Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 106719 September 21, 1993
DRA. BRIGIDA S. BUENASEDA, Lt. Col. ISABELO BANEZ, JR., ENGR. CONRADO REY MATIAS, Ms.
CORA S. SOLIS and Ms. ENYA N. LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY JUAN FLAVIER, Ombudsman CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, and NCMH NURSES
ASSOCIATION, represented by RAOULITO GAYUTIN, respondents.
Renato J. Dilag and Benjamin C. Santos for petitioners.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondent Ombudsman.
Crispin T. Reyes and Florencio T. Domingo for private respondent.

DECISION
QUIASON, J.:
This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction
or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992,
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners, Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Chief of Hospital III;
Isabelo C. Banez, Jr., Administrative Officer III; Conrado Rey Matias, Technical Assistant to the
Chief of Hospital; Cora C. Solis, Accountant III; and Enya N. Lopez, Supply Officer III, all of the
National Center for Mental Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman
to disqualify Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the
Ombudsman, from participation in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner
(Rollo, pp. 2-17; Annexes to Petition, Rollo, pp. 19-21).
The questioned order was issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the
Ombudsman (OBM-ADM-0-91-0151) by the private respondents against the petitioners for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to
controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw
and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias (Rollo, pp. 4-15).
On September 10, 1992, this Court required respondents Comment on the petition.
On September 14 and September 22, 1992, petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition (Rollo, pp.
124-130); Annexes to Supplemental Petition; Rollo pp. 140-163) and an Urgent Supplemental
Manifestation (Rollo, pp. 164-172; Annexes to Urgent Supplemental Manifestation; Rollo, pp.
173-176), respectively, averring developments that transpired after the filing of the petition and
stressing the urgency for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order.
On September 22, 1992, this Court . . . Resolved to REQUIRE the respondents to MAINTAIN in
the meantime, the STATUS QUO pending filing of comments by said respondents on the original
supplemental manifestation (Rollo, p. 177).
On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct respondent Secretary of Health to
comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992 (Rollo, pp. 182-192, Annexes, pp. 192-
203). In a Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health
to comment on the said motion.
On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled Omnibus Submission, respondent NCMH Nurses
Association submitted its Comment to the Petition, Supplemental Petition and Urgent
Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were the motions to hold the lawyers of
petitioners in contempt and to disbar them (Rollo, pp. 210-267). Attached to the Omnibus
Submission as annexes were the orders and pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. OBM-
ADM-0-91-1051 against petitioners (Rollo, pp. 268-480).
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with: (1) unlawfully advising or
otherwise causing or inducing their clients petitioners Buenaseda, et al., to openly defy, ignore,
disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their preventive suspension by Order
of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . .; (2) unlawfully interfering with and obstructing the
implementation of the said order (Omnibus Submission, pp. 50-52; Rollo, pp. 259-260); and (3)
violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and
unethical conduct by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception and
by committing subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings (Omnibus
Submission, pp. 52-54; Rollo, pp. 261-263).
On November 11, 1992, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Supplement to Motion to Direct
Respondent Secretary of Health to Comply with 22 September 1992 Resolution' (Manifestation
attached to Rollo without pagination between pp. 613 and 614 thereof).
On November 13, 1992, the Solicitor General submitted its Comment dated November 10, 1992,
alleging that: (a) despite the issuance of the September 22, 1992 Resolution directing
respondents to maintain the status quo, respondent Secretary refuses to hold in abeyance the
implementation of petitioners preventive suspension; (b) the clear intent and spirit of the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is to hold in abeyance the implementation of petitioners
preventive suspension, the status quo obtaining the time of the filing of the instant petition; (c)
respondent Secretarys acts in refusing to hold in abeyance implementation of petitioners
preventive suspension and in tolerating and approving the acts of Dr. Abueva, the OIC appointed
to replace petitioner Buenaseda, are in violation of the Resolution dated September 22, 1992;
and (d) therefore, respondent Secretary should be directed to comply with the Resolution dated
September 22, 1992 immediately, by restoring the status quo ante contemplated by the
aforesaid resolution (Comment attached to Rollo without paginations between pp. 613-614
thereof).
In the Resolution dated November 25, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary to comply
with the aforestated status quo order, stating inter alia, that:
It appearing that the status quo ante litem motam, or the last peaceable uncontested status
which preceded the present controversy was the situation obtaining at the time of the filing of
the petition at bar on September 7, 1992 wherein petitioners were then actually occupying their
respective positions, the Court hereby ORDERS that petitioners be allowed to perform the duties
of their respective positions and to receive such salaries and benefits as they may be lawfully
entitled to, and that respondents and/or any and all persons acting under their authority desist
and refrain from performing any act in violation of the aforementioned Resolution of September
22, 1992 until further orders from the Court (Attached to Rollo after p. 615 thereof).
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition
and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) The authority of the Ombudsman is only to
recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend; and (b) Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are
conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been
met in the instant case (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
In the pleading filed on January 25, 1993, petitioners adopted the position of the Solicitor General
that the Ombudsman can only suspend government officials or employees connected with his
office. Petitioners also refuted private respondents motion to disbar petitioners counsel and to
cite them for contempt (Attached to Rollo without pagination).
The crucial issue to resolve is whether the Ombudsman has the power to suspend government
officials and employees working in offices other than the Office of the Ombudsman, pending the
investigation of the administrative complaints filed against said officials and employees.
In upholding the power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioners, respondents
(Urgent Motion to Lift Status Quo, etc, dated January 11, 1993, pp. 10-11), invoke Section 24 of
R.A. No. 6770, which provides:
Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any
officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence
of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,
oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charge would
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondents continued stay in office may prejudice
the case filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided.
Respondents argue that the power of preventive suspension given the Ombudsman under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770 was contemplated by Section 13 (8) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, which provides that the Ombudsman shall exercise such other power or perform
such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General and the petitioners claim that under the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend to the heads of the departments and other
agencies the preventive suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation
conducted by his office. Hence, he cannot order the preventive suspension himself.
They invoke Section 13(3) of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the Office of the
Ombudsman shall have inter alia the power, function, and duty to:
Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure or prosecution, and
ensure compliance therewith.
The Solicitor General argues that under said provision of the Constitutions, the Ombudsman has
three distinct powers, namely: (1) direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against
public officials or employees at fault; (2) recommend their removal, suspension, demotion fine,
censure, or prosecution; and (3) compel compliance with the recommendation (Comment dated
December 3, 1992, pp. 9-10).
The line of argument of the Solicitor General is a siren call that can easily mislead, unless one
bears in mind that what the Ombudsman imposed on petitioners was not a punitive but only a
preventive suspension.
When the constitution vested on the Ombudsman the power to recommend the suspension of
a public official or employees (Sec. 13 [3]), it referred to suspension, as a punitive measure. All
the words associated with the word suspension in said provision referred to penalties in
administrative cases, e.g. removal, demotion, fine, censure. Under the rule of Noscitor a sociis,
the word suspension should be given the same sense as the other words with which it is
associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or
with which it is associated (Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh, 75 Phil. 371 [1945]; Caltex (Phils.) Inc.
v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247 [1966]).
Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which grants the Ombudsman the power to preventively suspend
public officials and employees facing administrative charges before him, is a procedural, not a
penal statute. The preventive suspension is imposed after compliance with the requisites therein
set forth, as an aid in the investigation of the administrative charges.
Under the Constitution, the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to recommend to the
appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of erring public officials or employees. In order
to make an intelligent determination whether to recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has
to conduct an investigation. In turn, in order for him to conduct such investigation in an
expeditious and efficient manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
The need for the preventive suspension may arise from several causes, among them, the danger
of tampering or destruction of evidence in the possession of respondent; the intimidation of
witnesses, etc. The Ombudsman should be given the discretion to decide when the persons facing
administrative charges should be preventively suspended.
Penal statutes are strictly construed while procedural statutes are liberally construed (Crawford,
Statutory Construction, Interpretation of Laws, pp. 460-461; Lacson v. Romero, 92 Phil. 456
[1953]). The test in determining if a statute is penal is whether a penalty is imposed for the
punishment of a wrong to the public or for the redress of an injury to an individual (59 Corpuz
Juris, Sec. 658; Crawford, Statutory Construction, pp. 496-497). A Code prescribing the procedure
in criminal cases is not a penal statute and is to be interpreted liberally (People v. Adler, 140 N.Y.
331; 35 N.E. 644).
The purpose of R.A. No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform
efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute,
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will
effectuate the purposes and objectives of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper
the work of the Ombudsman should be avoided.
A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed
for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of
Public Utilities v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas. Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. (2d) 213 [1940]; Wallace v.
Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E., 438 [1934]).
In Nera v. Garcia, 106 Phil. 1031 [1960], this Court, holding that a preventive suspension is not a
penalty, said:
Suspension is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the
charges are established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his
removal, then he is removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.
To support his theory that the Ombudsman can only preventively suspend respondents in
administrative cases who are employed in his office, the Solicitor General leans heavily on the
phrase suspend any officer or employee under his authority in Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770.
The origin of the phrase can be traced to Section 694 of the Revised Administrative Code, which
dealt with preventive suspension and which authorized the chief of a bureau or office to
suspend any subordinate or employee in his bureau or under his authority pending an
investigation . . . .
Section 34 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2266), which superseded Section 694 of the
Revised Administrative Code also authorized the chief of a bureau or office to suspend any
subordinate officer or employees, in his bureau or under his authority.
However, when the power to discipline government officials and employees was extended to the
Civil Service Commission by the Civil Service Law of 1975 (P.D. No. 805), concurrently with the
President, the Department Secretaries and the heads of bureaus and offices, the phrase
subordinate officer and employee in his bureau was deleted, appropriately leaving the phrase
under his authority. Therefore, Section 41 of said law only mentions that the proper disciplining
authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority
pending an investigation . . . (Sec. 41).
The Administrative Code of 1987 also empowered the proper disciplining authority to
preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an
investigation (Sec. 51).
The Ombudsman Law advisedly deleted the words subordinate and in his bureau, leaving the
phrase to read suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation . .
. . The conclusion that can be deduced from the deletion of the word subordinate before and
the words in his bureau after officer or employee is that the Congress intended to empower
the Ombudsman to preventively suspend all officials and employees under investigation by his
office, irrespective of whether they are employed in his office or in other offices of the
government. The moment a criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman,
the respondent therein is deemed to be in his authority and he can proceed to determine
whether said respondent should be placed under preventive suspension.
In their petition, petitioners also claim that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the suspension order without affording
petitioners the opportunity to confront the charges against them during the preliminary
conference and even after petitioners had asked for the disqualification of Director Arnaw and
Atty. Villa-Rosero (Rollo, pp. 6-13). Joining petitioners, the Solicitor General contends that
assuming arguendo that the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend erring public
officials and employees who are working in other departments and offices, the questioned order
remains null and void for his failure to comply with the requisites in Section 24 of the
Ombudsman Law (Comment dated December 3, 1992, pp. 11-19).
Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was
validly issued even without a full-blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the
parties. In Nera, supra, petitioner therein also claimed that the Secretary of Health could not
preventively suspend him before he could file his answer to the administrative complaint. The
contention of petitioners herein can be dismissed perfunctorily by holding that the suspension
meted out was merely preventive and therefore, as held in Nera, there was nothing improper
in suspending an officer pending his investigation and before tho charges against him are heard
. . . (Nera v. Garcia., supra).
There is no question that under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman cannot order the
preventive suspension of a respondent unless the evidence of guilt is strong and (1) the charts
against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect
in the performance of duty; (2) the charge would warrant removal from the service; or (3) the
respondents continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
The same conditions for the exercise of the power to preventively suspend officials or employees
under investigation were found in Section 34 of R.A. No. 2260.
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
expressly left such determination of guilt to the judgment of the Ombudsman on the basis of
the administrative complaint. In the case at bench, the Ombudsman issued the order of
preventive suspension only after: (a) petitioners had filed their answer to the administrative
complaint and the Motion for the Preventive Suspension of petitioners, which incorporated
the charges in the criminal complaint against them (Annex 3, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 288-
289; Annex 4, Rollo, pp. 290-296); (b) private respondent had filed a reply to the answer of
petitioners, specifying 23 cases of harassment by petitioners of the members of the private
respondent (Annex 6, Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 309-333); and (c) a preliminary conference
wherein the complainant and the respondents in the administrative case agreed to submit their
list of witnesses and documentary evidence.
Petitioners herein submitted on November 7, 1991 their list of exhibits (Annex 8 of Omnibus
Submission, Rollo, pp. 336-337) while private respondents submitted their list of exhibits (Annex
9 of Omnibus Submission, Rollo, pp. 338-348).
Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that Director Raul Arnaw and Investigator Amy de
Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in recommending the suspension of
petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had acted with grave abuse of discretion
in acting favorably on their recommendation.
The Motion for Contempt, which charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or
otherwise inducing their clients to openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered
by the Ombudsman and the Secretary of Health cannot prosper (Rollo, pp. 259-261). The Motion
should be filed, as in fact such a motion was filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that
the acts alleged to constitute indirect contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers
to question the validity and propriety of the preventive suspension of their clients.
On the other hand, we take cognizance of the intemperate language used by counsel for private
respondents hurled against petitioners and their counsel (Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private
Respondent Urgent Motions, etc.; (2) Adoption of OSGs Comment; and (3) Reply to Private
Respondents Comment and Supplemental Comment, pp. 4-5).
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his clients cause. The language of a lawyer,
both oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession (Lubiano v.
Gordolla, 115 SCRA 459 [1982]). The use of abusive language by counsel against the opposing
counsel constitutes at the same time a disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides,
the use of impassioned language in pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light.
The Motion for Disbarment (Rollo, p. 261) has no place in the instant special civil action, which is
confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion for the purpose of relieving persons
from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial officers. There is a set of procedure for the
discipline of members of the bar separate and apart from the present special civil action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the Status quo ordered to be maintained in the
Resolution dated September 22, 1992 is LIFTED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo,
Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 176058 March 23, 2011

PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-GRAFT COMMISSION (PAGC) and THE OFFICE OF THE

PRESIDENT, Petitioners,
vs.
SALVADOR A. PLEYTO, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the dismissal of a department undersecretary for failure to declare in his Sworn
Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) his wifes business interests and financial
connections.

The Facts and the Case

On December 19, 2002 the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) received an anonymous
letter-complaint1from alleged employees of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).
The letter accused DPWH Undersecretary Salvador A. Pleyto of extortion, illicit affairs, and
manipulation of DPWH projects.

In the course of the PAGCs investigation, Pleyto submitted his 1999,2 2000,3 and 20014 SALNs.
PAGC examined these and observed that, while Pleyto said therein that his wife was a
businesswoman, he did not disclose her business interests and financial connections. Thus, on April
29, 2003 PAGC charged Pleyto before the Office of the President (OP) for violation of Section 8 of
Republic Act (R.A.) 6713,5 also known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees" and Section 7 of R.A. 30196 or "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."7

Pleyto claimed that he and his wife had no business interests of any kind and for this reason, he
wrote "NONE" under the column "Business Interests and Financial Connections" on his 1999 SALN
and left the column blank in his 2000 and 2001 SALNs.8 Further, he attributed the mistake to the fact
that his SALNs were merely prepared by his wifes bookkeeper.9

On July 10, 2003 PAGC found Pleyto guilty as charged and recommended to the OP his dismissal
with forfeiture of all government financial benefits and disqualification to re-enter government
service.10

On January 29, 2004 the OP approved the recommendation.11 From this, Pleyto filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration12 claiming that: 1) he should first be allowed to avail of the review and
compliance procedure in Section 10 of R.A. 671313 before he is administratively charged; 2) he
indicated "NONE" in the column for financial and business interests because he and his wife had no
business interests related to DPWH; and 3) his failure to indicate his wifes business interests is not
punishable under R.A. 3019.
On March 2, 2004 PAGC filed its comment,14 contending that Pleytos reliance on the Review and
Complicance Procedure was unavailing because the mechanism had not yet been established and,
in any case, his SALN was a sworn statement, the contents of which were beyond the corrective
guidance of the DPWH Secretary. Furthermore, his failure to declare his wife's business interests
and financial connections was highly irregular and was a form of dishonesty.

On March 11, 2005 Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita ordered PAGC to conduct a
reinvestigation of Pleytos case.15 In compliance, PAGC queried the Department of Trade and
Industry of Region IIIBulacan regarding the businesses registered in the name of Miguela Pleyto,
his wife. PAGC found that she operated the following businesses: 1) R.S. Pawnshop, registered
since May 19, 1993; 2) M. Pleyto Piggery and Poultry Farm, registered since December 29, 1998; 3)
R.S. PawnshopPulong Buhangin Branch, registered since July 24, 2000; and 4) RSP Laundry and
Dry Cleaning, registered since July 24, 2001.16

The PAGC also inquired with the DPWH regarding their Review and Compliance procedure. The
DPWH said that, they merely reminded their officials of the need for them to comply with R.A. 6713
by filing their SALNs on time and that they had no mechanism for reviewing or validating the entries
in the SALNs of their more than 19,000 permanent, casual and contractual employees.17

On February 21, 2006 the PAGC maintained its finding and recommendation respecting Pleyto.18 On
August 29, 2006 the OP denied Pleytos Motion for Reconsideration.19 Pleyto raised the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA),20 which on December 29, 2006 granted Pleytos petition and permanently
enjoined the PAGC and the OP from implementing their decisions.21 This prompted the latter offices
to come to this Court on a petition for review.22

Issues Presented

This case presents the following issues:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in not finding Pleytos failure to indicate his spouses
business interests in his SALNs a violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6713.

2. Whether or not the CA erred in finding that under the Review and Compliance Procedure,
Pleyto should have first been allowed to correct the error in his SALNs before being charged
for violation of R.A. 6713.

The Courts Rulings

This is the second time Pleytos SALNs are before this Court. The first time was in G.R.
169982, Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-
CIDG).23 In that case, the PNP-CIDG filed on July 28, 2003 administrative charges against Pleyto
with the Office of the Ombudsman for violating, among others, Section 8 of R.A. 6713 in that he
failed to disclose in his 2001 and 2002 SALNs his wifes business interests and financial
connections.

On June 28, 2004 the Office of the Ombudsman ordered Pleyto dismissed from the service. He
appealed the order to the CA but the latter dismissed his petition and the motion for reconsideration
that he subsequently filed. Pleyto then assailed the CAs ruling before this Court raising, among
others, the following issues: 1) whether or not Pleyto violated Section 8(a) of R.A. 6713; and 2)
whether or not Pleytos reliance on the Review and Compliance Procedure in the law was
unwarranted.
After threshing out the other issues, this Court found that Pleytos failure to disclose his wifes
business interests and financial connections constituted simple negligence, not gross misconduct or
dishonesty. Thus:

Neither can petitioners failure to answer the question, "Do you have any business interest
and other financial connections including those of your spouse and unmarried children living
in your household?" be tantamount to gross misconduct or dishonesty. On the front page of
petitioners 2002 SALN, it is already clearly stated that his wife is a businesswoman, and it
can be logically deduced that she had business interests. Such a statement of his wifes
occupation would be inconsistent with the intention to conceal his and his wifes business
interests. That petitioner and/or his wife had business interests is thus readily apparent on
the face of the SALN; it is just that the missing particulars may be subject of an inquiry or
investigation.

An act done in good faith, which constitutes only an error of judgment and for no ulterior
motives and/or purposes, does not qualify as gross misconduct, and is merely simple
negligence. Thus, at most, petitioner is guilty of negligence for having failed to ascertain that
his SALN was accomplished properly, accurately, and in more detail.

Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. In the
case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to
perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is flagrant and
palpable. Both Section 7 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Section 8 of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees require the
accomplishment and submission of a true, detailed and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities. Petitioner was negligent for failing to comply with his duty to provide a detailed list
of his assets and business interests in his SALN. He was also negligent in relying on the
family bookkeeper/accountant to fill out his SALN and in signing the same without checking
or verifying the entries therein. Petitioners negligence, though, is only simple and not gross,
in the absence of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part, and in
consideration of the fact that his SALNs actually disclose the full extent of his assets and the
fact that he and his wife had other business interests.

Gross misconduct and dishonesty are serious charges which warrant the removal or
dismissal from service of the erring public officer or employee, together with the accessory
penalties, such as cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in government service. Hence, a finding that a public
officer or employee is administratively liable for such charges must be supported by
substantial evidence.24

The above concerns Pleytos 2001 and 2002 SALN; the present case, on the other hand, is about
his 1999, 2000 and 2001 SALNs but his omissions are identical. While he said that his wife was a
businesswoman, he also did not disclose her business interests and financial connections in his
1999, 2000 and 2001 SALNs. Since the facts and the issues in the two cases are identical, the
judgment in G.R. 169982, the first case, is conclusive upon this case.

There is "conclusiveness of judgment" when any right, fact, or matter in issue, directly adjudicated on
the merits in a previous action by a competent court or necessarily involved in its determination, is
conclusively settled by the judgment in such court and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is
the same.25
Thus, as in G.R. 169982, Pleytos failure to declare his wifes business interest and financial
connections does not constitute dishonesty and grave misconduct but only simple negligence,
warranting a penalty of forfeiture of the equivalent of six months of his salary from his retirement
benefits.26

With regard to the issue concerning compliance with the Review and Compliance Procedure
provided in R.A. 6713, this Court already held in G.R. 169982 that such procedure cannot limit the
authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations. R.A. 6770, otherwise known
as "The Ombudsman Act of 1989," intended to vest in the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority.27 Here, however, it was the PAGC and the OP, respectively, that
conducted the investigation and meted out the penalty of dismissal against Pleyto. Consequently,
the ruling in G.R. 169982 in this respect cannot apply.

Actually, nowhere in R.A. 6713 does it say that the Review and Compliance Procedure is a
prerequisite to the filing of administrative charges for false declarations or concealments in ones
SALN. Thus:

Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both
Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine
whether said statements which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper
form. In the event a determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate
Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary
corrective action.

(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of
both Houses of Congress shall have the power within their respective jurisdictions, to render
any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each
instance to the approval by affirmative vote of the majority of the particular House concerned.

The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar
factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with
it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in this Act.

(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof
insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary of
Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
in the case of the Judicial Department.

The provision that gives an impression that the Review and Compliance Procedure is a prerequisite
to the filing of an administrative complaint is found in paragraph (b) of Section 10 which states that
"The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual
situation, and who, after the issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not
be subject to any sanction provided in this Act." This provision must not, however, be read in
isolation.

Paragraph (b) concerns the power of the Review and Compliance Committee to interpret the law
governing SALNs. It authorizes the Committee to issue interpretative opinions regarding the filing of
SALNs. Officers and employees affected by such opinions "as well as" all who are similarly situated
may be allowed to correct their SALNs according to that opinion. What the law prohibits is merely the
retroactive application of the committees opinions. In no way did the law say that a public officer
clearly violating R.A. 6713 must first be notified of any concealed or false information in his SALN
and allowed to correct the same before he is administratively charged.
Furthermore, the only concern of the Review and Compliance Procedure, as per paragraph (a), is to
determine whether the SALNs are complete and in proper form. This means that the SALN contains
all the required data, i.e., the public official answered all the questions and filled in all the blanks in
his SALN form. If it finds that required information has been omitted, the appropriate Committee shall
so inform the official who prepared the SALN and direct him to make the necessary correction.

The Court cannot accept the view that the review required of the Committee refers to the substance
of what is stated in the SALN, i.e., the truth and accuracy of the answers stated in it, for the following
reasons:

First. Assuring the truth and accuracy of the answers in the SALN is the function of the filers
oath28 that to the best of his knowledge and information, the data he provides in it constitutes the true
statements of his assets, liabilities, net worth, business interests, and financial connections,
including those of his spouse and unmarried children below 18 years of age.29 Any falsity in the
SALN makes him liable for falsification of public documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code.

Second. The law will not require the impossible, namely, that the Committee must ascertain the
truth of all the information that the public officer or employee stated or failed to state in his SALNs
and remind him of it. The DPWH affirms this fact in its certification below:

This is to certify that this Department issues a memorandum every year reminding its
officials and employees to submit their Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) in compliance with R.A. 6713. Considering that it has approximately 19,000 permanent
employees plus a variable number of casual and contractual employees, the Department
does not have the resources to review or validate the entries in all the SALNs. Officials and
employees are assumed to be accountable for the veracity of the entries considering that the
SALNs are under oath.30 1avvphi1

Indeed, if the Committee knows the truth about the assets, liabilities, and net worth of its
departments employees, there would be no need for the law to require the latter to file their sworn
SALNs yearly.

In this case, the PAGC succeeded in discovering the business interest of Pleytos wife only after it
subpoenaed from the Department of Trade and IndustryBulacan certified copies of her business
interests there. The Heads of Offices do not have the means to compel production of documents in
the hands of other government agencies or third persons.

The purpose of R.A. 6713 is "to promote a high standard of ethics in public service. Public officials
and employees shall at all times be accountable to the people and shall discharge their duties with
utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty, act with patriotism and justice, lead modest
lives, and uphold public interest over personal interest."31 The law expects public officials to be
accountable to the people in the matter of their integrity and competence. Thus, the Court cannot
interpret the Review and Compliance Procedure as transferring such accountability to the
Committee.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition but finds petitioner Salvador A. Pleyto guilty only of
simple negligence and imposes on him the penalty of forfeiture of the equivalent of six months of his
salary from his retirement benefits.

SO ORDERED.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION* DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN**
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, per
Special Order 975 dated March 21, 2011.

** Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.

Nachura, per raffle dated August 3, 2009.

1 Rollo, pp. 83-89.

2 Id. at 92.

3 Id. at 90.

4 Id. at 91.
5 Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation
to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know,
their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their
spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their
households.

(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials
and employees, except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and
casual or temporary workers, shall file under oath their Statement of Assets,
Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18)
years of age living in their households.

6Section 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after the
approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other
year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or
separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department
Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the
Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and
employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true
detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts
and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount
of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their
statements in the following months of January.

7 Rollo, pp. 93-95.

8 Id. at 96-101.

9 Id. at 108-109.

10 Id. at 124-132.

11 Id. at 133-138.

12 Id. at 139-152.

13Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both
Houses of the Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine
whether said statements which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in
proper form. In the event a determination is made that a statement is not so filed, the
appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the
necessary corrective action.

(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated
Committees of both Houses of Congress shall have the power within their respective
jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this Act, in writing, to persons covered
by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative vote of the majority
of the particular House concerned.
The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a
similar factual situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in
accordance with it shall not be subject to any sanction provided in this Act.

(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and
(b) hereof insofar as their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of
the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the Executive Department and the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 197307, February 26, 2014

FLOR GUPILANAGUILAR AND HONORE R. HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, v. OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO; AND PNPCIDG, REPRESENTED BY
DIR. EDUARDO MATILLANO, Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to reverse and set aside the July 22,
20091Decision of the Court of Appeals and its June 13, 2011 Resolution in CAG.R. SP No.88954, affirming
the decision of the Ombudsman in OMBCA030327I that found petitioners guilty of grave misconduct
and dishonesty and dismissed them from the service.

The Facts

In June 2003, the Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNPCIDG)
conducted an investigation on the lavish lifestyle and alleged nefarious activities of certain personnel of the
Bureau of Customs, among them petitioners Flor GupilanAguilar (Aguilar), then Chief of the Miscellaneous
Division, and Honore Hernandez (Hernandez), Customs Officer III. Aguilar was then receiving a basic annual
salary of PhP 249,876. Her yeartoyear assets, liabilities and net worth for CYs 1999 to 2002, taken from
her Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) for the corresponding years, are shown below:

Real
Properties 19993 20004 20015 20026
2

House and
Lot in
P880,000.00 P980,000.00 P1,030,000.00 P1,030,000.00
Quezon
City
Apartment
in Caloocan P500,000.00 P550,000.00 P550,000.00 P550,000.00
City
Personal
Properties
7

Car P450,000.00 P450,000.00 P450,000.00 P900,000.00

Jewelry P500,000.00 P600,000.00 P650,000.00 P750,000.00
Appliances P100,000.00 P120,000.00 P125,000.00 P135,000.00
Furniture
P100,000.00 P120,000.00 P125,000.00 P150,000.00
and Fixture
Total P2,530,000.0 P2,820,000.0 P2,930,000.0 P3,515,000.0
Assets 0 0 0 0
Liabilities
GSIS P450,000.00 P400,000.00 P300,000.00
Car Loan P500,000.00
Total
P450,000.00 P400,000.00 P800,000.00
Liabilities
P2,530,000.0 P2,370,000.0 P2,530,000.0 P2,715,000.0
Net Worth
0 0 0 0

Her SALNs for the years aforementioned do not reflect any income source other than her employment. The
spaces for her spouses name and business interest were left in blank.

Following weeks of surveillance and lifestyle probe, the PNPCIDG investigating team, headed by Atty.
Virgilio Pablico, executed on July 28, 2003 a JointAffidavit, depicting Aguilar, who, in her Personal Data
Sheet, indicated Blk 21 Lot 8 Percentage St. BIR Vill, Fairview, QC as her home address, as owning
properties not declared or properly identified in her SALNs, specifically the following:

Real Properties

1. Lot 6, Blk 21, BIR Village, Fairview, Quezon City worth approximately
Php1,000,000.00;
2. A 4bedroom Unit 1007A Antel Seaview Towers, 2626 Roxas Blvd., Pasay City
worth Php12,000,000.00, with rights to 4 parking slots; and
3. Residential lot in Naga City worth Php148,200.00

Personal
Properties

Make/Model Plate No. Registered Owner

Honda CRV BIM888 Flor G. Aguilar
Isuzu Trooper HRH659 Honore R. Hernandez
BMW (red) XCR500 Asia Intl Auctioneer, Inc.
BMW (silver) XFD441 Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc.8

It was also unearthed that, during a fouryear stretch, from July 1999 to June 2003, Aguilar, per the Bureau
of Immigration (BI) records, took 13 unofficial trips abroad, eight to Los Angeles, California, accompanied
most of the time by daughter Josephine. During the same period, her two other daughters also collectively
made nine travels abroad. Per the PNPCIDGs estimate, Aguilar would have spent around PhP 3,400,000 for
her and her daughters foreign travels.

In view of what it deemed to be a wide variance between Aguilars acquired assets and what she spent for
her fouryear overseas travels, on one hand, and her income, on the other, the PNPCIDG, through
P/Director Eduardo Matillanoin a lettercomplaint of July 28, 2003, with enclosures, on a finding that she
has violated Republic Act No. (RA) 13799 in relation to RA 301910 and 671311 charged her with grave
misconduct and dishonesty. Hernandez was charged too with the same offenses. Upon evaluation of the
complaint and of the evidence presented, which included the aforementioned jointaffidavit, the
Ombudsman created an investigating panel which then conducted administrative proceedings on the
complaint, docketed as OMBCA030327I.

By Order of September 3, 2003, then Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio, Jr. placed Aguilar
under preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay. Another Order,12 however, was issued,
effectively lifting the order of preventive suspension on the stated ground that Aguilars untraversed
controverting evidence considerably demonstrated the weakness of the evidence in support of the
complaint.

In the meantime, Aguilar filed her CounterAffidavit,13 primarily addressing the allegations in the
aforementioned jointaffidavit. In it, she belied allegations about not declaring Lot 6, Blk 21, BIR Village,
Fairview. As explained, what she considers her dwelling in that area consists of a duplextype structure that
sits on the Lot 8 she originally owned and the contiguous Lot 6, which she subsequently acquired from one
Norma Jurado. Anent Unit 1007A of Antel Seaview Towers, Aguilar pointed to her USbased brother Carlo
as owner of this condo unit, the latter having purchased it from Mina Gabor on July 14, 2003. Carlo, as she
averred, has allowed her to stay in the unit. Appended to Aguilars counteraffidavit is a Deed of
Sale14 purportedly executed in Los Angeles in favor of Carlo.

Aguilar also denied owning the socalled third real property, the Panicuason, Naga City lot, since she had
already sold it in 1992.

As to allegations that she owns but failed to declare the four abovelisted vehicles, Aguilar admitted to
owning only the subject Honda CRV van, but denied the charge of failing to declare it in her SALN. She
ascribed ownership of the Isuzu Trooper to Hernandez. As for the red and silver BMW cars registered in the
name of the entities mentioned in the complaint, Aguilar alleged that they were merely lent to her by her
brothers friend.

Not being the owner of the properties aforementioned, Aguilar wondered how she can be expected to
include them in her SALN.

Finally, she claimed having seven brothers and two sisters in the US who had sponsored her US trips and
who at times even sent airline tickets for her and her daughters use.

Hernandez, for his defense, alleged that the complaint adverted only to his being the registered owner of an
Isuzu Trooper. There is no specification, he added, as to his acquisition of, and not declaring, unexplained
wealth.15

Ruling of the Ombudsman

Based on the evidence on record and the parties position papers, the investigating panel issued for approval
a draft Decision16 dated June 3, 2004, which found Aguilar guilty of the offenses charged. And while
Hernandez was also charged and investigated, the fallo and even the body of the proposed decision was
silent as to him, save for the following line:

x x x the fact that the motor vehicle, Isuzu Trooper with Plate No. HRH 659 is registered in his
[Hernandezs] name, does not make him administratively liable.17

Evidently not totally satisfied with the panels recommended action, the Ombudsman directed that a joint
clarificatory hearing be conducted, and one was held on September 23, 2004. The proceedings resulted in
the issuance of what the investigating panel styled as Supplemental Decision18 dated January 6, 2005
further detailing the bases for the earlier finding on Aguilars liability. Like the earlier draft, no reference was
made in the fallo of the Supplemental Decision to Hernandezs guilt or innocence.

Following a review of the two issuances thus submitted, then Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo issued on
January 18, 2005 a decision denominated Supplement,19 approving, with modification, the
adverted Decision and Supplemental Decision. The modification relates to the liability of Hernandez whom
the Ombudsman found to be Aguilars dummy and equally guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty
deserving too of the penalty of dismissal from the service. Dispositively, the Supplement reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 03 June 2004 and Supplemental Decision dated 06 January 2005 are
approved insofar as it finds respondent Flor Aguilar guilty of the administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct
and Dishonesty and is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service, with the accessory penalty
of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification for re
employment in the government service.

Further, the undersigned hereby disapproves the ruling contained in the Decision dated 03 June 2004 with
regard to Honore Hernandez, the latter being likewise found guilty of the administrative offenses of Grave
Misconduct and Dishonesty and is hereby meted the penalty of Dismissal from the service, with the
accessory penalty of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
for reemployment in the government service.

SO ORDERED.

Aguilar and Hernandez moved for but were denied reconsideration20 via an Order21 of February 28, 2005.
The two then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition for review under Rule 43, docketed as CAG.R.
SP No. 88954. Even as they decried what they tag as a case disposition in installments, petitioners asserted
the absence of substantial evidence to support the allegations in the complaint, and that the judgment of
dismissal is recommendatory and not immediately executory.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA, in its assailed Decision of July 22, 2009, affirmed that of the Ombudsman, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Ombudsman finding petitioners
guilty of Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty, and meted them the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
government service, with the accessory penalty of cancellation of elibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits
and perpetual disqualification for reemployment in the government service in OMBCA030327I is
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[22

Even as it junked petitioners contention on the sufficiency of the complainants inculpating evidence and on
the nature of the Ombudsmans judgment, the CA declared that petitioners remedy under the premises is
an appeal to this Court by force of Section 14 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of
1989. Sec. 14 provides that [n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decisions or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court on pure questions of
law, while Sec. 27 states that [f]indings of fact by the [OMB] when supported by substantial
evidence are conclusive.

On June 13, 2011, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a Rule 43 petition to assail the findings or decisions of the Ombudsman in an
administrative case is proper;
2. Whether or not the acts complained of constitute grave misconduct, dishonesty or both;
3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to support the assailed findings of the Ombudsman and
the CA; and
4. Whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman is but recommendatory or immediately executory.

Petitioners also invite attention to the June 4, 2012 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila in
Criminal Case No. 08263022, acquitting Aguilar for falsification allegedly involving the same disputed
transactions in OMBCA030327I.
 The Courts Ruling

The petition, on its procedural and substantial aspects, is partly meritorious. The Court shall first address
procedural issues and concerns raised in this recourse.

Petitioners properly appealed to the CA

Petitioners first contend that the CA erred in its holding that, in line with Sec. 1423 and Sec. 27 of RA 6770,
they should have appealed the Ombudsmans Decision to this Court on questions of law instead of filing a
Rule 43 petition before the CA.

Petitioners stand on solid ground on this issue.

The Ombudsman has defined prosecutorial powers and possesses adjudicative competence over
administrative disciplinary cases filed against public officers. What presently concerns the Court relates to
the grievance mechanism available to challenge the OMBs decisions in the exercise of that disciplinary
jurisdiction.

The nature of the case before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) determines the proper remedy available
to the aggrieved party and with which court it should be filed. In administrative disciplinary cases, an appeal
from the OMBs decision should be taken to the CA under Rule 43, unless the decision is not appealable
owing to the penalty imposed.

In the case at bar, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of his administrative disciplinary jurisdiction had, after
due investigation, adjudged petitioners guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty and meted the
corresponding penalty. Recourse to the CA via a Rule 43 petition is the proper mode of appeal. Rule 43
governs appeals to the CA from decisions or final orders of quasijudicial agencies.24

Reliance by the CA on Sec. 14 in relation to Sec. 27 of RA 6770 to support its position as to which court a
party may repair to to assail the OMBs decision in disciplinary cases is misinformed. As has been held, those
portions of said Sec. 27 and any other provisions implementing RA 6770, insofar as they expanded the
appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its concurrence, violate Article VI, Sec. 30 of the 1987
Constitution.25 We said so in the landmark Fabian v. Desierto:26

WHEREFORE, Section 27 of [RA] 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of
[A.O.]. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the [OMB]), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the
Office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further
force and effect. (Emphasis added.)

As a consequence and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasijudicial agencies
in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of Rule 43.27Barata v. Abalos, Jr.,28Coronel
v. Desierto,29 and recently Dimagiba v. Espartero30 have reiterated the pertinent holding in Fabian.

The Decision of the Ombudsman is mandatory and immediately executory

This brings us to the issue on the nature of the Ombudsmans decisions in administrative disciplinary suits, it
being petitioners posture that such decisions, as here, are only recommendatory and, at any event, not
immediately executory for the reason that the PNPCIDG filed the basic complaint on August 20,
200331 when the ruling in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman32 had still controlling sway. To
petitioners, Tapiador enunciated the dictum that the Ombudsmans disciplinary power is only to recommend,
the power to suspend and dismiss erring personnel being vested in the head of the office concerned. As a
corollary point, petitioners also advance the argument that the legal situation changed only when Office of
the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals33 and Ombudsman v. Samaniego34were decided in June 2006 and
September 2008, respectively.

We are not impressed.

Petitioners witting or unwitting invocation of Tapiador is specious. Administrative disciplinary authority of
the OMB does not end with a recommendation to punish. The statement in Tapiador that the Ombudsman is
without authority to directly dismiss an erring public official as its mandate is only to recommend was
mere obiter dictum, and cannot, in the words of Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,35 be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of the Supreme Court. In fact, the pronouncement in Tapiador on the Ombudsmans disciplinary
authority was only limited to two sentences, to wit:

x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no
authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service x x x. Under Section 13,
subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only recommend the
removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.36

The terse obiter in Tapiador should be compared with the holding in Ombudsman v. De Leon37 which even
chronicled the pertinent internal rules of procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) and illustrated
that, as early as 2000, rules were already enforced by the OMB that provide for the immediate execution of
judgments pending appeal. As pointed out in De Leon, Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 prescribes
the rules on the effectivity and finality of the OMBs decisions:

SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. (1) All provisionary orders at the Office of the Ombudsman
are immediately effective and executory.

xxxx

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten
(10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the
motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the Ombudsman x x x. (Emphasis
supplied.)

The then Sec. 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (AO 07) or the Rules of Procedure of the OMB, in
turn, stated:

Sec. 7. Finality of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case of conviction
where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a
fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the
decision shall become final after the expiration of ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the
respondent, unless a motion for reconsideration or petition for certiorari, shall have been filed by
him as prescribed in Section 27 of RA 6770. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Court, in Lapid v. Court of Appeals,38 has interpreted the abovequoted provision to mean that the
sanctions imposed by the Ombudsman other than public censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than
one month or a fine equivalent to one month salary are not immediately executory and can be stayed by an
appeal timely filed. The pertinent ruling in Lapid has, however, been superseded.39On August 17, 2000, AO
14A was issued amending Sec. 7, Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the OMB. The rule, as thus
amended, pertinently reads:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where x x x the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision
shall be final and unappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed x x x.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive
suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not receive by reason of the
suspension or removal. (Emphasis supplied.)
Then came AO 17 dated September 15, 2003 further amending Sec. 7 of Rule III. Thus, the section now
provides:

Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, and in case
of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one
month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory, and unappealable. In
all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals x x x.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension or
removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been under
preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did not
receive by reason of the suspension or removal. (Emphasis supplied.)

Clearly then, as early as August 17, 2000, when AO 14A was issued, the OMBimposed penalties in
administrative disciplinary cases were already immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal timely filed.
In this case, it must be noted that the complaint dated July 28, 2003 was filed on August 20, 2003 or after
the AO 14A has come into effect. Thus, no error can be attributed to the CA when it ruled that the
penalties imposed by the Ombudsman against petitioners are immediately executory. Immediate execution
argues against the outlandish notion that the Ombudsman can only recommend disciplinary sanctions.

The acts complained of constitute Dishonesty but not Grave Misconduct

a. Grave Misconduct

The charges against petitioners for grave misconduct and dishonesty basically stemmed from their alleged
act of amassing unexplained wealth or acquiring properties disproportionate to their income, petitioner
Aguilars alleged failure to declare them in her SALNs, and for petitioner Hernandezs alleged acquiescence
to be her dummy. To our the mind, however, we find that even if petitioners, for argument, failed to include
several properties in their SALNs, the omission, by itself, does not amount to grave misconduct.

Largo v. Court of Appeals40 is instructional as to the nature of the offense. To constitute misconduct, the
complained act/s or omission must have a direct relation and be linked to the performance of official duties.
The Court wrote in Amosco v. Magro:

x x x By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as affects his performance of his duties as
an officer and not such only as affects his character as a private individual. In such cases, it has
been said at all times, it is necessary to separate the character of the man from the character of the officer
x x x. It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance warranting removal from office of an officer
must have direct relation to and be connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the office x x x.41

Owning properties disproportionate to ones salary and not declaring them in the corresponding SALNs
cannot, without more, be classified as grave misconduct. Even if these allegations were true, we cannot see
our way clear how the fact of nondeclarations would have a bearing on the performance of functions by
petitioner Aguilar, as Customs Chief of the Miscellaneous Division, and by petitioner Hernandez, as Customs
Operations Officer. It is nonsequitur to assume that the omission to declare has served, in some way, to
hinder the rendition of sound public service for there is no direct relation or connection between the two.
Without a nexus between the act complained of and the discharge of duty, the charge of grave misconduct
shall necessarily fail.

b. Dishonesty

Dishonesty, as juridically understood, implies the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty or probity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.42 It is a malevolent act that puts serious
doubt upon ones ability to perform duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee.43
The inculpatory allegations in the controversy, if proved, qualify as acts of dishonesty that would merit
dismissal from service. The requirement of filing a SALN is enshrined, as it were, in the Constitution44to
promote transparency in the civil service and operates as a deterrent against government officials bent on
enriching themselves through unlawful means. By mandate of law, it behooves every government official or
employee to make a complete disclosure of his or her assets, liabilities and net worth in order to suppress
any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually results from nondisclosure of such
matters.45

The significance of requiring the filing of a complete, truthful, and sworn SALN as a measure to curb
corruption in the bureaucracy cannot be gainsaid. Secs. 7 and 8 of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
Act (RA 3019) are emphatic on this point:

Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Every public officer, within thirty days after assuming office,
and thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every calendar year, x x x shall
prepare and file x x x a true, detailed and sworn statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding
calendar year x x x.

Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained Wealth. If in accordance with the
provisions of [RA 1379], a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in
his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in
the name of the spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their
acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. x x x [M]anifestly excessive
expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents including x x x frequent
travel abroad of a nonofficial character by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently
out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this
Section x x x. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the administrative
suspension of the public official concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained
wealth is completed.

The aforequoted Section 8 speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth and excessive expenditure, the evil
sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which directs full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a
means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at minimizing if not altogether curtailing the
opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service. By the SALN,
the public is able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it serves as a valid check and
balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.46

The failure to file a truthful SALN puts in doubts the integrity of the officer and would normally amount to
dishonesty. It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration in the SALN does not automatically
amount to such an offense. Dishonesty requires malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false
statements; otherwise, the government employee may only liable for negligence, not for dishonesty.47 In
addition, only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the income of the public
officer/employee and income from other sources, and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or
explain these sources of income and acquisitions, does he or she become susceptible to dishonesty.48

Substantial evidence

The core of the controversy in this case lies in whether or not the complainants pieces of evidence extant in
and deducible from the records meet the quantum of evidence required to justify the dismissal action taken
against petitioners. Petitioner Aguilar argues that the initial evidentiary assessment by the OMB when it
lifted the order of preventive suspension was correct. To recall, the OMB declared at that time that the
evidence PNPCIDG presented was not strong enough to support the basic complaint.

In essence, petitioners, Aguilar in particular, urge us to gauge whether or not the complainant has hurdled
the quantum of evidence requirement in administrative cases so as to shift the burden of evidence on them.
Respondents, on the other hand, are correct in pointing out that a review of the evidence would necessarily
entail a corresponding evaluation of facts ascertained by the Ombudsman and the CA, and that as a general
rule, the Court should refrain from delving into factual questions. However, we have already held in a catena
of cases that the general rule admits of exceptions, including when the judgment is based on
misappreciation of facts or when the findings of facts are conflicting.49 In light of the series of seemingly
confusing orders and rulings promulgated by the Ombudsman, it is beyond cavil that a review of the facts in
this case is warranted.

a. Evidence against petitioner Aguilar

i. Lot 6, Block 21, BIR Village, Fairview, Quezon City

Petitioner Aguilar admits owning this parcel of land, but insists at every turn that she had consistently
declared it in her SALNs. A perusal of her SALNs from 19992002 would indeed show that she had declared
ownership of the Fairview property, entering it merely as House & Lot, Q.C. This is as opposed to the
allegations of the PNPCIDG that what she has been declaring is Lot 8 of Block 21, and not Lot 6.

We sustain the findings of the Ombudsman contained in the Supplemental Decision as to the validity of
petitioner Aguilars account on this point. As observed by the Ombudsman, the house and lot she declared
as residence is actually a duplextype structure, with a party wall in the middle, erected on two lots, Lots 6
and 8. When petitioner Aguilar purchased Lot 8 from one Norma Jurado, she dismantled the dividing wall to
make a solitary unit.

This explanation finds support from a perusal of her travel documents wherein she interchanges her address
between said Lot 6 and Lot 8.

ii. Antel Towers

Petitioner Aguilar argues next that the fourbedroom condominium apartment with two parking slots along
Pasay City is actually owned by her USbased brother Carlo who allegedly purchased it from Mina Gabor, as
evidenced by the Deed of Sale dated July 14, 2003.

The Court, as were the CA and the OMB, is unconvinced. A cursory reading of the deed shows July 14, 2003,
or a month after the PNPCIDG initiated an investigation over Aguilars lifestyle, as its date of execution. On
the other hand, petitioner Aguilar admitted during the clarificatory hearing conducted on September 23,
2004 that, as early as 2000, she and her daughter have already been occupying the apartment, thus:

Q: You said in your direct clarificatory questioning that you dont know when Carlo Gupilan bought this
property? A: Yes, sir.

Q: But when did you reside in that property for the first time? A: Mga 2000 pa yun.

Q: When for the first time did you know that Carlo Gupilan acquired that Antel Towers property? A: Noon
pong sinabi niya: Ate, napakalayo sa opisina mo ang bahay mo. Gusto mo gamitin mo yung bahay ko sa
Pasay?

Q: Mga kailan yun? A: Mga 2000.50

Evidently, a serious disparity exists between the document presented and the statements petitioner Aguilar
herself made. As the CA observed, citing the Ombudsmans findings, petitioner insists that the property is
owned by her brother Carlo who invited her to stay in his condo unit in 2000. However, per the document
she presented, the alleged Deed of Sale between him and Gabor, was only executed on July 14, 2003.

On what authority then she has been staying on the apartment unit before the alleged CarloGabor sales
transaction was executed remained unexplained. This aberration coupled by her beneficial ownership of the
property, as demonstrated by her possession and occupancy of the unit, casts serious doubts as to her
brothers alleged ownership of the unit since 2000 and renders dubious the alleged deed of sale. To recall,
graft investigators will not only look into properties in a public servants name, but also those claimed by
their relatives or dummies. The SALN requirement will be a useless ritual if public officers can easily evade
the obligation to disclose if they register the asset under someone elses name.
iii. Naga City property

As petitioner Aguilar alleged, she purchased the property from her parents who, in June 1990, executed the
corresponding deed of sale in her favor. This sale may be documented, but her claim that she subsequently
sold the Naga property to one Rosendo Gonzales sometime in 1992 is not supported by evidence. She has
not adduced any document or deed proving that she no longer owns the property. On the other hand, the
PNPCIDG was able to secure from the City Assessors office a copy of the tax declaration of the property in
2002 which, on its face, clearly yields this fact: the property is still registered under Aguilars name; the
alleged sale between her and Rosendo Gonzales was not annotated.

iv. Vehicles

There is no quibbling as to the ownership of the Honda CRV and the Isuzu Trooper. The question pivots only
as to the two (2) BMWs that petitioner Aguilar had acknowledged using.

Per petitioner Aguilars account, a friend of another brother, Salvador, has allowed her the use of the BMWs.
As claimed, USbased Salvador is in the business of exporting used cars from the US to the Philippines and
has local contacts which include the two corporations under whose names the BMWs are registered. The
PNPCIDG, on the other hand, submitted pictures51 taken during its surveillance of Aguilar showing the red
and silver BMWs leaving the parking space of Antel Towers, if not parked at slots reserved for the use of the
unit Aguilar has been occupying.

We rule, as the CA and the Ombudsman earlier did, against petitioner Aguilar on this point. As found by the
Ombudsman and confirmed by the CA, petitioner Aguilar had control and possessionboth attributes of
ownershipof the two BMW vehicles. While she alleged having only borrowed them, her statement during
the clarificatory hearings that she does not know who the real owners are over stretches credulity. Her
allegation was that the vehicles were only lent her by her brothers friend. But when pressed on how she
came into contact with the friend, who was unnamed, since her brother is in the US, she was unable to give
a direct answer.52

In another perspective, it bears to stress that petitioner Aguilar, a ranking customs official, had veritably
admitted to receiving benefits from the above named corporations which had been facilitating her brothers
used car export business. As correctly observed by the Ombudsman, Sec. 7 of RA 6713 or the Code of
Ethical Standards53 prohibits public officials and employees from directly or indirectly soliciting or accepting
gifts, favor or things of monetary value from anyone in connection with any operation being regulated by, or
any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office. The AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices
Act declares and penalizes similar acts.54

The act complained of as regards the BMW cars for sure is indicative of corruption, tending to suggest that
petitioner Aguilar had used her position in the customs bureau to advance her brothers business interests
as well as that of the two corporations which facilitate the vehicle exportation and importation business.
Thus, even in the absence of compelling evidence to prove that petitioner Aguilar is the actual owner of the
subject highpriced BMW vehicles, she can still be held amenable under the premises for conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service.

v. Foreign Travels

Petitioner Aguilars exculpating allegations, as earlier narrated, as to her foreign travels during the period
material fail to convince.

While indeed some of her siblings executed affidavits tending to prove they have sufficient income to
shoulder her travels, they stopped short of saying that they did in fact contribute or entirely pay, as Aguilar
urges the Court to believe, for her and her daughters trip to Los Angeles. Nowhere in the documents was it
mentioned that they defrayed petitioner Aguilars expenses for her visits. The general affidavits merely
indicated their jobs and how much salary they receive monthly. As held in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Racho,55 an unexplained wealth case, the documents that Racho presented, purportedly showing his
brothers financial capability to send or contribute large sum of money for their business, do not prove that
they did, in fact, contribute or remit money for their supposed joint business venture.
As a final note on the matter, petitioner Aguilar had submitted affidavits56 wherein she averred that all
expenses for her and her daughters travel shall be borne or defrayed by her alone.57 So what happens to
her claim that her siblings shouldered most of her travel expenses?

vi. Summary

Administrative proceedings are governed by the substantial evidence rule, meaning a finding of guilt in an
administrative case may and would issue if supported by substantial evidence that the respondent has
committed the acts stated in the complaint. Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.58 Its absence is not shown by stressing
that there is contrary evidence, direct or circumstantial, on record.59

In the case at bar, the required evidence sufficient to justify holding petitioner Aguilar administratively liable
has been, to us, as to the CA, satisfied. Not only did she fail to declare in her SALN the residential lot located
at Panicuason, Naga City, she likewise failed to satisfactorily explain her beneficial ownership of the Antel
Seaview Towers fourbedroom condominium unit and her use of the two BMWs registered in the name of
different corporations, which, as the records show, are both based in Olongapo City.

Relevant to this determination is Sec. 2 of RA 1379,60 in relation to Sec. 8 of RA 3019, which states that
whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been
unlawfully acquired. When the presumption holds, the burden of evidence then shifts to the respondent, in
this instance petitioner Aguilar, to show that the financial resources used to acquire the undeclared assets
and her expenditures came from lawful income. To be sure, petitioner Aguilar has failed to discharge this
burden, as the CA, and the OMB before it, have determined. The explanation she offered when confronted
with her undeclared acquisitions and travel splurge is too flimsy compared to her own admissions as to her
beneficial ownership over the properties. Her SALNs during the years in question clearly indicated she was a
pure compensation income earner. With an annual salary of PhP 249,876, it is incomprehensible how she
could have acquired her undeclared assets on top of paying for her annual travels and living expenses. The
discrepancy in the total valuation of her declared and undeclared assets is also too glaring for petitioner
Aguilars omission to be written off as mere negligence or carelessness. As a result, no error can be
attributed to the CA and the Ombudsman adjudging her guilty of dishonesty.

Petitioner Aguilars acquittal in Crim. Case No. 08263022 of the Manila RTC on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence would not carry the day for her. The dismissal of the criminal aspect of the complaint filed
against Aguilar has hardly any bearing on the administrative case mainly because the quantum of evidence
required to support a finding of guilt in a criminal case is proof beyond reasonable doubt. Administrative
cases are, as a rule, separate and independent from criminal suits and are governed by differing evidentiary
criteria. The acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not conclude
the administrative proceedings, nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because unlike in
criminal cases where the threshold quantum of evidence required is proof beyond reasonable doubt, only
substantial evidence is necessary in administrative cases.61

b. Evidence against petitioner Hernandez

Unlike in the case of his copetitioner, this Court is unable to make out a case of dishonesty, let alone grave
misconduct against petitioner Hernandez. To be sure, the OMB investigating panel, in the Decision dated
June 3, 2004, recommended petitioner Hernandezs exoneration. However, in a bizarre twist, the
Ombudsman, in its Supplement dated January 18, 2005, disapproved the panels own assessment of the
sufficiency of evidence as regards petitioner Hernandez and ruled that, while the Isuzu Trooper with Plate
No. HRH659 was registered under his name, it is actually owned by Aguilar. Accordingly, the Ombudsman
decreed Hernandezs dismissal for supposedly consenting to act as Aguilars dummy. The Ombudsman, in
net effect, used petitioner Hernandezs own admission of vehicle ownership against him and ruled that he
could not afford to acquire the car on his salary of PhP 14,098 a month.

In ruling for petitioner Hernandez, we do so taking stock of the pronouncement in the first
issued Decision of the Ombudsman. There was indeed no specific allegation in the complaint against him
other than his owning an Isuzu Trooper vehicle, which he declared in his SALN. But mere ownership is not
an actionable administrative offense. The PNPCIDG also did not present any additional evidence as against
petitioner Hernandez. We are, thus, at a loss to understand how the Ombudsman, after saying in not so
many words that Hernandez was not guilty, would completely reverse itself in the Supplement. Having
already disposed of the issue as regards petitioner Hernandez in the Decision, it was then quite improper for
the Ombudsman to reverse its findings six months after, albeit no evidence had been adduced in the interim
to support the new finding.

While the Ombudsmans reasoningas adopted by the CA, regarding petitioner Hernandezs purchasing
capability, or lack of itmay be plausible at first blush, the latter was able to justify his ownership of the
Isuzu Trooper. Evidence on record would show that aside from his employment, he and his wife have other
sources of income. As he alleged in his pleadings, his wife, Ruth, is a practicing physician who, besides
maintaining a clinic in both the Seamens Hospital in Manila and at the Medical Center Muntinlupa, engages
in OBGYN consultancy. And as seen in his SALN for 2002, the couple run Sarah Katrinas Drugstore in Las
Pias City and even own shares of stocks in Medical Center Muntinlupa. A car loan worth PhP 1,600,000 was
also reported in his 2002 SALN.62 In fine, there is valid reason to conclude that the Hernandez couple, with
their combined income, could very well afford a mediumpriced motor van.

Given these circumstances, the innocence claim of petitioner Hernandez becomes all the more credible and
the justifications offered sufficient to absolve him of administrative liability. It should be understood that the
laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained wealth. Where the source of the undisclosed
wealth can be properly accounted for, as in the case of petitioner Hernandez, then it is explained wealth
which the law does not penalize.63

Under OMB AO 17, if the respondent, meted by OMB the penalty of suspension or removal, is exonerated on
appeal, he shall be considered as having been under preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and
such other emoluments that he failed to receive by reason of that suspension or removal. So it must be in
the case of petitioner Hernandez.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed July 22, 2009 Decision and June 13,
2011 Resolution in CAG.R. SP No.88954 are MODIFIED. The charge for Grave Misconduct against Flor
GupilanAguilar is DISMISSED, while the appellate courts finding of her liability for Dishonesty and the
corresponding penalty imposed are AFFIRMED.

The CA Decision, however, insofar as it finds Honore Hernandez guilty of the offenses charged against him,
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against him for Grave Misconduct and Dishonesty is
accordingly DISMISSED. He is accordingly ordered REINSTATED immediately to his former or equivalent
position in the Bureau of Customs without loss or diminution in his salaries and benefits. In addition, he shall
be paid his salary and such other emoluments corresponding to the period he was out of the service by
reason of the judgment of dismissal decreed by the Office of the Ombudsman, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, Bersamin,*Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 181598 March 6, 2013

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.
ARNEL A. BERNARDO, ATTORNEY V, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision1 dated January 23, 2007, as well as the Resolution2 dated January 7, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86062, entitled "ARNEL A. BERNARDO, Attorney V, Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V MARCELO, FACT-FINDING AND
INTELLIGENCE BUREAU (FFIB)- Office of the Ombudsman, and HON. GUILLERMO L. PARAYNO,
JR., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue," which reversed and set
aside the Decision3 dated July 6, 2004 issued by petitioner Office of the Ombudsman (the
Ombudsman) in OMB-C-A-03-0531-K (LSC), entitled "Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB),
Represented by Atty. Ma. Elena A. Roxas v. Arne! A. Bernardo, Attorney V, Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR)."

These are the facts of this case, as summed by the Court of Appeals:

Respondent Arne! A. Bernardo was hired by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on September 3,
1979 and therein rendered continuous and uninterrupted service until his promotion to his present
position as Attorney V with Salary Grade of 25 and assigned as Technical Assistant at the Office of
the Deputy Commissioner of Internal Revenue Criminal Prosecution Group. Primarily, the
respondent derived his income from his employment with the BIR.

On various dates in 1979 up to 2001 respondent acquired various properties and had business
interests in BP Realty Corporation which was registered in 1988, and in Rinas Boutique and Gift
Shop-Gels Gift Center where his wife is the owner/proprietress. He and his family also made several
foreign travels during the period 1995 to 2002. However, petitioners SALN for the years 1993 up to
2001 did not disclose any business interest and/or financial connection, but showed a steady
increase of his net worth.

Based on the foregoing, respondent was administratively and civilly charged with acquiring
unexplained wealth by the FFIB (hereafter, the "OMBUDSMAN"). Accordingly, on November 12,
2003 the OMBUDSMAN filed the appropriate administrative action against the respondent for
Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic Act No. 1379. This case was
docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0531-K (LSC) entitled "Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB),
Represented by Atty. Ma. Elena A. Roxas versus Arnel A. Bernardo, Attorney V, Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR)".
In its Complaint, the OMBUDSMAN alleged that the respondent is an incorporator and director of BP
Realty Corporation as shown by its Articles of Incorporation dated October 15, 1998 and that his
wife, Ma. Lourdes I. Bernardo is the owner/proprietress of Rinas Boutiques and Gift Shop-Gels Gift
Center as may be shown by Business Permits for CY 1999-2003. On various dates in 1979 up to
2001 the respondent purchased parcels of residential and agricultural land, the purchase prices and
costs of which were manifestly out of proportion or not commensurate to his and his wifes lawful
incomes, allowances, savings or declared assets. He and his family also made several foreign
travels during the period 1995 to 2002. The respondents cash on hand and net worth also
consistently increased. However, respondents SALN for the years 1993 up to 2001 did not disclose
any business interest and/or financial connection.

The evidence for the Ombudsman consists of the CERTIFICATION (dated July 7, 2003) of the
annual salary compensation and allowances received by the respondent from 1998 to 2002; Articles
of Incorporation and By-Laws of BP Realty Corporation which shows that the respondent is one of
the incorporators of the said corporation; Business Permits of Rinas Boutiques and Gift Shop;
Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information dated June 24, 2003 issued by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) which shows that BP Realty Corporation is registered with the (SEC)
on November 4, 1988 and is on active status and that said corporation failed to file the General
Information Sheet for 1990-2003 as well as its Financial Statement from 1989 to 2002; SALNs for
the years 1993 to 2001; Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 166204, 244954, 191636, CLOA-T-
9835, CLOA-T-9834, T-118783; Declaration of Real Property No. D-105-03089, D-105-05849; Deed
of Absolute Sale dated October 23, 1997 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. RT-57064 (T-
113488) of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan; Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 27, 1985 over a
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 151157 of the Registry of Deeds Manila; Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 10, 1999 over a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 190651 of the Registry of Deeds of
Manila; Certification dated June 3, 2003 issued by the Bureau of Immigration which shows the travel
records from January 1995 to May 31, 2003 of the respondent, his wife, Ma. Lourdes I. Bernardo,
and his children Lorina I. Bernardo and Adrian

I. Bernardo, Angeline I. Bernado, and Aldrin I. Bernardo; and Certification dated June 3, 2003 which
shows the travel records of the respondents wife, Ma. Lourdes I. Bernardo from January 1995 to
May 31, 2003.

The Ombudsman thus sought that the respondent be adjudged guilty of acquiring unexplained
wealth and be dismissed from the service, as well as the forfeiture of his properties.

In his Counter-Affidavit dated January 30, 2004 the respondent (respondent below) averred that: he
is engaged in various legitimate businesses; he had divested his interest and/or shares from BP
Realty Corporation as may be shown by a Deed of Assignment dated November 28, 1988, and that
its certificate of registration had been revoked as may be shown by the Certificate of Corporate
Filing/Information issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission on September 29, 2003 for
being inactive pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A; he religiously paid corresponding internal
revenue taxes from income of the business disclosed in his SALN, as may be shown by his Income
Tax Returns covering the period 1998, 1999, 2000, and 2001; on his earnings derived not purely
from compensation income, but also from legitimate business as well as business interest or
financial connection to Rinas Boutique and Gift Shop/Gels Gift Center managed by his wife as
shown by business permits for Rinas Boutique and Gift Shop, he stated that he disclosed in his
SALNs filed during the period 1993 to 2001 under "B. Personal and Other Properties" the following:
"Merchandise Inventory", "Building Improvement", "Store Equipment" and "Depreciation" accounts;
on the respondents non-declaration of an agricultural land purchased in Bulacan in 1995, the
respondent points out that the agricultural land declared in his SALNs for 1995 to 2001 appeared to
refer to only one (1) parcel although in truth and in fact, the acquisition covered two (2) parcels of
land awarded to him under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program of the government,
covered by TCT No. CLOA-T9834 (consisting of 8,969 sq.m.) and TCT No. 9835 (consisting of
20,004 sq.m.) both registered on November 27, 1995 with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The
reason for this is because he honestly believed that it was sufficient to declare the two (2) lots as
one, with the total cost indicated in his SALN, since the two parcels were acquired at the same time
in 1995; respondent had availed of Tax Amnesty under the following laws: Executive Order No. 41
dated August 22, 1986 (for the years 1981 to 1985), PD No. 213 dated June 16, 1973 (for the years
1969 to 1972), PD No. 631 dated January 6, 1975, and PD No. 1840 dated December 31,
1980.4(Citations omitted.)

From its appreciation of the aforementioned evidence, the Ombudsman rendered a Decision dated
April 21, 2004 which expressed its conclusion that respondent had acquired unexplained wealth
during his tenure as a government employee. The dispositive portion of said ruling is reproduced
here:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED:

1. Respondent ARNEL A. BERNARDO is hereby found GUILTY of Dishonesty, in

accordance with the provision of Section 8 of Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to Republic
Act No. 1379, for which the penalty of DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE, with cancellation
of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetual disqualification for reemployment
in the government service, is hereby recommended pursuant to Sections 53 and 58, Rule IV
of the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

2. That the Honorable Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be furnished a copy
of the Resolution, for the implementation of this administrative penalty in accordance with
law, with the request to inform this Office of the action taken hereon.

3. Finally, it is respectfully recommended that copies of the case records be referred to the
Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau, this Office for the preparation and filing of the
appropriate complaint pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1379.5

In explanation of its guilty verdict, the Ombudsman essentially opined that the value of respondents
acquired properties, the costs of his and his familys foreign trips abroad, and the increasing net
worth indicated in his Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALNs) for the years 1993 to
2001 were manifestly disproportionate to his salary and allowances. The Ombudsman also decreed
that there was no proof of respondents claim of other lawful income nor was there any evidence that
the purported donation he received in the amount of 8,000,000.00 was lawful. Thus, the
Ombudsman concluded that respondents properties were illegally acquired based on a finding that
the evidence presented by the latter allegedly failed to rebut the presumption provided for by law.

Respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which, in turn, rendered the assailed January
23, 2007 Decision, overturning the Ombudsmans finding of administrative guilt on the part of
respondent. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision states:

WHEREFORE, reversible error having been committed by the Ombudsman, the instant petition is
hereby GRANTED and its Decision dated April 21, 2004 as well as the Order dated July 22, 2004
are both REVERSED and SET ASIDE.6

The Ombudsman moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in the
assailed January 7, 2008 Resolution.
Thus, the Ombudsman filed the present petition with the following issues submitted for
consideration:

I.

CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE FINDING OF GUILT

AGAINST THE RESPONDENT WAS SUPPORTED BY MORE THAN SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE THAT SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT HE HAS COMMITTED
DISHONESTY AND SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE: (A) FOR FAILURE TO DISCLOSE HIS
BUSINESS INTERESTS, (B) FOR HAVING ACCUMULATED PROPERTIES WORTH
MORE THAN HIS LAWFUL MEANS TO ACQUIRE, (C) FOR HIS FAILURE TO DISCLOSE
SUCH PROPERTIES IN HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH
(SALN), AND (D) FOR FAILING TO DISCLOSE IN HIS SALNs HIS AND HIS SPOUSES
FINANCIAL AND BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS.

II.

AS CONSISTENTLY HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT, THE FINDINGS OF THE OFFICE

OF THE OMBUDSMAN DESERVE GREAT WEIGHT, AND MUST BE ACCORDED FULL
RESPECT AND CREDIT.7

The Ombudsman argues that there are factual and legal bases to uphold its findings, particularly as
to the administrative liability for Dishonesty of respondent. It further asserts that the findings of fact of
an administrative agency akin to itself must be respected, as long as such findings are supported by
substantial evidence, even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or preponderant.

The petition is without merit.

Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule." Otherwise stated, a
finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence that the respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint. Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable
might conceivably opine otherwise.8

As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari because
the Court is not a trier of facts.9 When supported by substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the parties and are not reviewable by this Court,
unless the case falls under any of the following recognized exceptions: (1) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (4) when
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same
is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the findings set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) when the findings of
fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
evidence on record.10

The issue of whether or not there is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for the charge of
Dishonesty is one of fact, which is not generally subject to review by this Court. Nonetheless, a
review of the facts of the instant case is warranted considering that the findings of fact of the
Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals were not in harmony with each other.

The Ombudsman applied against the respondent the prima facie presumption laid down in Section 2
of Republic Act No. 1379, which states that:

Section 2. Filing of petition. Whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his
incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public
officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired
property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x x x.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Nevertheless, the presumption in the aforementioned provision is merely prima facie or disputable.
As held in one case, "a disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may
be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it
stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence."11

Unsurprisingly, Section 5 of the same statute requires any court, before which the petition for
forfeiture is filed, to set public hearings during which the public officer or employee may be given
ample opportunity to explain to the satisfaction of the court how he had acquired the property in
question, to wit:

Section 5. Hearing. The court shall set a date for a hearing, which may be open to the public, and
during which the respondent shall be given ample opportunity to explain, to the satisfaction of the
court, how he has acquired the property in question.

Respondent appears to have been given sufficient opportunity by the Ombudsman to rebut the
prima facie presumption applied against him which is that his properties were illegally acquired,
however, as the instant case illustrated, the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals came to differing
conclusions with regard to respondents evidence.

A careful perusal of the records of this case has convinced this Court that although respondent had
acquired properties, cash on hand and in bank, and had gone on foreign travels with his family, the
aggregate cost of which appear to be not in proportion to the combined salaries of the respondent
and of his wife, it had been sufficiently shown that such assets and expenses were financed through
respondents, and his wifes, other lawful business income and assets, and for which they have paid
the corresponding taxes thereon.

Anent the Ombudsmans charge that respondents 1985 purchase of real property could not be
supported by his salaries for the period 1980 to 1985, the Court of Appeals noted in respondents
favor his availment of tax amnesty for the taxable years 1981 to 1985 under Executive Order No. 41
dated August 22, 1986. To our mind, this circumstance sufficiently showed that respondent had
income other than his salaries for the relevant period prior to his purchase of the aforementioned
property. Indeed, it is significant to point out that only respondents SALNs for the periods 1993 to
2001 were presented in evidence by the Ombudsman. Interestingly, Assistant Ombudsman Pelagio
S. Apostol, who was among the signatories to the Ombudsmans Decision dismissing respondent
from the service, wrote and appended a comment to the said Decision recommending, among
others, that the FFIB "secure additional Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Networth starting from
the first day of government service to establish the true opening net worth of the respondent."12 To
be sure, this is a tacit admission that the evidence on record failed to present an accurate picture of
all the lawful sources of income of respondent prior to his 1993 SALN.
As for the other charges of unexplained acquisitions/expenses made by the Ombudsman against
respondent, we quote with approval the detailed discussion made by the Court of Appeals, speaking
through then Court of Appeals Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes (who is now a member of this
Court), in the assailed January 23, 2007 Decision:

For the year 1989, We find that the respondent had satisfactorily explained how he was able to
acquire a residential land in Quezon City covered by Tax Declaration Nos. D-105-02089 and D-105-
05849 for 235,420.00 despite the fact that his declared income for the year 1989 only amounts to
43,140.00. As pointed out by the respondent, the lot covered by Tax Declaration No. D-105-03089,
and the property improvement thereon covered by Tax Declaration No. D-105-05849, was awarded
to the respondent by the GSIS for 235,420.00 pursuant to a housing program for BIR employees,
subject to a monthly salary deduction of 2,001.00 since June 1990. This was also secured by the
respondents GSIS Insurance Policy and a Real Estate Mortgage on the same property as shown by
loan documents.

Anent the Ombudsmans claim that the respondent had failed to justify the increase in his "cash on
hand and in bank", and to substantiate his claim that the reason for the increase thereon was due to
a cash donation of 8,000,000.00 made in favor of the respondent in the year 2001. The
Ombudsman points out that the respondents SALN for the year 2000 showed a total networth of
12,734,083.60 while his "cash on hand and in bank" is 3,921,061.80. Then for the year 2001, the
respondents SALN showed a total networth of 21,085,296.95 while his "cash on hand and in bank"
is 10,431,897.45. We are convinced that the respondent had substantiated his claim that the
reason for the increase in his "cash on hand and in bank" was due to a cash donation of
8,000,000.00 made in his favor in the year 2001. The respondent had voluntarily made such
disclosure in his SALN as required by the law. The Deed of Donation October 8, 2001 is, indeed, a
credible proof that such donation was lawful, there being no showing of its illegality. As correctly
noted by the respondent, there was no legal requirement to attach the Deed of Donation or to
disclose the identity of the donor, nor to append to the SALN evidence of payment of the imposable
tax due as Sec 99 (b) of RA No. 8424 or the Tax Reform Act of 1997, imposes the tax liability arising
from the gratuitous act upon the donor, not upon the donee.

For the year 1999, the Ombudsman noted that the respondent acquired a residential land in Manila
for 1,000,000.00, and this is covered by TCT No. 244854 issued by the Register of Deeds of
Manila, despite the fact that his "cash on hand and in bank" had decreased in the amount of
565,823.10, such amount together with his income for the year 1999 in the sum of only
230,628.00 are not sufficient to justify the purchase of the residential land. Even with the reported
net income from Rinas Boutique and Gift Shop/Gels Gift Center for 1999 amounting to only
63,857.65, the purchase still could not be justified. For his part, the respondent insists that this
property was acquired by him and his wife from the latters parents. According to the respondent, his
SALN for 1999 shows that his "cash on hand and in bank" was 3,653,079.85, which is adequate to
justify this purchase. To support his contention, the respondent submitted documentary evidence
consisting of the following:

a. Annual Income Tax Return for 1999

b. Financial Documents:

b.1 Audited Report

b.2 Balance Sheet

b.3 Income Statement

 b.4 Rental Income Statements

b.5 Employers Certificate of Compensation Payment/Tax Withheld

b.6 Monthly Agents Commission/ Withholding Tax Report

b.7 Certificate of Creditable Tax Withheld at Source issued by the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office

b.8 Official Receipt issued by the Traders Royal Bank as proof of payment of income
Tax Liability in the amount of 159,974.65

We are convinced that the respondent had justified his purchase of the residential land in 1999 for
1,000,000.00. In his SALN for 1999, the respondent had declared a networth of 12,447,700.75
and cash on hand and in bank in the amount of 3,653,079.85. His aggregate tax payment of
159,974.65 would indeed negate the Ombudsmans claim that his additional income derived from
his wifes business amounted to only 63,857.65, and this is bolstered by the fact that in the
respondents annual income tax return for 1999 he reported a taxable business income of
425,904.50 while his wife reported a taxable business income of 63,857.65. We also note that the
respondent had also derived income from lottery business as may be shown by Annexes "5-I" to "5-
R" of his Counter-Affidavit. Although such exhibits are in the name of his (respondent) brother
Alberto A. Bernardo, the latter had already assigned to him the operation of two (2) lotto
outlets/terminals located in Sta. Mesa, Manila and in Quezon City on June 9, 1998 as shown by the
Deed of Assignment. These exhibits also negate the Ombudsmans claim that "(A)s regards the
respondents claim of other income (rental, lottery, other income) no proof of the same was
presented."

For the year 1990, the Ombudsman alleged that the respondent acquired a residential land in Manila
for 230,000.00, covered by TCT No. 244854 issued by the Register of Deeds of Manila, despite the
fact that his declared income for the year 1990 only amounts to 57,432.00. In defense, the
respondent said that this acquisition was truthfully disclosed in his SALN, and that he had the
capacity to make this purchase as he was engaged in lawful business, deriving lawful income. The
Ombudsman in its Decision stated that in 1995, the respondent acquired a residential land located in
Quezon City for 4,150,000.00 and an agricultural land in Bulacan worth 500,000.00. The
respondent indicated in his SALN for the year 1995 as one of his liabilities, "notes payable" in the
amount of 4,000,000.00 which the Ombudsman presumed to have been used by the respondent in
buying the said properties. The Ombudsman noted, however, that the respondents loan payable
had decreased by 2,000,000.00 in 1996, but his "cash on hand and in bank" had increased from
3,861,077.05 to 4,701,709.95. The Ombudsman emphasizes that while the respondent had paid
out cash in the amount of 2,000,000.00, his cash on hand and in bank did not decrease, but even
increased by 1,600,072.90 which means that he had earned a total amount of 3,600,072.90 for
the year 1996 alone. respondents building improvements likewise increased from 143,420.00 to
902,860.00. However, his annual income for 1996 amounted only to 177,428.00. The respondent
however draws attention to his SALN for the year 1995 which shows that he was financially capable
of purchasing property valued at 4,150,000.00 as he had a cash disposable balance of
12,323,731.75 and net worth of 6,471,782.95. The Ombudsman also makes much of the fact of
the respondents and his familys trips abroad in the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, pointing out that
the respondents lawful income for the years 1995 (157,000.00), 1996 (177,408.00), and 1997
(224,988.00) cannot support such travels. But this is denied by the respondent, saying that his
Cash on Hand and In Bank (Cash Flow Analysis) for the years 1995 to 2001, his Income Tax
Returns for the years 1995-1996-1997, and his networth including disposable income was more than
sufficient to justify his property acquisitions and foreign travels for the covered period.
In an attempt to present a clear outline of his financial capacity, the respondent presented a
comparative Cash Flow Analysis which he had embodied in his counter-affidavit. The evidence for
herein respondent as attached to his Counter-Affidavit consists of the Deed of Assignment dated
November 28, 1988 to show that the respondent had absolutely transferred and conveyed his rights
and interests over BP Realty Corporation to Noble Bambina B. Perez; Certificate of Corporate
Filing/Information dated June 24, 2003 issued by the SEC which shows that BP Realty Corporations
Certificate of Registration was revoked on September 29, 2003; a copy of the Sales Invoice of Rinas
Boutique and Gift Shop-Gels Gift Center; Annual Income Tax Return of the respondent for the years
1998 to 2001 with Reports of Independent Certified Public Accountants To Accompany Philippine
Income Tax Return; Amended SALN for the year 1995; and Revenue Special Order dated May 5,
2003. His income tax returns clearly show that he had been paying taxes not only for compensation
income, but for business incomes, as well. In fact, a big chunk thereof was derived from rental
incomes of the respondent.

Notably, the Ombudsman appeared to have heavily relied solely on the respondent SALNs for the
years 1993 to 2001. We do not understand why no evidence was presented to show the respondent
beginning net worth from the first day of his employment with the government as declared in the
SALNs filed by him. His beginning net worth must be considered for purposes of determining
whether his disposable income was more than sufficient to justify his property acquisitions and
foreign travels for the covered period, and whether he possesses the financial capability to acquire
or purchase properties as reported in his SALNs. Such net worth of the respondent as declared in
the statement filed by him from the first day of his employment with the government shall be
considered as his true new worth as of such date, for purposes of determining his capacity for future
property acquisitions during his tenure as a public officer. Any unexplained increase in his net worth
thereafter may then fall within the ambit of the presumption provided by Republic Act No.
1379.13 (Citations omitted.)

As regards to the Ombudsmans contention that respondent should be administratively held liable for
Dishonesty for also failing to truthfully declare in his SALNs the business interests and financial
connections that are attributable to himself, his spouse, and unmarried children below 18 years of
age living in his household, we hold that, absent a clear showing of intent to conceal such relevant
information in his SALN, administrative liability cannot attach.

An examination of his SALNs during the period 1993 to 2001 would reveal that, although respondent
indicated the words "Not Applicable" to the SALN question "Do you have any business interest and
other financial connections including those of your spouse and unmarried children below 18 years
living in your household?," he likewise declared under the enumeration entitled "B. Personal and
Other Properties" personal properties consisting of "Merchandise Inventory," "Building
Improvement," "Store Equipment," and "Depreciation" which clearly indicate his engagement in
lawful businesses since the said items have nothing to do with compensation income.

Furthermore, respondent clearly indicated on the face of his 1999 and 2000 SALNs that his spouse
is a "businesswoman" which manifested his intent to divulge and not to conceal the business
interests of his wife. In fact, this Court had previously ruled in another case that the indication of the
wife as a "businesswoman" leads to the inference that said person has business interests:

Neither can petitioners failure to answer the question, "Do you have any business interest and other
financial connections including those of your spouse and unmarried children living in your house
hold?" be tantamount to gross misconduct or dishonesty. On the front page of petitioners 2002
SALN, it is already clearly stated that his wife is a businesswoman, and it can be logically deduced
that she had business interests. Such a statement of his wifes occupation would be inconsistent
with the intention to conceal his and his wifes business interests. That petitioner and/or his wife had
business interests is thus readily apparent on the face of the SALN; it is just that the missing
particulars may be subject of an inquiry or investigation.14 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Valencia,15 we elaborated on the nature and effects of an

administrative charge of Dishonesty as follows:

Dishonesty is incurred when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact,
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination,
registration, appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; the disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. It is
a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon ones ability to perform his duties with the integrity and
uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. Like the offense of Unexplained Wealth,
Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service
treats Dishonesty as a grave offense, the penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first
infraction. (Citations omitted.)

On the other hand, we had, on occasion, defined Negligence as the omission of the diligence which
is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of
the time, and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is negligence when there is a breach
of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence when a breach of duty is
flagrant and palpable.16

Given the fact that respondent was able to successfully overcome the onus of demonstrating that he
does not possess any unexplained wealth and that the omissions in his SALNs did not betray any
sense of bad faith or the intent to mislead or deceive on his part considering that his SALNs actually
disclose the extent of his and his wifes assets and business interests, we are inclined to adjudge
that respondent is merely culpable of Simple Negligence instead of the more serious charge of
Dishonesty.

This Court had previously passed upon a similar infraction committed by another public official in
Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG)17 and
ruled that suspension without pay, not removal from office, is the appropriate penalty therefor:

It also rules that while petitioner may be guilty of negligence in accomplishing his SALN, he did not
commit gross misconduct or dishonesty, for there is no substantial evidence of his intent to deceive
the authorities and conceal his other sources of income or any of the real properties in his and his
wifes names. Hence, the imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from public service and
all other accessory penalties on petitioner is indeed too harsh. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to pay
attention to the details and proper form of his SALN, resulting in the imprecision of the property
descriptions and inaccuracy of certain information, for which suspension from office for a period of
six months, without pay, would have been appropriate penalty. (Citation omitted.)

Prescinding from our analysis of the facts and circumstances attending this case, we are inclined to
impose the same penalty on herein respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated January 23, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
respondent Arnel A. Bernardo is found GUILTY of simple negligence in accomplishing his
Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN), and as a penalty therefor, it is ORDERED
that he be SUSPENDED from office for a period of six (6) months without pay.
SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice

Chairperson

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 183890, April 13, 2011 ]

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, PETITIONER, VS. MANUEL P.

VALENCIA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
At bench is a petition for review assailing the April 11, 2008 Decision[1] and
the July 16, 2008 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89299, which [1] reversed and set aside the September 30, 2004
Decision3 and January 31, 2005 Order4 of the Office of
the'Ombudsman (Ombudsman) finding respondent Manuel P. Valencia,
Jr. (Valencia), Chief Customs Operations Officer of the Bureau of Custom
(BOC), guilty of Dishonesty; and [2] nullified the October 14, 2003
Order[5] of the Ombudsman that placed Valencia under preventive
suspension.

From the records, it appears that Valencia declared the following assets and
liabilities in his sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and
Networth (SALN) as of December 31,1999:[6]

I. ASSETS
a. Real Properties

Year Assessed Acquisition

Kind Location
Acquired Value Cost
House/Lot Paraaque 1988 P713.210.00 P1,225,070
Total P 1,225,070

b. Personal and other Properties

Kind Year Acquired Acquisition Cost

Car 1988 P299,000.00
Jewelries 1979 P100,000.00
 Cash on Hand/In
P275,000.00
Bank
Total P674,000.00

II. LIABILITIES

Nature Amount
Loans & Mortgage P350,000.00
Total P 350,000.00

As of December 31, 2001, Valencia declared the following assets and

liabilities:

I. ASSETS
a. Real Properties

Year Assessed Acquisition

Kind Location
Acquired Value Cost
House/Lot Paraaque 1998 P713,210.00 P1,225,070
Total P 1,225,070

b. Personal and other Properties

Kind Year Acquired Acquisition Cost

Jewelries Various years P150,000.00
Cash on Hand/In
P600,000.00
Bank
Total P750,000.00

II. LIABILITIES

Nature Amount
 Loans & Mortgage P250,000.00
Total P 250,000.00

On July 21, 2003, not satisfied that the entries made by Valencia in his
SALN were reflective of his actual net worth, Napoleon P.
Guenero (Guerrero), Intelligence Officer V of the Department of Finance,
filed a complaint/motion for Subpoena/Subpoena Duces Tecum[7] with the
Ombudsman against him for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 13798 in
relation to Section 8,[9] R.A. No. 3019.[10]

The criminal aspect of the complaint was docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0447-

H, while the administrative aspect was docketed as OMB-C-A-03-0275-H.

In his complaint, Guerrero alleged that Valencia maintained two (2) US

dollar time deposit accounts with the Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC). The first account with the amount of US$2,013,248.80
was covered by Certificate No. 962460, while the second, with the amount
of US$1,812,165.38, was covered by Certificate No. 962461. According to
Guerrero, these huge amounts were "the actual fruits of his illegal
transactions and activities of as an employee of the Bureau of Customs."[11]

In support of his allegation that Valencia maintained these accounts,

Guerrero attached two (2) Letters of Agreement[12] placing the two US
dollar time deposit accounts under the custody of FEBTC and authorizing
said bank to apply the proceeds of the accounts to the forward contracts
entered into by Valencia and FEBTC.

The complaint also alleged that the house and lot declared by Valencia in
his SALNs was grossly undervalued considering that the house, described
as "impressive," was erected on a parcel of land consisting of five (5)
contiguous lots. [13]

Finally, it was alleged that from the credit card billings of his Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI) Mastercard, it could be inferred that Valencia
maintained a lavish lifestyle.

Guerrero sought issuance of a subpoena duces tecum against FEBTC and

BPI for the production of records relative to the two U.S. dollar time
deposits of Valencia and his Mastercard account, respectively.
Instead of a counter-affidavit, Valencia filed a Motion To Set Aside Orders
Both Dated September 3, 2003[14] contending that the case was not yet ripe
for preliminary investigation/administrative adjudication, and that he
should be excused from filing a counter affidavit because 1] the complaint
was subscribed and sworn to before Assistant Ombudsman Ernesto M.
Nocos (Nocos), a person not authorized to administer oaths under Section
41 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6733;[15] 2]
the complaint lacked the certification from Nocos that he "personally
examined the complaint and that he is satisfied that he voluntarily executed
and understood his complaint" in violation of Section 3 (a), Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court; and 3] similar charges against him, in CPL No. 99-1783,
were earlier dismissed by the Ombudsman for lack of evidence.

In its Order[16] dated October 3, 2003, the Ombudsman denied Valencia's

motion, citing Section 15 and Section 26 of R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known
as the "Ombudsman Act of 1989." The Ombudsman added that the
properties involved in CPL No. 99-1783 were different from those alleged
by Guerrero to have been unlawfully acquired. Valencia was, thus, ordered
to submit his counter-affidavit, those of his witnesses, as well as other
supporting documents.

Answering the charges hurled against him, Valencia alleged in his

Consolidated Counter-Affidavit[17] that at the time he joined the Bureau of
Customs on October 1, 1982, his family had been in the textile and garment
business for more than fifteen (15) years; and that because of their
business, his family was able to purchase a house and lot in Dasmarinas
Village, Makati City, then valued at P400,000.00. The house and lot was
later on sold for P1,500,000.00. His family then transferred to B.F. Homes
in Paraaque and rented a house.

Then, sometime in 1985, his family transferred again to a house and lot
belonging to his aunt, Paulina Potente (Potente), also in B.F. Homes,
Paranaque. As his aunt preferred to live in General Trias, Cavite, he offered
to lease-purchase the house to which she agreed. From 1985 to 1987, he
introduced improvements to the house worth P600,000.00.

At the rear portion of the house of Potente, two (2) vacant lots belonging to
one Rosalinda B. Silva were being offered for sale. Being adjacent to the
house of his aunt, he purchased the same on August 24, 1988 for a total
consideration of P268,950.00. Consequently, a Deed of Absolute Sale18
vvas executed by the parties and Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos.
12695 and 12696 were eventually issued in his name.

After fully paying the three (3) lots owned by his aunt, he obtained a Deed
of Absolute Sale[19] dated September 26, 1988 executed by Potente in his
favor. As a result, TCT Nos. 14704, 14705 and 14706 were issued in his
name. When declared for real property tax purposes, the Assessor's Office
of Paranaque assigned a market value in the amount of P641,870.00 and
assessed value of P513,500.00 for the house.[20]

It was Valencia's contention that his properties were accurately valued in

his SALNs, and that his house, which may look impressive, was a result of
regular maintenance and minor additions or renovations introduced from
time to time.

Valencia denied that he had been maintaining the two US dollar time
deposits pointing out that the Letters of Agreement did not even bear his
signature. Thus, the agreements were mere scraps of paper with no
probative value. On October 14, 2003, on the basis of the complaint of
Guerrero, the Ombudsman placed Valencia under preventive suspension
for six (6) months without pay. He sought the lifting of the order of
preventive suspension, but his request was denied by the Ombudsman in its
Order[21] dated November 14,2003.

When the parties were required to submit their position papers, Valencia
manifested that he would waive his right to a formal investigation and
would submit the case for decision.[23]

Complainant Guerrero did not file a position paper.

On April 6, 2004, for the purpose of verifying the complaint, the

Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces lecum24 against the BPI Card
Customer Service Department. It requested for the clear and certified
copies of Valencia's Mastercard transactions from 2003 backward.

After receiving the photocopies of the monthly statements for Valencia's

Mastercard transactions, the Ombudsman required Valencia to file his
Comment. Valencia, however, filed a Motion to Set Aside Order dated July
16, 2004 and for Early Resolution of Cases.,[25]According to him, the said
order of the Ombudsman requiring him to file his comment after eight (8)
long months of inaction was "irregular, unprocedural and in violation of his
constitutional right to due process." He further pointed out that the
monthly statements of the BPI Mastercard transactions were not original
documents, thus, the authenticity and due execution of which must first be
proven.

Valencia's motion was not acted upon by the Ombudsman. Instead, the
Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum[26] addressed to the manager
of FEBTC to produce documents relative to the alleged time deposits in his
name. Due to the acquisition of FEBTC by BPI, a similar subpoena ' was
addressed to the president of BPI on August 11, 2004.

In a letter[28] dated August 20, 2004, invoking the Court's ruling in Lourdez
T. Marquez v. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto,[29] BPI informed the Ombudsman
that absent any case pending before a court of competent jurisdiction, it
was legally restricted from producing documents regarding bank deposits,
particularly foreign currency deposits, without the written permission of
the depositor.

Despite said letter, on August 27, 2004, Ernesto N. Olaguer (Olaguer), the
Service Manager of BPI in charge of the records of all deposit accounts,
submitted an affidavit30 stating that "[d]espite diligent efforts, and given
the limited information on the US Dollar Time deposits, wherein only the
number of the time deposit certificates and the amount were specified, [he
was] not able to locate any time deposit records belonging to Manuel P.
Valencia, Jr."

In its September 2, 2004 Order,[31] the Ombudsman required Olaguer and

the counsel for BPI to appear before it for clarificatory hearing.

On September 30, 2004, being of the view that Valencia maintained a

lavish lifestyle and lived beyond the modest means that his salary as a
government official could offer, the Ombudsman opined that he must have
derived income from unlawful sources. This, according to the Ombudsman,
constituted deception and dishonesty which warranted his dismissal from
office. Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:

FOREGOING CONSIDERED, pursuant to Section 52 (A-1) Rule IV of the

Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases (CSC Resolution No. 991936),
dated August 31, 1999, respondent MANUEL P. VALENCIA is hereby found
guilty of DISHONESTY and is meted the corresponding penalty of
DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE including all its accessory penalties and
without prejudice to criminal prosecution.

SO ORDERED.

Valencia sought reconsideration of the Decision of the Ombudsman, but the

same was denied on January 31, 2005.

At the CA, however, the decision of the Ombudsman was reversed.

According to the CA, the charge of Unexplained Wealth under R.A. No.
1379 in relation to Section 8 of R.A. No, 3019 was separate and distinct
from the offense of Dishonesty under Section 36 of Article IX of the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines.[32] The CA reasoned out that to hold
Valencia liable for Dishonesty when in fact the charge against him was for
Unexplained Wealth, violated Valencia's right to due process, especially his
right to be informed of the charges against him and to be convicted only of
the offense charged.

Furthermore, it added that even if the offense of Dishonesty were to be

considered, there was no substantial evidence on record to hold Valencia
administratively liable. The CA, thus, explained:

The evidence relied upon by the Office of the Ombudsman consists of

petitioner's Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SALs) and photocopies of
petitioner's Transfer of Certificate of Titles, photocopies of alleged Letters
of Agreement executed between petitioner and then Far East Bank and
Trust Company and unauthenticated copies of petitioner's alleged BPI
Mastercard transactions. Furthermore, the Office of the Ombudsman
believed respondent's speculations [i] that petitioner's money are fruits of
his illegal transaction and activities as an employee of the Bureau of
Customs, [2] that petitioner accomplished his SALs in a manner in order to
evade investigation or criminal prosecution for acquiring unexplained
wealth, and [3] that petitioner has a lavish spending habit.

Aside from the certified true copies of petitioner's Statements of Assets and
Liabilities (SALs). the pieces of evidence presented by respondent have no
probative value for being mere photocopies. As such photocopies, as earlier
averted to, they are incompetent pieces of evidence unworthy of any
probative value.

The genuineness and authenticity of the evidence against petitioner is

grievously suspicious in view of the fact that the photocopies of the Letters
of Agreement of petitioner's alleged time deposits with then Far East Bank
and Trust Company and petitioner's alleged BPI Mastercard transactions
are not certified as true copies by the responsible officer in custody of the
originals thereof. Such being the case, the conclusions of the respondent
arising from these pieces of evidence are mere hearsay which are, again,
inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Section 36, Rule 130 of the Revised
Rules of Court.[33]

Finally, the CA also opined that even assuming the evidence of the
prosecution were admissible, the same was insufficient to hold Valencia
guilty of the charges against him. Thus, it disposed:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated 30 September 2004 and Order dated 31 January7 2005 of the Office
of the Ombudsman are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order
dated 14 October 2003 is NULLIFIED and petitioner is hereby
REINSTATED to Ms former position without loss of seniority, rights and
with payment of back salaries and other accrued benefits.

Hence, this petition.

GROUNDS FOR ALLOWANCE OF PETITION

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS' REVERSAL OF THE

PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN'S DECISION
FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE FOR DISHONESTY IS AN ERROR OF LAW CONSIDERING
THAT -
A. THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN AND SETTLED ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES
ALLOW THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO RENDER ITS
DECISION IN ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY CASES BASED ON
THE AFFIDAVITS AND DOCUMENTS CONSTITUTING THE EVIDENCE
ON RECORD.

B. THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE SHOWING PRIVATE

RESPONDENT VALENCIA'S NON-DECLARATION IN HIS SALNs OF HIS
ACQUISITION OF REAL PROPERTIES AND LAVISH LIFESTYLE,
GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO HIS INCOME AS A GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEE, CONSTITUTED SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF HIS
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY FOR DISHONESTY.

II.

THE ISSUANCE OF THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDER BY THE

PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN FINDING, AT THAT
STAGE, THE EVIDENCE OF GUILT ON THE PART OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT VALENCIA FOR DISHONESTY BEING THUS FAR
STRONG .[34]

On due process, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that Valencia was
not deprived of his constitutional right thereto.

Section 7 and Section 8 of R.A. No. 3019 explain the nature and importance
of accomplishing a true, detailed and sworn SALN, thus:

Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Every public officer, within

thirty days after assuming office, and thereafter, on or before the fifteenth
day of April following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the
expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from
office, shall prepare and file with the office of corresponding Department
Head, or in the case of a Head Department or chief of an independent
office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement
of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and
family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next
preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less
than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first
statement on or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of said
calendar year.

Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to Unexplained Wealth.

If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One
Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-Nine, a public official has been found to
have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name
of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of
proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall he
ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and
dependents of such public official may be taken into consideration, when
their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shewn.
Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly excessive expenditures incurred
by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents including but
not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious
display of wealth including frequent travel abroad of a non-official
character by any public official when such activities entail expenses
evidently out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken
into consideration in the enforcement of this Section, notwithstanding am7
provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned
shall constitute valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public
official concerned for an indefinite period until the investigation of the
unexplained wealth is completed.

In the case of Carabeo v. Court of Appeals,[35] citing Ombudsman v.

Valeroso,[36] the Court restated the rationale for the SALN and the evils that
it seeks to thwart, to wit:

Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to

be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure
of wealth in the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed
particularly at curtailing and minimizing, the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. "Unexplained" matter normally results from "non-
disclosure" or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public
officials and employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the
policy of accountability of all public officers and employees in the
government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor movement in the
fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and balance mechanism to
verify undisclosed properties and wealth. [Emphasis supplied]

On the other hand, Dishonesty is incurred when an individual intentionally

makes a false statement of any material fact, practicing or attempting to
practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination,
registration, appointment, or promotion.[37] It is understood to imply the
disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of
integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness
and straightforwardness; the disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.[38] It
is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one's ability to perform his
duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or
employee.[39] Like the offense of Unexplained Wealth, Section 52 (A)(1),
Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil
Service treats Dishonesty as a grave offense, the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service at the first infraction.

From the above, when the statement of wealth becomes manifestly

disproportionate to an employee's income or other sources of income and
he fails to properly account or explain his other sources of income, he
becomes liable for Dishonesty. This is especially true considering that when
a public officer takes an oath or office, he binds himself to faithfully
perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and
to act primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, a public officer in the
discharge of duties, is to use that prudence, caution and attention which
careful persons use in the management of his affairs.[40]

Consequently, an accused charged with Unexplained Wealth cannot claim

to have been denied due process should he be held administratively liable
for Dishonesty.

It should be pointed out that the actual recital of facts of the complaint
shows that the nature and cause of the accusation hurled by Guerrero
includes the charge of Dishonesty. Well-settled is the rule that what
determines the real nature and cause of the accusation against an accused
is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint and not
the caption or preamble of the information or complaint, nor the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law.[41]
The Court, however, sustains the finding of the CA that there is no
substantial evidence to hold Valencia liable for Dishonesty.

Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule."

Otherwise stated, a finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to
be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that the
respondent has committed acts stated in the complaint.[42] Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine
otherwise.[43]

The question of whether there is sufficient evidence to hold Valencia liable

for the charges against him is one of fact, which is not generally subject to
review by the Court. A review of the facts, however, is in order not only
because the findings of fact of the Ombudsman and the CA were
diametrically opposed, but also because the Ombudsman decision was
alleged to have been grounded on speculations, surmises and conjectures.

It should be noted that other than the SALNs of Valencia, the evidence of
the prosecution consists of photocopies of 1] the unsigned letters of
agreement alluding to Valencia's dollar time deposit accounts; and 2] the
monthly statements of the BPJ Mastercard transactions of Valencia.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the law does not require evidence

beyond reasonable doubt or preponderance of evidence. Substantial
evidence is enough. This presupposes, however, that the evidence proferred
is admissible under the rules. With respect to photocopied private
documents, the rule is that before it can be considered admissible in
evidence, its due execution or genuineness should be first shown.[44] Failing
in this, the photocopies are inadmissible in evidence; at the very least, it has
no probative value.[45]

As the records bear out, the due execution and genuineness of the
photocopied letters of agreement and monthly statements of the BPJ
Mastercard transactions of Valencia were never verified and confirmed. The
basic rule is that these photocopied private documents are secondary
evidence which are inadmissible unless there is ample proof of the loss of
the originals.[46] Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as
evidence. The Court cannot rightly appreciate firsthand the genuineness of
an unverified and unidentified document, much less, accord it evidentiary
value.[47] Regarding the photocopied letters of agreement, these were not
even signed by Valencia. Thus, these letters of agreement relating to the
alleged dollar time deposits of Valencia and his credit card billings are
incompetent pieces of evidence unworthy of any probative value.

As to the US dollar deposits, the Ombudsman did try to verify them. On

August 27, 2004, however, as earlier stated, Olaguer, the Service Manager
of BPI in charge of the records of all deposit accounts, stated in his affidavit
that "[d]espite diligent efforts, and given the limited information on the US
Dollar Time deposits, wherein only the number of the time deposit
certificates and the amount were specified, [he was] not able to locate any
time deposit records belonging to Manuel P. Valencia, Jr."

To dismiss a public officer or employee on the basis of photocopies of

private documents which are questioned and disputed is to set a dangerous
precedent. It can be abused by oppressive or abusive superiors who may
want their own protege to replace the charged officers or employees or by
any individual who may want to harass a public employee for no legitimate
reason at all. Photocopies should only be considered as evidence if they are
not contested, if they are admitted, or if they constitute matters which need
not be proved. Unverified photocopied private documents are not evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

Nevertheless, granting that these pieces of evidence relied upon by the

Ombudsman are admissible in evidence, the Court still finds the same
insufficient to establish the liability of Valencia for Dishonesty. The Court
quotes, with approval, the following disquisition of the CA on the matter:

Besides, even gratia argumenti that the evidence are admissible, still,
respondent's evidence against the petitioner is not sufficient to hold the
petitioner guilty of the charges against him. The following evidence on
record should have impelled the Office of the Ombudsman to absolve the
petitioner:

1. Petitioner's family owned a house and lot in Dasmarias, Village,

Makati City which they sold in 1977 for a hefty sum of P1,500,000.00.
 2. Petitioner and his family acquired their present residential house and
lot in BF Homes, Paranaque City (composed of three contiguous lots)
by leasing it from petitioner's aunt in 1985 until they were able to buy
it in 1988.

3. Petitioner purchased two adjacent lots in August 1988.

4. The cumulative acquisition cost of his house and lot which is

P1,225,070.00 and its current assessed value at P713.210.00 were
duly reflected in petitioner's Statement of Assets and Liabilities
(SALs) from 1994 to 2001.

As observed by the CA, the Ombudsman totally ignored the affidavit of BPI
Service Manager Olaguer certifying that he could not locate any time
deposit record belonging to Valencia. Being a responsible officer in custody
of the supposed time deposits, his attestation is the best evidence that the
bank does not have a record of any time deposit in the name of Valencia.

In sum, with the presented SALNs being the only competent evidence for
the prosecution, the Court upholds the finding of the CA that there is no
substantial evidence that respondent Manuel P. Valencia [1] acquired
property though unlawful means, [2] maintained US time deposit accounts,
and [3] lived a lavish lifestyle.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Abad, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 185685

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

NACHURA,
- versus -
PERALTA,

ABAD, and

MENDOZA, JJ

NIETO A. RACHO,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
January 31, 2011

X ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) assails the February 21, 2008
Decision[2] and November 20, 2008 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals-
Cebu (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 00694 which reversed and set aside the
administrative aspect of the April 1, 2005 Joint Order[4] of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas.

The April 1, 2005 Joint Order of the Ombudsman found respondent Nieto A.
Racho (Racho) guilty of dishonesty and ordered him dismissed from the service
with forfeiture of all benefits and perpetual disqualification from public office. The
assailed CA Decision, however, found Racho guilty of negligence only and reduced
the penalty to suspension from office for six months, without pay.

From the records, it appears that DYHP Balita Action Team (DYHP), in a letter
dated November 9, 2001, reported to Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, Primo
Miro, a concerned citizens complaint regarding the alleged unexplained wealth of
Racho, then Chief of the Special Investigation Division of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), Cebu City.[5] To support the allegation, the complainant attached
copies of bank certifications, all issued in June of 1999, by Metrobank Cebu
(Tabunok Branch),[6] BPI Cebu (Mango Branch),[7] and PCI Bank (Magallanes
Branch).[8] In total, Racho appeared to have an aggregate bank deposit
of P5,798,801.39.

Acting on the letter, the Ombudsman launched a fact-finding investigation and

directed the BIR to submit Rachos Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth
(SALN) from 1995 to 1999. BIR complied with the order and gave copies of Rachos
SALN. Soon, the Ombudsman found that Racho did not declare the bank deposits
in his SALN, as mentioned in the DYHPs letter. Accordingly, the Ombudsman filed a
Complaint for Falsification of Public Document under Article 171 of the Revised
Penal Code (OMB-V-C-02-0240-E) and Dishonesty (OMB-V-A-02-0214-E) against
Racho.

The Ombudsman, in its August 21, 2002 Memorandum, adopted the Final
Evaluation Report[9] of Administrative Officer Elpidio Montecillo as the sworn
complaint. Thereafter, Racho submitted his counter-affidavit attacking the
procedural infirmities of the complaint against him.[10] At the scheduled
clarificatory hearing, Racho invoked his right to remain silent. On January 02, 2003,
Graft Prosecution Officer (GPO) Pio Dargantes did not give weight to the bank
documents because they were mere photocopies. As a result, he dismissed the
complaint for dishonesty (OMB-V-A-02-214-E) due to insufficiency of evidence.[11]

On review, Director Virginia Palanca, through a memorandum dated May 30,

2003,[12] decreed that Rachos act of not declaring said bank deposits in his SALN,
which were disproportionate to his and his wifes salaries, constituted falsification
and dishonesty. She found Racho guilty of the administrative charges against him
and imposed the penalty of dismissal from service with forfeiture of all benefits and
perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Racho moved for reconsideration[13] but his motion was denied in an Order
dated July 15, 2003.[14]

Racho appealed the said order of dismissal to the CA. On January 26, 2004,
the CA reversed the Ombudsmans ruling and ordered the reinvestigation of the
case.[15]

In compliance with the CAs decision, the Ombudsman reinvestigated the case. In
his Comment,[16] Racho denied sole ownership of the bank deposits. In support of
his position, he presented the Joint Affidavit[17] of his brothers and nephew,
particularly Vieto, Dean and Henry Racho, allegedly executed on December 18,
2004. In the joint sworn statement, it was alleged that he and his siblings planned
to put up a business and eventually established Angelsons Lending and Investors,
Inc., a corporation registered[18] with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) on April 30, 1999. To prove their agreement, Racho presented a
Special Power of Attorney,[19] dated January 28, 1993, wherein his brothers and
nephew designated him as the trustee of their investments in the business venture
they were intending to put up and authorized him to deposit their money into his
questioned bank accounts to defray business-related expenses. Racho averred that
his wife also set up a small business named Nal Pay Phone Services registered under
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) on April 30, 1999.[20]

On January 10, 2005, in its Reinvestigation Report, the Office of the

Ombudsman-Visayas found no reason to deviate from its previous findings against
Racho.[21] Thus, the Reinvestigation Report disposed:

With all the foregoing, undersigned finds no basis to change,

modify nor reverse her previous findings that there is probable
cause for the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT,
defined and penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code,
against respondent Nieto A. Racho for making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts in his SALN. As there are
additional facts established during the reinvestigation, re: failure of
Mr. Racho to reflect his business connections, then the Information
filed against him should be amended to include the same. Let this
Amended Information be returned to the court for further
proceedings.

SO RESOLVED.[22]

Racho filed a motion for reconsideration[23] but the Ombudsman denied it in

its April 1, 2005 Joint Order.[24]
 Racho elevated the case to the CA by way of a petition for review[25] under
Rule 43 of the Rules of Court assailing the administrative aspect of the April 1, 2005
Joint Order of the Ombudsman-Visayas.
On February 21, 2008, the CA rendered the challenged decision. Citing Pleyto
v. Philippine National Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG),[26] the CA opined that in charges of dishonesty intention is an important
element in its commission.[27] The CA ruled that Racho never denied the existence
of the bank accounts. Instead, he undertook to explain that those were not wholly
owned by him and endeavored to secure and submit documentary evidence to
buttress explanation. Judging from his conduct, there is want of intent to conceal
information. Intent, as held in the Pleyto case, is essential to constitute dishonesty
and without the intent to commit a wrong, the public officer is not dishonest, albeit
he is adjudged to be negligent.[28]

Accordingly, the decretal portion of the CA decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on the

administrative aspect of Ombudsman Visayas JOINT ORDER
dated April 1, 2005 is hereby GRANTED. The said JOINT ORDER,
in so far as it affirmed the petitioners guilt for dishonesty and
imposed the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of all benefits and
perpetual disqualification to hold office is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner is adjudged GUILTY of NEGLIGENCE in
accomplishing his Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth
(SALN) and is ORDERED to be SUSPENDED FROM OFFICE
WITHOUT PAY FOR A PERIOD OF SIX (6) MONTHS.[29]

The Ombudsman moved for reconsideration,[30] but the CA stood by its decision
and denied said motion in its November 20, 2008 Resolution.[31]

Hence, this petition.

In its Memorandum,[32] the Office of the Ombudsman submits the following:

 ISSUES

I.

THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN

THE INSTANT CASE IS SANCTIONED BY THE MANDATE OF THE OFFICE
AS AN ACTIVIST WATCHMAN.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS RELIANCE ON A FICTITIOUS

DOCUMENT WHOSE AUTHENTICITY HAS BEEN PUT TO QUESTION IN A
SEPARATE CRIMINAL CASE PRESENTS AN EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL
RULE THAT AN APPEAL BY CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 45 SHOULD RAISE
ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOUND THE SPECIAL POWER

OF ATTORNEY AND THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT OFFERED AS
EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT TO BE SPURIOUS, HOWEVER, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITHOUT RULING ON THE
AUTHENTICITY OF THE SAME DOCUMENTS, RELIED ON THE
SAME TO FIND RESPONDENT GUILTY ONLY OF NEGLIGENCE;

AND

THE COURT OF APPEALS FINDING OF LACK OF INTENT ON THE

PART OF RESPONDENT RACHO TO CONCEAL INFORMATION IS
NOT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE
 III

THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS REPEATEDLY RAISED THE

SPURIOUS CHARACTER OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT AND SPECIAL POWER
OF ATTORNEY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS. THE COUNTER-
AFFIDAVITS COUNTERING ITS AUTHENTICITY WAS SUBMITTED FOR THE
FIRST TIME BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, AND NOT BEFORE THIS
HONORABLE COURT.

IV

THE DECISIONS, RESOLUTIONS AND ORDERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE

OMBUDSMAN ARE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY EVEN PENDING APPEAL
UNDER SECTION 7, RULE III OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AS AMENDED; CONSEQUENTLY THE
WRIT OF INJUNCTION EARLIER ISSUED SHOULD BE LIFTED.[33]

The Ombudsman argues that the CA failed to see the discrepancies on Rachos
Special Power of Attorney itself such as a statement that the date of registration of
the Nal Pay Phone Services was last April 30, 1999, when the Special Power of
Attorney had been allegedly executed on 28 January 1993.[34] The Ombudsman
insists that these inconsistencies should have alerted the CA to delve more deeply
into the case and check if Rachos explanation through the supposed dubious
documents should be given weight at all.[35]

THE COURTS RULING

The Court finds merit in the petition.

 As a general rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts.[36] When supported by
substantial evidence, the findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding on
the parties and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls under any of
the following recognized exceptions:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures;

(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

impossible;

(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;

(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the
issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;

(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based;

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners'
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and
 (10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.[37] [Emphasis supplied]

Undeniably, the findings of fact of the Ombudsman are different from those
of the CA. Thus, the Court finds it necessary to take a second look at the factual
matters surrounding the present case.

From the records, it is undisputed that Racho admitted the bank accounts,
but explained that the deposits reflected therein were not entirely his. Racho
proffered that some of the money came from his brothers and nephew as part of
their contribution to the business that they had planned to put up. He presented a
Special Power of Attorney (SPA), dated January 28, 1993, and Joint Affidavit of his
siblings that echoed his explanation.

In the appreciation of the said documents, the Ombudsman and the CA took
opposing views. The Ombudsman did not give weight to the SPA due to some
questionable entries therein. The CA, on the other hand, recognized the fact that
Racho never denied the existence of the bank accounts and accepted his
explanation. Accordingly, the CA decreed that although Racho was remiss in fully
declaring the said bank deposits in his SALN, the intent to make a false statement,
as would constitute dishonesty, was clearly absent.

The pivotal issue in this case, however, is whether or not Rachos non-
disclosure of the bank deposits in his SALN constitutes dishonesty.

The Court views it in the affirmative.

Section 7 and Section 8 of Republic Act (R.A.) 3019[38] explain the nature and
importance of accomplishing a true, detailed and sworn SALN, thus:
 Sec. 7. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. Every public
officer, within thirty days after assuming office, and thereafter, on
or before the fifteenth day of April following the close of every
calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or
upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and
file with the office of corresponding Department Head, or in the
case of a Head Department or chief of an independent office, with
the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement of
the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal
and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers
assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar
year, may file their first statement on or before the fifteenth day of
April following the close of said calendar year.
Sec. 8. Prima Facie Evidence of and Dismissal Due to
Unexplained Wealth. If in accordance with the provisions of
Republic Act Numbered One Thousand Three Hundred Seventy-
Nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his
incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons,
an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion
to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be
ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the
spouse and dependents of such public official may be taken into
consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means
cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or
manifestly excessive expenditures incurred by the public official,
his spouse or any of their dependents including but not limited to
activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of
wealth including frequent travel abroad of a non-official character
by any public official when such activities entail expenses evidently
out of proportion to legitimate income, shall likewise be taken into
consideration in the enforcement of this Section, notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances
hereinabove mentioned shall constitute valid ground for the
administrative suspension of the public official concerned for an
indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth
is completed.
 In the case of Carabeo v. Court of Appeals,[39] citing Ombudsman v.
Valeroso,[40] the Court restated the rationale for the SALN and the evils that it seeks
to thwart, to wit:

Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth,

the evil sought to be suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which
mandates full disclosure of wealth in the SALN, is a means of
preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing and
minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. Unexplained matter normally results from non-disclosure
or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials and
employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy
of accountability of all public officers and employees in the
government. By the SALN, the public are able to monitor
movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a valid check and
balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.

Complimentary to the above-mentioned provisions, Section 2 of R.A.

1379[41] states that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during
his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the
income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima
facie to have been unlawfully acquired.

By mandate of law, every public official or government employee is required

to make a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth in order to
suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth because the latter usually
results from non-disclosure of such matters. Hence, a public official or employee
who has acquired money or property manifestly disproportionate to his salary or
his other lawful income shall be prima facie presumed to have illegally acquired it.

It should be understood that what the law seeks to curtail is acquisition of

unexplained wealth. Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly
accounted, then it is explained wealth which the law does not penalize.
In this case, Racho not only failed to disclose his bank accounts containing
substantial deposits but he also failed to satisfactorily explain the accumulation of
his wealth or even identify the sources of such accumulated wealth. The
documents that Racho presented, like those purportedly showing that his brothers
and nephew were financially capable of sending or contributing large amounts of
money for their business,[42] do not prove that they did contribute or remit money
for their supposed joint business venture.
[43]
Equally, the Special Power of Attorney that was supposedly issued by Vieto, Dido
and Henry Racho in favor of Racho on January 28, 1993 to show their business
plans, contained a glaringly inconsistent statement that belies the authenticity of
the document, to wit:

1. To be the Trustee Attorney-in-fact of our investment in

ANGELSONS LENDING AND INVESTORS, INC. of whom we are
the Stockholders/Investors as well as the NAL PAY PHONE
SERVICES, which was registered by the DTI last April 30, 1999 in the
name of NIETO RACHOs wife of whom we are likewise investors.
[emphasis supplied]

Definitely, a document that was allegedly executed in 1993 could not contain a
statement referring to a future date registered by the DTI last April 30, 1999. This
certainly renders the intrinsic and extrinsic value of the SPA questionable.
 More important, the Joint Affidavits allegedly executed by Rachos siblings
and nephew to corroborate his story were later disowned and denied by his
nephew, Henry, and brother, Vieto, as shown by their Counter-Affidavits.[44] Henry
averred that he was out of the country at the time of the alleged execution of the
Joint Affidavit on December 18, 2004 and he arrived in Manila only on September
16, 2005. Vieto, on the other hand, denied having signed the Joint Affidavit. He
disclosed that as a left-handed person, he pushes the pen instead of pulling it. He
concluded that the signature on the Joint Affidavit was made by a right-handed
person.[45] He likewise included a copy of his passport containing his real signature
for comparison.[46]

Thus, the SPA and Joint Affidavits which should explain the sources of Rachos
wealth are dubious and merit no consideration.
Although Racho presented the SEC Certificate of Registration
of Angelsons,[47] the business that he supposedly put up with his relatives, he
showed no other document to confirm that the business is actually existing and
operating. He likewise tried to show that his wife built a business of her own but
he did not bother to explain how the business grew and merely presented a
Certificate of Registration of Business Name from the DTI.[48] These documents,
however, do not prove that Racho had enough other sources of income to justify
the said bank deposits. Ultimately, only P1,167,186.33[49] representing his wifes
retirement benefits, was properly accounted for. Even this money, however, was
reduced by his loan payable of P1,000,000.00 as reflected in his 2000 SALN.[50]

Dishonesty begins when an individual intentionally makes a false statement

in any material fact, or practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud
in order to secure his examination, registration, appointment or promotion.[51] It is
understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray.[52] It is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon ones ability to
perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer
or employee.[53] Section 52 (A)(1), Rule IV of the Revised Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in Civil Service treats dishonesty as a grave offense the
penalty of which is dismissal from the service at the first infraction.[54]

Indeed, an honest public servant will have no difficulty in gathering, collating and
presenting evidence that will prove his credibility, but a dishonest one will only
provide shallow excuses in his explanations.

For these reasons, the Court is of the view that Pleyto v. Philippine National
Police (PNP)-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG)[55] which the CA
cited as basis to exculpate Racho of dishonesty, is not applicable in this case. In
the Pleyto case, the Court recognized Pleytos candid admission of his failure to
properly and completely fill out his SALN, his vigorous effort to clarify the entries
and provide the necessary information and supporting documents to show how he
and his wife acquired their properties.[56] The Court found substantial evidence that
Pleyto and his wife had lawful sources of income other than Pleytos salary as a
government official which allowed them to purchase several real properties in their
names and travel abroad.[57]

Unfortunately for Racho, his situation is different. The Court, thus, holds that
the CA erred in finding him guilty of simple neglect of duty only. As defined, simple
neglect of duty is the failure to give proper attention to a task expected from an
employee resulting from either carelessness or indifference.[58] In this case, the
discrepancies in the statement of Rachos assets are not the results of mere
carelessness. On the contrary, there is substantial evidence pointing to a conclusion
that Racho is guilty of dishonesty because of his unmistakable intent to cover up
the true source of his questioned bank deposits.

It should be emphasized, however, that mere misdeclaration of the SALN

does not automatically amount to dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth
becomes manifestly disproportionate to the employees income or other sources of
income and the public officer/employee fails to properly account or explain his
other sources of income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty because when
a public officer takes an oath or office, he or she binds himself or herself to faithfully
perform the duties of the office and use reasonable skill and diligence, and to act
primarily for the benefit of the public. Thus, in the discharge of duties, a public
officer is to use that prudence, caution and attention which careful persons use in
the management of their affairs.[59]

The Court has consistently reminded our public servants that public service
demands utmost integrity and discipline. A public servant must display at all times
the highest sense of honesty and integrity, for no less than the Constitution
mandates the principle that a public office is a public trust; and all public officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people and serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[60]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 21, 2008 Decision and
November 20, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals-Cebu are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The administrative aspect of the April 1, 2005 Joint Order of the
Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
 I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 210128, August 17, 2016

ATTY. AMADO Q. NAVARRO, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND DEPARTMENT OF

FINANCE-REVENUE INTEGRITY PROTECTION SERVICES (DOF-RIPS), REPRESENTED BY JOSE
APOLONIO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the April
24, 2013 Decision1 and the November 8, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
124353, which affirmed the September 8, 2009 Decision3 and the May 31, 2011 Order4 of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman), in OMB-C-A-05-0260-F.

The questioned issuances of the Ombudsman found petitioner Atty. Amado Q. Navarro (Navarro) guilty of
the administrative offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713,5 resulting in his dismissal from the service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement
benefits, except the cash equivalent of his accrued leave credits, and perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.

The Antecedents

In 1980, CPA-lawyer Navarro began his employment at the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) as Revenue
Examiner I with an annual gross salary of P11,904.00. He then became the Revenue District Officer (RDO)
of Baguio City and was later designated as Chief Revenue Officer IV (CRO IV) with an annual salary of
P246,876.00.

The Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (DOF-RIPS), a division of the Department
of Finance (DOF) tasked to conduct investigations on allegations of corrupt practices of officials and
employees of offices attached to or supervised by the DOF, received a complaint against Navarro. Acting
thereon, the DOF-RIPS investigated Navarro and opined that based on his Statement of Assets, Liabilities
and Networth (SALN), he had been steadily amassing landholdings in Baguio City since his appointment as
the RDO there and had constructed three (3) structures on some of the parcels of land.6 chanro bleslaw

On May 30, 2005, Intelligence Officers Oscar Moratin, Virman L. Sayang-od and Johnny S. Lassin,
representing the DOF-RIPS, filed their Joint Complaint-Affidavit7 before the Ombudsman against Navarro, for
acts and omissions that are deemed illegal, unjust, improper, and/or otherwise irregular or immoral.8 It was
averred hi the said complaint that Navarro did not properly declare his assets in his SALNs; that Navarro did
not own any real property prior to his employment with the BIR in 1980; that he acquired his real
properties, including a resort and commercial buildings, in Baguio City and La Union; that, even assuming
they were declared under "Improvements," the amounts declared in his SALN were miniscule, as the
improvements constructed were two (2) multi-storey buildings and a two-storey building;9 and that he
overstated his liabilities to decrease his networth and failed to disclose his engagement in other forms of
businesses. For said reason, it was the conclusion of the DOF-RIPS that "his substantial real property
ownership is manifestly out of proportion to his lawful income."10chanrob leslaw

On July 21, 2005, Navarro filed his Counter-Affidavit11 in the criminal aspect thereof denying the averments
therein. He attached the documents pertaining to his applicable share of ownership with his siblings over the
properties enumerated in the said complaint-affidavit and his other sources of lawful income. This counter-
affidavit was later considered by the Ombudsman in the administrative case.

On April 4, 2008, the Ombudsman placed Navarro under preventive suspension pending investigation and
while awaiting the adjudication of the administrative complaint against him.

On September 8, 2009, the Ombudsman rendered a decision finding Navarro guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and violation of R.A. No. 6713 and meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service with its
accessory penalties.12chan robles law
Navarro filed a motion for reconsideration claiming that he was deprived of his right to due process, but it
was denied.

Aggrieved, he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 before the CA.

Acting thereon, the CA dismissed Navarro's petition for lack of merit as it considered the Ombudsman
decision and resolution amply supported by substantial evidence. The CA was not convinced that he was
denied due process. The CA was of the view that he was able to file a motion for reconsideration of the
assailed decision and even attached thereto a copy of the counter-affidavit he had submitted in the criminal
case against him, where he answered in detail all the accusations against him. The CA reiterated the
principle that the essence of due process was simply to be heard, or as applied in administrative
proceedings, to be given an opportunity to explain one's side, or to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of; and that the quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively
liable was merely substantial evidence.13chan roble slaw

The CA found that Navarro failed to comply with his obligation as a government employee to truthfully
disclose in detail all of his business interests in his SALN. The CA noted that in his SALNs submitted from
1998-2002, Navarro simply lumped together the declared properties based on their location, which went
against the legal mandate for a government employee to submit a true and detailed statement of his assets
and liabilities. Moreover, he did not disclose any of the business interests he and his wife were engaged in.
The CA agreed with the Ombudsman that because his total income in 1982 from the government and from
other sources was only P28,244.00 and that he was able to purchase a lot with improvements worth
P55,000.00, his assets were disproportionate to his lawful income.14 chan roble slaw

Aggrieved, Navarro moved for a reconsideration but the CA denied his motion.

Hence, the present petition raising the following

ISSUES

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN, WHICH WERE
AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, WERE BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, ON
CONJECTURES, SURMISES AND SPECULATIONS, UNSUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

WHETHER THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, WHICH WERE
AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS, FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE CONVINCING
EXPLANATIONS OF THE PETITIONER DULY SUPPORTED BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WHICH
ARE ALL PUBLIC DOCUMENTS SHOWING:

a. THAT HIS PROPERTIES WERE ALL LEGALLY ACQUIRED AND WITHIN HIS
LAWFUL INCOME AS A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE AND FROM OTHER
LAWFUL SOURCES; AND

b. THAT IF THERE WAS ANY "MISDECLARATION OR INCOMPLETE DETAILS"

IN HIS SALN, THE SAME WERE NOT INTENTIONAL TO CONCEAL HIS
ASSETS BUT THE SAME WAS COMMITTED IN GOOD FAITH WHICH SHOULD
NOT BE VISITED WITH THE EXTREME PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM
GOVERNMENT SERVICE AND FORFEITURE OF ALL BENEFITS DUE HIM FOR
MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS OF DEDICATED, SATISFACTORY AND
UNBLEMISHED GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

Navarro argues that the conclusion of the Ombudsman and the CA that his assets were disproportionate to
his lawful income, without considering his other sources of income before and after he was taken in, was
erroneous. He further explained that he could not have declared other assets as exclusively his because he
co-owned those properties with his brother, Engr. Victor Navarro (Engr. Victor), and sister, Atty. Epifania
Navarro (Atty. Epifania), who had assets and sources of income of their own.
In its Comment,15 the Ombudsman insisted that there was substantial evidence to support the finding of
culpability against Navarro for grave misconduct, dishonesty and violation of R.A. No. 6713 because he
failed to declare true and detailed SALNs and he accumulated assets which were manifestly disproportionate
to his lawful income. The Ombudsman considered such failure as constituting grave misconduct and
asserted that Navarro deliberately concealed his financial and business interests in his SALNs, by
intentionally lumping together all of his real properties, depending on their location and, thus, hiding the
true nature of the properties.

In its Comment,16 the DOF-RIPS argued that Navarro's disclosure of his Baguio properties was highly
irregular as the said properties were lumped in a single amount, without specifying the cost and location of
each property because the number of properties and their respective locations imply a higher value. As far
as the declared improvements were concerned, the DOF-RIPS claimed that the stated value thereof did not
match the kind of buildings constructed on the lots. It added that Navarro misdeclared the; cost of the
improvements on certain La Union properties, which he co-owned with his relatives, by not specifying his
proportionate shares in the said improvements.

The DOF-RIPS also averred that the records showed that Navarro was usually joined by his siblings in the
acquisition of real properties as well as in the construction of the improvements. Thus, the values indicated
in Navarro's SALNs should have been equivalent to his proportionate shares in the commonly owned
properties. It admitted though that this was so in Navarre's SALNs for the years 1980, 1981, 1982, 1990,
1993, and 1994.

The DOF-RIPS agreed with the Ombudsman and the CA that the rest of Navarro's SALNs were laden with
numerous discrepancies and so they could not be possibly considered truthful statement of his assets,
liabilities and business interests.

The pleadings show that the central issue to be addressed is whether Navarro's failure to declare with
particularity his assets and business interests in his SALN was a sufficient ground to hold him
administratively liable for the offenses of dishonesty and grave misconduct, warranting his dismissal from
the service. The Ombudsman stated that he committed misdeclaration, over-declaration and nondeclaration
of his assets and liabilities in his SALNs.

Ruling of the Court

The Court finds merit in the petition.

Indeed, the general rule in administrative law is that the courts of Justice should respect the findings of fact
of administrative agencies. The rule, however, is not absolute as there are recognized exceptions thereto.
One is when the precise issue is whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the
administrative agency.17 Substantial evidence has been held as that which is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even
if other minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.18 cha nrob leslaw

The SALN and the Manner of Accomplishing it

The submission of a sworn SALN is expressly required by R.A. No. 6713.19 Section 8 thereof provides that it
is the duty of public officials and employees to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of their
assets, liabilities, net worth, and financial and business interests, including those of their spouses and of
unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households. The sworn statement is
embodied in a. pro forma document with specific blanks to be filled out with the necessary data or
information. Insofar as the details for real properties are concerned, the information required to be disclosed
are limited to the following: 1) kind, 2) location, 3) year acquired, 4) mode of acquisition, 5) assessed value,
6) current fair market value, and 7) acquisition cost.

Examining the form to be filled-out, the Court notes that it requires information that gives a general
statement of the assets, liabilities and net worth of an employee. This, however, does not give the employee
an unbridled license to fill out the form whimsically. The contents must be true and verifiable.

In the subject years or before 2011, public officers and employees accomplished their SALNs by filling out
the prescribed form drawn up by the Civil Service Commission (CSC). As can be gleaned therefrom, what
was only required was a statement of one's assets and liabilities in general. There appeared to be no
obligation to state in detail his assets and liabilities in the prescribed form.

On July 8, 2011, the CSC came out with CSC Resolution No. 1100902, prescribing the guidelines in the filling
out of the Revised SALN form for the year 2011.

On March 15, 2012, however, the CSC issued CSC Resolution No. 1200480 deferring the implementation of
CSC Resolution No. 1100902 for several reasons, one of which was the concern of the Senate Committee
that "the majority of government workers are unequipped with sufficient knowledge on how to accomplish
the said form properly."20 chan rob leslaw

Nondeclaration or Concealment

Refuting the conclusion reached by the Ombudsman and the CA, Navarro submits that he accomplished his
annual SALN in accordance with the prescribed format by the CSC, the details of which, to the best of his
knowledge and belief, were generally accepted in the government service and was in substantial compliance
with the provisions of law.21 chan robleslaw

After a thorough study on the matter, the Court is of the considered view that Navarro's "lumping" of his
properties in his SALN starting in the year 1998 did not, per se, amount to making an untruthful statement.
A perusal of the records would show that whatever properties were combined, grouped or lumped together
from that year onwards were the same properties previously declared, adding only those new or recent
acquisitions. The respondents did not identify a property which he did not declare.

As properly explained by Navarro, the properties, ascribed to him but which were not declared by him, were
not his. The improvements on the property located at No. 148 Rimando Road, Baguio City, were not his.
This property belonged to Merceditas Navarro, wife of his brother, Engr. Victor. His property was at No. 140
Rimando Road, where two buildings were then being constructed. One was his and the other one belonged
to Atty, Epifania, his sister. He could not include their properties or shares in his SALNs as these were not
owned by him, not being claimed by him, and not declared in his name.22 chanrobles law

There was no clear proof either that Engr. Victor and Atty. Epifania were his dummies. Navarro claimed that
Engr. Victor was a civil engineer, a sanitary and geodetic engineer and the sole distributor of almost all the
national daily newspapers in Baguio City and the Cordillera region; while Atty. Epifania is a CPA and a bar
topnotcher from the Ateneo de Manila University. Both, as practitioners of their professions, earned more
than he did. Pooling their resources, they bought properties near their ancestral home where they were
born.23chan roble slaw

Over-declaration of acquisition costs in the 1996 SALN

The DOF-RIPS charged that Navarro over-declared the total acquisition cost of his real properties in the
1996 SALN by as much as P260,000,00. It explained that his 1994 SALN only showed a total amount of
P350,000.00 as the acquisition cost for land which suddenly increased to P980,000.00 in 1996, though
records revealed a total of P720,000.00 after adding his proportionate share in the acquisitions he made in
the said year in the amount of P370,000.00.24 chanroble slaw

At the outset, Navarro had pointed out that the over-declaration of his property was not used as a ground
by the Ombudsman to justify the conclusion in its September 8, 2009 decision. It was brought about for the
first time in the Ombudsman Order, dated May 31, 2011, which denied his motion for reconsideration.

At any rate, Navarro disputed the charges and explained that there was a purchase of property in the year
1995 in the amount of P400,000.00, half of which pertained to him. Although the terms and conditions were
finalized in 1995, but because of some infirmities in the documentation, the transfer was only effected late
in the year 1997. As far as the remaining P60,000.00 was concerned, it referred to a purchase of real
property in the amount of P120,000.00, half of which belonged to him. Navarro also admitted that the latter
property was being introduced for the first time in this petition to prove that his declarations in all his SALNs
were true to the best of his knowledge and information and that there was no intention to conceal the said
property and the transaction as they were, in fact, declared in his SALN. He added that he did not touch on
them as they were never alleged or put in issue in the complaint-affidavit.25 cralaw redc hanro bleslaw

The above explanation, however, did not convince the DOF-RIPS. It stressed that there was no evidence of
the 1995 sale because the purchase was made only in 1997 as evidenced by the deed of sale. Hence, it
concluded that there was over-declaration in the 1996 SALN of Navarro.
Following Navarro's explanation, the property subject of the sale in 1995 was the same property subject of
the transfer made in 1997. He really acquired an interest in the property in 1995 so that in his 1996 SALN,
as the sale was finalized in 1995, he already declared the property.

To the Court, this is an acceptable explanation for the increase in the total amount of acquisition costs in his
1996 SALN. That the documentation was finally perfected in 1997 had no controlling significance because he
actually claimed the property as his and so declared it in his 1996 SALN. The Court sees nothing wrong with
such reporting.

The records further revealed that in the 1996 SALN, Navarro separately indicated the year of acquisition of
each of his Baguio properties as 1981, 1987, 1990, 1995, and 1996. The total cost of these acquisitions
amounted to P535,000.00. In his 1998 SALN, he lumped all of his Baguio properties, indicating "1981 to
1997" as the years of acquisition,26 the total cost of which amounted to P735,000.00. The last amount
remained consistent over the succeeding SALNs as there were no other Baguio purchases made.

When Navarro included "1997" in his 1998 SALN, it meant that he declared a purchase made in that year.
Considering that the records showed no other purchase in 1997 but the property subject of the December
31, 1997 deed of sale with the consideration of P400,000.00, half of which belonged to him, it could be fairly
deduced that the said property was the "1997" referred to in the 1998 SALN resulting in the increase of
P200,000.00 in the total acquisition cost.

Following Navarro's explanation that the property he declared in his 1996 SALN was the very same property
he added in 1997, then there was double declaration resulting in an inaccuracy - the over-declaration of
P200,000.00. Because the common practice in accomplishing the SALN is copying the entries in,the
immediately preceding year and just adding any subsequent acquisitions,26 inaccuracies are very likely to
happen. In this regard, Navarro was remiss in failing to rectify the details of his SALN. His attention
regarding the double declaration, however, should have been called so he could have made the necessary
corrective action, as will be shown later.

Nondeclaration of business interests as well as a specific improvement

The DOF-RIPS also charged Navarro with failure to specifically disclose his and his wife's business interests
in his SALNs. Navarro himself submitted certifications showing his other sources of income and also
admitted renting out apartment units and public store spaces as early as 1984, yet these were never
declared in any of his SALNs.27 Navarro, however, insisted that incomes from all sources were properly
declared in his Income Tax Returns (ITR).28 In resolving this matter, the Ombudsman found that: ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry

As to his business interests, the respondent, at the time of accomplishing and filing his SALNs, did not
disclose with particularity the businesses he and his wife were engaged in, although there was a
declaration as to the existence of these interests. On the contrary, the complainant was able to gather
documents showing that they operate a grocery/general merchandise store, bicycles for hire, a resort, the
renting out of stalls and apartment units, and a gasoline station. These, again, constitute
misdeclaration.29 [Emphasis supplied]
Affirming the findings of the Ombudsman, the CA concluded that Navarro failed to comply with his obligation
as a government employee to truthfully disclose in detail all of his business interests in his SALNs.30 The CA
stated that the petitioner failed to declare in his SALNs 1] the 504 sq. m. property which he and his brother
Engr. Victor purchased for P400,000.00 in December 1997; and 2] his business interests and those of his
wife.

As earlier pointed out, the alleged nondeclaration of his share in the 504 sq. m. property was adequately
explained. It was already declared upon completion of the transaction but the documentation was finalized
only two years later because of some infirmities therein. With respect to Navarro's business interest, the
Court is satisfied with his explanation. Thus:
ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

(c) xxx. The details required in the prescribed format of the statement were all indicated properly and
adequately. The Petitioner's declarations, as well as all those required to accomplish and file a SALN, are
limited by the fields of information required in the prescribed form. The details in question in the subject
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman are not required in the prescribed form of the SALN as provided
by the Civil Service Commission in use for the years in question. The details in question have been
addressed and are now required in the Revised SALN Form as prescribed by the Civil Service Commission,
the use of which has been, however, deferred for reasons cited for 2011 declarations of those required to
accomplish and submit a SALN. xxx31[Emphases supplied]
In Pleyto vs. PNP-Criminal Investigation & Detection Group (Pleyto),32 the Court held that neither could the
failure to answer the question "Do you have any business interest and other financial connections including
those of your spouse and unmarried children living in your household?" be tantamount to gross misconduct
or dishonesty. In this case, Navarro did not conceal any business interest of his wife because he had
disclosed the same and other sources of income with proof thereof. As likewise held in Pleyto, a disclosure of
his wife's occupation would be inconsistent with the charge that he concealed his and his wife's business
interests.

As regards the nondeclaration of a specific improvement, the DOF-RIPS averred that Navarro owned the
improvement located at No. 148 Rimando Road, Baguio City, but it was not declared in his SALN. It further
claimed that, contrary to his self-serving statement of not owning the said property, Navarro failed to
present any document to disprove his presumed ownership of the lot as shown by its corresponding tax
declaration. The Ombudsman agreed with the DOF-RIPS that Navarro was not able to rebut the presumption
of such ownership.33 chanrob leslaw

As earlier pointed out, however, the properties which were being ascribed to Navarro did not belong to him
and had never been claimed by him. The improvements located at No. 148 Rimando Road, Baguio City,
could not be his because the property at No. 148 Rimando belonged to Merceditas Navarro, wife of his
brother, Engr. Victor. His property was at No. 140 Rimando Road, where two buildings were then being
constructed. One was his, as properly explained, and the other one belonged to Atty. Epifania, his sister.
The important point was that the parcel of land covered by the said tax declarations and deed of sale was, in
fact, declared in his SALN.

Corrective Action

Navarro, at the outset, has claimed that he filled out and accomplished the annual SALN in accordance with
the prescribed format by the CSC, the details of which, to the best of his knowledge and belief, were
generally accepted in the government service and were in substantial compliance with the provisions of law.
He was never informed by the applicable office of any incompleteness or any impropriety in the
accomplishment of his SALNs.34 chanro bles law

In this regard, Navarro is correct. The appropriate office or committee should have given him the
opportunity to correct the entries to conform to the prescribed requirements at that time. Section 10 of R.A.
No. 6713 covering Review and Compliance Procedure and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR),
provide that in the event the authorities determine that a statement is not properly filed, the appropriate
committee shall inform the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.
Section 10 reads: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry

Section 10. Review and Compliance Procedure. - (a) The designated Committees of both Houses of the
Congress shall establish procedures for the review of statements to determine whether said statements
which have been submitted on time, are complete, and are in proper form. In the event a determination is
made that a statement is not so filed, the appropriate Committee shall so inform the reporting
individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.

(b) In order to carry out their responsibilities under this Act, the designated Committees of both Houses of
Congress shall have the power within their respective jurisdictions, to render any opinion interpreting this
Act, in writing, to persons covered by this Act, subject in each instance to the approval by affirmative vote
of the majority of the particular House concerned.

The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual
situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject
to any sanction provided in this Act.

(c) The heads of other offices shall perform the duties stated in subsections (a) and (b) hereof insofar as
their respective offices are concerned, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, in the case of the
Executive Department and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, in the case of the Judicial Department.
[Emphasis supplied]
Section 1, Rule VIII, Review and Compliance Procedure of the Rules Implementing the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees R.A. No. 6713 reads: ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry

Section 1. The following shall have the authority to establish compliance procedures for the review of
statements to determine whether said statements have been properly accomplished: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
 (a) In the case of Congress, the designated committees of both Houses
of Congress subject to approval by the affirmative vote of the
majority of the particular House concerned;

(b) In the case of the Executive Department, the heads of the

departments, offices and agencies insofar as their respective
departments, offices and agencies are concerned subject to approval
of the Secretary of Justice.

(c) In the case of the Judicial Department, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court; and

(d) In the case of the Constitutional Commissions and other

Constitutional Offices, the respective Chairman and members
thereof; in the case of the Office of the Ombudsman, the
Ombudsman.
The above official shall likewise have the authority to render any opinion interpreting the provisions on the
review and compliance procedures in the filing of statements of assets, liabilities, net worth and disclosure of
information.

In the event said authorities determine that a statement is not properly filed, they shall inform
the reporting individual and direct him to take the necessary corrective action.

The individual to whom an opinion is rendered, and any other individual involved in a similar factual
situation, and who, after issuance of the opinion acts in good faith in accordance with it shall not be subject
to any sanction provided in the Code. [Emphasis supplied]

Given the opportunity, Navarro could have disclosed the acquisition costs and cost of the improvements in a
more detailed way. His failure to amend his presentation, without his attention on the matter being called,
cannot be considered as indicative of an untruthful declaration of his assets. Unless there is a concrete proof
that the values or acquisition costs stated in Navarro's SALNs were not what they were supposed to be, then
a conclusion that the same were untruthful cannot be reached.

Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct

Dishonesty is committed when an individual intentionally makes a false statement of any material fact,
practices or attempts to practice any deception or fraud in order to secure his examination, registration,
appointment, or promotion. It is understood to imply the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, betray or
defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; and the lack
of fairness and straightforwardness.35 chanro bleslaw

Misconduct, on the other hand, is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard
of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the
performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished
from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of
an established rule must be manifest.36 chanrob leslaw

From the given definitions above, the element of intent to commit a wrong exists in both administrative
offenses of dishonesty and grave misconduct which, under the law, merit the penalty of dismissal from
service. Thus, without any malice or wrongful intent, administrative liability cannot attach.

Here, there was no substantial evidence showing any malice or intent to deceive on the part of Navarro in
accomplishing the questioned SALNs. Navarro would not have endeavoured to produce voluminous
documents to prove that he truthfully declared his properties, albeit lumped together, if his intention was to
conceal them. The documents he submitted showed the veracity of the acquisitions he made and their
respective costs as reflected in his SALNs. The physical impression of the DOF-RIPS of what and how the
properties actually looked, without anything more concrete than mere conjectures that the said properties
commanded a higher value or that the amounts did not match the kind of buildings constructed thereon,
would not make Navarro's SALNs any less truthful.

The Court cannot help but observe that the charges filed by the DOF-RIPS against Navarro, that his SALNs
bore misdeclarations, over-declarations and nondeclarations, are based on mere speculations and
conjectures. Without concrete corroborating evidence to substantiate the charges, the Court cannot simply
rely on such surmises as they are "not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative value and,
surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment."37 The Court's decision must be based upon competent
proof "for the truth must have to be determined by the hard rules of admissibility and proof."38 chanrob leslaw

The Court has once emphasized that a mere misdeclaration in the SALN does not automatically amount to
dishonesty. Only when the accumulated wealth becomes manifestly disproportionate to the income or other
sources of income of the public officer/employee and he fails to properly account or explain his other sources
of income, does he become susceptible to dishonesty.39 Although there appeared to have a prima
facie evidence giving rise to the presumption of accumulation of wealth disproportionate to his income,
Navarro was able to overcome such presumption by coming out with documentary evidence to prove his
financial capacity to make the subject acquisitions and to prove that the amounts he stated in his SALNs
were true. It should be understood that the laws on SALN aim to curtail the acquisition of unexplained
wealth. Where the source of the undisclosed wealth can be properly accounted for, then it is "explained
wealth" which the law does not penalize.40 cha nrob leslaw

Considering that Navarro sufficiently explained his acquisitions as well as his other lawful sources of income
to show his and his wife's financial capacity to acquire the subject real properties, he cannot be deemed to
have committed dishonesty. He cannot be adjudged guilty of grave misconduct either as his alleged
"lumping" of real properties in his SALN did not affect the discharge of his duties as a revenue officer.

The question now is: did he commit simple negligence for improperly accomplishing his SALNs?

A review of the case and the applicable rules and jurisprudence guides the Court to a negative finding.

Negligence is the omission of the diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds
with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. In the case of public officials, there is
negligence when there is a breach of duty or failure to perform the obligation, and there is gross negligence
when the breach of duty is flagrant and palpable.41 chan robles law

As previously discussed, however, evident bad faith was wanting on the part of Navarro. Although it is the
duty of every public official/employee to properly accomplish his/her SALN, it is not too much to ask for the
head of the appropriate department/office to have called his attention should there be any incorrectness in
his SALN. The DOF, which has supervision over the BIR, could have directed Navarro to correct his SALN.
This is in consonance with the above-quoted Review and Compliance Procedure under R.A. No. 6713, as well
as its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), providing for the procedure for review of statements to
determine whether they have been properly accomplished. To reiterate, it is provided in the IRR that in the
event authorities determine that a SALN is not properly filed, they should inform the reporting individual
and direct him to take the necessary correctiye action.

In this case, however, Navarro was not given the chance to rectify the nebulous entries in his SALNs.
Instead, the DOF, through its RIPS, filed a complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman on the ground that his
SALN was "generalized." Regardless, Navarro was able to show and explain the details of his SALN when he
submitted his counter-affidavit with the necessary documents, to which the DOF-RIPS and the Ombudsman
and the CA coldly closed their eyes.

As there was only a failure to give proper attention to a task expected of an employee because of either
carelessness or indifference,42 Navarro should have been informed so he could have made the necessary
explanation or correction. There is nothing wrong with a generalized SALN if the entries therein can be
satisfactorily explained and verified.

Lest it be misunderstood, the corrective action to be allowed should only refer to typographical or
mathematical rectifications and explanation of disclosed entries. It does not pertain to hidden, undisclosed
or undeclared acquired assets which the official concerned intentionally concealed by one way or another
like, for instance, the use of dummies. There is actually no hard and fast rule. If income has been actually
reported to the BIR in one's ITR, such fact can be considered a sign of good faith.

The Court is not unaware that in the cases of Office of the Ombudsman v. Bernardo (Bernardo)43 and Pleyto,
the officers concerned were adjudged liable for simple neglect of duty and meted out the penalty of
suspension of six (6) months for filing generalized SALNs. In Pleyto, it was written: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary

xxx It also rules that while petitioner may be guilty of negligence in accomplishing his SALN, he did not
commit gross misconduct or dishonesty, for there is no substantial evidence of his intent to deceive the
authorities and conceal his other sources of income or any of the real properties in his and his wife's names.
Hence, the imposition of the penalty of removal or dismissal from public service and all other accessory
penalties on petitioner is indeed too harsh. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to pay attention to the
details and proper form of his SALN, resulting in the imprecision of the property descriptions and
inaccuracy of certain information, for which suspension from office for a period of six months,
without pay, would have been appropriate penalty. [Emphasis supplied]
A careful reading of Bernardo and Pleyto, however, discloses that Navarro is not similarly situated. In the
two cases, the public officials concerned did not include or specify the business interests and other sources
of income of their respective spouses. In this case, Navarro disclosed their common assets and sources
although his presentation was wanting in some details. During the investigation and in his pleadings, he was
able to explain the cited incongruity.

The Court is mindful of the duty of public officials and employees to disclose their assets, liabilities and net
worth accurately and truthfully. In keeping up with the constantly changing and fervent society and for the
purpose of eliminating corruption in the government, the new SALN is stricter, especially with regard to the
details of real properties, to address the pressing issue of transparency among those in the government
service. Although due regard is given to those charged with the duty of filtering malicious elements in the
government service, it must still be stressed that such duty must be exercised with great caution as grave
consequences result therefrom. Thus, some leeway should be accorded the public officials. They must be
given the opportunity to explain any prima facieappearance of discrepancy. To repeat, where his explanation
is adequate, convincing and verifiable, his assets cannot be considered unexplained wealth or illegally
obtained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The April 24, 2013 Decision of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 124353, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered exonerating respondent Atty.
Amado Q. Navarro of the charges against him.

SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

Carpio, Del Castillo, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Brion, J., on leave.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture &
Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of
Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA
IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and
APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the
Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on
Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a decision
or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official exercising quasi-judicial
functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise,
where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other
government agency or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human
Rights take cognizance of the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as
substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These
facts, 1 together with others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise
undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among
them members of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of
Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted actions" to
"dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the public authorities to act
upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them
they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the
DECS premises on September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government
to negotiate the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The
"mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio,
gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers participating in
the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those
directives notwithstanding, the mass actions continued into the week, with more teachers joining in
the days that followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the charges. They were also preventively
suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with
P.D. 807. 5

the latter
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named respondents, 6

filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for
issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was
denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also denied
their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of November 14, 1990, "the respondents
led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The
case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cario dated December 17, 1990, rendered after
evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the
respondents, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine
(9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cario), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court
(on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition

Both petitions in this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations,
before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9

a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly situated" or "other
similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27,
1990 to the Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful
mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and
consequently for reasons completely unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection therewith the Commission
scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cario requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cario) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R.
Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the

The Commission
mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12

thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting these facts and making the following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its
investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now
suspended and deprived of their wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cario,
of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga, school
superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are
hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at
11:00 A.M. and to bring with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations
aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the Commission will
resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cario sought and was granted leave to file
a motion to dismiss the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging
as grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that the CHR has no
jurisdiction over the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases,
as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cario in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy
and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil
Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cario to issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively
suspend them, and issue decision on those charges."17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cario's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the

It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied

Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18

due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the
administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission was empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the
Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case decided by the
Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991
in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf
of petitioner Cario, has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this
Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to
hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends,
in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following
general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the
imposition of administrative disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and)
with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of
finality and definiteness, the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the
Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this
Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take appeals to the
Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the
Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine,
certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not
meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or
duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it
may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened
to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual
conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,
finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This
function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23

Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the
Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing
abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need
protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
 (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate
all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in
cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of
its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to
adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire

The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to

into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27

learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient
inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and
accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to
inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . .
an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter
or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on

And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or

the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30

with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits"
(adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be
a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or
civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or
not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to
this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are
justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any,
may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
 and it appears that appeals have been
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33

seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court
itself has had occasion to pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process;
and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may
be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse
verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the
Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own
judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or
negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cario, it would have no power anyway to
reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cario was in error, is to refer the

matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil Service Commission. 35
It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof
are prohibited "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits."

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ, concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the
Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa

I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and
in many other similar cases:

(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students
and their parents;

(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and
the latter's families;

(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those
who defend the same;

(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of
strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.

The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission
on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but the
responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and
JUSTICES.

Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this
case.

# Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the result. The teachers are not to be blamed for exhausting all means to overcome the
Secretary's arbitrary act of not reinstating them.

PARAS, J., concurring:

I concur with the brilliant and enlightening decision of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa
I wish to add however that the Commission on Human Rights should concern itself in this case and
in many other similar cases:

(1) not only with the human rights of striking teachers but also the human rights of students
and their parents;

(2) not only with the human rights of the accused but also the human rights of the victims and
the latter's families;

(3) not only with the human rights of those who rise against the government but also those
who defend the same;

(4) not only the human rights of striking laborers but also those who as a consequence of
strikes may be laid off because of financial repercussions.

The defense of human rights is not a monopoly of a government agency (such as the Commission
on Human Rights) nor the monopoly of a group of lawyers defending so-called "human rights' but the
responsibility of ALL AGENCIES (governmental or private) and of ALL LAWYERS, JUDGES, and
JUSTICES.

Finally, the Commission should realize that while there are "human rights", there are also
corresponding "human obligations."

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I vote to dismiss the petition for the same reasons stated in my earlier separate opinion filed in this
case.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 101476 April 14, 1992

EXPORT PROCESSING ZONE AUTHORITY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, TERESITA VALLES, LORETO ALEDIA and PEDRO
ORDONEZ,respondents.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:

On May 30, 1980, P.D. 1980 was issued reserving and designating certain parcels of land in Rosario
and General Trias, Cavite, as the "Cavite Export Processing Zone" (CEPZ). For purposes of
development, the area was divided into Phases I to IV. A parcel of Phase IV was bought by Filoil
Refinery Corporation, formerly Filoil Industrial Estate, Inc. The same parcel was later sold by Filoil to
the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).

Before EPZA could take possession of the area, several individuals had entered the premises and
planted agricultural products therein without permission from EPZA or its predecessor, Filoil. To
convince the intruders to depart peacefully, EPZA, in 1981, paid a P10,000-financial-assistance to
those who accepted the same and signed quitclaims. Among them were Teresita Valles and Alfredo
Aledia, father of respondent Loreto Aledia.

Ten years later, on May 10, 1991, respondent Teresita Valles, Loreto Aledia and Pedro Ordoez
filed in the respondent Commission on Human Rights (CHR) a joint complaint (Pinagsamahang
Salaysay) praying for "justice and other reliefs and remedies" ("Katarungan at iba pang tulong"). The
CHR conducted an investigation of the complaint.

According to the CHR, the private respondents, who are farmers, filed in the Commission on May
10, 1991 a verified complaint for violation of their human rights. They alleged that on March 20,
1991, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. Engineer Neron Damondamon, EPZA Project Engineer,
accompanied by his subordinates and members of the 215th PNP Company, brought a bulldozer
and a crane to level the area occupied by the private respondents who tried to stop them by showing
a copy of a letter from the Office of the President of the Philippines ordering postponement of the
bulldozing. However, the letter was crumpled and thrown to the ground by a member of
Damondamon's group who proclaimed that: "The President in Cavite is Governor Remulla!"

On April 3, 1991, mediamen who had been invited by the private respondents to cover the
happenings in the area were beaten up and their cameras were snatched from them by members of
the Philippine National Police and some government officials and their civilian followers.

On May 17, 1991, the CHR issued an Order of injunction commanding EPZA, the 125th PNP
Company and Governor Remulla and their subordinates to desist from committing further acts of
demolition, terrorism, and harassment until further orders from the Commission and to appeal before
the Commission on May 27, 1991 at 9:00 a.m. for a dialogue (Annex A).

On May 25, 1991, two weeks later, the same group accompanied by men of Governor Remulla,
again bulldozed the area. They allegedly handcuffed private respondent Teresita Valles, pointed
their firearms at the other respondents, and fired a shot in the air.

On May 28, 1991, CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista issued another injunction Order
reiterating her order of May 17, 1991 and expanded it to include the Secretary of Public Works and
Highways, the contractors, and their subordinates. The order reads as follows:

Considering the sworn statements of the farmers whose farmlands are being
bulldozed and the wanton destruction of their irrigation canals which prevent
cultivation at the farmlands as well as the claim of ownership of the lands by some
farmers-complainants, and their possession and cultivation thereof spanning
decades, including the failure of the officials concerned to comply with the
Constitutional provision on the eviction of rural "squatters", the Commission
reiterates its Order of May 17, 1991, and further orders the Secretary of Public Works
and Highways, their Contractors and representatives to refrain and desist from
bulldozing the farmlands of the complainants-farmers who have come to the
Commission for relief, during the pendency of this investigation and to refrain from
further destruction of the irrigation canals in the area until further orders of the
Commission.

This dialogue is reset to June 10, 1991 at 9 00 a.m. and the Secretary of the
Department of Public Works and Highways or his representative is requested to
appear. (p. 20, Rollo; emphasis supplied)

On July 1, 1991, EPZA filed in the CHR a motion to lift the Order of Injunction for lack of authority to
issue injunctive writs and temporary restraining orders.

On August 16, 1991, the Commission denied the motion.

On September 11, 1991, the petitioner, through the Government Corporate Counsel, filed in this
Court a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction, alleging that the CHR acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the restraining order and injunctive writ; that the private
respondents have no clear, positive right to be protected by an injunction; that the CHR abused its
discretion in entertaining the private respondent's complaint because the issue raised therein had
been decided by this Court, hence, it is barred by prior judgment.

On September 19, 1991, this Court issued a temporary restraining order, ordering the CHR to cease
and desist from enforcing and/or implementing the questioned injunction orders.

In its comment on the petition, the CHR asked for the immediate lifting of this Court's restraining
order, and for an order restraining petitioner EPZA from doing further acts of destruction and
harassment. The CHR contends that its principal function under Section 18, Art. 13 of the 1987
Constitution, "is not limited to mere investigation" because it is mandated, among others, to:

a. Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights;
 b. Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for
violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

c. Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all
persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for
preventive measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human
rights have been violated or need protection;

d. Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty

obligations on human rights. (Emphasis supplied.) (p. 45, Rollo)

On November 14, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion praying that he be
excused from filing a Comment for the CHR on the ground that the Comment filed by the latter "fully
traversed and squarely met all the issues raised and discussed in the main Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition" (p. 83, Rollo).

Does the CHR have jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction or restraining order against supposed
violators of human rights, to compel them to cease and desist from continuing the acts complained
of?

In Hon. Isidro Cario, et al. vs. Commission on Human Rights, et al., G.R No. 96681, December 2,
1991, we held that the CHR is not a court of justice nor even a quasi-judicial body.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power
is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards
claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is
not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly
speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority
of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may
be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitely, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

xxx xxx xxx

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the
matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it
means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative
disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by
the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More
particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of
(a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute
a strike and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to
discontinue those actions and return to their classes despite the order to this effect
by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations
warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances
complained of by them; and (c) what were the particular acts done by each individual
 teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or
omissions. (pp. 5 & 8.)

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not
be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction
for, if that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or by law" (Oroso, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 76828-32, 28 January
1991; Bacalso vs. Ramolete, G.R. No. L-22488, 26 October 1967, 21 SCRA 519). It is never derived
by implication (Garcia, et al. vs. De Jesus, et al., G.R. No. 88158; Tobon Uy vs. Commission on
Election, et al.. G.R. Nos. 97108-09, March 4, 1992).

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a preliminary writ of injunction) which the CHR may
seek from the proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only
be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a Justice
of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. It may also be granted by the judge of a Court of
First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] in any action pending in an inferior court within his district."
(Sec. 2, Rule 58, Rules of Court). A writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is
available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection of the rights and
interest of a party thereto, and for no other purpose

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The orders of injunction dated
May 17 and 28, 1991 issued by the respondent Commission on Human Right are here by
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the temporary restraining order which this Court issued on
September 19, 1991, is hereby made PERMANENT.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado,
Devide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Feliciano and Bellosillo, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon. Isidro Carino, et al. vs. Commission
on Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it is my considered view
that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)
If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status
quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in effect,
an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in
situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such
cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional
commissions, which are not courts of law under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of
lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings (investigation).

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:

I dissent for the reasons stated in my separate opinion in Hon. Isidro Carino, et al. vs. Commission
on Human Rights, et al., G. R. No. 96681, 2 December 1991. In addition, it is my considered view
that the CHR has the unquestioned authority in appropriate cases to "provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the under privileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection." (Section 18(c), Article XIII, 1987 Constitution)

If the CHR can not, by itself, issue any cease and desist order in order to maintain the status
quo pending its investigation of cases involving alleged human rights violations, then it is, in effect,
an ineffective instrument for the protection of human rights. I submit that the CHR, consistent with
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, may issue cease and desist orders particularly in
situations involving a threatened violation of human rights, which it intends to investigate, and such
cease and desist orders may be judicially challenged like the orders of the other constitutional
commissions, which are not courts of law under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, on grounds of
lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further
proceedings (investigation).
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48685 September 30, 1987

LORENZO SUMULONG and EMILIA VIDANES-BALAOING, petitioners,

vs.
HON. BUENAVENTURA GUERRERO and NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, respondents.

CORTES, J.:

On December 5, 1977 the National Housing Authority (NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of
parcels of land covering approximately twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal) including the
lots of petitioners Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an area of 6,667 square
meters and 3,333 square meters respectively. The land sought to be expropriated were valued by
the NHA at one peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the market value fixed by the provincial
assessor in accordance with presidential decrees prescribing the valuation of property in
expropriation proceedings.

Together with the complaint was a motion for immediate possession of the properties. The NHA
deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with the Philippine National Bank, representing the "total
market value" of the subject twenty five hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1224
which defines "the policy on the expropriation of private property for socialized housing upon
payment of just compensation."

On January 17, 1978, respondent Judge issued the following Order:

Plaintiff having deposited with the Philippine National Bank, Heart Center Extension
Office, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, the amount of P158,980.00 representing
the total market value of the subject parcels of land, let a writ of possession be
issued.

SO ORDERED.

Pasig, Metro Manila, January 17, 1978.

(SGD)
BUENAVENTURA S.
GUERRERO

J
u
d
g
e
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due process of law. This was however, denied.

Hence, this petition challenging the orders of respondent Judge and assailing the constitutionality of
Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended. Petitioners argue that:

1) Respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave

abuse of discretion by issuing the Order of January 17, 1978 without notice and
without hearing and in issuing the Order dated June 28, 1978 denying the motion for
reconsideration.

2) Pres. Decree l224, as amended, is unconstitutional for being violative of the due
process clause, specifically:

a) The Decree would allow the taking of property regardless of size

and no matter how small the area to be expropriated;

b) "Socialized housing" for the purpose of condemnation proceeding,

as defined in said Decree, is not really for a public purpose;

c) The Decree violates procedural due process as it allows immediate

taking of possession, control and disposition of property without
giving the owner his day in court;

d) The Decree would allow the taking of private property upon

payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by
government assessors;

e) The Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to

determine what would be the "just compensation" in each and every
raise of expropriation.

Indeed, the exercise of the power of eminent domain is subject to certain limitations imposed by the
constitution, to wit:

Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (Art. IV,
Sec. 9);

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws (Art. IV, sec. 1).

Nevertheless, a clear case of constitutional infirmity has to be established for this Court to nullify
legislative or executive measures adopted to implement specific constitutional provisions aimed at
promoting the general welfare.

Petitioners' objections to the taking of their property subsumed under the headings of public use, just
compensation, and due process have to be balanced against competing interests of the public
recognized and sought to be served under declared policies of the constitution as implemented by
legislation.

1. Public use
 a) Socialized Housing

Petitioners contend that "socialized housing" as defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, for
the purpose of condemnation proceedings is not "public use" since it will benefit only "a handful of
people, bereft of public character."

"Socialized housing" is defined as, "the construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class
members of our society, including the construction of the supporting infrastructure and other
facilities" (Pres. Decree No. 1224, par. 1). This definition was later expanded to include among
others:

a) The construction and/or improvement of dwelling units for the middle and lower
income groups of the society, including the construction of the supporting
infrastructure and other facilities;

b) Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters and slum dwellers as

well as the provision of related facilities and services;

c) Slum improvement which consists basically of allocating homelots to the dwellers

in the area or property involved, rearrangemeant and re-alignment of existing houses
and other dwelling structures and the construction and provision of basic community
facilities and services, where there are none, such as roads, footpaths, drainage,
sewerage, water and power system schools, barangay centers, community centers,
clinics, open spaces, parks, playgrounds and other recreational facilities;

d) The provision of economic opportunities, including the development of commercial

and industrial estates and such other facilities to enhance the total community
growth; and

e) Such other activities undertaken in pursuance of the objective to provide and

maintain housing for the greatest number of people under Presidential Decree No,
757, (Pres. Decree No. 1259, sec. 1)

The "public use" requirement for a and exercise of the power of eminent domain is a flexible and
evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. In this jurisdiction, the statutory and judicial
trend has been summarized as follows:

The taking to be valid must be for public use. There was a time when it was felt that a
literal meaning should be attached to such a requirement. Whatever project is
undertaken must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of streets or parks.
Otherwise, expropriation is not allowable. It is not anymore. As long as the purpose
of the taking is public, then the power of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to remove any doubt, determines what is
public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for
resale at cost to individuals. The other is in the transfer, through the exercise of this
power, of utilities and other private enterprise to the government. It is accurate to
state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use [Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes,
G.R. Nos. 60549, 60553-60555 October 26, 1983, 125 SCRA 220 (1983) at 234-5
quoting E. FERNANDO, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 523-4, (2nd
ed., 1977) Emphasis supplied].
The term "public use" has acquired a more comprehensive coverage. To the literal import of the term
signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the broader notion of indirect
public benefit or advantage. As discussed in the above cited case of Heirs of Juancho Ardona:

The restrictive view of public use may be appropriate for a nation which
circumscribes the scope of government activities and public concerns and which
possesses big and correctly located public lands that obviate the need to take private
property for public purposes. Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines. We
have never been a laissez faire State. And the necessities which impel the exertion
of sovereign power are all too often found in areas of scarce public land or limited
government resources. (p. 231)

Specifically, urban renewal or redevelopment and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized
as a public purpose, not only because of the expanded concept of public use but also because of
specific provisions in the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution made it incumbent upon the State to
establish, maintain and ensure adequate social services including housing [Art. 11, sec. 7]. The
1987 Constitution goes even further by providing that:

The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty through
policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment, a rising
standard of living and an improved quality of life for all. [Art. II, sec. 9]

The state shall by law, and for the common good, undertake, in cooperation with the
private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and housing which will
make available at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. It
shall also promote adequate employment opportunities to such citizens. In the
implementation of such program the State shall respect the rights of small property
owners. (Art. XIII, sec. 9, Emphaisis supplied)

Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum, the general welfare. The
public character of housing measures does not change because units in housing projects cannot be
occupied by all but only by those who satisfy prescribed qualifications. A beginning has to be made,
for it is not possible to provide housing for are who need it, all at once.

Population growth, the migration to urban areas and the mushrooming of crowded makeshift
dwellings is a worldwide development particularly in developing countries. So basic and urgent are
housing problems that the United Nations General Assembly proclaimed 1987 as the "International
Year of Shelter for the Homeless" "to focus the attention of the international community on those
problems". The General Assembly is Seriously concerned that, despite the efforts of Governments at
the national and local levels and of international organizations, the driving conditions of the majority
of the people in slums and squatter areas and rural settlements, especially in developing countries,
continue to deteriorate in both relative and absolute terms." [G.A. Res. 37/221, Yearbook of the
United Nations 1982, Vol. 36, p. 1043-4]

In the light of the foregoing, this Court is satisfied that "socialized housing" fans within the confines of
"public use". It is, particularly important to draw attention to paragraph (d) of Pres. Dec. No. 1224
which opportunities inextricably linked with low-cost housing, or slum clearance, relocation and
resettlement, or slum improvement emphasize the public purpose of the project.
In the case at bar, the use to which it is proposed to put the subject parcels of land meets the
requisites of "public use". The lands in question are being expropriated by the NHA for the expansion
of Bagong Nayon Housing Project to provide housing facilities to low-salaried government
employees. Quoting respondents:

1. The Bagong Nayong Project is a housing and community development

undertaking of the National Housing Authority. Phase I covers about 60 hectares of
GSIS property in Antipolo, Rizal; Phase II includes about 30 hectares for industrial
development and the rest are for residential housing development.

It is intended for low-salaried government employees and aims to provide housing

and community services for about 2,000 families in Phase I and about 4,000 families
in Phase II.

It is situated on rugged terrain 7.5 kms. from Marikina Town proper; 22 Kms. east of
Manila; and is within the Lungs Silangan Townsite Reservation (created by
Presidential Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977).

The lands involved in the present petitions are parts of the expanded/additional areas
for the Bagong Nayon Project totalling 25.9725 hectares. They likewise include raw,
rolling hills. (Rollo, pp. 266-7)

The acute shortage of housing units in the country is of public knowledge. Official data indicate that
more than one third of the households nationwide do not own their dwelling places. A significant
number live in dwellings of unacceptable standards, such as shanties, natural shelters, and
structures intended for commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes. Of these unacceptable
dwelling units, more than one third is located within the National Capital Region (NCR) alone which
lies proximate to and is expected to be the most benefited by the housing project involved in the
case at bar [See, National Census and Statistics Office, 1980 Census of Population and Housing].

According to the National Economic and Development Authority at the time of the expropriation in
question, about "50 per cent of urban families, cannot afford adequate shelter even at reduced rates
and will need government support to provide them with social housing, subsidized either partially or
totally" [NEDA, FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN For 1974-1977, p. 357]. Up to the present,
housing some remains to be out of the reach of a sizable proportion of the population" [NEDA,
MEDIUM-TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992, p. 240].

The mushrooming of squatter colonies in the Metropolitan Manila area as well as in other cities and
centers of population throughout the country, and, the efforts of the government to initiate housing
and other projects are matters of public knowledge [See NEDA, FOUR YEAR DEVELOPMENT
PLAN For 1974-1977, pp. 357-361; NEDA, FIVE-YEAR PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1978-
1982, pp. 215-228 NEDA, FIVE YEAR PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1983-1987, pp. 109-
117; NEDA, MEDIUM TERM PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT PLAN 1987-1992, pp. 240-254].

b) Size of Property

Petitioners further contend that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, would allow the taking of "any
private land" regardless of the size and no matter how small the area of the land to be expropriated.
Petitioners claim that "there are vast areas of lands in Mayamot, Cupang, and San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal hundred of hectares of which are owned by a few landowners only. It is surprising [therefore]
why respondent National Housing Authority [would] include [their] two man lots ..."
In J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administration [G. R. No. L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31
SCRA 413 (1970) at 428] this Court earlier ruled that expropriation is not confined to landed estates.
This Court, quoting the dissenting opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Republic vs. Baylosis, [96 Phil.
461 (1955)], held that:

The propriety of exercising the power of eminent domain under Article XIII, section 4
of our Constitution cannot be determined on a purely quantitative or area basis. Not
only does the constitutional provision speak of lands instead of landed estates, but I
see no cogent reason why the government, in its quest for social justice and peace,
should exclusively devote attention to conflicts of large proportions, involving a
considerable number of individuals, and eschew small controversies and wait until
they grow into a major problem before taking remedial action.

The said case of J.M. Tuason Co., Inc. departed from the ruling in Guido vs. Rural Progress
Administration [84 Phil. 847 (1949)] which held that the test to be applied for a valid expropriation of
private lands was the area of the land and not the number of people who stood to be benefited.
Since then "there has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the "number of people to be benefited
test" " [Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. v. Dimayuga, G.R. No. 32049, June 25,1984, 130
SCRA 30 (1984) at 39]. Thus, in Pulido vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 57625, May 3, 1983, 122
SCRA 63 (1983) at 73], this Court stated that, "[i]t is unfortunate that the petitioner would be
deprived of his landholdings, but his interest and that of his family should not stand in the way of
progress and the benefit of the greater may only of the inhabitants of the country."

The State acting through the NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular
property/properties to be taken for socialized housing purposes and how much thereof may be
expropriated. Absent a clear showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross abuse of discretion, which
petitioners herein failed to demonstrate, the Court will give due weight to and leave undisturbed the
NHA's choice and the size of the site for the project. The property owner may not interpose
objections merely because in their judgment some other property would have been more suitable, or
just as suitable, for the purpose. The right to the use, enjoyment and disposal of private property is
tempered by and has to yield to the demands of the common good. The Constitutional provisions on
the subject are clear:

The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national development. (Art. II,
sec. 10)

The Congress shall give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic,
and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good. To this end, the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of property and its increments. (Art, XIII,
sec. 1)

Indeed, the foregoing provisions, which are restatements of the provisions in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions, emphasize:

...the stewardship concept, under which private property is supposed to be held by

the individual only as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As
a mere steward, the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own
exclusive and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation
[Mataas na Lupa Tenants Association, Inc. supra at 42-3 citing I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE
POLITICAL LAW, 70 (1983 ed.)].
2. Just Compensation

Petitioners maintain that Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended, would allow the taking of private
property upon payment of unjust and unfair valuations arbitrarily fixed by government assessors. In
addition, they assert that the Decree would deprive the courts of their judicial discretion to determine
what would be "just compensation".

The foregoing contentions have already been ruled upon by this Court in the case of Ignacio vs.
Guerrero (G.R. No. L-49088, May 29, 1987) which, incidentally, arose from the same expropriation
complaint that led to this instant petition. The provisions on just compensation found in Presidential
Decree Nos. 1224, 1259 and 1313 are the same provisions found in Presidential Decree Nos. 76,
464, 794 and 1533 which were declared unconstitutional in Export Processing Zone All thirty vs.
Dulay (G.R. No. 5960 April 29, 1987) for being encroachments on prerogatives.

This Court abandoned the ruling in National Housing Authority vs. Reyes [G.R. No. 49439, June
29,1983, 123 SCRA 245 (1983)] which upheld Pres. Decree No. 464, as amended by - Presidential
Decree Nos. 794, 1224 and 1259.

In said case of Export Processing Zone Authority, this Court pointed out that:

The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.

Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It
means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. ALL the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities,
should be considered.

xxx xxx xxx

Various factors can come into play in the valuation of specific properties singled out
for expropriation. The values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for
very wide areas covering several barrios or even an entire total with the exception of
the poblacion. Individual differences are never taken into account. The value of land
is based on such generalities as its possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or
other crops. Very often land described as directional has been cultivated for
generations. Buildings are described in terms of only two or three classes of building
materials and estimates of areas are more often inaccurate than correct. Tax values
can serve as guides but cannot be absolute substitutes for just compensation.

To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors
since they had the opportunity to protest is illusory. The overwhelming mass of
landowners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by
local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less
analyze, the statements. The Idea of expropriation simply never occurs until a
demand is made or a case filed by an agency authorized to do so. (pp. 12-3)

3. Due Process

Petitioners assert that Pres. Decree 1224, as amended, violates procedural due process as it allows
immediate taking of possession, control and disposition of property without giving the owner his day
in court. Respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a writ of possession without notice and without
hearing.

The constitutionality of this procedure has also been ruled upon in the Export Processing Zone
Authority case, viz:

It is violative of due process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation in the tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to basic
concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of minor bureaucrat or
clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro
and con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a
fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated. (p. 13)

On the matter of the issuance of a writ of possession, the ruling in the Ignacio case is reiterated,
thus:

[I]t is imperative that before a writ of possession is issued by the Court in

expropriation proceedings, the following requisites must be met: (1) There must be a
Complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and in substance; (2) A provisional
determination of just compensation for the properties sought to be expropriated must
be made by the trial court on the basis of judicial (not legislative or executive)
discretion; and (3) The deposit requirement under Section 2, Rule 67 must be
complied with. (p. 14)

This Court holds that "socialized housing" defined in Pres. Decree No. 1224, as amended by Pres.
Decree Nos. 1259 and 1313, constitutes "public use" for purposes of expropriation. However, as
previously held by this Court, the provisions of such decrees on just compensation are
unconstitutional; and in the instant case the Court finds that the Orders issued pursuant to the
corollary provisions of those decrees authorizing immediate taking without notice and hearing are
violative of due process.

WHEREFORE, the Orders of the lower court dated January 17, 1978 and June 28, 1978 issuing the
writ of possession on the basis of the market value appearing therein are annulled for having been
issued in excess of jurisdiction. Let this case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings to determine the compensation the petitioners are entitled to be paid. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-59118 March 3, 1988

JUAN DIZON AND SOLEDAD RAMOS, petitioners,

vs.
BRIG. GEN. VICENTE EDUARDO AND COL. TEDDY CARIAN, respondents.

Free Legal Assistance Group for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

RESOLUTION

TEEHANKEE, C. J.:

"This is a case of disappeared persons" (desaparecidos). This was the opening plea filed six years ago by the late Senator Jose Wright
Diokno as lead counsel 1 on behalf of the parents of the two young persons Eduardo Dizon, 30 years of age at the time, single and described
in the petition as "a community leader and a self-employed businessman (despite his having only one arm)" and Isabel Ramos, 22 years of
age at the time, single and a former architecture student. The two had been arrested with others by the military, detained in the military
camp, and then claimed by the military to have been released after nine days. But they were not released to their parents, who had been
visiting them, nor to any other responsible person and were never seen or heard from by anyone since then.

Senator Diokno passed away a year ago last February 27th. He, together with the martyred Senator
Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. were the first victims of martial law imposed in September 1972 by then
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, destroying in one fell swoop the Philippines' 75 years of stable
democratic traditions and established reputation as the showcase of democracy in Asia. They were
the first to be arrested in the d ark of the night of September 22, 1972, as the military authorities
spread out through the metropolis upon orders of the President-turned-dictator to lock up the
opposition together with newspaper editors, journalists and columnists and detain them at various
army camps. What was the martial law government's justification for the arrest and detention of
Diokno and Aquino? The government's return to their petitions for habeas corpus claimed that they
were "regarded as participants or as having given aid and comfort "in the conspiracy to seize political
and state power and to take over the government by force.'"2 The fact is that they just happened to
be the foremost contenders for the Presidency of the Republic in the scheduled November 1973
Presidential elections, at which time Mr. Marcos would have finished his second 4-year term and
barred under the prevailing 1935 Constitution from running for a third term. In their petitions for
habeas corpus, they challenged the proclamation of martial law and their arbitrary detention,
invoking the Constitution and the Bill of Rights.

It was to take almost two years for Diokno to regain his liberty. No charges of any sort were ever
filed against him. His continued arbitrary detention without any charges for close to two years was
getting more and more untenable. As the separate opinion-resolution 3 of then Chief Justice Querube
C. Makalintal stated, a vote of seven-to-five of the Court's twelve members then in favor of granting
Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition filed earlier was not deemed sufficient by the majority which
scheduled the promulgation of the Court's action and resolution dismissing all the petitions and
upholding the validity of the martial law proclamation for September 12, 1974, which was the last day
before Justice Calixto Zaldivar's compulsory retirement from the Court upon reaching the age of 70.
But as the said opinion-resolution further stated: "Before they could be promulgated, however, a
major development supervened: petitioner Diokno was released by the President in the morning of
September 11, 1974. In view thereof all the members of this Court except Justice Castro agreed to
dismiss Diokno's petition on the ground that it had become moot, with those who originally voted to
grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an additional ground for such dismissal.

What is not found in the proceedings or opinions and which should now be made part of the record
for the sake of historical truth is that what precipitated the sudden order releasing Diokno on
September 11, 1974 was that Mme. Justice Cecilia Munoz-Palma, who had been appointed to the
Court with two others on October 21, 1973, had submitted a dissent with her separate opinion
assailing Diokno's continued detention for two years without charges as a violation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. This promptly reached the big ears of Mr. Marcos and he forthwith
issued the release order and aborted Justice Palma's dissent. The Court's 11-member 4opinion-
resolution dismissing all petitions and upholding the validity of the proclamation of martial law with
eight separate opinions was ultimately released on September 17, 1974.5

Senator Ninoy Aquino underwent an even more tortuous ordeal. He was charged on August 11,
1973 with murder, subversion and illegal possession of firearms and found guilty and sentenced to
death by a military commission, notwithstanding his being a civilian and the fact that said general
offenses were allegedly committed before the imposition of martial law, and could not fall within the
jurisdiction of military commissions, which are not courts but mere adjuncts of the Commander-in-
Chief to enforce military discipline. Mr. Marcos had publicly pronounced the evidence against Ninoy
as "not only strong but overwhelming" in a nation-wide press conference on August 24, 1971
following the Plaza Miranda bombing three days earlier of the LP proclamation meeting, yet had not
charged him before the civil courts. Ninoy had contended correctly but in vain that he had been
publicly indicted and his guilt prejudged by Mr. Marcos' and he could not possibly get due process
and a fair trial before a group of Mr. Marcos' military subordinates. 6 In 1980. After over eight years of
detention, Ninoy Aquino was allowed to leave to undergo heart surgery in the U.S. After three years
of exile, he sought to return and as is now history, he was to die within 60 seconds of his being led
away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the MIA on August 21,1983 at past 1 p.m.

Diokno and Ninoy had undergone untold hardships of solitary confinement and deprivation during
their long detention. In fact, at one time they themselves had disappeared were
also desaparecidos. Their wives filed in early April, 1973 an urgent petition, stating that after their
visitation privileges were stopped since March 10, 1973 and February 25, 1973, respectively, their
husbands had disappeared from their detention cells and that they had lost all contact with them for
over a month and, worse, that all their personal effects and clothes, including their eyeglasses,
toothbrushes and medicines had been ominously returned without any explanation to their homes. It
turned out that Ninoy had been able to smuggle out of his solitary cell a written statement critical of
Mr. Marcos and his martial law regime. He and Diokno were thereafter secretly flown out, manacled
and blindfolded, by the military to the army camp at Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija where they were
stripped naked and isolated in boarded cells with hardly any light or ventilation.

On the same day, April 6, 1973, the Court forthwith "upon humanitarian consideration .... resolved
unanimously to grant ... (their) prayer to be allowed to visit their husbands, subject to such
precautions as respondents may deem necessary." Again, we must record here for the sake of
historical truth, and so that such undue interference and pressure upon the Court may never again
come to pass, that upon the issuance of the Resolution, the then Acting Solicitor General (in the
absence of then Solicitor General Mendoza), upon orders of the powers that were, sought audience
with the then Chief Justice (who convened the members of the Court), in an attempt to convince the
Court to recall the Resolution, citing reasons of national security and personal safety of the
detainees and that "compliance with the Resolution will encroach upon and dangerously erode the
martial law powers exclusively vested in the President by the 1935 and 1973 Constitution." 6-a The
Court, as one, maintained its Resolution (telling him to file a proper motion for reconsideration, which
he did on April 10, 1973 and was to be rendered moot afterwards). To do otherwise would have
been craven submission and abdication. When their wives finally got to see Diokno and Ninoy on
April 8,1973 for thirty minutes after a four-hour automobile trip to the concentration camp at Fort
Magsaysay, they were a pitiable sight, having lost about 30 to 40 pounds in weight.

After Diokno's release on September 11, 1974, in the words of living legend Justice J.B.L. Reyes "(I)t
is a measure of his soul's greatness that after being unjustly imprisoned for two years and released
without any charges being preferred against him, Ka Pepe wasted no time in protests or
recriminations but immediately proceeded to organize and guide the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) dedicated to the gratuitous defense and vindication of others who, like him, would be
persecuted, oppressed and denied justice. To this task he dedicated the rest of his life, even when
nailed to the bed of suffering that brought him to an early grave." 7 It is fitting that his selfless
dedication to the cause of the poor, the deprived and the oppressed and to pro bonoservice be
herein duly acknowledged, albeit posthumously. He knew only too well, having experienced it
himself with his wife and family, the mental anguish and torture and the sustained shock undergone
by the spouses and families of persons who have disappeared "the crushing reality of loss
coupled with the unreality of death that afflicts the families of those who have disappeared The result
is a form of mental torture brought about by either the suspension of bereavement or the feeling of
helplessness and paralyzing uncertainty about what to do to protect their loved ones." 8 He wished
at the very least to alleviate their pain and anguish. Illustrious son of an illustrious father, Justice
Ramon Diokno, 9 he left a legacy of hope and faith in the Filipino, as he wrote:

When martial law was imposed, what happened to the law?

And so law in the land died. I grieve for it but I do not despair over it. I know, with a
certainty no argument can turn, no wind can shake, that from its dust will rise a new
and better law: more just, more human and more humane. When that will happen, I
know not. That it will happen, I know .10

This application for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus had been filed on December 17,1981 by
petitioners, Juan Dizon and Soledad Ramos, on behalf of their son, Eduardo Dizon and their
daughter, Isabel Ramos, respectively, who were arrested on September 15,1981 by Philippine
Constabulary (PC) elements of the Pampanga PC Command then led by respondent Provincial
Commander Col. Teddy Carian at Barrio Sto. Rosario, Sta. Ana, Pampanga without warrant of arrest
or Presidential Order of Arrest They were detained by the respondents at the PC Stockade at San
Fernando, Pampanga under the jurisdiction of respondents Brig. Gen. Vicente Eduardo, then
Regional Commander of the area, holding office at Camp Olivas, and Col. Teddy Carian for
interrogation and investigation without assistance of counsel. The desaparecidos were allegedly
released nine days later, or on September 24,1981, as per their release papers of the same
date.11 However, they were never seen nor heard from since their supposed release. Alleging that
the signatures of the desaparecidos on their release papers were falsified and thus, they were never
released by the military said release being a scheme of the respondents to prolong their detention,
torture and interrogation, the petitioners-parents filed the petition at bar on December 17,1981.

The Court issued the writ of habeas corpus on December 29, 1981. In the return of the writ filed on
behalf of respondents on January 5,1982, by then Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, and
verified by respondent, then Provincial Commander Col. Carian, respondents insisted that the
detainees were indeed released on September 24,1981, and submitted the supporting affidavits
dated December 30, 1981 of Major Reynaldo C. Cabauatan and lst Lt. Roque S. Maranon, both
assigned with respondent Carian's Provincial Headquarters.12 Respondents denied petitioners'
allegation of falsification of the detainees' signatures on their release papers, claiming that the same
were signed in their presence and asked for dismissal of the petition.

Diokno invoked the United Nations General Assembly Resolution expressing deep concern over
such cases of involuntary disappearances and calling on all governments to stamp it out, as follows:

RESOLUTION ON DISAPPEARED PERSONS

December 20, 1978

The General Assembly.

Recalling the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and in

particular Articles 3, 5, 9, 10 and 11, concerning, inter alia, the right to life, liberty and
security of person, freedom from torture, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention,
and the right to a fair and public trial; and the provisions of articles 6,7,9 and 10 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which define and establish
safeguards for certain of these rights;

Deeply concerned by reports from various parts of the world relating to enforced or
involuntary disappearances of persons as a result of excesses on the part of law
enforcement or security authorities or similar organizations, often while such persons
are subject to detention or imprisonment, as well as of unlawful actions or
widespread violence;

Concerned also at reports of difficulties in obtaining reliable information from

competent authorities as to the circumstances of such persons, including reports of
the persistent refusal of such authorities or organizations to acknowledge that they
hold such persons in their custody or otherwise to account for them;

Mindful of the danger to the life, liberty and physical ty of such persons arising from
the persistent failure of these authorities or organizations to acknowledge that such
persons are held in custody or otherwise to account for them;

Deeply moved by the anguish and sorrow which such stances cause to the relatives
of disappeared persons, especially to spouses, children and parents;

1. Call upon Governments:

(a) In the event reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances, to devote

appropriate resources to searching for such persons and to undertake speedy and
impartial investigations;

(b) To ensure that law enforcement and security authorities or organizations are fully
accountable, especially in law, in the discharge of their duties, such accountability to
include legal responsibility for unjustifiable excesses which might lead to enforced or
involuntary disappearances and to other violations of human rights;

(c) To ensure that the human rights of all persons, including those subjected to any
form of detention and imprisonment, are fully respected;
 (d) To cooperate with other Governments, relevant United Nations organs,
specialized agencies, inter-governmental organizations and humanitarian bodies in a
common effort to search for, locate or account for such persons in the event of
reports of enforced or involuntary disappearances;

2. Requests the Commission on Human Rights to consider the question of

disappeared persons with a view to making appropriate recommendations;

3. Urges the Secretary-General to continue to use his good offices in cases of

enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons, drawing, as appropriate, upon
the relevant experience of the International Committee of the Red Cross and of other
humanitarian organizations;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to draw the concerns expressed in this resolution

to the attention of all Governments, regional and inter-regional organizations and
specialized agencies for the purpose of conveying on an urgent basis the need for
disinterested humanitarian action to respond to the situation of persons who have
disappeared.

UN Document A/RES 33/173

Diokno posed on behalf of the desaparecidos the following vital questions in the case at bar: When
respondents' defense to a petition for habeas corpus is that they released the detainees for whom
the petition was filed, but the allegation of release is disputed by petitioners, and it is not denied that
the detainees have not been seen or heard from since their supposed release, do petitioners have
the burden in law of proving that the detainees are still detained by respondents or does the burden
shift to respondents of proving that they did release the detainees? Secondly, if respondents have
the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that they released the detainees, have they
in fact discharged that burden in this case? And lastly, if respondents have not satisfied the Court
that they released the detainees, but nevertheless refuse or are unable to produce their bodies, what
relief may the Court grant petitioners?

I. On the first question, we have applied the general rule in a number of cases that the release of a
detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic. Respondents make
such a plea in line with their return that they had released the desaparecidos after nine days. But
their return begs the question. The cited general rule postulates that the release of the detainees is
an established fact and not in dispute, and that they do not continue to be missing persons
or desaparecidos. Where, however, there are grounds for grave doubts about the alleged release of
the detainees, which we share, particularly, where the standard and prescribed procedure in
effecting the release has not been followed, then the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence the alleged release is shifted to the respondents. Release is an affirmative defense and
"each party must prove his own affirmative allegations," 13 just as the burden of proof of self-defense
in a killing rests on the accused. Moreover, evidence of release lies particularly within respondents'
power.

II. This brings us to the second question: Have the respondents proved the alleged release by clear
and convincing evidence? Diokno submitted a negative answer thereto on the following grounds:

1. The signatures of the detainees on their release papers were falsified. (Petitioners submitted
specimen signatures of the desaparecidos Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos, attached as Annexes
"B" and "C", respectively, of the petition. At the hearing of the case on January 7, 1982, the records
of the PC/INP Command, San Fernando, Pampanga were submitted to this Court by the Solicitor
General. On page 33 thereof, is found the application for registration as voter of Eduardo Dizon
which was filed with the Election Registrar of Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on October 29,1977, while on
page 88- 95, are found the statement of Isabel Ramos when she previously surrendered to the
Bataan PC Command in 1978, the booking sheet and arrest report, and on pages 51-62 and 73-84
are copies other statement executed on September 16,1981, after her second arrest. A xerox copy
of the voting record 14 of Eduardo Dizon, when he voted at Sta. Ana, Pampanga in the 1981
presidential election was also submitted. The documents bear the signatures of the undisputed
detainess. Diokno submitted that even the signatures of the detainees on documents that
respondents themselves submitted are markedly different from the signatures on their supposed
release certificates. With respect to Eduardo Dizon, Diokno noted particularly the very poor line
quality of Dizon's signature on the release certificate when compared to the speed and freedom of
his signature on his voter's application form . 15 With respect to Isabel Ramos, the final letter's' in
Ramos in the waiver of detention and certificate of release do not contain any retrace or flourish,
whereas in all her signatures on her statements the final letter "s" has a retrace like an "x" as the last
stroke. 16

The Solicitor General, in turn, in the Answer filed as Supplement to the Return on behalf of
respondents disputes Diokno's conclusions about the falsity of the detainees' signatures on the
release certificates and questions the reliability of the specimen signatures used, adding that "it is
not possible to make any comparison of signatures for the purpose of determining genuineness on
the basis of xerox copies.17

2. Respondents did not follow the prescribed standard procedure for releasing detainees:

a) Respondents did not release the detainees to their parents though the latter had been visiting
them and, in fact Dizon's father was in the camp on the very day he was supposedly released.
Failing this, they should be released to another responsible person in the community. This is the
standard practice, as shown by the certificate of release of Isabel Ramos when she was first taken
into custody in 1978 as well as the certificates of release of the other alleged "Communist Terrorists"
arrested with the two desaparecidos who were released a day ahead.

b) Defense Ministry regulations require that releases be reported to the Ministry within 72 hours.
Respondent Carian did not report the supposed releases to the Ministry. In fact, he did not even
report their "releases" to his regional commander, respondent Gen. Eduardo.

c) Respondent Carian's command could not readily furnish copies of the detainees' release
certificates to their parents when the latter asked for them. They took one month to produce the
certificate of Isabel and three months to produce that of Eduardo.

d) Respondent Col. Carian had no authority, inherent or delegated, to release the detainees. In
respondents' return, it was stated that the two were arrested in flagrante delicto with unlicensed
firearms and explosives. Under General Order No. 67 (October 8, 1980), only the President or his
duly authorized representative could have released the two before trial. Respondent Carian's
records also fail to show that he consulted with respondent General Eduardo, much less with
Defense Minister Enrile, before he supposedly released the detainees.

3. The inherent implausibility of respondent Carian's reason for supposedly releasing the detainees
that they had agreed to act as spies.

a) Respondent Carian says he knew that Isabel had once before been detained for subversive
activities. It is unlikely that Isabel would have agreed to become a spy and even more unlikely that
respondent Carian would have believed her if she had.
b) Respondent Carian knew that the probability of the detainees' keeping their supposed bargain
was remote. Yet, he took no precautions to insure compliance. Worse, when they broke the
supposed bargain by failing to report as he says they agreed to, he took no steps to look for them.

c) If respondent Carian wanted the detainees to become spies, he certainly made

sure neither would be effective.

He did not follow the prescribed procedure in releasing them. That made the release and
consequently the detainees themselves--immediately suspect.

He required them to report to his command twice a month. That made it virtually certain that their
activities would be discovered, and soon, by their comrades.

He eagerly revealed the supposed bargain in his defense in this case, making it a matter of public
record. That effectively stifled any possibility of the supposed bargain's ever being carried out.

It appears clear that no bargain was ever made with the detainees for them to be released in order
for them to act as spies. The given reason for their release in order to act as spies appears far from
credible considering that respondents were admittedly aware the risk that the detainees "would
renege on their promise."18 The burden of proving their actual release remains undischarged!

4. What is likewise difficult of comprehension is that according to the affidavits of Major Cabauatan
and Lt. Maranon, elements of their command after encountering a group of "heavily armed men"
captured the detainees with other alleged Comminist Terrorists; with one casualty on the latter's
side, yet all of them except the two detainees "were released on or before September 23, 1981,
having been found out that no sufficient evidence would be established to warrant their further
detention" (see fn. 12, supra) and on September 24,1981, the two desaparecidos were likewise
supposedly released. This appears to be a result of respondents' own decision, without proper
referral to the proper prosecution authorities to make the judgment. This was in effect admitted by
the Solicitor General in his Supplemental Answer stating that:

The release of Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos was part of a military operation
against the NPA. The Pampanga PC Commander, respondent Lt. Col. Carian, had
authority from higher headquarters to do what was essential in connection with that
military operation. This was confirmed during the hearing by respondent Gen.
Eduardo. Respondent Carian used sound discretion in releasing the two. Instead of
attempting to prosecute them with evidence perhaps inadequate to convict although
adequate prima facie, he decided to derive benefit from the situation by using them
to obtain information on NPA activities. 19

Having been supposedly found with explosives and unlicensed firearms in an encounter, such
decision to release them instead and enlist them as spies again appears to strain credulity. More so
in the case of Isabel Ramos who at 19 years in 1978 had already reneged on her alleged promise to
spy for respondents. And in the case of Eduardo Dizon, while the military regarded him as a
suspected "Communist Terrorist", his claim as a community leader seems to have valid basis for the
Solicitor General himself had appointed him as KBL watcher in the 1980 elections and his father had
sought the Solicitor General's assistance several times to find Eduardo. Nor have respondents
questioned petitioners' good faith and their efforts to find their missing children.

III. The Court regrets that it cannot grant the relief sought by petitioners. It is not the repository of all
remedies for every grievance. But the Court does state that under the facts and circumstances
above set forth, it is far from satisfied and as already indicated shares the grave doubts about public
respondents' allegation that they had released the desaparecidos on September 24, 1981, nine days
after they were taken into custody. Petitioners' charges of falsification of the detainees' alleged
signatures on the certificates of release, compounded by the irregularities and failure of respondents
to follow the prescribed procedure in effecting the release for purposes of authentication and to
produce and furnish the parents upon request copies of the release certificates (taking one month in
the case of Isabel Ramos and three months in the case of Eduardo Dizon) need thorough
investigation. If duly determined, they would involve, as indicated by Diokno, prosecution for criminal
contempt, falsification of public document, perjury and violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code requiring delivery of detained persons to the judicial authority within the periods therein fixed,
and worse. This connotes that the respondents with their subordinates who executed the supporting
affidavits, Major Cabauatan and Lt. Maranon, were involved in a grand conspiracy for the purpose.
The Court cannot make this determination. It is not a trier of facts, nor does it have the means and
facilities to conduct such investigation of the grave charges at bar as well as of the whereabouts and
fate of the desaparecidos.

While the case was pending under the martial law regime of Mr. Marcos whom the people finally
ousted on February 25, 1986, the Court was hard put to refer the charges to an independent
government entity or agency to conduct such investigation. Diokno in his traverse of February
24,1982 to the return had in expressing hope that the desaparecidos might still be alive as against
the Solicitor General's conjecture that they may have met their death after their alleged release, cited
documented cases of other detainees who were arrested and hidden by the military for periods from
four months to almost a year, then allowed to surface, such as that of:

Delfin Delica, a former university student arrested on October 11, 1975, along the
highway in Bulacan, Central Luzon. He was confined incommunicado for nearly a
year in a 'safehouse' of the Constabulary Anti- Narcotics Unit (CANU), which is also
involved in anti-subversive operations, before his relatives were informed of his
whereabouts and were allowed to see him. ...

Another prisoner arrested and kept in isolation by CANU was Francisco Pascual, Jr.,
a pastor at the Four-square Church and student at the University of the Philippines,
Los Baos. Pascual was held incommunicado for four and a half-months in a
safehouse and tortured by CANU agents led by Lieutenant Colonel Saturnino
Domingo, deputy CANU chief. Pascual, however, managed to escape from the
"safehouse" to tell of his ordeal.

A more recent case ... is that of Sixto Carlos, Jr. Arrested on April 23, 1979, in
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, with no witnesses, Sixto Carlos, Jr. was held
incommunicado and blindfolded in a small, dark room where he was tortured for
several days. His tormentors refused to allow him to take medication prescribed for
his heart ailment, although they had found the results of his ECG test in his wallet. It
was four months before his family learned of his whereabouts.

... Sixto Carlos, Jr.'s father is a retired Colonel and was at one time the armed forces
Judge Advocate General. Normally the military officers who arrested Sixto, Jr. would
have given due regard to this fact and informed the retired colonel of his son's
whereabouts and well-being. But even the armed forces chief of staff, General
Romeo Espino, and Defense minister Juan Ponce Enrile categorically denied having
Sixto, Jr. in custody despite persistent appeals by the family.

... it took a personal audience by Sixto, Jr.'s wife with President Marcos to get
definitive information that the prisoner was alive and in military custody. Only upon
 Marcos' order was the wife and she alone first allowed to visit her husband at
the heavily-secured military Security Unit detention area in Fort Bonifacio. Sixto, Jr.'s
lawyer, Jose W. Diokno, later managed to see him once; Sixto, Jr. was pressured to
dismiss Diokno as his lawyer, under threat of losing the visiting privilege of his wife
and children if he did not do so.

Disappearances: A Workbook, New York: Amnesty International USA, 1981, pp.

71-72.20

Fortunately, after the historic February 1986 peaceful revolution which saw the ouster of the Marcos
dictatorship and the restoration of freedom and democracy in our beloved land, President Corazon
C. Aquino immediately moved to restore fundamental democratic structures and processes. One
such step, among many, was the creation on March 18, 1986 of the Presidential Committee On
Human Rights (PCHR) 21 with Diokno himself as chairman to affirm "the new governments
commitment to "uphold and respect the people's civil liberties and human rights,'" and "the United
Nations General Assembly's Resolution of 14 December 1984, encouraging all member states to
take steps for the establishment or, where they already exist, the strengthening of national
institutions for protection of human rights," 22 and was primarily charged with the investigation, among
others, of "complaints it may receive, cases known to it or to its members, and such cases as the
President may, from time to time assign to it, of unexplained or forced disappearances (extra-judicial
killings, salvaging, massacres, torture, hamletting, food blockades) and other violations of human
rights, past or present, committed by officers or agents of the national government or persons acting
in their place or stead or under their orders, express or implied."

More, the 1987 Constitution which was overwhelmingly ratified on February 2,1987 expressly
mandated the creation of the Commission on Human Rights as an independent office 23 in place of a
mere Presidential Committee. The Constitution vested the Commission on Human Rights with
broader powers than its predecessor committee, such as to investigate, on its own or on complaint
by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights; to exercise
visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities; to establish a continuing program of
research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights; to
recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, on their families; to monitor the government's
compliance with international treaty, obligations on human rights and grant immunity from
prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its
authority. On May 5, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 163 declaring
the effectivity of the creation of the Commission On Human Rights as provided for in the 1987
Constitution. This case (as well as all other cases, past and present) may therefore be properly
referred to said Commission for a full and thorough investigation and determination of the facts and
circumstances surrounding the disappearance of Eduardo Dizon and Isabel Ramos and of the
related grave charges of petitioners against the respondents and the other officers above-named.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to refer this case to the Commission on Human Rights for
investigation and appropriate action as may be warranted by its findings, and to furnish the Court
with a report of the outcome of its investigation and action taken thereon. This Resolution is
immediately executory.

Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.

Grio-Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MELECIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Except for the obiter in pp. 2-9.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur.

Separate Opinions

MELECIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

Except for the obiter in pp. 2-9.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur.