Ladiana vs.

People

Doctrine: The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession, is
competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession
need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.

Facts: The crime committed was Robbery with Homicide. The accused are Antonio Manuel Uy and
Ricky Ladiana. That on or about the 27th day of June 2001, in Pasay City, upon conspiring and
confederating together and mutually helping one another, with intent to gain, by means of force and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and carry away the following
jewelry belonging to Jeepney Shopping Center. In the same evening, appellant and Ricky went to the
house of Eduardo dela Cruz in Antipolo. Ricky told Eduardo that they were in trouble and asked him to
accompany appellant to the house of Panfilo dela Cruz in Zambales. Ricky told Eduardo that appellant
will be staying in Zambales for two to three days. Eduardo acceded to such request. While waiting for a
bus going to Zambales, they drank coffee in a nearby store. During their conversation, Eduardo asked
appellant what happened. Antonio confessed to Eduardo that he and Ricky entered a place in Pasay City
and they killed two persons and seriously wounded another whom they left fighting for his life.
Appellant also told Eduardo about the vault which contained money and that if "he can open the vault,
and even if they die their family will live comfortably. After a week, Eduardo went to SPO3 Rodrigo
Urbina of the PNP Regional Mobile Patrol Group. Eduardo told SPO3 Urbina what was confessed to him
by appellant and that he brought appellant to Zambales. SPO3 Urbano coordinated with the Pasay City
Police Station, Crime Investigation Division, for appellant's arrest. The joint team of the Regional Mobile
Patrol Group, the Pasay City Police Station and the Palauig Police Station arrested appellant in the house
of Panfilo in Zambales. Antonio was frisked and a cross pendant was recovered from his pocket.

Issue:

Whether or not the confession to Eduardo Dela Cruz was sufficient to convict of the crime.

Ruling:

Antonio's confession to Eduardo, who is not a police officer, is admissible in evidence. The declaration of
an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him. Appellant's admissions are not covered by Sections 12 (1)
and (3) of Article III of the Constitution, because they were not extracted while he was under custodial
investigation. The rule is that any person, otherwise competent as a witness, who heard the confession,
is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard and understood all of it. An oral confession
need not be repeated verbatim, but in such case it must be given in its substance.
People vs. Ulit

Doctrine: It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from
whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to cross-examination. The basis for the
exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not subject to the test which can ordinarily be
applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the declarant is not present and available for
cross-examination.

Facts: The crimes committed were 2 counts of rape and 2 counts of acts of lasciviousness. The accused
was Feliciano Ulit, the uncle of the victim. When the prosecution offered in evidence the appellants
Sinumpaang Salaysay before the barangay chairman as part of the testimony of Barangay Tanod
Fernando David, the appellant objected to its admission on the ground that the appellant was not
assisted by counsel and that, he was forced and coerced into signing the same. Nevertheless, the trial
court admitted the statement as part of Davids testimony. The appellants counsel, likewise, objected to
the admissibility of victims sworn statement on the ground that she was incompetent to give the same
because of her mental illness. The trial court admitted the sworn statement of victim in evidence as part
of her testimony.

Issue: whether the Prosecution Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt that the Appellant Raped the Victim

Ruling: We have reviewed the evidence on record and we are convinced that the prosecution adduced
proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant raped the victim in November 1996. The victim
declared in her sworn statement, on direct examination and her testimony on clarificatory questions
made by the trial court, that indeed, the appellant raped her in November 1996. We do not agree with
the ruling of the trial court that the contents of the sworn statement of Lucelle are hearsay, simply
because she did not testify thereon and merely identified her signatures therein. By hearsay evidence is
meant that kind of evidence which does not derive its value solely from the credence to be attributed to
the witness herself but rests solely in part on the veracity and competence of some persons from whom
the witness has received the information. It signifies all evidence which is not founded upon the
personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is elicited, and which, consequently, is not subject to
cross-examination. The basis for the exclusion appears to lie in the fact that such testimony is not
subject to the test which can ordinarily be applied for the ascertainment of truth of testimony, since the
declarant is not present and available for cross-examination. In criminal cases, the admission of hearsay
evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision while the accused shall enjoy the right to
confront and cross-examine the witness testifying against him. Generally, the affidavits of persons who
are not presented to testify on the truth of the contents thereof are hearsay evidence. Such affidavit
must be formally offered in evidence and accepted by the court; otherwise, it shall not be considered by
the court for the simple reason that the court shall consider such evidence formally offered and
accepted.
In this case, Lucelle testified on and affirmed the truth of the contents of her sworn statement
which she herself had given. As gleaned from the said statement, she narrated how and when the
appellant raped and subjected her to lascivious acts. She was cross-examined by the appellants counsel
and answered the trial courts clarificatory questions. The prosecution offered her sworn statement as
part of her testimony and the court admitted the same for the said purpose without objection on the
part of the appellant.
People vs. Sayaboc

Doctrine: The failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders
the confession valueless and inadmissible.

Facts: The crime committed in this case was murder. The trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death; and
(2) finding appellant Marlon Buenviaje guilty as principal and appellants Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso guilty as accomplices in the crime of homicide. The accused attacked, and assaulted Joseph
Galam, inflicting upon him mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death
thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs. SPO4 Cagungao was called to to take the statement
of Sayaboc. When he arrived at the headquarters he saw Sayaboc being interviewed by reporters inside
the investigation room. He then brought Sayaboc to the inner part of the room. Before taking the
statement of Sayaboc, he advised the latter of his constitutional rights. Then Sayaboc told him that he
wanted to have a counsel of his own choice. But since Sayaboc could not name one, Cagungao asked the
police officers to get a lawyer. The police officers brought Atty. Rodolfo Cornejo of the PAO, who then
conferred with Sayaboc for a while. After Cagungao heard Sayaboc say, okay, he continued the
investigation, during which Atty. Cornejo remained silent the entire time. However, Cagungao would
stop questioning Sayaboc whenever Atty. Cornejo would leave to go to the comfort room. That night
Sayaboc executed an extrajudicial confession in Ilocano dialect. He therein confessed to killing Joseph
Galam at the behest of Marlon Buenviaje for the sum of P100,000. He likewise implicated Miguel
Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso. The confession was also signed by Atty. Cornejo and attested to by one
Fiscal Melvin Tiongson. The appellant argues that the extrajudicial confession may not be admitted in
evidence against him because the PAO lawyer who was his counsel during the custodial investigation,
was not a competent, independent, vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he
remained silent during the entire proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in
the National Police Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial confession of
accused Sayaboc when it was taken without the assistance of not competent and independent nor by
effective and vigilant counsel.

Ruling: Sayabocs extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence against him, since it was made after
he was informed of, and accorded, his constitutional rights. Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial
confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that the
prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights during
custodial investigation have been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has
been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being
investigated would succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given
voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment,
the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial investigation renders the
confession valueless and inadmissible. The Court likewise ruled that Sayaboc was not afforded his
constitutional right to a competent counsel. While we are unable to rule on the unsubstantiated claim
that Atty. Cornejo was partial to the police, still, the facts show through the testimonies of Sayaboc and
prosecution witness SPO4 Cagungao that Atty. Cornejo remained silent throughout the duration of the
custodial investigation. The Court held, however, that the prosecution has discharged its burden of
proving his guilt for the crime of homicide.