1. Manila Prince Hotel v.

GSIS
February 3, 1997
Bellosillo, J.

Facts:

The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), pursuant to

the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50, decided to sell through public bidding 30 to
51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation.

There were two bidders; the Manila Prince Hotel Corporation

(MHC) and Malaysian firm Renong Berhad. Manila Prince offered
to buy 51% of shares at 41.58 pesos per share. On the other hand,
Renong Berhad also offered to buy 51% of the shares but at a
higher 44 pesos per share.

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winner of the

public bidding, Manila Prince offered to match their bid at 44
pesos per share but GSIS refused to accept the bid.

Manila Prince seeks to inhibit GSIS from declaring Renong

Berhad as the winner of the bidding. They contend that GSIS
violated the Filipino First Policy stated in Sec. 10(2), Art. XII of
the 1987 Constitution.

Issue:

W/N GSIS violated the Filipino First Policy.

Held:

Yes. The Filipino First Policy states that in the grant of rights,
privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The above states provision is self-executing in nature and does

not need implementing legislation to be carried out. It is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself.

The sales of the assets of the MHC by the GSIS is a state

action. A state action occurs when the activity engaged in is a
public function, when the government is involved with a private
actor to make the government responsible for his action, and when
the government has approved or authorized the action. Clearly, the
selling of the MHC shares by GSIS falls under the 2nd and 3rd
categories of state action.

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 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, if refers
not only to natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of
Filipinos. Therefore, the Manila Hotel can be considered as a part of
national patrimony.

The GSIS should therefore give preference to Manila Prince in

the sale of the MHC shares, in concurrence with the Filipino First
Policy.

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2. Nitafan v. CIR
July 23, 1987
Melencio-Herrera, J.

Facts:

David Nitafan, Wenceslao Polo, and Maximo Savellano, all

judges presiding over Branches 52, 19, and 53 of the Regional Trial
Court, NCR Judicial Region, seek to prohibit the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court
from making any deduction of taxes from their salaries.

The petitioners contend that deducting tax from their salaries is

unconstitutional as it is a violation of Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1987
Constitution. The provision states that salaries of the judiciary shall
not be decreased.

Issue:

W/N the petitioners salaries are subject to tax deductions.

Held:

Yes. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was not
to exempt the salaries of the members of the judiciary from tax
deductions.

Based on the deliberations of the 1986 Constitution

Commission, exemption from tax deductions violates the principle of
uniformity of taxation and the equal protection clause since the
salaries of the members of the judiciary are not the only ones subject
to taxation.

The Commission also amended the provision to change the

word diminished to decreased and put a period after it so that it
will be understood that the salaries of the members of the judiciary
are subject to tax.

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3. Amores v. HRET
June 29, 2010
Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

Milagros Amores questions the legality of the assumption of

office of Emmanuel Joel Villanueva as the party-list representative of
the Citizens Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of
Representatives. Amores petition was denied by the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Amores contends that Villanueva assumed office without a

formal proclamation issued by COMELEC. Villanueva was
disqualified as a nominee for CIBACs youth sector since at the time
he filed his Certificate of Candidacy he was already 31 years old and
was beyond the age limit of 30 years old pursuant to RA 7941 or the
Party-List System Act. Villanuevas change of affiliation from the
youth sector to the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector
was not effected at least 6 months prior to the May 2007 elections to
be qualified to represent the latter sector.

HRET contends that the age qualification for youth sectoral

nominees under Sec. 9 of RA 7941 was only applicable to those party-
lists exclusively representing the youth sector, which CIBAC is not.
HRET says that there was no change in party-list affiliation, only the
sector in said party-list and no violation of Sec. 15 of RA 7941.

Issue:

W/N Sections 9 and 15 of RA 7941 applies to the case.

Held:

Yes. According to Sec. 9 of RA 7941, a nominee of the youth

sector must be at least 25 years old but not more that 30 years old on
the day of the election.

The Court finds no evidence for HRETs interpretation that Sec.

9 applied only to those nominated during the first three congressional
terms after the ratification of the Constitution or until 1998, unless a
sectoral party is said to be exclusively representing the youth sector.

When the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is not room for construction or interpretation. There is only
room for interpretation. Since Sec. 9 is contained in RA 7941 or the
Party-List System Act, it covers all youth sector representative
nominees.

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 Also, HRETs ratiocination that Sec. 9 of RA 7941 only applies
to sectoral parties registered exclusively as representing the youth
center has no merit. The maxim ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguire debemus must apply. When the law does not distinguish,
we must not distinguish.

Sec. 15 of RA 7941 states that any elected party-list

representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation
during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, that if he
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six months
before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-
list representative under his new party or organization.

The statute is clear and free from ambiguity and must therefore
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation.

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4. Francisco v. HRET
November 10, 2003
Carpio-Morales, J.

Facts:

Two impeachment complaints were brought within the span of

1 year against Chief Justice Hilario Davide Jr. for alleged violation of
the Constitution, betrayal of public trust, and other high crimes.

The first impeachment complaint was filed by former President

Joseph Estrada but was dismissed by the House Committee on
Justice for being insufficient in substance. Four months later, the
second impeachment complaint was filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B.
Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) and was accompanied by
a Resolution of Endorsement signed by at least 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives.

The petitioner Atty. Ernesto Francisco, and various other

individuals alleged that the second impeachment proceeding against
Davide is unconstitutional since it is a violation of Art. XI of the 1987
Constitution which presents a one-year bar before one can initiate
impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer.

Issue:

W/N the second impeachment proceeding against Chief Justice

Davide is unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes. Under Sec. 3(5), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution, no

impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year.

Verbal legis must be applied to the present provision. Under

this maxim, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

5. Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary

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 February 22, 1991
Fernan, C.J.

Facts:

The petitioners question the constitutionality of EO No. 284

issued by President Corazon Aquino allowing members of the
Cabinet, their undersecretaries, and their assistant secretaries to hold
not more than two other government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions.

The petitioners contend that EO No. 284 is contrary to Sec. 13,

Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the members of
the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution, hold any other office or
employment during their tenure.

The petitioners also aver that the phrase unless otherwise provided
in this Constitution in the above state provision only exempts the Vice-
President and the Secretary of Justice from the prohibition, by virtue of
Sec. 3(2), Art. VII and Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII of the Constitution
respectively.

Issue:

W/N EO No. 284 is unconstitutional.

Held:

Yes. The intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution was to

treat the President and his official family as a class by itself and to
impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.

While all other appointive officials in the civil service are

allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during
their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions
of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself. Sec. 13 Art VII is meant to be the exception
applicable only to the President and his official family, while Sec. 7,
Art. I-XB was meant to be a general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees.

6. Chiongbian v. De Leon

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 January 31, 1949
Moran, C.J.

Facts:

William Chiongbang seeks to permanently prohibit Customs

Officials from cancelling the registration fees of his vessels, and to
prohibit the Philippine Shipping Administration from rescinding the
sale of three vessels to him.

The basis for the acts of the two respondents mentioned was
that Chiongbian is not a Filipino citizen and therefore not qualified by
law to operate and own vessels of Philippine registry. The Philippine
Shipping Administration also alleges that Chiongbian made a
misrepresentation in their contract of sale that his father was a
naturalized Filipino citizen.

Issue:

W/N Chiongbian is a Filipino citizen.

Held:

Yes. Chiongbians father, Victoriano, was elected as a

municipal councilor of Plaridel, Occidental Misamis and became a
Filipino citizen by virtue of Art. IV, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. The
petitioner, who was then a minor, also became a Filipino citizen by
reason of Subsection 3. This is also in conformity with jurisprudence
that a legitimate minor follows the citizenship of his father.

However, the respondents argued that Art. IV, Sec. 1(2) does
not extend to the children of the grantee because according to the
original draft of the provision, it originally contained the phrase and
their descendants which was deleted from the final draft, this
showing that the provision merely intended the privilege of
citizenship to be strictly personal to the grantee.

The Court ruled that the mere deletion of the said phrase is not
conclusive and that it could have been done because the framers of
the Constitution deemed it superfluous, knowing the meaning of the
phrase was already covered by Subsection 3. The final provisions of
the Constitution must prevail over the preliminary drafts.

7. Macalintal v. COMELEC

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July 10, 2003
Austria-Martinez, J.

Facts:

Petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality

of certain provisions of RA No. 9189 or The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act.

Sec. 5 allows the registration of voters who are immigrants or

permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of executing
an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines.
The petitioner argues that this provision violates the residency
requirement in Sec. 1, Art. V of the 1987 Constitution.

Sec. 18(5) empowers COMELEC to proclaim the winning

candidates for national offices and party-list representatives,
including the President and the Vice-President. The petitioner argues
that this provision violates Sec. 4, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution
which vests the sole power to proclaim the winning candidates for
President and Vice-President to the Congress.

Sec. 25 allows Congress to exercise the power to review, revise,

amend, and approve the implementing rules and regulations that the
COMELEC shall promulgate. The petitioner argues that this provision
violates Sec. 1, Art. IX-A of the 1987 Constitution which gives
independence to COMELEC.

The Court upholds Macalintals right to file the petition, as its

essence has presented an issue significant to the Filipino people,
considering that public funds are used and appropriated for the
implementation of RA 9189.

Issue:

W/N the said provisions of RA 9189 is unconstitutional.

Held:

With regard to Sec. 5, no. The Court cites the discussions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission on the topics of absentee voting and
absentee vote qualification. The Constitutional Commission intended
to enfranchise all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned
their domicile of origin. They intended to qualify as voters young
Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of
origin is the Philippines.

By the doctrine of necessary implication in statutory

construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional

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provisions, the strategic location of Sec. 2, Art. V after Sec. 1, Art. V
indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an
exception to the actual residency requirement of Sec. 1 with respect to
qualified Filipinos abroad.

With regard to Sec. 18(5), yes. The proclamation of the winning

candidates in the provision is far too sweeping that it includes the
proclamation for the presidency and vice-presidency. The COMELEC
cannot be allowed to encroach upon the constitutional powers of the
Congress.

With regard to Sec. 25, yes. Both parties in the case at bar are
unanimous in claiming that this provision is unconstitutional. Thus,
there is no actual issue on this question.

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