G.R. No.
L-29192 February 22, 1971
GERTRUDES DE LOS SANTOS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAXIMO DE LA CRUZ, defendant-appellant.
Benjamin Pineda for plaintiff-appellee.
Ceasar R. Monteclaros for defendant-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
Direct appeal to this Court on questions of law from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, in its Civil Case No. Q-8792.
From the record of this case, we cull the following salient facts: On May 21, 1965,
Gertrudes de los Santos filed a complaint for specific performance against Maximo de la
Cruz, alleging, among others, that on August 24, 1963, she and several co-heirs,
including the defendant, executed an extrajudicial partition agreement (a copy of which
was attached to the complaint) over a certain portion of land with an area of around
20,000 sq. m.; that the parties thereto had agreed to adjudicate three (3) lots to the
defendant, in addition to his corresponding share, on condition that the latter would
undertake the development and subdivision of the estate which was the subject matter of
the agreement, all expenses in connection therewith to be defrayed from the proceeds of
the sale of the aforementioned three (3) lots; that in spite of demands by the plaintiff, by
the co-heirs, and by the residents of the subdivision, the defendant refused to perform his
aforesaid obligation although he had already sold the aforesaid lots. The plaintiff prayed
the court to order the defendant to comply with his obligation under the extrajudicial
partition agreement and to pay the sum of P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
In his answer, the defendant admitted the due execution of the extrajudicial partition
agreement, but set up the affirmative defenses that the plaintiff had no cause of action
against him because the said agreement was void with respect to her, for the reason that
the plaintiff was not an heir of Pelagia de la Cruz, deceased owner of the property, and
was included in the extrajudicial partition agreement by mistake; and that although he
had disposed of the three lots adjudicated to him, nevertheless the proceeds of the sale
were not sufficient to develop and improve properly the subdivided estate. The answer
contained a counterclaim wherein the defendant alleged that the plaintiff had likewise
sold her share in the estate for P10,000.00, and that the extrajudicial partition agreement
being void insofar as the latter was concerned, he was entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the
proceeds as his share by way of reversion. The defendant prayed that the complaint be
dismissed; that the extrajudicial partition agreement be declared void with respect to the
plaintiff; and, on his counterclaim, that the plaintiff be ordered to pay him the sum of
P2,500.00.
On motion of the defendant, the court below entered an order on July 19, 1965, declaring
the plaintiff in default for not having answered the counterclaim.
On July 6, 1966, the case was submitted for decision on the following stipulation of facts:
1. That the parties admit the existence and execution of the "Extra-
Judicial Partition Agreement" dated August 24, 1963, which was
marked as Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff, and Exhibit "I" for the defendant,
which partition agreement was marked as Annex "A" in the complaint;
2. That the parties agree that the original purpose of the above-
mentioned Extra-Judicial Partition Agreement was for the distribution of
the in question for the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz; however the parties
further agree that several lots in the said land have been sold by some
of the co-heirs, and there are houses several houses constructed
therein and residents therein;
3. That the parties agree that the defendant is the appointed
Administrator and In-charge of the development and subdivision of the
land in question, as provided for in the aforementioned extrajudicial
partition agreement;
4. That parties agree that Lots 1, 2 and 3 as described on page 3, 3rd
paragraph to the last of said partition agreement have been sold by the
defendant herein; and parties further agree that there are no properly
constructed roads, nor proper light and water facilities;
5. That the parties agree that the defendant is the nephew of the
deceased Pelagia de la Cruz aforementioned, who was the owner and
predecessor in interest of the land which was the subject matter of the
extra-judicial partition agreement;
6. That the parties agree that the plaintiff is the grandniece of the said
Pelagia de la Cruz;
7. That Pelagia de la Cruz died intestate and without issue on October
16, 1962, as evidenced by a death certificate, which is marked as
Exhibit "2" for tap defendant; and
8. That Marciana de la Cruz is the mother of the plaintiff and the niece
of the said Pelagia de la Cruz, and that the said Marciana de la Cruz
died on September 22, 1935, as evidenced by Exhibit "3" for the
defendant.
In its decision dated November 3, 1966, the court a quo held that the defendant, being a
party to the extrajudicial partition agreement, was estopped from raising in issue the right
of the plaintiff to inherit from the decedent Pelagia de la Cruz; hence, he must abide by
the terms of the agreement. The court ordered the defendant "to perform his obligations
to develop Lots 1, 2 and 3 of (LRC) Psd-29561 as described on page 2 of the
Extrajudicial Partition Agreement" (meaning, apparently, that the defendant should
develop the subdivision because said Lots 1, 2 and 3 were intended to be sold for this
purpose), and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,000.00 as actual damages, the sum of
P500.00 as attorney's fees, and the costs. No disposition was made of defendant's
counterclaim. The defendant filed a "Motion for New Trial" but the same was denied.
Hence, this appeal.
The seven (7) errors assigned by defendant-appellant in his brief boil down to the
following:
1. The court a quo erred in not holding that the extrajudicial partition
agreement is null and void with respect to plaintiff-appellee, and,
consequently, that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
defendant-appellant.
2. The court a quo erred in holding that defendant-appellant is
estopped from questioning plaintiff-appellee's right to have the
agreement enforced.
3. The court a quo erred in ordering defendant-appellant to pay actual
damages to plaintiff-appellee, and, on the other hand, in not granting
the relief prayed for by defendant-appellant in his counterclaim.
We shall discuss seriatim these errors as thus condensed.
1. In the stipulation of facts submitted to the court below, the parties admit that the owner
of the estate, subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la
Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendant-appellant is a nephew of
the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz, her
mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of the said Pelagia de la Cruz; that plaintiff-
appellee's mother died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz;
and that the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute
the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
The pivotal question is whether, in the premises, plaintiff-appellee is a heir of the
decedent. We are convinced that she is not. Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece
of Pelagia de la Cruz, she could not inherit from the latter by right of representation.
 ART. 972. The right of representation takes place in the direct
descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children of
brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full or half blood.
Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes
the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it
properly takes place. ... .
Applying these two (2) provisions, this Court, in Linart y Pavia vs. Ugarte y Iturralde, 5
Phil., 176 (1905), said,
... [I]n an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not
participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a
nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the
collateral line the right of representation does not obtain beyond sons
and daughters of the brothers and sisters, which would have been the
case if Pablo Linart, the father of the plaintiff, had survived his
deceased uncle.
In the present case, the relatives "nearest in degree" to Pelagia de la Cruz are her
nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee,
a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance.
But what is the legal effect of plaintiff-appellee's inclusion and participation in the
extrajudicial partition agreement insofar as her right to bring the present action is
concerned? They did not confer upon her the right to institute this action. The express
purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement, as admitted by the parties in the
stipulation of facts, was to divide the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz.
Indeed, the said agreement itself states that plaintiff-appellee was participating therein in
representation of her deceased mother. The pertinent portion of the agreement is herein
quoted, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, we ... and Diego de los Santos, married to
Anastasia de la Cruz; Mariano delos Santos married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo
delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos,
married to Narciso Ramota; all in representation of our mother,
MARCIANA DELA CRUZ, ..., do hereby by these presents, mutually,
voluntarily and amicably agree among ourselves to equitably divide the
property left by the deceased PELAGIA DELA CRUZ, and adjudicate
unto ourselves definite and independent portions of the estate in the
following manner ... .
It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were
laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff-appellee was one of the legal heirs of
Pelagia de la Cruz. Plaintiff-appellee not being such a heir, the partition is void with
respect to her, pursuant to Article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:
ART. 1105. A partition which includes a person believed to be a heir,
but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Partition of property affected between a person entitled to inherit from the deceased
owner thereof and another person who thought he was an heir, when he was not really
and lawfully such, to the prejudice of the rights of the true heir designated by law to
succeed the deceased, is null and void (De Torres vs. De Torres, et al., 28 Phil. 49).
A fortiori, plaintiff-appellee could hardly derive from the agreement the right to have its
terms enforced.
2. The extrajudicial partition agreement being void with respect to
plaintiff-appellee, she may not be heard to assert estoppel against defendant-appellant.
Estoppel cannot be predicated on a void contract (17 Am. Jur. 605), or on acts which are
prohibited by law or are against public policy (Baltazar vs. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power
Co., et al., G.R. Nos. 16236-38, June 30, 1965 [14 SCRA 5221). In Ramiro vs. Grao, et
al., 54 Phil., 744 (1930), this Court held:
No estoppel arises where the representation or conduct the party
sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon a mistake.
And which there is authority to the contrary, the weight of authority is
that the acts and declarations of a party based upon an innocent
mistake as to his legal rights will not estop him to assert the same,
especially where every fact known to the party sought to be estopped
is equally well known to the party setting up the estoppel. (21 C.J.,
1125, 1126.)
And in Capili, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-18148, February 28, 1963 (7
SCRA 367), this Court said:
Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to
raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the
widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the
inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her
deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those
inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants
require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of
the facts and be apprised of his rights at the time he performs the act
constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no
estoppel. ... .
3. The award of actual damages in favor of plaintiff-appellee cannot be sustained in view
of the conclusion we have arrived at above. Furthermore, actual or compensatory
damages must be duly proved (Article 2199, Civil Code). Here, no proof of such
damages was presented inasmuch as the case was decided on a stipulation of facts and
no evidence was adduced before the trial court.
We now come to defendant-appellant's counterclaim, in which he alleged that plaintiff-
appelee sold her share to a certain person for the price of P10,000.00, and claims that he
is entitled to one-fourth (1/4) of the proceeds by right of reversion. It will be noted that
plaintiff-appellee had been declared in default on defendant-appellant's counterclaim; but
the latter did not present any evidence to prove the material allegation therein more
specifically, the alleged sale of the former's share for the sum of P10,000.00. That no
such evidence had been adduced is understandable, for the parties expressly submitted
the case for the resolution of the court upon their stipulation of facts which, unfortunately,
did not make any mention of the alleged sale; and neither had defendant made any offer
or move to introduce the necessary evidence to that effect for the consideration and
evaluation by the trial court.
Defendant-appellant contends, however, that in view of plaintiff-appellee's having been
declared in default, the latter must be deemed to have admitted all the allegations in his
counterclaim, so that the court a quo should have granted the relief prayed for by him.
We find no merit in this contention.
Section 1, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:
SECTION 1. Judgment by default.if the defendant fails to answer
within the time specified in these rules, the court shall, upon motion of
the plaintiff and proof of such failure, declare the defendant in default.
Thereupon the court shall proceed to receive the plaintiff's evidence
and render judgment granting him such relief as the complaint and the
facts proven may warrant. This provision applies where no answer is
made to a counterclaim, crossclaim or third-party complaint within the
period provided in this rule.
The abovequoted rule was taken from Sections 128 and 129 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. In Macondray & Co. vs. Eustaquio, 64 Phil., 446 (1937), this Court said:
 Under section 128 of our Code of Civil Procedure, the judgment by
default against a defendant who has neither appeared nor filed his
answer does not imply a waiver of rights except that of being heard
and of presenting evidence in his favor. It does not imply admission by
the defendant of the facts and causes of action of the plaintiff, because
the codal section requires the latter to adduce his evidence in support
of his allegations as an indispensable condition before final judgment
could be given in his favor. Nor could it be interpreted as an admission
by the defendant that the plaintiff's causes of action find support in the
law or that the latter is entitled to the relief prayed for. ... .
Nevertheless, the basic fact appears in the stipulation submitted by the parties that said
plaintiff-appellee admitted having received a portion of the estate by virtue of the
extrajudicial partition agreement dated August 24, 1963, to wit:
(9). Lot 9, (LRC) Psd-29561, containing an area of 1,691 sq. m. as
described in the Technical Description to be adjudicated to Diego delos
Santos, married to Anastacia dela Cruz; Mariano delos Santos,
married to Regina Baluyot; Hilario delos Santos, married to Andrea
Ramoy; Gertrudes delos Santos, married to Pascual Acuna; Alejo
delos Santos, married to Leonila David; and Sotera delos Santos,
married to Narciso Ramota, in co-ownership, share and share alike.
Such being the case, defendant-appellant is apparently correct in his contention that the
lower court erred in not passing on his counterclaim and, consequently, in not sentencing
appellee to turn over to him his corresponding share of said portion received by appellee
under the void partition. Remote relatives or unrelated person who unduly received and
took possession of the property of a deceased person without any right, by virtue of a null
and void partition, must restore it to the legitimate successor in the inheritance (De
Torres vs. De Torres, et al., supra). Of course, if such share has already been disposed
of by appellee to a bona fide purchaser, as seems to be indicated in the unproven
allegations of the counterclaim, We cannot render judgment awarding any specific
amount to defendant-appellant as his proportionate share of the proceeds of such sale
for the reason that, as already stated above, this aspect of the counterclaim has not been
touched upon in the stipulation of facts nor has it been supported by evidence which
appellant should have presented in the lower court but did not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is
hereby reversed and set aside; the defendant-appellant is absolved from any ability to
and in favor of plaintiff-appellee; and, on appellant's counterclaim, appellee is hereby
sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding share of the property she has
received under the extrajudicial partition hereinbefore mentioned if the same has not
already been disposed of as alleged. Costs in both instance against plaintiff-appellee.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar Castro, Fernando,
Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES
and ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the
question raised is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can
inherit from the latter, her mother-in-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales,
a resident of Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T.
Rosales and their two (2) children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another
child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales,
and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has
an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00).
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales
Acebes administratrix of the said estate.
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16,
1972 declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing
their respective share of the estate
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter),
1/4; Macikequerox Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in
her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased,
claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son,
Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial
court denied her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a
widow (surviving spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the
Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in
question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by
their own right, and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an
intestate heir can only inherit either by his own right, as in the order of intestate
succession provided for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation provided for
in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by
right of representation, and if any one of them should have died,
leaving several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided
among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children
or their descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be
entitled to the same share as that of a legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of
representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence
of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the
more confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse
an intestate heir of the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of
Article 887 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by
those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which
case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to
the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the
parent-in-law. We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil
Case No. 3597 (not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the
lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio, the decedent's son-in-law, who,
although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a
third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not
support petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the
estate contemplated therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is
the subject matter of the intestate estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased
Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V.
Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and
971 of the Civil Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one whom the person represented
would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law
because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the
person represented) who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter
whom his father would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of
representation as she has no filiation by blood with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio
Rosales he had an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as
compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of her husband was extinguished by his
death that is why it is their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his deceased father, Carterio
Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to
pass upon the second question posed by the petitioner.
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not
an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit,
with costs against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-18753 March 26, 1965
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANA DEL VAL, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellant.
J.C. Zulueta, G. D. David and N. J. Quisumbing for oppositor-appellant.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila
leaving properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will written in Spanish which she
executed at her residence at No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila. She affixed her
signature at the bottom of the will and on the left margin of each and every page thereof
in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar C. Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn
affixed their signatures below the attestation clause and on the left margin of each and
every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. Said will was
acknowledged before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the testatrix and her
witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following preliminary statement: that she was
possessed of the full use of her mental faculties; that she was free from illegal pressure
or influence of any kind from the beneficiaries of the will and from any influence of fear or
threat; that she freely and spontaneously executed said will and that she had neither
ascendants nor descendants of any kind such that she could freely dispose of all her
estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene
A. Teotico, married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina Mortera. To said spouses the
testatrix left the usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building, while the naked ownership
thereof she left in equal parts to her grandchildren who are the legitimate children of said
spouses. The testatrix also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and universal heir to
all the remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for hearing on September 3, 1955 after
the requisite publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, a deceased
sister of the testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an opposition to the
probate of the will alleging the following grounds: (1) said will was not executed as
required by law; (2) the testatrix was physically and mentally incapable to execute the will
at the time of its execution; and (3) the will was executed under duress, threat or
influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor
had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959,
the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who
took care of the testatrix during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on
November 10, 1960, admitting the will to probate but declaring the disposition made in
favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with the statement that the portion to be vacated by the
annulment should pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for
reconsideration of that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be
vacated by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal
heirs, while the oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the
judgment which decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested
leave to intervene and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of
the decision which nullified the legacy made in his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted to having been denied, both petitioner
and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former from that portion which nullifies the
legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the vacated portion as subject of
succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion which admits the will
to probate. And in this instance both petitioner and oppositor assign several errors which,
stripped of non-essentials, may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has oppositor Ana
del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question been
duly admitted to probate?; (3) Did the probate court commit an error in passing on the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the
portion to be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the
property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The
Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party
has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one
who has a claim against the estate like a creditor (Idem). On the other hand, in Saguinsin
v. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962, this Court said:
According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of
administration must be filed by an "interested person." An interested party has
been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor
(Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this
jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest
required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No.
L-3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70 Phil. 311).
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor any interest in any of the provisions of
the will, and, in the negative, would she acquire any right to the estate in the event that
the will is denied probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no
interest in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any
claim to any property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any
provision designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate. She has
also no interest in the will either as administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any claim
against any portion of the estate because she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building located in Escolta, she had already
disposed of it long before the execution of the will.1wph1.t her true intent.
In the supposition that, the will is denied probate, would the oppositor acquire any
interest in any portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She would acquire such right
only if she were a legal heir of the deceased, but she is not under our Civil Code. It is
true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera,
a deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if
it be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased
sister of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an
illegitimate child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of
her natural father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has
no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; ... ." And the philosophy behind this provision is well expressed in Grey v. Fabie,
68 Phil. 128, as follows:
Between the natural child and the legitimate relatives of the father or mother
who acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of succession. They cannot be
called relatives and they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a blood tie,
but the law does not recognize it. On this, article 943 is based upon the reality of
the facts and upon the presumption will of the interested parties; the natural
child is disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the natural child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing but the product of sin, a
palpable evidence of a blemish upon the family. Every relation is ordinarily
broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding
further grounds of resentment. (7 Manresa, 3d., p. 110.)
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from the fact that she is an adopted child of
Francisca Mortera because under our law the relationship established by adoption is
limited solely to the adopter and the adopted and does not extend to the relatives of the
adopting parents or of the adopted child except only as expressly provided for by law.
Hence, no relationship is created between the adopted and the collaterals of the adopting
parents. As a consequence, the adopted is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives
of the adopter.
The relationship established by the adoption, however, is limited to the adopting
parent, and does not extend to his other relatives, except as expressly provided
by law. Thus, the adopted child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting parents, nor of the legitimate children
which they may have after the adoption, except that the law imposes certain
impediments to marriage by reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the adopter. The relationship created is
exclusively between the adopter and the adopted, and does not extend to the
relatives of either. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652).
Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter and adopted, and does not extend
to other members of the family of either; but the adopted is prohibited to marry
the children of the adopter to avoid scandal. (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law
by Justice Jose B. L. Reyes and Ricardo C. Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also
Caguioa, Comments and Cases on Civil Law 1955, Vol 1, pp. 312-313; Paras,
Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol. 1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to intervene either as testamentary or as
legal heir in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to
probate. Oppositor claims that the same should not have been admitted not only
because it was not properly attested to but also because it was procured thru pressure
and influence and the testatrix affixed her signature by mistake believing that it contained
The claim that the will was not properly attested to is contradicted by the evidence of
record. In this respect it is fit that we state briefly the declarations of the instrumental
witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in perfect state of health at the time she
executed the will for she carried her conversation with her intelligently; that the testatrix
signed immediately above the attestation clause and on each and every page thereof at
the left-hand margin in the presence of the three instrumental witnesses and the notary
public; that it was the testatrix herself who asked her and the other witnesses to act as
such; and that the testatrix was the first one to sign and later she gave the will to the
witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the testatrix since 1945; that it was the
testatrix herself who asked her to be a witness to the will; that the testatrix was the first
one to sign and she gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and afterwards she gave it
to the notary public; that on the day of the execution of the will the testatrix was in the
best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was asked by the testatrix to be one of the
witnesses to the will; that he read and understood the attestation clause before he signed
the document, and all the witnesses spoke either in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said
that the instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed the will at the same time and
place and identified their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that the will
was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper pressure and influence is also belied by
the evidence. On this point the court a quo made the following observation:
The circumstance that the testatrix was then living under the same roof with Dr.
Rene Teotico is no proof adequate in law to sustain the conclusion that there
was improper pressure and undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of isolation
of the testatrix from the oppositor and her witnesses, for their supposed failure
to see personally the testatrix, attributable to the vehemence of Dr. Rene
Teotico, to exclude visitors, took place years after the execution of the will on
May 17, 1951. Although those fact may have some weight to support the theory
of the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the weightier fact that nothing
could have prevented the testatrix, had she really wanted to from subsequently
revoking her 1951 will if it did not in fact reflect and express her own
testamentary dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor and her
witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at the Escolta, in Quiapo and Sta. Cruz,
Manila, walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on different occasions,
each of them was able to talk with her.
We have examined the evidence on the matter and we are fully in accord with the
foregoing observation. Moreover, the mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband
Rene Teotico had the opportunity to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she
lived in their house several years prior to the execution of the will and that she was old
and suffering from hypertension in that she was virtually isolated from her friends for
several years prior to her death is insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses
had testified that the testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the
solemnity of the occasion executed the will under consideration. The exercise of
improper pressure and undue influence must be supported by substantial evidence and
must be of a kind that would overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to
destroy her free agency and make her express the will of another rather than her own
(Coso v. Deza, 42 0. G. 596). The burden is on the person challenging the will that such
influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter which here was not done, for
the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was disproved by the testimony of the
instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among
which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law." (Palacios v. Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch
upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected,
and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. ...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions
therein contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail
to produce the effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by
anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the
testator is the law governing the interested parties, and must be punctually
complied with in so far as it is not contrary to the law or to public morals.
(Montaano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a
will was executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was
in a condition to make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the
new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such
proceedings determines and can determine nothing more. In them the court has
no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions made in the will. It can not
decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another one is valid.
(Castaeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the pronouncement made by the court a
quo declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be
set aside as having been made in excess of its jurisdiction. Another reason why said
pronouncement should be set aside is that the legatee was not given an opportunity to
defend the validity of the legacy for he was not allowed to intervene in this proceeding.
As a corollary, the other pronouncements touching on the disposition of the estate in
favor of some relatives of the deceased should also be set aside for the same reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of the decision which declares that the
will in question has been duly executed and admitted the same to probate, the rest of the
decision is hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Regala, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), G.R. No. 153736
substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEE and their
Children, namely: NICANOR S. TUMBOKON, JR.,
NELIA S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA T. SEGOVIA,
NOBELLA S. TUMBOKON, NABIGAIL T. TAAY,
NAZARENE T. MONTALVO, NORGEL S. Present:
TUMBOKON, NEYSA S. TUMBOKON,
SILVESTRE S. TUMBOKON, NORA T.
MILCZAREK, NONITA T. CARPIO, NERLYN S.
TUMBOKON, and NINFA T. SOLIDUM, CARPIO MORALES, Chairperson
Petitioners, BRION,
BERSAMIN,
ABAD,* and
-versus- VILLARAMA, JR., JJ
 APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE Legaspi, Primo Legaspi, Jose Legaspi, and Paulina S. de Magtanum, was assigned also
MAGTANUM, to Branch III of the CFI, and involved the same parcel of land from where the coconut
Respondents. Promulgated: fruits subject of the crime of qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 2269 had been taken.

On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI following
the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act, [4] rendered its decision in favor of
August 4, 2010 the petitioners herein, holding and disposing thus:

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
After a careful study of the evidence on record, the Court finds
DECISION
that the plaintiffs were able to establish that plaintiff Rosario Sespee
Tumbokon purchased the land in question from Cresenciana Inog
on December 31, 1959 (Exh. C). Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired
BERSAMIN, J.:
the land by purchase from Victor Miralles on June 19, 1957 (Exh. B).
The question presented in this appeal is whether the ruling in a criminal prosecution for
Seven (7) years before, on May 8, 1950, the land was mortgaged by
qualified theft (involving coconut fruits) bound the complainant (petitioners herein) and
Victor Miralles to Cresenciana Inog as shown by a Deed of Pacto de
the accused (respondents herein) on the issue of ownership of the land, which was
Retro (Exh. A), and from 1950 up to 1959, Cresenciana Inog was in
brought up as a defense, as to preclude the Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Court of
continuous and peaceful possession of the land in question. xxx
Appeals (CA) from adjudicating the same issue in a civil case filed prior to the
xxxx
promulgation of the decision in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of
the plaintiffs, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel of land with an
area of 12,480 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly
1. The plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners,
Barangay San Isidro, in the Municipality of Ibajay, Province of Aklan. The land planted to
and entitled to the possession of the parcel of land of 12,480 square
rice, corn, and coconuts was originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespee (Alejandra),
meters in area, declared in the name of plaintiff Rosario S. Tumbokon,
who had had two marriages. The first marriage was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she
under Tax Declaration No. 29220, situated in Barangay Buenavista
bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor Miralles. The second marriage was to
(formerly San Isidro), Ibajay, Aklan;
Jose Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia (Apolonia), who married
Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by Apolonia and
2. The defendants are ordered and directed to vacate the land
Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor
in question, and restore and deliver the possession thereof to the
Miralles; hence, Crisanto Miralles was Alejandras grandson.
plaintiffs; and
The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial after Spouses
3. No pronouncement as to damages, but with costs against the
Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee (petitioners) asserted their right in it by virtue of
defendants.
their purchase of it from Cresenciana Inog, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase
from Victor Miralles. The tug-of-war over the property between the petitioners and the
SO ORDERED.[5]
respondents first led to the commencement of a criminal case. The Spouses Nicanor
Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against
respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum and others not parties herein, namely:
The respondents appealed to the CA.
Rosendo Magtanum, Antonio Magtanum, Ulpiano Mangilaya, charging them with stealing
coconut fruits from the land subject of the present case. [1] The criminal case, docketed as
On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the
Criminal Case No. 2269, was assigned to Branch III of the erstwhile Court of First
complaint,[6] opining and ruling thus:
Instance (CFI) of Aklan.[2]
The appellees trace their acquisition of the subject lot to the
After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as charged in its
admitted primal owner Alejandra Sespee through her supposed sale of
decision dated June 10, 1972. The respondents appealed (C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR), but
it to her son-in-law Victor Miralles, who sold this to Cresenciana Inog,
the CA affirmed their conviction on February 19, 1975, whereby the CA rejected
and who in turn sold it to the appellees. In the process, they presented
respondent Apolonias defense of ownership of the land.[3]
the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. B, June 19, 1957) executed by Victor
Miralles in favor of Cresenciana Inog but wherein it is provided in the
said instrument that:
In the meanwhile, on September 21, 1972, or prior to the CAs rendition of its
decision in the criminal case, the petitioners commenced this suit for recovery of
That this parcel of land abovementioned was
ownership and possession of real property with damages against the respondents in the
inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespee, by the party
CFI. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 240 and entitled Spouses Nicanor P.
Tumbokon and Rosario S. Sespee v. Apolonia G. Legaspi, Jesus Legaspi, Alejandra
 of the First Part being the sole heir of the said Alejandra
Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters.
This claim of being the sole heir is obviously false and erroneous for
Alejandra Sespee had more than one intestate heir, and Victor Miralles
as a mere son-in-law could not be one of them.
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and
contradictory claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from
Alejandra Sespee. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of
course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim is
sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard particulars like what
was the price, when and where was the sale made, who were present,
or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that
Victor Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations of an
owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or
even adverted to.
The testimonial evidence of the appellants as to ownership, the
sale and possession is inadequate, with even the appellant Nicanor
Tumbokon stating that:
Q Did you come to know before you purchase (sic)
the property from whom did V. Miralles acquired (sic)
the land?
A No, sir.
xxx
Q And you did not come to know out (sic) and why
V. Miralles came to possess the land under litigation
before it was sold to C. Inog?
A All I was informed was V. Miralles became
automatically the heir of A. Sespee after the death of
the wife which is the only daughter of A. Sespee.
Q How did you know that V. Miralles became
automatically the heir of the land after the death of
his wife?
A He is the only son-in-law. (TSN, pp. 2-3, Feb. 26,
1974; emphasis supplied)
While Victor Miralles may have been in physical possession of the lot
for a while, this was not as owner but as mere Administrator as was
clearly appearing in tax declaration no. 21714 (Exhs. J, 1).The
corroboration in this by Lourdes Macawili (TSN, June 7, 1973) does
not help the appellees (herein petitioners) any for she never knew the
source of the property. Neither does the testimony of Crisanto Miralles
succor the appellees (petitioners). He was the son of Victor Miralles
and the husband of the said Cresenciana Inog, the supposed buyer,
owner and possessor of the land in question from 1950-1957, and yet
Crisanto Miralles could only say:
Q Are there improvements on the land in question?
A I do not know because I did not bother to go to the
land in question.(TSN, p. 4, Aug. 18, 1973; emphasis
supplied)]
These strongly suggest that the sales and claim of possession
were shams, and are further demolished by the following testimonies:
Q After the death of Alejandra Sespee who inherited
this land in question?
A Apolonia.
Q At present who is in possession of the land in
question?
A Apolonia Legaspi.
Q From the time that Apolonia Legaspi took
possession of the land up to the present do you
know if anybody interrupted her possession?
A No sir. (tsn, Urbana Ta-an Vda. de Franco, p.
7, Nov. 24, 1977)
xxx
Q Now, since when did you know the land in
question?
A Since I was at the age of 20 yrs. old. (TSN;
Crispina Taladtad, p. 3; Jan. 20, 1977; [she was 74
yrs. old at the time of this testimony]).
xxx
Q And for how long has Apolonia Garcia Legaspi
been in possession of the land in question?
A Since the time I was at the age of 20 yrs. old when
I was been (sic) invited there to work up to the
present she is in possession of the land.
Q You said that you know Cresenciana Inog, do you
know if Cresenciana Inog has ever possessed the
land in question?
A Never.
Q You also said that you know Nicanor Tumbokon
and his wife Rosario Tumbokon, my question is do
you know if this Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife
Rosario have ever possessed and usufructed this
land under litigation?
A No, sir.
Q You also stated a while ago that you know Victor
Miralles, do you know if Victor Miralles had ever
possessed this under litigation?
A No, he had not. (p. 9, ibid; emphasis supplied)
 Thus neither do We buy the appellees contention that
ownership of the disputed land was acquired by their predecessors-in-
interest thru lapse of time. Acquisitive prescription requires possession
in the concept of owner, and they have not been able to prove even
mere possession.
As proponents it was incumbent upon the appellees to prove
that they were the owners of the lot and that they were being unlawfully
deprived of their possession thereof. But this they failed to do. It is a
basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative
allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts
the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove this
affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the
respondent has to prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative
defenses and counterclaim.(AKELCO vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 121439, Jan
25,2000)
But this hoary rule also cuts both ways. Appellants too must
also prove the allegations to support their prayer to declare the litigated
lot the exclusive property of the defendants Apolonia G. Legaspi and
Paulina S. Magtanum; (Answer, p. 6, record). Apolonia Legaspi
however is only one of the putative intestate heirs of Alejandra Sespee,
the other being Crisanto Miralles who stands in the stead of Ciriaca,
his predeceased mother and other daughter of the decedent. But then
no judgment can be made as to their successional rights for Crisanto
Miralles was never impleaded. Neither is there a proof that can
convince that Paulina S. Magtanum who is merely a niece of the
decedent, should also be declared a co-owner of the inherited lot.
Because of said inadequacies, We cannot rule beyond the
holding that the appellees (petitioners) are not the owners and
therefore not entitled to the recovery of the litigated lot.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and in its place judgment is rendered DISMISSING the
Complaint.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The issues to be resolved are the following:
1. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. CV 45672 reversing the
decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 240 was supported by law
and the evidence on record;
2. Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR affirming
the decision of the CFI of Aklan in Criminal Case No. 2269 had the
effect of res judicata on the issue of ownership of the land involved
in Civil Case No. 240, considering that such land was the same
land involved in Criminal Case No. 2269.
Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A
Reversal by the CA was supported
by law and the evidence on record
The CA correctly found that the petitioners claim of ownership could not be
legally and factually sustained.
First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that
Victor Miralles, the transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners immediate
predecessor in interest) had any legal right in the first place to transfer ownership. He
was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only her son-in-law (as the husband of
Ciriaca, one of Alejandras two daughters). Thus, the statement in the deed of absolute
sale (Exhibit B) entered into between Victor Miralles and Cresenciana Inog, to the effect
that the parcel of land was inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespee by Victor
Miralles being the sole heir of the said Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or
sisters, was outrightly false.
Secondly, a decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part
of the decedents estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887, Civil
Code, viz:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and
ascendants, with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not
excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do they exclude one
another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly
proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes
mentioned, shall inherit from them in the manner and to the extent
established by this Code. (807a)
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent
Apolonia, her daughter, and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter succeeded
Alejandra by right of representation because his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased
Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living or if she could have
inherited.[8] Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles) was called to the succession by
law and not by the person represented (Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not
Ciriaca.[9]
The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay testimony of Nicanor
Tumbokon to the effect that he had been informed that Victor Miralles had bec[o]me
automatically the heir of Alejandra after the death of his wife, the wife being the only
daughter and he the only son-in-law a plain irrelevancy.
Thirdly, Victor Miralles supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale from
Alejandra had no competent factual support in the records. For one, the oral sale was
incompatible with the petitioners anchor claim that he had acquired the land by
inheritance from Alejandra. Also, the evidence that the petitioners adduced on the oral
sale was insufficient and incredible, warranting the CAs rejection of the oral sale under
the following terms:
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and
contradictory claim that Victor Miralles instead bought the lot from
Alejandra Sespee. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of
course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim is
sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the standard particulars like
what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who were
present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of
documentary proof that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and
performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations nor
tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to.[10]
With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an heir
of Ciriaca, the transfer of the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was ineffectual. As a
consequence, Cresenciana Inog did not legally acquire the land, and, in turn, did not
validly transfer it to the petitioners.
B ownership of the land, but in the latter, the legal ownership of the land was not the main
Bar by res judicata is not applicable.
The petitioners submit that the final ruling in the criminal case had already determined
the issue of ownership of the land; and that such ruling in the criminal case barred the
issue of ownership in the civil case under the doctrine of res judicata.
The submission has no merit.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided;
a thing or matter settled by judgment.[11] The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of
law, dictated by wisdom and sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it
is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to litigation by the same parties
over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It has been appropriately said that the
doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of jurisprudence, and is put upon
two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: the one, public policy and
necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he
should be vexed twice for one and the same cause nemo debet bis vexari pro una et
eadem causa. A contrary doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet to the will and
neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of
suitors to the preservation of the public tranquillity and happiness.[12]
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in
all later suits and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. [13] The
foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be
permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right or fact has been
judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, so long as it remains
unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or
estate.[14]
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must
concur: (1) the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on
the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second actions (a) identity of
parties, (b) identity of the subject matter, and (c) identity of cause of action. [15]
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior
judgment, or estoppel by verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of
a second action upon the same claim, demand, or cause of action; the second, known
as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule of auter action pendant, ordains
that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any
future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action and has the
effect of preclusion of issues only.[16]
Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine of res
judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not
applicable, because the causes of action in the civil and the criminal actions were
different and distinct from each other. The civil action is for the recovery of ownership of
the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal action was to determine whether the act
of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the trees growing within the disputed
land constituted the crime of qualified theft. In the former, the main issue is the legal
issue. The issue of guilt or innocence was not dependent on the ownership of the land,
inasmuch as a person could be guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he were the
owner of the land.
Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves
commenced both actions, and fully and directly participated in the trial of both actions.
Any estoppel from assailing the authority of the CA to determine the ownership of the
land based on the evidence presented in the civil action applied only to the petitioners,
who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the civil action after the CA had ruled
adversely against them.
Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to exceptions,
such as where there is a change in the applicable legal context, or to avoid inequitable
administration of justice.[17] Applying the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments to this
case will surely be iniquitous to the respondents who have rightly relied on the civil case,
not on the criminal case, to settle the issue of ownership of the land. This action for
recovery of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership of the
property. In contrast, the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the criminal
case was only the response to the respondents having raised the ownership as a matter
of defense.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision
rendered on May 15, 2001 by the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 89224-25 January 23, 1992
MAURICIO SAYSON, ROSARIO SAYSON-MALONDA, BASILISA SAYSON-LIRIO,
REMEDIOS SAYSON-REYES and JUANA C. BAUTISTA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, DELIA SAYSON, assisted by her
husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO SAYSON AND DORIBEL
SAYSON, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
At issue in this case is the status of the private respondents and their capacity to inherit
from their alleged parents and grandparents. The petitioners deny them that right,
asserting if for themselves to the exclusion of all others.
The relevant genealogical facts are as follows.
Eleno and Rafaela Sayson begot five children, namely, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa,
Remedios and Teodoro. Eleno died on November 10, 1952, and Rafaela on May 15,
1976. Teodoro, who had married Isabel Bautista, died on March 23, 1972. His wife died
nine years later, on March 26, 1981. Their properties were left in the possession of Delia,
Edmundo, and Doribel, all surnamed Sayson, who claim to be their children.
On April 25, 1983, Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, and Remedios, together with Juana C.
Bautista, Isabel's mother, filed a complaint for partition and accounting of the intestate
estate of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 1030 in Branch
13 of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. The action was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, who alleged successional rights to the disputed estate as the decedents'
lawful descendants.
On July 11, 1983, Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed their own complaint, this time for the
accounting and partition of the intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, against the
couple's four surviving children. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1042 in the
Regional Trial Court of Albay, Branch 12. The complainants asserted the defense they
raised in Civil Case No. 1030, to wit, that Delia and Edmundo were the adopted children
and Doribel was the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and Isabel. As such, they were
entitled to inherit Teodoro's share in his parents' estate by right of representation.
Both cases were decided in favor of the herein private respondents on the basis of
practically the same evidence.
Judge Rafael P. Santelices declared in his decision dated May 26,
1986, 1 that Delia and Edmundo were the legally adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel
Sayson by virtue of the decree of adoption dated March 9, 1967. 2 Doribel was their
legitimate daughter as evidenced by her birth certificate dated February 27,
1967. 3 Consequently, the three children were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela
by right of representation.
In his decision dated September 30, 1986, 4 Judge Jose S. Saez dismissed Civil Case
No. 1030, holding that the defendants, being the legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel
as established by the aforementioned evidence, excluded the plaintiffs from sharing in
their estate.
Both cases were appealed to the Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated. In its
own decision dated February 28, 1989, 5 the respondent court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in Civil Case No. 1030 (CA-G.R. No. 11541), the
appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED. In Civil case No. 1042 (CA-
G.R. No. 12364), the appealed decision is MODIFIED in that Delia and
Edmundo Sayson are disqualified from inheriting from the estate of the
deceased spouses Eleno and Rafaela Sayson, but is affirmed in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
That judgment is now before us in this petition for review by certiorari. Reversal of the
respondent court is sought on the ground that it disregarded the evidence of the
petitioners and misapplied the pertinent law and jurisprudence when it declared the
private respondents as the exclusive heirs of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson.
The contention of the petitioners is that Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted
because Doribel had already been born on February 27, 1967, when the decree of
adoption was issued on March 9, 1967. The birth of Doribel disqualified her parents from
adopting. The pertinent provision is Article 335 of the Civil Code, naming among those
who cannot adopt "(1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or natural children by legal fiction."
Curiously enough, the petitioners also argue that Doribel herself is not the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel but was in fact born to one Edita Abila, who manifested
in a petition for guardianship of the child that she was her natural mother. 6
The inconsistency of this position is immediately apparent. The petitioners seek to annul
the adoption of Delia and Edmundo on the ground that Teodoro and Isabel already had a
legitimate daughter at the time but in the same breath try to demolish this argument by
denying that Doribel was born to the couple.
On top of this, there is the vital question of timeliness. It is too late now to challenge the
decree of adoption, years after it became final and executory. That was way back in
1967. 7 Assuming the the petitioners were proper parties, what they should have done
was seasonably appeal the decree of adoption, pointing to the birth of Doribel that
disqualified Teodoro and Isabel from adopting Delia and Edmundo. They did not. In fact,
they should have done this earlier, before the decree of adoption was issued. They did
not, although Mauricio claimed he had personal knowledge of such birth.
As the respondent court correctly observed:
When Doribel was born on February 27, 1967, or about TEN (10) days
before the issuance of the Order of Adoption, the petitioners could
have notified the court about the fact of birth of DORIBEL and perhaps
withdrew the petition or perhaps petitioners could have filed a petition
for the revocation or rescission of the adoption (although the birth of a
child is not one of those provided by law for the revocation or
rescission of an adoption). The court is of the considered opinion that
the adoption of the plaintiffs DELIA and EDMUNDO SAYSON is valid,
outstanding and binding to the present, the same not having been
revoked or rescinded.
Not having any information of Doribel's birth to Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, the trial
judge cannot be faulted for granting the petition for adoption on the finding inter alia that
the adopting parents were not disqualified.
A no less important argument against the petitioners is that their challenge to the validity
of the adoption cannot be made collaterally, as in their action for partition, but in a direct
proceeding frontally addressing the issue.
The settled rule is that a finding that the requisite jurisdictional facts
exists, whether erroneous or not, cannot be questioned in a collateral
proceeding, for a presumption arises in such cases where the validity
of the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary jurisdictional facts
were proven [Freeman on Judgments, Vol. I, Sec. 350, pp. 719-720].
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case of Santos v. Aranzanso, 8 this Court declared:
Anent this point, the rulings are summed up in 2 American
Jurisprudence, 2nd Series, Adoption, Sec. 75, p. 922, thus:
An adoption order implies the finding of the
necessary facts and the burden of proof is on the
party attacking it; it cannot be considered void
merely because the fact needed to show statutory
compliance is obscure. While a judicial determination
of some particular fact, such as the abandonment of
his next of kin to the adoption, may be essential to
the exercise of jurisdiction to enter the order of
adoption, this does not make it essential to the
jurisdictional validity of the decree that the fact be
determined upon proper evidence, or necessarily in
accordance with the truth; a mere error cannot affect
the jurisdiction, and the determination must stand
until reversed on appeal, and hence cannot be
collaterally attacked. If this were not the rule, the
status of adopted children would always be
uncertain, since the evidence might not be the same
at all investigations, and might be regarded with
different effect by different tribunals, and the
adoption might be held by one court to have been
valid, while another court would hold it to have been
of no avail. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the question of Doribel's legitimacy, we hold that the findings of the trial courts as
affirmed by the respondent court must be sustained. Doribel's birth certificate is a
formidable piece of evidence. It is one of the prescribed means of recognition under
Article 265 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code. It is true, as the
petitioners stress, that the birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence 9 of filiation
and may be refuted by contrary evidence. However, such evidence is lacking in the case
at bar.
Mauricio's testimony that he was present when Doribel was born to Edita Abila was
understandbly suspect, coming as it did from an interested party. The affidavit of
Abila 10 denying her earlier statement in the petition for the guardianship of Doribel is of
course hearsay, let alone the fact that it was never offered in evidence in the lower
courts. Even without it, however, the birth certificate must be upheld in line with Legaspi
v. Court of Appeals, 11where we ruled that "the evidentiary nature of public documents
must be sustained in the absence of strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity
or nullity."
Another reason why the petitioners' challenge must fail is the impropriety of the present
proceedings for that purpose. Doribel's legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint
for partition and accounting but in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party.
The presumption of legitimacy in the Civil Code . . . does not have this
purely evidential character. It serves a more fundamental purpose. It
actually fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child can
be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of defense or
as a collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. . .
. 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In consequence of the above observations, we hold that Doribel, as the legitimate
daughter of Teodoro and Isabel Sayson, and Delia and Edmundo, as their adopted
children, are the exclusive heirs to the intestate estate of the deceased couple,
conformably to the following Article 979 of the Civil Code:
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the
parents and other ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and
even if they should come from different marriages.
An adopted child succeeds to the property of the adopting parents in
the same manner as a legitimate child.
The philosophy underlying this article is that a person's love descends first to his children
and grandchildren before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads among his
collateral relatives. It is also supposed that one of his purposes in acquiring properties is
to leave them eventually to his children as a token of his love for them and as a provision
for their continued care even after he is gone from this earth.
Coming now to the right of representation, we stress first the following pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and
not by the person represented. The representative does not succeed
the person represented but the one who the person represented would
have succeeded.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other
children who are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own
right, and the latter by right of representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the
granddaughter of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased
father in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Article 981,
quoted above, she is entitled to the share her father would have directly inherited had he
survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other children. 13
But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom
the grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be
deemed to be a legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not
include the right of representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between
only the adopting parents and the adopted child and does not extend to the blood
relatives of either party. 14
In sum, we agree with the lower courts that Delia and Edmundo as the adopted children
and Doribel as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro Sayson and Isabel Bautista, are their
exclusive heirs and are under no obligation to share the estate of their parents with the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals was correct, however, in holding that only Doribel has
the right of representation in the inheritance of her grandparents' intestate estate, the
other private respondents being only the adoptive children of the deceased Teodoro.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.
Narvasa, C.J., Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 168960 July 5, 2010
AMELIA B. HEBRON, Petitioner,
vs.
FRANCO L. LOYOLA, ANGELO L. LOYOLA, RAFAEL L. LOYOLA, ARMANDO L.
LOYOLA, SENEN L. LOYOLA, MA. VENUS L. RONQUILLO, PERLA L. ABAD and the
Intestate Estate of EDUARDO L. LOYOLA, CARMELITA A. MANABO, HERMINIA
AGUINALDO-ROSAS, DIGNA AGUINALDO-VALENCIA, ROGELIO AGUINALDO,
MILA AGUINALDO-DIAZ, BABY AGUINALDO, RUBEN LOYOLA substituted by
JOSEFINA C. LOYOLA, GLESILDA A. LEGOSTO, EVELYN C. LOYOLA, MARINA C.
LOYOLA, AURE C. LOYOLA, CORAZON C. LUGARDA and JOVEN FRANCISCO C.
LOYOLA, LORENZO LOYOLA, CANDELARIA LOYOLA, NICANDRO LOYOLA,
FLORA LOYOLA, TERESITA L. ALZONA, VICENTE LOYOLA, ROSARIO L.
LONTOC, SERAFIN LOYOLA, ROBERTO LOYOLA, BIBIANO LOYOLA, PURITA
LOYOLA, ESTELA LOYOLA, ESTER DANICO,EDUARDO DANICO, EMELITA
DANICO, MERCEDITA DANICO, HONESTO DANICO, DANTE DANICO, ERLINDA
DANICO-DOMINGUEZ represented by TEODORO DOMINGUEZ and BEVERLY
ANNE DOMINGUEZ, EFREN CABIGAN and ISIDRO CABIGAN, Respondents.
ALBERTO L. BAUTISTA represented by FELICIDAD G. BAUTISTA, AGNES B.
ZULUETA, AYREEN B. ALBA, JOSEPH ANTHONY G. BAUTISTA, ANN-JANET G.
BAUTISTA and ALFREDO L. BAUTISTA, Unwilling Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Courts, not being omniscient, can only strive to determine what actually and truly
transpired based on the evidence before it and the imperfect rules that were designed to
assist in establishing the truth in disputed situations. Despite the difficulties in
ascertaining the truth, the courts must ultimately decide. In civil cases, its decision must
rest on preponderance of admissible evidence.
This petition for review assails the February 22, 2005 Decision1 and the July 7, 2005
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 64105. The CA partially
granted the appeal before it and modified the June 22, 1999 Decision3 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, Branch 20, which ordered the partition of two parcels of land
among the seven sets of plaintiffs (respondents herein).
Factual Antecedents
This case originated from a suit for partition and damages concerning the two parcels of
land denominated as Lot Nos. 730 and 879 of the Carmona cadastre. Lot No. 730, with
an area of 17,688 square meters, was owned by Remigia Baylon who was married to
Januario Loyola. Lot No. 879, with an area of 10,278 square meters was owned by
Januario Loyola, the husband of Remigia Baylon. Januario and Remigia had seven
children, namely Conrado, Jose, Benjamin, Candida, Soledad, Cristeta and Encarnacion,
all surnamed Loyola.
The administration of the said lots was entrusted to Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. All the
heirs of Januario and Remigia received their shares in the fruits of the subject properties
during Encarnacion's administration thereof. With the latter's death on September 15,
1969, administration of the subject properties was assumed by her daughter, Amelia
Bautista-Hebron, who, after some time, started withholding the shares of Candida and
the heirs of Conrado. By the time partition of the said properties was formally demanded
on November 4, 1990, Candida was the only one still living among the children of
Januario and Remigia. The rest were survived and represented by their respective
descendants and children, to wit:
1. Conrado Loyola, by his children, Ruben Loyola, now substituted by his heirs,
namely, Josefina, Edgardo, Evelyn, Marina, Aure, Corazon and Joven
Francisco, all surnamed Loyola, and respondents Lorenzo Loyola, Candelaria
Loyola, Flora Loyola, Nicardo Loyola, Teresita Loyola-Alonza, Vicente Loyola
and Rosario Loyola-Lontoc;
2. Jose Loyola, by his children, respondents Serafin Loyola, Bibiano Loyola,
Roberto Loyola, Purita Loyola-Lebrudo and Estela Loyola;
3. Benjamin Loyola, by his children, respondents Franco Loyola, Angelo Loyola,
Rafael Loyola, Senen Loyola, Perla Loyola-Abad, Ma. Venus Loyola-Ronquillo,
Armando Loyola as well as his daughter-in-law by his son, Eduardo Loyola,
respondent Carmen Hermosa;
4. Soledad Loyola, by her children, respondents Ester Danico, Eduardo Danico,
Mercedita Danico, Honesto Danico, Emelita Danico and Dante Danico;
5. Cristeta Loyola, by her children, respondents Efren Cabigan and Isidro
Cabigan; and
6. Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista, by her son, respondent Alfredo Bautista, by
petitioner Amelia Bautista-Hebron, and by her daughter-in-law by her son,
Alberto Bautista, respondent Felicidad Bautista, and the latter's children,
respondents Anjanet, Agnes, Ayren and Joseph Anthony, all surnamed
Bautista.
For petitioner's failure to heed their formal demand, respondents filed with the RTC of
Imus, Cavite, Branch 20, the complaint for partition and damages from which the instant
suit stemmed. While manifesting her conformity to the partition demanded by her co-
heirs, petitioner claimed in her amended answer that Candida and the heirs of Conrado
have already relinquished their shares in consideration of the financial support extended
them by her mother, Encarnacion. In the pre-trial order, the trial court consequently
limited the issue to be resolved to the veracity of the aforesaid waiver or assignment of
shares claimed by petitioner.
Trial on the merits then ensued. While conceding their receipt of financial assistance
from Encarnacion, Candida and the heirs of Conrado maintained that adequate
recompense had been effectively made when they worked without pay at the former's
rice mill and household or, in the case of Carmelita Aguinaldo-Manabo, when she
subsequently surrendered her earnings as a public school teacher to her said aunt.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On June 22, 1999, the trial court rendered a Decision granting the partition sought. The
dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the
partition of the following real properties, to wit:
1. The parcel of land known as Lot 730 of the Carmona Cadastre with an area
of 17,688 sq. meters more of less; and
2. the parcel of land known as Lot 879 of the Carmona Cadastre with an area of
10,278 sq. meters, more of less among all the seven (7) sets of plaintiffs in
seven (7) equal parts.
In this regard, the parties are directed within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof to make
the partition of the two (2) lots among themselves should they agree, and thereafter, to
submit in Court their deed of partition for its confirmation.
SO ORDERED.4
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner, the defendant in the case before the RTC, appealed the Decision to the CA.
The CA found the petitioner entitled to participate in the partition of the subject
properties. It stated that petitioner's inadvertent exclusion from the partition of the subject
properties arose from the trial court's use of the phrase "seven (7) sets of plaintiffs" in
the dispositive portion of the appealed Decision instead of the more accurate "seven (7)
sets of heirs."
The CA however, like the trial court, found that petitioner was not able to prove the
existence of the waiver or assignment of their shares by Candida and the heirs of
Conrado. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED and the appealed June 22, 1999
decision is, accordingly, MODIFIED to include appellant's participation in the partition of
the subject parcels as one of the heirs of Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista. The rest
is AFFIRMED in toto.5
The CA denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner. Hence, petitioner
elevated the case to us via the present petition for review.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE BURDEN OF PROOF WAS SHIFTED TO
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AMELIA B. HEBRON AND THAT THE LATTER FAILED TO
SUBSTANTIATE HER CLAIM WITH PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
II
WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT A SPOUSE PRESENT CANNOT RELINQUISH THE
SHARES IN THE PARCELS OF LAND IF IT WILL DEPRIVE MINOR CHILDREN OF
THEIR HEREDITARY RIGHTS.
III
WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT NO CONCRETE PROOF EVIDENCING THE SALE OR
ASSIGNMENT OF SHARES OF CANDIDA LOYOLA-AGUINALDO AND CONRADO
LOYOLA IN THE TWO PARCELS OF LAND IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER'S MOTHER,
ENCARNACION LOYOLA-BAUTISTA, HAD BEEN PRESENTED BY PETITIONER
DURING THE TRIAL DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF PAROL EVIDENCE BY WAY OF
AN EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
IV
WHETHER X X X THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
NOT CONSIDERING THAT CANDIDA LOYOLA-AGUINALDO AND THE HEIRS OF
CONRADO LOYOLA ARE BARRED BY ESTOPPEL IN ASSERTING THAT THEY ARE
STILL ENTITLED TO SHARE IN THE QUESTIONED PARCELS OF LAND.6
Petitioner's Arguments
Petitioner contends that she has no affirmative allegation to prove, hence, the burden of
proof is on respondents and not on her. And if at all, she has proven that Candida and
the heirs of Conrado have relinquished their respective shares.
She further contends that ownership of inherited properties does not fall under Articles
321 and 323 of the Civil Code and thus, the properties inherited by the children of
Conrado can be alienated by their mother, Victorina, in favor of petitioner's mother.
Petitioner also contends that her parol evidence proved the alleged executed agreement
of waiver of shares in the two subject inherited properties in consideration of the
educational and other financial support extended by Encarnacion to Candida and
Conrado's respective families.1avvphi1
Finally, petitioner posits that Candida and the heirs of Conrado are estopped by laches
from asserting their entitlement to shares in the subject properties.
Respondents' Arguments
On the other hand, respondents argue that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have not
relinquished their shares in the litigated properties. They insist that the alleged
agreement of relinquishment of shares cannot be proved by parol evidence.
They also contend that all the issues raised are factual in nature, and the findings of fact
of the CA are final and conclusive and thus, may not be the subject of review by the
Supreme Court, absent any of the recognized exceptions to the said rule.
Our Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Burden of Proof
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court states:
Section 1. Burden of Proof.- Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on
the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence
required by law. (Emphasis supplied)
From the above provision it is clear that the defendant, not only the plaintiff, also has a
burden of proof. The plaintiffs have the duty to establish their claims. And, it is the
defendants who have the duty to establish their defenses.
Children of the deceased, like Candida and her siblings, are compulsory heirs who are
entitled to a share in the properties of the deceased. Art. 980 of the Civil Code states:
"The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right, dividing the
inheritance in equal shares." The heirs of Conrado are also heirs of Remigia and
Januario, being the children of a child of Remigia and Januario; and as such are entitled
to their shares in the estate of Remigia and Januario.7
Petitioner has admitted in her answer that respondents are heirs of Remigia and
Januario;8 and that the two subject properties were left behind by Remigia and
Januario.9 "An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof." 10 Hence, we find no error
committed by the CA when it affirmed the ruling of the trial court that the burden was on
petitioner to establish her affirmative defense of waiver or sale of the shares of Candida
and the heirs of Conrado.
The defense of petitioner is that Candida and the heirs of Conrado have waived or sold
their shares in the subject properties. This alleged fact is denied by the respondents.
Hence, this is the fact that is at issue and this alleged fact has to be proven by petitioner,
who is the one who raised the said alleged fact. The burden of proof of the defense of
waiver or sale is on petitioner.
Whether petitioner has been able to prove the said fact is undoubtedly a question of fact,
not of law. It involves the weighing and calibration of the evidence presented. In the
absence of any of the exceptions that call for the Court to do so, the Court will not disturb
the factual findings of the RTC that were affirmed by the CA in the present case.
Shares of Minor Children
The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their
grandparents Remigia and Januario. These children, not their mother Victorina, were the
co-owners of the inherited properties. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her
powers in conveying, if she did indeed convey, to the petitioners mother the undivided
share of her minor children in the property involved in this case. "The powers given to her
by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of administration and cannot
include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the permission of the
court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her minor
children."11 In a number of cases, where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not
seek court approval of the sale of properties of their wards, minor children, the Court
declared the sales void.12
Although the CA inaccurately cited Articles 321 and 323 of the Civil Code, its conclusion
that Victorina had no capacity to relinquish her children's shares in the inherited
properties was, nevertheless, correct.
Evidence of Sale/Waiver of Shares in Real Properties
On this factual issue too, we find no reason to disturb the finding of the CA affirming that
of the RTC that petitioner failed to prove by preponderance of evidence her alleged fact
of relinquishment, by sale or waiver, of the shares of Candida and the heirs of Conrado.
Again, the court has no duty to delve into and weigh the pieces of evidence presented by
the parties and passed upon by both the RTC and the CA with consistent conclusions on
this matter and absent the other exceptions to the general rule. Nevertheless, we did so,
but find no error in the findings of the RTC and the CA on this issue.
The very sketchy and partly hearsay testimony of petitioner was resoundingly rebutted by
the testimonies of the respondents. The hearsay letter of Soledad, self-serving entries of
relinquishment in the notebook of accounts and tampered notebook of educational
expenses hinting at a relinquishment of shares cannot be given weight. Moreover, these
were refuted by the presentation of document embodying the notarized extrajudicial
partition establishing no such relinquishment. The evidence does not preponderate in
favor of petitioner.
Absent a preponderance of evidence on the fact in issue of relinquishment of shares,
then Candida and the heirs of Conrado, as admitted heirs of Remigia and Januario, are
entitled to their shares in the two subject properties.
Laches
Laches is the failure of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, or to
assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled
thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. 13
In the present case, the book of accounts, showing the record of receipts of some heirs
of their shares, has repeated entries in Amelia's handwriting that Candida and the heirs
of Conrado are no longer entitled to shares in the fruits of the properties in litigation
because they have sold or given their share in the said properties to Encarnacion. These
entries only prove that Amelia no longer recognized the entitlement of Candida and the
heirs of Conrado to their respective shares. It is relevant to note however that the entries
in the book of accounts started only on July 17, 1986. Hence, there is definite proof of
non-recognition by petitioner of Candida and the heirs of Conrado's entitlement to shares
in the subject properties starting only on July 17, 1986. Before this time, during the
administration of the properties by Encarnacion Loyola-Bautista and some undetermined
number of years after her death, Candida and the heirs of Conrado were proven to have
been receiving their shares in the fruits of the subject properties.
On record is the written demand letter for partition of the litigated properties signed by
Candida and the heirs of Conrado dated November 4, 1990. The complaint for partition
was subsequently filed on February 23, 1993.
From July 17, 1986, to November 4, 1990 only 4 years have elapsed. Even from July 17,
1986 to February 23, 1993 just six years have passed. Considering that the parties are
closely related to each other and considering also that the parties are many different
heirs, some of whom reside outside the Philippines, the passage of six years before the
respondents asked for partition through the court is not unreasonable. We find
respondents not guilty of laches.
WHEREFORE the petition for review is DENIED. The February 22, 2005 Decision and
the July 7, 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 64105
are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180997 November 17, 2010
SPOUSES MARIANO (a.k.a. QUAKY) and EMMA BOLAOS, Petitioners,
vs.
ROSCEF ZUIGA BERNARTE, CLARO ZUIGA, PERFECTO ZUIGA, and property did not fully belong to Cresencia.13
CEFERINA ZUIGA-GARCIA,Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
March 30, 20072 and the Resolution dated November 26, 20073 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84452.
The antecedents
Subject of the controversy is a 238-square-meter lot, designated as Lot No. 1-P, and
situated in Poblacion, Rapu-Rapu, Albay. Petitioner-spouses Mariano and Emma
Bolaos (petitioner-spouses) purchased it from Cresencia Zuiga-Echague (Cresencia)
on June 20, 2001. The sale was registered in the name of petitioner-spouses before the
Municipal Assessors Office in Rapu-Rapu, Albay.
On October 30, 2001, respondents Roscef Zuiga Bernarte, Claro Zuiga, Perfecto
Zuiga, and Ceferina Zuiga-Garcia (Roscef, et al.) filed a complaint4 for declaration of
partial nullity of deeds of transfer and sale with prayer for preliminary injunction against
petitioner-spouses, Flavia Zuiga (Flavia), and Cresencia before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Legazpi City, docketed as Civil Case No. 10033.
The complaint, in essence, alleged that: Roscef, et al., and Flavia and Cresencia are
legitimate half-blood brothers and sisters, all children of the deceased Roman Zuiga, Sr.
(Roman) from his second and first marriages, respectively; during his lifetime, Roman
owned a residential land with improvements, identified as Lot No. 1-P per Tax
Declaration No. 99-001-017045 for the year 2000; Roman had the lot declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Flavia, Sisters and Brothers, per a Sworn
Statement6 he executed in 1973, and filed with the then Assessors Office, which issued
Tax Declaration No. 2975;7 Roman died on August 9, 1976, and his heirs did not settle or
partition the subject property; on June 20, 2001, Flavia, without authority from the co-
owners of the lot, executed a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale 8 over it in favor of
Cresencia; Cresencia, in turn, also without authority from the said co-owners, executed
on the same day a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale9 in favor of petitioner-spouses; on
the basis of these notarized deeds, Tax Declaration No. 99-001-0170310 was issued to
petitioner-spouses as sole declared owners of Lot No. 1-P.
In praying for preliminary injunction, Roscef, et al. further alleged that petitioner-spouses
started demolishing their ancestral home on the subject property and initiated the
construction of a new building thereon, despite pleas to desist from further destroying the
ancestral home.
In her answer with cross-claim,11 Flavia denied the genuineness and due execution of
the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Cresencia, and alleged that the subsequent sale
made by the latter was valid and effective only as to her aliquot share, but null and void
as to the rest of the property. She also claimed that, during the confrontation before the
barangay, she informed Mariano of these facts and even admonished him not to destroy
the existing house on Lot No. 1-P, nor to make any constructions thereon. She said that,
despite this notice, petitioner-spouses, on August 15, 2001, forcibly entered her house
and demolished a large portion of it.
In her own answer,12 Cresencia denied the material allegations of the complaint, and
alleged that Flavia was the sole owner of Lot No. 1-P, thus making her a buyer and seller
in good faith and for value. Cresencia also averred that Roscef, et al., as children of
Roman by his second wife, do not have any share in the subject property since Roman
had already orally partitioned it during his lifetime.
For their part, petitioner-spouses alleged that the subject property was owned in common
by Flavia, Cresencia, and their full-blood brothers and sisters only, and that, later on,
Flavia acquired the entire lot. Flavia then sold it to Cresencia, who, in turn, sold it to
petitioner-spouses. They asserted that they had acquired Lot No. 1-P in good faith and
for value, without any knowledge of the adverse claim of Roscef, et al. or that the
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that Roscef, et al., Flavia and Cresencia are
legitimate half brothers and sisters and the identities of the parties and of the subject
property.14
Trial on the merits ensued. Thereafter, the RTC rendered its decision dated December 1,
2004,15 disposing as follows
WHEREFORE, Premises Considered, this Court renders judgment declaring that the
property interest acquired by the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos over Lot No. 1-P
a 238-square-meter lot situated [o]n Salazar Street, Poblacion Rapu-Rapu, Albay is
limited only to the ideal shares belonging to Flavia A. Zuiga and Cresencia Zuiga-
Echague constitutive of an ideal share equivalent to 2/11 portion of such lot, and hereby
partially nullifying the two deeds of absolute sale both dated 20 June 2001 over Lot No.
1-P exceeding the ideal share of 1/11 for each one of the sellers Flavia A. Zuiga and
Cresencia Zuiga-Echague. The defendants are hereby ordered to pay the plaintiffs the
amounts of: a) 15,000 pesos as attorneys fees; and b) 10,000 pesos as litigation
expenses. The defendants shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.16
Aggrieved, petitioner-spouses interposed an appeal before the CA, ascribing error to the
RTC in holding that the property was the capital of Roman and in declaring that the
property interest acquired by them was limited only to the ideal shares of Flavia.
The CA denied the appeal, and affirmed in toto the RTC judgment. Hence, this petition
anchored on the sole question of law of whether or not the CA wrongly applied the law on
co-ownership, specifically Article 484,17 relative to Article 98018 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner-spouses argue that the CA gravely erred when it concluded that Lot No. 1-P is
owned in common by the children from the first and second marriages of Roman. They
posit that the brothers and sisters mentioned in Tax Declaration No. 2975 for December
14, 1948-1949 refer only to Romans children from his first marriage, when the property
was bequeathed to them by their father, then still a widower, and prior to the celebration
of his marriage to Ceferina on October 18, 1954. They claim that Roman did so probably
because the property belonged to the paraphernal property of his deceased first spouse
Flavia. According to them, there was no credible evidence, not even a single document,
to prove that the property originally belonged to Roman, but the RTC and the CA gave
credit to Ceferinas testimony that she was told by her father, while at a tender age, that
the property belonged to them. They contend, to the contrary, that the testimony of
Josefina, a child from the first marriage, should be the one given credence due to her
unbiased assertion that the property was purchased from the paraphernal assets of their
mother Flavia, such that the lot had never been registered in the name of Roman
because he had no reason to claim it as his own.
We disagree. The assertions of petitioner-spouses cannot stand on the face of the
evidence, both documentary and testimonial, presented before the RTC.
More specifically, petitioner-spouses contention, i.e., that the subject property really
belonged to Romans first spouse Flavia as her paraphernal property, cannot be
sustained. This position was anchored from the testimony of Josefina 19 that the lot was
actually bought by her maternal grandfather and given to her mother Flavia. Josefinas
declarations before the RTC do not deserve merit and weight, particularly in light of her
statement that she was told so by her elders way back in 1923, when at that time she
was only around three (3) years of age.20 Besides, such a pronouncement was not
supported by any proof, save for the lame excuse that the deed of sale showing the said
transaction was allegedly lost and destroyed by a typhoon at a time when she was
already married, claiming that she was then the custodian of the supposed document.
Evidence, to be worthy of credit, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but must be credible in itself.21 In other words, it must be natural, reasonable,
and probable to warrant belief. The standard as to the truth of human testimony is its
conformity to human knowledge, observation, and experience; the courts cannot heed
otherwise.22 Regretfully, petitioner-spouses allegations do not measure up to the
yardstick of verity.
The findings of the RTC, as concurred by the CA, are enlightening
The facts of the case that appear of record to be without dispute follow, to wit: Roman
Zuiga, Sr. during his lifetime married twice. His first wife was Flavia while Ceferina
became his second wife. Flavia died sometime in the year 1944 or 1945. Roman Sr. and
Flavia begot seven children, namely: Josefina, Flavia, Woodrow, Pablo, Manuel, Roman,
Jr. and Cresencia. On 18 October 1954, Roman Zuiga, Sr. married Ceferina Bendaa
(Exhibits "F," "6"). Roman, Sr. and Ceferina had four children, and they were the plaintiffs
Roscef, Claro, Perfecto and Ceferina. Roman Zuiga, Sr. died on 9 August 1976. It
appears that his second wife Ceferina Bendaa died ahead of him. His eleven children
by his first and by his second marriage survived him. In the face of the sworn statement
he executed in the year 1973 he declared the lot in question (now Lot No. 1-P) then
embraced by Tax Declaration No. 2975 as among the several properties that belonged to
him (Exhibits "C," "3," in relation to Exhibits "A," "1"). Such lot under such tax declaration
was declared for taxation purposes for the first time on 14 December 1948 in the name of
Flavia A. Zuiga, brothers and sisters (Exhibits "A," "1"). Flavia A. Zuiga sold such 238-
square-meter lot situated in Salazar St., Poblacion, Rapu-Rapu, Albay to her sister
Cresencia Zuiga-Echague on 20 June 2001 (Exhibits "D," "2"). On the same day
Cresencia Zuiga-Echague sold the same lot in favor of the spouses Mariano and Emma
Bolaos (Exhibit "E").
Now, Roman Zuiga, Sr.s first wife Flavia passed away in the year 1944 or 1945. On 18
October 1954, he married his second wife Ceferina. Lot No. 1-P was declared for tax
purposes for the first time on 14 December 1948 in the name of Flavia Zuigas sisters
and brothers. The defendant Flavia A. Zuiga admitted that her parents always declared
the properties they acquired in her name Flavia A. Zuiga[,] sisters and brothers
since she was a 7-year-old lass. She never acquired the properties on her own
including Lot No. 1-P. She would always recognize her father Roman Zuiga, Sr. as the
actual owner of such lot when he was alive.
The reckoning date for the acquisition of Lot No. 1-P should be the date when it was
declared for tax purposes in the name of the defendant Flavia A. Zuiga, sisters and
brothers which is 14 December 1948 notwithstanding the testimonies rendered that
such lot was acquired while Roman Zuiga, Sr. was married to Flavia and even prior to
such marriage. Such testimonies that are obviously easy to fabricate have no
documentary evidence seen of record to sustain them. This Court finds Tax Declaration
No. 2975 (Exhibit[s] "A," "1") that bec[a]me effective in the year 1949 as the credible
ancient documentary evidence that speaks of the true date Roman Zuiga, Sr. acquired
Lot No. 1-P. As earlier noted, his first wife died in the year 1944 or 1945 while he married
his second wife on 18 October 1954. Obviously, Roman Zuiga, Sr., while still a widower
in the year 1948, acquired Lot No. 1-P. Clearly such lot was his capital property.
Roman Zuiga, Sr. having passed away on 9 August 1976, Lot No. 1-P now forms part of
his estate. Except for Lot No. 1-P, the record has not shown any other property left by
Roman Zuiga, Sr. at the time of his death. In the absence of whatever evidence that he
executed a will his legitimate children by his first and second marriages inherit such lot in
equal share[s] as intestate heirs (Article 980, The Civil Code). It follows that Lot No. 1-P
has to be divided among them into eleven equal shares.
Until such time that Lot No. 1-P has been partitioned among Roman Zuiga, Sr.s eleven
legitimate children, as co-owners being co-heirs their shares remain ideal (Article 1078,
The Civil Code). Not one of the eleven children can claim as his or hers a specifically
identified portion of Lot No. 1-P.
This Court finds Flavia Zuigas verbal claim that she never sold Lot No. 1-P to her sister
Cresencia Zuiga-Echague to be without merit. Not a shred of evidence appears of
record showing that the signature appearing in the face of the deed of absolute sale was
not Flavia A. Zuigas (Exhibits "D," "2"). At any rate, this Court holds that the written
deed of absolute sale dated 20 June 2001 that Flavia A. Zuiga signed is more credible
evidence than her self-serving, uncorroborated and easy to concoct testimony that she
never sold such lot to her sister Cresencia Zuiga-Echague.1awphil
However, the above deed of absolute sale that Flavia A. Zuiga executed was valid and
effective only to the extent of her ideal share in Lot No. 1-P. The validity of the other deed
of absolute sale Cresencia Zuiga-Echague executed in favor of the spouses Mariano
and Emma Bolaos is limited to her ideal share and the other ideal share she acquired
from Flavia A. Zuiga. In effect[,] the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos acquired the
ideal shares of the sisters Flavia A. Zuiga and Cresencia Zuiga-Echague.
The claim by the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos that they were purchasers in
good faith has little relevance. Lot No. 1-P appears as [an] unregistered lot, and thus they
merely step into the shoes of the seller. They cannot acquire [a] property interest greater
tha[n] Cresencia Zuiga- Echagues.
Anyway, the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos acquired Lot No. 1-P from Cresencia
Zuiga-Echague on the very same day that Flavia A. Zuiga sold it to Cresencia Zuiga-
Echague. The tax declaration over Lot No. 1-P at the time the spouses Mariano and
Emma Bolaos acquired such lot speaks that its owners were Flavia A. Zuiga, sisters
and brothers (Exhibit "G"). Awareness by the spouses Mariano and Emma Bolaos of
such tax declaration while they were buying Lot No. 1-P, they knew that Flavia A. Zuiga
was not the exclusive owner of Lot No. 1-P at the time they purchased it.23
Considering that Roman died on August 9, 1976, the provisions of the Civil Code on
succession, then the law in force, should apply, particularly Articles 979 and 980, viz.
Art. 979. Legitimate children and their descendants succeed the parents and other
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age, and even if they should come from
different marriages. x x x.
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Thus, the RTC correctly ruled that Lot No. 1-P rightfully belongs to the 11 children of
Roman, seven (7) from his first marriage with Flavia and four (4) from his second
marriage with Ceferina, in equal shares. As there was no partition among Romans
children, the lot was owned by them in common. And inasmuch as Flavia did not
successfully repudiate her sale of her aliquot share to Cresencia, the transfer stands as
valid and effective. Consequently, what Cresencia sold to petitioner spouses was her
own share and Flavias share in the property that she acquired by virtue of the notarized
deed of sale, which is only 2/11 of Lot No. 1-P. Therefore, the restitution of the property
in excess of that portion by petitioner spouses is clearly warranted.
Indeed, the findings of the trial court, with respect to the operative facts and the credibility
of witnesses, especially when affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest
degree of deference and respect by this Court, except when: (1) the findings of a trial
court are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) a lower courts
inference from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) there
is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) the findings of the court go
beyond the issues of the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; (5) there is misapprehension of facts; and
(6) the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which
they are based are premised on the absence of evidence, or are contradicted by
evidence on record.24Notably, none of these exceptions is attendant in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated March 30, 2007
and the Resolution dated November 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. CV
No. 84452 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R. Yangco, RAFAEL
CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS, RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE
J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD ASPRER and CIPRIANO
NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of seventy-seven years.
His will dated August 29, 1934 was probated in the Court of First Instance of Manila in
Special Proceeding No. 54863. The decree of probate was affirmed in this Court's 1941
decision in Corpus vs. Yangco, 73 Phil. 527. The complete text of the will is quoted in
that decision.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest relatives were (1) his
half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio
(3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus, and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half
brother, Pablo Corpus, and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother
Jose Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona Arguelles, the
widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis Rafael Yangco, Ramona had
begotten five children with Tomas Corpus, two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo
Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated November 26,
1945 was submitted by the administrator and the legatees named in the will. That project
of partition was opposed by the estate of Luis R. Yangco whose counsel contended that
an intestacy should be declared Because the will does not contain an institution of heir. It
was also opposed by Atty. Roman A. Cruz, who represented Juanita Corpus, Pedro
Martinez and Juliana de Castro. Juanita Corpus was already dead when Atty. Cruz
appeared as her counsel.
Atty. Cruz alleged in his opposition that the proposed partion was not in conformity with
the will because the testator intended that the estate. should be "conserved" and not
physically partitioned. Atty. Cruz prayed "que declare que el finado no dispuso en su
testamento de sus bienes y negocios y que ha lugar a sucession intestado con respecio
a los raismos y que same un dia en esta causa para la recepcion de pruebas previa a la
declaracion de quienes son los herederos legales o abintestato del difunto."
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the project of partition. It
held that in certain clauses of the will the testator intended to conserve his properties not
in the sense of disposing of them after his death but for the purpose of Preventing that
"tales bienes fuesen malgastados o desfilpar radios por los legatarios" and that if the
testator intended a Perpetual prohibition against alienation, that conch tion would be
regarded "como no puesta o no existents". it concluded that "no hay motives legales o
morales para que la sucession de Don Teodoro R. Yangco sea declarada intestada (See
Barretto vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888, which cites article 785 of the Spanish Civil Code as
prohibiting perpetual entails, and Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals, L-28734, March 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 546.)
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus (deceased) and the
estate of Luis R. Yangco aped to this Court (L-1476). Those appeals were dismissed in
tills Court's resolutions of October 10 and 31, 1947 after the legatees and the appellants
entered into compromise agreements. In the compromise dated October 7, 1947 the
legatees agreed to pay P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs
of Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas Corpus signed
that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita Corpus. The estate of Luis R.
Yangco entered into a similar compromise a ment A the resolution dismissing the appeal
became, final and executory on October 14 and November 4, 1947, entries of judgment
were made on those dates.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, Tomas Corpus Signed a receipt dated October
24, 1947 wherein he acknowledge that he received from the Yangco estate the sum of
two thousand pesos (P2,000) "as settlement in full of my share of the compromise
agreement as per understanding with Judge Roman Cruz, our attorney in this case"
(Exh. D or 17).
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the settlement and
physical partition of the Yangco estate. The probate court approved that agreement and
noted that the 1945 project of partition was pro tanto modified. That did not set at rest the
controvery over the Yangco's estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus, filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate
estate. He alleged in his complaint that the dispositions in his Yangcos will sing perpetual
prohibitions upon alienation rendered it void under article 785 of the old Civil Code and
that the 1949 partition is invalid and, therefore, the decedent's estate should be
distributed according to the rules on intestacy.
The trial court in its decision of July 2, 1956 dismissed the action on the grounds of res
judicata and laches. It held that the intrinsic validity of Yangco's will was passed upon in
its order dated December 26, 1946 in Special Proceeding No. 54863 approving the
project of partition for the testator's estate.
Tomas Corpus appealed to the Court of Appeals which in its resolution dated January
23, 1964 in CA-G. R. No. 18720-R certified the appeal to this Court because it involves
real property valued at more than fifty thousand pesos (Sec. 17151 Judiciary Law before
it was amended by Republic Act No. 2613).
Appellant Corpus contends in this appeal that the trial court erred in holding (1) that
Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, (2) that his will had been duly legalized and (3)
that plaintiff's action is barred by res judicata and laches.
In the disposition of this appeal it is not necessary to resolve whether Yangco's will had
been duly legalized and whether the action of Tomas Corpus is barred by res judicata
and laches. The appeal may be resolved by de whether Juanita Corpus, the mother of
apt Tomas Corpus was a legal heir of Yangco. Has Tomas Corpus a cause of action to
recover his mother's supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate?
To answer that question, it is necessary to ascertain Yangco's filiation The trial court
found that Yangco "a su muerte tambien le sbrevivieron Luis y Paz appellidados Yangco,
hermanos naturales reconocidos por su padre natural Luis R. Yangco". The basis of the
trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child and
not a legitimate child was the statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco,
dated June 14, 1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged
natural children. His exact words are:
Primera. Declaro que tengo cuatro hijos naturales reconocidos,
Hamados Teodoro, Paz, Luisa y Luis, los cuales son mis unicos
herederos forzosos (Exh. 1 in Testate Estate of Teodoro Yangco).
That will was attested by Rafael del Pan Francisco Ortigas, Manuel Camus and Florencio
Gonzales Diez
Appellant Corpus assails the probative value of the will of Luis R. Yangco, Identified as
Exhibit 1 herein, which he says is a mere copy of Exhibit 20, as found in the record on
appeal in Special Proceeding No. 54863. He contends that it should not prevail over the
presumption of legitimacy found in section 69, Rule 123 of the old Rules of Court and
over the statement of Samuel W. Stagg in his biography of Teodoro R. Yangco, that Luis
Rafael Yangco made a second marital venture with Victoria Obin implying that he had a
first marital venture with Ramona Arguelles, the mother of Teodoro.
These contentions have no merit. The authenticity of the will of Luis Rafael Yangco, as
reproduced in Exhibit I herein and as copied from Exhibit 20 in the proceeding for the
probate of Teodoro R. Yangco's wilt in incontestable. The said will is part of a public or
official judicial record.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas Corpus are presumed
to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have taken place between Ramona and
Tomas. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. It is disputably presumption "That a man
and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
contract of marriage"; "that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board, is legitimate", and "that things have happened according
to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life" (Sec. 5[z], [bb] and cc
Rule 131, Rules of Court).
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was illegitimate and
since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose Corpus, himself a legitimate child,
we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus has no cause of action for the recovery of the
supposed hereditary share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's
estate. Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no reciprocal
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives. The trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint of Tomas Corpus.
Article 943 of the old Civil code provides that "el hijo natural y el legitimado no tienen
derecho a suceder abintestato a los hijos y parientes legitimos del padre o madre que to
haya reconocido, ni ellos al hijo natural ni al legitimado". Article 943 "prohibits all
successory reciprocity mortis causa between legitimate and illegitimate relatives" 16
Sanchez Roman, Civil Code, pp. 996-997 cited in Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 63 Phil.
279, 287. See 16 Scaevola Codigo Civil, 4th Ed., 455-6). ...
Appellant Corpus concedes that if 'Teodoro R. Yangco was a natural child, he (Tomas
Corpus) would have no legal personality to intervene in the distribution of Yangco's
estate (p. 8, appellant's brief).
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code which provides that
"an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same
manner from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is disgracefully looked upon by
the legitimate family while the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.
The law does not recognize the blood tie and seeks to avod further grounds of
resentment (7 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., pp. 185- 6).
Under articles 944 and 945 of the Spanish Civil Code, "if an acknowledged natural or
legitimated child should die without issue, either legitimate or acknowledged, the father or
mother who acknowledged such child shall succeed to its entire estate; and if both
acknowledged it and are alive, they shall inherit from it share and share alike. In default
of natural ascendants, natural and legitimated children shall be succeeded by
their natural brothers and sisters in accordance with the rules established for legitimate
brothers and sisters." Hence, Teodoro R. Yangco's half brothers on the Corpus side, who
were legitimate, had no right to succeed to his estate under the rules of intestacy.
Following the rule in article 992, formerly article 943, it was held that the legitimate
relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child (Cacho vs. Udan L- 19996,
April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693. See De Guzman vs. Sevilla, 47 Phil. 991).
Where the testatrix, Rosario Table was the legitimate daughter of Jose Table the two
acknowledged natural children of her uncle, Ramon Table her father's brother, were held
not to be her legal heirs (Grey vs. Table 88 Phil. 128).
By reason of that same rule, the natural child cannot represent his natural father in the
succession to the estate of the legitimate grandparent (Llorente vs. Rodriguez, 10 Phil.
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322; Allarde vs. Abaya, 57 Phil. 909).
The natural daughter cannot succeed to the estate of her deceased uncle, a legitimate
brother of her natural mother (Anuran vs. Aquino and Ortiz, 38 Phil. 29).
WHEREFORE the lower court's judgment is affirmed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo, (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 125485. September 13, 2004]
RESTITUTA LEONARDO, assisted by JOSE T. RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, and TEODORO SEBASTIAN, VICENTE SEBASTIAN, CORAZON
SEBASTIAN, assisted by ANDRES MARCELO; PEDAD SEBASTIAN, HEIRS
OF EDUVIGIS SEBASTIAN, namely: EDUARDO S. TENORLAS, ABELARDO
J. TENORLAS, ADELA S. and SOLEDAD S. TENORLAS, represented by
EDUARDO S. TENORLAS, and HEIRS OF DOMINADOR, namely:
NAPOLEON SEBASTIAN, RUPERTO SEBASTIAN, ADORACION
SEBASTIAN, PRISCILLA SEBASTIAN, LITA SEBASTIAN, TITA SEBASTIAN
and GLORIA SEBASTIAN, represented by NAPOLEON SEBASTIAN;
EVELYN SEBASTIAN; AURORA SEBASTIAN; and JULIETA
SEBASTIAN, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals which in turn affirmed the
judgment[2]of Branch 57, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Carlos City, dismissing for
lack of cause of action the complaint filed by petitioner against private respondents for
declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Jose Sebastian and
Tomasina Paul.
Petitioner Restituta Leonardo is the only legitimate child of the late spouses
Tomasina Paul and Balbino Leonardo. Private respondents Teodoro, Victor, Corazon,
Piedad, as well as the late Eduvigis and Dominador, all surnamed Sebastian, are the
illegitimate children of Tomasina with Jose Sebastian after she separated from Balbino
Leonardo.
In an action to declare the nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian before Branch 57, RTC of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, petitioner alleged that, on June 24, 1988, at around 5:00 p.m., private
respondent Corazon Sebastian and her niece Julieta Sebastian, and a certain Bitang,
came to petitioners house to persuade her to sign a deed of extrajudicial partition of the
estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose Sebastian. Before signing the document, petitioner
allegedly insisted that they wait for her husband Jose Ramos so he could translate the
document which was written in English. Petitioner, however, proceeded to sign the
document even without her husband and without reading the document, on the
assurance of private respondent Corazon Sebastian that petitioners share as a legitimate
daughter of Tomasina Paul was provided for in the extrajudicial partition. Petitioner then
asked private respondent Corazon and her companions to wait for her husband so he
could read the document. When petitioners husband arrived, however, private
respondent Corazon and her companions had left without leaving a copy of the
document. It was only when petitioner hired a lawyer that they were able to secure a
copy and read the contents thereof.
Petitioner refuted[3] private respondents claim that they were the legitimate children
and sole heirs of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul. Despite the (de facto) separation
of petitioners father Balbino Leonardo and Tomasina Paul, the latter remained the lawful
wife of Balbino. Petitioner maintained that no joint settlement of the estate of Jose
Sebastian and Tomasina Paul could be effected since what existed between them was
co-ownership, not conjugal partnership. They were never married to each other. The
extrajudicial partition was therefore unlawful and illegal.
Petitioner also claimed that her consent was vitiated because she was deceived
into signing the extrajudicial settlement. She further denied having appeared before
Judge Juan Austria of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan on July
27, 1988 to acknowledge the execution of the extrajudicial partition.
Private respondents, in their answer with counterclaim, [4] raised the defense of lack
of cause of action. They insisted that the document in question was valid and binding
between the parties. According to them, on July 27, 1988, they personally appeared
before Judge Austria of the MTC of Urbiztondo, who read and explained the contents of
the document which all of them, including petitioner, voluntarily signed.
Private respondents contended that their declaration that they were legitimate
children of Jose Sebastian and Tomasina Paul did not affect the validity of the
extrajudicial partition. Petitioners act of signing the document estopped her to deny or
question its validity. They moreover averred that the action filed by petitioner was
incompatible with her complaint. Considering that petitioner claimed vitiation of consent,
the proper action was annulment and not declaration of nullity of the instrument.
On July 27, 1989, petitioner filed an amended complaint [5] to include parties to the
extrajudicial partition who were not named as defendants in the original complaint.
During the August 23, 1990 pre-trial conference,[6] no amicable settlement was
reached and the parties agreed that the only issue to be resolved was whether
petitioners consent to the extrajudicial partition was voluntarily given.
In a decision dated February 22, 1993, the RTC of San Carlos City, Pangasinan
rendered a decision[7] dismissing the complaint as well as the counterclaim. The court a
quoruled that the element of duress or fraud that vitiates consent was not established
and that the proper action was the reformation of the instrument, not the declaration of
nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of estate. By way of obiter dictum, the trial court
stated that, being a legitimate child, petitioner was entitled to one-half (or 19,282.5 sq.m.)
of Tomasina Pauls estate as her legitime. The 7,671.75 square meters allotted to her in
the assailed extrajudicial partition was therefore less than her correct share as provided
by law.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court in its May
23, 1996 decision.[8] Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
The sole issue in this case is whether the consent given by petitioner to the
extrajudicial settlement of estate was given voluntarily.
We hold that it was not.
The essence of consent is the agreement of the parties on the terms of the
contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. It is the concurrence of
the minds of the parties on the object and the cause which constitutes the contract. [9] The
area of agreement must extend to all points that the parties deem material or there is no
consent at all.[10]
To be valid, consent must meet the following requisites: (a) it should be intelligent,
or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (b) it should be free and (c) it
should be spontaneous. Intelligence in consent is vitiated by error; freedom by violence,
intimidation or undue influence; and spontaneity by fraud.[11]
In determining the effect of an alleged error, the courts must consider both the
objective and subjective aspects of the case which is the intellectual capacity of the
person who committed the mistake.[12]
Mistake, on the other hand, in order to invalidate consent should refer to the
substance of the thing which is the object of the contract, or to those conditions which
have principally moved one or both parties to enter into the contract. [13]
According to the late civil law authority, Arturo M. Tolentino, the (old) rule that a
party is presumed to know the import of a document to which he affixes his signature and
is bound thereby, has been altered by Art. 1332 of the Civil Code. The provision states
that [w]hen one of the parties is unable to read, or if the contract is in a language not
understood by him, and mistake or fraud is alleged, the person enforcing the contract
must show that the terms thereof have been fully explained to the former.
Article 1332 was a provision taken from american law, necessitated by the fact that
there continues to be a fair number of people in this country without the benefit of a good
education or documents have been written in English or Spanish.[14] The provision was
intended to protect a party to a contract disadvantaged by illiteracy, ignorance, mental
weakness or some other handicap. It contemplates a situation wherein a contract is
entered into but the consent of one of the contracting parties is vitiated by mistake or
fraud committed by the other.[15]
Thus, in case one of the parties to a contract is unable to read and fraud is alleged,
the person enforcing the contract must show that the terms thereof have been fully
explained to the former.[16] Where a party is unable to read, and he expressly pleads in
his reply that he signed the voucher in question without knowing (its) contents which
have not been explained to him, this plea is tantamount to one of mistake or fraud in the
execution of the voucher or receipt in question and the burden is shifted to the other
party to show that the former fully understood the contents of the document; and if he
fails to prove this, the presumption of mistake (if not fraud) stands unrebutted and
controlling.[17]
Contracts where consent is given by mistake or because of violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud are voidable.[18] These circumstances are defects of the will, the
existence of which impairs the freedom, intelligence, spontaneity and voluntariness of the
party in giving consent to the agreement. In determining whether consent is vitiated by
any of the circumstances mentioned in Art. 1330 of the Civil Code, courts are given a
wide latitude in weighing the facts or circumstances in a given case and in deciding in
favor of what they believe actually occurred, considering the age, physical infirmity,
intelligence, relationship and the conduct of the parties at the time of making the contract
and subsequent thereto, irrespective of whether the contract is in a public or private
writing.[19]
Although under Art. 1332 there exists a presumption of mistake or error accorded
by the law to those who have not had the benefit of a good education, one who alleges
any defect or the lack of a valid consent to a contract must establish the same by full,
clear and convincing evidence, not merely by preponderance of evidence. [20] Hence,
even as the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to rebut the presumption of
mistake, the plaintiff who alleges such mistake (or fraud) must show that his personal
circumstances warrant the application of Art. 1332.
In this case, the presumption of mistake or error on the part of petitioner was not
sufficiently rebutted by private respondents. Private respondents failed to offer any
evidence to prove that the extrajudicial settlement of estate was explained in a language
known to the petitioner, i.e. the Pangasinan dialect. Clearly, petitioner, who only finished
Grade 3, was not in a position to give her free, voluntary and spontaneous consent
without having the document, which was in English, explained to her in the Pangasinan
dialect. She stated in open court that she did not understand English. Her testimony,
translated into English, was as follows:
Q: While you were there is your house at barangay Angatel, Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan, what happened?
A: On June 24, 1988, I was in our house because I got sick, sir.
Q: What happened?
A: When the time was about 5:00 oclock, I was awaken by my daughter-in-
law, Rita Ramos, and told me that my half sister Corazon would like to
tell us something, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I let them come in, sir.
Q: Did they come in?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was the companion of your half sister Corazon Sebastian when she
arrived in your house?
A: Julita Sebastian and her daughter Bitang, sir.
Q: And who is this Julita Sebastian to you?
A: She is my niece, sir.
Q: And then when they got inside the house, what happened?
A: I asked them their purpose, sir.
Q: Did they tell you their purpose?
A: I asked their purpose in coming to our house and they told me, I came here
because I have a partition executed so that the share of each one of us
will be given, she said sir.
Q: Did you see that document?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN
Q: Did you read the document?
A: No, sir because I was waiting for my husband to have that document read
or translated to me because I could not understand, sir.
Q: What could you not understand?
A: I can not understand English, sir.
Q: But anyway, can you read?
A: Yes, sir in Pangasinan.
Q: Now, that document which according to you was brought by your half sister
Corazon Sebastian, what happened to that document?
A: Corazon Sebastian request(ed) me to sign, sir.
Q: Did you sign immediately?
A: Yes, sir, because according to her, all my shares were embodied in that
document as a legal daughter.[21]
Petitioners wish to wait for her husband, Jose T. Ramos, to explain to her the
contents of the document in the Pangasinan dialect was a reasonable and prudent act
that showed her uncertainty over what was written. Due to her limited educational
attainment, she could not understand the document in English. She wanted to seek
assistance from her husband who was then out of the house. However, due to the
misrepresentation, deception and undue pressure of her half-sister Corazon Sebastian,
petitioner signed the document. Corazon assured petitioner that she would receive her
legitimate share in the estate of their late mother.
Later on, when petitioners husband examined the extrajudicial partition agreement,
he found out that petitioner was deprived of her full legitime. Under the law, petitioners
share should have been one-half of her mothers estate, comprising a total area of
19,282.50 square meters. Under the defective extrajudicial settlement of estate,
however, petitioner was to receive only 7,671.75 square meters. This was a substantial
mistake clearly prejudicial to the substantive interests of petitioner in her mothers estate.
There is no doubt that, given her lack of education, petitioner is protected by Art. 1332 of
the Civil Code. There is reason to believe that, had the provisions of the extrajudicial
agreement been explained to her in the Pangasinan dialect, she would not have
consented to the significant and unreasonable diminution of her rights.
MTC Judge Austria, the officer who notarized the extrajudicial settlement, stated
that he explained the contents to all the parties concerned. Granting arguendo, however,
that Judge Austria did indeed explain the provisions of the agreement to them, the
records do not reflect that he explained it to petitioner in a language or dialect known to
her. Judge Austria never stated in his testimony before the court a quo what language or
dialect he used in explaining the contents of the document to the parties. [22] Significantly,
he was not even certain if the parties to the agreement were present during the
notarization of the document:
ATTY. TULAGAN
Q: Reflected upon all the pages of this Exhibit 1 are numerous signatures, two
of whom belongs (sic) to Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo Sebastian
Tenorlas.
ATTY. D. TULAGAN
(continuing)
The Philippines on July, 1989, will you please educate us now Judge Austria
on this document?
ATTY. O. DE GUZMAN
That will be improper, your Honor.
COURT
What is the question, you repeat the question.
INTERPRETER:
Reflected upon all the pages of this Exhibit 1 are numerous signatures, two of
whom belongs (sic) to Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo Sebastian
Tenorlas, in your just concluded testimony, you said that everyone of
them appeared with you, we have here a documented evidence coming
from the Department of Justice, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
Manila, certifying that Piedad Paul Sebastian and Eduardo Sebastian
Tenorlas did not arrive in the Philippines or departed from the Philippines
on July, 1998, will you please educate us now Judge Austria on this
document?
ATTY. O. DE GUZMAN:
Your Honor please, before the witness answer, may we examine the
certification first and may we state for the record that the month of July,
1998 does not specify any date.
 ATTY. L. TULAGAN:
July.
ATTY. O. DE GUZMAN:
But not a particular date, for the record.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN:
For the whole month of July, no departure and no arrival. This is a
certificate from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. I do not know about
this, as a matter of fact, I do not even know this person personally
WITNESS:
Somebody that kind of name appeared before me.
ATTY. L. TULAGAN:
Q: Since you do not know everybody from Urbiztondo, Pangasinan it is
possible that another person appeared and signed for that name?
A: Yes, possible.[23]
Therefore, the presumption of mistake under Article 1332 is controlling, having
remained unrebutted by private respondents. The evidence proving that the document
was not fully explained to petitioner in a language known to her, given her low
educational attainment, remained uncontradicted by private respondents. We find that, in
the light of the circumstances presented by the testimonies of the witnesses for both
parties, the consent of petitioner was invalidated by a substantial mistake or error,
rendering the agreement voidable. The extrajudicial partition between private
respondents and petitioner should therefore be annulled and set aside on the ground of
mistake.
In Rural Bank of Caloocan, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[24] we ruled that a contract may
be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent, even if the act complained of is committed
by a third party without the connivance or complicity of one of the contracting parties. We
found that a substantial mistake arose from the employment of fraud or
misrepresentation. The plaintiff in that case was a 70-year-old unschooled and unlettered
woman who signed an unauthorized loan obtained by a third party on her behalf. The
Court annulled the contract due to a substantial mistake which invalidated her consent.
By the same reasoning, if it is one of the contracting parties who commits the fraud
or misrepresentation, such contract may all the more be annulled due to substantial
mistake.
In Remalante v. Tibe,[25] this Court ruled that misrepresentation to an illiterate
woman who did not know how to read and write, nor understand English, is fraudulent.
Thus, the deed of sale was considered vitiated with substantial error and fraud. This
Court further held:[26]
Since it has been established by uncontradicted evidence that the plaintiff is practically
unschooled and illiterate, not knowing how to read, write and understand the English
language in which Exhibit 22 was drafted, it would have been incumbent upon the
defendant to show that the terms there of have been fully explained to the plaintiff. The
evidence is entirely lacking at this point, and the lack of it is fatal to the cause of the
defendant for his failure to discharge the burden of proof.
Generally, the remedy of appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
contemplates only questions of law and not issues of fact. [27] This rule, however, is
inapplicable in cases such as the one at bar where the factual findings complained of are
absolutely devoid of support in the records or the assailed judgment of the appellate
court is based on a misapprehension of facts.[28] Thus, this case is an exception to the
general rule on the conclusiveness of facts, the evidence pointing to no other conclusion
but the existence of vitiated consent, given the diminished intellectual capacity of the
petitioner and the misrepresentation of private respondent Corazon Sebastian on the
contents of the extrajudicial partition.
Private respondents also maintain that petitioner has no cause of action since the
remedy that should be pursued is an action for annulment and not for declaration of
nullity. Private respondents therefore pray for the dismissal of this petition on the ground
of lack of cause of action.
Before ruling on this procedural matter, a distinction between an action for
annulment and one for declaration of nullity of an agreement is called for.
An action for annulment of contract is one filed where consent is vitiated by lack of
legal capacity of one of the contracting parties, or by mistake, violence, intimidation,
undue influence or fraud.[29] By its very nature, annulment contemplates a contract which
is voidable, that is, valid until annulled. Such contract is binding on all the contracting
parties until annulled and set aside by a court of law. It may be ratified. An action for
annulment of contract has a four-year prescriptive period.[30]
On the other hand, an action for declaration of nullity of contract presupposes
a void contract or one where all of the requisites prescribed by law for contracts are
present but the cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy, prohibited by law or declared by law to be void. [31] Such contract as
a rule produces no legal and binding effect even if it is not set aside by direct legal action.
Neither may it be ratified. An action for the declaration of nullity of contract is
imprescriptible.[32]
The petitioners pleading was for the declaration of nullity of the extrajudicial
settlement of estate. However, this did not necessarily mean the automatic dismissal of
the case on the ground of lack of cause of action.
Granting that the action filed by petitioner was incompatible with her allegations, it is
not the caption of the pleading but the allegations that determine the nature of the
action.[33] The court should grant the relief warranted by the allegations and the proof
even if no such relief is prayed for.[34] In this case, the allegations in the pleading and the
evidence adduced point to no other remedy but to annul the extrajudicial settlement of
estate because of vitiated consent.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 1996 is hereby
REVERSED. The extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Tomasina Paul and Jose
Sebastian is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No cost.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Carpio-Morales, J., on official leave.
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all
surnamed SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO
SANTERO, et al., petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN, respondents.
Ambrosio Padilla, Mempin & Reyes Law Offices for petitioners.
Pedro S. Sarino for respondent Felisa Pamuti Jardin.
RESOLUTION
PARAS, J.:
The decision of the Second Division of this Court in the case of Anselma Diaz, et al. vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 6574, promulgated June 17, 1987 declaring
Felisa Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero, and its Resolution of February 24, 1988 denying the
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 2, 1987, are being challenged in this Second
Motion for Reconsideration dated July 5, 1988. After the parties had filed their respective
pleadings, the Court, in a resolution dated October 27, 1988, resolved to grant the
request of the petitioners for oral argument before the court en banc, and the case was
set for hearing on November 17, 1988 to resolve the question: Does the term "relatives"
in Article 992 of the New Civil Code which reads:
 An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children or relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
include the legitimate parents of the father or mother of the illegitimate children? Invited
to discuss as amici curiaeduring the hearing were the following: Justice Jose B.L. Reyes,
former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, Dr. Arturo Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo
Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane.
The facts of the case, as synthesized in the assailed decision, are as follows:
It is undisputed: 1) that Felisa Pamuti Jardin is a niece of Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero who together with Felisa's mother Juliana
were the only legitimate children of the spouses Felipe Pamuti and
Petronila Asuncion; 2) that Juliana married Simon Jardin and out of
their union were born Felisa Pamuti and another child who died during
infancy; 3) that Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero is the widow of
Pascual Santero and the mother of Pablo Santero; 4) that Pablo
Santero was the only legitimate son of his parents Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero; 5) that Pascual Santero died in
1970; Pablo Santero in 1973 and Simona Santero in 1976; 6) that
Pablo Santero, at the time of his death was survived by his mother
Simona Santero and his six minor natural children to wit: four minor
children with Anselma Diaz and two minor children with Felixberta
Pacursa.
(pp. 1-2, Decision; pp. 190-191, Rollo)
Briefly stated, the real issue in the instant case is this who are the legal heirs of
Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero her niece Felisa Pamuti-Jardin or her grandchildren
(the natural children of Pablo Santero)?
The present controversy is confined solely to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda.
de Santero. In connection therewith, We are tasked with determining anew whether
petitioners as illegitimate children of Pablo Santero could inherit from Simona Pamuti
Vda. de Santero, by right of representation of their father Pablo Santero who is a
legitimate child of Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
Petitioners claim that the amendment of Articles 941 and 943 of the old Civil Code (Civil
Code of Spain) by Articles 990 and 992 of the new Civil Code (Civil Code of the
Philippines) constitute a substantial and not merely a formal change, which grants
illegitimate children certain successional rights. We do not dispute the fact that the New
Civil Code has given illegitimate children successional rights, which rights were never
before enjoyed by them under the Old Civil Code. They were during that time merely
entitled to support. In fact, they are now considered as compulsory primary heirs under
Article 887 of the new Civil Code (No. 5 in the order of intestate succession). Again, We
do not deny that fact. These are only some of the many rights granted by the new Code
to illegitimate children. But that is all. A careful evaluation of the New Civil Code
provisions, especially Articles 902, 982, 989, and 990, claimed by petitioners to have
conferred illegitimate children the right to represent their parents in the inheritance of
their legitimate grandparents, would in point of fact reveal that such right to this time does
not exist.
Let Us take a closer look at the above-cited provisions.
Art.902. The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding
articles are transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right
of representation and if any one of them should have died, leaving
several heirs, the portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the
latter in equal portions. (933)
Art. 989. If, together with illegitimate children, there should survive
descendants of another illegitimate child who is dead, the former shall
succeed in their own right and the latter by right of representation.
(940a)
Art. 990. The hereditary rights granted by the two preceding articles
to illegitimate children shall be transmitted upon their death to their
descendants, who shall inherit by right of representation from their
deceased grandparent. (941a) Emphasis supplied).
Articles 902, 989, and 990 clearly speak of successional rights of illegitimate children,
which rights are transmitted to their descendants upon their death. The descendants (of
these illegitimate children) who may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be
legitimate or illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that the
persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three named provisions are
very clear on this matter. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It may
be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child is
entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of Article 982, which provides that "the
grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a
conclusion is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child to the
legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would set at naught the
provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to instant case because Article 992
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be amiss to state that
Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the exception.
"The rules laid down in Article 982 that 'grandchildren and other descendants shall inherit
by right of representation and in Article 902 that the rights of illegitimate children ... are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an illegitimate child
has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
or mother."' (Amicus Curiae's Opinion by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12)
"Article 992 of the New Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits
absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate
children and relatives of the father or mother of said illegitimate child. They may have a
natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purpose of Article 992.
Between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully looked
down upon by the legitimate family; and the family is in turn, hated by the illegitimate
child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the former, and the resources of
which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the law does no more
than recognize this truth, by avoiding further ground of resentment." (7 Manresa 110
cited in Grey v. Fable 40 OG (First S) No. 3, p. 196).
According to petitioners, the commentaries of Manresa as above- quoted are based on
Articles 939 to 944 of the old Civil Code and are therefore inapplicable to the New Civil
Code and to the case at bar. Petitioners further argue that the consistent doctrine
adopted by this Court in the cases of Llorente vs. Rodriguez, et al., 10 Phil.,
585; Centeno vs. Centeno, 52 Phil. 322, and Oyao vs. Oyao, 94 Phil. 204, cited by
former Justice Minister Justice Puno, Justice Caguioa, and Prof. Balane, which
identically held that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed ab intestato the
legitimate father or mother of his natural parent (also a legitimate child himself is already
abrogated by the amendments made by the Now Civil Code and thus cannot be made to
apply to the instant case.
Once more, We decline to agree with petitioner. We are fully aware of certain substantial
changes in our law of succcession, but there is no change whatsoever with respect to the
provision of Article 992 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, by the said substantial change,
Article 992, which was a reproduction f Article 943 of the Civil Code of Spain, should
have been suppressed or at least modified to clarify the matters which are now the
subject of the present controversy. While the New Civil Code may have granted
successional rights to illegitimate children, those articles, however, in conjunction with
Article 992, prohibit the right of representation from being exercised where the person to
be represented is a legitimate child. Needless to say, the determining factor is the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to be represented
is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may
represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate
descendants cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate
descendants may exercise the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed
Article 992. In this wise, the commentaries of Manresa on the matter in issue, even
though based on the old Civil Code, are still very much applicable to the New Civil Code
because the amendment, although substantial, did not consist of giving illegitimate
children the right to represent their natural parents (legitimate) in the intestate succession
of their grandparents (legitimate). It is with the same line of reasoning that the three
aforecited cases may be said to be still applicable to the instant case.
Equally important are the reflections of the Illustrious Hon. Justice Jose B.L. Reyes which
also find support from other civilists. We quote:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was
admitted only within the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943
of that Code prescribed that an illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father and
mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own
Art. 992, but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995
and 998) our Code allows the hereditary portion of the illegitimate child
to pass to his own descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate. So
that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a legitimate child
from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent,
the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference
being indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil
Code we shall have to make a choice and decide either that the
illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right of representation, in
which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said
article and modify Articles 992 and 998. The first solution would be
more in accord with an enlightened attitude vis-a-vis illegitimate
children. (Reflections on the Reform of hereditary
Succession, JOURNAL of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, First
Quartet 1976, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 40-41). (p. 7, Decision; p. 196,
Rollo)
It is therefore clear from Article 992 of the New Civil Code that the phrase "legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother" includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero
as the word "relative" is broad enough to comprehend all the kindred of the person
spoken of. (Comment, p. 139 Rollo citing p. 2862 Bouvier's Law Dictionary vol. 11, Third
Revision, Eight Edition) The record reveals that from the commencement of this case the
only parties who claimed to be the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero are Felisa Pamuti Jardin and the six minor natural or illegitimate children of
Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the provisions of Article 992, the
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court did not commit any error in holding Felisa
Pamuti Jardin to be the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of the late Simona
Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general
acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordance therefore with the canons of statutory
interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and inclusive
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. Esrinche, in his Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia defines parientes as "los que estan relacionados por
los vinculos de la sangre, ya sea por proceder unos de otros, como los
descendientes y ascendientes, ya sea por proceder de una misma raiz
o tronco, como los colaterales. (cited in Scaevola, op. cit., p. 457). (p.
377, Rollo)
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more
restrictive sense than it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of
interpretation. Besides, he further states that when the law intends to use the term in a
more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003
and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the
context indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as
already discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.
To recapitulate, We quote this:
The lines of this distinction between legitimates and illegitimates. which
goes back very far in legal history, have been softened but not erased
by present law. Our legislation has not gone so far as to place
legitimate and illegitimate children on exactly the same footing. Even
the Family Code of 1987 (EO 209) has not abolished the gradation
between legitimate and illegitimate children (although it has done away
with the sub-classification of illegitimates into natural and 'spurious'). It
would thus be correct to say that illegitimate children have only those
rights which are expressly or clearly granted to them by law
(vide Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1973 ed., vol. III, p. 291).
(Amicus Curiae's Opinion by Prof. Ruben Balane, p. 12).
In the light of the foregoing, We conclude that until Article 992 is suppressed or at least
amended to clarify the term "relatives" there is no other alternative but to apply the law
literally. Thus, We hereby reiterate the decision of June 17, 1987 and declare Felisa
Pamuti-Jardin to be the sole heir to the intestate estate of Simona Pamuti Vda. de
Santero, to the exclusion of petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the second Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED, and the assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Cortes, Grio-
Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
The ponente, Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras, is a noted teacher of Civil Law subjects and
a well-known author of many Commentaries on the Civil Code. The amicus curiae
former Justice Jose B.L. Reyes, former Justice Ricardo C. Puno, former Senator Arturo
Tolentino, former Justice Eduardo Caguioa, and Professor Ruben Balane together
with the ponente read like a veritable Who's Who in Civil Law in the Philippines.
It is, therefore, with trepidation that I venture to cast a discordant vote on the issue before
the Court. But it is perhaps because I am not as deeply steeped in the civil law tradition
and in the usually tidy and methodical neatness characterizing its ancient precepts that I
discern a change effected by our own version of the Civil Code. The orthodox rules which
earlier inflexibly separated the legitimate from the illegitimate families have been relaxed
a little. The oppobrium cast on illegitimate children and the disadvantages they suffer in
law are no longer as overwhelming as before. The wall is no longer as rigid as it used to
be. The efforts of the Code Commission and the Congress to make our civil law conform
"With the customs, traditions, and idiosyncrasies of the Filipino people and with modern
trends in legislation and the progressive principles of law" have resulted in deviations
from the strict and narrow path followed by Manresa and other early glossators. I,
therefore, do not feel bound to follow the ancient interpretations in the presence of
absurd and unjust results brought about by amendments in the new Civil Code.
We have here a case of grandchildren who cannot inherit from their direct ascendant,
their own grandmother, simply because their father (who was a legitimate son) failed to
marry their mother. There are no other direct heirs. Hence, the properties of their
grandmother goes to a collateral relative her niece. If the niece is no longer alive, an
even more distant group of grandnieces and grandnephews will inherit as against the
grandmother's own direct flesh and blood.
As pointed out by the petitioners, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court
disregards the order of intestate succession in Arts. 978 to 1014 of the Civil Code and
the right of representation in Art. 970 of descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate as
provided by Arts. 902, 993, and 995.
I agree that a clear and precise amendment is needed if collateral relatives such as
illegitimate children and legitimate uncles, aunts, or cousins or illegitimate siblings and
their legitimate half-brothers or half-sisters are to inherit from one another. But I must
stress that the barrier is between the legitimate and illegitimate families. I see no reason
why we should include a grandmother or grandfather among those where a firm wall of
separation should be maintained. She cannot be a separate "family" from her own
grandchildren.
The ancient wall was breached by our Code Commission and Congress in Art. 902 of the
Code which provides:
The rights of illegitimate children set forth in the preceding articles are
transmitted upon their death to their descendants, whether legitimate
or illegitimate. (843a)
The illegitimate children of an illegitimate child have the right to represent him in the
circumstances given in preceding articles. Before the Code was amended, that right was
reserved to the illegitimate child's legitimate off-spring.
I find it absurd why the petitioners could have represented their father Pablo if their
grandparents Simona and Pascual had not been legally married. Senator Tolentino,
while supporting the majority view of this Court states:
xxx xxx xxx
In the present article, the Code Commission took a step forward by
giving an illegitimate child the right of representation, which he did not
have under the old Code. But in retaining without change provisions of
the old Code in Article 992, it created an absurdity and committed an
injustice, because while the illegitimate descendant of an illegitimate
child can represent, the illegitimate descendant of a legitimate child
cannot. The principle that the illegitimate child should succeed by
operation of law only to persons with the same status of illegitimacy
has thus been preserved. And this is unfair to the illegitimate
descendants of legitimate children. Dura lex, sed lex. (Tolentino,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. III, 1987 ed., p. 330.)
The adoption of a harsh and absurd interpretation, pending an amendment of the law,
does not impress me as correct. Precisely, the word "relatives" in Art. 992 calls for
reinterpretation because the Code has been amended. The meaning of relatives must
follow the changes in various provisions upon which the word's effectivity is dependent.
My dissent from the majority opinion is also premised on a firm belief that law is based on
considerations of justice. The law should be interpreted to accord with what appears right
and just. Unless the opposite is proved, I will always presume that a grandmother loves
her grandchildren legitimate or illegitimate more than the second cousins of said
grandchildren or the parents of said cousins. The grandmother may be angry at the
indiscretions of her son but why should the law include the innocent grandchildren as
objects of that anger. "Relatives" can only refer to collateral relatives, to members of a
separate group of kins but not to one's own grandparents.
I, therefore, vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995
BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL,
MADRONA MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA
MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and NUMERIANA MANUEL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 37,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA
MANUEL, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
The property involved in this petition for review on certiorari is the inheritance left by an
illegitimate child who died intestate without any surviving descendant or ascendant.
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling,
initiated this suit. During his marriage with Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair
with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. Several years
passed before Antonio Manuel, his wife Beatriz, and his mistress Ursula finally crossed
the bar on, respectively, 06 August 1960, 05 February 1981 and 04 November 1976.
Juan Manuel, the illegitimate son of Antonio, married Esperanza Gamba. In
consideration of the marriage, a donation propter nuptias over a parcel of land, with an
area of 2,700 square meters, covered by Original Certificate of Title ("OCT") No. P-20594
was executed in favor of Juan Manuel by Laurenciana Manuel. Two other parcels of
land, covered by OCT P-19902 and Transfer Certificate of Title ("TCT") No. 41134, were
later bought by Juan and registered in his name. The couple were not blessed with a
child of their own. Their desire to have one impelled the spouses to take private
respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own
"daughter".
On 03 June 1980, Juan Manuel executed in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of
Sale Con Pacto de Retro (with a 10-year period of redemption) over a one-half (1/2)
portion of his land covered by TCT No. 41134. Juan Manuel died intestate on 21
February 1990. Two years later, or on 04 February 1992, Esperanza Gamba also passed
away.
On 05 March 1992, a month after the death of Esperanza, Modesta executed an Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land covered by OCT P-
20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134 (all still in the name of Juan Manuel).
Following the registration of the document of adjudication with the Office of the Register
of Deeds, the three titles
(OCT P-20594, OCT P-19902 and TCT No. 41134) in the name of Juan Manuel were
canceled and new titles, TCT No. 184223, TCT No. 184224 and TCT No. 184225, were
issued in the name of Modesta Manuel-Baltazar. On 19 October 1992, Modesta
executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and
Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half (1/2) portion of the land (now covered by TCT
No. 184225) that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con
Pacto de Retro. These acts of Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a
complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, the petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
The case, there being no material dispute on the facts, was submitted to the court a
quo for summary judgment.
The trial court, in its now assailed 15th August 1994 decision, dismissed the complaint
holding that petitioners, not being heirs ab intestato of their illegitimate brother Juan
Manuel, were not the real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Petitioners were also
ordered to jointly and severally (solidarily) pay
(a) respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,000.00 for exemplary damages, P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and P500.00 for
litigation expenses and (b) Estanislaoa Manuel the sum of P5,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,000.00 for exemplary damages and P500.00 for attorney's fees.
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court.
The petition before us raises the following contentions: That
1. THE LOWER COURT (HAS) FAILED TO CONSIDER THE LAST
PARAGRAPH OF ARTICLE 994 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE, AS THE
CONTROLLING LAW APPLICABLE BY VIRTUE OF THE ADMITTED FACTS,
AND NOT ARTICLE 992 OF THE SAME CODE.
2. THE LOWER COURT, IN NOT ANNULLING ALL THE ACTS OF, AND
VOIDING ALL DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY, RESPONDENT MODESTA
BALTAZAR, WHO ARROGATED UNTO HERSELF THE RIGHTS OF AN HEIR
TO THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN MANUEL, (HAS) VIRTUALLY
GRANTED SAID RESPONDENT THE STATUS OF AN HEIR MANIFESTLY
CONTRARY TO LAW, MORALS AND PUBLIC POLICY.
3. TO ENFORCE ONE'S RIGHT WHEN THEY ARE VIOLATED IS NEVER A
LEGAL WRONG.1
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate
(while the other half would pertain to Juan's surviving spouse) under the provision of the
last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be
succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be entitled to the entire
estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate, and the latter the other
half. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article
992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children
or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child. (Emphasis
supplied)
Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on
succession as the "principle of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the
illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral
line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other
hand, although it does not totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the
rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no application, however,
on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is
explained by a noted civilist.2 His thesis:
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that
under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the
illegitimate family from members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue
of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit
from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of "brothers and
sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to
illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)
The Court, too, has had occasions to explain this "iron curtain", firstly, in the early case
of Grey v. Fabie3 and, then, in the relatively recent cases of Diaz v. Intermediate
Appellate Court4 and De la Puerta v. Court of Appeals.5 In Diaz,we have said:
Article 992 of the New Civil Code . . . prohibits absolutely a succession ab
intestato between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives
of the father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of
blood, but this is not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between
the legitimate family and the illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is disgracefully
looked down upon by the legitimate family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated
by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged condition of the
former, and the resources of which it is thereby deprived; the former, in turn,
sees in the illegitimate child nothing but the product of sin, palpable evidence of
a blemish broken in life; the law does no more than recognize this truth, by
avoiding further grounds of resentment.
The rule in Article 992 has consistently been applied by the Court in several other cases.
Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had
half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's inheritance; 6 that
the legitimate collateral relatives of the mother cannot succeed from her illegitimate
child;7 that a natural child cannot represent his natural father in the succession to the
estate of the legitimate grandparent;8 that the natural daughter cannot succeed to the
estate of her deceased uncle who is a legitimate brother of her natural father; 9 and that
an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father.10 Indeed, the law on succession is animated by a uniform general
intent, and thus no part should be rendered inoperative 11 by, but must always be
construed in relation to, any other part as to produce a harmonious whole.12
In passing, we might, in easy graphic presentation, collate the order of preference and
concurrence in intestacy expressed in Article 978 through
Article 1014, inclusive, of the Civil Code; viz.:
Order of Preference Order of Concurrence
(a) Legitimate Children and (a) Legitimate Children and
Descendants Descendants, Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(b) Legitimate Parents and (b) Legitimate Parents and
Ascendants Ascendants Illegitimate
Children and Descendants,
and Surviving Spouse
(c) Illegitimate Children and (c) Illegitimate Children and
Descendants (in the absence Descendants and Surviving
of ICDs and LPAs, the Spouse
Illegitimate Parents)
(d) Surviving Spouse (d) Surviving Spouse and (a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;
Illegitimate Parents (b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of
the deceased, to wit:
(e) Brothers and Sisters/ (e) Brothers and Sisters/
Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista
Nephews and Nephews and Nieces Manuel C. Pascual
Nieces and Surviving Spouse Jose C. Pascual
(f) Other Collateral Relatives (f) Alone Susana C. Pascual-Bautista
(within the fifth civil degree) Erlinda C. Pascual
Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.
(g) State (g) Alone
(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is
deceased, to wit:
not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the
Avelino Pascual
benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. 13
Isoceles Pascual
We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity
Loida Pascual-Martinez
of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the three (3) TCT's
Virginia Pascual-Ner
issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor
Nona Pascual-Fernando
of Estanislaoa Manuel, was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not
Octavio Pascual
being the real "parties-in-interest"14 in the case, had neither the standing nor the
Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;
cause of action to initiate the complaint.
(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full
The Court, however, sees no sufficient reason to sustain the award of amounts
blood of the deceased, to wit:
for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses. An
Olivia S. Pascual
adverse result of a suit in law does not mean that its advocacy is necessarily so
Hermes S. Pascual
wrongful as to justify an assessment of damages against the actor. 15
(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan
deceased and represented by the following:
(Branch 37) is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it has awarded moral and
Dominga M. Pascual
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses, in favor
Mamerta P. Fugoso
of private respondents, which portion is hereby DELETED. No special
Abraham S. Sarmiento, III
pronouncement on costs.
Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay
SO ORDERED.
Eleuterio P. Sarmiento
Feliciano, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Domiga P. San Diego
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992
Nelia P. Marquez
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL, petitioners,
Silvestre M. Pascual
vs.
Eleuterio M. Pascual
ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL,
(Rollo, pp. 46-47)
SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C.
Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres Pascual, filed
PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal, Br. XXIII), a Special
PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA
Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the intestate estate of her late husband
PASCUAL-NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA
(Rollo, p. 47).
PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S.
On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental Petition to the
PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila, respondents.
Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly stated that Olivia Pascual and
Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).
PARAS, J.:
On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit, to the
This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside: (a) the
effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full blood brother of her
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 14010 entitled
late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement made by the oppositors, that
"Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C.
they were are not among the known heirs of the deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p.
Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista, Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C.
102).
Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the
On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a COMPROMISE
trial court and (b) the resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for
AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein petitioners Olivia S. Pascual
reconsideration.
and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V of such compromise agreement provides,
The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:
to wit:
Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged natural
This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the
children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent
continuation of the above-entitled proceedings until the final
Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).
determination thereof by the court, or by another compromise
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue, legitimate,
agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia Pascual and Hermes
acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and was survived by the following:
 Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres Pascual. (Rollo, p.
108)
The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the
Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, manifesting
their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual, their uncle (Rollo,
pp. 111-112).
On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate Hereditary Rights
(Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to reiterate Hereditary
Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).
On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge Manuel S.
Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is
hereby resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of
Olivia and Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).
On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo, pp. 515-
526). and such motion was denied.
Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14010
(Rollo, p. 15.).
On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the decision the
dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 38)
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration of said decision and on July 14, 1988,
the Court of Appeals issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration (Rollo,
p. 42).
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
After all the requirements had been filed, the case was given due course.
The main issue to be resolved in the case at bar is whether or not Article 992 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized natural children from
the inheritance of the deceased.
Petitioners contend that they do not fall squarely within the purview of Article 992 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, can be interpreted to exclude recognized and of the
doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC (150 SCRA 645 [1987]) because being acknowledged
natural children, their illegitimacy is not due to the subsistence of a prior marriage when
such children were under conception (Rollo, p. 418).
Otherwise stated they say the term "illegitimate" children as provided in Article 992 must
be strictly construed to refer only to spurious children (Rollo, p. 419).
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that herein petitioners are within the
prohibition of Article 992 of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Diaz v. IAC is
applicable to them.
The petition is devoid of merit.
Pertinent thereto, Article 992 of the civil Code, provides:
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such
children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate
child.
The issue in the case at bar, had already been laid to rest in Diaz v. IAC, supra, where
this Court ruled that:
Article 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it
prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the illegitimate
child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of
said legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is
not recognized by law for the purposes of Article 992. Between the
legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to be an
intervening antagonism and incompatibility. The illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate family; the family is in
turn hated by the illegitimate child; the latter considers the privileged
condition of the former, and the resources of which it is thereby
deprived; the former, in turn, sees in the illegitimate child nothing but
the product of sin, palpable evidence of a blemish broken in life; the
law does no more than recognize this truth, by avoiding further
grounds of resentment.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children.
Applying the above doctrine to the case at bar, respondent IAC did not err in holding that
petitioners herein cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the
latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their
father.
In their memorandum, petitioners insisted that Article 992 in the light of Articles 902 and
989 of the Civil Code allows them (Olivia and Hermes) to represent Eligio Pascual in the
intestate estate of Don Andres Pascual.
On motion for reconsideration of the decision in Diaz v. IAC, this Court further elucidated
the successional rights of illegitimate children, which squarely answers the questions
raised by the petitioner on this point.
The Court held:
Article 902, 989, and 990 clearly speaks of successional rights of
illegitimate children, which rights are transmitted to their descendants
upon their death. The descendants (of these illegitimate children) who
may inherit by virtue of the right of representation may be legitimate or
illegitimate. In whatever manner, one should not overlook the fact that
the persons to be represented are themselves illegitimate. The three
named provisions are very clear on this matter. The right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants
of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. It
may be argued, as done by petitioners, that the illegitimate descendant
of a legitimate child is entitled to represent by virtue of the provisions of
Article 982, which provides that "the grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation." Such a conclusion
is erroneous. It would allow intestate succession by an illegitimate child
to the legitimate parent of his father or mother, a situation which would
set at naught the provisions of Article 992. Article 982 is inapplicable to
the instant case because Article 992 prohibits absolutely a
succession ab intestato between the illegitimate child and the
legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother. It may not be
amiss to state Article 982 is the general rule and Article 992 the
exception.
The rules laid down in Article 982 that "grandchildren and other
descendants shall inherit by right of representation" and in Article 902
that the rights of illegitimate children . . . are transmitted upon their
death to their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate
are subject to the limitation prescribed by Article 992 to the end that an
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother. (Amicus Curiae's Opinion
by former Justice Minister Ricardo C. Puno, p. 12). Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 182 SCRA 427; pp. 431-432; [1990]).
Verily, the interpretation of the law desired by the petitioner may be more humane but it
is also an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of
the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the
language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what is says.
(Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 758-759 [1988]). The courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Aparri v. CA, 127 SCRA 233
[1984]). When the law is clear, it is not susceptible of interpretation. It must be applied
regardless of who may be affected, even if the law may be harsh or onerous.
(Nepomuceno, et al. v. FC, 110 Phil. 42). And even granting that exceptions may be
conceded, the same as a general rule, should be strictly but reasonably construed; they
extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in
favor of the general provisions rather than the exception. Thus, where a general rule is
established by statute, the court will not curtail the former nor add to the latter by
implication (Samson v. C.A., 145 SCRA 654 [1986]).
Clearly the term "illegitimate" refers to both natural and spurious.
Finally under Article 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are generally placed
under one category, which undoubtedly settles the issue as to whether or not
acknowledged natural children should be treated differently, in the negative.
It may be said that the law may be harsh but that is the law (DURA LEX SED LEX).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the assailed
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated April 29, 1988 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19281 June 30, 1965
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO SANTILLON, CLARO
SANTILLON, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
PERFECTA MIRANDA, BENITO U. MIRANDA and ROSARIO CORRALES, oppositors-
appellees.
Clodualdo P. Surio and Claro Santillon (in his own behalf) for petitioner-appellant.
Patricio M. Patajo for oppositors-appellees.
BENGZON, C.J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, specifying
the respective shares of the principal parties herein in the intestate estate of Pedro
Santillon.
On November 21, 1953, Santillon died without testament in Tayug, Pangasinan, his
residence, leaving one son, Claro, and his wife, Perfecta Miranda. During his marriage,
Pedro acquired several parcels of land located in that province.
About four years after his death, Claro Santillon filed a petition for letters of
administration. Opposition to said petition was entered by the widow Perfecta Miranda
and the spouses Benito U. Miranda and Rosario Corrales on the following grounds: (a)
that the properties enumerated in the petition were all conjugal, except three parcels
which Perfecta Miranda claimed to be her exclusive properties; (b) that Perfecta Miranda
by virtue of two documents had conveyed 3/4 of her undivided share in most of the
properties enumerated in the petition to said spouses Benito and Rosario; (c) that
administration of the estate was not necessary, there being a case for partition pending;
and (d) that if administration was necessary at all, the oppositor Perfecta Miranda and
not the petitioner was better qualified for the post. It appears that subsequently, oppositor
Perfecta Miranda was appointed administratrix of the estate.
On March 22, 1961, the court appointed commissioners to draft within sixty days, a
project of partition and distribution of all the properties of the deceased Pedro Santillon.
On April 25, 1961, Claro filed a "Motion to Declare Share of Heirs" and to resolve the
conflicting claims of the parties with respect to their respective rights in the estate.
Invoking Art. 892 of the New Civil Code, he insisted that after deducting 1/2 from the
conjugal properties is the conjugal share of Perfecta, the remaining 1/2 must be divided
as follows: 1/4 for her and 3/4 for him. Oppositor Perfecta, on the other hand, claimed
that besides her conjugal half, she was entitled under Art. 996 of the New Civil Code to
another 1/2 of the remaining half. In other words, Claro claimed 3/4 of Pedro's
inheritance, while Perfecta claimed 1/2.
After due notice and hearing, the court, on June 28, 1961, issued an order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS it is hereby ruled and
ordered that in the intestate succession of the deceased Pedro Santillon, the
surviving spouse Perfecta Miranda shall inherit ONE-HALF (1/2) share and the
remaining ONE-HALF (1/2) share for the only son, Atty. Claro Santillon. This is
after deducting the share of the widow as co-owner of the conjugal properties.
... .
From this order, petitioner Claro Santillon has appealed to this Court. Two questions of
law are involved. The first, raised in Perfecta's Motion to Dismiss Appeal, is whether the
order of the lower court is appealable. And the second, raised in appellant's lone
assignment of error, is: How shall the estate of a person who dies intestate be divided
when the only survivors are the spouse and one legitimate child?
The First Issue: It is clear that the order of the lower court is final and, therefore,
appealable to this Court.
Under Rule 109, sec. 1, a person may appeal in special proceedings from an order of the
Court of First Instance where such order "determines ... the distributive share of the
estate to which such person is entitled."
The Second Issue: Petitioner rests his claim to 3/4 of his father's estate on Art. 892 of
the New Civil Code which provides that:
If only the legitimate child or descendant of the deceased survives the widow or
widower shall be entitled to one-fourth of the hereditary estate. ... .
As she gets one-fourth, therefore, I get 3/4, says Claro. Perfecta, on the other hand, cites
Art. 996 which provides:
If a widow or widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the
surviving spouse has in the succession the same share as that of each of the
children.
Replying to Perfecta's claim, Claro says the article is unjust and unequitable to the extent
that it grants the widow the same share as that of the children in intestate succession,
whereas in testate, she is given 1/4 and the only child 1/2.
Oppositor Perfecta Miranda, on the other hand, contends that Art. 996 should control,
regardless of its alleged inequity, being as it is, a provision on intestate succession
involving a surviving spouse and a legitimate child, inasmuch as in statutory construction,
the plural word "children" includes the singular "child."
Art. 892 of the New Civil Code falls under the chapter on Testamentary Succession;
whereas Art. 996 comes under the chapter on Legal or Intestate Succession. Such being
the case, it is obvious that Claro cannot rely on Art. 892 to support his claim to 3/4 of his
father's estate. Art 892 merely fixes the legitime of the surviving spouse and Art. 888
thereof, the legitime of children in testate succession. While it may indicate the intent of
the law with respect to the ideal shares that a child and a spouse should get when they
concur with each other, it does not fix the amount of shares that such child and spouse
are entitled to when intestacy occurs. Because if the latter happens, the pertinent
provision on intestate succession shall apply, i.e., Art. 996.
Some commentators of our New Civil Code seem to support Claro's contention; at least,
his objection to fifty-fifty sharing. But others confirm the half and half idea of the
Pangasinan court.
This is, remember, intestate proceedings. In the New Civil Code's chapter on legal or
intestate succession, the only article applicable is Art. 996. Our colleague, Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, professor of Civil Law, is quoted as having expressed the opinion that
under this article, when the widow survives with only one legitimate child, they share the
estate in equal parts. 1 Senator Tolentino in his commentaries writes as follows:
 One child Surviving. If there is only one legitimate child surviving with the
spouse, since they share equally, one-half of the estate goes to the child and
the other half goes to the surviving spouse. Although the law refers to "children
or descendants," the rule in statutory construction that the plural can be
understood to include the singular is applicable in this case. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. III, p. 436.)
The theory of those holding otherwise seems to be premised on these propositions: (a)
Art. 996 speaks of "Children," therefore it does not apply when there is only one "child";
consequently Art. 892 (and Art. 888) should be applied, thru a process of judicial
construction and analogy; (b) Art. 996 is unjust or unfair because, whereas
in testate succession, the widow is assigned one-fourth only (Art. 892), she would get
1/2 in intestate.
A. Children. It is a maxim of statutory construction that words in plural include the
singular. 2 So Art. 996 could or should be read (and so applied) : "If the widow or widower
and a legitimate child are left, the surviving spouse has the same share as that of
the child." Indeed, if we refuse to apply the article to this case on the ground that "child"
is not included in "children," the consequences would be tremendous, because "children"
will not include "child" in the following articles:
ART. 887. The following are compulsory heirs: (1) legitimate children and
descendants ... .
ART. 888. The legitime of legitimate children and descendants consists of
one-half of the hereditary estate ... .
ART. 896. Illegitimate children who may survive ... are entitled to one-fourth
of the hereditary estate ... . (See also Art. 901).
In fact, those who say "children" in Art. 996 does not include "child" seem to be
inconsistent when they argue from the premise that "in testate succession the only
legitimate child gets one-half and the widow, one-fourth." The inconsistency is clear,
because the only legitimate child gets one-half under Art. 888, which speaks of
"children," not "child." So if "children" in Art. 888 includes "child," the same meaning
should be given to Art. 996.
B. Unfairness of Art. 996. Such position, more clearly stated, is this: In testate
succession, where there is only one child of the marriage, the child gets one-half, and the
widow or widower one-fourth. But in intestate , if Art. 996 is applied now, the child gets
one-half, and the widow or widower one-half. Unfair or inequitable, they insist.
On this point, it is not correct to assume that in testate succession the widow or widower
"gets only one-fourth." She or he may get one-half if the testator so wishes. So, the
law virtually leaves it to each of the spouses to decide (by testament, whether his or her
only child shall get more than his or her survivor).
Our conclusion (equal shares) seems a logical inference from the circumstance that
whereas Article 834 of the Spanish Civil Code, from which Art. 996 was taken,
contained two paragraphs governing two contingencies, the first, where the widow or
widower survives with legitimate children (general rule), and the second, where the
widow or widower survives with only one child (exception), Art. 996 omitted to provide for
the second situation, thereby indicating the legislator's desire to promulgate just one
general rule applicable to both situations.
The resultant division may be unfair as some writers explain and this we are not called
upon to discuss but it is the clear mandate of the statute, which we are bound to
enforce.
The appealed decision is affirmed. No costs in this instance.
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977
GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO CARTENA, defendant-
appellant.
Antonio E. Lacsam & Cesar A. Azucena, Jr. for appellant.
Ricardo A. Fabros, Jr. for appellees.
GUERRERO, J.:
This is an appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals 1 in accordance with the
provisions of Sec. 17, paragraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, since the
only issue raised is the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter
which is purely a legal question.
The following findings of fact by the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City
in Civil Case No. SP-265, and adopted by the Court of Appeals, show that:
Simeon Bagsic was married to Sisenanda Barcenas on June 8, 1859
(Exh. "D") Of this marriage there were born three children namely:
Perpetua Bagsic (Exhibit G), Igmedia Bagsic (Exhibit F), and Ignacio
Bagsic (Exhibit H). Sisenanda Barcenas died ahead of her husband
Simeon Bagsic.
On June 3, 1885, Simeon Bagsic remarried Silvestra Glorioso (Exhibit
"E"). Of this second marriage were born two children, Felipa Bagsic
(Exhibit J) and Maura Bagsic (Exhibit I). Simeon Bagsic died sometime
in 1901. Silvestra Glorioso also died.
Ignacio Bagsic died on April 18, 1939 (Exhibit C) leaving the plaintiff
Francisca Bagsic as his only heir. Igmedia Bagsic also died on August
19, 1944 (Exhibit B) survived by the plaintiffs Dionisio Tolentino, Maria
Tolentino and Petra Tolentino.
Perpetua Bagsic died on July 1, 1945 (Exhibit A). Surviving her are her
heirs, the plaintiffs Gaudencio Bicomong, Felicidad Bicomong, Salome
Bicomong, and Gervacio Bicomong.
Of the children of the second marriage, Maura Bagsic died also on
April 14, 1952 leaving no heir as her husband died ahead of her. Felipa
Bagsic, the other daughter of the second Geronimo Almanza and her
daughter Cristeta Almanza. But five (5) months before the present suit
was filed or on July 23, 1959, Cristeta Almanza died leaving behind her
husband, the defendant herein Engracio Manese (Exhibit 1-Manese)
and her father Geronimo Almanza.
The subject matter of the complaint in Civil Case No. SP-265 concerns the one-half
undivided share of Maura Bagsic in the following described five (5) parcels of land which
she inherited from her deceased mother, Silvestra Glorioso, to wit:
A. A parcel of land in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo, planted with
38 fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 1,077, sq. m. Bounded
on the N. by German Garingan; on the E. by Juan Aliagas; on the S. by
Bernardino Alina; and on the W. by Feliciana Glorioso Covered by Tax
No. 12713 for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now
Tax No. 31232, assessed at P170.00 in the name of defendant
Geronimo Almanza;
B. A parcel of land, also situated in Bo. San Ignacio, City of San Pablo,
planted with fruit bearing coconut trees, with an area of 9,455 sq. m.
Bounded on the N. by Paulino Gajuco; on the E. by Felisa Gavino and
German Garigan; on the S. by Esteban Calayag; and on the W. by
Laureano Ambion, Covered by Tax No. 12714 for the year 1948 in the
name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
C. A parcel of land situated in same Bo. San Ignacio, City of San
Pablo, planted with 376 fruit bearing coconut trees and having an area
of 11,739 sq. m. Bounded on the N. by Jacinto Alvero, Anacleto
Glorioso and Bernardino Alma; on the E. by Bernardino Alma; on the
S. by Rosendo Banaad, Jacinto Alvero and Casayan River; and on the
W. by Anacleto Glorioso Covered by Tax No. 12715 for the year 1948
in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No. 31234, assessed at
P2,720.00 in the name of defendant Geronimo Almanza;
D. A residential lot, situated at P. Alcantara Street, Int., City of San
Pablo, with an area of 153, sq. m. Bounded on the N. by heirs of Pedro
Calampiano; on the E. by Petronilo Cartago; on the S. by Ignacio
Yerro; and on the W. by Melecio Cabrera. Covered by Tax No. 17653
for the year 1948 in the name of Silvestra Glorioso, now Tax No.
21452, assessed at P610.00 in the name of Cristeta Almanza; and
E. A parcel of coconut land, situated at Bo. Buenavista, Candelaria,
Quezon, planted with 300 coconut trees fruit bearing. Area - 24,990 sq.
m. Bounded on the N. (Ilaya) by heirs of Pedro de Gala on the E. by
Julian Garcia; on the S. (Ibaba) by Julian Garcia, and on the W. by
Taguan River. Covered by Tax No. 21452, assessed at P910.00.
Three sets of plaintiffs filed the complaint on December 1, 1959, namely: (a) the
Bicomongs, children of Perpetua Bagsic; (b) the Tolentinos, children of Igmedia Bagsic;
and (c) Francisco Bagsic, daughter of Ignacio Bagsic, in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna and San Pablo City against the defendants Geronimo Almanza and Engracio
Menese for the recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura Bagsic.
After the death of Maura Bagsic, the above-described properties passed on to Cristela
Almanza who took charge of the administration of the same. Thereupon, the plaintiffs
approached her and requested for the partition of their aunt's properties. However, they
were prevailed upon by Cristeta Almanza not to divide the properties yet as the expenses
for the last illness and burial of Maura Bagsic had not yet been paid. Having agreed to
defer the partition of the same, the plaintiffs brought out the subject again sometime in
1959 only. This time Cristeta Almanza acceded to the request as the debts, accordingly,
had already been paid. Unfortunately, she died without the division of the properties
having been effected, thereby leaving the possession and administration of the same to
the defendants.
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
who are hereby declared to be entitled to ten twenty-fourth (10/24)
share on the five parcels of land in dispute. The defendant Engracio
Manese and the heirs of the deceased Geronimo Almanza, who are
represented in the instant case by the administrator Florentino
Cartena, are hereby required to pay the plaintiffs from July 23, 1959
the sum of P625.00 per annum until the ten-twenty fourth (10/24) share
on the five parcels of land are delivered to the plaintiffs, with legal
interest from the time this decision shall have become final.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
City of San Pablo, September 21, 1962.
(
R
e
c
o
r
d
o
n
A
p
p
e
a
l
,
p
p
.
4
-

From the aforesaid decision of the trial court, Florentino Cartena, the substitute
defendant for Geronimo Almanza, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The other
defendant, Engracio Manese, did not appeal and execution was issued with respect to
the parcels of land in his possession, that is, those described under Letters D and E in
the complaint. Hence, the subject matter of the case on appeal was limited to the one-
half undivided portion of only three of the five parcels of land described under letters A, B
and C in the complaint which defendant Cartena admitted to be only in his possession. 2
On appeal, defendant-appellant Cartena contends that the provisions of Arts. 995, 1006
and 1008 of the New Civil Code, applied by the trial court in allowing plaintiffs-appellees
to succeed to the properties left by Maura Bagsic were not the applicable provisions. He
asserts that in the course of the trial of the case in the lower court, plaintiffs requested
defendants to admit that Felipa Bagsic, the sole sister of full blood of Maura Bagsic, died
on May 9. 1955. Since Maura Bagsic died on April 14, 1952, Felipa succeeded to
Maura's estate. In support thereof, he cites Art. 1004 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they
shall inherit in equal shares," and he concludes with the rule that the relatives nearest in
degree excludes the more distant ones. (Art. 962, New Civil Code)
On the other hand, plaintiffs-appellees claim that the date of death of Felipa Bagsic was
not raised as an issue in the trial court. It was even the subject of stipulation of the
parties as clearly shown in the transcript of the stenographic notes that Felipa Bagsic
died on May 9. 1945. 3
The Court of Appeals ruled that the facts of the case have been duly established in the
trial court and that the only issue left for determination is a purely legal question involving
the correct application of the law and jurisprudence on the matter, hence the appellate
court certified this case to Us.
We hold that the provisions of Art. 975, 1006 and 1008 of the New Civil Code are
applicable to the admitted facts of the case at bar. These Articles provide:
Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of tile
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions."
Art. 1006. Should brothers and sisters of the full blood survive together
with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the former shall be entitled
to a share double that of the latter.
R Art. 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall
e succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the rules laid
c down for brothers and sisters of the full blood.
In the absence
o of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
Article 1003r of the New Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the
entire estate
d of the deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an
issue, andoher husband and all her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded
by the surviving
n collateral relatives, namely the daughter of her sister of full blood and the
ten (10) children
A of her brother and two (2) sisters of half blood in accordance with the
provision ofp Art. 975 of the New Civil Code.
By virtue ofp said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit
in their owne right. In Abellana-Bacayo vs. Ferraris-Borromeo, L-19382, August 31, I965,
14 SCRA 986,a this Court held that "nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of
representation
l (that is per stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the
deceased.",
Under the psame provision, Art. 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the
nephews or . nieces are on the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to
whether their
4 relationship to the deceased is by whole or half blood, the sole niece of
whole blood 7 of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and n of half blood. The
only difference in their right of succession is provided in Art. 1008, NCC in relation to
Article 1006 of the New Civil Code (supra), which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole
niece of full blood to a share double that of the nephews and nieces of half blood. Such
distinction between whole and half blood relationships with the deceased has been
recognized in Dionisia Padura, et al. vs. Melanie Baldovino, et al., No. L-11960,
December 27, 1958, 104 Phil. 1065 (unreported) and in Alviar vs. Alviar, No. L-22402,
June 30, 1969, 28 SCRA 610).
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa
Bagsic, her sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half blood
citing Art. 1004, NCC is unmeritorious and erroneous for it is based on an erroneous
factual assumption, that is, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which as indicated here
before, is not true as she died on May 9, 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura
Bagsic.
We find the judgment of the trial court to be in consonance with law and jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed. No costs.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma, Martin and Fernandez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a
resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris,
Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as
well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said
resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to
be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession
and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or
spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris,
who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest
intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending
parties to said Melodia Ferraris:
Note: Picture
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a
deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt
and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be
excluded by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is
three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded
by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with
article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is
of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees
removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of
representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their
own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both
kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor
and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her
contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood,
they shall inherit in equal shares.
ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and
nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles
952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse,
if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other
collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present
Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is
true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to their proximity
to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of
equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009
(Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino
expressly states:
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children
of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth
degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the
succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth
degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there
being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis
supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.
The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No Exemption from the provisions of Article 567 of the Civil Code is
costs. specifically reserved.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
concur. Area: 1 hectare, 06 ares, 07 centares.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
JUAN DE DIOS CARLOS, G.R. No. 179922
Petitioner, Parcel No. 2
Present:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 159-B), being a portion of Lot 159, situated in
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., the Bo. of Alabang, Municipality of Muntinlupa, Province of Rizal, x x x
Chairperson, containing an area of Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Forty One
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, (13,441) square meters.
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL, also CHICO-NAZARIO,
known as FELICIDAD S. VDA. NACHURA, and
DE CARLOS or FELICIDAD REYES, JJ. Parcel No. 3
SANDOVAL CARLOS or
FELICIDAD SANDOVAL VDA. A parcel of land (Lot 159-B-2 of the subd. plan [LRC] Psd-325903,
DE CARLOS, and TEOFILO Promulgated: approved as a non-subd. project), being a portion of Lot 159-B [LRC]
CARLOS II, Psd- Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa,
Respondents. December 16, 2008 Metro Manila, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE, points 2 to 4 by Lot
155, Muntinlupa Estate; on the SE, point 4 to 5 by Lot 159-B-5; on the
x--------------------------------------------------x S, points 5 to 1 by Lot 159-B-3; on the W, points 1 to 2 by Lot 159-B-1
(Road widening) all of the subd. plan, containing an area
DECISION of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY (130) SQ. METERS, more or less.

REYES, R.T., J.:

PARCEL No. 4

ONLY a spouse can initiate an action to sever the marital bond for marriages
solemnized during the effectivity of the Family Code, except cases commenced prior
to March 15, 2003. The nullity and annulment of a marriage cannot be declared in a
judgment on the pleadings, summary judgment, or confession of judgment.
We pronounce these principles as We review on certiorari the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the summary
judgment[2]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage, status of a child, recovery of property, reconveyance, sum of money, and
damages.
A parcel of land (Lot 28-C of the subd. plan Psd-13-007090, being a
portion of Lot 28, Muntinlupa Estate, L.R.C. Rec. No. 6137), situated in
the Bo. of Alabang, Mun. of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. Bounded on the
NE, along lines 1-2 by Lot 27, Muntinlupa Estate; on the East & SE,
along lines 2 to 6 by Mangangata River; and on the West., along line 6-
1, by Lot 28-B of the subd. plan x x x containing an area
of ONE THUSAND AND SEVENTY-SIX (1,076) SQUARE METERS.
PARCEL No. 5

The Facts
The events that led to the institution of the instant suit are unveiled as follows:
Spouses Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate. They left six
parcels of land to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios
Carlos. The lots are particularly described as follows:
Parcel No. 1
PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 50, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. de
Solocan. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 49; por el NE, con la parcela
36; por el SE, con la parcela 51; y por el SW, con la calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla a S. gds. 01'W, 72.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta manzana,
que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila, situado on el
esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos. Castillas,
continiendo un extension superficial de CIENTO CINCUENTA (150)
METROS CUADRADOS.

Lot No. 162 of the MUNTINLUPA ESTATE SUBDIVISION, Case No.

6137 of the Court of Land Registration. PARCEL No. 6
 PARCELA DE TERRENO No. 51, Manzana No. 18, de la subd. De
Solocon. Linda por el NW, con la parcela 50; por el NE, con la parcela
37; por el SE, con la parcela 52; por el SW, con la Calle Dos
Castillas. Partiendo de un punto Marcado 1 en el plano, el cual se
halla at S. 43 gds. 01'E, 82.50 mts. Desde el punto 1 de esta
manzana, que es un mojon de concreto de la Ciudad de Manila,
situado on el esquina E. que forman las Calles Laong Laan y Dos.
Castillas, continiendo una extension superficial de CIENTO
CINCUENTA (150) METROS CUADRADOS.[3]
During the lifetime of Felix Carlos, he agreed to transfer his estate to
Teofilo. The agreement was made in order to avoid the payment of inheritance
taxes.Teofilo, in turn, undertook to deliver and turn over the share of the other legal
heir, petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos.
Eventually, the first three (3) parcels of land were transferred and registered in
the name of Teofilo. These three (3) lots are now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 234824 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; TCT No. 139061
issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City; and TCT No. 139058 issued by the
Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner. The lot is now covered
by TCT No. 160401 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Makati City.
On May 13, 1992, Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by
respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilos death,
Parcel Nos. 5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent Felicidad and co-
respondent, Teofilo II. The said two (2) parcels of land are covered by TCT Nos. 219877
and 210878, respectively, issued by the Registry of Deeds of Manila.
In 1994, petitioner instituted a suit against respondents before
the RTC in Muntinlupa City, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1964. In the said case, the
parties submitted and caused the approval of a partial compromise agreement. Under
the compromise, the parties acknowledged their respective shares in the proceeds from
the sale of a portion of the first parcel of land. This includes the remaining 6,691-square-
meter portion of said land.
On September 17, 1994, the parties executed a deed of extrajudicial partition,
dividing the remaining land of the first parcel between them.
Meanwhile, in a separate case entitled Rillo v. Carlos,[4] 2,331 square meters
of the second parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs Rillo. The remaining
10,000-square meter portion was later divided between petitioner and respondents.
The division was incorporated in a supplemental compromise agreement
executed on August 17, 1994, with respect to Civil Case No. 94-1964. The parties
submitted the supplemental compromise agreement, which was approved accordingly.
Petitioner and respondents entered into two more contracts in August
1994. Under the contracts, the parties equally divided between them the third and fourth
parcels of land.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action, docketed as Civil Case No.
95-135, against respondents before the court a quo with the following causes of action:
(a) declaration of nullity of marriage; (b) status of a child; (c) recovery of property; (d)
reconveyance; and (e) sum of money and damages. The complaint was raffled to Branch
256 of the RTC in Muntinlupa.
In his complaint, petitioner asserted that the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required
marriage license. He likewise maintained that his deceased brother was neither the
natural nor the adoptive father of respondent Teofilo Carlos II.
Petitioner likewise sought the avoidance of the contracts he entered into with
respondent Felicidad with respect to the subject real properties. He also prayed for the
cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the name of respondents. He argued that
the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
Finally, petitioner claimed indemnification as and by way of moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs of suit.
On October 16, 1995, respondents submitted their answer. They denied the
material averments of petitioners complaint. Respondents contended that the dearth of
details regarding the requisite marriage license did not invalidate Felicidads marriage to
Teofilo. Respondents declared that Teofilo II was the illegitimate child of the
deceased Teofilo Carlos with another woman.
On the grounds of lack of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the case before the trial
court.They also asked that their counterclaims for moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorneys fees, be granted.
But before the parties could even proceed to pre-trial, respondents moved for
summary judgment. Attached to the motion was the affidavit of the justice of the peace
who solemnized the marriage. Respondents also submitted the Certificate of Live Birth of
respondent Teofilo II. In the certificate, the late Teofilo Carlos and respondent Felicidad
were designated as parents.
On January 5, 1996, petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment on
the ground of irregularity of the contract evidencing the marriage. In the same breath,
petitioner lodged his own motion for summary judgment. Petitioner presented a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar of Calumpit, Bulacan, certifying that there is no
record of birth of respondent Teofilo II.
Petitioner also incorporated in the counter-motion for summary judgment the
testimony of respondent Felicidad in another case. Said testimony was made in Civil
Case No. 89-2384, entitled Carlos v. Gorospe, before the RTC Branch 255, Las Pias. In
her testimony, respondent Felicidad narrated that co-respondent Teofilo II is her child
with Teofilo.[5]
Subsequently, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa submitted to the
trial court its report and manifestation, discounting the possibility of collusion between the
parties.
RTC and CA Dispositions
On April 8, 1996, the RTC rendered judgment, disposing as follows:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants
(respondents) Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) Counter-Motion for Summary Judgment is
hereby granted and summary judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
plaintiff as follows:
1. Declaring the marriage between defendant Felicidad
Sandoval and Teofilo Carlos solemnized at Silang, Cavite on May 14,
1962, evidenced by the Marriage Certificate submitted in this case, null
and void ab initio for lack of the requisite marriage license;
2. Declaring that the defendant minor, Teofilo S. Carlos II, is
not the natural, illegitimate, or legally adopted child of the late Teofilo
E. Carlos;
3. Ordering defendant Sandoval to pay and restitute to
plaintiff the sum of P18,924,800.00 together with the interest thereon at
the legal rate from date of filing of the instant complaint until fully paid;
4. Declaring plaintiff as the sole and exclusive owner of the
parcel of land, less the portion adjudicated to plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
11975, covered by TCT No. 139061 of the Register of Deeds of Makati
City, and ordering said Register of Deeds to cancel said title and to
issue another title in the sole name of plaintiff herein;
5. Declaring the Contract, Annex K of complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void, and ordering the
Register of Deeds of Makati City to cancel TCTNo. 139058 in the
name of Teofilo Carlos, and to issue another title in the sole name of
plaintiff herein;
6. Declaring the Contract, Annex M of the complaint, between
plaintiff and defendant Sandoval null and void;
7. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210877 in the names
of defendant Sandoval and defendant minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
exclusive name of plaintiff herein;
8. Ordering the cancellation of TCT No. 210878 in the name
of defendant Sandoval and defendant Minor Teofilo S. Carlos II and
ordering the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue another title in the
sole name of plaintiff herein.
Let this case be set for hearing for the reception of plaintiffs
evidence on his claim for moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorneys fees, appearance fees, and litigation expenses on June 7,
1996 at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Dissatisfied, respondents appealed to the CA. In the appeal, respondents
argued, inter alia, that the trial court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in rendering
summary judgment annulling the marriage of Teofilo, Sr. and Felicidad and in declaring
Teofilo II as not an illegitimate child of Teofilo, Sr.
On October 15, 2002, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC ruling, disposing
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the summary judgment appealed from
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in lieu thereof, a new
one is entered REMANDING the case to the court of origin for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA opined:
We find the rendition of the herein appealed summary
judgment by the court a quo contrary to law and public policy as
ensconced in the aforesaid safeguards. The fact that it was appellants
who first sought summary judgment from the trial court, did not justify
the grant thereof in favor of appellee. Not being an action to recover
upon a claim or to obtain a declaratory relief, the rule on summary
judgment apply (sic) to an action to annul a marriage. The mere
fact that no genuine issue was presented and the desire to expedite
the disposition of the case cannot justify a misinterpretation of the
rule. The first paragraph of Article 88 and 101 of the Civil
Code expressly prohibit the rendition of decree of annulment of a
marriage upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. Yet,
the affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment practically
amount to these methods explicitly proscribed by the law.
We are not unmindful of appellees argument that the
foregoing safeguards have traditionally been applied to prevent
collusion of spouses in the matter of dissolution of marriages and that
the death of Teofilo Carlos on May 13, 1992 had effectively dissolved
the marriage herein impugned. The fact, however, that appellees own
brother and appellant Felicidad Sandoval lived together as husband
and wife for thirty years and that the annulment of their marriage is the
very means by which the latter is sought to be deprived of her
participation in the estate left by the former call for a closer and more
thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the case. Rather
that the summary nature by which the court a quo resolved the issues
in the case, the rule is to the effect that the material facts alleged in the
complaint for annulment of marriage should always be proved. Section
1, Rule 19 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Judgment on the
pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue,
or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion
of that party, direct judgment on such pleading.
But in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved. (Underscoring
supplied)
 Moreover, even if We were to sustain the applicability of the
rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. While it may be readily conceded that a valid
marriage license is among the formal requisites of marriage, the
absence of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article
80(3) in relation to Article 58 of the Civil Code the failure to reflect the
serial number of the marriage license on the marriage contract
evidencing the marriage between Teofilo Carlos and appellant
Felicidad Sandoval, although irregular, is not as fatal as appellee
represents it to be. Aside from the dearth of evidence to the contrary,
appellant Felicidad Sandovals affirmation of the existence of said
marriage license is corroborated by the following statement in the
affidavit executed by Godofredo Fojas, then Justice of the Peace who
officiated the impugned marriage, to wit:
That as far as I could remember, there was
a marriage license issued at Silang, Cavite on May
14, 1962 as basis of the said marriage contract
executed by Teofilo Carlos and Felicidad Sandoval,
but the number of said marriage license was
inadvertently not placed in the marriage contract for
the reason that it was the Office Clerk who filled up
the blanks in the Marriage Contract who in turn, may
have overlooked the same.
Rather than the inferences merely drawn by the trial court,
We are of the considered view that the veracity and credibility of the
foregoing statement as well as the motivations underlying the same
should be properly threshed out in a trial of the case on the merits.
If the non-presentation of the marriage contract the primary
evidence of marriage is not proof that a marriage did not take place,
neither should appellants non-presentation of the subject marriage
license be taken as proof that the same was not procured. The burden
of proof to show the nullity of the marriage, it must be emphasized,
rests upon the plaintiff and any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Considering that the burden of proof also rests on the party
who disputes the legitimacy of a particular party, the same may be said
of the trial courts rejection of the relationship between appellant Teofilo
Carlos II and his putative father on the basis of the inconsistencies in
appellant Felicidad Sandovals statements. Although it had effectively
disavowed appellants prior claims regarding the legitimacy of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II, the averment in the answer that he is the illegitimate
son of appellees brother, to Our mind, did not altogether foreclose the
possibility of the said appellants illegitimate filiation, his right to prove
the same or, for that matter, his entitlement to inheritance rights as
such.
Without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
We find appellees bare allegation that appellant Teofilo Carlos II was
merely purchased from an indigent couple by appellant Felicidad
Sandoval, on the whole, insufficient to support what could well be a
minors total forfeiture of the rights arising from his
putative filiation.Inconsistent though it may be to her previous
statements, appellant Felicidad Sandovals declaration regarding the
illegitimate filiation of Teofilo Carlos II is more credible when
considered in the light of the fact that, during the last eight years of his
life, Teofilo Carlos allowed said appellant the use of his name and the
shelter of his household. The least that the trial court could have done
in the premises was to conduct a trial on the merits in order to be able
to thoroughly resolve the issues pertaining to the filiation of appellant
Teofilo Carlos II.[8]
On November 22, 2006, petitioner moved for reconsideration and for the
inhibition of the ponente, Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador. The CA denied the twin
motions.
Issues
In this petition under Rule 45, petitioner hoists the following issues:
1. That, in reversing and setting aside the Summary
Judgment under the Decision, Annex A hereof, and in denying
petitioners Motion for reconsideration under the Resolution, Annex F
hereof, with respect to the nullity of the impugned marriage, petitioner
respectfully submits that the Court of Appeals committed a grave
reversible error in applying Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code,
despite the fact that the circumstances of this case are different from
that contemplated and intended by law, or has otherwise decided a
question of substance not theretofore decided by the Supreme Court,
or has decided it in a manner probably not in accord with law or with
the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
2. That in setting aside and reversing the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed a serious reversible error in
applying Section 1, Rule 19 (now Section 1, Rule 34) of the Rules of
Court providing for judgment on the pleadings, instead of Rule 35
governing Summary Judgments;
3. That in reversing and setting aside the Summary Judgment
and, in lieu thereof, entering another remanding the case to the court
of origin for further proceedings, petitioner most respectfully submits
that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion,
disregarded judicial admissions, made findings on ground of
speculations, surmises, and conjectures, or otherwise committed
misapplications of the laws and misapprehension of the
facts.[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Essentially, the Court is tasked to resolve whether a marriage may be declared void ab
initio through a judgment on the pleadings or a summary judgment and without the
benefit of a trial. But there are other procedural issues, including the capacity of one who
is not a spouse in bringing the action for nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
I. The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage must be
proved. Neither judgment on the pleadings nor summary judgment is allowed.So
is confession of judgment disallowed.
Petitioner faults the CA in applying Section 1, Rule 19 [10] of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides:
SECTION 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer
fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of
the adverse partys pleading, the court may, on motion of that party,
direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation, the material facts alleged in the
complaint shall always be proved.
He argues that the CA should have applied Rule 35 of the Rules of Court governing
summary judgment, instead of the rule on judgment on the pleadings.
Petitioner is misguided. The CA did not limit its finding solely within the provisions of the
Rule on judgment on the pleadings. In disagreeing with the trial court, the CA likewise
considered the provisions on summary judgments, to wit:
Moreover, even if We are to sustain the applicability of the
rules on summary judgment to the case at bench, Our perusal of the
record shows that the finding of the court a quo for appellee would still
not be warranted. x x x[11]
But whether it is based on judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, the CA was
correct in reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court. Both the rules on
judgment on the pleadings and summary judgments have no place in cases of
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and even in annulment of marriage.
With the advent of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, known as Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the question on the
application of summary judgments or even judgment on the pleadings in cases of nullity
or annulment of marriage has been stamped with clarity. The significant principle laid
down by the said Rule, which took effect on March 15, 2003[12] is found in Section
17, viz.:
SEC. 17. Trial. (1) The presiding judge shall personally
conduct the trial of the case. No delegation of evidence to a
commissioner shall be allowed except as to matters involving property
relations of the spouses.
(2) The grounds for declaration of absolute nullity or
annulment of marriage must be proved. No judgment on the pleadings,
summary judgment, or confession of judgment shall be
allowed. (Underscoring supplied)
Likewise instructive is the Courts pronouncement in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.[13] In
that case, We excluded actions for nullity or annulment of marriage from the application
of summary judgments.
Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, save for
annulment of marriage or declaration of its nullity or for legal
separation, summary judgment is applicable to all kinds of
actions.[14] (Underscoring supplied)
By issuing said summary judgment, the trial court has divested the State of its
lawful right and duty to intervene in the case. The participation of the State is not
terminated by the declaration of the public prosecutor that no collusion exists between
the parties. The State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered.[15]
Both the Civil Code and the Family Code ordain that the court should order the
prosecuting attorney to appear and intervene for the State. It is at this stage when the
public prosecutor sees to it that there is no suppression of evidence. Concomitantly, even
if there is no suppression of evidence, the public prosecutor has to make sure that the
evidence to be presented or laid down before the court is not fabricated.
To further bolster its role towards the preservation of marriage, the Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages reiterates the duty of the public prosecutor, viz.:
SEC. 13. Effect of failure to appear at the pre-trial. (a) x x x
(b) x x x If there is no collusion, the court shall require the public
prosecutor to intervene for the State during the trial on the merits to
prevent suppression or fabrication of evidence. (Underscoring
supplied)
Truly, only the active participation of the public prosecutor or the Solicitor General will
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing the fabrication or suppression of
evidence.[16]
II. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases
commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and (2) Marriages
celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may not
be filed by any party outside of the marriage. The Rule made it exclusively a right of the
spouses by stating:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages.
(a) Who may file. A petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife. (Underscoring supplied)
Section 2(a) of the Rule makes it the sole right of the husband or the wife to file
a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage. The rationale of the Rule is
enlightening, viz.:
 Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file a
petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory
or intestate heirs of the spouses or by the State. The Committee is of
the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior
to the death of their predecessor, and, hence, can only question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse
filed in the regular courts. On the other hand, the concern of the
State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its
dissolution.[17] (Underscoring supplied)
The new Rule recognizes that the husband and the wife are the sole architects
of a healthy, loving, peaceful marriage. They are the only ones who can decidewhen and
how to build the foundations of marriage. The spouses alone are the engineers of their
marital life. They are simultaneously the directors and actors of their matrimonial true-to-
life play. Hence, they alone can and should decide when to take a cut, but only in
accordance with the grounds allowed by law.
The innovation incorporated in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC sets forth a demarcation
line between marriages covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the
Civil Code. The Rule extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the
Family Code which took effect on August 3, 1988.[18]
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages marks the beginning of the end of the right of the heirs of the deceased
spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the surviving spouse. But the Rule
never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any recourse under the law. They can still
protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules on Annulment
of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages, compulsory
or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.[19]
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003 although the marriage involved is within the
coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new Rule which became effective
on March 15, 2003[20] is prospective in its application. Thus, the Court held in Enrico v.
Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli,[21] viz.:
As has been emphasized, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines, and is prospective
in its application.[22] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner commenced the nullity of marriage case against respondent Felicidad
in 1995. The marriage in controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would
govern depends upon when the marriage took place.[23]
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the applicable law is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.[24] But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an action to declare the
marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for the declaration of
nullity of marriage?
We respond in the negative. The absence of a provision in the Civil Code
cannot be construed as a license for any person to institute a nullity of marriage
case.Such person must appear to be the party who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. [25] Elsewise stated,
plaintiff must be the real party-in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.[26]
Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest or an interest in
issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere
curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no
material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the case is dismissible on the
ground of lack of cause of action.[27]
Illuminating on this point is Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals,[28] where the
Court held:
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force
at the time the respondents were married, or even in the Family
Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to
declare the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can
demonstrate proper interest can file the same. A petition to declare the
nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and must be based
on a cause of action. Thus, in Nial v. Badayog, the Court held that the
children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their
successional rights.
xxxx
In fine, petitioners personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of marriage cannot be ascertained because of the absence of
the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a remand of
the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is
necessary to determine whether respondent Orlando was granted a
divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted the same
allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree
was obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlandos
remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondents marriage
as bigamous and void ab initio but reduced the amount of moral
damages from P300,000.00 to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages
from P200,000.00 to P25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is
proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which
allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the
instant petition to declare nullity of marriage on the ground that
petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the
same.[29](Underscoring supplied)

III. The case must be remanded to determine whether or not petitioner is a
real-party-in-interest to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage in
controversy.
In the case at bench, the records reveal that when Teofilo died intestate in 1992, his only
surviving compulsory heirs are respondent Felicidad and their son, Teofilo II.Under the
law on succession, successional rights are transmitted from the moment of death of the
decedent and the compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. [30]
Upon Teofilos death in 1992, all his property, rights and obligations to the extent of the
value of the inheritance are transmitted to his compulsory heirs. These heirs were
respondents Felicidad and Teofilo II, as the surviving spouse and child, respectively.
Article 887 of the Civil Code outlined who are compulsory heirs, to wit:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with
respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the Civil
Code.[31]
Clearly, a brother is not among those considered as compulsory heirs. But although a
collateral relative, such as a brother, does not fall within the ambit of a compulsory
heir, he still has a right to succeed to the estate. Articles 1001 and 1003 of the New Civil
Code provide:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled
to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants,
illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the
following articles. (Underscoring supplied)
Indeed, only the presence of descendants, ascendants or illegitimate children
excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the estate of the decedent. The presence
of legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted child or children of the deceased precludes
succession by collateral relatives.[32] Conversely, if there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall
succeed to the entire estate of the decedent.[33]
If respondent Teofilo II is declared and finally proven not to be the legitimate,
illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner would then
have a personality to seek the nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. This is so, considering that collateral relatives, like a brother
and sister, acquire successional right over the estate if the decedent dies without issue
and without ascendants in the direct line.
The records reveal that Teofilo was predeceased by his parents. He had no
other siblings but petitioner. Thus, if Teofilo II is finally found and proven to be not a
legitimate, illegitimate, or adopted son of Teofilo, petitioner succeeds to the other half of
the estate of his brother, the first half being allotted to the widow pursuant to Article
1001 of the New Civil Code. This makes petitioner a real-party-interest to
seek the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage of his deceased brother
with respondent Felicidad. If the subject marriage is found to be void ab initio, petitioner
succeeds to the entire estate.
It bears stressing, however, that the legal personality of petitioner to bring the
nullity of marriage case is contingent upon the final declaration that Teofilo II is not a
legitimate, adopted, or illegitimate son of Teofilo.
If Teofilo II is proven to be a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally adopted son of
Teofilo, then petitioner has no legal personality to ask for the nullity of marriage of his
deceased brother and respondent Felicidad. This is based on the ground that he has no
successional right to be protected, hence, does not have proper interest.For although the
marriage in controversy may be found to be void from the beginning, still, petitioner
would not inherit. This is because the presence of descendant, illegitimate, [34] or even an
adopted child[35] excludes the collateral relatives from inheriting from the decedent.
Thus, the Court finds that a remand of the case for trial on the merits to
determine the validity or nullity of the subject marriage is called for. But the RTC is
strictly instructed to dismiss the nullity of marriage case for lack of cause of action
if it is proven by evidence that Teofilo II is a legitimate, illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of Teofilo Carlos, the deceased brother of petitioner.
IV. Remand of the case regarding the question of filiation of respondent
Teofilo II is proper and in order. There is a need to vacate the disposition of the
trial court as to the other causes of action before it.
Petitioner did not assign as error or interpose as issue the ruling of the CA on the
remand of the case concerning the filiation of respondent Teofilo II. This notwithstanding,
We should not leave the matter hanging in limbo.
This Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned
as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of
the case.[36]
We agree with the CA that without trial on the merits having been conducted in the case,
petitioners bare allegation that respondent Teofilo II was adopted from an indigent
couple is insufficient to support a total forfeiture of rights arising from his putative
filiation. However, We are not inclined to support its pronouncement that the declaration
of respondent Felicidad as to the illegitimate filiation of respondent Teofilo II is more
credible. For the guidance of the appellate court, such declaration of respondent
Felicidad should not be afforded credence. We remind the CA of the guaranty provided
by Article 167 of the Family Code to protect the status of legitimacy of a child, to wit:
 ARTICLE 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as an adulteress. (Underscoring supplied)
It is stressed that Felicidads declaration against the legitimate status of Teofilo II is the
very act that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot
affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.[37]
Finally, the disposition of the trial court in favor of petitioner for causes of action
concerning reconveyance, recovery of property, and sum of money must be
vacated.This has to be so, as said disposition was made on the basis of its finding that
the marriage in controversy was null and void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:
1. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court in regard to the action
on the status and filiation of respondent Teofilo Carlos II and the
validity or nullity of marriage between respondent Felicidad Sandoval
and the late Teofilo Carlos;
2. If Teofilo Carlos II is proven to be the legitimate, or illegitimate, or legally
adopted son of the late Teofilo Carlos, the RTC is
strictly INSTRUCTED to DISMISS the action for nullity of marriage for
lack of cause of action;
3. The disposition of the RTC in Nos. 1 to 8 of the fallo of its decision
is VACATED AND SET ASIDE.
The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to conduct trial on the merits with
dispatch and to give this case priority in its calendar.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.
FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA FERARIS DE VILLEGAS,
JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS, oppositors-appellees.
Mateo C. Bacalso and C. Kintanar for petitioner-appellant.
Gaudioso Sosmea and C. Tomakin for oppositors-appellees.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This is a pauper's appeal, directly brought to this Court on points of law, from a
resolution, dated September 20, 1961, excluding petitioner-appellant herein, Filomena
Abellana de Bacayo, as heir in the summary settlement of the estate of Melodia Ferraris,
Special Proceeding No. 2177-R of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Third Branch, as
well as from the order, dated October 16, 1961, denying a motion to reconsider said
resolution.
The facts of this case are not disputed by the parties.
Melodia Ferraris was a resident of Cebu City until 1937 when she transferred to
Intramuros, Manila. She was known to have resided there continuously until 1944.
Thereafter, up to the filing on December 22, 1960 of the petition for the summary
settlement of her estate, she has not been heard of and her whereabouts are still
unknown. More than ten (10) years having elapsed since the last time she was known to
be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her succession
and distributing her estate among her heirs.
Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City, consisting of one-third (1/3) share in the
estate of her aunt, Rosa Ferraris, valued at P6,000.00, more or less, and which was
adjudicated to her in Special Proceeding No. 13-V of the same court.
The deceased Melodia Ferraris left no surviving direct descendant, ascendant, or
spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely, Filomena Abellana de
Bacayo, an aunt and half-sister of decedent's father, Anacleto Ferraris; and by
Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita, and Juanito, all surnamed Ferraris, her nieces and
nephew, who were the children of Melodia's only brother of full blood, Arturo Ferraris,
who pre-deceased her (the decedent). These two classes of heirs claim to be the nearest
intestate heirs and seek to participate in the estate of said Melodia Ferraris.
The following diagram will help illustrate the degree of relationship of the contending
parties to said Melodia Ferraris:
Note: Picture
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is: Who should inherit the intestate estate of a
deceased person when he or she is survived only by collateral relatives, to wit an aunt
and the children of a brother who predeceased him or her? Otherwise, will the aunt
concur with the children of the decedent's brother in the inheritance or will the former be
excluded by the latter?
The trial court ruled that the oppositors-appellees, as children of the only predeceased
brother of the decedent, exclude the aunt (petitioner-appellant) of the same decedent
reasoning out that the former are nearer in degree (two degrees) than the latter since
nieces and nephews succeed by right of representation, while petitioner-appellant is
three degrees distant from the decedent, and that other collateral relatives are excluded
by brothers or sisters or children of brothers or sisters of the decedent in accordance with
article 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Against the above ruling, petitioner-appellant contends in the present appeal that she is
of the same or equal degree of relationship as the oppositors appellees, three degrees
removed from the decedent; and that under article 975 of the New Civil Code no right of
representation could take place when the nieces and nephew of the decedent do not
concur with an uncle or aunt, as in the case at bar, but rather the former succeed in their
own right.
We agree with appellants that as an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the
nephews from the decedent (three degrees) since in the collateral line to which both
kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor
and then descending to the heir (Civil Code, Art. 966). Appellant is likewise right in her
contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation
(i.e., per stripes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided
expressly by Article 975:
ART. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the deceased
survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if they survive with
their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they shall inherit in equal
portions.
Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews
and nieces of the de cujusexclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins,
etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and
1009 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that provided as follows:
ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
 ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, The decision appealed from, in so far as it conforms to this rule, is hereby affirmed. No
they shall inherit in equal shares. costs.
ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ.,
nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full concur.
blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes. Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers
or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
Under the last article (1009), the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the
decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to
the succession. This was also and more clearly the case under the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, that immediately preceded the Civil Code now in force (R.A. 386). Thus, Articles
952 and 954 of the Code of 1889 prescribed as follows:
ART. 952. In the absence of brother, or sisters and of nephews or nieces,
children of the former, whether of the whole blood or not, the surviving spouse,
if not separated by a final decree of divorce, shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased.
ART. 954. Should there be neither brothers or sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, nor a surviving spouse, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the
estate of deceased.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them
by reason of the whole blood.
It will be seen that under the preceding articles, brothers and sisters and nephews and
nieces inherited ab intestato ahead of the surviving spouse, while other collaterals
succeeded only after the widower or widow. The present Civil Code of the Philippines
merely placed the spouse on a par with the nephews and nieces and brothers and sisters
of the deceased, but without altering the preferred position of the latter vis-a-vis the other
collaterals.
Appellants quote paragraph 2 of Tolentino's commentaries to Article 1009 of the present
Civil Code as declaring that Article 1009 does not establish a rule of preference. Which is
true as to "other collaterals," since preference among them is according to their proximity
to the decedent, as established by Article 962, paragraph 1.
ART. 962. In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more
distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place.
But Tolentino does not state that nephews and nieces concur with other collaterals of
equal degree. On the contrary, in the first paragraph of his commentaries to Article 1009
(Vol II, p. 439) (which counsel for appellants had unethically omitted to quote), Tolentino
expressly states:
Other collaterals. The last of the relatives of the decedent to succeed in
intestate succession are the collaterals other than brothers or sisters or children
of brothers or sisters. They are, however, limited to relatives within the fifth
degree. Beyond this, we can safely say there is hardly any affection to merit the
succession of collaterals. Under the law, therefore, relatives beyond the fifth
degree are no longer considered as relatives, for successional purposes.
Article 1009 does not state any order of preference. However, this article should
be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest relatives
exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there
being no right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or
preference among them on account of the whole blood relationship. (Emphasis
supplied)
We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent
survive and are willing and qualified to succeed.