ALEJANDRA IRLANDA vs CATALINA PITARGUE

G.R. NO. L-6920, March 28, 1912

FACTS:
Anselmo Irlanda died leaving only two sons Felix and Vicente and four tracts of coconut
land at Nagcarlang, Laguna. Upon the death of Anselmo, Vicente took possession of said
tracts because Felix was in Camarines engaged in business. Felix died leaving her
daughter and on that same year, Vicente died leaving Catalina Pitargue, and daughters
Augustina, Isabel, Sergia and Flaviana Irlanda, who took possession of the four tracts of
land in spite of the demands made at various times by the plaintiff. The court ordered
that the property be divided into two equal parts, one for Alejandra and the other for the
children of Vicente. Catalina Pitargue was sentenced to restore the heirs a sum at the
rate of P72 a year, as the value of the products of said lands up to the time when the
same were delivered, counting from July 1, 1902, to be divided into two parts in the same
way as the lands. The defendants were sentenced to pay the costs in equal proportions.
Counsel for the defendants excepted to this judgment and asked for a new trial, which
motion was overruled. Counsel for the plaintiff also excepted to the portion relating to
the amount of damages granted her, and further prayed that such portion of the decision
be annulled and a new trial ordered, which motion was overruled on December 22, with
exception on the part of the plaintiff. The corresponding bills of exception were
presented and by agreement of both parties merged into one, which after approval was
forwarded to this court. Hence, this appeal through bills of exception.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a right to claim on the property.

HELD:
Under article 807 of the Civil Code, the legitimate children and descendants, with regard
to their legitimate parents and ascendants, are heirs by force of law. The plaintiff as the
daughter of Felix Irlanda is the granddaughter and legitimate descendant in direct line of
Anselmo Irlanda, owner of the said property.

According to article 925, the right of representation shall always take place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending; and shall only be recognized in the collateral
line in the favor of the children of brothers or sisters, whether they be of whole or half
blood.

The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation. (Art.
933, Civil Code.)
A half of the property left by her grandfather at his death cannot be withheld from the
plaintiff, because her father did not receive it in his lifetime, and as said property is still
undivided she has an unquestionable right to demand the partition thereof as heiress in
an intestate estate by right of representation of her said grandfather.

MAGIN RIOSA vs PABLO ROCHA et.al.

 G.R. No. L-23770, February 18, 1926

FACTS:
Maria Corral and Mariano Riosa had three children Santiago, Jose and Severina. The
latter died during infancy and the other two survived their father. Mariano left a will
dividing his property between his two children giving Jose the eleven parcels of land
described in the complaint. Santiago upon his death was survived by his spouse Francisca
Villanueva and two children Magin and Consolacion. Jose and Marcelina had a child who
died before Jose. Upon the death of Jose he left a will which he named his wife as his
only heir. The will of Jose was filed for probate. Notwithstanding the fact that Marcelina
Casas was the only heir named in the will, on account of the preterition of Maria Corral
who, being the mother of Jose Riosa, was his legitimate heir, Marcelina and Maria
entered into a contract which they divided between themselves the property left by Jose.
Maria sold parcels Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 and 11 to Marcelina. Marcelina then sold these
eight parcels of land to Pablo Rocha, however he returned parcels nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 to
Maria stating in the deed executed for the purpose that these parcels of land had been
erroneously included in the sale made by Maria to Marcelina. CFI denies the probate of
the will. On appeal, the Court reversed the decision of the lower court and allowed the
will to probate. By virtue of article 811 of the Civil Code these eleven parcels of land are
reservable property. It results, furthermore, that parcels 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 still
belong in fee simple to Maria Corral, and that parcels 10 and 11 were successively sold by
Maria Corral to Marcelina Casas and by the latter to Pablo Rocha. Lastly, it appears that
Magin and Consolacion Riosa are the nearest relatives within the third degree of the line
from which this property came. Magin brought an action praying tha the property be
declared as reservable property and that Jose and Consolacion be declared reserves.

ISSUE:
Whether Magin Riosa should have been reserved by Marcelina in her favor.

HELD:
Yes. In the reserva troncal the property goes to the reservor as reservable property and
it remains so until the reservation takes place or is extinguished. In a reservation by the
widowed spouse there are two distinct stages, one when the property goes to the
widower without being reservable, and the other when the widower contracts a second
marriage, whereupon the property, which theretofore has been in his possession free of
any encumbrance, becomes reservable. If the property is sold during the first stage,
before becoming reservable, it is absolutely free and is transferred to the purchaser
unencumbered. But if the sale is made during the second stage, that is, when the duty to
reserve has arisen, the property goes to the purchaser subject to the reservation, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage Law. This is the reason why the law provides
that should the property be sold before it becomes reservable, or before the widower
contracts another marriage, he will be compelled to secure the value of the property by a
mortgage upon contracting a new marriage, so that the reservation may not lose its
efficacy and that the rights of those for whom the reservation is made may be assured.

It has been held by jurisprudence that the provisions of the law referred to in article 868
tending to assure the efficacy of the reservation by the surviving spouse are applicable to
the reservation known as "reserva troncal," referred to in article 811, which is the
reservation now under consideration. In accordance with article 977, Maria Corral,
reservor, is obliged to have the reservation noted in the registry of deeds in accordance
with the provisions of the Mortgage Law which fixes the period of ninety days for
accomplishing it (article 199, in relation with article 191, of the Mortgage Law.
Pablo Rocha is ordered to record in the registry of deeds the reservable character of
parcels 10 and 11.

ROSALIO BONILLA et.al. vs Barcena et.al.

G.R. No. L-41715, June 18, 1976
FACTS:
Fortunata Barcena, instituted a civil action before CFI Abra to quiet title over certain
parcels of land. Fortunata died during the pendency of the case and her counsel asked
for substitution by her minor children and husband but the court immediately dismissed
the case on the ground that a dead person cannot be a real party in interest and has no
legal personality to sue. The motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition
for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Fortunata can be subsituted by her children and husband.

HELD:
While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted
by his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. The duty of the counsel to inform
the court whereby a party who died has been complied with. The respondent Court,
however, instead of allowing the substitution, dismissed the complaint on the ground
that a dead person has no legal personality to sue. This is a grave error. Article 777 of the
Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent." From the moment of the death of the decedent, the heirs
become the absolute owners of his property, subject to the rights and obligations of the
decedent, and they cannot be deprived of their rights thereto except by the methods
provided for by law.

MARIA USON vs MARIA DEL ROSARIO et.al.

G.R. No. L-4963, January 29, 1953
(**yung kabit mo na kaparehong pangalan ng asawa mo) hahahha :D

FACTS:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession. Faustino Nebreda died in
1945 before the effectivity of the new Civil Code, he left no other heir except Maria
Uson. However, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said
lands. Faustino had four illegitimate children with Maria del Rosario.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of Faustino are entitled to the inheritance.

HELD:

The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as
completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same
before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From that moment,
therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question became
vested. Under the old Civil Code, illegitimate children are not entitled to any successional
rights. The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the illegitimate
children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

MARGARITA SALVADOR vs. HON. JUDGE ANDRES STA. MARIA, et.al.

G.R. No. L-25952, June 30, 1967
FACTS:
Celestino executed a deed of sale in favor of spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili
covering seven parcels of titled land and two parcels of untitled land situated in Bulacan.
Alleging that the sale was void for lack of consideration, he filed a suit for reconveyance
of said parcels of land before CFI, Bulacan Br. I (reconveyance court). Celesitino Salvador
died testate. Twenty-one persons were substituted as plaintiffs in the action for
reconveyance. Special proceedings for probate of will was instituted before CFI Bulacan
Br. II (probate court). Dominador Cardenas was appointed as special administrator.
There were instituted heirs in the will and there were also alleged relatives substituted in
the reconveyance. In the suit for reconveyance, the court ordered Alfonso and Anatolia
to reconvey the parcels of land to the instituted heirs. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
reconveyance with the correction that it be in favor of 21 substituted heirs. The CFI
Bulacan Br. II, in testacy proceedings, one of the parcels of land was sold to PNB so that
with its proceeds debtors who filed claims may be paid.

Br. I ordered PNB to release proceeds to 21 plaintiffs in the reconveryance however no

release was made since PNB was waiting for Br. IIs order. Br. II ordered the return of
the passbook to administrator.

The substituted heirs filed a present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the parcels of land and the proceeds of the sale of one of them
form part of the properties of the estate?
2. Does final judgment in the reconveyance bar the disposition of the reconveyed
properties by the settlement court?

HELD:
It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific, distributive shares of
inheritance does not become finally determinable until all the debts of the estate are
paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate,
and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of the debts.

At any rate, the proceeds of Lot 6 alone appears more than sufficient to pay the debt and
there will remain the other parcels of land not sold. As to the question of who will receive
how much as heirs, the same is properly determinable by the settlement
court, after payment of the debts.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is denied, without costs. So ordered.

DE GUZMAN vs BENITEZ
G.R. No. 61167-68 January 20, 1989
FACTS:
Francisco Benitez was the only surviving child of Pascual Benitez and Camila Valenzuela.
Upon the death of Francisco, he has no descendants, nor ascendants nor brother and
sister. Dionisia whose father was the brother of Camila filed a petition for administration
of the intestate estate of Francisco and for the issuance of letters of administration.
Emeterio de Guzman opposed the petition on the ground that Francisco left a will
bequeathing the entire estate to him. Upon the death of Emeterio, he was substituted
by his heirs Fidel de Guzman. Petitioners for administration presented the testimony of
Dr. Jose Fernandez for the guardianship of Francisco on account of insanity. The court
rendered judgment disallowing the will and appointing Dionisia as administratix. On
appeal, the CA affirmed the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the decision of CA on account of incompetence of Francisco is correct.

HELD:
Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which we are not at liberty to review
because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth, may be raised. The cardinal rule is that the trial courts, assessment of
the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the appeallate court
because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its
findings, when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on
appeal.

PAZ SAMANIEGO-CELADA vs LUCIA ABENA

G.R. No. 145545, June 30, 2008
FACTS:
Petitioners was the first cousin of Margarita Mayores who died single without any ascending nor
descending heirs. She was survived by first counsins Catalina Samaniego-Bombay, Manuelita
Samaniego Sajonia, Feliza Samaniego, and petitioner. Respondent Lucia was the lifelong
companion of decedent.

Margarita executed a last will where she bequeathed one half of her undivided share of real
property to Norma Pahingalo and Florentino Abena and the other half to Isabelo and Amanda
Abena. All personal properties were left to Lucia and designated also as sole executor of will.

Petitioners filed a petition for letters of administration of the estate of Margarita. Respondent
filed a petition for probate of the will and the cases were consolidated.

RTC rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and
respondent as the executor of the will.

On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the will was signed by the testator in the presence of the witnesses and
of one another.
2. Whether or not the signatures of the witnesses on the pages of the will were signed on
the same day, and
3. Whether or not undue influence was exerted upon the testator which compelled her to
sign the will

HELD:
The issues that petitioner is raising are all questions of fact. This Court does not resolve
questions of fact in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Well-settled is the rule that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.

Nonetheless, a review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal that
petitioners arguments lack basis.

In fine, the court finds that the testator was mentally capable of making the will at the time of
its execution, that the notarial will presented to the court is the same notarial will that was
executed and that all the formal requirements (See Article 805 of the Civil Code) in the
execution of a will have been substantially complied with in the subject notarial will.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

MARIA GERVACIO BLAS et.al. vs ROSALINA SANTOS etl.al.

G.R. No. L-14070, March 29, 1961
FACTS:
Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz and had three children, they had
grandchildren to Eulalio, name Maria Gervacio Blas, plaintiff, Marta Gervacio Blas, defendant and
Lazaro Gervacio Blas. Lazaro died and survived by three legitimate children, Manuel Gervacio
Blas, Leoncio Gervacio Blas and Loida Gervacio Blas, plaintiffs. Marta died and Simeon
contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. Simeon Blas executed a last will disposing
the half of property acquired during the second marriage, after payment of debt, to Maxima
Santos de Blas. Andres Pascual, son in law of testator in the first marriage was present in the
preparation of will. The testator asked Andres to make a document marked as Exhibit A that
among others, that portion or 1/2 share corresponding to the will be given to the heirs and
legatees or beneficiaries named in the will of Simeon.

The plaintiff alleged that they are entitled to inherit properties but the same have already been
included in the inventory of the estate of the deceases Simeon Blas. The court below held that
said Exhibit A has not created any right in favor of plaintiffs which can serve as basis for the
complaint; that neither can it be considered as a valid and enforceable contract for lack of
consideration and because it deals with future inheritance. The court also declared that Exhibit
"A" is not a will because it does not comply with the requisites for the execution of a will. Also, in
its decision the court stated that the heirs can no longer make any claim for the unliquidated
conjugal properties acquired during said first marriage, because the same were already included
in the mass of properties constituting the estate of the deceased Simeon Blas and in the
adjudications made by virtue of his will, and that the action to recover the same has prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Exhibit A can be a basis for the claim of plaintiffs heir.

HELD:
We find, as contended by plaintiffs-appellants that the preparation and execution of Exhibit "A"
was ordered by Simeon Blas evidently to prevent his heirs by his first marriage from contesting
his will and demanding liquidation of the conjugal properties acquired during the first marriage,
and an accounting of the fruits and proceeds thereof from the time of the death of his first wife.
Exhibit "A", therefore, appears to be the compromise defined in Article 1809 of the Civil Code of
Spain, in force at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A", which provides as follows:
Compromise is a contract by which each of the parties in interest, by giving, promising, or
retaining something avoids the provocation of a suitor terminates one which has already the
provocation been instituted. Exhibit "A" states that the maker (Maxima Santos) had read and
knew the contents of the will of her husband read and knew the contents of the will Simeon Blas
she was evidently referring to the declaration in the will(of Simeon Blas) that his properties
are conjugal properties and one-half thereof belongs to her (Maxima Santos) as her share of the
conjugal assets under the law. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-
half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are
stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties
were in existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936.

It will be noted that what is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271
of the Civil Code is "future inheritance." To us future inheritance is any property or right not in
existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the
future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are well defined
properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement as
belonging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in
the conjugal properties may not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually
in existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed.