SECTION 14 RIGHT TO COUNSEL

15. 46 VILLANUEVA V PEOPLE (644 SCRA 358 not 356 as seen in case list -.-)
FACTS: In this case, it was found out by the court that petitioner Villanueva through her former
counsel, had taken a wrong procedure. After the RTC rendered an adverse decision, she should have
sought relief from the Sandiganbayan in conformity with R.A. No. 8249 Under R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. Thus, in this case, the CA was correct in dismissing the
appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the gross negligence of petitioners counsel violated her constitutional right
RULING: (Qualified no, issue cant be answered categoricallyread on) In light of what has been
shown, the Court is inclined to suspend the rules to give the petitioner a chance to seek relief from
the Sandiganbayan. The Court likewise makes exception to the general rule that the mistakes and
negligence of counsel bind the client.
It bears stressing at this point, that the rule which states that the mistakes of counsel bind the client
may not be strictly followed where observance of it would result in outright deprivation of the clients
liberty or property, or where the interests of justice so require.
It is highly unjust for her to lose her liberty only because of the gross negligence of her former
counsel.
At this juncture, the Court takes opportunity to state that it is not countenancing the inexcusable
negligence committed by petitioners former counsel, Atty. Santos M. Baculi, in handling petitioners
case. He is, accordingly, warned to be more careful and meticulous in the discharge of his duties to
his clients.
Every lawyer should, therefore, serve his client in a meticulous, careful and competent manner. He is
bound to protect the clients interests and to do all steps necessary therefor as his client reasonably
expects him to discharge his obligations diligently.
ABSENCE OF VIOLATION
15.47 PEOPLE V AQUINO GR 129288
FACTS: Aquino was charged with a special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Aquino prays for
the remand of the case to the lower court because he was denied of his right to the assistance of
counsel due to the gross incompetence of his previous counsel who was less than zealous in
defending his interest. His counsel confined his defense to the illegal arrest subsequent to
arraignment and disregarded his plea to present other witnesses.
ISSUE: Whether Aquinos right to assistance of counsel was violated
RULING: NO. Court said that: Aquino was assisted by a counsel and if he had difficulties with this
counsel, he should have informed the trial court of this fact. He had the opportunity to do so, yet he
chose to keep quiet. He could have insisted on presenting his own version of the events but he did
nothing, thereby clearly indicating his full agreement with his counsels chosen strategy. Besides, his
conviction was not based on the weakness of the evidence for the defense but on the strength of the
prosecutions case.
15.48 VILLANUEVA V PEOPLE GR 135098
FACTS: Petitioner Villanueva was a finance officer of the Philippine Constabulary (now Philippine
National Police), he dabbled in money-lending. He issued checks to complainant, Rafer which were
dishonored by the bank and stamped Account Closed. Petitioner was charged with violations of BP
Blg. 22 aka Bouncing Checks Law. Petitioner was found guilty and belatedly filed for an MR before
the CA. The CA denied the MR because, inter alia it was filed out of time. Petitioner insist that the MR
should be given due course because his former counsel withdrew from the case. After having
difficulty of finding a new counsel, he hired Atty. Ibay as counsel de parte and the latter filed Motion
for Extension of Time to File Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner contends that this procedural
blunder by his lawyer, in effect, violated his constitutional right to counsel.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners right to counsel was violated
RULING: NO. The records show petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice in the trial court,
and also by counsel de parte before the Court of Appeals. When his new lawyer filed his motion for
reconsideration out of time, there was no violation of petitioners right to counsel.
Further, a client is bound by the acts of his counsel. The rule extends even to the mistakes
and negligence committed by the latter, except only when such mistakes or neglect would result in
serious injustice to the client. In our view, petitioner here has failed to present any cogent reason
why this Court should find an exception in his case. There is no showing that Atty. Ibay was so grossly
incompetent or so grossly negligent when he filed a tardy motion for reconsideration on petitioners
behalf. In fact, it could be said petitioner was the one who should be faulted, having hired Atty. Ibay
when the period to move for reconsideration had run out. A party cannot blame his counsel for
negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect.
PRESENCE OF VIOLATION
15.49 PEOPLE V NADERA (342 SCRA 490)
FACTS: Accused was found guilty of four counts of rape of his minor daughters and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for one count of rape and death for each of the remaining
three counts. Accused contends that among others, his counsel Atty. Monolo Brotonel was cavalier. It
is discernible in (a) his refusal to cross examine a witness; (b) the manner in which he conducted
cross examination; and, (c) his failure not only to present evidence for the accused but also to inform
the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. Thus, the accused right to counsel was allegedly
violated.
ISSUE: Whether the right to counsel was violated?
RULING: YES. The right to counsel must be more than just the presence of a lawyer in the
courtroom or the mere propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel
means that the accused is amply accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who
commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts accordingly. It means an efficient and
truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory representation. Measured by this
standard, the defense counsels conduct in this case falls short of the quality of advocacy
demanded of him, considering the gravity of the offense charged and the finality of the penalty.
A glaring example of his manifest lack of enthusiasm for his client's cause is his decision not to
cross examine the witness.
15.50 CALLANGAN V PEOPLE (493 SCRA 269)
FACTS: Petitioner was found guilty of the crime of perjury. She filed a timely motion for new trial on
the ground that she was deprived of her day in court because of the gross negligence of her counsel,
Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, and his utter lack of diligence in the performance of his duty to represent her
in every stage of the suit. Her counsel, inter alia, failed to: file the demurrer to evidence, failed to
inform client of such failure to file, failure to attend the hearing, failure to seek proper relief and
failure to appear of promulgation of judgment. MTC denied the motion for new trial because the
ground upon it was based was not in the Rules of Court for new trial in criminal cases.
ISSUE: Whether the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion
RULING: NO. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of MTC. HOWEVER, in view of the
circumstances of this case, outright deprivation of liberty will be the consequence of petitioners
criminal conviction based solely on the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, to prevent a miscarriage
of justice and to give meaning to the due process clause of the Constitution, the Court deems it wise
to allow petitioner to present evidence in her defense.
The rule that the negligence of counsel binds the client admits of exceptions. The recognized
exceptions are: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law, (2) when its application will result in outright deprivation of the clients liberty or property or
(3) where the interests of justice so require. In such cases, courts must step in and accord relief to a
party-litigant.
The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the
nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without
counsel. Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty without affording her the right
to be assisted by counsel is to deny her due process
RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
15.51 PEOPLE V REGALA (L-23693) (113 SCRA 490)
FACTS: Defendants Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores were charged with the crime of murder with
assault upon an agent of a person in authority in an information filed before the CFI of Masbate. It is
contended that the appellant cannot be convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault
upon an agent of a person in authority. Because the information filed against appellant did not allege
the essential elements of assault that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the
assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. Therefore, it cannot be validly claimed
without violating the accuseds right to be informed of the charges against them.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of the accuseds rights to be informed
RULING: YES. The fact that the crime of assault was established by the evidence of the prosecution
without any objection on the part of the accused cannot likewise cure the aforestated defect in the
information so as to validly convict the accused thereof; because to do so would be convicting the
accused of a crime not properly alleged in the body of the information in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
15.52 ENRILE V SALAZAR (186 SCRA 217)
FACTS: Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested, the information filed against him charged him of murder and
frustrated murder committed on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. His counsel insist
that, inter alia, that such criminal offense does not exist in the statute books and also; that Enrile
arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of probable cause, both violative of his right to be
informed and right against unlawful arrests.
ISSUE: Whether Enriles right to information was violated
Whether Enriles right against unlawful arrest was violated
RULING: NO. The Court rules that the information filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an
offense. Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion with murder and
multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging simple rebellion. The plaint of
petitioners counsel that he is charged with a crime that does not exist in the statute books, while
technically correct so far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with other
offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric.
NO. Petitioner claims that the warrant of arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes
after the case was raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter sufficient time to
personally go over the voluminous records of the preliminary investigation. Merely because said
respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with
that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that
single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed.
15.53 PEOPLE V TAGUBA (229 SCRA 188)
FACTS: Enrique Taguba and Mirafe Taguba were both charged with eight counts of illegal recruitment
and three counts of estafa in separate informations. It is contended that the appellants cannot be
convicted of illegal recruitment on a large scale because only two of the complainants, Jesus Garcia
and Elena Santiago, categorically testified that their recruitment came after February 10, 1986. This
was the date when P.D. 2018, the law defining and penalizing illegal recruitment in a large scale,
took effect. Thus, P.D. 2018 cannot apply to the appellants retroactively as it would be an ex post
facto law as to them as such would constitute a violation of the accuseds right to be informed.
ISSUE: Whether the contention is valid
RULING: YES. An accused can only be penalized for the offense specified in the information or
necessarily included in such offense.Moreover, each of the eight informations for illegal
recruitment charged the appellants with illegally recruiting only one person. It is a basic right of the
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and, if he is found
guilty, to be penalized only for the offense specified in the information or necessarily included in
such offense. Under the decree, illegal recruiting on a large scale can take place only when it is
committed against three or more persons, individually or as a group.
15.54 PEOPLE V BARTE (230 SCRA 401)
FACTS: Barte was charged with Murder but convicted by the trial court of Murder With Use of
Unlicensed Firearm, pursuant to P.D. 1866. It is contended that the trial court of convicting the
accused of Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm under P.D. 1866, considering that nowhere in the
Information is it alleged that he used an unlicensed firearm. The Information merely states that the
abovenamed accused, armed with a short firearm, with deliberate intent to kill. Consequently, the
accused can only be declared guilty of Murder.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred
RULING: YES. Court said that it cannot agree with the trial court that the accused should be
convicted of Murder with Use of Unlicensed Firearm under P.D. 1866. Even if the prosecution has
established that accused-appellant was not legally issued any firearm to qualify the crime to Murder
with Use of Unlicensed Firearm, we cannot convict him for this particular offense as that would
violate a fundamental constitutional precept, i.e., that the accused shall have the right to be fully
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Consequently, the accused can only
be declared guilty of Murder.
15.55 PEOPLE V VITOR (245 SCRA 392)
FACTS: Accused was indicted for the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City.
The Court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of two separate offenses of
RAPE defined and penalized under the RPC. It is now contended by both the defense and the
prosecution that the court a quo erred in convicting appellant of two counts of rape because the
information charges him with only one act of rape.
ISSUE: Whether the accused should only be held liable for one act of rape
RULING: YES, otherwise the accuseds right to information is violated. There can only be one
conviction for rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows five
separate acts of forcible sexual intercourse. Indeed, the information, which we have purposely
quoted at the beginning of this opinion, charges only one felony of rape, hence, appellant cannot be
held liable for more than what he was charged with. There can only be one conviction for rape if the
information charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows five separate acts of forcible
sexual intercourse. Corollarily, the award for civil liability ex delicto should also be for and correspond
to only one criminal offense.
15.56 SABINIANO V CA (249 SCRA 24)
FACTS: Isagani Sabiniano and Rodolfo Martinez were charged with the crime of Malversation of
Public Funds through Falsification of Public Document in an information filed with the lower court
however, he was found guilty of Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document.
ISSUE: Whether the convictions were valid?
RULING: 1) As to Isagani, NO. Evidence showed that his participation was in line with his official
duties and in obedience of a superior, thus, erroneous to convict him for the crime in the information
for such violated his right to be informed of the charges against him.
2) As to Rodolfo, YES. The courts below correctly convicted petitioner of estafa thru
falsification of public documents instead of malversation thru falsification of public documents, the
crime for which he was charged in the information. Estafa is included as a less serious offense than,
and cognate to, malversation.
15.57 PEOPLE V REYES (242 SCRA 264)
FACTS: Appellant Thelma Reyes and her husband was found guilty of Illegal Recruitment defined and
penalized under Article 38, P.D. No. 442 aka Labor Code of the Philippines. Appellant contends that
the trial court erred in not considering the fact that there are only 2 complainants in the information
filed against the accused hence they cannot be prosecuted under Article 38 P.D. No. 442 which is
illegal recruitment committed on a large scale.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction is valid
RULING: NO. In this case the information against appellant mentioned only the 2 complainants as
having been illegally recruited by appellant and her husband. The trial court, however, held appellant
guilty of illegal recruitment on a large scale because aside from 2 complainants, appellant and her
husband allegedly recruited 4 others.
HOWEVER, a conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of
illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually or as a group. In this case, only the
2 complainants were stated in the information. To allow otherwise would violate the accuseds
constitutional right to information of the charges against her.
15.58 PEOPLE V LEGASPI (246 SCRA 206)
FACTS: Appellants in this case was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with double
homicide. 2 informations were filed, the first one charged the accused with double murder while the
second one charged the accused with violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti-Carnapping Act.) Appellant
Pamela asserts that they were wrongly convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with double
homicide because they can only be convicted for crimes in alleged in the informations.
ISSUE: Whether Pamelas contention is correct
RULING: YES, Court found it with merit. While the trial court can hold a joint trial of two or more
criminal cases and can render a consolidated decision, it cannot convict the accused of a complex
crime constitutive of the various crimes alleged in the two informations.Appellants were charged
with two separate informations, one for double murder (and the other for violation of R.A. No. 6539.
Their conviction can only be limited to the crime alleged or necessarily included in the allegations in
the separate informations. What controls is the description of the offense, as alleged in the
information. Thus, the accused were deprived of their constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14).
15.59 PEOPLE V RAMOS (245 SCRA 405)
FACTS: Accused was convicted beyond reasonable doubt for two crimes of rape. Accused interposed
the instant appeal wherein it is argued that conviction for two counts of rape is improper because it
is premised on improbable and inconsistent testimony of private complainant and because the
information charged only one count of rape.
ISSUE: Whether the contention of the accused is valid
RULING: YES. Where the information charges the commission of only one act of rape, the accused
can be convicted of only one crime of rape even if the evidence shows that two separate acts of rape
were committed.however, the contention of accused-appellant that he cannot be convicted of two
crimes of rape is well-taken. A reading of the information clearly shows that accused-appellant was
charged with the commission of only one act of rape. He can, therefore, be convicted of only one
crime of rape even if the evidence shows that two separate acts of rape were committed
15.60 PEOPLE V NAMAYAN (246 SCRA 646)
FACTS: Namayan was convicted of rape for having carnal knowledge with complainant Margie Pagaygay,
a woman deprived of reason and mentally retarded, against her will, by means of violence and
intimidation. Evidence showed that there were 3 acts of rape but the information only charged the
accused with 1 act.

ISSUE: Whether the accused can be convicted of 3 acts of rape

RULING: NO. While the evidence shows 3 acts of rape, there can be prosecution for only one,
because the information charges only one offense. Violative of the right to be informed of the
natures of the charges against him.
15.61 PECHO V PEOPLE (262 SCRA 518)
FACTS: Petitioner was guilty of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official
and commercial documents. SC held that he could not be convicted violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019, as amendedbecause the said section penalizes only consummated offenses and the
offense charged in this case was not consummated. He could, nevertheless, be convicted of the
complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents, which
is necessarily included in the crime charged. Petitioner seasonably filed An MR on the ground that
after having been acquitted of the violation of the special law, he could not be convicted anymore of
attempted estafa through falsification of official and commercial documents. In other words, his
acquittal of the crime charged precludes conviction for the complex crime of attempted estafa
through falsification of official and commercial documents, because both offenses arose from the
same overt act as alleged in the information in Criminal Case. The Office of the Solicitor General
rejects the theory of the petitioner and submits that the information in this case contains the
essential ingredients of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents; therefore,
the petitioner could be convicted of the complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of
public and commercial documents without violating Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution on
the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
ISSUE: Whether the accuseds right to information will be violated is he is convicted of the complex
crime
RULING: NO. There is absolutely no merit in the petitioners claim that he could not be convicted of
the said crime without offending his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
The right to be informed has the following objectives: First. To furnish the accused with such
a description of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense; second, to avail
himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause;
and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in
law to support a conviction, if one should be had. In order that this requirement may be satisfied,
facts must be stated; not conclusions of law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent; these
must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable particularity of time, place, names (plaintiff or
defendant), and circumstances. In short, the complaint must contain a specific allegation of every
fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the crime charged.
It follows that an accused may be convicted of a crime which, although not the one charged,
is necessarily included in the latter. This is pursuant to Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court.
15.62 PEOPLE V LAURENTE (255 SCRA 543)
FACTS: RTC of Pasig found Laurente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Highway Robbery
with Homicide, defined and penalized under P.D. No. 532. It is contended that Laurente cannot be
validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No. 532, because a robbery
committed on a Philippine highway by persons who are not members of the proscribed lawless
elements or directed only against a specific, intended, or preconceived victim, is not a violation of
P.D. No. 532. The amended information shows, that except for the emphasis of the place where the
robbery was committed, i.e., a highway, the charge is actually for robbery with homicide as defined
and penalized under Article 294(1) of the RPC.
ISSUE: Whether Laurente can be convicted of robbery with homicide as provided in the amended
information
RULING: YES. Laurente cannot be validly convicted for highway robbery with homicide under P.D. No.
532 but he can be convicted of robbery with homicide. On the matter of an accuseds right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, it is elementary that what determines the
offense charged is not the characterization made by the prosecutor who prepared the information,
but the allegations in the indictment.
15.63 PEOPLE V ROSARE (264 SCRA 398)
FACTS: In an information filed before the RTC of Legazpi, Rosare was charged with having raped
Rosalina Orubia, a 30-year old mental retardate, the trial court rendered judgment finding Rosare
guilty of the crime of statutory rape. The accused appealed, contending that the information filed
against him alleges carnal knowledge through force, whereas his conviction was based on the
finding that the victim is a mental retardate which fact is not alleged in the information nor
sufficiently established by substantial evidence. Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of
statutory rape because the fact that the victim was a mental retardate was never alleged in the
information and, absent this element, the acts charged negate the commission of the offense for
which he was convicted by the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether the contention is valid
RULING: NO. In the information filed against the accused, it was clearly stated that the offended
party is suffering from mental retardation. We hold, therefore, that this should be deemed a
substantial compliance with the constitutional mandate that an accused be informed of the nature
of the charge against him. More importantly, appellant cannot feign ignorance of the victims mental
condition considering that they are first cousins and very close in their association, aside from the
fact that appellant lives only around half a kilometer away from the house of the victim. The element
of surprise on the part of the defense can definitely not be invoked in this case, hence it cannot be
said that appellant was in any way deprived of the opportunity to adequately prepare for his defense.
HOWEVER, the accused accused cannot be held liable for statutory rape where the information filed
does not contain any averment with regard to the age of the victimthe age of the victim is an
essential element. Notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of rape.
15.64 PEOPLE V EVANGELISTA (256 SCRA 611)
FACTS: Evangelista was found guilty of murder and illegal possession of firearm. The accused posit
that the trial court gravely erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
murder and illegal possession of firearm charged in two separate informations. The information
charged accused-appellant with simple illegal possession of firearm but the trial court found him
guilty of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866, after finding that
accused-appellant had used an unlicensed firearm in killing.
ISSUE: Whether the trial court erred
RULING: YES in so far as convicting the accused for use of unlicensed firearm only. The use of an
unlicensed firearm in the commission of murder is a qualifying circumstance and must be
specifically alleged in the information, otherwise the accused cannot be sentenced to death for
illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form. Consequently, it must be specifically alleged in
the information, otherwise the accused cannot be sentenced to death for illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form without violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him
15.65 PEOPLE V CRUZ (259 SCRA 109)
FACTS: Accused Cruz appeals the judgment of the lower court finding him guilty of rape. Because,
according to his counsel, it appears from the records that the accused did not succeed with having
sexual intercourse with the victim on April 25, 1991. And later on, the victim testified saying that she
was referring to incidents that took place prior to April 25, 1991 and that the rape which occurred on
April 25 was not consummated.
ISSUE: Whether the conviction of the accused was correct
RULING: NO. Due process demands that the accused in a criminal case should be informed of the
nature of the offense with which he is charged before he is put on trialan accused cannot be
convicted of rape where the evidence shows that the rape was committed on some other date
different from the date indicated in the information.It is clear from Mary Janes testimony that
accused-appellant succeeded in raping her in the past, but not on April 25, 1991. Accused-appellant
cannot be convicted for consummated rape on the basis of such evidence as the complaint
specifically refers to the offense committed on April 25, 1991. To convict him for an offense not
alleged in the complaint or information will violate such right.
15.66 PEOPLE V DE GUZMAN (265 SCRA 228)
FACTS: An information was filed against Gener de Guzman for rape, he was found guilty. During re-
direct examination, the victim testified that she was raped 3 times which was inconsistent with her
previous statement saying that the act was only done once which is what was reflected in the
information filed before the court.
ISSUE: Whether the accused can validly be held liable for 3 acts of rape
RULING: NO. Consistent with the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he was chargedthere
can only be one conviction for rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence
shows three separate acts of sexual intercourse.What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two
acts of attempted rape and one consummated rape, committed in light of the testimony of Gilda. The
information, however, charged the accused with only one act of rape; hence, There can only be one
conviction for rape if the information charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows three
separate acts of sexual intercourse.
15.67 SALUD IMSON-SOUWEHA V RONDEZ (279 SCRA 258)
FACTS: Complainant Souweha charged respondent Atty. Rondez of being a privy, or instrumental, in
the forgery of her signature appearing in the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of her deceased
parents. However, the Court agreed with the IBPs finding that respondent, in essence, acted in good
faith in connection with his participation in/approval of the extrajudicial settlement. However,
respondent was reprimanded when the investigating commissioner found out that Souwehas
deceased parent and children became close family friends and clients of the Atty. Rondez
ISSUE: Whether the reprimand was valid
RULING: NO. It is improper for a penalty to be imposed on a respondent not on the basis of the acts
complained of but on account of the motu proprio finding of the investigating commissioner that the
respondent is guilty of having represented conflicting interests Souweha late fathers two sets of
children (from legal wife and common law wife). This cannot be done without seriously violating the
very fundamental and constitutionally protected right of a person to be informed of the nature of the
charge for which he is being held accountable
15.68 PEOPLE V MANANSALA (273 SCRA 502)
FACTS: Dante Manansala was guilty of rape against his fourteen-year old daughter, Jennifer
Manansala. However, after further investigations and cross examinations it appears that the crime
committed should be qualified seduction and not rape.
ISSUE: Whether the accused can be convicted of qualified seduction
RULING: No. Qualified seduction does not include rape. Considering the allegations in the
complaint that the rape in this case was committed by means of force, violence and intimidation,
accused-appellant cannot possibly be convicted of qualified seduction without offense to the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the accusation against him.
15.69 PEOPLE V PALOMAR (278 SCRA 114)
FACTS: Palomar and others were found guilty of multiple murder, attempted homicide and frustrated
murder in separate informations. The trial court consolidated the hearing of the three cases [s]ince
the said criminal cases [arose from] the same incidents and the evidence to be presented in each
case are likewise the same. Although only a single felonymultiple murderwas alleged in Criminal
Case No. 6753, the Court observes that the prosecution had actually proven four separate counts of
murder. These overt criminal acts were committed separately by appellants, each of whom was
motivated by a separate criminal intent. However, the Information in Criminal Case No. 6753
charged only the complex crime of multiple murder without specifying the participation of each
accused in the killing of each victim
ISSUE: Whether accused can be convicted of a crime other than what is contained in the information
RULING: NO. They cannot be convicted of four counts of murder. To do so would contravene
appellants right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them.It is a
basic right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and,
if found guilty, to be penalized only for the offense specified in the information or necessarily
included in such offense.
15.70 PEOPLE V ORTEGA (276 SCRA 166)
FACTS: Garcia and one other person conspired and caused the death of Andre Masangkay by
inflicting serious physical injuries. It is contended that Garcia can not be held liable as a principal
because the prosecution failed to allege such death through drowning in the Information.
Accordingly, an accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the
complaint or information. Constitutionally, he has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
ISSUE: Whether there is a violation of Garcias constitutional right to information
RULING: YES. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the complaint or information
would be a violation of this constitutional right. Section 14, par. 2, of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
guarantees the following:
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him
By parity of reasoning, Appellant Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning in an
information that charges murder by means of stabbing.