IN RE: ALMACEN G.R. No.
12871, February 18, remembered that a petition to review the decision
1970
FACTS:
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one
Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said
civil case but Almacen filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of
said motion but he failed to indicate the time and
place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion
was denied. He then appealed but the Court of
Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the trial
court with regard to the motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari
before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied
his appeal in a minute resolution. This earned the
ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions
as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers
certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
continue practicing his profession when members
of the high court are men who are calloused to
pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity. He
further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his
client was made to pay P120k without knowing the
reasons why and that he became one of the
sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy. He
also stated that justice as administered by the
present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act
on Almacens petition as the Court wanted to wait
for Almacen to actually surrender his certificate.
Almacen did not surrender his lawyers certificate
though as he now argues that he chose not to.
Almacen then asked that he may be permitted to
give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him . . . in an open and
public hearing. He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was
however unapologetic.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Almacen should be
disciplined.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that
minute resolutions are needed because the
Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write
full opinion for every petition they reject otherwise
the High Court would be unable to effectively carry
out its constitutional duties. The proper role of the
Supreme Court is to decide only those cases
which present questions whose resolutions will
have immediate importance beyond the particular
facts and parties involved. It should be
of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but
of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need
to fully explain the courts denial. For one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court,
the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled
for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer,
both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has
the right to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. His right as a citizen to criticize the
decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful
manner, and the independence of the bar, as well
as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by
the courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such
criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is misplaced.
As a veteran lawyer, he should have known that a
motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the
opposing party of the time and place of trial is a
mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by
the court. He has only himself to blame and he is
the reason why his client lost. Almacen was
suspended indefinitely.
A.C. No. 145 December 28, 1956
JOSEFINA MORTEL, petitioner,
vs.
ANACLETO F. ASPIRAS, respondent.
On March 17, 1953, Josefina Mortel complained
before this Court against Attorney Anacleto F.
Aspiras, alleging substantially that:
1. Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent,
representing himself as single, courted her and
eventually won her affection; 2. on December 22,
1952, following his instructions, she came to Manila
so they could get married, and she stayed with her
sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and after
December 31, 1952, upon being assured of
marriage she allowed him to live with her as her
husband; 4. on January 3, 1953, a marriage license
was applied for, with the son of the respondent,
Cesar Aspiras, as one of the applicants; 5. upon
suggestion of respondent, she was married to said
Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love with
the latter; 6. after the marriage, she and respondent
continued cohabiting together, the ceremony being
a mere formality performed at the indication of
respondent, who was a married man and who used
his knowledge and education to abuse and destroy
her.
On April 9, 1953, the petitioner filed a motion to
withdraw and/or dismiss alleging that the contents
of her complaint did not represent her true
sentiments, the respondent acted in good faith,
and her marriage to respondents son, Cesar
Aspiras, was without any fraud or deceit
whatsoever.
Believing that the matter was not a mere private
affair of petitioner, but that it affected the legal
profession 1 , this Court denied the motion to
dismiss, and required the respondent to answer.
On May 6, 1953, the respondent made his answer,
asserting that petitioner had really married his son
Cesar Aspiras, and denying having had any
amorous or sexual relations with her. He also said
she knew all the time he was a married man.
On May 13, 1953, the Court referred the case to
the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.
On November 2, 1953, the Solicitor General
reported that in view of the motion to withdraw filed
by the petitioner, he found no other alternative but
to recommend the dismissal of the case.
Of course, for lack of evidence, the complaint was
dismissed on November 5, 1953.
However, on December 17, 1953, the petitioner
filed a motion to re-open the matter, alleging that
she had asked for dismissal before the office of the
Solicitor General pursuant to an amicable
settlement with the respondent; but that the truth
was, petitioner and respondent lived together as
husband and wife, from April to November, 1953 at
No. 383 Int. 5 Tejeron, Sta. Ana, Manila and that as
a result she was on the family way. She also
charged the respondent with having ordered his
son, Cesar, to live with them, for the purpose of
camouflaging their living together.
On January 5, 1954, this Court granted the above
petition to re- open and referred the papers to the
Solicitor General for re- investigation, report and
recommendation.
After conducting the proper inquiry, and based on
the evidence adduced before him, the Solicitor
General filed in accordance with the Rules a
complaint against the respondent, praying for his
disbarment, on the ground that he seduced
Josefina Mortel by a promise of marriage, and to
cover up his illicit relations, he made his son,
Cesar, a minor to marry the said Josefina Mortel on
January 14, 1953; and, what is worse, after the
marriage, the respondent continued having sexual
relations with the spouse of his own son.
On May 6, 1955, this Court ordered the respondent
to reply to the official charges of the Government
prosecutor.
He replied in due time repeating the same denials
he had previously made in this Court. Then he
asked for, and was granted, a chance to introduce
evidence in addition to the proofs submitted to, and
forwarded by, the Solicitor General. Yet he failed to
produce any.
At the oral argument he did not appear to defend
himself, but asked for permission to file a
memorandum which he afterwards presented.
Therein he maintains that the complaints
allegations were not supported by the evidence,
that the petitioner is in pari delicto and deserves no
remedy, and that the alleged misconduct is not
sufficient ground for disbarment.
In regard to the first point, the oral and
documentary evidence at hand establish beyond
reasonable doubt the following facts:
In the year 1952 Josefina Mortel, 21 years of age,
single, was a teacher residing with her widowed
mother in Sawang Barrio School, Romblon,
Romblon. Sometime in August, of that year she met
the respondent. Atty. Anacleto P. Aspiras, an
employee of the Cebu Portland Cement Co., who
represented himself as single, although he was
already married to Carolina Bautista Aspiras with
whom he had seven children.
A reckless Lothario, he wooed her personally and
by correspondence until he finally conquered her
trusting heart. He visited her at her house and must
have charmed even the mother, because without
much ado she approved of him. The climax came
when on a certain night of November, 1952, he was
invited to stay and spend the night at her house,
due to a typhoon which was raging. About 3 or 4
a.m., while the mother was in the kitchen, he crept
into Josefinas room and after glibly promising
marriage, succeeded in seducing her. From that
time on, and without the benefit of marriage she
gave him the privileges of a husband. Thereafter
yielding to his invitation, Josefina came to Manila in
December, 1952, for the purpose of marrying him,
despite her mothers desire to have the marriage
celebrated the following month of April, so as to
enable her to continue teaching until the end of the
school term. She stayed with her sister at 10
Espiritu Street, Pasay City.
Accompanied by the respondent, she went on
January 3, 1953 to the Manila City Hall, where for
the first time, she met his son Cesar, who was
introduced (by respondent) as his nephew, and her
bridegroom-to- be. She says respondent again told
her to follow his instructions, and left the two of
them (with Atty. Espino) at the City Hall. He then
departed for Cebu. She filled up the application for
marriage (Exhibits 7, 8, Respondent) and wrote the
name of Cesar as her husband-to-be.
In connection with the above instructions, it is
probable that before filing the application Josefina
discovered or was told that respondent was a
married man. But she was persuaded by
respondent to enter into a sham marriage with his
nephew Cesar, so that she may rightfully claim to
be Mrs. Josefina Aspiras and save her face before
her relatives and acquaintances who had known
her amorous relations with Attorney Aspiras.
Accordingly on January 14, 1953, Josefina and
Cesar were married 2 at the Manila City Hall before
Judge Aragon, with the respondent and Rosario R.
Veloso (Cesars aunt) as witnesses. After the
ceremony, the two contracting parties separated,
never to live together as husband and wife.
However, the respondent continued up to
November, 1953 his adulterous relations with
Josefina, as a result of which she gave birth to a
baby boy on January 24, 1954.
Josefinas sworn testimony that herein respondent
pretended to be single and promised marriage, is
confirmed by his love letters, portions of which say:
. . . You are alone in my life till the end of my years
in this world . . . I will bring you along with me
before the altar of matrimony . . .. (Exhibit A-6,
September 22, 1952.)
Through thick and thin, for better or for worse, in
life or in death, my Josephine you will always be
the first, middle and the last in my life. In short, you
will be the only woman to me as I used to say to
you. (Exhibit A, November 2, 1952.)
And her testimony that after her marriage to Cesar
she continued living, as wife, with herein
respondent is borne out by his letters to Josefinas
mother dated February 9, 1953 and March 6, 1953
Exhibits A-19 and A-21.
Obviously the courtship and seduction by
respondent was morally wrong, and this obliquity
became worse when he made use of his minor son
Cesar to redeem his promise of marriage and/or
to cover up his illicit relations, as the Solicitor
General alleged. He corrupted his own descendant
by turning him into an accomplice of his marital
infidelities.
But he says, the marriage was a true marriage, the
contracting parties being actually in love with each
other. Granted. Then his moral delinquency
becomes all the more unpardonable: he cohabited
with the wife of his own son after the marriage
which he himself arranged and witnessed.
It is immaterial that Josefina Mortel the complainant
was also at fault in pari delicto, respondent
suggests because this is not a proceeding to
grant her relief, but one to purge the profession of
unworthy members, to protect the public and the
courts 3 . So much so that even if she should
presently ask for dismissal, the matter may not be
dropped, the evidence at hand being sufficient to
warrant disciplinary action. Anyway, pari delicto is
not always a complete defense. 4
Supposing that respondents conduct is not one of
those mentioned in the Rules for which an attorney
may be disbarred, 5 still, in this jurisdiction, lawyers
may be removed from office on grounds other than
those enumerated by the statutes. (In re Pelaez, 44
Phil. 567.) And we recently applied that principle in
Balinon vs. De Leon, 50 Off. Gaz., 583.
In the United States wherefrom our system of legal
ethics derives, the continued possession . . . of a
good moral character is a requisite condition for the
rightful continuance in the practice of the law . . .
and its loss requires suspension or disbarment,
even though the statutes do not specify that as a
ground for disbarment. (5 Am. Jur. 417.)
As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court,
One of the requisite qualifications for one who
holds the office of an attorney at law is that he or
she shall be of good moral character, in so far as it
relates to the discharge of the duties and
responsibilities of an attorney at law. This is a
continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to
admission to the bar, and the loss of such
qualification requires his suspension. The
respondent is a member of the bar of this court.
The charges preferred against him challenge his
moral integrity. Just as it was the duty of this court
to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a
showing that he lacked the necessary
qualifications, so is it its duty now to remove him
upon like proof. (Re Stolen, 193 Wis. 602; 55 A. L.
R. 1361.)
Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting
to crime will not disbar, as some cases hold 6and
on this we do not decide. But respondents moral
delinquency having been aggravated by a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage, and
by corruption of his minor son or destruction of the
latters honor, the undersigned all agree he is unfit
to continue exercising the privileges and
responsibilities of members of the bar. 7
Wherefore it becomes the duty of this Court to
strike, as it does hereby strike his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix,
JJ., concur.
Canon 24 Suspension, Disbarment, and
Discipline of Lawyers
Joven and Rasing vs. Atty. Cruz and Atty.
Magsalin III, AC. No. 7686, July 31, 2013
Facts:
Version of the Complainants
This case is an administrative complaint for
disbarment filed by Jaime Joven and Reynaldo C.
Rasing against Attys. Pablo R. Cruz and Frankie O.
Magsalin III for deceit, malpractice, gross
misconduct and falsification of public
documents.The disbarment complaint stemmed
from a labor case filed by complainant Joven
against Phil. Hoteliers, Inc. and/or Dusit Hotel
Nikko, a client of respondents' law firm, P.R. Cruz
Law Offices.
On July 16, 2007, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) rendered a decision in NLRC
NCR CA No. 039270-04. Joven's counsel, Atty.
Solon R. Garcia, received their copy of the decision
on August 14, 2007. As to respondents, they
received a copy of the decision on August 24, 2007
based on the Registry Return Receipt that was sent
back to the NLRC.Stamped thereon was
"RECEIVED AUG 24 2007" and signed by
"tess."Atty. Garcia found it unusual for the
respondents to receive a copy of the said decision
of the NLRC 10 days after he has received his own
copy, considering that both law offices of the ones
representing the complainant and the respondents
are located in Quezon City. With this, Atty. Garcia
asked for a certification from the post office as of
the actual date respondents received a copy of said
decision.
Based on the certification complainants lodged the
instant disbarment complaint against respondents.
They allege that Teresita "Tess" Calucag, secretary
of respondents law firm, altered the true date of
receipt of the NLRC decision when she signed and
stamped on the Registry Return Receipt the date
August 24, 2007 to make it appear and to mislead
the NLRC and the opposing party that the decision
was received on such later date and not on August
14, 2007. They conclude that respondents caused
the alteration of the true date of their actual receipt
with the intention of extending by ten days the
period within which to file a motion for
reconsideration. Complainants submit that the
alteration of the true date of receipt done on the
registry return card (a public document), the use of
the altered date and the making of untruthful
statements in a narration of facts in the Partial
Motion for Reconsideration (also a public
document) constitute falsification of public
document on several counts, deception and gross
professional misconduct.
Version of the Defense
According to the respondents, the mentioned
decision was received by one of the staff of their
law office, Henry Agellon. The latter usually
receives mails when TessCalucag, the office
secretary, is busy or is not around. During August
14, 2007, there were 4 mails that was received by
Agellon which was evidenced by a receipt dated on
the same day. On August 24, 2007, another batch
of mails were received but this time by Tess
Calucag. The mistake arose when Calucag, having
believed that the decision was received among
those registered mails which were delivered on
August 24, stamped the Registry Return Card of
the said decision and signed them as received on
the same date.
Respondents, merely relying on the records of their
secretary, followed the said date in drafting their
motion for reconsideration pertaining to the
decision of the NLRC. They contended that they did
not in any way act with fraud, malice, deceit, nor
with gross misconduct. The arguments of the
complainants are mere self-serving and does not
totally prove that the respondents induced their
secretary to alter the date of the receipt of the said
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Cruz and Atty. Magsalin III
should be suspended or disbarred on the grounds
of deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct?
Ruling:
No. The complaint was correctly dismissed by the
IBP for lack of merit.
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension
proceedings always rests on the shoulders of the
complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary
power only if the complainant establishes the
complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that
warrants the imposition of the harsh penalty. As a
rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that
he is innocent of the charges made against him
until the contrary is proved. An attorney is further
presumed as an officer of the Court to have
performed his duties in accordance with his oath.
In this case, complainants failed to discharge their
burden of proving respondents administrative
liability. While there is incongruity between said
certification and the records of respondents law
firm as to when the subject NLRC decision was
actually received by the latter, there is no clear and
convincing evidence presented by complainants
that respondents maliciously made it appear that
they received the decision on a date ten days later
than what is reflected on the record. Complainants
would like to convince this Court that the only
logical explanation as to the discrepancy is that
Calucag, a secretary under the employ of
respondents, was ordered by respondents to stamp
a much later date instead of the actual date of
receipt for the purpose of extending by ten-day
period within which to file a Motion for
Reconsideration under the NLRC Rules of
Procedure. Clearly, such claim is merely anchored
on speculation and conjecture and not backed by
any clear preponderant evidence necessary to
justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a
member of the Bar.
It is likewise worthy to note that the registry return
card which the QCCPO itself returned to the NLRC
corroborates respondents claim that to their
knowledge, their law firm actually received the
subject NLRC decision on August 24, 2007, after
relying on the date of receipt relayed to them by
their secretary and as stamped by the latter on their
copy of the subject NLRC decision. We find merit in
respondents argument that had Calucag stamped
the wrong date on the Registry Return Card, the
postman who had full view of the receiving and
stamping, would have called Calucags attention to
correct the same or he would just have refused to
receive the same altogether considering that it was
erroneous. Having accepted the Registry Return
Card with the date August 24, 2007 stamped on it
as the date of receipt can only mean that the
postman considered it as correct.
Also, the registered mails delivered on August 14,
2007 were received by Agellon which explains his
signature appearing on the postmans logbook for
said date. The fact that the Registry Return Card
was signed by Calucag, and not by Agellon,
buttresses respondents contention that the subject
NLRC decision may not have been among the
registered mails received on August 14, 2007 by
Agellon. Otherwise, it should be Agellon' s
signature that would appear on the Registry Return
Card and not Calucag's.
WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint
against respondents Attys. Pablo R. Cruz and
Frankie O. Magsalin III is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
WILHELMINA S. OROZCO, petitioner, vs. THE
FIFTH DIVISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
AND LETICIA JIMENEZ
MAGSANOC, respondents.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Ostensibly, the question raised in this present
petition is of general interest to students of law
whether a newspaper columnist is an employee of
the newspaper which publishes the columns.
However, for failure to file the appeal bond required
by law, the Court is impelled to defer the settlement
of the above issue until the jurisdictional
requirement has been duly complied with.
This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court assails the Resolution[1] of the Court of
Appeals Fifth Division denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by Wilhelmina Orozco
(Orozco) and the Decision[2] of the same division in
CA-G.R. SP No. 50970, the dispositive portion of
which provides:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition
is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the
public respondent NLRC affirming the decision of
the Labor Arbiter that private respondent
Wilhelmina Orozco is an employee of petitioner PDI
is hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent Orozcos
complaint is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The above ruling of the Court of Appeals reversed
the Decision[4] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which affirmed
theDecision[5] of the Labor Arbiter,[6] the decretal
portion of which stated:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
finding complainant to be an employee of
respondent company; ordering respondent
company to reinstate her to her former or
equivalent position, with backwages.
Respondent company is also ordered to pay her
13th month pay and service incentive leave pay.
Other claims are hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
This case arose out of the complaint filed by
Orozco against private respondents Philippine Daily
Inquirer (PDI) and Leticia Jimenez-Magsanoc
(Magsanoc), the editor-in-chief of the PDI at that
time, for illegal dismissal, underpayment, non-
payment of allowance, separation pay, retirement
pay, service incentive leave pay, 13th month pay,
moral and exemplary damages, discrimination in
pay and for attorneys fees[8] with the Arbitration
Branch of the NLRC on 1 June 1993.[9]
Based on the records of this case, Orozco was
engaged as a columnist by PDI on 8 March 1990.
She penned the column Feminist Reflections which
appeared in the Lifestyle Section under the
editorship of Lolita T. Logarta.[10]
Orozco worked by submitting weekly columns with
a per article wage of Two Hundred Fifty Pesos
(P250.00) which was later increased to Three
hundred Pesos (P300.00).[11]
In June 1991, Magsanoc as editor-in-chief of PDI
discussed how to improve the Lifestyle section of
the newspaper with the Lifestyle editor. They
agreed to cut down the number of columnists and
for this reason, PDI decided to drop or terminate
Orozcos column in November 1992.[12]
Orozcos column thus appeared in PDI for the last
time on 7 November 1992. Upon inquiry at the
office of Magsanoc as to why her column was
stopped, the secretary told Orozco that it was
Eugenia Apostol (Apostol), the chairperson of PDI,
who had decided to stop her column.[13]
Apostol was out of the country at that time so
Orozco waited until February 1993 to talk to her. In
a telephone conversation with Orozco, Apostol
stated that she had been told by Magsanoc that
there were too many columnists in the Lifestyle
Section.[14]
Aggrieved at the stoppage of her column, Orozco
filed the instant case against private respondents
before the NLRC. The PDI raised as primary
defense the claim that Orozco was not an
employee of the newspaper. However, in
a Decision dated 29 October 1993, Labor Arbiter
Arthur L. Amansec ruled that Orozco had been
illegally dismissed, after concluding that Orozco
had indeed been an employee of the PDI.
The PDI, through counsel, received a copy of the
Labor Arbiters Decision on 16 December 1993.[15] It
timely filed a Notice and Memorandum dated 24
December 1993, but it did not lodge a cash or
surety bond in the amount equivalent to the
monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
PDI adverted to such failure on its part before the
NLRC but justified the same on the ground that
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter did not fix any
amount but merely stated that Orozco was entitled
to backwages.
The NLRC dismissed the appeal in
its Decision dated 23 August 1994. In this Decision,
it made note of the failure of PDI to perfect the
appeal by filing the cash or surety bond.
Nonetheless, the NLRC ventured to delve on the
merits, and thereupon, affirmed the finding of the
Labor Arbiter that Orozco was an employee of PDI.
Private respondents elevated the case to the
Supreme Court by way of the special civil action of
certiorari. Pursuant to the ruling in St. Martin
Funeral Homes v. NLRC,[16] this Court referred the
case to the Court of Appeals.
On 11 July 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the NLRC by holding that Orozco is not
an employee of PDI. The reversal was grounded on
factual premises, the appellate court concluding
that the NLRC had misappreciated the facts and
rendered a ruling wanting in substantial evidence. It
thereby dismissed Orozcos complaint for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals likewise dismissed
Orozcos motion for reconsideration on 11
September 2002. Hence, this petition.
In her Memorandum, Orozco posits that the Court
of Appeals should have dismissed outright the
private respondents petition for certiorari for their
failure to file a cash bond or a surety bond as
provided for in Article 223 of the Labor Code.
In support of the argument, Orozco contends that a
grievous error tantamount to grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the Court of Appeals
when it failed to appreciate the observation of the
NLRC that private respondents did not perfect their
appeal as they did not deposit on time any cash or
surety bond in compliance with the provision of Art.
223 of the Labor Code when they filed an appeal of
the Labor Arbiters decision at the NLRC. Orozco
argues that the posting of the cash or surety bond
is mandatory and must be made by the employer
within the reglementary period of ten (10) days from
receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision so as to
perfect his appeal. Failing to do so, the employer
loses the right to appeal, and the Labor Arbiters
decision becomes final and executory, regardless
of whether or not the NLRC declares it so, by
operation of law.[17]
The NLRC in its decision concluded that it had no
jurisdiction over PDIs appeal but proceeded
nonetheless to discuss the merits of the case. On
the other hand, the Court of Appeals made no
mention at all of the jurisdictional defect, whether in
its recital of facts or discussion of the arguments.
The novelty of the argument on the merits aside, it
is essential not to lose sight of the jurisdictional
issue, as it determines whether or not an appeal
had indeed been perfected.
The provisions of the Labor Code are quite clear
cut on the matter. The relevant portion of Article
223 states:
ART. 223. Appeal. - Decisions, awards or orders of
the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless
appealed to the Commission by any or both parties
within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such
decisions, awards, or orders. . .
In case of a judgment involving a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer may be
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or
surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission in the
amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from. (emphasis supplied)
By explicit provision of law, an appeal is
perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety
bond. The reason behind the imposition of this
requirement is not difficult to divine. As the Court
said in Viron Garments Mftg., Co., Inc. v. NLRC:[18]
The requirement that the employer post a cash or
surety bond to perfect its/his appeal is apparently
intended to assure the workers that if they prevail in
the case, they will receive the money judgment in
their favor upon the dismissal of the employer's
appeal. It was intended to discourage employers
from using an appeal to delay, or even evade, their
obligation to satisfy their employees' just and lawful
claims.[19]
But while the posting of a cash or surety bond is
jurisdictional and is a condition sine qua non to the
perfection of an appeal, there is a plethora of
jurisprudence recognizing exceptional instances
wherein the Court relaxed the bond requirement as
a condition for posting the appeal.
In Olacao v. NLRC[20] for example, the NLRC had
discovered that the separation pay awarded by the
Labor Arbiter had already been paid by the
employer. Since a modification of the Labor Arbiters
Decision was the only way to forestall the grant of
separation pay twice, the NLRC allowed the appeal
perfected only on the twelfth (12th) day.
[21]
In Cosico, Jr. v. NLRC,[22] the employer timely
posted the bond based on the monetary award for
back wages and thirteenth month pay, but
excluding the exorbitant award for moral and
exemplary damages. The Court ruled that there
was substantial compliance, owing to the fact that
the NLRC had since excluded the award of
damages from the computation of the surety bond.
[23]
And in Star Angel Handicraft v. NLRC,[24] the
Court noted that a motion for reduction of the
appeal bond had been filed within the reglementary
period, and that the appeal should not be deemed
perfected until the NLRC has acted on the motion
and the appellant has filed the bond as fixed by the
NLRC.[25]
In YBL v. NLRC,[26] the appeal was interposed by
the employers on 11 September 1989, or only six
(6) days from the effectivity of the Interim Rules on
Appeals which incorporated for the first time the
appeal bond requirement imposed by Republic Act
No. 6715, an amendatory law to the Labor Code.
The Court therein considered the apparent fact that
neither the counsel for the employer nor that for the
employee was already aware of the then new
requirement requiring the posting of a bond on
appeal.[27] The same justification was cited with
approval by the Court inBlancaflor v. NLRC,[28] and
the same circumstance is likewise apparent
in Rada v. NLRC.[29]
In the case of Taberrah v. NLRC,[30] the Court made
note of the fact that the assailed decision of the
Labor Arbiter concerned did not contain a
computation of the monetary award due the
employees, a circumstance which is likewise
present in this case. In said case, the Court stated,
As a rule, compliance with the requirements for the
perfection of an appeal within the reglamentary
period is mandatory and jurisdictional. However, in
National Federation of Labor Unions v. Ladrido as
well as in several other cases, this Court relaxed
the requirement of the posting of an appeal bond
within the reglementary period as a condition for
perfecting the appeal. This is in line with the
principle that substantial justice is better served by
allowing the appeal to be resolved on the merits
rather than dismissing it based on a technicality.[31]
The judgment of the Labor Arbiter in this case
merely stated that petitioner was entitled to
backwages, 13th month pay and service incentive
leave pay without however including a computation
of the alleged amounts. As the private respondents
asserted in their motion for reconsideration anent
the NLRC decision:
III. NO BOND WAS FILED BECAUSE OF THE
VAGUENESS OF THE AWARD
The award as contained in the appealed 29
October 1993 decision did not state the exact
amount to be awarded. In particular, while it may be
assumed, as stated in the decision subject of this
motion, the award be based on the P300.00 per
column/article basis, this is not clear in the decision
which likewise mentioned an award for thirteenth
(13th) month pay and service incentive leave pay.
Noteworthy is the fact that the complainant, not
being an employee, was not being paid a fixed
salary. Hence, herein respondents-appellants
requested in their memorandum on appeal that the
Commission fixes (sic) the amount of the bond, if it
finds the same necessary in exceptional cases like
the present case, to wit:
xxx Respondents-appellants however manifest that
they are able and willing to post a bond that this
Commission may fix if the latter finds it
necessary. (Notice and Memorandum on Appeal
dated 24 December 1993, p. 7).[32] (Emphasis in the
original)
In the case of NFLU v. Ladrido III,[33] this Court
postulated that private respondents cannot be
expected to post such appeal bond equivalent to
the amount of the monetary award when the
amount thereof was not included in the decision of
the labor arbiter.[34] The computation of the amount
awarded to petitioner not having been clearly stated
in the decision of the labor arbiter, private
respondents had no basis for determining the
amount of the bond to be posted.
Thus, while the requirements for perfecting an
appeal must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for orderly discharge of
judicial business,[35] the law does admit of
exceptions when warranted by the circumstances.
Technicality should not be allowed to stand in the
way of equitably and completely resolving the rights
and obligations of the parties.[36] But while this
Court may relax the observance of reglementary
periods and technical rules to achieve substantial
justice,[37] it is not prepared to give due course to
this petition and make a pronouncement on the
weighty issue obtaining in this case until the law
has been duly complied with and the requisite
appeal bond duly paid by private respondents.
WHEREFORE, without giving due course to the
petition, the Labor Arbiter is hereby ordered to
clarify the amount of the award due the petitioner.
Private respondents are ordered to post the
requisite bond in accordance with Article 223 of the
Labor Code, whereupon, the petition will be given
due course. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.