Valino v Adriano Et. Al.

G. R. No. 182894, April 22, 2014

Facts: Atty. Adriano married respondent Rosario on 1955. They had 5 children and 1 adopted daughter. Their marriage however
turned sour and they eventually separated-in-fact. 20 years later, Atty. Adriano courted Valino, one of his clients, until they
decided to live together as husband and wife. Despite such arrangement, he continued to provide financial support to Rosario
and their children.
In 1992, Atty. Adriano died of acute emphysema. At that time, Rosario was in the US spending Christmas with her children.
Since no family members were around, Valino shouldered the funeral and burial expenses herself. When Rosario learned about
the death, she immediately called Valino and requested that the interment be delayed but her request was unheeded. The remains
of Atty. Adriano were then interred at the Valino family mausoleum at the Manila Memorial Park.
Claiming that they were deprived of the chance to view the remains and that his burial there was contrary to his wishes,
respondents filed for damages against Valino, and prayed that the remains be transferred to the family plot at Holy Cross
Memorial Cemetery in Novaliches, Quezon City.
Valino countered that Rosario and Atty. Adriano had been separated for more than 20 years before he courted her. That unlike
Rosario, Valino was there for Adriano when he was seriously ill, and even paid for his medical expenses. According to Valino,
Atty. Adrianos last wish was that his remains be interred in the Valino family mausoleum. She counter sued for damages.
RTC considered that since Valino was the one who performed all the duties and responsibilities of a wife, it could be reasonably
presumed that Adriano wished to be buried in the Valino family mausoleum. The CA reversed the RTC decision and favored
Rosario, the legal wife, to the custody of the remains of her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New Civil Code in
relation to Article 199 of the Family Code, it stated that the law gave the surviving spouse not only the duty, but also the right to
make arrangements for the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario had the better right due to their subsisting marriage,
despite being separated in fact for 30 years. It directed the respondents to exhume and to transport the remains to the family plot,
at their expense.
Issue: Whether or not Rosario was entitled to the remains of Atty. Adriano.
Ruling: Yes, Rosario, who is the legal wife, has custody over the remains of her deceased husband. Article 305 of the Civil
Code, in relation to what is now Article 199 of the Family Code, specifies the persons who have the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements for the deceased:
Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order established
for support, under Article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred.
In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.
Art. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following persons in
the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters.

From the above provisions, it is undeniable that the law simply confines the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to the
members of the family to the exclusion of ones common law partner. In Eugenio v Velez, as to Eugenios claim that he should
be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty to make funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled that
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years
as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife
in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and that they
produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such
form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage.

In this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to Rosario, she being the surviving legal
wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from her husband and was in the US when he died has no controlling
significance. In the absence of clear and satisfactory proof of waiver or renunciation, the right and duty to make funeral
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is rightfully vested upon the legal wife.
Considering the ambiguity as to the true wishes of the deceased, it is the law that supplies the presumption as to his intent. No
presumption can be said to have been created in Valinos favor, solely on account of a long-time relationship with Atty. Adriano.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of an individual is outside the commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that a
certain right of possession over the corpse exists, for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the exclusion of the intrusion by third
persons who have no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right, arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to bury
their dead, also authorizes them to take possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to have it remain in its final resting
place, or to even transfer it to a proper place where the memory of the dead may receive the respect of the living. This is a family
right. There can be no doubt that persons having this right may recover the corpse from third persons.
All this notwithstanding, the Court finds laudable the acts of Valino in taking care of Atty. Adriano during his final moments and
giving him a proper burial. It would thus be unkind to assess actual or moral damages against her.

SAGALA-ESLAO vs. CA

G.R. No. 116773

January 16, 1997

Facts:

Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with Teresita
Eslao, mother of Reynaldo. The couple had two children, namely Leslie and Angelica. Leslie was entrusted to the
care and custody of Maria's mother while Angelica was entrusted with her parents at Teresita's house.

Reynaldo died 4 years later. Maria intended to bring Angelica to her mother's place, but Teresita prevailed and
entrusted to the custody of Angelica. Maria returned to her mother's house and stayed with Leslie.

Years later, Maria married James Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American orthodontist, and she migrated to US with
him. A year after the marriage, Maria returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them
to US. Teresita, however, resisted by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was 10 days
old and accused Maria of having abandoned Angelica. The trial court rendered a decision where Teresita was
directed to cause the immediate transfer of custody of the child to Maria. CA affirmed with the lower court's
decision.

Issue:

Does the Teresita have the right to the custody of the child?

Ruling:

NO. Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be transferred or renounced except in cases
authorized by law. The right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of
parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home or an orphan
institution. When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a renunciation of parental
authority. Even if a definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. The father and mother,
being the natural guardians of unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody
and company.

In this case, when Maria entrusted the custody of her minor child to Teresita, what she gave to the latter was
merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.

Thus, Teresita does not have the right to the custody of the child.
 JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS, G.R. No. 190710

FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to
DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of his mother Elsie who got
acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also submitted documents which include (a) petitioners
certificate of live birth; (b) petitioners baptismal certificate; (c) petitioners college diploma, showing that he
graduated from Saint Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation
from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of Music; and
(f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial
in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and
Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion
for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as
Jesses father.

Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba
namely, a prima facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between
the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled
where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is premature
considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour
of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had
been met and held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima facie
case.

ISSUE: Whether a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order

HELD: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since
no evidence has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.

Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy
and integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or
on application of any person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order
shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample
exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA
testing now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation
for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific
potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The existence
of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy or integrity of the
DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is commenced. This does not mean,
however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions
are established.

In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be a show cause hearing wherein
the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered
a search, which, under their Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil
actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have differed regarding
the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity
cases. We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory
blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained
hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a
blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient
evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same
condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment
suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence
or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Nepomuceno vs Lopez
G.R. 181258, March 18, 2010

Facts: Arhbencel Ann Lopez, represented by her mother Araceli Lopez, filed a complaint for recognition and support against
petitioner Ben-Hur Nepomuceno. Arhbencel claimed that she was born out of extramarital affair between Ben-Hur and Araceli.
To prove her filiation, Arhbencel presented a handwritten note executed by petitioner which reads: I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno,
hereby undertake to give and provide financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth day of each month
for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting August 15, 1999, to Arhbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother
Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment later depending on the needs of the child and my income.
Petitioner denied that he was the father of Arhbencel and alleged that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note on
account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that, among other
things, Arhbencels Certificate of Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did not bear petitioners
signature; that petitioners hand written undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical acknowledgment that
Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no showing that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of Arhbencel
as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note. Thus, Arhbencel appealed.
Issue: Whether or not the handwritten note is sufficient to establish Arhbencels filiation as an illegitimate child and therefore
entitle her to support.
Held: No. Arhbencels entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation. The handwritten
note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is therefore not within the ambit of
Article 172 (2) vis-a-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which provides that the filiation of illegitimate children may be
established by a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned admitting such filiation. Here, petitioner has not
only consistently denied his filiation with Arhbencel, he has also not performed any contemporaneous acts admitting such
filiation. The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value
to establish filiation to petitioner because the latter has not signed the same.

Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676

FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the RTC Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries
in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from female
to male. It appearing that Jennifer is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical
condition where afflicted persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer grew up with secondary
male characteristics. To further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing
that she is suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained
that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not
develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court decided in her favor but the Office
of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of Rules 103
and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as ruled by the
lower court.

HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because it failed
to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without
merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a copy of the
petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the
proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions of Rules
103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that the determination of a persons sex
appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the
delicate facts present in this case.

In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which is the
condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and female sexes.
In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.

The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid
classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence presented. In the
instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a
female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held that where
the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity
that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred
in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy.
To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence
of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law,
the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a
male.

HATIMA C. YASIN vs SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT

G.R. No. 94986 February 23, 1995

Facts:
On May 5, 1990, Hatima C. Yasin filed in the Shari'a District Court in Zamboanga City a "Petition to resume the use of maiden
name", stating that she, a divorcee, Muslim Filipino of legal age, was formerly married to Hadji Idris Yasin, also a Muslim
Filipino in accordance with Muslim rites and customs, and who is now residing at Barangay Recodo, Zamboanga City, but on
March 13, 1984, they were granted a decree of divorce by the Mindanao Islamic Center Foundation, Inc., in accordance with
Islamic Law, and that thereafter the former husband Hadji Idris Yasin contracted another marriage to another woman.
Petitioner seeks to be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name Hatima Centi y Saul. The respondent court ordered
amendments to the petition as it was not sufficient in form and substance in accordance Rule 103, Rules of Court, regarding the
residence of petitioner and the name sought to be adopted is not properly indicated in the title thereof which should include all
the names by which the petitioner has been known. Hatima filed a motion for reconsideration of the order alleging that the
petition filed is not covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court but is merely a petition to resume the use of her maiden name and
surname after her divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband
to another woman. The respondent court denied the motion since compliance to rule 103 is necessary if the petition is to be
granted, as it would result in the resumption of the use of petitioners maiden name and surname.
Issue: Whether or not the annulment of marriage or divorce under the Muslim Code requires a petition for the resumption of the
use of a maiden name.
Ruling: No. The court ruled that for the purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the
only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. Petitioner's registered name is Hatima
Centi Y. Saul. In the instant petition, petitioner does not seek to change her registered maiden name but, instead, prays that she
be allowed to resume the use of her maiden name in view of the dissolution of her marriage to Hadji Idris Yasin, by virtue of a
decree of divorce granted in accordance with Muslim law.
According to Tolentino We have no law which provides that the wife shall change her name to that of the husband upon
marriage It seems, therefore, that a married woman may use only her maiden name and surname. She has an option, but not a
duty, to use the surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by this Article. (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines,
Vol. I, p. 724, 1983 ed.) This is based on Articles 370 and 371 of the Civil Code in which the use of the word may is used.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname, or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs."
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If
she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and surname. However, she may choose to continue employing
her former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Similarly, when the marriage ties or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of death of the husband or divorce as authorized by
the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change in her civil status in order to revert
to her maiden name as the use of her former husband's name is optional and not obligatory for her. I essence, when petitioner
married her husband, she did not change her name but only her civil status. Neither was she required to secure judicial authority
to use the surname of her husband after the marriage as no law requires it. The use of the husband's surname during the marriage,
after annulment of the marriage and after the death of the husband is permissive and not obligatory except in case of legal
separation.

HERBERT CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA
CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998

Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children.
Anna Marie learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco. Anna Marie filed a petition for
legal separation which was approved. Petitioner then left for the US where he was granted a divorce which gave
sole custody of the three minor children to Anna Marie. While in the US, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical
Clinic a portion of his earnings were remitted to the Philippines for his childrens expenses and another, deposited in
the bank in the name of his children. Meanwhile, private respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago
Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed for the adoption of the three minor Cang
children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over
the children. On the ground that the legal separation allowed her to enter into any contract without the written
consent of her husband,
 Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition
thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of
supporting the children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his beloved children.

The trial court granted the adoption of the children.

One of the reasons was Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press, real estate
business, export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial
assets and income.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
is now before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written
consent as a natural father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not parental authority can be entrusted to a person because he could provide a larger measure of
material comfort.

Ruling:
No. It would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in
deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to
the matter, taking into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the
child.
The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than
his inability to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be
proof that he had so emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they
were given to adopting parents. The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more
important emotional tie between him and his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to
their whims but also because he was a person they could share with their daily experiences.
The Clavanos attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority stemmed from their notion that he was an
inveterate womanizer. Petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the
conclusion that petitioner was necessarily an unfit father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not,
strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the
children.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of
necessity, deprive petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. As such, in
instant case, petitioner may not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental authority,
notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie in the legal separation case.
The petition for adoption is denied.
Geronimo vs. Santos

Karen Santos, claiming to be the only child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint for
annulment of document and recovery of possession against the defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who
are the brothers of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the property belonging to her parents
was passed on to her by the law on intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a document
declaring themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and adjudicating to themselves the property
in question; and that consequently, they took possession and were able to transfer the tax declaration of the subject
property to their names. She prayed that the document be annulled and the tax declaration of the land transferred
to her, and that the defendants vacate the property and pay her damages.

Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the plaintiff is the only child and legal heir of his
brother Rufino. He disclosed that when Rufinos wife could not bear a child, the couple decided to adopt the plaintiff
who was Caridads niece from Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur. Believing that in the absence of a direct heir, his brother
Emiliano and he should succeed to the estate of their brother. He was also able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs
alleged birth certificate which had irregular features.
The trial court ruled that respondent is a legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the filiation of legitimate children:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her filiation by showing that she has enjoyed
that open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad

The evidence consists of the following:

(1)the plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name Geronimo;
(2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for her tuition fees and other school expenses;
(3) she was the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS;
(4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was appointed legal guardian of the person and property of
the plaintiff from the estate left by Rufino; and
(5) both Caridad and the plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino

Issue: W/N Petitioner is the legitimate child of Spouses Geronimo.

Ruling: No.

The document in question was signed by one Emma Dao who was not identified as either the parent of the
plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate
envisioned by the law

Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature
of the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which rendered the document questionable. Even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such irregularities on her own birth certificate. These
irregularities and the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged birth of respondent are
sufficient to overthrow the presumption of regularity attached to respondents birth.

We also find that the concurrence of the secondary evidence relied upon by both courts a quo does not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed a child of the deceased spouses

In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romualdo Villanueva the Court ruled that the presence of a similar set of
circumstances which were relied upon as secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at bar does not
establish that one is a child of the putative parents.

The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a
valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child.
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It
is not conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made there by the interestedparties.

Pe-Lim vs CA, G.R. No. 112229. March 18, 1997

FACTS: This petition for review on certiorari sprang from a complaint filed by Maribel Cruz for child support on behalf of
her daughter, private respondent Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim, against petitioner Raymond Pe Lim who, Maribel claims, is Joanna's
father.

In this case woos a maid, succeeds in seducing and impregnating her, only to disclaim the paternity of the child when made to
account for his misdeeds.

Maribel was sixteen years old in 1978 and a part-time student. She also worked as a receptionist at Tonight's Club and
Resthouse along Manila. She met petitioner during her first night on the job. Maribel left for Japan in July 1981, already
pregnant, and returned to Manila in October of the same year.
Maribel gave birth but the couple never married because petitioner claimed that he was not financially stable. In 1983 the
petitioner abandoned them and Maribel had to work in countless jobs but it wasnt enough to support her and her daughter. He
also caused the registration of the name Joanna Rose C. Pe Lim on the child's birth certificate Hence she filed with the RTC
against petitioner for not giving support.
Petitioner, on the other hand, has a different version: He claims that in 1978, he went to Tonight's Club and Resthouse to relax
after a hard day's work. There he met Maribel. She started kissing him and whispering to him that they could go anywhere and
rest. Raymond declined to take Maribel up on her offer saying that he only wanted someone to talk to. They became friends
after that first meeting, and while he often saw her, there was no intimacy between them.
Raymond alleged that he was not Maribel's only customer at the club. In 1980, she left for Japan to work as an entertainer. In
1981, she returned to Manila pregnant, and appealed to Raymond for help because she claimed that she could not face her
relatives in her condition.
The decision of the RTC made Raymond to pay fees and damages.
Petitioner now argues before the Court that there is no clear and convincing evidence on record to show that there was actual
cohabitation between him and Maribel. In fact, petitioner infers that Maribel became pregnant only when she went to Japan. In
short, he denies that he is the father of Joanna Rose.
The court then found out that there were handwritten letters of Raymond to Maribel and Joanna that he loves her and he
couldnt possibly be the father and husband that they wanted him to be since of his financial incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can deny his paternity.

RULING: No. His belated denial cannot outweigh the totality of the cogent evidence of handwritten letters and receipt of his
name in the Certificate of Live Birth of Joanna. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children. Article 172 of the Family Code states: "The
filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.'

Remo vs Secretary of Foreign Affairs

GR No. 169202 March 5, 2010

Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen, married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine
passport, which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her
given name, and Remo as her middle name. While her marriage was still subsisting, she applied for the
renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request
to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. When her request was denied, she
made a similar request to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied the request,
holding that while it is not obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name, use of maiden name is
allowed in passport application only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The
Secretary explained that under the implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act of
1996, a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce, and
death of the husband.

Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which affirmed the Secretarys ruling. The CA also affirmed
the ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine
Passport Act of 1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code which allows the
wife to continue using her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge
Sharia District Court.

Issue: Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to
the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage.

Held: No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement passport while her marriage subsists.

Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia
District Court (supra), a married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to use her husbands surname upon
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden name because when a woman marries, she
does not change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not conflict with this principle.

RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations, does not prohibit a married woman from using her
maiden name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows
a married woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use her maiden name. Such an applicant is not
required to adopt her husbands surname.

In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt her husbands surname or continuously
use her maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally
requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to
continue using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from continuously using her
maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to
the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of
husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists,
she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married womans
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage.

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio v Republic

GR No. 174689 October 22, 2007

FACTS: Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a
male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always
identified himself with girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment,
breast augmentation and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact
engaged with an American man to be married. He then filed a petition for the change of his first name from
Rommel Jacinto to Melly and sex of birth from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC of
Manila.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner as it would be more in consonance
with the principle of justice and equity, because grating the petition would bring much awaited happiness on the
part of the petitioner and her fianc and the realization of their dreams.
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines, thru the office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth
certificate on the ground of sex alteration.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to change his name and sex in his birth certificate.

Ruling: NO. Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change of first
name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present
proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he
will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article 413 of the
Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by
special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of
birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or
midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex
reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error
is immutable.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that
reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth
certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the
legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

HERBERT CANG V. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses RONALD V. CLAVANO and MARIA CLARA CLAVANO
G.R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot three children. Anna Marie
learned of her husbands alleged extramarital affair with Wilma Soco. Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation which
was approved. Petitioner then left for the US where he was granted a divorce which gave sole custody of the three minor
children to Anna Marie. While in the US, petitioner worked in Tablante Medical Clinic a portion of his earnings were remitted
to the Philippines for his childrens expenses and another, deposited in the bank in the name of his children. Meanwhile, private
respondents Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Diago Clavano, respectively the brother and sister-in-law of Anna Marie, filed
for the adoption of the three minor Cang children before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.

Anna Marie likewise filed an affidavit of consent alleging that her husband had long forfeited his parental rights over the
children. On the ground that the legal separation allowed her to enter into any contract without the written consent of her
husband,

Upon learning of the petition for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines and filed an opposition thereto,
alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the
children while his finances were too meager compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
parental authority over his beloved children.

The trial court granted the adoption of the children.

One of the reasons was Ronald and Maria Clara Clavano were childless and, with their printing press, real estate business,
export business and gasoline station and mini-mart in Rosemead, California, U.S.A., had substantial assets and income.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of adoption. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner is now
before this Court, alleging that the petition for adoption was fatally defective as it did not have his written consent as a natural
father.

ISSUE:
Whether or not parental authority can be entrusted to a person because he could provide a larger measure of material comfort.

Ruling:
No. It would be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding
whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his children. There should be a holistic approach to the matter, taking
into account the physical, emotional, psychological, mental, social and spiritual needs of the child.
The conclusion of the courts below that petitioner abandoned his family needs more evidentiary support other than his inability
to provide them the material comfort that his admittedly affluent in-laws could provide. There should be proof that he had so
emotionally abandoned them that his children would not miss his guidance and counsel if they were given to adopting parents.
The letters he received from his children prove that petitioner maintained the more important emotional tie between him and
his children. The children needed him not only because he could cater to their whims but also because he was a person they
could share with their daily experiences.
The Clavanos attempt at depriving petitioner of parental authority stemmed from their notion that he was an inveterate
womanizer. Petitioner carried on an affair with a paramour cannot be taken as sufficient basis for the conclusion that petitioner
was necessarily an unfit father. That a husband is not exactly an upright man is not, strictly speaking, a sufficient ground to
deprive him as a father of his inherent right to parental authority over the children.
The transfer of custody over the children to Anna Marie by virtue of the decree of legal separation did not, of necessity, deprive
petitioner of parental authority for the purpose of placing the children up for adoption. As such, in instant case, petitioner may
not be deemed as having been completely deprived of parental authority, notwithstanding the award of custody to Anna Marie
in the legal separation case.
The petition for adoption is denied.

OLYMPIA BALTAZAR, in behalf of her minor son, ARMENIO SERFINO, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.SERGIO
SERFINO defendant-appellee. G.R. No. L-17315 July 31, 1965 (SUPPORT)

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant Olympia Baltazar, in behalf of her minor son, Armenio Serfino appeals from the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental, ordering defendant-appellee Sergio Serfino to pay P15-worth of monthly support from the
rendering of judgment on July 1960.

Olympia, a widow, bore the son of Sergio, a married man, on December 19, 1943. She contends that the amount granted by the
court should have been P50, payable from the time of Armenios birth except for the period of May 1957 to April 1959 when the
child was living with his father and that the defendant-appellee should pay P1000 on account of attorneys fees.

ISSUE:
W/N the defendant should pay a monthly support dating from his sons birth.

RULING:
No. As to when payment thereof should begin, the law says that the obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time
the person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date it is
extrajudicially demanded (Article 298, Civil Code). In this case, payment should begin June 1959, for it was then that appellants
made the extrajudicial demand on appellee.

Judgment modified. Defendant-appellee is sentenced to pay Armenio Serfino the sum of P25.00 monthly from June 1959 (when
the extrajudicial demand was made) and the sum of P300.00 as attorneys fees, with costs.

Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the same
needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extra-judicial demand.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.MERLYN MERCADERA through her Attorney-in-Fact, EVELYN M.
OGA, Respondent. G.R. No. 186027 December 8, 2010 (CIVIL REGISTER)
FACTS:
Merlyn Mercadera sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No.
9048. Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general, as the case may be, is now authorized to effect
the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. The Office of
the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because
the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections
filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048." Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction
of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog
City (RTC).

Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order for a hearing. During the hearing the following facts
were gathered from the documentary evidence and the oral testimony of Oga as reported by the lower court are: A. In the
certification of birth issued by the same registry, her given name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn; B. In her certificate of
baptism, her name appears as Merlyn; C. In her diplomas, it uniformly shows Merlyn; D. She is working in UP Mindanao and
her certificate of membership also shows Merlyn. However, when she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of live
birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence, this
petition.

Her petition was granted and the RTC directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her name appearing
in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. In a four-page decision, the RTC
ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition.
Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate
of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified. The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the
reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. The OSG argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for change
of name in a petition for correction of entries. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name might seem
innocuous enough to grant but "it is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights." What the
lower court actually allowed was a change of Mercaderas given name, which would have been proper had she filed a petition
under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor.

The CA was not persuaded. This Court does not entertain any doubt that the petition before the trial court was one for the
correction on an entry in petitioners Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which she sought to change her name. In a case
cited by the CA, the high court reiterated the distinction between the phrases "to correct" and "to change." To correct simply
means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else
of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not qualify as to the kind
of entry to be changed or corrected or distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or change may be. Such entries
include not only those clerical in nature but also substantial errors.
ISSUE: WON THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN
RESPONDENTS NAME UNDER RULE 103.

HELD:
No. The decision of the CA is affirmed. Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname,
or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code which provides that no person can change his name or surname without judicial
authority. Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil
registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code which provides that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order.

In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous
error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For
the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. It appears
from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over the scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. The
"change of name" contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change
of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule
10834 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say,
not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule
108.

A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the OSGs assumption that Mercadera intended to change
her name under Rule 103. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought
a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To
change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."36 From
the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered
given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does not
take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical error in spelling.

Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercaderas case which recognize the same a harmless error. In
this case, the use of the letter "a" for the letter "e," and the deletion of the letter "i," so that what appears as "Marilyn" would read
as "Merlyn" is patently a rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between "Marilyn" and "Merlyn" may
well be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercaderas Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to
correct the same. The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled
given name which she had been using ever since she could remember.

GRACE M. GRANDE v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, GR No. 206248, 2014-02-18

Facts:
Grace Grande (Grande) and
Patricio Antonio... and Jerard Patrick
The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own
The parties' relationship, however,... eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two
children in May 2007.
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC
Since respondent Antonio... failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected the
welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental
custody over their children.
Not satisfied with the CA's Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration... her motion
was denied
Issues:1. The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation.
2. What could be the adverse effect if by herein petitioner father granting for the recognition of their filiation?
3. Who has the sole parental authority over the children?
Ruling:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child.
Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 9255[14] which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation... has been expressly recognized by their father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided,
the father has the right to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by
RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the... record of birth appearing in
the civil register or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children with
the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary... public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the
paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an
official declaration of his children's surname as
Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not
the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname
of their illegitimate... children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says
and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation. Respondent's position that the court can order
the minors to... use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its
words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his... illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive and operates to confer
discretion upon the illegitimate children.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for
the court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal
provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 114492 isMODIFIED in part and shall
hereinafter read as follows:
a.[Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to
the custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is
hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b.[Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the
children out upon the written consent of [Grande];
c.The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard
Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
d.The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.

Parental Authority
Rosaldes vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 173988, October 8, 2014
FACTS: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School
located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of
his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael
Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, petitioner went to Michael and pinched
him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryans body hit a desk.
As a result, he lost consciousness. Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down
on the floor. Michael Ryan cried. After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan,
accompanied by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the
incident. His mother and his aunt reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza who advised them to have
Michael Ryan examined by a doctor.
Crime charged: violation of Anti-Child Abuse Law (Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610)
RTC: convicted petitioner of child abuse
CA: affimed the conviction
ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of petitioner constitute child abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610
HELD: (YES)
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit. She is guilty of child abuse, a violation of R.A. 7610. Although the
petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical injuries on him was
unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim
that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than
the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or
individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority.

NOTES:Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
person of the child as the parents. In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in
child care exercising special parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)

Proof of the severe results of the petitioners physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita Castigador,
the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at about 1:00
oclock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the time the boy had sustained his injuries.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly: (b) Child abuse refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or
not, of the child which includes any of the following: (1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment; (2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a
child as a human being; (3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or (4) Failure to
immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his
permanent incapacity or death.
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not be habitual. The CA concluded
that the petitioner went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched hard
Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor; and as the boy fell down, his
body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness but instead of feeling a sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held
the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor.
JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner, vs.THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents. G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987 (SUPPORT)
FACTS:
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado,
filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao.
The latter denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which was in due course conducted by the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping test, held 21 January 1969, indicated
that Janice could not have been the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.

The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive but upon plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for
reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly
support. Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping
tests. As there was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that
the result of the tests should have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity. The Court of Appeals upheld
Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial court"s decision.

ISSUE: WON the results of the blood grouping tests is admissible and conclusive to prove non-paternity?

HELD:
Yes. Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much
more definite in their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing in cases of disputed parentage has already
become an important legal procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive
as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity that is, the fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product
of the mother and alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the blood type of the
child is not the possible blood type when the blood of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.

Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests in the instant case by impugning the qualifications of
the NBI personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be
without merit. The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has had extensive practice in this
area for several years. The blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically recognized blood grouping
systems, the MN Test and the ABO System, under witness and supervision. Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five
months to have been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first blood test, she,
represented by her mother, declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as Jao was willing
to undergo such a test again.

Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals and holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved
in the case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence
has been presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper
conduct of the tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately reflecting a scientific fact.

JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN
DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, vs. RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo
City, Respondent. G.R. No. 177728 July 31, 2009 (Use of surnames)
FACTS:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian
Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided
in the house of Dominiques parents.On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, or on November 2, 2005,
Jenie, who continued to live with Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela Cruz
"Aquino".
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar,
Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the childs Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo
Butch Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his
yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting.

By letter dated November 11, 2005, the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies
application for registration of the childs name because it was not signed by the father and the child cannot use the surname of
his father because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity to
acknowledge his paternity to the child. Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against
respondent. The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the handwritten Autobiography, the same does not
contain any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE: WON THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN
DELA CRUZ CAN BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A "PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN
INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A.
9255, WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS SURNAME.
HELD:
Yes. The petition is granted. The City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the
late Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live
Birth, and record the same in the Register of Births. Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private handwritten instrument. The
recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity; hence,
no separate action for judicial approval is necessary; it does not, indeed, explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument
acknowledging the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must, however, be read in conjunction
with Article 175 and 172. It is therefore implied.

In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by him,
substantially satisfies the requirement of the law. The special circumstances to the cases are: died 2 months prior to childs birth,
handwriting is recognized by the brother and autobiography corresponds to the facts presented, and corroborated by affidavit of
acknowledgement by father and brother who stand to be affected by their hereditary rights.

FRANCLER P. ONDE vs. OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRATION OF LAS PINAS CITY
GR 197174
September 10, 2014

Article 412 No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.
Article 413 All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
FACTS: Petitioner sees the correction of entries in his certificate of live birth before the RTC. He alleged that he is the
illegitimate child of his parents Guillermo A. Onde and Matilde DC Pakingan, but his birth certificate stated that his parents were
married. His birth certificate also stated that his mothers first name is Tely and that his first name is Franc Ler. He prayed that
the corrections be: (1) Date and place of marriage of parents from Dec 23. 1983, Bicol to Not Married," (2) First name of his
mother from Tely to Matilde, (3) and lastly his first name from Franc Ler to Francler.
RTC dismissed the petition for it is not just a mere correction and is not for a summary proceeding but requires an adversarial
proceeding since the first correction is substantial in nature and it would affect the legitimacy of the petitioner. The RTC also
held that the 2nd and 3rd requests can be done without judicial authority under the authority provided for the Local Civil Registrar
to correct clerical errors provided in RA 9084.
ISSUE: Whether or not the change of marriage status of parents is an adversarial issue that cannot be resolved through a normal
summary proceeding.
HELD: Yes, the change of marriage status of parents is an adversarial issue that cannot be resolved through a normal summary
proceeding. It will affect the marriage status of his parents and his status as a child, especially in terms of legitimes and other
benefits that only a legitimate child enjoys. He should prove to the Court that his claims were true and to be supported by proper
evidences, as such an issue cannot be judged alone with a mere petition or affidavit, and requires concrete evidence of proof.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS: Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga
Garcia. He alleged therein, among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia;
that Stephanie has been using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mothers surname, and that her
surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption. On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a
motion for clarification and/or reconsideration praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological mother as his middle name.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption because: (1)
there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is
customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of the
name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name
should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of her
illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
ISSUE: W/N an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name.
RULING: YES. As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176
of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use
the Surname of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child may use.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely provides
that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects
of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided by law to a
legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as
discussed above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees as earlier
discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle name
will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552
(law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert
or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother in the future.
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.

JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO vs. CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V

CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V vs. Hon. HELEN B. RICAFORT
G.R. No. 156254
June 28, 2005

FACTS: On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC, a petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Joycelyn with an ancillary prayer for custody pendent lite of their almost four- year old son, Rafaello.
On April 3, 2002, the Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child to Crisanto. He testified that Joycelyn took their almost
4-year old son, minor (Rafaello), with her at Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Despite efforts exerted by him, he has
failed to see his child. Presently, both Joycelyn and Rafaello stayed with the formers stepfathers residence.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the wife failed to appear despite notice. Furthermore, a
house helper of the spouses testified that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the house and even
saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations
with Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City. Hence, the Court hereby awards custody of the minor to his father.
After which, a case was filed before the Court of Appeals which issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this
time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. The Court found that the reasons stated by Crisanto are not to be a compelling
reason as provided in Art 213 of the Family Code that the minor shall not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. The Court finds the reasons stated by him are not to be compelling reasons. However, the
father should be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do not appear compelling reasons to deprive him of the company
of his child.
ISSUE: Whether or not the custody of the four-year old minor child should be awarded to the mother?
RULING: Yes, Crisanto did not present sufficient evidence against the fitness of the mother that will compel the court to rule
against the mandatory character of Art. 213 of the Family code which states that, In case separation of parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant consideration, especially
the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. No child under seven yrs. of age shall be
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of their
child. The Order of the RTC only temporary custody which is Provisional in nature and subject to change as circumstance may
warrant. No evidence was presented that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual proclivities (lesbian) or that his
proper moral and psychological development suffered as a result.

SUSAN LIM-LUA vs. DANILO LUA

G.R. No. 175279-80
5 June 2013

FACTS: Petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent Danilo Y. Lua
and prayed for support pendente lite in the amount of P 500, 000.00 as monthly support for her as well as their children. The
Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the support pendente lite ordering P 250, 000.00 as the monthly support and that Danilo Lua
should pay P 1, 750, 000.00 as support in arrears covering September 2003 to March 2004. According to Art. 203 of the Family
Code, support is demandable from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand.
Danilo Lua refused to pay the support in arrears pendente lite and filed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA reversed
the RTC decision and decreased the monthly support to P 115, 000.00. Also, the CA ordered Danilo Lua to pay P 2, 645, 000.00
as total support in arrears covering September 2003 to July 2005. From the CA decision, Danilo Lua complied by issuing a check
in the amount of P 162, 651.90 payable to Susan Lua. He explained that he deducted P 2, 482, 348.16, which sums up the
advances he gave to his children and Susan Lua, from the total support in arrears. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not certain expenses incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears he owes
to his wife and children.
HELD: Yes, the amount of support may be increased or decreased proportionately in accordance with the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to support. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those
related by marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means
of the giver and to the needs of the recipient. As provided in Article 194 of the Family code, such support comprises everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family.
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by Danilo Lua to be credited against the accrued support pendente
lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food, household
expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also Susan Luas scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of two
expensive cars bought by Danilo Lua for his children plus their maintenance cost, travel expenses of Susan Lua and Angelli,
purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear
no relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. It is but fair and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance
and basic necessities of Susan Lua and his children. This would imply that any amount Danilo Lua seeks to be credited as monthly
support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and household expenses.

RODOLFO S. AGUILAR vs. EDNA G. SIASAT

G.R. No. 200169
January 28, 2015

Doctrine: Filiation may be proved by an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required.
FACTS: Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar spouses) died, intestate and without debts leaving
two parcels of land. Petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed mandatory injunction with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat
alleging that he is the only son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses. Thus, he was entitled to the said parcels of land.
Respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger who was
raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child of the
Aguilar spouses. Upon death of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who inherited the conjugal share of the former, her brothers and sisters
inherited her estate as she had no issue.
Among the documentary evidences presented by the petitioner was Alfredo Aguilars Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1,
a public instrument subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during his employment with BMMC, which bears his
signature and thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent. He argued
that he cannot present his Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the Local Civil Registry
of Bacolod City were destroyed.
RTC ruled that petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient interest in this action for failure to support evidentiary evidence
to show his filiation to the spouses. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto stating that the use of a family surname certainly
does not establish pedigree. The evidence failed to hurdle the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to
establish ones legitimate filiation by open and continuous possession or any other means allowed by the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SSS Form E-1 is a substantial proof of filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.
RULING: Yes. Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit "G") satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship
to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code that he is indeed a legitimate issue of the Aguilar spouses. Said
document, by itself, constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned."
Any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is required. In
fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition that does
not require a separate action for judicial approval.

TEOFISTA BABIERA vs PRESENTACION CATOTAL

G.R. No. 138493
June 15 2000

FACTS: In order to preserve her inherited estate she acquired from her late parents, Presentacion B. Catotal asks the court to
affirm petitioner Teofistas certificate of birth void and ordering the city civil registrar to terminate the same. Catotal filed a
petition in court, insisting that the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, who died on May 26, 1996 and July
6, 1990, had only one existing child and that was her. She asserted that in September 1996, a baby girl was delivered by hilot
in their house and without the knowledge of her parents, Flora Guinto, the real mother of Teofista as well as their housemaid
faked the registration of the facts of birth of her child, by simulating that she was the child of the aforesaid spouses, and made
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by forging her signature. She also claimed that she saw with her own eyes and
personally witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista Guinto, in their house, assisted by hilot; that the birth certificate of
Teofista Guinto is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature of informant forged, and it contained false entry
and also, its medically impractical for a 54 years old woman to give birth.
Teofista filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the petition states no cause of action, it being an attack on the legitimacy
of the respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no legal
capacity to file the instant petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Catotal has legal authority to file the special proceedings in accord with Art. 171?
RULING: No. Article 171and 170 of Family Code mentioned by petitioner are actually are not applicable in this case. The
present case alleged and showed that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. The prayer was not to declare that petitioner
was an illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former was not the latters child at all. The action did not impugn
petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, because there was no blood relation to impugn in the first
place.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioners Birth Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific
facts attendant in the case, as well as the totality of the evidence presented during trial, sufficiently negate such presumption.
First, there were already irregularities regarding the Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar. More
important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mothers signature therein was different from her signatures in other documents
presented during the trial.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, the evidence of Hermogena Babiera which stated that she did not give birth to
petitioner, and that the latter was neither her nor her husbands.
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ART. 166, Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only of the following grounds:

(2) That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could have not been that of the
husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Article 164;

Agustin v CA GR No.162571 June 15,2005

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner Arnel
L. Agustin, for support and support pendent lite before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. In their
complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they entered into an intimate
relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday on November 10, 1999. The babys birth
certificate was purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel also shouldered the pre-natal and hospital
expenses but later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and
even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child for the
reason that Fe had a secret relationship with another man, Jun. Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an
order directing all the parties to submit them to DNA paternity testing.

Issue: Whether or not paternity may be established thru DNA testing

Ruling: Yes. Art. 166 Paragraph 2 provides that filiation can be proved by biological or other scientific reasons,
as in the case at bar, DNA testing. Martins entitlement to support depends completely on the determination of
filiation by such test. For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed equalizer
for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. The belief in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. This is an opportunity to forcefully reiterate that DNA
testing is a valid means of determining paternity. Moreover, DNA testings accuracy with which paternity can be
proven has increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support agreement (current
testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to 99.999999% accuracy).

Gan v Republic
GR No. 2017147 September 14, 2016

Family Code, Art. 176, as amended by RA 9255 - Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this
Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in
a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each
illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.

Civil Code Article 368- Art. 368. Illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 shall bear the surname of the
mother.

Facts: This is a petition for the correction of name. Petitioner was born out of wedlock to her father Pia Gan, a
Chinese national and her mother Consolacion Basilio, a Filipino citizen. The name Emelita Basilio which she seeks
to correct appears in her birth certificate. Petitioner claims that she had been using Emelita Basilio Gan in her
school, employment and government records, and in her marriage contract.
The RTC required her to amend her petition, from correction of name to change of name, in conformity with Rule
103 of the Rules of Court. Hearing was set and published in a newspaper of general circulation. The OSG authorized
the Provincial Prosecutor to appear in the proceedings in its behalf. RTC eventually granted the petition.
Respondent moved to reconsider, saying that petitioner failed to prove that she was recognized by her father.
Motion for reconsideration was denied.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, stating that petitioner, being an illegitimate child, may only use
the surname of her father if filiation was expressly recognized. (Art. 176 of the Family Code as amended by RA
9255).
Petitioner contends that recognition is immaterial, saying that a change of name is reasonable and warranted if
necessary to avoid confusion.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner, a child born in 1956 out of wedlock may be allowed to use the surname of her
father.

Held: No, petition is denied. Since petitioner was born in 1956, the Civil Code shall govern. Art. 368 thereof provide
that illegitimate children shall bear the surname of the mother. Illegitimate children have no option to use the
surname of their father.

Spouses Lim v. Lim

October 30, 2009

Article 199 (Support)

Facts:
Respondent Ma. Cheryl S. Lim, married Edward, son of petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim. Cheryl bore three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl, Edward and their three children resided at the house of
petitioners in Forbes Park, Makati City together with Edwards ailing grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim.
Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary of 6k, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no
steady source of income.
After quite some time, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park residence, bringing with her their three children (then all minors), after
a violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described
a very compelling situation.
Cheryl then, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua Giak and Mariano (defendants) in RTC for support. RTC rendered judgment
ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide 40k monthly support to respondents, with Edward shouldering 6k and
petitioners the balance of 34k subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary liability. RTC, while denying reconsideration, clarified that
petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable because of the latters inability to get sufficient support.
Petitioners appealed to the CA assailing among others, their liability to support respondents, invoking Article 194 of the Civil
Code. CA affirmed RTCs decision.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are concurrently liable with Edward to provide support to respondents.

Held:
Yes. Petitioners are liable to provide support but only to their grandchildren. However, grandchildren cannot demand support
directly from their grandparents if they have parents(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting them. This is
so because we have to follow the order of support under Article 199.
Thus, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to
relatives by blood, of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III belong to the category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support from the Lim family extends only to her husband
Edward arising from their marital bond. Cheryls share from the amount of monthly support RTC awarded cannot be determined
from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand the case to the trial court for this limited purpose.

Uyguanco v. CA
October 26, 1989
Proof of filiation

Facts:
Apolinario Uyguanco died inestate in 1975, leaving his wife, four legitimate children and properties which they divided among
themselves. Graciano Uyguanco filed a complaint for partition against the petitioners, claiming that as the illegitimate son of the
deceased and of Anastacia Bacjao, he must not be left out of the extrajudicial statement of the estate. He also claimed that he
received support from his father while in high school and was also assigned by his father as storekeeper at the Uyguangco store.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Graciano could not prove his alleged filiation having none of the
documents required in Art 278 of the New Civil Code ( i.e. record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing). Neither he may resort to Article 285 of the NCC because he was already an adult when his alleged father
died.
Graciano insists however that he is- in possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of
his family as is under Article 283 of the NCC.

Issue:Whether or not Graciano may adequately prove filiation.

Held: No. Since his father has already died, his action is now barred as Article 172 specifically requires that when the action is
based on other proof of filiation such as one and continuous possession, the action must be brought during the lifetime of the
alleged parent.

THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

ART. 213. In case of the separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of
the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)

No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise.

Santos Sr. V CA 252 SCRA 407 (1995)

Facts:Leouel Santos and Julia Rosario Bedia got married and bore a son, Leouel Jr. The couple later on lived with
Julias parents, private respondents Spouses Bedia. Their marriage, however did not last long. Petitioner and
wife Julia agreed to place their son in the temporary custody of the latter's parents. The respondents alleged
that they provided for the support of the boy because petitioner could not afford to do so. On September 2,
1990, petitioner along with his two brothers visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was
staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and
clandestinely spirited him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental. The spouses Bedia then filed a
"Petition for Care, Custody and Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City.

Issue:Whether or not the private respondents spouses Bedia be granted custody over the child as the ones who
provided for the support of the latter.

Ruling:No. The grandparents financial ability and the love and affection showered on the boy are insufficient to
defeat petitioners parental authority and right to custody. The legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. To award the father custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It will also
give the father the chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support
which a father can give.

Civil Code of the Philippines

ART. 421. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order.

CERUILA VS. DELANTAR

GR NO. 140305 DECEMBER 9, 2005

FACTS: Spouses Platon and Librada Ceruila filed an action for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of Maria
Rosilyn Telin Delantar before the RTC of Manila. Rosilyns birth certificate was questioned spouses Cerulia for the reasons that
said birth certificate was made an instrument of the crime of simulation of birth and therefore invalid and spurious, and it falsified
all material entries therein. She is the child-victim in the rape case involving Romeo Jalosjos

The RTC ordered to set the hearings and directed the publication of said order once a week for three consecutive weeks in a
newspaper of general circulaton. The Civil Registrar of Manila was summoned but did not participate in the proceedings. On
April 11, 1997 the RTC rendered its decision granting the petition. On July 15, 1997 Rosilyn represented by DSWD, her legal
guardian filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment in the petition for cancellation of entry of her birth certificate
claiming that she and her guardian were not notified of the petition and the subsequent judgment and learned about the same only
from the news on May 16, 1997.

On June 10, 1999 the CA granted the petition and declared null and void the decision of the RTC. The motion for reconsideration
filed by spouses Ceruila before the CA was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the RTC in the cancellation and annulment of the Certificate of Birth of Maria Rosilyn
Telin Delantar is valid.

HELD: No. The changes sought is a substantial change that would adversely affect the respondent. And it was only the Civil
Registrar (CR) of Manila served with summons, although notified, CR did not participate in the proceedings. This alone is clearly
not sufficient to comply with the requirements laid down by the rules. The claim that lack of summons on Rosilyn was cured by
publication of the order setting the case for hearing is not correct. In Republic vs. Valencia, it was held that the parties who must
be made parties to a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register are the civil registrar
and all persons who have or who are claiming interests who would be affected thereby; respondent, being a person whose interests
would be adversely affected by the petition, is an indispensable party to the case; publication cannot be substituted for notice;
respondent cannot be declared in default since she was not properly notified. Here, it is clear that no party could be more interested
in the cancellation of Rosilyns birth certificate than Rosilyn herself. Her filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at stake.

Summons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction, but to comply with the requirements of
fair play on due process. This is but proper to afford the person concerned the opportunity to protect her interest if she so chooses.
Rosilyn was never made a party at all to the proceedings seeking the cancellation of her birth certificate. Neither did petitioners
make any effort to summon the Solicitor General. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other indispensable parties
should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of the child but the child as well, together with
the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other persons who may be
affected by the change should be notified or represented .

GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, Petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, Respondent.

Facts:

Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29, 1989. After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents in
Fairview, Quezon City. Almost a year later, on December 8, 1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.

On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He
alleged that nine years before he married Ma. Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario Gopiao, which
marriage was never annulled. Gerardo also found out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights, Quezon
City.

The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the
child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation rights.

Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the
bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of the decision which granted to the petitioner so-called
visitation rights. between the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday." She argued that there was nothing in
the law granting "visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child." She further maintained that Jose
Gerardos surname should be changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that an illegitimate
child shall use the mothers surname.

Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation rights and the retention of Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the "best interest of the child" principle, the trial court denied Ma. Theresas motion

Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation rights
to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of Gerardos surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo had
already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use her surname (Almonte). After hearing the oral arguments of the
respective counsels of the parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and
held that Jose Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during her first marriage. It brushed aside the
common admission of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave little weight to Jose Gerardos birth
certificate showing that he was born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married

Issue: Whether or not Gerardo Concepcion and Ma. Theresa could impugn the legitimacy of Jose Gerardo?

Ruling:No. "As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides: The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.

Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare
declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are the
legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what a parent says it is.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)24 of
the Family Code. He cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband
Mario or, in a proper case,25 his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife.26 Impugning
the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.27 Since the marriage of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt
that there was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where
personal access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary.

The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child.

EDWARD V. LACSON, Petitioner,vs.MAOWEE DABAN LACSON and MAONAA DABAN LACSON, represented by
their mother and guardian ad-litem, LEA DABAN LACSON, Respondents.

Note:

Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right to receive the
same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.

Facts:The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of petitioner Edward V. Lacson
and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson.

Not long after the birth of Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and children
to seek shelter somewhere else. For a month, they stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas)
mother and then with her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the house of
Leas mother. The sisters and their mother for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to another not
their own.
It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband Edward for support, relying initially on his
commitment memorialized in a note to give support to his daughters. However, Edward reneged on his promise of support,
despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the same. Lea admitted that Edward occasionally gave their children meager
amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave
small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College
in Iloilo City. In the early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward for support
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to graduate.

Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being gainfully employed and owning several
pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure
and neglect, their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban.

Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their needs. He explained, however, that his lack of
regular income and the unproductivity of the land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular
support. He also blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00 monthly allowance prayed for in the
complaint.

The RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters, as represented by their mother. In that judgment,
the trial court, following an elaborate formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific
sum which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is obliged to support from 1976 to 1994 even if no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial,
demand having been made by the respondents ?

Ruling:

YES.

It conveniently glossed over the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two could
celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of the sisters during their tender years to go
through the motion of demanding support from him, what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult
during the period material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to have been made
sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the
imperious tenor commonly used by legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was,
however, definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of the situation is no less
a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were, the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of
support in arrears had been made in this case

Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement from the petitioner. The provision
reads: When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently needed by the latter,
any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give
support. Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the petitioner and Noel
Daban is a quasi-contract, an equitable principle enjoining one from unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.

As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures arrived at by the two courts
below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper. Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the final numbers cannot
plausibly be laid on the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they fixed such amount based on the
varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation and to the financial resources of the petitioner,
as proved by the evidence adduced below. As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and
family relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver and to
the needs of the recipient

VANCIL v. BELMES
G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
Parental Authority
Facts:
The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, a naturalized American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over the pesons and estate
of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder Vancil, a Navy serviceman of United States of America who
died in the said country leaving an estate consisting of proceeds from death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.
Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children, instituted a motion for Removal of Guardianship and Appointment of
Bonifacia Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors.
Trial Court rejected Belmes petition. However, the CA reversed the RTCs order. Bonifacia Vancil then filed in the SC the
present petition arguing that the CA gravely erred in ruling that Helen Belmes, the biological mother should be appointed the
guardian of the minors despite the undisputed proof that under her custody, her daughter minor Valerie was reped seven times
by Oppositors live-in partner, and being a naturalized American Citizen is clearly not a statutory requirement to become a
guardian.
Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine who between
the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.
Issue:
Whether or not Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian.
Ruling:
YES. Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian. Article 211 of Family Code
states: The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common childrenxxx
Bonifacia Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence, or
unsuitability of Helen Belmes. Considering that Helen Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental authority
over Vincent, Bonifacia Vancil has to prove Helen Belmes unsuitability. Assuming that Helen Belmes is unfit as a guardian of
Vincent, still Bonifacia Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will
find difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the Court should not appoint
persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

G.R. No. L-50974-75 May 31, 1989 Filiation

JUAN CASTRO and FELICIANA CASTRO, petitioners, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CIPRIANO NAVAL and
BENITA C. NAVAL, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the brother and sister of the late Eustaquio Castro while respondent
Benita Castro Naval is the only child of Eustaquio. Respondent Cipriano Naval is the husband of Benita Castro. The
plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the defendant alleging, among other things, that they are
the forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on 1923. Plaintiff Marcelina Bautista, the surviving
spouse of the deceased Eustaquio Castro, also filed an action for partition of properties against defendant Benita
Castro Naval alleging, among other things, that they are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died
in Mayantoc, Tarlac on 1961 and that they are entitled to the partition of the properties of said deceased. The
defendants in their amended answer in both cases allege that Benita Castro Naval is the only child of the
deceased Eustaquio and that said Eustaquio Castro is the son of Pedro Castro, therefore, the complaint for partition
has no cause of action.
It appears that defendant Benita Castro Naval, a child of Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen, was born on 1919
in San Bartolome, Tarlac (Exhibit A). Eustaquio Castro, who caused the registration of said birth gave the date
indicated in the civil registry that he was the father. Benita Castro was later baptized in the Roman Catholic Church
of Camiling, Tarlac, wherein the baptismal certificate appeared that her parents are deceased Eustaquio Castro
and Pricola Maregmen (Exhibit C). When EustaquioCastro died, pictures were taken wherein the immediate
members of the family in mourning were present, among whom was Benita Castro Naval (Exhibits D and D-1). On
this score, the plaintiffs in their complaint admitted that defendant Benita C. Naval is the forced heir
of Eustaquio Castro and a compulsory heir of Eustaquio Castro. Eustaquio Castro and Pricola Maregmen lived as
husband and wife until the death of Pricola on 1924. The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro Naval is the
acknowledged and recognized child of Eustaquio Castro and is, therefore, entitled to participate in the partition of the
properties left by him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child
of Eustaquio Castro.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals. The Court cited Article 175 which provides that
"Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. First, Benita Castro Naval is unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio Castro who was qualified to
legally marry when she was conceived and born. From her birth on March 27, 1919 until the father's death on August
22, 1961 or for 42 years, Benita lived with her father and enjoyed the love and care that a parent bestows on an
only child. The private respondents, themselves, admitted in their complaint in Civil Case No. 3762 that Benita is a
forced heir of Eustaquio Castro.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the illegitimate family is of no special relevance here because
Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There are no legitimate
children born of a legitimate wife contesting the inheritance of Benita.
Third, it was Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita reported and registered. There is no indication in the
records that Eustaquio should have known in 1919 that apart from reporting the birth of a child, he should also have
signed the certificate and seen to it that it was preserved for 60 years. Or that he should have taken all legal steps
including judicial action to establish her status as his recognized natural child during the reglementary period to do
so.
Fourth, it was Eustaquio who gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano Naval. The couple continued to live
with the father even after the wedding and until the latter's death.
Fifth, the certificate of baptism and the picture of the Castro family during the wake for Eustaquio may not be sufficient
proof of recognition under the Civil Code
G.R. No. L-21180 March 31, 1967
IN THE MATTER OF THE CHANGE OF NAME OF ANTONINA B. OSHITA.
ANTONINA B. OSHITA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

FACTS:
Antonina B. Oshita, the legitimate child of Kishimatsu Oshita, a Japanese citizen and and Buena Bartolome, a Filipina, upon
reaching the age of majority, filed with the CFI of Davao a petition to have her name changed from "Antonina B. Oshita" to
"Antonina Bartolome" because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing a Japanese surname; that her older brother
and sister, who had earlier elected Philippine citizenship, have been using the surname "Bartolome". The petition was signed
by the petitioner herself and was "subscribed and sworn to" by her before the Deputy Clerk of Court. The requirements for the
publication of the hearing of the petition were duly complied with. Asst. City Attorney Roque M. Barnes, acting in behalf of
the Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss the petition upon the grounds that the petition does not state a cause of action
and that no sufficient reasons had been shown to justify the grant by the lower court of the petition for a change of name. The
appellant urges that under Article 364 of the Civil Code legitimate children shall principally use the surname of the father. The
petitioner-appellee filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and set the case
for hearing. The Assistant City Attorney of Davao City did not present any evidence in support of his opposition to the petition,
but simply reiterated his motion to dismiss. The trial court rendered a decision granting the petition. Hence this appeal by the
Solicitor General.

ISSUE: W/N Petitioner had sufficient reason to justify the change of name

HELD:
Yes. It has been shown that the petitioner-appellee is the legitimate daughter of Buena Bartolome and Hishimatsu Oshita; that
upon reaching the age of majority she elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that being already a
Filipino citizen she desires to adopt a Filipino surname; that her older brother and sister who had also elected Philippine
citizenship have been using the surname "Bartolome"; and that she desires to have the surname "Bartolome" instead of
"Oshita", because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing Japanese surname. The lower court further observed
that "It cannot be denied that there had been ill feeling among the Filipinos against the Japanese due to the last Pacific war.
Although normal relations between the Philippines and Japan have been established the ill feelings still persist among some
Filipinos especially among the less educated who had unpleasant experience during the war." There is no showing that the
appellee was motivated by any fraudulent purpose, or that the change of her surname will prejudice public interest. We believe
that the lower court acted correctly when it considered these circumstances as reasons sufficient to justify the change of name
as prayed for by the petitioner-appellee.
Moreover, the matter of whether to grant or deny a petition for a change of name is left to the sound discretion of the court. The
following, ruling of this Court is relevant:
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the question of "proper and reasonable cause" is left to the sound
discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be satisfactory to the Court and not all the best evidence available.
In the present case the trial court found to its satisfaction that petitioner was in earnest in his desire to do away with all traces of
his former Chinese nationality and henceforth to be recognized as a Filipino. Such desire is in line with the policy of our
naturalization law that applicants for naturalization should fully embrace Filipino customs and traditions and socially mingle
with Filipinos.
It has not been shown that petitioner has any fraudulent intent in seeking a change of name. No criminal, civil, tax or any other,
liability on his part, which he may avoid by the change of name, has been suggested. Nothing has been presented to show any
prejudice to the Government or to any individual should the petition be granted. In the absence of prejudice to the State or any
individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality which unduly hamper social and
business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for a change of name. It is not trivial, whimsical or capricious.

G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988

VICENTA TAN, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAVAO, respondent.

FACTS:
This 26-year old case involves what is probably now a valuable lot in the City of Davao whose owner left for China with her
entire family in 1923 and never returned. The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia adopted a girl which they named
Dominga Garcia. At the age of nineteen years, Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman, Tan Seng alias Seng Yap, with whom she
had three children, named Vicenta, Mariano and Luis. In 1923, Dominga Garcia and her three children emigrated to Canton,
China. In less than a year, Tan Seng followed his family to his country of origin.
According to the petitioner, Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955. She left in the Philippines a 1,966-square-meter lot in
Davao, registered in her name. Since her departure for China with her family, neither she, nor her husband, nor any of their
children has returned to the Philippines to claim the lot.
Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, died in May 1936. In 1948, her nephew, Ramon Pizarro, occupied a part of
Dominga's property and collected the rentals from the owners of other houses occupying the land. Another nephew of Cornelia,
Segundo Reyes, informed the Solicitor General about the property. The City Fiscal and NBI investigated Segundo Reyes,
Ramon Pizarro and Aurelio Pizarro regarding the whereabouts of Dominga Garcia, Tan Seng, and their children.
During the investigation, Ramon Pizarro alleged that Vicenta Tan, daughter of Dominga, was married and living in Bacolod
City, but he did not know her exact address. Aurelio Pizarro, on the other hand, controverted that statement because as far as he
knew, Vicenta Tan left for China with her mother and brothers in 1923.
The City of Davao filed a petition in the CFI of Davao to declare Dominga Garcia's land escheated in its favor. It alleged that
Dominga Garcia and her children are presumed to be dead and since Dominga Garcia left no heir person by law entitled to
inherit her estate, the same should be escheated. The court set the petition for hearing and directed the City to cause (as it did )
the publication of its petition in the 'Mindanao Times," a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Davao,
and in the Official Gazette, once a week for six (6) consecutive weeks. Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the
ground that courts are not authorized to declare that a person is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia's being in China
is not a sufficient ground to deprive her of her property by escheat proceedings. The CFI ruled in favor of the City of Davao.
Pizarro appealed to the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Vicenta Tan and/or her
attorney-in-fact, Ramon Pizarro, appealed by petition for certiorari to this Court, alleging that the Court of Appeals erred in
declaring that petitioner Vicenta Tan may be presumed dead.

ISSUE: W/N Dominga Garcia and her heirs may be presumed dead in the escheat proceedings as they are, in effect,
proceedings to settle her estate.

HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court's ruling that Dominga Garcia and her heirs may be presumed
dead in the escheat proceedings as they are, in effect, proceedings to settle her estate. Indeed, while a petition instituted for
the sole purpose of securing a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead cannot be entertained, if that were the
only question or matter involved in the case, the courts are not barred from declaring an absentee presumptively dead as an
incident of, or in connection with, an action or proceeding for the settlement of the intestate estate of such absentee. Direct
evidence proving that Dominga Garcia, her husband and her children are in fact dead, is not necessary. It may be presumed
under Article 390 of the New Civil Code which provides:
ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years ...
The Court of Appeals found that the City of Davao was able to prove the facts from which the presumption arises. It said:
... Its evidence preponderantly shows that in 1923 Dominga Garcia and her family left the Philippines bound for China. Since
then until the instant petition was filed on September 12, 1962, a period covering about 39 years, nothing had been heard about
them. It is not known whether all or any of them is still alive at present. No heir, devisee or any other person entitled to the
estate of Dominga Garcia has appeared and claimed the same.

ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA CALISTERIO, respondent.

G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000

FACTS:
Teodorico Calisterio died intestate on April 1992, leaving several parcels of land. His wife, herein respondent Marietta Espinosa
Calisterio who was previously married to James William Bounds on 13 January 1946, survived him. Bounds disappeared without
a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta
having secured a court declaration that James was presumptively dead.
Petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, the surviving sister of Teodorico, filed a petition claiming to be inter alia, the sole
surviving heir of Teodorico Calisterio. She alleged that the marriage between the latter and Marietta was bigamous and thereby
null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the estate of the
deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate would have been settled.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner Antonia but on appeal, the Court of Appeal
reversed the decision. It rendered decision in favor of Marietta declaring her marriage to Teodoro valid and thus entitled her to
estate of the deceased.

ISSUE:Whether or not the marriage between deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta is valid, despite absence of declaration
of presumptive death and would in turn be determinative of her right as a surviving spouse.

RULING: The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was solemnized on 08 May 1958 where the
law in force was the Civil Code, not the Family Code, which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family Code
itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting marriage where at least 7 consecutive
years of absence of the spouse. Hence, the marriage is valid and Marietta can claim a portion of the estate. The property should
be rightly divided one portion to the surviving spouse and the other portion to the estate of the deceased spouse.
The applicable specific provision is Article 83 of the New Civil Code which provides: Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently
contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall
be illegal and void from its performance, unless: (1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or (2) The first spouse had
been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed
to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according
to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.

TOLENTINO VS COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:

Respondent Consuelo David was legally married to Arturo Tolentino. Their marriage likewise produced children.
The marriage was dissolved and terminated pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation on Sepember 15,
1943 by a decree of absolute divorce on the ground of desertion and abandonment by the wife. The trial court
granted the divorce on its finding that Arturo Tolentino was abandoned by Consuelo David for at least three (3)
continuous years. Thereafter, Arturo Tolentino married a certain Pilar Adorable, who however, died soon after
their marriage. Tolentino subsequently married Petitioner Constancia on April 21, 1945.Consuelo David, continued
using the surname Tolentino after the divorce and up to the time of the filing of this complaint. The petitioner
insists that the use by respondent Consuelo David of the surname Tolentino is a continuing actionable wrong and
states that every use of the surname constitutes a new crime. Action was brought with only verbal demands in
between and an action to reconstitute the divorce case.

ISSUE:Whether or not a woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined by the latter's
present wife from using the surname of her former husband.

RULING:Philippine law is understandably silent. We have no provisions for divorce in our laws and
consequently, the use of surnames by a divorced wife is not provided for. Considering the circumstances of this
petition, the age of the respondent who may be seriously prejudiced at this stage of her life, having to resort to
further legal procedures in reconstituting documents and altering legal transactions where she used the surname
Tolentino, and the effects on the private respondent who, while still not remarried, will have to use a surname
different from the surnames of her own children, we find it just and equitable to leave things as they are, there
being no actual legal injury to the petitioner save a deep hurt to her feelings which is not a basis for injunctive
relief.

Herald Black Dacasin v. Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin GR. 168785 Feb. 5, 2010
FACTS: Petitioner is an American who married respondent, a Filipino, in Manila, April 1994. They have one daughter,
Stephanie, born on September 21, 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained a divorce decree from the Illinois court,
which awarded sole custody to the respondent. On January 28, 2002, petitioner and respondent executed an agreement for the
joint custody of Stephanie. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the RTC Makati to enforce the agreement considering that
the respondent violated such agreement by exercising sole custody over Stephanie. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent
on the ground that the trial court precluded from taking cognizance of the case considering the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court.
ISSUE: WON the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement for the joint
custody of the petitioner and respondents wife.
RULING:
Yes, the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit, but not to enforce the Agreement which is void. In this jurisdiction,
parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law,
morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed inexistent and
void from the beginning.
At the time of the Agreement, Stephanie was under 7 years old. And Art. 213(2) of the Family Code provides that no child
under 7 years of age should be separated from the mother. The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it
was also rejected by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father.
However, Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of the mandatory maternal custody
regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody proceedings the best interest
of the child. Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the Court remanded the case for the trial court to settle the
question of Stephanies custody. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings,
equity may be invoked to serve the childs best interest.

HERRERA VS ALBA
G.R No. 148220 June 15, 2005
FACTS:May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in order for the
latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armis allegations. In the year 2000,
the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid) DNA testing to establish whether or not
Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However, Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he
claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered widespread acceptance hence any result therefrom will not be
admissible in court; and that the said test is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.
ISSUE:Whether or not DNA is a valid probative tool to determine filiation under Philippine Law
RULING:Yes. As of 2002, there was no longer any question on the validity of the use of DNA analysis as evidence.
The Court moved from the issue of according "official recognition" to DNA analysis as evidence to the issue of
observance of procedures in conducting DNA analysis. DNA analysis that excludes the putative father from paternity
should be conclusive proof of non-paternity. If the value of Probability of Paternity is less than 99.9%, the results of
the DNA analysis should be considered as corroborative evidence. If the value of Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or
higher, then there is refutable presumption of paternity. This refutable presumption of paternity should be subjected
to the Vallejo standards. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among
other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of
contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
BENITEZ BADUA V. CA

G.R. No. 105625 ll Jan. 24, 1994

FACTS:Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various propertieslocated in Laguna. Isabel
died in 1982 while hishusband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a complaint for the issuance of letters
of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.

The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses sincechildhood, though not
related to them byblood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses
submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses name were reflected as her parents. She
even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives
of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological
child. Trial court decided in favor of the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

ISSUE:WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.

RULING:No. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is
not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act
amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.It
is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs of the deceased because she
died without descendants and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente effectively repudiated the Certificate of
Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared that he was the petitioners father.

Art. 147-148 of the Family Code

Susan Nicdao Cario v. Susan Yee Cario GR. 132529
FACTS:SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted two marriages during his lifetime. He was first married to petitioner Susan
Nicdao on June 20, 1969; and the second was on Nov. 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee, with whom he cohabited with for
almost 10 years, starting from 1982. Upon Santiagos death in Nov. 23, 1992, bother Nicdao and Yee filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect an
amount of P146,000, and Yee was able to collect P21,000. Yee filed an instant case praying that petitioner be ordered to return
to her at least one-half of the death benefits amounting to P146,000.
Yee admits that her marriage with Santiago took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial
declaration of nullity of, the marriage between Nicdao and Santiago. She claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage and only became aware of the fact during the funeral when Nicdao introduced herself as Santiagos wife. Yee also
claimed that the marriage between Nicdao and the deceased is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court decided in favor of Yee. And on appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.
ISSUE: WON Yee may validly claim half of the amount of the death benefits claimed by Nicdao.
RULING: No. Although the marriage between Nicdao and Santiago was proven to be invalid due to the lack of a marriage
license, the declaration of its nullity does not validate the marriage of Yee to Santiago. The fact remains that Yees marriage to
Santiago was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio.
Under Art. 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships,
relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances
of the same married man, Only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions.
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-
ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Considering that Yees marriage to
Santiago is bigamous, Art. 148 applies.
Meanwhile, Art. 147 of the same Code applies to Nicdao considering that this article applies to unions of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is void for other reasons, like
the absence of a marriage license.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and the
other did not contribute thereto. Conformably, even if the disputed death benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a
government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the Nicdao to share one-half thereof. As
there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus,
one-half of the subject death benefits under scrutiny shall go to Nicdao as her share in the property regime, and the other half
pertaining to Santiago shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
The decision of the CA, which affirmed the decision of the trial court is hereby reversed and set aside.