CIVPRO MIDTERMS: CASE DOCTRINES

CASE: DOCTRINE
SONTE V. In this regard, Administrative Circular No. 09-94 is instructive:
[19]

CLARAVAL xxxx
2. The exclusion of the term damages of whatever kind in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33
(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court
SEBASTIAN V. The law, as written, unequivocally speaks of the "appropriate city or municipal court" as the forum for the execution of the settlement
NG or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. Notably, in expressly conferring authority over these courts, Section 417 made no
distinction with respect to the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved. Thus, there can be no question that the law's
intendment was to grant jurisdiction over the enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards to the city or municipal courts regardless
of the amount. A basic principle of interpretation is that words must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation where the words of a statute are clear,' plain and free from ambiguity
BARRIDO V. (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where
NONATO the assessed value of the propertyor interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)or, in civil actions in Metro
Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever
kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value
of the adjacent lots. (as amended by R.A. No. 7691) 9

Here, the subject propertys assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly does not exceed the required limit
of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila tofall within the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took
cognizance of the instant case

BRGY. SAN It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities
ROQUE V. has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity,
PASTOR the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the
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governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for the court is duty-bound to determine the just
compensation for it. This, however, is merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after the
court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation
GONZALES V. 1. a commercial case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its regular branch, the proper courses of action are as follows:
GJH LAND 1.1 If the RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, assigned to the sole special branch;

1.2 If the RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, then the case shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-
docketing as a commercial case, and thereafter, raffled off among those special branches; and

1.3 If the RTC has no internal branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case shall be referred to the nearest RTC with a
designated Special Commercial Court branch within the judicial region. Upon referral, the RTC to which the case was referred to should re-
docket the case as a commercial case, and then: (a) if the said RTC has only one branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, assign
the case to the sole special branch; or (b) if the said RTC has multiple branches designated as Special Commercial Courts, raffle off the case
among those special branches.
2. If an ordinary civil case filed before the proper RTC is wrongly raffled to its branch designated as a Special Commercial Court, then the case
shall be referred to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as an ordinary civil case. Thereafter, it shall be raffled off to all courts of the same
RTC (including its designated special branches which, by statute, are equally capable of exercising general jurisdiction same as regular
branches), as provided for under existing rules.

3. All transfer/raffle of cases is subject to the payment of the appropriate docket fees in case of any difference. On the other hand, all docket
fees already paid shall be duly credited, and any excess, refunded.
 4. Finally, to avert any future confusion, the Court requires that all initiatory pleadings state the action's nature both in its caption and body.
Otherwise, the initiatory pleading may, upon motion or by order of the court motu proprio, be dismissed without prejudice to its re-filing after
due rectification. This last procedural rule is prospective in application.

5. All existing rules inconsistent with the foregoing are deemed superseded
LARENA V. SPLITTING OF CAUSE OF ACTION. The principle is well established that a party will not be permitted to split a cause of action and
VILLANUEVA make it the basis of several suits, but that rule applies only to cases where the cause is in existence at the time the action is brought.
CONTRACT OF LEASE; ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF RENT; INSTALLMENTS OF RENT. When a contract of lease provides for the
payment of the rent in separate installments, each installment may be considered an independent cause of action, but in an action
upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action was brought must be included
BLOSSOM V.
WHEN FORMER JUDGMENT IS A BAR. In its compliant of March 3, 1927, plaintiff seeks to recover damages accrued since
MANILA GAS
November 23, 1923, for a willful breach of a contract for the sale and delivery of water gas and coal gas tar at stipulated prices, and
for answer defendant alleges that in the former action in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, in which plaintiff here was
the plaintiff, and the defendant here was the defendant, and founded upon the same cause of action alleged in the complaint that
plaintiff recovered judgment against the defendant on the merits, decreeing a breach of the same contract and awarding damages
in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of P26,119.08 with legal interest from November 23, 1923, which judgment became and is now
final. Held,That the judgment which the plaintiff obtained in the former action founded upon a breach of the same contract is a bar
to this action.
ONLY ONE CAUSE OF ACTION WHEN CONTRACT IS ENTIRE. As a general rule, a contract to do several things at several
times is divisible, and a judgment for a single breach of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach. But
where the contract is entire, and the breach total, there can be only one action in which plaintiff must recover all damages.
WHEN CONTRACT IS INDIVISIBLE. When the defendant terminated a continuing contract by absolute refusal in bad faith to
perform, a claim for damages for a breach is an indivisible demand, and where, as in this case, a former final judgment was
rendered, it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may thereafter sustain.
WHAT PLAINTIFF SHOULD PROVE. In an indivisible contract plaintiff should prove in the first action not only such damages as it
has then actually sustained, but also such prospective damages as it may be legally entitled to recover by reason of the breach.
SWAGMAN V. With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaint for a sum of money and damages was filed with
CA the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of action has as yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in
violation of the terms of the three promissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of action,
the private respondent had no right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court should have therefore dismissed his complaint.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case
may be determined in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters
included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. 12 Section 5 thereof applies to
situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to
such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a causeof action
may be cured by evidence presented during the trial.
However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the
complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts.
It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending
ADA V.
The actions of partition and rescission cannot be joined in a single action.
BAYLON
By a joinder of actions, or more properly, a joinder of causes of action is meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of
action in one action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two or more civil causes of
action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition. A plaintiff may
under certain circumstances join several distinct demands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition
Nevertheless, while parties to an action may assert in one pleading, in the alternative or otherwise, as many causes of action as they
may have against an opposing party, such joinder of causes of action is subject to the condition, inter alia, that the joinder shall not
include special civil actions governed by special rules
A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the court sua sponte, may be adjudicated by the
court together with the other causes of action.
A supplemental pleading may raise a new cause of action as long as it has some relation to the original cause of action set
forth in the original complaint
The true rule, therefore, is whether the entire amount arises from one and the same act or contract which must, thus, be sued
for in one action, or the several parts arise from distinct and different acts or contracts, for which a party may maintain
separate suits

MARILAG V. A case is barred by prior judgment or res judicata when the following elements concur: (a) the judgment sought to bar the new action
MARTINEZ must be final; (b) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) the
disposition of the case must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be as between the first and second action, identity of
parties, subject matter, and causes of action
litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to that situation wherein another action is pending
between the same parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.
For the bar of litis pendentia to be invoked, the following requisites must concur: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as
represent the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful would amount to res judicata in the other
To be sure, splitting a cause of action is a mode of forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of
action, but with different prayers, where the ground of dismissal is litis pendentia (or res judicata, as the case may be)
In loan contracts secured by a real estate mortgage, the rule is that the creditor-mortgagee has a single cause of action against the
debtor-mortgagor, i.e.,to recover the debt, through the filing of a personal action for collection of sum of money or the
institution of a real action to foreclose on the mortgage security. The two remedies are alternative

BANDA V. Requisites of a class suit are:
ERMITA o Subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many person
o Parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court
o Parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the
interests of all concerned
In Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company the Court held that:
o An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not
a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should
allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of
a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine
whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to
contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on
record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest.
In MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. It observed that an element of a class suit or
representative suit is the adequacy of representation
 o In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider
Whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class;
The proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class
Any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.
Ibaes v. Roman Catholic Church: where the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to
represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper.

NAVARRO V. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
ESCOBIDO interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as
defined by Article 44 of the Civil Code:Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
1) The State and its political subdivisions;
2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; their personality begins as soon as they
have been constituted according to law;
3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate
and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a civil action.
BUT As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in
this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her
Complaint does not state a cause of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in
behalf of Kargo Enterprises
As to the ownership of Kargo Enterprises it was registered in the name of Karen T. Go, who described herself in the Complaints to
be "a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and doing business under the trade name
KARGO ENTERPRISES".
the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is registered in the name of a married woman, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is married.
By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved
Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal or
paraphernal property, we hold that it is conjugal property.
A rule on partnership applicable to the spouses' circumstances is Article 1811 of the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property.
The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement between the partners, has an equal right with his partners
to possess specific partnership property for partnership purposes;
Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo Enterprises and the properties registered under
this name; hence, both have an equal right to seek possession of these properties.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-owned properties.
Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-
owners.
TALLORIN V. The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:
TAROMA Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs and defendants.
Indispensable parties are those with such an interest in the controversy that a final decree would necessarily affect their rights, so that
the courts cannot proceed without their presence. Joining indispensable parties into an action is mandatory, being a requirement of
 due process. Without their presence, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality.
The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void. Indeed, it would have no authority to
act, not only as to the absent party, but as to those present as well. And where does the responsibility for impleading all
indispensable parties lie? It lies in the plaintiff.
Here, the Taronas sought the annulment of the tax declaration in the names of defendant Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez and, in its place, the reinstatement of the previous declaration in their father Juanito's
name.
any decision granting what the Taronas wanted would necessarily affect the rights of such persons to the property covered by the tax
declaration.
a tax declaration is a primary evidence, if not the source, of the right to claim title of ownership over real property, a right enforceable
against another person. The Court held in Uriarte v. People that, although not conclusive, a tax declaration is a telling evidence of the
declarant's possession which could ripen into ownership. DaECST
when the RTC and the CA annulled Tax Declaration 6164 that belonged not only to defendant Tallorin but also to Margarita Pastelero
Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez, which two persons had no opportunity to be heard as they were never impleaded. The RTC and
the CA had no authority to annul that tax declaration without seeing to it that all three persons were impleaded in the case.
But the Taronas' action cannot be dismissed outright.
the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal.
Section 11, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-joinder or misjoinder of
parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its
own initiative. Only if plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action.
CRISOLOGO V. In an action for the cancellation of memorandum annotated at the back of a certificate of title, the persons considered as
JEW AGRO indispensable include those whose liens appear as annotations pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529
In Southwestern University v. Laurente: the Court held that the cancellation of the annotation of an encumbrance cannot be
ordered without giving notice to the parties annotated in the certificate of title itself.
It would be an error for a judge to contend that no notice is required to be given to all the persons whose liens were annotated at the
back of a certificate of title.
As indispensable parties, Spouses Crisologo should have been joined as defendants in the case pursuant to Section 7, Rule 3
of the Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.
The reason behind this compulsory joinder of indispensable parties is the complete determination of all possible issues, not only
between the parties themselves but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment.
MACADAWIB V. The Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that it is the integrity and correctness of the public records in the custody of the PNP,
POLICE National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) and Civil Service Commission (CSC) which are involved and which would be affected by
any decision rendered in the petition for correction filed by herein petitioner.
The aforementioned government agencies are, thus, required to be made parties to the proceeding.
They are indispensable parties, without whom no final determination of the case can be had.
The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and
all conditions, their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. For this reason, SC held that when it appears of
record that there are other persons interested in the subject matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the action, it is the
duty of the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either plaintiffs or defendants. Where the petition failed to join as
party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in the court, the same should be dismissed. When an
indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed.
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the plaintiff.
In the instant case, there is a necessity to implead the PNP, NAPOLCOM and CSC because they stand to be adversely affected by
petitioner's petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations in petitioner's service records.
REPUBLIC V. Respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and
UY citizenship.
She sought the correction allegedly to reflect the name which she has been known for since childhood, including her legal documents
 such as passport and school and professional records
She likewise relied on the birth certificates of her full blood siblings who bear the surname "Lugsanay" instead of "Sy" and citizenship
of "Filipino" instead of "Chinese."
In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in
effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her
rights and obligations in this country
In sustaining the RTC decision, the CA relied on the Court's conclusion in Republic v. Kho, Alba v. Court of Appeals, and Barco v.
Court of Appeals, that the failure to implead indispensable parties was cured by the publication of the notice of hearing
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
In this case, it was only the Local Civil Registrar of Gingoog City who was impleaded as respondent in the petition below
Respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the
persons who have interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential
oppositors:
One given to the persons named in the petition
Another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties
Summons must be served not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements of
fair play and due process to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses
RESIDENT Moreover, even before the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases became effective, the Court had already taken a permissive
MARINE position on the issue of locus standi in environmental cases. In Oposa, the Court allowed the suit to be brought in the name of
MAMMALS V generations yet unborn based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
REYES ecology is concerned. Furthermore, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology, a right that does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist from the inception of humankind, carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules, which allow
any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws. It is worth noting here that the Stewards
are joined as real parties in the Petition and not just in representation of the named cetacean species. The Stewards, Ramos and
Eisma-Osorio, having shown in their petition that there may be possible violations of laws concerning the habitat of the Resident
Marine Mammals, are therefore declared to possess the legal standing to file this petition.
MIGUEL V. Because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the Kasunduang Pag-aayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded
MONTANEZ pursuant to Article 2041 of the New Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his original demand. Perforce, the complaint
for collection of sum of money is the proper remedy
Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution
by the Barangay Lupon within 6 months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such settlement in the
appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the 6 month period.
Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local Government Code and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The Punong Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement
And to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his obligation under the settlement
Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the Rules of Court, as amended
The cause of action is the amicable settlement itselfhas the force and effect of a final judgment
SABAY V. Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduan that embodied their agreement was never implemented; no actual
PEOPLE settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his promised recommendation to settle the dispute.
The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to issue a Certification to File an Action, indicating that the disputing parties did
not reach any settlement.
The settlement of the case was conditioned on the recommendation of the building inspector; with no recommendation, no resolution
of the conflict likewise took place.
 the Barangay Captain, as a public official, is presumed to act regularly in the performance of official duty. In the absence of contrary
evidence, this presumption prevails; his issuance of the disputed Certification to File an Action was regular and pursuant to
law. Thus, the Barangay Captain properly issued the Certification to File an Action.
Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain's issuance of the Certification to File and Action, we note
that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC.
o As held in Diu v. Court of Appeals: the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over
the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein.
TRAVERO V Respecting the appellate court's dismissal of petitioners' appeal due to the failure of some of them to sign the therein accompanying
BOBONGAN verification and certification against forum-shopping, the Court's guidelines for the bench and bar in Altres v. Empleo, 20 which were
culled "from jurisprudential pronouncements", are instructive:
For the guidance of the bench and bar, the Court restates in capsule form the jurisprudential pronouncements already reflected
above respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification against
forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and non-
compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court
may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the
allegations in the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in
good faith or are true and correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons". DcCITS
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who
did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them
in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in the challenged Resolutions of the appellate court. Petitioners' contention that
the appellate court should have dismissed the petition only as to the non-signing petitioners or merely dropped them as parties to
the case is thus in order.
PPA V. SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section, substantial amendments may be
GOTHONG made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent
to delay. Orders of the court upon the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to
the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.
The Court has emphasized the import of Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, 3 thus:
Interestingly, Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that
the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules.
The clear import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the amendment may (now)
substantially alter the cause of action or defense."
This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments
sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding
VILLAROSA V The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now
BENITO limited and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states "general manager"
instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary" instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or
any of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule, . . . It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined
JURISDICTION NOT ACQUIRED WHERE SERVICE OF SUMMONS WAS MADE ON BRANCH MANAGER. Accordingly, we rule
that the service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the
general manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner.
INEFFECTIVE SERVICE OF SUMMONS; FILING OF MOTION TO DISMISS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE VOLUNTARY APPEARANCE.
The fact that defendant filed a belated motion to dismiss did not operate to confer jurisdiction upon its person.
Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules, Section 20 now provides that "the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside
from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance."
The emplacement of this rule clearly underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons. Accordingly,
the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the
court.
There being no proper service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant.
SPS. GALUZA Whenever practicable, the summons must be served on the defendant in person. Substituted service may be resorted to only when
V. MATH AGRO service of summons within a reasonable time is impossible. Impossibility of prompt service should appear in the return of service
the efforts exerted to find the defendant and the fact that such efforts failed must be stated in the return of service
Service of summons upon the defendant is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his person.
In the absence of a valid waiver, trial and judgment without such service are null and void
This process is solely for the benefit of the defendant. Its purpose is not only to give the court jurisdiction of the person of the
defendant, but also to afford the latter an opportunity to be heard on the claim made against him.
The summons must be served to the defendant in person. It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a
reasonable time that a substituted service may be made.
Impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such
efforts failed.
This statement should be made in the proof of service.
This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service.
It has been held that this method of service is "in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence
may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute".
Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully,
and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective.
CITIZENS The action of plaintiff petitioner, being in personam, the Court could not validly acquire jurisdiction on a nonappearing defendant,
SURETY V. absent a personal service of summons within the forum.
HERRERA Without such personal service, any judgment on a non-appearing defendant would be violative of due process
The proper recourse for a creditor in the same situation as petitioner is to locate properties, real or personal, of the resident
defendant debtor with unknown address and cause them to be attached under Rule 57, section 1(f), in which case, the
attachment converts the action into a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem and the summons by publication may then
accordingly be deemed valid and effective.
PNOC V. The present rule expressly states that it applies "[i]n any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like,
SANTOS or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry." Thus, it now applies to any action, whether
in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. 12
Regarding the matter of the affidavit of service, the relevant portion of Section 19, 13 Rule 14 of the Rules of Court simply speaks of
the following:
. . . an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed
to the defendant by registered mail to his last known address.
Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or
advertising manager of the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by publication is complemented by
service of summons by registered mailto the defendant's last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an
affidavit "showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the
defendant by registered mail to his last known address."
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court
ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail is
imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
Moreover, even assuming that the service of summons was defective, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
by his own voluntary appearance in the action against him.
RAPID CITY V. It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant
VILLA by virtue of the latter's voluntary appearance.
It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file
answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary
submission to the court's jurisdiction.
This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to
challenge, among others, the court's jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority
PALMA V. Considering that private respondent was temporarily out of the country, the summons and complaint may be validly served on her
GALVEZ through substituted service under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in the
preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of
suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
We have held that a dwelling, house or residence refers to the place where the person named in the summons is living at the time
when the service is made, even though he may be temporarily out of the country at the time. 21 It is, thus, the service of the
summons intended for the defendant that must be left with the person of suitable age and discretion residing in the house of the
defendant. Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as important as the issue of due process as that of
jurisdiction.
In addition, we agree with petitioner that the RTC had indeed acquired jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the
latter's counsel entered his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification and without questioning the propriety of
the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for Extension of Time to File Answer.
In effect, private respondent, through counsel, had already invoked the RTC's jurisdiction over her person by praying that the motions
for extension of time to file answer be granted.
We have held that the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for
reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission
to the jurisdiction of the court.
CHU V. MACH In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the person who received the summons in the defendants
ASIA behalf was one with whom the defendant had a relation of confidence, ensuring that the latter would actually receive the
summons
Impossibility of prompt personal service must be shown by stating that efforts have been made to find the defendant personally and
that such efforts have failed
In case at bar, it was not shown that the security guard who received the summons in behalf of the petitioner was authorized and
 possessed a relation of confidence that petitioner would definitely receive the summons
o Service on the security guard could not be considered as substantial compliance with the requirements of
substituted service
REICON Certiorari proceeding is an original and independent action and not considered as part of the trial that had resulted in the rendition of
REALTY V. the judgment or order complained of
DIAMOND o CA erred when it dismissed Reicons certiorari petition
o The service of said pleading upon the person of the respondent, and not upon his counsel, is what the rule properly requires
Jurisdiction over the person of Diamond had already been acquired by the CA through its voluntary appearance by virtue of the
Manifestation filed by its counsel
Diamonds special appearance cannot be treated as a specific objection to the CAs jurisdiction over its person for the reason that the
argument it pressed on was about the alleged error in the service of Reicons certiorari petition and not the CAs service of its
resolution indicating its initial action on the said pleading
MANOTOC V. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons any
CA judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is void
If substituted service of summons is resorted to, it must be strictly complied with
o Compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much important as the issue of due process as of
jurisdiction
Requirements of valid substituted service
o IMPOSSIBILITY OF PROMPT SERVICE
Party relying on substituted service must show that the defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service
Service of summons has no set period; However, when the court, clerk of court or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to
make the return of the summons and submits the return of summons, the validity of the summons lapses
Reasonable time means no more than 7 days (plaintiff); 15-30 days (sheriff)
Sheriffs are enjoined to thry their best efforts to accomplish personal service on the defendant
Several attempts means at least 3 tries
Sheriff must \cite why such efforts were unsuccessful
o SPECIFIC DETAILS IN THE RETURN
Sheriff must describe in the Return of the Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted
personal service
Efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in the return
o A PERSON OF SUITABLE AGE AND DISCRETION
A person of suitable age and discretion: 18 yrs old and considered to have enough discernment to understand the
importance of summons
Person must have the relation of confidence to the defendant
Ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of summons
o COMPETENT PERSON IN CHARGE
If substituted service will be done at the defendants office or regular place of business, it should be served on a
competent person in charge of the place
Must be made to the one managing the office of the defendant
Must have knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance and
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons
Facts and circumstances should be stated with more particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service,
dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of occupants of the alleged residence and the reasons for
failure should be included in the return to show the efforts undertaken
FIGUEROA V. As the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or
PEOPLE imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years, jurisdiction to hear and try the same is conferred on the Municipal
Trial Courts (MTCs). Clearly, therefore, the RTC of Bulacan does not have jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2235-M-94.
While both the appellate court and the Solicitor General acknowledge this fact, they nevertheless are of the position that the
 principle of estoppel by laches has already precluded the petitioner from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC the trial
went on for 4 years with the petitioner actively participating therein and without him ever raising the jurisdictional infirmity.
The petitioner, for his part, counters that the lack of jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter may be raised at any time even for
the first time on appeal. As undue delay is further absent herein, the principle of laches will not be applicable. Actadi
The general rule should, however, be, as it has always been, that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the
court's absence or lack of jurisdiction
SOLIVEN V. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691, which took effect on April 15, 1994 or prior to the institution of Civil Case No. 94-1788,
FAST FORMS provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases instituted in Metro Manila exceeds P200,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original jurisdiction thereof is lodged
with the Regional Trial Court.
Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount of the demand in the complaint instituted in Metro Manila does not exceed
P200,000.00, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive original
jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. DISEaC
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, we specified the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. 7691. Paragraph
2 of the Circular provides:
"2. The exclusion of the term 'damages of whatever kind' in determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section 33
(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of
the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action,
the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court."
While it is true that jurisdiction may be raised at any time, "this rule presupposes that estoppel has not supervened."
HSBC V. No litis pendencia; the two case could stand together
ALDECOA The principle upon which a plea of another action pending is sustained is that the later action is deemed unnecessary and vexatious.
Requirements to sustain plea:
There must be the same parties, or at least such as represent the same interests.
There must be the same rights asserted and the same relief prayed for.
This relief must be founded on the same facts and the title or essential basis of the relief sought must be the same.
The identity in these particulars should be such that if the pending case had already been disposed of, it could be pleaded in bar as a
former adjudication of the same matter between the same parties.
TEST OF IDENTITY OF SUBJECT MATTERS. A plea of the pendency of a prior action is not available unless the prior action is of
such a character that, had a judgment been rendered therein on the merits, such a judgment would be conclusive between the parties
and could be pleaded in bar of the second action. The rule is applicable, between the same parties, only when the judgment to be
rendered in the action first instituted will be such that, regardless of what party is successful, it will amount to res adjudicata against
the second action.
A pending action to annul a mortgage is not a bar to an action for foreclosure of the same mortgage, for the reason that, although the
parties are or may be the same, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for in the two actions are entirely dissimilar.
TIJAM V. Laches is failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could
SIBONGHANOY or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and after
obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction
"It is argued that the surety's counsel did not file an answer to the motion 'for the simple reason that all its defenses can be set up
during the hearing of the motion even if the same are not reduced to writing'.
There is obviously no merit in this pretense because, as stated above, the record will show that when the motion was called, what the
surety's counsel did was to ask that he be allowed and given time to file an answer
Moreover, it was stated in the order given in open court upon request of the surety's counsel that after the fourday period within
which to file an answer, 'the incident shall be deemed submitted for resolution'; and counsel apparently agreed, as the order was
issued upon his instance and he interposed no objection thereto.
SANTOS V. INSUFFICIENCY OF FACTUAL BASIS IS NOT A GROUND FOR A MOTION TO DISISS
SANTOS-GRAN It is a ground which becomes available only after the questions of fact have been resolved on the basis of stipulations, admissions or
evidence presented by the plaintiff
Remedy: Demurrer to evidence taken only after the plaintiffs presentation of evidence
Amended complaint is still dismissible ont eh ground of failure to state a cause of action
A COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF ACTION IF AVERS THE EXISTENCE OF: A RIGHT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF BY
WHATEVER MEANS AND UNDER WHATEVER LAW IT ARISES OR IS CREATED AN OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF THE
NAMED DEFENDANT TO RESPECT OR NOT TO VIOLATE SUCH RIGHT AN ACT OR OMISISION ONT THE PART OF THE
DEFENDANT VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHT OF THE PLAINTIFF OF CONSTITUTING A BREACH OF THE OBLIGATION OF
DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFFF FOR WHICH THE LATTER MAY MAINTAIN AN ACTION FOR RECOVERY OF THE DAMAGES
Elementary test in a motion to dismiss on such ground: Whether or not the complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief
demanded
Allegations in the complaint do not proffer ultimate facts which would warrant an action for nullification of the sale and recovery of the
properties
Prescriptive period: IF THERE IS AN ACTUAL NEED TO RECONVEY THE PROPERTY AS WHEN THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT IN
POSSESSION, THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE BASED ON AN IMPLIED TRUST PRESCRIBES IN 10 YEARS RECKONED
FOR THE DATE OF REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OR THE ISSUANCE OF THE TITLE
Filing of the petitioners complaint was beyond the 10 year period
SHIMIZU V. We also find that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488 is not warranted. Based on available records and on the averments of the
MAGSALIN parties, the following events were chronologically proximate to the dismissal of Civil Case No. 02-488: (a) on March 24, 2003, the
court admitted FGU Insurance's third-party complaint; (b) the trial court cancelled the June 20, 2003 hearing upon FGU Insurance's
motion; and (c) on June 16, 2003, Baetiong filed his Answer to the third-party complaint but did not serve it upon the petitioner.
None of these events square with the grounds specified by Section 3, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court for the motu proprio dismissal of
a case for failure to prosecute. These grounds are as follows:
(a) Failure of the plaintiff, without justifiable reasons, to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief;
(b) Failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time;
(c) Failure of the plaintiff to comply with the Rules of Court; or
(d) Failure of the plaintiff to obey any order of the court.
In our view, the developments in the present case do not satisfy the stringent standards set in law and jurisprudence for a non
prosequitur. 33 The fundamental test for non prosequitur is whether, under the circumstances, the plaintiff is chargeable with want of
due diligence in failing to proceed with reasonable promptitude. 34 There must be unwillingness on the part of the plaintiff to
prosecute. 35
In this case, the parties' own narrations of facts demonstrate the petitioner's willingness to prosecute its complaint. Indeed, neither
respondents FGU Insurance nor Baetiong was able to point to any specific act committed by the petitioner to justify the dismissal of
their case. aSIDCT
While it is discretionary on the trial court to dismiss cases, dismissals of actions should be made with care. The repressive or
restraining effect of the rule amounting to adjudication upon the merits may cut short a case even before it is fully litigated; a ruling of
dismissal may forever bar a litigant from pursuing judicial relief under the same cause of action. Hence, sound discretion demands
vigilance in duly recognizing the circumstances surrounding the case to the end that technicality shall not prevail over substantial
justice.

SOLIMAN V. Such contention is speculative. We cannot presume that the respondent had the intention of availing of the remedies of motion for
FERNANDEZ judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment but failed to file the same. The fact remains that the respondent had the option to
move for pre-trial and if he fails to do so as he did, the branch clerk of court had the duty to have the case set for pre-trial. Moreover,
the period of more than four (4) months or from 21 September 2004 up to 31 January 2005 may not be considered an unreasonable
length of time to warrant the terminal consequence of dismissal of the case.
To be sure, the dismissal of the case cannot be for respondent's "failing to take any step for further prosecution of this case" because
the further step is not his, but for the clerk of court, to take.
In Malayan Insurance Co, Inc. v. Ipil International, Inc., 30 this Court held that the failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the action without
 any justifiable cause within a reasonable period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is no longer interested to obtain from
the court the relief prayed for in the complaint. The presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because the plaintiff, on a motion
for reconsideration of the order of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause for such failure.
We also note that in the trial court, petitioner as defendant was in delay in filing his answer yet the court showed some leniency in
admitting his answer despite of the delay. We find no reason why respondent as plaintiff should not be granted the same leniency for
his failure to move for pre-trial. For after all, and to underscore the point, the resolution of the Court in A.M. No. 03-1-09-
SC 31 provides that: "Within five (5) days from date of filing of the reply, the plaintiff must move ex parte that the case be set for pre-
trial conference. If the plaintiff fails to file said motion within the given period, the Branch Clerk of Court shall issue a notice of pre-
trial." Dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute is not the result stated in the rule. The trial court is required to proceed to pre-trial
through the notice of pre-trial and setting the case for pre-trial by the Branch Clerk of Court.ESITcH
On a final note, we emphasize that in the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to
observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense
with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.
BACALSO v. Arcelona v. Court of Appeals defines indispensable parties under Section 7 of Rule 3, Rules of Court as follows:
PALIGOS o P]arties-in-interest without whom there can be no final determination of an action. As such, they must be joined either as
plaintiffs or as defendants. The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action requires, of course, the
joinder of all necessary parties where possible, and the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions, their
presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the
court (that) the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Petitioners are co-owners of a fishpond . . . The fishpond is undivided; it is impossible to pinpoint which specific portion of the
property is owned by Olanday, et. al.and which portion belongs to petitioners
o Indeed, petitioners should have been properly impleaded as indispensable parties
The absence then of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of a court null and void for want of authority to
act, not only as to the absent party but even as to those present.