THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 150256.  March 25, 2004]

CATALINO P. ARAFILES, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE JOURNALISTS, INC., ROMY MORALES, MAX

BUAN, JR., and MANUEL C. VILLAREAL, JR., respondents.

DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

Petitioner, Catalino P. Arafiles, seeks a review of the July 31, 2001 Decision [1] of the Court of
Appeals dismissing his complaint for damages against respondents Philippine Journalists, Inc., Romy
Morales, Max Buan, Jr., and Manuel C. Villareal, Jr.
About 2 a.m. on April 14, 1987, while respondent Morales, a reporter of People’s Journal Tonight,
was at the Western Police District (WPD) Headquarters along United Nations Avenue, Manila, Emelita
Despuig (Emelita), an employee of the National Institute of Atmospheric Sciences (NIAS), lodged a
complaint against petitioner, a NIAS director, for forcible abduction with rape and forcible abduction with
attempted rape before the then on duty Patrolman Benito Chio at the General Assignments Section of the
headquarters.[2]
In the presence of Morales, Emelita executed a sworn statement [3] narrating the events surrounding
the reported offenses committed against her by petitioner.  The pertinent portions of her sworn statement
are reproduced hereunder:
T:    Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto ngayon sa aming tanggapan at nagbibigay ng isang
malaya at kusang loob na salaysay?
A:    Para po magsuplong, tungkol sa karumaldumal naginawa sa akin ni Director Catalino P.
Arafiles ng PAG-ASA.
T:    Kailan at saan ito nangyari?
A:    Noong hong March 14, 1987, diyan ho sa Plaza Miranda ako sapilitan isinakay sa kotse
niya at itinuloy sa Flamingo hotel bandang alas pagitan ng 5:30 at 6:00 ng hapon.
T:    Kailan naman ang sumunod na pagtatangka sa puri mo si Direktor Arafiles?
S:    Kagabi ho. Bandang alas 9:00 ng gabi.
T:    Sa ikaliliwanag ng pagsisiyasat na ito maari bang isalaysay mo sa akin sa isang maikling
talata kung paano nangyari ang ipinagsusumbong mong ito?
S     Kagagaling ko lang po sa aking klase sa Feati University noong March 14, 1987, bandang
alas 5:45 ng hapon, humigit kumulang, habang ako ay naghihintay ng sasakyan pauwi
mula sa Plaza Miranda ng may tumigil sa sasakyan sa tabi ko, at bigla na lang po akong
hinaltak ni Direktor Arafiles papasok sa loob ng kotse niya at may ipina-amoy sa akin na
nasa tissue na kulay yellow at bigla na lamang akong naghina at nahilo.  Sabay din ho sa
pagpapa-amoy niya sa akin ang pagtutok niya sa akin ng isang kutsilyo, at sabi sa akin ay
huwag daw akong makulit tapos ay pinatakbo na niya ang kotse niya. Pamaya-maya ay
nararamdaman kong karga-karga niya ako pa-akyat sa isang hagdanan.  Tapos ibinaba
ako sa isang kamang naroroon at akoy unti-unti niyang hinuhubaran.  Pamaya-maya ho ay
pinaghahalikan po niya ako at nararamdaman ko rin ang mga kamay niya sa mga
maseselan na parte ng katawan ko, pero wala akong sapat na lakas para pigilin siya o
 sumigaw man lamang.  Nagawa niyang makuha ang aking pagka-babae noong gabing
iyon at nararamdaman kong masakit na masakit ang buong katawan ko.  Tinakot niya ako
na huwag magsumbong sa mga kapatid ko at sa mga maykapangyarihan at kung hindi ay
papatayin daw ako at tatanggalin pa sa trabaho at pati mga kapatid ko ay papatayin daw
po.  Binibigyan ako ng pera pero ayaw kung tanggapin pero pilit niyang inilagay sa bag ko
at ng tingnan ko ay P55.00 lang.  Pagkatapos ay hinila na niya akong pababa at pilit ding
pinasakay sa kotse niya at doon ako pinababa sa isang lugar na maraming dumadaan ng
biyaheng Quiapo at sumakay na lamang ako ng jeep pauwi.  Kagabi naman po, bandang
alas-9:00 ng gabi, sa may kanto ng United Nations Ave. at Taft Ave., Ermita, Mla., habang
hinihintay ko ang pinsan ko na umihi lang matapos akong bumili ng gamot ng tumigil na
naman sa tapat ko ang kotse ni Director.  Bigla na lamang niya akong hinila papasok sa
kotse sabay tutok sa akin ng kutsilyo at sabi sa akin ay huwag na raw akong papalag, total
ay butas na raw ako.  Sa takot ko ay hindi ako nakakibo at itinuloy din ako sa Flamingo
hotel.  Ng hinuhubaran na niya ako ay bigla na lamang nag-buzzer tapos naka-usap niya
yong bellboy na nagsabi sa kanya na may naghahanap daw sa akin o sa amin dalawa na
nakakita sa paghaltak niya sa akin.  Ng umakyat sa itaas yong bellboy ay nag-usap sila
sandali tapos nakita ko pinagbibigyan niya ng pera yong bellboy at yong guwardiya.  Tapos
ay doon kami bumaba sa likod na sa tingin ko ay fire escape at nakalabas kami ng hotel
tapos doon ako ibinaba sa isang lugar na hindi ko rin matandaan kong saan at doon na
lang ako kumuha ng taxi at nagpahatid ako sa Pasay City Police ngunit dito rin ako itinuro.
[4]
 (Underscoring supplied)
Following the execution by Emelita of her sworn statement, Patrolman Chio made the following entry
in the Police Blotter which was perused by Morales:

280

11:00 PM

4/13/87                                  PAT. BENITO CHIO ON DUTY

2:00 AM 4/14/87 Subject Emelita Despuig y Puaso reported and personally came to this office that she was
abducted by a certain Catalino P. Arafiles and alledgely (sic) rape (sic) last March 14, 1987 in a motel in
Ermita.  The undersigned made a referral to Medico-legal for Physical/Genital Exam. B. Chio.[5]

Morales thereupon personally interviewed Emelita for the purpose of reporting the same in the next
issue of People’s Journal Tonight.[6] By his claim, he, after the interview, tried to contact Arafiles at the
NIAS office to verify Emelita’s story but failed, the office having already closed. [7]
Morales then wrote an account about Emelita’s complaint and submitted it to his editor. [8]
That same day, April 14, 1987, Morales’ report appeared as headline on People’s Journal Tonight
reading:

GOV’T EXEC RAPES COED

By ROMY MORALES

A PRETTY coed, working as a grant-in-aid scholar at a Manila university and as an office worker at a government
office in Quezon City, was raped by her boss, a government agency director, last March 15, but afraid to lose her job
– and of being harmed – she chose to keep her ordeal to herself.

Last night, the government man, a director of the National Institute of Atmospheric Science, a branch of
PAGASA, again abducted the girl after following her around, forcing her into his car and locking her up in a Malate
motel.
This time, however, the girl was not to be raped as easily as the first time, when the man used chloroform in forcing
her into submission.

The girl fought like a tigress, alerting roomboys at the Flamingo Motel at corner Carolina and Quirino Ave.  Perhaps
as a ploy, motel personnel called up the room and told the man some Capcom soldiers were waiting for them
outside.

The call saved the girl from being raped the second time around.

Her abductor immediately left the motel, with the girl in tow, and then dropped her off somewhere in Ermita.

When the man had gone, the girl took a taxi and went straight to the Western Police District and filed a complaint.

The girl, 20-year-old Emilita Arcillano (not her real name), said she was first raped last March 15 by her boss whom
she identified as a certain Director Catalino Arafiles.

She recalled that while waiting for a ride at Plaza Miranda, Arafiles alighted from his Volkswagen Beetle, dragged
her inside and then pressed a cotton with chloroform on her mouth and nose.

When she regained consciousness she was already inside the Flamingo Motel, already raped, she said.

She said Arafiles told her not to report the matter or she would lose her job and she and her family would be harmed.

When the act was to be repeated last night, Emilita decided to fight.  “Nanlaban ako at nagsisigaw at sinabi kong
mabuti pang patayin na lang niya ako,” Emilita told Pat. Benito Chio of WPD General Assignments Section.

She said the suspect abducted her at the corner of Taft Ave. and United Nations Ave. at about 9:15 last night.

When Arafiles was told Capcom soldiers were waiting for them outside the Flamingo Motel, he allegedly paid P100
each to four roomboys to help him go out through a side gate.

The police will pick up Arafiles for questioning today.[9]

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

About a year following the publication of above-quoted report or on April 13, 1988, petitioner
instituted a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against respondents for
damages[10] arising therefrom.
In his Complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-53399, petitioner alleged that on account of the
“grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item” prepared by respondent
Morales, edited by respondent Buan, Jr., allowed for publication by respondent Villareal, Jr. as president
of Philippine Journalists, Inc., and published by respondent Philippine Journalists, Inc., aspersions were
cast on his character; his reputation as a director of the NIAS at the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical
and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) was injured;  he became the object of public
contempt and ridicule as he was depicted as a sex-crazed stalker and serial rapist; and the news item
deferred his promotion to the position of Deputy Administrator of PAGASA.
In their Answer,[11]respondents prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint, they alleging that “the news
item, having been sourced from the Police Blotter which is an official public document and bolstered by a
personal interview of the victim is therefore privileged and falls within the protective constitutional
provision of freedom of the press . . . . ,” and by way of Compulsory Counterclaim, they prayed for the
award of moral and exemplary damages plus attorney’s fees.
 Branch 97 of the Quezon City RTC, noting as follows:

[T]he publication stated that a “pretty coed was raped by her boss”, and not qualifying said statement that it was
merely a report, with such phrases as “allegedly” or “reportedly”.  Furthermore, the article in question continued
reporting as if it were fact and truth the alleged abduction of the same girl by her boss, identified as “Director of the
National Institute of Atmospheric Science.”  The questioned article did not even hint that it was merely based on
interview with the said girl or that it was reflected in the police blotter, and then it would have been fair, for the
mind of the reader would be offered the other side to speculate on.  As it turned out, the other side, the side of the
defamed and libeled had an alibi to prove the story false, aside from his testimony that proved the inherent
unnaturalness and untruthfulness of the alleged victim of the alleged rape and abduction, [12]

rendered a Decision[13] of August 13, 1992, in favor of petitioner, disposing as follows:

In view of the above evidence and the foregoing considerations, this Court hereby renders judgment in favor of
plaintiff and against the above-mentioned defendants, and orders the latter to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiff the following amounts: 1.) P1,000,000.00, as nominal damages; 2.) P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
3.) P1,000.000.00, as moral damages; 4.) P50,000.00, as attorney’s fees; and 5.) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[14]

Respondents’ motion for reconsideration [15] of the trial court’s decision having been denied by
Resolution[16] of March 2, 1993, they appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Citing Borjal et al. v. Court of Appeals et al.[17] which held that:

The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.  In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition.   If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as
long as it might be reasonably inferred from the facts.[18] (Underscoring supplied),

the CA found that herein petitioner “was not able to prove by a preponderance of evidence that [herein
respondents] were motivated by a sinister intent to cause harm and injury to [herein petitioner] . . .”
Accordingly, by Decision of July 31, 2001, the CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s decision and
dismissed petitioner’s complaint.[19] Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration[20] of the appellate court’s
decision was denied by Resolution of October 12, 2001, [21] hence, the petition at bar.
The petition revolves around the issue of whether the CA erred in holding that the publication of the
news item was not attended with malice to thus free respondents of liability for damages.
It bears noting that the complaint petitioner instituted is one for damages under Article 33 of the Civil
Code which provides:

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.  Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Article 33 contemplates a civil action for the recovery of damages that is entirely unrelated to the
purely criminal aspect of the case. [22] A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and
prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely
independent of the institution, pendency or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the
provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense
charged and the civil liability arising therefrom.[23]
 The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, those found in the Chapter on Human Relations, namely
Articles 19 and 21, provide:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous
material must be examined and viewed as a whole.[24]

The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be
enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context.  Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the
scope, spirit and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. x x x

A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is
addressed would ordinarily understand it.  So, the whole item, including display lines, should be read and construed
together, and its meaning and signification thus determined.

In order to ascertain the meaning of a published article, the whole of the article must be considered, each phrase
must be construed in the light of the entire publication x x x  The headlines of a newspaper must also be read in
connection with the language which follows.[25]

Petitioner brands the news item as a “malicious sensationalization” of a patently embellished and
salacious narration of fabricated facts involving rape and attempted rape incidents.  For, so petitioner
argues, the police blotter which was the sole basis for the news item plainly shows that there was only
one count of abduction and rape reported by Emelita.
The entry made by Patrolman Chio in the police blotter which respondent Morales scrutinized at the
WPD headquarters recorded indeed Emelita’s complaint about only a case for abduction with rape which
occurred on March 14, 1987.  In her above-quoted sworn statement, however, earlier given before the
same Patrolman Chio in the presence of Morales who subsequently interviewed her, Emelita reported
about an abduction with rape incident which occurred on March 14, 1987 and an abduction incident which
occurred on April 13, 1987.
Petitioner’s anchoring of his complaint for damages on a charge of “malicious” sensationalization of
fabricated facts thus fails.
The presentation of the news item subject of petitioner’s complaint may have been in a sensational
manner, but it is not per se illegal.[26]
Respondents could of course have been more circumspect in their choice of words as the headline
and first seven paragraphs of the news item give the impression that a certain director of the NIAS
actually committed the crimes complained of by Emelita.  The succeeding paragraphs (in which petitioner
and complainant Emelita were eventually identified) sufficiently convey to the readers, however, that the
narration of events was only an account of what Emelita had reported at the police headquarters.
In determining the manner in which a given event should be presented as a news item and the
importance to be attached thereto, newspapers must enjoy a certain degree of discretion.

Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that the
respondents, under the circumstances of this case, had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press.  The
newspapers should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to courageously and effectively perform
their important role in our democracy.  In the preparation of stories, press reporters and [editors] usually have to race
with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they should not be held to account, to a
point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfection in the choice of words.[27](Underscoring supplied)

In fine, this Court finds that case against respondents has not been sufficiently established by
preponderance of evidence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,  and Corona, JJ.,  concur.
Vitug, (Chairman), on official leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27710             January 30, 1928

ISIDRO BAMBALAN Y PRADO, plaintiff-appellant, 

vs.
GERMAN MARAMBA and GENOVEVA MUERONG, defendants-appellants.

Pedro C. Quinto for plaintiff-appellant.

Turner, Rheberg and Sanchez for defendants-appellants.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

The defendants admit in their amended answer those paragraphs of the complaint wherein it is alleged
that Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura was the owner, with Torrens title, of the land here in question and that
the plaintiff is the sole and universal heir of the said deceased Isidro Bambalan y Colcotura, as regards
the said land. This being so, the fundamental question to be resolved in this case is whether or not the
plaintiff sold the land in question to the defendants.

The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17,
1922. The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed said document, yet he did so by intimidation
made upon his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva Muerong, who threatened the former
with imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular point does not decisively support the plaintiff's
allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for
the reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it
does not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land in question.

What is deduced from the record is, that his mother Paula Prado and the latter's second husband Vicente
Lagera, having received a certain sum of money by way of a loan from Genoveva Muerong in 1915
which, according to Exhibit 3, was P200 and according to the testimony of Paula Prado, was P150, and
Genoveva Muerong having learned later that the land within which was included that described in said
Exhibit 3, had a Torrens title issued in favor of the plaintiff's father, of which the latter is the only heir and
caused the plaintiff to sign a conveyance of the land.

At any rate, even supposing that the document in question, Exhibit 1, embodies all of the requisites
prescribed by law for its efficacy, yet it does not, according to the provisions of section 50 of Act No. 496,
bind the land and would only be a valid contract between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
register of deeds to make the proper registration, inasmuch as it is the registration that gives validity to
the transfer. Therefore, the defendants, by virtue of the document Exhibit 1 alone, did not acquire any
right to the property sold as much less, if it is taken into consideration, the vendor Isidro Bambalan y
Prado, the herein plaintiff, was a minor.

As regards this minority, the doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado and Mercado vs. Espiritu  (37 Phil.,
215), wherein the minor was held to be estopped from contesting the contract executed by him pretending
to be age, is not applicable herein. In the case now before us the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age; his
minority was well known to the purchaser, the defendant, who was the one who purchased the plaintiff's
first cedula used in the acknowledgment of the document.
In regard to the amount of money that the defendants allege to have given the plaintiff and her son in
1992 as the price of the land, the preponderance of evidence shows that no amount was given by the
defendants to the alleged vendors in said year, but that the sum of P663.40, which appears in the
document Exhibit 1, is arrived at, approximately, by taking the P150 received by Paula Prado and her
husband in 1915 and adding thereto interest at the rate of 50 per cent annum, then agreed upon, or P75 a
year for seven years up to July 31, 1922, the sate of Exhibit 1.

The damages claimed by the plaintiff have not been sufficiently proven, because the witness Paula Prado
was the only one who testified thereto, whose testimony was contradicted by that of the defendant
Genoveva Muerong who, moreover, asserts that she possesses about half of the land in question. There
are, therefore, not sufficient data in the record to award the damages claimed by the plaintiff.

In view of the foregoing, the dispositive part of the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without any
express findings as to the costs in this instance. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 73867 February 29, 1988

TELEFAST COMMUNICATIONS/PHILIPPINE WIRELESS, INC., petitioner, 

vs.
IGNACIO CASTRO, SR., SOFIA C. CROUCH, IGNACIO CASTRO JR., AURORA CASTRO, SALVADOR
CASTRO, MARIO CASTRO, CONRADO CASTRO, ESMERALDA C. FLORO, AGERICO CASTRO,
ROLANDO CASTRO, VIRGILIO CASTRO AND GLORIA CASTRO, and HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT,respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

Petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Intermediate Appellate Court, dated 11 February
1986, in AC-G.R. No. CV-70245, entitled "Ignacio Castro, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, versus Telefast
Communication/Philippine Wireless, Inc., Defendant-Appellant."

The facts of the case are as follows:

On 2 November 1956, Consolacion Bravo-Castro wife of plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. and mother of the
other plaintiffs, passed away in Lingayen, Pangasinan. On the same day, her daughter Sofia C. Crouch,
who was then vacationing in the Philippines, addressed a telegram to plaintiff Ignacio Castro, Sr. at 685
Wanda, Scottsburg, Indiana, U.S.A., 47170 announcing Consolacion's death. The telegram was accepted
by the defendant in its Dagupan office, for transmission, after payment of the required fees or charges.

The telegram never reached its addressee. Consolacion was interred with only her daughter Sofia in
attendance. Neither the husband nor any of the other children of the deceased, then all residing in the
United States, returned for the burial.

When Sofia returned to the United States, she discovered that the wire she had caused the defendant to
send, had not been received. She and the other plaintiffs thereupon brought action for damages arising
from defendant's breach of contract. The case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan and
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 15356. The only defense of the defendant was that it was unable to
transmit the telegram because of "technical and atmospheric factors beyond its control." 1 No evidence
appears on record that defendant ever made any attempt to advise the plaintiff Sofia C. Crouch as to why
it could not transmit the telegram.

The Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, after trial, ordered the defendant (now petitioner) to pay the
plaintiffs (now private respondents) damages, as follows, with interest at 6% per annum:

1. Sofia C. Crouch, P31.92 and P16,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00

as moral damages.

2. Ignacio Castro Sr., P20,000.00 as moral damages.

3. Ignacio Castro Jr., P20,000.00 as moral damages.

 4. Aurora Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

5. Salvador Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

6. Mario Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

7. Conrado Castro, P10,000 moral damages.

8. Esmeralda C. Floro, P20,000.00 moral damages.

9. Agerico Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

10. Rolando Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

11. Virgilio Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

12. Gloria Castro, P10,000.00 moral damages.

Defendant is also ordered to pay P5,000.00 attorney's fees, exemplary damages in the amount of
P1,000.00 to each of the plaintiffs and costs. 2

On appeal by petitioner, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision but eliminated
the award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch and the award of P1,000.00 to
each of the private respondents as exemplary damages. The award of P20,000.00 as moral damages to
each of Sofia C. Crouch, Ignacio Castro, Jr. and Esmeralda C. Floro was also reduced to P120,000. 00
for each. 3

Petitioner appeals from the judgment of the appellate court, contending that the award of moral damages
should be eliminated as defendant's negligent act was not motivated by "fraud, malice or recklessness."

In other words, under petitioner's theory, it can only be held liable for P 31.92, the fee or charges paid by
Sofia C. Crouch for the telegram that was never sent to the addressee thereof.

Petitioner's contention is without merit.

Art. 1170 of the Civil Code provides that "those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of
fraud, negligence or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for
damages." Art. 2176 also provides that "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done."

In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent Sofia C. Crouch entered into a contract whereby, for
a fee, petitioner undertook to send said private respondent's message overseas by telegram. This,
petitioner did not do, despite performance by said private respondent of her obligation by paying the
required charges. Petitioner was therefore guilty of contravening its obligation to said private respondent
and is thus liable for damages.

This liability is not limited to actual or quantified damages. To sustain petitioner's contrary position in this
regard would result in an inequitous situation where petitioner will only be held liable for the actual cost of
a telegram fixed thirty (30) years ago.

We find Art. 2217 of the Civil Code applicable to the case at bar. It states: "Moral damages include
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate results of the defendant's wrongful act or omission."
(Emphasis supplied).

Here, petitioner's act or omission, which amounted to gross negligence, was precisely the cause of the
suffering private respondents had to undergo.

As the appellate court properly observed:

[Who] can seriously dispute the shock, the mental anguish and the sorrow that the
overseas children must have suffered upon learning of the death of their mother after she
had already been interred, without being given the opportunity to even make a choice on
whether they wanted to pay her their last respects? There is no doubt that these
emotional sufferings were proximately caused by appellant's omission and substantive
law provides for the justification for the award of moral damages. 4

We also sustain the trial court's award of P16,000.00 as compensatory damages to Sofia C. Crouch
representing the expenses she incurred when she came to the Philippines from the United States to
testify before the trial court. Had petitioner not been remiss in performing its obligation, there would have
been no need for this suit or for Mrs. Crouch's testimony.

The award of exemplary damages by the trial court is likewise justified and, therefore, sustained in the
amount of P1,000.00 for each of the private respondents, as a warning to all telegram companies to
observe due diligence in transmitting the messages of their customers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is modified so that petitioner is held
liable to private respondents in the following amounts:

(1) P10,000.00 as moral damages, to each of private respondents;

(2) P1,000.00 as exemplary damages, to each of private respondents;

(3) P16,000.00 as compensatory damages, to private respondent Sofia C. Crouch;

(4) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees; and

(5) Costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Yap (Chairman), Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/21141067/Sarmiento-v-Mison

http://www.scribd.com/doc/21126989/Bautista-v-Salonga

http://www.scribd.com/doc/35237874/Additional-Cases-for-Art-7-Consti