inhibited himself later the case led to the
deputy Ombudsman. The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and he said the decision is
final and executory. Fabian appealed the case to the SC. She averred that Section 27
of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) pertinently provides that -In all
administrative diciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari
within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec 27 of the Ombudsman Act is valid.
HELD:
Taking all the foregoing circumstances in their true legal roles and effects,
therefore, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to
this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI
of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such
disregard of the constitutional prohibition. That constitutional provision was intended
to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its
appellate jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR. vs. THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and

JUDGE FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES
G.R. No. 132177 (July 19, 2001)
BUENA, J.:
Facts:

On May 23, 1997, Florentino M. Alumbres, filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman, a Criminal Complaint for physical injuries, malicious mischief for the
destruction of complainants eyeglasses, and assault upon a person in authority. It was
alleged that he requested Caoibes to return the executive table he borrowed from
respondent; that Caoibes did not answer so respondent reiterated his request but
before he could finish talking, petitioner blurted Tarantado ito ah, and boxed him at
his right eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his eyeglasses was
thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses unserviceable; and that respondent had the
incident blottered with the Las Pias Police Station. He prayed that criminal charges
be filed before the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner. On June 13, 1997,
respondent Judge lodged another administrative case with the Supreme Court, praying
for the dismissal of petitioner from the judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or
conduct unbecoming a judicial officer. The Office of the Ombudsman required
petitioner to file a counter-affidavit. But instead of filing a counter-affidavit, petitioner
filed on July 7, 1997 and Ex-Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme
Court, praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its investigation of Case No.
OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and refer the same to the Supreme Court .Petitioner
contended that the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has the
authority to make a preliminary determination of the respective culpability of
petitioner and respondent Judge who, both being members of the bench, are under its
exclusive supervision and control.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint
against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises from their administrative
duties, and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said judge or court
employee had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.
Held:
It appears that the present case involves two members of the judiciary who
were entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furniture. Under
Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested
with exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by
itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an
administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges
and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as
to whether and administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true
regardless of whether an administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact that
the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is informed of it, he should
give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes

upon not only administrative liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is
clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that a
case before it does or does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive
the Court of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a
power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as
it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative

supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme
Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and
take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
JUDGE RENATO A. FUENTES, vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN-

MINDANAO, GRAFT INVESTIGATION OFFICER II, MARIVIC A.
TRABAJO-DARAY, ANTONIO E. VALENZUELA in his capacity as the
Director for Fact Finding and Intelligence of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Mindanao, and MARGARITO P. GERVACIO, JR., in his
capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Mindanao
G.R. No. 178902 (April 21, 2010)
ABAD, J.:
Facts:
Pursuant to the governments plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City,
the Republic of the Philippines filed an expropriation case against the owners of the
properties affected by the project. The expropriation case was presided by Judge
Renato A. Fuentes. The government won the expropriation case. DPWH still owed the
defendants-lot owners. The lower court granted Tessie Amadeos motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. On
May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the
Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the
levy as All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public Works
and Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City. The auction sale pushed through and
Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together
with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to withdraw the auctioned properties on
May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from doing so by the custodian of the
subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo, who claimed that his office
was totally unaware of the auction sale, and informed the sheriff that many of the

properties within the holding area of the depot were still serviceable and were due for
repair and rehabilitation.
On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second

District of Davao City and Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator,
Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to
comment on the report recommending the filing of an administrative case against the
sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous implementation of the writ of
execution. The Department of Public Works and Highways, through the Solicitor
General, filed an administrative complaint against Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that Judge Renato A.

Fuentes be charged before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No.
3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be administratively charged before the Supreme
Court with acts unbecoming of a judge.
Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e).
Fuentes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to

dismiss complaint and/ or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated
a criminal complaint against petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e].
And he conducted an investigation of said complaint against petitioner. Thus, he
encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of administrative supervision over all
courts and its personnel.
The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an

investigation because the Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which
would verify the propriety of the issuance of the questioned order and writ. Moreover,
the Court Administrator has not filed any administrative case against petitioner judge
that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in
the exercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence of an administrative charge for the same acts
before the Supreme Court.
Held:

No. Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989,
provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its
own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at
any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such
cases.
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or

administrative complaint before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his
power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to the
Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme

Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the
Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court
personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Petitioners questioned order directing the attachment of government property

and issuing a writ of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his
official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess of
jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the
given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the judicial action only by
the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. No other entity or official of
the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not
any functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--
whether final and executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis
for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order.
That prerogative belongs to the courts alone.
ADAJAR V. DEVELOS
Facts:

Luz C. Adajar filed a complaint against Teresita Develos, Cyrus Ellorin and
Celsa Ellorin, who are government employees stationed at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Complainant alleged that she delivered
pieces of jewelries on a consignment basis amounting to 70,000 pesos to Mrs. Teresita
Develuz at her office at RTC Branch 8 Staff Room, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon with
the agreement that she will pay the said amount within Three (3) Months. Mrs.
Develuz made partial payments in the total amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos. However, when demanded from to pay the balance of P20,000.00 Pesos, she
refused. On February 6, 2002 complainant, again, went to RTC Branch 8 to collect the
account from Mrs. Develuz when the latter, in an angry and loud voice said, Dili ba
nga gihatagan ta naman ka sa listahan sa mga nakakuha sa alahas? Ikaw na ang
maningil sa ila, (which in English literally means IS IT NOT THAT I HAVE
ALREADY GIVEN YOU THE LIST OF THOSE WHO GOT THE JEWELRIES?
YOU COLLECT IT YOURSELF). While having a verbal tussle, Mr. Cyrus Ellorin
who is a co-employee of Mrs. Develuz, with the designation of court interpreter of
Branch 8, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, allegedly, went near and shouted. Mr. Cyrus
Ellorin violently pushed complainant of the staff room, practically driving her out as
if she was a leper. Employees of the office of the Clerk of Court brought her to their
office and gave her water and comforted her. The incident was reported to the police
and entered into the blotter.
Respondents contend that the acts of respondents Celsa Ellorin and Teresita
Develos being complained of by complainant were not in relation to their functions as
court employees but were in connection with the pecuniary activity of complainant.
Respondents further assert that complainant is guilty of dishonesty for certifying that
she did not commence any other action before any tribunal or body except before this
Court when in fact she also filed a complaint for misconduct with the Office of the
Ombudsman, Mindanao. Respondents also submitted in evidence a Joint-Affidavit
executed by persons who were indebted to complainant stating therein that respondent
Develos simply facilitated the sale of jewelry made by complainant.
Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, acting on the complaint for misconduct
filed by herein complainant, rendered a Decision dismissing the administrative case
against herein respondents as well as the counter-complaint filed by the latter against
herein complainant.
The Investigating Judge adopted the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman,
Mindanao and, accordingly, recommended that the instant administrative complaint
be dismissed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Office of the Ombudsman should take cognizance of this
case
Held:

No, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao should not have taken

cognizance of the instant case the same being administrative in nature. As correctly
pointed out by the OCA, it has been settled as early as the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez
that:
Article VIII, Section 6 of the 1987 constitution exclusively vests in the
Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from
the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court
clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other
branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of power.
Pursuant to the above-settled rule, the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao
should have referred the instant complaint to this Court for appropriate action, instead
of resolving the same. Hence, we agree with the OCA that the Decision rendered by
the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao in OMB-M-A-02-126-E does not have any
force and effect on the present administrative case before us.
IN RE: REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE
Facts:
Before the Court is a Memorandum dated September 18, 2013 from Atty. Eden
T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative Officer, Office of
Administrative Services of the Supreme Court, requesting guidance/clarification on
the applicability to the Judiciary of Section 7, Rule III of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Republic Act No. (RA) 101541 which states:
Section 7. Notice of Pendency of Case. The retiring employee shall seek

Clearance of Pendency/Non-Pendency of Administrative Case from his/her employer
agency, Civil Service Commission (CSC), Office of the Ombudsman, or in case of
presidential appointees, from the Office of the President.
Section 6,2 Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (Constitution)
exclusively vests in the Court administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel.3 As such, it oversees the court personnels compliance with all laws and
takes the proper administrative action against them for any violation thereof.4 As an
adjunct thereto, it keeps in its custody records pertaining to the administrative cases of
retiring court personnel.
In view of the foregoing, the Court rules that the subject provision which
requires retiring government employees to secure a prior clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of administrative case/s from, among others, the CSC should not be made
to apply to employees of the Judiciary.1wphi1 To deem it otherwise would disregard
the Courts constitutionally-enshrined power of administrative supervision over its
personnel. Besides, retiring court personnel are already required to secure a prior
clearance of the pendency/non-pendency of administrative case/s from the Court

which makes the CSC clearance a superfluous and non-expeditious requirement

contrary to the declared state policy of RA 10154.5
Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court has the authority of the courts personnel?
Held:
Yes, the same principles dictate that a prior clearance of pendency/non-
pendency of administrative case/s from the Office of the President (albeit some court
personnel are presidential appointees, e.g., Supreme Court Justices) or the Office of
the Ombudsman should not equally apply to retiring court personnel. Verily, the
administrative supervision of court personnel and all affairs related thereto fall within
the exclusive province of the Judiciary.
It must, however, be noted that since the Constitution only accords the
Judiciary administrative supervision over its personnel, a different treatment of the
clearance requirement obtains with respect to criminal cases. As such, a clearance
requirement which pertains to criminal cases may be imposed by the appropriate
government agency, i.e., the Office of the Ombudsman,6 on retiring court personnel
as it is a matter beyond the ambit of the Judiciarys power of administrative
supervision.
PEOPLE V. GACOTT
Facts: For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC
Judge Eustaquio Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme
Court. The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP
10k for gross ignorance of law. The judgment was made by the Second Division of
the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme Court has the competence
to administratively discipline respondent judge?
Held: To require the entire court to deliberate upon and participate in all
administrative matter or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the
Court, especially in administrative matters, since even cases involving the penalty of
reprimand would require action by the Court En Banc.
IN RE: IBP ELECTIONS

696 SCRA 8 (2013)
Facts:
This is yet another controversy involving the leadership of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) that could have been resolved at the Integrated Bar of the

Philippines level but was instead referred to this taking away precious resources that
could have been better applied to resolve other conflicts for the public interest.
The consolidated cases involve two Administrative Matters. The first
Administrative Matter (A.M. No. 13-04-03-SC) arose from a Motion filed by Atty.
Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western Visayas. Atty. Ubano sought to
invalidate or have this Court declare as ultra vires the portion of the March 21, 2013
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors which approved the nomination of Atty.
Lynda Chaguile as replacement of IBP Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B.
Habawel. The second Administrative Matter arose from another Motion filed by Atty.
Ubano who sought to nullify the May 22, 2013 election for IBP Executive Vice
President (EVP) and restrain Atty. Vicente M. Joyas from discharging the duties of
IBP EVP/Acting President. In a Resolution dated June 18, 2013, this Court
consolidated the second Administrative Matter with the first.
On March 27, 2013, Atty. Marlou B. Ubano, IBP Governor for Western
Visayas, filed a Motion (Original Motion) in relation to A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC. Atty.
Ubano sought to invalidate or have this Court declare as ultra vires the portion of the
March 21, 2013 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors which approved the
nomination of Atty. Lynda Chaguile as the replacement of IBP Governor for Northern
Luzon, Denis B. Habawel. In this Original Motion, Atty. Ubano noted that on
December 4, 2012, this Court approved an amendment to Article I, Section 4 of the
IBP By-Laws which considers as ipso facto resigned from his or her post any official
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines who files a Certificate of Candidacy for any
elective public office. Under the amended By-Laws, the resignation takes effect on
the starting date of the official campaign period. Atty. Ubano alleged that the IBP
Governor for Northern Luzon, Denis B. Habawel, filed a Certificate of Candidacy to
run for the position of Provincial Governor of the Province of Ifugao on or before
October 5, 2012, and that on or before December 21, 2012, IBP President, Roan
Libarios, filed a Certificate of Substitution to run as a substitute congressional
candidate for the First District of Agusan del Norte.2
ISSUE: Whether or not the Supreme Court has a jurisdiction over the IBP?
Held:
The leadership of our Integrated Bar must find a better way of resolving its
conflicts other than elevating these matters to this Court. It cannot fail to show
maturity in resolving its own conflicts. It behooves the members of the legal
profession to avoid being solitigious that they lose sightof the primordial public
interests that must be upheld in every case and conflict that is raised to the level of
this Court.
Otherwise, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines will continue to alienate its
mass membership through political contestations that may be viewed as parochial
intramurals from which only a few lawyers benefit. It will be generations of leaders
who model needless litigation and wasted time and energy. This is not what an
integrated bar of a noble profession should be. The Motion to Declare dated March
27, 2013 as Ultra Vires or Invalid the Urgent Motion to Defer/Restrain Performance
of Duties as Successor Governor of IBP Northern Luzon Region dated April 22,

2013and the Very Urgent Motion to Restrain Atty. Chaguile from Voting in the EVP
Election on May22, 2013 dated May 20, 2013 filed by Atty. Marlou B. Ubano are
denied for being moot and academic.
YLAYA V. GACOTT
Facts:
Fe Ylaya filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. GacOtt. According to her,
Atty. Gacott deceived her and her late husband, Laurentino, into signing a preparatory
deed of sale which they thought would be used in the sale of the properties to the City
Government of Puerto Prinsesa because at that time the said properties were subject to
expropriation proceedings. But to their dismay, according to her, it was converted into
a deed of absolute sale in favor of Atty. Gacotts uncle Reynolds So. Atty. Gacott
denied these and claimed that Laurentino and Reynold had originally purchased the
properties that they were co-owners and that Laurentino subsequently sold his share to
Reynold under the deed of absolute sale. He also argued that it was clear from the
document that the intended buyer was a natural person, not juridical because there
were spaces for the buyers legal age, marital status, and citizenship. Also, he claimed
that he was even constrained to file a subsequent motion to intervene on behalf of
Reynold because the complainant maliciously retained the TCTs to the subject
properties after borrowing them from his office.
Then, after some time, Fe Ylaya submitted a motion to withdraw and executed
an affidavit affirming and confirming the existence, genuineness, and due execution
of the deed of absolute sale. The IBP governor resolved to suspend Atty. Gacott to 2
years, finding him guilty of violation of Rule 1.01 and canon 16 of the code of
professional responsibility.
Issue:
1. Whether or not Atty. Gacott indeed deceived the spouses and should be suspended.
2. Whether or not the motion to withdraw and affidavit affirming and confirming the
existence, genuiness, and due execution will affect the disbarment proceedings.
Held:
1. Yes but not because of violation of Rule 1.01. Atty. Gacotts failure to prove the
existence of co ownership does not lead to the conclusion that the deed of aabsolute
sale is spurious and he was responsible for creating the spurious documents.
However, he is liable for violating canon 16, rule 15.03, and rule 18.03. Canon
16, he was remiss in his obligation to hold in trust his clients properties. he lost
certificates of land titles that were entrusted to his care by Reynold. Rule 15.03, he
admitted to be a acting as legal counsel for the former owner of the subject properties,
spouses Ylaya, and Reynold So. There was no written consent from any of the parties
involved. Rule 18.03, he neglected legal matters entrusted to him. Records show that
he never filed motion for leave to intervene on behalf of the spouses in the
expropriation proceedings, contrary to what he claimed.

2. No. While Fe Ylaya submitted the motion to withdraw the verified complaint and
the affidavit appear to exonerate Atty. Gacott, complete exoneration is not the
necessary legal effect as they are immaterial for purposes of the disbarment
proceedings. According to Sec 5 Rule 139-B of the rules of Court, no investigation
shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of charges or failure of the complainant to prosecute the
same. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for
private grievances. They are undertaken and prosecutes solely for the public welfare.
Atty. Gacott was suspended from practice of law for one year.
ECHEGARAY V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a TRO stating the execution of
petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only
violated the rule on finality of judgment but also encroached on the power of the
executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the
finality of judgment has already been rendered and that by granting the TRO, the
Honorable Court has in effect granted reprieve which is an executive function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited Sec 19, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. The provision is
simply the source of power of the President to grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final judgment. The
provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the power of courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a
death convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher
right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the
right to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-
equal and coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.
IN RE: DESIGNATION OF JUDGE RODOLFO U. MANZANO AS MEMBER

OF THE ILOCOS NORTE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE.
Facts:
Judge Manzano sent a letter to the SC stating that he was, through Executive Order
RF6-04, designated by Gov. Farinas as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial

Committee on Justice, which was created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order

No. 856 and was appointed as a member of the Committee.
With that, he was asking the Court to authorize him to discharge the functions and
duties of the office and to consider his membership in the Committee as part of the
primary functions of an Executive Judge. He alleged that his membership in the
Committee is neither violative of the Independence of the Judiciary nor a violation of
Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section .7, Article IX (B), both
of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of his present
position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Region, and as a member of the Judiciary.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Manzano can accept the appointment as member of
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice?
Ruling:
No. The committee was created by the Executive branch of the government where its
members discharge administrative functions. Though it may be quasi-judicial, it is
still administrative in nature. Judge Manzano is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official. Moreover, RTC Judges may only render assistance when such are
reasonable incidental to the fulfillment of their judicial functions.
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City

Committees on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of
detainees, particularly those involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail
congestion and improving local jail conditions. Among the functions of the
Committee are
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden,

final or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in the
discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for
appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed

prejudicial to the proper administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative

functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare and the
promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature
or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence.
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is
provided that
Section 6. Supervision.The Provincial/City Committees on Justice

shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of justice Quarterly

accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the Office of the

Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial

Committee on Justice, which discharges an administrative function will be in
violation of the Constitution thus, the Court is constrained to deny his request.
LEAGUE OF CITIES V. COMELEC
Facts: During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income
requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to convert into cities solely to
secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are
incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment, a total of 57 municipalities
had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills
during the 11th Congress.
During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No.
29. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12thCongress adjourned
without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16
of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed
between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in
Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:
Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009: The City of x x x shall be exempted from the
income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.These cityhood bills
lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Petitioners filed the present petitions to
declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners
also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of
the Local Government Code.
Issue: Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution and the equal protection clause. YES
Held: The Cityhood Laws violate both the Constitution and the equal protection
clause. Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city,
municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary

substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the political units directly affected.
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the
criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is
only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in
the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city,
including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such
criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Likewise, Section 450 of the Local Government Code provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred
million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on
2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least 100 square kilometers, as certified by the
Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than 150,000 inhabitants, as certified by the
National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly
identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply
where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands.
The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the
general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality

into a city from P20 million toP100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased
income requirement.
The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification
under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the
classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same
income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16

respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in

the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
MANGELEN V. CA
Facts: Mangelen filed a case for breach of contract against Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
and Pedro Habaluyas. The Defendants were declared in default for their failure to file
an answer within the reglementary period. The trial court rendered a Decision in favor
of plaintiff awarding him exemplary damages which was not included in his prayer.
Issue: Whether the award of exemplary damages was proper?
Held:
No. Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court provides that judgment entered against a
party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from that prayed
for.
Consequently, an award of exemplary damages should not have been made since it
was not even prayed for. Besides, the complaint is for breach of contract. Exemplary
damages may only be awarded therein if private respondents acted in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
There is a difference between a judgment against a defendant based on evidence

presented ex-parte pursuant to a default order and one based on evidence presented
ex-parte and against a defendant who had filed an answer but who failed to appear at
the hearing. In the former, section 5 of Rule 18 provides that the judgment against the
defendant should not exceed the amount or to be different in kind from that prayed
for. In the latter, however, the award may exceed the amount or be different in kind
from the prayed for.
OCA VS. FUENTES III
Facts:
On 13 June 2011, a judicial audit was conducted at the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 49, Tagbilaran City, Bohol, presided over by Judge Fernando G. Fuentes III
(Judge Fuentes III).
The judicial audit report[1] of the team from the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) revealed that as of 13 June 2011, the aforementioned court had 272 (138
criminal and 134 civil) pending cases in its docket. Of these cases, 83 (24 criminal
and 59 civil) were deemed submitted for decision. The report also revealed that of the
cases submitted for decision, 70 were already beyond the reglementary period to
decide, with some cases submitted for decision as far back as 2003. Further, 31 of

these 70 cases were appealed from the first level courts, with two criminal cases
involving detention prisoners.
On 22 August 2011, the Court resolved, among others, to direct Presiding Judge
Fuentes III, to:
CEASE and DESIST from hearing cases in his court and devote his time in
deciding cases and resolving pending incidents/motions listed in matrices I and II
of this Report, giving priority to Crim[inal] Case Nos. 14116 (PP v. Sarabia) and
14299 (PP v. Formentera, Jr.) which involve[d] detention prisoners, to continue
a)
until the above shall have all been finally disposed of, and to furnish the Court,
through the OCA, copies of such decisions/orders related thereto; and that his
salaries, allowances and other benefits be ordered WITHHELD pending full
compliance with this directive;
RESOLVE the twenty-seven (27) pending incidents/motions in matrix number
b)
III; [and]
EXPLAIN in writing, within fifteen (15) days from notice, why no administrative
sanction should be taken against him for his failure to decide/resolve the 83 cases
c)
enumerated in Nos. I and II and the 27 cases with pending motions enumerated in
No. III;
x xx x[2]
HELD
Under the 1987 Constitution, trial judges are mandated to decide and resolve cases
within 90 days from submission for decision or resolution. Corollary to this
constitutional mandate, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for
the Philippine Judiciary requires judges to perform all judicial duties efficiently, fairly,
and with reasonable promptness. The mandate to promptly dispose of cases or
matters also applies to motions or interlocutory matters or incidents pending before
the magistrate. Unreasonable delay of a judge in resolving a pending incident is a
violation of the norms of judicial conduct and constitutes gross inefficiency that
warrants the imposition of an administrative sanction against the defaulting
magistrate.[10]
Judge Fuentes III concedes that there is no valid justification for the delay in resolving
the cases pending in his court. Indeed, his frequent travels to his residence in Ozamis
City, which led to travel fatigue and poor health, will not absolve him from liability.
We have always reminded judges that the Court is not unmindful of the circumstances
that may delay the disposition of the cases assigned to them. Thus, the Court remains
sympathetic to seasonably filed requests for extension of time to decide cases.
Unfortunately, no such requests were made by Judge Fuentes III until the judicial
audit was conducted by the OCA and a directive was issued to him by the Court.
In Office of the Court Administrator v. Javellana,[11] the Court held that a judge cannot
choose his deadline for deciding cases pending before him. Without an extension
granted by the Court, the failure to decide even a single case within the required

period constitutes gross inefficiency that merits administrative sanction. If a judge is

unable to comply with the period for deciding cases or matters, he can, for good
reasons, ask for an extension.
An inexcusable failure to decide a case within the prescribed 90-day period

constitutes gross inefficiency, warranting the imposition of administrative sanctions
such as suspension from office without pay or fine [12] on the defaulting judge. The
fines imposed vary in each case, depending chiefly on the number of cases not
decided within the reglementary period and other factors, such as the presence of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the damage suffered by the parties as a result
of the delay, the health and age of the judge, and other analogous circumstances.
In the instant administrative matters, we deem the reduction of the fine proper
considering that this is the first infraction of Judge Fuentes III in his more than 15
years in the service. We also take into consideration the fact that Judge Fuentes III
exerted earnest effort to fully comply with the directives of the Court as contained in
the resolution.
With regard to his delay in rendering judgment in Civil Case No. 7028, we deem the
same included in the penalty to be imposed in A.M No. RTJ-12-2318. Otherwise, we
will be penalizing Judge Fuentes III twice for the same offense or omission.
In conclusion, we exhort all judges to perform their judicial duties with reasonable
promptness because the honor and integrity of the judicial system is measured not
only by the fairness and correctness of the decisions rendered, but also by the
expediency with which disputes are resolved.[13]
YNOT VS INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

No. L-74457
Petition: Certiorari
Petitioner: RestitutoYnot
Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court
Ponente: Cruz
Date: March 20, 1987
Facts:
In October 25, 1980, then President Ferdinand Marcos enacted Executive Order
626-A which amended EO 626. The new executive order prohibited to the
interprovincial movement of carabaos and carabeef. Section 1 of EO 626-A
proclaims:
... The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this EO as

amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the
government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection
Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving

farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see

fit, in the case of carabaos.
In January 13, 1984, petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pumpboat from
Masbate to Iloilo when they were confiscated by the police station commander of
Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for violation of the above measure. The petitioner sued for
recovery, and the RTC of Iloilo city issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a
supersedeas bond of Php 12,000. The courts sustained the confiscation of the carabaos
and, since they could be no longer produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond.
The courts declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order for
lack of authority. The Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the trial court decision
after the petitioner appealed, hence this petition.
Issues:
1.) W/N the Regional Trial Court has the authority to rule on the constitutionality
of the Executive Order
2.) W/N Executive Order 626 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
1.) YES, The lower courts have authority to resolve the issue of constitutionality
of legislative measures. The supreme court has declared that while lower
courts should observe modesty in examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted,
subject only to review by the highest tribunal. The courts have the jurisdiction
under the Constitution, to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgements and
orders of the lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This means that the resolution of such
cases may be made in the first instance by these lower couce.
2.) YES. The ban on the transportation of carabaos from one province to another
(EO 626-A), their confiscation and disposal without a prior court hearing is
violative of the due process for lack of reasonable connection between the
means employed and the purpose to be achieved and for being confiscatory.
Also, the manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in

the EO is evident of undue delegation of legislative powers. The phrase may
see fit is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. It is laden with
perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. Only the
officers named and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in
their own exclusive discretion. Therefore there is an invalid delegation of
legislative powers.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION
JALOSJOS VS. COMELEC (2012)

Facts:
In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for
Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan
Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In September 2008 he
began occupying the house. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of
Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo
to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,
claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when he
indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC, on June 3,
2010 the En Banc granted Erasmos motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos
ineligible to seek election as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga
Sibugay. It held that Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by
continuing to hold the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he
should be deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place to Barangay
Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Jalosjos challenges the COMELECs
finding that he did not meet the residency requirement and its denial of his right to
due process.
Held:
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all
questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend
to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the
House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of
these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the
House of Representatives. The Court has already settled the question of when the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The
proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC
of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET. The fact is that on election day of
2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from the Second
Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then
existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the
congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before
election day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second Division that allowed his
name to stay on that list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order
suspending his proclamation pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of
his proclamation and assumption of office, any issue regarding his qualification for
the same, like his alleged lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to
consider and decide. Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June
3, 2010, Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election. Thus, theCOMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed upon the
issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of Representative
of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.

LUIS K. LOKIN, JR. AND TERESITA F. PLANAS, Petitioner, v.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS: The Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list
organization, manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections. They submitted a list of five nominees from which its
representatives would be chosen should CIBAC obtain the number of qualifying
votes. However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was amended: the
nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were
withdrawn; Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and
Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were retained.
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as
second nominee on the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by
Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of
nominees and the withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It
approved the amendment of the list of nominees with the new order as follows:
1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane Borje
The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of
CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of
CIBAC.
Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim
him as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for
certiorari assailing Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded
Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its nominees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates
the Party-List System Act; and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC
and allowing the amendment of the list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in
fact or law and after the close of polls.
RULING: The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokins case is not an
election protest nor an action for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between
the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and

irregularities, to determine who obtained the higher number of votes entitling them to
hold the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo warranto questions
the ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari
against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in
accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for certiorari
and the action for mandamus are based on different causes of action and the reliefs
they sought were different. Forum shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively to obtain a favorable judgment.
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC
issued Resolution No. 7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance
with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As
an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of Congress nor issue IRRs that may
enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and enforces. Section
8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list
of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen
in case it obtains the required number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their
consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of
any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shal be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC
except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be
placed last in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of
Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered
resigned.
The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite
meaning, there is no room for interpretation or construction but only for application.
Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of nominees and alteration of the order in the
list of nominees names after submission of the list to the COMELEC. It enumerates
only three instances in which an organization can substitute another person in place of
the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the
nominee fies; (2) when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3)
when the nominee becomes incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception
to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly but reasonably
construed.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A.
No. 7941 when it provided four instances by adding nomination is withdrawn by the
party as statutory ground for substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to
expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to implement. An IRR should remain
consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant or modify it. An

IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law
and the IRR, the law prevails.
The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No.
7804 was declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list
organization to withdraw its nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the
nomination to the COMELEC.
MAMERTO SEVILLA, JR. V. COMELEC AND RENATO SO
G.R No. 203833 March 19, 2013
FACTS:Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of Punong Barangay of

Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City during the October 25,2010 Barangay and
SangguniangKabataan Elections, in which Sevilla was proclaimed as the winner. So
filed an election protest with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral
fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested precints. The MeTC dismissed
the election protest.
So filed a motion for reconsideration from the dismissal order instead of a notice of
appeal; he also failed to pay the appeal fee within the reglementary period. But the
MeTC denied the motion for reconsideration on the ground that it was prohibited
pleading. In response, So filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MeTC Judge.
The COMELEC Second Division granted Sos petition and held that certiorari can be
granted despite the availability of appeals when the questioned order amounts to an
oppressive exercise of judicial authority. It also ruled that the assailed order was
fraught with infirmities and irregularities in the appreciation of the ballot.
The COMELEC en banc, by a vote of 3-3, affirmed the COMELEC Second
Divisions ruling.
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it gave due course to the
petition despite its loss of jurisdiction after the dismissal order became final and
executory due to Sos wrong choice of remedy.
HELD:
The court resolve to dismiss the petition for having been prematurely filed and
remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action. It ruled that COMELEC
en bancs resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a majority decision required by the
Constitution and by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
In the present case, it appears from the records that the Comelecen banc did not issue
an Order for a rehearing of the case in view of filing in the interim of the present

petition for certiorari by Sevilla. In both the cases of Juliano and Marcoleta, cited
above, we remanded the cases to the Comelecen banc for the conduct of the required
rehearing pursuant to the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Based on these considerations,
we thus find that a remind of this case is necessary for the Comelecen banc to comply
with the rehearing requirement of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure.
GARCES V COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
LucitaGarces was appointed Election Registrar of Gutalac, Zamboangadel Norte on
July 27, 1986. She was to replace respondent Election Registrar Claudio Concepcion,
who, in turn, was transferred to Liloy, Zamboangadel Norte.
Both appointments were to take effect upon assumption of office. Concepcion,
however, refused to transfer post as he did not request for it. Garces was directed by
the Office of Assistant Director for Operations to assume the Gutalac post. But she
was not able to do so because of a Memorandum issued by respondent Provincial
Election Supervisor Salvador Empeynado that prohibited her from assuming office as
the same is not vacant.
Garces received a letter from the Acting Manager, Finance Service Department, with
an enclosed check to cover for the expenses on construction of polling booths. It was
addressed Mrs. LucitaGarces E.R. Gutalac, Zamboangadel Norte which Garces
interpreted to mean as superseding the deferment order. Meanwhile, since Concepcion
continued occupying the Gutalac office, the COMELEC en banc cancelled his
appointment to Liloy.
Garces filed before the RTC a petition for mandamus with preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction and damages against Empeynado and Concepcion.
Meantime, the COMELEC en banc resolved to recognize respondent Concepcion as
the Election Registrar of Gutalac and ordered that the appointments of Garces be
cancelled.
Empeynado moved to dismiss the petition for mandamus alleging that the same was
rendered moot and academic by the said COMELEC Resolution, and that the case is
cognizable only by the COMELEC under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A of the 1987
Constitution.Empeynado argues that the matter should be raised only on certiorari
before the Supreme Court and not before the RTC, else the latter court becomes a
reviewer of an en banc COMELEC resolution contrary to Sec. 7, Art. IX-A.
RTC dismissed the petition for mandamus on two grounds, viz., (1) that quo warranto
is the proper remedy, and (2) that the cases or matters referred under the
constitution pertain only to those involving the conduct of elections.
CA affirmed the RTCs dismissal of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the case is cognizable by the Supreme Court?

HELD:
No. The case is cognizable in the RTC.
Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides:
Each commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or
matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the rules of the
commission or by the commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
from receipt of a copy thereof.
This provision is inapplicable as there was no case or matter filed before the
COMELEC. On the contrary, it was the COMELECs resolution that triggered this
Controversy.
The case or matter referred to by the constitution must be something within the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., it must pertain to an election dispute. The settled
rule is that decision, rulings, order of the COMELEC that may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari under Sec. 7 Art. IX-A are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers involving elective
regional, provincial and city officials.
In this case, what is being assailed is the COMELECs choice of an appointee to
occupy the Gutalac Post which is an administrative duty done for the operational set-
up of an agency. The controversy involves an appointive, not an elective, official.
Hardly can this matter call for the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
To rule otherwise would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions
that are best ventilated before the RTC, a court which the law vests with the power to
exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
*Petition denied
VELOSO V COA
Facts:On December 7, 2000, the City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8040
entitled An Ordinance Authorizing the Conferment of Exemplary Public Service
Award to Elective Local Officials of Manila Who Have Been Elected for Three (3)
Consecutive Terms in the Same Position.
Pursuant to the ordinance, the City made partial payments in favor of the
following former councilors:

Councilor/Recipients Check Date Amount

Abraham C. Cabochan353010 06/07/05 P1,658,989.09
Julio E. Logarta, Jr. 353156 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08
Luciano M. Veloso 353778 06/30/05 P1,658,989.08
Jocelyn Dawis-353155 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08
Asuncion
Marlon M. Lacson 353157 06/14/05 P1,658,989.08
Heirs of Hilarion C.353093 06/09/05 P1,628,311.59
Silva
TOTAL P9,923,257.00
On August 8, 2005, Atty. Gabriel J. Espina (Atty. Espina), Supervising Auditor

of the City of Manila, issued Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-
100(05)07(05)[6] with the following observations:
1. The initial payment of monetary reward as part of

Exemplary Public Service Award (EPSA) amounting to P9,923,257.00
to former councilors of the City Government of Manila who have been
elected for three (3) consecutive terms to the same position as
authorized by City Ordinance No. 8040 is without legal basis.
2. The amount granted as monetary reward is excessive and

tantamount to double compensation in contravention to Article 170 (c)
of the IRR of RA 7160 which provides that no elective or appointive
local official shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law.
3. The appropriations for retirement gratuity to implement EPSA

ordinance was classified as Maintenance and Other Operating
Expenses instead of Personal Services contrary to Section 7, Volume III
of the Manual on the New Government Accounting System (NGAS)
for local government units and COA Circular No. 2004-008 dated
September 20, 2004 which provide the updated description of accounts
under the NGAS.
Issue: WON the COA has the authority to disallow the disbursement of local
government funds.

Ruling: Section 458 of RA 7160 defines the power, duties, functions and
compensation of the SangguniangPanlungsod, to wit:
SEC. 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. - (a)

The SangguniangPanlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of
this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city
as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall:
xxxx
(viii) Determine the positions and salaries,

wages, allowances and other emoluments and benefits
of officials and employees paid wholly or mainly from
city funds and provide for expenditures necessary for
the proper conduct of programs, projects, services, and
activities of the city government.
In the exercise of the above power, the City Council of Manila enacted on
December 7, 2000 Ordinance No. 8040, but the same was deemed approved on
August 23, 2002. The ordinance authorized the conferment of the EPSA to the former
three-term councilors and, as part of the award, the qualified city officials were to be
given retirement and gratuity pay remuneration. We believe that the award is a
gratuity which is a free gift, a present, or benefit of pecuniary value bestowed without
claim or demand, or without consideration.
However, as correctly held by the COA, the above power is not without
limitations. These limitations are embodied in Section 81 of RA 7160, to wit:
SEC. 81. Compensation of Local Officials and Employees. The

compensation of local officials and personnel shall be determined by
the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That the increase in compensation
of elective local officials shall take effect only after the terms of office
of those approving such increase shall have expired: Provided,
further, That the increase in compensation of the appointive officials
and employees shall take effect as provided in the ordinance
authorizing such increase; Provided however, That said increases shall
not exceed the limitations on budgetary allocations for personal
services provided under Title Five, Book II of this Code: Provided

finally, That such compensation may be based upon the pertinent

provisions of Republic Act Numbered Sixty-seven fifty-eight (R.A. No.
6758), otherwise known as the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.
Moreover, the IRR of RA 7160 reproduced the Constitutional provision that

no elective or appointive local official or employee shall receive additional, double, or
indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the
consent of the Congress, any present, emoluments, office, or title of any kind from
any foreign government. Section 325 of the law limit the total appropriations for
personal servicesof a local government unit to not more than 45% of its total annual
income from regular sources realized in the next preceding fiscal year.
While it may be true that the above appropriation did not exceed the budgetary
limitation set by RA 7160, we find that the COA is correct in sustaining ND No. 06-
010-100-05.
Section 2 of Ordinance No. 8040 provides for the payment of retirement and gratuity
pay remuneration equivalent to the actual time served in the position for three (3)
consecutive termsas part of the EPSA. The recomputation of the award disclosed that
it is equivalent to the total compensation received by each awardee for nine years that
includes basic salary, additional compensation, Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance, representation and transportation allowance, rice allowance, financial
assistance, clothing allowance, 13th month pay and cash gift.This is not disputed by
petitioners. There is nothing wrong with the local government granting additional
benefits to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the granting of
incentive benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees. Considering,
however, that the payment of these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it
must not contravene the law on disbursement of public funds.
As clearly explained by the Court in Yap v. Commission on Audit, the disbursement of

public funds, salaries and benefits of government officers and employees should be
granted to compensate them for valuable public services rendered, and the salaries or
benefits paid to such officers or employees must be commensurate with services
rendered. In the same vein, additional allowances and benefits must be shown to be
necessary or relevant to the fulfillment of the official duties and functions of the
government officers and employees. Without this limitation, government officers and
employees may be paid enormous sums without limit or without justification
necessary other than that such sums are being paid to someone employed by the
government. Public funds are the property of the people and must be used prudently at
all times with a view to prevent dissipation and waste.[41]
AGRA V. COA

FACTS:
On July 1, 1989, Republic Act No. 6758 (the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989) took effect, Section 12 of which provides:
Sec. 12. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation.All allowances,
except for representation and transportation allowances; clothing and laundry
allowances; subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on
boardgovernment vessels and hospital personnel; hazard pay; allowances of
foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and such other additional
compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM,
shall be deemed included in the standardized salary rates herein prescribed. Such
other additional compensation, whether in cash or in kind, being received by
incumbents only as of July 1, 1989 notintegrated into the standardized salary rates
shall continue to be authorized. Existing additional compensation of any national
government official or employee paid from local funds of a local government unit
shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be
paid by the National Government.
Thus, pursuant to its authority under Section 23 of R.A. No. 6758, the DBM x x x
issued on October 2, 1989, DBM-CCC No. 10. Section 5.5 of DBM-CCC No. 10
enumerated the various allowances/fringe benefits authorized to GOCCs/GFIs
which are not to be integrated into the basic salary and allowed to be continued
only for incumbents of positions as of June 30, 1989 who are authorized and
actually receiving said allowances/benefits as of said date. Among these was the
rice subsidy/allowance.
A group of NEA employees who were hired after October 31, 19893 claimed that
they did not receive meal, rice, and childrens allowances. Thus, on July 23, 1999,
they filed a special civil action for mandamus against NEA and its Board of
Administrators before the Regional Trial Court.
The RTC rendered its decision on December 15, 1999 in favor of the NEA
employees. The branch clerk of court issued a certification stating that such
judgment has become final and executory.
NEA filed an appeal to the CA, however the CA ordered the extinguishment of the
funds of NEA. Thus, NEA filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. Meanwhile,
the RTC held inabeyance the execution of its December 15, 1999 Decision.
The SC reversed and set aside theCourt of Appeals decision and reinstated the
RTC decision stating, among other things:
Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as amended by Section 26of P.D. No.
1445, it is the COA which has primaryjurisdiction to examine, audit and settle all
debts andclaims of any sort due from or owing the Government orany of its
subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities,including government-owned or
controlled corporationsand their subsidiaries. With respect to money claimsarising
from the implementation of R.A. No. 6758, theirallowance or disallowance is for
COA to decide, subjectonly to the remedy of appeal by petition for certiorari tothis
Court.

Thereafter, in 2001, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) in

response to the request of the then NEA Administrator stated that since there was
no appeal made in the December 15, 1999 decision by the RTC, such had become
the law of the case which must now be applied. Pursuant to such opinion, the NEA
issued a Resolution No. 29 approving the entitlement of rice allowances to NEA
employees hired after October 31, 1989.
However, the resident auditor of COA did not allow the payment of the rice
allowance for those who are not incumbent as of June 30, 1989. Motion for
Reconsideration was filed before the COA but the same was denied and hence this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the claim of NEA employees.
Held:
NO. The RTC has no jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of
money claims arising from implementation of RA 6758.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, when an administrative body clothed
with original and exclusive jurisdiction, courts are utterly without power and
authority to exercise concurrently such jurisdiction. Accordingly, all the
proceedings of the court in violation of that doctrine and all orders and decisions
reached thereby are null and void. It will be noted that money claims are
cognizable by the COA and its decision is appealable only to the Supreme Court.
The lower courts have nothing to do with such genus of transactions. The SC
observed however that the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the
writ of execution to allow the parties to preempt the action of the COA.
COCOFED v. REPUBLIC
663 SCRA 514 (January 24, 2012)
FACTS :
1971: RA 6260 created the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer

the Coconut Investment Fund, a fund to be sourced from levy on the sale of
copra. The copra seller was, or ought to be, issued COCOFUND receipts. The
fund was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, (meaning, the COCOFED
would be in-charge for the funds) the national association of coconut
producers having the largest membership.
1972: When martial law started in 1972, several presidential decrees were
issued to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the
coconut levy fund:

PD 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF)

and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized
to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the
price of edible oil.
PD 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund (CIDF) to

finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.
1973: PD 232 created the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to accelerate

the growth and development of the coconut and oil industry.
The most relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 section 2, which permitted the
use of the Fund by PCA for the acquisition of commercial bank for the
benefit of the coconut farmers and the distribution of the shares of the stock of
the bank it acquired free to the coconut farmers. Thus, the PCA acquired the
First United Bank, later renamed United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).
(Parts of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various
projects and/or was converted into different assets or investments through the
years.)
After EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order 1
which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered to file
cases for sequestration in the Sadiganbayan.
Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the UCPB
registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held trust by the
PCA. The Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial
Summary Judgment that the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds
and that Section 2 of PD No. 755 was unconstitutional.
The COCOFED representing the over a million coconut farmers via Petition
for review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending among
others that the sequestration amounted to the taking of private property
without just compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the Operative Fact Doctrine applies to this case.
HELD :

No. Applying the Operative Fact Doctrine would not only be iniquitous but would
also serve injustice to the Government, to the coconut industry, and to the people,
who, whether willingly or unwillingly, contributed to the public funds, and therefore
expect that their Government would take utmost care of them and that they would be
used no less, than for public purpose. It is highly inappropriate to apply the operative
fact doctrine to the UCPB shares. Public funds, which were supposedly given utmost
safeguard, were haphazardly distributed to private individuals based on statutory
provisions that are found to be constitutionally infirm on not only one but on a variety
of grounds. Worse still, the recipients of the UCPB shares may not actually be the
intended beneficiaries of said benefit. Clearly, applying the Operative Fact Doctrine
would not only be iniquitous but would also serve injustice to the Government, to the
coconut industry, and to the people, who, whether willingly or unwillingly,
contributed to the public funds, and therefore expect that their Government would
take utmost care of them and that they would be used no less, than for public purpose.
VERSOZA V CARAGUE
FACTS:
This resolves the MFR of the SCs Decision affirming COA decision which
substantially held that petitioner (as former Executive Director of the Cooperative
Development Authority or CDA) is personally and liable for the amount of
P881,819.00 covered by a COA Notice of Disallowance and involved overpriced
computer units.
ISSUE:
whether brand should be considered by COA as one basis of comparison, in light of
compliance with intellectual property laws on software piracy and hardware imitation.
RULING:
The COA, under the Constitution, is empowered to examine and audit the use of
funds by an agency of the national government on a post-audit basis. For this purpose,
the Constitution has provided that the COA shall have exclusive authority, subject to
the limitations in this Article, to define the scope of its audit and examination,
establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and promulgate accounting
and auditing rules and regulations, including those for theprevention and disallowance
of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures, or
uses of government funds and properties. As such, CDAs decisions regarding
procurement of equipment for its own use, including computers and its accessories, is
subject to the COAs auditing rules and regulations for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive and extravagant expenditures.
Necessarily, CDAs preferences regarding brand of its equipment have to conform to
the criteria set by the COA rules on what is reasonable price for the items purchased.
In this case, the brand information was found by the COA as irrelevant to the
determination of the reasonableness of the price of the computers purchased by CDA.
Hence, on this ground, the MFR is dismissible.

DELOS SANTOS V. COA
FACTS:
Sometime in October 2001, then Congressman Antonio V. Cuenco (Cuenco) of the

Second District of Cebu City entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
the Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center (VSMMC or hospital), represented by Dr.
Eusebio M. Alquizalas (Dr. Alquizalas), Medical Center Chief, appropriating to the
hospital the amount of P1,500,000.00 from his Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF) to cover the medical assistance of indigent patients under the Tony N' Tommy
(TNT) Health Program (TNT Program).
Several years after the enforcement of the MOA, allegations of forgery and
falsification of prescriptions and referrals for the availment of medicines under the
TNT Program surfaced.
In the initial investigation conducted by the CoA, it was found out that there were
unseen and unnoticeable irregularities attendant to the availment of the TNT Program.
the results of which were reflected in AOM No. 2005-001 dated October 26, 2005, it
was found that : (a) 133 prescriptions for vaccines, drugs and medicines for anti-
rabies allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing P3,407,108.40, and already paid
by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco appeared to be falsified; (b) 46 prescriptions
for other drugs and medicines allegedly dispensed by Dell Pharmacy costing
P705,750.50, and already paid by VSMMC from the PDAF of Cuenco likewise
appeared to be falsified; and (c) 25 prescriptions for drugs and medicines allegedly
issued by Dell Pharmacy costing P602,063.50 were also ascertained to be falsified
and have not been paid by VSMMC.
Leonor D. Boado (Boado), Director of the CoA Regional Office VII in Cebu City,
Delos Santos explained that during the initial stage of the implementation of the MOA
(i.e., from 2000 to 2002) the hospital screened, interviewed, and determined the
qualifications of the patients-beneficiaries through the hospitals social worker.
However, sometime in 2002, Cuenco put up the TNT Office in VSMMC, which was

run by his own staff who took all pro forma referral slips bearing the names of the
social worker and the Medical Center Chief, as well as the logbook. From then on, the
hospital had no more participation in the said program and was relegated to a mere
bag keeper. Since the benefactor of the funds chose Dell Pharmacy as the sole
supplier, anti-rabies medicines were purchased from the said pharmacy and, by
practice, no public bidding was anymore required.
Subsequently, or on September 8, 2008, the SAT Team Supervisor, Boado, issued ND

No. 2008-09-01, disallowing the amount of P3,386,697.10 for the payment of drugs
and medicines for anti-rabies with falsified prescription and documents, and holding
petitioners, together with other VSMMC officials, solidarily liable therefor.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal to the CoA and a motion for reconsideration,
respectively, but the same were denied. Petitioner now comes to the SC via petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CoA committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners
solidarily liable for the disallowed amount of P3,386,697.10.
HELD:
No.Political Law- public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be
liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or
damage.
The CoA correctly pointed out that VSMMC, through its officials, should have been
deeply involved in the implementation of the TNT Program as the hospital is a party
to the MOA and, as such, has acted as custodian and disbursing agency of Cuencos
PDAF. Further, under the MOA executed between VSMMC and Cuenco, the hospital
represented itself as willing to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation
of a Medical Indigent Support Program. More importantly, it undertook to ascertain
that [a]ll payments and releases under [the] program x x x shall be made in

accordance with existing government accounting and auditing rules and regulations. It
is a standing rule that public officers who are custodians of government funds shall be
liable for their failure to ensure that such funds are safely guarded against loss or
damage, and that they are expended, utilized, disposed of or transferred in accordance
with the law and existing regulations, and on the basis of prescribed documents and
necessary records.
In particular, the TNT Program was not implemented by the appropriate implementing
agency, i.e., the Department of Health, but by the office set up by Cuenco. Further, the
medicines purchased from Dell Pharmacy did not go through the required public
bidding in violation of the applicable procurement laws and rules. Similarly, specific
provisions of the MOA itself setting standards for the implementation of the same
program were not observed. For instance, only seven of the 133 prescriptions served
and paid were within the maximum limit of P5,000.00 that an indigent patient can
avail of from Cuencos PDAF. Also, several indigent patients availed of the benefits
more than once, again in violation of the provisions of the MOA. Clearly, by allowing
the TNT Office and the staff of Cuenco to take over the entire process of availing of
the benefits of the TNT Program without proper monitoring and observance of
internal control safeguards, the hospital and its accountable officers reneged on its
undertaking under the MOA to cooperate/coordinate and monitor the implementation
of the said health program.
Evidently, petitioners neglect to properly monitor the disbursement of Cuenco's PDAF

facilitated the validation and eventual payment of 133 falsified prescriptions and
fictitious claims for anti-rabies vaccines supplied by both the VSMMC and Dell
Pharmacy, despite the patent irregularities borne by the referral slips and prescriptions
related thereto. Had there been an internal control system installed by petitioners, the
irregularities would have been exposed, and the hospital would have been prevented
from processing falsified claims and unlawfully disbursing funds from the said PDAF.
Verily, petitioners cannot escape liability for failing to monitor the procedures
implemented by the TNT Office on the ground that Cuenco always reminded them
that it was his money.
All told, petitioners acts and/or omissions as detailed in the assailed CoA

issuances and as aforedescribed reasonably figure into the finding that they failed to
faithfully discharge their respective duties and to exercise the required diligence
which resulted to the irregular disbursements from Cuencos PDAF. In this light, their
liability pursuant to Sections 104 and 105of the Auditing Code, as well as Section 16
of the 2009 Rules and Regulations on Settlement of Accounts, as prescribed in CoA
Circular No. 2009-006, must perforce be upheld. Truly, the degree of their neglect in
handling Cuencos PDAF and the resulting detriment to the public cannot pass
unsanctioned, else the standard of public accountability be loosely protected and even
rendered illusory.
The petition is hereby DISMISSED.
REBLORA V. AFP
Facts:
The petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy. He was born on May 22
1944.
Prior to entering military service, the petitioner rendered civilian government service
as a Barrio Development Worker at the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) from January 6, 1969 to July 20, 1974.
On May 21, 1973, the petitioner entered military service as a Probationary Ensign in
the Philippine Navy. He was called to active duty effective August 26, 1974.
On January 25, 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines officially confirmed the
incorporation of petitioners civilian government service at the DILG with his length
of active service in the military pursuant to section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1638,
as amended by PD No. 1650, which provides:
Section 3. For the purpose of this Decree active service of a military person shall
mean active service rendered by him as a commissioned officer, enlisted man, cadet,
probationary officer, trainee or draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
service rendered by him as a civilian official or employee in the Philippine
Government prior to the date of his separation or retirement from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, for which military and/or civilian service he shall have received pay
from the Philippine Government and/or such others as may hereafter be prescribed by
law as active service; Provided, That for purposes of retirement, he shall have
rendered at least ten (10) years of active service as an officer or enlisted man in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines; and Provided further, That no period of such civilian
government service longer than his active military service shall be credited for
purposes of retirement. Service rendered as a cadet, probationary officer, trainee or
draftee in the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be credited for retirement

purposes at the option of the officer or enlisted man concerned, subject to such rules
and regulations as the Minister of National Defense shall prescribe.
On May 22, 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of 34 years of active service, the
petitioner was compulsorily retired from the military by virtue of General Order No.
142. He was, at that time, already ranked as a Commander in the Philippine Navy.
Claim of Retirement Benefit
After his retirement, petitioner claimed retirement benefits under Section 17 of PD no.
1638 which provides:
Section 17. When an officer or enlisted man is retired from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines under the provisions of this Decree, he shall, at his option, receive a
gratuity equivalent to one (1) month of base and longevity pay of the grade next
higher than the permanent grade last held for every year of service payable in one (1)
lump sum or a monthly retirement pay equivalent to two and one-half percent (2
1/2%) for each year of active service rendered, but not exceeding eighty-five percent
(85%) of the monthly base and longevity pay of the grade next higher than the
permanent grade last held: Provided, That an officer retired under Section 11 or 12
shall be entitled to benefits computed on the basis of the base and longevity pay of the
permanent grade last held: Provided, further That such retirement pay shall be subject
to adjustment on the prevailing scale of base pay of military personnel in the active
service: Provided, furthermore, That when he retires, he shall be entitled, at his
option, to receive in advance and in lump sum his annual retirement pay for the first
three (3) years and thereafter receive his annual retirement pay payable in equal
monthly installment as they accrue: Provided, finally, That if he dies within the three-
year period following his retirement and is survived by beneficiaries as defined in his
Decree, the latter shall only receive the derivative benefits thereunder starting the first
month after the aforecited three-year period. Nothing in this Section shall be
construed as authorizing adjustment of pay, or payment of any differential in
retirement pay to officers and enlisted men who are already retired prior to the
approval of this Decree as a result of increases in salary of those in the active duty
may have their retirement pension adjusted based on the rank they hold and on the
prevailing pay of military personnel in the active service, at the time of the
termination of their recall to active duty.
The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already reached the age of
fifty-six (56) with a total of thirty-one (31) years in active service, inclusive of his
four years in the DILG, which fulfilled the conditions for compulsory retirement
under Section 5(a) of PD No. 1638, as amended.[17] Verily, the COA found that,
applying the provisions of PD No. 1638 as amended, petitioner was not actually
underpaid but was rather overpaid his retirement benefit in the amount of P77,807.16.
[18]
The COA thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Commission is of the view that the

applicable law in the case of Captain Reblora is PD No. 1638 as amended by PD No.

1650 and not RA No. 340 as the latter law applies only to those who retired prior to
September 10, 1979. Thus, the limitation on the term of service of 56 years of age or
upon accumulation of 30 years of satisfactory active service as provided under the
said law should be complied with. Accordingly, the payment of his retirement benefit
should be in accordance with PD No. 1638.
Issue: WON there was an abuse of discretion on the part of COA
Ruling:
The main controversy in this case is the computation of petitioner's retirement
benefits under PD No. 1638, as amended. From the facts, we can see that the
petitioner, the AFP and the COA each offered contrasting solutions to this query:
a. Petitioner, for his part, advocates for a computation of his retirement benefits
that would include his four (4) years of civilian service at the DILG and his
thirty (30) years of actual military service.
b. The AFP, on the other hand, advances a computation of retirement benefits

that only covers the petitioner's thirty (30) years of actual military service i.e.,
21 May 1973 up to 22 May 2003. Petitioner's four (4) years of civilian service
at the DILG is excluded.
c. The COA, meanwhile, advances a computation of petitioner's retirement

benefits that covers the latter's four (4) years of civilian service at the
DILG plus his years in actual military service but only up to 22 May 2000.
Petitioner should be considered compulsorily retired on 22 May 2000 pursuant
to Section 5(a) of PD 1638, as amended.
Of these three, this Court finds that the computation of COA is the one that is
supported by PD No. 1638. The other two simply finds no basis in law.
PD No. 1638, as amended, is the law that governs the retirement and separation of
military officers and enlisted personnel. With respect to the retirement of military
officers and enlisted personnel, the law provides for two kinds: compulsory
retirement and optional retirement. Both kinds of retirements contemplate the
satisfaction of a certain age or length of service requirement by, or the fulfillment of
some other conditions on the part of, a military officer or personnel. Retirement,
however, is deemed compulsory if, upon the satisfaction of the conditions prescribed
by law, retirement of the concerned officer takes place by operation of law; while
retirement is deemed optional if, despite the satisfaction of such conditions,
retirement would only take place when elected by the officer himself.

SANTIAGO v. COMELEC
270 SCRA 106 (1997)
Topic: The Amending Process, By The People Through Initiatives
Facts:
On 6 Dec 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfinfiled with COMELEC
a Petition to Amend the Constitution to Lift Term Limits of elective Officials by
Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the time and dates
for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused the necessary publication of
the said petition in papers of general circulation, and c.) instructed local election
registrars to assist petitioners and volunteers in establishing signing stations. On 18
Dec 1996, Miriam Defensor-Santiago et.al. filed a special civil action for prohibition
against the Delfin Petition. Santiago argues that: 1.) the constitutional provision on
peoples initiative to amend the constitution can only be implemented by law to be
passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed by Congress, 2.) RA 6735
indeed provides for three systems of initiative namely, initiative on the Constitution,
on statues and on local legislation. The two latter forms of initiative were specifically
provided for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made
for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter of peoples
initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future law as pointed out by
former Senator Arturo Tolentino.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to
the constitution and if so whether the act, as worded, adequately covers such
initiative.
Ruling:
Yes, RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to
the constitution but is unfortunately inadequate to cover that system. Sec 2 of Article
17 of the Constitution provides: Amendments to this constitution may likewise be
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters therein. . .
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right This
provision is obviously not self-executory as it needs an enabling law to be passed by
Congress. Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986 Con-Con stated without
implementing legislation Section 2, Art 17 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode
of amending the constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses Congressional
action in the last analysis is still dependent on Congressional action. Bluntly stated,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the constitution until
Congress provides for its implementation. The people cannot exercise such right,
though constitutionally guaranteed, if Congress for whatever reason does not provide
for its implementation.
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC

Facts: The Constitutional Convention of 1971 approved on 28 September 1971

Organic Resolution No 1, amending Section 1 Article V of the Constitution so as to
lower the voting age to 18 and that the plebiscite for partial amendment to take place
with the local elections on November 1971. President DiosdadoMacapagal called
upon the COMELEC to help the Convention implement the said resolution. On 30
September 1971 COMELEC resolved to inform the Convention that it will hold the
plebiscite. Succeeding resolutions on campaigning and confirming the authority of the
President of the Convention to implement the Organic Resolution were approved.
Petitioner, Arturo Tolentino contended that under Section 1 Article XV of the
Constitution, the proposed amendment in question cannot be presented to the people
for ratification separately from each and all of the other amendments to be drafted and
proposed by the Convention.
Issue: Whether or not the Convention may call for a plebiscite on the sole amendment
contained in Organic Resolution 1 pursuant to Section 1 Article XV of the
Constitution.
Decision: Petition is granted. Organic Resolution No. 1 and the implementing acts
and resolutions of the Convention, insofar as they provide for the holding of a
plebiscite on 08 November 1971, as well as the resolution of the respondent
COMELEC complying therewith are declared null and void.
The condition and limitation that all the amendments to be proposed by the same
Convention must be submitted to the people in a single plebiscite pursuant to Section
1 Article XV of the Constitution. The part that the people play in its amendment
becomes harder, when a whole constitution is submitted to them, more or less they
can assumed its harmony as an integrated whole, and they can either accept or reject it
in its entirety. When an amendment is submitted to them that is to form part of the
existing constitution, in like fashion they can study with deliberation the proposed
amendment in relation to the whole existing constitution and or any of its parts
JAVELLANA vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
- On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, as
amended, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of
the Philippines.Said Resolution was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132.
- While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President
issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the entire Philippines under Martial
Law.

- On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution.

The next day, then-President Marcos issued Presidential Decree (PD) No. 73,
submitting to the Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Proposed
Constitution, as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or rejection
of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
- On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against to enjoin the
respondents from implementing PD 73 until further orders of the Court.
- He alleged, inter alia, that said PD has no force and effect as law because the
calling of such plebiscite, among others, are, by the Constitution, lodged
exclusivelyin Congress, and there is no proper submission to the people of
said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of
speech, press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the
people of the contents thereof.
- On January 17, 1973, the President issued Proclamation No. 1102, which
provided that the Proposed Constitution has been ratified by an overwhelming
majority of all of the votes cast by the members of all the Barangays (Citizens
Assemblies) throughout the Philippines, and has thereby come into effect.
- On January 20, 1973, Javellana filed a case against the respondents to restrain
them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution
not found in the 1935 Constitution.
- Javellana alleged that respondents are acting without or in excess of
jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution on the ground that
the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create
the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution;
without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution
was not a free election, hence null and void.
- Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No.
1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same import and
objective.
ISSUE:
WON the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.
HELD: YES.
- The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in
accordance with the provisions of Article XV of the 1935 Constitution is
justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our
1935 Constitution) shall show.

- The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar
character are justiciable, not political, is plain and simple. One of the principal
bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the principle of
separation of powers. This principle of separation of powers under the
presidential system goes hand in hand with the system of checks and balances,
under which each department is vested by the Fundamental Law with some
powers to forestall, restrain or arrest a possible or actual misuse or abuse of
powers by the other departments. And so, when a power vested in said officer
or branch of the government is absolute or unqualified, the acts in the exercise
of such power are said to be political in nature, and, consequently, non-
justiciable or beyond judicial review. Otherwise, courts of justice would be
arrogating upon themselves a power conferred by the Constitution upon
another branch of the service to the exclusion of the others.
- Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to
limitations, the issue on whether or not the prescribed qualifications or
conditions have been met, or the limitations respected, is justiciable or non-
political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the
contested act, not its wisdom.
- Therefore, the question whether or not the revised Constitution drafted by the
1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified in accordance with said Art.
XV is a justiciable one and non-political in nature, and that it is not only
subject to judicial inquiry, but, also, that it is the Court's bounden duty to
decide such question.
- And in the case at bar, six (6) justices held that the Proposed Constitution was
not validly ratified. However, no majority vote has been reached by the Court
as to the issue of whether or notthe people have accepted the 1973
Constitution.
- Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new
Constitution being considered in force and effect. There are not enough votes
to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1 - CASES

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CONSTITUTION

The Court further held that:

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

On February 9, 1987, petitioner De Leon received a Memorandum antedated

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

TAADA VS. TUVERA

Petitioners invoked the people's right to be informed on matters of public

Respondents contend that petitioners have no legal personality or standing and

Whether or not laws or statutes are required to be published in the Official

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

1. Whether or not COMELECs refusal of Pamatongs request for

1. Whether or not COMELECs refusal of Pamatongs request for presidential

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TONDO MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION v THE COURT

A. To provide fiscal autonomy to government hospitals;

B. Secure funding for priority public health programs;

C. Promote the development of local health systems and ensure its

D. Strengthen the capacities of health regulatory agencies;

E. Expand the coverage of the National Health Insurance Program

F. On 24 May 1999, then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada issued

G. A petition for the nullification of the Health Sector Reform Agenda

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

I. 5. The Court of Appeals held that Executive Order No. 102 is

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

concerned can only invalidate the pertinent provisions of Department Circular

SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x xx In case of termination of overseas

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

JOSE ANGARA VS THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA,

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

TAWANG MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, Petitioner, v. LA TRINIDAD

On 9 October 2000, Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) filed with the

ISSUE: Whether or not a public utility franchise may be exclusive in character

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

CASE DIGEST: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK),

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition?

The appeal has no merit.

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

Issue: Should respondent Ramoneda-Pita be dismissed?

In this case, Ramoneda-Pita's length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The

WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found GUlLTY of dishonesty.

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

The Applicable LAW

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

ATENEO DE DAVAO UNIVERSITY - COLLEGE OF LAW

INTERPRETATION of the law