RULE 14

Vda. De Macoy vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 95871 February 13, 1992

FACTS:

Dominga Tabora Vda. de Macoy was the owner of a rice land. She acquired the
land from spouses Patrocinio and Pablo Serrano. On December 28, 1970, she executed
a document which is dominated "Pabilihang Mabibili-Muli" or sale with a right to
repurchase in favor of private respondent Jesus F. Redillas and Anatalia Elon, for the
sum of P6,000.00 over the land. It was provided therein that the period of repurchase is
between December 29, 1973 and December 29, 1975.

Dominga Tabora Vda. de Macoy died in February, 1972, leaving her heirs
petitioners Julieta Macoy Pongco, Rufina, Francisco, Miriam and Herson Macoy and
Teopista Macoy de Zantua. Alleging failure of petitioners to repurchase the land, private
respondent Jesus F. Redillas executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership. Private
respondent spouses then filed a petition for recording of consolidation of ownership
before the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines Norte.

Petitioners was declared in default for failure to file an answer to the petition.
Private respondents then presented their evidence and judgment was rendered by the
trial court ordering consolidation of ownership and registration of title over the land in the
name of private respondents.

Private respondents mortgaged the land to the Rural Bank of Jose Panganiban,
Inc. to secure a loan of P15,000.00. They borrowed an additional amount of P10,00.00
from the bank.

Petitioners filed a petition for relief from the trial court's decision alleging that
respondents (petitioners) could not possibly have filed their Answer to the Petition for
Consolidation of Ownership and gone to trial. Finding the petition meritorious, the trial
court set aside its previous order and decision and granted new trial.

Consequently, petitioners, through their representative Teopista Macoy de Zantua,

filed their answer to the petition of private respondents. They alleged that the document
executed by the late Dominga Tabora Vda. de Macoy was not a sale with a right to
repurchase but an equitable mortgage or a contract of antichresis. They alleged further
that even assuming it to be a sale with a right to repurchase they nevertheless had thirty
(30) days from final judgment under Article 1606 of the Civil Code within which to redeem
the land. During the trial, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners, ordered the Register
of Deeds to immediately restore.
 Private respondents appealed to public respondent Court of Appeals. Respondent
court reversed the trial court's decision.

ISSUE:

WON failure to serve summons to other petitioners would render the

judgment void.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court adopt the finding of the trial court that no valid
service of summons was effected on the other petitioners. Therefore, its decision is void.
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court acquires
jurisdiction over his person. This process is for the benefit of the defendant, and is
intended to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim against him. In the
absence of such service or a valid waiver thereof, the trial and judgment are void.
 RULE 14

Acance vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 159699. March 16, 2005

FACTS:

Spouses Yolanda Quijano and Ambrocio Tria, Spouses Epifania Quijano

and Raphael Villanueva, Spouses Napoleon and Pilar Quijano (respondents herein),
represented by their attorney-in-fact Engr. Julius F. Villanueva, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa an amended complaint against Spouses Jesulito and
Vilma Acance, Spouses Nestor and Lynne Acance, and Spouses Manuel and Guia
Acance (petitioners herein).

The amended complaint sought to annul the Extra-Judicial Settlement of

the Estate of Deceased Jesus P. Acance and Waiver of Rights executed by Jesulito,
Manuel and Nestor, all surnamed Acance, and their mother Angela.

The amended complaint alleged that the siblings Yolanda, Epifania and
Napoleon were the legitimate children of Angela Paglicawan and Vernier Quijano. The
couple, however, became estranged after the birth of their youngest child. While working
thereat, Angela met Jesus Acance. They lived together as common law husband and wife
and bore the siblings Jesulito, Manuel and Nesto. Angela went to the United States to
work as a nurse. With the savings she earned therefrom, she acquired the subject parcels
of land.

In seeking to nullify the extra-judicial settlement of estate executed by the Acance

siblings, the Quijano siblings alleged that the subject real properties are conjugal
properties of Angela and Vernier because these were acquired by Angela during the
subsistence of her first marriage with Vernier. As such, they (the Quijano siblings) have
a valid right to succeed over the said properties as the lawful and compulsory heirs of
Angela and Vernier.

Upon motion of the respondents (the Quijano siblings and their spouses), as
plaintiffs therein, the court a quo issued an order declaring the petitioners (the Acance
siblings and their spouses), as defendants therein, in default for their failure to file an
answer to the amended complaint.

Petitioner Rosalino Acance, as attorney-in-fact and administrator of the subject

properties, filed with the court a quo a Motion to Lift/Set Aside Order of Default. Petitioner
Rosalino alleged that the Acance siblings had appointed him as their private prosecutor
in a criminal case involving the subject real properties. He filed therein a Motion to
Represent Defendants and set the same for hearing on February 5, 2002. On the said
date, however, petitioner Rosalino found out that his motion was not included in the court
calendar for that day. Since there was no action on his motion, he had the impression
that the court a quo needed time to determine other jurisdictional requirements
considering that the petitioners are American citizens and non-residents of the
Philippines.

Petitioner Rosalino further alleged that he had not received a copy of the complaint
filed. The only pleading he received pertaining to the case was that of the motion to
declare the petitioners in default and setting the hearing. At the said hearing, the
respondents motion was granted and the petitioners were declared in default.

The court a quo denied the motion to lift the order of default. It explained that the
petitioners are all residing abroad but the real properties subject of the complaint are
situated in Muntinlupa City. Accordingly, upon motion, they were deemed served with the
summons and the amended complaint through publication thereof in a newspaper of
general circulation in Muntinlupa City, where the properties are located, and nationwide
on October 20, 2001. The petitioners had sixty (60) days from the last publication or until
December 2, 2001 within which to file their answer. However, they failed to do so.

ISSUE:

WON court a quo has acquired jurisdiction over all parties including those living
abroad

HELD:

No. The court a quo acted with grave abuse of discretion in declaring the
petitioners in default without showing that there was full compliance with the requirements
for extraterritorial service of summons under Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioners are citizens of the United States and residents thereof. Further, the
suit against them involves real property wherein the petitioners, as defendants therein,
have an interest. These facts clearly warranted extraterritorial service of summons in
accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. The rationale for service of
summons on a nonresident defendant is explained, thus:

We repeat, service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country is
required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the
requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that the property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be
subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to
defend in the action, if he be so minded. The only relief that may be granted in such an action against such
a nonresident defendant, who does not choose to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Philippine court,
is limited to the res.
 RULE 15

Sarmiento vs. Zaratan

G.R. No. 167471, February 5, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita

Zaratan, in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. The lower court
rendered a decision in favor of petitioner.
Respondent filed her notice of appeal. RTC directed respondent to submit her
memorandum in accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules
of Court and petitioner to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt. Instead
of filing memorandum, he filed motion for extension of time of five days due to his failure
to finish the draft of the said memorandum. The motion remained unacted. The RTC
dismissed the appeal as it was filed beyond the expiration of fifteen-day period.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate Execution, while respondent moved for the
reconsideration. Both motions were denied by the RTC. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration of the said order, while respondent sought clarification on whether order
dismissing the appeal was anchored on Section (b), Rule 40 or Section 7(c) of the same
Rule. The RTC reconsidered its previous order by granting petitioners motion for
immediate execution, but denied respondents motion for clarification.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which
was granted. The appellate court nullified and set orders of the RTC and ordered the
reinstatement of respondents appeal. Consequently, respondents appeal memorandum
was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceeding.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a Motion for Inhibition of

the members of the Eighth Division of the Court of Appeals. Both motions were denied
for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
WON the lack of notice of hearing in the motion for extension of time to file
memorandum on appeal is fatal
HELD:

No. The motion in question does not affect the substantive rights of petitioner as it
merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum. The required extension was due
to respondents counsels illness, lack of staff to do the work due to storm and flood,
compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim likewise that said
motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought extension
prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently filed
within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice
requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to
the possession of the land in question.

Further, it has been held that a motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated
motion where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity
to resist the application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the
other of the parties to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the
other party or parties. As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a
right to resist the relief sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that
his rights be not affected without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that ex
parte motions are frequently permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and
under circumstances of emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is
sometimes made where notice or the resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of
the motion.
 RULE 15

Aneco vs. Landex

G.R. No. 165952, July 28, 2008

FACTS:

Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of

land in San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine
(39) lots. It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen
(17) lots to respondent Landex.

The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one
of its lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction with
the RTC in Quezon City. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental complaints seeking to
demolish the newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages.

Landex filed its answer alleging that Aneco was not deprived access to its lots due
to the construction of the concrete wall. The RTC rendered a decision granting injunction.
Landex moved for reconsideration. Records reveal that Landex failed to include a notice
of hearing in its motion for reconsideration. Realizing the defect, Landex later filed a
motion setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a motion
for execution claiming that the RTC decision is already final and executory. The RTC
denied the motion for execution of Aneco. The RTC issued an order granting the motion
for reconsideration of Landex and dismissing the complaint of Aneco.

Aneco appealed to the CA. The appellate court rendered a decision affirming
the RTC order. Aneco moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. Hence, the
present petition or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:
WON RTC and the CA correctly exercised its discretion in ignoring the procedural
defect i.e., submitting a motion for reconsideration without notice of hearing.

HELD:
Yes. It is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder
rather than promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as
much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere technicalities. Substantive
justice trumps procedural rules. In Barnes v. Padilla, The Supreme Court held:

Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to suspend
or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this
Court itself has already declared to be final x x x.

The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules
must not be applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.

Here, The Supreme Court has ruled that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised
their discretion in opting for a liberal rather than a strict application of the rules on notice
of hearing. It must be stressed that there are no vested rights to technicalities. It is within
the courts sound discretion to relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits
of a case. This Court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave
abuse or palpable error. Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even
mandates a liberal construction of the rules to promote their objectives of securing a just,
speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part

of due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court
and gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence
of a notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of
notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is
proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective
motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially
complied. In E & L Mercantile, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, The Supreme Court
held:

Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application
of a rule such that any deviation is inexorably fatal. Rules of procedure, and this includes
the three (3) days notice requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their
object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court). In Case
and Nantz v. Jugo (77 Phil. 517), this Court made it clear that lapses in the literal
observance of a rule of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the
adverse party and have not deprived the court of its authority.
 A party cannot ignore a more than sufficient opportunity to exercise its right to be
heard and once the court performs its duty and the outcome happens to be against that
negligent party, suddenly interpose a procedural violation already cured, insisting that
everybody should again go back to square one. Dilatory tactics cannot be the guiding
principle.

The rule in De Borja v. Tan (93 Phil. 167), that what the law prohibits is not the
absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be
heard, is the applicable doctrine. (See also Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA
205; Omico v. Vallejos, 63 SCRA 285; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA
488.) x x x

The Supreme Court also found that the procedural lapse committed
by Landex was sufficiently cured when it filed another motion setting a hearing for its
defective motion for reconsideration.Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the
motion for reconsideration but Anecos counsel failed to appear. The RTC then
gave Aneco additional time to file comment on the motion for reconsideration.

Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to
oppose the motion for reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was
afforded ample time to file a comment, as it did comment, on the motion for
reconsideration. There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the
CA correctly ignored the procedural defect.
 RULE 16

Heirs of Hinog vs. Melicor

G.R. No. 140954. April 12, 2005

FACT:

Private respondents Custodio, Rufo, Tomas and Honorio, all surnamed Balane, filed
a complaint for Recovery of Ownership and Possession, Removal of Construction and
Damages against Bertuldo Hinog.
In March 1980, they allowed Bertuldo to use a portion of the said property for a period
of ten years and construct a small house. After the expiration of the ten-year period, they
demanded the return of the occupied portion and removal of the house constructed
thereon but Bertuldo refused and instead claimed ownership of the entire property.
In his answer, he alleged ownership of the disputed property by virtue of a Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by one Tomas Pahac with the knowledge and conformity of
private respondents. Bertuldo died. Atty. Petalcorin, now appearing as new counsel, filed
a motion to expunge the complaint from the record and nullify all court proceedings on
the ground that private respondents failed to specify in the complaint the amount of
damages claimed so as to pay the correct docket fees.
Private respondents opposed the motion to expunge. In their rejoinder, petitioners
contented that deficiency in payment of docket fees can be made as a lien on the
judgment. The trial court, while ordering the complaint to be expunged from the records
and the nullification of all court proceedings taken for failure to pay the correct docket
fees, nonetheless, upon payment of exact prescribed docket/filing fees for the main cause
of action, plus additional docket fee for the amount of damages being prayed for in the
complaint.
Upon payment of deficiency docket fees, private respondents filed a manifestation to
reinstate the case which was opposed by the petitioner. The trial court, however, reinstate
the case.
Petitioners, upon prior leave of court, filed a supplementing pleading but opposed by
private respondents. The trial court denied the supplemental pleading on the ground that
the Deed of Absolute Sale is a new matter which was never mentioned in the original
answer prepared by Bertuldos original counsel and which Bertuldo verified.

ISSUE:
WON heirs of Hinog can raise that the court has no jurisdiction over their person.
HELD:
No. Petitioners went through the motion of filing a supplemental pleading and only
when the latter was denied, or after more than three months have passed, did they raise
the issue that the complaint should not have been reinstated in the first place because
the trial court had no jurisdiction to do so, having already ruled that the complaint shall be
expunged.
After recognizing the jurisdiction of the trial court by seeking affirmative relief in their
motion to serve supplemental pleading upon private respondents, petitioners are
effectively barred by estoppel from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction. If a party
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge the courts jurisdiction
in the same case. To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of
litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
Nevertheless, there is a need to correct the erroneous impression of the trial court as
well as the private respondents that petitioners are barred from assailing the Order which
reinstated the case because it was not objected to within the reglementary period or even
thereafter via a motion for reconsideration despite receipt.
 RULE 16

Macaslang vs. Zamora

G.R. No. 156375, May 30, 2011

FACTS:

The respondents Renato Zamora and Melba Zamora filed a complaint

for unlawful detainer in the MTCC of Danao City, alleging that the petitioner
Dolores AdoraMacaslang sold to respondents a residential land located in
Sabang, Danao City. The petitioner requested to be allowed to live in the
house with a promise to vacate as soon as she would be able to find a new
residence. They further alleged that despite their demand after a year, the
petitioner failed or refused to vacate the premises.
Despite the due service of the summons and copy of the complaint,
the petitioner did not file her answer. The MTCC declared her in default upon
the respondents motion to declare her in default, and proceeded to receive
the respondents oral testimony and documentary evidence. Thereafter, the
MTCC rendered judgment against her
The lower court rendered a decision against the petitioner. The
petitioner appealed to the RTC. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
petitioner dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action. The
same may, however, be refiled in the same Court, by alleging plaintiffs cause of
action, if any.

The respondents appealed to the CA assailing the RTCs decision for

disregarding the allegations in the complaint in determining the existence or non-
existence of a cause of action. The appellate court reversed and set aside the RTCs
decision and reinstated the MTCCs decision in favor of the respondents.

ISSUE:
WON the CA correctly found that the complaint stated a valid cause of
action.
HELD:
Yes. Based on its allegations, the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of
action for unlawful detainer. Firstly, it averred that the petitioner possessed the
property by the mere tolerance of the respondents. Secondly, the respondents
demanded that the petitioner vacate the property, thereby rendering her
possession illegal. Thirdly, she remained in possession of the property despite the
demand to vacate. And, fourthly, the respondents instituted the complaint
on March 10, 1999, which was well within a year after the demand to vacate was
made around September of 1998 or later.
A complaint states a cause of action if it avers the existence of the three
essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(a) The legal right of the plaintiff;

(b) The correlative obligation of the defendant; and

(c) The act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

If the allegations of the complaint do not aver the concurrence of these

elements, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground
of failure to state a cause of action. Evidently, it is not the lack or absence of a cause
of action that is a ground for the dismissal of the complaint but the fact that the
complaint states no cause of action. Failure to state a cause of action may be raised
at the earliest stages of an action through a motion to dismiss, but lack of cause of
action may be raised at any time after the questions of fact have been resolved on
the basis of the stipulations, admissions, or evidence presented.
 RULE 17
Dael vs. Spouses Beltran
G.R. No. 156470, April 30, 2008

FACTS:

Petitioner Frederick Dael filed before the RTC of Negros Oriental, a complaint for
breach of contract and damages against respondent-spouses Benedicto and Vilma
Beltran. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that respondents sold him a parcel of land
covering three hectares. Petitioner alleged that respondents did not disclose that the land
was previously mortgaged. Petitioner further alleged that it was only on August 6, 2001
when he discovered that an extrajudicial foreclosure over the property had already been
instituted, and that he was constrained to bid in the extrajudicial sale of the land
conducted. Possession and ownership of the property was delivered to him when he paid
the bid price

Petitioner argued that respondents non-disclosure of the extrajudicial foreclosure

constituted breach of contract on the implied warranties in a sale of property as provided
under Article 1547 of the New Civil Code. He likewise claimed that he was entitled to
damages because he had to pay for the property twice.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioner had no cause
of action since the contract to sell stated that the vendor was Benedicto Beltran and the
vendee was Frederick George Ghent Dael, not the petitioner. In a hearing on the motion,
Atty. Dirkie Y. Palma, petitioners counsel, disclosed that petitioner is the father of
Frederick George Ghent Dael whose name appears as the contracting party in the
contract to sell.

The RTC on the same day ordered petitioner to clarify whether or not he and
Frederick George Ghent Dael were one and the same person; whether or not they were
Filipinos and residents of Dumaguete City; and whether or not Frederick George Ghent
Dael was of legal age, and married, as stated in the contract to sell. Petitioner did not
comply. Instead, he filed a notice of dismiss. The RTC dismissed the complaint with
prejudice.

Arguing that the RTC erred in dismissing the complaint with prejudice based on
respondents motion to dismiss, and not without prejudice based on his notice of
dismissal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied
ISSUE:

WON RTC is correct in dismissing the case with prejudice based on respondents
motion to dismiss.

HELD:

No. Section 1 of Rule 17 specifically provides that a plaintiff may file a notice of
dismissal before service of the answer or a motion for summary judgment. Thus, upon
the filing of the Notice of Dismissal by the plaintiff, the Motion to Dismiss filed by
respondents became moot and academic and the trial court should have dismissed the
case without prejudice based on the Notice of Dismissal filed by the petitioner.
Furthermore, said provision does not encompass Motion to Dismiss as to warrant the
dismissal with prejudice.

Moreover, to allow the case to be dismissed with prejudice would erroneously

result in res judicata and imply that petitioner can no longer file a case against
respondents without giving him a chance to present evidence to prove otherwise.
 RULE 17

PNB vs. Estate of De Guzman

G.R. No. 182507, June 18, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Gina de Guzman obtained loan from petitioner, Philippine National

Bank, secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land registered in her name.
Gina acquired the property from her father, Francisco de Guzman, through a deed of
absolute sale. Ginas sister, Rosalia de Guzman, the beneficiary of the family home
standing on the said lot, gave her consent to the mortgage

Later, Rosalia filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Document,

Cancellation of Title, Reconveyance, Cancellation of Mortgage, and Damages against
Gina and petitioner, alleging that the purported sale of the property by Francisco to Gina
was fraudulent. The Complaint was then amended to replace respondent Intestate Estate
of Francisco de Guzman as plaintiff.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the case due to plaintiffs failure to
comply with its order to pay the legal fees so that alias summons could be served. No
appeal was taken from this order; hence, the dismissal became final and executory.
Respondent Intestate Estate filed another complaint essentially the same
allegations as the former complaint. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata, alleging that the complaint is barred by prior judgment, however, denied
by the court. Since there was no determination of the merits of the first case, the filing of
the second complaint was not barred by res judicata.

Petitioner filed a second motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping. The
court denied the motion for lack of merit and required the petitioner to answer. Petitioner
filed another motion to dismiss, raising the same ground, which was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner filed another Motion to Dismiss, raising the same ground, which was denied

Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the three RTC
Orders, this time, raising the following grounds: (a) res judicata; (b) forum-shopping; (c)
lack of jurisdiction over the person; and (d) complaint states no cause of action. However,
it was denied for lack of merit and gave petitioner five days within which to file its answer
 Finally, petitioner filed an Answer to the Complaint, again raising therein the issue
of res judicata. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial. Three years later, specifically on
February 15, 2005, petitioner filed another Motion to Dismiss with leave of court,
alleging res judicata and forum-shopping. The lower court denied the petition.

ISSUE:

WON disposition of the first case, complaint for declaration of nullity of document,
cancellation of title, reconveyance, cancellation of mortgage, and damages , was on merit

HELD:
Yes. A ruling on a motion to dismiss, issued without trial on the merits or
formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on the merits. Section 3 of Rule
17 of the Rules of Court is explicit that a dismissal for failure to comply with an order of
the court shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. In other words, unless
the court states that the dismissal is without prejudice, the dismissal should be understood
as an adjudication on the merits and is with prejudice.

Nonetheless, bearing in mind the circumstances obtaining in this case, we hold

that res judicata should not be applied as it would not serve the interest of substantial
justice. Proceedings on the case had already been delayed by petitioner, and it is only
fair that the case be allowed to proceed and be resolved on the merits. Indeed, we have
held that res judicata is to be disregarded if its rigid application would involve the sacrifice
of justice to technicality, particularly in this case where there was actually no
determination of the substantive issues in the first case and what is at stake is
respondents home.
 RULE 18

Agatep vs. Vda. De Lim

G.R. No. 170540, October 28, 2009

FACTS:

A parcel of land owned by respondent Natalia Aguinaldo Vda. de Lim was

mortgage by her to the PNB to secure a loan which she obtained from the said bank.
Lim was not able to pay her loan prompting PNB to foreclose the property. The
subject parcel of land was sold at public auction to PNB as the highest bidder. Lim
failed to redeem the property. After the expiration of the one-year redemption period
allowed by law, PNB consolidated its ownership over the disputed land.[5] As a
consequence, TCT No. T-10759 in the name of Lim was canceled and a new
certificate of title (TCT No. T-65894) was issued in the name of PNB

While the mortgage was still in effect, Lim sold the subject property to
petitioner's husband, Isaac Agatep. T.he sale was not registered. Neither did Lim
deliver the title to petitioner or her husband. Nonetheless, Agatep took possession
of the same, fenced it with barbed wire and introduced improvements thereon.
Subsequently, Agatep died in 1978. Despite his death, his heirs, including herein
petitioner, continued to possess the property.

The disputed parcel of land was sold t respondent Roberta L. Rodriguez, who
is the daughter of respondent Lim. Subsequently, TCT No. T-65894, in the name of
PNB, was canceled and a new title (TCT No. T-89400) was issued in the name of
Rodriguez.

Petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance and/or damages with the RTC
of Aparri, Cagayan against respondent. Later, the complaint was amended to
implead PNB as a party-defendant.

RTC dismissed the amended complaint for failure of petitioner (then plaintiff)
to file her Pre-Trial Brief.
 The CA rendered its Decision dismissing herein petitioner's appeal for lack of
merit and affirming the assailed Decision of the RTC.

ISSUE:

WON pre-trial, as well as the filing of another pre-trial brief, is not

required when the complaint is amended to implead another defendant.

HELD:
No. Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure
to appear at the pre-trial.

The pre-trial brief serves as a guide during the pre-trial conference so as to

simplify, abbreviate and expedite the trial if not to dispense with it. It is a devise
essential to the speedy disposition of disputes, and parties cannot brush it aside as a
mere technicality.[19] In addition, pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed,
because their non-observance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights.
Like all rules, they should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons
when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with
the degree of his thought[less]ness in not complying with the procedure.

It must be pointed out, however, that in the case cited by petitioner to support
her argument, the Court found no need for a second pre-trial precisely because there
are no additional causes of action alleged and the impleaded defendants merely
adopted and repleaded all the pleadings of the original defendants. Petitioner's
reliance on the above-cited cases is misplaced because, in the present case, the RTC
correctly found that petitioner had a separate cause of action against PNB. A separate
cause of action necessarily means additional cause of action. Moreover, the defenses
adopted by PNB are completely different from the defenses of Lim and Rodriguez,
necessitating a separate determination of the matters enumerated under Section 6,
Rule 18 of the Rules of Court insofar as PNB and petitioner are concerned. On these
bases, we find no error in the ruling of the CA which sustained the trial court's
dismissal of the amended complaint against PNB for failure of petitioner to file her
pre-trial brief.

In the present case, the Court observes that in the Order of the RTC dated June
6, 2000, the trial court noted the absence of both the petitioner and her counsel during
the scheduled pre-trial conference with respect to the amended complaint impleading
PNB. Under the above-quoted Rules, such absence is an additional ground to dismiss
the action against PNB.
 RULE 18

Allarde vs. Judge Laggui

A.M. No. RTJ-89-329. March 17, 1993

FACTS:
A sworn complaint, dated 16 May 1989, was filed by Atty. Rodolfo T. Allarde
against respondent Judge Pedro N. Laggui, Regional Trial Court, Branch 60, Makati, for
ignorance of the law, gross and manifest partiality amounting to graft, and knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment/order.

Complainant alleged the pre-trial proceedings in the case were conducted

by the Hon. Job B. Madayag, Branch 145, same court. When no settlement was reached
by the parties, they proceeded to present their respective evidence. Upon orders of the
court, herein complainants counsel submitted the Memorandum for the Plaintiff while the
defendants counsel failed to comply with the said order.

Respondent Judge set the case for pre-trial, apparently setting aside the
pre-trial proceedings already conducted by the Hon. Job B. Madayag. For failure of
complainant and his counsel to appear at the scheduled continuation of the pre-trial on
September 30, 1987, the respondent Judge, in open court, ordered the dismissal of the
case.

Complainants counsel seasonably filed a Motion to Lift Order of Dismissal

which was, however, denied by the respondent Judge notwithstanding the justifications
submitted for such failure.

Complainant contended that in denying the motion, the respondent Judge

put an end to a justifiable controversy without resolving the merit of the case. Respondent
Judge refuted the allegations of the complaint.

ISSUE:

WON trial court has jurisdiction to dismiss an action for failure to appear at the pre-
trial conference.
HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court do not believe that respondent judge rendered an unjust
judgment/order. Section 2, Rule 20 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as follows:
"Sec. 2. Failure to appear at pre-trial conference. A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may
be non-suited or considered as in default."

Unquestionably, the trial court has the discretion to declare a party non-suited.
Such exercise of discretion will not be interfered with by the appellate courts, absent a
showing of grave abuse thereof. At the pre-trial of the aforesaid civil case, both
complainant and his counsel did not appear despite notice to both of them in open court
and a subsequent written notice sent to them which they also received. We find said
dismissal to be in order.