Tony Skoviak

Understanding
January 4th, 2016

Justified (Conditional) Credence:

Capturing the Benefits of both Understanding and Justified True Belief

INTRODUCTION

An agents credence is typically defined as her degree of belief, or the strength of her

belief, in a statement or outcome. So, Mary might say she believes twice as strongly that her car

will start as that it will not. In other words, Marys credence in her car starting is twice as much

as her credence in her car not starting. This can be represented by a credence function. For

example, in Marys case, we could write1:

2
( ) =
3

1
( ) =
3

This can be further improved by turning these claims into conditional statements: Marys degree

of belief that her car will start, given that it is very cold outside, is half as much as that it will not.

This can be written:

1
( | ) = 3

2
( | ) = 3

Where cr(x|y) is read credence in x given that y or credence in x assuming that y.

1
In this paper I will assume that cardinal credence values are a useful concept, for further argument see: look up
some arguments for this and list them here?
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In this paper I will argue that reformulating epistemological problems in terms of

conditional credence provides many of the same benefits given by supplementing or replacing

traditional epistemology with a concept of understanding, or a concept resembling

understanding (Kvanvig 2003, 2007; Zagzebski 2001; Hills 2015). First, I will flesh out the concepts

surrounding the issue and sketch what I mean by justified conditional credence. Next, I will give

a brief overview of how justified conditional credence can provide many of the main benefits of

understanding.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

What I mean by traditional epistemology are two primary methodological qualities: 1)

Directing knowledge at propositions, such that knowledge claims are of the form s knows p

where p is a proposition, and 2) Defining knowledge as justified true belief. True simply means

that the proposition describes an actual state of affairs; it is factual. What should count as

justification is more contentious. However, it is generally taken in traditional epistemology that

knowledge requires some sort of justificatory criteria. Many problems are brought up against this

epistemic methodology. For example, that directing knowledge only at propositions misses

something important; it is too atomistic to explain the deep interconnection of our beliefs and

the holistic nature of our reason. Another is the claim made by Kvanvig that Gettier-problems

make justification of traditional epistemology impossible or overly complex (2003, 109). What

most of the criticisms share is the assertion that justified true beliefs about propositions cant be

the whole epistemic story.

Understanding is less strictly defined in the literature, but some concepts that are

associated with understanding are: the grasping of objects, granting cognitive control (Hills),
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and being holistic or interconnected. These are argued to be benefits above and beyond what

traditional epistemology can offer us. I will focus on the following seven epistemic benefits that

understanding (U) is said to have over justified true beliefs (JTB):

i. U avoids Gettier problems simply, while JTB becomes overly complex if it is made

Gettier-proof.

ii. U involves an interconnection of ideas (it is holistic), while JTB focuses on one

proposition at a time (it is atomistic).

iii. U cognitively enables agents to act in the world, while JTB does not.

iv. Know-how can be reduced to or explained by U, but not by JTB.

v. U cant be transmitted by testimony, while JTB can.

vi. U is more tethered than JTB.

vii. U can be directed at objects, while JTB is directed only at propositions.

JUSTIFIED CONDITIONAL CREDENCE

The concept that I will be using in order to address these worries is justified conditional

credence (JCC). Formal epistemologists often speak of something going wrong when credence

distributions do not follow certain rules. This resembles talk of justification in traditional

epistemology. The rules are usually taken to be the axioms of Kolmogorovs probability theory2

(1933), which I will treat as a necessary part of JCCs justification. A full picture of justification

would take me too far away from the goal of this paper, but there are a number of options that

we could turn to (probablisim, likelihoodism, among other options). The justification will end up

2
The three axioms are roughly as follows: 1) Probabilities are non-negative numbers, 2) The sum of the
probabilities of all possible outcomes of an event is one, 3) For mutually exclusive outcomes, the probability of the
disjunction of those outcomes is the sum of the individual probabilities of those outcomes.
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looking something like this: a credence is justified iff it both adheres to Kolmogorovs axioms, and

the formulation of the belief is grounded in measured probabilities, likelihoods, etc. (depending

on which justificatory option we support).

A credence is the degree of a belief an agent has in the truth of a proposition. A

conditional credence is the degree of belief that an agent has in the truth of a proposition

conditional upon some supposition. That is, something of the form, Given that the sky is filled

with dark clouds moving swiftly toward my house, my credence that it will rain soon is very high

where the assigned credence doesnt violate Kolmogorovs axioms and is grounded in our theory

of justification. By grounded I mean: if we argue that our credence function should ideally map

onto likelihoods, then for my credence in it will rain soon given that the sky is filled with dark

clouds moving swiftly toward my house being very high to be justified, I must assign that

credence because I know the likelihood is calculated to be very high. I will now give plausible

ways for JCC to provide the benefits ascribed to U.

i. GETTIER PROBLEMS

JCCs answer to Gettier problems is very simple. We make all of our credential claims

conditional on whether or not the parameters of an event are typical or atypical. To take the

classic barn example:

Cr(what I am looking at is a barn|typical parameters) = .9

Cr(what I am looking at is a barn|atypical parameters) = .1

This way of formulating our beliefs reveals Gettier behind the curtain, pulling the strings, and

allows us to address our epistemic fallibility in a satisfactory way.

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ii. INTERCONNECTION

The conditional nature of JCC requires an interconnection between at least two distinct

propositions. However, it can also allow for very deep interconnections. Take a possible set of

credences that a physicist might entertain:

crP(light is a wave|general theory of relativity is true)

crP(light is a wave|quantum field theory is true)

The physicist who reflects on what light is whilst assuming all the implications of some theory is

making many deep connections between his thoughts. We can also reverse the order of the

propositions and maintain the deep interconnection in the opposite direction (by supposing

light is a wave and then asking how probable each theory is).

iii. COGNITIVE ENABLING

Alison Hills argues that understanding why p gives an agent control over p and its

relationship to its explanation (2015, 3). This includes four key abilities: explaining p, following

explanations of p, inferring p from its explanation, and being able to provide the explanation

when given p. Let us assume that p is very probable given the explanation and that given the

explanation it is very probable that p. If this is so, then cr(p|explanation), when justified, gives

us the ability to explain p (we know that p is very likely given its explanation), infer p from

its explanation (by looking at our set of credences of the form cr(x|explanation) and selecting

the x yielding the highest credence), and the ability to follow explanations of p (the

connection between the explanation and p grounds our high degree of belief in
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p|explanation). Similarly, cr(explanation|p), when properly justified, allows us to provide the

explanation when given p (by selecting the x yielding the highest credence for cr(x|p)).

iv. REDUCIBILITY OF KNOW-HOW

While JCC is not committed to the reducibility of know-how, there is a plausible way

that it can be done. Mary knows how to cook an omelet if crM(I can cook an omelet) is very high

and is justified (an empirical matter). We can further address the complexity of know-how by

looking at a set of justified credences:

crM(x|A) = 0.1

crM(x|B) = 0.5

crM(x|C) = 0.9

Where x is the successful outcome and A, B, C, n are possible methods of achieving x. (e.g.

My degree of belief that I will have cooked a good omelet given that I do [C] is very high and

given that I do [A] is very low.) It is important to note that A, B, C, n need not be explicit

descriptions; my credence that I will have ridden a bike given that I do the things I do to ride a

bike will be high because I have empirical evidence suggesting that when I do those things,

whatever they are, I often successfully ride a bike.

v. TRANSMISSION BY TESTIMONY

JCC seems more like JTB than U when it comes to transmission; it seems that one could

have a high degree of belief in the general theory of relativity given that light behaves like a

wave without grasping what that means. However, for a conditional credence to be justified, it
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must have arisen in us because of some observation about the world3 (of probabilities,

likelihoods, etc.). This means that the person who strongly believes the above without knowing

what light or general theory of relativity stand for cannot possibly have a justified credence;

their belief could not possibly have been formed because of some observation about the world.

Forming this belief requires knowledge of both terms and their (probabilistic) connection; JCC

arises when one knows that x makes y more probable because of the properties of x and y.

vi. TETHERING

Being more tethered roughly means being harder to change or undermine. The claim

goes: JTB is easy to undermine once you have it, but U is hard to undermine once you have it.

Whether or not we agree with this, or agree that being tethered is a benefit, JCC can handle this

worry. It handles it in the same way that it handles transmission in section v. Namely, if our

theory of justification is good, then forming our conditional credences on the basis of it, will, in

many cases, grant us highly tethered beliefs. If the formation of our credence is grounded in a

well-measured events (fair coin flips, die rolls, etc.), it will be very challenging to undermine.

The less well-measured the event, the easier it will be to undermine a credence grounded on it.

However, I dont see this as an inherent problem of the model, and I believe understanding

suffers from a similar grounding issue. In fact, it seems that understanding would be tethered

specifically when we have a very good predictive model which we are using (e.g. the

explanation for why a tree fell (physics), why classical free-will is incompatible with

determinism (logic), etc.).

3
This does not mean that the believer must make the observation themselves; they can be told about the
observation, but they still must form the belief on the basis of some evidence (if necessary, taking into account
their credence in the reliability of the informer).
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vii. OBJECTUAL VS. PROPOSITIONAL

If this is a categorical problem for any epistemic theory, then it is a problem for JCC as

well. However, I think rather that this distinction arises because of the simplistic way in which

JTB operates upon propositions. Take the example, I know/understand that black holes exist.

Whether we use know or understand seems to change the meaning. However, take I have a

high degree of belief that black holes exist, given that sections of space showing the qualities

predicted of black holes have been observed through telescopes. By filling in the given we

capture the complexity of understanding, and by using the conditional credence form we

capture the clarity of the knowledge statement.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this short paper is to show that we can keep the more well-defined and

logical structure of JTB, while capturing many of the commonly cited benefits of understanding.

To further flesh out the model, the next steps would include: showing that JCC does indeed

capture the benefits of JTB, providing a more rigorous theory of justification, and answering

rebuttals from proponents of understanding.

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Bibliography

Hills, Alison. 2015. Understanding Why. Nous 1-28. doi: 10.1111/nous.12092.

Kvanvig, Jonathan L. 2003. The value of knowledge and the pursuit of understanding.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

--- 2009. The Value of Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kolmogorov, A. N. 1950. Foundations of the theory of probability. Oxford, England: Chelsea

Publishing Co., 1950.

Zagzebski, Linda. 2001. Recovering Understanding. In Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on
Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford: Oxford University Press.