To: Robin Earnest, Senior Attorney

From: Darius Brown, Law Student

Zachary Yale, Law Student

Re: Claim for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

___________________________________________________________

I. QUESTION PRESENTED [DB]

Is Lucas liable to Wideman in the tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress when a) W
invited family friend Lucas to view his new house over a friendly family dinner and she tweeted
and geotagged a congratulatory statement about his win in the Lucas v. Smith case; b) after W
had informed L he was having some anxiety about threats relating to his prosecution in that case;
W is now seeking therapy for anxiety and taking lexapro?
II. SHORT ANSWER [ZY]
No, Lucas is not liable. The decision in Vance. V. Vance provides the controlling law in
establishing a four prong test for establishing intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Wideman made no attempt to discourage Lucas from posting any of the photos to the internet,
relieving her of any prior knowledge claim. The simplistic nature of posting a photo is indicative
to the fact that Lucass behavior was neither extreme or outrageous. In addition, Mr. Wideman
displayed symptoms prior to Ms. Lucass actions making it difficult to make a case of causality.
Finally, Mr. Widemans alleged injuries are consistent with such a line of work and would be
inappropriate to consider as severe.
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS [ZY]
On June 13th 2016, Mr. Wideman invited Ms. Lucas into his home for a cordial visit and dinner.
In the weeks prior, Mr. Wideman had enjoyed some success in his work as an attorney
successfully securing a 35 year prison sentence for the somewhat notorious Lucious Smith Case.
Following dinner, the two families celebrated the time with some pictures. One of which
included Mr. Wideman and his family that they willingly and knowingly posed for, without
explicit instruction not to post such a photo online. Lucas decided to post this photo with an
endearing caption congratulating Mr. Wideman on his work with the Smith case to Twitter,
including with the picture a GEO tag.
Since this event, Mr. Wideman has expressed how unnerving this post has made him, especially
being the center of attention for a notorious case. While Mr. Wideman has not experienced any
threats directly related to the information given in the tweet, he fears for his and his familys
safety in light of the information going public. Mr. Wideman has even expressed he is seeing a
psychiatrist and taking medication to deal with the symptoms resulting from the stress he has
sustained. Mr. Wideman is intending to seek damages from what he interprets as reckless
behavior on the part of Ms. Lucas, which he claims has severely impacted his day to day life.
IV. DISCUSSION
 SOLOMON WIDEMAN LIKELY DOES NOT HAVE A CLAIM AGAINST
LAUREN LUCAS FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS.
Maryland courts first recognized the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED)
in Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611 (Md. 1977). Adopting the Restatement (Second) of Torts 46
(1965), Harris identified four elements necessary in order to succeed on a claim of IIED. These
elements include the following: 1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct
must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the wrongful
conduct and the emotional distress; (4) The emotional distress must be severe. 380 A.2d at 614.
Because all four elements can be met on the facts here, Wideman is unlikely to succeed on an
IIED claim against Lauren Lucas. The specific analysis of, and factual application to, each of
these elements is discussed in detail below.
A. Whether Lucas conduct was reckless? [ZY]
In determining what the court should consider to be reckless in reference to the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, Maryland has several relevant cases that help
establish the controlling law for this case. The most important case for establishing precedence
in Maryland for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is Harris v. Jones, 380
A.2d 611 (Md. 1977), this case set forth that in order for an action to be considered reckless
there must be prior knowledge that the action being taken has a high probability of inducing
distress. Another detrimental case in establishing controlling law for the first prong is Green v.
TA Shoemaker & Co. 111 Md. 69, 73 A. 688 - 1909. This case is vital to our argument as it
establishes an important precedence in the state of Maryland, in the absence of injury there
cannot be recovery from emotional distress. The last case we look to for guidance on this type
of tort in Maryland is Vance v. Vance, 408 A. 2d 728 - Md: Court of Appeals 1979, which
found that for an action to be considered extreme, that action must be so outrageous as to go
beyond all bounds of decency and be considered utterly intolerable by society. It is with these
precedents established hereto that we can begin to apply these rules to the current case.
In regards to applying the controlling cases to the case at hand, we can begin with establishing
relevance of Harris v. Jones and the idea of prior knowledge. In this case Ms. Lucas did have
prior knowledge of the case, and was even quick to congratulate Mr. Wideman on his success.
However, Ms. Lucas could not have foreseen her tweet causing Mr. Wideman emotional
distress. Ms. Lucas only thought that she was merely sharing her excitement for her friend with
her Twitter followers, which is essentially the entire point of social media. Next, we can apply
to the controlling law of Green v. TA Shoemaker & Co, which established that there cannot be a
claim for emotional distress in the absence of physical injury. In this case, Mr. Wideman began
seeing a psychiatrist for symptoms he claims manifested after Ms. Lucas tweet. While this is in
line with what is considered viable for reckless behavior according to Green, we can debunk
this potential counterargument with reference to the third prong of causality in the
counterargument subsection. Lastly, we apply the ruling of Vance v. Vance to the facts of this
case. Vance v. Vance helped set the ground rules for what can be considered reckless behavior,
the definition being, So outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community." In this case, the action of tweeting clearly does not satisfy the established
definition. Tweeting a picture, and even with the inclusion of a location, is in no means aligned
with the definition as it is a normal practice that all of society partakes in. Social media has
become so intertwined with our everyday lives, and to consider using these platforms as a
reckless action would establish a dangerous precedence where all social media use could be
interpreted as reckless. Thus, in this case the court is highly unlikely to consider that Ms. Lucas
actions were indeed reckless. With the base connections established between the controlling
cases and the case of Lucas v. Wideman, we can begin to analyze the similarities between the
cases that ensure the courts likelihood to rule in favor of Ms. Lucas.
In Harris v. Jones, the plaintiff had been suffering from a speech impediment which he was
extremely sensitive about. Despite this, the defendant continued to ridicule the plaintiff to the
point where the speech impediment worsened. Subsequently, the plaintiff made an unsuccessful
claim against the defendant for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Similarly, Ms. Lucas
was aware of the death threats that Mr. Wideman was receiving that were already causing him
emotional distress. However, similarly to Harris, Ms. Lucas actions were not intended to
contribute to the cause of the original emotional distress. Ms. Lucas actions in no way shape or
form intended to promote the kind of threats that Mr. Wideman was already receiving. It
follows then as in Harris v. Jones that Ms. Lucas actions cannot be considered reckless even
though she had prior knowledge of the situation rather than prior knowledge of the
consequences of her actions.
In reference to Green v. TA Shoemaker and CO., the defendant was conducting construction
near the plaintiff's house. The constant presence of loud noise from the ensuing explosions left
the plaintiff in constant fear for her life, which lead to her experiencing emotional stress and
filing suit. In this case, Mr. Wideman was in constant fear for his life from the death threats he
was experiencing from his successful trial. However in Green v. TA Shoemaker and CO. the
court ruled that there could not be a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress because
the plaintiff did not have any physical symptoms manifest from the emotional distress. On the
contrary, in the current case there was indeed a development of physical symptoms. Yet the
major differences in this case lies in when the emotional distress began. In the controlling case
the distress began immediately following the start of the construction work, and in the current
case the distress began before Ms. Lucas action. We will go into more detail on this in the
counterargument subsection that follows this one.
In Vance v. Vance, the plaintiff sued the defendant for emotional distress over the fact that there
marriage was technically never valid. In the controlling case, the court found in favor of the
defendant due to the fact that he could have never predicted that his actions could have resulted
in the emotional distress of the plaintiff, because the defendant could not have predicted that the
revelation of their invalid marriage would cause the plaintiff emotional distress. Similarly, in
Wideman v. Lucas, the defendant could not have predicted that her action would have caused
her friend so much emotional distress. The actions taken by Ms. Lucas were without intention
of causing emotional distress to Mr. Wideman, and without anticipation of causing emotional
distress. Thus, because Ms. Lucas could not have reasonably anticipated the emotional distress
resulting from her actions, she cannot be held liable in this instance
To conclude the first prong, it is important to revisit the potential counterargument established
in the Green v. TA Shoemaker and Co. case. As previously mentioned, this case established the
necessity for a physical symptom in order to justify a claim for emotional distress, such
symptoms were experienced by Mr. Wideman. However, unlike the controlling case, Mr.
Wideman was experiencing symptoms before Ms. Lucas ever tweeted the picture. It then
follows, according to the third prong of causality, that Mr. Wideman cannot use this in his case
for emotional distress. This would be the biggest threat to the first prong, yet when we compare
the facts across all prongs we see that this claim will prove ineffective to establish emotional
distress.
B. Whether Lucas conduct was extreme and outrageous? [DB]
In regards to the second prong Extreme and Outrageous conduct, Lucas conduct was well
within the boundaries of socially acceptable behavior in this day and age. The test for extreme
and outrageous conduct is set out in Harris v. Jones. There the court stated that extreme and
outrageous conduct can only be found when the conduct goes beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Here, Lucas conduct of tweeting and geotagging a picture of Wideman and his family, cannot
be constituted as outside the bounds of decency because Twitter is a modern day social media
service that people across the majority of society, have come to embrace and use. So much so
that most cell phones come with the capability to use twitter. As stated in Kentucky Fried
Chicken Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663 (1992), the conduct must be exceeding all bounds
usually tolerated by decent society. If these capabilities are built into every phone built today,
and people use these features frequently, then the mere use of these abilities cannot be extreme
and outrageous.
In Kentucky Fried Chicken Co. v. Weathersby, 326 Md. 663 (1992). Even in this instance, with
points of similarity, the court did not find the defendants actions as extreme and outrageous.
Another previous instance is in Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical, 106 Md. App. 470
(1995), where the conduct in question was Peninsula Regional Medical Centers firing of
Bagwell after hitting of a patient in reaction to claiming to being bit. The bar for extreme and
outrageous is set high by court in Harris v. Jones, as a means to avoid claims of IIED for mere
insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities. If extreme and
outrageous conduct wasnt found in these two cases, then the conduct in the case at hand has to
be deemed trivial in comparison them.
The conduct is still not extreme and outrageous, even if one were to argue that it was due to her
knowledge of Widemans worries regarding his work, referencing BN v. KK, 312 Md. 135
(1988). In BN v. KK, Dr. Ks knowledge and non-disclosure of his genital herpes to his at the
time sexual partner, Ms. N. This still does not constitute as extreme and outrageous conduct as
the court stated in Hamilton v. Ford Motor Credit Co, 66 Md. App. 46 (1986) though the
conduct was unquestionably rude, insensitive, callous, and in poor taste. It was not, however,
extreme and outrageous. Another route of argument to counter this notion is that Wideman
gave Lucas passive consent when he was made aware of the phones capabilities and still
decided to take the photo, review it, and allow Lucas to carry on. Overall, the prong of extreme
and outrageous conduct is unlikely to be satisfied.

C. Whether Widemans injuries were causally related to the conduct? [DB]

In order for the fourth tort causal connection to be met the facts need to show a causal
connection between the conduct of Lucas and the emotional distress Wideman claims to
experience. Harris v. Jones is the controlling case law as it establishes that causal connection
can not be found where there is a preexisting condition. Specifically in Harris v. Jones, William
R. Harris was an employee of General Motors Corporation that had a speech impediment that
caused him to stutter, which he was insecure about. In spite of having knowledge of Harris
insecurities regarding his disability, his supervisor, Robert Jones, ridiculed him consistently.
Harris alleged this lead to nervousness, worsening of his speech impediment, and injuring his
self-esteem. The court ultimately did not find in favor of Harris. Here the same should be
found as the true cause of Widemans distress did not stem from Lucas tweet but from his
career choice. At the dinner Wideman told Lucas that the Lucas v. Smith case he was working
on was extremely stressful because he was receiving death threats. So much so that he was
ready to change careers after the case was over. Two weeks later he is still in the same career
field and working back in the courtroom, where he states that he froze up. The emotional
distress that Wideman experienced predated the Lucass tweet, therefore making the condition
preexisting and not causally related.
Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490 (1979) displays an additional way in which a causal connection
cannot be found here. In Vance v. Vance, Arnold Vance (Dr. Vance) and Muriel Vance
(Muriel) took part in a religious marriage ceremony. After living with one another as husband
and wife for eighteen years and having two children, Dr. Vance left Muriel for another woman.
Muriel sought alimony and child support but Dr. Vance fought this decree by stating that their
marriage was void as he never divorced his first wife. Upon learning of this, Muriel alleged that
she became severely distressed, which lead her to seek damages on the claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Though the lower courts found in favor of Muriel, that decision
was reversed based on insufficient evidence of a causal connection. The courts reasoning
behind this decision was that the eighteen years of Dr. Vances misrepresentation of his marital
status was not in of itself the cause of Muriels distress. The court stated that there must have
been a subsequent revelation under circumstances such as deterioration of the marriage which
would prevent the situation from being remedied. Here, the circumstances are the same. For
two weeks Wideman did not have knowledge of Lucas tweet. Despite this lack of knowledge,
Wideman should have known that Lucas would tweet the picture they took together and geotag
it, as she told him of her new smartphones capabilities. The events at the dinner should have
gave Wideman a warning of the conduct to come similar to Muriel Vance, so causation cannot
be found here.
Even if the court should find that in spite of the time between the conduct and distress there was
a causal connection using precedence set in Reagan v. Rider, 70 Md. App. 503 (1987) where the
court stated that it was not a requirement for the distress to immediately follow the conduct
alleged of inciting it. This would be irrelevant as the true cause of Widemans distress did not
stem from Lucas tweet but from his career choice, and Wideman should have know from the
events at the dinner party that Lucas would tweet the photo. Therefore, a causal connection can
not be established, which means that Wideman will not succeed in proving this element of
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.
D. Whether WIdemans injuries were severe? [ZY]
The controlling cases for the prong of establishing severity begins with Harris v. Jones, 380
A.2d 611 (Md. 1977). Harris v. Jones established that in order for injuries resulting from
emotional distress to constitute as severe, that no reasonable man can be expected to endure it.
Another case that provides precedence for what constitutes severity is Leese v. Baltimore
County, 497 A. 2d 159 - Md: Court of Special Appeals 1985. According to this case, injuries
can only be considered severe if they are severely disabling. According to these established
definitions for severity, Mr. Widemans injuries would not hold up in court as being considered
severe.
Harris v. Jones is applicable to this case in that Mr. Wideman claims that the emotional distress
resulting from Ms. Lucas actions impacted his life. Yet the stress from Ms Lucas actions has
not kept Mr. Lucas from working or participating in his day to day life. The only change we see
from this stress is his participation of therapy and the addition of medication in his daily routine.
Clearly, Mr. Wideman has been able to function normally in society, and his new found
condition is far from unbearable. In reference to Leese v. Baltimore County, we see a similar
pattern emerge. Mr. Wideman has not experienced a drastic shift in lifestyle that would
constitute his emotional distress as severely disabling. When we apply the definitions from the
controlling cases to the facts of Wideman v. Lucas, neither definitions would define Mr.
Widemans condition as being severe. It is likely then, that the court would not be able to fulfill
the fourth prong of severity for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and would likely find
in favor of Ms. Lucas.
When we compare the specifics of Harris v. Jones to Wideman v. Lucas, we confirm that Mr.
Widemans condition is not sufficient to constitute a label of severe. As we mentioned in earlier
prongs, the plaintiff in Harris v. Jones suffered from a speech impediment. The plaintiff in this
case claimed that the actions of the defendant caused this condition to worsen, and filed suit for
emotional distress. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, citing that the worsening of a
preexisting condition was not enough to constitute severity. Similarly in Wideman v. Lucas, the
plaintiff was suffering from a preexisting condition resulting from the death threats that he was
receiving as a result of his recent success as a prosecutor. Ms. Lucas was not the cause of these
death threats and therefore the stress induced from them. Following the same logic of the
controlling case, Ms. Lucas cannot be liable if her actions merely worsened the stress Mr.
Wideman was already experiencing.
Leese v. Baltimore County also shares some similarities with Wideman. v. Lucas. In this
controlling case, the plaintiff claimed they were wrongly terminated from their job filing many
infractions including a suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, the court
found that the plaintiffs suit of this tort failed to meet the fourth prong for the test of severity.
A large part of the courts reasoning for this was that the plaintiff was still able to participate in
day to day life in the form of looking for a new job. In this case, Mr. Wideman was still able to
complete similar day to day activities despite claiming severe injury from the emotional distress
caused by Ms. Lucas tweet. It should then follow that the court will rule that Mr. Widemans
injuries could not be considered severe if they follow the same logic of the court in the
controlling case.
The only possible counterargument that could be made is that the emotional distress has lead to
Mr. Wideman considering leaving his job and moving his family. Luckily for our interests, the
court cannot make rulings based on intentions or inclinations and is unlikely to rule for Mr.
Wideman. Instead, the court will base its rulings off the facts that already exist including the
fact that Mr. Wideman has not been disabled so severely that he cannot participate in his day to
day life. Therefore, it is safe to say that the court will likely favor Ms. Lucas in its ruling.
E. Conclusion [ZY]
In conclusion, the court is likely to rule in favor of the defendant in the case of Wideman v.
Lucas. As we dissect each of the four prongs necessary to prove intentional infliction of
emotional distress, we find significant holes in each prong. If all four prongs are necessary to
constitute a valid suit, it is likely for the court to see the requirements for all prongs are absent.
This leads us to confidently believe that the court is likely to favor Ms. Lucas, with little chance
of the plaintiff being able to validate all four prongs of the test for intentional infliction of
emotional distress.