Names of the parties The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate

The CA reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land and
Docket number surrender it to the respondents. It ruled that the patent and title of CamiloLasola, private respondents
Date of promulgation predecessor-in-interest, had already become indefeasible since April 28, 1977; and that petitioners
Facts action for reconveyance in the nature of their protest with the Bureau of Lands and counterclaim in their
Arguments of plaintiff answer to the complaint for recovery of possession, already prescribed.
Argument of defendant ISSUE:Whether or not the petitionershave the equitable right to the possession of land in litigation.NO
Issues
Sc ruling RULING:The petition was not granted and it affirmed the decision of the CA upholding the right of
OMANDAM v. CA private respondents. The Court ruled that CA did not err in ordering the petitioners to vacate and
DE LEON v. NENITA DE LEON-REYES surrender the land to said respondents.
PADILLA v. CA Commonwealth Act 141 as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, gives in its sections 3 and
REPUBLIC v. RAYMUNDO VIAJE 4 to the Director of Landsprimarily and to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now the
MERIDA v. PEOPLE Secretary of Department of Environment and Natural Resources)ultimately the authority to dispose and
DAGUDAG (RET.), COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, manage public lands.In this regard, courts have no jurisdiction to inquire into the validity of the decree of
BRANCH 38, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RESPONDENT. registration issued by the Director of Lands.Only the DENR Secretarycan review, on appeal, such decree.
MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY DENRs jurisdiction over public landsdoes not negate the authority of courts of justice to resolve
MMDA v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY 2011 questions of possession and their decisions stand in the meantime that the DENR has not settled the
EFREN R. LEYNES v. PEOPLE respective rights of public land claimants. But once the DENR has decided, particularly with the grant of
LU DO v. AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO homestead patent and issuance of an OCT and then TCT later, its decision prevails.
OPOSA v. FACTORAN In this case, Lasola applied for a homestead patent over the contested area, which was granted on May
SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES v. REPUBLIC 21, 1968. The Order for the issuance of the patentwas issued by the Bureau of Lands and the
MARAVILLA v. PRIVALDO TUPAS corresponding Original Certificate of Title was issued by the Register of Deeds. It was only after 13 years
BAGUNU, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, RESPONDENTS. from the date of the Orderdirecting the issuance of the patent that petitioners protested the homestead
SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION v. PEOPLE + grant with the Bureau of Lands.
ORTEGA v. JUDGE ROGELIO LL. DACARA + We note that the partiesdid not manifest as to whether an appeal was made from the decision of the
ARIGO v. SCOTT H. SWIFT + Regional Director of DENR-IX. Further, no mention was ever made in their pleadings regarding the
BRAGA v. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA + matter. From the said Order of the DENR Regional Directorup to the present, five years have
HILARION M. HENARES v. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING + lapsed. From this, we can conclude that no appeal has been made and that the DENR decisiondismissing
the petitioners protest and upholding respondents right on the contested area has attained finality.
[ GR No. 128750, Jan 18, 2001 ] By now it appears indubitable that private respondents, spouses Trabasas and Bonilla, have been duly
CARQUELO OMANDAM v. CA + confirmed in their right to possession of Lot No. 8736 as owners thereof. By virtue of the deed of sale
executed by OCT holder CamiloLasola as early as September 24, 1987, in favor of Trabasas, who then
FACTS OF THE CASE: On January 29, 1974, the Bureau of Landsin Pagadian Cityissued in favor of secured a transfer certificate of title in his name, private respondentsclearly have superior right over the
CamiloLasola a Homestead Patent covering Lot No. 8736, with an area of 23,985 sq. m. in Sagrada, land claimed by petitioners Omandam
Tambulig, Zamboanga del Sur. The Register of Deedsissued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) in his name. 2.[ GR No. 205711, May 30, 2016 ]
On April 28, 1983, respondent Blas Trabasasbought the land from a Dolores Sayson who claimed she was PEDRO DE LEON v. NENITA DE LEON-REYES +
the owner of said land. Trabasas later on discovered that petitioners CarqueloOmandam and RositoItom
had occupied the land. Meanwhile, Omandam protested Lasolas homestead patent before the Bureau of This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Pedro de Leon from the May 31,
Lands and prayed for cancellation of the OCT. Upon Saysons advice, Trabasas repurchased the land from 2012 decision[1] and January 16, 2013resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
Lasola, who executed a deed of sale dated September 24,1987. On August 9,1989, Trabasas acquired a 90307.[3] The CA reversed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) finding of laches in Civil Case Nos. 02-08 and
new transfer certificate of title. 02-20.[4]
On April 16,1990, spouses Blas Trabasas and Amparo Bonilla filed a complaint against petitioners for
recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land with the Regional Trial Court. They alleged that
they were the true and registered owners of the land and Omandam and Itom should vacate it. Antecedents
Petitioners answered that they purchased the land from one Godofredo Sela who had been in
possession for almost twenty years. Petitioner Pedro de Leon (Pedro) and respondent Nenita de Leon-Reyes (Nenita) are the legitimate
The RTC declared that neither respondents herein nor their predecessors-in-interest were ever in children of Alejandro de Leon (Alejandro).
possession of the land. It ruled that petitioner have the equitable right to the possession of the land in
litigation and reconvey subject land to the petitioners. It ordered the cancellation of the Torrens Nenita is married to respondent Jesus Reyes with whom she has two children: respondents Myeth and
Certificate of Title in names of the respondents, and issue another in name of the petitioners. Jenneth, both surnamed Reyes.
Pending the appeal, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)dismissed
Omandams protest previously filed with the Bureau of Lands. It said that Omandamfailed to prove that During his lifetime, Alejandro possessed two parcels of public land (subject lots) in Brgy. Burgos, San
Lasola, respondents predecessor-in-interest, committed fraud and misrepresentation in acquiring the Jose, Tarlac. The lots, designated as Lot No. 6952 and Lot No. 6521, have a combined area of 171,939
patent, hence there is no ground for its revocation and cancellation of its corresponding title. square meters.
Sometime between 1995 and 1996, the government granted free patents covering the subject lots in
favor of Nenita and her family. Consequently, the Register of Deeds issued the following Original
Certificates of Title (OCT):
OCT No. 16757[5] covering Lot No. 6521 (39,270 square meters) issued on July 13, 1995, in the name of
Nenita de Leon-Reyes;
OCT No. 17580[6] covering Lot No. 6952-G (32,934 square meters) issued on March 8, 1996, in the name
of Nenita de Leon-Reyes;
OCT No. 17581[7] covering Lot No. 6952-A (14,098 square meters) issued on March 8, 1996, in the name
of Myeth L. Reyes; and
OCT No. 17582[8] covering Lot No. 6952-B (10,000 square meters) issued on March 8, 1996, in the name
of Jenneth Reyes.
Sometime after the issuance of the titles, Pedro filed a Protest with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation of facts in the acquisition of
title.[9]
In a complaint dated May 22, 1997, Nenita's family filed an unlawful detainer case against Pedro before
the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac. The complaint was docketed as Civil
Case No. 319-SJ (97).
On May 19, 1998, the MCTC dismissed the ejectment case without prejudice due to the pendency of
Pedro's protest before the Bureau of Lands/DENR.[10]
Nenita's family appealed the dismissal to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac, where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. 98-33.
On July 21, 1999, the RTC affirmed the MCTC's dismissal of the complaint without prejudice to the filing
of the proper action with the proper forum.[11]
Soon after, the DENR dismissed Pedro's Protest after finding that Nenita (and her family) had met all the
requisites for a public land grant.[12] The DENR upheld the validity of the grant of patents to Nenita's
family.[13] Pedro did not appeal the DENR's dismissal of his protest.[14]
On February 5, 2002, Nenita and her family filed a complaint against Pedro for Recovery of Possession
and Damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-08.
On April 16, 2002, Pedro likewise filed a complaint against Nenita's family for Reconveyance of Title and
Damages. His complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-20.
Nenita claimed that Alejandro transferred his possessory rights over the property to her in a document
dated May 5, 1970.[15] The document became the basis for her free patent application with the DENR.
She also denied that any fraud or wrongdoing attended her application and invoked the DENR's dismissal
of Pedro's protest for his failure to rebut the presumption of regularity in the issuance of the patent.[16]
Pedro claimed that Alejandro transferred possession over the subject lots to him in 1971 and that he had
been in possession of it ever since.[17] He claimed that he asked Nenita for assistance to cause the titling
of the properties in his name but the latter took advantage of his lack of education and fraudulently
acquired a free patent in her name instead. Pedro further contested the May 5, 1970 Transfer of Rights
in favor of Nenita as a forgery.[18]
The RTC consolidated and jointly heard the two cases. After the presentation of testimonial evidence,
Pedro was given several opportunities to make a Formal Offer of his documentary evidence. However,
he failed to do so and the consolidated case was submitted for decision without his documentary
evidence.[19]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC divided the issues in two: first, whether the Transfer of Rights and the subsequent grant of free
patents to Nenita's family were valid; and second, whether Nenita's family were entitled to possession of
the subject lots.
On the first issue, the court found the transfer of rights, as well as the subsequent issuance of free
patents, valid. Pedro, the RTC reasoned, failed to adduce sufficient evidence to invalidate the deed of
transfer and the issuance of the patents. The RTC added that there were no clear and convincing
evidence to substantiate his allegations of forgery; in fact, Pedro did not even make a formal offer of his
documentary evidence.[20]
However, on the second issue, the RTC held that Nenita's family was no longer entitled to recover
possession of the subject lots due to the principle of laches. It held that Nenita failed to raise a
restraining arm against Pedro's introduction of several improvements on the subject lots, such as the
construction of his house, the planting of several fruit-bearing and several teak trees, and his sole
appropriation of the entirety of the harvests; Nenita's inaction for over 32 years (since the execution of
the Transfer of Rights); and her undeniable knowledge of Pedro's adverse possession extinguished her
right to recover the properties due to her own inexcusable negligence.[21]
The RTC then declared Nenita and her family's titles as null and void and ordered them to pay Pedro
damages.
Ruling of the CA
On May 31, 2012, the CA reversed the RTC's ruling, validated the OCTs in the name of Nenita's family,
and ordered Pedro to surrender possession of the subject lot.
As the RTC did, the CA validated Nenita's ownership of the disputed lots. The CA found that despite
Pedro's denomination of his complaint as one for "Reconveyance of Titles and Damages," it was, in fact,
one for reversion which he had no legal personality to file. The CA reasoned that Pedro's failure to allege
that the subject lots were private lands, or even just alienable and disposable lands of the public domain,
and his admission of State ownership over the subject lots were fatal to his complaint for
reconveyance.[22]
Citing Banguilan v. Court of Appeals,[23] the CA explained that when the complaint admits State
ownership of the land or admits it to be public land, then the case is one for reversion, not
reconveyance.[24] If the grantees' patents were cancelled, as Pedro prayed for, the result would have
been the return of ownership over the lots to the State, not to a contending claimant like Pedro who had
no legal interest over them.
The CA emphasized that Pedro failed to prove, or even allege, the private or alienable character of the
subject lots. Thus, he had no personality to ask for their reconveyance because that right belongs to the
State, the previous owner of the subject lots.
The CA further pointed out that Pedro failed to appeal the DENR's dismissal of his Protest case against
the grant of the patents to Nenita's family.[25] Thus, the DENR's findings that (1) the free patents and
OCTs granted to Nenita's family were valid and that (2) Pedro and his family already owned a total of 30
hectares of land - and therefore, no longer entitled to a grant of any more alienable and disposable
public lands - had attained finality.
On the issue of laches, the CA held that the length of time between the formal grant of the patents and
the issuance of the OCTs in 1995-1996, and the filing of the complaint for Recovery of Possession in 2002
was insufficient to constitute laches. As Nenita alleged in her complaint in Civil Case No. 02-08, Pedro's
occupation of a portion of the properties was out of mere tolerance, without any contract and without
paying any rentals; her generosity to her estranged brother should not be used against her.[26]
Pedro moved for reconsideration but the CA denied the motion on January 16, 2013. The denial paved
the way for the present petition.
The Parties' Arguments
Pedro insists that he is the rightful owner of the property. He argues that the CA erred in not finding the
existence of fraud and/or forgery and that a title emanating from a fraudulently secured free patent
does not become indefeasible.
Citing Lorzano v. Tabayag,[27] Pedro concedes that a fraudulently secured patent can only be assailed by
the government in an action for reversion, but emphasizes that direct reconveyance is available when
public land was fraudulently and in breach of trust titled in the name of the defendant. Reconveyance
exists as an enforcement of a constructive trust.[28]
Moreover, Pedro claims that as of the date of the grant of the free patent to Nenita's family, the
properties had already ceased to be part of the public domain on account of his continued occupation
and possession for the period required by law. Thus, the lots were beyond the DENR's jurisdiction to
dispose of.[29]
He also argues that the MCTC's dismissal of the ejectment case [Civil Case No. 319-SJ (97)][30] that
Nenita filed against him in 1997, which was subsequently affirmed by the RTC in Civil Case No. 98-33,
conclusively proves that he had possessed the subject lots since 1971.
Nenita counters that: (1) Pedro raises questions of fact that are improper in a petition for review
on certiorari; (2) despite the denomination of Pedro's original complaint before the RTC, it was, in fact,
an action for reversion; (3) as established during the trial, Pedro had already received 211,846 square
meters of property as his share in the inheritance of their father; and (4) the subject lots were her
rightful share from the estate of their father.
Our Ruling
We DENY the petition for lack of merit.
First, we emphasize that this Court is not a trier of facts. An appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court is limited to questions of law. Save for a few judicially carved exceptions,[31] this
Court will not disturb the factual findings of trial courts.
Pedro unjustifiably faults the CA for not finding the existence of fraud and forgery. However, the RTC
already passed upon this question and found no basis to conclude that the grant of the patent to Nenita
was accompanied by fraud or forgery.
Other than his self-serving testimony, Pedro failed to substantiate his allegation of forgery with clear and
convincing evidence. Pedro has nobody to blame but himself for his failure to formally offer any
documentary evidence that could have supported his claim.[32]
As the rules clearly state, courts will not consider evidence unless it has been formally offered.[33] A
litigant's failure to make a formal offer of evidence within a considerable period of time is considered a
waiver of its submission; evidence that has not been offered shall be excluded and rejected.
Notably, both the RTC and the CA agree that Nenita with her family are the true owners of the subject
lots and that the free patents and the OCTs issued to them are valid. We find no reason to revisit this
factual finding of the lower courts.
Second, Pedro's contention that the judgment in the ejectment case conclusively proves his prior
possession since 1971 - and therefore proves fraud - is unwarranted.
The dispositive portion of the MCTC's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the meantime that the Protest is pending with the Bureau of Land[s], this case is
dismissed without prejudice.
The Counterclaims are likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED, (emphasis supplied)
While the fallo of the RTC's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision appealled [sic] from is hereby AFFIRMED and this
case be [sic] DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of the proper action in a proper forum.
SO ORDERED, [emphases supplied, underscoring retained]
As Pedro himself admits, the MCTC's dismissal of Nenita's ejectment case was based on the pendency
of his protest before the Bureau of Lands. While the Courts may appear to have passed upon the issue of
prior physical possession, the fallo clearly shows that the dismissal was not made based on the merits of
the case. When a conflict exists between the dispositive portion (or the fallo) and the opinion of the
court in the body of the decision, the former must prevail.[34]
Ultimately, the MCTC's dismissal cannot produce the effect of conclusiveness of judgment. In Spouses
Antonio v. Sayman[35] we clearly explained the concept of res judicata by conclusiveness of judgment.
The principle of res judicata is applicable by way of (1) "bar by prior judgment" and (2) "conclusiveness of
judgment." This Court had occasion to explain the difference between these two aspects of res judicata
as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of
action. In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action.
Otherwise put, the judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction on the merits concludes
the litigation between the parties, as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit
involving the same cause of action before the same or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of res judicata known as
"conclusiveness of judgment." Stated differently, any right, fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or
necessarily involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of
the two actions is the same.
Stated differently, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been
squarely put in issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent
jurisdiction. The fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and
persons in privity [sic] with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the
judgment or order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition;
the conclusively settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any future or other action between
the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, only the identities of
parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment,
[emphases supplied]
Evidently, the MCTC's dismissal of Nenita's ejectment complaint, as affirmed by the RTC, produced no
such effect because the dismissal was not on the merits and was without prejudice to the re-filing of the
case. Any pronouncements made with respect to the issue of possession were merely obiter dicta.
Third, the public character of the subject lands precludes the RTC from resolving the conflicting claims of
"ownership" between Pedro and Nenita.
Under Section 11 of the Public Land Act (PLA),[36] there are two modes of disposing public lands through
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles: (1) by judicial confirmation; and (2) by administrative
legalization, otherwise known as the grant of free patents.[37]
The substantive provisions governing the first mode are found in Chapter VIII (Sections 47-57) of the PLA
while its procedural aspect is governed by Chapter III (Sections 14-38) of the Property Registration
Decree.[38]
Section 48 of the PLA particularly specifies who are entitled to judicial confirmation or completion of
imperfect titles:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and, occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a
bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.[39] [emphasis supplied]
Upon compliance with the conditions of Sec. 48 (b) of the PLA, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, right to a grant over the land. For all legal intents and purposes, the land is
segregated from the public domain, because the beneficiary is conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant.[40] The land becomes private in character and is now
beyond the authority of the director of lands to dispose of.[41]
At that point, original registration of the title, via judicial proceedings, takes place as a matter of course;
the registration court does not grant the applicant title over the property but merely recognizes the
applicant's existing title which had already vested upon the applicant's compliance with the requirement
of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945.
On the other hand, Chapter VII (Sections 44-46) of the PLA substantively governs administrative
legalization through the grant of free patents. Section 44 particularly identifies who are entitled to a
grant of a free patent:
Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twelve (12)
hectares and who, for at least thirty (30) years prior to the effectivity of this amendatory Act, has
continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest a tract or
tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, who shall have paid the real estate tax thereon
while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this
Chapter, to have a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twelve
(12) hectares x x x. [42][emphasis supplied]
Unlike an applicant in judicial confirmation of title who claims ownership over the land, the applicant for
a free patent recognizes that the land applied for belongs to the government. A patent, by its very
definition, is a governmental grant of a right, a privilege, or authority.[43] A free patent, like the one
issued to Nenita, is an instrument by which the government conveys a grant of public landto a private
person.[44]
Pursuant to the Administrative Code[45] and the PLA,[46] the DENR has exclusive jurisdiction over the
management and disposition of public lands. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the DENR has the power
to resolve conflicting claims over public lands and determine an applicant's entitlement to the grant of a
free patent.[47]
Unless it can be shown that the land subject of a free patent had previously acquired a private character,
regular courts would have no power to conclusively resolve conflicting claims of ownership or possession
dejure owing to the public character of the land.[48] The Director of Lands (ultimately, the DENR
Secretary), not the court, has jurisdiction to determine, as between two or more applicants for a free
patent, who has satisfactorily met the requirements of the law for the issuance of a free patent.[49] The
court has no jurisdiction over that matter.
In this case, Pedro failed to prove that the subject land had attained a private character; as the CA
observed, Pedro's complaint in Civil Case No. 02-20 failed to even allege that the subject lands were
private lands or alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.[50] What Pedro alleged was that
the subject lands were public land which he had possessed since 1971, "thereby (he) had acquired a right
to a grant, a government grant, without the formality of application for confirmation of title thereto"[51]
Under the PLA, for public land to attain a private character by operation of law, the applicant must have
openly, continuously, exclusively, and notoriously possessed and occupied alienable agricultural land of
the public domain, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945.[52] Pedro's failure to prove the
private character of the subject lands divests the regular courts of jurisdiction to resolve his claim of
ownership thereon. The courts may not usurp the authority of the Director of Lands and of the DENR to
dispose of lands of the public domain through administrative proceedings under the PLA.[53]
Pedro had the opportunity to assert his claim over the subject lands before the DENR when he filed his
Protest. However, he did not appeal the dismissal of his claim. The PLA[54] and the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction render the DENR's factual findings conclusive on the courts in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion; the doctrine of res judicata bars Pedro from re-litigating his claim before a different tribunal.
Fourth, the remedy of reconveyance is only available to a landowner whose private property was
erroneously or fraudulently registered in the name of another. It is not available when the subject
property is public land because a private person, who is evidently not the landowner, would have no
right to recover the property. It would simply revert to the public domain.
Thus, reconveyance cannot be resorted to by a rival applicant to question the State's grant of a free
patent.[55] The exception to this rule is when a free patent was issued over private lands that are
beyond the jurisdiction of the Director of Lands/DENR to dispose of.[56]

Lastly, we agree with the CA that Nenita's right to recover possession of the property had not been
barred by laches. As the registered owners of the subject properties, Nenita and her family have the
imprescriptible right to recover possession thereof from any person illegally occupying it.
As we held in Spouses Ocampo v. Heirs of Dionisio,[57] prescription and laches cannot apply to land
registered under the Torrens system.[58] No title to registered land, in derogation of that of the
registered owner, shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.[59]
WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the May 31, 2012 decision and the January 16, 2013 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90307.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
3. [ GR No. 147205, Mar 10, 2004 ]
HEIRS OF LOURDES POTENCIANO PADILLA v. CA +
AZCUNA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated January 9, 2001 and
the Resolution dated February 28, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 60636 which reversed
the Decision and Resolution of the Office of the President rendered in OP Case No. 20-A-8913.
The antecedents follow.
At the core of the controversy is a parcel of land identified as Lot 9098, Cad. 455-D, situated at Brgy.
Pulo, Cabuyao, Laguna, with an approximate area of 34,932 square meters. Dr. Conrado Potenciano was
the recognized occupant of the property which, through the years and even long after his death in 1954,
remained for tax purposes under his name.
In 1982, pending the settlement of Dr. Conrado Potenciano's estate before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, the judicial administrator, Victor Potenciano, sold the disputed property to spouses Chito and
Nenita Coson. On November 12, 1989, the Cosons sold the lot to Catherine Tuazon, who, in turn, sold the
same to E.S. Aure Lending Investor, Inc. (ESALI), represented by Ernesto S. Aure, respondent herein. All
the deeds of sale covering these transactions uniformly provided that the vendor shall execute the final
deed of sale after survey, segregation and filing of an application in the proper court for authority and
approval of the final deed of sale.
On September 10, 1996, respondent Aure filed a free patent application for the said property with the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR), Los Baos, Laguna. He based his claim of ownership on a deed of sale dated
September 11, 1996 executed by ESALI conveying the property to him.
Subsequently, the heirs of Lourdes Potenciano Padilla, petitioners herein who are the legal heirs of Dr.
Conrado Potenciano, protested respondent's application. They claimed that the property has been
adjudicated to them by virtue of an extra-judicial partition approved by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 4, sometime in 1986. Petitioners also manifested that on March 11, 1997, they applied
for the original titling of the disputed lot before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna, Branch 24.
After an investigation, finding the protest unfounded, DENR Regional Executive Director Antonio G.
Principe issued an Order dated April 24, 1998, dismissing petitioners' protest, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, [the] instant protest of Nicanor Padilla III, representing the Hrs. of
Lourdes Potenciano Padilla, is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of merit. Eventually, the Office of the
Community Environment and Natural Resources is hereby directed to proceed with the processing of the
Free Patent Application No. 043404-132 of Ernesto S. Aure covering Lot 9098, Cad. 455-D situated at
Brgy. Pulo, Cabuyao, Laguna.
SO ORDERED. [1]
On August 12, 1998, Regional Executive Director Principe issued a Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the said Order filed by petitioners.
Petitioners thereafter appealed the case to the Office of the DENR Secretary, which affirmed the assailed
Order and Resolution. Thus, on April 30, 1999, then DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles rendered a
Decision that ruled:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the appeal of the Heirs of Lourdes P. Padilla, represented
by Nicanor Padilla III is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Order and Resolution, dated April 24,
1998 and August 12, 1998, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[2]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and the same was denied in an Order dated September 2,
1999, thus:
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, the instant motion for reconsideration should be, as it is hereby
DISMISSED, and the Decision, dated April 30, 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Petitioners thereafter sought relief from the Office of the President.
Departing from the preceding rulings, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary
Ronaldo B. Zamora, reversed the Decision and Order of the DENR. The dispositive portion of its June 5,
2000 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision and order of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
dated April 30, 1999, and September 2, 1999, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the protest filed by the heirs of Lourdes P. Padilla dated September 16, 1998 against FPA
No. 043404-132 of Ernesto S. Aura is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.[4]
From the aforesaid Decision, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the same office
denied in a Resolution dated July 25, 2000.[5]
Under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, respondent had until August 19, 2000 to appeal from
the aforesaid decision and resolution. However, instead of perfecting an appeal, he opted to file with
the Court of Appeals on September 8, 2000 a special civil action for certiorari. In that petition, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 60636, respondent alleged that the Office of the President committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled on the validity of the sale executed by
the judicial administrator of the late Dr. Conrado Potenciano, and in declaring that the case should be
tried before the land registration court in order to settle the question of ownership.[6]
On January 9, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision reversing the Decision and Resolution of
the Office of the President, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision and Resolution of public respondent, dated 5 June 2000
and 25 July 2000, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the Decision and
Order of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, dated 30 April 1999 and 2 September
1999, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners moved to reconsider. However, the Court of Appeals maintained its Decision in a Resolution
dated February 28, 2001.[8]
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following assigned errors:
I amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[13]
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AS A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION [,] [THE SAME] HAVING BEEN RESORTED TO AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR A LOST APPEAL AND [IT] BEING AN ERRONEOUS REMEDY.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN RESOLVING A PETITION [FOR] CERTIORARI
UNDER RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS THOUGH IT WAS AN ORDINARY APPEAL
UNDER RULE 43.
III
GRANTING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT THE PETITION IS PROPER AND COULD BE VALIDLY
ENTERTAINED, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN ASCRIBING THE
FALSE ENTRIES OF THE RESPONDENT IN HIS FREE PATENT APPLICATION AS "MINISCULE INACCURACY"; IN
FINDING THE PETITIONERS TO HAVE GIVEN THE RESPONDENT A REASON TO BELIEVE THAT PETITIONERS
HAVE TRANSFERRED VALID TITLE TO HIM; AND IN FINDING THE PETITIONERS, BY LACHES, TO HAVE
WAIVED THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE FREE PATENT APPLICATION.[9]
The main question being raised by petitioners is whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving due
course to and in granting the petition for certiorari filed by respondent.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in entertaining the special civil action
for certiorari filed by respondent under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the same being actually a
substitute for lost appeal. Records show that respondent received the Resolution of the Office of the
President denying the motion for reconsideration on August 4, 2000. The 15-day reglementary period to
appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, therefore, lapsed on August 19, 2000. On September 8, 2000,
more than a month after receipt of the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, respondent
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari to nullify the Decision and Resolution issued by
the Office of the President. Petitioners, therefore, argue that the Court of Appeals erred in taking
cognizance of the petition filed before it, as it was an obvious move to revive a lost appeal.
The petition is meritorious.
The availability to respondent of the remedy of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
to appeal the Decision and Resolution of the Office of the President effectively foreclosed his right to
resort to a special civil action for certiorari.[10] It bears emphasis that the special civil action
for certiorari is a limited form of review and is a remedy of last recourse. The Court has often reminded
members of the bench and bar that this extraordinary action lies only where there is no appeal nor plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[11] It cannot be allowed when a party to a
case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute
for a lapsed or lost appeal. To reiterate, a petition for review is a mode of appeal, while a special civil
action for certiorari is an extraordinary process for the correction of errors of jurisdiction. The two
remedies are distinct, mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[12]
Admittedly, there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be resorted to despite
the availability of an appeal. It is to be noted, however, that the long line of decisions denying the special
civil action for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or in instances where the appeal period had
lapsed, far outnumbers the instances where certiorari was given due course. The few significant
exceptions were: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates, or when the
broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, or when the questioned order
In the instant case, there was no urgency or need for respondent to resort to the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari. The records are bereft of any showing that petitioners misled, prevented, or obstructed
respondent from pursuing an appeal.[14] As borne out by the records, respondent still had ample time
and opportunity to file an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. It is, therefore, obvious that
respondent interposed the special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals not because it is
the speedy and adequate remedy, but to make up for the loss, through omission or oversight, of the
right of ordinary appeal.[15] There was thus no compelling reason for the Court of Appeals to have
treated the petition for certiorari filed by respondent as an ordinary appeal. This is especially true
considering that respondent filed the petition well beyond the reglementary period for filing a petition
for review, without offering any reason therefor.[16] Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of
procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality at least to explain its failure to
comply with the rules.[17]
Respondent seeks to justify his resort to a special civil action for certiorari by putting emphasis on the
Office of the President's ruling on the validity of the contracts of sale and pronouncement on the
appropriateness of the land registration court as venue to determine the ownership of the disputed
property. Claiming that the Office of the President overstepped its jurisdiction in laying out these rulings,
which he asserts to be falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts, respondent insists that
the special civil action for certiorari he filed with the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy.
The argument lacks merit. The Court has said that in determining whether the proper remedy is a special
civil action for certiorari or a petition for review, the nature of the questions intended to be raised on
appeal is of no consequence. It may well be that those questions will treat exclusively of whether or not
the judgment or final order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, which questions are the peculiar targets of the extraordinary writ of certiorari. This is
immaterial.[18] As recently stated in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. JANCOM
Environmental Corp.:[19]
The remedy to obtain reversal or modification of the judgment on the merits is appeal. This is true even
if the error, or one of the errors, ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the
findings of fact or of law set out in the decision. The existence and availability of the right of appeal
proscribes a resort to certiorari, because one of the requirements for availment of the latter remedy is
that "there should be no appeal."
In the present case, the Court finds no reason why the question being raised by respondent, i.e., whether
the Office of the President committed grave abuse of discretion or lacked or exceeded its jurisdiction in
issuing its Decision, could not have been raised by him on appeal.[20]
Moreover, assuming that the nature of the questions raised are consequential, it must be pointed out
that for the remedy of petition for certiorari to prosper, the burden is on the party filing the petition to
prove not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the public respondent.[21] Grave abuse of discretion is one that is so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and personal hostility.[22] While the Court of Appeals may not have agreed with
the conclusions of the Office of the President, a perusal of the Decision and Resolution rendered by the
latter shows that the findings therein were premised on factual and legal bases clearly stated in the
aforesaid Decision and Resolution. These bases, even if subject to argument, cannot be dismissed as
"despotic or arbitrary" or "as having been motivated by passion or personal hostility."
Furthermore, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, a reading of the body of the assailed Decision of
the Court of Appeals readily shows that the petition for certiorari was mistakenly treated as if it were a
petition for review. Right at the start of the Decision, the Court of Appeals wrongly identified the case as
an "appeal by petition for review."[23] The same error may be found in that part of the Decision where
the issues for review were introduced.[24] Moreover, the Decision's ratio inaccurately commenced with:
"The Court finds merit in the appeal."[25] It is further noted that nowhere in the Decision was there a
discussion of any jurisdictional error or grave abuse of discretion committed by the Office of the
President that would have justified the granting of respondent's petition. The Decision is silent on the
main jurisdictional errors raised by respondent in his petition. Instead, it focused more on the merits of
the case, as though the petition was brought on ordinary appeal. If any, the only mention of grave abuse
of discretion was in the latter part, where the Decision barely concluded that: "All said, the Court finds
that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in reversing the decisions of the agencies and
tribunals preceding its own, meriting correction by this Court."[26] Without doubt, such sweeping
conclusion does not pass the standards set by jurisprudence and procedural law in qualifying what
constitutes grave abuse of discretion. It is, lastly, observed that in the dispositive portion of the Decision
the Court of Appeals "reversed and set aside" the Decision and Resolution of the Office of the President,
instead of nullifying them, as would have been proper in a certiorari case.
The Court cannot countenance the foregoing error of blurring the distinction between a special civil
action for certiorari and a petition for review. Procedural law has its own rationale in the orderly
administration of justice, namely, to ensure the effective enforcement of substantive rights by providing
for a system that obviates arbitrariness, caprice, despotism or whimsicality in the settlement of
disputes. The enforcement of procedural rules is not antithetical to the substantive rights of the
litigants.[27] The policy of the courts is to give effect to both procedural and substantive laws, as
complementing each other, in the just and speedy resolution of the dispute between the parties.[28]
The Court thus holds that the Court of Appeals erred in giving due course to and in granting respondent's
petition. The filing of thecertiorari suit, therefore, did not prevent the Decision and Resolution of the
Office of the President from becoming final.[29]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 9, 2001 and the Resolution dated
February 28, 2001 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
4. [ GR No. 180993, Jan 27, 2016 ]
REPUBLIC v. RAYMUNDO VIAJE
Facts:
The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Republic and as represented by the LRA,
filed on July 10, 2000 a complaint for cancellation of title and reconveyance with the RTC of
TreceMartires City, docketed as Civil Case No. TM-1001. The action mainly sought the nullity of the TCT
individually issued in the name of the defendants for having been issued in violation of law and for
having dubious origins. The title was allegedly derived from TCT No. T-39046 issued on Oct. 1, 1969
which was derived from OCT No. 114 issued on March 9, 1910. The Republic alleged that OCT No. 114
and the documents of TCT No. T-39046 do not exist in the records of the Register of Deeds of Cavite and
TreceMartires.
The OSG entered its appearance on Aug. 7, 2001 and deputized Atty. Artemio Legaspi and the
members of the LRA legal staff to appear in Civil Case No. TM-1001. The OSG also requested that notice
of hearings, orders, decisions and other processes be served on both the OSG and the deputized counsel.
However, the notice of appearance stated that only notices of orders, resolutions, and decisions served
on him will bind the party represented. Subsequently, Atty. Alexander Acosta of the LRA entered his
appearance pursuant to the OSG Letter dated Aug. 7, 2001.
On April 11, 2003, the RTC dismissed the complaint due to the non-appearance of the counsel
for the Republic. The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the RTC. Pre-trial was
again set and re-set, but on Jan. 23, 2004 the RTC finally dismissed the case with prejudice.
The OSG forthwith filed a manifestation and motion, informing the RTC that Atty. Acosta was
not given notice of the pre-trial schedule. The OSG also argued that its deputized counsel should have
been notified of the settings made by the trial court as it is not merely a collaborating counsel who
appears with an OSG lawyer during hearing, rather its deputized counsel appears in behalf of the OSG
and should be separately notified.
The RTC denied the OSGs manifestation and motion, subsequently, on motion of the
defendants, the RTC issued an order on Oct. 4, 2004 recalling its previous order that gave due course to
the OSGs appeal. The ground for the recall was the OSGs failure to indicate in its notice of appeal the
court to which the appeal was being directed.
Thus the OSG filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and on Nov. 28, 2007,
rendered a decision dismissing the OSGs petition on the grounds that the petition was filed one day late
and the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Civil Case No. TM-1001 and
the OSGs notice of appeal. It ruled that the OSGs failure to indicate in its notice of appeal the court to
which the appeal is being taken violated Sec. 5 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellate court erred in not holding that respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing the notice of appeal.
Held:
The Court cannot attribute error to the CA when it affirmed the RTCs recall of its order
granting the OSGs notice of appeal. The RTC simply applied the clear provisions of Sec. 5, Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, which mandated that a notice of appeal shall specify the court to which the appeal is
being taken.
Nevertheless, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the Court resolves to relax the
stringent application of the rules, both on the matter of service of notices to the OSG and its deputized
counsel, and on the notice of appeal.
The OSGs omission should not work against the Republic. For one, the OSG availed of the
proper remedy in seeking a review of the RTCs order of dismissal by pursuing on ordinary appeal and
filing a notice of appeal, albeit without stating where the appeal will be taken. For another, an ordinary
appeal from a final decision of the RTC rendered in the exercise of its original jurisdiction can only be
elevated to the CA under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, in Ulep vs. People of the Philippines,
the OSGs failure to designate where the appeal will be taken was a case of inadvertence and does not
appear to be a dilatory tactic on its part. More importantly, the OSGs omission should not redound to
the Republics disadvantage for it is a well-settled principle that the Republic is never estopped by the
mistakes or error committed by its officials or agents.
The petition is granted, the decision dated Nov. 28, 2007 of the CA is reversed and set aside.
Civil Case No. TM-1001 and all its records are remanded to the RTC of TRECE Martires City for further
disposition on the merits.
5. GR No. 158182, Jun 12, 2008 ]
SESINANDO MERIDA v. PEOPLE
FACTS: Petitioner was charged in the RTC of Romblon with violation of Section 68 of PD 705for
"cutting, gathering, collecting and removing a lone narra tree inside a private land over which private
complainant Oscar Tansiongco claims ownership. When confronted during the meeting about the
fellednarra tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of
one Vicar Calix who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from Tansiongco in October
1987 under a pacto de retro sale. It was later found out that he converted the narra trunk into lumber.
He was found guilty by the Trial Court but he appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his
defense of denial. Petitioner also contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case because it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided
under Section 80 of PD 705. CA affirmed the lower courts ruling, but ordered the seized lumber
confiscated in the government's favor. Also, it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is
bound by his extrajudicial admissions of cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any
DENR permit.
ISSUE:
1) W/N the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even though it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest officer. YES.
2) W/N petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705. YES.
RATIO:
1. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure list the cases which must be initiated by a complaint filed
by specified individuals, non-compliance of which ousts the trial court of jurisdiction from trying such
cases. However, these cases concern only defamation and other crimes against chastity and not to
cases concerning Section 68 of PD 705. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an
interested person from filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD
705, as amended.
Moreover, here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest
Development who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod Property but Tansiongco, a
private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property. Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted
for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there is prima facie evidence to support the
complaint or report." At any rate, Tansiongco was not precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705
or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged
violation of Section 68 of PD 705.
2) Petitioner is guilt of the second paragraph of section 80, which is the cutting, gathering, collecting,
or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land without any
authority. The court also said that the lumber or processed log is covered by the forest products
term in PD 705, as the law does not distinguish between a raw and processed timber.
6. [ A.M. No. RTJ-06-2017, June 19, 2008 ]
LT. GEN. ALFONSO P. DAGUDAG (RET.), COMPLAINANT, VS. JUDGE MAXIMO G.W. PADERANGA,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 38, CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, RESPONDENT.
FACTS:
Illegal forest products were possessed by NMC Container Lines, Inc. were seized by the DENR. The items
were found to be lacking the required legal documents and were consequently abandoned by the
unknown owner.
Later a certain Roger C. Edma filed a writ of replevin for the release of said confiscated products.
Respondent Judge issued the writ despite the fact that an administrative case was already pending
before the DENR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Paderanga is liable for gross ignorance of the law and for conduct unbecoming a
judge.
HELD:
Yes. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies. In the instant case, Edma did not resort to, or avail of, any administrative
remedy. He went straight to court and filed a complaint for replevin and damages.
Second, under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence.
Third, the forest products are already in custodia legis and thus cannot be the subject of replevin.
Judge Paderangas acts of taking cognizance of the replevin suit and of issuing the writ of replevin
constitute gross ignorance of the law.
Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that competence is a
prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Section 3 of Canon 6 states that judges shall take
reasonable steps to maintain and enhance their knowledge necessary for the proper performance of
judicial duties. Judges should keep themselves abreast with legal developments and show acquaintance
with laws. The rule that courts cannot prematurely take cognizance of cases pending before
administrative agencies is basic. There was no reason for Judge Paderanga to make an exception to this
rule. The forest products were in the custody of the DENR and Edma had not availed of any
administrative remedy. Judge Paderanga should have dismissed the replevin suit outright.
7. GR Nos. 171947-48, Dec 18, 2008 ]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY +
Constitutional Law Right to a Healthful Ecology
In 1999, the Concerned Residents of Manila Bay (CROMB) filed an action for mandamus to compel the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) and other government agencies to clean up the
Manila Bay. CROMB argued that the environmental state of the Manila Bay is already dangerous to their
health and the inaction of MMDA and the other concerned government agencies violates their rights to
life, health, and a balanced ecology guaranteed by the Constitution. CROMB also averred under the
Environmental Code, it is MMDAs duty to clean up the Manila Bay.
The trial court agreed with CROMB and ordered MMDA et al to clean up the Manila Bay. MMDA assailed
the decision on the ground that MMDAs duty under the Environmental Code is merely a discretionary
duty hence it cannot be compelled by mandamus. Further, MMDA argued that the RTCs order was for a
general clean up of the Manila Bay yet under the Environmental Code, MMDA was only tasked to attend
to specific incidents of pollution and not to undertake a massive clean up such as that ordered by the
court.
ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA may be compelled by mandamus to clean up Manila Bay.
HELD: Yes. It is true that in order for MMDA to implement laws like the Environmental Code, the process
of implementing usually involves the exercise of discretion i.e., where to set up landfills. But this does
not mean that their function or mandate under the law is already discretionary. Looking closer, MMDAs
function to alleviate the problem on solid and liquid waste disposal problems is a ministerial function. In
short, MMDA does not have the discretion to whether or not alleviate the garbage disposal problem in
Metro Manila, particularly in the Manila Bay area. While the implementation of the MMDAs mandated
tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the
law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
Anent the issue on whether or not MMDAs task under the Environmental Code involves a general clean
up, the Supreme Court ruled that MMDAs mandate under the Environmental Code is to perform
cleaning in general and not just to attend to specific incidents of pollution. Hence, MMDA, together with
the other government agencies, must act to clean up the Manila Bay as ordered by the RTC.
8. GR Nos. 171947-48, Feb 15, 2011 ]
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF MANILA BAY
FACTS:
The Supreme Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48 ordering petitioners to clean up,
rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their different capacities.
The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluate the quarterly progressive
reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the
execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for
the agencies to perform their assigned tasks.
ISSUE: Whether or not the recommendation by the Committee is an encroachment over the powers and
functions of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.
HELD: The petition lacks merit.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Adjudicative function
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIII
of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative
function of the Court.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status
reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.
Petition is DENIED.
9. GR No. 224804, Sep 21, 2016 ]
EFREN R. LEYNES v. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE OF THE CASE
The acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing an outlet (prinsa), and excavating in
the mangrove forest constitute conversion because it altered the natural structure and form of the
mangrove forest.
FACTS
Efren, Alan and Javier, all surnamed Leynes, were charged with the violation of Section 94, Republic Act
No. 8550 (Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998) for constructing a one-half hectare fishpond in a mangrove
area, cutting of mangrove trees and for excavating, constructing a dike, and installing an outlet (prinsa)
in the mangrove forest without a fishpond lease agreement. These acts had allegedly caused damage to
the mangrove area found therein. Efren and Alan both entered a plea of not guilty while Javier, remained
at large.
As a defense, Efren and Alan contended that the act punishable under the said law is "conversion" and
that the construction of dikes and installation of an outlet (prinsa) do not amount to conversion, but a
rehabilitation and improvement of the mangrove forest. They also argued that the mangrove forest was
already a fishpond since 1970. Furthermore, Efren claimed ownership over the mangrove area by
presenting a tax declaration issued in the name of his grandfather, Emilio Leynes. Efren likewise forwards
that he merely introduced improvements in the area covered by a Certificate of Non Coverage issued in
his favor by the Department of Natural Resources. By this according to Efren, shows his good faith.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted petitioner Efren but dismissed the charge against Alan for the
failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy between him and Efren and/or participation in the
commission of the offense. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed Efren's conviction.
ISSUE:
Is Leynes, in cutting a mangrove tree, guilty of the crime of conversion of mangroves under Sec. 94 of
R.A. 8550?
RULING:
YES. Section 94, R.A. No. 8550 provides that It shall be unlawful for any person to convert mangroves
into fishponds or for any other purposes. For an offense of conversion of mangrove forest to exist, the
following elements must concur: (1) the site of the fishpond is a mangrove forest; (2) there was a
conversion of the mangrove area into a fishpond; and (3) the appellant made the conversion. The
presence of the first and third elements, i.e., the site of the fishpond is a mangrove forest and the
appellant made the conversion, are undisputed.
As regards the third element, conversion means "the act or process of changing from one form, state,
etc., to another." In the case at bar, Efren's acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing
an outlet (prinsa), and excavating in the mangrove forest constitute conversion because it altered the
natural structure and form of the mangrove forest. Even if the Court considers Efren's defense that when
he inherited the mangrove forest areas from his grandfather it was already a fishpond, such does not
absolve him from liability. His continued introduction of improvements and continued use of the
mangrove forest area as a fishpond, despite knowledge of the same being a mangrove forest area,
impose upon him criminal liability.
In any case, what the law prohibits is not only the conversion of the mangrove forest into fishponds, but
also its conversion into any other purpose. Indeed, Efren may not have caused the conversion of the
mangrove forest into a fishpond, but his acts of cutting mangrove trees, constructing a dike, installing an
outlet (prinsa), and excavating in the mangrove forest altered the natural structure and form of the
mangrove forestan act punishable by Sec. 94 of R.A. No. 8550.
Anent his claim of good faith, the Court, as already held in its past pronouncements, cannot give
credence to such defense. R.A. No. 8550 is a special law. It punishes conversion of mangrove forests into
fishponds and for other purposes. As a special law, failure to comply with the same being malum
prohihitum, intent to commit it or good faith is immaterial.
As regards Efren's defense that the mangrove forest area is covered by a tax declaration, the Court
reiterated the findings of the lower court that the issuance of a tax declaration does not justify Efren's
continued possession and introduction of improvements. In fact, pursuant to Section 75 of P.D. No. 705,
the issuance of a tax declaration of a land not classified as alienable and disposable is a criminal act. The
tax declaration issued in his favor cannot act as a shield from criminal liability.
Lastly, Efren also cannot invoke the Certificate of Non Coverage issued in his name as a permit to
introduce improvements in the mangrove forest. As correctly held by the RTC: (1) "the issuance thereof
shall not exempt the grantee from compliance with applicable environmental laws, rules and regulations,
including, the permitting requirements of other government agencies, and (2) only the granting of
fishpond lease agreement pursuant to Sec. 45 of R.A. 8550 could exempt Efren from prosecution of Sec.
94 of the same law." A perusal of the records reveals that Efren is bereft of any fishpond lease
agreement. Absent any fishpond lease agreement, Efren, despite the issuance of a Certificate of Non
Coverage in his name, is not exempted from compliance with applicable environmental laws, rules and
regulations, such as Sec. 94 of R.A. No. 8550.
10. GR NO. 143307, Apr 26, 2006 ]
LU DO v. AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Aznar Brothers Realty Company, a partnership engaged in buying and selling real properties and in
livestock and agriculture business was awarded of Foreshore Lease over an 8,485sqm land located in
Sawang, San Nicolas, Cebu City. However, Lu Do and Lu YM Corporation, a manufacturer and exporter of
coconut oil products, took possession of the said land on July 21, 1965. Since then and up to the present,
4 Lu Do introduced improvements on the land, such as, bodega for copra, cylindrical tank for coconut oil
and automotive shop. Said occupation of the land was by virtue of a purported provisional permit
alleged to have been issued by the Bureau of Lands. However, such permit was found to be inexistent in
the records, hence, the improvements introduced by petitioner were held to have been made in bad
faith. The Director of Lands rendered a decision revoking the award in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty
Company. While the Minister of Natural Resources reversed the decision of the Director of Lands
upholding the award of the land in favor of Aznar, and ordered the Lu Do to remove the improvements
on the land, otherwise, the same would be forfeited in favor of the government. The Court of Appeals
favored Aznar and the Supreme Court denied the further petition of Lu Do. Said decision of the Court
became final and executory. Lu Do subsequently filed a Motion to Suspend Enforcement of Decision but
was also denied. Lu Dos arguments were: that the improvements it introduced in the land increased to
not less than P9,335,400.00, and it would be unfair for the government to forfeit said improvements in
its favor; that the land in question should be rebidded in view of dissolution of respondent partnership
by reason of the death of two of its partners; and that the questioned land ceased to be a foreshore land
having been transformed into an area suitable for industrial/ commercial purposes, hence said land is no
longer a proper subject of a foreshore application.
ISSUE: WON 1. It would be unfair for the government to forfeit the improvements introduced by the
petitioner. 2. The land in question should be rebidded in view of dissolution of respondent partnership
by reason of the death of two of its partners. 3. The questioned land ceased to be a foreshore land
having been transformed into an area suitable for industrial/ commercial purposes, hence no longer a
proper subject of a foreshore application.
HELD: 1. Whether the petitioner does not have nor has a provisional permit to use and occupy the land,
forfeiture of the permanent improvements introduced thereon is still proper. Section 38 of the Public
Land Act provides: Section 8. Leases shall run for a period of not more than twenty-five years, but may
be renewed once for another period of not to exceed twenty-five years, in case the lessee shall have
made important improvements which, in the discretion of the Secretary of [the Department of
Environment and Natural resources], justify a renewal. Upon final expiration of the lease, all buildings
and other permanent improvements made by the lessee, his heirs, executors, administrators, successors,
or assigns shall become the property of the Government, and the land together with the said
improvements shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter five of this Act. In the
instant case, the purported temporary or provisional permit of petitioner enabled it to use the subject
land for more than 40 years. It was able to occupy the land for a period equivalent to a full term of a
lease, and for almost the entire duration of the maximum period allowed for a renewal thereof.
Petitioner cannot therefore pretend that the Decision of the Minister of Natural Resources ordering it to
remove the improvements on the land is greatly disadvantageous to it. Petitioner is in fact placed in a
better position because it was allowed to remove its improvements, unlike legitimate awardees of the 5
right to lease a public land whose improvements become government property at the expiration of the
lease. 2. In case of Eusebio v. Sociedad Agricola de Balarin.it was held that the death of the partners did
not automatically forfeit the rights they acquired over the land and that their heirs and the new
association established by them should be considered subrogated in the place of the original partners.
Further, under section 105 of the Public Land Act, the heirs-at- law of a natural person, who dies before
the final grant, are subrogated to his rights and obligations, and entitled to have issued to them the
patent or final concession upon proof of compliance with the requirements of the law. 3. In the same
vein, there is no merit in the contention of petitioner that the questioned foreshore lease should be
revoked because the land is no longer a foreshore land having been converted by it (petitioner) to a
commercial/industrial land. Indeed, the Court of Appeals correctly held that since the said land was a
foreshore land at the time the application was filed, the right to lease the same should still be awarded
to respondent. To forfeit the right of respondent would be the height of injustice as it would reward
petitioner for successfully stalling the enforcement of a final and executory decision.
11. [ GR No. 101083, Jul 30, 1993 ]
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
FACTS:
A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises. They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding
generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the
concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right considers the rhythm and harmony of nature which indispensably include,
inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the countrys
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end
that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minors assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
12. [ GR NO. 152570, Sep 27, 2006 ]
SAAD AGRO-INDUSTRIES v. REPUBLIC
FACTS: The instant petition for review assails the decision of the Court of Appeals which invalidated the
sale of the Lot No. 1434 of Cad-315-D, a parcel of land with an area of 12.8477 hectares located in
Barangay Abugon, Sibonga, Cebu to petitioner.
SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc. is directed to surrender the owner's duplicate copy of Original Certificate of
Title [No.] 0-6667 to the Register of Deeds of Cebu City which was ordered to cancel OCT [No.] 0-6667
and all other transfer certificates of title that may have been subsequently issued.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming insufficiency of evidence and failure to consider
pertinent laws, proved futile as it was dismissed for lack of merit.
ISSUE: What is the Regalian Doctrine?
RULING: The Court has always recognized and upheld the Regalian doctrine as the basic foundation of
the State's property regime.Under the Regalian doctrine or jura regalia, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. Under this doctrine, lands not otherwise appearing to be
clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. In instances where a parcel of land
considered to be inalienable land of the public domain is found under private ownership, the
Government is allowed by law to file an action for reversion, which is an action where the ultimate relief
sought is to revert the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine. Considering that the land
subject of the action originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.
13. [ GR No. 192132, Sep 14, 2016 ]
HEIRS OF ZOSIMO Q. MARAVILLA v. PRIVALDO TUPAS
Indeed, the well-settled principle of immutability of final judgments demands that once a judgment has
become final, the winning party should not, through a mere subterfuge, be deprived of the fruits of the
verdict.1 There are, however, recognized exceptions to the execution as a matter of right of a final and
immutable judgment, one of which is the existence of a supervening event.2
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated May 25,
2010 seeking to set aside the Decision3 dated November 11, 2009 and the Resolution dated March 17,
2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) that declared null and void and set aside the Orders dated February 2,
2009 and April 7, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Kalibo, Aklan directing the execution of the
latter's Decision dated March 31, 2003 that became final and executory on May 21, 2007.
The facts follow.
According to respondent, he, along with the other heirs of the late Asiclo S. Tupas, has maintained the
occupation and possession of certain portions of the property subject of this case. Thereafter, the late
Zosimo Maravilla claimed ownership over 10,000 square meters of said property by virtue of a Deed of
Sale dated February 8, 1975, purportedly executed between him and the late Asiclo S. Tupas. The
property situated in Diniwid, Barangay Balabag, Malay, Aklan, is more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land situated at Barangay Balabag, Malay, Aklan bounded on the North by Gil Aguirre, F.
Flores; South by Antonio Tupas & T. Sacapao, East by Asicio (sic) Tupas, and West by Seashore L.
Villanueva of approximately 1,000 hectares, assessed at P2,610.00 under Tax Declaration No. 1304, in
the name of Maravilla, Ozosimo A. for the year of 1985.
Maravilla filed a case for quieting of title with recovery of possession and damages before Branch 9 of
the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, docketed as Civil Case No. 4338. The dispositive portion of the Decision4reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the deed of sale (Exhs. A & 1) executed by Asiclo Tupas in favor of plaintiff Zosimo Maravilla
over one-half () portion or about 5,000 sq. m. of the conjugal property of the former as legal and valid;
2. Ordering that the portion sold be delineated from the shoreline with a length of at least 28 m. long
from the southwestern direction traversing in a straight line towards northeastern part between points
5-6 embracing an area of about 5,000 sq. m., depicted in Exh. G, interpreted in relation to amended
commissioner's report and sketch plan, dated August 25, 1992 (Exh. L) across Lots B and A; with the
northern portion of 5,000 sq. m. awarded to the defendants and the southern portion of 5,000 sq. m. to
plaintiff; Defendants' cottages that may be found in plaintiff's one- half portion shall be removed by the
former at their expense within 30 days from the finality of this decision. The existing muniments of the
parties to the land in question like tax declarations, certificates of title, and other related documents are
ordered modified or corrected to conform to this decision;
3. Defendants are ordered jointly and severally, to refund plaintiff the amount of seven thousand pesos
(P7,000.00), Philippine currency, representing the consideration of the portion of the land in question
herein awarded to them; and
4. Plaintiff is ordered to pay defendants for attorney's fees and litigation expenses in the sum of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000.00) and the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.5
Maravilla filed an appeal with the CA questioning the RTC's decision that he is only entitled to of the
area sold even if the validity of the deed of sale was upheld. The CA, in a Decision6 dated August 28,
1996, ruled that:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo is SET ASIDE and another judgment is issued declaring
Zosimo Maravilla the owner of 10,000 sq. m. undivided share in the 36,382 sq. m. parcel of land of Asiclo
S. Tupas and Francisca Aguirre and directing that this land be partitioned, either extra-judicially or
judicially, and that Maravilla's portion of the property be determined; and ordering the defendants to
turn over possession of the portion allocated to Maravilla.
Special Proceedings No. 39517 is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.7
On October 21, 1999, Maravilla filed another case for partition and damages before the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 6, and on March 31, 2003, it disposed of the case as follows:8
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered containing that the one-hectare portion in the Sketch Plan
[Annex B-1; Complaint] is the rightful share of the plaintiff.
Defendants are ordered to restore possession thereof to the plaintiff, and to pay jointly and severally the
latter the agreed monthly reasonable compensation for the use and occupation thereof of P5,000.00
starting in 1990 until possession is fully restored to plaintiff.
Costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.9
Respondent appealed the decision with the CA, and in a Decision10 dated April 13, 2007, the latter
dismissed the appeal on the ground of res judicata. The CA opined that the first case, the one for
quieting of title and the second case for partition, both presented identity of facts and evidence and that
the truth of the matter is, part of the judgment of the first case ordered for partition of the subject
parcel of land to delimit the portion owned by herein petitioner.
On October 31, 2008, Maravilla filed a Motion for Execution11 of the March 31, 2003 Decision of the
RTC-Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan.
While the motion for execution was pending before the RTC-Branch 6 of Kalibo, Aklan, this Court, on
October 8, 2008, declared Boracay as government property in the consolidated cases of The Secretary of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. andSacay, et al. v. the
Secretary of the DENR, et al. (Boracay Decision)12
On February 2, 2009, a Resolution was issued by the RTC granting the motion for execution.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the same in an Order dated April 7,
2009.
Thus, respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA assailing the Resolution and the Order issued
by the RTC. Respondent raised as an issue that the grant of the motion for execution is not in accordance
with this Court's decision in The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al., a supervening event, and
that the RTC erred in not declaring as null and void the deed of sale of unregistered land considering that
Boracay has been classified as an inalienable land. The CA granted the petition, thus:
Withal, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders dated February 2, 2009 and April 7, 2009,
respectively, issued by public respondent are hereby declared NULL and VOID and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Maravilla's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated March 17, 2010, hence, the
present petition.14
Petitioners (the heirs of Maravilla) raise the following grounds:
In rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution, petitioners most humbly submit that the Court of
Appeals gravely erred in making the following legal conclusions that warrants the power of review and
supervision by the Honorable Supreme Court:
I. The Court of Appeals so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings when
it set aside the Orders of the Regional Trial Court granting execution of the 31 March 2003 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court in relation to the 28 August 1996 [Decision] of the Court of Appeals, both of
which judgments have long become final and executory.
II. The Court of Appeals' finding that the Boracay Decision is a supervening event that prevents the trial
court from implementing the writ of execution is not in accord with the applicable decisions of this
Honorable Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals erred in finding that:
a. the Boracay Decision had a direct effect on the issue litigated and settled with finality between the
parties, and substantially changed the rights and relations between the parties;
b. with the declaration of Boracay as state-owned, the claim of herein petitioners of rights to the
Property is already without basis;
c. to allow execution of the judgment would be to give undue advantage to herein petitioners and would
be a miscarriage of justice.15
They also bring up the following arguments:
I. Petitioners are entitled as a matter of right to the execution of the judgments that have long become
final and executory.
II. The pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the Boracay Decision is not a supervening event:
A. The settled dispute between the parties as to who has the better right to the Property is distinct and
separate from the issue of titling sought in the Boracay Decision;
B. The Boracay Decision does not substantially change the rights and relations between the petitioners
and respondent that were already decided by the courts with finality;
C. Notwithstanding the Boracay Decision, it is still possible to execute the decision regarding the
partition and restoration of the possession of Property in favor of petitioners as against respondent;
III. The Boracay Decision does not render the execution sought by [the] petition as unjust or inequitable
that precludes the execution of the final and executory judgments.16
Petitioners insist that the CA's Decision dated August 28, 1996 in the original case for Quieting of Title
with Recovery of Possession and Damages entitled petitioners to the restoration of their possession of
the property consisting of 10,000 sq. m. out of the 36,382 sq. m. tract of land, after the validity of the
sale to Maravilla by respondent's predecessor has been upheld by the court with finality. They further
claim that it is well entrenched in Our rules and jurisprudence that the prevailing party may move for the
execution of a decision that has become final and executory as a matter of right and the issuance of the
writ of execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court.
The pronouncement in the Boracay Decision, according to petitioners, is not a supervening event. The
Boracay Decision is simply a recognition of the right of the State to classify the island and to pave the
way for the eventual titling or formalization of ownership claims of lands classified as alienable and
disposable, and as to whether or not petitioners may secure title to the property is an issue that has not
yet ripened into a legal controversy between petitioners and the State. Petitioners argue that the settled
dispute between the parties as to who has the better right to the property is distinct and separate from
the issue of titling sought in the Boracay Decision by the claimants therein.
Furthermore, petitioners do not contest the legal status of the land; what they assert is the satisfaction
of their right to enjoy whatever imperfect rights that their predecessors had validly acquired from
respondent's predecessor, as confirmed with finality by the courts.
The petition lacks merit.
The basic issue to be resolved is whether or not this Court's decision in The Secretary of the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the
DENR, et al. can be considered as supervening event and if so, whether or not such supervening event
can prevent the execution of a judgment that has already attained finality.
In the present case, petitioners' basis of their claim over the subject property is the Deed of Sale of
Unregistered Land that the late Zosimo Maravilla executed with the late Asiclo S. Tupas. This Deed of
Sale has been acknowledged and adjudged by the RTC to be binding between the parties, and in fact, has
attained finality. This Court, however, in The Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al.,ruled that the
entire island of Boracay as state-owned except for lands already covered by existing titles. To have a
clearer view of the antecedents of the said case, the following are thus quoted:
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the National
Reservation Survey of Boracay Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by
named persons.
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine
reserves under the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later
approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No.
1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 precluded them from filing an application
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82
raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial.
They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not place
Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it was
susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise
known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names through
judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It formed
part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest", which was not available for disposition pursuant to
Section 3 (a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code, as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants' reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was
misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since
Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot
ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1) respondents-
claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these parcels of land were
planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or
less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-
claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation No.
1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They decided to
forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their respective
memoranda.
The RTC took judicial notice that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1 and
30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the
Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of
Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on August 7, 1933.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their
lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed therein; and to
have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the
approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants' right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It ruled
that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay were
inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. The Circular itself recognized private ownership of
lands. The trial court cited Sections 87 and 53 of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private
ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of
the forest reserve.
The OSG moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied. The Republic then appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the appeal
filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. Hence, the present petition under
Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Proclamation No. 1064 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of reserved forest
land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural
land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on
each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the
area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, Wilfredo Gelito, and other landowners in
Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition,mandamus, and nullification of
Proclamation No. 1064. They alleged that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior vested rights" over
portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since
time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building
internationally-renowned first class resorts on their lots.
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island is deemed agricultural
pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first Public Land Act. Thus, their
possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over their
occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section 3 (a) of
PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot be the
subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the courts,
which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is
a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.17
The consolidated petitions basically raise the issue of whether or not private individuals may acquire
vested right of ownership over the island, considering that they have been in open and continued
possession for several years. With such factual antecedents, this Court adjudicated that Boracay is
classified as a public land, in particular, a forest land, thus:
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain
prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public forest under PD No. 705.
The DENR 109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority certify that Boracay Island
is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as public
forest. Section 3 (a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public domain which
has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination of which lands are
needed for forest purpose and which are not". Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including
those in Boracay Island, are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles
already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to be out
of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of its forest
cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for local and
foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the island;
that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of Proclamation
No. 1064 will destroy the island's tourism industry, do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public
domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks", do not necessarily refer to
large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes. The
discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest
land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers.
"Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as
forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released
in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of
the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. At any rate, the
Court is tasked to determine the legal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout.
Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial
establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However, private claimants
argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist
zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an agricultural
land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The
reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands" and "areas declared as alienable and disposable" does
not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only
to private lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas in
public lands are declared forest reserves.
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the island
can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5
of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Development's authority to declare areas in the
island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay Island
as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as alienable and
disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did
in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.
The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, coves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist zone and
marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the public and
private sectors in the development of the areas' tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance
in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for
tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas' alienability.
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas, Port
Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and
surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few.
If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private
disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable and opened
the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141 provide that it is only the President, upon
the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the
public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the Office
of the President. Courts have no authority to do so. Absent such classification, the land remains
unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96 hectares
of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each side of the
center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form part of the area
reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants' argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through Proclamation
No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing vested rights.18
Therefore, the island, being owned by the State, can only be declared or made subject of private
ownership by the Government. And only the Government can determine the manner in which the island
should be disposed of or conveyed to private individuals, pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine as this Court
ruled in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap:19
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is
the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.20 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.21
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the
State.22 Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by
grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.23 Necessarily, it is up to the State to
determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as
the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be
the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege,
not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary
acts of ownership.24
It was only in 2006 when certain parts of Boracay became agricultural land when then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064, positively declaring parts of Boracay as alienable and
opening the same to private ownership.
As such, the CA is then correct in ruling that with this Court's pronouncement that Boracay is state-
owned, petitioners' claim of ownership over the subject property is negated, thus:
With the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court of Boracay as state-owned, private respondent's
ownership over the property in dispute is defeated. As discussed at length by the highest tribunal in the
consolidated cases of The Secretary of DENR, et al. v. Yap, et al. in G.R. No. 167707 and Sacay, et al. v.
The Secretary of DENR, et al. in G.R. No. 173775, Boracay is an unclassified land of public domain. Thus,
where land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter how long cannot confer
ownership or possessory right.
It follows then that Asicio (sic) S. Tupas was not in a position to sell that which he did not own in the first
place. This is because at the time the sale was entered into between private respondent and the late
Asicio (sic) S. Tupas, the land in dispute was not alienable and subject to disposition. Since private
respondent derives title from whatever right his predecessor-in-interest had, which unfortunately Asicio
(sic) S. Tupas had none, his claim is no longer tenable. Private respondent cannot acquire a right greater
than what his predecessor-in-interest had. To allow the execution of judgment would be to give undue
advantage to private respondent whose very basis of claim is no longer tenable.25cralawred
The above reasoning of the CA has its basis on a simple logic that one cannot dispose of a thing he does
not own. In this case, at the time of the sale of the subject property, the late Asiclo S. Tupas had no right
to sell a property that has not been declared alienable by the State; hence, he cannot pass unto another
any right or title to own or possess the land. Therefore, the "Sale of Unregistered Land" entered into
between the late Asiclo S. Tupas and the late Zosimo Maravilla on February 8, 1975, previously
considered valid and legitimate and became the basis used by the RTC to settle the dispute between the
parties as to who has the better to right to the property, has become null and void because the subject
property of the contract is a forest land and cannot be alienated at the time the said deed of sale was
executed. Article 1347 of the Civil Code provides that only things, which are not outside the commerce of
man, including future things, may be the objects of the contracts and Article 1409 of the Civil Code also
states that contracts whose objects are outside the commerce of man are non-existent and void ab
initio.
With the above disquisitions, this Court's decision in The Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR), et al. v. Yap, et al. and Sacay, et al. v. the Secretary of the DENR, et al. is,
therefore, considered as a supervening event that can stay the execution of a judgment that has already
attained finality. In Abrigo, et al. v. Flores, et al.26 this Court ruled that:
Once a judgment becomes immutable and unalterable by virtue of its finality, its execution should follow
as a matter of course. A supervening event, to be sufficient to stay or stop the execution, must alter or
modify the situation of the parties under the decision as to render the execution inequitable, impossible,
or unfair. The supervening event cannot rest on unproved or uncertain facts.
xxxx
We deem it highly relevant to point out that a supervening event is an exception to the execution as a
matter of right of a final and immutable judgment rule, only if it directly affects the matter already
litigated and settled, or substantially changes the rights or relations of the parties therein as to render
the execution unjust, impossible or inequitable.27 A supervening event consists of facts that transpire
after the judgment became final and executory, or of new circumstances that develop after the
judgment attained finality, including matters that the parties were not aware of prior to or during the
trial because such matters were not yet in existence at that time.28 In that event, the interested party
may properly seek the stay of execution or the quashal of the writ of execution,29 or he may move the
court to modify or alter the judgment in order to harmonize it with justice and the supervening
event.30 The party who alleges a supervening event to stay the execution should necessarily establish
the facts by competent evidence; otherwise, it would become all too easy to frustrate the conclusive
effects of a final and immutable judgment.31
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court dated May 25,
2010 of petitioners heirs of Zosimo Q. Maravilla is DENIED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Decision
dated November 11, 2009 and the Resolution dated March 17, 2010 of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
14. G.R. No. 186487, August 15, 2011 ]
ROSITO BAGUNU, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES FRANCISCO AGGABAO & ROSENDA ACERIT, RESPONDENTS.
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration[1] filed by Rosito Bagunu (petitioner) to reverse our April 13,
2009 Resolution[2] which denied his petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
R.L.O. Claim No. 937/DENR Case No. 5177
The present controversy stemmed from a protest filed by the spouses Francisco Aggabao and Rosenda
Acerit (respondents) against the petitioner's free patent application over a parcel of unregistered land
located in Caniogan, Sto. Tomas, Isabela (subject land), pending before the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Region II, Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (DENR Regional Office).
The subject land was previously owned by Marcos Binag, who later sold it (first sale) to Felicisimo
Bautista (Bautista). In 1959, Bautista, in turn, sold the subject land (second sale) to Atty. Samson Binag.
On December 12, 1961, Atty. Binag applied for a free patent[3] over the subject land with the Bureau of
Lands (now Lands Management Bureau).[4] On November 24, 1987, Atty. Binag sold the subject land
(third sale) to the petitioner,[5] who substituted for Atty. Binag as the free patent applicant. The parties'
deed of sale states that the land sold to the petitioner is the same lot subject of Atty. Binag's pending
free patent application.[6]
The deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land, the Bureau of Lands' survey,[7] and the free
patent applications uniformly identified the subject land as Lot 322. The deeds covering the second and
third sale also uniformly identified the boundaries of the subject land.[8]
On December 28, 1992, the respondents filed a protest against the petitioner's free patent application.
The respondents asserted ownership over Lot 322 based on the Deeds of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Sale, dated June 23, 1971 and April 15, 1979, executed in their favor by the heirs of one Rafael
Bautista.[9]
The Office of the Regional Executive Director of the DENR conducted an ocular inspection and formal
investigation. The DENR Regional Office found out that the petitioner actually occupies and cultivates
"the area in dispute including the area purchased by [the respondents]."[10]
On July 10, 1998, the DENR Regional Office ruled that the petitioner wrongfully included Lot 322 in his
free patent application since this lot belongs to the respondents. The DENR Regional Office ordered:
[The respondents to] file their appropriate public land application covering Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D xxx;
[The petitioner's free patent application] be amended by excluding Lot No. 322, Pls-541-D, as included in
Lot No. 258;
[A] relocation survey xxx to determine the exact area as indicated in [the parties'] respective technical
description of x x x Lot Nos. 258 and 322, Pls-541-D.[11]
The petitioner moved for reconsideration. The DENR Regional Office denied the motion ruling that in
determining the identity of a lot, the boundaries and not the lot number assigned to it - are controlling.
Since the boundaries indicated in the deed of sale in the petitioner's favor correspond to the boundaries
of Lot 258, what the petitioner acquired was Lot 258, notwithstanding the erroneous description of the
lot sold as Lot 322.[12]
On appeal, the DENR Secretary affirmed[13] the ruling of the DENR Regional Office. After noting the
differences in the boundaries stated in the parties' respective Deeds of Sale, the DENR Secretary
concluded that the land claimed by the petitioner is, in fact, distinct from that claimed by the
respondents. The DENR Secretary ruled that based on the parties' respective deeds of sale, the
Subdivision Plan of the lot sold to the petitioner and Atty. Binag's affidavit - claiming that the designation
of Lot 322 in the Deed of Sale in the petitioner's favor is erroneous - what the petitioner really acquired
was Lot 258 and not Lot 322.[14] The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

COURT OF APPEALS' RULING
The CA affirmed the ruling of the DENR Secretary. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the CA
ruled that since questions on the identity of a land require a technical determination by the appropriate
administrative body, the findings of fact of the DENR Regional Office, as affirmed by the DENR Secretary,
are entitled to great respect, if not finality.[15] The petitioner assails this ruling before the Court.
Civil Case No. 751
In the meantime, on November 22, 1994 (or during the pendency of the respondents' protest), Atty.
Binag filed a complaint for reformation of instruments, covering the second and third sale, against
Bautista and the petitioner (the civil case) with the Cabagan, Isabela Regional Trial Court (RTC). Atty.
Binag alleged that while the deeds evidencing the successive sale of the subject land correctly identified
the boundaries of the land sold, the deeds, nevertheless, erroneously identified the subject land as Lot
322, instead of Lot 258.[16]
On December 9, 1994, the petitioner and Bautista filed a motion to dismiss with the RTC, citing the
pendency of the land protest before the Bureau of Lands. The RTC held in abeyance its resolution on the
motion to dismiss.[17]
After obtaining a favorable ruling from the DENR Regional Office, the respondents joined Atty. Binag in
the civil case by filing a complaint-in-intervention against the petitioner. The complaint-in-intervention
captioned the respondents' causes of action as one for Quieting of Title, Reivindicacion and
Damages.[18] The respondents alleged that the petitioner's claim over Lot 322 is a cloud on their title
and ownership of Lot 322. The respondents also alleged that they were in peaceful, continuous, public
and adverse possession of Lot 322 from the time they fully acquired it in 1979 until sometime in August
of 1992, when the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, ejected them from Lot 322 after transferring
his possession from Lot 258.[19] The respondents asked the RTC to declare them as owners of Lot 322.
After the CA affirmed the DENR Secretary's favorable resolution on the respondents' protest, the
respondents asked the RTC to suspend the civil case or, alternatively, to adopt the DENR Secretary's
ruling.[20] In their prayer, the respondents asked the RTC to:
[Adopt] the findings of the DENR as affirmed by the Court of Appeals xxx thus, the cause of action xxx for
reformation of contracts be granted;
[Order the petitioner] to vacate Lot 322 xxx and his [Free Patent Application] be amended to exclude Lot
322 xxx.
[Set the case] for hearing to receive evidence on the claim of the [respondents] for damages[.]
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in affirming the DENR Secretary's jurisdiction to resolve the
parties' conflicting claims ofownership over Lot 322, notwithstanding that the same issue is pending with
the RTC. By ruling that the petitioner bought Lot 258 (and not Lot 322) from Atty. Binag and for
adjudicating Lot 322 to the respondents, the DENR effectively reformed contracts and determined claims
of ownership over a real property matters beyond the DENR's competence to determine.
The petitioner faults the CA for applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction since the issue of who has a
better right over Lot 322 does not involve the "specialized technical expertise" of the DENR. On the
contrary, the issue involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence and the application of
the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are matters within the competence of the courts.
The petitioner claims that the DENR Secretary's factual finding, as affirmed by the CA, is contrary to the
evidence. The petitioner asserts that the Deed of Sale in his favor clearly identified the property sold as
Lot 322, which was the same land Atty. Binag identified in his free patent application; that the area of Lot
322, as previously determined in a survey caused by the vendor himself (Atty. Binag), tallies with the
area stated in the deed in his favor; that he has been in possession of Lot 322 since 1987, when it was
sold to him; and that his present possession and cultivation of Lot 322 were confirmed by the DENR
Regional Office during its ocular investigation.
The petitioner also invites our attention to the incredulity of the respondents' claim of ownership over
Lot 322, based on Atty. Binag's testimony during the hearing on the respondents' protest. According to
the petitioner, the respondents could not have expressed interest in buying Lot 322 from Atty. Binag had
they already acquired Lot 322 from the heirs of one Rafael Bautista. The petitioner adds that as early as
1979, the respondents were already aware of Atty. Binag's free patent application over Lot 322. Yet, they
filed their protest to the free patent application only in 1992 when the petitioner had already substituted
Atty. Binag. The petitioner claims that the respondents' inaction is inconsistent with their claim of
ownership.
Lastly, the petitioner contests the adjudication of Lot 322 in the respondents' favor by claiming that the
respondents presented no sufficient evidence to prove their (or their predecessor-in-interest's) title.
In our April 13, 2009 Resolution, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible
error in the assailed CA Decision and for raising substantially factual issues. The petitioner moved for
reconsideration, confining his arguments to the issue of jurisdiction and the consequent applicability of
the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
THE RULING
We deny the motion for reconsideration.
Questions of fact generally barred under Rule 45
The main thrust of the petitioner's arguments refers to the alleged error of the DENR and the CA
in identifying the parcel of land that the petitioner bought an error that adversely affected his right to
apply for a free patent over the subject land. In his motion for reconsideration, the petitioner apparently
took a cue from our April 13, 2009 Resolution, denying his petition, since his present motion limitedly
argues against the DENR's jurisdiction and the CA's application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The petitioner correctly recognized the settled rule that questions of fact are generally barred under a
Rule 45 petition. In the present case, the identity of Lots 258 and 322 is a central factual issue. The
determination of the identity of these lots involves the task of delineating their actual boundaries in
accordance with the parties' respective deeds of sale and survey plan, among others. While there are
instances where the Court departs from the general rule on the reviewable issues under Rule 45, the
petitioner did not even attempt to show that his case falls within the recognized exceptions.[21] On top
of this legal reality, the findings and decision of the Director of Lands[22] on questions of fact, when
approved by the DENR Secretary, are generally conclusive on the courts,[23] and even on this Court,
when these factual findings are affirmed by the appellate court. We shall consequently confine our
discussions to the petitioner's twin legal issues.
The determination of the identity of a
public land is within the DENR's exclusive
jurisdiction to manage and dispose of lands
of the public domain
The petitioner insists that under the law[24] actions incapable of pecuniary estimation, to which a suit
for reformation of contracts belong, and those involving ownership of real property fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Since these actions are already pending before the RTC,
the DENR Secretary overstepped his authority in excluding Lot 322 from the petitioner's free patent
application and ordering the respondents to apply for a free patent over the same lot.
In an action for reformation of contract, the court determines whether the parties' written agreement
reflects their true intention.[25]In the present case, this intention refers to the identity of the land
covered by the second and third sale. On the other hand, in a reivindicatory action, the court resolves
the issue of ownership of real property and the plaintiff's entitlement to recover its full possession. In
this action, the plaintiff is required to prove not only his ownership, but also the identity of the real
property he seeks to recover.[26]
While these actions ordinarily fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, the court's jurisdiction to
resolve controversies involving ownership of real property extends only to private lands. In the present
case, neither party has asserted private ownership over Lot 322. The respondents acknowledged the
public character of Lot 322 by mainly relying on the administrative findings of the DENR in their
complaint-in-intervention, instead of asserting their own private ownership of the property. For his part,
the petitioner's act of applying for a free patent with the Bureau of Lands is an acknowledgment that the
land covered by his application is a public land[27] whose management and disposition belong to the
DENR Secretary, with the assistance of the Bureau of Lands. Section 4, Chapter 1, Title XIV of Executive
Order No. 292[28] reads:
Section 4. Powers and Functions. - The Department [of Environment and Natural Resources] shall:
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public lands, mineral
resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate taxes, fees, charges, rentals
and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the exploration, development, utilization or
gathering of such resources;
xxx
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification, surveying and titling
of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies[.] (Underscoring supplied.)
Under Section 14(f) of Executive Order No. 192,[29] the Director of the Lands Management Bureau has
the duty, among others, to assist the DENR Secretary in carrying out the provisions of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141)[30] by having direct executive control of the survey, classification, lease, sale
or any other forms of concession or disposition and management of the lands of the public domain.
As the CA correctly pointed out, the present case stemmed from the protest filed by the respondents
against the petitioner's free patent application. In resolving this protest, the DENR, through the Bureau
of Lands, had to resolve the issue of identity of the lot claimed by both parties. This issue of identity of
the land requires a technical determination by the Bureau of Lands, as the administrative agency with
direct control over the disposition and management of lands of the public domain. The DENR, on the
other hand, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to manage and dispose of public lands, must likewise
determine the applicant's entitlement (or lack of it) to a free patent. (Incidentally, the DENR Regional
Office still has to determine the respondents' entitlement to the issuance of a free patent[31] in their
favor since it merely ordered the exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner's own application.) Thus, it is
the DENR which determines the respective rights of rival claimants to alienable and disposable public
lands; courts have no jurisdiction to intrude on matters properly falling within the powers of the DENR
Secretary and the Director of Lands,[32] unless grave abuse of discretion exists.
After the DENR assumed jurisdiction over Lot 322, pursuant to its mandate, the RTC must defer the
exercise of its jurisdiction on related issues on the same matter properly within its jurisdiction,[33] such
as the distinct cause of action for reformation of contracts involving the same property. Note that the
contracts refer to the same property, identified as "Lot 322," - which the DENR Regional Office, DENR
Secretary and the CA found to actually pertain to Lot 258. When an administrative agency or body is
conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to the subject matter pertaining to its
specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction since the law does not sanction a split of
jurisdiction[34]
The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil
Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now
performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial
function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of
regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.[35]
The DENR has primary jurisdiction to
resolve conflicting claims of title over
public lands
The petitioner argues that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, claiming that the
issue (of who has a better right over Lot 322) does not require the "specialized technical expertise" of
the DENR. He posits that the issue, in fact, involves interpretation of contracts, appreciation of evidence
and application of the pertinent Civil Code provisions, which are all within the competence of regular
courts.
We disagree.
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts must refrain from determining a controversy involving
a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to its resolution by the
latter, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact[36]
In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply [the doctrine of primary jurisdiction] to
cases involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies[. It may occur
that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter
involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters
or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.] It applies "where a claim is originally
cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution
of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view."[37]
The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the
case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of [the Lands
Management Bureau] are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.[38] (Emphases added.)
The resolution of conflicting claims of ownership over real property is within the regular courts' area of
competence and, concededly, this issue is judicial in character. However, regular courts would have no
power to conclusively resolve this issue of ownership given the public character of the land, since under
C.A. No. 141, in relation to Executive Order No. 192,[39] the disposition and management of public lands
fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Director of Lands, subject to review by the DENR
Secretary.[40]
While the powers given to the DENR, through the Bureau of Lands, to alienate and dispose of public land
do not divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants or applicants
(to protect their respective possessions and occupations),[41] the respondents' complaint-in-
intervention does not simply raise the issue of possession whether de jure or de facto but likewise raised
the issue of ownership as basis to recover possession. Particularly, the respondents prayed for
declaration of ownership of Lot 322. Ineluctably, the RTC would have to defer its ruling on the
respondents' reivindicatory action pending final determination by the DENR, through the Lands
Management Bureau, of the respondents' entitlement to a free patent, following the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.
Undoubtedly, the DENR Secretary's exclusion of Lot 322 from the petitioner's free patent application and
his consequent directive for the respondents to apply for the same lot are within the DENR Secretary's
exercise of sound administrative discretion. In the oft-cited case of Vicente Villaflor, etc. v. CA, et
al,[42] which involves the decisions of the Director of Lands and the then Minister of Natural Resources,
we stressed that the rationale underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies to questions on the
identity of the disputed public land since this matter requires a technical determination by the Bureau of
Lands. Since this issue precludes prior judicial determination, the courts must stand aside even when
they apparently have statutory power to proceed, in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of the
administrative agency.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the motion for reconsideration. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
15. GR No. 172678, Mar 23, 2011 ]
SEA LION FISHING CORPORATION v. PEOPLE +
FACTS: In response to fishermen's report of poaching off Mangsee Island in Balabac, Palawan, a
combined team of Philippine Marines, Coast Guard and barangay officials conducted search and seizure
operations therein. There they found F/V Sea Lion anchored three nautical miles northwest of Mangsee
Island. Beside it were five boats and a long fishing net already spread over the water. The team boarded
the vessel and apprehended her captain, a Filipino, and a crew composed of three Filipinos and three
Chinese. Also arrested were 17 Chinese fishermen aboard F/V Sea Lion. The Provincial Prosecutor of
Palawan dismissed the charges except those against the 17 Chinese fishermen. This was after it was
found out that the crew of F/V Sea Lion did not assent to the illegal acts of said 17 Chinese fishermen
who were rescued by the crew of the F/V Sea Lion from a distressed Chinese vessel. The prosecutor
concluded that the crew, unarmed, outnumbered and hampered by language barrier, acted only out of
uncontrollable fear of imminent danger to their lives and property which hindered them from asserting
their authority over these Chinese nationals. With the crew of F/V Sea Lion now exculpated, F/V Sea Lion
was thus, recommended to be released to the petitioner upon proper showing of evidence of its
ownership of the aforesaid vessel. Petitioner, however, failed to act in accordance with said Resolutions.
The Seventeen (17) accused were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals for the crime of
Violation of Section 88, sub-par. (3) of R.A. 8550 and sentenced them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE
(5) YEARS TO SIX (6) YEARS, SIX (6) MONTHS AND SEVEN (7) DAYS. The Fishing Vessel F/V Sea Lion I as
well as the fishing paraphernalia and equipments used by the accused in committing the crime was
ordered confiscated in favor of the government. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration to
delete from said Sentences the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion but was denied by RTC and CA, thus this
petitioner was filed. Petitioner contends that F/V Sea Lion should be released to it because it is the
registered owner of said vessel and her captain and crew members were not among those accused of
and convicted invoking Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code. The OSG contends that even if Article 45 of
the Revised Penal Code is applicable, still the present petition must fail due to petitioner's failure to
present its third-party claim at the earliest opportunity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the confiscation of F/V Sea Lion was valid.
HELD: YES. The petition has no merit. The CA did not find either lack or error of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. There was no jurisdictional error because based on the Informations, the offenses
were committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. The penalties imposable under the
law were also within its jurisdiction. As a necessary consequence, the trial court had the authority to
determine how the subject fishing vessel should be disposed of. Likewise, no grave abuse of discretion
attended the issuance of the trial court's order to confiscate F/V Sea Lion considering the absence of
evidence showing that said vessel is owned by a third party. Evidently, the remedial relief pursued by the
petitioner was infirm and improper. Significantly, the lack of any factual basis for the third-party claim of
ownership was not cured at all when the petitioner filed its motion for reconsideration before the trial
court. At that point, evidence should have been adduced to support the petitioner's claim (so that a new
trial or reopening of the trial on the confiscation aspect should have been prayed for, rather than a mere
motion for reconsideration.) There is firstly the factual issue - to be proved by proper evidence in order
to be properly considered by the court - that the vessel is owned by a third party other than the accused.
Article 45 required too that proof be adduced that the third party is not liable for the offense. After the
admission by the accused through their guilty plea that the vessel had been used in the commission of a
crime, we believe and so hold that this additional Article 45 requirement cannot be simply inferred from
the mere fact that the alleged owner is not charged in the same case before the court. Given the
absence of any admissible evidence of third-party ownership and the failure to comply with the
additional Article 45 requirement, the court's order to confiscate the F/V Sea Lion pursuant to Article 87
of R.A. No. 8550 cannot be incorrect to the point of being an act in grave abuse of discretion.
16. [ AM No. RTJ-15-2423, Jan 11, 2017 ]
SANTIAGO D. ORTEGA v. JUDGE ROGELIO LL. DACARA +
Facts:
Ortega filed a complaint of gross negligence and gross ignorance of the law against Judge Dacara when
he denied his application for writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against BFAR RO V. He stated that
the judge did not know the difference between writ of preliminary injunction and writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction. Dacara in his decision stated that Ortega did not present any evidence for the
need to be protected, that the trial court is prohibited to issue preliminary injunction according to P.D.
605 and that his court has no jurisdiction since the defendants are in Pili Camarines Sur.
Issue:
Was Dacara correct in his decision to not issue the writ of preliminary injunction
Ruling:
Dacara is correct in stating that he is prohibited from issuing a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction
in accordance with sec. 1 of P.D. No. 605. The SC also stated that in order for a judge to be rendered
liable in his mistake in the exercise of his adjudicative functions there must be fraud, malice or bad faith
on his part. In this case there was no evidence to prove that Dacara committed bad faith.
17. GR No. 206510, Sep 16, 2014 ]
MOST REV. PEDRO D. ARIGO v. SCOTT H. SWIFT +
Facts:
In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine
habitat of which entry and certain human activities are prevented and afforded protection by a
Philippine law. The grounding incident prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan
with TEPO from the SC.
Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy. As
petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity from suit between US
and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.
Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian
violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology since these events caused and
continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect other provinces surrounding
the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from damages, they sought a directive from the SC for the institution of civil,
administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in violation of environmental laws and regulations in
connection with the grounding incident. They also prayed for the annulment of some VFA provisions for
being unconstitutional.
Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA
No. The general rule on states immunity from suit applies in this case.
First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special
civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners claim, the US
government could not be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy
who have control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the satisfaction of any
judgment against these officials would require remedial actions and the appropriation of funds by the US
government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity in
correlation with the principle of States as sovereign equals par in parem non habet non imperium
bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the court over their persons.
Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the Tubbataha Reefs
Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident under the customary
laws of navigation.
The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA 10067
and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the
UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the
rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latters internal waters and the
territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on the traditional uses of the oceans, which is
codified in UNCLOS.
As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was
centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such has nothing to do with the acceptance by
the US of customary international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)
Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected of the US to
bear international responsibility under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which
adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. ##
Other Issues
Claim for Damages Caused by Violation of Environmental Laws Must be Filed Separately
The invocation of US federal tort laws and even common law is improper considering that it is the VFA
which governs disputes involving US military ships and crew navigating Philippine waters in pursuance of
the objectives of the agreement.
As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to
special civil actions. Since jurisdiction cannot be had over the respondents for being immuned from suit,
there is no way damages which resulted from violation of environmental laws could be awarded to
petitioners.
In any case, the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan provides that a criminal case against a person charged with a
violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately. Hence, a ruling on the application or non-
application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to a US personnel who may be found
responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan.
Challenging the Constitutionality of a Treaty Via a Petition for the Issuance of Writ of Kalikasan is Not
Proper
The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the US as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the US government. The VFA being a valid
and binding agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its terms
and provisions. A petition under the Rules on Writ of Kalikasan is not the proper remedy to assail the
constitutionality of its provisions.
Relevant Laws and Jurisprudence
States Immunity from Suit Extends to its Officials (Garcia vs Chief of Staff, 1966)
Exception to the Doctrine of States Immunity from Suit (Shauf vs CA, 1990)
Article 30, UNCLOS: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
Article 31, UNCLOS: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes
18. GR No. 223076, Sep 13, 2016 ]
PILAR CAEDA BRAGA v. JOSEPH EMILIO A. ABAYA +
BRION, J.:
This is an Urgent Petition for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary environmental protection order (TEPO). The petition is directed against the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and the Philippine Ports Authority's (PPA)
modernization project: the Davao Sasa Wharf (the project), a 30-year concession to develop, operate,
and manage the port under the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) scheme.
The project is allegedly being carried out without the necessary Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) or Environmental Impact Statements required under Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1586[1] and
P.D. 1151.[2] The project also allegedly failed to conduct local consultation and to secure
prior sanggunian approval as required by the Local Government Code.[3]
The Facts
The Port of Davao is a seaport located in Mindanao. It is compose of several ports, all within the gulf of
Davao, but its base port is the Sasa Wharf located at Barangay Sasa, Davao City.
In 2011, the Sasa Wharf was pegged for privatization under the PPP scheme.
In 2012, the PPA commissioned a feasibility study (PPA study) on the current condition of the Sasa Wharf
and its potential new targets in volume increase expansion. The study, which was completed in 2012,
was conducted by Science & Vision For Technology, Inc.
The PPA study estimated that the modernization project would cost an estimated 3.5 Billion pesos for
the purchase of new equipment and the installation of new facilities.[4]
However, the DOTC commissioned another firm, Hamburg port Consultants, to conduct a second
feasibility study (DOTC study) which was concluded in 2013. The DOTC study has a projected cost of 18
billion pesos and requires the expansion of Sasa Wharf by 27.9 hectares.[5]
The DOTC study served as one of the primary considerations for current Sasa Wharf expansion project.
On December 21, 2014, the Regional Development Council for Region XI (the Council) endorsed the
project through Resolution No. 118 subject to the following conditions that must be met before its
implementation:[6]
The DOTC shall immediately secure the acquisition of 6.4 hectares of right of way, per recommendation
of the National Economic and Development Authority - Investment Coordination Committee (NEDA-ICC);
The DOTC shall ensure that appropriate compensation is paid to the owners of the properties to be
acquired as additional right of way;
The DOTC shall ensure the proper relocation/resettlement of the informal settlers affected by the
project; and
The DOTC shall ensure the project will also benefit the port users and the people of Davao by providing
better, more affordable service, and generating sustainable employment opportunities.[7]
On April 10, 2015, the DOTC published an invitation to pre-qualify and bid for the Project.[8]
On March 15, 2016, the petitioners - all stakeholders from Davao City and Samal, Davao del Norte - filed
this Urgent Petition for a Writ of Continuing Mandamus and/or Writ of Kalikasan.
The Petition
The petitioners allege: (1) that the DOTC issued the notice of public bidding despite noncompliance with
Resolution No. 118; (2) that the DOTC did not conduct prior consultation and public hearings nor secure
the approval of the sanggunian concerned as required under Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC; (3) that the
Davao City sanggunian had passed a resolution objecting to the project for its noncompliance with the
LGC; and (4) that the DOTC has not yet obtained an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) as
required under P.D. 1586.
They argue that the DOTC's implementation of the project - one that as a significant impact on the
environment - without preparing an Environmental Impact Statement, securing an ECC, or consulting the
affected stakeholders, violates their constitutional right to a healthy and balanced ecology.
The petitioners seek to restrain the implementation of the Project - including its bidding and award -
until the respondents secure an ECC and comply with the LGC.
The Counter-arguments
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), invoke the prematurity of the
petition. They argue that the Project is still in the bidding process; thus, there is still no proponent to
implement it.
The proponent not the respondents has the duty to initiate the Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) process and to apply for the issuance of the ECC.[9] Until the bidding process is concluded, the EIA
process cannot be undertaken and it would be premature to impute noncompliance with the
Environmental Impact Statement System.[10]
Moreover, consultation with the stakeholders and the local government is premature and speculative at
this point because the proponent has not yet identified the actual details of the project's
implementation. Again, compliance with the consultation requirements of the LGC remains premature
pending the award of the contract.
They further argue that the allegations do not warrant the issuance of a writ of kalikasan because the
petitioners failed to prove the threat of environmental damage of such magnitude as to prejudice the
life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces.[11]
Our Ruling
The petition is premature.
To better understand our judgment, we must first delve into the relevant laws and their progression over
time.
On June 6, 1977, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted P.D. 1151, the Philippine Environmental Policy. It
required all agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or
-controlled corporations (GOCCs), as well as private corporations, firms, and entities to prepare a
detailed Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for every project or undertaking that significantly affects
the quality of the environment.[12]
A year later on June 11, 1978, President Marcos issued P.D. 1586 which expounded on P.D. 1151 to
institutionalized a more comprehensive EIS System.[13] It introduced the ECC, a certificate issued by the
President his representative) to environmentally critical projects that have sufficient safeguards to
protect and preserve the environment. It also penalized th who violate the Environmental Impact
System, its implementing rules, or the conditions of their ECC.[14]
P.D. 1586 tasked the National Environmental Protection Council (the Council) to issue its implementing
rules and regulations (IRR). Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), a bureau under the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), absorbed these powers later on after the council was
abolished.[15]
In 1991, Congress enacted the LGC which promoted public participation by requiring national
government agencies to consult stakeholders before undertaking programs with significant ecological
impact.
In 1996, President Fidel V. Ramos mandated the continuous Strengthening of DENR's Environmental
Impact Assessment Capability.[16] He also required project proponents to conduct the environmental
impact study and the feasibility study of proposed projects simultaneously in order to maximize the use
of resources.[17]
In an effort to further rationalize the EIS System and streamline the CC application process, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo directed the DENR Secretary to issue new guidelines in 2002.[18]
Consequently, the DENR issued Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2003-30, the current IRR for the EIS
System.
Impact Assessment and the EIS System
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is the process of evaluating and predicting the likely impacts -
including cumulative impacts - of an undertaking on the environment.[19] Its goal is to prevent or
mitigate potential harm to the environment and to protect the welfare of the affected community. To
this end, the process requires proponents to truthfully and responsibly disclose all relevant information
on the project through the EIS. This facilitates meaningful and informed public participation that ensures
the project's social acceptability to the community.
The following are the key operating principles of the EIS System:
The EIS System is concerned primarily with assessing the direct and indirect impacts of a project on the
biophysical and human environment and ensuring that these impacts are addressed by appropriate
environmental protection and enhancement measures.
The EIS System aids proponents in incorporating environmental considerations in planning their projects
as well as in determining the environment's impact on their project.
Project proponents are responsible for determining and disclosing all relevant information necessary for
a methodical assessment of the environmental impacts of their projects;
The review of the EIS by EMB shall be guided by three general criteria: (1) that environmental
considerations are integrated into the overall project planning, (2) that the assessment is technically
sound and proposed environmental mitigation measures are effective, and (3) that, social acceptability is
based on informed public participation;
Effective regulatory review of the EIS depends largely on timely, full, and accurate disclosure of relevant
information by project proponents and other stakeholders in the EIA process;
The social acceptability of a project is a result of meaningful public participation, which shall be assessed
as part of the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) application, based on concerns related to the
project's environmental impacts;
The timelines prescribed by this Order, within which an Environmental Compliance Certificate must be
issued, or denied, apply only to processes and actions within the Environmental Management Bureau's
(EMB) control and do not include actions or activities that are the responsibility of the proponent.[20]
Projects or undertakings that pose a potential significant impact to the environment are required to
undergo impact assessment in order to secure ECCs.[21] The proponent initiates the application process
by filing a comprehensive EIS with the EMB. The EIS should at least have the following:
EIS Executive Summary;
Project Description;
Matrix of the scoping agreement identifying critical issues and concerns, as validated by EMB;
Baseline environmental conditions focusing on the sectors (and resources) most significantly affected by
the proposed action;
Impact assessment focused on significant environmental impacts (in relation to project
construction/commissioning, operation and decommissioning), taking into account cumulative impacts;
Environmental Risk Assessment if determined by EMB as necessary during scoping;
Environmental Management Program/Plan;
Supporting documents; including technical/socio-economic data used/generated; certificate of zoning
viability and municipal land use plan; and proof of consultation with stakeholders;
Proposals for Environmental Monitoring and Guarantee Funds including justification of amount, when
required;
Accountability statement of EIA consultants and the project proponent; and
Other clearances and documents that may be determined and agreed upon during scoping.[22]
The EIS contains a detailed project description of the nature, configuration, the raw materials/natural
resources to be used, production system, waste generation and control, timelines, and all other related
activities of the proposed project.[23] It also includes an Environmental Management Plan (EMP)
detailing the proponent's preventive, mitigating, compensatory, and contingent measures to enhance
the project's positive impacts and minimize ecological risks.[24]
Projects with potentially significant negative environmental impacts are further required to conduct
public consultations so that the environmental concerns of stakeholders are addressed in formulating
the EMP.[25]
The impact assessment concludes with EMB's approval (in the form of an ECC) or rejection (in the form
of a denial letter).[26] The ECC signifies that the proposed project will not cause
significant negative impact on the environment based on the proponent's representation. It also certifies
that the proponent has complied with the EIS System and has committed to implement its approved
EMP. Accordingly, the ECC contains the specific measures and conditions that the proponent must
undertake to mitigate the identified environmental impacts.
The duty to comply with the EIS System rests on the proponent.
The Sasa Wharf Modernization Project has the potential to significantly affect the quality of the
environment, putting it within the purview of the EIS System. However, (1) who is responsible for
preparing and filing the EIS and (2) when does this duty arise?
P.D. 1151 and P.D. 1586 requires all agencies and instrumentalities of national government, including
GOCCs, and private corporations, firms, and entities to file the EIS for every proposed project or
undertaking that significantly affects the quality of the environment.[27] Section 4 of P.D. 1151 reads:
Section 4. Environmental Impact Statements. Pursuant to the above enunciated policies and goals, all
agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, including government-owned or -controlled
corporations, as well as private corporations, firms, and entities shall prepare, file, and include in every
action, project, or undertaking which significantly affects the quality of the environment, a detailed
statement on:
(a) the environmental impact of the proposed action, project or undertaking;
(b) any adverse environmental effect which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented;
(c) alternative to the proposed action;
a determination that the short-term uses of the resources of the environment are consistent with
(d)
the maintenance and enhancement of the long-term productivity of the same; and
whenever a proposal involve the use of depletable or nonrenewable resources, a finding must be
(e)
made that such use and commitment are warranted.
Before an environmental impact statement is issued by a lead agency, all agencies having jurisdiction
over, or special expertise on the subject matter involved shall comment on the draft environmental
impact statement made by the lead agency within thirty (30) days from receipt of the same.[28]
On the other hand, P.D. 1586 states:
Section 2. Environmental Impact Statement System. There is hereby established an Environmental
Impact Statement System founded and based on the environmental impact statement required, under
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151, of all agencies and instrumentalities of the national
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations,
firms and entities, for every proposed project and undertaking which significantly affect the quality of
the environment.[29]
These provisions demonstrate the expansive scope of the EIS System. Unfortunately, they are
also ambiguous when it comes to identifying with particularity the responsible party in multilateral and
collaborative projects.
The IRR of the EIS System simply designates the responsible party as the proponent. Ordinarily, the
proponent is easy to identify - it is the natural or juridical person intending to implement the
project.[30] But who ane the proponents in PPP Projects which are a collaborative effort between the
government and the private sector?
Republic Act No. 6957[31] as amended by R.A. 7718, commonly known as the Build-Operate-Transfer
(BOT) Law, identifies the proponent in a PPP project as "the private sector entity which shall
have contractual responsibility for the project"[32]Accordingly, there is yet no project proponent
responsible for the EIS and the ECC until the bidding process has concluded and the contract has been
awarded.
Considering that the Project is still in the bidding stage, the petition or continuing mandamus to compel
the respondents to submit an EIS and secure an ECC is premature. It is also misplaced because the public
respondents DO NOT have the duty to submit the EIS or secure an ECC.
The LGC requires the lead agency to conduct local consultation and secure the approval of the concerned
sanggunian prior to the implementation of the project.
The issuance of the ECC does not exempt the project from ompliance with other relevant laws. The LGC,
in particular, requires the government agency authorizing the project to conduct local consultation and
kecure prior consent for ecologically impactful projects:
Section 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of Ecological Balance. - It shall be
the duty of every national agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation authorizing or
involved in the planning and implementation of any project or program that may cause pollution,
climatic change, depletion of nonrenewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland, or forest cover, and
extinction of animal or plant species, to consult with the local government units, nongovernmental
organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain the goals and objectives of the project or
program, its impact upon the people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or minimize the adverse effects thereof.
Section 27. Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government
authoritiesunless the consultations mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with,
and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided, That occupants in areas where
such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have been
provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.[33]
The duty to consult the concerned local government units and the stakeholders belongs to the national
government agency or GOCCauthorizing or involved in the planning and implementation of the project -
not the private sector proponent. In this case, this refers to the DOTC.
The LGC does not prohibit the agency from acting through a medium such as the project
proponent.[34] In fact, the required consultation under the LGC may overlap with the consultation
prescribed under the EIS System. Both are intended to measure a project's social acceptability and
secure the community's approval before the project's implementation.
However, the agency is responsible for ensuring that: (1) the concerned LGUs and stakeholders have
been thoroughly and truthfully informed of the objectives of the program and its ecological impact on
the community; so that (2) the community, through theirsanggunian, can intelligently give their approval
to socially acceptable projects and reject the unacceptable ones. These requirements must be complied
with befor the project is implemented.
But when does implementation begin?
The BOT Law defines the proponent as the private sector entity with the contractual responsibility over
the project.[35] The contract to a project is executed between the concerned agency and the winning
bidder within seven (7) days from the latter's receipt of the notice from the agency that all conditions
stated in the Notice of Award have been complied with.[36]
Upon the signing of the contract, the winning bidder becomes the project proponent. Within another 7
days from the date of approval or signing of the contract by the head of the Agency, the agency will
isjsue a "Notice to Commence Implementation" to the proponent.[37] Interestingly enough, even this
does not signal the start of the implementation stage.
Upon receipt of the Notice, the proponent is required to prepare detailed engineering designs and plans
based on the prescribed minimum design and performance standards and specifications in the
bid/tender documents.[38] The agency shall review the detailed engineering designs in terms of its
compliance with the prescribed standards and specification the designs are found acceptable, the agency
shall approve them incorporation in the contract to be signed by the proponent and the agency.[39]
The proponent shall construct the project based on the design and performance standards and
specifications in the detailed engineering design.[40] The signing of the finalized contract incorporating
the detailed engineering design is the reckoning point when implementation can begin. This is the start
of the Construction Stage.
The Sasa Wharf Modernization Project has not yet reached the construction stage. The bidding process
had not even been concluded when ithe present petition was filed. On this account, the petition is also
premature for the purpose of compelling the respondents to comply with Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC.
The purpose of a writ of continuing mandamus is to compel the espondent to perform his duties under
the law. This remedy is available When any government agency, instrumentality, or officer unlawfully
neglects a Specific legal duty in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental law,
rule, or regulation, or a right therein, unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of such
right and :here is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[41]
The writ cannot be resorted to when the respondent is not the person obliged to perform the duty under
the law (as is the case under the EIS System) or when the period for the respondent to perform its legal
duty has not yet expired (as is. the case with the consultation requirements of the LGC). Accordingly, we
cannot issue a writ of continuing mandamus.
The petition does not warrant a writ of Kalikasan.
Likewise, the Court cannot issue a writ of kalikasan based on the petition. The writ is a remedy to anyone
whose constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated or threatened with violation by
an lawful act or omission. However, the violation must involve environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or provinces in
order to arrant the issuance of the writ.[42]
The petitioners allege that the respondents have begun the process of transgressing their right to health
and a balanced ecology through the bidding process.[43] They cite The Competitiveness of Global Port-
Cities: Synthesis Report[44] to identify the four major negative impacts related to port operations: 1)
environmental impacts, 2) land use impacts, 3) traffic impacts, and 4) other impacts. The synthesis report
claims that most of these impacts affect the surrounding localities.
They claim that the environmental impacts of port operations "are within the field of air emissions,
water quality, soil, waste, biodiversity, noise and other impacts. These environmental impacts can have
consequences for the health of the population of the port city, especially the poorer parts of port
cities."[45]
The petitioners also cite Managing Impacts of Development in Coastal Zone, a joint publication of the
DENR, the Bureau of Fisheries Aquatic Resources (BFAR), the Department of the Interior and
Government (DILG), and the DENR Coastal Resource Management Project (CRMP) that identified the
effects of coastal construction and reclam including ports and offshore moorings.[46] The petition
alleges that:
According to Managing Impacts, "Coastal construction has been the most widespread of activities
affecting coastal resources" since "Any construction that modifies the shoreline will invariably change
currents, wave action, tidal fluctuations, and the transport of sediments along the coast" while "Coastal
construction that restricts the circulation of coastal water bodies can also degrade water quali[t]y and
coastal ecosystems."[47]
However, these allegations are insufficient to warrant a writ of kalikasan.
First, the petition failed to identify the particular threats from the Project itself. All it does is cite the
negative impacts of operating a port inside a city based on the Synthesis Report. However, these impacts
already exist because the Port of Davao has been operating since 1900. The Project is not for the
creation of a new port but the modernization of an existing one. At best, the allegations in support of the
application for the writ of kalikasan are hazy and speculative.
Second, the joint publication is titled Managing Impacts of Development in the Coastal Zone for a reason;
it identifies the potential environmental impacts and proposes mitigation measures to protest the
environment. The petition is misleading because it only identified the isks but neglected to mention the
existence and availability of mitigating measures.[48]
Moreover, this Court does not have the technical competence to ssess the Project, identify the
environmental threats, and weigh the sufficiency or insufficiency of any proposed mitigation measures.
This specialized competence is lodged in the DENR, who acts through the EMB In the EIA process. As we
have already established, the application of the EIS System is premature until a proponent is selected.
Further, we fail to see an environmental risk that threatens to prejudice the inhabitants of two or more
cities or municipalities if we do not estrain the conduct of the bidding process. The bidding process is not
equivalent to the implementation of the project. The bidding process itself 'annot conceivably cause any
environmental damage.
Finally, it is premature to conclude that the respondents violated the conditions of Resolution No. 118
issued by the Regional Development Council of Region XI. Notably, the Resolution requires compliance
before the implementation of the project. Again, the project has not yet reached the implementation
stage.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for its prematurity and lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
19. GR NO. 158290, Oct 23, 2006 ]
HILARION M. HENARES v. LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING +
Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accordwith the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Doctrines
The LTFRB and the DOTC cannot order owners of PUV to useCNG as an alternative to gasoline.
Mandamus is available onlyto compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as aduty. Here,
there is no law that mandates the respondentsLTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
useCNG.
Henares v. LTFRB
, GR 158290, October 23, 2006.
HENARES V. LTFRB
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamuscommanding respondents LTFRB and DOTC
to require PUVs touse compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.Asserting their right to clean air,
petitioners contend that thebases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order theLTFRB to require
PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie inSection 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in
Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749otherwise known as the "Philippine Clean
Air Act of 1999."
Issue: WON LTFRB CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIREPUVs TO USE CNG THROUGH A WRIT OF
MANDAMUS?
Held: NO. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitutionand the Clean Air Act in their prayer for
issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs touse CNG as an
alternative fuel. Although both are generalmandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind
of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of
CNG by public vehicles.Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural GasVehicle Program
for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect onFebruary 24, 2004. A thorough reading of the executive
order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment isbeing addressed. To a certain extent,
the instant petition hadbeen mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.
Regrettably, however, a writ of mandamus is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents
LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. Further, mandamus will not
generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither
is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be
preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides,
comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the
coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition.
In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology
with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice" in Oposa,
where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we
recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we
said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even
if the right is "assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, it is because of the well-founded fear
of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to
health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing
importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and
advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present
generation, but also for those to come."
It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on
the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on
air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these
pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring resort to drastic measures to reduce
air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to
pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the
writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more
properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental
problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken