People vs Relova

FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the Philippines seeks to set
aside the orders of Respondent Judge Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed
against Mr. Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the petitioners motion for
reconsideration.. On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of BatangasElectric
Light System, equipped with a search warrant issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and
examine the premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one Manuel Opulencia.
They discovered electric wiring devices have been installed without authority from the city
government and architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said devices are
designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings ofelectric current consumption in the
plants electric meter. The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the complaint
was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should be 2months prior to discovery that the
act being a light felony and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another case
was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of Batangas for a violation of a
Batangas Ordinance regarding unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and
prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16. Before arraignment, Opulencia filed
a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is not
double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the accused was
unauthorized installation of electrical devices without the approval and necessary authority from
theCity Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the case was dismissed,
as opposed to the second offense which is theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised
Penal Code making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint against Mr.Opulencia.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense to the
second offense charged against him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of
electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense for the second offense
because as tediously explained in the case of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances
or kinds of double jeopardy. The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense and the second sentence states that If an act is punishable by
a law or an ordinance, the conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the same
act. In the case at bar, it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia will fall
on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein it contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. It further explains that even if the offensescharged are not the
same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an ordinance and the second charge
was a violation against the revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one
and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other thus making it against the logic of double jeopardy. The fact that Mr.
Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming
from the same identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
G.R. No. 110315 January 16, 1998

RENATO CUDIA, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON. CARLOS D. RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI, Angeles City, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing his petition and
finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a second information against him,
although a first information charging the same offense had been previously dismissed, over petitioner's
vigorous opposition.

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez, Mabalacat, 2 Pampanga,
by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was
brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo, Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation
was thereafter conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:

That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his
control one (1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live
ammunitions, which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary
authority and permit to carry the same.

ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 3 (Emphasis petitioner's.)

The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter the Angeles
City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charges.
During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the parties to the fact that, contrary to
the information, petitioner had committed the offense in Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City.
Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement among the judges of the Angeles City RTC as to
who would handle cases involving crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the
re-raffling of the case to a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of
the city. Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.

On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an information
charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the
Information, stating "that thru inadvertence and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into
hastily filing the Information in this case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in
connection with the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta.
Inez, Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga" 4and
that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a result of which two
separate informations for the same offense had been filed against petitioner. The latter filed his opposition
to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless, granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3,
1990.

On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the ground that his
continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which
he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had been dismissed despite his
opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash; hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, stating that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the
ground that the petition could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was
defective. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.

Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE

CITY PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO FILE THE FIRST INFORMATION.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE

FIRST JEOPARDY DID NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST
INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED WAS NOT VALID.

We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.

Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that "(n)o person shall be twice put in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense . . ." Pursuant to this provision, Section 7 of Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court provides in part that "(w)hen an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form
and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, . . . "

In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be
present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof. 5

In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to prove the
existence of the following:

(a) Court of competent jurisdiction

(b) Valid complaint or information

(c) Arraignment

(d) Valid plea

(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused. 6

It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded "not guilty"
therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay, over his opposition
even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the first two requisites have been
met.

As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction
to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of Appeals and the Solicitor
General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no
jurisdiction over the case. In the words of the Solicitor General:

The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court
of Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal
cases is jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo,
89 SCRA 699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any
one of the essential ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77).
Although both Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which
has jurisdiction to try offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was
arraigned before Branch 60, not Branch 56. 7

It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before it must be
resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its jurisdiction. Administrative
Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,
and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines, dated January 17,
1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to Twelve are hereby defined
as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

PAMPANGA

xxx xxx xxx

1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY and the
municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field U.S. Airbase.

xxx xxx xxx

Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.

Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs,
Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks in the doctrine that
jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any trial court.

With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of
Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the
Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation
to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987, pertinently provides that:

Sec. 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:

xxx xxx xxx

b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes,

misdemeanors and violations of all penal laws and ordinances within
their respective jurisdictions and have the necessary information or
complaint prepared or made against the persons accused. In the
conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the
sworn statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by
subpoena for the purpose.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied

It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare
informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information,
when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another. 8 It must be
exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone authorized by law. If not, the court does
not acquire jurisdiction. 9

Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor in
filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof. 10 As correctly pointed out by the Court of
Appeals, petitioner's plea to an information before he filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all
objections to it insofar as formal objections to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not
by express provision of the Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions, 11 questions relating to
want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed by a
competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court over the person of the
accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the accusation. In consonance with this view, an
infirmity in the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence,
acquiescence, or even by express consent. 12

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so defective in
form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained, its dismissal without the
consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the
dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy
does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily
dismissed by the prosecution. 13

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the
investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is an all too
familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or inadvertence of its officials
and employees. 14 To rule otherwise could very well result in setting felons free, deny proper protection to
the community, and give rise to the possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.

Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal, should
have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court, in Galvez vs. Court
of Appeals 15 has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also
quite plausible under the same provision that, instead of an amendment, an information may be
dismissed to give way to the filing of a new information.

In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition against
twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the simple reason that
the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first information meant that petitioner could
never have been convicted on the strength thereof.

As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the instant
petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

G.R. No. L-42925 January 31, 1977

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. RICARDO D. GALANO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII,
and GREGORIO SANTOS, respondents.

Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Hugo Nathanael P. de
Pano, Jr. and Trial Attorney Blesila O. Quintillan for petitioner.

Juanito M. Romano for respondent.

TEEHANKEE, J:

The Court sets aside the respondent judge's orders dismissing the information for estafa against
respondent accused, since the offense charged clearly has not prescribed. The complaint filed with
the Batangas court which expressly alleged commission of the offense within the municipality and
which pended for twelve years (the accused having jumped bail and evaded rearrest for nine years)
and which was eventually dismissed by said court for lack of territorial jurisdiction as a result of the
proof adduced before it properly interrupted and tolled the prescription period. Respondent judge
failed, in ruling otherwise, to apply the settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in
criminal cases by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof. The
case is ordered remanded for determination with the utmost dispatch, since this case has already
been pending for fifteen years owing to respondent accused's deplorable tactics. The undisputed
factual background of the case is succinctly stated by then Acting Solicitor General, now Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals, Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., thus:

1. On October 2,1962, a criminal complaint for estafa was filed in the municipal court
of Batangas, Batangas (now City Court of Batangas City) against the accused-
respondent Gregorio Santos by complainant, Juanito Limbo, ...

2. Gregorio Santos was arrested to answer for the above charge, and upon his
arrest, posted a bail bond for his provisional liberty. The accused was thereafter
 arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge. Then, the case was heard on its
merits. However, on September 16, 1964, the accused jumped bail. As a result, his
bail bond was forfeited and the case against him archived by the municipal court of
Batangas, Batangas.

3. It was not until September 14, 1973, about nine years later, when the accused was
re-arrested, and the trial of the said case resumed.

4. On October 21, 1974, while the said case was pending trial, private respondent
Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss the case on the ground that the Batangas
court did not have territorial jurisdiction over the case, the evidence showing that the
crime was committed in Manila.

5. Finding the motion meritorious, the Batangas City Court issued an order dated
November 5, 1974, dismissing the case against Gregorio Santos for lack of territorial
jurisdiction over the crime charged ...

6. On November 14, 1974, the complainant Juanito B. Limbo refiled the same case
against Gregorio Santos in the Fiscal's Office of Manila. A preliminary investigation
was conducted. On July 29, 1975, the corresponding information was filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 22397, ...

7. On November 12, 1975 the accused Gregorio Santos filed a motion to dismiss
criminal Case No. 22397 on the grounds of prescription and double jeopardy.

8. The prosecuting fiscal filed his opposition to said motion on December 2, 1975, to
which the accused filed a rejoinder on December 5, 1975.

9. On December 8, 1975, the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XIII, presided
over by the Honorable Ricardo D. Galano, issued an order dismissing Criminal Case
No. 22397 on the ground that the offense charged had already prescribed, ... The
prosecution moved for the reconsideration of said order but this was denied by the
lower court by order of January 7, 1976. ...

10. From the said Order of dismissal, the City Fiscal of Manila offenses provides:
interposed an appeal by certiorari to this Honorable Court on January 24, 1976. On
March 3, 1976, this honorable Court issued the Resolution of March 3, 1976
requiring the Solicitor General to file the petition for review within fifteen days from
receipt thereof ...

The People avers in the petition 1 that respondent judge "dismissing criminal Case No. 22397 despite
the provisions of Article l of the Revised Penal Code, which clearly indicate that the offense charged has
not prescribed" and "in not considering the prevailing jurisprudence indicating non-prescription of the
offense charged, and in holding that the case ofPeople v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494, does not apply to the
case at bar."

The petition is patently meritorious and must be granted.

I. The offense of estafa for which respondent accused stands charged clearly has not prescribed.
 Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or by their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint
or information and shall commence to run again when the proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to him. ...

The offense was committed on or about September 16, 1962 when respondent failed to account for
and instead misappropriated to his own use the sum of P8,704.00 representing the net proceeds
(minus his commission) of 272 booklets of sweepstakes tickets that had been entrusted to him be
the complainant, who promptly filed on October 2, 1962 plainly within the ten-year prescriptive period
the criminal complaint against respondent accused in the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas.
The prescriptive period was thereupon interrupted.

After his plea of not guilty and during the trial, respondent accused jumped bail in September, 1964
and evaded rearrest for nine years until September, 1973 and the trial was resumed. When the
Batangas court in its Order of November 5, 1974 upon respondent's motion dismissed the complaint
"for lack of jurisdiction" since the evidence(of both prosecution and accused) showed that all
elements of the crime were committed in Manila (and not in Batangas), 2 the proceedings therein
terminated without conviction or acquittal of respondent accused and it was only then that the prescriptive
period (which was interrupted during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court) commenced to run
again.

When the City Fiscal of Manila upon complainant's instance refiled on July 29, 1975 the same case
against respondent accused in the Manila court of first instance, (after having conducted a
preliminary investigation), it is clear that not even a year of the ten-year prescriptive period had been
consumed.

Respondent accused intent on thwarting his prosecution filed anew a motion to dismiss the
information on grounds of prescription and double jeopardy. There is manifestly no jeopardy,
because he was not acquitted by the Batangas court which on the basis of the evidence could
neither convict him because it was thereby shown to have no jurisdiction over the offense.

But respondent judge gravely erred in sustaining the ground of prescription, ruling that there was no
interruption of the prescriptive period during the pendency of the case in the Batangas court because
"(T)he proceedings contemplated by Article 91 are proceedings which are valid and before a
competent court. If they are void from the beginning because the court has no territorial jurisdiction
of the offense charged, it is as if no proceedings were held thereat. If this is so, then the warrant or
order of arrest as well as the bail given by the accused for his provisional liberty is of no effect.
Inevitably, there can be no jumping bail to speak of and there are no proceedings to be interrupted."

This is plain error for "Settled is the rule ... that the jurisdiction of a court is determined in criminal
cases by theallegations of the complaint or information and not by the result of proof." 4

It follows clearly that the Batangas court was vested with lawful jurisdiction over the criminal
complaint filed with it which expressly alleged that the offense was committed "in the Municipality of
Batangas, province of Batangas" and that the proceedings therein were valid and before a
competent court, (including the arrest warrant, the grant of bail and forfeiture thereof upon the
accused's jumping of bail), until the same court issued its November. 1974 order dismissing the
Case and declaring itself without territorial jurisdiction on the basis of the evidence presented to it by
both prosecution and the accused.
It follows just as clearly that the prescriptive period was interrupted and tolled during the 12-year
pendency of the proceedings before the Batangas Court (for nine years of which respondent
accused had jumped bail and evaded re-arrest).

II. Respondent judge gravely erred in dismissing the information on the ground of prescription and
disregarding the controlling case of People vs. Olarte. 5

In the second People vs. Olarte case, 6 the Court clarified precisely for the guidance of bench and bar
that the true doctrine is that the filing of the compliant in the municipal court, even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary investigation (where the offense charged is beyond its jurisdiction to try the case
on the merits) should, and does interrupt the period of prescription, as follows:

Analysis of the precedents on the issue of prescription discloses that there are two
lines of decisions following differing criteria in determining whether prescription of
crimes has been interrupted. One line of precedents holds that the filing of the
complaint with the justice of the peace (or municipal judge) does interrupt the course
of the prescriptive term: (People vs. Olarte, L-131027, June 30, 1960 and cases cited
therein; People vs. Uba, L-13106, October 16, 1959; People vs. Aquino, 68 Phil. 588,
590.) Another series of decisions declares that to produce interruption the complaint
or information must have been filed in the proper court that has jurisdiction to try the
case on its merits:People vs. Del Rosario, L-15140, December 29, 1960; People vs.
Coquia, L-15456, June 29, 1963.

In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench
and Bar, this Court has reexamined the question and after mature consideration has
arrived at the conclusion that thetrue doctrine is, and should be, the one established
by the decision holding that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it
be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should and does,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court
where the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on its merits. Several
reasons buttress this conclusion: first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code, in declaring that the period of prescription 'shall be interrupted by the filing of
the complaint or information' without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in
the court for preliminary examination or investigation merely, or for action on the
merits. Second, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed may only
proceed to investigate the case, its actuation already represents the initial step of the
proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the
right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. All that
the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the
requisite complaint. 7

Respondent judge in his dismissal order correctly cited the rationale for statutory prescriptions, inter
alia, that "the delay in instituting the proceedings not only causes expenses to the State, but exposes
public justice to peril, for it weakens oral evidence due to the lapse of the natural period of duration
of memory if not to anything, else. And it is the policy of the law that prosecutions should be prompt
and that statutes enforcing that promptitude should be maintained, they being not merely acts of
grace, but checks imposed by the State upon its subalterns, to exact vigilant activity and to secure
for criminal trials the best evidence that can be obtained. 8

But respondent judge fell into grave error in not applying the controlling case of Olarte on his
misconception that there had been no valid complaint filed with a competent court in Batangas
contrary to what has already been held hereinabove that the express allegations of the complaint
that the offense was committed in Batangas vested the Batangas court with lawful
jurisdiction until its dismissal order twelve years later for lack of jurisdiction as a result of
the proof presented before it during the tiral (and in not taking into account that the delay was not at
all due to the State but to respondent accused himself who jumped bail and escaped tile law for nine
[9] years and who apparently has made no effort all this time to make good the amount the to
complainant or any part thereof).

Since the record with transcript of the testimonial evidence in the Batangas court is complete (and
shows that the trial was continued on August 2, 1974 to September 10, 1974 while respondent
accused was testifying on the witness stand but that he instead filed his motion to dismiss of October
14, 1974 which granted by the Batangas court for lack of territorial jurisdiction) and this case had
already been pending for almost 15 years, all the evidence already taken by the Batangas court as
recorded in the minutes and transcript shall be deemed reproduced upon remand of the case to the
Manila court which is hereby ordered to receive only the remaining evidence of the respondent
accused and such rebuttal evidence as the parties may have and thereafter resolve the case with
the utmost dispatch.

ACCORDINGLY, respondent judge's dismissal orders of December 8, 1975 and January 7, 1976 are
hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to respondent judge or whoever presides Branch XIII of
the Manila court of first instance for continuation of the trial (with reproduction of the evidence in the
Batangas city court in Criminal Case No. 532 thereof, entitled "People vs. Gregorio Santos") in line
with the directives in the preceding paragraph. Respondent judge or the judge presiding his court is
further ordered to report to this Court the action taken hereon within a period of ninety (90) days from
promulgation of this decision. In view of the many years that the criminal case has been pending,
this decision is declared immediately executory upon promulgation.

G.R. No. L-26376 August 31, 1966

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff and appellant,

vs.
AURELIO BALISACAN, defendant and appellee.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General I. C. Borromeo and T. M.
Dilig for plaintiff and appellant.
Rolando de la Cuesta for defendant and appellee.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is an appeal by the prosecution from a decision of acquittal.

On February 1, 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Norte. The information alleged:

That on or about December 3, 1964, in the Municipality of Nueva Era, province of Ilocos
Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused,
with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
stab one, Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that immediately caused his
death.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.

To this charge the accused, upon being arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In doing so, he was
assisted by counsel. At his de oficio counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence
to prove mitigating circumstances. Thereupon the accused testified to the effect that he stabbed the
deceased in self-defense because the latter was strangling him. And he further stated that after the
incident he surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.

Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on the basis of the above-mentioned testimony of the accused, the
court a quorendered a decision acquitting the accused. As stated, the prosecution appealed
therefrom.

This appeal was first taken to the Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its brief on September 9, 1965.
No appellee's brief was filed. After being submitted for decision without appellee's brief, the appeal
was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals on July 14, 1966, as involving questions purely of law
(Sec. 17, Republic Act 296). And on August 5, 1966, We ordered it docketed herein. 1wph1.t

The sole assignment of error is:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED OF THE OFFENSE

CHARGED DESPITE THE LATTER'S PLEA OF GUILTY WHEN ARRAIGNED.

Appellant's contention is meritorious. A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with

respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself from said charge and leaves
the court with no alternative but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances. (People
v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 563). In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to establish
mitigating circumstances, for the purposes of fixing the penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not
be taken as a trial on the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused.

In view of the assertion of self-defense in the testimony of the accused, the proper course should
have been for the court a quo to take defendant's plea anew and then proceed with the trial of the
case, in the order set forth in Section 3 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. Order of trial. The plea of not guilty having been entered, the trial must proceed in the
following order:

(a) The fiscal, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, must offer evidence in support of
the charges.

(b) The defendant or his attorney may offer evidence in support of the defense.

(c) The parties may then respectively offer rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in
furtherance of justice, permit them to offer new additional evidence bearing upon the main
issue in question.

(d) When the introduction of evidence shall have been concluded, unless the case is
submitted to the court without argument, the fiscal must open the argument, the attorney for
the defense must follow, and the fiscal may conclude the same. The argument by either
attorney may be oral or written, or partly written, but only the written arguments, or such
portions of the same as may be in writing, shall be preserved in the record of the case.
In deciding the case upon the merits without the requisite trial, the court a quo not only erred in
procedure but deprived the prosecution of its day in court and right to be heard.

This Court now turns to Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which provides that: "The People
of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy." The
present state of jurisprudence in this regard is that the above provision applies even if the accused
fails to file a brief and raise the question of double jeopardy (People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23,
1956; People v. Bao, L-12102, September 29, 1959; People v. De Golez, L-14160, June 30, 1960).

The next issue, therefore, is whether this appeal placed the accused in double jeopardy. It is settled
that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy (People v. Ylagan, 58 Phil.
851; People v. Quimsing, L-19860, December 23, 1964). In the present case, it is true, the accused
had first entered a plea of guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being allowed
to prove mitigating circumstances, that he acted in complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore
as the court a quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the
court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea
of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no
standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal, there can be no double
jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein.1

Furthermore, as afore-stated, the court a quo decided the case upon the merits without giving the
prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant.
In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite,
its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is
no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy (People
v. Cabero, 61 Phil. 121; 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 235; McCleary v. Hudspeth 124 Fed. 2d. 445).

It should be noted that in rendering the judgment of acquittal, the trial judge below already gave
credence to the testimony of the accused. In fairness to the prosecution, without in any way doubting
the integrity of said trial judge, We deem it proper to remand this case to the court a quo for further
proceedings under another judge of the same court, in one of the two other branches of the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte sitting at Laoag.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and this case is remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the defendant, trial
with presentation of evidence for the prosecution and the defense, and judgment thereafter, No
costs. So ordered.

Disini vs Secretary of Justice

Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal code provisions on libel as well as Section
4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.

The RPC provisions on libel read:

Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one
who is dead.

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the
following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal,
moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any
judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any
statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel committed by means of writing, printing,
lithography, engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition,
or any similar means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods
or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may be
brought by the offended party.

The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand, merely incorporates to form part of it the
provisions of the RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:

Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable
under this Act:

xxxx

(c) Content-related Offenses:

xxxx

(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, committed through a computer system or any other similar means which may be
devised in the future.

Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice" even when the latest
jurisprudence already replaces it with the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for
conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed malice" from the accuseds defamatory
statement by virtue of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.

Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on libel should be stricken down as
unconstitutional for otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice" could easily be
overturned as the Court has done in Fermin v. People39 even where the offended parties happened
to be public figures.

The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable act or condition concerning another; (b)
publication of the charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender makes the defamatory statement with
the knowledge that it is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.42 The reckless
disregard standard used here requires a high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must
be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in fact entertained serious doubts as
to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not sufficient to
establish actual malice.43

The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where such
element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public
figure, as in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First
National Conference on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime
law, mainly target libel against private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter
standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a
public figure. Societys interest and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion
of public affairs.44

Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that its ruling in Fermin disregarded the
higher standard of actual malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli Fermin guilty of committing
libel against complainants who were public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence of malice
in fact in that case. Thus:

It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations
against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a general denial, convince us that
there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious
in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during
the electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)

Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide leeway given to utterances against public
figures in the above case, cinema and television personalities, when it modified the penalty of
imprisonment to just a fine ofP6,000.00.

But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of
malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of
the assailed statement.45For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for
the defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.46

Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the
countrys obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They
point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation laws should include the
defense of truth.

But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute
an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the
condition that the accused has been prompted in making the statement by good motives and for
justifiable ends. Thus:

Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that
it was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be
admitted, unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect
to facts related to the discharge of their official duties.

In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.

Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize
libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle
freedom of expression.48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of
expression, its exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not
absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.49

The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and
that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. Indeed,
cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code,
already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online defamation constitutes
"similar means" for committing libel.

But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the cybercrime law penalizes the author of the
libelous statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the penal
code provisions on libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from
that of print.

Online libel is different. There should be no question that if the published material on print, said to be
libelous, is again posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be the subject of two
separate libels. The two offenses, one a violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the
other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve essentially the same elements and are in
fact one and the same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel under Section 4(c)(4)
is not a new crime but is one already punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes
the computer system as another means of publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws
would be a blatant violation of the proscription against double jeopardy.76

The same is true with child pornography committed online. Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the
ACPAs scope so as to include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously discussed, ACPAs
definition of child pornography in fact already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and
ACPA would likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy.

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section
7 that authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act
10175 to actual cases, WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of:

1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act
10175 and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a violation of the proscription
against double jeopardy; as well as

2. Child pornography committed online as to which, charging the offender under both Section
4(c)(2) of Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of
2009 also constitutes a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to these, is VOID
and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.R. No. 189754 October 24, 2012

LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA, Petitioners,

vs.
SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is the petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision1

elated May 19, 2009 and Resolution2 dated September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, entitled Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan v. lion. Rizalina T Capco-Urnali, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Mandaluyong City, Branch 212, Lito
Bautista, and Jimmy Alcantara, which granted the

petition for certiorari of respondent Sharon G. Cuneta-Pangilinan. TheCA Decision reversed and set
aside the Order3 dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 212, Mandaluyong
City, but only insofar as it pertains to the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence filed by petitioners
Lito Bautista (Bautista) and Jimmy Alcantara (Alcantara), and also ordered that the case be
remanded to the trial court for reception of petitioners' evidence.

The antecedents are as follows:

On February 19, 2002, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City filed two (2)
informations, both dated February 4, 2002, with the RTC, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City, against
Pete G. Ampoloquio, Jr. (Ampoloquio), and petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, for the crime of libel,
committed by publishing defamatory articles against respondent Sharon Cuneta-Pangilinan in the
tabloid Bandera.

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4872, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 24th day of April, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officer[s] of Bandera Publishing Corporation,
publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping and aiding one
another, with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor,
shame and contempt, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and
ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which among others
have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:

MAGTIGIL KA, SHARON!

Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, Id like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo
yata yung sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.

Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng Central Institute of
Technology at ni isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all throughout the article, weve
maintained our objectivity, pero sa interview sa aparadoric singer- actress in connection with an
album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi nitong shes supposedly looking into the item that
weve written and most probably would take some legal action.

xxx

Magsalita ka, Missed Cuneta, at sabihin mong hindi ito totoo.

Ang hindi lang namin nagustuhan ay ang pagbintangan kaming palagi naman daw namin siyang

sinisiraan, kaya hindi lang daw niya kami pinapansin, believing na part raw siguro yun ng aming
trabaho.

Dios mio perdon, what she gets to see are those purportedly biting commentaries about her
katabaan and kaplastikan but she has simply refused to acknowledge the good reviews weve done
on her.

xxx

Going back to this seemingly disoriented actress whos desperately trying to sing even if she truly
cant, itanggi mo na hindi mo kilala si Pettizou Tayag gayung nagkasama raw kayo ng tatlong araw
sa mother's house ng mga Aboitiz sa Cebu more than a month ago, in connection with one of those
political campaigns of your husband.

xxx

thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputations of a vice, condition
or defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or contempt.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

In Criminal Case No. MC02-4875, the Information dated February 4, 2002 reads:

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2001, in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating
together with Jane/John Does unknown directors/officers of Bandera Publishing Corporation,
publisher of Bandera, whose true identities are unknown, and mutually helping, and aiding one
another, with deliberate intent to bring SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN into public dishonor,
shame and contempt did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with malice and
ridicule, cause to publish in Bandera (tabloid), with circulation in Metro Manila, which, among others,
have the following insulting and slanderous remarks, to wit:

NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARYANG SUPPORTER NI KIKO!

FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko Pangilinan na si
Pettizou Tayag, a multi-millionaire who owns Central Institute of Technology College in Sampaloc,
Manila (it is also one of the biggest schools in Paniqui, Tarlac).

xxx

Which in a way, she did. Bagama't busy siya (she was having a meeting with some business
associates), she went out of her way to give Sharon security.
So, ang ginawa daw ni Ms. Tayag ay tinext nito si Sharon para mabigyan ito ng instructions para
kumportable itong makarating sa Bulacan.

She was most caring and solicitous, pero tipong na-offend daw ang megastar at nagtext pang "You
dont need to produce an emergency SOS for me, Ill be fine."

Now, nang makara[t]ing na raw sa Bulacan si Mega nagtatarang daw ito at binadmouth si Pettizou.
Kesyo ang kulit-kulit daw nito, atribida, mapapel at kung anu-ano pang mga derogatory words na
nakarating siyempre sa kinauukulan.

Anyhow, if its true that Ms. Pettizou has been most financially supportive of Kiko, how come Sharon
seems not to approve of her?

"She doesnt want kasi her husband to win as a senator because when that happens, mawawalan
siya ng hold sa kanya," our caller opines.

Pettizou is really sad that Sharon is treating her husband like a wimp.

"In public," our source goes on tartly, "pa kiss-kiss siya. Pa-embrace-embrace pero kung silang
dalawa na lang parang kung sinong sampid kung i-treat niya si Kiko."

My God Pete, Harvard graduate si Kiko. Hes really intelligent as compared to Sharon who appears
to be brain dead most of the time.

Yung text message niyang "You dont need to produce an emergency SOS for me," hindi bat she
was being redundant?

Another thing, I guess its high time that she goes on a diet again. Jesus, she looks 611 crosswise!

xxx

Kunsabagay, she was only being most consistent. Yang si Sharon daw ay talagang mega-brat,
mega-sungit. But who does she think she is? Her wealth, dear, would pale in comparison with the
Tayags millions. Kunsabagay, shes brain dead most of the time.

xxx

thereby casting publicly upon complainant, malicious contemptuous imputation of a vice, condition or
defect, which tend to cause complainant her dishonor, discredit or contempt.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Upon arraignment, petitioners, together with their co-accused Ampoloquio, each entered a plea of
not guilty. Thereafter, a joint pre-trial and trial of the case ensued.6

Respondents undated Complaint-Affidavit7 alleged that Bautista and Alcantara were Editor and
Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera, and their co-accused, Ampoloquio, was
the author of the alleged libelous articles which were published therein, and subject of the two
informations. According to respondent, in April 2001, she and her family were shocked to learn about
an article dated March 27, 2001, featured on page 7 of Bandera (Vol. 11, No. 156), in the column
Usapang Censored of Ampoloquio, entitled Naburyong sa Kaplastikan ni Sharon ang
Milyonaryang Supporter ni Kiko, that described her as plastic (hypocrite), ingrate, mega-brat, mega-
sungit, and brain dead, which were the subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-4875.8 Another article,
with the same title and similar text, also featured on the same date, appeared on page 6 of Saksi
Ngayon, in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio.9 Moreover, respondent averred that on April 24,
2001, Ampoloquio wrote two follow-up articles, one appeared in his column Usapang Censored,
entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon!, stating that she bad-mouthed one Pettizou Tayag by calling the latter
kulit-kulit (annoyingly persistent), atribida (presumptuous), mapapel (officious or self-important), and
other derogatory words; that she humiliated Tayag during a meeting by calling the latter bobo
(stupid); that she exhibited offensive behavior towards Tayag; and that she was a dishonest person
with questionable credibility, which were the subject of Criminal Case No. MC02-4872.10 Another
article, entitled Magtigil Ka, Sharon Cuneta!!!!, also featured on the same date with similar text, and
appeared on page 7 of Saksi Ngayon (Vol. 3, No. 285), in the column Banatan of Ampoloquio,11 with
the headline in bold letters, Sharon Cuneta, May Sira? on the front page of the said
issue.12 Respondent added that Ampoloquios articles impugned her character as a woman and wife,
as they depicted her to be a domineering wife to a browbeaten husband. According to Ampoloquio,
respondent did not want her husband (Senator Francis Pangilinan) to win (as Senator) because that
would mean losing hold over him, and that she would treat him like a wimp and sampid (hanger-on)
privately, but she appeared to be a loving wife to him in public. Respondent denied that Tayag
contributed millions to her husbands campaign fund. She clarified that Tayag assisted during the
campaign and was one of the volunteers of her husbands Kilos Ko Movement, being the first cousin
of one Atty. Joaquinito Harvey B. Ringler (her husbands partner in Franco Pangilinan Law Office);
however, it was Atty. Ringler who asked Tayag to resign from the movement due to difficulty in
dealing with her.

After presenting respondent on the witness stand, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of
Documentary Exhibits dated October 11, 2006, which included her undated Complaint-Affidavit.13

On November 14, 2006, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer
to Evidence.14In their Demurrer to Evidence,15 which was appended to the said Motion, Bautista and
Alcantara alleged that the prosecution's evidence failed to establish their participation as Editor and
Associate Editor, respectively, of the publication Bandera; that they were not properly identified by
respondent herself during her testimony; and that the subject articles written by Ampoloquio were
not libelous due to absence of malice.

On April 25, 2008, the RTC issued an Order16 granting petitioners Demurrer to Evidence and
dismissed Criminal Case Nos. MCO2-4872 and MCO2-4875. The trial court opined, among others,
that since the prosecution did not submit its Comment/Opposition to the petitioners' Demurrer to
Evidence, the averments therein thus became unrebutted; that the testimonial and documentary
evidence adduced by the prosecution failed to prove the participation of petitioners as conspirators
of the crime charged; and that during the direct examination on July 27, 2004 and cross-examination
on August 1, 2006, respondent neither identified them, nor was there any mention about their actual
participation.

As a consequence, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit17 dated May 29, 2008, with the attached
Comment (to Accused Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara's Demurrer to Evidence)18 dated March 24,
2008, stating that during the pendency of the trial court's resolution on the petitioners' Motion for
Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence, with the attached Demurrer to Evidence,
the prosecution intended to file its Comment, by serving copies thereof, through registered mail,
upon counsels for the petitioners, including the other accused, and the respondent; however, said
Comment was not actually filed with the trial court due to oversight on the part of the staff of the
State Prosecutor handling the case.19 Claiming that it was deprived of due process, the prosecution
prayed that its Comment be admitted and that the same be treated as a reconsideration of the trial
court's Order dated April 25, 2008.
In an Order dated June 3, 2008, the RTC granted the prosecutions' Motion to Admit, with the
attached Comment, and ruled that its Comment be admitted to form part of the court records.

On August 19, 2008, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, seeking to set aside the
RTC Orders dated April 25, 2008 (which granted petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence and ordered the
dismissal of the cases against them) and June 3, 2008 (which noted and admitted respondent's
Comment to form part of the records of the case).

In a Decision dated May 19, 2009, the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby reversing and
setting aside the RTC Order dated April 25, 2008, but only insofar as it pertains to the grant of
petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, and ordered that the case be remanded to the trial court for
reception of petitioners' evidence.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 7, 2009 which, however, was
denied by the CA in a Resolution dated September 28, 2009.

Hence, petitioners filed this present petition, raising the following arguments:

I.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS IS

BARRED BY THE PETITIONERS' RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS

DOES NOT LIE TO CORRECT ALLEGED ERRORS OF JUDGMENT COMMITTED BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING PETITONERS' DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE.

Petitioners allege that the Order of the RTC, dated April 25, 2008, granting the Demurrer to
Evidence was tantamount to an acquittal. As such, the prosecution can no longer interpose an
appeal to the CA, as it would place them in double jeopardy. Petitioners contend that respondent's
petition for certiorari with the CA should not have prospered, because the allegations therein, in
effect, assailed the trial court's judgment, not its jurisdiction. In other words, petitioners posit that the
said Order was in the nature of an error of judgment rendered, which was not correctible by a
petition for certiorari with the CA.

Petitioners aver that although the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution had not been denied due
process, however, it erred in ruling that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in
granting petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence, on the basis that the prosecution failed to prove that they
acted in conspiracy with Ampoloquio, the author of the questioned articles. They added that what the
prosecution proved was merely their designations as Editor and Associate Editor of the publication
Bandera, but not the fact that they had either control over the articles to be published or actually
edited the subject articles.
Respondent counters that petitioners failed to show special and important reasons to justify their
invocation of the Court's power to review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She avers that the
acquittal of petitioners does not preclude their further prosecution if the judgment acquitting them is
void for lack of jurisdiction. Further, she points out that contrary to petitioners contention, the
principle of double jeopardy does not attach in cases where the court's judgment acquitting the
accused or dismissing the case is void, either for having disregarded the State's right to due process
or for having been rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and not merely errors of judgment.

Respondent also avers that even if the prosecution was deemed to have waived its right to file a
Comment on the petitioners Motion for Leave of Court to File the Attached Demurrer to Evidence,
this did not give the trial court any reason to deprive the prosecution of its right to file a Comment on
the petitioners Demurrer to Evidence itself, which was a clear violation of the due process
requirement. By reason of the foregoing, respondent insists that petitioners cannot invoke violation
of their right against double jeopardy.

The petition is impressed with merit.

At the onset, it should be noted that respondent took a procedural misstep, and the view she is
advancing is erroneous. The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases before the
Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35
(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides that the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials
and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. It
shall have specific powers and functions to represent the

Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and the CA, and all other courts or tribunals in all
civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official
capacity is a party.20 The OSG is the law office of the Government.21

To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him
can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant
or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned. In a catena of cases, this view has been time and again espoused and
maintained by the Court. In Rodriguez v. Gadiane,22 it was categorically stated that if the criminal
case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal on the criminal aspect of the
case must be instituted by the Solicitor General in behalf of the State. The capability of the private
complainant to question such dismissal or acquittal is limited only to the civil aspect of the case. The
same determination was also arrived at by the Court in Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company v.
Veridiano II.23 In the recent case of Bangayan, Jr. v. Bangayan,24 the Court again upheld this guiding
principle.

Worthy of note is the case of People v. Santiago,25 wherein the Court had the occasion to bring this
issue to rest. The Court elucidated:

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the
private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If
a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the
criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or
complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may
appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is
alleged that the trial court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or
on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved.
In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or complainant. The
complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action
questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may
be prosecuted in name of said complainant.26

Thus, the Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State,
the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State through the
solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such appeal.27

In the case at bar, the petition filed by the respondent before the CA essentially questioned the
criminal aspect of the Order of the RTC, not the civil aspect of the case. Consequently, the petition
should have been filed by the State through the OSG. Since the petition for certiorari filed in the CA
was not at the instance of the OSG, the same should have been outrightly dismissed by the CA.
Respondent lacked the personality or legal standing to question the trial courts order because it is
only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), who can bring actions on behalf of the State in
criminal proceedings, before the Supreme Court and the CA.28 Thus, the CA should have denied the
petition outright.

Moreover, not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be stressed that the
granting of petitioners Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a dismissal of the case on the
merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to evidence will place the accused in double
jeopardy. Consequently, the Court disagrees with the CAs ruling reversing the trial courts order
dismissing the criminal cases against petitioners.

Under Section 23,29 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the prosecution
terminates the presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial court may dismiss the case on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence upon the filing of a Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with
or without leave of court. If the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and the
same is denied, he may adduce evidence in his defense. However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is
filed by the accused without prior leave of court and the same is denied, he waives his right to
present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.

Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the
trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient
enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that
the prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the accused's Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling
is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an acquittal and may no longer be
appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would, thus, violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.30
Anent the prosecutions claim of denial of due process. As correctly found by the CA, the
prosecution was not denied due process. Suffice it to state that the prosecution had actively
participated in the trial and already rested its case, and upon petitioners' filing of their Demurrer to
Evidence, was given the opportunity to file its Comment or Opposition and, in fact, actually filed its
Comment thereto, albeit belatedly. The CA emphasized that the word "may" was used in Section 23
of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that if leave of court is
granted, and the accused has filed the Demurrer to Evidence within a non-extendible period of ten
(10) days from notice, the prosecution "may" oppose the Demurrer to Evidence within a similar
period from its receipt. In this regard, the CA added that the filing of a Comment or Opposition by
1w phi 1

respondent is merely directory, not a mandatory or jurisdictional requirement, and that in fact the trial
court may even proceed with the resolution of the petitioners' Demurrer to Evidence even without the
prosecution's Comment.

One final note. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code specifies the persons that can be held liable
for libel. It provides:

ART. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be responsible for the same.

The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper,
magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for the defamation contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.31

From the foregoing, not only is the person who published, exhibited or caused the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing shall be responsible for the same, all other persons who
participated in its publication are liable, including the editor or business manager of a daily
newspaper, magazine or serial publication, who shall be equally responsible for the defamations
contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. The liability which attaches to
petitioners is, thus, statutory in nature.

In Fermin v. People,32 therein petitioner argued that to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360
of the Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly participated in or consented to the
preparation and publication of the libelous article. She also averred that she had adduced ample
evidence to show that she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending article,
nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid. The
Court struck down her erroneous theory and ruled that therein petitioner, who was not only the
Publisher of Gossip Tabloid but also its President and Chairperson, could not escape liability by
claiming lack of participation in the preparation and publication of the libelous article.

Similarly, in Tulfo v. People,33 therein petitioners, who were Managing Editor, National Editor of
Remate publication, President of Carlo Publishing House, and one who does typesetting, editing,
and layout of the page, claim that they had no participation in the editing or writing of the subject
articles which will hold them liable for the crime of libel and, thus, should be acquitted. In debunking
this argument, the Court stressed that an editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge
and control over the publication, is held equally liable with the author of the libelous article. This is
because it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper, and
interposing the defense of lack of knowledge or consent as to the contents of the articles or
publication definitely will not prosper.

The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article 360 was already
elucidated as early as in the case of U.S. v. Ocampo,34 to wit:
According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication
containing libelous matter is liable for the same by reason of his direct connection therewith and his
cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is
the publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its
publication are liable as publishers.35

Accordingly, Article 360 would have made petitioners Bautista and Alcantara, being the Editor and
Assistant Editor, respectively, of Bandera Publishing Corporation, answerable with Ampoloquio, for
the latters alleged defamatory writing, as if they were the authors thereof. Indeed, as aptly
concluded by the court a quo:

The aforestated provision is clear and unambiguous. It equally applies to an editor of a publication in
which a libelous article was published and states that the editor of the same shall be responsible for
the defamation in writing as if he were the author thereof. Indeed, when an alleged libelous article is
published in a newspaper, such fact alone sufficient evidence to charge the editor or business
manager with the guilt of its publication. This sharing of liability with the author of said article is
based on the principle that editors and associate editors, by the nature of their positions, edit, control
and approve the materials which are to be published in a newspaper. This means that, without their
nod of approbation, any article alleged to be libelous would not be published.

Hence, by virtue of their position and the authority which they exercise, newspaper editors and
associate editors are as much critical part in the publication of any defamatory material as the writer
or author thereof.36

Nevertheless, petitioners could no longer be held liable in view of the procedural infirmity that the
petition for certiorari was not undertaken by the OSG, but instead by respondent in her personal
capacity. Although the conclusion of the trial court may be wrong, to reverse and set aside the Order
granting the demurrer to evidence would violate petitioners constitutionally-enshrined right against
double jeopardy. Had it not been for this procedural defect, the Court could have seriously
considered the arguments advanced by the respondent in seeking the reversal of the Order of the
RTC.

The granting of a demurrer to evidence should, therefore, be exercised with caution, taking into
consideration not only the rights of the accused, but also the right of the private offended party to be
vindicated of the wrongdoing done against him, for if it is granted, the accused is acquitted and the
private complainant is generally left with no more remedy. In such instances, although the decision
of the court may be wrong, the accused can invoke his right against double jeopardy. Thus, judges
are reminded to be more diligent and circumspect in the performance of their duties as members of
the Bench, always bearing in mind that their decisions affect the lives of the accused and the
individuals who come to the courts to seek redress of grievances, which decision could be possibly
used by the aggrieved party as basis for the filing of the appropriate actions against them.

Perforce, the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212, Mandaluyong City,
in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions as against
petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, should be reinstated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 19, 2009 and Resolution dated
September 28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 104885, are REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The portion of the Order dated April 25, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 212,
Mandaluyong City, in Criminal Case Nos. MC02-4872 and MC02-4875, which dismissed the actions
as against petitioners Lito Bautista and Jimmy Alcantara, is REINSTATED.
G.R. Nos. 153304-05 February 7, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), IMELDA R. MARCOS, JOSE CONRADO
BENITEZ and GILBERT C. DULAY,* Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari filed by the People of the Philippines (petitioner) assailing the
decision dated March 22, 2002 of the Sandiganbayan1 in Criminal Case Nos. 20345 and 20346
which granted the demurrers to evidence filed by Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez
(respondents) and Rafael Zagala.

The Facts

The petition stemmed from two criminal informations filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging the
respondents with the crime of malversation of public funds, defined and penalized under Article 217,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The charges arose from the transactions that
the respondents participated in, in their official capacities as Minister and Deputy Minister of the
Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) under the MHS Kabisig Program.

In Criminal Case No. 20345, respondents, together with Gilbert C. Dulay, were charged with
malversation of public funds, committed as follows:

That on or about April 6, 1984 or sometime and/or [subsequent] thereto, in Pasig, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public
officers charged with the administration of public funds and as such, accountable officers, Imelda R.
Marcos being then the Minister of Human Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez being then the Deputy
Minister of Human Settlements and Gilbert C. Dulay being then [the] Assistant Manager for Finance,
Ministry of Human Settlements, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage
of their positions, acting in concert and mutually helping one another thru manifest partiality and
evident bad faith did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in a series of anomalous
transactions, abstract the total amount of P57.954 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency from the
funds of the Ministry of Human Settlements in the following manner: accused Conrado Benitez
approved the series of cash advances made and received by Gilbert C. Dulay, and made it appear
that the funds were transferred to the University of Life, a private foundation represented likewise by
Gilbert C. Dulay when in truth and in fact no such funds were transferred while Imelda R. Marcos
concurred in the series of such cash advances approved by Jose Conrado Benitez and received by
Gilbert C. Dulay and in furtherance of the conspiracy, in order to camouflage the aforesaid
anomalous and irregular cash advances and withdrawals, Imelda R. Marcos requested that the
funds of the KSS Program be treated as "Confidential Funds"; and as such be considered as
"Classified Information"; and that the above-named accused, once in possession of the said
aggregate amount ofP57.954 Million Pesos (sic), misappropriated and converted the same to their
own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in the said amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours]2

In Criminal Case No. 20346, respondents together with Zagala were charged with malversation of
public funds under these allegations:
That on or about April 6 to April 16, 19843 and/or sometime or subsequent thereto, in Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all
public officers charged with the administration of public funds and as such, accountable officers,
Imelda R. Marcos being then the Minister of Human Settlements, Jose Conrado Benitez being then
the Deputy Minister of Human Settlements[,] and Rafael Zagala being then [the] Assistant Manager
for Regional Operations and at the same time Presidential Action Officer, while in the performance of
their official functions, taking advantage of their positions, acting in concert and mutually helping one
another thru manifest partiality and evident bad faith[,] did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally, in a series of anomalous transactions, abstract from the funds of the Ministry of Human
Settlements the total amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic), Philippine Currency, in the following
manner: Jose Conrado Benitez approved the cash advances made by Rafael Zagala and Imelda R.
Marcos concurred in the series of cash advances approved by Jose Conrado Benitez in favor of
Rafael G. Zagala; and in furtherance of the conspiracy, Imelda R. Marcos in order to camouflage the
aforesaid anomalous and irregular cash advances, requested that funds of the KSS Program be
treated as "Confidential Funds"; and as such be considered as "Classified Information"; and the
above-named accused, once in possession of the total amount ofP40 Million Pesos (sic),
misappropriated and converted the same to their own use and benefit to the damage and prejudice
of the government in the said amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [Emphasis ours]4

Only the respondents and Zagala were arraigned for the above charges to which they pleaded not
guilty; Dulay was not arraigned and remains at large. On March 15, 2000, Zagala died, leaving the
respondents to answer the charges in the criminal cases.

After the pre-trial conference, a joint trial of the criminal cases ensued. The prosecutions chief
evidence was based on the lone testimony of Commission of Audit (COA) Auditor Iluminada Cortez
and the documentary evidence used in the audit examination of the subject funds.5

The gist of COA Auditor Cortez direct testimony was summarized by the Sandiganbaya, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. 20345

[s]he was appointed on March 31, 1986 by then COA Chairman Teofisto Guingona, Jr. to head a
team of COA auditors. Upon examination of the documents, she declared that an amount of P100
Million Pesos (sic) from the Office of Budget and Management was released for the KSS Project of
the Ministry of Human Settlements (MHS) by virtue of an Advice of Allotment for Calendar Year
1984. Also, an amount of P42.4 Million Pesos (sic) was separately disbursed for the Kabisig
Program of the Ministry of Human Settlements. With regard to the amount ofP100 Million Pesos (sic)
received by the MHS, P60 Million Pesos (sic) [was] disbursed through cash advances. Of the P60
Million Pesos (sic) in cash advances, accused Zagala received P40 Million Pesos (sic) in four (4)
disbursements while accused Dulay received the remaining P20 Million Pesos (sic) in two
disbursements.

With respect to accused Rafael Zagala, the cash advances consist of four (4) disbursement
vouchers in the amount of P5 Million Pesos (sic), P10 Million Pesos (sic), P10 Million Pesos (sic)
and P15 Million Pesos (sic). All of these vouchers are in the name of accused Zagala as claimant
and accused Benitez as approving officer and are accompanied by their corresponding Treasury
Warrants that were countersigned by accused Benitez and approved by accused Dulay.

In contrast, x x x a disbursement voucher in the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic) was drawn in
favor of accused Gilbert Dulay and approved by accused Benitez. Pursuant to this, a Treasury
Warrant was issued to the order of accused Dulay, countersigned by accused Benitez and approved
by accused Zagala. Another voucher was drawn in favor of accused Dulay in the amount of P10
Million Pesos (sic) and approved by accused Benitez. Again, a Treasury Warrant was issued to the
order of accused Dulay in the amount of P10 Million Pesos (sic), which was countersigned by
accused Benitez and approved by accused Zagala.

x x x [A]ccused Marcos sent a letter to then President Ferdinand E. Marcos requesting that the fund
intended for the KSS Project in the amount of P100 Million Pesos (sic) be deemed as "Confidential
Fund".

x x x [T]he liquidation of accused Zagalas account, which was contained in a Journal Voucher dated
November 27, 1984, was without any supporting documents. Upon this discovery, witness requested
and secured a certification from the Manager of the National Government Audit Office to the effect
that the COA did not receive any document coming from the MHS. However, this liquidation voucher
which contained figures in the total amount of P50 Million Pesos (sic), comprised the entire cash
advances of accused Zagala in the amount of P40 Million Pesos (sic) and the P10 Million Pesos
(sic) cash advance made by accused Dulay. Since the amount ofP10 Million Pesos (sic) was already
contained in Zagalas Journal Voucher, the witness and her team of auditors tried to locate the
remaining P10 Million Pesos (sic) and found out that accused Dulay had liquidated the same
amount.6 (footnotes omitted)

According to COA Auditor Cortez, Zagalas cash advances were supported by a liquidation report
and supporting documents submitted to the resident auditor even before the P100 Million Kilusang
Sariling Sikap (KSS) fund was made confidential.7 The witness also testified that the COA resident
auditor found no irregularity in this liquidation report.8

COA Auditor Cortez stated that since the P100 Million KSS fund was classified as confidential, the
liquidation report should have been submitted to the COA Chairman who should have then issued a
credit memo. No credit memo was ever found during the audit examination of the MHS
accounts.9 COA Auditor Cortez admitted that she did not verify whether the supporting documents of
Zagalas cash advances were sent to the COA Chairman.10

Respondent Marcos was prosecuted because of her participation as Minister of the MHS, in
requesting that theP100 Million KSS fund be declared confidential. Respondent Benitez was
prosecuted because he was the approving officer in these disputed transactions.

In Criminal Case No. 20346

Regarding the Kabisig Program of the MHS, the COA team of auditors examined the vouchers of the
MHS, which upon inspection revealed that there were at least three (3) memoranda of agreements
entered into between the MHS and University of Life (UL). With reference to the first Memorandum
of Agreement dated July 2, 1985, an amount of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic) was transferred by the
MHS to the UL to pay for the operations of the Community Mobilization Program and the Kabisig
Program of the MHS. Accused Benitez as the Deputy Minister of the MHS and accused Dulay as
Vice President of the UL were the signatories of this agreement. Although there is no disbursement
voucher in the records, it is admitted that a Treasury Warrant was drawn in the sum of P21.6 Million
Pesos (sic). The second Memorandum of Agreement dated July 10, 1985 provided for a fund
transfer in the amount of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic) for the Human Resources Development Plan of the
MHS. Accordingly, a Disbursement Voucher certified by accused Dulay and approved by accused
Benitez was drawn in the sum ofP3.8 Million Pesos (sic). The third Memorandum of Agreement in
the sum of P17 Million Pesos (sic) was granted for the acquisition of motor vehicles and other
equipment to support the Kabisig Program of the MHS. For that reason, a Disbursement Voucher
pertaining thereto accompanied by a Treasury Warrant was drafted.

Similarly, the witness declared that although they did not examine any of the records of the UL, the
abovementioned sums were not received by the UL based on the affidavit of the UL Comptroller
named Pablo Cueto. In the same way, an affidavit was executed by the UL Chief Accountant named
Ernesto Jiao attesting that there is no financial transaction on record covering the purchase of motor
vehicles. Again, witness Cortez admitted that they did not examine the books of the UL on this
matter but only inquired about it from Mr. Jiao. The affidavit of Mr. Jiao with respect to the
nonexistence of the purchases of motor vehicles was further corroborated by the affidavit of one
Romeo Sison, who was the Administrative Assistant of the Property Section of the UL.

The respective treasury warrants representing the various sums of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic), P17
Million Pesos (sic) and P3.8 Million Pesos (sic) were subsequently deposited with the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Shaw Blvd. Branch, Mandaluyong, under various accounts. Soon
after, several checks were drawn out of these funds as evidenced by the Photostat copies recovered
by the COA auditors. In the course of the testimony of the witness, she revealed that her team of
auditors classified said several checks into different groups in accordance with the account numbers
of the said deposits.

x x x [T]he amount of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic), the same was intended for the Human Resource
Development Plan of the UL. x x x [T]he aforesaid amount is not a cash advance but rather paid as
an expense account, which is charged directly as if services have already been rendered. Hence, UL
is not mandated to render liquidation for the disbursement of P3.8 Million Pesos (sic).

The sums of P21.6 Million Pesos (sic) and P17 Million Pesos (sic) were deposited under x x x the
name of the UL Special Account. Out of these deposits, the following first sequence of withdrawals
of checks11 payable either to its order or to cash x x x reached a total sum of P5,690,750.93 Million
Pesos (sic).

The second list of checks12 [which] consists of numerous [Managers] Checks x x x reached the
amount ofP18,416,062.15.

A third set of checks allegedly consists of nine (9) ordinary checks and two (2) managers checks in
the sum ofP1,971,568.00 and P4,566,712.18[,] respectively. x x x

Moreover, [a] witness confirmed that as regards the amount of P17 Million Pesos (sic) intended for
the acquisition of motor vehicles, P10.4 Million Pesos (sic) was spent for the purchase of some five
hundred (500) units of motorcycles while P2.1 Million Pesos (sic) was used to procure eight (8)
brand new cars. The balance of P4.5 Million Pesos (sic) was later refunded to the MHS. As regards
the five hundred (500) units of motorcycle, the Presidential Task Force furnished the witness
documents attesting to the transfers of some two hundred seventy-one (271) units of motorcycles
from the UL to the MHS by virtue of Deed of Assignments allegedly executed on February 17, 1986.
However, of the two hundred seventy-one (271) units of motorcycle, only one hundred ninety (190)
units were covered with complete documents. With respect to the eight (8) brand new cars, the team
of auditors did not see any registration papers. (footnotes omitted; underscorings ours)13

COA Auditor Cortez admitted that the audit team did not conduct a physical inventory of these motor
vehicles; it based its report on the information given by the Presidential Task Force.14 She
emphasized that the audit team found it highly irregular that the motor vehicles were registered in
the name of University of Life (UL) and not in the name of MHS; and for this reason, she believed
that no proper liquidation was made of these vehicles by MHS.15
After COA Auditor Cortez testimony, the prosecution submitted its formal offer of evidence and
rested its case.

Subsequently, separate motions to dismiss the criminal cases, by way of demurrers to evidence,
were filed by Zagala and the respondents on November 15, 1997, January 5, 1998 and January 28,
1998; on January 27, 1998, the prosecution filed a Manifestation stating that it was not opposing the
demurrers to evidence.16

The Sandiganbayans Ruling

The Sandiganbayan granted the demurrers to evidence and acquitted the respondents in its assailed
decision dated March 22, 2002. The dispositive portion of this decision reads:

Wherefore, the Demurrers to Evidence are hereby granted. Accused Imelda R. Marcos, Jose
Conrado Benitez and Gilbert C. Dulay are hereby acquitted of the crime of Malversation in Criminal
Case No. 20435 for insufficiency of evidence to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused
Imelda R. Marcos, Jose Conrado Benitez and Rafael G. Zagala are likewise acquitted of the offense
of Malversation in Criminal Case No. 20346 for insufficiency of evidence in proving their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.17

In dismissing these criminal cases, the Sandiganbayan found no evidence of misappropriation of the
subject funds in the two criminal cases considering the unreliability and incompleteness of the audit
report.18

The Issues

The issues for our consideration are:

1. Whether the prosecutors actions and/or omissions in these cases effectively deprived the
State of its right to due process; and

2. Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in granting the demurrers to
evidence of the respondents.

The petitioner claims that the State was denied due process because of the nonfeasance committed
by the special prosecutor in failing to present sufficient evidence to prove its case. It claims that the
prosecutor failed to protect the States interest in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. To
support its position, petitioner cites the case of Merciales v. Court of Appeals19 where the Court
nullified the dismissal of the criminal cases due to the serious nonfeasance committed by the public
prosecutor.

The petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction that resulted in a miscarriage of justice prejudicial to the States interest
when it took the demurrers to evidence at face value instead of requiring the presentation of
additional evidence, taking into consideration the huge amounts of public funds involved and the
special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrers to evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We do not find the petition meritorious.

We are called to overturn a judgment of acquittal in favor of the respondents brought about by the
dismissal, for insufficiency of evidence, of the malversation charged in the two criminal cases. As a
rule, once the court grants the demurrer, the grant amounts to an acquittal; any further prosecution
of the accused would violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.20 Notably, the
proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals based on errors of judgment, but not
errors of jurisdiction. Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy will not attach,
these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;21 and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a partys due process rights.22

A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process implies an invalid or
otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds are established, the judgment of acquittal is
considered void; as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have the effect of an
acquittal.23 Thus, the defense of double jeopardy will not lie in such a case.24

Accordingly, a review of a dismissal order of the Sandiganbayan granting an accuseds demurrer to

evidence may be done via the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65, based on the narrow
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.25 Mere allegations of
grave abuse of discretion, however, are not enough to establish this ground; so also, mere abuse of
discretion is not sufficient.26 On the petitioner lies the burden of demonstrating, plainly and distinctly,
all facts essential to establish its right to a writ of certiorari.27

In the present case, the petitioner particularly imputes grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for its grant of the demurrer to evidence, without requiring the presentation of
additional evidence and despite the lack of basis for the grant traceable to the special prosecutors
conduct. The special prosecutors conduct allegedly also violated the States due process rights.

There is grave abuse of discretion when the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary or despotic manner, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in the exercise of its judgment.28 An
act is done without jurisdiction if the public respondent does not have the legal power to act or where
the respondent, being clothed with the power to act, oversteps its authority as determined by
law,29 or acts outside the contemplation of law. For the grant of the present petition, the petitioner
must prove, based on the existing records, action in the above manner by the Sandiganbayan.

I. States right to due process

In People v. Leviste,30 we stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court;
in criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the
burden of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public
interest.31 The States right to be heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the public
prosecutor properly undertook his duties in pursuing the criminal action for the punishment of the
guilty.32

The prosecutors role in the administration of justice is to lay before the court, fairly and fully, every
fact and circumstance known to him or her to exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to
establish the guilt or innocence of the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or
presumption on what the judge may or is disposed to do.33 The prosecutor owes the State, the court
and the accused the duty to lay before the court the pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical
and meticulous attention, clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence
to the end that the courts mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the innocent may not suffer; and
that the guilty may not escape unpunished.34 In the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the
prosecutor has ample discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the
prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what evidence to present or who to call
as witness.35

The petitioner claims that the special prosecutor failed in her duty to give effective legal
representation to enable the State to fully present its case against the respondents, citing Merciales
v. Court of Appeals36 where we considered the following factual circumstances - (1) the public
prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was insufficient; (2) the
refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take the stand; (3) the
knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecutions evidence when the demurrer to
evidence was filed before it; and (4) the trial courts failure to require the presentation of additional
evidence before it acted on the demurrer to evidence. All these circumstances effectively resulted in
the denial of the States right to due process, attributable to the inaction of the public prosecutor
and/or the trial court.

Merciales was followed by Valencia v. Sandiganbayan,37 where we recognized the violation of the
States right to due process in criminal proceedings because of sufficient showing that the special
prosecutor haphazardly handled the prosecution. In upholding the prosecutions right to present
additional evidence under the circumstances, Valencia took into account the fact that the former
special prosecutor rested his case solely on the basis of a Joint Stipulation of Facts that was not
even signed by the accused.

These two cases, to our mind, not only show the existing factual considerations38 that led to the
conclusion that the public prosecutor willfully and deliberately failed to perform his mandated duty to
represent the States interest, but stress as well that there must be sufficient facts on record
supporting this conclusion. In the absence of these supporting facts, no conclusion similar to the
Merciales and Valencia outcomes can be reached.

The requirement for supporting factual premises finds complement in the general rule founded on
public policy39that the negligence or mistake of a counsel binds the client. While this rule admits of
exceptions40 (as when the gross negligence of a counsel resulted in depriving the client of due
process), the application of the exception likewise depends on a showing of facts on record
demonstrating a clear violation of the clients due process rights.

II. The factual premises cited in the petition and the issue of due process

In the present case, we find that the State was not denied due process in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan. There was no indication that the special prosecutor deliberately and willfully failed
to present available evidence or that other evidence could be secured. For purposes of clarity, we
shall address the instances cited in the petition as alleged proof of the denial of the States due
process rights, and our reasons in finding them inadequate.

First. The petitioner bewails the alleged lack of efforts by the special prosecutor to ascertain the last
known addresses and whereabouts, and to compel the attendance of Pablo C. Cueto, Ernesto M.
Jiao and Romeo F. Sison, UL officers who executed affidavits in connection with the alleged
anomalous fund transfers from MHS to UL.

The special prosecutor likewise allegedly did not present the records of the UL to show that the
sums under the Memoranda of Agreement were not received by UL (based on the affidavit of UL
Comptroller Cueto) and that no financial transactions really took place for the purchase of the motor
vehicles (based on the affidavit of UL Chief Accountant Jiao, as corroborated by the affidavit of UL
Administrative Assistant Sison).
We note that, other than making a claim that these instances demonstrate the serious nonfeasance
by the special prosecutor, the petitioner failed to offer any explanation showing how these instances
deprived the State of due process. An examination of the records shows that the affidavits of
Cueto,41 Jiao and Sison surfaced early on to prove the alleged anomalous fund transfers from MHS
to UL. The records further show that during the hearing of December 5, 1995 - when the special
prosecutor was asked by the presiding judge what she intended to do with these affidavits the
special prosecutor replied that she planned to present Jiao and Cueto who were the chief
accountant and the designated comptroller, respectively, of UL.42 The same records, however, show
that, indeed, an attempt had been made to bring these prospective witnesses to court; as early as
April 20, 1994, subpoenas had been issued to these three individuals and these were all returned
unserved because the subjects had RESIGNED from the service sometime in 1992, and their
present whereabouts were unknown.43

We consider at this point that these individuals executed their respective affidavits on the alleged
anomalous transactions between MHS and UL sometime in 1986; from that period on, and until the
actual criminal prosecution started in 1994, a considerable time had elapsed bringing undesirable
changes one of which was the disappearance of these prospective witnesses.

Significantly, no evidence exists or has been submitted showing that the special prosecutor willfully
and deliberately opted not to present these individuals. The petitioner also failed to show that the
whereabouts of these individuals could have been located by the exercise of reasonable diligence in
order to prove that the special prosecutor had been remiss in performing her duties. We can in fact
deduce from the allegations in the petition that even at present, the petitioner has not and cannot
ascertain the whereabouts of these prospective witnesses.

Further, the records show that the affidavits of these individuals (who denied the transfer of the
funds in the amounts of P21.6 Million, P3.8 Million and P17 Million from MHS to UL) were refuted by
contrary evidence of the prosecution itself. The records indicate that the special prosecutor
presented treasury warrants and disbursement vouchers issued in the name of UL, bearing the
respective amounts for transactions between MHS and UL.44

The special prosecutor admitted that the audit team failed to examine the records of UL to support
the prosecutions allegation of an anomalous fund transfer. COA Auditor Cortez admitted, too, that
the amounts (P21.6 Million and P3.8 Million) were transferred45 to UL46 and that a portion of the
amount of P17 Million, i.e.,P12.5 Million, was used to purchase 500 motorcycles and eight cars,
while the remaining amount of P4.5 Million was refunded by UL to MHS.47

Under these facts, and in the absence of indicators too that other persons could have testified, we
cannot give weight to the petitioners allegation that no efforts were exerted by the special
prosecutor. On the contrary, we find under the circumstances that the special prosecutor exerted
reasonable efforts to present these individuals in court, but failed to do so for reasons beyond her
control. One of these reasons appears to be the simple lack of concrete evidence of irregularities in
the respondents handling of the MHS funds.

Second. The petitioner alleged that the special prosecutor failed to present the resident auditor to
testify on the physical inventory of the vehicles, or to produce documents showing that an inspection
was conducted on the vehicles.

The prosecutions theory, as the records would show, was to prove that there had been
misappropriation of funds since the motor vehicles were registered in ULs name instead of the
MHS.48 In this regard, the special prosecutor presented COA Auditor Cortez who testified that the
audit team did not assail the existence of the motor vehicles and she also did not dispute that the
amount of P12.5 Million (out of P17 Million) was used to purchase 500 motorcycles and eight cars.
The witness stated that the audit team was more concerned with the documentation of the
disbursements made rather than the physical liquidation (inventory) of the funds.49 The witness
further explained that it was the Presidential Task Force which had the duty to keep track of the
existence of the motor vehicles.50 She reiterated that the audit team was only questioning the
registration of the vehicles; it never doubted that the vehicles were purchased.51

More importantly, COA Auditor Cortez stated that at the time the team made the audit examination in
April 1986, 500 registration papers supported the purchase of these motorcycles;52 none of the audit
team at that time found this documentation inadequate or anomalous.53 The witness also stated that
the Presidential Task Force gave the audit team a folder showing that P10.4 Million was used to
purchase the motorcycles and P2.1 Million was used to purchase the cars.54 Checks were presented
indicating the dates when the purchase of some of the motor vehicles was made.55 COA Auditor
Cortez also testified that 270 of these motorcycles had already been transferred by UL in the name
of MHS.56 She stated that all the documents are in order except for the registration of the motor
vehicles in the name of UL.57

Given these admissions regarding the existence of the motor vehicles, the presentation of the
resident auditor who would simply testify on the physical inventory of the motor vehicles, or that an
inspection had been conducted thereon, was unnecessary. Her presentation in court would not
materially reinforce the prosecutions case; thus, the omission to present her did not deprive the
State of due process. To repeat, the prosecutions theory of misappropriation was not based on the
fact that the funds were not used to purchase motor vehicles, in which case, the testimony of the
resident auditor would have had material implications. Rather, the prosecutions theory, as
established by the records, shows that the imputed misappropriation stemmed from the registration
of the motor vehicles in ULs name an administrative lapse in light of the relationship of UL to MHS
simply as an implementing agency.58

Third. Despite the Sandiganbayans warning on June 7, 1996 that the various checks covering the
cash advances for P40 Million were "photostatic" copies, the special prosecutor still failed to present
the certified copies from the legal custodian of these commercial documents.

The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for failing to present the original copies of the checks
drawn out of theP21.6 Million and P17 Million combination account from the United Coconut Planters
Bank (UCPB), as well as theP3.8 Million expense account with the same bank. The presentation
would have allegedly proven the misappropriation of these amounts.59

Records show that instead of presenting the original copies of these checks, the special prosecutor
tried to establish, through the testimony of COA Auditor Cortez, that these checks were photocopied
from the original checks in the possession of UCPB, which were obtained through the assistance of
the UL management.60 Thus, while the originals of these checks were not presented, COA Auditor
Cortez testified that the photostatic copies were furnished by the UCPB which had custody of the
original checks.61 Further, the witness also testified that at the time she made the examination of
these documents, the entries thereon were legible.62 She also presented a summary schedule of the
various micro film prints of the UCPB checks that she examined.63

At any rate, we observe that the defense never objected64 to the submission of the photostatic copies
of the UCPB checks as evidence, thus making the production of the originals dispensable. This was
our view in Estrada v. Hon. Desierto65 where we ruled that the production of the original may be
dispensed with if the opponent does not dispute the contents of the document and no other useful
purpose would be served by requiring its production. In such case, we ruled that secondary evidence
of the content of the writing would be received in evidence if no objection was made to its
reception.66 We note, too, that in addition to the defenses failure to object to the presentation of
photostatic copies of the checks, the petitioner failed to show that the presentation of the originals
would serve a useful purpose, pursuant to our ruling in Estrada.

We reiterate in this regard our earlier observation that other than enumerating instances in the
petition where the State was allegedly deprived of due process in the principal case, no explanation
was ever offered by the petitioner on how each instance resulted in the deprivation of the States
right to due process warranting the annulment of the presently assailed Sandiganbayan ruling.

Fourth. The petitioner faults the special prosecutor for making no effort to produce the "final audit
report" dated June 6, 1986, referred to in the last paragraph of the Affidavit67 dated June 10, 1987 of
COA Auditor Cortez.

The records show that although this final audit report dated June 6, 1986 was not presented in court,
the prosecution questioned her on the contents of this audit report since she had a hand in its
preparation. COA Auditor Cortez directly testified on the audit teams findings and examination,
which took three hearings to complete; the cross-examination of COA Auditor Cortez took two
hearings to complete; and subsequently, the Sandiganbayan ordered that a clarificatory hearing be
held with respect to COA Auditor Cortez testimony. In addition to her testimony, the special
prosecutor did present, too, other pieces of documentary evidence (from which the final audit report
was based) before the Sandiganbayan.

Under these circumstances, we are reluctant to consider the special prosecutors omission as
significant in the petitioners allegation of serious nonfeasance or misfeasance.

Fifth. The petitioner presents the special prosecutors failure to oppose the demurrer to evidence as
its last point and as basis for the applicability of the Merciales ruling.

The failure to oppose per se cannot be a ground for grave abuse of discretion. The real issue, to our
mind, is whether the special prosecutor had basis to act as she did. As the point-by-point
presentation above shows, the dismissal of the criminal cases cannot be attributed to any grossly
negligent handling by the special prosecutor. To begin with, the prosecutions case suffered from
lack of witnesses because, among others, of the time that elapsed between the act charged and the
start of the actual prosecution in 1994; and from lack of sufficient preparatory investigation
conducted, resulting in insufficiency of its evidence as a whole. In sum, in the absence of
circumstances approximating the facts of Merciales and Valencia, which circumstances the
petitioner failed to show, no basis exists to conclude that the special prosecutor grossly erred in
failing to oppose the demurrer to evidence.

Neither are we persuaded by the petitioners position that the special prosecutors Manifestation of
non-opposition to the demurrer needed to be submitted to, and approved by, her superiors.68 The
petitioners argument assumes that the special prosecutor lacked the necessary authority from her
superiors when she filed her non-opposition to the demurrers to evidence. This starting assumption,
in our view, is incorrect. The correct premise and presumption, since the special prosecutor is a
State delegate, is that she had all incidental and necessary powers to prosecute the case in the
States behalf so that her actions as a State delegate bound the State. We do not believe that the
State can have an unbridled discretion to disown the acts of its delegates at will unless it can clearly
establish that its agent had been grossly negligent69 or was guilty of collusion with the accused or
other interested party,70 resulting in the States deprivation of its due process rights as client-
principal.
Gross negligence exists where there is want, or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or
diligence, or the entire absence of care. It involves a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them.71 As the above discussions show, the State failed to clearly
establish the gross negligence on the part of the special prosecutor (or to show or even allege that
there was collusion in the principal case between the special prosecutor and the respondents) that
resulted in depriving the petitioner of its due process rights; and, consequently prevent the
application of the rule on double jeopardy. If at all, what the records emphasized, as previously
discussed, is the weakness of the prosecutions evidence as a whole rather than the gross
negligence of the special prosecutor. In these lights, we must reject the petitioners position.

We take this opportunity to remind the prosecution that this Court is as much a judge in behalf of an
accused-defendant whose liberty is in jeopardy, as it is the judge in behalf of the State, for the
purpose of safeguarding the interests of society.92 Therefore, unless the petitioner demonstrates,
through evidence and records, that its case falls within the narrow exceptions from the criminal
protection of double jeopardy, the Court has no recourse but to apply the finality-of-acquittal rule.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby DENY the petition.

Ivler vs. San Pedro

G.R. No. 172716November 17, 2010
FACTS:

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with two separate offenses: (1)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent
Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and
damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded
guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking
this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information for the second delict for placing him in
jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal
case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
 Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend
proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought
reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari
when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent; and

2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further
proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death
of respondent Ponces husband.

RULING:

The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same
offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid
information.

Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under
the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself
and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-
offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as
applied to Article 365.

These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible

under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are
thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any
disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for
quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-
crimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed
under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light
offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient
schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling. Petition granted.

Lejano vs People and People vs Webb

On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their
home in Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced that it had solved the crime. It
presented star-witness Jessica Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had witnessed the
crime. She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as the culprits. She also tagged police officer,
Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as an asset to the NBI by leading
the agency to criminals. Some of the said criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become
the darling of the NBI because of her contribution to its success. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals found that Alfaros direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by gruesome cross-
examination should be given a great weight in the decision of the case.

In Alfaros story, she stated that after she and the accused got high of shabu, she was asked to see
Carmela at their residence. After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion with her,
Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more drugs and plotted the gang rape on
Carmela. Webb, on the other hand, denied all the accusations against him with the alibi that during the
whole time that the crime had taken place, he was staying in the United States. He had apparently left
for the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27 October 1992. As documentary evidence, he
presented photocopies of his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from both the
Philippines and the US, Flights Passenger Manifest employment documents in the US during his stay
there and US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the Philippine DFA. Aside from
these documentary alibis, he also gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA and acquitted accused, namely: Hubert Webb,
Antonio Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo
Biong on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied
the prosecution due process of law; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as
lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in
the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses."
Issue:

Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may be reconsidered.

Ruling:

No, as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered for it places the accused under double
jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible, but the grounds are
exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravely abused its discretion,
resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any of such cases, the State may assail
the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.

Althou complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring pleas for
reconsideration under such exceptions. He did not specify that violations of due process and acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. Vizconde did not also
alleged that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. What the complainant actually
questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and assessment of the prosecution witnesses'
credibility. That the court committed grave error in finding Alfaro as not a credible witness. The
complaint wants the court to review the evidence anew and render another judgment based on such
evaluation which is not constitutionally allowed and therefore, the judgment of acquittal can no longer
be disturbed.

G.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, Petitioner,

vs.
PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN, Respondents.

DECISION

Tinga, J.:

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision2 dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution3 dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled, Pretzy-
Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan
and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial
Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the
crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to
Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:
That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a
10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut
shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby
hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong
who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the
instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of
Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is
registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage
of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-
mentioned.

An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner
was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5

On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed
a motion for leave of court to file an amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of
abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned
the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only
extracted from the car by the by-standers."7

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the
motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn.8 On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted
the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9

Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the
prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was
granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10 dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the
prosecutions failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless
imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11 dated 25 April 2005.

In the Order12 dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the
crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to
establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:

An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence
presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said
allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven.
It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.

xxxx

Nowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who
committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who
has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused
who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime.
The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the
time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has
been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the
allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in
evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were
not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor
presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not
established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence
was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it
was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to
Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified
only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the
incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime
and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled
this case from its inception.

xxxx

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecutions [evidence] conclusively show
that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the
proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the
defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and
can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane
of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2
shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the rear left portion
of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out
together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting
the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards
the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of
the accused.

xxxx

Every criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two thingsthe fact of the crime, i.e.,
the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that
the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove
these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the
accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO
DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary
liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized
representative.

SO ORDERED.13

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14 alleging that the MTCs
dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution.
Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed
as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of
the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.
In the order15 dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the
remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC
ruled that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it
failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that
the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to
the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC
however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accuseds civil liability, especially since the
judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and
resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is
AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings
on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.

SO ORDERED.16

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack
of merit in the order17 dated 12 September 2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and
resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties
damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the
MTC are

null and void. In so ruling, the appellate court cited Tulor v. Garcia (correct title of the case is Cuyos
v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or
physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case
is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless
imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support
in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure,
which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property
through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceed P10,000.00. As there was no
proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount
ofP1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive portion
of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of
the merits of the case.

SO ORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,20 arguing that jurisdiction over
the case is determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on
Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the
RTCs jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21 It reiterated that it is the
RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious
killing as well as abandonment of the victims.
In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal
case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which
confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal
negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally
unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also
faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.

The petition has merit. It should be granted.

The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense
charged pertained to the RTC.

Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29
December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however
declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but
aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however
that respondents attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was
unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to withdraw their motion
to amend the information. The information filed before the trial court had remained
unamended.23Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the
original Information without any aggravating circumstance.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period toprision correccional in its medium period. When such reckless
imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article
imposes upon the defendant the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less
serious physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or
negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is
committed.24 Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in
view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed
either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were
he to be found guilty, is prision correccional in its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4
years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).

Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is
conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof.26 When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2)
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691
extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It
explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall
have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for reckless
imprudence punishable with prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods should fall
within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the
same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal
case.27 Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the
case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.

As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the
offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such
as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted,
it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant
conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to
an acquittal of the accused."28 Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence
may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.29 But while the
dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still
reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual
findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse
and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial
court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely
abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in
resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules
of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint. The MTCs conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby
disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records
also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.

The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the
matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil
aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of
the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. 31 However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a
finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist32 or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.34 This is because when the accused
files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects
of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court
should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the
accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil
aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35
A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings
that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not
commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished
by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence
which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible
for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime
as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck
at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is
the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear
left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly
establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need
to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioners
acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and
Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case
No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the
offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

People vs Domingo

FACTS:
The Court of Appeals found appellant Jesus Domingo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
attempted murder, frustrated murder, and frustrated homicide.
On or about the 29th day of March 2000, complainant and her children were sleeping inside their house
when Domingo when she was awakened when the accused entered their kitchen armed with a screwdriver
and a kitchen knife. He stabbed the complainant and her children. Raquel Indon, complainant, pleaded the
appellant to spare her daughter but teh appellant answered Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na. Two of her
children died.
Five years passed, the defense counsel said that nine days prior the commission of the crime, appellant
suffered sleeplessness, lack of appetite, and nervousness. Occasionally, a voice would tell him to kill.
Appellant averred that when he regained his memory, one week had already passed since the incidents,
and he was already detained. They submitted a psychiatric evaluation, and psychological examination as
evidence that appellant suffered from Schizophrenia, a mental disorder characterized by the presence of
delusions and or hallucinations, disorganized speech and behavior, poor impulse control and low
frustration tolerance. The doctor could not find out when the appellant started to suffer this illness, but
the symptoms of Schizophrenia which were manifested by the patient indicated that he suffered from the
illness six months before the Center examined the appellant. The counsel of the appellant raised the
defense of insanity of the appellant.

ISSUE: WON the appellant is exempt from criminal liability on the ground of insanity.
HELD:
No, the defense of insanity is unmeritorious. Insanity exempts the accused only when the finding of
mental disorder refers to appellants state of mind immediately before or at the very moment of the
commission of the crime. This was not the case in the issue at bar, what was presented was proof of
appellants mental disorder that existed five years after the incident, but not at the time the crimes were
committed. The RTC also considered it crucial that appellant had the presence of mind to respond to
Raquel Indons pleas that her daughters be spared by saying, Ngayon pa, nagawa ko na.
Even assuming that nine days prior the crime the appellant was hearing voices ordering him to kill people,
while suggestive of an abnormal mental condition, cannot be equated with a total deprivation of will or an
absence of the power to discern. Mere abnormality of mental faculties will not exclude imputability.
The law presumes every man to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes that all acts are
voluntary, and that it is improper to presume that acts are done unconsciously. Thus, a person accused of
a crime who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of proving beyond reasonable
doubt that he or she was insane immediately before or at the moment the crime was committed.

G.R. No. 127772 March 22, 2001

ROBERTO P. ALMARIO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENTINO A. TUASON, JR., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
AND RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORP., respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal by certiorari seeks to set aside the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated November
21, 19961and of January 7, 1997,2 in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, which denied the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction instituted by petitioner against the Hon.
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 139, Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), and the People of the
Philippines.3 Involved in said petition were the orders of Judge Jaime D. Discaya and Judge Tuason
dated October 25, 19954 and April 11, 1996,5 respectively, issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-
62 which petitioner claimed were violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy but
which respondent appellate court upheld. 1wphi 1.nt

The factual antecedents in these cases, as culled by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Petitioner is one of the accused in Criminal Case No. 91-6761, for estafa thru falsification of
public document, and Criminal Case No. 91-6762, for estafa, with respondent RCBC as the
offended party in both cases.

The informations were filed on October 22, 1992. After petitioners arraignment on March 18,
1992, pre-trial was held, which was terminated on October 21, 1994. Thereafter, the cases
were scheduled for continuous trial in December 1994, and in January and February 1993,
but the hearings were cancelled because the Presiding Judge of the court was elevated to
this Court and no trial judge was immediately appointed/detailed thereto.
The hearing set for June 21, 1995, was postponed for lack of proof of notice to all the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, upon request of private
prosecutor, and without objection on the part of petitioners counsel, postponed to July 24,
1995. However, for lack of proof of service of notice upon petitioners three co-accused, the
hearing set for July 24, 1995, was likewise cancelled and the cases were reset for trial on
September 8 and 25, 1995.

On September 8, 1995, private complainant failed to appear despite due notice. Hence, upon
motion of petitioners counsel, respondent court issued the following order:

When this case was called for hearing, private complainant is not in Court despite
notice. Atty. Alabastro, counsel for accused Roberto Almario, moved that the case
against the latter be dismissed for failure to prosecute and considering that accused
is entitled to a speedy trial.

WHEREFORE, the case against accused Roberto Almario is hereby dismissed. With
respect to accused Spouses Susensio and Guillerma Cruz and Dante Duldulao,
1st warrant be issued for their arrest.

SO ORDERED.

Upon motion of the private prosecutor and despite the opposition of petitioner, respondent
court in its Order dated October 25, 1995, reconsidered the Order of September 8, 1995.
The pertinent portion of said order reads as follows:

In Hipolito vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 108478-79, Feb. 21, 1993) the Supreme
Court held that the right of the accused to a speedy trial is deemed violated only
when the proceedings is attended by vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or
when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to (e) lapse
without the party having his case tried. At least this right is relative, taking into (the)
account the circumstances of each case.

There has been no vexations, capricious and oppressive delays, or unjustified

postponements of the trial, or a long time is allowed to (e) lapse without the party
having his case tried which would constitute, according to the above case, violation
of the right of the accused to speedy trial. After arraignment of the accused, the pre-
trial was set and the same was ordered terminated on October 25, 1994. On June
21, 1995, the case was set for initial presentation of evidence of the proof of service
of the notices to the accused and their respective counsels. On July 17, 1995,
counsel for the accused did not interpose objection to private prosecutor's motion to
postpone due to absence of witnesses. On July 24, 1995, the trial could not proceed
as, being a joint trial of three criminal cases, the three other accused were not
present. There were only three settings from the date of termination of the pre-trial
for the prosecution to present evidence and the same were postponed with valid
reasons.

The dismissal in the Order dated September 8, 1995, did not result in the acquittal of
the accused since the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, and
its dismissal having been made upon the motion of the accused there is no double
jeopardy.
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order dated September 8, 1995 dismissing
the charge/case against the accused Roberto Almario is reconsidered and set aside.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the above order. Acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 9, 1995, respondent Judge issued his assailed Order of
April 11, 1996, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 9 November

1995 is hereby denied for lack of merit considering that, based on the foregoing
facts, the proceedings in this case have not been prolonged unreasonably nor were
there oppressive delays and unjustified postponements in violation of the Accused's
constitutional right to speedy trial.

SO ORDERED.6

Aggrieved by the foregoing order, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction against the presiding judge of Branch 139 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, RCBC and the People of the Philippines. In a resolution
dated November 21, 1996, respondent appellate court denied the petition due course and dismissed
it for lack of merit. Petitioner's motion to reconsider it was likewise denied for lack of merit in a
resolution dated January 7, 1997.

Before us, petitioner maintains that the appellate court erred in sustaining the trial court which, in
turn, had gravely abused its discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, when it reconsidered the
order which dismissed the criminal cases against him. Petitioner asserts that this reversal was a
violation of the doctrine of double jeopardy, as the criminal cases were initially dismissed for an
alleged violation of petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial.7

The issue for resolution is whether, in petitioner's cases, double jeopardy had set in so that
petitioner's constitutional right against such jeopardy had been violated.

Article III, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his
express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or
other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the
accused had leaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.

x x x
Clearly, jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after
arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or
acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.8

In the cases at bar, the order of dismissal based on a violation of the right to speedy trial was made
upon motion by counsel for petitioner before the trial court. It was made at the instance of the
accused before the trial court, and with his express consent. Generally, the dismissal of a criminal
case resulting in acquittal made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own motion will
not place the accused in double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two exceptions, namely:
insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy trial.9Double jeopardy may attach when
the proceedings have been prolonged unreasonably, in violation of the accused's right to speedy
trial.10

Here we must inquire whether there was unreasonable delay in the conduct of the trial so that
violation of the right to speedy trial of the accused, herein petitioner, resulted. For it must be recalled
that in the application of the constitutional guaranty of the right to speedy disposition of cases,
particular regard must also be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.11 Both the
trial court and the appellate court noted that after pre-trial of petitioner's case was terminated on
October 21, 1994, continuous trial was set in the months of December 1994, and January and
February of 1995. The scheduled hearings, however, were cancelled when the presiding judge was
promoted to the Court of Appeals, and his successor as trial judge was not immediately appointed,
nor another judge detailed to his sala. 1w phi 1.nt

Records show that on June 21, 1995, hearing was postponed for lack of proof of notice to the
accused and their counsel. The hearing on July 17, 1995, was postponed upon motion of the private
prosecutor without objection from petitioner's counsel. The hearing set on July 24, 1995 was reset,
despite the presence of petitioner and his counsel, because of lack of proof of service of notice to
co-accused Dante Duldulao and the spouses Susencio and Guillerma Cruz.12

As observed by respondent appellate court, delay in the trial was due to circumstances beyond the
control of the parties and of the trial court. The first and third postponements were clearly justified on
the ground of lack of notice to accused, co-accused, and/or counsel. Another was made without
objection from petitioner's counsel. However, on September 8, 1995, counsel for petitioner moved
for dismissal of this case, because of the absence of the private prosecutor due to a severe attack of
gout and arthritis, although he had sent his associate lawyer acceptable to the court.13 All in all, there
were only three re-setting of hearing dates. Thus, after a closer analysis of these successive events,
the trial court realized that the dates of the hearings were transferred for valid grounds. Hence, the
trial court set aside its initial order and reinstated the cases against petitioner,14 which order the
appellate court later sustained.

That there was no unreasonable delay of the proceedings is apparent from the chronology of the
hearings with the reasons for their postponements or transfers. Petitioner could not refute the
appellate court's findings that petitioner's right to speedy trial had not been violated. As both the trial
and appellate courts have taken pains to demonstrate, there was no unreasonable, vexatious and
oppressive delay in the trial. Hence, there was no violation of petitioner's right to speedy trial as
there were no unjustified postponements which had prolonged the trial for unreasonable lengths of
time.15

There being no oppressive delay in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we
concur with the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that petitioner's right to speedy trial had
not been infringed. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial had not been violated, there was
no reason to support the initial order of dismissal.

It follows that petitioner cannot invoke the constitutional right against double jeopardy when that
order was reconsidered seasonably.16 For as petitioner's right to speedy trial was not transgressed,
this exception to the fifth element of double jeopardy - that the defendant was acquitted or convicted,
or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused -
was not met. The trial court's initial order of dismissal was upon motion of petitioner's counsel, hence
made with the express consent of petitioner. That being the case, despite the reconsideration of said
order, double jeopardy did not attach. As this Court had occasion to rule in People vs. Tampal, (244
SCRA 202) reiterated in People vs. Leviste,17 where we overturned an order of dismissal by the trial
court predicated on the right to speedy trial -

It is true that in an unbroken line of cases, we have held that the dismissal of cases on the
ground of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that would bar further prosecution
of the accused for the same offense. It must be stressed, however, that these dismissals
were predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. These cases are not
applicable to the petition at bench considering that the right of the private respondents to
speedy trial has not been violated by the State. For this reason, private respondents cannot
invoke their right against double jeopardy.

Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals were thus not in error when they allowed reinstatement
of the cases against petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-42312, dated November
21, 1996 and January 7, 1997, which upheld the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
139, in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-6761-62, are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.