Science and Public Policy, volume 22, number 1, February 1995, pages 9-18, Beech Tree Publishing, 10 Watford
Close, Guildford, Surrey GUI 2EP, England.
Viewpoint
The 'uncertain quest': mobilising science and
technology for development
Jean-Jacques Salomon
The Uncertain Quest ainlS to present up-to date
infornwtion on the knowledge, controversies,
experiences and problenlS related to the inter-
actions anwng science, technology and devel-
opment The world is divided into two
civilisations that interact strongly, albeit in a
one-sided way. One civilisation is based on the
growth ofscientific knowledge, the other den,-
onstrates a more or less passive acceptance of
results generated by the first Science is no
longer seen as the answer to every prayer: cu-
riosity nlUst be acconlpanied by conlpassion.
Professor Jean-Jacques Salomon is at the Conservatoire National
des Arts et Metiers, Centre Science Teclmologie et Societe, 2 rue
Conte, 75003 Paris, France. This is based on a lecture at the
United Nations University, Tokyo, given by the author on 11 July
1994, on the occasion of the publication in English of The
Uncertain Quest: Science, Technology and Development, edited
by Jean-Jacques Salomon, Francisco R Sagasti and Celine
Sachs-Jeantet (United Nations University Press, Tokyo, New
York and Paris, 1994, ISBN 92-808-0835-4). It was simultane-
ously published in French (Economica, Paris) and Spanish
(Fundo de Cultura Economica, Mexico).
The author is grateful to the United Nations University and in
particular the Rector, Professor Gurgulino de Souza, for the
support they gave to the project.
Science and Public Policy February 1995
E
DITING A BOOK of this nature was in itself
an uncertain endeavour: to bring together 16
contributors, from all around the world; to
reach a consensus about what needs to be known,
reviewed and evaluated in a field that is essentially
multidisciplinary, without clear-cut frontiers, and in
which views sometimes differ radically and ideolo-
gies can easily intrude.
What was our aim in preparing this volume? First,
we wanted to produce a source book in every sense
ofthe term - the most up-to-date information on the
knowledge, controversies, experiences and problems
related to the interactions among science, technology
and development, including the most pertinent and
important bibliographical references. We intended
the book not only for students at any level in a wide
range of disciplines, but also for researchers, admin-
istrators and (why not) policy-makers and even poli-
ticians - assuming that such people still have the
time and are willing to learn by reading.
Secondly, in this time of considerable change,
questioning and reappraisal, we wanted to stress that
science and technology do matter, and nowadays
matter more and more. This should be self-evident,
and yet we all know that in many developing
countries, it is still so little appreciated, by both
decision-makers and the general public, that people
either do not know or do not realise the benefits that
a deliberate and consistent development strategy can
derive from scientific and technical resources.
Thirdly, we felt it essential to place the 'defence
and illustration' of the role that science and technol-
ogy can play in the process of development in a
critical context, namely that these benefits can never
be taken as given and cannot be understood or as-
0302-3427/95/10009-10 US$08.00 Beech Tree Publishing 9
Mobilising S&Tfor development
sessed in a simple-minded positivist manner. Too
often people underestimate the fact that science and
technology function successfully only within a larger
social, political and economic environment which
provides an effective combination of non-technical
incentives and complementary inputs in the innova-
tion process. Science and technology are not exoge-
nous factors that determine a society's evolution
independently from its historical, social, political,
cultural or religious background.
To stress this point from the very outset of our
endeavour meant that we would dispel any illusions
that there was a linear and predictable relationship
between science and technology and the development
process. We had to take into account the variety of
situations facing the developing countries, especially
as regards their endowment in terms of science and
technology, and thus the fact that there is no single
model for defining and implementing strategies.
Moreover, we had to acknowledge the contradictory,
ifnot disappointing, results achieved by development
economics, and stress the effort that must be made
in order to integrate science and technology policy
into an overall policy for economic and social
development.
Let me now review some clear lessons that have
emerged from our quest.
Development is a journey
Whatever its pace and level, development is a journey
between tradition and modernity. In this dynamic
process, quantitative indicators are always relative:
development never stops and certainly is never
achieved once and for all, nor can progress be meas-
ured merely in quantitative terms. Neither 'take-off
nor increasing industrialisation can ever be a reliable
guarantee against slipping back, as Eastern Europe
has shown recently.
In addition, although the data available provide
points of comparison, we are not dealing with a scale
of values derived from a single theoretical pattern.
The journey takes time, incurs costs, requires choices
to be made, and so demands a resolute collective
determination not simply to cope with the risks arising
from change, but to try in a long-term perspective to
guide change in a particular direction.
As Gunnar Myrdal has emphasised, the terminol-
ogy used by the social sciences is not neutral. l We
now talk about 'developing countries' rather than
'underdeveloped countries' because we want to play
down the realities of structural imbalance, and stress
instead the chances of catching up. The courteous
language of diplomacy suggests that there is merely
a short time-lag separating the industrialised coun-
tries from those that are not there yet: all that is needed
to bridge the gap is to adopt the 'right' economic
policy.
The term 'developing country' is illogical, accord-
ing to Myrdal, because it conveys the idea that there
10
The means to modernise are partly
economic, but institutional, social,
political and cultural factors also
count: the success of the development
process depends on many different
elements in combinations that cannot
be determined by economic indicators
alone
are countries which are not developing. Besides, it
gives no indication of whether a country wants to
develop or is taking practical steps to foster its devel-
opment. In this sense, the first requirement - not just
in terms ofchronology, but above all ofprinciples -
can be summed up in this determination to try to
develop, not so much with a view to breaking with the
past (or at least not with all earlier traditions) as to
acquiring the means 10 modernise.
These means are partly but not entirely economic;
institutional, social, political and cultural factors also
count. The development process is a package in which
success depends on many different elements in com-
binations that can never be determined by economic
indicators alone.
The most general lesson is that technical change
does not transform societies independently of other
factors unrelated to technology as such. The social
and cultural factors - the attitudes and the beliefs
attached to economic, political and social organisa-
tion - influence the role that science and technology
play in a given society. In their tunl the spread ofnew
knowledge, products and processes derived from sci-
entific and technological progress, transform social
structures, modes of behaviour and attitudes of mind.
The role of teclmical change in the process of
economic growth is recognised by all theories of
development. But what precisely is that role? In par-
ticular, what part did science and technology play in
the eC'onomic and social transfoffilations that accom-
panied the Industrial Revolution from its beginnings?
Answers to these questions can be neither easy nor,
consequently, swift, requiring as they do a subtle
analysis, a long-term historical perspective, and ref-
erence to examples drawn from nlanY different social
SCIences.
One thing is sure: the ways in which technical
change transfornls attitudes, institutions and societies
cannot be reduced to a simple linear relationship that
is automatic, that is, detenninistic. And the rapid
spread of a new teclmology never of itself implies
rapid social change. Other factors are involved, such
as economic, social and educational policies, the ne-
gotiations and agreements between interest groups,
the well-established customs of daily life and social
institutions, the society's values and traditions.
Science and technology are not independent vari-
Science and Public Policy Feb11.lwy J995

abIes in the process of development: they are part of
a human, economic, social and cultural setting shaped
by history. It is this setting above all which determines
the chances of applying scientific knowledge that
meets the real needs of a country. There are not two
systems - science and technology on one side and
society on the other - held together by some magic
formula. Rather, science and technology exist in a
given society as a system that is more or less capable
of osmosis, assimilation and innovation, but also of
rejection, according to realities that are simultane-
ously material, historical, cultural and political.
All in all, there is no inevitability in technical
change: neither its pace nor its direction is predeter-
mined (even though the strength of certain industrial
and national lobbies in imposing their factories or
products cannot be underestimated), and the success
of an innovation is never certain. Technology influ-
ences economics and history, but it is itself the prod-
uct and the expression ofculture. In brief, science and
technology are a social process among others.
It is from this angle that the links between science,
technology and society in developing countries
should be addressed. Beyond a certain threshold of
resources, capital accumulation is never by itself a
guarantee of growth. On the contrary, it is first and
foremost the organisation of society, which in turn
determines the organisation ofproduction, that allows
a country to create and exploit its scientific and tech-
nical resources. These factors define the extent to
which science and technology can operate to initiate
and stimulate the process of development, and not
vice versa.
If science and technology are not external to this
process, it is because they cannot themselves be either
developed or used other than in a given economic and
social framework. Extreme underdevelopment is in
this sense the stage of development that puts no
pressure on the social structure to become involved in
scientific and technical research. Even countries
above this level may find themselves unable to take
advantage of science and technology if they lack a
favourable economic and social structure. The lesson
to be learned from history, and especially the history
of science, is that the routes and institutions by which
knowledge develops and is transmitted across a soci-
ety, as much as across cultural frontiers, are neither
linear nor mechanistic.
The Industrial Revolution witnessed the start of a
new type of growth, which was connected with a
succession of technical innovations that speeded up
the pace of change, although their origins and devel-
opment depended on a wide range of non-technical
factors. In Europe, capitalistic competition encour-
aged technical developments geared to increasing
labour productivity. These changes happened and
were able to spread only because the economic, insti-
tutional and social circumstances were favourable. In
their turn, these circumstances were altered by the
progress of science and technology and then influ-
enced the rate and direction of technical innovation.
Science and Public Policy Febrowy 1995
Mobilising S& Tfor development
The process was extremely complex, as David Landes
stressed in the conclusion to his history of the Indus-
trial Revolution: 2
"There is a wide range of links, direct and
indirect, tight and loose, exclusive and partial,
and each industrialising society develops its
own combination ofelements to fit its traditions,
possibilities, and circumstances. The fact that
there is this play ofstructure, however, does not
mean that there is no structure."
In this delicate and uncertain "play of structure",
which is affected by the historical and cultural back-
ground ofeach country, the institutional and political
prerequisites for making good use ofthe scientific and
technical resources available mainly relate to these
non-economic factors. The growing interdependence
of nations and the emergence of the world economy
have not abolished the individuality of cultures and
societies.
The journey from tradition to modernity raises the
same question for all developing countries, but they
are the only ones in a position to reply, in line with
the decisions that they take themselves, about science
and technology as about everything else. This ques-
tion is double-edged: how to modernise without sac-
rificing tradition? How to preserve tradition without
compromising modernisation? More than ever, the
hurly-burly of politics that we are witnessing as we
approach the 21st century warns any developing
country to be sensitive to the implications of this
question.
Sea of change
If a book like ours had been prepared a quarter of a
century ago, the editors and contributors would have
been less hesitant to celebrate the marvels of what
science and technology can offer to mankind. The title
and the contents would have been more optimistic
with regard to their potential positive influence.
Tfi'is does not mean that, in this turbulent sea of
change, the unprecedented opportunities for improve-
ments in living standards offered by scientific and
technological progress should be minimised. No civ-
ilisation has produced in so short a time so much new
knowledge and technical know-how, all of which
have permitted human beings to extend their under-
standing of Nature and themselves, and to increase
the wealth of nations. As Christopher Freeman once
put it,3
"not only in the narrow sense of increased pros-
perity, but also in the more fundamental sense
ofbeing able to do things which have never been
done before at all. "
Modem science and technology have become such an
indispensable ingredient of the development process
11
Mobilising S& Tfor development
The current political, economic,
social, cultural, environmental,
scientific and technological changes
are continuously altering the ways in
which the processes of knowledge
generation and utilisation interact
with other spheres of human activity
that nothing can be built for the future without making
the best of this ingredient.
Today, however, the uncertain quest ofmobilising
science and technology for development appears
more elusive. Again we must admit that our knowl-
edge of the interactions among science, technology
and development is fragmentary. The fundamental
changes these concepts are now experiencing make it
all the more difficult to derive authoritative and un-
ambiguous conclusions from advances in the field.
This task is further complicated by the constella-
tion of political, economic, social, cultural, environ-
mental, scientific and technological changes now
occurring, for they are continuously altering the ways
in which the processes of knowledge generation and
utilisation interact with other spheres ofhuman activ-
ity. More important, the sidetracks, the adverse ef-
fects and the costs of change resulting from scientific
and technical advances mean that progress as such can
no longer be taken for granted. After Minamata,
Bhopal and Chernobyl, we know that the spectre of
technological catastrophe is no longer a science-
fiction fantasy.The dangers of nuclear weapons and
energy and the damage to the environment from in-
dustrial activity put Reason and Rationality on trial
- and this is also part of the new uncertainty of the
quest.
We have listed in the volume some of the most
important changes in this constellation. Although
they are common knowledge, they still deserve to be
stressed if we want to understand and overcome the
challenges ahead. The uncertain world in which we
live has many dimensions: a rapidly shifting political
setting, changes in the patterns of world economic
interdependence, growth and diversification ofsocial
demands, emergence ofenvironmental concerns, and
major transformations in the cultural landscape. Let
me just evoke some ofthese changes to illustrate how
little we are prepared, in spite of the historically
unparalleled scientific and technological tools we en-
joy, to face what is at stake in the transition to the 21 st
century.
Political setting
The end of the Cold War has undermined the ideo-
logical, military and political foundations ofthe inter-
national order that prevailed during the last
12
half-century. The world is in transition to a 'post-
bipolar' political and economic order, whose nature
is in the process of being defined, but which requires
a profound re-examination ofthe means ofproviding
national, regional and international security as a pre-
condition for development. Some of the elements of
this new order include:
the potential elimination of the threat of an all-out
nuclear war;
an increase in the number and intensity of regional
conflicts;
the likelihood of a more co-operative approach to
conflict resolution among key political and eco-
nomic players; and
an emerging larger role for international institu-
tions in fostering and maintaining international
security.
Ethnic and religious tensions within and between
countries destabilise an order that the major military
powers may no longer keep under their influence.
Despite diminished global superpower rivalry, there
is no evidence of a decline in regional disputes, or in
organised violence by ethnic groups, independence
movements, terrorists, or drug traffickers. At the same
time, the nation-state is becoming less important as a
political unit, in the sense of being able to control
whatever phenomena - economic, social, environ-
mental or technological - take place in the world at
present.
This is hard to get used to, for political systems are
geared to focus on states as the locus of power and
decision-making. The pre-eminence and sovereignty
of states is being eroded in many aspects of foreign
and economic policy~ as is highlighted by the renewed
importance of the United Nations in conflict preven-
tion and resolution, the proliferation of regional trade
and economic agreements, the growing economic
power of international corporations, and the condi-
tions established by international financial institu-
tions for obtaining access to resources under their
control.
Political pluralism, popular participation and
democratic movements are becoming a fact of life
everywhere: East, West, North and South. It is now
almost unthinkable to accept, at least without outrage,
loud protest and international sanctions, any govern-
ment's imposition of a repressive regime on its citi-
zens. By the early 1990s, East European countries had
their first open elections in half a century, a majority
of the countries of Latin America had democratic
regimes, a military coup failed in Russia, and the
Central Asian states ofthe former Soviet Union were
struggling to become modem nations. White rule has
ended in South Africa, and there were pressures to
abolish one-party rule in many countries of Africa.
However, as the civil wars in the fonner Yugoslavia,
Somalia or Rwanda show, advances towards democ-
racy and peaceful coexistence are by no means
guaranteed.
Science and Public Policy FebnwlJ' 1995

International economy
The majortransfonnations taking place in the patterns
ofworld economic interdependence include the rapid
growth and globalisation of financial markets,
changes in trade patterns, new situations in key
countries that affect the world economy. International
financial markets now comprise a tight web of trans-
actions involving global securities trading, arbitrage
in multiple markets and currencies, portfolio invest-
ments through a bewildering array of international
funds, and massive transborder capital movements.
Financial transactions have acquired a life of their
own and are becoming separate from the production
and distribution of goods and services.
So far, few developing countries have been able to
benefit from the rapidly expanding flows of foreign
direct investment, only five developing economies -
China, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt and Malaysia - ac-
counting for about 80%. The reasons why most ofthe
poor countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the
Middle East have not been able to attract direct for-
eign investment include their remote geographic lo-
cation in relation to main export markets; the
relatively small size of their domestic markets; defi-
ciencies in physical and institutional infrastructure;
lack of a skilled workforce; inadequate investment
incentives; but also - too often - stupid and selfish
behaviour of leaders only interested in seizing for
themselves the scarce resources of their people.
The most important changes in the direction and
content ofinternational trade are the emergence ofthe
North Pacific as the world's largest trading area, the
movement towards world-wide trade liberalisation,
the rise of regional trading blocs (Europe after 1992
and the North American Free Trade Agreement), and
the shift in the content of international trade against
primary commodities (exported mainly by develop-
ing countries) and in favour of high technology serv-
ices and manufactured products (typically
industrialised nations' exports). A new web of com-
mercial linkages between transnational corporations
(covering manufacturing, finance, trade and services)
has now emerged, of which strategic alliances in
pre-competitive research and development are a
prime example.
In addition, we have seen completely new situ-
ations in several key countries and regions that affect
The spread of new technologies is
transforming the nature of work and
leisure, creating jobs that are less like
traditional tasks, yet it is these
traditional tasks which still offer the
largest number of employment
opportunities in developing countries
Science and Public Policy February 1995
Mobilising S& T for development
the world economy significantly, such as the fact that
the United States became a net debtor, Japan has
become a dominant economic and financial actor in
the international scene, the USSR has dissolved and
its republics are undergoing a painful transition to-
wards market economies - a path followed earlier
by Central and East European countries. Growing
interdependence has created an international eco-
nomic environment which transmits disturbances and
magnifies disruptions. Technological advances in
telecommunications and infonnation sciences have
contributed to this, while the absence of effective
international rules and institutions to regulate finan-
cial and trade flows, and the limitations of economic
policy co-ordination among the world's leading
economies, have helped to increase uncertainty.
Social demands
The explosive growth in social demands in the devel-
oping regions has been triggered largely by popula-
tion increases during the last 30 years. Coupled with
a significant slowdown in population growth in the
industrialised nations, this has led to a highly skewed
world-wide distribution of social needs and of the
capabilities to satisfy them.
The dynamics of population growth strongly con-
dition the demand for food, education, employment,
housing and other social goods. Although total world
food production is sufficient to provide each and
every human being with adequate nourishment, exist-
ing political, social and institutional arrangements, at
both the national and international levels, have proved
incapable of doing so. Anned conflicts, added to
droughts and natural disasters, have conspired to
make it even more difficult to ensure access to food
in many developing countries.
Demand for basic health care and elementary edu-
cation has expanded rapidly during the last three
decades, as developing countries made efforts to im-
prove the provision ofthese services to growing popu-
lations. Migration and accelerated urbanisation
created huge demands for housing, sanitation, trans-
portation and energy supply - a situation that adds
unmet urban needs and widespread urban poverty to
the deprivation typical of rural populations through-
out the developing world.
Unemployment has emerged as perhaps the most
troublesome and persistent problem everywhere. This
is a growing issue in industrialised countries, where
technical change seems now to depend so heavily on
capital that unemployment appears to have become
one of the new structural characteristics of economic
growth for the foreseeable future, ifnot for ever.
Ifthere are reasons to be anxious about the outlook
for employment in the industrialised countries, there
are few grounds for optimism about most developing
countries. Here the jobs created by the new 'techno-
economic paradigm' resulting from computer and
infornlation sciences, biotechnologies, new materi-
als, new telecommunications and media networks are
13
Mobilising S& T for development
generated against a background of non-employment,
and the promises of a production system that will be
more and more based on robots and fully automated
factories may increasingly conflict, in view ofdemo-
graphic trends, with the demand for jobs in develop-
ing countries.
The spread of the new technologies is already
transforming the very nature of work and leisure,
creating jobs that are less and less like traditional
tasks, although it is precisely these traditional tasks
which still offer the largest number of employment
opportunities in developing countries. Develop-
ing countries face the difficult challenge of raising
labour productivity while at the same time absorb-
ing the growing number of entrants into the work
force.
Population imbalances could pose the problem of
uncontrolled mass migration from developing to in-
dustrialised countries, threatening social cohesion
and international solidarity. In some West European
countries there is already a backlash against 'foreign-
ers' , although the fear of massive inflows of workers
from the East or the South has failed, as yet, to
materialise. The role ofhuman capital and technologi-
cal capabilities will become even more important as
a major determinant of long-term growth in the next
decade.
In the developing countries, the level and quality
of investments in human resources will have to rise
significantly during and after the end of this century
in order to deal with the rapid rise in the number of
young people - the largest segment ofthe population
- while aging in industrialised nations will have a
major impact on demand for social services as well as
important consequences for the patterns of consump-
tion, savings and even the direction of technical
change.
Concern about the environment
There is now greater awareness of the limits that the
ability ofnatural ecosystems to regenerate themselves
impose on human activities, as well as ofthe dangers
of the uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources,
and from overloading the Earth's capacity to absorb
waste. We have witnessed the emergence of truly
global environmental threats, which underscored the
possibility that unforeseen ecological instabilities
could cause irreversible environmental damage. Ma-
jor changes in life-styles will be essential around the
world ifwe are to tackle the problem ofenvironmental
sustainability as we move into the 21 st century.
The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro endorsed
"Agenda 21", a wide-ranging world programme of
action to promote sustainable development, but the
negotiations exposed the divergence of perspectives
between industrialised and developing nations, and
the few items that were adopted in the Agenda are far
from being taken seriously, much less implemented.
Still, the greater importance of environmental con-
cerns implies that access to development assistance
14
during the next decade will be increasingly linked to
attaining environmental objectives.
Another result is that some industrialised countries
are positioning themselves to compete in what will be
one of the most dynamic markets of the future -
environmentally sound technologies. Being able to
deliver 'green' technologies is already a source of
competitive advantage in the global search for new
markets.
Cultural transformations
Three powerful cultural forces are shaping the inter-
national scene in the transition to the 21st century:
the growing importance of religious values and the
rise of fundamentalism as a driving force of eco-
nomic and political actions in many parts of the
world;
the tensions between pressures towards cultural
homogeneity brought about by the pervasive influ-
ence of mass media, and the desire to preserve
cultural identity; and
the development of ethical issues at the forefront
of choices in relation to the environment, to the
new technologies and even to scientific research.
We have entered a technological world that will pro-
vide mankind with more and more artificial parts and
manipulation which raise new issues and challenge
traditional values. The 'genetic person', as much as
the 'computer person', now being developed by the
progress of science and teclmology, involves threats
that go far beyond the fantasies of Orwell or Huxley.
The mastery of human reproduction and the increas-
ing commercial use ofproducts from the human body
lead to enormous ethical problems whose novelty
leaves lawyers, representatives of religions, philoso-
phers and (even more) politicians uncertain as to what
is to be allowed or forbidden through scientific
research.
For instance, it will be difficult to impose a world-
wide ban on any intervention on the human genome,
although more and more biologists denowlce the risk
ofeugenics and abuses involved in the progress ofthe
most advanced bio-medical research. Sonle even sug-
gest a moratorium in this field, such as Professor
Pierre Chanlbon, who argued recently, in his inaugu-
ral lecture at the College de France, that "a world
moratorium for fifty years would seem to nle an
extremely wise decision". 4
It is not a coincidence that, in most industrialised
and in some developing countries, special Commis-
sions have been set up, often at the level of the
legislative branch, but also in the framework ofadvi-
sory bodies independent from the executive, to antici-
pate and assess the impact of technical change and
sometimes even that of scientific discoveries: Offices
of Technology Assessment, Commissions on Bio-
medical Ethics, on Freedom and Infonnation Sci-
ences, on the Prevention ofTechnological Risks, and
Science and Public Policy February 1995

so on. An increasing numberoffields call formechan-
isms of regulation so as to correct, limit, and, if
possible, avoid the negative or unforeseen effects of
scientific and technological activities.
Against this background of fundamental changes
in the international context, the single item which
does not appear as uncertain is that North/South co-
operation will remain a peripheral concern of indus-
trialised countries, especially as they focus their
attention on their own internal problems, on
co-ordinating economic policies, on improving their
competitiveness, and on easing the transition of the
former Soviet Union and East Europe towards market
economies. As prospects for greater resource flows to
developing countries appear doubtful, policy reform,
structural adjustment, and the mobilisation ofscience
and technology for development objectives will take
place in a resource-constrained environment. This
will test the political will of their governments to
embark on the uncertain and long-term enterprise of
building science and technology capabilities,
particularly when facing a multiplicity of urgent
short-term needs.
Threat to survival?
For all these reasons, nobody today can share the
positivist optimism ofthe Enlightenment's concept of
progress: by the same token, the straight road to
greater knowledge and material progress does not
necessarily lead to the less direct road to 'happiness'
and 'moral progress'. During this century there have
been so many dark sides in the balance sheet of
scientific and technical progress that even the benefi-
cial results are now under suspicion: is the price to be
paid too high?
Let us be unequivocal: from its very outset modem
science has been an uncertain activity, but the cultural
context in which it developed from the 17th to the 19th
century never really treated its promises as threats to
the survival of mankind. Nor did it lead to controver-
sies that became the subject of public debate and
concerns in the media and for the laYman. The very
uncertainty of the quest stems from this change,
whose roots lie in what happened in the course ofthis
century. Since science, no less than technology, was
deeply implicated in what happened, it is legitimate
to ask how far the rationality they reflect is adding to
the problems mankind now has to face.
For instance, totalitarian regimes were built on
philosophies that claimed to have a sense of history,
and this historical necessity, which took the place of
religion among people who proclaimed their lack of
religion, was presented as a scientific fact. We have
watched the collapse of these regimes, which man-
aged to do enormous damage in a remarkably short
time. But when we reflect on the political and military
impetus behind this century's conflicts, and come full
circle back to Sarajevo, it is hardly surprising that
Reason comes under suspicion.
Science and Public Policy February 1995
Mobilising S& Tfor development
When we reflect on the political and
military impetus behind this
century's conflicts, and come full
circle back to Sarajevo, it is hardly
surprising that Reason comes under
suspicion
What have we learned in this century, beguiled by
Utopian dreams of perfect social order, of the possi-
bility of creating new human beings fit for a brave
new world? Pierre Hassner's answer is that we have
discovered the fragility of human life in two senses:
first, that the whole of civilisation could be destroyed
by nuclear weapons; second, that moral codes and
standards of behaviour can easily be shattered when
challenged by the most primitive forms ofsavagery.5
Science itself cheerfully lends its support to this
savagery, and Hannah Arendt6 thought this was an
aberration typical ofour century: one can in the same
breath "laud the natural sciences for having prompted
a demonstrable and increasingly rapid growth of
knowledge and capability", and "blame them for
having increased in scarcely less demonstrable fash-
ion, instruments of death, despair and nihilism". The
most significant aspect of this nihilism and despair,
she added, is that
"the natural sciences no longer spare the scien-
tists, whose well-founded optimism could still,
during the 19th century, be contrasted with the
equally well-founded pessimism ofthe thinkers
and poets. "
Another side of this aberrant behaviour has recently
been commented upon by Albert Hirschman: the
logic of the connections between political advance
and economic development. Hirschman encapsulates
the range of viewpoints in a few key phrases:
1. First, "All good things go together": economic
development gives rise to political progress and
vice versa, so that the two move ahead haononi-
ously, in parallel.
2. Then by contrast there is the pessimistic view-
point that "Everything has its cost", or "There's
no such thing as a free lunch", meaning that
economic development automatically carries
with it some political costs or vice versa: any
political progress is likely to haml economic
development.
3. Between these extremes there is a third and
slightly more complex position, which could be
labelled "perasperaadastra": economic growth
is all that matters initially, while political progress
must be held back or even reversed, that is, sac-
rificed in the name of economic gains; later, this
15
Mobilising S& Tfor development
temporary sacrifice will be made good. The op-
posite can also be considered worthwhile: to sac-
rifice economic development in the short term in
order to achieve political progress. 7
Albert Hirschman comments ironically on these
views, noting that they must delight economists who
believe in savings and deferred consumption, as well
as psychologists used to the general notion ofdelayed
satisfaction of desires. The fact is that the most rapid
growth in the third world has occurred under ex-
tremely repressive regimes, although some repressive
regimes also missed out completely on industrial
growth. There can be no doubt that an interventionist
modernisation policy based on the most advanced
technologies does not allow opposition or, even less,
anarchy; and democracy does not foster decision-
making or planning by a small group of technocrats
or senior army officers, who choose to target one
sector of development at the expense of all the rest.
However much supporters ofdemocracy may wish
to see better links between political and economic
progress, it appears that the two are more often quite
separate. Economists, says Hirschman, have been
reticent about making generalisations or conjectures
in this area. But is the interpretation that he offers
instead, in terms of "on and off connections", be-
tween independence and interdependence, really any
improvement? Only in the long term is it possible to
see a logic in the "repertory of historical ruses" that
he suggests drawing up, but then in the long term, as
Keynes would point out, the losers will be forgotten.
Personally, I am afraid that the relationship is, like
the famous residual factor fashionable in the 1960s,
more a measure of our own ignorance than anything
else.
Nevertheless, there is a lesson to be learned from
this debate. Impatience to catch up, and the mirage of
western science as the magic formula required to do
so, cause people to think that the process of modem-
isation mainly involved finding technical solutions.
The scientism - or the lack of awareness - that
inspires this approach ignores the time factor and
assumes that the elasticity of tolerance for the spurts
of change is infinite. The success of the strategies of
industrialisation by forced marches is similar to cav-
alry charges that gain ground but put offthe real battle
- in this case, development.
The inevitable inequalities of economic growth
generate pressures that can act as stimulants in the
short tenn, yet can become so unbearable in the
medium term that they ultimately bring the whole
process to a halt. Very few countries, so far, have been
able to make these inequalities work in favour of the
development of the whole of society - that is, with-
out going too fast or too far in exploiting profitable
opportunities. What is the elasticity of tolerahce of
growing income inequalities? The question is put in
economists' jargon; in simpler political language it
might be rephrased: At what point does pursuit of
growth cause social unrest or even civil war?
16
History's revenge on economics
Thus the lesson is as simple as it is clear: history
always gets its revenge on economics. A development
policy that neglects the problem of income distribu-
tion inevitably lays itself open to social upheavals
later on and consequently to the repercussions when
the authorities are forced to become tougher and more
arbitrary. To reconcile the anlbition for economic
growth with greater distributive justice is undoubt-
edly the surest way not only to avoid social upheavals,
but also to guarantee continuing growth. None of the
technical solutions offered by science and technology
can act as a substitute for this political and social
imperative.
R&D is merely a tool used toward goals other than
science in the strict sense - those are the objectives
that shape the future of a society, not the other way
around. Thus, even more than in the industrialised
countries, the progranlmes of scientific research and
technical education cannot be separated from the type
of development path each country hopes to follow. In
other words, what a country wants to do with science
and technology is ultimately linked to what it cares
about.
The concept of the third world emerged as both a
third element and a buffer more or less manipulated
by, and manipulating, the two rival blocs, commu-
nism and capitalism, that confronted each other after
the Second World War. Now that communism has
collapsed, the notion of the third world is all the more
meaningless in that most of the former communist
countries have created a new category, that of indus-
trialised countries which have become in their tum
newly developing countries. Moreover, developing
countries do not constitute a homogeneous category
and the need to distinguish various levels ofdevelop-
ment and even underdevelopment is more pertinent
than ever.
Two civilisations
What.. .is certain is that the world will continue to
remain divided into two civilisations that interact
strongly, although the interaction is one-sided: the
second civilisation is dependent on, and deeply af-
Now that communism has collapsed,
the notion of the third world is fairly
meaningless in that most of the
former communist countries have
created a new category of
industrialised countries which have
become in their turn newly
developing countries
Science and Public Policy February 1995

fected by, the first, and lacks the capacity to influence
the first to the same degree in return. The first civili-
sation is based on the growth of science as the main
knowledge-generating activity, the rapid evolution of
science-related technologies, the incorporation of
these technologies into productive and social pro-
cesses, and on the emergence of new fonns of work-
ing and living deeply influenced by the
Weltanschauung (ideology) of modem science and
science-related technologies.
The second civilisation is characterised by its in-
ability to generate scientific knowledge on a large
scale and by a more or less passive acceptance of
scientific results generated in the first; by a techno-
logical base that comprises a substantive component
of traditional techniques and a veneer of imported
techniques; by a productive system whose modern
segment is dependent on the expansion ofproduction
in industrialised nations and on the absorption of
imported technology.
The first civilisation, corresponding to the devel-
oped or highly industrialised countries, has an endo-
genous scientific and technological base. This base is
still present, in spite of its current difficulties and
disruptions, in the fornler communist countries of
East Europe, and one of the most important agree-
ments signed in 1992 between the United States, the
European Community and Japan was precisely in-
tended to help these countries keep this base alive.
This comes down to helping somebody not to sink
when he or she already knows how to swim.
The second civilisation is not swimming, but strug-
gling for survival, with the exception of a handful of
countries that have recently succeeded in catching up
with some of the best swimmers in the first civilisa-
tion. The great majority ofthe countries in the second
civilisation not only lag behind, but above all lack
most of the basic ingredients (in tenns of resources,
institutions, manpower and cultural background) in-
dispensable if they are to benefit from scientific
knowledge and new technological innovations.
In our volume, we stress that the historical reasons
for this situation deserve to be carefully studied in
these countries by local scholars, and should be part
of the science studies research programmes that can
help policy-makers and society at large to become
more aware of the internal and external conditions
that have jeopardised, and still jeopardise, the devel-
opment, if not the emergence, of a scientific and
technological capacity. Hopefully this source book
will contribute to a better understanding and thus
greater mastery of all these conditions.
Development is an uncertain quest in which the
seekers are doomed to rely more and more on science
and technology. The quest is uncertain not only be-
cause there is no prior guarantee of success (or that it
will be lasting), but above all because it raises ques-
tions about the price of modernity: what benefits can
a country expect to derive from it, in political, eco-
nomic, social and cultural temls? and what sacrifices
is that country prepared to make on its behalf? Devel-
Science and Public Policy Februaty 1995
Mobilising S& Tfor development
opment is not a neutral process with no impact on the
social structures that are involved; science and tech-
nology do not always bring about improvements to
those areas that they affect.
Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution,
economic progress has meant upheavals - what
Schumpeter called "creative destruction" leading to
the renewal ofeconomic and social structures. This is
what is involved in innovation, and now that innova-
tion is worshipped as the driving force ofinternational
competitiveness, we need to remember that it always
has a price attached: technical change is accompanied
by social change and hence social costs.
What is at stake for the next century is to reconcile
the two civilisations in a context offair, but also lucid
and critical, co-operation. To my mind, this is pre-
cisely the vocation of the United Nations University.
The developing world has forced the industrialised
countries to recognise not only that their cultures are
extremely diverse, but that this diversity is perfectly
legitimate. Both sides have leanled, too, that develop-
ment cannot take place without dialogue between
cultural heritage and instrumental rationality, even if
there are tensions on both sides.
In the upheavals marking the end of this century,
especially after the collapse of totalitarian ideologies
and regimes, the whole world is searching for new
paths and alternatives leading to a better social order.
Just as the developing countries are having to take on
board some ofthe aspects ofmodenlity that they used
to criticise, so the industrialised countries are having
to restore some aspects of tradition that they used to
challenge.
Science and technology can contribute a great deal
to development, but cannot do evel)'thing: above all
they do not offer a ready-made solution to the problem
of values that is raised by the clash between tradition
and modernity. In this time of uncertainty, the editors
and the contributors to The Uncertain Quest may
claim some degree of success if at least this lesson,
although modest, is conveyed to the students, re-
searchers, administrators, policy-makers and even
politicians they intended to address. On the one hand,
nobody can believe any longer that growth necessar-
ily brings with it greater democracy and happiness;
on the other hand, we all know now that development
requires growth and a certain degree of rationality.
Conclusion
There is no better conclusion than to repeat the quo-
tation which introduces our volume and which the
three co-editors felt expressed exactly what we had in
mind - and, let me add, in our hearts - when we
started to discuss and plan this book. It is from the
physicist Victor ('Vicky') Weisskopfwho, after hav-
ing dealt with highly scientific matters - particle
physics, of which he was one of the world's leading
specialists - went on to become more philosophical
and wrote: 8
17
Mobilising S& T for development
"All parts and all aspects of science belong
together. Science cannot develop unless it is
pursued for the sake of pure knowledge and
insight. It will not survive unless it is used
intensely and wisely for the bettennent of hu-
manity, and not as an instrument of domination
by one group over another. Human existence
depends upon compassion and curiosity. Curi-
osity without compassion is inhuman; compas-
sion without curiosity is ineffectual."
Science has become an uncertain venture not only
because, by their very nature, discovering and inno-
vating are not givens - they never were - but also
and above all because the sense of what is involved
in searching seems to be more and more lost in the
torrent of applications and resulting problems that
surround humanity. The alliance between curiosity
and compassion is all the more what both scientists
and any other man or woman needs to celebrate as the
most urgent and obvious imperative.
18
References
1. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: an Inquiry into the Poverty of
Nations (Pantheon Books, New York, 1969).
2. David S Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological
Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from
1750 to the Present (Cambridge University Press, 1969).
3. Christopher Freeman, The Economics oflndustriallnnovation
(Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1974).
4. Pierre Chambon, "Les obligations de I'homme genetique", Le
Monde, 30 June 1994, page 2.
5. Pierre Hassner, "Le XXe siecle, la guerre et la paix", La
Pensee Politique, Ecrire I'histoire du XXe siede: La politique
et la raison (Gallimard/Le Seuil, Paris, 1994).
6. Hannah Arendt, La Condition de I'Homme Moderne
(Calmann-Levy, Paris, 1961) page 294. (The quotation is
translated from the French version). On the issue of techno-
logical risks and the democratic control of technical change,
see Jean-Jacques Salomon, Le Destin Technologique (Bal-
land, 1993, Gallimard/Folio 1994).
7. Albert Hirschman, "The on-and-off connection between Politi-
cal and economic progress", American Economic Review,
Papers and Proceedings, May 1994. The French version is
more developed than the original: "Des liens accidentes entre
progres politique et progres economique", La Pensee Poli-
tique (Gallimard/Le Seuil, Paris, 1994).
8. Victor Weisskopf, Physics in the Twentieth Century: Selected
Essays (MIT Press, Cambridge/London, 1972) page 364.
Science and Public Policy Febnwty 1995