LETTERS

Issn 0012-9976
Ever since the first issue in 1966,
EPW has been Indias premier journal for An Unrepentant Police Force conferred onto us by the Constitution,
comment on current affairs are intrinsic to our democracy. Crude
and research in the social sciences.
It succeeded Economic Weekly (19491965),
which was launched and shepherded
by Sachin Chaudhuri,
W e strongly condemn the ongoing
attempts by the police of Kurnool
district, Andhra Pradesh, to continuously
and mala fide attempts to curb these
rights, and silence dissent, will not go
unopposed. We will not sit by and watch
who was also the founder-editor of EPW.
As editor for 35 years (19692004) harass U G Srinivasulu, an Adoni-based as the government seeks to dismantle
Krishna Raj
gave EPW the reputation it now enjoys. advocate and the Human Rights Forum democratic norms, and tries to stymie
editor
(HRF) secretary for Andhra Pradesh and open, critical and diverse debate.
Paranjoy Guha Thakurta Telangana States (AP&TS). The HRF will continue to hold the
EXECUTIVE Editor Over the past three years, the police government and its various instruments
Lina Mathias
have filed several criminal charges against accountable to the law and to democratic
Deputy Editor
Bernard DMello Srinivasulu, and several other activists of procedures. We shall endure in our work
SENIOR Assistant editorS Adoni town, all of which are patently false. towards safeguarding and spreading
lubna duggal He has consistently opposed the arbitrary human rights, as a culture in our society.
ABHISHEK SHAW
copy editor
and mala fide use of the law by the police, The unfortunate reality today is that
jyoti shetty and has critiqued their unlawful meth- the police are only as lawful or lawless as
Assistant editorS ods. He has also spoken out and under- the political government wishes them to
P S Leela
SANGEETA GHOSH taken campaigns against various indus- be. We, therefore, call upon the AP gov-
ANISHA GEORGE tries based in Kurnool district that are ernment to rein in this arbitrary exercise
ASSISTANT Editor (DIGITAL) endangering peoples health and the en- of power by the Kurnool police. We de-
SHIREEN AZAM
vironment. He has opposed the fabricat- mand that all charges against Srinivasulu
EDITORIAL Assistant
Advait Rao Palepu ed charges against marginalised sections be dropped and the cases foisted upon
production and has sought the proper and effective him be withdrawn.
u raghunathan
s lesline corera implementation of the Scheduled Castes V S Krishna
suneethi nair (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs) (Pre- Human Rights Forum General Secretary, AP&TS
Circulation MANAGER vention of Atrocities) Act. S Jeevan Kumar
B S Sharma Human Rights Forum President, AP&TS
However, he has been met with hostility
Advertisement Manager
Kamal G Fanibanda by the police, who have taken recourse to
General Manager plain abuse of the law and foisting false Arrival of Militant Ram
Gauraang Pradhan charges. When the HRF along with several in Bengal
Publisher
K Vijayakumar organisations sought the enforcement of
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environmental regulations on industries
emitting toxins into the air, ground, wa-
tercausing immense injury to the people
T he late eminent scholar, A K Ramanu-
jan, reminded us in his well-known
text, Three Hundred Ramayanas, that not
Economic and Political Weekly near Adoniinstead of invoking the law only do we have one story told by Valmiki
320321, A to Z Industrial Estate and penalising those industries, false in Sanskrit, we have a variety of Rama tales
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel
Mumbai 400 013 charges, including those under the SCs and told by others, with radical differences
Phone: (022) 4063 8282 STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, were among them. It may be mentioned in this
EPW Research Foundation levelled against HRF functionaries. When connection that the Academic Council of
EPW Research Foundation, established in 1993, conducts
research on financial and macro-economic issues in India. the HRF questioned the indiscriminate Delhi University decided to drop this cele-
Director registration of a huge number (460 in all) brated text from the history syllabus a few
J DENNIS RAJAKUMAR of rowdy sheets against the people in Ado- years ago, despite intense opposition from
C 212, Akurli Industrial Estate
Kandivali (East), Mumbai 400 101 niand pointed out the harassment and the history department. The decision was
Phones: (022) 2887 3038/41 humiliation this would entailinstead of preceded by a militant protest by activists
epwrf@epwrf.in
taking corrective measures, the polices re- from the Bharatiya Janata Partys (BJP)
Sameeksha TrusT
(Publishers of Economic & Political Weekly) taliation was to book a rowdy sheet on student wing, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi
Board of Trustees Srinivasulu himself! They even went to Parishad, who barged into the history
Deepak Nayyar, Chairman the extent of fabricating a case under Sec- department to protest the teaching of the
D N Ghosh, Managing Trustee
Andre Beteille, Deepak Parekh, tion 153A of the Indian Penal Code (creat- Ramanujan text and vandalised the place.
Romila Thapar, Rajeev Bhargava, ing enmity between communities) against The above episode is not an isolated
Dipankar Gupta, Shyam Menon
him. This is perhaps the first time that a one. Different parts of India are witness-
Printed by K Vijayakumar at Modern Arts and Industries,
151, A-Z Industrial Estate, Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, human rights activist has been charged ing manifestations of militant Hinduism
Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013 and published by him on behalf under this section in AP&TS. being preached by the BJP.
of Sameeksha Trust from 320321, A-Z Industrial Estate,
Ganpatrao Kadam Marg, Lower Parel, Mumbai-400 013. We wish to remind the government Public celebration of Ram Navami was
Editor: Paranjoy Guha Thakurta.
that dissent and the various freedoms never a part of the cultural tradition of
4 april 15, 2017 vol lII no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Bengal. But, Kolkata and different districts
of West Bengal witnessed the unfamiliar
sight of sword-brandishing, saffron-clad
men accompanied by women and children
marching down the streets and chanting
slogans like Jai Shri Ram and Har Har
Mahadev to celebrate Ram Navami on 5
April 2017. Reportedly, members of various
outfits backed by the Vishva Hindu Pari-
shad, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and
BJP took out over 150 rallies in West Bengal
to celebrate the festival. In fact, processions
with swords, spears, bows and arrows, and
bike rallies festooned with saffron flags
ruled the roads in numerous pockets of
Kolkata and districts of West Bengal. The
state president of the BJP, Dilip Ghosh, was
seen among those holding swords in
Kharagpur. To put it in his own words:
Lord Rama carried a bow and arrow. So
how can his puja be done with empty
hands? When Muharram is observed there
is no talk of polarisation But, when Ram
Navami is celebrated, they say it will lead
to polarisation. If Ram Navami does lead to
polarisation, let it be. We will do it.
The aggressive assertion of militant
Hinduism in West Bengal is organically
connected with the BJPs landslide victory
in Uttar Pradesh. Let us see how the land
of Bengal Renaissance faces the chal-
lenge posed by militant Hinduism.
Arup Kumar Sen
Kolkata
Should We Atone for Our
Ancestors Sins?
S hashi Tharoors speech at the Oxford
Union debate (May 2015) on the pro-
position Britain Owes Reparations to Her
Former Colonies garnered a lot of atten-
tion. His argument for the motion was
quickly followed by his recent book An Era
of Darkness: The British Empire in India in
which he dwells upon the issue of repara-
tions and apology in a greater detail. He
writes that, I, for one, dearly hope that a
British prime minister finds the heart, and
spirit to get on his or her knees [] and
beg forgiveness from the Indians.
Tharoors book is essentially a historical
narration of Indias colonial encounter,
but the question of paying reparations or
apologising for historic wrongs, involves
a philosophical enquiry as well. Let me
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017
highlight five interesting and philosophi-
cally-enticing dimensions of the debate,
which, perhaps, have been somewhat
eclipsed by the historic tenor of the book
and the Oxford debate.
First, the basic question that underlies
the debate on reparations is: Should we
atone for the sins of our ancestors? If
Britain does so, an argument can be made
that the present British generation is pay-
ing an undeserved penalty for the acts of
their ancestors. Similarly, if the present
generation of Indians receives reparations
or accepts an apology for atrocities inflict-
ed on their ancestors, an argument can
be made that the present Indian genera-
tion is reaping unmerited benefits.
Harvard philosopher Michael Sandel has
investigated the issue in his book Justice. He
rejects the body of opinions descending
from John Locke to John Rawls, that he col-
lectively calls moral individualism, which
argues that each individual is a free moral
agent and, therefore, not morally responsi-
ble for the actions of any other individual.
Sandel argues that moral individualism
leaves little space for collective responsi-
bility, collective morality and solidarity,
without which societies and nations would
be torn asunder and collective group iden-
tities would become meaningless. There-
fore, Sandel may agree with Tharoor that
the British people, as a collective, bear
the moral burden of historic injustices
they have inflicted.
Second, Tharoor, like Sandel, argues
that rendering apologies for the historic in-
justices is irrevocably linked to the sense of
national and collective moral responsibility
and hence, to national identity. However, it
must be argued that the ideas of nation-
hood and national identity are based, apart
from a shared collective history and cul-
ture, on collectively forgetting the acri-
mony and injustices of the past and the se-
lective elision of historic atrocities. Tha-
roors book fails to recognise this aspect.
Third, if Britain must apologise for colo-
nising India, must India apologise to large
parts of Asia that the historic Indian rulers,
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vol lII no 15
LETTERS
Guptas, etc, had colonised? History and
culture are like a fabric of several interknit-
ted strands. When one strand criss-crosses
another, fragments of history are born.
When the British criss-crossed with the
Indians in the colonial context, colonial
Indian history was born. The same can be
said for the history of any country in any
period. Tharoors demand for an apology is
tantamount to fraying the fabric of history
by separating its interwoven strands.
Fourth, it is interesting that Tharoor
opens his book by citing American philo-
sopherwriter Will Durants criticism of
British colonialism. In a different con-
text, Durant once wrote in his acclaimed
book Pleasures of Philosophy, Morals that
change slowly, are changing today like
clouds before the wind. If morals are
like clouds before winds, then can moral
standards of the present age be the yard-
stick to judge the moral worth of actions
in the past? Liberal democracy and sov-
ereignty are the morals of the present
just as colonialism and imperialism were,
more or less, accepted norms of the past.
Lastly, there is the question that if India
did not have had its colonial experience,
how would have Indian history paved?
Tharoor has made an appreciable effort to
argue that the British colonisation of India
was its age of darkness and India would
have been much better off without it. There
are others, like Nirad C Chaudhary, who see
Indias colonial encounter as a watershed
that transformed it into a modern nation.
Historians attempt to explain events of
history through reason, rational argu-
ments, and cause-and-effect. But, the fact
remains that these are all speculations be-
cause the laws of motion that govern the
movement of history are beyond rational
comprehension. Irrespective of the rational
merit of these historical arguments, it is im-
possible to speculate with certainty, what
trajectory Indian history would have taken
without its colonial encounter. Historians
cannot be omniscient cosmic observers.
Suyash Saxena
NEW DELHI
5
LETTERS
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6 april 15, 2017 vol lII no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 april 15, 2017
Americas Reckless Syria Policy
Trumps military action in Syria will further the fortunes of the Salafi jihadist forces.
I
mperialisms moral cloak has always been humanitarianism.
So even a United States (US) President who has been openly
espousing militarism, racism and jingoism was able to garner
bipartisan consensus when he fell back upon the time-tested tactic
of drawing US imperialisms moral red line. Never mind the use of
Agent Orange by the US military as part of Operation Ranch Hand
during the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1971. All the US presidential
administration had to do is establish almost instantlywithout
waiting for the United Nations Security Council and an impartial
investigationthat the Syrian government had engaged in a chemi-
cal weapons attack, and then, with the verdict broadcast widely
by corporate media, carry out the sentence as soon as possible.
On 4 April, in the ongoing six-year-old civil war in Syria, there
was a chemical weapons attack on the rebel-held town of Khan
Sheikhoun in Idlib province. Almost immediately the White House
condemned the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad
for the attack. The mass media and practically the entire political
establishment denounced the Syrian government as the culprit. The
next day, US President Donald Trump expressed horror at the
images of innocent children, innocent babies choked to death by
the poisonous gas and declared that an unacceptable line has been
crossed. He convened a meeting of the National Security Council
to consider the possible military options, and the following day
two US warships in the Mediterranean fired 59 Tomahawk cruise
missiles at the Syrian air base at Shayrat, close to the city of Homs.
Referring to the allegations that his government had engaged in a
chemical weapons attack, the Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al
Muallem categorically stated that the Syrian Arab Army did not
and will not use such weapons even against the terrorists who are
targeting our people, but the powers-that-be and the establish-
ment media just ignored him. Instead, they gave wide coverage
to US Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haleys statement.
What she said implied that Washington has the right to wage war
against Syria when the international community consistently
fails in its duty to act collectively against that country. Predictably,
the US corporate media and the political establishment applauded
Trump for the US militarys attack on Syria. Indeed, the host of
CNNs flagship foreign affairs show, Fareed Zakaria, who had until
then been slamming the new President, now began fawning
over Trumps action, declaring that with the cruise missile attack
on Syria, Trump became the President of the United States!
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol lII no 15
Frankly, a lot of US imperialisms antiquated script seems to
be replayed in a closed loop. The 1991 US invasion of oil-rich
Iraq was ostensibly to prevent the atrocities that the Iraqi armed
forces had supposedly planned to inflict on the people of Kuwait.
The 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia was justified on the
grounds that President Slobodan Milosevic was planning an
ethnic cleansing which had to be prevented. In 2001, the invasion
of Afghanistan was justified on the claim that the Taliban regime
was harbouring the perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks.
The 2003 invasion of Iraq was sought to be legitimised on the
plea that President Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass
destruction. In 2011, NATO-led forces militarily intervened in
Libya and their Islamist proxies assassinated President Mua-
mmar Gaddafi on the moral grounds that his forces were about
to engage in a large-scale massacre in Benghazi.
There has been a long-standing pattern in Washingtons funding,
arming and mobilisation of religious fundamentalists to further
its geopolitical ambitions. The American Central Intelligence
Agencys teaming up with the Muslim Brotherhood against Arab
nationalists in the 1950s and the US arming of the Mujahideen
against the Soviet Union in the 1980s come to mind. The same
dirty tactics have been employed in the six-year-old Syrian civil
war. In particular, it is the spread of Saudi Arabias state religion,
Wahhabisma sect of Sunni Islam, puritanical and ultra-
conservativethat has been the theological inspiration of
Salafi jihadist groups like Islamic State (ISIS) and Al Qaeda, and
their affiliates in Iraq and Syria. The Al Qaedas Jabhat al Nusra
is, for instance, the most powerful of the rebel forces backed by
the CIA that is challenging the rule of Assad in Syria.
The problem isnt just Wahhabism but the cynical funding and
arming of such Salafi jihadist factions to serve the narrow ends of
US imperialism. It is high time the United Nations demands that
the US, Saudi Arabia and Gulf-state governments give up their
support of the various Salafi jihadist militias who are acting as
proxies of US imperialism in Syria. An honest analysis would put
this phenomenon at the root of the crisis in Syria today, and also
of one of the most traumatic refugee problems of the 21st century.
Trumps action will only both boost the military fortunes of the
Salafi jihadist forces and in turn harden the RussianIranian
support for Assad in the Syrian civil war. The result: more atro-
cities against civilians and further refugee trauma.
7
EDITORIALS
No Panacea for Agrarian Distress
Loan waivers do not address the deep-rooted problems of Indias farmers.
T
he vagaries of the monsoon and the consequent droughts,
floods, or crop failures that immiserate vast sections of
farmers and agricultural labourers in India, are a matter of
routine even seven decades after independence. In fact, the crisis
has only deepened. With inadequate agrarian policies to confront
systemic structural issues, rural India continues to suffer. The
evocative images of farmers from Tamil Nadu protesting in the
capital for over a month now, holding dead snakes and rats in
their mouths (as that is all that is available in their fields to curb
hunger), and skulls of their kin who died due to destitution,
have brought home the extent of the agrarian distress.
After two consecutive drought years, though the south-west
monsoon was normal in most parts of India, there is a severe
drought in particular parts of the country due to the failure of the
north-east monsoon. The central government has declared eight
statesKerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Rajasthan,
Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Madhya Pradeshas drought-
affected. In January 2017, the Tamil Nadu government declared
the state to be drought-affected and waived cooperative bank
loans of small and medium farmers (who comprise around 92%
of all farmers in the state). Later, a high court order directed the
state government to waive cooperative bank loans of all farmers
(30% of the total cooperative bank loans were given to larger
farmers). Today, Tamil Nadu farmers are demanding further relief
from the central government in the form of a waiver of farm loans
from nationalised banks and better compensation for crop failure.
The newly-elected Uttar Pradesh government has declared a farm
loan waiver expected to cost the state government `36,359 crore.
These measures do promise some relief to farmers, but they are
no panacea for the deep-rooted agrarian crisis in general and rural
indebtedness in particular. A loan waiver is at best an immediate
response to an emergency situation. In 2008, the United Progres-
sive Alliance (UPA) government undertook a large loan waiver
programme. That experience, which cost the exchequer in excess
of `70,000 crore, tells us that loan waivers, even if unavoidable at
times, are a one-time relief from partial indebtedness and do
nothing to stop the recurrence of widespread rural indebtedness.
Not surprisingly, the otherwise-reticent governor of the
Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the head of the National Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development have spoken of the moral
hazard entailed in loan waivers that supposedly discourage
8 april 15, 2017
honest borrowers from repaying their loans on time. RBI Gover-
nor Urjit Patel added that loan waivers undermine credit disci-
pline and result in higher government borrowing which, in
turn, increases the costs of borrowing by others and could
eventually affect the national balance-sheet.
The facts are simple. Politicians believe loan waivers enhance
their popularity, moral hazards be damned. Many argued that the
UPA would not have been able to return to power in 2009 had it
not been for the farm loan waiver scheme. Agricultural loan waivers
and subsidies do not benefit the poorest in rural India. In fact, loan
waivers do little to relieve the indebtedness of the most vulnerable
farmers who are either landless or possess smallholdings. These
farmers are not considered creditworthy, have no access to insti-
tutional credit and are entirely dependent on usurious money-
lenders. Loan waivers do not alleviate agrarian crises that have
deep structural roots in Indias economy, including uneven access
to subsidies, skewed landownership patterns, and a degeneration
of government-supported agricultural extension programmes.
The agrarian crisis has not only persisted, but has become more
acute. Climate change and extreme weather patterns have further
exacerbated the insecurities of farmers. The lack of quality capital
assets in surface irrigation and rainwater harvesting continues to be
a challenge. This has led to a growing dependence on depleting
groundwater as the main source of irrigation. About half of the
countrys cropped area still does not have access to assured irri-
gation facilities. The union governments decision to increase the
number of workdays under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Act to 150 days a year in the eight
drought-affected states is a welcome move. Creation of assets
that conserve water, improve irrigation and prevent drought-like
condition from recurring needs to be expedited.
There are a host of other factors that have adversely affected
the balance sheets of Indian farmers. While costs of production
continue to rise, returns remain low and uncertain. Markets for
agricultural produce in India and the world over are imperfect
and volatile. Dwindling farm incomes and rural indebtedness
need to be understood in this light. Unless concerted efforts are
made to address these systemic problems, little will be achieved
to break this vicious cycle. Loan waivers are band-aid solutions
at best. They offer temporary relief. The more permanent solu-
tions remain to be addressed.
vol lII no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EDITORIALS

Clear Message from Kashmir

The virtual boycott of the parliamentary bypoll shows us the extent of disillusionment with the Indian state.

F
or long, Indians were made to believe that large election were made to believe that despite being bludgeoned by brute
turnouts in the Kashmir Valley represent a true measure power, Kashmiris would still come out and vote. The abysmally
of the peoples mood. We looked at voter turnout without low turnout of 7.14% in the Srinagar parliamentary constituency
considering the number of people who boycotted elections. We on 9 April, and the violence on that day that led to the death of
8 april 15, 2017 vol lII no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

eight young protesters and injuries to around 200 others tells us
the real story. It is a resoundingly clear statement that Kashmiris
are disillusioned with Indias constitutional institutions.
We need to recognise that there are significant differences
in election turnout in Kashmir for local bodies, assembly and
parliamentary polls, with maximum votes recorded for local
bodies and the lowest for parliamentary polls. This indicates
the level of confidence Kashmiris have in these institutions and
their political relevance. People voting in much larger numbers
for local bodies reflects their desire to address everyday concerns.
They vote in the assembly elections knowing that the state
government can only mitigate the consequences of the devas-
tation caused by decades-old repression without resolving the
political crisis. Voting in parliamentary elections is different. For
a large majority of Kashmiris, Indias Parliament lost its appeal
in 1993 when it unanimously resolved to speak of Jammu and
Kashmir as an integral part of India and reiterated its claim on
the territory held by Pakistan. At the same time, it ignored the
military suppression of Kashmiris and their democratic demands.
Neither the present nor past Indian governments have shown
any appetite for serious political negotiations to resolve the
political crisis in Kashmir. Having hollowed out constitutional
autonomy, and boasted in Parliament of having done so in 1964,
there are few takers for autonomy in Kashmir and, one might
add, in India.
So even within the logic of the argument advanced by the
government, it is apparent that there has been a consistent dis-
interest in parliamentary polls in the Kashmir Valley since 1998
with 70%80% of voters boycotting them. Today this figure has
climbed to 93%, rising from 74% in 2014. This shows the rapid
erosion in the pro-Indian constituency under the leadership of
the Bharatiya Janata Party-led central government. Narendra
Modi may be able to charm the bigots and jingoists in India with
his terrorism or tourism jargon, but in Kashmir this does not
cut much ice. It is tragic when a government begins to believe
its own spin that propagates that Pakistan-is-behind-all-thats-
wrong-in-Kashmir, and that the solution lies in dangling the
carrot of tourism and jobs to the youth. This premise has been
questioned by people with impeccable establishment credentials,
including cabinet ministers, a former national security advisor
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol lII no 15
EDITORIALS
and Indian Army generals. They have drawn attention to the
indigenous character of militancy and advocated initiation of
purposeful political dialogue. Unfortunately, the government
in Delhi continues to exhibit a singular lack of wisdom in its
Kashmir policy.
Policy and opinion-makers who find fault with Kashmiris for
acting as proxies for Pakistan and for their assertion of their
Muslimness, fail to acknowledge that the Indian state has
turned decisively against Muslims in India. Take the recent
statement of the President of the Jammu Chamber of Commerce
and Industries Rakesh Gupta, asking people to identify and
kill Rohingya and Bangladeshi Muslims. This is not an isolated
incident. It mirrors the growing and brazen anti-Muslim rhetoric
in many parts of India.
It is also worth noting that the mood on the street in Kashmir
is one of anger and defiance. While bullets and pellets have
caused casualties to mount, they have also convinced a large
section of the people, especially the youth, that the Government
of India only understands the language of armed militancy.
The large turnout at encounter sites, while operations are on,
to support and save their own who have picked up guns, suggests
that Kashmiris believe that union with India under an avowedly
Hindu majoritarian dispensation is detrimental for their very
survival. Young people are not offering themselves to be killed
or maimed for a few hundred rupees as propagandists argue.
Rather they do so because they feel they have no other avenue
left to be heard and for the demand for azaadi to be taken
seriously. The reasons for peoples anger and disillusionment
are also evident when you recall the activities of gau rakshaks
in Jammu, the permission accorded to Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh cohorts to brandish weapons in public in a Disturbed
Area, the deliberate delay in extending relief and rehabilita-
tion to victims of the cataclysmic floods of September 2014,
and the casualties suffered by civilians since the 8 July 2016
killing of Burhan Wani.
It is time Indians understood that the problem in Kashmir lies
amidst us, not in Pakistan, and in our collective refusal to accept
the simple truth that the disenchantment and disillusionment
of Kashmiris with India and Indian civil society has deepened.
This is the message from the 93% who boycotted the polls.
9

From 50 Years Ago
Vol II, No 15 april 15, 1967
EDITORIALS
Eyes on Diego Garcia
The US State Department cannot pretend to
be surprised by the Indian Foreign Ministers
threat to protest in the United Nations against
the British plan to build a refuelling and com-
munications centre on the island of Diego Garcia
in the middle of the Indian Ocean. [Mahomme-
dali Currim] Chagla has said nothing new that
Indian spokesmen have not said earlier. The
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017
plan to have a joint US-UK base in the Indian
Ocean was mooted in the autumn of 1963,
when leaks in the American press no doubt
inspired indicated the American desire to
make its presence felt in the Indian Ocean in
the shape of the US Seventh Fleet.
The US State Department at first tried to
make it appear that an Anglo-American pres-
ence in the Indian Ocean was necessary to give
a sense of security to Pakistan against India and
India against Pakistan, not to mention China.
But this was not accepted by New Delhi which
felt that any American incursion in the Indian
Ocean would only invite Soviet retaliatory action.
Next came the offer of a nuclear umbrella
from Washington. This too fell through though
at one stage India did show some confused
vol lII no 15
EDITORIALS
interest. India has never accepted the basic as-
sumption that an Anglo-American military pres-
ence in Diego Garcia will add to her security.
The bid to take over Diego Garcia means a
qualitative change in the character of the mili-
tary interest of western powers in South-East
Asia. It is not beyond the realm of the possible
that soon nuclear weaponry might be introduced
in this area, spelling the final and irrevocable
defeat of the concept of a nuclear-free zone in the
Indian Ocean. A relevant question in this con-
text is what the Soviet has up its sleeve. Should
Moscow decide to accept the western challenge
in the Indian Ocean with a series of diplomatic
moves in the Oceans peripheral states, we would
see an intensification of the cold war in an area
in which India has very important stakes.
9
HT PAREKH FINANCE COLUMN
Lebenslge of
Money Laundering
Avinash Persaud
W
e have seen the cycle before.
A money laundering ring is
busted open by a British news-
paper following an investigation by foreign
authorities. We learn that British compa-
nies and banks washed the proceeds of
criminal activities in London and the
United Kingdom (UK) dependencies. The
British authorities respond the next day
by saying that a thorough inquiry is
underway or at least that they are seri-
ously considering one. The story then
slips from the front page until the next
ring is broken open.
On 20 March 2017, the Guardian
revealed that it had received documents
from a three-year investigation by the
Latvian and Moldavian authorities into
what has been called the Global Laun-
dromat. These documents purport to
show that British-registered companies
and British-based banks were heavily
involved in the moving out of at least
$20 billion (bn) of proceeds of criminal
activities from Russia. Last year, sepa-
rately, the Home Affairs Select Commit-
tee of the UK Parliament published a
report suggesting that the London hous-
ing market was a primary avenue for the
laundering of 90 bn of illicit money
every year. Some of that may have come
from India. The year before that, Rob-
erto Saviano, a leading expert on the
international drugs trade was quoted in
the Independent, saying of the global
drugs trade that Mexico is its heart and
London is its head.
London has not become the global
capital of money laundering by accident.
Money launderers and those financing
terrorist activities need two things. The
first is a lot of financial transactions in
which they can quickly lose their deal-
ings. When it comes to international
financial centres, giants wash more and
London is a giant. The second is a place
10
where company and account opening
staff turn a blind eye to who is the
owner of a business or a bank account.
Secrecy over beneficial ownership of
companies is the main avenue of money
laundering.
Over the past five years, Michael Findley,
Daniel Nielson, and Jason Sharman have
carried out an interesting experiment
where they adopt the usual tags of a
money launderer, refuse to provide bene-
ficial ownership information and try to
set up a company. They made over 7,400
email solicitations to lawyers and corpo-
rate service providers across 182 coun-
tries. They then compiled an index based
on the number of different providers they
had to go to on average in a single juris-
diction before they were successful at
setting up a company without beneficial
ownership information. Amongst the
seven countries with the largest finan-
cial centres, the UK was the easiest place
to set up a shell company. Next came the
United States.
Compliance with anti-money launder-
ing rules has become a big business.
Banks spend a fortune on it every year
and even more the next. The UK is a
member of two organisations, the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the European
Union (EU) that routinely publishes black
lists of countries that these bodies
deem high risk, a danger to the inter-
national financial system or uncooper-
ative. London, New York, and Zurich
have never featured on these lists. Instead,
the usual pariahs of the West, Cuba,
North Korea, Iran, Yemen, and Venezuela
populate these lists. The listings also
include a spread of small states. In the
past, Antigua, Guyana, St Kitts and
Nevis have been tarred.
The only thing this motley collection
of countries has in common is that they
APRIL 15, 2017
present the most marginal threat to the
international financial system and are
powerless to respond to being listed. The
lists are political. North Korea flips on
and off the lists depending on progress
in anti-nuclear talks. And they are weap-
onised. Banks face large fines for facili-
tating financial flows with countries on
the lists, and as a result, they have with-
drawn payments services leaving these
countries stranded financially. The EU
and OECD are in danger of pushing these
countries into the hands of the very people
they listed them for helping. While the
Findley study indicates that there are
no Caribbean countries where it is
easier to set up a shell company than in
the UK, Caribbean countries have lost
the most correspondent relationships
with international banks.
The British are in denial. There is a
word for it in GermanLebenslge
which means the lie you have to tell
yourself to live your life. It is hard for the
British to feel good about themselves if
they thought the success of the City of
London and the London property market,
related in no small part to the worldwide
proceeds from crime as opposed to their
worldly skills. It does not help that finance
and property were the two engines of eco-
nomic growth for the UK over the past few
decades. Once the British newspapers
have revealed the latest money launder-
ing ring, they quickly return to the nar-
rative that the threat lies outside and,
oddly, in tiny places.
Money launderers are wise to the
deception. While the gaze of the inter-
national authorities is firmly fixed in the
Cayman Islands, Bahamas, and Seychelles,
money launderers find it safer to flock
to London. The politicisation of the
blacklists has enabled money launder-
ing in general, and London to become
its centre. In the Findley, Nielson and
Sharman study, after repeated efforts,
they were never able to set up a shell
company in Cayman Islands, Bahamas
or the Seychelles.
Avinash Persaud (apersaud@me.com) is
chairman of Elara Capital Limited and emeritus
professor of Gresham College, London.
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
OF POWER & POLITICS
Party with a Difference?
Suhas Palshikar
From adopting winnability as the
core principle of nominating
candidates to removing political
appointees of the previous
government, and in dealing with
governments of opposition
parties, the behaviour of the
Bharatiya Janata Party has been
so much like the Congress that
the latter would rejoice in the
assurance that there is no mukti
from its ways and manners. The
crucial difference between the
BJP and other parties is that it is
able to instil a sense of destiny not
just among its rank and file but
also the general public and
convince it that the party is doing
desh seva while others have been
doing only politics.
Of Power & Politics
Political commentator Suhas Palshikar will
write a monthly column that will analyse and
put into perspective political events and their
consequences. It will be published in the
second issue of the EPW every month.
Suhas Palshikar (suhaspalshikar@gmail.com)
is a political commentator and former teacher
of politics and public administration at the
Savitribai Phule Pune University, Pune.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
P
olitical parties in India have long
displayed a tendency towards what
some commentators have called
Congressisation. The Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP), too, has received criticisms
that in the moment of its high glory and
political ascendance, it is beginning to
behave much like the Congress (Sen 2017).
Improving upon the classical war
cry of non-Congressism, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi aggressively campaigned
for a Congress-mukt India during the
election campaign of 2014. While the
aggression was a novelty, the idea itself
has been basic to the existence of the BJP.
Not only has it (and the Jan Sangh earlier)
always aimed at replacing the Congress
but it has also spoken of clearing the politi-
cal ground of Congress-type politics.
The BJP has so self-consciously been
different from the Congress that its politics
often amounted to a complete contempt
for and rejection of the ideas and practices
that got identified with the Congress.
This distinguishes the Jan SanghBJP from
other fragments of the Janata family of
parties of the 1970s and the 1980s. The
insistence on being different from the
Congress was the origin of the BJPs auda-
cious slogan of party with a difference.
At a very broad level, this slogan captures
a critique not just of the Congress but of
the politics of the establishment, a genre
of politics that was contaminated by the
Congress. At another level, this slogan also
represented the middle class exasperation
with various forms of politicking that the
Congress party evolved. The difference
also originated in the diverse patterns of
organisational structures that the BJP and
Congress adoptedthe latter having a
chaotic pattern while the former, since the
Jan Sangh days, always believed in a strict
hierarchy and chain of command. So long
as the BJP (and previously, the Jan Sangh)
was a party with a limited spread, narrow
social base and a partial cadre base, it
could afford to retain this difference.
The question is, can the BJP manage
to be different from the Congress (and
vol liI no 15
indeed other parties) in the times of its
current pre-eminence? Since the BJPs
victory of 2014, it has begun to resemble
the Congress in two respects. One is in
its policy of accommodating anyone and
everyone and the other is in the cynical
pursuit of power at any cost. This process
of the BJPs Congressisation began in
the 1990s when leaders like Pramod
Mahajan convinced the party to become
pragmatic in its approach to ideology and
programmes and practical in its dealings
with the many non-Congress parties. It
could of course be said that an alliance
with various parties (who did not sub-
scribe to the BJPs ideas) constituted a
tactical move. But now in power on its
own strength, unencumbered by the
pressures of coalition politics, is the BJP
living up to its claim of being different?
Dilemma of Opening Up
Starting with the Ram Janmabhoomi
mobilisations, the BJP began expanding its
social base. Post 2014, the party conducted
a massive drive for membership recruit-
ment and during that time again, the filters
or gatekeeping mechanisms became
practically non-existent. This opened up
the party to all kinds of political entrepre-
neurs. In this sense, the BJP has lived
for a long time with the dilemma. The
dilemma is to maintain a balance between
the impulse of expansion and that of
being different. (Incidentally, following
from this same dilemma, many have
always believed that as the BJP grows,
its Hindutva too would become moder-
ate. More on this issue later.)
It would however be a mistake to
blame the partys failure to be different
on the entry of new social sections into
the BJP. The real challenge to its claims
of being different does not come from
its opening up to the masses. The real
Congressisation that afflicts the party
comes from its urge to grab formal power
and prove its political smartness. So, its
real challenge is to attract the same
known (and once detested) faces from
the Congress, do what the Congress used
to do, and yet claim a moral high ground.
In other words, can ex-Congresspersons
and the Congresss ways of doing
politics bring in mukti (freedom) from
the Congress?
11
OF POWER & POLITICS
Thus, a critical aspect of Congressisa-
tion pertains to indiscriminate accom-
modation of political actors from other
parties, including the Congress, for imme-
diate electoral gains, and even giving
them plum positions of power. Its chief
minister in Manipur was not long ago an
important Congress functionary in the
state. An important central minister from
Assam too has been a Congress stalwart
there. A prominent anti-BJP ex-Congress-
person has got a berth in the Goa cabinet.
Similarly, an important Congress func-
tionary in Uttar Pradesh is now a minis-
ter in the BJP government in the state.
One can make a long list of such
imported personalities that the party has
been flaunting during the past three years.
Particularly in states where the BJP is not
yet very strong, prominent leaders of
other parties are given important posi-
tions when they join the BJP. In a state
like Maharashtra, where the party has not
been traditionally very strong, the 2014
assembly elections witnessed induction of
political actors from the two Congress
parties on a visibly large scale. Later, in
the recently concluded local body elec-
tions, the party actually went on an aggres-
sive shopping expedition for candidates
from any and every party with a potential
to get elected. This practiceboth of poli-
tical entrepreneurs hopping parties and
parties shopping for useful merchandise
is not necessarily new.
One more criticism of the party with
a difference can arise from the conduct
of formal power. When a party comes to
occupy formal institutions of government,
one begins to expect that the party would
impose self-restraint over its political
anxieties. The power-holders are surely
not expected to be exemplars of selfless
choices, but at least need to adopt the fig
leaf of normative constraints. The BJP has
excelled the Congress in ridding itself of
that fig leaf. More than morality, this is a
matter of procedural probity. That the
Congress often violated the procedural
aspects of democratic behaviour, both in
politics and governance, does not absolve
the BJP from similar acts of commission
and omission. From adopting winnabil-
ity as the core principle of nominating
candidates to removing political appoin-
tees of the previous government, and in
dealing with governments of opposition
parties, the behaviour of the BJP has been
12
so much like Congress that the latter
would rejoice in the assurance that there
is no mukti from its ways and manners.
The BJPs crucial test came after the
recently held assembly elections in five
states. During the tumultuous phase of the
decline of the Congress, on many occa-
sions, hung legislatures emerged in a
number of states and through them, the
principle that the leader of the largest
party (or pre-election alliance), gets the
first opportunity to be invited to form the
government became the norm. But throw-
ing patience and prudence to the wind,
the BJP gloated about its better political
management skills and the governors of
Goa and Manipur allowed themselves to
violate this norm. Not only did the party
rush to violate the norm, it also frankly
sought to publicise its midnight smartness
(Times of India 2017).
A New Norm
But the BJP is after all, a party with a
difference and therefore, the alleged
violations of the norm and other accusa-
tions can be countered by it by recourse to
the world of new norms and principles.
Thus, its haste in forming the govern-
ments has been defended on the ground
of a new norm: if the leader of the larger
party does not make a formal claim, then
the governor could legitimately invite
the next in line instead of invitingas a
routinethe leader of the largest party.
The fig leaf here was the hair-splitting over
the difference between claiming the right
to government formation and waiting
for the governor to invite to form a gov-
ernment. When the Congress violated
the norms it often resulted in the norms
getting judicially strengthened; when
the BJP does that the same, it seeks to
redefine the existing norm to suit it
and get judicial approval.
Just as in the case of government forma-
tion the BJP hid behind the thin argument
of waiting versus claiming, in the case
of its open door policy for eager Congress-
persons to cross over, it is not unlikely
that the party would soon come out with
some official justification of being different
in spite of the similarity. In the recently
held local elections in Maharashtra, second
rung leaders did justify the candidatures
of many tainted persons by likening the
BJPs struggle to that of the Pandavas
against the Kauravas. It was openly argued
APRIL 15, 2017
that those with a tainted past (legal or
political), actually become purified by
joining the cause of good against the
evil. (For a straightforward justification
and argument that those with a criminal
past become ex-criminals once they
join the BJP and that by joining the BJP
they get reformed, see Nitin Gadkaris
interview.) And he is surely not a second
rung leader (APB Majha 2017)! So, even
in being similar, the BJP manifests some
very crucial signs of difference: it is the
adherence to the idea that the political
adversary constitutes evil and that
aligning with the BJP is not only an act
of piety, it is also an act of expiation.
This approach is fundamentally differ-
ent from what one would expect in a
competitive democratic set-up.
Sustaining Faith
These twin beliefs that it is engaged in a
war against evil and that whoever joins
that war becomes automatically purified,
sustain and will keep on sustaining the
inner faith of the BJP in not only its dif-
ference from others but a self-belief in
the intrinsic necessity of its own variant
of politics. These beliefs allow the party to
adroitly marry a pragmatic political instinct
with its claims to the moral high ground.
It is besides the point whether the
architects of these argumentative manoe-
uvres are cynical or sincere; the crucial
difference (between BJP and other parties)
is that it is able to instil a sense of destiny
not just among its rank and file but the
general public and convince them that the
party is doing desh seva while others
have been doing only politics.
It is this manoeuvre that informs the
dominance of the BJP in the present
juncture of Indias politics.
References
APB Majha (2017): Ranenni Shivsena Sodu Naye
Mhanun Shevatparyant Tyanchyajaval Basun
Hoto: Gadkari, 1 April, http://abpmajha.abplive.
in/mumbai/nitin-gadkari-on-majha-katta-latest-
updates-387103.
Sen, Ronojoy (2017): In the New India Proclaimed by
PM Modi How, in so Many Ways, BJP Is the New
Congress, Times of India, 18 March, http://blogs.
timesofindia.indiatimes.com/toi-edit-page/in-
the-new-india-proclaimed-by-pm-modi-how-in-
so-many-ways-bjp-is-the-new-congress/.
Times of India (2017): How Amit Shah and Nitin
Gadkari Checkmated Congress to Form BJP Gov-
ernment in Goa, 16 March, http://timesofindia.
indiatimes.com/elections/assembly-elections/
goa/news/how-amit-shah-and-nitin-gadkari-
checkmated-congress-to-form-bjp-government-
in-goa/articleshow/57673008.cms.
vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Suppressing the Symptoms or
Treating the Malady?
Abhay Shukla
Maharashtra, which recently
witnessed several attacks on front
line doctors, has comparatively
very low levels of per capita public
health spending, shortfalls in
health facilities, and major
shortages of specialist public
doctors. Dialogue mechanisms
should be developed based on
community monitoring, while
existing legal provisions for
grievance redressal need
implementation. Doctorpatient
communication must improve,
and the serious ailments afflicting
public health services in
Maharashtra must be addressed to
move beyond superficial solutions.
The author gratefully acknowledges inputs
from Sanjay Nagral, Ravi Duggal and members
of the SATHI team while writing this article.
Abhay Shukla (abhayshukla1@gmail.com) is a
public health professional and health activist
associated with the Jan Swasthya Abhiyan and
Alliance of Doctors for Ethical Healthcare.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
M
aharashtra has witnessed a
spate of attacks by attendants
of patients on front line doctors
in public hospitals across the state in
March 2017. This precipitated a major
strike by over 4,000 resident doctors,
which was supported by the 40,000-strong
Indian Medical Association (IMA) in the
state. The Bombay High Court intervened
based on a public interest litigation that
had been filed against the strike, and
ordered the resident doctors to resume
work. With the government having given
an assurance that 1,100 additional security
guards will be appointed in public hos-
pitals across the state, the strike was with-
drawn after nearly five days of turmoil.
What was notable in this process was
that all major parties involvedthe
doctors associations, the government, and
the courttreated these attacks purely
as a security issue. The chief justice of
the high court termed the attacks as
madness, perhaps implying that there
could be no understandable rationale for
people to be moved to such violent action.
It appeared as if the growing popular
dissatisfaction with the availability and
quality of services being provided in major
public hospitals across Maharashtra had
nothing to do with the violence that had
erupted in certain public hospitals of the
state. This seemed like a situation where
a cauldron of water had been allowed to
simmer on a flame, and yet when the pot
boiled over, this was sought to be con-
trolled by putting a lid on the vessel,
rather than by putting out the fire.
Not Just about Law and Order
All would agree that such attacks on
front line doctors, who are often over-
worked and provide health services in
difficult conditions, are completely inap-
propriate and unjustified. However, the
question is, how can such situations be
vol lIi no 15
definitively prevented? Is the appoint-
ment of a few security guards in each
hospital department the complete solution
to this problem? (The state has around
130 larger public hospitals, not counting
municipal hospitals; 1,100 additional
guards would mean an average of about
eight more guards per hospital.) Or are
there deeper health system issues that
must also be addressed? The Jan Arogya
Abhiyan, a state-level coalition of civil
society organisations working in the
health sector, organised a press confer-
ence in Mumbai on 22 March 2017 during
the strike period, with the participation
of health activists and certain organisers
of junior doctors and nurses (Iyer 2017).
Here, the need to prevent violence, with
a focus on addressing such underlying
health system issues was strongly under-
scored, summarised by the slogan: Dont
target the doctors, target the system.
An accompanying concern is that when
doctors go on strike, the Essential Services
Maintenance Act, 1968 is invoked with
the argument that unlike, say, factory
workers, doctors are not allowed to
strike since they perform an essential
public service. The chief justice is reported
to have mentioned during the hearing
that if doctors go on strike like factory
men, then they are unfit to be doctors.
Besides the implied slur on factory work-
ers, there is a deeper question that arises
here. When doctors are on strike, health-
care is declared an essential service,
but does the state accord the same level
of priority to these essential health
services while allocating resources and
human power?
Public Health Expenditure
Despite being a state with relatively
high per capita income (fifth highest
among major Indian states), Maharashtra,
spending `831 per capita, figures towards
the bottom when states are ranked by
per capita public health expenditure
(Figure 1, p 14).
It can be seen that per capita health
spending in Maharashtra is below the
national average (`963), and is barely
around half of the amounts for Rajasthan
(`1,584) and Kerala (`1,650), which have
13
COMMENTARY
Figure 1: Per Capita Public Health Spending 201516
Bihar 433
Uttar Pradesh 734
Maharashtra 831
Odisha 868
India 963
Tamil Nadu 1,050
Chhattisgarh 1,154
Rajasthan
Kerala
Delhi
Mizoram
Goa
0 500 1,000 1,500
Source: Calculations based on data in MoHFW (2016); population projections based on 2011 Census.
lower per capita incomes as compared to
Maharashtra. Neighbouring Goa is in a
separate league in this regard (`4,874),
and even though it is a much smaller
and richer state, its per capita public
health spending is six times higher than
Maharashtras, giving some idea of the
desirable levels of expenditure required to
ensure adequate health services.
What is equally a matter of serious
concern is that public health expenditure
by Maharashtra has been declining as a
proportion of the gross state domestic
product (GSDP), declining from 1% in
198586 to 0.49% in 201718, and plac-
ing Maharashtra behind most states in
the country. Even during the current
financial year, allocations for public
health and medical education have been
cut down by 4.4% compared to the re-
vised budget estimates for 201617.1 Do
these pathetic levels of public health
spending reflect the high priority that
must be accorded to this so-called essen-
tial service?
Shortfall of Services
Public health services in Maharashtra
were relatively performing well until the
mid-1980s. However, given the subse-
quent crunch on financial resources, as
well as declining political priority and
the privatisation of healthcare, it is not
surprising that there are now serious
shortfalls in providing health services at
various levels, forming the backdrop to
rising public dissatisfaction. As per the
most recent official data available (MoHFW
2015: Table 11), there is a shortfall of 22%
in the number of sub-centres, 18% in the
number of primary health centres, and
14
1,584
1,650
2,506
4,006
2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000 4,500
35% in the number of community health
centres (rural hospitals). Compared to 550
rural hospitals that are required to serve
the population (estimated at 2011 levels),
only 360 are in place, which naturally
would force a greater number of patients
to seek care in higher level hospitals,
placing significant strain on them.
Further, there are serious shortages of
specialist doctors in the public hospitals
that are functioning. Compared to 1,440
specialist doctors required in rural hos-
pitals across the state, only 578 are in
position, indicating a shortfall of nearly
60% in this critical cadre of doctors who
are essential for treating complicated
and emergency conditions (MoHFW 2015:
Table 28). It is, perhaps, but expected
that out of the 360 rural hospitals in
Maharashtra, only 127 (35%) currently
meet Indian Public Health Standards
(MoHFW 2015: Table 37B). Shortages of
medical staff plague district hospitals also,
which have a 24% shortfall of doctors
(MoHFW 2015: Table 69). It should be
noted that massive, unregulated prolifera-
tion of the private medical sector has con-
tributed to this situation, since even
specialist doctors graduating from public
medical colleges are pulled away by the
magnet of private hospitals. With 50
medical colleges, Maharashtra leads the
country just behind Karnataka. Yet, after
churning out so many doctors, if over half
of the required posts for specialist doctors
remain vacant year after year, should this
not be regarded as a larger policy failure?
What is even more serious is that certain
district-level hospitals (such as in Akola,
Latur and Nanded) are running with
hardly any specialist doctors, while almost
APRIL 15, 2017
(in `) all posts of Class 1 specialist doctors are
vacant in the medical college-associated
hospitals in these districts. In many dis-
trict hospitals, even the appointed senior
doctors are often reported as missing in
action since they are busy in their private
practices. It is an open secret that in many
district hospitals, after the morning out-
patient department hours, specialists are
unavailable, leaving the running of the
hospital to junior doctors. It is in such
settings that services for critical patients
4,874
might not be available in a timely manner,
5,000
leading to the front line doctors being
exposed to socially explosive situations.
Guidance and Redressal
Another important factor that contributes
to the breakdown of communication and
trust in the context of public hospitals is
the lack of effective patient guidance
and redressal systems. Patients and rela-
tives from rural areas, who travel long
distances to the district hospital located
in an unfamiliar setting, require system-
atic information and support, which are
often lacking. When complaints do arise,
which is inevitable, effective mechanisms
need to be in place to deal with these as
promptly as possible, while ensuring
accountability of the service providers.
Here, the experience of Community
Based Monitoring and Planning (CBMP)
of Health Services, a process being im-
plemented since 2007 as a component of
the National Health Mission in 30 blocks
across 14 districts of Maharashtra,2 pro-
vides a number of positive examples
about how such dialogue and grievance
redressal could be developed as part of
accountability mechanisms. In each CBMP
block, facilitators and coordinators belon-
ging to nodal civil society organisations
have been given the responsibility for
promoting community action, and fre-
quently receive calls from patients re-
quiring support in rural and sub-district
hospitals. These activists, who are aware
of healthcare provisions, dialogue with
the relevant health officials and doctors
to ensure that required services are
made available, while also guiding the
patient in negotiating the health facility.
Since major grievances are also periodi-
cally discussed in multi-stakeholder moni-
toring and planning committees at block
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and district levels, and during annual
jan samvads (public dialogues), this pro-
cess ensures that health providers are
held accountable, while attempts are
made to address health service-related
structural issues through local problem-
solving and decentralised planning.
It may be relevant to explore how sim-
ilar dialogue, accountability and griev-
ance redressal mechanisms might be
developed in the context of larger public
health facilities like district and medical
college hospitals, which seem to be the
epicentre of the recent violent incidents
in Maharashtra, reflecting the complete
breakdown of trust and communication
between people and healthcare provid-
ers. Provision for help desks in larger
hospitals run by local civil society
groups, and widely publicised and acces-
sible grievance redressal forums could
be steps in this direction. Such mecha-
nisms would, of course, not be substitutes
for much-needed health budget, human-
power and service-related improvements,
but could complement these to ensure
that mandated services become more
accessible, and conflicts are minimised
through dialogue for problem-solving in
various situations.
Prevention of Violence
In this context, some of the legal dimen-
sions also deserve attention. Resident
doctors (who fall in a grey zone, some-
where between students, workers and
professionals) are not paid a salary, but
rather get a stipend that is not indexed
to inflation. Hence, the Maharashtra
Association of Resident Doctors (MARD)
goes on strike almost every year, dem-
anding a rise in the stipend for resident
doctors, and after some negotiations
with the government, generally based
on certain raise in stipends, the strike is
withdrawn after a few days. What is rel-
evant here is that, during these strikes
by junior doctors, besides the perennial
demand for increase in stipends, the
demand for protection against attacks
has also emerged since 2006. It is nota-
ble that such attacks have been growing
in the case of private hospitals also, with
serious dissatisfaction relating to medical
care among patients and relatives, even
though the causes for dissatisfaction in
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
public and private hospitals are likely to
be qualitatively different.
Given this background, on demand
from the IMA Maharashtra State, the
Maharashtra government enacted the
Maharashtra Medicare Service Persons
and Medicare Service Institutions (Pre-
vention of Violence and Damage or Loss
to Property) Act in 2010.3 According to
this act, violence against doctors, medi-
cal staff and medical establishments is a
non-bailable offence, which can attract
imprisonment of up to three years, and a
fine of up to `50,000. Further, in case of
damage to property, any offender would
have to pay as compensation twice the
amount of loss caused to the property.
Though sound in principle, in practice
it seems that these legal forms of protec-
tion have not worked very well. In fact,
the need for stringent implementation of
this act was repeatedly invoked during
the recent doctors strike. Yet, it is a moot
question as to whether a mob of angry
relatives and attendants of a patient,
who acutely perceive some serious griev-
ance in a hospital, perhaps following the
death of a near one, would reflect on the
provisions of such an act and then quietly
go home, without their grievance (real
or otherwise) being addressed. Here, we
might get a clue as to the reasons for the
ineffectiveness of this act until now,
from the final functional clause in the
act itself. This clause seems to have been
inserted as an afterthought, and is not
generally mentioned by public votaries
for the act belonging to medical associa-
tions. As per available information, this
section has effectively not been imple-
mented in the last seven years since the
act came into force. Implicitly admitting
that patients might have some genuine
grievances in hospitals, which need to
be addressed through participatory mech-
anisms, Section 7 of the said act states:
(1) The State Government shall, by notifica-
tion in the Official Gazette, establish the
Authority for the area as may be specified
in such notification, to hear grievances of
victims of medical negligence or mismanage-
ment and to aid and advise such victims for
taking recourse to an appropriate forum for
suitable relief.
(2) The Authority shall consist of experts
one each from the field of medical, law, con-
sumer movement and health management.
(emphasis added)
vol lIi no 15
COMMENTARY
We are led to speculate as to why this
section of the statute has never been
publicised by the government and has
not been implemented so far. What might
have been the impact, if over the last seven
years this clause had been implemented
with full sincerity and political will in
public and private hospitals across the
state? With the creation of multistake-
holder authorities in every area to guide
people with complaints, with prompt guid-
ance available to address grievances,
could some of the attacks by disgruntled
elements have been averted? Could a
significant number of peoples genuine
grievances related to hospitals been
resolved? While such questions cannot be
answered definitively, there is no doubt
that until now this law seems to have
been interpreted selectively even by the
government, and a crucial provision to
support patients and healthcare users has
been ignored. Instead of bridging it, the
gap between hospitals and people has been
allowed to further widen, with tragic con-
sequences that we are witnessing today.
DoctorPatient Relationship
Another aspect that emerges, besides
unavailability of required care and adve-
rse health outcomes in some cases, is the
frequent lack of empathetic and sensitive
communication by doctors. There is no
doubt that junior doctors are often over-
worked, stretched for time, and have
multiple responsibilities to handle. But,
especially in critical cases, rude or cal-
lous behaviour by doctors can become the
last straw that might break the bounds
of patience of a group attending to the
patient, who may have even witnessed
the death of a family member. Perhaps,
fewer armed guards might suffice if doc-
tors are regularly oriented in communi-
cation skills and management of crisis
situations in a sensitive manner. Once
again, this would not substitute the need
for adequate health system resources,
structural improvements and upgrada-
tion of healthcare services, but definitely
needs to be kept in mind as a supplemen-
tary measure of some importance.
Finally, at a social level, there seems
to be a general decline in levels of toler-
ance and a greater tendency to indulge
in group violence, which is manifesting
15
COMMENTARY
in many forms. It is ironic that with the
dismantling of the welfare state through
neo-liberal policies, one of the most visible
symbols of welfare, namely, public hospi-
tals, are emerging as targets. There is no
doubt that the wide spectrum of social
organisations, movements and political
parties in Maharashtra must, on the one
hand, strongly appeal to people to desist
from attacking doctors and healthcare
staff and, on the other hand, start actively
demanding and working for health sys-
tem improvements and changes.
To conclude, these unfortunate attacks
on doctors are not just a law and order
16
problem, rather they should be treated as
wake up calls, symptoms of a deep health
system malaise, embedded in an increas-
ingly troubled social milieu. Government
and society must squarely recognise and
address the serious ailment afflicting
public health services in Maharashtra to-
day. The provision of security guards
can, at best, partially suppress the symp-
toms. For a definitive cure, we must tack-
le the roots of this systemic problem.
notes
1 Maharashtra state budget figures for 201617
and 201718 available at https://beams.maha-
kosh.gov.in.
APRIL 15, 2017
2 See, http://www.cbmpmaharashtra.org/.
3 See, http://www.lawsofindia.org/pdf/mahara-
shtra/2010/2010MH11.pdf.
References
Iyer, Malathi (2017): Health Budget Cuts Leading
to Violence against Doctors, Say Experts, Times
of India, 23 March, http://timesofindia.india-
times.com/city/mumbai/health-budget-cuts-l-
eading-to-violence-against-doctors-say-exper-
ts/articleshow/57788212.cms.
MoHFW (2015): Rural Health Statistics, 201415,
Statistics Division, Ministry of Health and
Family Welfare, Government of India, New
Delhi.
(2016): Health Sector Financing by Centre and
States/UTs in India (201314 to 201516),
National Health Accounts Cell, Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, Government of
India New Delhi.
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Uttar Pradesh Elections 2017
Failure of Pre-electoral Coalition
Adnan Farooqui, E Sridharan
This article examines the electoral
alliance between the Samajwadi
Party and the Congress in the
recently held Uttar Pradesh
assembly elections in the context
of Indias complex polity at the
national and state levels.
Adnan Farooqui (adnan.farooqui@gmail.com)
teaches at the Department of Political
Science, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.
E Sridharan is Academic Director, University of
Pennsylvania Institute for the Advanced Study
of India, New Delhi.
16
W
hat can we expect about elec-
toral coalitions in India, parti-
cularly state-level electoral
coalitions, from theory and comparative
experience?1 India does not neatly fit
into theories of coalition politics deve-
loped on the basis of the European
experience of parliamentary democracy
in mostly unitary states with less ethnic
heterogeneity than India, and using
proportional representation or mixed-
member electoral systems.
First, Indias polity at the national or
state level is not characterised principal-
ly by a single leftright ideological axis
but multiple cross-cutting axes, includ-
ing the leftright axisfor example,
secular versus Hindutva, and a variety
of caste and community bloc-based axes,
varying statewise.
Second, party identification in India is
relatively weak both among politicians
and voters, and parties tend to be clien-
telistic, lacking well-defined social bases
compared to most Western democracies.
Defections and splits that are common in
Indian parties would be unusual in most
European parties because of well-defined
party ideologies, policy orientations and
relatively stable social constituencies.
There is a large floating vote that is up for
APRIL 15, 2017
grabs and major swings are possible, for
example, the 12% nationwide swing in
favour of the Bharatiya Janata Party
(BJP) in 2014 or nearly 25% swing for
the party in the assembly elections held
in March.
Third, generally speaking, parties have
a strong incentive to aggregate votes
through formation of alliances based on
sharing out the total number of contested
seats so as not to split but to pool votes.
This is because in a plurality-rule system
a small addition of votes has the poten-
tial to hugely increase or alternatively
decimate a party or coalition in terms of
seats. Since electoral coalitions, unlike
post-election coalitions, are formed under
conditions of uncertainty about which
party will get how many votes and win
how many seats, there are even greater
incentives to add on partners to increase
chances of victory, and not take any
chance of losing, without being too
particular about ideological and pro-
grammatic compatibility, except in con-
ditions of extreme incompatibility. Thus
the first-past-the-post system would tend
to give incentives to politicians to form
ideologically indiscriminate pre-election
coalitions, or even seat adjustments
for pooling of votes or avoiding splitting
of votes, which are only partial, not true,
coalitions (Laver and Schofield 1998:
2526, 20406; Sridharan 2002: 28081).
Even if a single party majority results
from a pre-election coalition in a first-
past-the-post system, the seat majority
of the dominant partner in a surplus
majority coalition depends on the vote
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

transfer of the supporters of the minor
partners to the major partner in seat-
sharing, that is, vote-pooling arrange-
ments, though their seats may not be
critical in the legislature elected, for
example, the Communist Party of India-
Marxist in West Bengal in all govern-
ments between 1977 and 2011, and the
BJP-led National Democratic Alliance
(NDA) in 2014. This gives an incentive
for the dominant party to accommodate
its smaller allies.
Fourth, available evidence indicates
that stable and effective coalitions at the
state level in India are based on roughly
proportionate sharing of seats in pre-
electoral coalitions based on a quota
whereby partner parties are allocated
seats which they either hold or were
runner-ups, and also when coalition
governments share portfolios in a roughly
proportionate manner (Sridharan 2014).
However, the logic of pivotality, or per-
ceived bridging vote share can violate
such quota-based pre-electoral coalitions
where the smaller party that is perceived
to hold a bridging vote share (that can
make a difference between victory and
defeat) is able to leverage that to extract
a higher number of seats to contest in a
pre-electoral coalition. We argue in the
present case of Uttar Pradesh (UP) in
2017, that the Congress managed to con-
test a number of seats that amounted to
93% more than its quota. While this
might have damaged the alliances pros-
pects, it is quite likely that the alliance
might have been doomed anyway given
that the BJP had around 40% vote share
in a three-cornered contest. It is unlikely
to face a serious challenge except from a
Bihar 2015-style grand alliance of the
opposition in the 2019 parliamentary
elections in the state. It is against this
background that we explore coalition
formation in UP between the Samajwadi
Party (SP) and the Indian National Con-
gress (INC) (henceforth Congress) and
seek out reasons for the failure of the
alliance in the recently held assembly
elections in the state.
Political System in Uttar Pradesh
The political history of UP since inde-
pendence closely resembles the politics
of India. We can broadly classify it into
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
COMMENTARY
four phases: 195067, 196790, 1990 The NDA won 73 seats in the 2014 parlia-
2007, and 2007 to the present. While the mentary elections, with the BJP alone
first phase was characterised by the winning 71 seats with an impressive vote
dominance of the Congress, the second share of 42.6%. Its previous best in the
phase heralded the advent of significant parliamentary elections from the state
opposition to the party in the state, as- was in 1998, when the party had won 57
sociated with the rise of a wide array of seats with a vote share of 36.5%. The SP,
parties claiming to represent agrarian BSP, and Congress were relegated to sec-
interests, and comprising primarily of ond, third, and fourth positions by vote
Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The third share. The SP and Congress won five and
phase, beginning in 1990, witnessed the two seats respectively, while the BSP
ascendance of Hindu nationalism, repre- failed to win even a single seat (Table 1).
sented in the rise, consolidation and con- The BJP vote share was nearly double the
comitant decline of the BJP in the state, 22.2% that of the SP and translated into a
and the emergence and consolidation of massive mandate73 out of the 80 seats
backward caste and lower caste parties for the BJP-led alliance (Verma 2014: 90).
the SP and the Bahujan Samajwadi Party In a four-cornered fight, the BJP ran a
(BSP) (Jeffrey 2014: 25). superior campaign with Prime Minister
The fourth phase began with the con- Narendra Modi leading from the front.
solidation of the core social base of the This, along with the moving away of
two principal contendersthe BSP and substantial numbers of non-Jatav Dalits,
the SP. What followed was a carefully non-Yadav OBCs from the BSP and SP
crafted attempt at social engineering, respectively, consolidation of the BJPs
achieved through consolidation of their traditional support base amongst the up-
core support base amongst Dalits, mainly per castes, and an alliance with the
Jatavs, and OBCs, principally Yadavs, Apna Dal, helped the BJP register a for-
shoring up vote plurality at the constitu- midable victory and decimate the oppo-
ency level with the additional support of sition (Verma 2014: 92).
Brahmins, Thakurs, non-Yadav OBCs and Most importantly, the BJP was the
Muslims. This resulted in single party leading party in 328 of the 403 assembly
majority (SPM) governments in the state segments. The tally for the SP, BSP and
by both BSP and SP in 2007 and 2012 Congress was 42, 15, and nine respec-
respectively. This was the apogee of caste- tively (Table 2). In a state with a four-
based political mobilisation in the state, cornered electoral contest, under a simple
where the multiparty system had come plurality system, the contests in the past
to be associated with the BSP and the SP. have been fairly close. To put this in
The two national parties, the BJP and perspective, the BSP in 2007 and the SP
Congress, were relegated to the sidelines. in 2012 won an absolute majority on
It is against this backdrop that the Table 2 : Party Position by Assembly Segments in
2014 parliamentary election results in 2014 Lok Sabha Elections for BJP, SP, BSP
the state, which witnessed the BJP-led and Congress
Party Lead Runner-up
NDA registering an electoral landslide,
BJP 328 62
were a departure from the previous
SP 42 141
assembly and parliamentary elections, as
BSP 9 155
the party had been in a state of gradual
INC 15 30
decline since the 1999 parliamentary elec- Source: Election Commission of India: Statistical Report on
tions and 2002 state assembly elections. General Elections 2014.
Table 1: Seats and Vote Share in 2014 Parliamentary Elections and 2017 Assembly Elections for BJP, SP,
BSP and Congress
Party Parliamentary Elections 2014 Assembly Elections 2017
SC SW VS (SC) VS PV PS Strike SC SW VS (SC) VS PV PS Strike
(%) (%) Rate (%) (%) (%) Rate (%)
BJP 78 71 43.7 42.6 1 1 91 384 312 41.55 39.65 1 1 81
SP 78 5 22.8 22.3 2 2 6 311 47 28.32 21.83 2 2 15
BSP 80 0 19.8 19.8 3 5 0 403 19 22.23 22.23 3 3 5
INC 67 2 9 7.5 4 3 3 114 7 22.13 6.25 4 4 6
Source: Election Commission of India: Statistical Reports on General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh
2017 and the Parliamentary Elections 2014.
vol lIi no 15 17
COMMENTARY

their own with a vote share of 30% and
29% respectively. The BSP and SP had
won their electoral majorities by a nar-
row average margin of 6% and 7% in
86% and 80% of the total seats won by
them in 2007 and 2012 assembly elections
(Table 3).
Table 3: Assembly Constituencies Won by the BSP
and SP in 2007 and 2012 Assembly Elections
Year Party Seats Seats with a Percentage of Average
Won Victory Margin Seats with a
Less than the Victory Margin (%)
Third Position Less than
Candidate the Third
Position
Candidate
2007 BSP 206 178 86
2012 SP 224 180 80
Source: Election Commission of India: Statistical Reports
on General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar
Pradesh 2007 and 2012.
In the 2014 parliamentary elections,
the BJP had won a whopping 43.7% of
the vote share in the 78 seats contested
by the party and had won 52 seats with
greater than 40% vote share. In 17 seats,
the BJP had a vote share of more than
50%. The BJPs performance in 328
assembly segments where the party had
the lead was equally formidable. In 253
of these 328 assembly segments, BJP
had over 40% vote share with an abso-
lute majority in 94 assembly segments
(Chakravarty 2017).
combined vote share of the SP, BSP and
Congress even in the 2014 parliamentary
elections was 49.6%. In the 2014 elec-
tions, both the SP and BSP had lost 18
seats each and the Congress lost two
seats by an average margin of 11% to
the BJP. The victory margin for the BJP
in these 38 seats was less than that
of the vote share of the third position
candidate. The BSP, SP, and the Congress
Margin
were in the third position in 18, 16, and
two of the seats respectively and so was
the Quami Ekta Dal (QED) in two seats
(Table 4).
6
However, this was easier said than done
7
not only due to the incompatible social
support base of the two principal non-
BJP parties, but also the history of acri-
monious personal relationship between
the BSP leader Mayawati and the SPs
Mulayam Singh Yadav. It dates back to
the 1995 attack on Mayawati by workers
of the SP after the BSP decided to break its
1993 alliance with the former (Jha 2015).
This acrimony was the main reason behind
the partys refusal to consider the SPs
offer of an alliance in January 2015. The
ruling SP government not only had to
face anti-incumbency but also had to
deal with the family feud within the ruling
party. Mulayam Singh Yadav remained
Pattern of Seat Sharing
The SP and the Congress reached a seat-
sharing arrangement where the two
parties decided to contest 298 and 105
seats respectively, although in reality,
both contested on 311 and 114 seats as
they were engaged in a face-to-face con-
test in 25 assembly seats.
If we assume that the seat sharing
was based on a quota defined as the
claim for the winner and runner-up
seats, then going by their performance
in 2012 assembly elections the SP and
the Congress should have contested 301
seats and 59 seats respectively. There-
fore, the two parties exceeded their
quota by 10 and 55 seats each (Table 5).
The SP staked its claim and fought in
260 seats out of the 301 seats where the
party was either a winner or a runner-up
in 2012. The remaining 51 seats contested
by the party comprised of constituencies
where the party was uncompetitive,
that is, not in the top two positions in
the 2012 elections.
Table 5: Pattern of Seat Sharing between SP and
Congress in 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly
Elections Based on Their Performance in 2012
Assembly Elections
Alliance Assembly Performance in 2012 Assembly
in 2017 Elections 2017 Elections
Seats W R Seats Managed
Contested beyond Quota

Against this backdrop, both the SP adamant in his refusal to ally with the SP 311 224 77 +10(3%)
INC 114 28 31 +55(93%)
and BSP were incapable to take on the Congress. His son and then UP chief
Source: Election Commission of India: Statistical Reports
resurgent BJP on their own. Therefore, minister Akhilesh Yadav responded posi- on General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar
the only viable option for both the SP tively to the Congresss overtures primarily Pradesh 2012 and 2017.

and BSP would have been to forge a to shore up his partys chances in the The Congress, on the other hand, con-
Bihar-like grand alliance, along with assembly elections and consolidate his tested only 32 of the 59 seats where it
the Congress in order to be in a credible position within the party in case of internal was either a winner or a runner-up. It
position to take on the BJP-led NDA in sabotage of its electoral prospects by dis- staked its claim and fought in as many
the 2017 assembly elections. This would gruntled sections within the extended as 82 constituencies where it was not
have made electoral sense too as the Yadav family. The attempt by the Rashtriya competitive (as explained above). These
Table 4: Parliamentary Constituencies in 2014
Lok Dal (RLD) to be part of an alliance included 13 seats which it had not con-
Won by the BJP Having a Victory Margin Less between the SP and the Congress was tested in the 2012 assembly elections. Its
than the Third Position Candidate scuttled primarily because of the formers then ally the RLD had contested seven of
Party Seats Won by Percentage of Average Runner- Second refusal to concede more seats than the the 13 seats. The Congress did seem to
BJP with a Seats Won by Margin up Runner-
Victory Margin the BJP with (%) up generous 105 to the Congress. The Con- have an upper hand given its performance
Less than the a Victory gress too refused to share seats with the in the 2012 assembly elections. It man-
Third Position Margin Less
Candidate than the Third RLD from its kitty of seats, though the two aged to secure 10 seats which the SP had
Position parties had contested the 2012 assembly won in the previous election and 19 seats
Candidate
elections in alliance. The alliance with where the SP was a runner-up. The SP on
BJP 38 54 11
SP, which was a lifeline for the Congress, the other hand staked its claim and fought
SP 18 16
was relegated to the margins of UP poli- in 16 constituencies contested by the RLD
BSP 18 18
tics. However, the fact that the Congress in the previous assembly election and
INC 2 2
and the SP decided to join hands was not contested by the RLD ally Congress.
QED 2
Source: Election Commission of India: Statistical Report on
indicative that both of them were not The number of seats contested by the
General Elections 2014. comfortable going it alone. SP where the Congress was a winner or a
18 APRIL 15, 2017 vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

runner-up were three and two, respec-
tively. In the 25 seats where the two
allies fought against each other, the SP
had won 13 seats and was a runner-up in
four others in the previous assembly
election, while the Congress had won
only two of these seats in the previous
assembly election in 2012; it was runner-
up in five seats and had not contested
two seats. Therefore, if we go by the
logic of seat-sharing quota, then the
SP should have contested 17 seats, and
the Congress seven seats. The SP was a
runner-up in one constituency, of the
two not contested by the Congress in
2012. In three seats the alliance decided
to back independents, and two of them
managed to win.
Electoral Performance
The electoral results were largely a repeat
of the 2014 parliamentary election. The
BJP-led alliance registered a spectacular
victory by winning 325 of the total 403
seats contested. The BJP alone won 312
seats of the 384 seats contested with a
vote share of 39.65%. While it was able
to hold on and consolidate its position in
the state, the opposition on the other
hand was completely decimated. The BJP
with its allies managed to win 80% of
the total seats in the assembly (Table 6).
Table 6: Seats and Vote Share in 2014 Parliamentary Elections and 2017 Assembly Elections for BJP, SP,
BSP and Congress
Party Parliamentary Elections 2014
SC SW VS(SC) VS PV PS
(%) (%)
BJP 78 71 43.7 42.6 1 1
SP 78 5 22.8 22.3 2 2
BSP 80 0 19.8 19.8 3 3
Congress 67 2 9 7.5 4 4
Source: Election Commission of India: Statistical Reports on General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh
2017, and General Elections 2014.
The SP managed to retain its vote
share from the 2014 parliamentary elec-
tion while the Congresss vote share reg-
istered a further decline, though the alli-
ance seemed to have benefited it more
than the SP if one looks at the vote share
of the two parties in the seats contested.
When compared to the 2014 election,
the SP vote share in the seats contested
by the party increased by 6 percentage
points, from 22.8% to 28.32%. The Con-
gress, on the other hand, registered an
increase in its vote share in the seats
contested by 13%, from 9% to 22.13%. In
the absence of an alliance, probably the
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
Congress would have failed to even open
its account. In fact, the overall vote share
of the party declined marginally by 1%.
The SP secured 11.7% seats, that is, 47
seats with a vote share of 21.8%. The
Congress managed a miniscule 1.7% of
the seat share, that is, seven seats, and a
vote share of 6.25%.
In the 25 seats where the alliance
partners contested against each other,
the BJP ended up winning 21 seats, and
its ally the Apna Dal(S) won one seat.
The SP was able to register a win in two
seats while the Congress could only
secure one. The BJP won by a convincing
share of more than 40% in as many as
12 of these 25 seats, while the SP and
Congresss combined vote share was
more than the BJPs in only five.
What Went Wrong?
The scale of the BJPs electoral domi-
nance in the recently held assembly elec-
tions could be gauged from the fact that
effective number of parties (ENP) both
by seat and vote share (ENPv) was the
lowest in the last 40 years. While the
ENP was 1.49 the ENP v was 3.42. The
low value of the two indicators reflects
how uneven the electoral contest was
both in terms of seats and vote share and
how absolute was the BJP-led alliances
Assembly Elections 2017
Strike SC SW VS(SC) VS PV PS
Rate (%) (%) (%)
91 384 312 41.55 39.65 1 1
6 311 47 28.32 21.83 2 2
0 403 19 22.23 22.23 3 3
3 114 7 22.13 6.25 4 4
dominance (Goyal and Kaushik 2017a).
The BJPs average margin in the seats
won by the party was 15.04% (Goyal
and Kaushik 2017b). The fact that the
BJPs vote share in 74% of the seats (232
seats) won by the party was over 40%
corroborates this and underscores the
depth of its victory.
The SP and the Congress overestimat-
ed their strength during the seat distri-
bution. This is corroborated if one looks
at the performance of the two parties in
the assembly segments in the 2014 parlia-
mentary elections. If the benchmark for
seat distribution would have been the
vol lIi no 15
COMMENTARY
competitiveness of the two parties in the
assembly segments in 2014, that is, win-
ner or runner-up, then the SP exceeded
its quota by 128 seats and the Congress by
69 seats. Therefore, in a whopping 197
constituencies, the two parties were al-
ready in a vulnerable position (Table 7).
Even if one were to go by their respec-
tive positions in the 2012 assembly elec-
tions, the SP and the Congress contested
in 51 and 72 seats in which they were un-
competitive. The allies SP and Congress
managed to win only in three and five
seats respectively.
Table 7: Pattern of Seat Sharing between SP and
Congress in 2017 Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections
Alliance Assembly Performance in 2012 Assembly
in 2017 Elections 2017 Elections
Seats W R Seats Managed
Contested beyond Quota
SP 311 42 141 128(70%)
Congress 114 15 30 69(153%)
Source: Election Commission of India: Statistical Reports
on General Elections to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar
Pradesh 2017, and General Elections 2014.
The alliance formation between the
SP and the Congress lacked coherence
and an eye for detail where the two
unequal parties were unable to reach
an amicable seat-sharing arrangement.
This was the result of both the internal
feud within the SP and a game of one-
upmanship between the proposed alliance
partners as well as warring factions
within the SP. The internal feud was
responsible for the release of two sepa-
Strike rate lists by the two factions within the
Rate (%) SP. On the other hand, the declaration of
81 a list of contestants by the SP, even as an
15
alliance was being negotiated with the
5
Congress was an attempt to pressurise
6
the party and present it with a fait ac-
compli. This resulted in a situation
where the two parties were left contest-
ing against each other in 25 seats. The
Congress managed to wrest as many as
29 seats from the SP where the party was
a winner and a runner-up in 10 and 19
seats respectively.
The BJP won 27 of these seats and one
seat was won by its ally, the Apna Dal(S).
The SP contested in only four such seats
where the Congress was either a winner
or a runner-up and lost three of these
seats to the BJP while managing to se-
cure one. The SP refused to ally with the
RLD and contested in 16 seats where the
RLD had contested in 2012 assembly
19
COMMENTARY
elections. The BJP won in 14 of these
seats. Even in the 25 constituencies
where the two parties contested against
each other the joint vote share of the SP
and the Congress exceeded that of the
BJP-led alliance only in five seats. The
combined vote share of 29.8% of both
the SP and Congress in the 2014 parlia-
mentary election was woefully short of
the BJPs vote share of 42.6%. In the 2017
assembly election, the combined vote
share of the SP-led alliance and BSP was
more than the BJP and its allies in 201
seats. The SP, BSP and Congress were in
the second position in 111, 58, and 33
seats respectively. Therefore to take on
the BJP electorally and have a fighting
chance, a simple coalition between the
20
SP and the Congress in the absence of
the BSP was severely inadequate.
Note
1 For an account of the evolution of coalition politics
in India, and expectations derived for state-level
coalition politics from the logic of the SMSP
system in a federal polity, see Sridharan (2002).
References
Chakravarty, Praveen (20017): Why BJP Loss
Would be Only Surprise of 2017 Poll, India
Spend, 4 January.
Goyal, Yugank and Arun K Kaushik (2017a): The
Algebra of Uttar Pradesh Election Results, Live
Mint, 22 March.
(2017b): Mathematically Speaking, the BJP in
2017 Is a Worthier Winner than the SP in
2012, Quartz India, 29 March.
Jeffrey, R (2014): Introduction, Development Fail-
ure and Identity Politics in Uttar Pradesh, Roger
Jeffrey, Craig Jeffrey and Jens Lerch (eds),
New Delhi: Sage.
APRIL 15, 2017
Jha, Dhirendra K (2015): The Humiliation That
Stops Mayawati from Accepting Samajwadi
Partys Offer, Scroll, 22 January.
Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield (1998): Multi-
party Government: The Politics of Coalition in
Europe, Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of
Michigan Press.
Sridharan, E (1999): Principles, Power and Coali-
tion Politics in India: Lessons from Theory,
Comparison and Recent History, Principles,
Power and Politics, D D Khanna and Gert W
Kueck (eds), New Delhi: Macmillan.
(2002): The Fragmentation of the Indian Party
System 19521999: Seven Competing Explana-
tions, Parties and Party Politics in India, Zoya
Hasan (ed), New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
pp 475503.
(2014): Conclusion, Coalition Politics in India:
Selected Issues at the Centre and the States,
E Sridharan (ed), New Delhi: Academic Foun-
dation.
Verma, A K (2014): Development and Governance
Trump Caste Identities in Uttar Pradesh,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 49, No 39,
pp 8994.
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
COMMENTARY
Taxation on Tobacco in India
Tool for Tobacco Control
Priya Mohan, Harry A Lando, Panneer Sigamani
An increased disposable income
among Indians has expanded
their tobacco purchasing power
and tobacco consumption. In fact,
beedis and smokeless tobacco are
increasingly being used among
women and children which
portends that the present taxation
system does not motivate users to
give up smoking.
Priya Mohan (sdrpriya@gmail.com) is with the
Department of Epidemiology and Public Health,
Central University of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur.
Harry A Lando (lando001@umn.edu) is with
the Division of Epidemiology and Community
Health, University of Minnesota, US. Panneer
Sigamani (sigamanip@cutn.ac.in) is head of
Department of Social Work, Central University
of Tamil Nadu, Thiruvarur.
20
T
obacco is the major factor causing
non-communicable fatal diseases
in India. Tobacco consumption in
India is unique and complex with various
forms of smoke and smokeless tobacco.
Its use is long-standing and is ingrained
among Indians from varying cultural
backgrounds. Also its social acceptability
poses great challenges for the regulation
of tobacco products and the enforcement
of tobacco legislation. However, there are
other barriers as well that prevent the
cessation of this practice such as poverty,
illiteracy, lack of awareness, aggressive
marketing strategies of giant tobacco
companies targeting vulnerable groups, a
growing economy and a less than optimal
implementation of provisions for tobacco
cessation by government agencies. This
article focuses on the current state of the
Indian population addicted to tobacco
use and the various methods used to
improve cessation, with a focus primarily
on taxation as a crucial measure that
encourages abstinence.
Tobacco consumption is the single most
important avoidable risk factor in the
growth of non-communicable diseases
APRIL 15, 2017
in India (Jha and Chaloupka 1999).
Tobacco-accounts for 12% to 25% of the
deaths among men in India (Gajalakshmi
et al 2003; Gupta et al 2005; Jha et al
2008); one half of tobacco-related
deaths occur between the ages of 35 and
69 yearsthe most economically pro-
ductive period (WHO 2002).
Tobacco Consumption in India
India is the third largest producer of
tobacco and the second highest consumer
of tobacco products. There is a broad
spectrum of tobacco products, aimed at
different socio-economic and demographic
categories. Unlike other countries, India is
unique in the use of multiple non-cigarette
preparations such as beedi (an indigenous
form of combustible tobacco) and the
extensive variety of oral tobacco products
(chewing, quid, and dentifrices). Beedis
account for 85% of smoked tobacco
(John et al 2010), however, there has
been growth in the number of cigarette
smokers in the past decade (Joseph 2011)
due to a rise in disposable incomes and
an increased affordability. Studies have
also shown that manufactured cigarettes
are displacing beedis (Jha et al 2011).
Prevalence estimates vary, with most
estimates obtained from the National
Family Health Survey3 (NFHS3) of
200506.
Approximately 10% of the worlds
tobacco smokers live in India (WHO
2008). Between the ages of 15 and 49
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 COMMENTARY

years, 57% of males and 11% of females
consume tobacco in a smoked or non-
smoked form. Around 120 million Indians
smoke, of these 115 million are males and
56 million are females. Fourty percent
of rural men and 10% of rural women
chew tobacco, 31% of urban men and
5.5% of urban women chew tobacco
(John et al 2010). Recent trends in toba-
cco use are not indicated with certainty.
However, the absolute number of male
smokers is rising, with male smokers
bet ween the ages of 15 and 24 account-
ing for the largest proportion of the
increased consumption (Sharma 2014).
About one million deaths are attribut-
able to smoking-related diseases annu-
ally in India (John et al 2010) and on an
average, male beedi smokers die six years
earlier and female beedi smokers die eight
years earlier than their non-smoking
counterparts. Male cigarette smokers die
an average of 10 years earlier than their
non-smoking counterparts. More than
half of tobacco-related smoking deaths
occur in illiterate sub-populations. Rou-
ghly 80% of these deaths occur in rural
areas. The risk of death due to chewing
tobacco is 15% for males and 30% for
females. Healthcare costs are a huge
burden for a developing economy like
India. Healthcare costs for tobacco-related
illness, spent by public and private
funds, was about `30,000 crore annually
(Reddy and Gupta 2004). Households
with a smoker have worse child health
outcomes, including lower immunisation
rates in children (Rani et al 2004).
Tobacco Control Measures
decreasing tobacco consumption espe-
cially among the young and lower in-
come sections in emerging economies
(WHO 2008, 2014a).
Taxation: Taxation plays a critical role
in tobacco control. Tobacco taxation and
consumption are inversely related (WHO
and IARC 2011); higher taxes are parti-
cularly effective with poorer or less edu-
cated groups (WHO 2010). Most high-
income countries have reduced their
overall tobacco consumption, over the
years, through increased taxation. France
reduced its tobacco consumption by 50%,
in a span of just 15 years, from 1990 to
2005 mostly due to a sharp rise in tobacco
excise taxation (Hill and Laplanche 2003).
Even among several low and middle-
income countries of South-East Asia
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand
taxes have exceeded 70% on top of the
retail price (WHO 2014b).
Unfortunately, India has the lowest
taxation rates on tobacco in the Asia
Pacific regionwell below the recom-
mendations of the World Bank and the
WHO. This creates significant challenges
for implementing cessation programmes.
Tobacco taxation in India is the most
complex tax policies in the world and
there is no uniformity. Taxes are based
W EPWRF India Time Series
NE
Expansion of Banking Statistics Module
Banking Indicators for 653 Districts
District-wise data has been added to the Banking Statistics module of the EPWRF India
Time Series (ITS) database.
on the type of product, length and quan-
tity of tobacco. Low levels of taxation,
with an inefficient tax structure contrib-
ute to increased tobacco consumption.
Taxation on cigarettes: A tax of 38% on
top of the retail price, is far below the
World Bank recommended rate of 65%
to 80%, and also it varies with length from
less than 65 mm to more than 85 mm.
Longer cigarettes are taxed at higher
rates, so companies manufacture varying
lengths to retain their customer base and
consumers shift to the cheaper options.
Taxation on beedi: Handmade beedis
are taxed at `12 per 1,000 sticks, machine
made beedis are taxed at `30 per 1,000
sticks and an average rate of 9% is ap-
plied to the retail price. As a result, nearly
98% of beedis are handmade (Sunley
2008) though mechanisation is available.
Also, small-scale beedi manufacturing
has been reduced to only 50% of the
market with a concomitant increase in
household beedi rolling, given that no
tax is levied if production is less than
two million beedis annually.
Taxation on oral tobacco: There is no set
tax on chewing tobaccothis is subject
to ad valorem taxes that are based on

Cessation is the only practical way to
substantially reduce the morbidity and
mortality issues associated with tobacco
consumption, in the relatively near term.
This requires comprehensive tobacco
control programmesincluding both price
and non-price interventions. Although
India has ratified the WHO Framework
Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO
FCTC), implementation of its provisions
has been suboptimal. According to the
WHO, the six policy measures included
in the MPOWER policy, if effectively
implemented have the ability to reduce
tobacco use, however, tobacco taxes are
by far the most effective method of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
This sub-module provides data for 653 districts for the following variables:
DepositNo. of Accounts and Amount, by Population Group (rural, semi-urban,
urban and metropolitan)
Credit (as per Sanction)Amount Outstanding, by Population Group
Credit (as per Utilisation)No. of Accounts and Amount Outstanding, by sectors
Credit-Deposit (CD) Ratio
Number of Bank OfficesBy Population Group
The data series are available from December 1972; on a half-yearly basis till June 1989
and on an annual basis thereafter. These data have been sourced from Reserve Bank
of Indias publication, Basic Statistical Returns (BSR) of Scheduled Commercial Banks
in India.
This module is a comprehensive database on the progress of commercial banking in
India in terms of extending the geographical spread and functional reach.
The EPWRF ITS has 16 modules covering a range of macroeconomic, financial and
social sector indicators on the Indian economy.
For more details, visit www.epwrfits.in or e-mail to: its@epwrf.in
vol lIi no 15 21
COMMENTARY

the value of tobacco products. The litera-
ture indicates that reducing oral tobacco
consumption through taxes, is not as
feasible as reducing smoked tobacco
consumption, due to the large and infor-
mal market of sub-suppliers, in the case
of oral tobacco (Jha et al 2011). This
leads to its greater use, and is of particu-
lar concern in India due to the dispro-
portionate usage by women and youth
and the fact that oral tobacco is a major
cause of oral cancer, of which India has
become an epicentre. It is of paediatric
concern also, because children on the
street begin consuming tobacco through
chewable forms that are available in
sachets (Priya and Lando 2014).
Literature on Tobacco Taxation
Higher taxation of tobacco products is
the single most effective intervention to
reduce consumption (Jha et al 2008). The
following are the consequences of an in-
creased taxation on beedi and cigarette
manufacturing, with respect to revenue
raise and premature mortality. Raising
taxes on beedis to `98 per 1,000 sticks
would raise tax revenue of over `36.9
billion and would also prevent 15.5 million
deaths in terms of current and future
beedi smokers (John et al 2010). Raising
cigarette taxes to `3,691 per 1,000 sticks
would raise tax revenue of over `146
billion and also prevent 3.4 million deaths
in current and future cigarette smokers
(John et al 2010). Uniformity in taxation
also is indicated. The increased tax reve-
nue could support comprehensive tobacco
control programmes, including cessa-
tion, and other social and public health
programmes such as those in Australia
(VicHealth) and Thailand (ThaiHealth)
(John et al 2010; WHO 2012).
Economic growth: Taxation policy should
be in accordance to income growth, with
annual systematic inflation-adjusted in-
creases built into the policy; otherwise
increased affordability will lead to an
increased consumption. In India, beedis
were nearly three times more affordable
in 2011 than in 1990, while cigarettes
were two times more affordable (Blecher
and Van Walbeek 2009). Manufactured
cigarettes are also displacing beedis (Jha
et al 2011) as a measure of affordability.
In the Indian scenario, high consump-
tion of tobacco is due to easy availability,
accessibility and affordability, exacerbated
by a lack of health education and aware-
ness as well as, poverty. Tobacco control
requires strong political willto control
tobacco production, to enforce strict regu-
lations as stated in the Cigarettes and
Other Tobacco Products Act 2003, to be
compliant with FCTC regulations and
guidelines and to include increased and
uniform taxation on smoking tobacco,
with an equal consideration on taxing
smokeless tobacco.
References
Blecher, E H and Corne P Van Walbeek (2009):
Cigarette Affordability Trends: An Update and
Some Methodological Comments, Tobacco
Control, tc2008.

Openings at the EPWI

The EPW Digital Initiative
The Economic and Political Weekly will be appointing editors, writers, visualisers, designers and programmers to conceptualise different forms of text and design for
communicating social sciences and humanities content to a digital audience.
The EPW is initiating a project to revamp its digital presence by, among other things, using its archives to create platforms for debate and public engagement. Please have a
look at the positions open now:
I. Deputy Digital Editor: The person will work closely with the digital editor, be involved in all aspects of the initiative and take key decisions about innovating with
editorial content. He/she will work with subject experts and the design team and also collaborate with the technology and business team. We are looking for someone who:
has a strong background in the humanities and social sciences and has strong writing and editing skills
will be able to transform academic expertise into communicating research to a digital audience
has experience with online publishing
Interested candidates should send their applications to appointments@epw.in before 25 April 2017 with a curriculum vitae, published writing samples and a letter describing
their interest in and plans for the EPW Digital Initiative.
II. Data Visualiser (Design): The person will primarily work with editors to break down components of EPW articles and recreate and redesign them in interesting
digital formats. He/she will implement design changes on the website and design occasional campaigns for social media. We are looking for someone who:
is able to conceptualise templates and layouts for infographics
has a deep understanding of digital design and user experience
is familiar with current practices in visualising data and interactive media, and is open to experimenting with visualising data which is narrative and not entirely
quantitative
The candidate should be proficient with Adobe Software suite (Photoshop, Illustrator and similar design tools). Familiarity with HTML, CSS and ability to work with a front-end
developer will be a plus.
Interested candidates should send their applications to appointments@epw.in before 25 April 2017 with a curriculum vitae and a letter describing their interest in and plans for
the EPW Digital Initiative and a portfolio of relevant work.
III. Editorial Digital Assistant: The person will be responsible for curating EPWs archival content to provide insights into current debates. He/she will also implement
a social media strategy for the EPW Digital Initiative, working with the design and editorial team to gauge response and reach, and follow-up with interface changes on the
website. We are looking for someone who:
has strong writing and editing skills and an interest in current affairs and the social sciences
has a mastery of social media channels, SEO strategies, and is swift in adapting to new publishing platforms and technologies
Interested candidates should send their applications to appointments@epw.in before 25 April 2017 with a curriculum vitae, writing samples and a cover letter describing their
interest in the EPW Digital Initiative.

Please write EPW Digital Initiative: [position you are applying for] in the subject line of your email. The interview for the shortlisted candidates will be
conducted either through telephone/Skype and/or in person in Mumbai. Only shortlisted candidates will be contacted. The selected candidate would be
required to work out of our Mumbai office at the earliest. Work experience may influence remuneration. We give preference to candidates from marginalised
backgrounds who meet our requirements.

22 APRIL 15, 2017 vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Gajalakshmi, V, R Peto, T S Kanaka and Prabhat
Jha (2003): Smoking and Mortality from Tu-
berculosis and Other Diseases in India: Retro-
spective Study of 43,000 Adult Male Deaths
and 35,000 Controls, Lancet, Vol 362(9383),
pp 50715.
Gupta, P C, M S Pednekar, D M Parkin and
R Sankaranarayanan (2005): Tobacco Associ-
ated Mortality in Mumbai (Bombay) India, Re-
sults of the Bombay Cohort Study, Inter-
national Journal of Epidemiology, Vol 34, No 6,
pp 13951402.
Hill, C and Agnes Laplanche (2003): Tobacco in
France the Real Figures, Paris, France.
Jha, P and Frank J Chaloupka (eds) (1999): Curbing
the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics
of Tobacco Control, World Bank Publications.
Jha, P, E Guindon, R A Joseph, A Nandi, R M John,
K Rao, F J Chaloupka, J Kaur, P C Gupta and
M Govind Rao (2011): A Rational Taxation Sys-
tem of Bidis and Cigarettes to Reduce Smoking
Deaths in India, Economic & Political Weekly,
Vol 46, No 42, pp 4451.
Jha, P, B Jacob, V Gajalakshmi, P C Gupta, N Dhingra,
R Kumar R, D N Sinha, R P Dikshit, D K Parida,
R Kamadod, J Boreham and Richard Peto (2008):
A Nationally Representative Case-Control
Study of Smoking and Death in India,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
New England Journal of Medicine, Vol 358,
pp 113747.
John, R M, R K Rao, M G Rao, J Moore, R S Deshpande,
J Sengupta, S Selvaraj, F J Chalouka and
Prabhat Jha (2010): The Economics of Tobacco
and Tobacco Taxation in India, International
Union against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease,
Paris, pp 152.
Joseph, R (2011): Male Smoking in India: Trend
Analysis from 19982010, Centre for Global
Health Research: Working Paper.
Priya, M and Harry A Lando (2014): Tobacco
Control: An Issue Twinned with Oral Cancer
Control, International Dental Journal, Vol 64,
No 5, pp 22032.
Rani, M, S Bonu, P Jha, S N Nguyen et al (2004):
Tobacco Use in India: Prevalence and Predictors
of Smoking and Chewing in a National Cross
Sectional Household Survey, Tobacco Control,
Vol 12, No 4, p 4.
Reddy, K S and P C Gupta (2004): Tobacco Control
in India, Ministry of Health and Family Wel-
fare, New Delhi: Government of India, pp 4347.
Sharma, D C (2014): India Raises Taxes on Cigarette,
Lancet, Vol 384 (9941), p 392.
Sunley, E M (2008): India: The Tax Treatment of
Bidis, Paris: International Union against Tuber-
culosis and Lung Disease.
vol lIi no 15
COMMENTARY
WHO (2002): The Tobacco Atlas, Geneva: World
Health Organization, http://www.who.int/whr
/2002/en/.
(2008): WHO Report on the Global Tobacco
Epidemic 2008, Geneva: World Health Organ-
ization, http://www.who.int/tobacco/mpower
/2008/en/.
(2010): WHO Technical Manual on Tobacco
Tax Administration, Geneva: World Health
Organization, http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstre
am/10665/44316/1/9789241563994_eng.pdf.
(2012): Tobacco Taxation and Innovative
Health-Care Financing, Regional Office for
South-East Asia, India.
(2014a): Guidelines for Implementation of
Article 6 of the WHO FCTC, Geneva: World
Health Organization, http://www.who.int/fctc
/guidelines/adopted/Guidelines_article_6.pdf.
(2014b): Taxation of Tobacco Products in the
South-East Asia Region, Geneva: World Health
Organization, http://www.searo.who.int/toba-
cco/wntd/wntd_2014_factsheet_1.pdf.
WHO and IARC (2011): Effectiveness of Tax and
Price Policies for Tobacco Control, WHO Press,
Vol 14, https://www.iarc.fr/en/publications/
pdfs-online/prev/handbook14/handbook14-0.
pdf.
23

No Country for Afghans
Meena Menon
Afghanistan is clearly unprepared
for a massive influx of refugees,
and human rights groups have
raised concerns about their future
in a country ripped apart by war
and terrorism with a worsening
security situation. Many of
the refugees are likely to join
the ranks of close to a million
internally displaced people in
Afghanistan and live in inhuman
conditions by all accounts.
Meena Menon (meenamenon@gmail.com) is
an independent journalist and author based in
Mumbai.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
W
hile a record number of Afghan
refugees returned home from
Pakistan in 2016, there is little
to celebrate. When the numbers started
swelling after mid-2016, the office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the refugee agency
of the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM)
spoke of an escalating humanitarian crisis.1
The wary green eyes of Sharbat Gula,
perhaps the most famous Afghan refugee
we know, whose photograph was pub-
lished on the cover page of an issue of the
National Geographic magazine in 1985,
reflect a certain indefinable anxiety. Then
she was simply known as the Afghan
girl till many years; later in 2002, the
photographer Steve McCurry went back
and found her in Tora Bora mountains
and learnt more about her. In 2016, she
was arrested in Pakistan and deported
for possessing a forged computerised
national identity card. Much has been
written about her piercing green eyes,
but very little of the plight of Afghan
refugees, who just like her, faced a gov-
ernment crackdown. An ailing Gula was
vol lIi no 15
COMMENTARY
welcomed back in Kabul by President
Ashraf Ghani in November 2016 and given
a government apartment, but the rest of
the refugees may not be so fortunate.
Mass Influx of Refugees
Afghanistan is clearly unprepared for such
a massive influx of refugees and human
rights groups have raised concerns about
their future in a country ripped apart by
war and terrorism with a worsening se-
curity situation. Many of the refugees,
they fear, are likely to join the ranks of
close to a million internally displaced
people (IDP) in Afghanistan and live in
inhuman conditions, by all accounts.
More than 3,70,000 registered Afghan
refugees returned homea 12-year high
in 2016, compared to just over 58,000 in
2015. On 14 October 2016 the number of
refugees leaving Pakistan crossed the
two lakh mark for the year after a slow
start and around 7,400 were crossing
the border every day. The majority of
them were heading for Kabul, Nangarhar,
Baghlan, Kunduz and Laghman provinces
in Afghanistan.2 However, some of these
areas are identified as the high-risk
areas because of bomb blasts due to IEDs
(improvised explosive devices), kidnap-
ping and spontaneous armed clashes
among government forces, tribal armed
groups, and different Taliban factions.
There are some reported manifestations
23
COMMENTARY
of Islamic State/Daesh, especially along
the border areas with Pakistan (UNICEF
2016).
Adding to the overall alarm, a new
report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW)
has indicted the Pakistan government for
unlawfully coercing Afghan refugees out
of Pakistan, and the UNHCR for remaining
silent about Pakistans large-scale refoule-
ment of Afghans, not once stating that
many of those returning were primarily
fleeing police abuses and fear of depor-
tation and that Pakistans actions were
unlawful (HRW 2017).3
Unlawful Forced Return
The HRW report pointed out that while
Pakistan hosted Afghan refugees for
nearly 40 years, in the past two years, it
has turned on the Afghan community.
The exodus amounts to the worlds
largest unlawful mass forced return of
refugees in recent times. Pakistani autho-
rities have made clear in public state-
ments they want to see similar numbers
return to Afghanistan in 2017 (HRW 2017).
The HRW has also accused the UNHCR
of doubling the cash support to return-
ing refugees from June to December
2016, effectively promoting their repa-
triation. While conditions in Afghani-
stan have not improved, it blamed
UNHCR for its failure to ensure that refu-
gees were fully informed of the condi-
tions to which they were returning be-
fore deciding to leave. Puncturing the
UNHCR claims that it assisted voluntary
repatriation, the HRW said those who left
Pakistan in the second half of 2016 did
not return voluntarily. It said that,
UNHCR therefore fundamentally abro-
gated its refugee protection mandate by
effectively supporting Pakistans mass
refoulement, thereby making UNHCR
complicit in these violations (HRW 2017).
The HRW had documented police abuses
against the Afghan refugees which began
after the terrorist attack on the Army
Public School in Peshawar in December
2014. Pakistans new National Action Plan
on counterterrorism includes register-
ing and repatriating Afghans who are
perceived as a security risk despite little
evidence in police records (Khan 2017).
Indias proximity to Afghanistan and
trade deals between the two countries
24
led to Pakistan feeling threatened, and
Afghans being abused as sons of Hindus
(HRW 2017). In June 2016, after the
clashes on the Torkham border which
killed a Pakistani major, the police abuse
increased and there were open threats
in the media that all Afghans would be
deported by the year end. Voices in the
media against the Afghan deportation
are few. Adil Zareef, a writer based in
Peshawar, said
Facts fly in the face of state persecution of
Afghan population as well as media hype
against Afghan and Pukhtun population re-
garding terrorism in Pakistan. Until state
policy regarding Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA), Baluchistan, besides Afghan
policy, remains hinged to (an) India-centric
obsession ... things will get worse.
Fear of Deportation
A major factor influencing the return of
Afghan refugees was the fear of deport-
ation. Returning refugees spoke to the
HRW about the widespread police extor-
tion, arbitrary detention, and deportation
threats from Pakistani government offi-
cials, police raids on refugee shelters and
apartments, exclusion of Afghan children
from state schools and the closure of
Afghan refugee schools, and unlawful
use of force and theft and a new trend
of nocturnal raids. The Pakistan authori-
ties announced through newspapers and
on television that it is illegal to rent
houses to Afghanis. After that, landlords
evicted them or refused to rent them
apartments or business premises. Afghans
were advised to leave Pakistan, and one
of the refugees reported that the author-
ities were making such announcements
on loudspeakers in the refugee areas.
Responding to the HRW report, the
UNHCR said in a statement that it shared
concerns of the HRW regarding the pres-
sures on Afghans which affected the
repatriation last year, but did not agree
with the conclusions of its report. In an
earlier statement, the UNHCR agreed
that the pace of returns in 2016 far out-
stripped Afghanistans capacity to help
people reintegrate after yearsin most
cases decadesof refuge in Pakistan.
Many of the refugees have returned to an
uncertain future in Afghanistan. Return-
ing refugees have to rebuild their lives
amidst increasing levels of internal
APRIL 15, 2017
displacement, insecurity and levels of vio-
lence not seen since the fall of the Taliban
in 2002 (UNHCR 2017).
Pakistan, in a statement,4 has refuted
the charges in the HRW report and said
that it is devoid of the larger perspec-
tive and the historical context in which
Pakistan and its people have been gener-
ous and gracious hosts to millions of
Afghans for over 37 years now. Pakistan,
the statement said, has shouldered this
huge responsibility largely on its own,
providing shelter, education, healthcare
and livelihood opportunities despite severe
strain on its limited resources.
Some 2.6 million Afghan refugees live
in more than 70 countries around the
world. An overwhelming majority, around
95% are hosted by just two countries
the Islamic Republic of Iran and Paki-
stan.5 Pakistan has seen an influx of
Afghans into their country since the
Soviet invasion in 1979 or a year earlier.
Many have not returned for fear of their
lives and the situation has not improved
much even after the 2014 elections in
Afghanistan.
The patience of Pakistanis with refu-
gees has long been exhausted. Most of
them fail to see the reason for the refugee
crisis and the role of Pakistan in facilitat-
ing the armed struggle first against the
Soviets and then supporting the Taliban
to gain ground in a continuing military
policy of strategic depth. Pakistan was
wearied of the refugee problem (host
fatigue as it is called). For the Afghan
refugees, what turned the tide last year
was the uncertainty of life and fear of
law-enforcing agencies in their host
country, which, it would seem, outdid
the terror and insecurity back home.
Views of UNHCR
Pakistan continues to host some 1.3 million
registered refugees and according to esti-
mates, approximately six lakh undocu-
mented Afghans. While the HRW report
pinpoints clear instances of coercion forc-
ing the Afghans to return, the UNHCR
admits6 that the wider security context
has also contributed to an increase in
the numbers of registered Afghans opting
to return. This means the tighter border
management controls at the Torkham
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

on 1 June 2016. Afghans now need valid
passports and visas in order to enter Pa-
kistan, prompting many to rejoin their
families in Afghanistan.
In addition, the increase in UNHCRs
voluntary repatriation and reintegration
cash grant has significantly contributed
to the increase in number of people opt-
ing to return, according to Duniya Aslam
Khan of UNHCR, Islamabad. The cash
grant was doubled from $200 to $400 per
individual in June 2016, which is $2,800
for a family of seven. However, in months
of regular monitoring at UNHCR centres
in Afghanistannot a single returnee
out of more than 4,500 interviewed upon
arrivalhas cited the cash grant as a
primary factor in their return.7
The UNHCR too had interviewed ret-
urning refugees and the answers were
similar (2017). In their feedback, refugees
spoke of the economic hardship, harass-
ment, fear of arrest and deportation in
Pakistanwith marked differences be-
tween the first and second halves of 2016.8
The refugees mentioned the campaign
of the Afghan government in Pakistan
Khpal Watan, Gul Watan (home sweet
home)asking Afghans to return home,
which was introduced for the first time.
Of those surveyed by telephone three
months after their return to Afghanistan,
52% said they were able to return to
their province of origin. The remaining
48% said they chose another province
due to lack of shelter, land, livelihood
opportunities or insecurity in their home
areas. Despite the challenges, 93% of re-
spondents said they were warmly re-
ceived by communities and 75% said
that three months after their repatria-
tion they felt they had made the right
decision to return (UNHCR 2017).
In 2017, no registered refugee has
returned as yet as the UNHCR-facilitated
return programme was halted for a
winter break on 1 December 2016 and was
slated to only resume in the first week of
March 2017. Meanwhile, in February, the
Pakistan government announced that it
will adopt a national policy relating to
the management of refugees and Afghan
nationals in Pakistan. The policy includes
the decision to extend the validity of the
Proof of Registration (POR) cards (an
identity card issued to all registered
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
Afghan refugees by the Pakistan govern-
ment) to some 1.3 million registered
Afghan refugees until the end of 2017; a
pledge to document Afghan nationals
who currently have no identification; a
commitment to adopt a national refugee
law; and a visa regime for different cate-
gories of Afghan nationals in Pakistan.9
However, the PoR card really did not
help the refugees as, despite this card
there is no assurance that they will not
be subjected to arrest or deportation. In
2016, the UNHCR had to intervene in
5,900 reported cases of arrest and deten-
tion of registered Afghans in Pakistan to
secure their release.
Life in the Camps
In Islamabad, the only refugee camp
which I visited while I was posted there
(201314) was on the outskirts of the
capital and very unlike the rest of the
tree-lined, well-laid out, capital. Over
3,000 Afghans crowded together in mud
huts and children milled around playing
cricket or riding donkey carts. There was
no school, just as there was no electricity
or water supply. Many refugees asked me
if I could intervene and take them with
me to India. While their home country is
in turmoil, life in the camp was not a bed
of roses. Most of them dreaded the
police, and the PoR cards that the gov-
ernment issued were often torn up by the
police, who arrested them.
The camps and the Afghan homes are
searched for arms and more often than
not, they are found. The Afghans carry
guns if they can afford it and that and
their piquant situation exposes them to
ill-treatment. Many of the families ran
around trying to get bail and release the
men who were arrested. Afghans in the
capital eke out a living by selling French
fries in the posh markets or gathering
garbage for a pittance and then burning
Obituaries
The EPW has started a section, Obituaries, which will note the passing of teachers and
researchers in the social sciences and humanities, and social activists who have contributed
to a just society.
The announcements will be in the nature of short notices about the work and careers of those
who have passed away.
Readers could send brief obituaries to edit@epw.in.
vol lIi no 15
COMMENTARY
it. Some of them sell vegetables but they
are viewed with suspicion. Before the
Afghan election in 2014, Pakistan was
bracing for a fresh influx of refugees,
drugs and guns, as one senior politician
put it. The strained relations between
Pakistan and Afghanistan have not helped
the refugees. Even in Karachi, Afghan
refugee camps are considered to be crimi-
nal hotbeds. There is a real fear voiced by
some politicians that Pashto would be-
come the main language of the city.
Other Challenges
Other than refugees, the IDPs also con-
stitute a challenge for Afghanistan.10
The frequent bombings and high casu-
alties due to attacks by the Taliban and
ISIS expand the frontier of violence and
pose a new challenge. Governance con-
tinues to remain an issue apart from
corruption and decreasing control over
the state in many provinces, something
the Afghan government is not prepared
to concede.
The security situation is worsening as
the analysis of the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
(SIGAR)11 of the most recent data provi-
ded by the US Forces in Afghanistan
(USFOR-A) suggeststhe numbers of the
Afghan security forces are decreasing,
while both casualties and the number of
districts under insurgent control or influ-
ence are increasing. The United Nations
Assistance Mission in Afghanistan re-
ported that 8,397 conflict-related civilian
casualties occurred between 1 January
and 30 September 2016.12
Since 2002, the United States Congress
has appropriated more than $117 billion
for Afghanistans reconstruction, the
largest expenditure to rebuild a country in
the US history. The SIGAR report pointed
out that more than half of all US recon-
struction dollars since 2002 have gone
25
COMMENTARY

26 APRIL 15, 2017 vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

towards building, equipping, training, and
sustaining the Afghanistan National De-
fense and Security Forces (ANDSF).
However, the ANDSF has not yet been
capable of securing all of Afghanistan
and has lost territory to the insurgency.
As of 28 August 2016, USFOR-A reported
that only 63.4% of the countrys districts
were under Afghan government control
or influence, a reduction from 72% as of
27 November 2015, a statement contest-
ed by the Afghan government.
From 1 January 2016 to 12 November
2016, according to figures provided by
the Afghan government to USFOR-A, 6,785
ANDSF service members were killed
and an additional 11,777 members were
wounded.13 Armed clashes between the
Afghan security forces and the Taliban
reached their highest level since the
UN reporting began in 2007, and marked
a 22% increase over the same period
in 2015.
Afghanistan is not only grappling with
the refugee influx, but its transition to a
democracy is plagued with poor gov-
ernance, low economic growth, rising
unemployment and worsening security
situation. There is tension in the top
level of the government itself with
accusations of nepotism by the first vice
president Abdul Rashid Dostum against
President Ghani and the Chief Execu-
tive Abdullah Abdullah in October and
controversy over Dostums kidnapping
of a political rival in November 2016.
There was a tussle over the dismissal of
seven ministers regarding their budget
spending by the Parliament in Novem-
ber 2016.
The Afghan government claims that
it controls all districts, but SIGAR quotes
the USFOR-A which reported that ap-
proximately 57.2% of the countrys 407
districts are under the governments con-
trol or influence as of 15 November 2016;
a 6.2% decrease from the 63.4% reported
last quarter in late August, and a nearly
15% decrease since November 2015.14
The deteriorating security situation
points to the difficulties in engaging
with the Taliban on the negotiating table.
Before the general elections in 2014, there
was much talk of peace and Pakistan was
asked to release some key Taliban leaders
under arrest for that purpose. The Afghan
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017
High Peace Council was tasked with
mediating in the talks. However, peace
was far from the minds of the Taliban
leaders and their cohorts and the Afghan
Taliban head Mullah Akhtar Mansour
was killed in Balochistan in a US drone
strike in May 2016. He had succeeded
Mullah Omar whose death in Quetta
had been kept a secret for two years.
Pakistan continues to face flak from
Ghani for giving Taliban sanctuary,
but it has repeatedly denied it, saying
that it does not allow terror strikes to be
plotted from its country and it should
not be blamed by Afghanistan. The US
has been putting pressure on Pakistan
to deal with the Haqqani Network for
a long time, but Pakistan denies that it
is supporting or shielding the powerful
Haqqanis.15
In the complex web of the politics of
the subcontinent, relations between India
and Afghanistan are seen as inimical to
Pakistan which is out on a limb, and not
about to give up its policy of strategic
depth. Evicting Afghan refugees may not
ease the security situation in Pakistan,
but it will expose thousands of returning
Afghans to a country which despite be-
ing their home may not be the best place
for them. Force and false promises of
land and security have led to a refugee
exodus from Pakistan, but in a strange
turn of events, for many Afghans who
were born in Pakistan or escaped there
as young children, it will remain probably
the only real home they will ever know
for some time.
Notes
1 UN Warns of Humanitarian Crisis as 7,400
Cross Afghan Border Each Day, UN News Cen-
tre, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?
NewsID=55288#.WJ8IVqLscfI, 13 October 2016.
2 Personal communication with Duniya Aslam
Khan of UNHCR Islamabad.
3 HRW (2017): It contains interviews with 92 ref-
ugees who returned to Kabul and 23 in Pes-
hawar, https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/02/
13/pakistan-coercion-un-complicity/mass-for
ced-return-afghan-refugees.
4 Issued on 14 February 2017 by the Pakistan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
5 Afghan Solution Strategy, UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, http://www.unhcr.org/af-
ghan-solutions-strategy.html.
6 Email interview with Duniya Aslam Khan,
UNHCR Islamabad.
7 See note 5.
8 After their return, the UNHCR conducted face-
to-face interviews with 4,285 people at their
point of arrival in Afghanistan and telephone
vol lIi no 15
COMMENTARY
interviews with some 1,300 people who had
been back for three months.
9 See note 5.
10 The Special Inspector General for Afghan
Reconstruction (SIGAR) report draws atten-
tion to an increase in internal displacement
and asylum seekers in the European Union
(EU). According to the UNs Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs, 5,83,000
people in Afghanistan fled their homes due to
conflict in 2016the highest number of dis-
placements since record-keeping started in
2008. Eurostatthe statistical office of the EU
reported 1,47,130 first-time asylum-seekers
from Afghans in the EU during the first three
quarters of 2016. The number of asylum appli-
cations from July to September was 7% higher
compared to the same period in 2015.
11 As per the UNHCR estimates, there is also a
significant level of internal displacement in
Afghanistan and as of mid-October 2016, over
323,000 people have been newly displaced by
fighting and ongoing conflict, adding to an
estimated protracted IDP population of 1.2 mil-
lion. Undocumented Afghan migrants are also
returning in large numbers in recent months,
according to the SIGAR report. The Interna-
tional Organization for Migration reports that
2,20,000 undocumented Afghan migrants have
returned from Pakistan in 2016. There is an
increase in those seeking asylum in Europe as
well. Quarterly report of SIGAR to the United
States Congress, 30 January 2017.
12 SIGAR report, 30 January 2017.
13 See note 12.
14 Of the 407 districts of Afghanistans 34 prov-
inces, 233 districts were under government
control (83 districts) or influence (150), 41 dis-
tricts (in 15 provinces) were under insurgent
control (9) or influence (32), and 133 districts
were contested. According to USFOR-A, the
number of districts under insurgent control or
influence rose 2% from August 30 to 15 Novem-
ber 2016, to 10.1% of the countrys total dis-
tricts, and the number of contested districts
rose 4.2% over the same period to 32.7% of all
districts (SIGAR report 2017).
15 On 2 December 2016, General John Nicholson, the
commander of the US and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan,
labelled Russia, Pakistan, and Iran as malign
actors that enable insurgent or terrorist groups
in Afghanistan. Nicholson said that Russia
lends public legitimacy to the Taliban, which
undermines the Afghan government and NATO
efforts to stabilise Afghanistan (SIGAR report).
References
HRW (2017): Pakistan Coercion, UN Complicity:
The Mass Forced Return of Afghan Refugees,
Human Rights Watch, 13 February, https://www.
hrw.org/report/2017/02/13/pakistan-coercion
-un-complicity/mass-forced-return-afghan-
refugees.
Khan, Ismail (2017): KP Prosecution Data Gives
Lie to Claims against Afghan Refugees, Dawn,
15 January, http://www.dawn.com/news/130
8486/kp-prosecution-data-gives-lie-to-claims-
aga inst-afghan-refugees.
UNHCR (2017): Tough Choices for Afghan Refugees
Returning Home after Years in Exile, UN High
Commissioner for Refugees, 3 February, http://
www.refworld.org/docid/589466fa4.html,
accessed on 11 February 2017.
UNICEF (2016): UNICEF Afghanistan Situation Re-
port 3, UNICEF, 12 October, http://relie fweb.
int/report/afghanistan/unicef-afghanist an-huma
nitarian-situation-report-3-12-october-2016.
27
Burma All the Way
Ashoke Chatterjee
T
o be expelled from ones native
land, or to live away by compulsion,
is the experience from which
emerge many narratives in our time.
Exile, immigrant, migr and refugee:
the terms overlap their burdens of dis-
placement and violation. Narratives of
loss are often of aspirations; power-mon-
gers will not countenance, and others un-
derstand all too seldom or too late. Ex-
iles from Burma have been tucked away in
Indian society for almost five decades,
unseen and unheard of, as New Delhi
accommodated the reality of military
rule in what became Myanmar in 1989.
This despite the ethnic cleansing of lakhs
of people of Indian origin, expelled earlier
as boatloads of refugees left the only
land they had known, taking with them
that love of soil which is the hallmark of
every Burmese. This book is a story of
another exiled life, rooted in Burma,
linked to India, and lived-out in the US
(United States), and across the globe. It
has been a life of conscience, driven by a
single unrelenting cause: Burma as a free,
democratic and inclusive society. No
political correctness hereit is Burma
all the way, the author dismissing the
generals claim that Myanmar correctly
encompasses all the inhabitants of his
polyglot country.
Opportunity Cost of a Conscience
My Conscience is a modest book with a
major significance. For thinking Indians,
it offers an important understanding of
the dynamics of a close neighbour
close by geography, yet distant in terms
of awareness and even logistics. (Only
Kolkata and Gaya are linked by a few
direct flights to Rangoon/Yangon. Todays
tourists find it quicker to fly to Bangkok
and then backtrack to what should be less
than a couple of hours flight.) My Con-
science provides an easy yet perceptive
education on the forces that transformed
Burma into Myanmar, and brought into
28
book reviewS
My Conscience: An Exiles Memoir of Burma by
U Kyaw Win, Eugene, Oregon: Resource Publications, 2016;
pp 254, `1,886 (paperback).
play, at Indias doorstep, regional powers
competing for access to the countrys
extraordinary wealth and strategic
advantages. Today with the opening of
Myanmar to Daw Aung San Suu Kyis
participation in national affairs, trade
and foreign investment, regional power
plays, tourism and the slow movement
away from military frameworks, this
book reminds us that such cataclysmic
changes next door have caused scarcely
a ripple in India, despite deep links of
history, faith and migration.
The book describes a life that has
spanned both the British and Japanese
rule, the end of the Raj in Burma in
1948, and the aspirations for freedom
that were shattered by the assassination
of General Bogyoke Aung San in 1947.
The horrors, that would later overtake
Burma and seal its borders, reflect
waves of ethnic conflict (of which the
Karen rebellion is the most serious),
incompetence and corruption. Despite
the brutality of a complete army takeo-
ver in the 1960s, it took the massacres of
1988 to finally draw the worlds atten-
tiontransfixed by repeated incarcera-
tions of Aung San Suu Kyi and all that
followed in their wake through the be-
trayals of electoral promises. There is a
warning here, of complacency about
constitutional advantages so scarce in
Indias neighbourhood and so precious
in terms of Burmese lives lost in their
pursuit, that the world prefers not to
notice. If indeed there is to be an era of
a Modi-driven look east policy, My
Conscience may offer useful lessons to
an India often obsessed with distant
powers at the cost of opportunities at its
borders, and all too casual about the
APRIL 15, 2017
influence its democracy should provide
in the region.
From Karmabhoomi
to Matrubhoomi
Born to Christian parents, with a Karen
mother and a Burmese father, the book
traces U Kyaw Wins journey from war-
torn Burma to Woodstock, the inter-
national school established over 150 years
ago in Mussoorie. Its culture of nations
and creeds, and its Himalayan-inspired
global network welcome a Burmese up-
bringing that harmonises Christian and
Buddhist heritage. Win takes the oppor-
tunity of his Indian schooling to explore
what is to become a surrogate homeland,
travelling from Kashmir to Kanyakumari.
After his college years in the US, a return
to Rangoon finds little prospect of a stable
earning. Another painful uprooting fol-
lows: taking Win back to the US to pur-
sue a career as an educator and then to
experience being an exile, living-out in
an adopted land. For Win and his siblings
what was meant to be a temporary sab-
batical absence from Burma, is sealed by
generals who take command of the
country closing its borders in 1962. All
who have left are suspected as traitors.
Commitment to the soil and country now
transforms as ties of love, within a family
struggling to remain in touch. Its efforts
are a poignant thread linking elements
of Wins story: ageing parents denied
contact with children overseas, children
terrified of contact that may rebound at
home on the old and the vulnerable,
risks that must be taken to know who is
alive and what succour may still be pos-
sible, letters and crackling phone lines
threatened by surveillance and suspicion.
These heartbreaking memories are of
visits dreamt and planned, only to be
frustrated by brutal restrictions. Family
despair is heightened by delusions that
a despotic regime will, one day, miracu-
lously reveal some benevolent purpose.
Secrecy becomes a way of life in a Burma
sealed from the outside world, to which
only the privileged junta has access to.
Over the years that follow, Win returns
again and again to India, comforted by
its tantalising proximity as a secular
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 BOOK REVIEW

karmabhoomi to a matrubhoomi trans-
formed into an army jail.
My Conscience tracks the military coup
that ousted Prime Minister U Nu in 1962
and its impact on Burmas contemporary
history. Prime Minister U Nu is among the
books long cast of characters, adding to
it an enigmatic flavour, as he flits in and
out of Wins life: in Burma, in the US and
then in self-imposed exile in Bhopal, and
besides the neglected grave of Burmas
last King in Ratnagiri, Maharashtra. His
exit is followed by the armys disastrous
Burmese way to socialism. By 1974
complete power is vested in a Peoples
Assembly headed by General Ne Win
and his military cohort. Soon, U Kyaw Win
is a marked man. In the US, Win meets
and marries an Indonesian, Gandasari
(Riri in the book). There is further
turmoil as her Muslim family rejects the
interfaith union. Turning adversity into
opportunity, the couple chooses a path of
conscience in their adopted land, working
for Burmas freedom as well as for har-
mony, in a world fragmented by prejudice
and oppression. Win and Riri become
American citizens to create a context for
advocacy and to avoid a stateless fate. In
1973 Win begins to type out his Burma
Bulletin, a modest newsletter for migrs
and friends in the US. Initially, the
response is limited; Burma is still a land
that only few Americans can identify by
name or on a map. Yet the Bulletins
impact is measured by juntas fury at
this exception to its media clampdown,
and Win as the editor is barred from
entering Burma. He helps found the
Committee for Restoration of Democracy
in Burma. Devious stratagems begin to
sustain contact and help the couple enter
their home territory sometimes, often
through porous borders in northern
Thailand alive with insurgent camps.
There, Win and Riri become familiar
figures, volunteering for relief work and
teaching. As the Burma Bulletin begins
to reach out to influential decision-
makers, the initial response falls on deaf
ears. Then, a relentless campaign begins:
demonstrations in Washington DC, letters
from across the globe, and links with
international networks on human rights;
suddenly, a friend becomes Burmas
most powerful symbol of resistance:
Aung San Suu Kyi returns to Rangoon to
look after her ailing mother. There,
history overtakes her.
Hopes for a Democratic Burma
In 1988, the Burma Bulletin draws atten-
tion to the thousands dead in anti-govern-
ment riots, and Wins efforts begin to rep-
resent the cause of Suu Kyi wherever he
can. During her incarceration and while
under house arrest (these continued
with brief respites until 2010), Kyaw Win
was among those who carried her torch
to spaces she could not reach. At the
Nobel Prize investiture, the Win family
was present on her behalf. Encounters
with the dictatorship also took place,
through official channels as well as clan-
destine ones, in an effort to reach out to
a home and a society where ties are
bound and are held close to the heart. In
one chilling account, Riri travels alone
with her children to Rangoon. Before
they can step out of the airport, Riri is
detained and abused as the wife of a
traitor. Finally, the power of a US pass-
port gives her a few precious hours with
Wins tearful parents, before she and

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Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol lIi no 15 29
BOOK REVIEW
the children dutifully prostrate them-
selves and return to the safety of a de-
parting flight without breathing a word
of their airport ordeal to the elders. In
2001, the unexpected intercession of a
Buddhist monk brings a Myanmar
visa for Win; his journey is protectively
monitored by US diplomats. Win returns
home to Yangon and to his parents,
and to places he has not seen in dec-
ades. A visit to Suu Kyi in 2003 does not
go unnoticed as spooks of the junta tag
every brief moment of their reunion.
Burma-watchers will find interest in
the books detailed listing of names (influ-
encers and those influenced from within
and outside Burma), dates (the book
moves back and forth across five decades
with dizzying speed) and locations
(colonial names recklessly replaced in
30
Myanmar; here they are carefully cross-
referenced). For others, such details may
interrupt what is an extraordinary flow
of recent history, told with the ease of a
living-room conversation. My Conscience
offers a perspective of Burma that is cau-
tiously optimistic. Win believes that much
will depend on the new administrations
ability to deal with decades-old seces-
sionist movements. He has an observation
that is uncomfortably appropriate to India
in 2016:
The separatist aspirations of Burmas minority
peoples are man-made. They arise in large
measure due to the arrogant presumption held
by the majority of Burmans that it is their
right, if not their destiny, to rule over others.
There is another story as well, be-
tween the lines of this book. It is the
story of America as a place for hope and
APRIL 15, 2017
opportunity. How many environments
in the world can enable such a productive
exile? A lifetime of separation is comforted
by extraordinary benefaction: churches,
colleges, friends and networks provide a
half-century of support to what was once
the slender hope of a few individuals. In
a year that has seen such monumental
tragedies of human displacement and
such vicious anti-immigrant rhetoric, My
Conscience is a reminder that for count-
less millions of people all over the globe,
despite its failings and contradictions,
the US remains a lamp lifted by a door.
Without America, My Conscience could
not have been lived or written.
Ashoke Chatterjee (ashchat@prabhatedu.org)
is a former Director of the National Institute
of Design and former President of the Crafts
Council of India.
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
BOOK REVIEW
Rereading a Tale of
Workers Insurgency
Arup Kumar Sen
I
ndian labour history writing mostly
covers the period up to 1947, the year
in which India got freedom from
British colonial rule and emerged as a
postcolonial state. In recent years, acti-
vist scholars have started documenting
and analysing labour protests and counter-
insurgency operations of the state in
postcolonial India. Ranabir Samaddars
book on the 1974 railway strike in India
is a valuable contribution in the domain
of research with an activist orientation.
The book draws our attention to the mak-
ing and unmaking of workers struggle
in the Indian Railways. It should be
mentioned in this connection that the
railway workers strike occurred at a
time when labour militancy was at its
peak in India.
The Crisis of 1974
Samaddar has situated the strike in the
context of the crisis of 1974. He argues
that the crisis of the economy, the crisis
of politics, and the crisis of society, com-
bined to create the explosive decade
30
The Crisis of 1974: Railway Strike and the Rank
and File by Ranabir Samaddar; Delhi: Primus Books,
2016; pp x+186, `850 (hardcover).
of 196777. He reminds us that the 1974
strike was not a sudden action, but a
culmination of protests and strikes by
railway workers across the country in
1967, 1968, 1970 and 1973 (p 12). The
different dimensions of the crisis and
upsurges of railway workers are explored
in the book. Both the supporters and
foes of the 1974 strike agreed that, it
had taken the form of a general strike.
The rank-and-file workers played a
pivotal role in the strike and they diso-
beyed the rules of conciliation laid down
in a liberal political system. The story of
workers resistance, narrated by Samad-
dar, enlightens us about the modalities
of mobilisation in the strike.
The charter of demands of the workers
included, among others, issues of bonus,
working conditions, work hours, distri-
bution of subsidised foodgrains and other
essential commodities, trade union rights,
APRIL 15, 2017
and de-casualisation of all casual rail-
waymen. The workers sense of dignity
made them defiant and propelled them
to choose the radical path of militancy,
challenging the patronclient charac-
ter of the major trade unions, which
claimed to represent them.
The Loco Running Staff, that is,
drivers, firemen, shunters, and engine
cleaners acted as the main force behind
the spread of the rebellious mood among
the workers. Besides the locoman, the
workers in the railway workshops also
played a crucial role. Their mobilisation
galvanised other category-wise unions
and gave a radical dimension to the
rank-and-file militancy. The mobilisa-
tion depended greatly on the zonal
and local union leaders, and of course,
the rank-and-file workers. Around 1.5
million railway workers participated in
the strike and the entire railway traffic
was paralysed.
Violent Expressions
Samaddar explained in the book how
the National Coordination Committee for
Railwaymens Struggle (NCCRS), formed
prior to the strike in February 1974, had
achieved the unity of the mass of work-
ers and leaders, craft unions and large
unions or federations, militants and mod-
erates, and vanguard and the followers
(p 10). He has not underestimated the
vol lIi no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 BOOK REVIEW

role of leadership. But, he reminds us
that the rank-and-file workers were forc-
ing the tempo of confrontation, and the
leaders had little freedom to choose the
course of action.
The railway workers struck work at
many places in retaliation against the
arrest of George Fernandes and other
popular leaders of the movement. The
strike was to begin on 8 May 1974. But,
there were lightning strikes from 3 May
onwards in Lucknow, Pathankot, Gaya,
Bilaspur, Hubli and other places, as news
of the arrest of the leaders reached the
workers. The workers had left their
factories, workshops, offices, stations,
engines, and lines, in protest.
Numerous violent moments in the
struggle of railway workers are recorded
in the book. Extensive brickbatting was
reported from Kathgodam, Kanpur and
Bareilly in North India. Allahabad witn-
essed violent and tense moments prior
to the strike. Mughalsarai became the
scene of pitched battles between thou-
sands of workers and the police and the
paramilitary forces.
At the beginning of the strike, a secret
meeting of workers in the South Eastern
Railway instructed the participants to
throw small bombs at loyal workers,
bombs and crackers at police pickets, and
organise sabotage on the railway track.
On 16 May, striking workers threw bombs
on a Central Reserve Police Force patrol
party at New Jalpaiguri in north Bengal.
The animosity between the militant rank-
and-file workers and the loyalists often
found violent expressions. On the day of
the withdrawal of the strike (28 May),
the strikers reportedly humiliated, dis-
honoured, and manhandled a large
number of loyal officers and employees
at Kharagpur in West Bengal.
then Railway Minister, L N Mishra, infor-
med the Parliament that the railway min-
istry would raise the number of Railway
Protection Force to 1,00,000 from the
prevailing strength of 60,000 in the next
two years. Later, open threats against
the strikers were issued by the railway
minister at the end of April 1974. Workers
were hounded out, caught, tortured,
jailed, and women and children were
driven out of homes (p 97). Around
1,00,000 employees were removed from
service. Moreover, about 50,000 casual
workers were terminated without any
notice, and 30,000 employees kept under
suspension. In various places, criminal
cases against common railway workers
continued long after the strike.
The 20-day long (828 May) railway
strike was crushed by brutal state vio-
lence. But, the spectre of the strike
haunted the Indian state. In his speech
in the Parliament on 21 August 1974, the
Railway Minister, L N Mishra, mentioned
the valuable lessons learnt from the
traumatic experience of the strike. One
such lesson is that the growth of mush-
room, category-wise associations and sub-
unions has to be discouraged. This ne-
gation of small associations by the minister
reflected the fear of militant activism of
the rank-and-file workers.
The Indira Gandhi-led Congress gov-
ernment took other draconian measures
after the suppression of the railway strike.
The government declared a national
Emergency on 25 June 1975, on the
grounds of internal threat to the secu-
rity of India, arrested hundreds of oppo-
sition leaders and party workers, and
removed the democratic rights of the
people of India during the Emergency
period (197577). The Congress party
was ousted by the Janata Party in the
parliamentary elections in 1977, and the
first non-Congress central government
was formed in India.
The 1974 railway strike challenged
the hierarchical culture of Indian trade
unionism, practised by the dominant
political parties. So, the top political
leaders were unhappy about the militancy
of the rank-and-file workers. S A Dange,
the most prominent leader of the Com-
munist Party of India, asked the work-
ers to return to work midway through
the strike. After the strike was over,
George Fernandes, the militant and most
popular leader of the strike, became an
embarrassment to the All India Railway-
mens Federation, which gave the call for
united general strike of railway workers,
and he was disposed of as its president.
More than four decades have passed
since the brutal suppression of the 1974
railway strike. Now, most of the workers
in India are leading footloose lives in
the age of neo-liberalism. The militant
workers struggles in contemporary India
and elsewhere are following new forms of
worker organisation outside the bureau-
cratic structure of traditional trade unions.
We know that memories of struggle are
carried over generations. Samaddar has
also noted that even today the memory
of the 1974 Railway strike arouses passion
and consternation.
Ranabir Samaddars serious political
reading of the tumultuous events of the
1974 railway strike in this book propels
us to rethink the possibilities and pre-
dicaments of the southern insurgency.
Arup Kumar Sen (arupksen@gmail.com)
teaches at the Department of Commerce,
Serampore College, West Bengal.

Brutal State Retaliation Licensing by EPWI

The government adopted brutal methods
against the striking workers and their
families. The armed forces of the state
were deployed in various labour towns.
Instances of train drivers being shackled
in their cabins were reported at the
height of the strike. Samaddar has viv-
idly narrated the counter-insurgency
measures adopted by the state to combat
the workers. Prior to the strike, the
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vol lIi no 15 31
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Beyond Territorial and Jurisdictional Confines
Farhana Ibrahim, Tanuja Kothiyal
T
his collection of articles on borderlands in South Asia is
a historical and ethnographic exploration of borders
and frontiers in the region. Taking the contemporary
iteration of South Asian borders as a point of departure, they
invite the reader to think beyond the territorial and jurisdic-
tional confines of states, nations and academic disciplines, and
to reflect instead on how concepts like mobility, negotiated
sovereignty, and affect enable us to disrupt the modern idea of
sovereignty as absolute and the state as sole arbiter of borders
and frontiers. These articles offer densely textured and histori-
cally grounded readings of particular borders in the region.
Attention to historical depth and geographical spread reveals
the difficulty of a retrospective reading of borders from
present-day naturalisations of territory and identity in nation
states and their borderlands. They also caution us against the
dangers of homogenising a discourse on borders, for each of
the borders under discussion here speaks with and against each
other in productive ways. In the articles, borders are territori-
ally defined limits, as borderlands, but they are also relational
entities that reach over and beyond themselves despite man-
dates to contain, divide and delimit. Borders are, of course,
also structural conditions that can be separated from their ter-
ritorial manifestations (Piliavsky 2013). In this sense, the border
is a conceptual tool that opens up discussions on nationality,
statehood, jurisdiction, identity and belonging beyond the
trope of the nation state, for too long naturalised as a unit of
analysis by academic disciplines. Today, we are at a moment in
history where once again there is a turn to the border ques-
tion even as many have begun to acknowledge that solutions
cannot always be found at the level of the nation state.
Globally, refugees are pushing across state borders seeking
homes away from sites of conflict, genocide or climate disas-
ters, in the process creating new borderlands. In resettlement,
they once again become enmeshed in borders of other kinds, as
fear, rumour or suspicion serve to configure their relationship
with their new neighbours. Within India, the casting of the Muslim
citizen as the outsider or the internal enemy is spatially Kautilya, those likely to be won over lived. Kautilya divides
instantiated with areas within cities being referred to as mini-
Pakistans (Ghassem-Fachandi 2012: 231). The nation states
external political borders are thus transposed onto internal
spatial, sociopolitical and cultural borders within the geographic
heart of the nation. Borders are thus not about territory alone;
they allow us to raise questions about internal jurisdictions
and about marginality, also about affect and desire.
Recent collections on borderlands in South Asia have pro-
ceeded in dialogue with ethnographic perspectives on the state
(Gellner 2013) or through the conceptual lens of marginality
32
(Cons and Sanyal 2013). In this volume, we seek to build on the
critical insights generated by these preceding works by deepen-
ing the historical engagement with both borders and the border-
lands they generate. All the articles directly tackle the question
of how geographical or territorial marginality from adminis-
trative centres does not preclude these spaces becoming central to
an understanding of authority, sovereignty or legitimacy. Nor
does the imposition of state authority seek to constitute its out-
lying areas in any unilateral fashion. As some of the articles in
this collection argue, the role of borderland populations is crucial
in mediatingeven directingthe relationship of the so-called
centre and its periphery, thus enabling a reconceptualisation
of the relationship of state and borders in terms of a centre
periphery framework and of marginality as the only concep-
tual lens through which to view borders and frontiers.
Borders, Frontiers and States: Rethinking Sovereignty
It is now well accepted in academic discourse that even though
borderlands may constitute the physical margins of the West-
phalian state, they are at the very core of nationalist discourses
about territorial survival and security and are also integral to
the ways in which the nation is both imagined and produced
(Aggarwal 2004; Bhan 2008; Gupta 2013). They may consti-
tute the physical edge but they are fairly central to the busi-
ness of statecraft. This proposition is important to initiate a
discussion on the nature of the state and its authority. While
modern states have increasingly come to view themselves as
territorially circumscribed, absolutely sovereign units with
monopolistic claims over violence, this notion occludes the
fact that the territorial sovereignty of states was not given a
priori but often wrested from competing claims to sovereignty
that were equally legitimate. States forged multiple relation-
ships with their frontier zones. The emergence of kingdoms
and empires inevitably led to the creation of frontiers or bor-
derlands, zones where the authority of the state was gradually
in dispute. These were the territories where, according to
those likely to be won over into four categories, that is, the
angry, the greedy, the frightened, and the haughty
(Rangarajan 1992: 48485).
These could be instigated against their own kings by stoking
anger, greed, fear or pride through the use of conciliation
(sama), gift (dana), won over through sedition (bheda) and
force (danda), the last to be used only if all other means failed
(Rangarajan 1992: 572). Revisiting the Mauryan empire,
Romila Thapar (2000: 463) views the Mauryan frontiers as
buffer zones that were deliberately kept underdeveloped, with
april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

the intention to keep them pliant rather than maintaining firm
control. Citing the fifth century Roman historian Priscus,
Owen Lattimore (1962: 481) refers to similar shifts in loyalties
among Roman traders who continued to serve the Huns on the
eastern frontiers of the Roman empire rather than return home
because of the pitiless taxation in Roman cities.
The frontiers of premodern states were thus zones of
negotiated loyalties and competing sovereignties that sus-
tained immense possibilities for the emergence of new social
and political formations. These were not merely neutral terri-
tories but political wombs where, cohesive, participatory,
segmentary communities, endowed with great military poten-
tial existed with tremendous potentialities for supplying new
rulers (Gellner 1995: 164). However, did the political turmoil
of these frontiers and the frequent shifts of loyalties represent
the unstable nature of sovereignty in the frontiers? Andre
Wink (1986, 2008: 27) suggests that premodern states were
essentially organised around conflicts and that sovereignty was
a matter of allegiances. Tracing the lineages of the word fitna
through the work of the 14th century Arab philosopher Ibn
Khaldun, Wink points out that the term could be interpreted as
a disruptive force only in the context of the universalist claims
of Islam. In the formation of various Muslim states, fitna
implied nothing more the use of conflict and conciliation in
local disputes to forge alliances. Ernest Gellners study of the
Berbers of the High Atlas Mountains in Morocco, views the
history of Morocco as that of conflicting and conciliatory rela-
tionships between the states of makhzen and siba, that is, the
pale and beyond the pale (Gellner 1969: 2). This idea has been
further developed by James Scott (2009: 5960) who views
sovereignties of the core as explicit as opposed to the
ambiguous, plural and shifting sovereignties of the frontiers.
This came about as modern states began to centralise and
monopolise territorial control, they disputed the claims of
inhabitants of the frontiers who could in the past have claimed
access to multiple notions of sovereignty. It is this access to
multiple sovereignties that converts frontiers and borderlands
into zones of creative possibilities of many kinds.
It is perhaps not surprising then that even modern borders
are not immune to a territorial anxiety on the part of their
respective nation states in South Asia. This anxiety transmutes
into a sensitivity with regard to its borders where, as Jason
Cons (2016) has recently argued in an ethnography of the en-
claves (chhitmahal) along the BangladeshIndia border, the
fragility and instability at the heart of national territory joins
forces with bureaucratic regulation and management to pro-
duce a sensitive space that is prone to high degrees of sur-
veillance and control precisely because it is also the site where
the ideological belief in the coincidence of nationality and ter-
ritory begins to unravel. Through the last two millennia,
South Asian frontiers have shifted several times with the crea-
tion as well as disintegration of kingdoms, empires and nation
states. With the emergence of several nation states in the last
century, it has become difficult to imagine frontiers that do not
match the current nation state boundaries. However, most
premodern states had little accurate sense of their territories
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
before cartography came to be extensively used to actually
draw maps and mark boundaries from the late 18th century
onwards.
In the Mughal empire, while attempts were made to mark
external boundaries through forts, etc, the strongest fortifica-
tions existed around towns and cities, giving us a sense of
where priorities lay in terms of exercising strict surveillance
and control. The control of vaguely defined external frontiers
was more often than not left to local rulers and chieftains,
thus ensuring little change in the conditions of local sover-
eignty with the expansion or contraction of frontiers (Embree
1977: 273). In the frontier zones, it is these tribesmen who
formed the necessary link in governance (Singh 1998: 44445).
Tanuja Kothiyals article in this collection argues that in harsh
and inhospitable frontiers like the Thar Desert, it was the local
chieftains and rulers who controlled and facilitated the flow of
commodities. From the early 19th century onwards, banditry
and highway robbery by local chieftains that came to be
viewed as threat to governance, was in fact an overt claim to
shared sovereignty that was being overridden by the marking
of competing jurisdictions both as an idea as well as a concrete
reality on maps. Frontiers become the sites where the state
seeks to unleash its knowledge-making apparatus to map, to
know and to tamethe cartographic impulse (Cons 2016) to
render the remote outpost at least as legible to the centre as
the core (if not more so).
With the advances in cartography by the mid-19th century,
it became possible to map clearly defined and ordered territo-
ries amenable to governance. In doing so, the search for natu-
ral frontiers like mountains, rivers, marshes, deserts, etc, those
great obstacles of nature that could serve as frontiers of sep-
aration and defence became a primary objective (Embree
1977: 278). However, what were viewed as great obstacles of
nature were in a true sense frontiers that were controlled by a
range of state and non-state actors facilitating the flow of
people and commodities. The marking of boundaries as well
as the creation of new circuits of commodity flows led to shifts
in the orientation of the regions themselves, as Vasudha Pande
demonstrates here, in the case of the IndoNepal frontier. The
marking of India and Nepal as two distinct national commu-
nities based on the core identities of these nations also led to a
homogenisation of community identities within groups like
the Gorkha and Bhotia which in the past had been quite
diverse. However, neither the cartographic practices that
informed the marking of these borders in the 19th and 20th
centuries, nor the bureaucratic practices that went into the im-
plementation of borders were in any way uniform, as Farhana
Ibrahim argues in case of the IndiaPakistan border in Kutch.
While the 19th century delineation of borders was about juris-
diction and governance, the recognition of national bounda-
ries led to a far more explicit and pronounced reiteration of
national identities, particularly in the case of Muslims along
We thank Farhana Ibrahim and Tanuja Kothiyal for putting
together this special issue on borderlands in South Asia.
33
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
the KutchSindh border. This reiteration was, however, not a
pregiven but the product of administrative debate and arrived
at over a period of time.
Taking on board the ethnographic disarticulation of the state,
ethnographies of administration and the bureaucratic apparatus
of the state (Gupta 2012; Hull 2012; Mathur 2016; Navaro-Yashin
2012) critically review the bureaucracy not as a site of Weberian-
style rationality alone, but as spaces that are constituted through
individual interpretations that may be an effect, for instance,
of class habitus (Chatterji 2013), but also through the very ma-
terial expressions (the paper, file, cadastral survey or map)
that they presume to be driven by. The materials of bureau-
cratic production are not, then, neutral purveyors of dis-
course, but as mediators that shape the significance of the
signs inscribed on them and their relations with the objects
they refer to (Hull 2012: 253). One of the themes that articles
in this collection engage with is a critical interrogation of the
notion that bordersand the nationalist imaginings that they
are supposed to engenderare consequences of bureaucratic
imposition from above. Disaggregating the bureaucratic pro-
duction of borders and their everyday management, the role of
borderland populations in the border question becomes an im-
portant focus of attention. Swargajyoti Gohains article at-
tends to the multilayered construction of authority in border
regions significantly nuancing a position that looks only at the
state and its subjects as either locked into relations of submis-
sion or antagonism. In doing so, she echoes other contributions
to border studies that have addressed modes of allegiance to
the state in complicated borders where the states performance
of sovereignty and peoples relationship to the state is scripted
in a way that cannot be always-already oppositional (Gupta
2013). Gohains article draws attention to the material pro-
duction of the border in Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh,
on Indias north-eastern border with China, marking a shift
away from overt preoccupations with forms of imagined com-
munity alone (Bhan 2008). Ethnographic perspectives on the
state have for long meditated in the difficulties with locating
the state as a singular or embodied entity (Abrams 1988).
Trouillot (2003) argued that it was state effects that
should be the focus of attention. Gohains argument on the
integration of the Tawang border into the Indian state de-
scribes a domain of overlapping jurisdictions that nonetheless
have shifted over time. Her attentive ethnography describes a
triangulation of authority between the state (even as it
leaves open the question of what exactly is the state) and the
Tawang monastery as it negotiates the shift from Tibetan to
Indian jurisdiction but in no simple or linear terms. The article
provides a nuanced understanding of the states so-called
control over frontier populations, especially in the context of
jurisdictions that are shared between political and religious
authority (for example, Eaton 1978).
Mobility and Affect in Borderlands
One of the ways in which the premise of borders as being
territorial and cultural demarcators has been disrupted is through
the notion of cross-border flows and movement. Studies of the
34
borderlands of South Asian nation states suggest that, over
centuries, these regions had been connected through religio-
cultural flows as well as trade. Both Buddhism and Islam cre-
ated their own circulatory networks that connected South Asia
to both West and East Asia. While the spread of Buddhism in-
tegrated East and Central Asian networks, Islam brought
about its own diaspora. Andre Wink suggests that by the
eighth century the area beyond the Indus river, called Al-Hind
by the Arabs was being drawn into the Islamic world through
Arab trading circuits emerging around the Indian Ocean, that
he calls an Arabic-speaking Mediterranean (1986: 2). It is
through trade as well as through Ghaznavide and Ghuride
conquests, that in South Asia settled agrarian riverine societies
came into close contact with traders and warriors from West
Asia, leading to shifts in both Eastern and Western frontiers of
Al-Hind. In a more contemporary context, the partitions of
1947 and 1971 configured movements across new state borders
in the East and West. As indicated above, the partition was not
the first catalyst of large-scale mobility in a region that has
been constituted through multiple patterns of cross border and
cross region mobility for centuries, if we take into account pat-
terns of mobility across the Indian Ocean (Amrith 2013; Ho
2006, and the Thar (Kothiyal 2016). Nor did the partition sig-
nal an end to mobility as people continued to cross borders for
marriage and kinship obligations (Ghosh, this collection) or
for work (Van Schendel 2001).
In Sahana Ghoshs article in this collection, once again, the
border is no abstraction, but realised through very real and
material interactions with border guards and paperwork
(forged documentary papers, mobile sim cards, etc) on the
IndiaBangladesh border. The Bengal borderlands challenge
normative assumptions on border crossing across states to
highlight how partition in the east led to a recasting of rela-
tions within rather than across borderlands. In Bengal, it was
often not displacement, but remaining in place that trans-
formed one into a refugee (Alexander et al 2016). Drawing
attention to the gendering of cross-border mobility, a relatively
new sub-theme in the border studies literature although it has
been on the agenda for much longer in feminist engagements
with law and trafficking (Kempadoo et al 2005; Kapur 2003;
Andrijasevic 2009), Ghosh turns to the work of kinship, an ob-
ligation that emerges as quintessentially womens work as they
strive to maintain family obligations across the border. Legality
and illegality in terms of the border are recast in this essay in
terms of kin obligations and the family. A biography of family
histories in the borderlands becomes in her article a biography
of the border itself, as it tracks these biographies in terms of
closures and openings, porosity and impermeability (Ghosh,
this collection). She suggests that it is not merely about the
border oscillating between permeability and its opposite
across time; this depends on who is crossing when and where,
in which direction, and for what purpose.
Closure and a (negotiated) porosity coexist within a single
temporal framework. Women are clearly the greater risk-bearing
subjects in crossing borders for the affective work of main-
taining familial ties, but risk is also mapped onto class and
april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

lifestyle. Yet, kinship also constitutes a shared universe that
enablesindeed encouragesrisks to be taken. Kinship is
about risk, about building bridges and negotiating emotional
chasms, between the natal and the affinal home, for instance.
Then again, it is expressed in forms that are locally resonant.
The Bengali border guards in Bangladesh may share culturally
evocative notions of the affective pull of the heart (moner
taan) that the more ethnically heterogeneous, non-Bengali-
speaking Indian border guards do not possess. Ghoshs rich
ethnographic vignettes break apart a rigid divide between
those who are policing the border and those whom it claims to
be policing. Border crossings are about negotiation, risk and
the affective life of the family.
However, a focus on cross-border mobility as a means of
subverting or evading state control, as Scott (2009) describes
it, cannot be reified into a fluidity that has been at times taken
to be an innate characteristic of borderlands. Borderlands are
liminal sites only if we assume a centrifugal and singular
source of authority that weakens as it emanates away from the
centre. While all borders do not support the same kinds of
cross-border flows structurally, borderland populations are
also invested differently in the desirability of crossing over to
the other side (Navaro-Yashin 2012). While the Bengal bor-
ders porosity is configured by risk and kinship through a par-
ticular kind of gendered border crossing, the western border
that divides Kutch from Sindh is a border that seeks to divide
the two sides in a far more finite way. Despite historical trade
routes and patterns of migration that occurred across the
Thar, the contemporary iteration of the border does not sanc-
tion legal border crossing in this section. Besides, as Ibrahim
suggests in her article, residents of the border may see them-
selves central to its maintenance rather than be seeking to
subvert it.
Borders and Subjective Lives
Beyond being spaces for the expression of authority and con-
trol, borderlands have also been explored as sites of affect
(Navaro-Yashin 2012). In an ethnographic study of the Greek
Cypriot borderlands, Yael Navaro Yashin asks, how do people
who live on borderlands respond to them affectively? What
impact do borders have on the subjective lives of people?
These effects are often complicated and contradictory in
nature. Indian Muslims on the western border have to deal
with fear and mistrust of the state and its military and
bureaucratic machinery that more often than not equates
Islam in India with a natural affective disposition towards
Pakistan and therefore constitutive of disloyalty in India.
Despite this, border residents in Kutch see themselves as
deeply enmeshed with the project of maintaining the inviola-
bility of the Indian border despite their own cross-border kin-
ship and familial networks which become chasms that remain
unbridgeable, quite unlike the negotiated porosity in cross-
border kin relations described for the Bengal borderlands by
Ghosh (this collection).
Anubhuti Mauryas article traces the affective resonance
that borderlands connote for states as well. They conjure up
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
images and fantasiesof the strange, wondrous and remote,
sites of the unknown and the unaccountable. They are also
zones of multiple imaginations, frontiers between the known
and the unknown. Through the liminality of the known and
unknown, borderlands were thus imagined as fantasies. Wink
suggests that these fantasies were rooted in the shared experi-
ences of travellers. For example, Arab accounts of ajaib al-Hind
ran parallel to the medieval European imagination of Mirabilia
Indae that saw India as a land of wonder, dreams and legends
(Wink 1986: 45). This was particularly true of the geographi-
cally inaccessible, and therefore hostile frontiers that evoked
both awe and revulsion. Mauryas article exemplifies this
duality of sentiment with regards to Kashmir, which emerged
both as a sacral as well as a wondrous space through travellers
accounts as well as the genre of ajaib-garaib, or the fantastic.
The emerging Mughal state that conquered Kashmir in 1586,
sought to constitute it through narrative and visual represen-
tations, practices of governance and tactile experiences, as jan-
nat nazir, a paradisiacal space. In doing so the Mughal state,
through an itinerary of leisure and pleasure, was able to con-
vert the binary of awe and revulsion of a frontier space, into a
spatial imaginary of order.
Wonder and the sense of spectaclealready acknowledged
as paradisiacal in the landscape of Kashmirthus became
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA

harnessed by the Mughal state into its imperial designs for the
frontier. By re-embedding the notion of wonder and spectacle
from the unknown/unknowable, squarely into the domain of
imperial design, it not only harnesses a public sense of wonder
and amazement from the natural world into the states crea-
tions, it also reinforces the fact that remote border areas are
often at the heart of imperial and state power. The question of
Kashmir continues to lie at the heart of the nation states
claims about territoriality, control and sovereignty. Finally,
Mallika Shakyas article, a critical reading of the 20th century
Nepali novels of Parijat and B P Koirala, continues with the
theme of affect and the border when she writes, Borders are
deeply subjective, populated not with pragmatic concernslet
alone considerations of political, cultural or geographic con-
structsbut with the core of the self. Shakya argues that na-
tion state borders are fundamentally incompatible with struc-
tures of intimacy and suggests that fiction may possibly provide
the language of affect that transcends the vocabulary of both
social science and the nation, both of which in their own ways
serve to reinstitute the violence of geographical and carto-
graphic classification. She asks, Can fiction generate its own
anthropology, allowing us to problematise the politics of
knowledge in theorising nationalism?
The articles included in this collection are meant to gener-
ate as many questions as they seek to answer. Our attempt in
this introduction has not been to provide any complete or
exhaustive literature review on the subject of borders and
frontiers but more an invitation to think through some of the
diverse borderlands of South Asia across multiple time periods
and different state regimes through the key themes identified
above: of negotiated sovereignty, mobility and affect in order
to generate new debates and conceptual articulations across
the disciplines.
[The editors are grateful to all referees whose comments were extremely
useful in shaping the articles in their present form. We also extend our
thanks to Aniket Alam, former Executive Editor, EPW, as it was his keen
interest in frontiers and borderlands that initiated this collection.]
Farhana Ibrahim ( fibrahim@hss.iitd.ac.in) teaches sociology and social
anthropology at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences,
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi. Tanuja Kothiyal
(tanuja@aud.ac.in) teaches history at Ambedkar University Delhi,
New Delhi.

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36 april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Of Tulips and Daffodils
Kashmir Jannat Nazir as a Political Landscape in
the Mughal Empire
Anubhuti Maurya
This article examines the emergence of the concept of
Kashmir jannat nazir as a literary and political imaginary
in the Mughal court. It represented a distinct
imagination about the region and emerged as a literary
imaginary in the late 16th century and over the early part
of the 17th century, entering into the imperial chronicles.
By the mid-17th century, the concept had become a part
of the political discourse and the language of Mughal
sovereignty. The literary and political imaginary of
Kashmir in the Mughal court drew upon older textual
traditions like the literature and histories from Kashmir,
corpora of Arab and Persian geographies compiled from
the ninth century onwards, travel accounts, wonder tales
and the chronicles of the Ghaznavid and Timurid courts.
Earlier versions of this article were presented at seminars in Lady
Shriram College, Delhi University and St Anthonys College, Oxford
University.
I am grateful to the editors, the anonymous reviewer and Manan Ahmed
Asif for their comments on this article. All shortcomings remain mine.
Anubhuti Maurya (anubhutimaurya@yahoo.com) teaches history at
Bharati College, Delhi University and is currently working towards
completing her book, The Making of Mughal Kashmir: Space, History and
Authority in Early Modern South Asia.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
F
or the inhabitants of the Mughal milieu, Kashmir was an
evocative word. In the literature of the courtpoetry,
travel accounts and chroniclesit was described as
Kashmir jannat nazir (Kashmir that is paradise like) and suba i
dil pazir (the province close to the heart). It would seem these
terms were merely descriptive of the extraordinary nature of
Kashmirs landscape.
For the Mughal empire the landscape of Kashmir was cen-
tral to the relationship between the empire and the region. A
Valley in the western Himalayas, Kashmir nestled behind a
high wall of mountains. It formed the northern border of the
empire, where issues of access, control and articulation of power
were an important concern. Over the 16th and 17th centuries, a
corpus of texts in the Mughal courtchronicles, travel acc-
ounts, epistles and administrative documentsdescribed and
discussed the region. Through these writings, Kashmir moved
from being an uncharted region on the borders of the empire
to a province cognisable within the imperial oecumene.
Contiguously, from the late 16th century, the landscape of
Kashmir was the subject of literary compositions, especially
the poetry of the Mughal court. The concept of Kashmir jannat
nazir emerged as a literary imaginary in this poetry of the late
16th century and underwent a change over the 17th century. In
the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the poetry of the court
eulogised the lush greenery, streams, springs, lakes, abundance
of flowers and fruits, the high mountains, and the salubrity of
Kashmirs climate. By the mid-17th century, the gardens laid out
by the Mughal elitesemperors, members of the royal family
and the courtbecame marvels, sources of wonder. The land-
scape of the Valley now served as the frame for the marvels of
the Mughal gardens. These shifts in the literary imaginary of
the paradisiacal reflected the changing relationship between
the empire and landscape of Kashmir.
In this article, I examine the emergence of the concept of
Kashmir jannat nazir as a literary and political imaginary in the
Mughal court. I argue that the concept represented a distinct
imagination about the region. It emerged as a literary imagi-
nary in the late 16th century and over the early part of the
17th century, it travelled into the imperial chronicles. By the
mid-17th century, the concept had become a part of the politi-
cal discourse and the language of Mughal sovereignty. The lit-
erary and political imaginary of Kashmir in the Mughal court
drew upon older textual traditions like the literature and
37
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
histories from Kashmir, corpora of Arab and Persian geographies
compiled from the ninth century onwards, travel accounts,
wonder tales and the chronicles of the Ghaznavid and Timurid
courts. By the mid-17th century, in the Mughal court, the con-
cept of Kashmir jannat nazir represented an already internal-
ised set of cultural meanings, which continued to be created
and communicated through the visual and literary medium.
The historiography on Kashmir in the 16th and 17th centuries
has divided the Mughal rule over the Valley into two distinct
partsacts of governance and acts of leisure.1 The royal journeys
into Kashmir and spatial practices of the Mughal elite, like the
construction of gardens, have been looked upon as acts of leisure.
Within this perspective, Kashmir is reduced to a site of aesthetic
gratification, as the space of enactment of royal leisure.
In this article, I argue that in Kashmir aesthetic and literary
practices, acts of leisure and pleasure were not discrete from
the exercise of imperial authority. These practices were specific to
the empires interaction with Kashmir, and constituted a response
to it. They informed the performance of governance as well as
the rituals of sovereignty.
Further, I argue that, the courtly imaginary of Kashmir jannat
nazir was a discourse of power. It was constituted by narrative
and visual representations, practices of governance and tactile
experiences. That is to say, the idea of Kashmir as a paradisiacal
space fashioned a relationship between the region and the
political world of the Mughal court. From a borderland, Kashmir
became central to the Mughal imagination of its sovereignty
and self-fashioning.
Tales of Wonder
The Kashmir Valley was discussed in a number of Arab and
Persianate textual traditions, like the Arab geographies and
Ajaib tales of the ninth and 10th centuries and the literature
from the Ghaznavid and Timurid courts. In these textual tradi-
tions, Kashmir was painted as a desirable but insular land,
guarded by high mountain walls. Many of these texts circulat-
ed in the Mughal court and influenced how, in the mid-16th
century, the court perceived the region.
Between the ninth and the 15th centuries, Kashmir was dis-
cussed in a number of Arab geographies2 and, contiguously, in
ajaib tales.3 In Ajaib i Hind of Nakhuda Buzurg ibn Shahryar,
stories of Kashmir ranged from the conversion of the king to
Islam (Buzurg ibn Shahryar 2000: 2);4 the description of a gorge
between mountains which held a large cache of diamonds of
unparalleled beauty, protected by a ring of fire (Buzurg ibn
Shahryar 2000: 103); to a marketplace, invisible to the human
eye, where jinnat gathered to buy, sell and to gossip (Buzurg ibn
Shahryar 2000: 23).5 The Arab geographies and the Ajaib tales
formed different episteme within the larger body of the literature
of routes and realms.6 These tales were premised upon the
distance between Kashmir and the place of telling/reading. At
the same time, they marked the region with a series of character-
istics and made it cognisable within larger geographies. Al
Berunis Kitab fi Tahqia ma lil-Hind (Book of Investigations in
Hind) and Yazdis Zafarnama were influential texts in the
Mughal court. Al Berunis Kitab al Hind was written in the
38
Ghaznavid court in the 11th century. Al Beruni had travelled to
Hindustan with Mahmuds armies. In his larger work on al-Hind,
Al Beruni had significant descriptions of Kashmir. His discus-
sions of Kashmir focused on two aspects of the region. One, he
described the geography of the region, routes and passes; chief
modes of transportation; the origin and course of the rivers
Jhelum (Jailam in Sachau translation) and Sindh; the city he
called Kashmir (Srinagar) and the surrounding regions (Al Beruni,
translated Sachau 2003: 15052). In his discussion on its topo-
graphic features, Al Beruni stressed the insularity of the region.
Two, he wrote of Kashmir as a significant centre of Sanskritic
learning, with a strong indigenous and independent tradition.
Though it was engaged in debates with other centres and schools
of Sanskritic education, Al Beruni suggested that the innovative
character of Kashmiri academy was linked to its geographic
insularity (Al Beruni, translated Sachau 2003: 87, 94, 123, 125).
Yazdis Zafarnama was written in the early 15th century, as
the chronicle of Sahib i Qiran Timur. The Zafarnama has a
brief discussion on Kashmir. It described the clime and climate
of Kashmir and talked of the number of inhabited villages, the
streams, vegetation, fruits and flowers. It mentioned the city
of Srinagar, which, like Baghdad, had a river running through
it, surmounted by a number of bridgesboth permanent as
well as boat bridges. It identified the roads into the Valley,
though each, the text informed the readers, was marked by its
own set of impossibilities.7 The Zafarnama stressed the diffi-
culty of access to the region hidden behind high mountains.
These textual traditions constituted Kashmir as an insular
place. Paradoxically, these discussions in the Arab geographies,
Ajaib tales, Al Berunis Kitab al Hind and in the Persianate tra-
ditions of the Timurid court, were informed by reports of itinerant
travellers and trading caravans. Kashmir appeared in these
different textual imaginations because of its presence in overlap-
ping networks of commerce, piety and politics. It was located off
the traditional silk route and was part of trade networks that
spanned from Central Asia to Ladakh, which were spread as far as
Bijapur and Golconda in the Deccan. From the late 13th century,
it was home to a number of Sufi orders which originated in
Central Asia and operated in the regions of the western and
central Himalayas. Sufi saints moved between Balkh, Badakh-
shan, Kashmir, Kishtwar, Ladakh, Yarkand and Tibet and had
deep links with Harmin (the cities of Mecca and Medina).
In 153940, when Humayun was besieged by Sher Shah, he
sought the advice of the Mughal collective. Mirza Haider Dughlat8
suggested that the conquest of Kashmir was a possibility and
that the Valley offered the safest of refuges possible to the em-
peror on the run (translated by Elias and Ross 1973). Humayuns
advisors turned down the Mirzas proposal on the grounds that
Kashmir was isolated and difficult of access and that Humayun
would be trapped there. These discussions and decisions in the
Mughal court in mid-16th century drew upon the image of
intransitivity constituted through the older textual traditions.
In 1540, while Humayun sought shelter in the Safavid court,
Mirza Haider led a small force to Kashmir. Negotiating the
fractures within the ruling elites in Kashmir, the Mirza estab-
lished control over the region. In the decade he spent as the ruler
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

of Kashmir, Mirza Haider wrote Tarikh i Rashidi.9 While the text
dealt only briefly with the Valley, Dughlats descriptions of Kashmir
challenged the older imaginations of the region. Mirza Haiders
account of Kashmir looked outward from the region, establish-
ing equivalences, comparisons and contemporaneity with pro-
cesses and events in other parts of Central and South Asia.
In the late 16th century, when Akbar demanded subservi-
ence from the Kashmiri rulers, he referred back to the Mirzas
conquest of Kashmir on behalf of Humayun, as the basis for
the Mughal claim on Kashmir.
These discussions in the Arabic and Persianate traditions in-
fluenced the political actions and intellectual engagements
with Kashmir in the courts of Akbar.
Early Discussions on Kashmir in Akbars Court
In 1586, after a difficult battle, Mughal armies entered Srinagar.
Though the establishment of Mughal authority in the region
took much longer, imperial chronicles proclaimed the entry
into Srinagar as the moment of conquest of Kashmir (Fazl 1998:
774; Ahmad 1992: 617). Conquest and annexation were acts of
territorial expansion but in the case of Kashmir, the land was
not merely the site of battle. In the imperial narratives, the
very landscapethe mountainous terrain, arduous roads, and
adverse climateposed a challenge and had to be conquered.
Early writings on Kashmir in Akbars court were suggestive of
an imperial centre exploring a newly conquered province and
slowly establishing authority over it. Imperial chronicles like
Tarikh i Alfi by Mullah Ahmad bin Nasrullah Tattavi, Akbarnama
and Ain-i Akbari by Abul Fazl and Tabaqat i Akbari by Nizamuddin
Ahmad compiled descriptive, factual and statistical accounts
of the region. In these chronicles, especially in Abul Fazls
Akbarnama and Ain-i Akbari, discussions on Kashmir contained
ethnographic notices, synoptic history, geographic descriptions,
accounts of customs, lore, tales of the marvellous and the
fantastic, theistic and philosophical traditions.
These accounts of the newly conquered province were pro-
duced through a multilayered process, which involved obser-
vations of and investigations into the region as well as engage-
ment with existing intellectual traditions. In their discussions
on Kashmir, the court chroniclers drew from the Arab and
Persianate traditions and the writings of the predecessors of
Mughal rule, like Mirza Haiders Tarikh i Rashidi (Dughlat 1973).
They drew upon regional intellectual traditions, both textual,
like the Rajatarangini, and oral accounts.
In the third daftar of the Ain-i Akbari, in An Account of
Twelve Provinces ((Ahwal i dawazdah subah) (Abul Fazl) edited
Blochmann 1872: 56289), Abul Fazl gave a detailed account
of the provinces of the empire, as they were getting formed at
the time of writing. The discussion on Kashmir in the Ain can
be divided into three distinct parts. There was an ethnographic
and geographic description of the region. The second part is
in the form of notices, organised in a tabular formlisting the
revenue figures, dominant castes, cavalry and infantry of each
district. The third part gave a brief history of the region.
Abul Fazls account of Kashmir began with a simple statement
of facts about the climate, best routes into the Valley and
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
weather. In the act of noting details about places, Abul Fazl
recorded the local lore that laid out, in a way, the sacral geo-
graphy of the region. The Ain gave descriptions of the houses, the
bazaars, food habits, clothes and fabrics and means of transporta-
tion of the region. Fazl commented on Kashmiri being the domi-
nant language of the region and the continuing use of Sanskrit
in literature. He noted that Kashmir had an old tradition of learn-
ing. He made disparaging remarks about the music of the region.
He commented on the presence of different religious groups.
There was a detailed description of the city of Srinagar, its length
and breadth, the main industries and manufactures, geo-
graphical spread and location, water available in the city, etc.
In the third part of the discussion on Kashmir, Abul Fazl gave
an abridged account of the history of Kashmir. This abridgement,
especially of the early history of the region, drew upon the new
translation of the Rajatarangini. Fazls account of the history
of the region began from the story of the origin of the Valley as a
large lake, emergence of the institution of kingship and culmi-
nated in conquest by Akbars army.
In the summary account of Kashmirs history, Abul Fazl
recounted incidents from a few, specific kings from the Raja-
tarangini. These rulers were set up as exemplars of good and
bad kingship. But more importantly, they formed the medium
through which Abul Fazl outlined issues of morality and virtue
in the exercise of kingship. Fazls account of the history of
Kashmir ended with the conquest of the region by the Mughal
armies. The institution of kingship, which in the originary nar-
rative had emerged from a quest for peace and justice, culmi-
nated in the establishment of Akbars rule over Kashmir.
The late 16th century chronicles of the Mughal court, were, in a
sense, writing the empire into being. Through the discussions
in the court chronicles, Kashmir moved away from the older
associations of insularity and the unknown. By creating sum-
mary geographic, ethnographic and historical accounts of the
region, Abul Fazl and other court chroniclers made Kashmir
familiar within the oecumene of the court and the empire.
In Praise of Kashmir
While court chronicles were compiling information on Kashmir,
synchronically the region was entering the poetic and literary
imagination of the Mughal court. The concept of Kashmir jannat
nazir first emerged as an imaginary in the literary productions
of the court in the late 16th century.
Urfi Shirazis qasida, Dar Wasf i Kashmir (In praise of Kashmir),
began with the lines,
Har Sokhteh jani ke be Kashmir dar ayad
Gar Murgh kabab ast ke ba-bal wa pur ayad (Urfi Shirazi nd: 31)10
In this qasida, Urfi described Kashmir as the land of soul alle-
viating beauty, with the miraculous ability to rejuvenate and
revitalise.
In 1589, when Akbar travelled to Kashmir, Faizi, the poet
laureate of the court travelled with him.11 In his qasida (poem
of praise), Dar Tausif i Kashmir wa Tahniyat i Fateh An wa Madah i
Akbar Padshah,12 Faizi described the excellencies of the region
and applauded its conquest by Akbars armies. He celebrated
Kashmir as a land especially blessedboth by its soul refreshing
39
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
beauty and its good fortune that it was entering the benevo-
lent embrace of Akbar Padshah (Faizi 1342 shamsi hijri: 42).
In this qasida, Faizi described Kashmir as ajab karnamah i
taqdir, the wondrous work of destiny (Faizi 1342 shamsi hijri:
42). Tajjub (wonder) remained an important part of the response
to Kashmir, but the nature of wonder had changed. While, in the
Ajaib traditions of the ninth to 11th centuries, the anxieties
generated by the mountainous insularity of Kashmir were articu-
lated in stories of danger lurking behind the mountain walls. In
the poetry of the Mughal court in the late 16th century, the
tajjub was expressed at the beauty of the landscape of Kashmir.
The poetry of the court wove the high mountains, salubrious
climate, springs, streams and lakes, the verdure of the Valley
into a literary imaginary of the paradisiacal beauty of Kashmir.
In the first half of the 17th century, Kashmir remained a distinct
topic of literary compositions of the court. Most major poets of the
court like Salim Tehrani, Mohammad Jan Qudsi (d 1646), Talib
Amuli (d 1652), Zafar Khan Ahsan (d 1670), Mir Ilahi (d 1653),
Tughra Mashhadi (d 166768) and others, had distinctive poems
on Kashmir in their oeuvre.13 These poems still spoke of the region
in terms of wonder. But now they expressed wonder at the gardens
and buildings constructed by the Mughal elite. The gardens
were described as paradisiacal and the landscape of the Valley
appeared as a worthy background to these imperial creations.
Majma ul Afkar was a miscellaneous collection of Mughal
Insha (Kinra 2015: 186) dated to the early 18th century (Chander
Shekhar 20092010: 11456). It offered models of laments,
elegies, letters of congratulation, commiseration to the sick,
letters of praise, of constructions by the patron, assemblies
held, battles won (bazm wa razm), etc. It also contained copies
of special letters, like letters from Humayun to Bairam Khan,
Jahangir to Shah Abbas and Shah Jahan to Mullah Shah.14 In
this collection of Insha, there was a discrete section on Kash-
mir. It included excerpts from Mohammad Salih Kambohs
Aml i Salih, Tabatabais Padshahnama, a long section from a ris-
alah by Maulana Shaida and a letter from Mulla Tughra to Qazi
Zahid. The section from Kamboh was a safarnama (travel ac-
count) and described Shah Jahans journey into Kashmir. From
Tabatabais Padshahnama, Majma excerpted the description
of Srinagar. Other sections of the Majma contained a panegyr-
ic poem to the beauty of the region, and a satire on the dangers
of the mountain roads. These selections disaggregated the lit-
erary imaginary of Kashmir jannat nazir into a number of
themes: the journey up to the Valley, the difficulties of the
road, the beauty of the region, and the wonders of the garden.
The literary imaginary of Kashmir jannat nazir emerged in the
poetry of the Mughal court over the late 16th and early 17th centu-
ries. In this period, the poetry and other writings of the Mughal
court were concerned with the landscape and natural features of
the region. By the mid-17th century, the jannat naziri of Kashmir
had shifted to the gardens laid out by the Mughal emperors.
The discussions across the different narrative traditions from
the court chronicles to the poetry of the court represented
multiple imaginations of Kashmir. The textual productions of
the late 16th and early 17th centuries, mapped the region as well
as produced a vocabulary by which to speak of it, making it
40
legible for the court and within the empire. These texts were a
part of the exercise of establishing Mughal authority in the
region. At the same time, these texts reflected the anxiety of
the empire in establishing authority in this distant province.
Anxieties of the Empire
In the 12th regnal year (1617), when he was travelling through
Gujarat, Jahangir received two different reports from Kashmir.
He noted these in his memoirs. The first reported the birth of
two daughters in the house of a silk merchant, born with teeth
and joined from the back to the waist. The life of this pair of
Siamese twins was brief (Jahangir AH 1349/1940: 231).
The other report informed the emperor about an outbreak of
the plague in Kashmir. The region was ravaged by an epidemic.
Jahangir provided details of the affliction. On the first day, a
person would experience headache, fever and nose bleed. By the
second day, the afflicted person would be dead. If one member
of the household fell ill, every other inhabitant of the house would
soon follow. Anybody who went near a sick person or a dead
body would be infected. The plague was deadly in its potency.
There was one person who had died, and they laid his body on straw to
wash it. By chance a cow ate some of the straw and died. Thereupon,
several dogs ate some of the cows flesh and they all died. Thing have
gotten so bad that neither will fathers come near their sons for fear
of death, nor will sons approach their fathers. (Thackston 1999: 254)
The end of the epidemic came with a mysterious chain of events.
One morning, when the plague was at its worst, people in the city
and its outskirts woke up to find symbols marking their doors.
There were three large circles, one on top of the other, two middle
sized circles and one small circle. There were also two empty circles.
(Thackston 1999: 254)
Following this, the part of the city where the plague had
originated burnt down to the ground. The fire and the appear-
ance of these symbols marked the diminution in the fierceness
of the epidemic.
In his recording of these reports from Kashmir, Jahangir
positioned himself in a discursive terrain that was both incred-
ulous as well as scientific (Mottahedeh 1997: 37). Jahangirs
record of these curious incidents was marked by a fullness of
details and created parallels with his customarily methodical
observations of natural and other phenomenon.15 At the same
time, Jahangir described these events as strange or tinged with
horror (ghraib) (Jahangir 1349/1940: 252). He ended his descrip-
tion of the plague and the fire with the words that the story does
not agree with the canons of reason, and my intellect cannot
accept it (ghaitan be qanun khirad rast na-mi ayad wa aql i
man qabul in mani na-mi kunad) (Jahangir 1349/1940: 252).
It is striking that the two incidents recorded by Jahangir came
to him as hearsay, albeit relayed to the court by the waqi nawis
(news writer) from the region. They were heard while the em-
peror and the court were on a journey through the province of
Gujarat. These storiesthe birth of Siamese twins, the appear-
ance of strange symbols in times of catastropheinvoked ele-
ments of the fantastic and echoed the genre of Ajaib wa ghraib.16
Ahmed has argued that the Ajaib and ghraib tales were
characteristics of borderlandsareas which were liminal to
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the geography of large empires but central to their imagination
of the self.17 The element of the fantastic in these stories rep-
resented a distinct episteme which reinforced the distance of
the suba of Kashmir from the royal court. It measured the distance
not in miles and metres but by marking Kashmir as a faraway
place where the inexplicable and unknowable could occur. These
stories were in marked contrast to Jahangirs writings on Kashmir.
In the Jahangirnama, descriptions and discussions of the region
were carefully parsed through methods of investigation and
observation. Jahangirs knowledge of the region was premised
upon actually seeing. These stories, in contrast, were reported.
The record of these stories in the Tuzuk reflected the tension
between the multiple imaginations of Kashmir in the imperial
chronicles. While the detailed reports in the imperial chroni-
cles made the region knowable, the distance between the
region and the imperial court generated anxieties of control.
Imperial Journeys to Kashmir
By the early 17th century, it had become an established prac-
tice for emperors, members of the royal family and the court to
travel to Kashmir. These royal sojourns to Kashmir were deep-
ly intertwined with the literary imaginary of Kashmir jannat
nazir. Akbar visited Kashmir three times (in 1589, 1593 and
1597). As emperor, Jahangir journeyed to Kashmir five times
(in 1619, 1622, 1624, 1625 and 1627) and Shah Jahan did so an
equal number of times, if not more. On their sojourns in the
Valley, emperors visited spectacles, experienced the novelties
of the region, undertook hunting expeditions. They travelled
through the Valley mostly by water, sitting in especially
designed boats and made camp in gardens.
On his three trips to Kashmir, Akbar surveyed the region and
identified certain sites as important. Akbar made camp and spent
time in the environs of Dal Lake, Shihabuddinpur, Achhwal,
Virnag, Wular Lake and Pampore. In Jahangirs reign, the imperial
camp undertook longer and more extensive journeys and investi-
gated local lore and natural phenomenon. Jahangir ordered
the exploration of the deep caves at Burzahom (Chadurah Haider
Malik 1991: 1213) and an examination of the medicinal proper-
ties of saffron (Thackston 1999: 433). In Shah Jahans reign, impe-
rial cavalcades followed the timetable that had been established
in the previous decades. Shah Jahans first trip to Kashmir as
emperor began from Agra in February 1634. He travelled
across the plains of North India to Lahore. The ascent began
from Lahore. The route into the Valley was chosen to ensure
arrival in the Valley in time to see the spring and the blossoming
of flowers. The emperor returned to Hindustan after all the off-
erings of the regionfrom the spring blossoming of flowers to
the autumnal maturing of the saffron fieldshad been sampled.
At the same time, the return journey had to be made before the
travellers were overtaken by the cold and snow of winters.
In Akbars reign, the imperial cavalcades toured the region,
surveying the sights. In Jahangirs reign, construction was car-
ried out at a number of these sites. For instance, Jahangir par-
celled out the lands on the banks of the Dal Lake amongst
members of the royal family and the nobility. A series of gar-
dens were built along the shores of the lake.
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
By the mid-17th century, Kashmir had become a spectacle.
In the accounts of these journeys, Kashmir land was no longer
marked by its insularity. On the contrary, the act of visiting
and looking was central to the imperial relationship with
Kashmir jannat nazir. For instance, when Shah Jahan trav-
elled to Kashmir in the 18th regnal year (164546), he insisted
that Nusrat Jung, who was about to begin his assignment in
Deccan, accompany him to the Valley. Lahori wrote that
Because Nusrat Jung had never visited Kashmir, order was given that
he should ride with the king and should be in attendance. It was said
that he should view the verdant valley, the blossoming trees and after
taking pleasure in the valley and enjoying its delights, he was to re-
turn to Deccan. (1868: 218)
This imperial directive prescribed Nusrat Jungs enjoyment
of Kashmir. At the same time, by riding along the emperor on his
maiden visit to the region, his enjoyment also became an object
of viewing. His enjoyment had to be visible to the emperor.
In 163940, on a visit to the Valley, Shah Jahan invited the
Ilchis (emissaries) from the courts of Rum and Bukhara to visit
Kashmir (Lahori 1868: 197). These emissaries became the au-
dience for an enactment of Mughal grandeur. In the gardens
on the shore of the Dal Lake, lamps were lit behind cascades of
water, bringing two idioms of beautywater and lightto
create a celebratory spectacle. Lahori described it thus:
On the eve of 24th (Rabi ul awwal), in front of the imperial harem,
order was given to decorate the gardens of Farah and Faiz Bakhsh,
the most wondrous sites in this city. From the parterres to the begin-
ning of the wall to the banks, in each of the two gardens, on both
sides of Shah Nahar and on all sides of the tanks, lamps were placed.
After that, at small intervals, tied to the wood were colourful lanterns.
Behind the screens/sheets of cascading water, in holders of marble,
lamps were arranged, creating wonder.
The emperor arrived from the north, distributing gold coins, serving
the poor And till one pahar of the evening was spent in pleasure
giving and spreading in the garden, after which a return was made to
the imperial palace. (1868: 199200)
As emperors travelled across Kashmir, they altered its land-
scape. In 1620, on the road back to Lahore, Jahangir was struck
by the beauty of a spring and a waterfall near the village of
Bahramgala (Thackston 1999: 349). He ordered the construc-
tion of a viewing platform, a seat to watch the spectacle. An
inscription on the stone noted the date of his passage. Ebba
Koch has discussed Jahangirs practices of claiming nature as
his own by making a permanent imprint on it with artistic
means, with architectural features, sculptures and inscrip-
tions (Koch 2009: 16162). By taking over natural phenome-
non, Jahangir, she says, accentuated them with dynastic im-
prints (Koch 2009: 168). In later periods, when Shah Jahan
visited the Valley, the imperial chronicles discussed the seat
built by Jahangir to view the waterfall. Bahramgala was dis-
tinguished by the royal intervention at the site.
The emperors gave new names to places as they travelled
through the Valley. New names drew from an event or a spe-
cific person linked to the Mughal presence in the region. Inch
was renamed Islamabad. Shah Jahan on his visit to Inch had
ordered the destruction of a pilgrimage (ziarat) there. Islam
Khan Mir Bakhshi held the area in tuyul (Lahori 1868: 4748).
41
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
The name Islamabad memorialised both the person and the
incident. Machhi Bhawan was given in jagir to Yaminuddaulah
Asaf Khan. He had carried out extensive construction in the
area, building tanks, canals and gardens. Shah Jahan renamed
the place Asafabad (Lahori 1868: 50). Shah Jahan modified the
garden laid out by Jahangir at Virnag. He raised pavilions
which overlooked the garden and the canals in which the wa-
ters from the spring of Virnag flowed. He gave this garden the
name of Shahabad (Lahori 1868: 5253).
The practice of renaming marked the land with imperial
presence, interventions and personnel. It created new political
and cultural associations between Kashmir and the Mughal
empire. Names like Islamabad and Shahabad resonated with
other places in the empire. The similarity of names did not
indicate a similarity of characteristics between these places.
The meaning and relevance of these names could only be loc-
ated within the histories of the Mughal empire. At the same
time, sites in Kashmir continued to carry new and old names.
Locally, the story of Mughal refashioning became joined to
older associations with these sites.
Royal journeys to Kashmir dismantled earlier notions of in-
sularity of the region. Accounts of these journeys reflect the
reconstitution of the sense of wonder associated with Kashmir.
It became the setting for imperial creations. By the mid-17th
century, these sites of imperial action were viewed as the spac-
es of paradisiacal beauty.
Mughal Gardens of Kashmir
Discussions on the Mughal gardens of Kashmir have focused
on themes of aesthetic and visual practices of the Mughal
court. These gardens have been viewed as spaces distant and
discrete from governance. However, I would argue that these
gardens represented spatial practices by which the authority
of the Mughal state was territorialised in the landscape of
Kashmir. The metaphor of paradise on earth invoked the phil-
osophical ideal of a benevolent Mughal badshahi. The gardens
became the space where this ideal was articulated in land. The
layout, deployment of waterways, choice of trees and plants,
use of symmetry as well as wilderness within these gardens
constituted a specific aesthetic vocabulary. High mountains
served as the background to these gardens, waters from springs,
streams and rivers were directed into channels running
through them, gushing out in fountains and pooling in tanks.
Flowers like laleh (tulips) and nargis (daffodils) and trees like
chinar (plane), aspen, poplars, apple and cherry populated
these gardens.
The patronage and commission of these constructions reflected
the contestations within the spheres of Mughal authority. They
also represented the interventions by the Mughal state in public
spaces, popular memory and local politics. These gardens were
employed within imperial frameworks of governance, habita-
tion and leisure. In time, the gardens came to take on the sense
of a settlement, with names like Zafarabad and Saifabad.
Bagh i Faiz Bakhsh and Farah Bakhsh, known as Shalimar
Bagh were the most celebrated of the Mughal gardens. The
area of Shalimar, on the bank of Dal Lake, had been a site of
42
pilgrimage, with a natural spring (Fazl 1998: 366). Raja Pravar
Sen, remembered as the founder of the city of Srinagar, had
first laid out a garden at this site. Though the garden had long
since disappeared, the village that came up at the site retained
the name Shalimar (Hasan I nd: 286).
While distributing the land around the Dal Lake amongst
the nobles of the court, Jahangir gave this piece of land to
Shah Jahan, with the directive to construct a garden at this site.
Shah Jahan named the garden Bagh i Faiz Bakhsh. The garden
was built on the principles of mountain garden, with ter-
raced gardens, organised in three distinct parts. The highest
part of the garden was the zenana garden, which offered open
spaces as well as privacy to the women of the palace (Villiers
Stuart 1913; Ruggles 2008). The second zone was the courtly
domain. A third and public section was laid out later (Ruggles
2008: 216). In the 1630s, Shah Jahan added another garden to
the existing one and named it Farah Bakhsh. This formed the
third part, the public part of the garden.
The best of the gardens is Farah Bakhsh, which was constructed at the
command of the emperor. The flowered earth of this garden is mod-
elled on the evergreen paradise; waters of Shah Nahr flowing through
the gardens remind one of the waters of Salsabil and Kausar; the fruits
of the garden are the most delicious in the world; the buildings of pal-
aces are like the faultless paradise. The architect of this marvel is the
emperor, Sahib i Qiran Sani. (Lahori 1868: 24)
Lahoris description exalted this garden to an approximation
of paradise. Sahib i Qiran Sani, Shah Jahan (the second lord of
conjunction), designed this garden. The greenery of the gar-
den, the blossoming of flowers and the buildings in it were
reminiscent of the imagery of paradise. Shah Nahr, the canal
that channelled the water from the old spring, was compared
to Salsabil and Kausar, the spring and canal through which
waters flowed through paradise.
Although under Shah Jahans directive, this part of the Dals
shore was refashioned into a new space, the older name of
Shalimar persisted and became the popular name for these
gardens. Shalimar Bagh drew a line of continuity between the
King who founded the city of Srinagar and the Mughal emperor
who fashioned it into paradise-like gardens.
In time, the word Shalimar itself became a synonym for the
grand Mughal gardens. When Shah Jahan laid out gardens in
Lahore, he called them Bagh i Faiz Bakhsh and Farah Bakhsh.
They came to be popularly known as Shalimar Bagh. Similar-
ly, Shalimar Bagh came up in Delhi, with the construction of
Shahjahanabad. Repeated appearance of Shalimar in the
name of Mughal gardens across North India invoked the
gardens of Kashmir as well as the imagery of paradise.
The names given to places in Kashmir referred to events and
people linked to the Mughal presence in the region. The
changed appellations inserted the Mughal presence into the
everyday imagination of these places as well as infused them
with the histories of localities. When names like Shalimar and
Sahibabad travelled to other parts of the empire, they specifi-
cally invoked the jannat naziri of Kashmir. This imaginary, by
the mid-17th century, had become a part of the imperial
vocabulary of self-representation.
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 EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA

The Mughal gardens of Kashmir harnessed nature into care-
fully crafted spaces. In the construction of these gardens local
geographies were significantly altered. Springs were har-
nessed, canals were dug, and small rivers were diverted. These
gardens were also spaces of horticultural experimentation.
Varieties of plants were transplanted and fruits like cherries,
guavas and apples were brought from other parts of the
empire. Underlying the descriptions of the fruits of Kashmir,
were careful records of the size and quality of fruits, compar-
ing them to produce of other provinces. New horticultural
techniques like grafting were introduced.
Patronage of constructionof buildings and gardenswas
a sphere of competing authorities. In his perambulations from
Agra to Lahore and then to Kashmir, Shah Jahan modified or
reconstructed a number of buildings and gardens laid out by
Jahangir. His reconstructions at Virnag were just one example.
Lahori explained it by noting that Jahangirs constructions
were not to the taste of Shah Jahan (Lahori 1868: 1112). In the
complicated politics of lineage and inheritance and the desire
to mark legacy, divergent aesthetics were sites of contestation.
When Asaf Khan constructed Nishat Bagh, adjoining Faiz
and Farah Bakhsh, it competed with Shah Jahans gardens in
beauty. The story is that Shah Jahan coveted Asaf Khans gar-
den. But Asaf Khan steadfastly failed to offer it to him. A pee-
vish emperor ordered the shutting off of the water supply to
the garden (Villiers Stuart 1913: 16768). The conflict in this
matter was on issues of ownershipnot just of land but of a
wondrous creation.
Zafar Khan Ahsan in his first term as governor in Kashmir
reconstructed the ziarat at Zadibal. Zadibal was the dargah of
the Nurbakhshi saint Mir Shams Iraqi and a site of veneration
for the Shias of the Valley. He laid out a garden at the site and
gave it the name of Hasanabad. These constructions by Zafar
Khan marked an intervention in the local politics of the region
and his garden came to carry political and religious valence. In
1635, when riots broke out in Srinagar as a result of sectarian
conflicts, Hasanabad was ransacked (Mattoo 1988: 15051).
Jahanara Begum owned three gardens in Kashmir: The gar-
den of Jawahir Khan Khwaja Sara on the island in Dal Lake,
Bagh i Nur Afshan laid out by Nur Jahan on the banks of Jhe-
lum and the garden at Safapur which had originally been laid
out by Mirza Haider Dughlat (Lahori 1868: 195). Jahanara laid
out a garden in her jagir at Achhwal and renamed it Sahiba-
bad, based on her title of Begum Sahiba. Jahanaras use of her
title in the act of renaming the garden was a political gesture.
When Jahanara Begum laid out gardens in Chandni Chowk in
Shahjahanabad, she also gave them the name of Sahibabad.
The name inscribed her presence in a very public and urban
space of the main street of the capital of the empire. The no-
menclature of her gardens in Chandni Chowk invoked the gar-
dens in Kashmir. Like she had inscribed her claim on the gar-
den at Achhwal, similarly her garden in Chandni Chowk
marked the land with her claim of authority.
The aesthetic practice of laying out gardens in Kashmir was
informed by the literary imaginary of Kashmir jannat nazir. In
time, in the poetry of the court, the Mughal gardens became
the sites of paradisiacal beauty. By laying out gardens, the
Mughal elite moulded the land of Kashmir and inscribed
Mughal authority into the landscape. They inserted Mughal
rule in the local memories and histories of places. I would
argue that the laying out of gardens was not just a mark of im-
perial control. The gardens were a part of the spatial practice
of the Mughal empire, by which imperial authority was territo-
rialised in the distant province of Kashmir.
Conclusions
From the earliest discussions on the region, there has been a
sense of exceptionalism associated with the geography of the
Kashmir. The narrative traditions from Kashmir of the early
medieval and the medieval invested sacrality in the landscape.
It would seem that the idea of a sacred land segued into the
metaphor of Kashmir as paradise in the Mughal traditions in
the early modern period (Zutshi 2014).
I have argued that the invocation of the imagery of paradise
in the discussions on Kashmir was not simply a descriptive de-
vice, nor was it a continuation of the older imagination of
Kashmir as a sacred land. Kashmir jannat nazir was a distinct
literary and political imaginary which emerged in the late 16th
century in the Mughal court and evolved over the 17th century.
It was a discourse of authority, which informed institutions of
governance and the spatial practices of the empire. In turn,
these practices territorialised the Mughal empire in the region.
Kashmir was an unusual borderland. It was neither porous
nor mobile. On the contrary, Kashmir jannat nazir was a closed
border, the place where journeys came to an end. The imagi-
nary of Kashmir jannat nazir became one of the ways in which
the authority of empire was articulated in the borderland.
Kashmir remains an evocative word for us todayas the site
of competing nationalisms, political contestations, deep suffer-
ing and fear. Ironically, this Kashmir sits alongside a strong visu-
al memory of a heavenly land (Kabir 2009).18 I would argue
that, while the landscape of the Valley has appeared in different
discursive traditions, our imagination today draws its lineage
from the very specific Mughal imaginary of Kashmir jannat nazir.

Notes
1 See Mattoo (1988); Kaw (2001); Bazaz
(1967: 21); Parmu (1969: 281); Sufi (1996);
Bamzai (1962).
2 Kashmir is mentioned in a number of Arab
Geographies. Among some of these are authors
like Al Baladhuri (d 892), Futuh al-Buldan, Ibn
Khurdadhbih (d 912), Kitab al Masalik wal
Mamalik, Gardizi, Zayn-ul Akhbar; Al-Masudi
(d 956), Muruj al Dhahab, Al-Idrisi (d 1156),
Kitab Nuzhat al-Mushtaq fi Khtiraq al-Afaq. See
the discussion in S Maqbul Ahmad (1989) and
S Maqbul Ahmad and Raja Bano (1984).
3 See discussion on the body of literature classi-
fied as Ajaib in Manan Ahmed Asif (2016),
Aditya Behl (2006), Travis Zadeh (2010).
4 This story qualifies as an ajaib because this
particular text is dated to the tenth century,
which predates the first Muslim ruler of Kashmir
by a few centuries.
5 Buzurg ibn Shahriyar (2000: 23). Interesting-
ly, this story is retold by a much later author, Al
Qalqashi (d 1418). There are modifications in the
names of the principal actors and the region is
identified as Alor or Alwar in the later story.
A story that was initially narrated as an Ajaib
became a credible tale in a later context. For Al
Qalqashis narration see Zaki (2009: 5152).
6 Zadeh (2010); Antrim (2012).
7 As quoted in Dughlat (1973: 432).

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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
8 Mirza Haider Dughlat was a Mughal nobleman
in the service of Sultan Said Khan of Kashghar.
In 1533, he led the Kashghari armies in a suc-
cessful campaign in Kashmir. However, upon
the plea of his armies, he returned to Kashghar.
Upon the death of Sultan Said Khan, Mirza
Haider lost favour at the court. He turned to
Kabul and joined his cousin Babur. On Baburs
death, he joined the service of Mirza Kamran.
When Humayun was looking for allies, Mirza
Haider joined him. In 1540, he conquered
Kashmir again and ruled as its proxy ruler. In
1546, he read the khutba and minted coins in
Humayuns name. He died in 1551 in Kashmir.
9 Anooshahr (2014) and Faruqui (2012) discuss
the Tarikh i Rashidi within the larger context of
Mughal political identities.
10 Every burnt soul that has come to Kashmr
[is revived]/Even a chicken made into a kebab
becomes whole.
11 For a longer discussion on Faizi see Alam and
Subrahmanyam (2012) and Kinra (2015).
12 The title of this qasida can be translated as
Description of Kashmir, Congratulations on Its
Victory and Praise of the Emperor Akbar.
13 See the discussion in Tikku (1971: 83157).
14 Majma ul Afkar, Khudabakhsh Oriental Library,
ms. HL 840. See Chander Shekhar (200910),
Hadis i Kashmir dar Nuskheh e Khatti Majma
ul Afkar in Qand i Parsi, Nos 4748, pp 11456.
15 See Koch (2009) and Lefebvre (2007) for dis-
cussions on Jahangirs notions of rationality.
16 See Travis Zadeh (2010), Alan Bates (2005) and
Touba Ghadessi (2011).
17 See Ahmed Asif (2011).
18 See Kabir (2009) for a discussion on the con-
trasting yet contiguous political and popular
discourses which constitute Kashmir as the
Territory of Desire.
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vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Relative Intimacies
Belonging and Difference in Transnational Families
Sahana Ghosh
Described here are stories of families within the
borderlands of India and Bangladesh who have kin
relations on the other side of the border. They are about
the continued making and maintenance of kinship ties
across transnational family networks over the changing
practices of border control. Officers and constables in
the Indian Border Security Force, tasked with preventing
all cross-border movements, recognised with sympathy
the existence and emotional power of cross-border
family ties. This article attempts to answer questions like
what normative and emotive ideas about kin obligations
and morality prevail upon individuals and families as
they decide whether or not to continue investment in
relations across borders. How do these sit within the
larger political economy of the border itself?
My deepest gratitude and respect to all the families in the Indian and
Bangladeshi borderlands who welcomed me into the histories and
rhythms of their transnational lives and for the many security force
personnel whose critical reflections and sympathies exceed their
duties. Thanks to Farhana Ibrahim, Tanuja Kothiyal, Martin Mattsson,
and Tariq Thachil for comments that helped to make some arguments
sharper. The fieldwork from which this article draws was funded by
grants from the Wenner Gren Foundation, the Social Science Research
Council, Macmillan Centre, and the National Science Foundation.
Sahana Ghosh (sahanagee@gmail.com) is a doctoral candidate in
Anthropology, and Womens, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at Yale
University.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
I
married into India out of greed for the melas, fairs, and now
I am stuck no jawa-asha, coming and going, for me,
Shefali Barman said with a deep sigh.1 A 26-year-old widow
in Putimari, a border village in Cooch Behar district of West
Bengal, India, she was bemoaning her inability to cross the border
to attend a nephews rice-eating ceremony, where all her natal
family would be gathered, in the nearby Bangladeshi border
village of Boraibari.2 The circuitous route Shefali usually took
between Putimari (in India) and Boraibari (Bangladesh), across
an unfenced portion of the border, had been closed at the time due
to a newly stationed Indian Border Security Force (BSF) patrol
there. She hastened to explain her reason for entering into a
marriage across an international border, lest it be thought flippant.
In my childhood, our father or older brothers would take my sisters and
me to the Rash Mela in Cooch Behar and smaller melas during Durga
Puja and Rathjatra in Dinhata.3 You see, it was no fun being Hindu in
Bangladeshbut each time we would come here [West Bengal, India],
we would see that so many women, so many families, Hindu and Muslim,
who would come to these melas, travelling to them from different places
and enjoying them till late at night The border was open in those years
[late 1980s to early 1990s], and the distance between Boraibari and
Dinhata was not very much. Jawa-asha was very easy, and when it was
necessary we occasionally stayed a night or two at relatives homes. Then
we would return to Bangladesh with toys, new dresses, and sweets.
With two paternal aunts married in the same area of
Cooch Behar district, she had also grown up witnessing the ease of
their jawa-asha with their natal home in Boraibari. Having thus
travelled these cross-border routes herself, she had been agreeable
to the proposal of marriage when it was broached, with the re-
assurance that it was close enough within the borderland for her
to visit frequently. Shefalis deep disappointment with her pre-
sentand possibly temporaryimmobility is thus made sharp-
er in contrast to the memories of these cross-border journeys of
her childhood and expectations based on those experiences.
Jawa-ashar majhe across the Bengal Border
Stories like Shefalis, of divided families and arrested routes,
have become recognisable to us in the context of the subconti-
nents partitioned borders through film, literature, and scholar-
ship; especially a recent series of excellent work on partitions
legacies.4 However, what distinctly sets apart stories like hers
is that rather than rupture, they are about the continued making
and maintenance of kinship ties across transnational family
networks over the changing practices of border control. Villages
such as Putimari and Boraibari across the region in northern
Bengal were all part of the Cooch Behar princely state, typically
45
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
knit together by a dense web of kinship relations and a great
deal of migration. Practically every family in this agrarian
region, that has come to be reconstituted as borderlands in/of
India and Bangladesh, with a Muslim majority demographic,
has kin relations who are now on the other side of the border.5
The formation of the border between India and then-Pakistan,
now-Bangladesh, meant that, within the borderlands, relations
were recast. Even today there are cross-border marriages,
although their number has greatly decreased since the steadily
militarised control of the border on the Indian side from the
mid-1990s onward. In conversations, officers and constables in
the Indian BSF, tasked with preventing all cross-border move-
ments, recognised with sympathy the existence and emotional
power of cross-border family ties. However, as they encoun-
tered these particular kinds of border-crossers, and considered
differentiating them from others who were transporting petty
goods across the border (for example, cumin from India to
Bangladesh) or crossing the border in search of work (for
example, labourers from Bangladesh into India), I found them
puzzling over questions.6 Why do border crossings for kinship
persist despite the risks and impediments to safe and fearless
border crossings in the borderlands? While one can understand
their existence for the partition generation, how do we under-
stand cross-border marriages in a context where the border
has been in visible existence with its growing security apparatus
for several decades? In taking these questions seriously as an
empirical invitation, related questions arose. What normative
and emotive ideas about kin obligations and morality prevail
upon individuals and families as they decide whether or not to
continue investment in relations across borders? How do these
sit within the larger political economy of the border itself?
Running over 4,096 km, the IndiaBangladesh border has
16 official land ports through which the cross-border move-
ment of goods is facilitated, though not all of these accommo-
date the movement of people, which is tied to the possession of
passports and appropriate visas.7 Residents of agrarian border-
lands such as these can hardly afford the cost and hassle of
fulfilling these bureaucratic-legal standards in either country.
Left to their own paths, illegal border crossings are thus un-
dertaken for a variety of reasons in everyday life: to visit fami-
ly, for religious and medical purposes, to transport goods and
trade, or in search of work (Ghosh 2011). Questions of violence,
marginality, and belonging have been at the heart of the
empirically rich, flourishing scholarship on borders and bor-
derlands in South Asia (van Schendel and de Maaker 2014; van
Schendel 2005; Gellner 2013; Cons and Sanyal 2013; Banerjee
2010). These have been explored in the contestations of
national sovereign power (for example, Shneiderman 2013;
Aggarwal and Bhan 2009; Jones 2011; Cons 2014), cross-border
economic networks or enterprises (for example, Harris 2013;
Sur 2013; Hussain 2013), cultural and religious connections and
belonging (Ibrahim 2009; Jalais 2013; Bal 2007). Although
central to the earlier feminist scholarship on gender, community,
and violence in partition and its aftermath (for example, Butalia
2000; Bhasin and Menon 2000; Das 2007) scholars working
on contemporary borders and borderlands, taken up by their
46
political-economic formations, have largely overlooked the
everyday life of the family and kinship, in its peculiarly short-
distance transnational form in the borderlands.8 Shefalis aborted
journey and personal history of border-crossings demand that
attention be paid to these two aspects together: the trials of
transnational kinship across changing practices of border control.
This article presents familial spatial practices serving kinship
along and across the border in north Bengal, looking not only
at moments of historical crisis at and since 1947, but also at or-
dinary times and the connections between them. It aims to
connect the discussions of a long partition (Zamindar 2007) to
the lively scholarship on the contemporary life and politics in
the IndiaBangladesh borderlands, deepening both in turn. In
doing so it seeks to make three contributions. First, it shows that
such histories of family networks across the borderlands com-
plicates our understanding of how the partition of the subconti-
nent remains a lived reality for those who, marginal to deltaic
and metropolitan Bengali identity, were most affected not by
displacement, but by remaining in place, in areas which have
come to be produced as borderlands in subsequent decades.
Second, in tracing these family histories and networks of kin
over generations, roughly from the 1950s to present times, it
suggests that a particular biography of the border itself emerg-
es, one which destabilises the linear account of the Bengal bor-
der from porosity towards closure. And finally, it argues that
the transnational family straddling the borderlands, despite its
sticky affective life, has become a site on which national differ-
ences and stereotypes take root, are cultivated and deployed.
In this article I draw on 24 months of ethnographic research
conducted in the Indian and Bangladeshi borderlands in
northern Bengal between 2012 and 2015 with residents and
border security forces. As I travelled back and forth across the
IndiaBangladesh border through the northern land port of
Changrabandha/Burimari, my own movement facilitated the
exchange of photographs, gifts, and messages between relatives.
Family charts grew denser with details of little known offshoots
in between my own comings and goings with 11 sets of trans-
national families whose histories and experiences I traced.
They had varying degrees and forms of contact, and I draw on
that range in this article to show the intertwining of mobility
and immobility between unequal state powers and the diffi-
cult nature of cross-border kinship ties, often involving prickly
decisions, in moral and material terms. The ethnographic fo-
cus will be on journeysimagined, completed, aborted, and
refusedand their narrative representations.
Pulled by Heartstrings: Ambivalences of Kinship,
Asymmetries of Border Control
It was the morning after Shahida Bibis youngest brothers
wedding in Madhupur (BD), and at the grooms house an
enormous vat of steaming khichudi was at hand to feed all the
relatives in the winter cold. I never imagined that you would
see me here, in my fathers house, said Shahida chachi to me,
as we devoured the spicy khichudi, washed down with sweet
milky tea. I was sure I would not come, she says, listing all
the work and responsibilities she had in Kathalbari (India) and
april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

referring to the physically arduous walk across the dry sand
banks of the river Jay that is a characteristic of the landscape
in the winter months. Then I cameshudhumatro moner taaney
(pulled only by the strings of my heart).
By this point I had known Shahida chachi for a few years. In
the border gram panchayat of Kathalbari, Cooch Behar district,
she had been introduced to me as a local leader and organiser of
the government-aided womens self-help groups. In her late 50s,
she is an activist for womens and child rights, and had been a
community worker for numerous non-governmental organisation
projects. She was clearly embarrassed that she had been
caught in the position of what the Government of India would
classify her: an illegal border-crosser. This embarrassment
tempered her delight at being able to share the joy and pride
of her fathers home and local influence with someone from
India. It was important to her that I understood what had
driven her to take such a risk, and that it was in fact a substantial
risk to her. I am always worried before I come. You know people
like us have nothing to do with the BSF. I start trembling just at
the thought of being stopped and questioned by them. Ashadul
Hossain, her elder son, who lives in Madhupur with his wife
and children, interjected, an exasperated smile on his face.
I am always telling her there is nothing to be scared of. She just has to
be normal and cross the BSF checkpoint and the river. Once on this
side, I go to pick her up from the [unfenced] zero line myself. Once
when I was bringing her from the zero line on my bike, the BGB [Border
Guards Bangladesh] saw and stopped us. I told them the truth and
they let us go. It was no problem! We are respected in society, people
know us, there is nothing to worry about.
I visited her in her younger brothers home after most of the
wedding guests had left and the chaos of celebrations had
calmed down. She returned to the subject of why she had
come, this time, and all the other times; moner taan, she
repeated over and over again.
I have given up everything here But when I hear that my father is
unwell or my niece or nephew will get married, I have to come. That is
my duty! Do you know what breaks my heart every day? Knowing
that when I die my brothers and my elder son will not be there to lay
me to rest. I live in fearsuppose I get news that something has hap-
pened to my aged father and mother. What if the BSF on duty are not
good? What if I am not able to manage and come?
I have notes of almost the same words uttered by Shahida
chachi again, half a year later. Do you know what breaks my
heart every day? Anguished tears rolled down her cheeks
on to her nine-year-old grandson sitting close to her. This time
she was on a brief visit to see her newborn granddaughter. I
have to do my duty, dont I? she said, rocking the week-old
baby in the cradle of her arms. What will people say if none of
us (referring to herself, her husband, and Ashaduls siblings
who live in Kathalbari, India) came to see Asahduls child, to
give it love and blessings?
It was a Friday and Ashadul, employed in the district govern-
ments agriculture department, was at home from work, busy
with prayers and meetings at their neighbourhood mosque. We
chatted in the kitchen of his house as Shahida chachi finished
preparing the lunchtime meal we would eat together once he
returned. In addition to lentils, greens, aloo bhorta (spiced mashed
potatoes), there was a fish preparation with vegetables, an egg
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
curry, as well as a mutton curry made in my honour. When I
remarked on this elaborate menu, where meat and fish were
clear signs of wealth and material abundance in rural north
Bengal, Shahida chachi pointed out that she found her sons
family here in Bangladesh ate very well, often better than she
did in India.9 Just imagine, as a mother I am not able to live out
my elder sons salaried success and status, she says woefully,
staring into the bubbling mutton gravy, shaking her head in
regret. Ashadul used to go to his parents house in Kathalbari
two or three times a year earlier. Smiling sheepishly he said,
dont you understand, I am not a boy any more. I am a respon-
sible grown person, also (looking down at his tucked in shirt
and jeans) I dont look like a village labourer any more, it is
hard to sneak past the BSF. Indicating that this is a contentious
matter between them, his mother whispered out of his earshot,
his sense of pride and dignity is very important now, more
than the moner taan, affective pull for his parents. He has
become obstinate against coming these days.
Kinship as a Moral Force
Such a call to duty, entangled with deep affective attachments,
with women largely bearing the burden of these duties towards
both natal and affinal families, to ones son, father, and brother
is the driving force of Shahida Bibis decisions to undertake
illegal travels across the border over the years. Anthropological
literature on kinship has explored its inherent ambivalences
(for example, Peletz 1995), the politics of normative demands
of kinship (for example, Carsten 2007), often serving as sources
of anxiety in the face of inability to fulfil those demands. For
numerous borderland residents, like Shahida Bibi and her son or
Shefali Barman, kinship obligations were not a moral compulsion
that they related to as an undesirable burden. Duty and affective
attachment were the two arcs along which kinship as a moral
force animated their lives. Their great desire to be a part of family
rituals and occasions, to perform kin roles of a daughter, brother,
sister, underscored an understanding of kinship as a form of
relatedness that could not be taken for granted but had to be
constantly performed in order for its promised moral fulfilments,
of which reciprocity was a key part, to accrue. Shahida Bibi
wanted to perform her roles as much as she wanted reciprocal
kin roles to be performed towards her, imagined most poign-
antly at times of birth and death.
The ambivalences of kinship are also manifest in terms of
emotional well-being and the realisation of life-course specific
expectations. Transnational separation had the potential to
threaten the social reproduction of gender and kinship roles
(Charsley 2005). For Shahida Bibi being denied the fruits of
her sons success raised questions over the credibility of her
own sacrifices as a good mother; after all, the ideal life-course
of a mothers journey culminates in being taken care of by
her son (elder son in particular) and partaking of that kin
exchange testifies to the moral uprightness of his character and
upbringing to his mothers credit. As Kapur and Cossman
(1996) note, the tremendous discursive power of the familial
ideology is to naturalise it, make these roles of dutiful daughter
and self-sacrificing mother inevitable. Here, the ubiquity of
47
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
these structural expectations of gendered life-cycle exchanges
and performances provide a counter-narrative of valuealbeit
within the bounds of a normative patriarchal discourseto
the legal regime of Indias unilateral border control architec-
ture, subtly critiquing its validity from such a moral standpoint.
Shefalis comments, with which I began, disarmingly straight-
forward, remind us that marriages mean movement, and once
formed, marital alliances and kinship ties require movement for
their upkeep. Impediments to these, in this case in the form of
BSF checks and controls, associated issues of social status, and
real risk of arrests or physical injury (the latter, in the form of
beatings, typically directed towards men caught by the BSF) can
seriously jeopardise the present and rule out the future for such
relationships. What these statements do not reveal is the gendered
nature of these movements: marriage is always migration for
women, a necessary corrective to dominant paradigms in migra-
tion studies.10 And in the case of this borderland, if the marrying
woman finds herself on a different side of the border from her
family, it also creates a particular kind of gendered border-crosser,
with its own politics of suspicion and sympathy in relation to
border control practices, as the comparison forced between
Shahida Bibi and her son makes painfully clear. Such a border-
crosser is distinct from those crossing for economic reasons
a distance doubly asserted by Shahida Bibi and her sonand
that distinction is vital to the real and perceived social accept-
ability of her movements, but nevertheless enmeshed in the
larger border economy of everyday mobility. As the BSF offic-
ers and troops acknowledged the moral rightness of transna-
tional relative intimacies and harboured sympathies for the
tribulations of those separated by the legal regime of this bor-
ders control, residents mirrored this in their expectations of al-
lowances from those law-enforcers. It was such individual recog-
nitions and sympathies that Shahida Bibi counted on, for the BSF
to be good as she anticipated to manage her future visits. reflections on the visit of a fake Indian voter-identity card-
Unlike Toba Tek Singhs incomprehension and epistemological
denial of the border, the artifice of statist divisions, it becomes
clear that the lived experiences of kin relations in this border-
land take that artifice of state-making into account, embodying
its inhumanity, staging a critique of its values in complicated
ways. If they can make arrangements for the enclave-dwellers,
why not for us? questioned Shefali, about the Indian state, amid
the travel and citizenship arrangements being made for the
enclave-exchange process between India and Bangladesh in this
same region, ongoing at that time.11 A mother visiting her son, a
daughter visiting her mother: the moral power of these subject
positions excluded them from the infamy of illegality in broader
social eyes, even though Shefali, Shahida, Ashadul, each of them
wrestled with concerns for social status being diminished through
association with the illegal border economy and questioning
by the Indian BSF. Their fearsas well as strategies employed
indicate that there is a hierarchy of exception for people like us,
visibly marked through, for example, dress in terms of class status,
whose compulsions to undertake such activities are sympatheti-
cally considered by the border security forces. This is remarka-
bly different from the moral discourses within which womens
mobility for work, unprotected by the shared ideology of the
48
family, is framed, prohibitively (Kapur 2005). The Indian states
inability to provide a measure for these legitimate citizens
needs, to the contrary, harassing and belittling them for these
needs, was perceived as a great failing and heartless, in con-
tradistinction to the Bangladeshi state characterised as more
humane in the form of the compassionate Border Guards
Bangladesh (BGB).
Transnational Separation, National Stereotypes
While certainly, what the map cuts up the story cuts across
(Certeau 1984: 129), the existence of national borders, however
they may be overcome or enforced, has its own material and
affective effects. The Indian states investment in an increasingly
militarised border security apparatus, from numerically higher
boots on the ground, durable fencing, floodlights, night vision
equipment and arms, surveillance cameras12 is in stark contrast
to the Bangladeshi states material presence on their side of border
security (fewer troops, no surveillance equipment, and no fence).
New historiography on the partition has shown us postcolonial
regimes of citizenship were produced through elaborate bureau-
cratic controls on mobility (Zamindar 2007) and the management
of refugees (Datta 2012). If citizen-subjects do imagine their
polities in contradistinction to proximate others through objects,
such as the map (Ramaswamy 2002) for example, we must
consider the material and affective effects of unequal sovereign
powers thus displayed at their shared border. How do close kin
come to live as national neighbours? In other words, to pose
the question of difference a little differently, when there are
numerous and deep continuities across the borders of national
maps, how is difference learned and imagined?
Master narratives of nation and national character are woven
into the weft and warp of transnational family life that bear out
the bitter reality of unequal neighbourly relations. Separate
bearing Bangladeshi kin to her relatives home in Kathalbari
(India) contrasted makes this point poignantly clear. Majidul
Hoque, a pharmacist in Kathalbari, is quite a contrast to Shahida
Bibi in his preferences for observing transnational kin obliga-
tions. His wife is from an erstwhile Bangladeshi enclave in
central Cooch Behar; her sister, Fatima, is married into an old
tobacco-growing centre, Bibiganj, now a Bangladeshi border
village. As the dulha bhai, brother-in-law, he has received
numerous invitations from Fatima, his sister-in-law, and niece
to simply cross the unfenced border and the BSF checkpoint
and visit them, especially since in their perception, as an Indian
citizen he may be able to do that more easily than them. In his
little room in the Kathalbari bazaar, stacked with medicines,
he confessed that he was uncomfortable with breaking the law
that comes with such border-crossings.
It is very difficult, they always put pressure on me to visit whenever we
talk on the phone.13 As it is they [his niece and his sister-in-law] come
abaidya bhabe, illegally. Bangladeshis have more courage than us In-
dians, they can be desperate. I am afraid to take them around on my
bike, even though they have cards.
Fatima of Bibiganj (Bangladesh) has three children; her
eldest, Jui, is a young college-going woman, who with her
april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

fake Indian voter identity card had crossed the border and
the BSF checkpoints passing through as an Indian citizen to
visit her khala, maternal aunt, several times in Kathalbari
and was keen to return. One evening I was seated in the
courtyard of their modest tin-walled house in Bibiganj and
being hosted with steaming cups of spiced black tea, plates of
sliced apple, Nutty biscuits, fried noodles, and sweets. An ap-
preciative comment from me about the spread of snacks to
accompany tea drew an indignant response from Jui, on her
experience of difference in hospitality between this side and
that side.
When someone comes to our house, whoever it may be, the very least
we will do, however poor we might be is to put some tea on the hearth.
Biskut, fruit, chanachur, if we have made some nashta (snacks) at
home, at least two or three types of things. But I have seen what they
are like on that side (referring to her visits)they will ask if you want
tea, if you should say no then thats the end! You wont even get tea! If
you get tea, maybe they will give some biskut with it. Nobody bothers
with anything else. People think too highly of themselves on that side.
While Majidul Hoque was quick to separate differences in
attitudes towards border control by deploying stereotypes
about national character as Indian and Bangladeshi among
his own kin, his niece Jui too read the differences she noticed
in the hospitality practices among her family in the light of
larger national differences and inequalities in bilateral relations.
Wielding a common joke contrasting the miserly West Benga-
lis with the generous East Bengalis, the placement of us and
them along national lines was enabled by a cultural intimacy
(Herzfeld 1997) that came from intimate knowledge circulat-
ing in a family and affirmation of cultural difference among
proximate others. Ashaduls assertion of his self-respecting
and proud national identity was jostling against such prevail-
ing stereotypes of a desperate, law-breaking Bangladeshi,
widely articulated by BSF personnel and residents in the Indi-
an borderlands. At what point would one cease to be a familial
relative (atmiya sajan), and appear as embodying these national
types, was an unresolved source of tension in cross-border
family networks; in whispers, jokes, and declined invitations,
they erupted in intimate relations.
As we saw with Shahida Bibi and Ashadul, neither mother
nor son wished to relocate, devoted as they are to the national
identities with which they characterise themselves and their
worlds today.14 The resentment they share is directed at the
inequality in neighbourly relations, deeply felt among trans-
national kin. While Indian kin in Bangladesh are not stopped
by the BGB (as Ashadul testified and Shefali does not fear in
her calculations), Bangladeshi kin found it practically impos-
sible to visit in the other direction.15 The toll this takes within
families is not negligible and puts a further strain on the ine-
qualities of exchange and reciprocity that are integral to kin-
ship. This is evident as what makes it dangerous for Ashadul
as a young male Bangladeshi Muslim to cross the BSF16 com-
pared to Shahida Bibi as an elderly Indian Muslim woman to
cross the BSF is elided, and instead the matter tersely settled,
within the family, in terms of affective attachments thereby
flattening the imbalances of risk and humiliations of being
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
positioned as a desperate Bangladeshi, a threat to Indian
border security.
We Have Been Here, the Border Happened
Close attention to these tensions in transnational kinship offer
insights into the fraught relationship between subjectivity,
national affinities, and grounded narratives of historical
change. Nation states, with their ordering of histories and re-
gimes of power, have been central in controlling and ruptur-
ing processes of movement and settlement. They seek to effec-
tively control the power of legitimacy of historical narratives
itself. Thus, as Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais have argued,
The movement of brides thus calls to be placed in the context
of national borders and practices, not just in the regulation of
who can enter and stay within a countrys borders, but in the
broader sense of who belongs and who does not (2015: 149).
Cross-border marriages, a particular aspect of transnational
kinship, are still being brokered for entirely pragmatic purpos-
es that take the violent lessons of history, of territorial state-
making, and communal polarisation seriously. To look no fur-
ther than Shahida Bibi, her predicament is the product of a
complicated life history, one in which the upheavals of wars,
its displacements and survivals are explicit themes, although it
is not an uncommon story in the borderlands. She was born in
Kathalbari and was a little girl when she moved to Madhupur,
then in East Pakistan, with her family as her father (still
remembered in Kathalbari bazaar as Taleb Ali Mahajan) ex-
changed his house, shop, and four acres of land with a Ray
family of Madhupur in 1965 in the threatening lead up to the
IndiaPakistan war. Then less than a decade later they all moved
back to Kathalbari for nine months to wait out the bloody war
of 1971, putting up at the house of her fathers old friend. That
is where her fate was sealed, as she sees it today. After the war,
her father married her to the son of the family that had shel-
tered them during the war. It was a way of staying connected
to his beloved Kathalbari, of infusing deeper meaning into the
bonds that had kept them alive in that trying year of 1971.
Who knew then that the border would be closed? For so many years it
was not a problem to cross the border, these checks and hassles17 are
very recent. After all, India freed Bangladesh, who knew it would
come to this?
Remarkable too are the silences about cross-border kin and
keeping contact with them in the space of everyday life in
India, whether through regular phone calls or irregular visits.
In the course of my ethnographic research I found that it
would be months after knowing someone that I would discover
his or her family connections in Bangladesh. Unless you were
someone who was also known to be in the same position, people
on the heavily surveilled Indian sidemostly Muslimdid
not feel they could trust you with these confidences, which
had transformed from being commonplace facts to sensitive
information. It was the reverse case in Bangladesh, where my
own Indian Bengali identity attracted unsolicited accounts
of familial connections from Muslim residents; the Hindu
minority was less forthcoming in similar fashion to their
minority counterpart in India. The state is, as Carsten notes,
49
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
heavily implicated in the transmission of kinship memories
(2007: 21). So it was by chance that I came upon the now trans-
national details of Afzal Hossains family network. A talkative
septuagenarian, I had been summoned for sessions at dawn,
after he read his first prayers of the day, to record his life his-
tory. The Bengali postcolonial trinity of Bose, Gandhi, and
Nehru hung on his wall alongside framed award certificates
received for contribution to education. Afzal master was giv-
ing an account of the high politics of the nationalist move-
ment through which HindoostanPakistan happened. His
kindly wife had brought us tea and breakfast, a distraction I
seized as a break from the school textbook history lecture.
Where is your baper bari (natal home), dadi? I asked her, a
standard question with which I began conversations with mar-
ried women of different generations, alert for patterns among/
across generations. A long silence fell upon us as the elderly
couple looked at each other uncomfortably. Its not close by,
said Afzal master, grey brows furrowed.
You wont report this will you? Her baper bari is in Bangladesh; it is my
mamar bari, maternal uncles family. When we got married it had just
become HindoostanPakistan, you wouldnt think there was a border
for many years, everything continued as usual. Even trains used to
run across the bridge here as before. Then it was only around the
6 September war that everything stopped.18 The train that went from
Kathalbari was stopped in Pakistan and war broke out. Our jawa-asha
stopped completely too. Pakistan kept kora, strict vigil at the border;
you could not get past the Khan-sena. I was in a sarkari chakri, govern-
ment job, our children had grown up what if they called us Pakistani?
Then came the ekattorer juddho [war of 1971], border-torder every-
thing disappeared.19 Pil-pil kore (in huge crowds) people came here
from Pakistan. My in-laws family came and took shelter in this house
my brothers-in-law and their families. Indira Gandhi gave them all
rations in the camps! They all went back after Bangladesh became in-
dependent but the border was open for many years. We never went
that way of course, abaidya bhabe, illegally.
Clearly not trusting his unworldly wife to narrate their
family history, Afzal master presented one to me that was
carefully constructed in reference to official national historical
events. His narrative emphasis on the righteous observance of
lawembodied in his familys giving up the upkeep of kin
relations by not crossing to East Pakistan/Bangladeshwas
integral to his public and self-image as a good citizen, and in
these times, a good Muslim. Despite being a respected and
well-known community elder, he feared being reportedfor
being married for over 50 years now to someone who may
today be labelled Bangladeshi.20
Bengals borders remained largely porous after partition and
uneven attempts by the state to control them were thus unsuc-
cessful (Chatterji 2009; van Schendel 2005). From mainstream
media to statist security statements, from governmental reports
to scholarly analyses, this porosity has been the defining charac-
teristic in descriptions of the IndiaBangladesh border. Shahida
Bibis lamentwho knew it would come to thisvoices an agent and had to travel to Kolkata for the appointment to
sentiments held by many others. This affective narration of
history, before the what happened has been entirely sub-
sumed into the that which is said to have happened, to follow
Trouillots (1995: 113) important semantic distinction, bears
strong resemblances to the responses of divided and displaced
50
families in the long years after partition. It demonstrates that,
although resembling the affective and familial strategies with
which people coped with the new borders that slashed through
the subcontinent, the strategies that continued in the several
decades after, rooted within the borderlands, were anchored in
particular political economies. For so many years, it was no
problem to cross the border does not mean an even porosity
along its length and breadth. As Shefali is faced with a new pa-
trol stationed along the route she had been employing, we real-
ise that the openness and closures of the border change, over
time and with local specificity. As do the strategies that residents
employ in order to successfully overcome the presence of border
security, in whatever material form, on whichever side.
Parallel Biographies
These family histories, spread over generations, mark a paral-
lel biography: that of the border itself. Starting with its birth
in 1947, the biography unfolds in terms of closures and open-
ings, porosity and impermeability, belying the modernist nar-
rative of linear temporal progression from open to porous to
increasing control and now approaching closure that we are
familiar with for this particular border, and for porous borders
more generally. This contradiction works at multiple levels.
One, people marked clear moments of openness and closure,
permissibility and porosity; in fact it was the absolute open-
ness at the time of the 1971 war that came after the experience
of strict enforcement and closure of the border on the Paki-
stani side in the years leading up to the war of 1965, that gen-
erated an understanding of border security as unstable and
capable of radical change. A progression from porous to closed
was not taken for granted, as closed to open had been seen to
happen before, and so residents with several generations-old ties
remain hopeful. Two, cross-border marriages reoccurred across
generations despite the border, not unaware of it, but taking
its openings and closures, its indeterminacies into account. In
fact we find, through glimpses in the accounts here, that there
were dense accretions of investment in cross-border ties as
safety nets in times of crisis. My research finds that through
marriages, among other things, cross-kinship was validated
and strengthened in times of political violence and communal
tension. Residents, even when thwarted in travel plans at a
given moment and in a given place, believed that it could not
be permanent; it had never been before. And, finally, the view
from within these transnational kinship networks suggests
that closure and a negotiated porosity exists simultaneously in
single temporal periods, becoming visible depending on which
side you approach the border from and in what perceptible
social position, as marked by religion, gender, and class.21
It was six months after this interview that Afzal master
announced to me that he had applied for a passport through
deposit his biometric data. He and his wife were mightily
excited; it was only in that conversation that I learned that one
of their daughters was married across the border and lived in
Hatibandha (subdivision in Lalmonirhat district). She had
been married at the end of the 1971 war to the son of her
april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

maternal uncles brother-in-law, whose family had also stayed
with them during the war. There had been about a decade of
jawa-asha on their part after 1971, and then the son-in-law
who held a salaried job had refused to take the risk once the
Bangali Khedao andolan started in nearby Assam.22 Afzal masters
life history, highly organised and full of precise details, was
dotted with ellipses. It was only with the passport application
that he could proudly share his plans to visit his daughter in
Bangladesh, indeed even acknowledge his daughter and her
family across the border. The silences and hesitations I recorded
among Indian borderland residents regarding their kinship
ties across the border are as illuminating as the emotional
words and actions shared vocally by several others. As Trouillot
reminds us, mentions and silences are thus active, dialectical
counterparts of which history is the synthesis (1995: 48). To
recover the messy character of history as process, as it was
lived through, attending to the narrative pulls of chronology,
the transformation of what happened into that which is said
to have happened (1995: 113).
Conclusions
As I drew old-fashioned kinship diagrams in notebooks for the
presently transnational families of Shahida Bibi, Shefali Barman,
Afzal Hoque, and numerous others, moving up or down the
generations (depending on whom I started with), I was noting
the place-name where each spouse was from. For the partition
generation, Cooch Behar, Alipurduar, Jalpaiguri, Moynaguri,
Rangpur, Kaliganj, Phulbari, Nageswari, Bhurungamari, Dhubri,
Gaibandha, these names plotted out the contours of a kinship
geography that stretched across united northern Bengal and
lower Assam, through the length and breadth of the Cooch Behar
princely state and greater Rangpur district. As several elderly
residents put it, they have not started doing anything new or
different by way of marriage practices or observance of
kinship relations. It is the border that happened to them and
turned their lives into transnational ones. Practices such as
residence and giving birth in ones baper bari, routinely prac-
tised without much interference in the form of border control
roughly in the years between 1947 and 1965 and then again
from 1971 up to the late 1980s, suddenly took on new significance.
For those who had records of these births in the form of birth
certificates in India, a documentary practice rarely seen before
the 1980s, they formed the basis for the acquisition of other
documents marking residence and eventually citizenship
ration cards, voter cards. For those born in Bangladesh, with
childhoods spent in their nana (maternal grandfather) or
mamar bari (house of maternal uncle), figured as places of
generosity and care, these experiences provided a vantage
point to speak of the neighbouring nation, its people and places,
with deep affective attachments. Even if such individuals had
resolutely decided not to undertake travel without a passport
in their adult lives.
These produced, without intentional design as the lives of
Afzal masters family testify, transnational ties and social
spaces. This is markedly different from the transnational net-
works and social spaces between places geographically distant,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
generated by labour migrations, which have been the primary
basis of theorisation of transnationalism from below (Smith
and Guarnizo 1998). I have shown that close attention to the
spatial practices employed by borderland residents opens up
a world of negotiation with multiple contingent factors: the
ambivalent pressures inherent in kinship, an unequal pair of
border control regimes that demands certain performances of
citizenship especially of its religious minorities, the discourses
of national stereotypes that seep into familial tensions. Spatial
practices range from individuals who undertake border-crossings
and risk the indignity of encounters with border security forces,
and worse still arrest, to those who in refusing to engage in
such risky illegal travels, perform citizenship in towing the
line of their sovereign states. I have stressed that existing rela-
tions did not end, they were recast and renewed and called
upon for new roles as people had to learn how to sustain not
only kinship ties but broader livelihoods and sociopolitical
pressures, especially as religious minorities in their respective
new nation states. Marriage and kinship obligations function
as social insurances in times of displacement. Furthermore
when there are no formal mechanisms for dispute resolution
in networks and transactions that spread across the border, being
embedded in kin obligations provide social protections, as is evi-
dent time and again through the often communally charged
violent displacements and wars of 1947, 1965, 1971, the tense
years of the Assam agitation in India, and more recently in the
years under the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in Bangladesh.
This paper has resituated kinship, gender, family, and inter-
generational dynamics firmly in relation to the issues of move-
ment, trade, and livelihood that dominate borderland studies
(including accounts of security forces and their excessive violence
or unsympathetic demeanour). It has argued that the border-
land transnational family transgresses the public/private divide
by becoming a site of and for public matters of legality and
national difference. This foregrounds the politics of affective
relations and moral thresholds between border villagers and
the border security forces marking a significant departure from
literature on borders and migration that has largely studied
womens labour migrations, and in the frames of trafficking and
sexual exploitation at the border (Ghosh 2015). I have argued
instead that female border-crossers are protected from stigma
as the moral discourses of the family ideology sanction their
desires and mobility unlike other women who cross for work
without the cover of this legitimising discourse of the family.
The moral righteousness inherent in the task of observance of
kin relations firmly separates border-crossings for familial rea-
sons from border-crossings for economic reasons beyond these
gendered roles. Even though there are those who choose to
abstain from illegal mobility, a desire for it leads them to seek
out other means, such as Afzal masters passport acquisition
and stealthy phone calls for almost all others. Many expressed
what Shahid Bibi articulated clearly. I wish there was some
way for us to come and go in a good way (bhalo bhabe). Cant
the government do something about it? The hope for change
in border security architectures remains, despite the tensions
and differences in relative intimacies.
51
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Notes
1 All names have been changed to protect the
identities of the individuals. Words in Bengali
have been italicised and their translation pro-
vided alongside. English words that were used
in Bengali sentences have been italicised to in-
dicate original usage.
2 All names of villages, gram panchayats, and
union parishads are fictitious although there
may be villages of these names in the districts
of Cooch Behar and Lalmonirhat as I have tried
to use common names.
3 Rash Mela in Cooch Behar is the second largest
fair in West Bengal. It is a significant annual
feature on the cultural calendar of north Bengal,
an event dating back to the days of the Cooch
Behar princely state. As a religious minority in
Bangladesh, the scale and number of various
fairs organised by Hindus are drastically small-
er, and while in the past there have been com-
munal tensions around these events, the pre-
sent Awami League government has been par-
ticularly mindful of protecting such minority
religious celebrations.
4 For example, see Suvir Kaul (2011) and Urvashi
Butalia (2015).
5 Joya Chatterji (2009) has demonstrated the de-
mographic reconfiguration of border-lying tha-
nas in West Bengal as Muslim majority through
distinct processes of migration, displacement
and resettlement in the communally tense dec-
ades after partition.
6 The attitudes of the BSF on the Indian side and
Bangladesh Border Guards and police on the
Bangladeshi side are completely different when
it comes to more large-scale organised net-
works of cross-border activities such as dealing
with cattle and drugs (ganja, Phensedyl).
7 http://www.hcidhaka.gov.in/pages.php?id=36,
last accessed on 12 March 2016.
8 A notable exception to this is the recent book
by C Alexander, J Chatterji and A Jalais (2015).
9 I use quotation marks here to indicate that these
proper names were used as such by Shahida
Bibi in our conversation.
10 A point most persuasively argued by Ibrahim
(2009) and Alexander, Chatterji and Jalais (2015).
11 See this for an overview of this exchange process
that unfolded in 201415: http://www.migration-
policy.org/article/india-and-bangladesh-swap-
territory-citizens-landmark-enclave-exchange.
12 http://mha.nic.in/hindi/sites/upload_files/
mhahindi/files/pdf/BM_Fence(E).pdf.
13 Residents on the Bangladeshi side use Indian
SIM cards within the range of Indian mobile
networks whose coverage extends for some
distance into the Bangladeshi borderlands, and
vice versa on the Indian side with Bangladeshi
mobile networks. This enables residents to
make calls at local rates rather than exorbitant
international call rates.
14 Radhika Gupta (2014) has written about simi-
lar sentiments of longing in the Kargili border-
lands and their unstable location with the con-
fines of the geo-body of the nation.
15 Visiting Bangladeshi kin are not only stopped
but also arrested by the BSF under the Foreigners
Act. According to the officer-in-charge at the
Dinhata Correctional Home, several of his
Bangladeshi under trials belonged to that un-
fortunate categoryvisiting kin. I write more
extensively about this asymmetry in border
control elsewhere (Ghosh 2011).
16 The cover story of Outlook magazine in Septem-
ber 2012 explicitly suggested that the Bangladeshi
Muslim man was The new enemy in a series
of stories on the threat of illegal migration to
national security, http://www.outlookindia.com/
magazine/issue/10897.
17 Here she is referring to the checkpoints and
patrols in the Indian borderland where the local
52
movement of residents and visitors is closely
monitored through the checking of identity cards,
unwarned questioning, and bodily searches.
This insistence monitoring has been dated by
all accounts to the mid-1990s in this region.
18 I consistently found that in oral accounts of
political and regional history, the 1965 India
Pakistan war was referred to as chhoy Septem-
berer juddho, referring to the date on which
hostilities formally broke out between the two
countries.
19 It is noteworthy that he uses ekattorer juddho,
the war of 1971, a term commonly used by the
lettered Bengali elite instead of gondogol, as
the peasant masses used to describe it. This
same use of terms is noticed and remarked
upon by Nayanika Mookherjee (2015).
20 This has to be read in the context of ongoing
political violence in neighbouring Assam over
the indiscriminate branding and violent intimi-
dation of Bengali Muslims as Bangladeshi
infiltrators. For insights into the increasing
religious polarisation between previously co-
existing Hindu and Muslim communities in the
Bengal borderlands, see Annu Jalais (2013).
21 Thanks to Farhana Ibrahim for pushing me to
make this point.
22 For an overview of the Assam Agitation see
Sanjib Baruah (1999).
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vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Reading Parijat and B P Koirala
Belonging and Borders in 20th Century Nepali Novels
Mallika Shakya
This article suggests a feminist reading of borders and
nation in investigating the poetics of transborder
humanism scattered in the popular genre of Nepali
fiction and poetry. While border-crossing is
predominantly associated with suffering and despair as
well as hope and relief, it may also allude to opportunism
and betrayal. My argument is that borders are not only
corporeal and political, but also introspective and
personal. I reflect on the works of Parijat and B P Koirala
whose lives criss-crossed the NepalIndia border on
more than one level. I argue that the conundrum of their
political and personal engagements might have
triggered a new poetic discourse on an individuals
relationship with society, state and the world. This genre
of writing speaks to an earlier South Asian discourse
dating back to Tagore but more recently, revisited in its
psychoanalytic interpretations by Ashis Nandy which
interpret borders and nationalism more flexibly to offer
an alternative that is different from its more mainstream,
Westphalian theorisations.
The author would like to thank several colleagues and friends for their
generous feedback on earlier drafts of this article, including Smadar
Lavie for introducing her to the anthropological movement among the
women of colour, Michael Hutt for feedback on her reading of Nepali
literature, and two anonymous reviewers of this journal for detailed
comments and meaningful suggestions. Part of the work for this article
was funded by the South Asian Universitys Institute of South Asian
Studies through a research grant on The Poetic Imagining(s) of
South Asia.
Mallika Shakya (mallika@sau.ac.in) teaches at the Department of
Sociology, South Asian University, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
B
orders may be political constructs representing frontiers
of contiguous territorial power but they also often become
vehicles for cultural homogenisation projects key to
modern nationalisms (Gellner 1983). Nationalist imagination
often has its borders sealed by either means of mythological
memories or the executive cartography of violence. Although
territories (and societies) bounded by state borders may appear
unbroken, in reality borders permit both discontinuous and
overlapping spaces which allow corporeal and subjective
crossings. The contact and transcendence of such crossings
may lead to more deliberate and self-conscious forms of public
and personal imaginations, which span a vast range from gen-
dered concerns for intimacy (Baldassar and Gabaccia 2011),
selfother dichotomy (Macey 2012), or universal humanism
(Hart 2015).
In this article, I try to understand borders and their national
manifestations through a critical reading of popular literature
from Nepal. In expanding social science categories by embrac-
ing literary imaginations, I take the viewas Shiv Visvanathan
(2003) didthat the vocabulary of the social sciences in its
current form is inadequate to understand the pain, evil and
suffering that are attendant on the fixity of national boundaries.
The uncompromising versions of nationalism and national
borders, in Ashis Nandys (2013) view, spread around the
world by piggybacking on colonialism, and then anti-colonial
struggle. It can further be added that the social science litera-
ture on nationalism continues to romanticise nations as public
imaginational projects without acknowledging the coercive
elements within them (Anderson 1991). One outcome of such
focus on the fixity of the nation and its borders is what Willem
van Schendel (2007) called the Wagah Syndrome, after the
daily choreographed display of aggressive masculinity at the
border between India and Pakistan at Wagah; he suggests that
this generates a psyche that influences the behaviour of the
state in other less densely militarised borders such as the one
between India and Bangladesh. I bring to this discussion a
feminist interpretation of borders which invokes the possibilities
of cross-border flow of ideas and imaginations (Saldivar-Hull
2000; Talpade Mohanty 2003).
I begin with a broad overview of Nepali poetry and fiction,
but my corpus for investigating the notions of belonging and
borders specifically consists of the novels penned by two leg-
endary Nepali writersParijat and B P Koiralawhose trans-
border lives offered Nepal a cosmopolitan vision of the nation.
I choose their works specifically for the deep concerns they
53
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
show for the incompatibility of nation state borders with con-
cerns of universal humanity at one level, and structures of inti-
macy on the other. Is rigid nationalism the Ulyssean one-eyed
Cyclop that needs slaying for humanism and reason to prevail
(Hyslop 2008)? Can an ultrarationalist interpretation of the
nation muffle the emotionality of belonging (Abu-Lughod 2000)?
A cursory review of literature shows that most frameworks
theorising transborder humanism in Africa, Asia and elsewhere
have originated from poetics of one kind or the other (Mbembe
2001), and at times, feminine agencies are invoked to express
the problems of belonging amidst coercive bureaucracies rooted
in masculine pursuits of muscle power and social dominance
(Spivak 1990). My paper explores ways of engaging with popu-
lar fiction and poetry to look for alternative views on nations
and borders. My aim in proposing a critical reading of a literary
corpus of this kind is to question the exclusionary corporeality
of borders and to explore alternative views on the self and the
world. In doing so, I join a conversation between Visvanathan
(2003) and Nandy (2013) that draws attention to the violence
that is inherent in the very idea of the nation state as we have
come to understand it in its Westphalian avatar following the
experiences of (anti)-colonialism.
My writing approach is not to ethnographise B P Koirala or
his work into its sociopolitical contexts as several anthropolo-
gists of poetics have done (Ali 2012; Langah 2012; Gupta 2014). I
acknowledge that literature and build on it, but I proceed further
to ask a related question: can fiction generate its own anthro-
pology, allowing us to problematise the politics of knowledge
in theorising nationalism? This is where I differentiate the
second section of my paper from the succeeding sections. The
former reads the sociopolitical contexts of the fictional plot,
while the latter sections read the fictive power of imagination
of two selected novels to decode their anthropological merits
in a way that expresses their concerns for universal humanism.
My engagement with the concept of universal humanism inter-
prets anthropology in a Kantian sense rather than to mean
ethnography per se. For Kant, humanity had to find the orders
of morality allowing us new ways of living together. He was
particularly concerned with how everyday particulars can be
reordered to allow us to develop new human associations that
are most inclusive. In referring to anthropology to mean
human teleology in this sensea concept I borrow from
Hart (2015)I build on the tradition founded by anthropolo-
gists such as Faye Harrison (1995) and Smadar Lavie (1995) in
their feminist responses to an earlier anthropological classic,
Writing Culture (Clifford and Marcus 1986).
This particular genre of writing which inserted women into
the project of writing culture, built on an earlier movement
among the women of colour as articulated in literary volumes
such as This Bridge Called My Back (Moraga and Anzaldua
1983), insisting on coalitions of diverse kinds in looking for ways
to meaningfully reshape the politics of knowledge in ant-
hropological meditations (Behar and Gordon 1995). These two
anthropological movementsa Kantian understanding of ant-
hropology as a discipline with concern for universal humanity,
and the Bridge projects insistence that poetics be the platform
54
for equalising knowledgeare central to my own reading of
the poetics of belonging and border.1
Border Crossing in Nepali Literature
There is a rich body of Nepali literature on border crossing,
ranging from minstrel (gin) songs and personal love letters
which circulate in and around remote villages at one end, to
published fiction and poetry penned by intellectual writers
which circulate in urban literary circles at the other. Collec-
tively, as Michael Hutt (2012) points out in his comprehensive
review of Nepali fiction and poetry on emigration, they speak
of both the pride and woes of lhurs (mercenary soldiers) and
muglns (economic migrants), often criticising the poverty,
political instability and exploitative social organisation at home,
but also of the grudges of those who remained home towards
their compatriots who chose to enlist in foreign armies or take
jobs outside the homeland.
Hutt (2012) has attributed Nepali poets and fiction writers
laments about their compatriots border crossing, to their
Marxist inclinations. He also pointed to the class, ethnic and
other heuristic conditions of Nepali writers, making way for a
kind of literary nationalism that considered emigration unpat-
riotic. On mercenary service, a renowned Marxist poet from
Kathmandu, Bhupi Sherchan, compares Nepali lhurs with
sacrificial buffaloes and puns Gorkhli (the warrior status of
Nepali soldiers) with goru khli (mere oxen).2 The military
awards and decorations earned are tainted:
It is lovely as it adorns your breast,
This decoration, this Victoria Cross,
But does it not emit sometimes
The rising stench of the corpse of your kin?
Sherchan 1984 [1969]: 63; translation by Hutt (2012: 21).
Stench and taint constitute a regularly invoked trope of pol-
lution when depicting lhurs. Mohan Himanshu Thapa (1973)
says a returning mercenary soldier is carrying a speck of poison
in the food [he] is bringing, some noxious gas in the cool breaths
[he] breathes.3 Another poet from Darjeeling in India, Agam
Singh Giri, too urges the lhurs to shed their memories of
war before entering homes, for they are bloody and polluted.4
Although this may reflect a pacifist belief that war is in itself
polluting, or that a war fought for someone elses cause is tainted,
the idea of pollution may hark back to the rituals of cleansing
imposed by the Nepali state on migrants returning home from
alien lands. Upon unification (or conquest) of the Nepali kingdom,
for example, King Prithvi Narayan Shah imposed such stringent
conditions of cleansing on the Newars of Kathmandu Valley
that the traders returning from Tibet, almost all of them
Buddhist, had to spend months with a Hindu priest undergoing
pti (cleansing) of theirallegedconsumption of yak meat
(the yak was held to be of sufficiently close kinship with the
Hindu-revered cows that purification rituals were considered
necessary) (Shakya 2013: 61).5
Literary narratives on migrants lives before leaving muluk
(home) to seek opportunities mugaln (abroad) speak of deso-
lation and despair, and have given rise to a left-leaning literary
genre of socialist realism,6 which is replete with imageries of
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

dukha (suffering) and bs metinu (homes wiped out) within the
homeland. It is not that the grass is greener on the other side of the
border, where narratives of bijog (despair) and dhokh (trickery)
continue to mark Nepalis lives abroad. The centrality of this
theme may derive from a classic epic Mun-Madan7 penned by the
great poet Laxmi Prasad Devkota (1936) and often considered the
greatest literary epic in Nepali literature. The feelings of despair
among those economically forced to abandon homes and
emigrate echo in a large body of contemporary fiction and poetry,
including Tana Sharmas Mero Kath (1966; My Story), Sharad
Poudels Simn Wripri (2004; On the Two Sides of the Border),
Bakhat Bahadur Thapas Paradesh (2007; Foreign Nation),
Krishna Dharavasis Sharanrthi (1999; The Refugee), etc.
On the other hand, Nepali writers on the other side of the
border it shares with India did not deny the treachery of migrant
or diasporic life even as they saw hope in their existence out-
side Nepal. Even if life was not ideal in their newly assumed
homes in pravs (foreign lands), they depicted that people held
on to the memories of deeper suffering back home. Lil Bahadur
Chettri is a renowned Nepali novelist hailing from the diasporic
community in North East India. Dhan, the protagonist of
Kshetris well-known novel Basi (1955; Residence), is a hard-
working young man from the Nepali hills who has his house
and cattle usurped by a duping moneylender, while his sister
Jhuma is impregnated and then abandoned in a state of emo-
tional and social limbo by her foreign lover. The two siblings,
ostracised by societyone cheated in wealth, the other in
chastitythus, have no other option but to leave home and cross
the border. The grass on the other side is not much greener.
Govinda Raj Bhattarais (1988) novel Mugaln, for instance,
speaks of the humiliation hill migrants face in the lowlands for
not possessing modern city skills such as navigating intercity
rail systems. The trope of suffering comes full circle with Indra
Bahadur Rais (1972) short story Hmi Jastai Mainki m
(Mainas Mother Is Just Like Us) which concludes with a scene
where a Nepali hill woman grabs her meagre belongings and
reorders her tiny vegetable stall for the next days business, after
being disrupted by the chaos of an uprising calling for a recog-
nition of Nepali identity in the Indian territory Darjeeling. A wise
head among the diaspora Nepali writers Rai speaks of the
home and the world as the mountains and the rivers in much
the same way as Ravina Aggarwal (2001) differentiates yul
(home and origin) from thang (plain land and residence), con-
trasting those who remain with those who leave, but also stress-
ing that a connection lingers between the two, that mountains
are always washed along by rivers (Rai 1993: 63).
Amid these ethnographically situated literary portrayals of
everyday suffering, a select few works in Nepali literature
stand out for their bolder and deeper exploration of the intro-
spective meanings of border crossing for individual psyches.
For example, Lainsingh Bangdels novel Muluk Bhira (2008;
Outside the Country) begins with a Nepali emigrant in Darjeeling
recalling how he had entered mugaln in torn clothes with
nothing but a khukuri (Nepali sword) in his waistband and a
ghm (bamboo mat to keep off the rain) on his head, and how
he now has enough to feed him and his family even though
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
there is no kipat (ancestral land) in mugaln. The story then
proceeds to show a certain psychotic disability in his character
which overpowers him from time to timesomething that can
only hark back to the violence and self-harm involved in the very
act of emigration and border crossing.8 The story culminates
by exposing the unfathomable darkness inside his hearthe
runs away and eventually commits suicide in remorse after he
murders his beloved wife in a fit of momentary rage.
This last story about the fatally destructive psyche imping-
ing on migratory experience points us to consider borders as
multilayered constructions of human psychology in addition
to their corporeal and spatial manifestations. This is where I
propose that the notion of poetics may offer the tropes neces-
sary to understand the human psyche, in the making of borders
rather than merely offering an ethnographic context. We are
to be reminded that borders are often drawn as contiguous
lines demarcating the separation of political and geographic
entities, but borders may also represent boundaries of personal
hope and despair just as they may represent boundaries of
national identities and constructions. The real and perceived
sufferings of mugaln have offered Nepali writers literary
tropes of despair and withdrawal, while giving rise to a cross-
border imagination verging on ethnographic realism. Alongside
the border of materiality is the border of emotions, addressing
a lived space of inner doubts and convictions being reworked
into a complex self as a result of having crossed political and
social boundaries. What emerges is a multilocal way of life
that may construct a subjective site that absorbs sensibilities
that are deeply transnational in their syncretic viewpoints. It
is to clarify this latter point that I discuss the life and work of
Parijat, arguably the most important left-leaning Nepali writer,
who lived a life that may well be called binational and who
nurtured transborder humanism, while leaving behind a rich
literary legacy that dealt with profound questions about our
subjective selves. Her literary contribution derives from Freudian
visangativd (absurdism) which Parijat introduced to Nepali
literature, which boldly confronted aspects of shunyat (void)
and nissrt (nothingness) of life.
Border between the Self and Others: Parijat
Parijat was born on the Lingiya tea estate of Darjeeling in April
1937, the daughter of the estates medical doctor who later quit his
job after his relationship with the British colonial owners soured.
He introduced his young children to the philosophies of Marx,
Engels and Gandhia privilege sometimes lacking in those
brought up in self-isolated Nepal under the Rana regime which
exercised an iron fist to suppress both political and intellectual
consciousness. While preaching liberalism, her father main-
tained an elitist way of life which distanced the children from
their working class surroundings. Parijat lost her mother at an
early age and suffered from a chronic illness for most of her life.
She then migrated to Kathmandu as a teenager although she
returned to India several times, initially to campaign for a revolu-
tionary leftist cultural movement Rlph and later, for medical
treatment. Although it is common for Darjeeling Nepalis to
visit, work and even live in Nepal, Parijats transborder living
55
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
seems to have given rise to a unique kind of transborder sensi-
bility as is reflected in her literary writings and political activism,
which, ironically needs to be juxtaposed against the deep
demarcation of the border she draws between herself and her
surroundings. I elaborate this paradox in the following way.
Rlph was a radical creative movement of the 1960s and
1970s that sought to generate a political consciousness expressed
through popular culture. A group of young singers, musicians and
poets, they travelled throughout the Himalayan foothills, criss-
crossing its political borders between Nepal and India. They sang,
wrote, and debated social inequality invoking neo-Marxist views,
at times travelling with no financial support other than spontane-
ous sponsorship of bus tickets, meals and beds (Manjul 1988a).
For a self-styled Marxist group, Rlph embraced the rhetoric of
individualistic anarchism. It is on this point that Rlph needs
to be differentiated from several other leftist cultural movements
that Nepal saw during the Maoist movement several decades
later. Even if some Rlphlis such as Ninu emphasised a Marxist
rationality of political resistance on class (Chapagain 2010),
others, including Manjul and Parijat, were inspired by a certain
creative energy rebelling against the social norms of sexuality,
rationality and morality. Especially for Parijat, it may even be
said that her borders were more about emotive self-ostracisation
than about Marxist class, let alone the borders of nationality.
She thought she stood out from everybody else because:
I demand more freedom, and I despair The philosophy that my life is
mine alone and nobody elses shall claim any rights in it is something
that has taken very, very deep roots in my heart.
quoted in Bhandari (1994: 3334)
Parijats masterpiece Shirishko Phl (1965; The Blue Mimosa)
is an absurdist expression9 of deep anguish, expressed in
terms of an unconquerable border demarcating self from the
surroundings. The plot of this novel revolves around a retired
mercenary soldier traumatised by his violent experiences in
World War II, who develops an attraction for a young but
unfemininely strong-minded woman. The trauma of war has
turned Suyog Bir Singhs life into a meaningless void that dis-
tances him from society, while Sakambari has a chronic illness
and she lives a life fiercely guarded against everything and
everyone. One fateful evening, Suyogbir impulsively kisses
Sakambari just once on the mouth while she is enjoying the blue
mimosas on the threshold of her home. The kiss shocks her and
she walks away. They never meet again. In the following days,
weeks and months, Suyogbir hears first that Sakambari is sick;
then that she is worse, and eventually, that she has died. The
novel ends with a wasting Suyogbir lamenting over Sakambari:
Within the glass I see two deep dark eyes. I see a shorn head. I drink and
I quench my thirst. My own fingers have become yellow with nicotine.
I often look at them and I console myself. (Sakam)Bari does not exist and
I recall that here, love does not exist either. I am living in an absurd
world and, I always acknowledge, I am living in a great void. (p 66)
Suyogbir suffers inconsolably. He cannot overcome the
boundary he has set for himself, as if the void he has inherited
from the far away war zone is a contagious one which he cannot
help but transmit. This void is not about hatred but apathy.
Hatred stirs action and may eventually lead to an outlet while
56
apathy keeps one immune to the consequences of inaction
(Stovling 1994). It is the lack of love and ones inability to con-
fess love that finally kills everyone, including the killer. In
Parijats universe, borders are deeply subjective, populated not
with pragmatic concernslet alone considerations of political,
cultural or geographic constructsbut with the core of the self.
The threshold of a home is possibly the only material repre-
sentation of border allowed in Parijats depiction of self and
othersa boundary that sets apart the lives of its characters
but connects their materiality with inner souls. Sakambaris
house is a homey one, populated by three unmarried sisters
and a seemingly spouseless maid. The house is full of feminine
manifestations of different kinds: the youngest who seeks the
pleasures of love and elopes, and the eldest whose renuncia-
tion of sexual pleasures has turned her into a soft-hearted,
conventional woman of contemporary Nepali society. It is the
middle one, Sakambari, who defies all female stereotypes, who is
sharp-mouthed, smokes endlessly and, using the imagery of
mimosa and bees, demands protectionself-destructive as it
may befrom all external influences. She says,
One buds for oneself, blossoms for oneself. If one must fall, why jostle
with a bee? If one must fall, why tolerate the assault of a bee? One falls
within, with ones own will. (p 12)
It is in the company of these four women that their bachelor
brother basks in love, to the extent that Suyogbir the homeless,
loveless old soldier confesses, I am jealous of a man for the first
time in my life (p 31). Suyogbirs fateful kiss on the threshold
under the mimosa blossom is one fleeting moment when the
border between Sakambaris self and the world collapses. The
intensity of the transcendent moment does not last, and the
magic vanishes (p 51). As Suyogbir later reflects, his intense
attraction to Sakambari had triggered memories of his violent
wartime past when he raped a woman in the jungles of Assam
and betrayed another. These brutalities he inflected on others
have their roots in the brutalities he suffered himself as a
mercenary soldier fighting someone elses imperial war. The
irony is starkest when he recalls telling the woman he was about
to rape, why construct this wall of ideology with the dying lot like
us? Come, let me rob you, you rob me too (p 39). Caught in this
vicious cycle of violence, what separates Sakambaris threshold
from Suyogbirs world, thus, is not the street adjacent, nor the
village nor nation; instead the demarcation is between a
Tagorean home and the world, love and wastea concept I
elaborate further in the following sections of this paper. After
an intense saga of introspection, Suyogbir does approach
Sakambaris threshold one more time, gathering all his courage
to confess his love for her. But it is too late and death has built
its own border and asserted its power to transcend all other
borders as Aggarwal (2001) shows us in her ethnography of a
faraway border village on the IndoPak border in the Himalayas.
Transcending Borders: Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala
While Parijats writing and being shows how national, political,
and social borders seep into personal psyche that ultimately
separates the self from the world, Bishweshwar Prasad Koirala
transcends the hard-edged definitions of democratic, national,
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

and social propriety when dealing with the ironies of individual
life. In common with Parijat, his fiction avoids local colour and
weaves plots that could easily be universally enacted. The pre-
dicaments of human conditions for him are not about the pains
of political or social borders; rather, they represent negotiations
with liminal spaces that are intensely personal. It is not sur-
prising that the literary positions B P Koirala took in his fiction
at times offended the political pieties of the national bourgeo-
isie that looked up to him as a political leader representing
their nation. I will discuss some such instances later in this arti-
cle. Here I look at some aspects of B P Koiralas life and ideology
in an attempt to clarify his universalist stance on humanism.
B P Koirala was a leading politician and literary writer from
Nepal whose dealings with India were both political and personal.
He was born in Banaras (Varanasi) in 1914, after his father
opposed the Rana regime and was forced to seek political asylum
in India. What politically connected Nepal with India at the time
was a shared context of (crypto)-colonialism. B P Koirala was
active in the Indian independence struggle from an early age:
at the age of eight, he individually boycotted his school in res-
ponse to Gandhis public appeal. Later, he joined and organ-
ised civil protests in Banaras, Patna and Calcutta, for which
he was arrested several times and jailed for four years in 1942.
When he was released from Indias Hazaribagh jail in 1946, it
was clear that national independence was not far off for India.
Realising this, B P Koirala called on the Nepali diaspora in India
to form a political party for Nepal (Koirala 1946). This led to
the founding of the National Congress, which later merged with
two other political parties to become a formidable political force
in 1950the Nepali Congress. This party led a popular movement
in Nepal ousting the Rana regime in 1951. Following a tripartite
agreement signed in Delhi between King Tribhuvan Shah, Prime
Minister Mohan Shumsher Jang Bahadur Rana and the Nepali
Congress, B P Koirala joined the coalition cabinet as Minister of
Home Affairs. After winning the first ever democratic election
held in Nepal in 1959, B P Koirala became Prime Minister. Within
less than two years, however, the new King Mahendra dissolved
Parliament, and had B P Koirala publicly arrested at a mass meet-
ing he was addressing. His health suffered in jail, and after eight
years of imprisonment, he was released and exiled to India.
B P Koirala spoke candidly about the 1970s being a decade of
uncertainty and turmoil for all of South Asia. He believed that
the American departure from Vietnam had turned South Asia
into a new frontier of the Cold War. He called on the political
analysts in Nepal and South Asia to acknowledge the growing
Westphalian aggression throughout the region rooted in seem-
ingly random incidents, such as Indias annexation of Sikkim,
Sheikh Mujibs assassination and the coup in Bangladesh,
emergency rule in India, and the growing distrust between
Nepali King Mahendra and the Indian establishment. B P Koirala
considered the South Asia region at threat under pressure
from the charged nationalisms brewing in the region, and on
this ground, he chose to repatriate and reconcile with King
Mahendra. He flew to Kathmandu on 31 December 1976, but
was arrested at the airport and once again imprisoned. Upon
his release five years later, he addressed the public only once, to
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
reiterate his call for national and regional reconciliations. His
health further deteriorated and he died the year after, in Nepal.
B P Koirala was consistent in his liberal vision of democracy,
nation and region, even though that put him in an awkward posi-
tion at times with the activists of his own party. For example, he
argued ardently in the late 1940s, when anti-Rana sentiment
was at its height among the opposition camp, that Nepals
democracy could coexist with dignity with a king, or two kings
from the Rana and Shah families, if needed, as he put it. His view
remained more or less the same when he chose to return to
Nepal in 1976, arguing that politics in Nepal demanded more
than an electioneering strategy but a vision of nation that
respected the complexity, depth and idiosyncrasy of human
lifea process he claimed that was initiated in the subcontinent
a century ago and elsewhere even earlier (Giri 2066/2009).
It cannot be sheer serendipity that B P Koirala left behind no
grand political documents but chose to pen seven extraordi-
nary novels during his long incarceration in jail. In fact, he saw
his novels as his legacy, as he clearly stated in one of the last
interviews he gave before his death. Although B P Koirala
maintained that his novels were altogether different from his
political career, it is hard to overlook the fact that B P Koiralas
fiction seemed to resonate his political conversations. His liter-
ary characters, like B P Koirala himself, resist hard-edged defi-
nitions of nation, society and self. They insist that boundaries
are neither objective nor cast in stone. They adamantly call for
an existentialist space that would redesign alternative codes
on national and social propriety in such a way as to do justice
to inner souls rather than outer structures (Pandey 2005).
B P Koiralas Teen Ghumt (Three Turns)
Here I read one of his novels, Teen Ghumt (1968; Three Turns),
to engage with the poetics of feminist nationhood that Koirala
offered Nepal, one possibly influenced by what Tagore had
envisioned about anti-colonial India and arguably, even one
comparable with what Mahashweta Devi lamented about
postcolonial India (Nandy 2013; Spivak 1990). The story of Teen
Ghumt is told as a flashback of a middle-aged woman. Not only
its layout but also the common content about a protagonist
womans views on different episodes of the national political
struggle she underwent, make Teen Ghumt a literary cousin of
Rabindranath Tagores Ghare-Bire (1919 and 2003; The Home
and the World). However, there are also significant differences.
Unlike Tagores Bimal, B P Koiralas Indramy is not repent-
ant about her past: [Indramy] does not feel bitter, only soft,
but the memory of a slight touch of sadness makes her heart
compassionate (pp 12). BP writes about Indramy as being
in a situation, when a woman probably feels that she has
reached her destination, from where she need not travel any
further, as if life sheds its loads and gains the peace of rest (p 2).
In this flashback, Indramy is honest about her feelings as a
fiercely independent young woman brought up in a well-to-do
family, politically aligned with the monarchy. She is fond of a
classmate, Ptmbar, but not yet aware that this would cause her
so dramatic a turn that would eventually make her into a drop of
water in a faraway ocean (p 8). It is only when marriage
57
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
proposals begin to arrive, and her mother rejects her casual
hint about Ptmbar being a potential suitor, that she becomes
aware of the depth of her love for him. Subsequently, she de-
serts her maternal home and knocks on Ptmbars door with-
out ever having consulted Ptmbar earlier. This was done in a
solitary state of mind that B P Koirala calls not under illusion;
just that her inner conscience was too clear for her outer reali-
ty (p 8). When she finally sees Ptmbar, the tension between
her inner and outer realities vanishes, as if to come together
in their common focus on Ptmbar. She then easily morphs
into her new role as Ptmbars wife (p 8).
Ptmbar is a member of a political party fighting for a national
regime change. His friends discuss armed resistance, which
Indramy does not approve of. But as the only woman, almost
like queen bee Bimala in Tagores Ghare-Bire, Indramy is
popular in this male circle where she is treated as a sister, daughter
and friend. This results in some tension between the couple,
which becomes worse as Indramy pines for a child at a time
when Ptmbar is preoccupied with the world outside their
home. One ominous night when Ptmbar goes to bed even as
Indramy stays awake sexually and emotionally snubbed, the
military raids the house. Ptmbar is arrested and sent to jail.
Ptmbars best friend Ramesh, who is also Indramys
favourite, is released from jail early while the rest of their
political circle is still behind bars. Ramesh is attracted to
Indramy and eventually they develop a relationship, which
is contrasted with her marriage:
it was Indramy who had taken the first step to enter Ptmbars
world. It was her who had reached out to Ptmbar, so if that was a
mistake she was the first to be blamed, Ptmbar only second. Maybe this
was the reason why she was the first owner of the joy, happiness, glory,
dignity of that relationship; Ptmbar only had the second share in it.
In relationship with Ramesh, however, it felt to Indramy, that the
situation was just the opposite. She did not take the first step there, she
only let herself be found. But isnt waiting to be reached audacious in
itself? If yes, Indramy considered herself a culprit of that much. (p 25)
The novel states almost factually that Indramy never
stopped loving Ptmbar. The day she slept with Ramesh, she
renewed her faith in religion and began her worship of the
national deity Pashupatinath in Ptmbars name. The day she
felt her pregnancy was also the day she regained her hope for
Ptmbars release from jail, and the day she broke up with
Ramesh. While many other Nepali women, both fictional and
real, like Indramy in the early pages of Teen Ghumt, have left
maternal homes to join lovers of their choice, this new avatar
of Indramy who takes a new man with pride and dignity is
not a Nepali Indramy at all. Her character pushes cultural
borders even further as she feels her love renewed for Ptmbar
while pregnant with another mans child.
Ptmbar is released from jail the day that Indramy goes
into labour. Against her uncultural hopes that this might be
the beginning of a happy family life for all three of them,
Ptmbar fulfils all cultural duties of matrimony and father-
hood but shuts himself off emotionally. He does not explain his
actions, assuming that cultural norms are so well established
that these should be obvious to Indramy. Indramy is any-
thing but a cultural creatureneither in her sexual affair with
58
Ramesh nor in her emotional expectations of Ptmbar. What
Ptmbar calls his kartabya (cultural duty) towards a wife and
child, Indramy calls lokcr (pretense). When Ptmbar accuses
Indramy of disloyalty, she replies,
I might not have kept up with what society would call my duty towards
you, but by nourishing the fundamentals of life, I have kept my internal
dignity and matrimonial loyalty intact. As soon as I conceived, I did not
let myself be touched by regrets; I waited for your return more ardently
than ever before. That is why I could never be touched by feelings of im-
purity (apavitrat), shame (lajj) or inferiority within me (kunth). (p 61)
As differences between the two intensify, Ptmbar urges
Indramy to send the child to an orphanage. An outraged
Indramy leaves Ptmbars home instead. Later, we hear
brief snippets of how everybodys lives develop thereafter
Ptmbar soon married a political comrade and went on to
become an established political leader of the new nation; Ramesh,
a parliamentarian and a householder. Only Indramy was
pushed out of the political and social boundaries of that na-
tion, for her two essential feminine rolesthat of a lover and a
mothercould not be accommodated there. She continues to
love Ptmbar as she always did even as she mumbles to her-
self towards the end of the novel with a resigned sense of
equanimity, this is what life is (p 73). The novel ends with a
scene where Indramys child has grown into a lively young
woman who brings her boyfriend home to meet her mother.
Indramy eagerly greets the young man, and says to herself,
he is extrovert in nature, just like Ramesh (p 74).
Localised, Subjective and Transcendent Borders
Borders demarcate lived geographies but also an intimate self.
As the sociopolitical contexts of fiction and poetry emerging
from Nepal that speak about Nepal illustrate, borders can con-
trast a neighbourly mugaln where the poor and the down-
trodden take refuge when flushed out of their native land, against
a nationalistic love for pristine pahd (hills) that need protection
from the worldly pollutions of warmongering. When poetics
copulates with the ethnography of contextualisation, the out-
come may be what Michael Hutt called socialist realism which
resists the evils of global capitalism. Put another way, the shifting
dynamics of the poetic imagination about borders and home-
lands, which is lodged in the dialectic of suffering here and hope
elsewhere, or vice versa, constructs a sociopolitical geography
of identity and belonging. This sociopolitical agenda of border
literature is the taxonomy of the collective, often verging on
an essentialised ethics of equity, justice and subversion.
Hutt (2012) is right to point out that the lhur- and
mugaln-bashing voices of socialist realism sit somewhat un-
easily with the unproletariat lives and work of Nepali poets
and fiction writers who never left home. Living this paradox
has generated its own tropes which Shamsher (1998) called
kavitm nr (slogans in poetry) and nrvdi kavit (poetic
sloganism), dating as far back to the legendary poet Laxmi
Prasad Devkota (Sangraula 1970; Vikal 1983). Through this
stream emerged Rlph, discussed earlier in this paper, a
movement that championed sociopolitical consciousness
through individual anarchism. Manjul, one of the Rlphlis,
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 EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA

went on to turn the consciousness-aesthetics paradox on its head Semiotic Borders

by writing anarchic poetry about a sloganist poet, Siddhicharan
Shrestha. Siddhicharan becomes Siddhicharans, and takes out a
procession (p 53), and the weight of this anomaly tires him so
much that, [he] eventually picks up both his legs and rests them
on his shoulders even as he keeps walking (Manjul 1998b: 25).
Manjuls contemporary Parijat, who lived a paradox of class
and borders, once clarified, just as she entered what is known
as the third (and final) phase of her writing, that I have now
made the jump ... I will from now on write as a Marxist (p 11).
She wrote two collections of short stories, some memoirs, essays
and poems during this phase. But this is not the phase that
eventually defined her. It remained overshadowed by her earlier,
introspective and absurdist writings, including Shirisko Phl
which I discussed at length in this paper.
The novels eponymous blue mimosas blossom on the thresh-
old of Sakambaris house, the location of the kissa momen-
tary violence collapsing the boundary between her home and
its surroundings but also connecting the anguish of the past with
hope for the future. Borders are not localised herethey do not
demarcate one culture or imagination from the other, let alone
nations. They speak of self and others, by taking up the metaphors
of the home and the world. Sakambari combines a lived psyche
with the public imagination of cross-border trajectory. This com-
bined genre also defines B P Koiralas work, even though his
borders are not divisive or protective like Parijats literary charac-
ters but transcendental. His own life was spent equally on the two
sides of the NepalIndia border involving arduous political strug-
gles for both Indian and Nepali nationalisms. His vision for a hu-
man nation found more ardent expression in his fiction than in
his political prose. Teen Ghumts protagonist Indramy is almost
B P Koiralas inner self, calling on the political and social systems
around her to make room for proto humanity. Her love for the two
men and her daughter who consecutively enter her life tran-
scends the boundaries of social and political structures. With an
ease uncharacteristic of a contemporary Nepali woman, she calls
on her husband to see the superiority of her honest acts over
outer constructions and borders of lokcr. She is not under-
stood. Hence, she detaches herself from his borders. She is not
bitter about the way her life unfolded. She is above all borders
created by others but at ease with herself. In their death and
departure, Indramy and Sakambari embody Mahasweta Devis
Douloti the Bountiful, she is defeated by a masculine practice
of nationhood but on death her corpse overfills the map of India
such that men are effectively barred from delivering a sermon
about nationalism on an Indian independence day (Spivak 1990).
My reading of Nepali literature is informed by Rabindranath
Tagore who sets the pattern for the diagnostic use of poetry
and fiction while critiquing the boundaries set on nation, local
and selfa trajectory that has since appealed to numerous
literary writers within and around South Asia.10 This genre of
writing speaks to the discourse on semiotics in the Saussurean
tradition in thinking about borders. Physical lines may demar-
cate localities and communities but the semiotic borders also
highlight emotional relationships between self and the other
(the other being community, society and state), just as they
establish proximal zones or transcend them. This is not alto-
gether different from the Freudian (191415) comment about
the relationship between the individual and the state, that
the state had forbidden to the individual the practice of
wrong-doing not because of a desire to abolish it but of a de-
sire to monopolize it, like salt and tobacco (p 279). This mode
of introspection calls for renewed interest from those studying
borders and the national psyches that are, at times, strategi-
cally bolstered through shows of aggressive territoriality and
the misplaced Westphalian legacy of executive cartography
which trample proto-humanity.
I invoke B P Koirala and Parijat along with other novelists
and poets writing on borders to bring back the focus on indi-
vidual concerns of belonging and freedom. I join Shiv Vis-
vanathan in suggesting that the social science of the nation
must seek to escape its current obsession with bureaucratic
order to capture the violence inherent in construction of bor-
ders. Poetry and novels have consistently shown borders and
nation as a genre of violence, at all levels, localised and sub-
jective. The second subversive possibility here has to do with
gender: Women are the primary victims of border-aggression
(like Sakambari) and border-policing (like Indramy). Pari-
jat has sometimes been called a genderless revolutionary
while B P Koirala is almost an honorary female in writing his
literary characters. It is in the engendering of the subversion
of border-related violence that these novels offer new ways of
looking at bordered nations and their relationships with the
world beyond the border. Suyogbir rejected by Sakambari
comes closest to empathising with the victims of his
violent aggression in the imperial battlefields. Indramy
rejected by national patriarchy carves out a space where
her daughter can freely live as she chooses. The challenge
now is to see if we can apply these categories of pain and gain
within the social science typologies on borders, belonging
and nation.

Notes
1 Within South Asia, Nosheen Ali (2016) has dis-
cussed the notion of mannkahat among the
Punjabis in Pakistan to mean the epistemic
place poetics holds in the Seraiki landscape.
2 See Titara, Battai ra Bhakkuko Ragoka Dantan-
haruprati (To the Offspring of Partridges, Quails
and Sacrificial Buffaloes) by Bhupi Sherchan
(1984/1969).
3 English translation by Hutt (2012: 20) of Mohan
Himanshu Thapas (1973: 28) Khukurimthi Ek
Chokt Bdal (A Chunk of Cloud above a
Khukuri [Nepali Sword]).
4 See discussion by Subedi (1978) on Agam Singh
Giris poem Yuddha ra Yoddh (War and the
Warrior), p 39.
5 The ritual was even stricter earlier for Newar trad-
ers who returned from southern districts under the
Mughal realms, who supposedly had to undergo
purifications by bathing for 40 days in cows urine,
drinking it, and eating cow dung occasionally, ac-
cording to records kept by Father Ippolito Desideri
in the early 18th century (Burghart 1984: 104).
6 The narratives of exploitation and alienation
under smjik/samjvdi yathrthavd (socialist
realism) include Ramesh Vikals Aviral Bagda-
chha Indrvati (Indravati Flows Undisrupted,
1983), Jagadish Ghimires Llm (The Auction,
1970), etc. A step further left is Marxist realism
which includes Khagendra Sangraulas
Chetanko Pahilo Dk (First Call of Conscience,
1970), Parijats Toribri, Bt Ra Sapanharu
(Mustard Fields, Paths and Dreams, 1976) and
Anindo Pahdsangai (With the Insomniac Hills,
1982).

Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 59
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
7 In this classic Nepali khanda kvya (short epic),
the protagonist Madan leaves home to travel to
Tibet for work despite his wifes protestations
that loving company is more important than
wealth. Madan is successful in Tibet but on his
way home he falls ill. A Tibetan eventually takes
pity on him and nurses him back to health.
However, upon his return home with his bags
of hard-earned gold, he finds that his wife has
committed suicide and his mother has died of a
broken heart.
8 See the autobiographical documentary film
My Mother India directed by Safina Uberoi
(2001) in which her mother, Patricia, a leading
sociologist, talks about the trauma brought on
by her surrendering of her Australian passport
to take Indian citizenship for which she was
forced to seek professional counselling.
9 See Luintels (2012) argument that while Indra
Bahadur Rai introduced absurdism in Nepali
literature through his novel ja Ramit Chha
(There Is a Spectacle Today, 1964) but Parijat
perfected it in her novel Shirisko Phul (The
Blue Mimosa, 1965).
10 See the corpus of poetry written by Faiz Ahmed
Faiz on the anguish and disillusionment caused
by newly created borders between India and
Pakistan and then, between East and West
Pakistan.
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Stovling, Brita (2051/1994): Heart in Flames, Parijat
Smriti Grantha, Ninu Chapagain and Khagendra
Sangraula (eds), [Parijat Memorial Book], Kat
hmandu: Parijat Smriti Kendra, pp 16667.
Subedi, Abhi (1978): Nepali Literature: Background
and History, Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar.
Tagore, Rabindranath (1919): Ghare Baire, in
Rabindra-Rachanabali (Calcutta: West Bengal
Government, 1961), Vol 9, pp 405550, English
translation by Surendranath Tagore and edited
by William Radice (2005), Delhi: Penguin
Books.
(2003): Ghar Aur Bhar (The Home and The
World), Hindi Translation by Pradeep Pandit,
Delhi: Diamond Pocket Books.
Talpade Mohanty, Chandra (2003): Feminism With-
out Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practising
Solidarity, Durham and London: Duke Univer-
sity Press.
Thapa, Bakhat Bahadur (2064/2007): Paradesh, [For-
eign Nation], Kathmandu: Ratna Pustak Bhandar.
Ek Chauta Bdal, Kathmandu: Yugantar
Prakashan.
Uberoi, Safina (2001): My Mothers India, Docu-
mentary Film 52 min, Australia Film Finance
Corporation and Chili Films.
Van Schendel, Willem (2007): The Wagah Syndrome:
Territorial Roots of Contemporary Violence in
South Asia, Violence and Democracy in India,
Amrita Basu and Srirupa Roy (eds), Calcutta:
Seagull, pp 3682.
Vikal, Ramesh (2040/1983): Aviral Bagdachha
Indavati [Indrvati Flows Undisrupted], Kath-
mandu: Sajha Prakashan.
Visvanathan, Shiv (2003): Interrogating the Nation,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 38, No 23,
pp 22952302.
vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Frontiers, State and Banditry in the Thar Desert in
the 19th Century
Tanuja Kothiyal
Through the instances of banditry in the ThurParkar
region of the Thar Desert in the mid-19th century, this
article explores the intersections between the categories
of bandit, rebel and state. In the context of the phrases
like pacification and tranquilisation of frontiers used along the ill-defined frontiers of princely states and the British
as mentioned in the British reports, which suggest a
state of constant turmoil, this study finds answers to the
questions such as: (i) Could banditry in the arid Thar
merely be understood through a criminal context, or
was it located in a political context of power? (ii) Were
the native rulers incapable of suppressing banditry or
were their negotiations with bandits a part of historical
system of exchange? (iii) Did banditry and the
rebelliousness that it was inextricably located in,
challenge the ideas about Rajputhood and warriorhood,
as they had emerged in the Rajput courts? (iv) Did
banditry constitute dissidence, as a number of bandits
were outlaws?
An early version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference
of Association of Asian Studies in Asia in Taipei in 2014. I thank my
co-panelists Farhana Ibrahim and Aparna Kapadia, as well as the
anonymous referee for their comments that helped me shape the paper.
Tanuja Kothiyal (tanuja.kothiyal@gmail.com) teaches history at the
School of Liberal Studies, Ambedkar University, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
T
his study explores the British engagement with banditry
on the frontiers of the Thar Desert in the mid-19th century.
The extension of direct and indirect British rule over
various parts of the Thar Desert made them encounter a range
of groups engaged in banditry, highway robbery and plunder
territories. These encounters highlighted arguments about
criminality, jurisdiction, legality, nomadism, settlement and
governance in the Thar, which was viewed as a harsh and ad-
versarial geography peopled by refractory nomadic groups.
The British records of early- and mid-19th century view ban-
ditry through the lens of criminality, as a law and order prob-
lem that could be resolved through better administration,
mapping, policing as well as through a criminal justice system
focused on retribution. However, in their encounters with
criminality the British administrators were often faced with
rather complex histories of bandits and their complicated
relationships with polity in the desert.
In contrast to the colonial view, recent approaches to ban-
ditry view it as a social and political response to exploitation.
Banditry, as pointed out by Eric Hobsbawm (2000: 13) in his
classic, cannot be understood except as part of history of
political power. Stewart Gordon (1969: 41629) argues that a
structured plunder ethic centred around the accumulation
of economic resources remained central to 18th century state
formation in Malwa. In her study of dakaiti in Bundelkhand,
Malavika Kasturi (2002: 203) views banditry as a multilayered
response by biradaris to the British attack on their territory,
power, honour, means of subsistence, and military masculine
culture. Norbert Peabodys (1991: 2956) exploration of Rajput
kingship in Kota, views rebellion as a defining feature of the
Hindu kingship, which allowed Rajput jagirdars to assert their
authority, in the circle of kings which was the Rajput kingdom.
Shail Mayarams (2006: 181) understanding of Meo banditry
views it as a resistance to state formation, one that forms a part
of a dialectic between the state and the anti-state. While being
different representations of rebellion, what these examples do
underline is a seamless intermingling of categories of the bandit
and the rebel, and their locations on the margins of dominant
state formations. Rather than being an act of criminality,
banditry and plunder almost appear as part of a moral claim,
whereby bandits locate themselves in hostile geographical and
political frontiers and posit challenges to the state.
In attempting to understand the relationship between geo-
graphy and moral claim to resistance, I refer to the 14th century
61
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who points out that the basis of
dialectic of desert and city life was rooted in the harsh desert
conditions, that engendered courage and fortitude in the
Bedouins (Arabic-speaking nomadic people from West Asian
deserts). The desert was the basis of all civilisation and the
nomadic dwellers of the desert were prior to, courageous and
superior to the sedentary people.
Unlike the Bedouins, Khaldun writes, the sedentary people,
settle in fertile plains and amass luxuries and become accus-
tomed to a life of abundance and refinement, their bravery
decreases (Dawood 2015: 95107). While the city, where the
state was based, formulated the law, the desert people escaped
further into the desert for fear of being meted out justice. In this
sense the Bedouins were always in a state of dissidence against
the city-dwellers, or the state. Ernest Gellner in his early work
on tribes of the Central High Atlas Mountains in Morocco,
employs the idea of institutionalised dissidence or siba that
existed in opposition to makhazen, which can be translated into
the state. If bled el-makhazen was the land of pale, then bled el-
siba was the land beyond the pale, each constituting a menace
to the other. The internal structures of the tribes that existed in
state of siba or makhazen being the same, there existed always
a possibility of movement from the former into the latter. Yet, a
number of people chose to remain self-consciously dissident,
beyond the pale in the state of siba (Dawood 2015: 13). James
Scott (2009: 3031) takes the argument further in proposing
that rather than being ungoverned, the people opting for the
state of siba were self-governing people (emphasis mine).
Through the instances of banditry in the ThurParkar region
of the Thar Desert in the mid-19th century, this article explores
the intersections between the categories of bandit, rebel and
state. Could banditry in the arid Thar merely be understood
through a criminal context, or was it located in a political con-
text of power? Were the native rulers incapable of suppressing
banditry or were their negotiations with bandits a part of his-
torical system of exchange? Did banditry and the rebelliousness
that it was inextricably located in, challenge the ideas about
Rajputhood and warriorhood, as they had emerged in the
Rajput courts? Did banditry constitute dissidence, as a number
of bandits were outlaws or barwutteas,1 exiles from their own
states? Were the British, while understanding banditry through
a criminal context, able to deal with it only as a question of
lawlessness? These questions become important in the con-
text of the phrases like pacification and tranquilisation of tion fostered sedentarisation, in the arid infertile desert, con-
frontiers used in the British reports, which suggest a state of
constant turmoil. The efforts to induce tranquility, industry
and order in the frontiers by encouraging settlement of agri-
culturalists, were rooted in the premise that social hostility
was ingrained in the adversarial geography of the region, and
hence, could be ordered.
Bandit, Rebel and State
The Thar Desert is a vast sandy plain located between the
Aravali mountains in the East and the Eastern bank of Indus in
the West as well as the Punjab basin in the North and the Rann
of Kutch in the South, dotted with dry scrubland, grasslands,
62
forts, urban and rural settlements. While being agriculturally
deficient, the Thar provides excellent fodder and forage to pas-
toralists, as well as passage to mercantile caravans. In 1947,
the Thar Desert was divided by the Radcliffe Line, an inter-
national boundary between the new nation states of India and
Pakistan. Before the partition, the Thar Desert was a part of
several states that fringed it, like Sind, Multan, Bikaner, Jais-
almer, Jodhpur, Umarkot, Kathiawar and Kutch. However, the
arid Thar, while claimed by powerful chiefships, was only
nominally controlled by any of these. By the 15th century,
emerging Rajput lineages had expanded their kingships
through extension of land grants in lieu of military services
and established their fortress capitals like Jaisalmer, Bikaner,
Jodhpur, etc, on the fringes of the desert, or in areas where
water was available (Kothiyal 2016: 6483).
The political elitisation of ruling clans was accompanied by
social elitisation, which resulted in marginalisation of groups
of warriors who either could not be accommodated or resisted
being accommodated in the emerging aristocratic structures.
This resulted in the pushing of older ruling groups into the
heart of the desert, reducing them to being petty chiefs or
thikanadars. These thikanas or chiefships like Pokhran,
Chohtan, Barmer, Pugal, Nuggur, Veravow, Bhoyotra, Bakasir,
etc, while claimed by their powerful neighbours paid nominal
obeisance in the form of irregular tribute that often had to be
extracted by force.
A number of these thikanas were located too far into the
desert to ever be controlled either by Rajput kings or by the
Mughal empire into which they were theoretically assimilated.
Their distant locations, often on important trade routes, allo-
wed them to exercise significant control on movements on
these routes, which they did by way of both, pillage or levying
of protection taxes, as the 18th century records of Jodhpur
state reveal.2 These instances of banditry were not new to the
region, but had been an integral part of medieval state forma-
tion in the region. Munhata Nainsi Ri Khyat, a 17th century
comprehensive source to the histories of clans ruling in the
Thar, mentions several instances where local chiefs engaged
in brigandage and pillage, looting caravans, horses, camels,
etc, that crossed the desert (Kothiyal 2016: 81).
Dhads or cattle raids had been an accepted form of warfare
engaged in by most Rajput chiefs, before their emergence as
settled aristocracies. While the medieval Rajput state forma-
trol over routes determined the access to power. This required
Rajput states to enter into a range of formal and informal
arrangements with thikanadars and other warriors, terms of
which could include warfare, extraction of tribute, payment
of protection taxes as well as occasional overlooking of brig-
andage and pillage, in order to ensure safe passage of cara-
vans through the desert. Most thikanadars levied taxes like
bolawo or rukhwali ri bhachh on commercial traffic, that un-
ambiguously were protection taxes. A similar tax called bolai
was levied by Bhil chiefs in Mewar (Jain 1993: 49). The British
officials also found these systems necessary even in the 19th
century for affording a ready system of local protection to
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travellers, merchandise and property in the cause of ensuring
safe transit to person through tracts where both stand in need
of armed escort.3
Following subsidiary alliances with the Rajput states bet-
ween 1812 and 1818, and the conquest of Sind in 1843, entire
Thar came under direct or indirect British control. With this
began a long process of settlement of Thar, with demarcation
of boundaries, that were to clearly define jurisdiction between
the British and native territories. This appeared to have been
of particular necessity in the ThurParkar region, West and
South West of Marwar, where frontiers of a number of states
like Sind, Multan, Bikaner, Jaisalmer, Marwar, Umarkot,
Kathiawar and Kutch met. This frontier region with shifting
and contested boundaries came to be seen as a disturbed and
disorganised frontier, frequented by barwutteas, roving bands
of robbers, bandits and highway men. It was viewed as a den
of thieves where they found a safe asylum and preyed upon
neighbouring states.4 Belonging to groups of locally powerful
recalcitrant Rajput thikanadars, Sindi chiefs, criminal tribes
like Bhils, Mers and Minas or mercenary warrior groups like
Khosas, Baluches, Sehraes, Larkhanis or Kuzzaks, these bands
with their intimate knowledge of the difficult geography of the
desert traversed across the desert with ease, preying upon
travellers, merchants and herders alike.
In one of the early descriptions of the region, James Tod
(2005: 236) highlights its solitude, desolation as well as its
hostility through imageries of anxious toil of caravans that
could come across, lying in ambush, a band of Sehraes, the
Bedouins of our desert, on the watch to despoil the caravan.
This sense was further highlighted in the Administrative Re-
port of Mallani district (present-day Barmer) 1868, that
underlined the absence of jurisdiction as the cause of lawless-
ness of the region, which was
the common ground of plundering Scindees, Beloochees, and Rajputs. In
these wilds they sought an easy refuge, and lived with their camels and
herds, a nomad and predatory life; thence they sallied into Scinde, Mar-
war and Guzerat, and were the pest of the country far and wide 5
The British intervention in the affairs of Rajput states in the
Thar often began with military action against recalcitrant
chiefs or fugitives. For instance, in 1824, the Jodhpur maharaja
was forced to give away 21 villages in KotKirana and Chang
paraganas, for the suppression of Khosas, a Baluch mercenary
group operating in the Thar (Shah 1982: 19). In 1832, Parkar
Field Force, constituted to deal with banditry in the Thur
Parkar carried out major offensive against Khosas and Rajput
barwutteas from Kutch.6 Another region that required tran-
quilisation was Mallani, which was held by old families,
descendants of Mallinath Rathor, who styled themselves Rawuls,
and posed threat to the authority of their Jodhpur clansmen.
They were known to support freebooters of many kinds. With
a view of establishing a strong centrical post in Balmeer, an
offensive into the Mallani was carried out in 1836.7
Similarly, in the Shekhawati region that was the frontier
between Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bikaner, an expedition was put
together in 1834, to supress the Bidawat, Larkhani and Sulhedi
chiefs (Shah 1982: 77). Similar operations were undertaken in
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Bharatpur and Kota states as well. These operations and expe-
ditions invariably resulted in disbanding of the kin-based
military support that the Rajput chiefs had traditionally relied
upon, as fugitive bandits often received shelter and support
from the very chiefs who were expected to suppress them. A
number of non-Rajput martial groups like Bhils and Mers that
themselves had at times been involved in banditry, were org-
anised into irregular corps to deal with incidents of banditry
on the frontiers of princely states. Efforts were made to include
Khosas into the Parkar Field Force and Bidawats, Larkhanis
and Sulhedis into the Shekhawati Brigade. Reasons for such
inclusions were not merely the channelisation of the criminal
tendencies of these groups, but very clearly recognition of the
fact of their intimate knowledge of the frontiers, besides being
a tacit acceptance of their martiality. The ability to commit
banditry and to control it was closely linked. The British too
were entering into agreements with the people who controlled
the frontiers, except that they were far more powerful than the
erstwhile Rajput rulers, and were able to impose terms. This,
however, did not necessarily mean that pacified bandits and
outlaws, always gave up their claims.
The bandits in the Thar did not belong to any one parti-
cular group. They were Rajputs, Baluches, Minas, Bhils, who
either independently or in alliance with other groups carried
out plunder and pillage in the villages and on the highways,
often accosting caravans. While grain, money, precious metals,
arms were usually the aim of these raids, camels and horses
were also prized commodities. Camels laden with or without
merchandise were waylaid and taken into a safe territory
from where they could not be recovered without use of force.
Often, the return of camels or merchandise was negotiated by
paying ransoms.8
Entangled Networks of Kinship Ties and Interstate Rivalries
Early British campaigns against bandits and freebooters in the
desert revealed the entangled networks of kinship ties and
interstate rivalries that allowed banditry to thrive. In the Thar
Desert, people accused of banditry were usually local chief-
tains, barwutteas or outlaws and mercenary warriors em-
ployed by the chieftains. Some of the early operations under-
taken in the ThurParkar region from 1832 onwards by the
Parkar Field Force, constituted to deal with lawlessness were
against barwutteas from Kutch and Kathiawar who had taken
refuge in the Parkar region and had taken to banditry. The
Parkur freebooters, as they were called, included Rajput bar-
wutteas from Kutch and Kathiawar, as well as Meena and
Bagri barwutteas.9 In one instance, the intelligence reports
from Jaisalmer conveyed that about a hundred men, accused
of murder and robbery in Gujarat had taken refuge in Chohtan
and Mallani.10 These fugitives, sheltered by Mallani chiefs,
ventured into Jodhpur territory and engaged in banditry.
After prolonged negotiations, the Parkar Field Force man-
aged to secure aid from both Jaisalmer and Jodhpur states, as
well as employ Khosas to carry out the operations.11 However,
more than being hampered by lack of military aid, the
operations became difficult because of internecine networks
63
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
of kinship and loyalties. Most men who were supposed to be
aiding the Parkar Field Force were found to be colluding with
barwutteas, having helped their entry into Mallani and even
plotting their escape to Punjab. The level of collusion was
such that Captain Cavafe of the Parkar Field Force reported
that, between the Khosas, Barwutteas and the authorities
whoever is stationed near the Junnah kills a good number
and that they secure a portion of the plunder from the
marauders.12 A similar situation was reported from the frontiers
of Marwar and Bikaner in 1837 when an assembly of Kuzzak
warriors, employed by the Thakur of Mundea, was reported
to be on the lookout for camels being taken to the Mundwa
fair in Nagaur.13
Similarly, subjects of Marwar, Mewar and Sirohi who had
carried out a spate of robberies in Palanpur, were found to
have sought refuge in Sirohi.14 Thus, frontiers of Thar were
ideal spaces for collusions between chieftains with old claims
to authority, outlaws, and mercenary warriors, who formed
parts of old supply lines of military labour in the region. These
arrangements allowed for articulations of old claims to sover-
eignty on part of local chieftains, subsumed by the Rajput state
formation as the following discussion on cases of banditry in
ThurParkar in 1858 reveals.
In 1858, a series of cases of cattle theft and robberies were
reported from the JodhpurSind frontier involving a Rajput
thikanadar Khushaal Singh Chauhan of Bakasir, his brother
Anar Singh, and a Khosa bandit called Kapree Khan.15 Of these
banditries, most involved waylaying of cattle and camels,
which were often traced to the village of Khushaal Singh. In one
of the cases a camel contractor of the commissariat depart-
ment was audaciously robbed of `10,500.16 Khushaal Singhs
villages lay on the frontiers of Jodhpur, Mallani, Palanpur
and Kutch, and after conducting raids in Sind, he and his men
often sought shelter in these territories where they were
reported to have several kinsmen. Even when Khushaal Singhs
men were captured, he managed to free them by use of force.
Not only did Khushaal Singh plunder neighbouring territories,
he levied grazing taxes, and imprisoned people who did not
pay the taxes.
It was reported that the property stolen from Sind even
when traced to villages of these Thakurs could not be recov-
ered as they had forcibly removed the thanas of Jodhpur state
in 1857 and refused to allow thanas to be set up in these villages.17
These thanas had been set up in 1853, and the Thakurs of Bakasir
had repeatedly requested for the removal of these thanas that
they saw as infringement.18 In fact, Khushaal Singh was reported
to have refused to allow Jodhpur Durbars authority to ever be
exercised in his districts, in a sense declaring himself free of
the authority of the Jodhpur state.19
Khushaal Singh and Kapree Khan Cases
In his predatory pursuits, Khushaal Singh allied with a Khosa
bandit Kapree Khan, who belonged to a group of Baluch war-
riors, and had been discharged from the ThurParkar police
force on charges of gross misconduct in 1852. The British
interaction with Khosas, who traced their origins to Sira and
64
Dera Ghazi Khan began even before they conquered Sind in
February 1843. Khosas had been the followers of the Kaloras, a
religious sect that ruled Sind till 1783. As the Talpur Wazirs
ousted Kaloras, Khosas refused to serve the new rulers and
escaped into the desert in the NuggurParkar districts, seek-
ing shelter with Rajput chiefs in Nuggur and Palanpur. They
made a living out of plunder, highway robbery, extraction, be-
sides lending their military services to petty Rajput chiefs of
Mallani which was viewed as a country with few scattered
villages, which for ages had been a grazing ground for camels,
kine goats and sheep, an anarchic region as it was totally
devoid of cultivation, and inhabited by Khosas.20
Khosas often waylaid a large number of camels from the
Sind and Kutch frontiers, to the extent that Lumsden, the
Political Agent in Kutch, reported that the entire frontier of
Sind was infested with the plundering Khosas.21 They were
said to locate themselves wherever it may best suit their
convenience, with no other permission than that conferred
by their swords, and upon the principle that might is
right.22 Based on their ability of plunder and pillage, they
collected protection taxes from the pastoralists who visited
the grazing grounds, cultivators as well as traders who
crossed the desert.
In September 1843, after the conquest of Sind, Captain
Jackson, the Political Agent, Mallani, had managed to negotiate
the surrender of four Khosa chiefs, who by their own admis-
sion had led a life of plunder.23 Among the terms of surrender
were absorption of Khosa chiefs into Jodhpur service, finan-
cial settlement and their organisation into some kind of
irregular corps dedicated to eradication of banditry in the
Thar. In the new emerging territorial arrangements after the
conquest of Sind, a new role was being envisaged for Khosas
which was to safeguard the British frontiers as part of the
Parkar Field Force. This was in accordance with the settle-
ment policies carried out with Bhils in Deccan and Khandesh,
where they had been organised into irregular corps (Brown
2014: 7275). The argument was that as a migratory and
predatory group located on the frontiers of Sind, Gujarat
and Jodhpur, the Khosas with their knowledge of the desert
could provide invaluable assistance in settling the region by
being reinvented as militia for the protection of the frontier.24
Captain Jackson viewed them as, fierce and independent
children of despotism who have hitherto never dreamt of
any law but that of their swords, and defied effectually the
Rulers of Sind, Joudpore and Jessulmere. From their cradles
they had been taught, that to yield their weapons without a
strike, disgraced them forever amongst their brethren.25
However, the Jodhpur state was less than willing to employ
Khosas whom they did not trust, and strongly protested any
move towards such accommodation.26 Some Khosas were
eventually included into the Parkar Field Force. Some of these
like Kapree Khan continued their plundering and eventually
either deserted or were discharged for misconduct.
After being discharged from the Parkar Police Force, Kapree
Khan joined forces with Khushaal Singh and continued pillage.
From the reports, it is clear that, after being joined by Kapree
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Khan, Khushaal Singh did not merely continue to venture
beyond his villages, but managed to dispossess a camel
contractor of the commissariat department of `10,500, bring-
ing him into direct conflict with the British.27 On applying to
the Jodhpur Darbar, the British authorities were informed
that the Bakasir Thakur Khushaal Singh had been in a state of
rebellion since 1857, and the Jodhpur Darbar was in no state to
provide any kind of assistance, as they no longer had thanas in
Bakasir. In fact, the British reports about the region suggest
that the thanadars employed in the villages of Bakasir had
themselves been in league with the robbers and demanded
shares of the plunder.28 In the face of the inability on the part
of the Jodhpur Darbar to prevent pillage by what were seen as
its subjects, the British officials were left with little choice but
to intervene into the Jodhpur frontier and help reinstate the
thanas in Bakasir.29
Khushaal Singhs activities were seen to constitute a striking
proof of growing disorder along the eastern frontier of Sind,
that by this time was a British territory. The deputy magistrate
in Meerpur Khas, Sind, reported that Khushaal Singh and his
men kept the frontier between Jodhpur and Sind in a perpet-
ual state of excitement and disgust at the same time for their
cattle are carried off into Bakasar or Boyotra districts nothing
can be done.30 He further reported that despite close linkages
of marriage and commerce the people of ThurParkar found it
difficult to travel to Jodhpur on account of fear of plunder and
pillage unleashed by Khushaal Singh.
Assertion of Sovereignty
The cases of Khushaal Singh and Kapree Khan, who are both
recorded as notorious bandits, raise interesting questions
about crime as assertion of sovereignty. Khushaal Singh belon-
ged to an old Chauhan lineage, whose claims to his ancestral
villages went further back than the Rathor clan that ruled over
Jodhpur. However, he was not an important thikanadar, unlike
the Pokhran Thakurs, who held important positions in the
Jodhpur court. The thikanadars of Bakasir, in return for irregular
tribute had maintained their own control, by way of levying
grazing taxes, etc. Banditry and highway robbery were obvi-
ous displays of control over routes of movement. Till 1853 there
was no evidence of Jodhpur thana in Bakasir. The thana which
became the symbol of extension of Jodhpur sovereignty in
Bakasir, was uprooted in 1857 and not allowed to be set up
again till 1861. While marginal to Jodhpur politics, Bakasirs
location at the frontiers of Jodhpur, Sind, Kutch and Kathiawar
made it an important point of access as well as escape. Histories
of Rajput states have always been studied in the context of
their contact with the Mughal empire. However, for places
like Bakasir, NuggurParkar, Veravow greater associations
existed with the western frontiers in Sind, rather than the
eastern Rajputana. These towns and villages also lay on the
migratory routes connecting Sind and Baluchistan to Kutch
and Kathiawar, which is why they became the refuge of Kho-
sas after the decline of their patrons, the Kaloras in 1783.
The collusion between Khushaal Singh and Kapree Khan
was a continuation of old networks of military associations.
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
The British administrators had attempted to pacify and eradicate
the Khosa plundering from the 1840s onwards, as the flow of
Baluch and Afghan military labour through Sind and Thar
threatened to extend the Afghan frontier to Sind. Despite their
depredations, Khosas were viewed though a lens of obvious
martiality, which was at the same time fearsome as well as
honourable.
However, for British administrators the depredations like
those of Khushaal Singh and Kapree Khan, also fed into the
larger picture of lawlessness that they faced in the Thar. The
frontiers of Rajput states, Sind, states in Kathiawar and Kutch
were all ill-defined. Mobility across frontiers was easy, and so
was escape. Often after committing robberies, bandits could
escape into areas of rival jurisdiction. In such cases it was
impossible either to seek surrender or recover the loot. In this
light, several military operations like one in Barmer, Mallani
in 1836 were carried out. The British administrators particu-
larly saw Barmer as the key of the desert, a point which
would give the most extended command and influence over
the population of the surrounding region.31 Barmer was to
become the point from where several military campaigns into
ThurParkar, Sind, Kutch and Kathiawar were undertaken.
Khushaal Singh and Kapree Khans banditry also provided the
British officials grounds for intervention with or without the
permission of Jodhpur state. Frere, the Commissioner of Sind
proposed that
if Joudpore Durbar objects to our interference let it control its own
subjects and afford us redress But if Joudpore Durbar is either un-
able or unwilling to keep its own subjects in order, I would solicit per-
mission for our Frontier Officers to deal with these petty plundering
Thakoors without reference to Joudpore.32
By questioning unwillingness and the inability of the Jodhpur
state to intervene, the British clearly underlined the linkages
between the bandits and Jodhpur state, as well as its failures
at governance in the frontiers. In fact, Frere believed that dis-
play of firmness on the part of the British had managed to pla-
cate a number of miscreants in Sind, and even Khushaal Singh,
on being threatened with armed action had agreed to surren-
der his portion of the loot.33 On examination, the claims of
sovereignty made by Khushaal Singh were found to be incor-
rect, and the only way of keeping the British territories free of
incursions from his depredations was by strengthening the
Jodhpur position by reinstating the Jodhpur thanas. Paradoxi-
cally, it was also proposed to raise a force, on Jodhpur expens-
es that could enter Bakasir at any point of time to investigate
cases of robbery.34 By 1861, depredations of Khushaal Singh
and Kapree Khan had been brought under control, though
there are no records of their arrest.
Borders, Governance and Jurisdiction
Banditry, thus, raised several questions about borders, gov-
ernance and jurisdiction. One of the most common problems
faced in the region was the absence of mutually recognised
boundaries, and therefore lack of clarity in matters of juris-
diction, which allowed people to move between the states
with ease, particularly if they wished to escape jurisdiction
65
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
for any reason. What was also interesting was not only the ab-
sence of clear boundaries, but the presence of zones where a
third party, usually a powerful and often recalcitrant thika-
nadar exercised influence. Pokhran at the borders of Jodhpur
and Jaisalmer, Pugal at the borders of Bikaner and Jaisalmer,
ThurParkar between Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Sind, Kathiawar and
Kutch, Shekhawati located on the frontiers of Jodhpur, Bikaner
and Jaipur, forests of Aravali between Jodhpur, Udaipur and
Sirohi were all zones of contested jurisdiction, where refuge
could be sought. These were also zones through which trade
routes passed, and therefore, making them zones not merely
of refuge and escape, but ones where immense control could
be exercised on circulation, particularly one that was commer-
cial in nature.35
While all states undertook measures to safeguard routes
as well as the caravan traffic, there were often localities
close to the routes where states did not exercise enough
influence, and had to negotiate either by overlooking illegal
exactions and protection taxes, or negotiate ransom after
thefts had been carried out. All examples above indicate that
cattle lifting and camel thefts were most common forms of
thefts. With the scale of theft, it is also clear that stolen cattle,
horses and camels would have been diverted to markets
through middlemen, or would have been returned after
ransom was received.
In all such cases, the durbars were aware of their inability
beyond a certain point, whereas the British officials not only
insisted on defining boundaries and jurisdictions, but also fix-
ing responsibility for loss of property, particularly if it was sto-
len from the British territories. In keeping with the intent to
suppress crime as well as to the tradition of granting asylum to
criminals, by 1870, the British made the princely states sign
Extradition Treaties that made it essential for people charged
with crimes like dacoity, robbery, cattle theft, burglary, arson,
etc, to be extradited. The princely states also agreed to refuse
sarna or asylum which was seen as akin to abutting of offences
(Aitchison 1909: 173).
Apart from military solutions, the British also encouraged
agrarian settlements in areas like Mallani. This meant intro-
ducing Jat peasantry to supplement the roving class of
graziers and hamlets with their rain crops of millet and
pulse spring up to relieve these deserts.36 Between 1865 and
1868, 70 villages had been founded in Mallani and the British
appeared to complement themselves on reclaiming people
from their predatory pursuits and encouraging cultivation,
trade and peaceful sources of income.37 However, new settle-
ments brought new rivalries, and therefore, boundary settle-
ments were undertaken to decide upon exact jurisdiction.
But mapping was necessary not only to settle disputes, but
to know the region better in order to administer it. Though
initial travellers like Captain Boileau, James Tod, Archibald
Adams had all drawn geographical sketches as well as
maps of the region, between 1870 and 1886, several topo-
graphical surveys of western frontiers of Jodhpur state
along Barmer, Sindree and Palanpur were undertaken and
accurate maps drawn.
66
Conclusions
My engagement with banditry, robbery and theft in the Thar
indicates that these were multiple representations of claims to
authority often predicated upon control over mobility through
the desert. In the dry arid Thar, control over circulation of
mobile wealth, like cattle or merchandise in transit, epito-
mised authority more than anything else. Located away from
agro-centric polities of northern India, Rajput brotherhoods in
far western desert, in association with other warrior groups,
forced Rajput kingships to negotiate passage, and thus, share
authority. Such power-sharing arrangements, on the one
hand, served the purpose of extending the authority of the
states in areas that were practically out of bounds for them. On
the other hand, for the bandits, who were often also local
chieftains, these arrangements allowed the perpetuation of a
bandit economy, based on protection and extortion in agricul-
turally-deficient arid desert.
Besides being claims to authority by way of control over
mobile wealth, banditry and plunder were also resistances
emanating out of certain moral claims to true Rajputhood,
one that thrived in difficult and hostile desert circumstances,
as against the one located in the courts. While the citadel
capitals or the durbars were located in fertile agrarian
zones, the recalcitrant chiefs were all located in the desert,
mountains or forests, spaces that were geographically hostile.
A survey of Rajput ruling dynasties of the Thar like Rathors
and Bhatis indicates that their initial power struggles were
located in the heart of desert from where they moved and
settled in fertile zones, building their citadel capitals
(Kothiyal 2016).38
The Thar desert represented a geographical opposition to
the agrarian zones where Rajput power centres were located.
The claims of the recalcitrant thikanadars in the frontiers
were based on survival in harsh terrains that rendered them
morally superior to the ruling clans. Thar was a zone of inter-
action between core areas which represent the explicit sover-
eignty of the Rajput courts, and ambiguous, plural and shift-
ing sovereignty of the frontiers (Scott 2009: 61). For the dur-
bars, the assertions of recalcitrant thikanadars and jagirdars
were rooted in an older history of moral claims of entitle-
ments, that were both acceded and contested.
Often the claims of the recalcitrant chiefs went further
back than the ruling families or at least were contiguous.
Rajput brotherhoods, as well as other groups, with intimate
knowledge of the desert, managed to enforce their terms on
the Rajput courts by holding the key to safe passage across
the desert. In this contract between the core and the
frontier, banditry emerged as a system of exchange. More-
over, depredations carried out by the outlaw fugitive or
barwuttea attracted a respectful acceptance and can be
seen to represent a kind of institutionalised dissidence. The
British administrators, finding it difficult to come to terms
with this rather diffused model of flow of authority, focused
on centralisation of authority in the courts of princely
states, while ascribing criminality to older power-sharing
arrangements.
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Notes
1 Barwutteas were generally Rajput fugitives,
but could also be Bhils, Minas or Mers. Outlawry
was an institutionalised practice of dissidence,
by which a fugitive could be banished from the
territory of a chieftain, or chosen to become a
barwuttea or an outlaw. In the past, this had
often meant that warriors who became fugi-
tives as a result of feuding went through a pe-
riod of wandering or vikhau, in which they
amassed resources or re-established them-
selves in some other territory. This system also
entailed a provision of shelter or sarna to bar-
wutteas or outlaws who carried out their raids
outside of the territory of the host state or
chief. A barwuttea could be provided shelter by
a rival chieftain, but could also choose to live a
life of predation and banditry. The British trea-
ties with Rajput states invariably included
clauses that required the Rajput states to not
offer shelter to barwutteas from other states.
2 For example, in 1766, the thikanadar of village
Chohtan, Barmer, Sadul Bhimsi was reported
to have waylaid camels travelling from Dhadh-
mala in Kutch. Ashadh Sudi 15, Jama Khrach ro
Navo, Kotda, Sanad Parwana Bahi No 5, VS
1823/1766 CE. In 1773, the merchants travelling
to Sind through Bikampur requested the creation
of a new route as they were harassed by the
thikanadars at Bikampur. Ashwin Sudi 14, Bud-
hwar, Phalodi Sayer, SP Bahi No 13, VS 1830/1773
CE. A charge of levying a new bulawo was made
against the thikanadar of Pokhran by Sahu Roop
Chand of Umarkot in 1783, when the merchant
was already paying rahadari and dan to the
Jodhpur state. Miti Ashwin Sudi 6, Somvar,
Jodhpur, SP Bahi, No 29, VS 1840/1783 CE.
Vikrami Samwat (VS) begins 57 years prior to
the Common Era and was in usage in Jodhpur
documents till 1868.
3 Foreign Political (FP), 17 December 1838, 3749,
National Archives of India. Henceforth, FP
and NAI.
4 FP, 12 February 1830, (67), NAI.
5 Administrative Report of the district of Mullani,
1868, 9, NAI.
6 Military Operations against Parkur Freebooters,
JodhpurJaisalmer Military, Rajputana Agency,
1832, NAI.
7 FP, 26 November 1832 (8), NAI.
8 FP, 12 February, 1830 (67). David Gilmartins
work on colonial Punjab also indicates the
presence of networks constituted of cattle lifters,
village headmen and rassagirs, that either dis-
posed of the stolen cattle or negotiated their
return for ransom (Gilmartin 2003: 3356).
9 Lt Col Litchfield of Parkar Field Force to Col
Lockett, Political Agent, 16 November 1832,
Military Operations against Parkur Freebooters,
JodhpurJaisalmer Military, Rajputana Agency,
1832, f 45, NAI.
10 Intelligence report of news writer in Jaisalmer,
Military Operations against Parkar Freebooters,
Rajputana Agency, Political Branch, File No 4
Jodhpur 1832 II, f 36, NAI.
11 Lt Col Litchfield of Parkur Field Force to Col
Lockett, Political Agent, 16 November 1832,
Military Operations against Parkur Freebooters,
JodhpurJaisalmer Military, Rajputana Agency,
1832, ff 3738, NAI.
12 Captain Cavafe to Henry Pottinger, 10 Decem-
ber 1838, Military Operations against Parkur
Freebooters, JodhpurJaisalmer Military, Raj-
putana Agency, fl 129, NAI.
13 Copies of Arzees from Vakil Jeypore Durbar,
16 December 1837; Bikaner Vakil, 18 December
1837; and Jhunhjunu Hakim, 24 December
1837; Disturbed State of Marwar on the Bikaner
and Shekhawati Frontiers, Jodhpur, Jagirdars
Disturbances and Riots, 14AJodhpur, Rajputana
Agency, 183637, ff 5459, NAI.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
14 Foreign Political, 8 September 1849, Nos 29, NAI.
15 In 1857 and 1858, several instances of rebel-
lions by jagirdars were reported in Rajputana.
A number of them were actually directed to-
wards Rajput rulers rather than the British, in
particular Takhat Singh of Jodhpur who had
highly vexed relationships with his nobles.
16 H B E Frere, Commissioner Sind to AGG Rajpu-
tana, 15 January 1859, f 33, Disturbed State of
Jodhpur Frontier Bordering on Sind File 85,
Jodhpur Old Vol II, Rajputana Agency, NAI.
17 H B E Frere Commissioner Sind to Lord Elphin-
stone, Governor and President, Bombay, 1 May
1858, Letter 191 of 1858, ff 68, Disturbed State
of Jodhpur Frontier Bordering on Sind File 85,
Jodhpur Old Vol II, Rajputana Agency, NAI.
18 Deputy Magistrate Meerpur Khas and ThurParkar
to Political Agent, Jodhpur, 106 of 1858, dated 12
November 1858, ff 100101, Disturbed State of
Jodhpur Frontier Bordering on Sind File 85,
Jodhpur Old Vol II, Rajputana Agency, NAI.
19 Deputy Collector, Meerpur Khas and Parkar to
Political Agent, Jodhpur, 513 of 1858, dated 25
October 1858, ff 9798, Disturbed State of
Jodhpur Frontier Bordering on Sind File 85,
Jodhpur Old Vol II, Rajputana Agency, NAI.
20 FP, October 1868, 6980, NAI.
21 I G Lumsden, Political Agent in Kutch to Maj
Lewis Brown, Political Agent Palanpur, No 44
of 1843, Dated 17 February 1843, ff 3233,
Plundering Expeditions of Khosa Chiefs on the
borders of Cutch (Kutch) and Mallani, 32,
Jodhpur, Boundary, Rajputana Agency, 1843.
22 Captain C F Jackson, Officiating Superintendent,
Mullanee to Col J Sutherland, AGG Rajputana,
Balmeer, 20 May 1843, ff 9697, Plundering
Excursions of Khosa Chiefs on Lands of Cutch
and Mullanee, 32, Jodhpur, Boundary, Rajpu-
tana Agency, 1843.
23 Depositions of Ullah Buksh, son of Kamal Khan
and Shobhdar, son of Shera Baloch were taken
at Jodhpur Political Agency on 5 August 1843,
Surrender of Khosa chiefs, 32, Jodhpur, Bound-
ary, Rajputana Agency, 1843, ff 16067.
24 Political Commissioner for Gujarat and Resident
at Baroda to Secretary to Government of Bombay,
28 April 1843, ff 8485, Plundering Expeditions
of Khosa Chiefs on the Borders of Cutch and
Mallani, 32, Jodhpur, Boundary, Rajputana
Agency, 1843, NAI.
25 Report on the state of people and country on
the frontier of Sindh, Joudhpore and Jessulmere,
File 32, Jodhpur, Boundary, Rajputana Agency
Office, 1843, 102, NAI.
26 Translation of a Note addressed by the Jodhpur
Vakeel on 28 September 1843 to the Political
Agent, Jodhpur, ff 16062, Plundering Expedi-
tions of Khosa Chiefs on the Borders of Cutch
and Mallani, 32, Jodhpur, Boundary, Rajputana
Agency, 1843, NAI.
27 Telegram dated 4 January 1859, Disturbed State
of Jodhpur Frontier Bordering on Sind, File 85,
Jodhpur Old Vol II, Rajputana Agency, NAI.
28 Captain J B Brooke, Officiating Political Agent,
Joudhpoor to Captain G B Tyrwhitt, Deputy
Magistrate of Meerpoor and ThurParkar, No 359
of 1858, 28 November 1858, ff 10405, Disturbed
State of Jodhpur Frontier Bordering on Sind,
File 85, Jodhpur Old Vol II, Rajputana Agency,
NAI.
29 H B E Frere, Commissioner, Sind to Lord Elphin-
stone, Governer and President in Council, Bombay,
8 February 1859, Disturbed State of Joudpore
Frontier along Sind, 85-Jodhpur old, Boundary,
Jodhpur, Rajputana Agency, ff 8589, NAI.
30 From the Deputy Magistrate of Meerpoor Khas
ThurParkar to the Magistrate of Hyderabad,
No 105 of 1858, dated 12 November 1858, ff 1838,
Disturbed State of Jodhpur Frontier Bordering
on Sind File 85, Jodhpur Old Vol II, Rajputana
Agency, NAI.
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
31 FP, 7 October, 1843 (199200), NAI. Mallani was
transferred to Bombay Government in 1836, and
Later to AGG, Rajputana in 1839, and to Political
Agent in 1843. It was restored to Marwar in 1898.
However, Barmer remained a British Military Post.
32 Frere to Elphinstone, 8 February 1859, Dis-
turbed State of Joudpore Frontier, f 85, NAI.
33 Frere to Elphinstone, 8 February 1859, Dis-
turbed State of Joudpore Frontier: 86.
34 Deputy Collector and Magistrate, Meerpur Khas
to Frere, Commissioner of Sind, No 113 of
26 January 1859, Disturbed State of Joudpore
Frontier, ff 9496.
35 A quantum of opium transferred from Malwa to
Karachi bunder, travelled on desert routes through
Kathiawar, Jaisalmer and Sind. Amar Farooqui
suggests that in opium producing and trading
zones of western India, several gangs of ban-
ditti mushroomed that included Pindarris, Bhils,
Gonds, Ramoshis, Kolis and Minas, who had been
previously employed by the Marathas. These
gangs could not have operated without the sup-
port of local chieftains. Farooqui (2005: 187).
36 FP, October 1868 (6980), NAI.
37 Same as note 36.
38 Rathors were initially located in the dry Mahewa
belt before moving to Mondor in 1395 CE, around
present-day Barmer. Bhatis had a long migra-
tory history through the desert, with Tanot and
Lodrovo being older power centres.
References
Aitchison, C U (1909): A Collection of Treaties, Engage-
ments and Sanads Relating to India and Neigh-
bouring Countries Vol III (The Treaties, etc,
Relating to States in Rajputana), Calcutta:
Government Printing Press.
Brown, Mark (2014): Penal Power and Colonial
Rule, London: Routledge.
Dawood, N J (ed) (2015): The Muqaddimah: An In-
troduction to History: The Classic Islamic Histo-
ry of the World, Ibn Khaldun, translated and
introduced by Franz Rosenthal, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press.
Farooqui, Amar (2005): Smuggling as Subversion:
Colonialism, Indian Merchants, and the Politics
of Opium, 17901843, London: Lexington Books.
Gellner, Ernest (1969): Saints of the Atlas, London:
ACLS History e-Book.
Gilmartin, David (2003): Cattle, Crime and Colo-
nialism: Property as Negotiation in North
India, IESHR, 40 (1), pp 3356.
Gordon, S (1969): Scarf and Sword: Thugs, Mar-
auders and State Formation in Eighteenth
Century Malwa, Indian Economic and Social
History Review, Vol 6, No 4, December.
Hobsbawm, Eric (2000): Bandits, London: Abacus.
Jain, M S (1993): Concise History of Modern Rajasthan,
New Delhi: Vishwa Prakashan.
Kasturi, Malavika (2002): Embattled Identities:
Rajput Lineages and the Colonial State in Nine-
teenth-Century North India, New Delhi: OUP.
Kothiyal, Tanuja (2016): Nomadic Narratives: A His-
tory of Mobility and Identity in the Great Indian
Desert, New Delhi: CUP.
Mayaram, Shail (2006): Against History, Against
State: Counterperspectives from the Margins,
New Delhi: Permanent Black.
Peabody, Norbert (1991) Kota Mahajagat or the
Great Universe of Kota: Sovereignty and Terri-
tory in 18th Century Rajasthan, CIS, 25, 1,
January to June, pp 2956.
Scott, James (2009): The Art of Not Being Governed:
An Anarchist History of Upland South East Asia,
New Haven: Yale University Press.
Shah, P R (1982): Raj Marwar During Paramountcy:
A Study in Problems and Policies up to 1923,
Jodhpur: Sharda Publishing House.
Tod, James (2005): Annals and Antiquities of
Rajasthan or the Central and Western Rajpoot
States of India, two volumes, edited by Douglas
Sladen, New Delhi: Rupa and Co.
67
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Borderlands, Empires and Nations
Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan Borderlands (c 18151930)
Vasudha Pande
In the first decade of the 19th century, Kumaun was part
of the Gorkha Empire connected to Kathmandu by a
well-serviced eastwest road. Trade in grain and salt by
shepherding communities linked it to Western Tibet. In
1815, when Kumaun became a part of the East India
Companys territories, this orientation changed.
Gradually, a network of roads and railways transformed
the hitherto impenetrable Tarai, to the south of Kumaun.
As the Kumaun economy integrated with the British
Empire, via the Tarai, the commodity composition of its
trade with Western Nepal (Nepal borderland) and
Western Tibet (Tibet borderland) was modified. The
subsequent mapping of these territories by the British
created not only new geographies but also engendered
new ways of knowing. The interaction of imperial
administrators with the people of the borderlands
produced narratives, which ignored earlier cultural
identities and generated new histories of groups like the
Gorkha and Bhotia.
Vasudha Pande (vasudhapande55@gmail.com) teaches history at Lady
Shri Ram College for Women, University of Delhi, New Delhi.
68
I
n the 19th century, empires and emergent nation states
divided the world into polities with well-defined borders.
By the mid-20th century, nation states were regarded as
the only legitimate political formations in the world system.
Borders were marked on maps, defended by legal experts, militia
and military, by state rituals and peoples imaginations. This
increasingly made states and their boundaries sacrosanct.
From the perspective of centres of authority, the border is
clear and distinct, it divides and separates. Borders affirm the
states control and jurisdiction, however, attempts to establish
control over territory and people are not always effective.
Though borders mark territorial distinctions, inevitably they
also create borderlands where people from both sides deal with
everyday accommodation. Borders produce borderlands as sites
that engender repeated negotiations of state identities mediated
through local exchanges. Baud and Van Schendel note,
Borders create political, social, and cultural distinctions, but simulta-
neously imply the existence of (new) networks and systems of interac-
tion across them. The existence of a border is our point of departure,
but at the same time we draw attention to the social networks that
reach across that border. (1997: 216)
Local people also modify state policies and borders through
their responses to marking and maintaining boundaries.
Marking borders often redirects trade and resource flow
along contiguous territories, but marking boundaries also
generates new histories and ethnographies, which produce
difference and othering. Comparative borderland studies
highlight this aspect as they try to understand how borders
restructure and reconfigure interactions between communi-
ties and state systems.
This paper problematises and traces the cross-cutting histories
of the contiguous Himalayan regions of Tarai, Kumaun, West-
ern Tibet, and Far-Western Region of Nepal in a single narrative,
not premised on nationalisms or imperial controls, but on
interactions and flow of resources (Figure 1, p 69). It studies
19th century demarcation of borders, after the Treaty of Sug-
auli between the East India Company (EIC) and Gorkhas
(agreed to in December 1815, ratified in March 1816), and the
resultant borderlands in the Himalayas and trans-Himalayas.
It explores the interactions in the borderlands that emerged
with the marking of borders by the EICs state (later the British
Empire) in the Central Himalayas and trans-Himalayas. It
focuses on how various governmentalities affected and were
affected by flows across this honeycomb of borderlands. It
also suggests that a historical narrative that links these marginal
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Figure 1: The Three BorderlandsKumaun, Western Tibet and Western Nepal
Source: Sherring (1906).
locations may actually create a geography and ethnography of
a form of knowing (Schendel 2002: 64768).
The Treaty of Sugauli brought the Gorkha Imperium, con-
sisting of a string of 60 principalities stretching from the Tista
in the east to the Sutlej in the west to an abrupt end (Regmi
1999). The treaty created an independent kingdom of Nepal,
which lost its territories between the rivers Kali and Sutlej
(the western divisions of Kangra, Garhwal and Kumaun) and
its Far-Western Tarai to the EICs state. Following the treaty,
Kumaun was attached to the EICs territories. The Kali River
marked the new boundary between Western Nepal and Eastern
Kumaun (Aitchison 1892). After the treaty, the Far-Western
Tarai or plains was controlled by the British till 1860, when it
was restored to the Rana rulers of Nepal. On the northern fringe
of British India (Kumaun) lay Tibet or the trans-Himalaya.
These regionsKumaun, Western Tibet, and Western Nepal
shared a long history of exchange and interaction from the
pre-historic period through the Tibetan Empire (7th9th century)
to the Gorkha Empire (early 17th and 19th century). This inter-
linkage was based upon an agro-pastoral system which in-
volved movement of different groups during one calendar year
through different ecological niches of the trans-Himalayas,
Upper Himalayas, middle mountains, Bhabar and Tarai. This
sharing of different habitats over the seasons meant fluid
boundaries. Given the nature of the terrain, this required con-
trolling the passes into the trans-Himalaya and into the mid-
dle mountains. To maintain these networks, trading and pas-
toralist communities followed a well-regulated framework of
customary and ritual practices to demarcate boundaries.
These were zealously implemented and no infringements were
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
permitted. Even as the British conquered Kumaun, their att-
empts to map the region faced resistance from local communi-
ties, and mapping could only be carried out through many
surreptitious journeys and much British strategy (Pathak
2008: 5575; Sherring 1906: 26364).
This paper demonstrates that in the 19th century all these
borderlands were rendered marginal and peripheral within
their respective states. The Kumaun region was far from the
imperial centre at Calcutta (later at Delhi). Also, as the King-
dom of Nepal with its capital at Kathmandu found its feet,
Far-Western Nepal lost its importance as the epicentre of Kha-
sa culture and the Gorkha state became an outpost of the state.
Likewise, Western Tibet also became a border province of
Tibet rule from Lhasa.
Background: Gorkha Empire 17681815
From the 16th to the 18th centuries, the many kingdoms of the
Central Himalaya and Tibet were closely connected to each
other and to North India through a network of trade routes1
(Figure 2, p 70).
During this period, Central Himalayan polities were affected
by two major developmentsan increase in population subse-
quent to the introduction of maize, and the piecemeal coloni-
sation of the Tarai (Regmi 1999: 72; Whelpton 2005: 16). The
region was divided into a large number of kingdoms, broadly,
known as the Baisi (22) organised around the Karnali River
and the Chaubaisi (24) organised around the Gandaki River.
The ascendance of the youngest and smallest member of the
Chaubaisi kingdomsthe Gorkhato overlordship is an
inspiring story, fuelled by vision, innovation and enterprise.
69
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Figure 2: Trade Routes Connecting Himalayas and Trans-Himalaya
Source: Digital Himalaya.
Prithvi Narayan Shahs (c 172375) success in subjugating
Kathmandu was significant (RRS 1973: 2127). After securing
his capital, he decided to pay attention to trade with Tibet. His
concern was the control of Tibetan passes with the desire to con-
trol silver bullion and coinage of Tibet (RRS 1973: 101; Burghart
1984: 10125). However, attempts to control the Northern trans-
Himalayan trade floundered. Subsequently, in 1791 a joint
force of the Tibetans and the Chinese defeated the Gorkhas
(Bahadur Shah), and Tibet was closed to outsiders in 1792.
While obstructed by these developments in the north, the
Gorkha state found that expansion southwards was also ham-
pered by other contenders, primarily, the EIC (Stiller 1973:
248). The movement westwards, however, continued and the
Gorkha Empire eventually stretched from the rivers Tista
in the east to the Sutlej in the west. This had significant
impact on the highland trade network shared by Saukas or
Bhotias,2 Gosains and other peripatetic groups. The British
were also keen to establish their presence in this trade. They
were, however, obstructed by the Gorkhali state as they tried
to get information by sending their men through Kumaun,
who were arrested by Gorkha administrators (Regmi 1999:
14859, 16771). In these circumstances, the AngloNepal disruption till 1815, when British control led to closure of
war of 1815 was significant for marking British territorial
control on the AngloGorkha frontier in the Tarai and
therefore for control of flows and resources within the Hima-
layas and trans-Himalaya. Also, the increased intervention of
both the emergent Gorkha elite as well as the EIC led to in-
creasing monetisation and impacted trading practices in the
region (Whelpton 2005a).
70
KumaunRampur/Moradabad Borderlands within
British India
The first issue that the British faced after the takeover of
Kumaun was of access from the south. At the base of the Central
Himalayan region lay a strip of landBhabarknown for its
porous soil where most of the streams and water courses
disappeared into the gravel. It was not uniform in breadth and
varied from 0.5 kilometres (km) to 6 km. The Tarai below the
Bhabar was a long and narrow strip of low-lying plain, the
zone of seepage where the water resurfaced, and where the
fine sand silt and clay were deposited by the emerging streams.
The level and fertile soil with a high water table rendered it
into wet and swampy country known for its malarial fevers,
habitable primarily in the winter. Traditionally, the Kumaun
rulers considered both Bhabar and Tarai integral parts of their
kingdom. More significantly, Tarai formed the upper limit of
the Ganga plain, which was increasingly controlled by Rohilla
Afghans since the mid-17th century (Gommans 1995: 115;
Husain 1994: 71). From this period till 1815, control of the
Kumaun Tarai was hotly contested and the northsouth con-
nection between the Bhotia traders and the Banjaras suffered
multiple claimants.
In the initial phase of British rule, the Bhabar and Tarai
were not part of Kumaun division. The Upper Bhabar was
under the control of Kumaun, but Bhabar proper and Tarai
were not. The first commissioner of Kumaun, Traill, argued for
a clear demarcation of boundaries. He found British adminis-
tration had been able to reclaim only 50 villages in Kota and
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Chakhata Bhabar of Kumaun, in eight years (181723) because
of insecurity created by bandits. In 1826, a joint report with
administrators from neighbouring divisions was adopted,
which sorted out boundary disputes (Atkinson 1981: Vol III,
part I, p 58). Grazing and forest produce taxes were farmed out
in three leases and cultivation was encouraged. In 1838, the
transfer of magisterial jurisdiction to the plains districts under
British control created fresh problems. Kumaun authorities,
now attributed the falling off of cultivation in the older clear-
ings and of the new ground in the Bhabar to such administra-
tive issues (Whalley 1991: 7172). The lieutenant governor was
persuaded, and the Bhabar tracts were transferred to Kumaun
in 1842, but the Tarai was destined to follow a much more
tortuous course (Tolia 1996: 62).
The Tarai (contiguous with Kumaun) presented a different
picture. Both cultivation and trade were deeply affected by the
uncertain conditions of the 18th century. The leaders of the
dacoits or marauding groups, like the Heris and Mewatis, col-
lected chowkidari duties on merchandise in transit. Besides,
theft of cattle was another major problem. The Gorkha state
had tried to curb these groups but was not successful. In 1823,
the boundary between Tarai and hill provinces was defined
and the Tarai was attached to Rohilkhand division. Heris and
Mewatis were granted jagirs by the British with the view to
settle them. However, in 1832, Bouldersons Settlement Report
of the Pergunnahs of Gadarpur and Rudrapur noted not only a
breakdown of the revenue arrangements but also the complete
collapse of the police system. The problem of policing generat-
ed a lot of discussion (Whalley 1991: 149). Halhed was deputed
as joint magistrate of Moradabad to bring the Heris and the
Mewatis under control. Jagirs granted to Heris and Mewatis
were abolished, as was the chowkidari system (Atkinson 1981:
vol III, part II, pp 51416). Gradually, the entire Tarai, with the
exception of the settled portion of Nanakmatta, became an
estate under the direct management of the government, to
which Kashipur was added in 1870. In 1891, Bhabar estate and
Tarai estate were brought together under the deputy commis-
sioner of Nainital. Their amalgamation was proposed in 1894
and ratified in 1895. The pacification and inclusion of the Tarai
gave Kumaun division a secure southern boundary.
During the 19th century, not only were the southern borders
of Kumaun restored, but British control also facilitated the
growth of internal networks. Initially, the British found them-
selves handicapped not only by the nature of the terrain in the
upper Himalayas but also by the very limited nature of the
roads in the middle mountains. Throughout the 19th century,
the British government worked hard to link Kumaun through
roads and railways to the rest of North India. The Gorkhas in
their quarter-century rule had focused on the Doti, Baitadi,
Almora, Srinagar to Kangra route (RRS 1998: 103) which lay
on an eastwest axis and these were also not of high quality.
Constrained by this, Traill noted,
the roads of communication throughout the province consist merely of
narrow footpaths, which are only partially practicable for laden cat-
tle, while rocky precipices frequently present themselves, which are
scarcely permissible for cattle in any state. (1828: 137234)
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
British military activity in the region led to the development
of roads on the eastern front, through the foothill passes of
Bamouri and Birmdeo (on the Nepal side). One road linked
Bamouri with Almora via Bhimtal and Peura, and the other
road connected Birmdeo with Pithoragarh via Lohaghat.
Almora was also connected with Lohaghat. The fording of
rivers by building three bridges began around 1830, and by
1840, six more suspension bridges were constructed over the
Ramganga near Rameshwar, Kosilla near Hawalbagh over
Bulleea River, over Saryu, Senril on the Almora Lohaghat road,
and over Ramganga on the Pithoragarh road (Tolia 1994: 91).
The commercial road in the early years of the 19th century was
along the Dhikuli pass from Chilkia Mandi to Tibet. Bishop
Heber in his journey to Almora in the second decade of the
19th century travelled from Rudrapur to Bamouri via Tanda
and then returned to Meerut via Dhikuli and Chilkia. He found
that Chilkia was the principal mart of trade, both into Kumaun,
and through that country into Tibet (Heber 1873: 21223).
New Routes
Gradually as the EIC consolidated its dominion, and as the
threat from Nepal receded, the focus shifted from eastern
Kumaun (contiguous with Nepal) towards Nainital. The dis-
covery of Nainital and its development led to the construction
of a new route (Pilgrim 1990). In 1845, the government as-
signed the building of a road from Nainital to Khairna and
sanctioned money for the establishment of a mandi or mart at
Kaladhungi.3 By 1848, a new line from Kaladhungi for passage
to Almora and Nainital was sanctioned.4 In 1855, a new road
was built which aligned Kaladhungi to Nainital.5
From this period till 1875, Kaladhungi was important
because it was on the route from Moradabad to Nainital. By
1873, there were cart roads from Ramnagar to Ranikhet and
Almora, and from Haldwani to Nainital. Second-class roads
were developed from Baramdeo, Haldwani, Ramnagar to
Lohaghat, Pithoragarh, Almora, Berinag, Bageshwar and
Garhwal, and these bridle roads could be used by mules and
horses. Roads also connected Pindari, Milam, Askot, Darma
and Byans, the inaccessible upper Himalayas to the rest of the
region.6 Road construction increased during the commissioner-
ship of Ramsay from 1856 to 1884. The growing importance of
the forest department also necessitated the building of roads
to facilitate the commercialisation of the forests of the hills.
By the early 1880s, communications had improved, with 470
miles of imperial road and 375 miles of road in the Bhotia region
of Milam Marchula, Kapkot, Pindar, Munsyari, Thal, Askot,
Tejam, Darma, Byans, Chaudans, Berinag and Chaukor (At-
kinson 1981, Vol III, part II, pp 41415). The late 19th century
witnessed a spurt in the construction of roads, not only by the
public works department, but also by the district boards of
Almora and Nainital, as well as the forest department. The
formation of Nainital district in 1891 probably catalysed the
construction of roads.7 The arrival of the railway line up to
Kathgodam on 29 October 1884 linked the region to the rest of
north India. In 1907, a railway line to Ramnagar from Moradabad
accelerated the process of integration (Sankrityayan Vikram
71
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Samvat 2015: 191). The railway line led to the increasing im-
portance of Haldwani, established in 1834 as a mart.
Gradually, Kumaun was accessible to travellers who were nei-
ther adventurers nor explorers. Pathak notes that the post-Mutiny
period saw a phenomenal increase in the number of tourists to
the region (1987: 24752). The establishment of Nainital in 1846,
and the development of a cantonment in Ranikhet in 1869, prob-
ably aided this change. By 1901, a visit to the hills was a pleasant
affair and the author of Almoriana said, come to Almora, then,
O reader in search of summer residence (1991: 5).
The improvement in roads led to the increasing use of ponies
and pack animals. Enterprising hillmen with some capital
used their mules for carrying surplus produce of the village to
local marts and bringing back salt, gur, cloth, bangles, pins,
torches, etc, in exchange (Pant 1935: 112). Part of the grain
trade continued to be in the hands of the Banjaras who had
been carrying on business in the region from an early period.
The itinerant tradesmen were usually Muslims and Kumbers
from the neighbouring plains districts. They kept packs of
ponies, mules and asses which brought bales of cloth and grain
from the Bhabar and took back bags of turmeric, chillies and
potatoes (Matiyani 1990: 204).
The early decades of the 20th century even saw the develop-
ment of wheeled traffic in areas where there were fairly service-
able roads. Cart roads between Almora, Ranikhet, Baijnath,
Ramnagar, and Kathgodam allowed for the use of small bull-
ock carts.8 By the second decade of the 20th century, vehicular
traffic had started plying along the major routes, though the
price of vehicular traffic was prohibitive.9 In 1920, Munshi H P
Tamata started the Hill Motor Transport Company, followed
by many others. Lorries ran from Haldwani and Kathgodam to
Almora and Ranikhet. Since all companies faced a shortage of
drivers, Tamata opened the Hill Motor Training School in 1921.
Consequently, by 1930, the major routes were well supplied.
We find that even though British dominion was successful in
connecting Kumaun with the plains and the Indian subconti-
nent, yet Kumaun remained peripheral in many ways. Mountain
folks and societies were treated as backward groups, which
required a paternalistic administration, different from that of
the core provinces of the empire. Through the 19th century,
Kumaun was administered differently from the United Prov-
inces (of which it was an administrative unit). It was a non-
regulation province, where standard rules and procedures did
not apply, and the commissioner was king (Whalley 1991: 6).
The additional powers vested in the administrators made the
system patrimonial and it is for this reason that the first
administrative history of the region by Whalley divides the
19th century naturally into three periods under three commis-
sionersTraill, Batten and Ramsay.
By the second decade of the 20th century, the emerging
modern intelligentsia of Kumaun found the system derogatory
and launched a movement against this special dispensation. In
1893, it started with a campaign for legal redress at the high
court,10 then also submitted a memorial and raised the matter
in the Uttar Pradesh Council. The Kumaun Parishad established
in 1916, had a five-point agenda, one of which was to remove
72
Kumaun from the jurisdiction of the Scheduled Districts Act.11
Kumaun was eventually removed from the purview of the
Scheduled Districts Act in 1926, after an agitation organised
by the Kumaun Parishad.12 This, however, did not make it less
peripheral, it still remained on the fringes of both the Empire
and the Nation.
The Western Borderlands of Nepal
The AngloGorkha war of 1815 changed many linkages bet-
ween borderlands. The British acquired Kumaun and thereby
gained access to Tibet from Kumaun. They also controlled the
Kumaun Tarai along with the Kumaun hills. The Gorkhas lost
not only Kumaun and Kangra, but also the Far-Western Tarai.
Consequently, now the Far-Western Nepali hill trade and the
TibetNepal trade was inhibited by the problem of access to
the plains. This had an adverse effect on the trade of Darma,
Byans and Jumla, which lost all their trade outlets in the Nepal
Tarai (Pandey 1997: 45558).
The 19th century was therefore a period of retrogression for
the Far-Western Region of Nepal. The restructuring of the
Nepal kingdom reduced the Far-Western Region to an outpost
located on the western border (Ojha Kathmandu Vikram Samvat
2049: 84102). A government concerned about safety and
security placed restrictions on trade, and access became diffi-
cult for Indians and Europeans. In pursuance of this policy
trade routes were closed and the few that remained open were
regularly policed (Stiller 1976: 123). An order after Sagauli cat-
egorically stated, close all tracks in the area and render them
unusable by planting bamboo, cane and thorny bushes as be-
fore (RRS 1981: 99). H A Oldfield, an English observer wrote,
The Nipalese are averse to the clearing of these forests as they look
upon the malarios jungle at the foot of the hills as the safest and surest
barrier. (1974: 47)
The government believed forests provide security and did
not encourage the building of roads and bridges for the facili-
tation of trade. The arterial route between Kathmandu and
Baitadi critical for the expanding Gorkha Empire now lost its
importance and Dotee became a provincial centre. The con-
nection between Dotee and Kathmandu was well established,
but provincial centres were not linked to each other. L F Stiller
finds the tedious pace of growth disturbing (1976: 134). The
process of monetisation which had begun in the 18th century
was now obstructed and as B Bishop notes,
in the central and western hills there was no development of
inter-regional trade of the type that could have led to the growth
of a system of hat bazars because high rents denied the farmer the
agricultural surplus necessary for such trade and government fiscal
policies drained off what little cash he had without recirculating it.
(1970: 11)
Yet, in spite of these obstacles, the trade of Western Nepal
with India and Tibet continued. The Gorkhas and the post-1815
Nepal state may have wanted to close Nepal to the EIC but were
keen to continue and promote trade with trans-Himalaya. The
Nepalese government was clearly aware of the importance of this
trade for its own economic well-being. In the mid-19th century,
a road was built on the Western Himalayas to facilitate the
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trade (Hodgson 1874: 97). Given the importance of this trade
for the Baisi region, local administrators also supported traders
and helped the traders of Darma, Byans and Jumla to find new
outlets for the import and export of their goods with Tibet.
In the west, two important trade points developed, the mart
near Jhulaghat in the middle mountains, which connected
Kumaun to western Nepal across the Kali from November to
June, and at Birmadeo in the Tarai, which connected western
Nepal to Tanakpur in India (Batten: 1851). In the initial years,
the Far-Western Tarai was under the control of Awadh, but it
was returned to Nepal in 1858. The restoration of the Far-Western
Tarai to Nepal marked a new era and a change of policy vis--
vis British India. The British encouraged the Ranas to open
Nepal to informal control. Landlocked Nepal was gradually
integrated with the Empire without acquiring formal control.
The process of the demarcation of the new borders was com-
pleted by 1860, and the Western Tarai became a part of the
Nepal kingdom now called Naya Mulk. Jang Bahadur ordered
local administrators to reopen existing irrigation channels
and to build new ones. The Muluki-Ain of 1856 encouraged
agricultural enterprise and provided that any peasant who
brought land under the plough would be granted tax exemp-
tion for five years and anyone bringing virgin land under culti-
vation would be able to retain one-tenth of that land under
birta. Tarai cultivation remained precarious because of the
nature of the terrain, which often debilitated the farmer with
malaria. A single epidemic could easily lead to the contraction
of agriculture. In spite of this, because the soil was fertile and
the Rana state supported irrigation, cultivators were willing to
shift from the northern hills to the Tarai region (RRS 1982:
181). Trade was carried on at the marts of Tulsipur, Bairampur
and Nanpari in India. Jang Bahadur persuaded Indian
merchants to cross the frontier and start trading at Gola
Mandi. Regmi suggests that the success of Nepalganj may also
be attributed to the coming of railways to the Indian side of the
border (RRS 1983: 72). Eventually, some Indian traders took up
residence at Nepalganj, and gradually, Nepalganj forests were
cleared under the supervision of the government and the town
of Nepalganj developed on the south-western border of India
and Nepal. By the early years of the 20th century, other market
towns like Birgunj and Golaghat had also come up in the Tarai
with the active support of the Nepali state (RRS 1986: 76).
As regards the trade with Tibet we find that the boundaries
between Nepal and India were porous and a shared sense of
identity and history on both sides of the Kali helped. E T Atkin-
son noted,
the Byans (Upper Himalayas) people can easily evade any order that they
think vexatious by migrating to Nepal, and they have no respect for law,
except so far as it makes itself felt by them. (1981: Vol III, part II, pp 83151)
Trade with Nepal
It is apparent that by the second half of the 19th century, Nepal
trade with Tibet was being rerouted through Jhulaghat and
Birmdeo in Kumaun. The Nepal government levied taxes on its
side of the Kali in Jhulaghat and Birmdeo. The trade of Darma
(Kumaun) increased elevenfold (between 1841 and 1900)
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
whereas the trade of neighbouring and prosperous Johar (fur-
ther west) increased only two-and-a-quarter times (Atkinson
1981: Vol III, part II, p 538). As a consequence, the Bhotias
dominated the trade in Shor or Pithoragarh.
The increase in trade probably facilitated the development
of the Jauljibi fair, which was held at the confluence of the Kali
and the Gori rivers. It was instituted by the Rajbar of Askot in
India in 1914. The importance of Jauljibi was that it lay at the
junction of four important routes leading from Nepal, Askot,
Johar and Darma respectively. S D Pant notes,
the celebration of the fair coincides with the opening of the pass and
the bridge to Nepal. During the rains the river Kali sweeps away its
bridge and it becomes very formidable. But during November a tempo-
rary bridge, which lasts until July, is constructed by some of the villag-
ers from Dotee who are exempted from the import and export duties
levied by the Nepal government. (1935: 198)
He reported that the trade in Nepali ghee, grains and fruit
formed an important aspect of the transactions. In the first few
decades of the 20th century, ponies from Tibet Bhot and Jumla
were also important merchandise.
Prithvi Narayan Shah was aware of several dozen types of
cloth of cotton goods produced in the Kathmandu valley and
the scope for expansion (Stiller 1976: 124). He elaborates on
this in Dibya Updesh where he recommends homespun cloth
and refuses entry to Indian and Company merchants (Stiller
1989: 6970). In keeping with this policy, the Gorkhas were wary
of transactions with the EIC and the government charged high
customs duties on goods coming into Nepal till the 1840s (Old-
field 1974: 301). Brian Hodgson, the resident, resented this, but
till Bhim Sen Thapa was in charge he could not intervene.
However, during the second half of the 19th century, Nepal,
under the Rana dispensation, emerged as an importer of cot-
ton products, raw cotton, yarn (European and Indian) and
cotton-piece goods (European and Indian).
Gradually, over the second half of the 19th century, the
commodity composition of Nepals trade with British India
underwent a major transformation. Western Nepal witnessed
a decline of its iron and copper manufactures during this period
and it gradually started importing metal goods. By the last
years of the 19th century, its imports of iron and other metal
products far exceeded its dwindling exports. By the last years
of the 19th century, Nepal was importing iron, copper, other
metals, sugar refined and unrefined, petroleum, provisions,
woollen-piece goods and even salt. Its exports consisted of timber,
livestock, turmeric, fibrous products, rice, pulse, wheat, spring
crops, hides and skins, sheep and goats, ghee, wax, etc.13
Reports from 190818 also indicate an export surplus with
British India. An increase in import of sambhar salt also indi-
cates an integration with the southern imperial economy, as
between 1833 and 1898 the quantity of salt imported increased
42 times.14 The change in the commodity composition of trade
indicates that Nepal was getting integrated into the imperial
economic system of British India.
This change was also accompanied by increasing problems
of agriculture in the middle Himalayan region of Far-Western
Nepal. This meant that while agricultural productivity did not
73
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
increase, the petty peasant was under a dual system of control
of the state and the jagirdar. Besides, slavery continued to be
recognised. Migration from the hill region in search of employment
started during the 19th century (Regmi 1978: 134). During the
slack season, migration was not a permanent affair; it was linked
to the agrarian cycle, and the migrants tended to return home
for the labour-intensive season (Dahal et al 1977: 1). Shreshtha
studied the northern region of Jumla and noted that,
expanded seasonal and long-term migrations and extended extra-re-
gional trading became increasingly indispensable components of the
subsistence system for a majority of the local population. (1993: 98)
British administrators of Kumaun noted the migration to
British territories. As early as 1821, an official noted that Shor
(Pithoragarh) on the eastern border of Kumaun formed till a
late period a part of the principality of Dotee, on the western
border of Kumaun. Within the last three years a considerable
influx of cultivators from adjoining Gorkha province of Dotee
has taken place in Shor.15 By the early years of the 20th century,
Shor was the most densely populated pargana of Kumaun,
with a density of 540 persons per square mile (Pant 1935: 76).
By the early 20th century, the drain of manpower from the
hills of Nepal ceased to be primarily a seasonal phenomenon
(Kansakar 1984: 4969). A factor responsible for increasing
migration from Western Nepal to Kumaun was the underde-
velopment of the Far-Western Tarai, which was yet to be
reclaimed. The actual development of the Tarai would have to
wait for the malaria eradication programme, of the World
Health Organization, which only arrived in 1965.
Another fallout of British control was the recruitment of
Gurkhas16 into the British Army. Initially it was a covert
arrangement because the Nepal government did not approve
clandestine operations for recruitment and took punitive
measures. This did not result in compliance. The British then
encouraged migration and Gurkha establishments came up
in Dharamshala, Darjeeling, Shillong and Dehradun. The Rana
regime, which came to power in 1846, realised the futility of
the embargo. It even established an office in Baitadi Jhulaghat
to recruit soldiers for the British Army (RRS 1982: 61). By 1904,
three Gurkha battalions of 1816 had swelled into 16, and by
1908, the Gurkha Brigade had reached its permanent estab-
lishment of 20 battalions organised in 10 rifle regiments. It is
estimated that 2,00,000 Nepalese participated in World War I
with casualties amounting to 2,00,000 (Kansakar 1984: 52).
The emergence of Gurkhas as a race with exceptional mar-
tial qualities is also a product of a new dispensation (Caplan
2006: 22545). The internal differentiation between the vari-
ous cultural groups of Nepal that is Magar, Gurung, Limbu,
Rai were brought under a single etonym of Gurkha.
KumaunWestern Tibet Borderlands
Regular trade between Kumaun and Western Tibet may be
traced back to the ninth century. The routes were difficult and
Kumauni folklore is replete with adventures on these journeys.
Early travellers to Kumaun and Garhwal also noted the inno-
vative nature of the communication system in the hills. For
example, Hardwicke who travelled to Srinagar in 1796 found
74
that the Nayar River was crossed by canoes made from the
bark of trees (Hardwicke 1801: 30947). Other visitors like
Colebrooke and Moorcroft were appalled by the difficulty
encountered in negotiating the route (Colebrooke 1812: 429
45, Moorcroft 1816: 37535).
KumaunWestern Tibet trade was linked to the exigencies
of nomadism in the upper Himalayas and was in the hands of
the Bhotias (a term applied to traders of Upper Himalayas
conducting trade with the trans-Himalayan regions) who com-
bined the role of shepherds with merchants. Tibet was accessi-
ble through the mountain passes, which were open for about
six months of the year. Trade was carried on by migration from
one set of summer dwellings situated in high cold valleys
towards the Tibetan frontier. These summer habitations at
Milam, Martoli, Burfu, Go, Garbyang, Kuti and Nabi served as
bases for the Tibetan trade, and as depots and stores for the
exports to Tibet (Pant 1935: 4860). The summer residences
were close to the bugyal/payar (meadows) where the Bhoti-
as would take their flock for summer pasturing. Usually two
trips to Tibet were undertaken during the summer and the raw
wool from Tibet was spun and woven by the women while
residing in the summer camps. By late September and early
October, the shift to the winter residences in the warmer
localities such as Tejam, Dharchula, Sobla, Thal, Galanti,
Nigalpani and Askot would begin. The major transactions
were carried on at the various fairs.
The Bhotia traders were not a homogeneous undifferenti-
ated community. The difference between the Johari and those
of Darma and Byans can be traced back to the 17th century
when the Joharis were able to extract special concessions from
Tibetan authorities.17 This obviously gave them an edge over
the other Bhotias. The difficulties faced by this trade neces-
sitated the elaboration of a rigorous system to regulate trade
practices. New entrants to the trade were discouraged by the
practice of mitras/designated partner, which sanctioned trade
and was initiated by a religious ceremony. Even the amount of
exchange was controlled and decided beforehand to prevent
an increase in the supply of particular goods. Traders were
restricted to trade with their partners, and traders of a certain
region were required to trade with a particular region in Tibet.
This also prevented a glut in the market and provided a system
of monitoring and regulating the volume of trade along the
passes. The difficulties of the terrain, were overcome by the
use of sheep and goats as carriers. Sheep could carry up to
1528 seers and goats from 810 seers. The routes traversed
took many days and yaks were often used in the most difficult
parts, and sometimes hybrid yaks known as Jibus were also
used. The exchange was carried on by barter and the exchange
rate varied from three to four of wheat or rice for one of salt
(Traill 1992: 13334).
While Europeans had attempted to find routes into the
trans-Himalaya from the 17th century onwards, it was the
British who were able to establish important trade links. The
EICs interest in the Himalayan and trans-Himalayan trade
was part of its search for new commodities for exchange bet-
ween Asia and Europe. With the acquisition of Bengal, the
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English realised the significance of commercial intercourse be-
tween Bengal and Tibet and were keen to expand their net-
work and to participate in this trade. Warren Hastings sent
George Bogle to Tibet in 1774 by way of Bhutan. The British
traders were interested in the Tibetan trade, because they
hoped to enter the Central Asian and Chinese trade via Tibet.
They felt that Tibet could be accessed through Kumaun in spite
of the closure of Nepal to British trade (RRS 1973: 14859, 16771).
John Pemble suggests that the EICs interest in Tibet and the
trans-Himalayan trade was determined by various factors.
Tibet was known as a source of precious metals, which would
have helped to rectify the drain of silver from Britain to India.
Tibet could also provide a market for English cloth and woollens,
and Tibet could grant the British access to shawls, a commodity
which could replace Indian cotton goods (Pemble 1971: 5486).
By 1815, however, it appears that the calculation may have
changed because the flow of treasure from Britain was not re-
quired because investment came from the revenues of Bengal.
Eagerness to open new markets for English woollens also was
not easy to implement and though interest in shawl wool did
persist, it was constrained by considerations of good relations
with the Sikhs, who controlled flow of wool from Kashmir.
The Bhotia Traders
The takeover of Kumaun by the EIC affected the IndoTibetan
trade, which was in flux during the turbulent period of the
18th century. Increasing monetisation created a problem for the
Bhotia traders who needed to invest large amounts of capital
in non-barter trade. Bhotia traders had suffered from heavy
exactions by the Gorkha government when the revenues of
Bhot were farmed out to local moneylenders and financiers.18
Many Bhotias were thus indebted to the Sahukars of
Almora. The trend towards monetisation was clearly evident
in the Bhabar (south) trade circuit. By the 1930s, the Bhabar
trade was conducted in cash (Pant 1935: 16671). Like the
Gorkhas before them, the British also resented the monopoly
of the Bhotias over the IndoTibetan trade. The Gorkhas had
encouraged the residents of Nagpur, Dasauli and other parga-
nas to enter the trade but they made little impact (Atkinson
1981: Vol III, part II, p 140). In 1815, Rutherford who was in
charge of the Companys investment in Moradabad proposed a
deputation to Tibet with a view to open up the trade between
the company and the natives of that country. He noticed that
the Almora merchants who came to Kashipur for purchase of
English cloths and manufactures went back to Almora and
sold them to the Bhotias. From there, the Bhotia trade carried
it to Gartok and other places in Tibet, thus four sets of profits
were made on the goods and this so enhanced the price (Atkin-
son 1981, Vol III, part II, p 138). Yet attempts at direct inter-
course of the company with Tibet were soon abandoned.
By the middle of the 19th century, interest in borax from
Tibet had fallen because of the discovery of mines in Tuscany
and manufacture from boric acid. Though trade in borax con-
tinued, it was no longer a commodity in great demand. The
British were primarily interested in the wool trade. The Sikh
interest in wool, with the campaign of Zorawar Singh and his
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
entry into Tibet brought tensions with the Sikhs to the fore. An
aspect of the AngloSikh war of the 1840s was the desire to
break the monopoly of Ladakh and Kashmir merchants over
the wool trade (Dutta 1970: 1628; Brown 1992: 14672). After
the Treaty of Amritsar in 1846, the British border was extend-
ed, and gradually Tibetan trade was integrated into the British
imperial system. British presence at the borders gradually led
to the restructuring of the wool trade.
By the 1870s, there was an increase in the imports of raw
wool, and a consequent decline in the imports of manufac-
tured woollen goods (Atkinson 1981: Vol III, part II, p 139).
This was linked to the development of the woollen mills at
Kanpur (Pant 1935: 62). The growing demand for raw wool
led to an increase in the import of raw wool from Tibet, and
the upper Himalayas of Kumaun. By the 1890s, the amount of
wool brought down to Tanakpur, in the east, had increased,
and the Bhotias were being paid advances by the Kanpur
mills for its supply. The demand for raw wool generated
through the advances given by the Kanpur mills also led to
the diversification of wool from Kulu to Almora. Over the 19th
century, local handloom industry declined, and raw wool was
diverted to Kanpur. By the 20th century, this had restruc-
tured the wool trade and brought the Kumaun and Tibet
economies into the ambit of the British Empire (Brown 1994:
21558; Pant 1935: 16671).
British state policy continued attempts to break the monop-
oly of Bhotia trade. For example, the British Chambers of
Commerce welcomed the 1886 Convention because it opened
up Tibet to British trade (Brown 1992: 14672). Yet the difficulty
of penetrating Tibetan commerce remained and British pres-
sure was mounted on Tibet by the expedition of Colonel Youn-
ghusband, which yielded three trade agencies in Tibet, that is,
Yatung, Gyantse and Gartok in 1904 (McKay 1997: xxvi). The
assault on monopolistic trade, eventually led to the Treaty of
Lhasa in 1904, which introduced free trade and changed the
old order of things (Sherring 1906: 118). Thakur Jai Chand
was appointed agent, and the district commissioner of Almora
made the first official visit in 1905.
Over the 19th century, the Bhotias faced not only a major
decline in trade in borax but as a result of better linkages with
the south, the Bhotia trader suffered decline in (barter trade)
demand for salt. Sambhar salt from the plains was cheaper
than Tibetan salt and made inroads into Kumaun. The rising
prices of grain, and frequent grain shortages in the last years
of the 19th century and the early years of the 20th century
probably facilitated the shift to plains salt in the monetised
regions of Kumaun. By the 1930s, trade in salt and borax had
diminished enormously owing to Italian borax and salt from
the plains (Pant 1935: 120).
The commodity structure of IndoTibetan exporimport
trade by the last years of the 19th century indicates a transforma-
tion as indicated by the Administration Reports of the North
Western Provinces 1897, 1898, 1899. Earlier, grain was one of
the major commodities for export from Kumaun to Tibet. The
decline in grain exports around the 1890s can be linked to the
increase in agricultural prices and to grain shortages. This can
75
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
also be linked to the increase in export of European cloth to
Tibet over the 19th century.
The close and intimate relationship between the Himalaya
and the trans-Himalaya was eroded, and the monopolistic
structure, which regulated the trade declined. Imperial
markets penetrated not only the Kumaun Himalaya but also
Western Tibet highlands. Local industries based on woollen
production declined, because of an increase in the exports of
raw wool, and the local industries of Kashipur and Jaspur
which had provided locally manufactured cotton cloth were
overtaken by European cloth, and Indian yarn.19
The Kumaun intelligentsia attributed the impoverishment
of Kumaun to the decline of trade in borax, salt, and local wool
industry.20 The system of free trade through the agency system
did not simplify the trade situation, and Bhotia complaints
against the system multiplied. In 1905, Sherrings visit to Tibet
and his negotiations with the Jongpons did not result in any
major benefits for the Bhotias or other traders, and the Brit-
ish agent remained ineffective (Sherring 1906: 157). In 1919,
the Bhotias complained that they were being denied access
to a mart beyond Gartok, and the Shakti of 1925 also noted
that the new trade policy was creating a fresh set of problems
for the Bhotia traders.
The Johari group was the most articulate of the Bhotia
groups. Its visibility was also an aspect of its linkage with the
intelligentsia of the Kumaun region. In 1920, the Johar branch
of the Kumaun Parishad was inaugurated. The Johar traders
functioned as a group and established the Johar Himalaya
Company with an initial capital of `20,000. It had five direc-
tors and was engaged in the wool trade. It advertised regularly
in the local newspaper and booked orders by value payable
post (VPP).21 The innovativeness of the Johar traders helped
them to adapt to the changing demands of trade caused by the
integration of Kumaun with the British economic system.
The Bhotias found themselves under pressure because of
the demands of the colonial regime. They had to pay a large
number of taxes to the governmentland tax, a tax on
livestock, a tax on trade, toll tax, income tax, along with taxes
to the Nepal and Tibet governments.22 They were also required
to pay a pasturage fee for transit through areas declared
reserved forest. In the region of Kali Kumaun, on the Tanakpur
route where the Bhotias had established a wool and borax
depot, the forest guards made life particularly difficult for the
Bhotias.23 By the 1930s, the Bhotias were no longer in
control either of trade routes or trade. In the south, they were
supplanted by new trading groups (Pant 1935: 222), and the
Kumaun villager was becoming accustomed to the commercial
Muslim traveller and to the itinerant middleman invariably
from the poor soil pattis of Tikhun and Phaldakot.
IndoTibetan trade, therefore, appears to have been sub-
jected to three phases of change. The first can be seen from
1815 to 1850, with some changes as a sequel to the AngloSikh
war and the extension of the British boundary up to Tibet. The
second from 1850 to 1890 which resulted in the integration of
the trans-Himalayan economy with the British imperial system,
and the third from 18901930 when a major restructuring of
76
the IndoTibetan trade occurred. Towards the early years of
the 20th century, the Bhotias faced a new situation. The
relationship between the trans-Himalaya and the Himalaya
was eroded by the advent of new modes of transport and com-
munication. The commodity composition of trade was modi-
fied, and the Bhotias lost their monopoly. The colonisation of
the Kumaun economy changed the structure of its trade; the
trans-Himalaya lost its significance, and Kumaun looked
southwards, beyond the Tarai.
A significant aspect of the mapping of the IndoTibetan
trade from Kumaun was the emergence of the term Bhotia
which has consistently been marked with double inverted
commas, because it was contested by the people for whom the
term was used. This contestation may be read in different
ways. Brown in a paper entitled What We Call Bhotias Are in
Reality Not Bhotias, suggests that the Bhotias claim to be
part of the Himalayan region and do not identify with Tibet
(Brown 1992: 14772). Nawa (2000: 3657) and Bergmann et
al (2008: 12229) also refer to the point that the term has
pejorative connotations. A problem with the term is that it
obscures the specific identities of different groups identified by
separate valleys, but the major concern is a refusal to be identi-
fied with Tibetan cultural traditions (Pande 2015: 1828). This
points to a southward orientation.
Conclusions
To the imperial order, the Himalayas and the trans-Himalaya
held out the promise of trade with China and Central Asia, but
it took almost a century to establish control. An infrastructure
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APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA

of roads and communications was required along with knowl-
edge about the region. Over the 19th century, the British
marked their dominion through a network of roads and also
through a massive cartographic exercise, mapping the Hima-
layas and the trans-Himalayas (Burrard and Hayden 1907).
Gradually, the Tibetan blockade crumbled, and the British
were able to enter the trans-Himalayan trade and break into
the various trade circuits that spanned the Himalaya and
trans-Himalaya. In the process, they affected and transformed
an intricate patchwork of agro-pastoral regimes that knit
together a variety of ecological niches vertically and laterally.
This paper provides a tiny window into the extensive disar-
ticulation and reconfiguration that resulted from the British
demarcation of borders in the highlands of Asia. We also need
to reflect on the impact of this process on cultural affiliations
and identity formations. The integration of the Kumaun
borderland into the British Empire altered its coordinates in
several ways. Linkage with the Indian subcontinent, via the
Tarai, foregrounded a sensibility premised on caste and Brah-
minical traditions (Pande 2013). The northward orientation
towards Tibet was eroded, and most histories of Kumaun writ-
ten in the colonial period make only a fleeting reference to
Western Tibet (in spite of a large number of references to Tibet
in folk legends as pointed out by Pande 1990/1937). As noted
earlier, even the Far-Western Region of Nepal was brought into
the ambit of the Empire, but in an indirect manner.
In the Far-Western Nepal borderlands, we find a muted but
nevertheless caste-based Hindu social system, developing in
consonance with the legal code, Muluki-Ain of 1856. This
obscured the historical dominance of the Khasa of Jumla, and
the word Khasa acquired pejorative connotations in both
Kumaun and Western Nepal. In Nepal, it was replaced by the
term Chettri, in Kumaun it was replaced by Rajput. Even the
famous Nepalese anthropologist Dor Bahadur Bista did not
include the Khasa in the first edition of his ethnography
of Nepal (1996). It was G Tucci, the Italian explorer and
historian, who brought to light the shared connection with
Western Tibet of the Malla kings of Jumla from as early as the
12th century (1956). Over the 19th and 20th centuries, the
term Gurkha acquired global recognition because of its use
by the British Army. The identification of Gurkhas as a martial
race by Hamilton (1819: 19) and later by Hodgson (1874: part II,
pp 3744) produced a persistent discourse on martial races
(Caplan 2006: 26081).
As for Western Tibet, the Forbidden Land attracted the ad-
venturer, the explorer, the seeker, and the pilgrim. By the early
decades of the 20th century, European adventurers and ex-
plorers enchanted by the landscapes of the trans-Himalayas
created the myth of Shangri-La. In contrast to Central Tibet,
Western Tibet proved more accessible, but Tibet emerged from
this exercise as an extraordinary cultural formation nurtured
in rugged isolation, shorn of its long historical connections with
the entire gamut of Himalayan cultures (from East to West). In
this representation, the Western Tibet borderland was reduced
to a region best known for the Kailash Mansarovar dyad, a place
for pilgrimage. For example, Kumauni elites redefined the
Tibet connection primarily as a Hindu pilgrimage to Kailash
Manasarovar in Manaskhand, a text full of Puranic allusions
with no historical resonance (Pande 1989). This process ob-
scured the long historical links, dating to prehistory and the
period of the Tibetan Empire.
British marking of dominion through roads and trade networks
also created a new understanding of the region, and conse-
quently, its history and culture. This new knowledge empha-
sised racial difference. Two terms used by the British to describe
Himalayan peoplesGurkha (Caplan 2006: 26081) and
Bhotia (Brown 1992; Bergman 2016) have clear racial over-
tones and have generated a fair amount of discussion. Tibetan cul-
ture was marked as Mongoloid, the other of the IndoAryan.
Central Himalayan cultures were recognised primarily as Indo
Aryan with the TibetoBurman traditions confined to the north-
ern fringe. This understanding was also a product of British rule.

notes
1 http://himalaya.socanth.cam.ac.uk/collectio-
ns/maps/iah/54-traderoute_color.pdf.
2 A significant aspect of the mapping of the Indo-
Tibetan trade from Kumaun was the emer-
gence of the term Bhotia which I consistently
mark with double inverted commas, because it
was contested by the people for whom the term
was used.
3 Pre-Mutiny Records, Revenue Letters Issued
(RLI), 31 March 1845.
4 Pre-Mutiny Records, RLI, 17 November 1848.
5 Pre-Mutiny Records, RLI, 22 April 1855.
6 Beckett Settlement Report, appendix 38 D.
7 Almora District Gazetteer Supplementary Notes
and Statistics, Vol XXXV, p 11.
8 Vernacular Newspaper Reports, 9 June 1890,
p 213.
9 Shakti, 4 February 1919.
10 Almora Akhbar, 25 October 1893, cited in
Vernacular Newspaper Reports, 4 October 1893.
11 Almora Akhbar, 21 August 1916.
12 Resolution re Bringing Kumaun under the Civil
Jurisdiction of the High Court, UP Legislative
Council Proceedings, Vol XX, 1924, Allahabad
1925: 18698.
13 Administration Reports of the North Western
Provinces, 1897, 1898, 1899.
14 Administration Report North Western Provinces,
18991900.
15 Pre-Mutiny Records, RLI, Vol 17.
16 Nepali people in military service with the British
were referred to as Gurkha, though in Nepal,
no group would respond to Gurkha.
17 Pre-Mutiny Records, RLI Vol 7, 1821.
18 Private Papers, Jugal Rais, Almora.
19 Administration Reports of North Western
Provinces, 1899: 13652.
20 Almora Akhbar, 21 August 1900.
21 Shakti, 25 February 1921.
22 Shakti, 24 February 1925.
23 Shakti, 8 December 1923.
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vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Bureaucracy and Border Control
Crime, Police Reform and National Security in Kutch, 194852
Farhana Ibrahim
Studies on militarisation and borders in South Asia have
often remained focused on zones of spectacular conflict
such as Kashmir, or Punjab during the partition. This
article tracks the production of a discourse on borders by
those charged with border security such as the police
and other senior bureaucracy in the decades following
the partition. It suggests that the border question
evolved gradually out of a series of everyday concerns
over local criminality that finally coalesced into the more
abstract category of national security. It examines
bureaucratic debates on police reorganisation in Kutch
between 1948 and 1952 to suggest that contemporary
discourses on nation and borders were arrived at
through intra-bureaucratic negotiations with the far less
abstract categories of village, locality and region.
Farhana Ibrahim (brahim.farhana@gmail.com) is with the Department
of Humanities and Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology
Delhi, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
A
nthropologists have written extensively on nationalism
(Handler 1988; Munasinghe 2002; Verdery 1991;
Williams 1989). Borderlands are conceptual sites at
which the relationship between the state and nation has been
productively interrogated and historicised (Bhan 2008; Cons
2016; Gupta 2013; Ibrahim 2009; Van Schendel 2004). I con-
tend here that the anthropological literature on borderlands
must also take seriously the mundane and banal ways in
which a bureaucratic discourse on borders is produced. I argue
that this discourse often precedesbut is also influenced by
the collective imagination of the national community, and its
attendant rules for sanctioning legitimate claims on citizen-
ship, identity and belonging, even as it delegitimises other
ways of being as anti or not properly national. Due to con-
straints of access to contemporary official paperwork pertain-
ing to aspects of national security that are deemedthough
not always consistentlysensitive, an ethnography of the
bureaucracy with regards to borderlands must necessarily
turn towards an earlier period wherethrough cracks in the
officially constituted archivessome sort of narrative may be
crafted.1 Thus in this article, I take an ethnographic excursion
into the first few years after partition, a period that provides a
fascinating sense of how freshly drawn up territorial borders
were translated into practice on the ground.
Bureaucratic letter writing at the time provides a glimpse
into the following kinds of questions: what did the new border
mean to law enforcement agents and to borderland residents?
How were village disputes, thefts of cattle and sacred idols,
and cross-border incursions reported? How were transgres-
sions of the border viewed? What were some of the concerns
around reorganising police and paramilitary forces in the
region? Far from being self-evident, I argue here that the new
border had to be produced on a fairly continuous basis through
letters, paperwork and administrative action. As the substance
of the article will demonstrate, neither the border as a physical
entity nor the territorial anxietythat typically marks the
postcolonial borders of South Asiawere necessarily uni-
formly or ubiquitously manifested.
Early Discourse on Borderlands and Belonging
An ethnographic reading of bureaucratic writing, during the
late 1940s, suggests that the newly established postcolonial
state did not have a clear or unambiguous understanding of
the how the border was to be managed. Muslims, constituting
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
a majority of the borders resident citizens, exacerbate the
postcolonial states position on national belongingwhere the
self-professed Muslim states of Pakistan and Bangladesh are
countered by ideas of a predominantly Hindu Indiaeven
as they become poster children for Indias so-called policy of
tolerance towards its minorities; therefore, allowing the
state to craft a nationalist narrative in contradistinction to its
immediate neighbours.
Given what we know to be the communally divisive atmos-
phere during partition, including contemporary nationalist
discourses that seek to craft a predominantly Hindu nationalist
narrative, it is possible to trace the roots of present-day practices
of exclusionary citizenship back to the early postcolonial
years. As Niraja Gopal Jayal argues in Citizenship and Its
Discontents (2013), current debates on citizenship in India that
seek to exclude the Muslim immigrants from their claims to
nationality, are informed by the early Constituent Assembly
debates on the subject thereby, retaining the shadow of the
partition. I have suggested elsewhere that these debates can be
traced even beyond partition, so that the partition of 1947 is
not seen as a singular ideological rupture in the Constitution
of debates around citizenship and belonging.2 However, the
material addressed in this article suggests that, even during
the political upheavals of 1947 and its immediate aftermath
neither did the state machinery nor the borderland residents
act in any predictable or preordained manner.
By tracking the bureaucratic production of border manage-
ment practices along Indias western border, specifically the
borderlands that divided Kutchnow a district in the Western
Indian state of Gujarat but at the time it was a state directly
administered by New Delhiand Pakistans southern prov-
ince of Sindh, I will suggest first, that subsequent to the
announcement of a formal partition, functionaries of the state
did not uniformly grasp the border in the abstract terms of the
nation state and concomitantly, of national security. Second,
belonging was discussed in terms of village and region instead
of the nation at large. Border security was often posited in
local termsthe safety of village property and personsrath-
er than in terms of the nation. Third, the material examined
here challenges the assumption that it is the prerogative of the
state to speak in terms of abstract national interest, which is
then further challenged by subaltern narratives of resistance
by those on its territorial margins. It will become evident here,
that rather than being constituted by the states discourse,
which was uneven, contradictory and often mired in the
language of locality, subaltern citizens on the states border-
lands often articulated nationalist concerns with clarity and
prescience thus, transcending the discourse of locality.
History of Border Management
Until 1965when the first cross-border armed conflict took
place on this bordera border management regime gradually
emerged, but it did not always have a clearly defined direction.
Some key questions included: how was the KutchSindh
border to be policed? Should it be subject to a specially-crafted
security regime now that it was a national boundary, or was it
80
sufficient to continue with pre-existing arrangements? What
was to be the policy governing the movements of those who
lived in border villages, many of whom were Muslim and had
family or friends on the other side?
Far from being taken for granted at the time of partition,
border management was actively produced through a series of
written exchanges that shuttled back and forth between the
administrative headquarters of Kutch, at Bhuj, and the Gov-
ernment of India (GoI) in New Delhi. A close reading of the
correspondence with regards to law enforcement and police
reorganisation in Kutch before 1965, allows one to trace a
gradualbut by no means linearcrystallisation of a regime
of citizenship and nationality over the border question. In the
following sections I will examine the administrative debates
on police reorganisation in Kutch between 1948when the
former princely state acceded to the Indian union of states
and 1952, to show that contemporary concerns around nation-
al security in border regions were eventually arrived at
through moments of non-linear negotiation, with the far less
abstract categories of village, locality and region. Letters and
bureaucratic memoranda also provide a glimpse into the con-
stitution of the nation via various publics that were seen as
the rationale for firm border management practices. The initial
threat of an unprotected border was posited to a secular and a
far more locally grounded public; for example, rich regional
merchants who suffered losses of property at the hands of
bandits and thieves. Over a period of time, by the 1950s, this
threat was couched in a more specific and abstract vein: the
nation is threatened by both an unprotected border as well as
by potentially treacherous Muslims who reside within the
border. Finally, the role played by borderland people in the
production of a bureaucratic discourse is neither passive nor
is it that of a predetermined opposition. Through a dialogic
engagement with the bureaucracy, they are far more central to
the process of state formation than is usually assumed of the
subaltern citizen.
The article is also an ethnographic illustration of the docu-
mentary practices of the newly postcolonial state, which belie
the coherence of an ideal-typical, Weberian rational bureau-
cratic regime. Taking on the observation that archival work
often remains extractive rather than ethnographic (Stoler
2002), it looks not just at the content of bureaucratic docu-
ments located in archives or government offices, but also pays
attention to the conditions of their production (Tarlo 2001).
Bureaucrats in service of the newly minted nation state were
not necessarily rationalist automatons executing their tasks in
favour of a predefined nationalist goal. Not only were these
goalposts not always very clearly defined, but these bureau-
crats also exercised their own judgment as the bearers of
specific structures of feeling (Stoler 2002: 10102). Veena Das
(2007) observation, that bureaucratic modes of inscription are
not only amenable to mimetic reproduction by others but that
they are also malleable in their interpretation by state func-
tionaries, becomes crucial for this article as will become
evident in subsequent sections. Also fluid, are the subjectivities
of those who are charged with the production of bureaucratic
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

orders. By remaining attentive to the production of a bureau-
cratic discourse around borders, the article also contributes to
ethnographic studies of the state, bureaucracy and adminis-
tration, where paperwork is a core ethnographic object (Gupta
2012; Mathur 2016; Navaro-Yashin 2012). Rather than examin-
ing the effects of bureaucratic paperwork on the people who
encounter it or who are sought to be constituted through it
(Navaro-Yashin 2012), I maintain that the paperwork consti-
tutes a dialogic encounter between state and citizen. Between
the movement of administrative files and secret memoranda
within the bureaucracy, and the circulation of petitions sub-
mitted by citizens to the state, we get a glimpse into the consti-
tution of the border, as a particular kind of jurisdictional
space, by both state and citizen.
Partition and the Bureaucracy: Making New Borders
There is an abundance of emerging scholarship on the parti-
tion that discusses how each new border was experienced
through various temporalities in different regions. Recent
studies have focused on the fallout, of how partitions borders
affected migration, citizenship and refugee status for instance
in Kashmir (Robinson 2012), Kargil (Gupta 2013), Bengal in
1947 (Chatterji 2007) and in 1971 (Kabir 2013; Alexander et al
2016), and in Sindh (Kothari 2007). Each of them adds new
ways of thinking about partitions in South Asia. The emergent
relationship between religion, region, and state along these
distinct but also quite malleable borders is far from stable;
challenging not only the notion of a clear-cut territorial or
emotional boundary but also of 1947 as the moment of
partition. An important body of work has highlighted the
political and bureaucratic machinations that unravel the
notion either of a spontaneous surge of people across the
border, fuelled by a desire to relocate to the right side,
or even of a surgical partition of territories and people
(Chatterji 2007; Das 1995; Zamindar 2007).
Vazira Zamindar makes a compelling argument for the
bureaucratic stakes at play during partition. In The Long Parti-
tion and the Making of Modern South Asia (2007), she writes of
how a Hindu rehabilitation in India could only be premised on a
Muslim evacuation to Pakistan. The so-called Muslim exodus
from Delhi in the immediate aftermath of 1947, was not only a
flight from a state that was increasingly unwilling to protect
Muslims who also wanted to stay on in India (Kidwai 2011), but
it was also the product of a bureaucratic discourse that used a
subjective evaluation of intention to migrate, rather than the
desire to return as a key determinant of Indian citizenship for
Muslims (Zamindar 2007: 84). As early as 1948, a significant tide
of Muslim evacuees chose to return to their Indian homes but
the Indian state would not accept them, creating in effect the
introduction of citizenship provisions ahead of the constitu-
tion itself (Zamindar 2007: 79; Jayal 2013). In contrast to this
are those Hindu women whom the Indian state classified as
abducted by Muslims and then sought to recover, regard-
less of the formers own desires (Das 1995). In the east, on the
other hand, the movement of refugees in 1947 was not treated
with the same finality as it was in Punjab; evacuee property
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
was not taken over by the state, the assumption being that the
refugees headed eastward might return to take possession of
their homes (Chatterji 2007). Similar assumptions configured
the refugee regime in the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir,
whose displaced were not considered to be partition refugees
at all (Robinson 2012). Moreover, at the first inter-Dominion
conference held in Calcutta between India and Pakistan in
April 1948, both states agreed to take the necessary steps to
prevent a large-scale population exodus along the lines of
what had occurred in the Punjab (Chatterji 2013).
While the partition of Punjab and Bengal are sometimes
contrasted to represent two types of partition experiences
with regards to state policy and migration patternsthis article
suggests that state policy regarding borders is the result of
complex and uneven debates at various levels of administration
even within a single borderland. This follows the identification
of bureaucracies as sites of affect and personalisation, which
is somewhat removed from the Weberian ideal of the bureau-
cratic rationality. While there is no doubt that bureaucratic
documents produce an affect among citizens (Navaro-Yashin
2012), they are also written by people who have particular views
on the subject matter under discussion. Zamindar (2007: 9091)
draws attention to the marginal notes in official files that
demonstrate that state policy was often directly influenced by
the ideas and prejudices of those individuals whose notations
appeared on files. Similarly, Joya Chatterji (2013) has argued
that the political elites of India and Pakistan met at the Cal-
cutta Conference of 1948 and cooperated to produce a secular
language to deal with the disorder and chaos that had ensued
from the partition. She suggests that even within an overall
atmosphere of communal violence, administrators on either
side were able to secure peace in terms that were based on a
shared class habitus of the governing elite, who were more
concerned with the containment of disorder from the lower
ranks; The idea that it was lowly functionaries at the bottom
of the food chain who spread the contagion of communalism,
while their enlightened superiors looked on in horror
(Chatterji 2013: 46).
This produced an overlapping consensus (Chatterji 2013:
47) between the two otherwise hostile states, over the man-
agement of the social mayhem in the wake of partition. Chat-
terji suggests that this language eventually permeated the dis-
course of crime and border management in the West, where there
was a corresponding shift in the reporting of cross-border raids
and incursions away from terms, that were unequivocally
communal and increasingly as secular crimes against per-
sons and property (Chatterji 2013: 4748).
In Kutch, class-conflict, rural disaffection and other non-
communal motives were attributed to crime and cross-border
incursions, but these reports also coexisted with a far more
broadly understood communal discourse that was attributed
to Muslim criminals and more specifically of anti-national
intent. While the latter view was more prevalent among the
Kutch police department, senior bureaucrats especially in
their missives to New Delhi were more likely to read the crime
and border question in the more secular categories of law
81
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
enforcement and the maintenance of local public order. The
making of a political discourse around borders is therefore a
far cry from a homogeneous or linear process; key differences
in perception between the local and national administration
belie notions of a singular discourse on nation and borders.
The bureaucracy is itself the site of multiple discursive strands,
which contest and compete with each other in the production
of official policy. Attention to the intra-bureaucratic domain
becomes a crucial step in moving away from the tendency in
academic work to reify state institutions into overtly purpose-
ful, unitary, and motivated actors (Gupta 2012: 187).
Police Reorganisation and Cross-border Crime
In 1948, S R Chaudhri, the inspector general of police (IGP) of
Delhi and AjmerMerwara, toured Kutch prior to submitting
his recommendations on police reorganisation for the region.
He was quite categorical in his recommendations, noting that
there was no need for the commission of a separate border
police force in the region. In his report on the reorganisation of
Kutch police dated 2 February 1949, he wrote:
As Kutch touches the boundary of Pakistan, the question of providing
police for the border was carefully considered. The physical features
of the country are, fortunately, helpful that way. There is a waste land
(Rann) to the depth of between 40 to 60 miles, all along the border
where there is no population or habitation. That is sufficient deter-
ment for any raider from Pakistan area to visit any of the villages in
Kutch State near the border for purposes of loot only. I was also told
that the people on both sides of the border are interrelated and are
mostly Muslims; so there can be very little communal motive behind a
raid. There have been a few incidents near the border, but they related
mostly to the satisfaction of private grudges against each other by the
men from the other side. There have been no border raids of the type
that is the case on the borders of Amritsar, Gurdaspur and Ferozepur
districts in the East Punjab. It would not, therefore, be necessary to
have a special police force for the purpose of protecting the border
only.3 (emphasis added)
Chaudhri proposed that the existing police stations at border
outposts were sufficient to tackle smuggling activities through
known routes. Muslims on either side of the border were not
perceived to be a threat to the Indian nation per se, so in this
view, cross-border raids from Pakistan could only have a local
and not a communal or even anti-national motive. In his reck-
oning, cross-border ties of kinship did not threaten the stability
of the nation. In fact, they created a joint local community that
was invested in maintaining peace in the neighbourhood.
Chaudhris views, however, differed sharply from the sugges-
tions on police reorganisation made by the local commissioner
of police in Kutch, H R Thakkar. Some months earlier, in a
letter dated 10 November 1948, Thakkar had written to the
chief commissioner, who was the highest administrative of-
ficer in Kutch,4 broaching the subject of police reorganisation.5
Describing his inspection of the Bhuj police headquarters and
the city police station, Thakkar expressed deep shock. The
constables were shabbily turned out, he wrote; they hardly
appeared to have any rudimentary knowledge of drill. Such
deplorable conditions were never seen or heard of even in
the most backward units of Kathiawar or any backward native
state. The predominantly Muslim composition of the force was
82
also a cause for concern. He observed, a majority of the men
are illiterate and Muslims, and urged that a firm overhaul in
standards of recruitment was required. Kutch, he added, is
more vulnerable to Pakistan activities, and therefore a strong,
well-trained armed strength and intelligent LIB (Local Intelli-
gence Bureau) are fundamentally needed. A month later, he
wrote again to the chief commissioner underscoring the need
for a strong police force, well trained in intelligence gathering,
to check the ingress into the province from Pakistan side (sic)
or on the suspected smuggling activities.6
This letter contained a detailed proposal for the reconstitution
of Kutchs police force, touching on almost all aspects of organisa-
tion: dress, recruitment, training, housing, salary, mounted
constabulary, intelligence, and the institution of village police.
Since police stations on the northern border were facing
Pakistan and were inaccessible during the monsoons, he recom-
mended the installation of a wireless transmitting station at
each of these police stations. In contrast to the visiting IGPs
assessment, the police commissioner in Kutch was of the firm
view that the border required specific attention from a security
point of view. He wrote, The Northern Boundary of Kutch fac-
es Pakistan and intensified police patrolling is essential on this
border. Acknowledging the increased vulnerability of Kutch to
Pakistan activities, he felt that a strong mounted patrol on
the border line is all the more necessary for security purposes.
Based on these firm and unequivocal recommendations,
chief commissioner C K Desai forwarded a scheme for police
reorganisation to the Ministry of States (MoS) at the GoI in
New Delhi on 11 December 1948. In April of the following year,
he had still not received a reply from the MoS, by which time
Chaudhri had already circulated his note dismissing the need
for special border security. On 15 April 1949, on being prodded
yet again by an impatient police commissioner, chief commis-
sioner Desai followed up with a gentle reminder to the MoS,
stating that he was still awaiting a final order on police reor-
ganisation from the ministry.7 It is worth noting that this letter
neither carried a reference to the undefended frontiers of
Kutch, nor to the vulnerabilities of the Kutch frontier to
Pakistan activity; so deeply underscored in the letters he had
received from the police commissioner, who had urged him to
forward his case to the MoS. In his communication with New
Delhi, Desai chose instead to highlight the threat to public
order from the recent increase in dacoities that caused
nuisance to the local public mind:
Only a couple of days back a serious dacoity8 [sic] took place at the
village Dumara where property worth `70,000 was looted. The fam-
ine conditions also have led to discontented people committing crimes.
Most of the rich Kutchees live in Bombay and have fairly large estates
in the villages in Kutch. Naturally when there are dacoities in the vil-
lages, these rich merchants in Bombay get nervous and the accounts
of dacoities are published in the newspapers, owned or sponsored by
them, in glowing colours. This in turn leads to an amount of insecu-
rity and agitation in the local public mind. I therefore consider that it
is absolutely necessary that the police reorganisation scheme is sanc-
tioned at an early date, as otherwise it is not possible to recruit suitable
men in the police department. I hope you will give this matter your
personal attention, and have the orders issued at an early date.9 (em-
phasis added)
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In his argument submitted to New Delhi, the chief commis-
sioner did not imply that the increase in criminal activity in
Kutch had anything to do either with its proximity to the bor-
der, nor to the fact that the perpetrators may have come from
Pakistan. On the contrary, he makes a clear and unambiguous
connection between famine and economic discontent that
leads to criminal activity in the countryside. The local public
mind is a secular, classed category comprised of rich mer-
chants, who were worried about thefts on their large estates.
We do not know what religion the dacoits profess, nor where
they came from. The threat to public order comes from dis-
contented people who are of the lower classes and who
threaten the social and economic stability of the mercantile
elite, which in Kutch are both Hindu and Muslim. We have no
specific information in this communication about the suitable
men that the Kutch police want to recruit urgently, even
though in another letter addressed to the chief commissioner,
the police chief urged his senior officer to remind New Delhi
to expedite the required sanction without which I experience
great difficulty in working out the police administration effi-
ciently. Here, he also sheds more light on suitable recruits:
Since late the well known decoit [sic] Silu has again appeared in Kutch
limits and started his depredations, he committed two robberies one
at Khanay and the other at Dumra, and as we are short of hands with
majority of Muslim strength I get no reliable officers and men in re-
serve to put them after the gang. The whole frontier of Kutch Province
is open which sometimes require [sic] to be guarded efficiently to pre-
vent such criminals coming in.10 (emphasis added)
Border and Identity Discourses
It is clear that the police commissioners reading of crime in
Kutch is not couched in the same, relatively secular, terms of
class and rural discontent that his superior officer chose to un-
derline when he wrote to the MoS. Thakkar assumes that the
known criminal, Silu, appeared in Kutch limits from the out-
side, presumably from across a frontier that needs to be effi-
ciently policed. Unlike in his earlier letters, Pakistan is not
mentioned directly, but he does comment on the communal
composition of the police force. Muslims of the force do not
constitute reliability. It would appear then, that such criminals
were best fought off by non-Muslims, either because the crimi-
nals were Muslim, or because they came from Pakistan, which
amounted to much the same thing. The local public mind in
this rendition seems to exclude the Muslim (Zamindar 2007),
unlike the letter written by Desai to the MoS which argued in
favour of its class-based exclusivity.
Muslims in Kutch were presumed locally to be less reliable
in securing the border and therefore were of limited use in the
police forces. This certainty is absentor at least not the basis
of argumentin the higher administrative echelons of the
chief commissioner and the IGP from Delhi, who chose not to
read cross-border criminality in terms that were anything other
than locally driven, that is for economic gain, and even when
from Pakistan, such crime was driven by a desire for loot
rather than communal or anti-national intent. By 1952, the
new chief commissioner, S A Ghatge, accounted for criminality
and cross-border activity in terms that were not that far off the
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
mark from his predecessors descriptions to the extent of ac-
counting for theft of village property, except that Pakistan (in-
stead of the Muslim) was now much more clearly identified as
the instigator of these raids against persons and property in
Kutch. On the subject of dacoities in Kutch, Ghatge wrote to a
joint secretary in the MoS, New Delhi on 7 December 1952:
The month of November 1952 was in a way very depressing for the
State of Kutch. In this month two serious dacoities took place, having
been committed by Pakistani Kutchis taking shelter in the southern
part of Sind. The first dacoity took place in a village which may be
regarded as a bordering one but the second one was much in the inte-
rior. The first dacoity took place (on 1 November 1952 at 6:30 pm) at a
village called Ratadia in the Lakhpat taluka. Four dacoits dressed like
Sindhis and talking Kutchi and Sindhiall between 25 to 30 years of
ageentered Kutch through the Rann. Three of them had guns and
one had a stick and an axe. They belaboured some of the Kanbis of the
place, fired gun shots in the air, entered houses and looted property
valued at `3,750. They took away a camel also from the village. They
left the same evening back for Pakistan through the Rann [] The
next dacoity took place on (17 November) at about 5:30 pm at a village
called Tumbdi in the Mundra taluka. Here too the dacoits numbering
[seven] entered the village, fired gun shots and took away property
reported to be worth about `25,000. The dacoits also took away orna-
ments of an idol in a Jain temple. Here the dacoity was indeed very
bold, since Tumbdi is in the southern side of Kutch. As the facts have
been ascertained now, five dacoits came from Pakistan. Two joined
them from Kutch.11 (emphasis added)
If a secularisation of the discourse of peacemaking, in the
immediate aftermath of th partition, meant that crimes were
less often attributed to members of religious communities and
more to their citizenship, for example: a religiously neutral
Pakistani intruder rather than a specifically Muslim one
(Chatterji 2013: 48). It is also true that the signifier Pakistani,
increasingly implied Muslim even if one was Indian. Zamindar
(2007) describes how an entire network of passes, permits and
passports were devised to control the identity and mobility of
people in the aftermath of partition. At times, Muslims were
deemed to be Pakistani even if they had not moved out of
India. In the letter cited above, Ghatge identified the criminals
as Pakistani Kutchis, a remarkable phrase which manages to
convey the impression of their being Muslim without quite
saying so in communal terms.12 Finally, while this letter
implies an association between criminality and Pakistan and/or
Muslims, it also indicates crimes of local economic intent.
Criminals from across the border had accomplices in Kutch
and their activities were oriented towards loot alone.
The upshot of these two audacious raids was, however, as
Ghatge wrote, that it became clear that the Pakistan govern-
ment has been harbouring dacoits wanted by Kutch who are
also able to get arms and ammunition in Pakistan and are
even able to move out openly in Pakistan and are not arrested
there in spite of the fact that intimation about such dacoits is
communicated to the police officers in Pakistan. Implying
some complicity in Kutch, he admitted, I feel that some per-
sons in our bordering villages do come to know about their
movements but our police department has failed to create that
trust and confidence in them required for securing timely
information.
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
While Ghatge, like his predecessor, treated these crimes as
disruptions to public life and property, he received applica-
tions from Jains in Bombay (Mumbai), Kutch, and other places
urging him to take action against the temple looters. He was
also burdened with the prospect of how to secure the border
with Pakistan in order to prevent any future recurrence of
such crimes. Pakistan was identified as the instigator of crimi-
nal activity against villages in Kutch, even against those that
lay some distance away from the border; compounding their
(Pakistans) audacity according to Ghatge. Unlike previous
occasions when such crimes were read purely as a result of
social and economic discontent within Kutch, Ghatge was
aware of the fact that security on the borders of Kutch also
meant building confidence among Muslims that lived on
the border.
Even as the dominant bureaucratic discourse of the time
which was couched in the secularised language of economic
crime, loot and dacoityprevented Ghatge from referring to
the perpetrators of crimes using communal categories. Muslim
residents of the border had no such compunctions and used
their religious identity as Muslims (homogenising a vast set
of differences between the various Muslim groups that live
along the Sindh border in Kutch) when addressing the state.
Even as the state was engaged in writing about the border, its
residents also chose to engage with the state using the same
medium. While the states overt bureaucratic memos displayed
restraint in communal matters, its citizens took a far more
pragmatic and direct view of the matter. It is around this time,
that it was possible to identify a gradual shift in the perception
of border dwelling Muslims as potentially anti-national ele-
ments, with the putative interests of the nation becoming more
closely aligned with the Hindu majority, even among the more
elite bureaucratic class.
How closely were borderland Muslims aligned to the nation
was now open to debate, while the question of belonging was
no longer tied to the immediate locality, that is, the border-
lands of KutchSindh. However, the administrative discus-
sions around this were still tentative and were only conducted
through the marginalia of secret memos and communiqus
within the corridors of power in New Delhi, as the following
section reveals.
Nationalism and Citizenship on the Border:
Voices from the Margins
Even as letters and memoranda on the question of border secu-
rity flew back and forth between Bhuj and New Delhi without
generating any broad consensus on the subject, citizens on the
border had their own interests in the matter. Tucked away
inside some of these bureaucratic missives is evidence of Mus-
lims living on the border who tackled the question of identity,
citizenship and security quite directly, leading to further
debate within the administration. In 1951, a group of Muslims
from the border areas of Banni and Khawda presented Ghatge
with a resolution.13 Writing to the MoS in New Delhi, Ghatge
reported that while on a tour of these regions, he met some
leading Muslims of the area who formally gave him a resolution
84
they had passed written in Gujarati script.14 Referring to false
propaganda [] carried on by and in Pakistan regarding the
harassment of Muslims in India, this delegation wished to go
on record to state that their sentiments are hurt by such prop-
aganda as it is false. This was followed by a firm declaration
of loyalty, We declare that we are loyal to the Government of
India, and if Pakistan government attacks the Indian govern-
ment we will sacrifice our lives for the security of India, as did
our forefathers in the past (emphasis added).
The declaration begins, interestingly, with the statement
We, the Muslims of Banni and Khawda, the northern part
of Kutch resolve as under. The northern border of Kutch
is populated by Muslims, primarily pastoralists of various
subgroups and denominations, but also by other communities,
locally referred to as Harijans and Adivasis. The latter two
groups were well outside the Hindu fold, at least until rela-
tively recent attempts were made to Hinduise them. For the
most part, these border communities have shared cultural
traits such as dress, marriage practices, consumption of meat,
and mortuary practices that render it difficult to distinguish
Harijans and Adivasis from their Muslim neighbours (Ibrahim
2012). The declaration purports to represent a collective
Muslim sentiment rather than the collective sentiment of
border dwellers. By 1951, there appeared to be a semblance of
suspicion that would begin to accrue more firmly against
Muslims on the Indian side of the border, after the armed
conflicts with Pakistan.
There is no doubt about the fact that this is a staunchly
political deputation. The other noteworthy point about the
declaration is its language, which we have access to only
through a translation, presumably by the chief commissioners
office in Bhuj. In this translation, the Muslim delegation
underscores its loyalty to the state as government. If Pakistan
were to attack India (note, not an attack on Kutch from across
the border as the letter-writing bureaucrats tended to affirm),
they assert that they are willing to lay down their lives for the
nation, as they have always done in the past. This memoran-
dum is couched within terms of national security that we are
more familiar within the context of contemporary inter-
national relationswhether this is more accurately reflected
in the concerns of its authors or translators. This is likely a concern
of the Muslims on the border too, for we hear from Ghatges
letter to the MoS that the Khawda delegation which consisted
of more experienced people handed him three copies of this
note with the request that two copies be forwarded to the
prime ministers of India and Pakistan, respectively, and that
one copy be retained by him. Even as senior officials were de-
bating the contours of border security and the need for main-
tenance of public order, border-dwelling Muslims seem to have
had a far more prescient understanding of the security of India,
the institutional apparatus and parameters within which it
was maintained, and how they would need to position them-
selves within it. While there are certainly valid questions to be
posed regarding how widely representative this declaration
of loyalty was, the language it espoused was unequivocal
about what it meant to be living along this border and an
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

equally clear understanding of the need to perform loyalty to
the nation using the universalist terms of state and nation
rather than local identity.
Ghatges correspondence with the ministry consequent to
this declaration is also noteworthy, indicating the lack of a
clear and well-defined policy on the social contours of border
management at this stage. In the same letter where he reports
on this memorandum of loyalty, Ghatge oscillates between
dismissing it outright even as he hints at it being a disingenu-
ous ploy by Muslims to divert attention from their possibly
illegal activities. On the one hand, he argued that such a
declaration was superfluous, there being no cause to cast
doubt upon certified citizens of the country, this is their
home and they have a right to live (sic). No such fresh alle-
giance is required. This indicates that their presence in India
(as opposed to flight to Pakistan) constitutes their allegiance.
He continues, I cannot see why it should be sent to the
Prime Minister of Pakistan, out of all. As I look at it, we are
not going to prove to Pakistan that we have been treating our
people well. They owe nothing to Pakistan. The idea itself is
mischievous. And on the other, he also implies that the dec-
laration has no meaning, merely being the work of some Intra-bureaucratic debates on police reorganisation in Kutch
ingenious brain following the usual faade of shouting ones
loyalty. He concluded, I would not believe a word of it. What
I will be looking to will be their conduct. As a consequence of
the mixed conclusions drawn by himin principle an overt
secular nationalist but unwilling to rule out surveillance on
border dwelling Muslims eitherGhatge concludes that he
does not believe any action is needed and if GoI were to agree,
he should kindly be informed so that I will tell the people so
in my own way.
The response to Ghatges letter arrived in the form of a
secret memo issued by the MoS15 indicating that there was noth-
ing remarkable or objectionable about Muslims re-affirming
loyalty to the GoI. Stating that similar resolutions have been
passed elsewhere in India, the memo suggested that the chief
commissioner was free not to attach much importance to the
resolution and to keep any suspicious persons under watch for
anti-national activities (emphasis added). It also expressed
no discomfort with allowing the group to directly forward a
copy of their resolution to the prime ministers of the two coun-
tries, if they so desired. It is in the marginal handwritten notes
on this memo, made by three officials of the ministry in
advancing order of seniority, that we get a sense of the range
of opinions between them. While the under secretary advo-
cated complete agreement with the chief commissioner,
the joint secretarys note indicated that he should tell the del-
egation that their resolution has been forwarded to GoI but
also that he must of course watch the behaviour of all
sections. The secretary on the other hand notes, I think the
CC (chief commissioner) is unnecessarily suspicious in this
case. The Muslims have tried to help us in counteracting Pak
(sic) propaganda and for this they have to be commended
rather than censured.
In his classic study of the French borderlands in the 18th and
19th centuries, Peter Sahlins (1988) noted that discourses of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
nationality were often enunciated with greater clarity on the
margins than at the political centres of state authority. Arguing
against the view that borderlands had to be enfolded into a
nationalist discourse that flowed outward from the centre, he
suggested that not only do ideas of the nation coexist with a
local sense of identity, but also that in some cases the nation
appeared on the periphery before it was built by the centre
(Sahlins 1988: 237). He also provided evidence of how local
communities in the borderlands of France and Spain petitioned
their states about village disputes in the 18th and 19th centuries,
increasingly using the emergent language of the nation. As
the memorandum of loyalty passed by Muslims of Banni
and Khawda reveals, the residents of these border villages
were all too conscious of their precarious position bet ween
the two rival states. Their choice of language and format of
engagement with the statethrough a written resolution
mimics the states own documentary practices even as it
pushes the state to clarify its own stand on the matter, which
as we can see was far from univocal.
Conclusions
between 1948 and 1952, enable two important insights: first,
that what we deem as contemporary concerns around border
security that are posited in the universalist terms of the nation
and national security, were enabled through moments of non-
linear negotiation with the far less abstract categories of
village, locality and region; and second, that bureaucratic
letter-writing reveals a number of ways in which the so-called
unitary discourse of the state, even on sensitive issues such as
national security, are filled with internal debates, inconsist-
encies and assumptions that are far from agreed-upon. This
article has argued that in the discussions on police reorgani-
sation there were two views on the subject of borderland
Muslims. One view is the fact that since people on either
side of the border were related to one another, this ruled
out cross-border criminality directed at the nation at large,
and only remained confined to the level of family disputes or
personal grudges. The border in this sense was an acknow-
ledgement of separate jurisdictions, but did not yet bear a
nationalist rhetoric. At the same time, however, the police de-
partment in Bhuj took a far more communally-driven view of
police reorganisation.
This article has sought to trace the early emergence of a dis-
course around borders and border Muslims in Kutch, to argue
that in the borderlands of Kutch and Sindh, an understanding
of the border in abstract terms of religion or nation was not a
pre-given in the moment of the partition, but was the product
of administrative debates, that was arrived at over a period of
time. Furthermore, residents of the border had key stakes in
this debate, in which they were active participants rather than
mere bystanders. In contemporary times, a deep distrust of
Muslims and their loyalty to the nation has been firmly en-
trenched within nationalist rhetoric; this is more pronounced
along the borders with the neighbouring Muslim-dominated
states of Pakistan and Bangladesh.
85
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA

Notes References Kidwai, Anis (2011): In Freedoms Shade (translated

1 Out of 104 File Requisition Slips pertaining to
this period Submitted to the National Archives
of India (NAI) in New Delhi, during spells of
Research in 2003 and 2004, the Number Returned
with the following Notations were: 48 NT
(Not Transferred), six Closed, three Secret,
six Under Search and three Sent for Micro-
filming. On the Production of Sensitivity on
a Borderland, see Cons (2016: 3436).
2 Farhana Ibrahim, Cross-border Intimacies:
Marriage, Migration and Citizenship in Western
India, forthcoming in Modern Asian Studies.
3 Report of Inspector General of Police (Delhi
and AjmerMerwara) on Reorganisation of
Kutch Police, National Archives of India (NAI)/
Ministry of States (MoS)/31(15)E, 1948.
4 Kutch state was administered by the central
government through a chief commissioner dur-
ing the period 194856 when it was merged
into the bi-lingual Bombay Province. In 1960, it
became the largest district in the newly consti-
tuted state of Gujarat.
5 Commissioner of Police (CP) H R Thakkar to
Chief Commissioner (CC), Kutch, dated 10 No-
vember, 1948, NAI/MoS/31(15)E, 1948.
6 CP to CC, Kutch, dated 3 December 1948, NAI/
MoS/31(15)E, 1948.
7 CC, Kutch to Joint Secretary (JS), MoS, dated
15 April 1949, NAI/MoS/31(15)E, 1948.
8 Crime, from the Hindi term dakaiti with perpe-
trators referred to as daku (dacoit)
9 CC, Kutch to JS, MoS, dated 15 April 1949, NAI/
MoS/31(15)E, 1948.
10 CP to CC, Kutch, dated 16 April 1949, NAI/
MoS/31(15)E, 1948.
11 CC, Kutch to JS, MoS, dated 7 December 1952,
NAI/MoS/22(157)PA/52, 1952.
12 Kutch and Sindh have always been entirely dis-
tinct regions and the former has never been a
part of Pakistan.
13 NAI/MoS/19(12)PA/51, 1951.
14 CC, Kutch to MoS, dated 25 September 1951,
NAI/MoS/19(12)PA/51, 1951.
15 No 4979PA/51, dated 5 October 1951, NAI/
MoS/19(12) PA/51, 1951.
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(2016): The Bengal Diaspora: Rethinking Muslim
Migration, London and New York: Routledge.
Bhan, Mona (2008): Border Practices: Labour and
Nationalism among Brogpas of Ladakh, Con-
temporary South Asia, 16, No 2, pp 13957.
Chatterji, Joya (2007): The Spoils of Partition: Bengal
and India, 194767, Cambridge: Cambridge
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cies: Deep Diplomacy in South Asia, Economic
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Cons, Jason (2016): Sensitive Space: Fragmented
Territory at the IndiaBangladesh Border, Seattle:
University of Washington Press.
Das, Veena (1995): National Honour and Practical
Kinship: Of Unwanted Women and Children,
Critical Events, Delhi: Oxford University Press,
pp 5583.
(2007): The Signature of the State: The Paradox
of Illegibility, Life and Words: Violence and the
Descent into the Ordinary, New Delhi: Oxford
University Press, pp 16283.
Gupta, Akhil (2012): Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Struc-
tural Violence, and Poverty in India, New Delhi:
Permanent Black.
(2013): Allegiance and Alienation: Border
Dynamics in Kargil, Borderland Lives in Northern
South Asia, David Gellner (ed), Durham: Duke
University Press, pp 4771.
Handler, Richard (1988): Nationalism and the Poli-
tics of Culture in Quebec, Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press.
Ibrahim, Farhana (2009): Settlers, Saints, and Sov-
ereigns: An Ethnography of State Formation in
Western India, New Delhi: Routledge.
(2012): Representing the Minority, Minority
Studies, Rowena Robinson (ed), New Delhi:
Oxford University Press, pp 11837.
Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2013): Citizenship and Its Dis-
contents, New Delhi: Permanent Black.
Kabir, Ananya Jahanara (2013): Partitions Post-
Amnesias: 1947, 1971 and Modern South Asia,
New Delhi: Women Unlimited.
by Ayesha Kidwai), New Delhi: Penguin.
Kothari, Rita (2007): The Burden of Refuge: The Sindhi
Hindus of Gujarat, Hyderabad: Orient Longman.
Mathur, Nayanika (2016): Paper Tiger: Law, Bureau-
cracy and The Developmental State in Himalayan
India. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
Munasinghe, Viranjini (2002): Nationalism in
Hybrid Spaces: The Production of Impurity Out
of Purity, American Ethnologist, Vol 29 (3),
pp 66392.
NavaroYashin, Yael (2012): The Make-Believe
Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity,
Durham: Duke University Press.
Robinson, Cabeiri deBergh (2012): Too Much Nation-
ality: Kashmiri Refugees, the South Asian
Refugee Regime and a Refugee State, 194774,
Journal of Refugee Studies, pp 122.
Sahlins, Peter (1988): The Nation in the Village:
State-Building and Communal Struggles in the
Catalan Borderland during the Eighteenth and
Nineteenth Centuries, The Journal of Modern
History, Vol 60, No 2, pp 23463.
Stoler, Ann Laura (2002): Colonial Archives and
the Arts of Governance, Archival Science,
Vol 2, pp 87109.
Tarlo, Emma (2001): Paper Truths: The Emergency
and Slum Clearance through Forgotten Files,
The Everyday State and Society in Modern India,
Chris Fuller and Veronique Benei (eds), London:
Hurst and Company, pp 6890.
Van Schendel, Willem (2004): The Bengal Border-
land: Beyond State and Nation in South Asia,
London: Anthem Press.
Verdery, Katherine (1991): National Ideology Under
Socialism: Identity and Cultural Politics in
Ceausescus Romania, Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Williams, Brackette (1989): A Class Act: Anthro-
pology and the Race to Nation across Ethnic
Terrain, Annual Review of Anthropology,
Vol 18, pp 40144.
Zamindar, Vazira Yacoobali (2007): The Long Partition
and the Making of Modern South Asia: Refugees,
Boundaries, Histories, New York: Columbia
University Press.

Money, Banking & Finance

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Introduction Saibal Ghosh, Partha Ray
MONETARY POLICY
Reflections on Analytical Issues in Monetary Policy: The Indian Economic Realities A Vasudevan
Negative Interest Rates: Symptom of Crisis or Instrument for Recovery C P Chandrasekhar
Vulnerability of Emerging Market Economies to Exogenous Shocks Bhupal Singh, Rajeev Jain
BANKING CHALLENGES
Indian Banking: Perception and Reality Ashima Goyal
Non-performing Assets in Indian Banks: This Time It Is Different Rajeswari Sengupta, Harsh Vardhan
Were Public Sector Banks Victimised through AQR? A Strategic Orientation Perspective Shubhabrata Basu, Moovendhan V
Did MGNREGS Improve Financial Inclusion? Saibal Ghosh
How Efficient Are Indias Cooperative Banks? Evidence from DCCBs Sarthak Gaurav, Jisha Krishnan
Role of Fintech in Financial Inclusion and New Business Models Ajit Ranade
FINANCIAL MARKETS
Determinants of Bid-ask Spread in the Indian Government Securities Market Golaka C Nath, Sahana Rajaram,
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Long-run Performance of Seasoned Equity Offerings: New Evidence from India Soumya G Deb
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86 APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
Embattled Frontiers and Emerging Spaces
Transformation of the Tawang Border
Swargajyoti Gohain
In the years following the IndiaChina War (1962),
Tawang underwent a significant makeover. In 1964, the
Indian government sanctioned the construction of the
Nehru Gompa monastery to commemorate Jawaharlal
Nehrus visit to Tawang. Nehru Gompa is a symbol of the
new relations between the Indian state and the Tibetan
Buddhist institutions that were forged in the early
postcolonial period in Indias North East Frontier. This
paper looks at the changing dynamics between the
Tawang Monastery, the local population, and the state in
this context, and focuses on how the Tawang Monastery
negotiated with the local administration through the
medium of official correspondence.
I carried out the research for this paper in Tawang in May 2013. This
was a field visit to Tawang following extended visits in 2008, 2009, and
2010. An initial draft was presented at the Asian Borderlands Research
Network conference in Hong Kong (810 December 2014).
I am grateful to the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi, Indian
Institute of Technology, Kanpur, and the North East India Studies
Programme, in Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi, for supporting this
paper at different stages of writing and revision. I am grateful to Kerstin
Grothmann from Humboldt University, Germany, for her valuable
comments on the first draft.
Swargajyoti Gohain (swargajyoti@gmail.com) is Assistant Professor of
Sociology at IIT Kanpur and is currently teaching in Ashoka University.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
I
n 1964, in the aftermath of the IndiaChina War of 1962,
the Indian government sanctioned the construction of the
Nehru Gompa (Tib Dgon Pa) monastery to commemorate
the visit of Indias first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru,
to Tawang, a far-flung border in north-east India. Locals
narrate how stones and bricks from an older kakaling, a
square arch that served as an entryway to the area, were used
as the foundation for the new monastery. The Nehru Gompa,
originally built as a kakaling, was later rebuilt as a monastery,
and the charge of its maintenance was given over to Tawang
Monastery, which controls the other monasteries in the area.
Nehru Gompa or Nehru Dolma Lakhang now stands in
Tawangs Nehru Market area as a symbol of the new relations
between the Indian state and the Tibetan Buddhist institutions
that were forged in the early postcolonial period in Indias
North East Frontier Agency (NEFA).
In the postcolonial history of Tawang, 1962 was a watershed
year. Having more or less continued the policy of loose ad-
ministration begun by the British colonial government in fron-
tier areas till the early 1950s, the Indian government rethought
its administrative strategies from a security perspective as
boundary-related disputes with China intensified. This meant
establishing political offices and agents in untouched frontier
regions, and the first paramilitary post was set up in Tawang
in 1951. Tawang was of particular strategic importance, as it
was coveted by the Chinese state which saw it as an extension
of Tibet; it had been under Tibetan rule for more than three
centuries. When border tensions blew up during the SinoIn-
dian War, offices, residences, and monasteries were temporar-
ily evacuated as Chinese troops overran Tawang for two
months (from October to December in 1962).
The war hastened the process of state consolidation in Tawang.
As the Indian government set up military bases and adminis-
trative quarters in Tawang, cooperatives, retail stores, and other
civic infrastructure also followed in a state-enabled urbanisa-
tion process; the aim was to cater to the needs of the military
population and to the new administrative, business, and pro-
fessional classes who started trickling in from the early 1970s.
So, how did the people of Tawang respond to the new govern-
ment and to the politico-economic and demographic changes
it initiated?
This paper looks at the changing dynamics between the
Tawang Monastery, the local lay population, and the state in this
changing context, and focuses on how the Tawang Monastery
negotiated with the local administration through the medium
87
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
of official correspondence. This, in turn, contributed to Tawangs
integration. I use the term integration to refer to the inclusion
of Tawang in Indian political and economic institutions and its
eventual cultural integration (Watson 2000).1
While scholars have written about the role and agency of
the state in fashioning border subjects (for example, Aggarwal
2004; Van Schendel 2005), I argue that the incorporation of
Tawang into Indian political networks was caused not only to
the deeds of an assertive state, but also by the recognition
given to the Indian administration by the local elitethat is,
high-ranking monks and the lay population.
Historicising the concept of recognition, Charles Taylor
(1994) wrote that individual and group identities rest on recogni-
tion and are always formed in dialogue with others. Ideally,
equal recognition means that all individuals and groups are
entitled to a uniform set of rights and immunities in the public
sphere in modern democratic states. However, in most societies,
some individuals or groups with historical disadvantages are
denied proper recognition or are not recognised. Hence, Taylor
argues that equal recognition should coexist with the politics
of difference, so that historically marginalised communities
are ensured protection by the state.
I apply recognition in reverse, in the sense that communi-
ties should be able to recognise the state as a legitimate
presence in their political lives. The state also needs to earn
recognition from the communities to which it extends its juris-
diction, and it attempts to do so through iterative (restating
its goals) and performative (active staging of its presence
by propagating cultural symbols, development goods, etc)
means. I look at one process which enabled the communities
of newly merged Tawang to recognise the Indian state. During
the period of political transition, highly placed monk officials
and village leaders in Tawang wrote petitions to the local
administration with a variety of requests. The image of the
Indian sovereign power acting through the local Tawang
administration became entrenched in the minds of Tawangs
public as the volume of official correspondence and govern-
ment circulars grew.
Of course, the state presence in Tawang was not just enforced
through official documents and bureaucratic outreach. Overt
state-building measures such as militarisation, and more covert
means such as the introduction of mainstream education and
development programmes in the post-war period, helped the
state to penetrate border regions (Gohain 2013).2 In this paper,
however, I highlight two aspects of the material basis for state
formation in Tawang. First, on the one hand, material concerns
forged (or forced) alliances amidst an expanding state appara-
tus, and on the other, the border population was driven by
instrumental concerns to recognise the former state; second,
the participation of border populations in the material tech-
nologies of governanceofficial documents and bureaucratic
correspondencefacilitated local recognition of the new
administration. This article draws on documents retrieved from
the deputy commissioners office in Tawang and, in particular,
on archives of petitions for government grants addressed to
the local administration.3
88
From Monastery Space to Administrative Base
Tawang is a town in the Tawang district in Arunachal Pradesh
in North East India, traditionally inhabited by the Monpa
communities who are of the Tibetan Buddhist faith.4 Located
on the borders between Indian, Tibetan, and Bhutanese terri-
tories, Tawang is famous for the Tawang Monastery which was
established by Mera Lama in 1680 as a Gelugpa outpost in the
17th century sectarian wars between Tibet and Bhutan, at the
initiative of the fifth Dalai Lama (Aris 1980). By decree of the
Dalai Lamas office, and with an administration linked to the
Tibetan government (Tib bodgzhung), the Tawang Monastery
was authorised to collect taxes from Monpa villages in and
around Tawang. Tawang and its adjacent district, West Kameng
(together known as Monyul), were divided into administrative
centres or dzongs (Tib rdzong, meaning fort or district), which
were in charge of jurisdiction and tax collection. The present
town of Tawang is located one kilometre away from the mon-
astery. Monyul had three major dzongs, from south to north
Talung Dzong, Dirang Dzong, and Tawang Dzong or Gyanghar
Dzongwhere grains collected as taxes were stored and car-
ried by compulsory or corve labourers u-la (Tib u lag) from
villages in a relay until they finally reached Tsona in Tibet,
which served as the administrative headquarters of Monyul.
Tawang Monastery deputed senior monks as dzongpons (offic-
ers) to the dzongs to oversee the collection of agricultural lev-
ies and to settle local disputes (Sarkar 1996). While people in
other parts of what is now Arunachal Pradesh also paid taxes
to some Tibetan private families (Grothmann 2012; Huber 2011),
it was only in Monyuland mainly through the Tawang Mon-
asterythat the Tibetan state established systematic control.
British officer Captain Bailey, who, along with Captain
Morsehead, was deputed to map the boundary between Tibet
and India in 1913, gave an account of the relation between
Monyul and Tibet (Bailey and Morsehead 1914; compare with
Approach Paper nd; Sarkar 1996):
Mnyul is the comparatively low-lying district of Tibet[,] which is gov-
erned by the lamas of Tawang. The district is governed by a council of
six[,] named Trukdri. They are the Kenpo, or Abbot of Tawang Gompa,
another lama in a high position, two monks known as Nyetsangs
and two Tsna [district in Tibet] Dzongpns. In this way, the Tsna
Dzongpns have a hand in the Government of Mnyul. In the summer
when the Dzongpns are at Tsna they keep agents at Tawang to act
for them but from November to April they themselves live at Tawang
and send their agents to live in the cold climate of Tsna. Under the
Trukdri are the two Dzongs, Dirang and Taklung, each of which is held
by two monks sent from Tawang who act together. The Dzongpns of
Taklung live at Amratala on the Assam border in grass huts during the
trading season. (pp 4142)
Tawang Monastery was the spiritual centre for all the
adjoining areas of Tawang; it allotted specific roles to local
people. Although traditionally located at the outskirts of
settlements, monasteries were never self-enclosed units; they
were bound to villages with organic ties (Goldstein 1989;
Sarkar 1996). Shyo Basti (Tib Shyo/Zhol meaning lower part or
that which is below in location), a village located just below
Tawang Monasteryand still in existence todaywas estab-
lished during the construction of the monastery. As part of the
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

monastic tradition, a group of people settled down near the
monastery premises to maintain it. The monastery, in turn,
looked after the needs and problems of the people from Shyo
Basti; the village and the monastery were engaged in what
may be seen as a patronclient relationship. Other villagers
also actively participated in the construction and maintenance
of the monastery, provided food supplies, and supplied labour
for services such as porterage or u-la.
The affairs of Tawang Monastery wereand still are
managed by a governing council, Lhangye Khang, headed
by the abbot. The office of lopon is next in the hierarchy after
the abbot, and the lopon manages the monastery affairs in the
abbots absence. Indeed, when I interviewed Tawang Monasterys
Lopon Acharya Ngawang Norbu in May 2013, my intermediary
Gelong Sangey Leta introduced him as the second abbot.
Other important office-bearers in the monastery administration
are the changzey (the abbots secretary), dratsangbuk (who
looks after the properties of the monastery), and the nyertsang
(who is responsible for collecting contributions from villagers
and issuing provisions to monks based on their entitlement).5
Tawang Monastery has 13 subsidiary monasteries as well as
two nunneries in the Tawang region.6 Nehru Gompa was later
added to the list of the original 12 branches. The abbot of Tawang
Monastery appoints monks to each branch for a three-year period.
The deputed monks have to take care of the monasterys affairs
and, in return, the monastery supplies their provisions. Tradi-
tionally, villagers contributed foodgrains and other articles to
sustain the monks (Sarkar 1996).7
In those pre-independence days, it was compulsory for each
family in the surrounding villages of Tawang, which had three
sons or more, to send their second or middle son, bu sum
barma (Tib bugsum barpa), to become a monk. Breach of this
custom resulted in community fines. Traditionally, each family
had to contribute foodgrains to the Tawang Monastery twice a
yearonce in summer and once in autumn (Approach Paper nd).
People who paid taxes in the form of grains were khreipas (Tib
khralpa). During the time of the monasterys founder, Mera
Lama, each taxpaying familys landed property was measured
in terms of khreikang, a local unit of land measurement. Each
householder had to pay a given amount of wheat, millet, or
barley per khreikang, which varied according to the year or
area. When the landed property of a householder was divided
among heirs, the khrei was also proportionately shared. Fami-
lies also had to provide firewood to the monastery in rotation
and cultivate land belonging to the monastery, retaining a per-
centage of the produce (Approach Paper nd; Sarkar 1996).
This system continued until the early 20th century. When
the Chinese Manchu general, Chao Ehr-feng, conducted some
exploratory forays south of Tibet towards the NEFA in 191011,
the British were alerted to the vulnerability of this border. As a
result, officers Bailey and Morsehead were deputed to map the
boundary between Tibet and British India in 1913. In 1914,
British and Tibetan representatives met at the Shimla Conven-
tion to delineate the IndoTibetan boundary, the McMahon
Line. According to this delineation, Tawang was included in
India. However, as the Chinese representative refused to sign
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
the boundary agreement, the British were reluctant to actively
engage in boundary demarcation. Thus, the Tibetan represent-
atives of Tawang Monastery from Tibet continued to collect taxes
from the Monpas.
For several years, Tawang had no dealings with the Indian
government except for occasional encounters with the odd
expedition of British officersCaptain Neville in 1914, Ludlow
and Sherriff in 193435 and 1938, and Frank Kingdon-Ward in
the 1930s, to name a few. Tawang remained de facto a part of
Tibet. In February 1951 (almost four years after Indias inde-
pendence and in the context of an impending Tibetan defeat
by Chinese forces),8 a paramilitary expedition to Tawang led
by Major Bob Khating of the Indian Frontier Administration
Services put an end to Tibetan tax collection and established
the first Indian administrative post in the region.
In October 1962, Chinese troops attacked several posts on
the western and eastern sectors of the SinoIndian border
(Lamb 1966).9 After the war ended, the Indian government
sealed all border passages between Tawang and Tibet. Tawang
was co-opted into the NEFA, a frontier tract that was initially
composed of five divisions: Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit
and Tirap. The office of the political officer, later renamed the
deputy commissioner, governed each division. Tawang was
made a subdivision of the Kameng Frontier Division, and the
highest political post in Tawang was that of additional political
officer, later renamed additional deputy commissioner. The
Ministry of External Affairs administrated the NEFA with the
governor of Assam acting as an agent to the President of
India. In 1972, NEFA became a union territory and was named
Arunachal Pradesh. In 1987, Arunachal Pradesh was con-
ferred full statehood; at present, it has 16 districts. Tawang
became an independent district with its own deputy commis-
sioner on 16 October 1984.10
Tawangs Makeover
In the years following the IndiaChina War, Tawang under-
went a significant makeover. The construction of new admin-
istrative quarters, the movement and settlement of Indian
Army troops, and their occupation of local residential, forest,
and grazing lands for use as housing, cantonment areas, and
firing ranges reinvented Tawang as a military base. Earlier,
Tawang Monastery and its networks constituted the dominant
spaces of Tawang by defining duties, roles, tenancy, and tax.
However, with the co-option of the monastery into Indian
politico-economic circuits, new networks replaced old ones. At
present, the abbot of Tawang Monastery holds the highest
office; this position was previously appointed by Tibet, but is
now appointed by the Dalai Lama from Dharamsala, in direct
consultation with the Government of India (Approach Paper
nd, emphasis mine).
During this phase of political transition, the monastery ad-
ministration negotiated with the Indian administration for
material assistance. While it had previously funded its reli-
gious and commercial supplies needs primarily through taxes
and partly from Tibets treasuries, Tawang Monastery now
had to rely on grants from the Indian administration to meet
89
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
the basic needs of its inmates and to conduct rituals. In 1996,
Sarkar wrote about the changed economic situation of the
monastery: With the establishment of the [Indian] adminis-
tration, these dzongs had ceased to function and the loss of the
tax is made up nowadays from other sources and internal
adjustments (1996: 15).
In this respect, writing petitions was an important means of
gaining access to the state. It was not as if official correspond-
ence came into existence through the dealings with the Indian
state. Writing, not speech, characterised earlier official inter-
actions between the Tibetan government and Tawang. As
Lopon Acharya said, Till 1951, the Tibetan Dzongpon used
to be based at Gyanghar. All orders sent from Tibet would
come in two copies, one to Tawang Monastery and the other to
the Dzongpon at Gyanghar. Tawang Monastery had many
branches up to Udalguri in Assam. Copies of all the orders
that came to Tawang Monastery from Tibet were sent to these
branches. The lama in charge of the branches would commu-
nicate the order to those working in the gompa under him.
Officers at Gyanghar Dzong would also send copies of the
orders to the villages. All such circulars were sent from
Tawang Monastery (personal interview with Lopon Acharya,
27 May 2013).
In postcolonial India, however, petition writing in the lan-
guage of modern bureaucracy was a technology of govern-
mentality (Gupta 2012) through which the communication
and interaction between populations and the state were regu-
lated by standardised rules. The monastery elite as well as
local populations discovered that they could now take recourse
to writing in English, the official language, and adopt the
bureaucratic format of government forms and applications
to reach out to the state. As village councils (mangmas) and
village heads discovered that they could directly communicate
with state offices, they also drafted appeals to the Tawang
administration for infrastructural support for their local
cultural institutions.
It was not writing per se, but official documentation that
was an issuethe legacy of British colonial rule. Scholars have
pointed out how bureaucratic documents have a generative
capacity; statistics, data, and reports act as originators (Gupta
2012; Hull 2012; Mathur 2012). But documents are also central
to how the state is imagined and encountered by subject popu-
lations, and how state presence materialises (Sharma and
Gupta 2006). As people participate in the culture of official
documentationfile culture, paperwork, proforma filling,
and so onthey allow themselves to be part of a shared identity
that is created, coordinated, and controlled by the exchange,
routing, and circulation of documents (Hull 2012). Thus, by
engaging with the document culture of the Indian state, the
people of Tawang made themselves its subjects.
Writing petitions for grants had another material out-
comepetitions were oriented towards material objectives
for securing financial aid for monastic sustenance and for new
cultural projects, such as the building of monastery schools
and cultural committees. The Indian state responded by giving
due consideration to these applications and supplications for
90
grants. This was not simply a way of carrying out patrimonial
responsibilities towards its marginal frontier inhabitants,
but Indian administrators also understood that promoting
local cultural institutions was key to holding onto a still
slippery border.
Custom, Conflict, and Change
At the turn of the 21st century, weighed down by the pressure
to keep up with the changing times, Tawang Monastery under-
went major renovations and a rehaul of its functioning system
in 2003. The Approach Paper for the Workshop on Traditional
System and Functioning of Tawang Monastery brought out by
Tawang Monastery during this time focused on the challenges
that the monastery had faced since its political control shifted
from Tibetan to Indian hands. Among other issues such as
greater disciplining of the monk population, the approach
paper discusses the need to open new channels of communi-
cation with the district administration. This included proposals
to have a member of the monastery regularly attend meetings
convened by the district administration, which centre on seek-
ing financial help from the Government of India to construct a
museum and preserve the monasterys antique treasures.
There were also proposals to improve the link between the
monastery and the laity by involving villagers in the running
of the monasteryby appointing and training people from
the surrounding villages to be caretakers of some branches
of Tawang Monastery. The problems addressed and the
solutions provided in the approach paper were not new; they
had originated in the 1950sin the period of Tawangs political
transition. With the loss of Tibetan networks, former equations
between the monastery and the laity also shifted. Tawang
Monastery lost its authority over former taxpaying subjects
who were freed from previous compulsory levies and subse-
quently became lax in performing traditional duties and ser-
vices to the monastery.
While doing my doctoral fieldwork (conducted in different
phases from 2008 to 2013), elderly Monpa villagers told me
that the local people were glad when Indian forces got rid of
the Tibetan tax officials in 1951. The Tibetan tax collector is
remembered as a cruel master in Tawangs collective memory.
Older people in their 80s recalled the dread that the Tibetan
tax collectors would arouse in them when they arrived for col-
lection. Punishments ranged from beatings, starvation, and
jail time for even the most trivial follies such as a failure to
feed the horses on time.
A locally published biography of Pema Gombu, an influential
man from one of the aristocratic clans of the Lhou administra-
tive subdivision and former head of the Lhou village in
Tawang, presents a description of how the people of Tawang
supported Major Bob Khatings expedition to Tawang.11 Pema
Gombu, who was 89 years old when I interviewed him and has
since passed away, mentioned that he had guided the Indian
forces through Tawang when they had first arrived. A common
local narrative is that the Monpas had requested the Indian
state to occupy their lands because they wanted to be free of
Tibetan rule. While I am not completely sure whether the
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

discursive element of requestwhereby the Monpas wishes They appealed to the Indian state to bring to account villagers
are supposedly taken into accountis a later addition to local
legend mediated by official representations, it hints at the
fissures that existed between the local lay people and an
extractive monastic system.
As the SinoIndian War raged in the mountainous terrain
of Tawang in the winter months of 1962, an incident took
place that revealed the extent to which the breach between
the monastery and the laity had widened. On 24 October 1962,
taking advantage of the wartime disorder, some local villagers
looted Tawang Monastery of many valuable items, including
sacred gifts to deities comprising priceless gems, silk robes,
gold, and diamonds. As the government had evacuated the
monastery, looters seized the opportunity to pilfer even the
personal property of many monks. When confronted later,
many of these villagers refused to return the items they had
stolen (Arunachal Pradesh State Archives 1962).12 The incident
weakened the monasterys position in local society, both spir-
itually and financially, while exposing the declining hold that
the monastery had on the local people.
A government official, Shri Chakma, touring Tawang in
1972, noted the changing relations between monasteries and
the lay people:
It was pointed out by the Rinpoche [abbot] that the gompa [monas-
tery] is finding difficulties in maintaining the day to day activities of
the monastery because of lacking interest on the part of the villagers in
the Tawang area. In the past [there was] material assistance by way of
foodgrains, firewood, etc, to maintain the livelihood of the inmates of
the monastery. With the advent of our administration and the expan-
sion of schools, agriculture, and other obligations such as provision of
porters for carrying loads, provision of labo[u]rers for construction of
roads, buildings, and various other government purposes, the religious
life of the people are gradually disturbed and traditional pattern of ac-
tivities seriously eroded. This is a very serious problem for the people
of Tawang region, and I thought it worth bringing to the notice of the
Administration and the members of Pradesh Council/Zilla Parishad.13
Weakening Influence of Buddhist Institutions
As the Indian administration grew in prominence, ideas of
democratic citizenship rather than that of a theocratic order
came to define social roles and membership. Previous hierar-
chies loosened as lay people observed high-ranking monks,
whom they held in awe, submit to the local administration. As
more and more non-Buddhist people moved into the area to
fulfil functions of security, governance, trade, and education,
local Monpas began interacting on a much wider cultural canvas,
and the overarching influence of local Buddhist institutions
slowly began to unravel.
During Tibetan rule, law and order situations under the
jurisdiction of Tawang Monastery were addressed by high-rank-
ing lamas, and disputes in Tawang were either settled by Tibetan
dzongpons or, if the disagreements were larger, they were taken
to the Lhasa courts. In cases of failure to perform duties or deliv-
er taxes, errant villagers were disciplined with straightforward
measures such as caning or imprisonment. With the declining
influence of Tawang Monastery in the politico-economic do-
main, civil disobedience mounted, and monastery authorities
turned to the new sovereign power to resolve these problems.
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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
who did not fulfil their duties as monastery subjects.
In a letter to the additional deputy commissioner of Tawang,
monastery authorities protested that the people of Kharteng
village were violating their traditional duties by not carrying
grains to Kharteng Gompa (an affiliate of Tawang Monastery),
as was expected of them, and were instead diverting them to
another village. The Tawang district administration responded
by holding a meeting with the villagers of Kharteng to remind
them of their traditional duties. The monastery also turned to
the Indian administration to settle or negotiate private disputes
and to enforce discipline among monks by sending Central
Reserve Police Forces to the monastery.14
Conversely, villagers also turned to the state as a medium
through which to negotiate with the monastery. Official corre-
spondence addressed to the additional deputy commissioner
in 197374 shows how in the changed social context, villages
(Kharman, Gispu and Mago-Thingbu) tried to bargain for
greater leeway in discharging traditional services by offering
cash in lieu of construction labour in the monastery.15
Besides calling on the state to adjudicate conflicts, monas-
tery authorities also requested financial aid from the state to
carry out cultural activities. For example, during the previous
Tibetan regime, public funds and levies were used to finance
the annual monastic festival, Torgya. Expenses for the Dungyur
festival, celebrated every third year, were met with taxes levied
from the Talung Dzong area; the first two days of the Monlam
Chenmoh ceremony, performed in the monastery in the first
Monpa lunar month (Dawa Dangpo), were funded by taxes from
Dirang (Sarkar 1996). When this source was extinguished as a
result of political change, Tawang Monastery appealed to the
local administration. In 1974, the monastery asked the adminis-
tration for extra security forces and continuous electricity
supply as well as costumes for cham (Tib religious ceremonial
dances held in the monastery).
The original cham dress (dress for lama dance) was provided to Ta-
wang gomba by [the] Tibet govt. [sic] when this region was under Ti-
betan region ... after that few items had been replaced by our admin.
[sic] In general, the dance dresses now used by the lamas during the
Tarja [Torgya] are really tattered and miserable and require replace-
ment to keep the prestige of the gomba and admin. [sic] because this
gomba is now more or less maintained by this administration.16
Deprived of their earlier sources of sustenance, high-rank-
ing monks had to rely on the new government to maintain
their existing lifestyles. An official letter (1973) shows how the
abbot of Tawang Monastery, Rigya Rinpoche, sought govern-
ment funds for transportation for his pilgrimage and a private
house that he could use as a meditation retreat:
[A]t present, I am staying in the monastery itself. But sometime[s] I
have to stay away from [the] population for meditation I decided to
construct a house of my own which can be used for meditation mandir
cum residence I will be grateful if administration can help me in
this respect.17
The monastery administration was not the only entity that
used formal grant applications to generate funding. As a letter
from a village council attests, rural people were also quick to
91
EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
recognise this new and democratic source of income. With the
establishment of village councils and panchayati raj institutions
in 1965, prominent villagers and village heads could directly
negotiate with state authorities in their capacities as resource
people to get grants to renovate village or local gompas. As
awareness about the states interest in keeping cultural institu-
tions alive grew, many of these men requested and were granted
funds for community activities.
Most requests from lay people for financial help were either
to revive dying customs or renovate decaying cultural struc-
tures. One of the first proposals of this kind, which was sub-
mitted under the cultural grant category in 197576, was in
support of the Choekor festival (Tib Chosskor meaning cycle
of teachings, texts). During the festival, lamas and lay repre-
sentatives from every village carried sacred Buddhist scrip-
tures from Tawang Monastery in procession around all the
villages to ensure good fortune and plentiful crops. Each village
provided the procession participants with food and drink in
temporary shelters; the money to buy food rations and con-
struct shelters was requested from the local administration.
There were also several petitions for grants to rebuild village
gompas. In response to such requests, in 1978, the local admin-
istration sanctioned a total of `93,938 to renovate 10 gompas
that came under Lumla, an administrative section in Tawang.
As the relations between the monastery, state, and laity
evolved, civil society organisations arose to mediate the relations
between the state and the monastery, and formed the basis of
an emerging public sphere (Habermas 1991).18 In Tawang, the
monastery was initially an all-enveloping entity, functioning
within the theocratic organisation of the Tibetan state. Public
and private interests fused with regard to the operation of
monasteries under the religious government of Tibet. Tawang
Monastery claimed absolute rights over its subjects and there was
no civil society force to question these claims. But with the dilu-
tion of the monasterys powers, and its absorption into the new
democratic administration, the situation was reversedthe
monastery was now on the side of civil society in the statecivil
society divide, and it required its own mediating organisations.
A new civil body, the Tawang Monpa Cultural Society, was
inaugurated on 27 July 1974. Fifty prominent Monpa elders at-
tended the inauguration, including representatives of differ-
ent subdivisions of Tawang, the abbot of Tawang Monastery,
lamas, panchayat members, and gaonburas (village heads). It
was agreed that the Tawang Monpa Cultural Society will make
a joint decision with monastery authorities regarding any dis-
ciplinary action to be taken against monastery employees.
While the pattern of monastic discipline would continue as
was custom, if the need for change arose, senior monks,
panchayat members, and gaonburas would discuss the matter.
This civil society organisation initially worked as the public
relations unit of the monastery,19 but gradually widened its
focus to include other activities.
The various forms of collaboration between the monastery,
civil society, and state were especially visible in the building
and operation of Tawang Monastery School, which came into
being in 197778 thanks to grants from the Arunachal Pradesh
92
government. When a political officer in Tawang observed that
people preferred to send their children to the newly set up gov-
ernment schools instead of to the monastery, he conferred
with the abbot of Tawang Monastery to discuss solutions. Both
parties recognised that the monastery would have to reform
its traditional curriculum by invigorating it with modern sub-
jects to attract students. In 198081, the monastery adminis-
tration obtained government funds to construct a school and a
hostel for students.20
Bartering Border Loyalties
The postcolonial transformations of Tawang call to mind Peter
Sahlins (1991) classic study on the formation of the France
Spain border in Cerdanya, a border region in the Pyrenees
ranges. Sahlins shifts his focus between the state/centre and
the local Catalan rural society to show how the border was not
only the result of state manoeuvres, but was also actively shaped
by local elites and rural peasants, who alternated between
Catalan and French national identities at different moments
to further their own interests. Thus, the construction of a
national identity among the border people was not a simple
imposition from the centre or a top-down Frenchification
process. Rather, it was a dialogical process, wherein local
inhabitants actively participated in fashioning their identities
as Frenchmen as opposed to Spaniards.
The integration of Tawang into the Indian state cannot
entirely be captured through relations of dominance and
resistance between the centre and the areas at the periphery.
The reorientation of Tawang from the Tibetan to Indian
government was not a completely state-directed process. It is
clear that deliberate calculations were involved, based on the
responses from the local elite and lay people; they were not
passive recipients of the policy, but worked to gain leverage
in the form of material aid from the new administration in
exchange for recognising Indian sovereignty.
The state acknowledged these appeals for material assistance
as a tactical measure. Michael De Certeau (1984) treats tactics
and strategies as opposites. He states that strategies are the
forthright, forceful, and well-formed ways of ruling that the
strong employ to have their way; on the other hand, tactics are
weapons of the weak, a kind of dissimulation where domi-
nated people momentarily inhabit the spaces of the dominant
in a fragmentary merging to win temporary gains. Here, I
extend De Certeaus conceptualisation to define tactics as not
just the weapons of the weak, but as the tools utilised by the
dominant to manufacture a hegemonic consensus. In manag-
ing subject populations, states frequently combine strategy
with tactical measures to build a consensus.
I have discussed previously how state strategies for incorpo-
rating Tawang into India have included the physical settle-
ment of military personnel and the construction of canton-
ments. Additionally, symbolic forms of occupation have in-
cluded changing Tibetan area names to Hindi names. Hindi
names, mostly given by the military, co-opt Tawang into the
HindiIndian cultural universe (Gohain 2013).21 On the other
hand, state tactics in Tawang comprise embracing symbols
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 EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA

and institutions of Tibetan Buddhism; in doing so, the state
manoeuvres an eventual integration through the temporary
adoption of others symbols and spaces. Thus, the Tawang War
Memorial, which is dedicated to the 2,420 Indian servicemen
who died in the 1962 SinoIndian War, is a large white Buddhist
stupa, complete with prayer wheels adorned with the Pali
script. The tribute to local culture in the architecture is a way
to garner local sympathy for the national military by appro-
priating Tibetan Buddhist cultural symbols. In using tactics,
the state does not blatantly advertise dominant cultural
symbols in the public sphere; its approach to secure hegemonic
consent is subtler.
In other border areas, the state has occasionally attempted
soft cultural imperialism to propagate national or dominant
symbols. Aggarwal (2004) describes how the Sindhu Darshan
Festival was inaugurated in Ladakh in 1997 at the specially
constructed Sindhu Ghat on the banks of the river Indus. Since
its inauguration, there has been a yatra (pilgrimage) to this
location every year in June. During this festival, the river Indus
is worshipped, flags hoisted, and hymns chanted to Mother
India. I had not observed festivals of this kind or scale in
Tawang in the course of my fieldwork. However, state patron-
age of local Buddhist institutions and cultural programmes is
becoming increasingly more visible. One may perceive the
Indian states promotion of activities and organisations that
preserve Tibetan Buddhist culture in Tawang as a tactical move
to earn loyalty in a region with border disputes. Further, some
nationalist narratives argue that Buddhism is an indigenous
offshoot of Hinduism, even though many scholars disagree
(for example, Omvedt 2003). This view of Buddhism has been
used to mobilise nationalist pride amongst marginal commu-
nities in India. The mushrooming of Vivekananda Kendra
schools in Arunachal Pradesh, which adopt a culture-based
curriculum that emphasises a blend of Buddhist cultural pres-
ervation, nationalism, and patriotism, is just one instance of
the attempt to seamlessly assimilate Hinduism, Buddhism,
and Indian nationalism.22
In 2009, the Department of Karmik and Adhyatmik Affairs
(DoKAA) (Tib Chos-rig) was created by the Arunachal Pradesh
government to look after the religious and cultural affairs of the
communities of Tawang and West Kameng. Its objectives included
the maintenance and construction of monasteries, renovation
of Buddhist pilgrimage sites, and providing support to the tra-
ditional Bhoti language and Sowa Rigpa medicine system.23
The first chairperson of DoKAA, the 13th Tsona Gontse Rimpoche
(the monk and former minister), was very active in ensuring
Buddhist cultural preservation and founded the movement
for a Mon Autonomous Region in 2003, before his untimely
death in 2014. In 2012, the three-day Tawang Festival to cele-
brate Mahayana Buddhism was first held. Since then, it has
been celebrated annually in April. The current chairperson of
DoKAA continues to organise activities to preserve and restore
Buddhist sites and monuments in Tawang and West Kameng
with the active support of the state government.
The current state sponsorship of Tibetan Buddhist cultural
preservation is not simply an avenue for cultural domination,
nor is the revival of the Tibetan Buddhist cultural toolkit a
show of cultural resistance by the marginalised. Rather, these
are the results of collaborations between the Indian adminis-
tration and the local political and religious elite. The willing-
ness of the state to entertain pleas for grants-in-aid in the im-
mediate post-Independence period was a similar tactic.24 Alert
to the fact that the loyalty of the border peoples has always to
be earned (Nanda 1982: 8),25 the state dispensed cultural
grants in return for loyalty. Then, as now, the state did not
invent the idea of bartering aid for loyalty, but developed it as
a tactical response to local appeals.
In the period after the SinoIndian War, the Indian state
asserted its presence in Tawang through the recognition that
the border people gave it. The monastery elite and local people
not only recognised the new sovereign power, but also sub-
mitted to it to secure material benefits. The state fashioned
new spaces that symbolically built a symbiotic relationship
between itself and the Tawang frontier; the Nehru Gompa,
with which I began this paper, was such a space. While the in-
terior of the monastery is like any otherwith Buddhist stat-
ues, the Dalai Lamas portrait, and mandalasthe entrance
has a portrait of Jawaharlal Nehru and his daughter, the for-
mer Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, on its walls. In addition,
there are marble busts of Nehru, Indira Gandhi, and her son
and political successor, Rajiv Gandhi, installed on the left side
of the courtyard. The Nehru Gompa remains a symbol of the
emerging relations between the border people and the Indian
state in Tawang.

Notes
1 Watson (2000) uses integration instead of
assimilation to speak of nationalist co-option,
because unlike assimilation, which brinks on
the denial of distinct cultural identities, inte-
gration accepts differences between the
parts but as included in the national
whole. In Indias case, while integration
with a multicultural spirit portrays India as a
composite culturewhere diversity is not
annihilated, but unified through fusionsuch
integration is impaired by the clause of alle-
giance to a national concept, primarily defined
by the majority culture. Integration, although
more nuanced than assimilation, also eventu-
ally makes demands for subordinate existence
in minority cultures and assumes that the
latter would prioritise a commitment to the
national goal over their ethnic and religious
allegiances.
2 I have dealt with state and military practices in
the Tawang frontier in my PhD dissertation,
currently under revision as Himalaya Bound:
Culture, Politics, and Imagined Geographies in
Indias North East Frontier (University of Wash-
ington Press, forthcoming).
3 The archive consisted of several faded blue
government files in unsystematic piles on the
floor against the walls of a small dusty room in
the deputy commissioners office in Tawang. I
am grateful to the deputy commissioner, Ab-
hishek Deb, for granting me permission to ac-
cess these files. Many government files were
either destroyed in the 1962 war or were moved
to safer central locations, but those that were
allowed to remain included correspondence,
mostly relating to petitions for grants between
monks, lay people, and the local administra-
tion from 1960 to 1989.
4 The Monpas are not a homogeneous group; they
consist of different communities that are split
based on language, custom, and traditions. On
the basis of language alone, four main (oral)
language groups can be identified: Tawang
Monpa, Dirang Monpa, Brokeh, and Lish.
5 Sonam Tsering, my friend from Tawang who
was social cultural officer (SCO) in the Tawang
deputy commissioners office in 2007 when I
visited, gave me the Approach Paper for the
Workshop on Traditional System and Function-
ing of Tawang Monastery (nd). He told me that
it was published around the time that Tawang
Monastery was being renovated in 2003. How-
ever, there is no date on the approach paper,

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EXPLORING BORDERLANDS IN SOUTH ASIA
and although it was probably published in
200304, I have listed it as nd (no date). My
account of Tawang Monasterys administrative
set up and present challenges are based on the
approach paper, interviews with Lopon Acharya
(27 May 2013), and Sarkars (1996) work.
6 The 12 monasteries affiliated to Tawang Monastery
were Sakti, Mormang, Manjing, and Khartung in
the Lumla subdivision of Tawang; Urgyelling,
Changbu, Shormang, Khromten, Ariadung, Brakar
and Kimnash in Tawang area; and Namchu in
Dirang. See Tawang Monastery (Sarkar 1996) for
interviews with Lopon Acharya Ngawang Norbu,
the second abbot of Tawang Monastery (27 May
2013), and Lama Thuptan Tashi, Tawang Monas-
tery (22 May 2013).
7 See Tawang Monastery (2007), http://tawang-
monastery.org/branch.php.
8 On 25 October 1950, China announced its
intention to militarily occupy Tibet: Peoples
Army units have been ordered to advance into
Tibet to free three million Tibetans from the
imperialist oppression and to consolidate
national defen[c]e on the western borders of
China (Bhargava 1964: 23).
9 In the eastern sector, which included the entire
state of Arunachal Pradesh, the boundary
dispute between India and China centred on
the alignment of the McMahon Line. While the
Indian government stuck to the colonially
demarcated boundary, the Chinese govern-
ment claimed almost 33,000 square miles
south of the McMahon Line. There has been
much debate in scholarly circles regarding the
causes of the IndiaChina War; while some
attribute the war to Chinese expansionist and
irredentist aims, others cite the aggressive
attitude of Indian nationalist leaders. For
more on this debate, see the writings of Neville
Maxwell (1970), T S Murty (1971), and Sujit
Dutta (2008).
10 From the website of the Tawang Deputy Com-
missioners office: http://tawang.nic.in/page14.
html.
11 A Brief Biography of Shri Pema Gombu (nd) from
Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh. I acquired a copy
from Pema Gombus son, Urgen Tsering, the
chairperson of Lhou Secondary School, Tawang.
12 Tawang Monastery, Kameng Frontier Division
(1962): External Affairs Commissioner, NEFA,
No PCT 73/63, Arunachal Pradesh State Archives.
13 An Extract Copy of Tour Notes of Shri U Chakma
(for the period 1422 October 1972): IFAS Security
Commissioner, Tezpur, Arunachal Pradesh.
14 On 25 October 1950, China announced its inten-
tion to militarily occupy Tibet: Peoples Army
units have been ordered to advance into Tibet
to free three million Tibetans from the imperi-
alist oppression and to consolidate national
defen[c]e on the western borders of China
(Bhargava 1964: 23).
15 File No 46 (1972): BDL No 3, Development
Branch, 197079, pp 4478.
16 Dress for Tarjacham, Miscellaneous File (B),
BDL No 2, 19701979, pp 4765.
17 Extract of a letter from Rigya Rinpoche, Tawang
Monastery abbot, to the Chief Secretary of
Arunachal Pradesh, Shillong (24 October 1973).
18 Public sphere, as defined by Jrgen Habermas
(1991), is the collective public opinion formed
through rational and critical debate between
civil society members, which then influences
the workings of the state. The public sphere
arose in Europe in 18th century bourgeois
society when the private split from the public,
unlike in the medieval period, when private
life and public affairs overlapped in the life of
the feudal lord. With the coming together of
private individuals as a public force to articu-
late the needs of society against the state, the
94
public sphere also signalled the formal recog-
nition of the state as an entity separate from
civil society.
19 A letter from the chairman of the Tawang
Cultural Society to All India Radio requesting a
broadcast of the minutes of a meeting between
civil society representatives and state adminis-
tration demonstrates the public relations role
that this organisation plays (31 July 1974).
20 Annexure III to Order No SO-13/76/PI (24 Novem-
ber 1980) contains the following announcement:
Know all men by these presents that we
Tawang Monastery School Committee, Tawang
(society registered under Societies Registra-
tion Act, 1960), and having its office at Tawang
in the state of Arunachal Pradesh [herein after
called the obligors] are held and firmly bond
to the President of India [herein after called
the government] in the sum of [`]65,100 only,
well and truly to be paid to the government on
demand and without a demur for which pay-
ment we formally find ourselves and succes-
sors and assigns by these presents.
Signed this eighth day of January nineteen
eighty one, whereas on the obligors request,
the government has as per AP govt. order no.
SO-13/76/PI dated 24.11.80,agreed to make
in favour of the obligors a grant of [`]65,100.
Signed by Chanzo Tashi, Secretary, Tawang
Gompa Monastery School Committee
A similar bond was presented on 28 January
1980, where the Tawang Gompa Monastery
School Committee acknowledged the receipt
of `92,425.
21 See also Gohain and Grothmann (2015).
22 Interview with principal, Vivekanda Kendra
School, Kitpi, Tawang (20 May 2013).
23 See http://www.karmikadhyatmik.in/about-us-
2/, accessed on 9 September 2016.
24 In 1979, the additional deputy commissioner of
Tawang proposed the opening of a new office
of social and cultural affairs because In a sensi-
tive border area like [the] Tawang Sub-division
this steadfast adherence of theirs to religion
has during the past years effectively withstood
the onslaught of marauders from across the
centuries thus symbolising their integrated
nationality and religion.
25 Neeru Nanda joined as the first woman addi-
tional deputy commissioner of Tawang in 1974
and wrote this book based on her experiences
in Tawang. She was a beloved administrator
and people speak of her with great adoration,
even today.
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vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Ethics in Ambedkars Critique of Gandhi
Gopal Guru
Among the political thinkers of modern India, Gandhi
and Ambedkar have elicited an intellectual enthusiasm
among scholars who remain arrested in debates on the
pre-eminence of one thinker over the other. The
Ambedkarite critique of Gandhi is centred on the latters
fast unto death in opposition to the MacDonald Award
of separate electorates for Dalits. Formalistic readings of
Gandhi are not in the interest of the robust, associative
and inclusive intellectual tradition at the core of
Ambedkars emancipatory project. Ambedkar was a
pathfinder who chose critique as a method of ethical
persuasion to gently pull in and retain members of caste
society in the interlocutory framework of conversation.
This article is a revised version of the first Sabarmati lecture titled
Dr Ambedkars Gandhi: A Step Forward delivered at Ahmedabad on
26 November 2016. I have since changed the title in lieu of Ramchandra
Guhas essay titled Gandhis Ambedkar (2001) while retaining the
essence that is essential to the ethical bond between Gandhi and
Ambedkar.
The author thanks Tridip Suhrud, Director and Chief Editor, Sabarmati
Ashram Preservation and Memorial Trust, Ahmedabad for permitting
the publication of this article, and Gopal Krishna Gandhi and Gurpreet
Mahajan for their inputs in writing it.
Gopal Guru (gopalguru2001@gmail.com) teaches at the Centre for
Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
A
mong the political thinkers of modern India, Gandhi1 and
Ambedkar have elicited an intellectual enthusiasm
among scholars who have been increasingly drawn in
the vortex of debate between these two thinkers. Some of
these GandhiAmbedkar scholars are newcomers to the
debate, and have provided compelling interpretations owing
to their skill of presenting complex arguments in what could
be seen as a new language (Kumar 2015).
Such scholarly efforts, however, seem to be inconsequential
to Ambedkars adherents who continue to be critical, in fact
dismissive, of Gandhi. To criticise Gandhi has not only become
customary for some Ambedkarites, but has been treated as the
only premise to establish Ambedkar as the pre-eminent thinker.
The intensification of the critique of Gandhi across time and
space foils any effort that seeks respite from and in this
embattled relationship between Gandhi and Ambedkar. For
example, young Dalits have been active in opposing the efforts
of leading Dalit scholars of literature who seek to locate some
affirmative energy in Gandhi.2 The Ambedkarite critique of
Gandhi is centred on the latters fast unto death in opposition
to the MacDonald Award of separate electorates for Dalits. The
critique leads to two opposing conceptions. The male Ambed-
karite looks at Gandhis fast as an act of utter unfairness in as
much as it coerces Ambedkar into accepting the Poona Pact.
Conversely, female Ambedkarites positively assess the role of
Ambedkar who, in their judgment, acted fairly in saving the
life of Gandhi by signing the Poona Pact.3
While Ambedkar too has been a victim of unfair criticism
from Gandhian scholars (Shah 1977), it is Gandhi who suffers
worse cognitive injustice. The rejection of Gandhi as an anti-
Dalit thinker by Ambedkars adherents is unreflective; finding
faults with Gandhi (dismissive criticism) without a reflexive
acknowledgement of that which is affirmative in Ambedkars
reading of Gandhi (redemptive and enabling critique). These
adherents hold the view that Ambedkar had developed a
determinatively, and justifiably so, bitter attitude towards
Gandhi. It is true that the language employed by Ambedkar for
Gandhi, is inhospitable and appears dismissive, interrogatory
and accusatory (Ambedkar 1948). Arguably, one finds this
linguistic turn in Ambedkar particularly after the Round
Table Conferences in the early 1930s.
The questions that arise are: did Ambedkar never adopt a
thin ethical vocabulary, such as persuasion, while approach-
ing Gandhi? That is, did he never find Gandhi to be a conscien-
tious interlocutor with affirmative energy? Did Ambedkar
follow a single, salutary path of finding fault with Gandhi by
mounting constant criticism against the latter? Was Ambedkar
95
SPECIAL ARTICLE
a path finder or a fault finder? If he was a path finder, did he
not choose critique as the method of ethical persuasion to gen-
tly pull in and retain members of caste society in the interlocu-
tory framework of conversation? Did his idea of critique form
an enabling condition which, in a moral sense, aids a thinker
to create an associative tradition of emancipation? These are
some of the core questions this essay seeks to address.
Formalistic Critique of Gandhi
Post-Ambedkar, the Dalit critique of Gandhi has been purely
rhetorical and lacking substance. This limitation derives from a
formalistic reading of Ambedkar. It is formalistic because it
does not put a moral and, more importantly, intellectual bur-
den on Ambedkars adherents. Thus, the latter do not consider
it necessary to reflectively endorse the principles of equality,
liberty, justice and fraternity, as championed by Ambedkar. The
logic of formalism encourages these adherents to rhetorically
assert such principles. To put it differently, mere assertion tends
to create among these adherents, a belief that treats such prin-
ciples as given. Formalism seeks to reduce the impact of robust
theoretical efforts, such as argumentation and ethical persua-
sion to mere assertion. Such assertions seek the ultimate origin
of normative principles, exclusively, in Ambedkar; this, in turn,
becomes a criterion to deliver a judgment against Gandhi. In
fact, such adherents treat the mere assertion of Ambedkars
principles as a sufficient condition for them to believe that these
principles were absent in Gandhi. A formalistic commitment to
universal principles may serve the immediate political agendas
of some, but how can such formalism be in the interest of the
robust, associative and inclusive intellectual tradition, that was
at the core of Ambedkars emancipatory project? Such a project
demands from its adherents, ethically and intellectually, a far
more serious treatment necessary for the full appreciation of
Ambedkar inclusive discourse of emancipation.
The exercise of persuasion requires a certain flexibility and
capaciousness that can be found in Ambedkars conception of
what should constitute a decent society, within which we
define the self in affirmative relation to others. In Ambedkars
conception, to be open to persuasion necessarily requires an
ethical ability to imagine our self as an extension of the sen-
tient other. Hence, it becomes absolutely necessary to avoid
formalism as it leads to a widening of the gap between the
universal and the particular, or the real and the ideal. Ambed-
kar and Gandhi were both committed to overcome (the) reality
(of untouchability) to achieve their conceptions of the ideal,
which converged on the unity of the equal worth of every
human being. The search for such an ideal, which forms the
normative basis of Dalit emancipation, makes it almost ethi-
cally mandatory for Ambedkars adherents to (re-)consider the
extent to which a new reading of Ambedkar can lead us to find
affirmative energy in Gandhi.
The need for a new reading of Gandhi can be envisaged
from the realisation that a formalistic approach to Ambedkar
results in compromising the impact of the ever-expanding
power of Ambedkars thought. Thus, Ambedkars adherents
should correspondingly reassess Gandhi as a thinker who was
96
genuinely interested in creating a world in which caste and
untouchability mattered less to ones social identification.
Ambedkars thought has been reduced to a ghosh vakya (emp-
ty slogan), a rhetoric that is repeatedly reproduced by the for-
mers adherents to refute any efforts of conciliation between
the two thinkers under reference. Formalism prevents adher-
ents from developing cognitive generosity, essential to locate
an expansive thrust in Ambedkars thought.
Selective reading of Ambedkar by his adherents is another
impediment in approaching Gandhi with emancipatory promise.
While selective reading has become a part of common sense
imagination, it is all the more disturbing when we come
across instances of it among one of Ambedkars biographers.
C B Khairmode, who is considered perhaps the most reliable
biographer of Babasaheb, fails to objectively present Ambed-
kars feelings over the assassination of Gandhi. Khairmode
(1983: 192) observes, Babasaheb neither participated in the
funeral nor did he make any public statement on the assassina-
tion of Gandhi. One, however, gets an opposite account from
the correspondence of Ambedkar of his feelings on Gandhis
assassination. Ambedkar strongly condemns the assassination
saying,
that Gandhi should have met his death at the hands of a Maharash-
trian. Nay! it would have been wrong for anybody to have com-
mitted such a foul deed I owe nothing to Mr. Gandhi and he has
contributed nothing to my spiritual, social and moral makeup. Not-
withstanding his antipathy to me I went to the Birla House on Satur-
day morning ... I was very much moved on seeing his dead body. I went
with the funeral procession for a short distance as I was unable to walk
and then returned home and again went to Rajghat on the bank of the
river Jamuna (Yamuna) but could not get to the Burning Place being
unable to break the ring formed by the crowd. (Rattu 1995: 63)
As the letter under reference indicates, Ambedkars emotions
concerning Gandhi do not seem to be consistent and uncondi-
tional. In fact, his criticism of Gandhi has not only been harsh,
but quite regular during 193248 (Ambedkar 1943, 1948).
However, Ambedkars criticism of Gandhi is ethical/moral in
nature, and the bitterness polemical if not outrightly, superficial.
Ambedkar and/ or Gandhi
At the formal/rational level, the adherents of both Gandhi
(Shah 1978) and Ambedkar continue to intensify the tension
between the two thinkers, by inserting authorial as well as
combative words such as or.4 The use of such barricading
words underlies a modernist claim in as much as it indicates
the limits in one particular thought and a claim of complete-
ness in another. Most Dalits, in their attempt to approach Gan-
dhi and Ambedkar, insert the word or between these two
thinkers. They seem to assert that there are limits in Gandhian
thought while Ambedkars thoughts are perfect for them. This
perfection is envisioned in terms of taking their struggle for
emancipation to its logical end. For them Ambedkars thought
is not only adequate, but is the only alternative as far as the
Dalit question of emancipation is concerned.
Or is a kind of claim for achieving pre-eminence for a
thought. The route to this pre-eminence is through the
transcendence of the emancipatory limits of earlier thought. Or
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

suggests a paradigmatic shift from earlier thought; a com-
pletely new conceptual vocabulary of understanding emanci-
pation. We have reached a situation where it has become diffi-
cult to distinguish whose pre-eminence are we talking about:
Gandhis or Ambedkars? Or are we talking about those who
are participating in the debate with the purpose to achieve
pre-eminence for themselves? It is important to note that the
question of pre-eminence of thought does not become so imp-
ortant for some perceptive scholars. For instance, D R Nagaraj,
an outstanding scholar on Gandhi and Ambedkar, observes that
the two thinkers had transformed each other through creative
confrontation; and that Gandhi had taken over economics from
Ambedkar, whereas the latter had internalised the importance
of religion as prescribed by Gandhi (1993: 24). However, Nagaraj
acknowledges that there are fundamental difficulties that
Ambedkar had with Gandhi, and that the latter cannot be sub-
sumed in such an act of balancing (1993: 16).
There have been efforts by some scholars to insert the con-
joining word and in order to make both Gandhi and Ambed-
kar commensurable.5 The word and, unlike or, does not yond the temporal (conception of plural, liberal power) into
erase the earlier line; on the contrary, it draws a parallel line.
And necessarily indicates similarity between two thoughts
and helps draw parallels between them.
Ambedkars emancipatory projects, however, go beyond the
limits of or and and, in as much as he draws a broad line acco- such as karuna (compassion) and maitri (friendship) that con-
mmodating the critical impulses of Gandhi therein. But Ambed-
kar finds the political sphere a fundamental impediment in
drawing such a broad line. Whenever Gandhi appeared stub-
born over the political rights of untouchables; or the Congress
party appeared indifferent, if not totally hypocritical, about the
caste question; or members of high caste Hindus acted recalci-
trantly; Ambedkar never felt frustrated nor became cynical. In
fact, Ambedkars patience to reason and debate based on an ethics
of persuasion with Gandhi, the Congress party and ultimately,
high caste Hindus is quite evident in his entire body of work.
Ambedkars Ethics of Persuasion
A fundamental question pertains to why Ambedkar is morally
qualified to take the ethical route of persuasion, as opposed to
the legal route. Essentially, Ambedkar was a path finder, and
the ethic of persuasion was an integral mode to his path find-
ing. Put differently, he was not a fault finder and hence, had no
use for paralytic cynicism or dismissive criticism that neces-
sarily arrests a person or a particular social group in the alien-
ating image of a victim or a difficult person. Ambedkar did not
allow cynicism to ontologically fold him into his own existen-
tial struggle. Since such a struggle is with the self, it tends to
lead a person to either take responsibility for being the cause
of his/her own victimhood, or he/she affixes responsibility
onto others for having pushed the former, along with his/her
social group, into a state of victimhood. Ambedkar never
engaged in such existential encounters, for it would have
either meant blaming himself for his own helplessness against
the authority of caste, or inducing a sense of guilt in Gandhi
for the latters problematic positions, particularly on the
questions of caste and separate electorates. Instead, Ambedkar
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
SPECIAL ARTICLE
took positive responsibility which required him to flow freely
in the social sphere and embark along with others, including
Gandhi, on the path of seeking truth. This path did not reside
in the real, immediate existence but in the ideal, for example,
of Buddhism. It is for this reason that he did not get stuck with
the historical truth of Poona Pact, 1932, as he knew that the
consequences of electoral dynamism would produce a differ-
ent, possibly bitter truth. The realisation of this truth is evi-
dent in observations made by some important leaders6 accord-
ing to whom, political representation, either through separate
or joint electorates, is not going to necessarily throw up auton-
omous Dalit representatives and leaders. It is due to the inher-
ent limits of liberal power, internal to both the Communal
Award as well as the Poona Pact, that Ambedkars main focus
remained on the search for truth in the ideal.
Those who continue to blame Gandhi for the Poona Pact do
have a point, but that point cannot be overstretched or over-
used against the latter; Ambedkars notion of truth does not
allow the same. Ambedkars ability to comprehend truth be-
the transcendental realm, did not allow him to remain entan-
gled in the historical memory of the Poona Pact; in fact, he
transitioned freely through constitution-making, and ulti-
mately, the conversion to Neo-Buddhism. Normative values
stitute the core ethical principle of Ambedkars Buddhism
make him flow freely with an adequate sense of freedom. It is
these principles that provide the common moral ground for
Ambedkar to find in Gandhi affirmative energies. As we shall
see in the last section of this essay, Ambedkar sees in Gandhi
the tradition of association and affirmation, an integral part
of Buddhism.
Ambedkars ethic of persuasion, which finds its creative
expression in the critique of Gandhi, could be better understood
in terms of a reaching mode that entails reflective judgment.
This is in contrast to the rushing mode which involves rash
judgment, such as a verdict delivered by a Gandhian scholar
stating Ambedkar had parochial interests of his community
(Shah 1977: 78), or a judgement delivered by the adherents of
Ambedkar7 suggesting that Gandhi was anti-Dalit. Rash
judgment, which is necessarily accompanied by a certain kind
of cynicism, would ultimately impair the process of persua-
sion. Conversely, reflective judgment, in order to succeed, has
to necessarily suspend, in fact, consciously avoid making or
rushing to rash judgment. The ethics of persuasion in Ambed-
kar operates through the redemptive forms of critique. This
redemption of the recalcitrant high caste Hindus cannot be
achieved by mere appeal to some abstract moral principle; it
has to be achieved by making them conscious of the ethical
inconsistencies that form a part of their recalcitrant self
(Ambedkar 2005: 129).8 Ambedkar does take recourse to the
principle of moral responsibility and uses it in order to keep
rash judgment at bay while approaching Gandhi. This princi-
ple is evident in his readiness to cooperate with those who do
not force him to compromise with his normative principles
(Ambedkar 2005: 152). In other words, Ambedkar uses the
97
SPECIAL ARTICLE
force of reflective judgment to create a space of connecting
Gandhi with his emancipatory project.
Ambedkar demonstrates the ability to imagine himself as
different from his untouchable self. His ethics of persuasion is
aimed at making others rise above themselves, the touchable
selves. It, thus, plays a normative function to demobilise the
self from his/her particular caste/gender location, and mobi-
lise such an abstracted self to the universal horizon where this
self can meet other selves on a universal ground of dignity.
Ambedkars Buddhism, thus, becomes such a universal ground
for assimilation of the abstracted self. Ambedkar seeks to
approach Gandhi outside the political through the ethical/
moral for the ultimate assimilation into Buddhism. It is no
doubt against the grain to suggest that Ambedkar invests in
Gandhi for the realisation of such a project; which is why he
finds in Gandhi, the virtue of truthfulness.
Truthfulness in Gandhi
One would like to state at the outset that acknowledging truth-
fulness in Gandhi is a function of Ambedkars capacity for re-
flective judgment, arising from an ethical need to do so. To put
it differently, Ambedkars ethics necessitate the discovery of
truthfulness in Gandhi, and not individual duty to behave
truthfully in conformation with moral principles that exist at
the abstract universal level. Let me clarify this point by draw-
ing on the conception of truthfulness as discussed by a pio-
neering scholar Raghavan Iyer. According to Iyer (1986),
truthfulness is internal to Gandhian ethics, and embodied in
confession. Such confession, in the Gandhian sense, would
demand the declaration of ones deception to those who one
has deceived (Iyer 1986: 201). Truthfulness in Gandhi has
another meaning, which suggests restraining ones emotions is
being truthful (Iyer 1986: 203). This conception has moral
strength. However, the conception of truthfulness in this essay
is different from the Gandhian sense. Ambedkar finds truth-
fulness in Gandhis moral and ethical consciousness, his ability
to take initiative in favour of the untouchables, and his effort
to create moral reason among the caste Hindus.
For Ambedkar, being truthful is being ethical and not only
morally conscious but also accepting of the truth. Ambedkar
(2005) finds this ethical stamina in Gandhi who according to
the former does not only tell the truth, but accepts it. In
Ambedkars conception, being truthful means an ethical action
has to be such that it ultimately leads to the emergence of an
ethically/morally stable social order; a social order that would
be permeated by a collective moral good such as maitri or un-
conditional friendship. Truthfulness, as Ambedkar would see
it, is nothing but truth performance. For him, grasping the
truth through action is more important than approaching it
through theoretical operation. Truth performs through action
and autonomous initiative. How does one understand the
performative dimension that makes truthfulness much more
important than the truth itself? Why should Ambedkar de-
mand truthfulness from the Hindus and Gandhi? Why did he
put a premium on truthfulness rather than on truth? This is
because for him, the ethical need to be treated with dignity in
98
actual practice is much more important than expressing oneself
in the truth by developing a metaphysical understanding of the
caste (of mind). Thus, Ambedkar would appreciate anyone being
truthful in terms of standing against untouchability, wherein
untouchability uses its power of live performance to cause
moral injury to Dalits on an everyday basis. For Ambedkar, un-
touchability, in its performative aspect, contains a lived truth
which has to be acknowledged without providing any evidence.
Gandhi does acknowledge this truth that is being performed
in the practice of untouchability. He neither asks Ambedkar
for any evidence nor engages him in debate to accept/arrive at
the truth of untouchability. For Gandhi, untouchability is self-
evident, among other things through its morally corrosive im-
pact on Ambedkar. For Gandhis truthfulness lies in his ethical
stamina to see truth in Ambedkars social suffering; truth that
results from the curse of untouchability. In short, Gandhis
truthfulness lies in his accepting the truth of untouchability at
face value. Put differently, economising on deliberative truth is
being truthful.9 Here, being truthful is defending dignity under
attack by untouchability that too without waiting for others
initiative. Ambedkar notes this truthfulness as a political virtue
in Gandhi in one of his letters written to a colleague in London.
Ambedkar writes,
I read Gandhis letters published from Yerwada Jail, I have read in
Daily Harold that Gandhi fasted for Ratnagiris Appasaheb Patward-
han.10 Gandhis stand was correct whereas British authorities were
wrong. How can they perpetuate hereditary occupation in one caste?
(Khairmode 2002: 76)
Not asking for the evidence of untouchability from Ambed-
kar is neither a matter of Gandhis epistemic generosity, which
would suggest the employment of arguments provided by
already available categories; nor is it the result of dialogue
which demands evidence from its participants. None of the
above modes fits into Gandhis method of achieving congru-
ence with others position. As we know, every concept of dia-
logue presupposes a form of argumentation that is typically
modern in nature. Gandhis truthfulness does not necessitate
him to adopt a dialogical method to argue out with Ambedkar
the question of untouchability. Although in his response to
Ambedkars published speech on the annihilation of caste, he
does argue with the latter about the question of caste.
Conversely, Gandhis truthfulness is also evident from the
fact that he asks the high caste Brahmins for evidence of un-
touchability in the Hindu shastras (Raimon 2006: 105). Gan-
dhi takes recourse to the method of debate and argumenta-
tion, to reason with the leaders of orthodox Hinduism. This
happened during the Vaikom Satyagraha in 1924. Gandhi,
though ironically so, also adopts parliamentary methods to
turn public opinion in favour of the eradication of untouchabil-
ity. On one occasion, when the upper caste in South India did
not agree with his anti-untouchbaility campaign, he along
with Rajagopalachari suggested a plebiscite on the question of
temple entry for untouchables in Calicut, which went in their
favour (Tendulkar 1951: 188). But Gandhi did not have the
same luck in his own home state, Gujarat. When an upper
caste Gandhian invited him to address a public meeting held
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on the question of untouchability, he refused to speak from the
stage. This was a protest against the local committees act of
segregating and marginalising the untouchables at the meet-
ing. He suggested a show of hands on his contention in favour
of the inclusion of untouchables in the main meeting space.
However, the majority went against his proposal. Accepting the
verdict of the upper castes, Gandhi joined the untouchables and
addressed them only (Tendulkar 1951: 209). Gandhis truthful-
ness is quite evident from the fact that on the question of un-
touchability he did not suggest to Ambedkar either for plebi-
scite or for voting. Gandhi treated these options as redundant,
as he accepted the truth of untouchability embodied in the experi-
ences of Ambedkar and his community, except for a brief argu-
ment that Gandhi holds out to Ambedkars annihilation of caste.
What matters in being truthful is not the epistemic calibre
of the thinker but the demonstration of moral stamina to stand
against untouchability as a reality, without hiding behind the
faade of intellectualism. Being truthful in Gandhi also means
developing moral capacity to become humble in front of the
experience of Ambedkar. Both these virtues have been well
described by Joseph Lelyveld (2011), who reproduces the fol-
lowing quote of Gandhi, Ambedkar has a right even to spit
upon me, as every untouchable has, and I would keep on smil-
ing if they did so. Lelyveld asserts that this resolutely smiling
face was not a mask but a measure of the man (2011: 214).
Gandhis moral capacity to subordinate is being truthful to
oneself. It is an exceptional generosity to the extent that
Gandhi learns how to see oneself. In subordinating oneself, he
was not showcasing sacrifice but being more truthful to
himself. This is what it means to grow from truth to truth.
There is an incremental movement in the growth of truth
and this process is internal to the genealogy present in Ambed-
kars project of engendering the transformative tradition of
emancipatory thought.
Genealogically Gandhi Belongs to Ambedkar
I argue that the principles of pluralism/relativism do not help
us in conceiving the sense in which Gandhi belongs to Ambed-
kar. A close and careful reading of Ambedkars work makes it
plausible for us to adopt a genealogical approach, which in my
considered opinion, is the most appropriate approach to gain
an ethical insight into Ambedkars efforts to interiorise Gandhi
in an emancipatory tradition. Following Murphy (2003), I further
argue that the genealogist is a historical relativist, who in his/
her attempt to create critical thought chooses from historically
available thought a relatively more promising option available to
the protagonist. A thought becomes promising to a protago-
nist, such as Ambedkar, not because it is a priori intellectually,
idealistically attractive but because it has an element of social
truth ingrained in the practice of such thought. It is this ethical
expression of the thought principle that makes a particular
thought more promising. Ambedkar in his cognitive capacity
sees a relative truth ingrained in Gandhis commitment to the
interrogation of the dehumanising practice of untouchability.
Both Gandhi and Ambedkar conceived the truth of untouch-
ability as historically produced through the social practices of
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
the touchables, and internalised by those who have been at the
receiving end of such a social evil. They portended that this
truth needed to be transcended within history. In this sense,
pushing the untouchable into the Harijan category would
amount to pushing them outside history. Gandhi tests the lim-
its of caste Hindus but also rescues them from direct political
confrontation with the untouchables. In this context, one is
reminded of Nagarajs assertion that both Gandhi and Ambed-
kar plunge in historical action to cure each other (Nagaraj
1993: 16). Here, it must be acknowledged that Gandhi has
shown the moral stamina to deliver a normative judgment
against the history of untouchability, in his interrogation of
peoples practices as well as examination of Hindu texts at a
number of places.
It is also important to acknowledge that Gandhis historical
judgment against untouchability has a moral faculty; unlike
Ambedkar, Gandhi is not socially positioned at the receiving
end of the humiliating practices of untouchability and yet he
feels morally tormented by it. He realises that untouchability
has a morally corrosive impact that does not allow Ambedkar
to remain a morally integrated self. The moral faculty of
Gandhis historical judgment against untouchability is also
discernible in his ability to individually own up to the crime of
untouchability that is collectively committed by the touchables
against the untouchables through the social history of India.
Moral faculty, from the Ambedkarite perspective, becomes
more important when we review it in the context of other
nationalist thinkers who were Gandhis contemporaries. These
thinkers tend to assign positive roles to the caste system and
untouchability or take sceptical positions on the same (Raju
2013: 97). In the genealogical mode, Gandhi stands out among
his contemporaries, including B G Tilak and Jawaharlal Nehru.
Ambedkar argues that Gandhis conception of peaceful resis-
tance is far superior to Tilaks active resistance because it has
its origins in Buddhism and its moral means of non-violence
(Kamble 1992: 167). Ambedkar defines Buddhas conception of
moral means by drawing on his teachings which implore that
we must conquer hatred or rage by means of peace; we must
detect untruth with the force of truth (Kamble 1992: 167).
Although Ambedkar finds Gandhi, rather than Tilak, closer to
him, he also expresses his disagreement with Gandhi. Ambed-
kar argues that Gandhi fails to follow higher levels of Buddhist
teaching and this failure has to be understood in terms of Gan-
dhis insistence on converting the principle of non-violence
into a rule (Kamble 1992: 168). However, this does not discour-
age Ambedkar from genealogically internalising Gandhi in
the critical tradition, for which Ambedkar offers the instance
of Jawaharlal Nehru. According to Ambedkar, Nehru seeks to
subsume the question of untouchability into a larger universal
category of workers (Ambedkar 2002: 379). Gandhi acknowl-
edges the question of untouchability as a deeply social question.
Ambedkar while noting the stark difference between Gandhi
and Nehru particularly on the question of untouchability
further observes that Nehru like Gandhi did not consider un-
touchability a blot on Hinduism (Ambedkar 2002: 379). Thus,
Ambedkar finds Gandhi, not Nehru, closer to his social vision.
99
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Conclusions in persuasion and conversion he, in a lose sense, is a realist

While I have a long-standing interest in writing and speaking
about Ambedkar and Gandhi, this interest is neither purely
epistemic nor is it aimed at producing any degree of fascina-
tion by writing on GandhiAmbedkar. In fact, it is deeply onto-
logical in the sense that it is related to changing the fate com-
mon to me, Gandhi and Ambedkar. All three of our futures are
linked up with the transformation of social relations in the
Indian context. Gandhis historical efforts to be a dependable
part of the vision to annihilate untouchability, if not caste,
forms the larger project of social transformation. This project
is further intensified by Ambedkar at a much deeper level by
attacking the essence of the caste system and not just un-
touchability, which is a derivative of the former. Changing
fate, thus, makes the efforts of Gandhi and Ambedkar
indispensable. Ambedkars project, both intellectual as well
as political, to reason out with members of caste society
makes it historically important to acknowledge the affirma-
tive energy in Gandhi. Ambedkars critique of Gandhi re-
volves around the hope that he would succeed in reasoning
out with caste infected Hindus first through persuasion and
finally, through conversion to Buddhism. Since he poses hope
and not a sceptic.
In Ambedkars emancipatory project, there are answers to
moral questions; questions as to why the caste Hindus do not
detoxify themselves of the vicious conviction that projects caste
as a social good worth cherishing. Ambedkar believes that the
caste system, which has created a pathological distance be-
tween the touchables and untouchables in Indian society, thus,
dividing it both vertically and horizontally, can be transformed
with force of the ethics of persuasion. In this context, I feel hon-
estly persuaded by the suggestion made by Gopal Krishna Gan-
dhi (personal communication). Keeping in view his suggestion,
let me then pose the following question and also offer a tenta-
tive answer: What was the collective project of Gandhi and
Ambedkar: Freeing India from different configurations of pow-
er, or redeeming India with its affirmative energy which, for
example, is internal to Buddhism? If it was the project of re-
deeming, then what was at the core of its realisationthe need
for practical ethics or the push of conceptual politics? Arguably,
in both the thinkers it was ultimately the ethical that was im-
portant for redemption, wherein conceptual politics was only
the initial condition to realise the redemption of India.

Notes
1 Authors such as Terchek (1998) seem to have
compared Gandhi with some of the leading
thinkers from the West. However, he did not
relate Gandhi with Ambedkar possibly on the
assumption that Ambedkar only operates in
the sensible world of politics. However, there
are scholars who have rescued Ambedkar from
what may be seen as, in the Kantian sense, the
realm of the sensible and placing him in the in-
telligible, by making Ambedkar a global figure.
This includes Eleanor Zelliot, Raosaheb Kasbe,
Sharad Patil, Gail Omvedt, D R Nagaraj, Anand
Teltumbde, Upendra Baxi, Bhikhu Parekh,
Meera Nanda, Aishwary Kumar, Saumyabrata
Choudhury, Manash Bhattacharjee, and sever-
al others.
2 A leading Dalit poet and intellectual Siddalin-
gaiah from Karnataka had to face his doctoral
students discontent when the former made an
affirmative connection between Gandhi and
Ambedkar. During a public discussion on
Anand Patwardhans movie Jai Bhim Comrade
in 2014 at Jawaharlal Nehru University, a Dalit
student argued that the use of the superlative
adjective of Mahatma for Ambedkar, by an im-
portant Dalit leader in the movie, is a stigmati-
sation of Ambedkar. However, the student
would have perhaps approved the attribution
of Mahatma to Jotirao Phule.
3 These conceptions may be evidenced in Bhimgeet
such as a popular number, Aika ho Gandhi, lagu
naka naadi (Listen up Gandhi, do not provoke us
Ambedkarites) sung by Dalit male singers, and
Sahikarun upkar kele Gandhiwar, sarvana urun
purale Ambedkar (By signing the Poona Pact,
Ambedkar did a great favour to Gandhi) per-
formed by a Dalit female singer in Maharashtra.
4 The use of the word or is not original; it has
been used by Arindam Chakrabarti previously.
5 These include Bhikhu Parekh, Thomas Pan-
tham and Ramachandra Guha.
6 This has been articulated by Prakash Ambed-
kar, a leading Dalit political leader with a re-
flective mind.
7 This is almost part of common sense among the
adherents of Ambedkar.
8 This is evident from the Chavdar water tank
movement in 1927, where Ambedkar exposes
the moral inconsistency within caste Hindus by
questioning the provision of access to water for
animals and not fellow humans. In the Parvati
temple entry movement in Poona, 1929, Ambed-
kar exposed the Hindus failure to see reason in
a movement that did not intend to destroy the
idol, but establish Dalits right to equality (Ambed-
kar 2005: 129). He pushes the ethical limits of
the high caste Hindus further by asking them
how they can oppose a movement supported by
Mahatma Gandhi (Ambedkar 2005: 129).
9 Ambedkar has a different conception of the
economy of truth which he uses to question
Gandhi. Ambedkar (1989: 317) saw in Gandhis
attempt to pass a resolution on untouchability,
the act of questioning a definite discursive (em-
phasis added) move to economise truth to its
vanishing point.
10 Gandhi fasted against the governments deci-
sion that did not allow Appasaheb Patward-
han, a Brahmin to undertake scavenging work
in Ratnagiri jail.
References
Ambedkar, B R (1943): Ranade, Gandhi and Jinnah,
Bombay: Thacker & Co Ltd.
(1948): What Congress and Gandhi Have Done
to the Untouchables, Bombay: Thacker & Co
Ltd.
(1989): Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and
Speeches, Vol 5, Mumbai: Government of
Maharashtra.
(2002): Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and
Speeches, Vol 18, Part III, Mumbai: Government
of Maharashtra.
(2005): Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and
Speeches, Vol 20, Mumbai: Government of
Maharashtra.
Bilgrami, Akeel (2003): Gandhi, the Philosopher,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol 38, No 39,
pp 415965.
Guha, Ramachandra (2001): An Anthropologist
among the Marxists and Other Essays, New
Delhi: Permanent Black.
Iyer, Raghavan N (1986): The Moral and Political
Thought of Mahatma Gandhi, Oxford: Claren-
don Press.
Kamble, Arun (1992): Dr B R Ambedkar: Janata
Patratil Lekh, Mumbai: Popular Prakashan &
Department of Marathi, Mumbai University.
Khairmode, C B (1983): Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambed-
kar: Charitra, Vol 9, Mumbai: Maharashtra Ra-
jya Sahitya & Sanskruti Mandal.
(2002): Dr Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar: Charitra,
Vol 5, Pune: Sugawa.
Kumar, Aishwary (2015): Radical Equality: Ambed-
kar, Gandhi and the Risk of Democracy, Stan-
ford: Stanford University Press.
Lelyveld, Joseph (2011): Great Soul: Mahatma Gan-
dhi and His Struggle with India, New Delhi:
Harper Collins.
Murphy, Mark C (2003): Alisdair MacIntyre. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nagaraj, D R (1993): The Flaming Fleet: A Study of
the Dalit Movement in India, Bangalore: South
Forum Press.
Raimon, S (2006): Selected Documents on Vaikom
Satyagraha, Trivandrum: Kerala State Archives
Department, Government of Kerala.
Raju, A Raghuram (2013): Philosophy and India,
New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Rattu, Nanak Chand (1995): Reminiscences and
Remembrances of Dr B R Ambedkar, New Delhi:
Falcon Books.
Shah, K J (1978): Consensus and Conflict: Some
Considerations, Indian Philosophical Quarter-
ly, Vol 6, No 1, pp 10108.
(1977): Dissent, Protest and Reform: Some
Conceptual Clarifications, Dissent, Protest
and Reform in Indian Civilisation, by S C Malik,
Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study,
pp 7080.
Tendulkar, D G (1951): Mahatma, Vol 2, Delhi:
Publications Division, Government of India.
(1951): Mahatma, Vol 3, Delhi: Publications
Division, Government of India.
Terchek, Ronald J (1998): Gandhi: Struggling for
Autonomy, New Delhi: Vistaar.

100 APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
SPECIAL ARTICLE
Ambedkar as a Political Philosopher
Valerian Rodrigues
Existing studies on B R Ambedkar largely focus on his
substantive religious, sociological, political and
constitutional concerns, and not on the concepts he
deployed for the purpose or modes of his
argumentation. His body of work demonstrates that he
formulated a number of concepts to take stock of the
social reality that he confronted, and/or reformulated
existing concepts by critically engaging with the body of
scholarship available to him. With regard to the
conception of the political, he advanced a
comprehensive and consistent design of what it means
to live as a public and how best to do so in a setting very
different from the West.
Valerian Rodrigues (valerianrodrigues@yahoo.com) is a National Fellow
of the Indian Council of Social Science Research based at Mangalore
University.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
T
here is much in Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkars writings
and social practices to consider him a philosopher in the
traditional sense. His association with certain philoso-
phers such as John Dewey is well known and in his later years,
he closely followed the teachings of the Buddha and philo-
sophical schools that claimed to be inheritors of Buddhas
teachings. He was familiar with the debates around socialism,
particularly revolving around the critique of capitalism that
informed the Fabian school. He followed the works of the
British idealists very closely, including their interface with
German philosophy, and classical Greek thought. He demon-
strates critical readings of certain philosophical texts of
Indiathe major Upanishads and the six systems of philosophy,1
particularly Samkhya and Badarayanas Uttara Mimansha. He
wrote a small treatise on the Bhagavad Gita. Among his
contemporaries, he closely followed the work of M K Gandhi,2
Sakhya Buddhism (wrote an introduction to the second edition
of Narasus What Is Buddhism), the Theosophical School, and
strands of Buddhist thought in Ceylon and Burma. Further, his
work is replete with familiarity with the major currents of Eu-
ropean enlightenment thought.
His philosophical interest revolved around (i) metaphysical
questions such as the nature of the self and being human; rela-
tionship of the self with the other; nature and consciousness;
causality; human telos; human action and its consequences,
etc; (ii) epistemological questions such as modes of and
approaches to knowledge; the problem of subject and object;
intersubjectivity and communication; truth, interpretation and
social practices; the nature of scientific method; and (iii) ethical
questions, particularly the relationship between morality and
regimes of rights on the one hand, and societal values and
human freedom on the other. Certain concerns of political philo-
sophy such as justice, liberty, equality, community, democracy,
authority, legitimacy and recognition were his lifelong pursuits.
While he approached and formulated the above-mentioned
metaphysical, epistemic and moral questions in his own distinct
way, the focus of this paper is limited to highlighting certain
central concerns of his political philosophy.
Political Philosophy
The term political philosophy has no single connotation;
although we do not call everyone who comments on public life
a political philosopher. We think that Plato was a political phi-
losopher and in recent years, John Rawls. In modern-day
India, some of the thinkers who came closest to being political
philosophers were M K Gandhi (Parekh 1989; Parel 2006),
Aurobindo Ghose (Singh 2014), Rabindranath Tagore in his
101
SPECIAL ARTICLE
work Nationalism (Tagore 1917: 1996) and The Religion of Man
(Tagore 1931: 1996), and Allama Iqbal in The Reconstruction of
Religious Thought in Islam (Iqbal 1930: 2003). Gandhi ad-
vanced a foundational critique of modernity and proposed a
distinct conception of freedom as swaraj. Aurobindo Ghosh
attempted to reconnect man to his inner self as well as to a
distinct conception of nation and the cosmos. Tagore closely
associated nationalism with the inexorable march of positivist
modernity and saw in it a threat to our sense of belonging, hu-
manity and cross-fertilisation of cultures. Iqbal critiqued
Western modernity for its one-sidedness and saw in Islam the
possibility of recasting modernity on new foundations.
Political philosophers consider the basic categories or con-
cepts around which we envisage our public life, relate them to
one another, and advance arguments defending/refuting a
concept(s) on one hand and its relation to other concepts on
the other. The evidence for the arguments might be drawn
from the mundane, empirical and philosophical stances that
encompass a concept. An exercise of this kind lends itself to
scrutiny and contestation of the existing positions on an issue,
including the modes and processes of undertaking such an
exercise. Reasoning of this kind may suggest the desirable and
the feasible, or the significant and commendable in public life
and policy as well as the preconditions and processes for their
realisation. It is important to point out that a robust public life
can contribute much for the thriving of political philosophy,
although wherever public life thrives there need not necessar-
ily be an engaged political philosophy. In the latter case, public
life might be held together through other ways such as cus-
toms, authority or power. Political philosophy, of course,
draws attention to such realities as the nature of public power,
its extent and limitations, modes of its constitution, relation
between the rulers and the ruled on one hand and among the
rulers themselves on the other, the entitlements of citizens
and persons, and what would be a good life to live in common.
Specifically, an exercise in political philosophy may draw
our attention to an aspect of public life which we may have
been relatively inattentive to and build its interconnections to
the basic units constituting our political understanding. Anto-
nio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist philosopher, for instance,
draws attention to the concept of civil society or hegemony,
which was not hitherto central in socialist political discourse,
with profound implications for our understanding of the state,
power and political legitimacy (Gramsci 2009: 21076); or for
that matter, John Rawls draws attention to the limitations of
utilitarianism and why the pursuit of net aggregate satis-
factions of the members of a political community is morally
indefensible (Rawls 1972: 2233 and 18490). Political philo-
sophy may also propose concepts which throw light on a fac-
et of political reality in very different ways than we are hith-
erto accustomed to see. Sometimes, it may dwell on com-
monsense and suggest which elements of it are defensible
and reasons for the same. At times, political philosophy
might just reconstruct an argument or revisit a concept
because the existing versions are simply inadequate. Exer-
tions of this kind involve reordering priorities in the relation
102
among concepts such as swaraj, justice, freedom, etc, and
advancing reasons for the same.
In recent years, several political philosophers have raised
doubts concerning the universality of political philosophy.
While scholars from the non-Christian world have charged
political philosophy for being close to the Judeo-Christian
frame, others have seen it as upholding an imperialism of
categories. Scholars from the global South and postcolonial
societies have rallied together to explore an alternative/
different conception of the political which can speak closely to
the experiences or the cultural repertoire of the people of
these societies.
Ambedkars Political Queries
In this paper, I wish to suggest that Ambedkar either formu-
lated or revisited many a concept and relations across them,
with regard to the conception of the political that advances a
relatively comprehensive and consistent design of what it
means to live as a public, and how best to do so in a setting
very different from the West. The questions that he asked
were: What does it mean to be human and a citizen? How does
one live a tradition? If the modern public is an autonomous
sphere made of free and equal members, how to ensure its con-
tinuity over time and inter-generationally? Is there a place for
religion in our public life and if so, what is the nature of such
religion? What is the basis of social cooperation in societies
where there are multiple forms and levels of inequalities
founded not merely on exploitation but complex modes of
oppression? How can diversities founded on distinct concep-
tions of ultimate ideals and reflected in ways of life as well as
specific institutions cohabit a shared public? How do we en-
gage with a sufficiently large group which makes a claim to
pursue its distinct ways and conceptions of life? What is the
role and limits of power? Some of the central concepts of the
political such as power, representation, legitimacy, citizen,
democracy, freedom, equality, rights and justice are deeply
bound with these questions. While all political philosophers
ask these questions or at least some of them, they also ask
them in specific philosophical and social contexts. Ambedkar
did the same. His philosophical context was the one inaugu-
rated by the enlightenment and his social context was the
Indian society in its colonial encounter and postcolonial tra-
vails. Much of the attention hitherto has been confined to the
context, such as existence of untouchability, decolonisation or
plurality of religious belonging, rather than the central politi-
cal philosophical issues that Ambedkar raised. Often the lim-
ited attention extended to Ambedkar as the icon of a social
group does not invite attention to the conceptual frame that
justifies and orders his concerns on a scale of priority.
There are some methodological problems that we need to
attend to while regarding Ambedkar as a political philoso-
pher: He is caught in far too many concerns that a political
philosopher would not be generally involved in. Often his
modes of presentation, disputation and argumentation are not
philosophical but sociological, legal, moral, public policy-driv-
en and even rhetorical. Further, in the national movement in
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India several political philosophical questions, such as freedom,
human equality and representation, became issues of interro-
gation on a day-to-day basis making it difficult to distinguish
his contribution from those of others. At the same time, it is
important to emphasise that while Ambedkar did not engage
in a systematic pursuit of political philosophy his writings and
practices were informed by it. The concepts that he employed
and the relations that he proposed across them demonstrated
a remarkable consistency and coherence. Further, while he
shared many ideas in common with the anti-colonial thinkers,
there is much that distinguishes him from others.
While within the scope of this paper I cannot dwell on an
analytical scrutiny of all the themes and concepts that he
engaged in, I will deliberate only on two issues: (i) provide an
outline of the major concepts that he proposed, and (ii) test
the mode of his argumentation by dwelling on an aspect of his
theory of social justice.
Central Concepts
Critical review of texts and historiography: Like many other
DalitBahujan thinkers, such as Jotirao Phule and Iyothee
Thass before him, Ambedkar thought that it is important to
reopen the question of interpreting texts and approaches to
history. Texts and historiography too are sites of reproduction
and contestation of power relations as other domains of social
life are. Many of the hallowed texts were replete with selective
deployment of evidence, displacement, silence, contradictions,
exaggeration, interpolations and heteronomy. They could sub-
serve partisan ends. In spite of such flaws they confidently
engaged with causeeffect relations and assumed normative
stances. Often the authority of such texts was seldom chal-
lenged. He thought that many a time uncritical reading of such
texts and their endorsement upheld existing social relations,
sustained dominance, and denied people reflective probings
into such texts. While this is generally true, in the Indian con-
text, texts have been very efficaciously employed to sustain a
ranked social order and uphold the principle of graded inequality.
Further, the injunctions with regard to reading and study ex-
plicitly excluded large sections of people from any access to
the texts, depriving them even of the possibility of participat-
ing in public reason.3 At the same time, even hallowed texts
contained accounts and reasoning that could be deeply sub-
versive.4 Besides there are texts and traditions such as those of
Buddhism, which not merely expose the sanctity and truth of
dominant texts and traditions but propose alternatives to them
as well. A critical reading of tika and interpretative engage-
ment with vyakhyana texts and traditions was central to
Ambedkars political perspective.5 He rejected, in no uncertain
terms, a positivist rendering of texts.
Human equality: For Ambedkar, human equality is an over-
riding principle and his writings advance some of the most
complex arguments in defence of this principle: The ethical
norm of human equality makes place for worth rather than
birth; does not assign people to fixed slots in advance; enables
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SPECIAL ARTICLE
struggle against dominance, and advances a level-playing field
to all against social prejudices (Rodrigues 2005). Ontologically,
all human beings, irrespective of race, gender and culture,
share certain foundational attributes in commonfeelings
and sentiments, love and compassion, reason and reflection,
solidarity and bonding, and assuming responsibility for their
actionsalthough domination and social codes may tie them
down to modes of action that are subservient and acceptable
to a social order. Interestingly, none of these arguments and
assumptions that he makes, appeal to any divine element as
foundational to the human. They all appeal to a set of lexically
prior values and assumptions grounded, as far as Ambedkar
was concerned, in reason. The significance of equality justifies
certain modes of political action: struggle against untoucha-
bility, the caste system, colonialism and class domination, and
for recognition, dignity and culture. Equality, therefore, is not
a unilinear pursuit but an overladen consideration and is clearly
tilted towards the worst-off. It is also an encompassing value:
the majority are not justified in pursuing a course of action in
the name of equality that subjects the rest to unequal consid-
eration. Every consideration extended to people has to justify
itself against the benchmark of equality. Ambedkar is very
critical of liberal democracy for its inability to institute equali-
ty in any meaningful sense, and sometimes thinks that the rise
of fascism has much to do with the yawning inequalities in
societies subscribing to this political perspective (Ambedkar
1990: BAWS, Vol 9, pp 18588). He finds notions such as
equality before law and equality of treatment inadequate to
encompass equality, and suggests that equality means treating
people as equals by factoring in the entire gamut of social
relations they are subject to. He also feels that much of
inequality is scripted by assigning people to stigmatised
groups, and the voices of such groups and their demands are
then made integral to considerations of equality. Natural and
social circumstances can also make the lot of many people
deeply unequal to that of others, in spite of their efforts. Equa-
lity as a level playing field cannot leave people to the whims of
such circumstances.
State and democracy: State as an organised power that
claims for itself sovereignty can be envisaged as an instrument
of dominance but also as a collective resolve for the further-
ance of a set of objectives. In the latter sense, Ambedkar
thought that the state can be a civilising agency and a resource
to undermine dominance. Since all resolutions could prove
tentative, state as the collective power and resolve of the soci-
ety need to be in place to ensure that the collective resolve is in
place. It makes Ambedkar inveigh strongly against such prop-
ositions as the withering away of the state. The principle that
should guard over the state is democracy. Democracy as a way
of life charts a course independent of the state, redefining the
scope and place of the latter. But democracy also contends
against the pervasive presence of power in everyday life and
transforms it into self-regulation. Ambedkar attempted to
reformulate the idea of democracy, by trying to rescue it from
the economistic binary of liberal and social democracy, and
103
SPECIAL ARTICLE
proposing it as the only defensible mode of public life
appropriate for human dignity and equality. Democracy is not
merely an institutionalised arrangement, which of course it is,
but the only way of life befitting human fulfilment. It makes
people reach out to others, and lets others reach out to them,
thereby, bringing collective resources to bear on ones striving.
As a way of life it invariably demands that we treat people with
respect. Mutual communication and fonts of bonding that are
constantly renewed and revisited form the nerve centres of
any democracy. While democracy has to be institutionalised,
in order to endure, particularly in deeply complex and plural
societies such as India, he saw it as an open-ended system
which defines and redefines itself in the indefinite future
(Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, pp 5777 and 9496).
Need for religion: How does one sustain a social order made
of equal and free citizens who elect themselves as a people
continuously? What is it that makes them bond together?
Rights and constitutional morality are important but in spite
of them conflicts might erupt, and they may not provide bonds
of solidarity in cases of pervasive social control, or social power
concentrated in a few hands. Therefore, a people need to
acknowledge themselves as welded together almost in a per-
manent sense and feel a sense of common belonging, although
nothing prevents them from revisiting those bonds afresh. For
Ambedkar, the name of such a permanent substratum is reli-
gion. He, therefore, affirmed strongly the necessity for a reli-
gion and quoted Edmund Burke, to say, True religion is the
foundation of society, the basis on which all true civil govern-
ment rests, and both their sanction (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS,
Vol 1, p 76). He rejected the liberal idea that religion is a private
affair, but saw it as the anchor that holds a society together. He
felt that religious ideals, in general, have a hold on mankind,
irrespective of an earthly gain, that secular ideas never have
(Ambedkar 1987: Philosophy of Hinduism, BAWS, 1987, Vol 3,
p 23). It never fails to work so long as there is faith in that ide-
al. To ignore religion is to ignore a live wire (Ambedkar 1987:
Philosophy of Hinduism, BAWS, 1987, Vol 3, p 23). At the
same time he distinguished between true religion and a
false one. The former is based on principles while the latter
appeals to rules and rituals. The former is centred on society
and appeals to morality, while the latter is centred on the
individual and makes morality an instrument of ones purpose
(Ambedkar 1982: Annihilation of Caste, BAWS, Vol 1, p 47;
Ambedkar 1987: Philosophy of Hinduism, BAWS, Vol 3,
pp 6771). A true religion cannot come in the way of mans
search for himself, dwarfing him against a transcendental
benchmark (Ambedkar 2003: Buddha and the Future of His
Religion, BAWS, Vol 17, part two, pp 97108). At the same
time, a true religion cultivates responsibility for ones actions.
He thought that
A religious act may not be a correct act but must at least be a respon-
sible act. To permit of this responsibility, religion must mainly be a
matter of principles only. It cannot be a matter of rules. The moment it
degenerates into rules it ceases to be religion as it kills responsibility
which is the essence of a truly religious act. (Ambedkar 1982: Annihi-
lation of Caste, BAWS, Vol 1, p 75)
104
While Ambedkar generally used the case of Brahminical
Hinduism to highlight what a true religion should not be, his
understanding on this issue was not merely limited to it. For
him, a true religion cannot be a set of fixed beliefs laid down
for all times but that which remains open for contestation and
renewal. Eventually, he came around to suggest that only
Buddhism or more correctly, a reformed version of the same
measures up to the criterion of being a true religion.
Cultural question and social relations: Ambedkar did not
endorse a position that there are two opposed cultures pitted
against each other in India or elsewhere, although culture is
widely employed as a mode of dominance and to sustain
servility of large masses. Cultures are not seamless entities out
there, but ways of life, beliefs, values and institutions that
need to be revisited by foregrounding the human and the prin-
ciples of equality, liberty, democracy and morality. Cultures,
like nations, are available for interrogation and are subject to
daily plebiscite and any attempt to arrest them or lay down
its contours could beget institutionalisation of dominance.
Therefore, the domain of culture is caught in a distinct order
of struggle. Ambedkar thought that power is dispersed across
the entire ensemble of social relations. It is manifest in every-
day relations either in the way of directing a course of action
or simply in the complex structures of everyday life, division of
labour, access to resources and opportunities, linguistic usag-
es, signs and symbols. Religion, social status and property are
all sources of power and authority (Ambedkar 1982: Annihi-
lation of Caste, BAWS, Vol 1, p 45). In the context of India,
caste, for instance, is not merely a matter of status but more
importantly, power. Given the differences in social relations
across societies, particularly regulative norms and modes of
social control, the diffusion of power assumes different forms
in them. Any attempt to radically transform power relations
has to grapple not merely with the diffusion of power across
the different levels of society but has to take the specific con-
text of its articulation into account.
The self and human agency: Implicit in all this is a concep-
tion of self, which in many ways is new to modern political
philosophising, woven around the concept of self as subject.
Ambedkar, taking a cue from Dewey initially and Buddha later,
denied any essentialised conception of the self. We constitute
ourselves, in a way, in and through the social world that we
inhabit, through all the stimulations that we are exposed to
and responding to them in turn. A society can enhance or mar
the prospects of human realisation. It can condemn people to
the netherworld of untouchability or slavery, or open up the
prospects of human fulfilment by letting people access its
resources as equals and extending support in this endeavour
through supports. Above all, there is a celebration of human
agency and its transformative potentiality in Ambedkars writ-
ings.6 While social relations of oppression subdue and even
deny human agency there are familial and community rela-
tions, protest traditions such as those inspired by the Buddha,
Kabir or Phule, and even negative sociality that can prove a
APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

trigger not merely to inspire a person to act but precipitate col-
lective transformative action. In this context, it is important to
recall his advice to Dalit activismeducate, agitate, organise.
Mode of Argumentation
Doing philosophy, and particularly political philosophy, inv-
olves constructing arguments that could sustain themselves
across all possible attempts to refute them. We can test the way
Ambedkar went about forging his arguments by studying the
way he makes a case for his distinct conception of representa-
tion. Instead of analytically dwelling on this idea, I will try to
demonstrate the way he tried to construct an argument with
regard to representation as integral to his theory of social justice.
Inadequacy of virtual representation: Quite early on, in his
statement to the Southborough Committee in 1919, Ambedkar
argued that virtual representation, that is, representation
through a general electorate is inadequate to meet the con-
cerns of the marginalised and the disadvantaged (Ambedkar
1982: BAWS, Vol 1, pp 24378). In such a mode of representa-
tion, the voice of these communities and social groups may be
subdued or even ignored. According to him, the first purpose
of representation is to transmit the force of individual opinion
and preference into public action (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS,
Vol 1, p 247). When a group or community is denied represen-
tation, or denied it in fair measure, then its beliefs and prefer-
ences have little bearing in shaping public policy. In India, the
untouchables formed such a group. There was an impassable
barrier between the touchables and untouchables, and bet-
ween them there were no shared bonds of aims, beliefs, aspi-
rations, knowledge and common understanding (Ambedkar
1982: BAWS, Vol 1, p 255). Therefore, virtual representation can
present the case of the untouchables very little. Besides the
disadvantaged, and among them particularly the untoucha-
bles, have much to gain or lose depending on the kind and ex-
tent of representation available to them. The untouchables, for
instance, may not have large property to protect from confis-
cation. But they have their very person confiscated (Ambed-
kar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, p 255). Representation can help them to
seek rights and resources to pursue their aims and objectives.
Fair representation for new associations: The idea of fair
representation is closely bound up with a concrete context and
the social relations in which it is embedded. It is the context
which specifies the appropriate modes and extent of represen-
tation. There are no ideal-typical models holding good every-
where. The progress of franchise in any society does not lay
down a model for other societies to follow. Britain in this
regard, Ambedkar felt, cannot be a model for India. There is no
guarantee that a limited franchise produces a better govern-
ment either. Narrow franchise aimed at elite representation
may bolster the importance of some communities to the detri-
ment of others (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 2, p 262). Unlike
generally believed, communal representation need not neces-
sarily harden social divisions: it could be a way of dissolving
them by bringing together men from diverse castes who
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15
SPECIAL ARTICLE
would not otherwise mix together in the legislative council
(Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, p 266) and by creating condi-
tions to beget new forms of associated life. Such associations
can threaten fossilised ways of life and help dissolve set
attitudes (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, p 266).
Adequate representation for minorities: He argued that a
minority7 should find not numerical but adequate representa-
tion. But it should not be so preponderant as to dictate terms to
the majority. In the context of the Simon Commission and his
plea for joint electorate with reservation for Scheduled Castes,
Ambedkar argued that minority representation should be of
such a magnitude as would make it worth the while of many a
party from the majority to seek an alliance with the minority. If
the party is compelled to seek an alliance with a minority, the
minority is undoubtedly in a position to dictate. If it is drawn
for the alliance, then it is adequately represented (Ambedkar
1982: BAWS, Vol 2, p 362). While giving due consideration to
the educational and economic status of minorities, he felt that
the actual figure be the ratio of its population to the total seats
multiplied by some factor which is greater than one and less
than two (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 2, p 363). The lower is the
standing of the community, the greater should be its electoral
advantage over the rest. If a minority is not protected with
weightage and adequacy, it will be entirely submerged.
Weightage, he felt, could be determined by employing fourfold
criteria: numbers, social standing, education and economic
strength. While keeping the demographic composition in view,
those who are economically and socially backward with low
educational accomplishments deserve additional consideration.
Separate electorate for untouchables: For Ambedkar, joint
electorate or separate electorate8 as modes of representation
are not a matter of principle but mechanisms to achieve cer-
tain ends. Separate electorates guarantee that a representative
enjoys the confidence of the electorate who are his special con-
cern. It is justified in the context when social identities closed
on themselves hold on to their particular interests with few
prospects of forging stable common interests. If there is homo-
geneity of interests, then joint electorates with reservation for
affected groups seems to be, in his opinion, a better option
(Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, p 374).9 Far from the argument
that separate electorate for untouchables, whom he clearly rec-
ognised as the bearers of a set of particular interests, will lead
to fissures within Hinduism, Ambedkar felt, social considera-
tions and not religious affiliation is the basis of the acceptance
of the electorate.10 He considered the argument that separate
electorates will reinforce anti-national spirit baseless, as every
group that demands separate electorate was not anti-national.
The demand need not necessarily have religious or communal
considerations. However, a majority, according to him, cannot
have separate electorate as it would be a permanent domina-
tion of the majority over the minorities. When political units
are primarily communal, majority-rule based on a community
is unjustifiable as it could perpetuate its rule confining other
communities to its tutelage.
105
SPECIAL ARTICLE

Social inclusion and public presence: Ambedkars second ar-
gument for preferential representation is based on social inclu-
sion and the significance of public presence. Preferential treat-
ment provides an opportunity to persons and groups who have
been hitherto denied social presence and are excluded, to be
reckoned in public life. Presence in public life affords an
opportunity to actively participate in the process of govern-
ment (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, p 247) and other walks of
life. Besides, participation in associated life begets social bonds
and stakes. This makes a big difference in certain societies such
as India where, he felt, there were no shared bonds of aims,
beliefs, aspirations, knowledge and common understanding
and therefore, little endosmosis across social groups. As a
consequence, given two candidates belonging to different groups
but purporting to represent the same interest, the voters will
mark their votes on the person belonging to the same community
(Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, 251) or someone they regard as
their man or woman. It may result in an entire group or
community from being counted out. He felt, untouchable com-
munities suffered the baneful effects of such exclusion the most.
Personal representation: Representation of opinions and
preferences alone is not an adequate measure for democracy.
It requires personal representation as well. The latter involves
representation of opinions as well as representation of per-
sons. A government for the people, but not by the people, is
sure to educate some into masters and others into subjects;
because it is by reflex effects of association that one can feel
and measure the growth of personality (Ambedkar 1982:
BAWS, Vol 1, p 251). It requires that adequate representatives
are drawn from the concerned groups. Territorial representa-
tion fails to provide adequate and effective representation to
minority groups. Such a situation gets further exasperated if
the majority and minorities in that area are relatively stable
made of specific social, religious and ethnic cleavages and
looked down upon by the majority.
Necessity of self-representation: Ambedkar also felt that there
were some constituencies such as untouchables who could be
represented by representatives from those groups and communi-
ties only (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 1, p 256). Illustrating the
case with regard to the untouchables, he felt that others did not
understand their situation of dehumanisation, subjugation,
denial of respect which one man owes to another as a human
being and the denial of rights of citizenship that ensues from
such a disposition. In such instances, representatives should
not merely hail from the concerned group or community but be
able to effectively highlight its concerns, monitor them across
contending interests and pursue their implementation. Fur-
ther, such representation should be in such numbers as will
constitute a force sufficient to claim redress. But such cases of
exclusive representation, he felt, should be rare and minimum,
and need to be given up once inclusive considerations prevail.
Healthy and confident self: Ambedkars third argument for
appropriate representation appeals to the requisites of consti-
tuting a human self, sure of itself: opportunities for social in-
teraction afforded through presence are indispensible for the
constitution of a healthy and confident self. In interaction with
others, a person becomes who he or she is. Valued or degraded
understanding of oneself has to do with ones location in such
interactions to a great extent. What one is as a person is what
one is as associated with others (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS,
Vol 2, p 54). Social exclusion can greatly impair the growth of
the human person and communities as has been the case with
untouchables in India. Untouchables have been denied their
very personhood and consequently the basis of their treatment
as equals. They have their very persona confiscated. The

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Deciphering Growth and Development: Past and Present Ravi Srivastava, Rahul Ranjan
Third Democratic Upsurge in Uttar Pradesh A K Verma
RSS, BJP and Communal Polarisation in Uttar Pradesh Polls Radhika Ramaseshan
Understanding the Potentialities: Ethnographic Study of Rural Dalit Women Leaders Archana Singh
The Weavers of Banaras Nita Kumar
The Time of Youth: Joblessness, Politics and Neo-religiosity in Uttar Pradesh Satendra Kumar
Facts and Fiction about How Muslims Vote in India: Evidence from Uttar Pradesh Rahul Verma, Pranav Gupta
Identity Equations and Electoral Politics: Investigating Political Economy of Land, Employment and Education Prashant K Trivedi, Surinder Kumar,
Srinivas Goli, Fahimuddin
The Demand for Division of Uttar Pradesh and Its Implications Ajit Kumar Singh
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106 APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 SPECIAL ARTICLE

socio-religious disabilities have dehumanised the untouchables
and their interests at stake are, therefore, the interests of
humanity. What they have been deprived of is something ba-
sic that is incomparably of greater interest than interests of
property (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 2, p 54). Social interac-
tions treat untouchables as despicable and others try to con-
struct superior selves of themselves on that basis. The former,
he says, are like Platos slaves who accept from another the
purposes which control their conduct. They are denied their
ability to make their choices and consequently, their agency.
They are socialised never to complain or expect improvement
in their lot or to expect common respect which one man
owes to another (Ambedkar 1982: BAWS, Vol 2, p 54). The
consequence of social dispositions as expressed in untoucha-
bility is to deprive its victims from claiming the right of citi-
zenship embodying such claims as personal liberty, equality
before laws, liberty of conscience, freedom of opinion and
speech, right of assembly, right of representation in countrys
government and right to hold office.
Conclusions
I have tried to demonstrate in this paper how Ambedkar
went about forging concepts, and setting up arguments with
regard to public life. Taken together, these concepts propose
a distinct ordering of political life that at the same time
responds to the cultural context of ones belonging. Unlike
the popular perception, Ambedkar does not subscribe to a
disembodied modernity11 but proposes a critical interpreta-
tive method to read culture and traditions. He argues for a
critical retrieval of culture rather than commit oneself to a
partisan other. Interactive social relations are the agency that
makes us the human that we are, and they set the precondi-
tions for what we can be. The human is humanly engendered
rather than by a superhuman being. Invariably, democracy is
the essential condition for the fullest development of the
human self in such contexts. Democracy demands that equal
consideration be extended to everyone and afford them equal
opportunity to participate in public affairs. Extending equal
consideration may require meting out unequal treatment to
people and the latter has to take the concrete context into
account. Ambedkar sees religion as the anchor for such a
pursuit, but in the process redefines religion truly as this-
worldly affair. The test of a true religion is its capacity to
enable human self-realisation. Emancipation is a this-worldly
affair and the responsibility for the same lies on every man
and woman.

Notes
1 The six systems of philosophy are Mimansa,
Vedanta, Samkhya, Yoga, Vaisesika and Nyaya.
All of them accept the primacy of the Vedas
unlike the Sramanik (Buddhist, Jain, etc) and
Lokayata modes of thought.
2 Ambedkars major work What Congress and
Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables is one of
the best illustrations of his close monitoring of
the life and work of M K Gandhi (Ambedkar
1948).
3 This theme runs through the writings of
Ambedkar throughout (see, The Annihilation
of Caste, BAWS, Vol 1, pp 2399; Philosophy
of Hinduism, BAWS, Vol 3, pp 394; and The
Buddha and His Dhamma, BAWS, Vol 11, 1992).
Supportive evidence can be found in secondary
literature (Queen 1994 and Rodrigues 1993).
4 Ambedkars work on the Shudras is an excellent
illustration for reading a subversive lineage in
the hallowed tradition. See Who Were the
Shudras? How They Came to Be the Fourth
Varna in the IndoAryan Society (BAWS, Vol 7,
1990, pp 1238). Similarly, the contest between
Vashista, the high-priest of the Brahmin esta-
blishment, and Vishwamitra, the Kshatriya,
who strove to be a high priest through rigorous
tapasya, recurs in many of his writings.
5 Kapil Kapoors Text and Interpretation: The
Indian Tradition provides a useful, although
contested, outline in this regard. There are
scholars who have located Ambedkar in this
interpretative tradition (Gokhale 2008).
6 One of his reflective stances in this regard goes
as follows: If time, nature, necessity and so
on, be the sole cause of the occurrence of an
event, then who are we? Is man merely a pup-
pet in the hands of time, nature, chance, Gods,
fate, necessity? What is the use of mans exis-
tence, if he is not free? (Rathore and Verma
2011: 133)
7 Ambedkar considered Dalits as a minority.
Anupama Rao (2010) has highlighted this issue
forcefully.
8 This distinction evoked much controversy in
the Indian national struggle, particularly
around the conjuncture of the Poona Pact. For
the Poona Pact, see Pyarelal (1958); and Ravin-
dra Kumar (1987).
9 Ambedkar, however, favoured joint electorate
only during certain phasesin his deputation
before the Simon Commission; during the Poona
Pact and in its immediate aftermath; and
during the phase of constitution-making for
free India. At other times, he demanded sepa-
rate electorate in an emphatic way. In the
former instances, he saw greater openness
between communities with a disposition to
reach out to others.
10 For Ambedkar, a policy measure is justified by
its social bearing and not religious implications.
11 This is one such representative comment:
Ambedkar was an unalloyed modernist. He
believed in science, history, rationality and
above all, in the modern state for the actualisa-
tion of human reason (Chatterjee 2006: 77).
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Chatterjee, Partha (2006): B R Ambedkar and
Troubled Times of Citizenship, Political Ideas
in Modern India, V R Mehta and Thomas
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Gokhale, Pradeep P (ed) (2008): The Philosophy of
B R Ambedkar, Pune: Sugava.
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Nowell Smith (eds), New Delhi: Orient
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Iqbal, Muhammad (1930: 2003): The Reconstruc-
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Kapoor, Kapil (2005): Text and Interpretation: The
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B R Publishing, pp 99122.
Rao, Anupama (2010): The Caste Question, Ranikhet:
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Rawls, John (1972): A Theory of Justice, Oxford:
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Rodrigues, Valerian (1993): Making a Tradition
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(2005): Ambedkar on Preferential Treat-
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Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol liI no 15 107
DISCUSSION
Availability of Pulses in
Rural Karnataka
Need to Use District-level Data
Christopher M Coghlan, Shonil A Bhagwat
In a response to Making Pulses
Affordable Again (EPW, 7 January
2017) by P K Joshi, Avinash
Kishore and Devesh Roy this
article aims to bring to the
fore the importance of using
district-level data on nutritional
levels and pulse production, that
can better inform public policy
and help improve human
development indicators.
Christopher M Coghlan (christopher.coghlan@
ouce.ox.ac.uk) is pursuing a DPhil at the School
of Geography and the Environment, University
of Oxford. Shonil A Bhagwat (shonil.bhagwat@
linacre.ox.ac.uk) teaches at the School of
Geography and the Environment, University of
Oxford and at the Department of Geography,
The Open University.
108
J
oshi et al (2017) identify the need to
increase the production of pulses in
India as a key policy priority. As a
cost-effective protein source, an increase
in the availability of pulses and their con-
sumption, particularly by individuals be-
low the poverty line (BPL), can address the
nutritional security of some of the poorest
people in India. We therefore agree with
Joshi et als overall recommendation that
state governments, across India, need to
introduce policies that increase the pro-
duction and availability of pulses. How-
ever, Joshi et als analysis based on state-
level data, does not answer the question of
where the greatest need and the greatest
potential lies, to increase the production
and consumption of pulses. We argue that
in order to implement Joshi et als recom-
mendations, Indian states will need to
consider district-level data on nutrition
deficiencies and yield potential of pulses.
Based on our analysis of Karnataka,
we suggest that it is essential to identify
district-level hotspots of (i) nutrition
deficiencies, and (ii) pulse production
potential. Some academics have suggested
that identifying undernourished districts
is necessary, prior to enacting interven-
tions (Desai and Vanneman 2014). Fur-
thermore, Karnataka is a rapidly urbanis-
ing state with significant urban and rural
inequality (Ghori 2015).
Research Design
Our analysis compares rural district infor-
mation in Karnataka with international-
level data for absolute household expendi-
ture on food (income), adult literacy rate
(education) and the percentage of preg-
nant women with anaemia (health)in
order to identify areas where nutritional
deficiencies are at their worst. We then
identify the pulse production potential of
april 15, 2017
districts in Karnataka. As shown by Joshi
et al (2017: 3839), amongst all the states
in India, Karnataka enjoys a relatively large
area of land allocated for chickpea (fourth)
and pigeon pea (second) cultivation in
201415, and from 2001 to 2010 the per-
centage increase in area under cultivation,
was also significant for chickpea (second)
and pigeon pea (first) crops. Furthermore
the Karnataka Comprehensive Nutrition
Mission (Indias first) benefits from its links
to the states department of agriculture
and opportunities for constructing agri-
culture-nutrition interventions are evi-
dent (Paarlberg 2012).
The following expands on the suggestion
made by Joshi et al (2017: 43) for an increa-
sed production of pulses within pulse pro-
ducing areas in cooperation with the har
khet ko paani (water to every farm) pro-
gramme, by highlighting the districts of
Karnataka with the best pulse production
yield(s).
Nutritional Deficiencies
Drawing on the United Nations Develop-
ment Programmes (UNDP) Human Devel-
opment Index (HDI), we created a Nutri-
tional HDI for Karnataka using district-
level data. The data refers to 201112,
the latest year of availability. The three
districts (Yadgir, Chikkaballapura and
Ramanagara) for which data was una-
vailable were excluded from our analysis.
The three dimensions of HDI as defined by
the UNDP are income, health and educa-
tion (UNDP India 2011). Suitable proxies
were input into the HDI framework and
compared against the international mini-
mum and maximum for each component.
Nutritional HDI Component (e g, Income/
Health/Education):
Karnataka Nutritional HDI Component
minus Minimum divided by Maximum
minus Minimum = Nutritional HDI
Component Score.
Cubed mean (Nutritional HDI Income
plus Nutritional HDI Health plus
Nutritional HDI Education) = Nutritional
HDI Score.
(i) Income was captured by the absolute
annualconverted from monthly data
household expenditure on food (NSS 2014).
The percentage of food expenditure in
vol lII no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

relation to the total household expenditure
is an established metric (FAO 2015). An
absolute figure was used to ensure parity
across districts between food expenditure
and total household expenses (NSS 2014).
(ii) Pregnant and lactating women consist-
ently have the most significant protein
deficiencies among vulnerable groups in
India (NNMB 2013). The use of anaemia as
a nutrition proxy is valid, due to the link
between iron deficiency (the most com-
mon deficiency) and anaemia (UNICEF/
UNU/WHO 2001). The health component
was captured by obtaining figures for
the percentage of pregnant women with
anaemia (MHFW 2013).
(iii) Education was captured by the litera-
cy rate of people over seven years of age
(MHFW 2013). Research maintains that
poor nutrition is linked to unsatisfactory
learning outcomes and a loss of produc-
tivity (Spears 2013). Nutritional HDI scores
are summarised in Table 1.
(iv) Scores were recorded, across the fol-
lowing categories of increasing severity:
>0.48 = Adequate; 0.45-0.499 = Slightly
Inadequate; 0.40-0.449 = Moderately
Inadequate; 0.35-0.399 = Significantly
Inadequate; 0.30-0.349 = Severely Inade-
quate; and <0.30 = Alarmingly Inade-
quate. All HDI scores <0.48 are consid-
ered low by the UNDP (2011).
Pulse Production
Production yield figures for pulses were
obtained from the Report on Area, Produc-
tion and Prices of Agricultural Crops in
Karnataka 200910 (Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics 2012). These yield
figures, corresponding to six levels of pro-
ductivity, are based on kilogram/hectare
yield levels for pulses: 1 = >700; 2 = 600
to 699.99; 3 = 500 to 599.99; 4 = 400 to
499.99; 5 = 300 to 399.99; and 6 = <300.
Results
The results demonstrate that an adequate
Nutritional HDI score is present only in
the district of Uttara Kannada (Table 1).
There is, however, the potential for Kar-
nataka to use its statewide resources to
increase the production of pulses strate-
gically and transfer them to areas where
nutritional deficiencies are severe. Table 1
illustrates that pulse productivity yields
are high in the five southern districts of
Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 15, 2017
DISCUSSION
Bengaluru rural, Bengaluru urban, Kolar, would assist in channelling the resources
Chamarajanagar and Chikmagalur. In of the water to every farm initiative most
general, district exports could vary based effectively. The Nutritional HDI informs
on Nutritional HDI with Davanagere, us about distribution recommendations
Chitradurga, Chikmagalur and Mysore and when supported by district-level
being in the most advantageous positions. scores, can make increases in the availa-
Table 1: Summary of Karnataka Rural District bility of pulses to the most vulnerable
Ratings sections of the states rural population, a
Karnataka Nutritional Production Score key policy priority. Karnatakas unique
District HDI Score Pulses
Uttara Kannada >.48 5
position in India makes it an ideal case
Kodagu .45-.479 5 study to trigger future policy uptake for
Belgaum 5 increasing pulse production elsewhere.
Chitradurga 3
Gadag .40-.449 6
Haveri 5 References
Shimoga 5 Desai, S and Reeve Vanneman (2014): Enhancing
Nutrition Security via Indias National Food Se-
Bellary 5
curity Act: Using an Axe Instead of a Scalpel?,
Bijapur 5
India Policy Forum, New Delhi, India: National
Chikmagalur 2 Council of Applied Economic Research.
Davanagere .35-.399 1 Directorate of Economics and Statistics (2012):
Gulbarga 4 Household Consumption of Various Goods
Koppal 5 and Services in Karnataka, NSS 66th Round,
Bengaluru: Government of Karnataka.
Mysore 3
Bagalkot 4
Dulsrund, A, U Kjaernes and Marthe Hrvik Austgulen
(2015): Institutional Conditions for Food Security
Bidar 4 in India: Exploring a Model of Household Food
Chamarajanagar 2 Security through the Study of Literature, Key
Dakshina Kannada 6 Concepts and Statistics, Oslo, Norway: Statens
Dharwad .30-.349 3 Institutt for Forbruksforskning.
Hassan 4 FAO (2015): Food Security Indicators, Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
Kolar 2 Rome, Italy, http://www.fao.org/economic/
Raichur 4 ess/ess-fs/ess-fadata/en/#.U-KOpix0zIU.
Tumkur 3 Ghori, G K (2015): KarnatakaState, India, Ency-
Udupi 4 clopaedia Britannica, http://www.britannica.
Bengaluru rural 1 com/place/Karnataka-state-India.
Bengaluru urban <.30 2 Joshi, P K, A Kishore and Devesh Roy (2017): Making
Pulses Affordable Again Policy Options from
Mandya 4
the Farm to Retail in India, Economic & Political
Weekly, Vol 52, No 1, pp 3744.
Agglomerations (largely neglected by Lall, S, U Deichmann and Zmarak Shalizi (2001):
India) could situate producers in close Agglomeration Economies and Productivity in
Indian Industry, Washington DC, USA: World
proximity to relevant industries (Duslrund Bank.
et al 2015) in the urban centres of Ben- MHFW (2013): District level Household and Facility
Survey No IV, Bangalore, Ministry of Health
galuru and Mysore, which as core nodes and Family Welfare, Government of Karnataka.
would provide complimentary services in NNMB (2013): Diet and Nutritional Status of Rural
Population, Prevalence of Hypertension and Di-
the financial, transportation and techno- abetes among Adults and Infant & young Child
logy sectors (Lall et al 2001). The remain- Feeding Practices, National Nutrition Monitoring
Bureau, Technical Report No 26, Hyderabad:
ing districts should aim to collaborate with National Institute of Nutrition, Indian Council
of Medical Research.
their neighbours and import pulses from
NSS (2014): Nutritional Intake in India 201112,
producer districts that are in close proxim- Report No 560, NSS 68th Round, New Delhi,
ity. For example, six of the nine most north- India: Ministry of Statistics and Programme Im-
plementation, National Statistical Organization,
erly districts (Bagalkot, Bidar, Raichur, National Sample Survey Office.
Bijapur, Gulbarga and Koppal) suffer from Paarlberg, R (2012): Impact Assessment: IFPRI 2020
Conference Leveraging Agriculture for Improv-
significantly or severely inadequate Nutri- ing Nutrition and Health, Delhi, India: 1012
February 2011, Washington DC, UA: Interna-
tional HDI scores and have pulse produc- tional Food Policy Research Institute.
tion yield scores of either four or five; the Spears, D (2013): Policy Lessons from the Imple-
mentation of Indias Total Sanitation Campaign,
two lowest categories (Table 1). These India Policy Forum, Vol 9, pp 6399.
districts will need significant assistance UNDP (2011): InequalityAdjusted Human Devel-
opment Index for Indias States, New Delhi, India:
in increasing their pulse production. United Nations Development Programme.
Our analysis complements the work of UNICEF/UNU/WHO (2001): Iron Deficiency Anae-
mia: Assessment, Prevention and Control: A Guide
Joshi et al (2017) by suggesting that an for Programme Managers, United Nations Inter-
opportunity exists to develop district- national Childrens Education Fund/United
Nations University/World Health Organization,
based increases in pulse production in http://www.who.int/nutrition/publications/
Karnataka. The strategies outlined above, en/ida_assessment_prevention_control.pdf.
vol lII no 15 109
CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation

Wholesale Price Index Foreign TradeMerchandise

The year-on-year (y-o-y) inflation rate based on WPI rose to a three-year high to
6.6% in February 2017 from 5.3% in February 2016 and -0.9%, a year ago. The
index of primary articles increased by 5% in January 2017 compared to 1.3%, a
month ago and 2.0% in February 2016. The index for food articles was higher by
2.7% against -0.6% in January 2017, however, lower than 3.9%, reported a year
ago. The index for fuel and power increased substantially by 21% in February
2017 against -7.1% in February 2016. The index for manufactured products rose
by 3.7% in February 2017 compared to -0.5%, last year.
The merchandise trade deficit stood at $8.9 billion (bn) in February 2017 compared
to $6.5 bn, reported a year ago. Exports rose by 17.5% to $24.5 bn and imports by
21.8% to $33.4 bn in February 2017 against $20.8 bn and $27.4 bn, registered in
February 2016. Oil imports increased substantially by 60.0% to $7.7 bn and the non-
oil imports by 13.7% to $25.7 from $4.8 bn and $22.6 bn, respectively, in the
corresponding period of the previous year. Cumulative exports increased by 2.5% to
$245.4 bn and imports declined by (-)3.7% to $340.7 bn during AprilFebruary 2016
17 compared to $239.4 bn and 353.7 bn, respectively, in the same period last year.

Consumer Price Index Index of Industrial Production

The CPI inflation rate rose to 3.7% in February 2017 compared to 3.1% in January 2017,
however, lower than 5.3% reported a year ago. Consumer food price inflation increased
to 2% in February 2017 from 0.6% in January 2017, but lower than 5.3% in February
2016. The CPI-rural inflation rate and CPI-urban inflation rate stood higher at 3.7% and
3.6%, respectively, in February 2017 compared to 3.4% and 2.9%, respectively, in January
2017. As per the Labour Bureau data, the CPI inflation rate for agricultural labourers
decreased to 3.1% in February 2017 from 5.0% in February 2016 and that of industrial
workers to 2.6% in February 2017 from 5.5%, a year ago.
The y-o-y growth rate of IIP increased to 2.7% in January 2017 against -0.1% in December
2016 and -1.6%, a year ago, with growth in manufacturing segment rising to 2.3% in
January 2017 compared to -1.7% and -2.9% in January 2016. Growth in the mining sector
rose to 5.3% in January 2017 from 1.5% last year, while that in electricity generation
decreased to 3.9% from 6.6% in January 2016. As per use-based classification, the
capital goods segment expanded by 10.7% in January 2017 against -21.6% registered in
January 2016. Growth in consumer durable goods slowed to 2.9% in January 2017 from
5.6%, a year ago and that in consumer non-durables stood at -3.2% in January 2017.

Movement of WPI Inflation AprilFebruary Merchandise Trade February 2017

Year-on-Year in % February 2017 Over Month Over Year (AprilFebruary)
($ bn) (%) (%) (201617 over 201516) (%)
9 Exports 24.5 10.7 17.5 2.5
6.6% Imports 33.4 4.5 21.8 -3.7
6
Trade deficit 8.9 -9.6 35.3 -16.6
3
Data is provisional. Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
201617
0
-0.9% Components of Trade February 2016 and February 2017
201516
-3 30
$22.6 billion $25.7 billion
$20.8 billion Non-oil Imports $24.5 billion
-6 Exports
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb*

$4.8 billion $7.7 billion

* Data (2017) is provisional.
Oil Imports

Trends in WPI and Its Components February 2017* (%)

Financial Year (Averages)
Weights Over Month Over Year 201314 201415 201516 $6.6 billion
Trade Deficit $8.9 billion
All commodities 100 0.5 6.6 6.0 2.0 -2.5 -15
Primary articles 20.1 0.9 5.0 9.9 3.0 0.3
Food articles 14.3 0.1 2.7 12.9 6.1 3.4
2016 FEBRUARY 2017 FEBRUARY
Fuel and power 14.9 1.3 21.0 10.3 -0.9 -11.7
Manufactured products 65.0 0.0 3.7 3.0 2.4 -1.1 Oil refers to crude petroleum and petroleum products, while non-oil refers to all other commodities.
* Data is provisional; Base: 200405=100; Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
Movement of IIP Growth AprilJanuary
Year-on-Year in %
Movement of CPI Inflation January 2016February 2017
12
Year-on-Year in %
9 8
201516
Consumer Food 4
201617 2.7%
6
0
CPI 4.8% -1.6%
3.7% -4
Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan*
3
* January 2017 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100.
Miscellaneous 2.0%
Industrial Growth: Sector-wise January 2017* (%)
0 Weights Over Over Year Financial Year (Avgs)
Jan F M A M J J A S O N Dec Jan Feb* Month 201415 201516
2016 2017
* Data is provisional. General index 100 4.0 2.7 2.8 2.4
Source: Central Statistics Office (CSO), Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Base: 2012=100. Mining 14.2 0.9 5.3 1.5 2.2
Manufacturing 75.5 4.9 2.3 2.3 2.0
CPI: Rural and Urban February 2017* (%) Electricity 10.3 0.5 3.9 8.4 5.6
Latest Over Over Financial Year (Avgs)
Month Index Month Year 201415 201516 Industrial Growth: Use-based
Basic goods 45.7 1.5 5.3 7.0 3.6
Rural (2012=100) 132.6 0.2 3.7 6.2 5.6
Capital goods 8.8 11.3 10.7 6.4 -2.9
Urban (2012=100) 128.2 0.3 3.6 5.7 4.1
Intermediate goods 15.7 -0.1 -2.3 1.7 2.5
CPI: Occupation-wise Consumer goods 29.8 7.2 -1.0 -3.4 3.0
Industrial workers (2001=100) 274.0 0.0 2.6 6.3 5.6 Consumer durables 8.5 21.4 2.9 -12.6 11.3
Agricultural labourers (198687=100) 869.0 -0.1 3.1 6.6 4.4 Consumer non-durables 21.3 0.0 -3.2 2.8 -1.8
* Provisional; Source: CSO (rural and urban), Labour Bureau (IW and AL). * January 2017 are quick estimates; Base: 200405=100; Source: Central Statistics Office.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

110 APRIL 15, 2017 vol lII no 15 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 CURRENT STATISTICS EPW Research Foundation
Indias Quarterly Estimates of Final Expenditures on GDP
201415 201516 201617
` crore | at 201112 Prices Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Private final consumption expenditure 1424854 (9.6) 1427794 (9.7) 1513178 (2.7) 1495290 (4.9) 1522765 (6.7) 1615790 (6.8) 1602632 (7.2) 1600012 (5.1) 1778353 (10.1)
Government final consumption expenditure 286020 (5.9) 313839 (12.3) 254581 (29.5) 287477 (0.5) 325987 (3.9) 264070 (3.7) 332106 (15.5) 375626 (15.2) 316595 (19.9)
Gross fixed capital formation 812203 (5.7) 808473 (-0.3) 823732 (1.3) 889781 (9.6) 908449 (12.4) 849912 (3.2) 870650 (-2.2) 860150 (-5.3) 879763 (3.5)
Change in stocks 61248 (53.8) 60666 (51.1) 56288 (44.8) 64888 (5.9) 65312 (7.7) 61988 (10.1) 76970 (18.6) 76013 (16.4) 73070 (17.9)
Valuables 46596 (26.4) 41514 (9.0) 40404 (20.5) 39168 (-15.9) 47795 (15.1) 45574 (12.8) 27049 (-30.9) 31123 (-34.9) 28079 (-38.4)
Net trade (Exportimport) -41023 -55579 -45759 -41475 -58298 -33387 -12292 -14857 -41201
Exports 621494 (11.7) 626487 (1.2) 636698 (2.0) 586330 (-5.7) 599544 (-4.3) 579567 (-9.0) 598705 (2.1) 594123 (-0.9) 599231 (3.4)
Less imports 662517 (-0.5) 682066 (4.7) 682457 (5.7) 627805 (-5.2) 657842 (-3.6) 612954 (-10.2) 610997 (-2.7) 608980 (-7.4) 640432 (4.5)
Discrepancies -55908 -40945 4845 -3432 -42752 26813 30645 45378 -6767
Gross domestic product (GDP) 2533991 (7.4) 2555761 (7.8) 2647270 (6.1) 2731697 (7.8) 2769256 (8.4) 2830760 (6.9) 2927761 (7.2) 2973444 (7.4) 3027893 (7.0)

Indias Overall Balance of Payments (Net): Quarterly

201516 ($ mn) 201617 ($ mn) 201516 (` bn) 201617 (` bn)
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q1 Q2 Q3
Current account -6132 -8559 -7121 -291 -3411 -7919 -389 [-1.2] -556 [-1.7] -469 [-1.4] -19 [-0.1] -228 [-0.6] -534 [-1.4]
Merchandise -34175 -37173 -33975 -23835 -25643 -33277 -2169 -2415 -2240 -1594 -1717 -2244
Invisibles 28043 28614 26854 23544 22231 25358 1780 1859 1770 1575 1489 1710
Services 17751 17835 18013 15745 16274 17639 1127 1159 1187 1053 1090 1189
of which: Software services 17512 18058 18556 17569 17699 18021 1111 1173 1223 1175 1185 1215
Transfers 16153 16263 15250 14002 13902 13894 1025 1057 1005 937 931 937
of which: Private 16267 16421 15305 14161 14048 13996 1033 1067 1009 947 941 944
Income -5861 -5484 -6408 -6203 -7944 -6176 -372 -356 -422 -415 -532 -416
Capital account 18637 8121 10915 7124 12788 6155 1183 [3.7] 528 [1.6] 720 [2.1] 477 [1.3] 856 [2.3] 415 [1.1]
of which: Foreign investment 10226 3150 11256 5931 22979 -1527 649 205 742 397 1539 -103
Overall balance 11430 -856 4056 6969 8512 -1242 725 [2.3] -56 [-0.2] 267 [0.8] 466 [1.3] 570 [1.5] -84 [-0.2]
Figures in square brackets are percentage to GDP.

Foreign Exchange Reserves Variation

31 March 1 April 31 March Over Over Financial Year So Far Financial Year
Excluding gold but including revaluation effects 2017 2016 2016 Month Year 201516 201617 201112 201213 201314 201415 201516
` crore 2254320 2226250 2229020 -29060 28070 -2770 25300 108086 82800 251570 322660 218620
$ mn 347765 337189 337605 5971 10577 -417 10160 -14361 -485 16769 40486 16297

Monetary Aggregates Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
` crore 2017 201516 201617 201314 201415 201516
Money Supply (M3) as on 17 March 12509890 201610 (1.6) 889506 (7.7) 1070217 (10.1) 892275 (7.7) 1127560 (13.4) 1032788 (10.9) 1067447 (10.1)
Components
Currency with public 1213496 149966 (14.1) -380042 (-23.8) 207356 (15.0) -383758 (-24.0) 104760 (9.2) 140362 (11.3) 211072.3 (15.2)
Demand deposits 1273982 94112 (8.0) 283344 (28.6) 99006 (11.1) 284148 (28.7) 58760 (7.8) 79652 (9.8) 98201.47 (11.0)
Time deposits 10006418 -42832 (-0.4) 983727 (10.9) 764927 (9.3) 991341 (11.0) 965330 (14.9) 800144 (10.7) 757312.8 (9.2)
Other deposits with RBI 15994 364 (2.3) 2476 (18.3) -1072 (-7.3) 543 (3.5) -1270 (-39.2) 12620 (640.6) 860.673 (5.9)
Sources
Net bank credit to government 4011819 -29421 (-0.7) 765856 (23.6) 238569 (7.9) 773335 (23.9) 335850 (12.4) -37476 (-1.2) 231089.6 (7.7)
Bank credit to commercial sector 8130207 83917 (1.0) 322305 (4.1) 758178 (10.8) 327139 (4.2) 777430 (13.7) 604434 (9.4) 753344.8 (10.7)
Net foreign exchange assets 2592344 -29496 (-1.1) 79425 (3.2) 262270 (11.7) 58622 (2.3) 287280 (17.6) 326709 (17.0) 283073.1 (12.6)
Banking sectors net non-monetary liabilities 2249096 -176614 (-7.3) 280791 (14.3) 191276 (10.8) 269531 (13.6) 275010 (16.8) -137041 (-7.2) 202536 (11.4)
Reserve Money
` crore 2017 201516 201617 201415 201516 201617
Reserve Money as on 31 March 2017 1900480 220980 (13.2) -280260 (-12.9) - - - - 195710 (11.3) 252280 (13.1) -280260 (-12.9)
Components - -
Currency in circulation 1335270 136860 (11.4) -328200 (-19.7) - - - - 147250 (11.3) 215150 (14.9) -328200 (-19.7)
Bankers deposits with RBI 544130 81230 (17.5) 42300 (8.4) - - - - 35860 (8.3) 36270 (7.8) 42300 (8.4)
Other deposits with RBI 21090 2900 (15.9) 5640 (36.5) - - - - 12630 (644.4) 860 (5.9) 5640 (36.5)
Sources - - - -
Net RBI credit to Government 620810 -13290 (-2.1) 195820 (46.1) - - - - -334180 (-47.8) 60470 (16.6) 195820 (46.1)
of which: Centre 619590 -13930 (-2.2) 195030 (45.9) - - - - -336610 (-48.2) 63520 (17.6) 195030 (45.9)
RBI credit to banks & commercial sector -309280 208060 (-40.2) -613810 (-201.6) - - - - 145020 (252.3) 102030 (0.0) -613810 (0.0)
Net foreign exchange assets of RBI 2397210 -36090 (-1.5) 13730 (0.6) - - - - 324760 (18.0) 256200 (12.0) 13730 (0.6)
Govts currency liabilities to the public 25090 470 (1.9) 3180 (14.5) - - - - 2090 (12.1) 2480 (12.8) 3180 (14.5)
Net non-monetary liabilities of RBI 833350 -61810 (-6.9) -120830 (-12.7) - - - - -58040 (-6.9) 168900 (21.5) -120830 (-12.7)

Scheduled Commercial Banks Indicators ( ` crore) Variation

Outstanding Over Month Over Year Financial Year So Far Financial Year
(As on 17 March 2017) 2017 201516 201617 201314 201415 201516
Aggregate deposits 10542050 55330 (0.5) 1214760 (13.0) 794000 (9.3) 1214760 (13.0) 955110 (14.1) 827730 (10.7) 794000 (9.3)
Demand 1161230 94610 (8.9) 272230 (30.6) 94970 (12.0) 272230 (30.6) 51620 (7.8) 80110 (11.2) 94970 (12.0)
Time 9380810 -39290 (-0.4) 942520 (11.2) 699040 (9.0) 942520 (11.2) 903480 (14.8) 747610 (10.7) 699040 (9.0)
Cash in hand 56630 -1150 (-2.0) -810 (-1.4) 4080 (7.6) -810 (-1.4) 5380 (13.3) 7490 (16.3) 4080 (7.6)
Balance with RBI 425690 -2550 (-0.6) 38250 (9.9) 14370 (3.9) 38250 (9.9) 34080 (12.1) 56730 (17.9) 14370 (3.9)
Investments 3207660 -131560 (-3.9) 582150 (22.2) 133680 (5.4) 582150 (22.2) 206720 (10.3) 279010 (12.6) 133680 (5.4)
of which: Government securities 3206120 -131260 (-3.9) 582190 (22.2) 134180 (5.4) 582190 (22.2) 207540 (10.4) 278560 (12.6) 134180 (5.4)
Bank credit 7565670 80420 (1.1) 316060 (4.4) 713190 (10.9) 316060 (4.4) 733640 (13.9) 542320 (9.0) 713190 (10.9)
of which: Non-food credit 7509810 130100 (1.8) 365450 (5.1) 702360 (10.9) 365450 (5.1) 731610 (14.2) 546350 (9.3) 702360 (10.9)

Capital Markets 7 April Month Year Financial Year So Far 201516 End of Financial Year
2017 Ago Ago Trough Peak Trough Peak 201314 201415 201516
S&P BSE SENSEX (Base: 197879=100) 29707 (20.3) 29000 24685 (-13.4) 29707 29974 24674 29649 27957 (24.9) 25342 (-9.4) 29621 (16.9)
S&P BSE-100 (Base: 198384=100) 9535 (24.5) 9237 7656 (-13.0) 9535 9598 7656 9494 8607 (28.3) 7835 (-9.0) 9494 (21.2)
S&P BSE-200 (198990=100) 4011 (25.6) 3873 3193 (-11.8) 4011 4035 3193 3992 3538 (31.9) 3259 (-7.9) 3992 (22.5)
CNX Nifty (Base: 3 Nov 1995=1000) 9198 (21.9) 8947 7546 (-12.9) 9198 9265 7546 9174 8491 (26.7) 7738 (-8.9) 9174 (18.5)
Net FII Investment in equities ($ Million)* 175344 (5.2) 170362 166631 (-1.1) - - - - 168116 (12.3) 166107 (-1.2) 174637 (5.1)
* = Cumulative total since November 1992 until period end. | Figures in brackets are percentage variations over the specified or over the comparable period of the previous year. | (-) = not relevant. | - = not available. | NS = new series. | PE = provisional estimates.
Comprehensive current economic statistics with regular weekly updates are available at: http://www.epwrf.in/currentstat.aspx.

Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 15, 2017 vol lII no 15 111
 Secondary Market Transactions in Government Securities, Forex Market and Money MarketMarch 2017

112
1 Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions 2 Netting Factor 3 Instrument-wise Break-up of Securities Transactions (` Cr)
Settlement Outright Repo Daily Average (Outright) Daily Average (Repo) a Securities b Funds a Outright Trades b Repo
Period Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Gross Net Netting Gross Net Netting Central Govt Treasury State Central Govt Treasury State
of Trades (` Cr) of Trades (` Cr) of Trades (` Cr) of Trades (` Cr) (` Cr) (` Cr) Factor (%) (` Cr) (` Cr) Factor (%) Dated Bills Govt Dated Bills Govt
March 2017 71137 852245 14737 2079287 3387 40583 641 90404 2931532 1317691 55.05 3031885 639185 78.92 682813 85642 83790 828030 199618 54139
March 2016 89747 967140 12964 1478570 4487 48357 589 67208 2445710 943950 61.40 2479913 401681 83.80 856328 63492 47320 565082 153117 12266
201617* 1342410 16874146 167888 23564763 5570 70017 622 87277 40603629 15078857 62.86 42368619 6265051 85.21 15198472 1073461 602213 9499803 1802788 532410
201516* 883167 9728541 135623 17249279 3665 40367 490 62272 26977725 10438154 61.31 27433525 4352880 84.13 8557672 854390 316479 6230697 2248204 142765
4 Tenor-wise Settlement Volume of Central 5 Deal Size Analysis (%) 6 Market Share of Top n Securities (%)
Government Dated Securities Settlement Period < 5 Cr 5 Cr > 5 Cr <=10 Cr >10 Cr<=20 Cr > 20 Cr Period Mar 2017 Mar 2016 201617* 201516*
Year March 2017 201617* 201516* % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total Top 5 71.43 67.19 68.59 66.26
CURRENT STATISTICS

2017 1685 128321 (0.85) 9741 (1.15) Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value
Top 10 78.82 81.12 86.20 82.74
2018 8262 111840 (0.74) 14278 (1.68) Mar 2017 6.09 0.73 55.55 23.18 19.32 16.06 7.11 10.09 11.93 49.94
Top 15 84.79 87.09 90.49 88.47
2019 17249 239527 (1.58) 35963 (4.24) 201617* 3.43 0.42 52.33 20.81 23.71 18.83 6.66 9.07 13.87 50.86 Top 20 88.76 90.69 92.79 91.80
2020 45220 947303 (6.24) 167733 (19.76)
2021 16718 252584 (1.66) 7581 (0.89) 7 Intercategory Member Turnover Activity for All Category 8 Market Share of Top Five Members
Buy Sell (Category-wise) (%)
2022 24084 185453 (1.22) 12705 (1.50)
Category Outright Reverse Repo CBLO Lending Uncollateralised Forex Outright Repo CBLO Borrowing Uncollateralised Forex Categories Mar 2017 Mar 2016 201617*
2023 41276 1131065 (7.46) 61646 (7.26) (Funds Lending) Money Market Money Market
2024 11992 429532 (2.83) 25367 (2.99) Lending@ Borrowing@
Cooperative Banks 57.44 54.74 56.83
2025 11480 587977 (3.88) 78736 (9.27) Cooperative Banks 3.89 0.22 3.50 59.72 0.20 3.73 2.08 1.18 0.82 0.20 Foreign Banks 78.11 87.43 87.23
2026 361613 5277535 (34.79) 158633 (18.68) Financial Institutions 0.40 0.93 0.26 - 0.00 0.42 0.05 7.52 - 0.00 Public Sector Banks 50.17 47.39 45.98
2027 6020 77404 (0.51) 12922 (1.52) Foreign Banks 27.40 34.73 2.22 5.06 42.35 24.61 22.26 4.68 6.54 43.19 Private Sector Banks 79.40 79.12 79.16
2028 4580 65632 (0.43) 3428 (0.40) Mutual Funds 60.61 66.14 62.48
Insurance Companies 3.16 4.24 11.06 - - 2.21 0.00 0.28 - -
2029 20038 2051531 (13.52) 133714 (15.75) Primary Dealers 91.19 91.03 93.18
Mutual Funds 9.44 45.02 79.32 - - 10.51 0.32 9.94 - -
2030 90700 3284852 (21.65) 97491 (11.48) Others 1.64 0.00 2.19 - - 1.17 3.55 4.91 - - 9 Market Share of Top n Members (%)
2031 0 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) Primary Dealers 11.86 2.64 0.08 0.01 - 12.73 14.96 1.56 29.21 - Period Mar 2017 Mar 2016 201617* 201516*
2032 1615 31332 (0.21) 3997 (0.47) Top 5 24.60 29.76 30.02 32.08
Private Sector Banks 14.18 7.32 0.23 10.91 26.16 14.40 29.40 22.35 38.91 26.11
2033 1535 39994 (0.26) 2157 (0.25) Top 10 40.42 46.65 45.15 48.64
Public Sector Banks 28.01 4.89 1.15 24.31 31.29 30.21 27.38 47.58 24.51 30.50
2034 3862 87142 (0.57) 6256 (0.74) Top 15 51.14 57.18 54.73 58.60
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
2035 1236 17560 (0.12) 605 (0.07) Top 20 59.55 65.48 62.20 65.67
2036 507 13374 (0.09) 97 (0.01)
10 Trading Platform Analysis of Outright Trades 12 Settlement Volume of Collateralised Borrowing and Lending Obligations (CBLO)
2037 0 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00)
Period OTC NDS-OM Period Overnight Term Total
2038 0 0 (0.00) 0 (0.00) Trades % Share Value (` Cr) % Share Trades % Share Value (` Cr) % Share Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume
2039 0 8039 (0.05) 87 (0.01) of Trades (` Crore) of Trades (` Crore) of Trades (` Crore)
March 2017 8212 11.35 240745 27.81 64137 88.65 624969 72.19
2040 350 10903 (0.07) 1704 (0.20) March 2017 16975 2455200 2476 298497 19451 2753697
March 2016 7422 8.44 196615 20.56 80498 91.56 759500 79.44
2041 1442 10832 (0.07) 1218 (0.14) 201617* 192122 20392360 25664 2560473 217786 22952833
201617* 84504 6.30 2804041 16.64 1255872 93.70 14051698 83.36
2042 2659 16147 (0.11) 1982 (0.23)
2043 423 19506 (0.13) 2833 (0.33) 13 Top 5 SecuritiesBasket Repo 14 Top 5 SecuritiesSpecial Repo
11 Type-wise Settlement Volume of Government Securities Transactions (` crore)
2044 4943 60007 (0.40) 4863 (0.57) Security Trades Value Rate Security Trades Value Rate
Period Outright Repo
2045 1076 51213 (0.34) 3300 (0.39) Proprietary Constituent Proprietary Constituent 6.35% GS 2020 163 54126 5.92 8.27% GS 2020 286 49851 5.77
2046 947 15203 (0.10) 0 (0.00) Trades Volume Trades Volume Trades Volume Trades Volume 09/11/2017 Maturing 364DTB 76 34906 5.92 6.97% GS 2026 631 49481 4.14
2051 967 9149 (0.06) 0 (0.00) March 2017 58699 710674 12438 141572 7151 1023393 367 58394 7.68% GS 2023 112 34311 5.92 7.61% GS 2030 405 41150 5.49
2055 334 10111 (0.07) 0 (0.00) March 2016 74952 793659 14795 173481 6135 685442 279 45023 7.80% GS 2021 99 31144 5.88 7.59% GS 2026 498 39813 4.38

APRIL 15, 2017

Total 682813 15171068 (100) 849037 (100) 201617* 1175422 14784469 166988 2089677 80313 11147179 3816 687822 6.05% GS 2019 83 27355 5.94 7.68% GS 2023 196 18693 5.81
15 Forex Settlement
Settlement Period Cash Tom Spot Forward Total Average Netting Factor: Forex 16 Category-wise Forex ActivityDeal Type
Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Gross Net Netting Category Cash Tom Spot Forward
(` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) (` Cr) ($ Mn) ($ Mn) ($ Mn) Factor (%)
Foreign Banks 46.73 50.92 36.91 46.74
March 2017 2867 527523 80273 4454 632286 96039 167814 1775755 269052 11200 820764 119791 186335 3756328 565155 8873 178873 26912 565155 24900 95.59 Public Sector Banks 25.16 19.52 39.02 25.61

vol LII no 15
201617* 34026 7008460 1046478 48895 8339217 1244934 1742074 19175458 2857496 101111 7702460 1126070 1926106 42225595 6274978 8302 182007 27047 6274978 294883 95.30 Private Sector Banks 27.97 29.47 23.76 27.56
17 Forex Deal Size Analysis (%) Cooperative Banks 0.13 0.09 0.31 0.09

EPW
Settlement Period < 1 mn 1 mn > 1 mn <= 5 mn > 5 mn <= 10 mn > 10 mn <= 20 mn > 20 mn Financial Institutions 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
% to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value % to Total Trades % to Total Value
March 2017 36.10 5.49 38.04 12.54 12.30 9.57 0.56 1.34 0.89 4.33 12.12 66.73
20 Forex Trading Platform: FX Clear
201617* 34.55 4.78 39.86 12.23 12.25 9.10 0.55 1.22 0.81 3.67 11.98 68.99
(Amount in $)
18 Market ShareForex (%) 19 Tenor-wise Forward Trade Analysis (%) Period Spot Daily Average
Period Mar 2017 Mar 2016 201617* 201516* Settlement Period < 30 Days > 30 Days & <= 90 Days > 90 Days & <= 180 Days > 180 Days & <= 365 Days > 1 Year Trades Value Trades Value
% to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total % to Total March 2017 63379 38807 3018 1848
Top 5 33.20 29.27 30.16 29.29 Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value Trades Value
Top 10 54.60 48.82 50.82 49.46 March 2017 12.21 20.64 19.37 21.03 20.89 21.46 45.35 34.57 2.19 2.29 March 2016 47541 25583 2377 1279
Top 15 68.86 62.67 65.10 63.40 March 2016 18.51 24.97 20.48 26.25 13.10 12.10 44.13 32.74 3.78 3.94 201617* 557267 316581 2312 1314
Top 20 78.31 72.97 75.09 73.98 201617* 17.07 25.96 22.69 26.05 16.14 14.68 39.50 29.31 4.59 3.99 201516* 453562 246902 1882 1024
EPW Research Foundation

Economic & Political Weekly

* Data pertains to AprilMarch. @: Call and Term Money Segment. (i) Figures in brackets are percentage to total, (ii) Tables 1 to 11 relate to Government Securities Market, (iii) Tables 12 to 14 relate to Money Market, and (iv) Tables 15 to 20 relate to Forex Market. Source: Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).
APPOINTMENTS/PROGRAMMES/ANNOUNCEMENTS ADVERTISEMENTS

Summer School on Health Economics Sardar Patel Institute of Economic and

jointly organized by IHEPA and APU
26-30 June 2017
Indian Health Economics and Policy Association (IHEPA) along with
Azim Premji University, Bengaluru is organizing a Five-day Summer
School during 26-30 June 2017 aimed at researchers in health
economics and introduces participants to various approaches with
a focus on various methods in health economics and economic
evaluation. In particular students will learn the advantages and
disadvantages associated with cost-effectiveness, cost-utility and
cost-benefit analysis.
Scholars who are in the midst of their health economics research are
the ideal participants. You may submit a detailed proposal of your
current work alongwith an abstract and it will be screened by a Panel
of Reviewers of IHEPA. Besides, you may send your detailed CV along
with a brief note on your expectation in attending the Summer School.
Length of the proposal should be between 2000-3000 words in MS-
Word and may be submitted electronically to secretary.ihepa@gmail.
com with Cc to office.ihepa@gmail.com. Please visit www.ihepa.in
for registration and other details.
Important dates
Submission of write-ups 10. 05. 2017
Communication on acceptance/rejection
from IHEPA 20. 05. 2017
Social Research
Drive-in Road, Thaltej, Ahmedabad 380054 (Gujarat)
Capacity Building Program for SC/ST Faculty
Members in Social Sciences
(25-30th May, 2017)
Applications are invited for ICSSR sponsored Capacity Building
Programme for SC/ST Faculty Members in Social Sciences during
25-30 th May, 2017. The purpose of the program is to enhance the
capacities of the faculties in undertaking independent research studies
and to turn their completed research into publishable materials in the
form of journal articles/ books.
Preference will be given to SC/ST faculty members from social science
discipline. However, in the absence of required number of SC/ST
participants, applicants from other marginalized groups (OBC, minority,
physically handicapped and women) will be given preference.
Outstation candidates will be provided actual bus/ train fares (upto III-tier
AC) by shortest route, and free boarding and lodging at the campus. No
program fee will be charged.
For application form and other details, visit our website www.spiesr.ac.in.
Completed applications alongwith necessary documents may be sent
to Dr. Hansa Jain, Course Director by email: program@spiesr.ac.in

Dates of the Summer School 26-30th June 2017 and copy to jainhansa123@gmail.com, or to the above address by
registered post.
Secretary, IHEPA
Last date of receiving applications: 10 th May, 2017

Call for Paper

Journal of Management and

Tata Institute of Social Sciences Public Policy invites research
Openings at the TISS
papers for June 2017 issue.
The Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) is a premier university funded by the
University Grants Commission (UGC), Government of India. Applications are invited Last date of submission:
for the posts of Assistant Professor (4), Post Doctoral Fellow (1), Documentation
Officer (1), Senior Professional (1) and Young Professional (3) for its Centre for 15 May 2017
Development Practice and Research based at Patna (Bihar).
For details regarding eligibility, selection process, salary, etc. for each position and
E-mail: editor.jmpp@gmail.com
online application, kindly visit the TISS website at www.tiss.edu. The last date of
receiving filled-in application form is 25th April 2017.
Website: www.jmpp.in

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS &

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
PONDICHERRY UNIVERSITY available at

Two-Week Capacity Building Workshop for Faculty Members in Ideal Books

Social Sciences (Sponsored by ICSSR, New Delhi)
26/2082, Tutors Lane
Duration: 20th May2nd June, 2017
Secretariat Statue
Last Date for Application Submission: 20th April, 2017 Thiruvananthapuram 695001,
For more details about the content of the programme kindly visit: Kerala
www.pondiuni.edu.in

Economic & Political Weekly EPW april 8, 2017 vol liI no 14 81

APPOINTMENTS/PROGRAMMES/ANNOUNCEMENTS ADVERTISEMENTS

Call for PhD Applications

Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute at the Heidelberg

University, Germany invites applications for outstanding students to
apply for two doctoral positions for the duration of three years under
the European Union Marie Curie Fellowship programme. This is part
of the Global India project of European Training Network (ETN H2020).
The Global India ETN will deliver a world-class multi-sectoral doctoral
training programme focused on Indias emergence as a global and
regional power, and its relationship with the EU. The European Training
Network is a multidisciplinary, multi-sectoral network bringing together
six leading European universities, with six leading Indian universities,
and six non-university partners.
We invite applications under two broad themes of:
1. State and re-distributive politics in India
2. India and the politics of climate change
Potential candidates would have displayed exceptional academic
performance and deep understating of the social, political and economic
issues. These are full-time positions which will entail spending time
on field-work, network activities and in organisations relevant for the
candidates research. Candidates are expected to publish during the
doctoral work. Candidates are invited to send the following documents:
1. A Letter of Application
2. A detailed CV
3. Latest mark sheet (BA, MA, and M.phil)
4. A project proposal based on one of the themes
5. The names and contact details of 3 referees who can comment
on the applicants capabilities and abilities
All applications should be sent at polsai@sai.uni-heidelberg.de by
8th May 2017.
The shortlisted candidates will be notified of the outcome by 1st June
2017. Please note that the fellowship will start from October 1st 2017.
We will not encourage any queries and emails related to the applications
during the screening process.
Women candidates are strongly encouraged to apply. Heidelberg
University is an equal opportunity institution.

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES

Indian Institute of Science Campus, Bengaluru 560 012
Tel. 080-22185000, Fax: 080-2218 5028
URL: www.nias.res.in
NIAS-UNDP Policy Research Initiative on Inequality and Human Development Project-related PhD Fellowships
The National Institute of Advanced Studies (NIAS) is a unique Indian institution conducting multidisciplinary research in areas that bridge the gap
between the natural and engineering sciences, social sciences, humanities and the arts. The NIAS-UNDP Policy Research Initiative on Inequality
and Human Development aims to develop policy options based on multidisciplinary and empirically consistent conceptualization of inequality and to
contribute towards public discourse to enable more informed policy choices. More details on NIAS and the Initiative are available on the NIAS website
(www.nias.res.in).
The NIAS-UNDP Policy Research Initiative on Inequality and Human Development is now inviting applications for project-related fellowships leading
to a PhD. Even as the recipients of the fellowships with benefit from the synergies of being a part of a larger project they will focus their efforts on one of
the following four areas: inequality in the sources, response and the consequences of risk in rural India; the use and control of markets to address the
challenge of inequality emerging from volatility in yield and prices in rural India; inequality and circular migration of labour in India; and the relationship
between inequality and political processes in rural India. The students will work in NIAS and will be registered with either Manipal University or Mysore
University.
ELIGIBILITY
The scholarships are open to those who have completed a Masters/M.Phil. degree in any relevant subject with a deep interest in issues relating to
inequality and human development. Some research and/or field experience in the concerned areas will be preferred.
FELLOWSHIP
Selected candidates will be entitled to fellowships, which will be available for a period of four years on a yearly renewable basis. The fellowship amount
is currently fixed at 25,000/- per month for the first two years and 28,000/- per month from the third year, with an additional 30% per month as House
Rent Allowance. Limited hostel seats are available on campus for women.
HOW TO APPLY
Please download the application form (http://www.nias.res.in/content/doctoral-programme) from our website. The completed and signed
application form should be sent along with scanned copies of undergraduate and post-graduate degree certificates and mark sheets and a
resume containing your academic history, skills, interests, published work, and accomplishments should be collated and sent as a single
PDF file to the email address: niasphd@gmail.com The subject line of the email should read Application for PhD in Inequality and Human
Development projects. Please note that the Institute will accept only applications submitted by email.
The deadline for receiving application with all required documents by email is April 30, 2017.
For additional information, applicants may contact:
jnsandhya@gmail.com, admin@nias.iisc.ernet.in

82 april 8, 2017 vol liI no 14 EPW Economic & Political Weekly