Out

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RACISM, ISLAMOPHOBIA, RELIGIOUS
DOGMATISM AND ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR
A dissertation submitted to the faculty o f the
California School o f Professional Psychology
In partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology at
Alliant International University, Los Angeles, California
By
Venus M. Nicolino
May 8, 2006
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
UMI Number: 3239044
INFORMATION TO USERS
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy
submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality illustrations and
photographs, print bleed-through, substandard margins, and improper
alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if unauthorized
copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.
UMI
UMI Microform 3239044
Copyright 2007 by ProQuest Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. This microform edition is protected against
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest Information and Learning Company

300 North Zeeb Road
P.O. Box 1346
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
ALLIANT INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY Los Angeles
The Dissertation o f Venus M. Nicolino, directed and approved

by the candidates Committee, has been accepted by the
Faculty o f the California School of Professional Psychology
in partial fulfillment o f the requirement for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
DATE
Dissertation Committee
J0.
/
Paula B. Johnson, Ph.D., Chairperson
Vula Baliotis, Ph.D.
ii
This dissertation is dedicated to my friend
Kevin Francis Cleary
April 15, 1962 - September 11, 2001
He was one o f over three thousand innocent people who lost their lives
on the morning o f September 11, 2001
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................v

List of Appendices .................................................................................................................... vii
Acknowledgement ................................................................................................................... viii
V ita.................................................................................................................................................ix
Abstract of D issertation............................................................................................................... x
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 1
Statement of the Problem................................................................................................ 1
Events o f 9/11...................................................................................................... 1
Background and Study Rationale................................................................................... 3
Beliefs................................................................................................................... 4
Attitudes............................................................................................................... 5
Theoretical Underpinnings o f the Study....................................................................... 7
Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Schem as........................................................... 7
Definition o f Terms........................................................................................................10
CHAPTER II LITERATURE R EV IEW .................................................................... 13

R acism .............................................................................................................................13
Defining R acism ............................................................................................... 14
Contemporary Forms o f Racism ..................................................................... 14
Modern racism .................................................................................... 15
Cultural Racism .................................................................................. 16
Prejudice, Stereotypes and V iolence..............................................................17
In-Group, Out-Group Phenom enon............................................................... 22
Ethnicity and V iolence.................................................................................... 27
Islam ophobia................................................................................................................. 29
Defining Islam ophobia.................................................................................... 30
X enophobia...................................................................................................... 32
History of Islamophobia .................................................................................33
Islamophobia in the U.S. Post 9 /1 1 ............................................................... 34
Prevalence of Islam ophobia........................................................................... 34
Manifestations o f Islamophobia......................................................................39
Religious D ogm atism ................................................................................................... 41
Defining Religious Dogmatism .....................................................................41
Dogmatism........................................................................................... 42
Fundamentalism and D ogm atism .................................................................. 45
Studying the Construct Religious D ogm atism .............................................47
Dogmatism and Prejudice ...............................................................................48
Studies on Dogmatism and V io len ce............................................................ 50
Religious Dogmatism and the Iraq W a r........................................................53
W a r................................................................................................................................. 54
Defining W a r.................................................................................................... 54
H ypotheses.................................................................................................................... 60
iv
CHAPTER III METHODS ..........................................................................................62
Origins o f the D a ta ........................................................................................................ 62
Description o f the S am p le............................................................................................ 62
Design...............................................................................................................................63
Instrumentation ............................................................................................................. 63
Racism Scale......................................................................................................64
Muslim Cultural Beliefs Scale ....................................................................... 64
Religious Fundamentalism S c a le ...................................................................65
War Scale........................................................................................................... 65
Procedures...................................................................................................................... 66
Methodology Assumptions and Limitations.............................................................. 67
CHAPTER IV RESULTS ............................................................................................. 69

Demographic Characteristics of the Sample.............................................................. 69
Reliability o f Scales ......................................................................................................72
Hypotheses T estin g .......................................................................................................73
Hypothesis 1 ......................................................................................................73
Hypothesis 2 ......................................................................................................73
Hypothesis 3 ......................................................................................................73
Hypothesis 4 ......................................................................................................76
Hypothesis 5 ......................................................................................................76
Hypothesis 6 ......................................................................................................76
Hypothesis 7 ......................................................................................................77
Summary of the R esults............................................................................... 80
CHAPTER V DISCUSSION........................................................................................81
Hypotheses and Areas o f Analysis .............................................................................82
Contribution o f Racism, Islamophobia, and Religious Dogmatism to War
Attitudes ................................................................................................................ 82
Relationship between Independent Variables and Attitudes toward W a r..............83
Racism and Attitudes toward W ar..................................................................83
Islamophobia and Attitudes toward W a r.......................................................84
Religious Dogmatism and Attitudes toward W ar.........................................85
Interrelationships between Independent Variables....................................................86
Racism and Islamophobia................................................................................ 86
Racism and Religious Dogmatism..................................................................87
Islamophobia and Religious Dogmatism....................................................... 88
Implications and Suggested Future Research .......................................................... 90
Suggested Areas for Future Research............................................................ 92
Implications........................................................................................................93
REFERENCES .......................................................................................................................... 95
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................... 108
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample............................................................................70
Table 2
Scale Means and Reliabilities....................................................................................................74
Table 3
Intercorrelations Between Scales.............................................................................................. 75
Table 4
Stepwise Multiple Regression for Variables Predicting Acceptance of W ar..................... 78
Table 5
Model Summary: Forced Entry A nalysis................................................................................79
vi
LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
War Scale................................................................................................................................... 109
Racism Scale.............................................................................................................................. 109
Muslim Beliefs Scale................................................................................................................110
APPENDIX B
Demographic Questionnaire....................................................................................................I l l
APPENDIX C
Informed Consent...................................................................................................................... 114
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to extend my sincere appreciation and gratitude to Paula B. Johnson,
Ph.D. for her support and enthusiasm for me and my research over the last five years.
Her undying patience, expertise and guidance, has been invaluable. She is an inspiration
and a woman with whom I will always cherish. My efforts at CSPP shined much brighter
because of the support she endlessly offered me. It is truly an honor to know her.
I was also fortunate to have Vula Baliotis, Ph.D. on my committee. Her
enthusiasm for this research was contagious. When I didnt think I could do it anymore,
her words of encouragement and support, were invaluable as well as her expertise to the
development and refinement o f this project. My deepest gratitude to Judy Holloway,
Ph.D. for taking the time out of her busy life to be a part of my committee. Her passion
for this topic was intoxicating and her constant positive feedback was invigorating.
I would like to acknowledge my husband Matthew, for all o f his patience,
kindness and unconditional love throughout the years. Things that were difficult before
are so much easier with him by my side, and my dreams that seemed unobtainable have
come true with his strength and encouragement. Without his existence my journey to
become a psychologist would be meaningless. He has allowed me to express a lifetime
of sadness without ever wavering. With his patience, I was able to turn my anger into
passion, despair into hope and blame into forgiveness. His love is sweet music to my
heart and soul.
viii
VITA
Venus M. Nicolino
1990-1994 B.A., New York University
1994 Phi Beta Kappa, New York University
1996-1998 M.A., Counseling Psychology New York University
1998 Summa Cum Laude, New York University
1995-1999 Intern: Mt. Sinai Hospital, Rape Domestic Violence and
Incest Department New York, New York
1 9 9 8-2000 North Queens Medical, Mental Health Department:
psychotherapist
2001-2003 Youth, Family Accountability Model: psychotherapist
2002-2003 Pre-Doctoral Practicum: Aids Project Los Angeles
2003 M.A., Clinical Psychology California School of
Professional Psychology, Los Angeles
2003-2004 Intern, Center For Healthy Aging
2004-2005 Intern, Center For Healthy Aging Health Department
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
The Relationships Between Racism, Islamophobia, Religious Dogmatism
and Attitudes Toward War
By
Venus M. Nicolino
Doctor o f Philosophy in Clinical Psychology
California School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles
2006
Paula B. Johnson, Ph.D., Chairperson
The purpose o f this study was to explore the relationships between racism,
negative attitudes toward Muslims (Islamophobia), religious dogmatism and attitudes
toward war in the months following the 9/11 attacks. Understanding the relationships
between these factors may help decipher possible underlying reasons for the fall out of
the 9/11 attacks, in particular the U.S. initiation of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. A
review of the literature suggested that racism, Islamophobia and religious dogmatism
may lead to violence and in some instances, war. A survey was administered to 199 men
and women residing in both Los Angeles and New York City. Positive significant
relationships were found between all four variables. Racism accounted for a significant
amount of the variance (39.7%) in the acceptance of war. Thus, it was suggested that the
endorsement of we/they relationships and in-group/out-group phenomenon may be
factors contributing to violence and war. While racism appears to be the predominant
predictor, Islamophobia and religious dogmatism did show individual relationships to the
endorsement o f pro-war attitudes. Although war is a complex system, this dissertation
suggests that underlying and unspoken attitudes and beliefs may be relevant to how,
when and against whom we go to war. Additional research is suggested and implications
for the understanding o f peace making are discussed.
XI
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Statement of the Problem
The intent of this study is to examine the relationships between racism, negative
attitudes toward Muslims (Islamophobia), religious dogmatism and attitudes toward war
in the months following the 9/11 attacks. Understanding the relationships between these
factors may help decipher possible underlying reasons for the fallout of the 9/11 attacks,
in particular the U.S. initiation o f wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The September 11, 2001
terrorist attack will be discussed to provide background related to the content o f the
study.
Events o f 9/11
On September 11, 2001, 19 members o f the international Islamic terrorist group,
A1 Qaeda, hijacked four commercial aircraft and succeeded in crashing three o f them into
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. A fourth airliner crashed in southwestern
Pennsylvania, probably because the passengers were able to resist the hijackers (Wald &
Sack, 2001).
On October seventh, the official response o f the United States government was to
launch a counterattack against Afghanistan, the country, according to U.S. President,
George W. Bush (2001), which provided A1 Qaeda a base o f operation. Despite the
administrations official position that Islam was a peaceful religion and that the terrorists
were extremists who in no way represented the Muslim mainstream (Bush), public
opinion in the United States since the attacks was marked by a distinct increase in racism
and anti-Islamic sentiment and behavior (Belluck, 2001). Comparisons were made
between this countrys internment o f Japanese-Americans during the Second World War
and the governments profiling o f Arab-Americans (Shenon & Johnston, 2001).
Four months after the September 11 attacks, Bush, in his 2002 State o f the Union
address, pointed to North Koreas export o f missile technology and its persistent nuclear
ambitions, identifying that country as one o f three nations belonging to what he termed
an axis of evil the other two being Iraq and Iran (Bush, 2002). In the same State of
the Union Address, the president pointed to Iraqs bio-warfare capabilities as qualifying it
for membership in the evil axis (Bush, 2002). Thus, soon after 9/11, the stage was being
set for future wars. On October 7, 2001 Bush announced the invasion o f Afghanistan and
the search for terrorist leader and 9/11 mastermind, Osama Bin Laden, a Muslim and
claimed follower o f the Islamic religion. In subsequent months, the Bush Administration,
supported by the government o f Tony Blair in the UK (Hoge, 2002), focused its efforts
on conducting an international campaign to make the case for a pre-emptive war against
Iraq (Kellman 2002; Ricks & Loeb, 2002).
Violence ensued abroad and at home; the number of hate crimes in the U.S. in
2001, following the 9/11 attack, increased by 20.7% when compared to the number of
hate crimes in 2000 (FBI, 2005a). Less overtly potent hate crimes were abundant even
among friends; for example, one Arab-American Muslim reportedly asked a friend to
stop calling him Saddam (Harden & Kilborn, 2002). Miles (2004) pointed out that the
September 11 attacks changed American views o f religion, putting the Muslim religion in
the focus as a form o f Islamic terrorism. In the above events, attitudes and beliefs about
Islam, race and religion appear to be involved in shaping how the American culture views
violence as a way to resolve conflict.
In her address to the 110th Convention o f the American Psychological
Association, Peace Division (48), Dane (2002), emphasized the psychological importance
of the impact of both the September 11th terrorist attack and the U.S. attack on
Afghanistan. That war has psychological implications has been documented (LeShan,
2002; McAlister, Sandstorm, Puska, Veijo, Chereches, & Heidmets, 2001; Montada &
Lerner, 1998, Mosse, 1957); however, factors related to the belief that war is an
appropriate response are important to explore.
The present study hopes to address this need, as it explores attitudes toward or the
acceptance of war and their relationship to: (1) racism, (2) Islamophobia and (3) religious
dogmatism following the 9/11 attacks. The results o f this study are hoped to contribute
to the growing body of psychological literature that addresses attitudes leading to conflict
behavior between individuals, specific groups, and nations.
Background and Study Rationale
The present research study views war as part of a larger system o f how people
understand the world and what they think it should be like (Holt, 1984, as cited in
Johnson, Handler & Criss, 1987). Previous studies (Rosenthal & Johnson, 1989; Johnson,
1987) have analyzed the relationship o f certain attitudes and beliefs to the acceptance of
war. Using a social psychological approach, this dissertation will study racism,
Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism in relation to the acceptance o f war as a solution
to international conflict, as seen in the months after the events of 9/11.
Taking its cue from Silverstein and Holt (1989), an underlying proposition o f the
current research is that prejudice (in this case, against Islam) may be generalized to
national enemies, and thus may make war more acceptable the more individuals hold
such beliefs. It will also be proposed that religious dogmatism in the post 9/11 months
may be related to attitudes toward war. In addition, ones prejudices against the other
may be seen in racism and also related to attitudes toward war.
Furthermore, the proposed study adopts the theoretical model o f Johnson, Handler
and Criss (1987), who proposed that our social system is supported by widely held
cultural attitudes and beliefs that may serve to perpetuate war. The present research aims
to reveal the mental heuristics that may perpetuate an acceptance o f war, and in so doing,
to enable a critical examination o f what was previously covert or nonconsciously held. It
is hoped that the present research will help to identify and understand attitudes and
beliefs that support war.
In order to clarify how beliefs and attitudes are used in the present study, the two
constructs will be explored.
Beliefs
A belief is a mental representation and one o f the building blocks o f conscious
thought (Neisser, 1976). Beliefs are the cognitive component o f attitudes (Neisser, 1976)
and therefore play an elemental role in the formation o f attitudes. An attitude would not
develop without a motivating belief (Adler & Gielen, 1994). In specific, the term belief
generally refers to information possessed by an individual, whether based in fact or
opinion, regarding other people, objects, and issues; furthermore, the implications for the
recipient of the information may be positive, negative, or neutral (Petty & Cacioppo,
1996). Kerlinger (1984) likens beliefs to statements made by an individual in order to
express presumed knowledge, faith, or opinion. Adler and Gielen define beliefs as
relatively stable cognitive structures that represent what exists for the individual in
domains beyond direct perception or inference from observed facts (1994, p. 140).
Beliefs are social constructions having to do with the nature, causes, and
consequences o f things, persons, events, and processes. Adler and Gielen (1994) add that
each cultures socialization has been guided by shared beliefs. For the purpose of the
current study, from both social structure and personality approaches, the term belief
focuses on how relatively enduring thoughts, feelings, and behaviors are influenced by
individuals' positions in the social structure and/or by the organization o f their social
environments.
Attitudes
Attitude, on the other hand, may be thought of as a broader, overarching term,
which encompasses the term belief. Attitudes have three main components: cognitive (a
belief about something), emotional or affective (an expression of how one feels about an
object), and behavioral (an action or behavior toward an object (Rosenberg & Hovland,
1960).
Attitudes are comprised o f enduring feelings (evaluations), which can be either
positive or negative, about an object or issue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996, p. 7; Adler &
Gielen, 1994). These feelings or evaluations are stored in ones memory (Judd, Ryan, &
Parke, 1991), though they may not always be conscious (Pinter & Greenwald, 2005;
Brunei, Tietje & Greenwald, 2004). Attitudes are complicated in that they not only may
be unconscious, but also in that someone can hold ambivalent (simultaneously positive
and negative) attitudes about the same object (Petty & Cacioppo). The term attitude has
gained preeminence over the term belief within the field o f psychology because attitudes
are considered to point to and predict underlying psychological functions. It is important
to note that emotion frequently plays a greater role than does intellect in the development
o f attitudes (Adler & Gielen).
Furthermore, attitudes are used to predict future behavior (Adler & Gielen, 1994).
For instance, they allow people to have an idea what to expect o f an individual in the
future (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996; Adler & Gielen). They also serve as predispositions to
act or react in a certain manner toward a specific object (Adler & Gielen). In other
words, once formed, attitudes serv[e] as an anchorage to structure or modify subsequent
experience or response (Sherif & Cantril, 1947, p. 5). Although attitudes may change,
attitudes are held within the context of social interactions and enduring, structured social
beliefs (Kerlinger, 1984, p. 5). They are also learned (Sherif & Cantril, 1947), as
opposed to being innate states o f being.
It is important to note that an individuals pattern o f attitudes is considered to be
one o f the most characteristic expressions o f personality (Baird, 2002; Craik, 1993). In
fact, personality profiles and descriptions have been compiled on groups o f people by
determining their attitudes toward significant persons, events, situations, and ideas (such
as religion, government, nationalism, internationalism, war, peace, and racism, among
other similar variables) (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Baird, 2002; Blackwell, 1993;
Chors, Moschner, Maes & Kielmann, 2005; Coryn, Beale, & Myers, 2004; Criss &
Johnson, 1989; Davidi, 2004; Feather, 1996; Feshback & White, 1986; Holt, 1987;
Johnson & Friedman, 1989; Kirkpatrick 1993; Kosterman & Feshback, 1987; Miller-
Kustack, 1989; O Neil, Patry & Penrod 2004; Petty & Cacioppo 1996; Poynting, 2004;
Rokeach, 1968; Rosenthal & Johnson 1989; Rowatt, Franklin & Cotton 2005; Sheppird,
1996; Unger, 2005).
As mentioned previously, the study o f attitudes and beliefs is part o f social
psychology, and social psychology is related to cognitive psychology and schemas
(Freeman, Pretzer, Fleming, & Simon, 2004). Below is a discussion concerning
cognitive psychology and the function o f cognitive schemas.
Theoretical Underpinnings o f this Study
This study is founded upon two theoretical orientations: social psychology
(introduced briefly above and discussed in more detail in Chapter II) and cognitive
psychology.
Cognitive Psychology and Cognitive Schemas
Cognitive psychology presents the notion o f schemas or complex patterns of
thoughts that determine how experiences are perceived and conceptualized and how these
schemas are employed when data is absent (Freeman, Pretzer, Fleming, & Simon, 2004;
Freeman, Simon, Beutler, & Arkowitz, 1989). Schemas reinforce preconceived ideas.
Cognitive distortions contribute to a feedback loop that supports attitudes, and these are
based on the idiosyncratic subjective experience o f the individual. To develop cognitions
the individual comes to terms with an object or environmental situation, activating
conceptual structures that are available to process new information. Thus, while there is
an ongoing process o f building new cognitive structures, these are based on old cognitive
resources. If motivated to reach a specific goal, the individual can influence and control
the building o f new structures. Core schemas or beliefs are the most important factor
related to how individuals view themselves or others (Freeman et al., 2004; Freeman et
al., 1989). Thus, in the post 9/11 months, ones schemas about war, religion, and national
background would come into play in how one interpreted the events.
Ones beliefs about war may also be embedded in cognitive schemas. Golec and
Federico (2004) explained that a positive conflict schema results in an individual or
leader finding a positive way to resolve conflict, and a negative conflict schema results in
the individual or leader finding a negative way, such as war, to resolve conflict.
Cognitive schemas are developed through early experiences and are supported by self-
perpetuating beliefs about current experiences (Freeman et al., 2004; Freeman et al.,
1989).
Cognitive schemas or core beliefs result in emotional reactions and actions
(Freeman et al., 2004; Freeman et al., 1989). Rummel (1976) provides a basis to help
understand the conflict resolution theory presented by Golec and Federico (2004).
According to Rummel (1976), behavior between individuals includes any person's actions
or lack o f actions, which is meaningfully understood within the context of another's field
o f expression. These interactions are characterized by direction, intensity, extension,
duration, and organization. Actions have manifest and latent functions. Rummel stated
that an individuals behavior is based on his or her perception o f anothers behavior, and
this generates a behavioral disposition; the manner in which these dispositions manifest
into specific social behavior is a function o f the individuals expectations o f the other's
corresponding behavior. In this manner, the individuals cognitive schema related to
conflict resolution preference is developed and maintained based on previously conceived
expectations related to the other. Thus, ones beliefs about war may be related to how
salient others, in this case those o f a particular religion, race or national origin, are
perceived.
Golec and Federico (2004) stated that individuals have a need for closure or the
resolution of intergroup conflict. This motivates the formation o f a conflict-related
preference or the individuals approach to reduce cognitive uncertainty. The individual
formulates and holds on to an opinion related to an issue instead o f having to deal with
confusion and ambiguity. Within this framework, a simple view o f the world is one in
which ones own group is right (the in-group) and the other, outsider group is wrong (the
out-group). To defeat the opponent brings about a sense of certainty and finality a state
that is consistent with closure and resolution of conflict. Conflict schemas include group
centrism or a group of attitudes that value the in-group and its norms. These shared
beliefs provide a definition of reality for the individual that can be drawn on to eliminate
uncertainty. In the following chapter the dynamics of and research on in-group / out
group beliefs will be discussed as related to the variables in the proposed study.
According to Golec and Federico (2004), conflict schemas are learned and define
the kinds o f social situations that are viewed as conflicts, when a conflict exists and how
to end it, and the most optimal way o f dealing with the conflict. Cultural and political
socialization contribute to the development of these schemas, which are reinforced by
parents, the educational and social system, and the media. There are many possible
conflict schemas, ranging from those suggesting that others must be distrusted to those
suggesting that others require compassion and cooperation. The individual adopts
strategies that are normative within his or her schemas. Within this theoretical frame, the
factors related to the conflict schema are complex (Golec & Federico, 2004).
This study will examine possible factors related to the conflict schema: war
attitudes, racial attitudes, religious dogmatism attitudes, and negative attitudes toward
Muslims (Islamophobia). The results of this study may contribute toward the growing
body of literature in psychology that addresses attitudes leading to conflict behavior
between individuals, specific groups, and nations. For clarification, below are definitions
of the terms to be included in this study, followed by chapter two which will discuss such
terms in more detail.
Definition o f Terms
Racism: Racism is a constant pattern o f prejudice and discrimination between
individuals or groups, where an individual or group is favored over another individual or
group in a systematic manner (Greene, 1986; Ridley, 1985). In regard to this study,
prejudice and discrimination can exist as a result o f differing physical characteristics
(such as skin color) or on the foundation of race, ethnicity, traditions, cultural practices,
and religion.
Islamophobia: Islamophobia refers to negative assumptions, attitudes, beliefs, fear,
and/or hatred that are held toward Islam and Muslim culture. Islamophobia embodies a
new form of racism whereby Muslims, an ethno-religious group, not a race, are
nevertheless constructed as a race (Sajid, 2005). In particular, Islamophobia can be
10
characterized by the belief that all or most Muslims (1) are religious fanatics, (2) have
violent tendencies toward non-Muslims, and (3) reject concepts such as equality,
tolerance, and democracy (Sajid, 2005).
Islam: The Islamic religion was founded in the 7th century A.D. Its birth served initially
to protect Arabs from western missionaries and crusaders. Muhammad was a preacher to
many followers of Islam, called Muslims. At the age o f forty, Muhammad declared
himself a Muslim and the messenger and prophet o f Allah (God). According to
Muhammad, Allah is synonymous with the same God in which the Jews and Christians
believe. According to Fiero (1995), the Islamic religion means, submission to Gods
will and merely completes Gods revelation to the Jews and Christians. (p.44)
M uslim: A Muslim is any person who has given shahadaf or confession of pledge that
has declared there is only one Allah (God), Muhammad is the prophet o f Allah, (Al
Faruqi, 1979), and there are no national or racial boundaries.
Arab: An Arab person is one who has originated from one o f the eighteen Arabic
speaking nations (Naff, 1983) and has cultural, ethnic and national roots originating from
the Arabian Peninsula. Arab and Muslim are not interchangeable terms (Suleiman,
1989). A person can be Arab, yet not be necessarily a Muslim and vice versa. Although
most Arabs are Muslims, only a minority o f Muslims are Arabs. Most Muslims are
segregated in non-Arab nations, such as Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Philippines,
India, Thailand and Bangladesh (Davidi, 2004).
Religious Dogmatism: Religious dogmatism is a doctrine or closed belief system
accepted as authoritative and indicative o f closed-mindedness and social dominance
orientation (Rokeach, 1960; Altemeyer, 1998). Altemeyer (1998) indicates dogmatic
11
attitudes may lead to an actively hostile approach in dealing with socially and culturally
sanctioned out-groups, sometimes resulting in war.
War: According to Johnson, Handler & Criss (1993), war is impartially viewed as larger
scale, organized conflicts between groups. Perhaps the most important characteristic of
international war is that the image o f the in-group must be enhanced, the out group
denigrated and the difference between them emphasized (Hinde & Pulkinnen 2000).
Chapter II will address each variable in more detail.
12
CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
The present study explores (a) racism, (b) Islamophobia, and (c) religious
dogmatism and their relationship to attitudes toward war. The months following the
September 11, 2001 attacks will be used as a backdrop against which these concepts will
be explored. The present study also attempts to generate further hypotheses and research
attempts that may lead to a better understanding of the barriers to peace and nonviolent
conflict resolution. Understanding the relationships between attitudes toward racism,
Islam, religious dogmatism, and acceptance o f war as a solution to international conflict
may be a step in finding ways to perpetuate peaceful and nonviolent solutions to
international problems.
The following areas will be reviewed in the literature review: racism,
Islamophobia, religious dogmatism and war attitudes. The first topic to be explored is
racism.
Racism
It will be proposed that racism was related to attitudes toward war in post 9/11
America. First, racism will be defined, and prejudice and stereotypes will be discussed.
Following that, the in-group, out-group phenomenon and ethnicity and violence will be
discussed, respectively.
13
Defining Racism
Various forms o f racism exist in our society, and the concept o f racism has been
defined in many different ways (Blauner, 1972; Greene, 1986; Ridley, 1985; McConahay
& Hough, 1978). First, definitions of racism will be presented, as well as relevant trends
in its expression, over the last several decades, followed by the definition to be used in
the present study.
Ridley called racism any behavior or pattern of behavior that systematically
denies opportunities to a particular social group, while advancing and supporting
privileges o f another group (1985, p. 60). Blauner defined racism as the tendency to
categorize people who are culturally different in terms o f non-culture traits (1972,
p. 17), such as skin color, hair, and facial structure. Similarly, Greene (1986) described
racism as a constant pattern o f prejudice and discrimination between individuals or
groups, where an individual or group is favored over another individual or group in a
systematic manner. In regard to this study, prejudice and discrimination can exist as a
result o f differing physical characteristics (such as skin color) or on the foundation o f
race, ethnicity, traditions, cultural practices, and religion.
Contemporary Forms o f Racism
This dissertation will focus on what are referred to as more contemporary forms
of racism, specifically modern and cultural racism. Traditional racism used scientific,
Darwinian language to justify the boundaries between different racial groups, arguing
that some races were genetically inferior to others (Barker, 1981; Seidal, 1986; Reeves,
1983); however, modern racism and cultural racism avoids these types of explicit
14
superiority claims (Seidal, 1986). Rather, these forms utilize ethno-culturally segregated
divisions to justify prejudice against and stereotyping o f outsiders (Wittenbrink, Judd, &
Park, 1997). According to Poynting (2004), modern racism and cultural racism are
evidenced in the rhetoric and actions o f both American political leaders and Muslim
religious leaders following the events o f 9/11. The two terms are explored in more depth
below.
Modern racism. First, modern racism does not suggest genetic inferiority, but
instead, attributes minority disadvantage to cultural variations (Meertens & Pettigrew,
1997). Secondly, most conceptualizations o f modem racism are developed in the United
States, from the vantage point that traditional American values are the norm and that
cultural differences are measured in terms o f how much they differ from this norm
(Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995.) Thirdly, modern racism maintains that racism is wrong,
but experiences racial minorities as making unfair demands or receiving too many
resources (McConahay, 1986). This aspect of modern racism is seen most clearly in
attitudes toward immigration (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; McConahay, 1986; Sears,
1988). For example, Muslims in the United States are viewed primarily as immigrants,
even though they may be native-born and, as such, have become part o f the societal
debate regarding public policies and social phenomena (Bobocel, Fling, Davey, Stanley,
& Zanna, 1998).
Modem racism can be characterized by the following six features (Pettigrew &
Meertens, 1995): (a) rejection o f gross stereotypes and blatant discrimination; (b)
normative compliance without internalization o f new behavioral norms of racial
acceptance; (c) emotional ambivalence toward outsiders, stemming from early childhood
15
socialization, and a sense that outsiders are currently violating traditional American
values; (d) indirect micro-aggressions against outsiders, which are expressed by
avoidance o f face-to-face interactions and by opposition to racial change for ostensibly
non-racial reasons; (e) a sense o f subjective threat from racial change; and (f)
individualistic conceptions of how opportunity and social stratification operate in
American society.
Modem racism is particularly insidious because the use o f key concepts such as
values and culture permits modem racism to be accepted (Poynting, 2004). Relying
on code words and talking in the name o f American values both allow for racially-laden
political messages to be conveyed without the use o f language that refers to race.
Modern racisms reliance on cultural exaggerations allows people to distance themselves
from accusations o f being prejudiced because they can claim simply to be reporting
actual outer-group differences (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). In this way, conditions of
attributional ambiguity allow people to appear unprejudiced.
The concept o f modern racism is relevant to this study because the author is not
measuring blatant types of racist attitudes (as are evident in more traditional models of
racism), but rather, the subtle types o f attitudes that people hold toward minority groups,
which are more consistent with modem racism.
Cultural racism. When compared to other historical periods o f racism, the post-
World War II period as a whole can be characterized as one o f cultural racism (Goldberg,
1993). Many authors have observed that the events of 9/11 have increased the level of
cultural racism toward Muslims (Ghazali, 2005; Poynting 2004; Stone, 2004). Cultural
racism is a value system that supports and allows discriminatory actions against racially
16
and ethno-culturally marginalized communities. It is targeted not just at people o f color,
but also at certain groups who are perceived to be culturally different; furthermore, it uses
cultural difference to disparage, marginalize, or demand cultural assimilation from
culturally different groups (Modood, 1994). Thus, groups with distinctive cultural
identities or community life suffer this additional dimension o f prejudice and stereotypes.
To understand this additional dimension o f cultural racism, below is a discussion
concerning prejudice and stereotypes.
Prejudice, Stereotypes and Violence
Racism is intricately tied to both prejudice and stereotypes, in that both o f these
elements can serve to promote racism (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Hewstone & Brown,
1986). Therefore, these two concepts will be discussed. Stereotypes can be defined as
faulty generalizations and frequently serve as mental shortcuts. Stereotypes can even be
activated outside conscious awareness by a fleeting image or word related to the
stereotyped group and, once activated, can influence attitudes and behavior (Greenwald
& Banaji, 1995). While not all stereotypes are equally harmful, negative stereotypes
often lead to prejudice (Hewstone & Brown, 1986).
While social scientists differ in their definitions o f prejudice, most would agree
that it involves a negative pre-judgment about a group or its members. Allport defined
prejudice as an antipathy based on faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or
expressed, and it may be directed toward a group or an individual o f that group (1954, p.
10). In psychology, prejudice refers to an attitude that includes feelings of contempt,
dislike, or loathing. Stereotypes and prejudice contain a component of irrationality,
17
including such fallacies as causal misattribution, improper generalization, excessive
categorization, and rejecting or ignoring counter-evidence (Allport, 1954).
One way racism, prejudice and stereotypes can operate is to associate certain
groups with violence, which has relevance to the present study. To demonstrate such an
association, Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, and Davies (2004) studied race, crime, and visual
processing. These authors pointed out that Blacks are stereotyped as being violent and
criminal and that this stereotype is associated with peoples evaluation o f aggressive
behavior, memory o f events, categorization o f non-weapons as weapons, and decisions to
shoot and use violence. The association between Blacks and crime tends to be automatic.
In fact, as noted by Eberhardt et al., the mere thought o f a Black person can lead to the
evaluation o f ambiguous behavior as aggressive, the miscategorization of harmless
objects as weapons, and the decision to shoot quickly or inappropriately. In short, Black
faces and bodies trigger thoughts of crime.
Eberhardt et al. (2004) conducted five studies to investigate this phenomenon.
For the first study, the bi-directional associations between social groups and concepts
(e.g., crime and basketball) that influence visual processing were investigated; whether
exposure to Black faces decreased perceptual threshold regarding recognizing crime
relevant objects was examined in 41 White university students. Findings showed that the
use o f Black face primes reduced the number o f frames needed to detect crime-relevant
objects accurately (compared to White- or no-prime conditions); exposure to White
primes inhibited detection of crime-relevant objects compared to no-prime conditions.
Thus, stereotypic associations altered the threshold at which real-world objects were
detected. Black faces triggered racialized seeing, which facilitated processing time o f
18
crime-relevant objects, while White primes had the opposite effect. This study is
important because it evidences that the same reality can be experienced quite
differently even when race is the only variable that differs. In regard to the present
study, according to DeAngelis (2001), the September 11th terrorists attacks caused many
Americans to unconsciously feel that Muslims (an ethno-religious group regarded as a
race) are dangerous. As a result, the quality o f the communication and reaction may be
negatively altered. This process occurs so quickly and unconsciously that people are
unlikely to even be aware that it occurs.
For the second study, Eberhardt et al. (2004) included 52 White students who
were presented with crime-relevant images for priming, as well as ten Black and ten
White faces with neutral expressions. Participants were asked to complete a dot-probe
task used to display two faces (one Black and the other White) and an experimental
packet. Findings showed that the concept of crime affected selective attention and that
participants were faster in directing their attention to the location o f a Black male face if
the concept o f crime was activated. Blacks were thought o f as criminal, and crime was
thought of as Black. In relationship to the present study, a similar process may occur in
the Western world when it comes to Muslims: Muslims are seen as terrorists, and
terrorism is seen as Muslim.
For the third study, 75 White male students participated in the experiment, but
priming included basketball-relevant words rather than crime images. Findings from this
study showed that stereotypic associations lead to visual tuning effects; in this case,
primed participants located a Black face faster than did unprimed participants.
Stereotypes influenced visual attention, despite the fact that the valence of the prime was
19
changed from crime to basketball; both primes produced changes in attentional
deployment, since both were strongly associated with Black Americans. Findings from
these studies point to the fact that racism, stereotypes, and prejudice occur not only with
regard to the most salient differences in a group, but also to differences that are
associated with that particular group. More specific to Muslims, Westerners may not
only be likely to demonstrate racist attitudes based on this groups skin color, but also to
other concepts such as Muslim dress and Islamic religion.
For the fourth study, the extent to which stereotype-induced attentional biases
were generalized to other populations was examined. Eberhardt et al. (2004) included 61
police officers for this study. Crime words were used as primes, and target faces were
from a database o f prisoners convicted o f first-degree murder in Florida. A pilot group
was shown 60 Black male faces and asked to use physical features to rate them
stereotypically. A second pilot group was shown a series o f 60 White male faces and was
asked to complete the same task. Five faces for each race were chosen, which were
matched for attractiveness across race for the Black and White face lineup. Study
participants either were or were not primed for crime and were asked to locate Black or
White faces in a surprise face-recognition memory task. As predicted, police officers
exhibited the same pattern of attentional bias as the undergraduate participants in studies
two and three. That is, priming police officers with crime caused them to remember
Black faces in a manner that more strongly supports the association between Blacks and
criminality. These results again inform the current study because they demonstrate that
the influence o f strong, stereotypic associations increases not only the likelihood that
20
social categories will trigger concepts (e.g., crime, aggression, terrorism), but also the
likelihood that a concept will trigger a social category (e.g., Black, Muslim).
For the fifth study, results o f study four were examined further. It was predicted
that, due to stereotypes, police officers would view Black faces as criminal more often
than they would White faces. For this study, 182 police officers were included. The
officers were shown faces and given no information, and they were asked to make
judgments o f criminality. Findings revealed that race played a significant role in their
judgments. Black faces were judged to be more criminal, showing that police officers
associated Blacks with crime. These findings supported those in study threenamely,
that police officers were more likely to falsely identify a Black face when primed with
crime. Thus, in all five o f the studies, bi-directional associations between social groups
and concepts were found, and these affected the processing o f stimuli in the visual
environment. Across the board, Black Americans were associated with crime. It should
be noted that, while Eberhardt et al. (2004) specifically addressed attitudes toward
Blacks, research has shown that a person who is prejudiced toward a particular minority
group is likely to show prejudice toward other minority groups as well (Maykovich,
1975).
A central hypothesis o f this study is that peoples negative attitudes toward
different races and out-groups are related to the acceptance o f war and violence against
others. The next section moves into a brief discussion o f this hypothesis and presents
findings in support o f this theory.
21
In-Group, Out-Group Phenomenon
According to Davis (1992), racial and ethnic conflicts are among the most potent
psychological problems confronting society today. In his view, groups (e.g., racial,
cultural, and religious) remain at odds because o f the belief that real and perceived
differences between groups somehow mean that one group is superior to another. Such
attitudes and beliefs result in prejudice and stereotypes (Fiske, 2000; Jones, 1997). The
group that is perceived as superior serves as the in-group, while the group that is
perceived as inferior serves as the out-group.
Groups are important in that they contribute to self-definition or identity (Miller-
Kustek 1989). For instance, people can define themselves through their ethnic and/or
national identity (Wagner, 2001). Groups also can contribute to ones self-evaluation; in
particular, peoples psychological attachment to their group is an important way in which
self-esteem is regulated (Miller-Kustek).
Group biases often serve more a function offavoritism toward one's own group
(in-group) than negative feelings toward other groups (out-group) (Brewer, 1999; Brewer
& Brown, 1998). However, Brewer and Brown propose that such biases can also be
formed by enhanced denigration o f those different from oneself or from inter-group
competition. Johnson and Friedman (1989) explored the relationship between attitudes
toward in-groups and attitudes toward out-groups and attitudes toward war in 85 males
and 98 females (n=l 85). Johnson and Friedman found that there was a lack o f a
significant relationship between love o f ones own group (in-group) and dislike o f other
groups (out-group). Thus, their research indicated that loving ones own group does not
necessarily mean disliking other groups. However, in the covariance structure model, in-
22
group was a part o f the connectedness latent variable that was negatively related to the
war system, which included acceptance o f war and dislike o f out-group. In other words,
more positive attitudes toward and in-group also had a slight non-significant negative
relationship to attitudes toward war, again indicating that solidarity may not have to lead
to divisiveness (Johnson & Friedman 1989). Thus, from this study it appears that it is
more likely for out-group antipathy, rather than for in-group cohesiveness to relate to
acceptance o f war. The proposed study will explore such out-groups after 9/11.
Within the in-group, out-group framework, research also indicates that people
tend to see out-group members as more alike than they do their own in-group members,
in terms of attitudes, values, personality traits, and other characteristics; this phenomenon
is called the out-group homogeneity effect (Linville, 1998). As a result of this effect, out
group members are at risk of being stereotyped. The out-group homogeneity effect occurs
regardless of whether the out-group is another race, religion, nationality, or other
naturally occurring group (Linville, 1998). More relevant to this study, the out-group
homogeneity effect is evident in that Western society views Muslims, as a whole, as
being the same (Stone, 2004).
Following the events of 9/11, the strong link between in-group, out-group
attitudes and violence became so apparent that it would be hard to deny the existence of
this phenomenon (Poynting, 2004; Stone, 2004). Initial indifference or low-level
violence toward Muslims (the out-group) may have been transformed, for some people,
into a need for nationalistic-related hate crimes. Immediately after the 9/11 attacks,
Muslims (including Muslim-Americans) quickly and clearly became the out-group, and
they, and those assumed to be Arab or Muslim, suffered many hate crimes. According to
23
the Southern Poverty Law Center (2005), in the days after hijacked planes tore into the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 9/11, the following events occurred:
Shopkeepers were shot to death in California, Texas, and Arizona as an anti-
Muslim backlash broke out across the country.
By Oct. 11, one month after the terrorist attacks, the Anti-Discrimination
Council had collected more than 700 reports o f hate crimes against Muslims.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations had 785 reports. At hate-crime
hotlines set up by the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the volume of calls per
hour peaked at 70. In Los Angeles alone, the police and sheriffs departments
reported 167 hate crimes in the first four weeks o f the backlash.
Targets were not limited to people of Middle Eastern descent, but included
those erroneously thought to be o f Middle Eastern descent.
Frank Silva Roque's alleged drive-by shooting spree in Mesa, Arizona, began
with the murder o f Balbir Singh Sodhi, a 49-year-old Sikh, who was neither
Arab nor Muslim, was hit outside his gas station.
Before the end of September, a Website set up for reports o f harassment and
hate crimes against Sikhs had received 274 complaints.
The range of hate crimes from Orlando to Oregon was even broader than the
range o f victims. Hate mail and verbal threats were reported by the hundreds.
Arab-Americans and Muslims were shot at, spat on, and physically assaulted in
schools, on the streets, and in their workplaces.
Mosques and worshippers became the targets o f rocks, bullets, arson and, at a
Hindu temple in New Jersey, a Molotov cocktail.
24
In Salt Lake City, a man was arrested for allegedly setting fire to a Pakistani
restaurant. In Palos Heights, Illinois, a man used the blunt end of a machete to
attack a Moroccan gas-station attendant.
On September 29, a Yemeni native was shot dead, apparently by a group of four
local teenagers, at his convenience store in Reedley, California. Two days
before the killing, Abdo Ali Ahmed had found a death threat note on his car
after grocery shopping in nearby Dinuba.
It is important to note that out-group prejudice is not just an American
phenomenon; rather, it has been found in cultures throughout the world (Aberson, Healy,
& Romero, 2000; Brewer, 1999). For example, Poynting (2004) reported on the
experience o f living with racism in Australia, as reported by Arabs and Muslims
following 9/11. Poytings findings indicated that the medias portrayal of Muslims was
unfair and biased, and institutional racism was reported. For example, Poyntings
interviewees recounted experiences such as unlawful detainment by police, harassment
by immigration officials and security services, and menacing visits from the Australian
Security Intelligence organization. Participants stated that they believed they would
never receive promotions in their workplace due to religious and cultural backgrounds,
and they reported being harassed by members o f their workplace (employees and clients).
Victims reported being harassed by train guards and station staff, as well as by people in
shopping centers and other public spaces. Notably, most incidents were not reported to
the police, since they were commonplace and numerous, and since victims felt
unwelcome and as though they did not belong. Victims reported that these incidents had
a large impact on their lives; they feared routine behaviors, such as shopping for food and
25
clothes. They stayed home in fear o f being attacked. The threat to in-group safety was
seen as so strong that even Middle Eastern people who were neither Arab nor Muslim
(such as Sikh men wearing turbans) were harassed and experienced violence (Poynting).
Comparisons between crimes immediately after 9/11 and crimes at other times are
astounding. The Federal Bureau o f Investigation (2005a) reported that, from 2000 to
2001, overall crimes increased 2.1%, and hate crimes increased 20.7%. In other words,
there were 1,667 more hate crimes in 2001 than in 2000. Hate crimes based on racial
bias included the largest percentage (44.9%), followed by bias related to ethnic/national
origin (21.6%), religion (18.8%), sexual orientation (14.3%), and disability (.4%).
The FBI (2005b) also reported that, in 2002, overall crimes increased by less than
one-tenth of a percent compared to those in 2001; however, following the 2001 terrorist
incidents, hate crimes were higher by 23% than they were in 2002. The FBI reported that
racial bias represented the largest percentage o f bias-related incidents (48.8%).
Race/ethnicity/national origin hate crimes from 1998 to 2003 have totaled 60% or more
o f all hate crimes; the range was from 60% to 65.1%, except following the 9/11 activities
directed at Arab/Middle Easterners, which rose to 67.5%.
The drastic increase in hate crimes after the events o f 9/11 not only reveals
peoples strong tendency to commit violence against out-group, but also makes clear that
stereotypes, prejudice, and racism lead to violence toward the out-group. Following is a
review of empirical literature related to this dissertations focus on racism and violence.
Ethnicity and violence are also discussed, followed by the summary and conclusion.
26
Ethnicity and Violence
Miller-Kustek (1989) found that attitudes toward people o f other ethnic groups
related to various forms of violence. The author attempted to investigate the relationship
between peoples perceptions o f the other and the acceptance o f violence and war
(Miller-Kustek). Measuring attitudes and prejudice, the author developed a model
addressing perceptions o f the other, which was termed we/they relationships. The
model includes three components: the perception o f others as (a) separate or different
from, (b) less valuable than, and (c) dangerous to ones own group (Miller-Kustek). The
link to violence and war was also assessed. Findings showed that the tendency to
perceive others as different, to devalue other groups, and to perceive others as threatening
was significantly related to, and even predicted, the acceptance o f planned violence,
including war (Miller-Kustek). The findings demonstrated that the way others were
perceived strongly related to the acceptance o f violence against groups. Negative
perceptions of people of ethnic groups different from ones own were most strongly
related to the acceptance of violence and war (Miller-Kustek). This empirical piece of
evidence demonstrates that, the more one believes that people o f other races are less
valuable, the more one believes in the use of violence (Miller-Kustek). As stated earlier, a
central focus of this study rests in the following hypothesis: the more one holds negative
attitudes toward racial, ethnic and religious groups, the more likely he or she will be to
accept war. Thus, Miller-Kusteks (1989) findings lend support to the proposed
hypothesis in this dissertation.
Correll, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink (2002) also studied the effects o f race on
decisions for violence. The true story of a police shooting o f Diallo, a 22 year-old West
27
African immigrant, who was standing in his own apartment doorway, was used to point
out that it is possible that racism was related to this violence. Diallo resembled a suspect
being tracked by the police, and officers fired 41 shots, 19 o f which hit the suspect who
was unarmed. This case brought to mind the stereotypic association between African
Americans and violence discussed earlier (Eberhardt et al., 2004). It is possible that race
affects interpretation, even when the participant is not aware o f this impact; this
phenomenon may have been exemplified by the number o f shots fired by the police when
they perceived themselves faced with a particular race.
Findings such as these relate to the proposed study in that underlying racism may lead to
acceptance of violent responses.
Based on the Diallo shooting, Correll et al. (2002) conducted four studies using a
videogame to examine shoot or do not shoot decisions when the targets were White
or African American. For the first study, participants were instructed to either shoot or
not shoot the unarmed targets in the videogame. Forty White participants
(undergraduates) made correct decisions to shoot armed targets more quickly when
targets were African American compared to White targets, and they did not shoot
unarmed targets more quickly when they were White. For the second study, 40 White
participants (undergraduates) had a shorter time window in which to make these
decisions. Findings from this study showed that participants mistakenly decided not to
shoot more when the target was armed and White than if he was armed and African
American; and they mistakenly shot the target more if he was unarmed and African
American than if he was White. The first two studies pointed out, that decisions to shoot
28
armed targets are made more quickly and accurately when the target is African American
compared to White, and decisions to not shoot are made more quickly and accurately
when the target is White. Findings were consistent with earlier studies (Blair, & Judd,
2002; Chen & Bargh, 1997; Duncan, 1976; Hilton & von Hippel, 1990; Sagar &
Schofield, 1980) demonstrating that (a) when ambiguous behavior is performed by an
African American, it is perceived as more hostile and threatening than when this behavior
is performed by a White person and that (b) participants recognize weapons more quickly
and accurately when seeing an African American face, as opposed to a White face.
Ultimately, Correll and associates (2002) studies demonstrated that stereotypes influence
behavioral judgments often erroneously.
Additional studies by Correll et. al (2002) and the studies presented above
(Miller-Kustek, 1989; Poynting, 2004; FBI 2005 a & b; Johnson & Friedman, 1989;
Eberhardt, et al. 2004; Correll et. al, 2002 ) indicated that cultural stereotypes, out-group
dislike, prejudice and racism o f particular groups may be even more related to acceptance
of violence, as will be further explored in the following section on Islamophobia.
Islamophobia
One o f the major foci of this dissertation is the study o f negative attitudes and
beliefs about Muslim culture and Islamic religion and the possible relationship of these
attitudes and beliefs to acceptance o f war. Below is a discussion concerning the nature of
negative attitudes and beliefs about Muslim culture and Islamic religion.
Du Bois observed that the problem o f the 20th century was the problem o f the
color line; the 21st century is plagued by a different problem, one that may reach back to
29
pre-modernitynamely, religious identity (Modood, 2005). Even before 9/11, it was
becoming evident that Muslims, not Blacks, were perceived as the other most
threatening to Western society (Modood, 2005). What began as a Black-White division
has been convoluted by cultural racism, Islamophobia, and a challenge to secular
modernity (Modood, 2005).
In response to the events of 9/11, the Administration o f President George W.
Bush advised that the U.S. War on Terrorism was not a war on Islam; regardless, many
Americans viewed it that way. Following the attack of 9/11, a national poll taken by the
University o f Michigan's Institute for Social Research found that 54 percent o f
respondents viewed the attack as motivated by a conflict between Christianity and Islam
(Tessler, 2003). Stereotypes and prejudices toward Islam and Muslims have become
troubling and have been called Islamophobia (Stone, 2004; Rudiger, 2003; Runnymede
Trust, 2004).
Defining Islamophobia
As noted in the previous chapter, Islamophobia refers to negative assumptions,
attitudes, fear, and/or hatred that are held toward Islam and Muslim culture.
Islamophobia embodies a new form o f racism whereby Muslims, an ethno-religious
group, not a race, are nevertheless constructed as a race (Sajid, 2005). In particular,
Sajids theoretical work indicates that Islamophobia can be characterized by the belief
that all or most Muslims (a) are religious fanatics, (b) have violent tendencies toward
non-Muslims, and (c) reject concepts such as equality, tolerance, and democracy,
believing these concepts are directly opposed to Islam (Sajid, 2005).
30
The term "Islamophobia" most often appears in discourse on the condition of
immigrant Muslims living as minorities in the United States, Europe, and Australia
(Sajid, 2005). This, along with other factors such as 9/11, has led to Muslim
communities suffering higher levels of racially motivated violence (Amin, 2002).
The Runnymede Trust (2004) has identified eight components that aid in defining
Islamophobia. This definition, from the 2004 document Islamophobia: A Challenge For
Us A ll, is widely accepted, including by the European Monitoring Center on Racism and
Xenophobia. Following are the eight components:
(a) Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change.
(b) Islam is seen as separate and other. It does not have values in common with other
cultures, is not affected by them, and does not influence them.
(c) Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is seen as barbaric, irrational, primitive, and
sexist.
(d) Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive o f terrorism, and engaged
in a clash o f civilizations.
(I) Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used for political or military advantage.
(g) Criticisms made of the West by Islam are rejected out o f hand.
(h) Hostility toward Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices toward Muslims and
exclusion o f Muslims from mainstream society.
(i) Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal.
Islamophobia is not just an attitude held by individuals; rather, it can be far-
reaching and societal. Institutional Islamophobia refers to the established laws, customs
and practices that systematically reflect and produce inequalities in society between
31
Muslims and non-Muslims (Stone, 2004). If such inequalities accrue to institutional laws,
customs, or practices, an institution is Islamophobic, whether or not the individuals
maintaining those practices have Islamophobic intentions (Commission fo r Racial
Equality, 2005).
Xenophobia
Islamophobia is closely related to the concept o f cultural xenophobia.
Xenophobia, fear of strangers or o f the unknown, comes from the Greek word, qcvorpoflla
(xenophobia). This literally means "fear o f the strange," from ^svoq (.xenos), "strange,"
and (poPoc (phobos), "fear." The term is typically used to describe fear or dislike of
foreigners; however, racism in general is sometimes described as a form o f xenophobia,
as are some prejudices. Basically, xenophobia implies a belief that the target is in some
way alien (Harris, 2001).
Two main objects are targeted in xenophobia (Harris, 2001). The first is a
population group present within a society, which is not considered part o f that society.
Often this target group includes recent immigrants, but xenophobia may be directed
against a group that has been present for centuries. This form o f xenophobia can facilitate
hostile and violent reactions, such as mass expulsion of immigrants. The second form of
xenophobia is primarily cultural, and the object o f the phobia is cultural elements within
a group that are considered alien. All cultures are subject to external influences, but
cultural xenophobia is often narrowly directed (for instance, at foreign influence on a
particular national way o f life) (Harris, 2001).
32
Xenophobia (and as follows, Islamophobia) is closely related to the concept of the
in-group, out-group phenomenon, which was described in the previous section on racism.
The in-group views those o f Muslim or Islamic faith and culture as strangers (the out
group) and holds gross negative generalizations about that group (Islamophobia). It may
also be related to cultural racism as discussed above.
The proposed study focuses on beliefs about Islam and the Muslim culture post-
9/11. Therefore, Islamophobia is defined for the proposed study as an expression o f
negative attitudes held by Americans in regard to Islam and the Muslim culture following
the event of 9/11.
History o f Islamophobia
Islamophobia dates back to the initial expansion o f Islam and grew as a result o f
the crusades (Amin, 2002). The phenomenon has been present in Western culture for
many centuries; for instance, hostility toward Islam and Muslims has been a feature of
European societies since the eighth century (Stone, 2004). In fact, some even argue that
the denigration o f Islamic civilization, associated with Islamophobia, is central to the
very concept o f Western civilization. The marginalizing o f Islam is seen to mark the
debut o f Western civilization and, thus, explains the depth and longevity of Western
Islamophobia (Said, 1981).
However, Islamophobia has taken different forms at different times and has
fulfdled a variety o f functions. For example, the hostility in Spain in the fifteenth century
was not the same as the hostility that had been expressed in the Crusades in the eleventh
through the thirteenth centuries, during the time o f the Ottoman Empire in the fourteenth
33
through the nineteenth centuries, or throughout the age o f empires and colonialism in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Stone, 2004). Thus, it may be more apt to speak o f
"Islamophobias" rather than o f a single phenomenon, with each version of Islamophobia
having its own features, as well as similarities with, and borrowings from, other versions.
Islamophobia in the U.S. Post-9/11
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001 had wide-
ranging effects on U.S. attitudes toward and beliefs about Islam/Muslims and about war
against this group. In particular, Anti-Islamic sentiment surged in the United States after
the 9/11 attack by terrorists (Associated Press, 2002). Since then, anti-Muslim views
were encouraged by a continuing number of terror attacks, including decapitations in
Iraq, as well as a violent attack on school children in Russia (.AP Wire, 2004).
According to Stone (2004), Americans' negative attitudes have manifested in
several ways. First, Islamophobia became prevalent. Second, it was more openly
accepted. Third, Americans have distorted the tenets o f the Muslim culture and faith.
These three issues are discussed below.
Prevalence o f Islamophobia
One main effect o f 9/11 is that Islamophobia has become more widespread
(Ghazali, 2005). Research has shown that negative stereotypes o f Muslims and Islam are
prevalent in the U.S. One study addressed the treatment that American Muslims were
subjected to over a one-year period following the events o f 9/11 (Livengood & Stodolska,
34
2004). The study aimed to establish how discrimination has affected Muslim-Americans'
behavior and to analyze people's responses to discrimination and the strategies they used
to overcome obstacles to their leisure participation. Qualitative, semi-structured
interviews were conducted with 25 individuals from Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq,
Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Turkey, Pakistan, India, Mexico, and Korea. Results indicate
that discrimination has affected Muslim immigrants directly through experiences in
leisure-related settings and while engaged in leisure activities. In specific, the range of
available leisure options and co-participants, their willingness to participate in leisure
activities, and their freedom of movement, travel, timing, and location o f activities have
been restricted. Most o f the discrimination experienced by Muslim-Americans was not of
a physically violent nature and included bad looks, verbal abuse, and social isolation.
Furthermore, American Muslims employed certain negotiation strategies to adapt to their
new environment, such as being vigilant and conscious about their surroundings, walking
in groups, blending in, restricting travel, and modifying travel patterns (Ghazali, 2005).
In contrast, the racism section above presented examples where violent attacks did occur.
Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton (2005) explored implicit and explicit attitudes
toward Muslims and Christians within a predominantly Christian sample in the U.S.
(n=166). Implicit attitudes were assessed with the Implicit Association Test (IAT), a
computer program that recorded reaction times as participants categorized names (of
Christians and Muslims) and adjectives (pleasant or unpleasant). Participants also
completed self-report measures of attitudes toward Christians and Muslims, as well as
some personality constructs known to correlate with ethnocentrism in terms of right-wing
authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and religious fundamentalism. Consistent
35
with social identity theory, participants' self-reported attitudes toward Christians were
more positive than were their self-reported attitudes toward Muslims. Participants also
displayed moderate implicit preference for Christians relative to Muslims. This IAT
effect could also be interpreted as implicit prejudice toward Muslims, as compared to
attitudes toward Christians. A slight positive correlation between implicit and explicit
attitudes was found. As self-reported anti-Arab racism increased using the Anti-Arab
Racism Scale (Pratto et al. 1994), social dominance orientation, right-wing
authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism increased, and self-reported attitudes
toward Muslims became more negative. The same personality variables were associated
with more positive attitudes toward Christians relative to Muslims on the self-report
level, but not on the implicit level (Rowatt et al.). These findings inform the current
studys hypotheses that the more one endorses racism and religious dogmatism (the latter,
which will be discussed in the next section), the more likely he or she will be to endorse
Islamophobia.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11th, 2001 have had a
wide ranging effect on peoples attitudes and beliefs (Coryn, Beale, & Myers, 2003). In a
2003 project, Coryn et al. studied the following variables: (a) feelings o f personal anxiety
created by the events o f 9/11 and the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, (b) levels of
patriotism toward the United States, and (c) subtle and blatant prejudicial attitudes toward
Arabs. Participants were students (n = 301; 174 female, 127 male) at Indiana University,
South Bend. Four rounds of data collection were completed during a period o f 19 months
following the events of September 11th, 2001. The questionnaire included scales for
measuring Patriotism, Prejudice, and Anxiety, as well as a set of sociodemographic
36
measures. Items for the three primary scales were adapted from existing measures.
Prejudice was measured using a ten-item Blatant Prejudice Scale (BPS) and a nine-item
Subtle Prejudice Scale (SPS). Originally designed to measure prejudice among British
people toward individuals from the West Indies, these scales were adapted directly from
Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) by substituting British with American and West
Indian or people from the West Indies with Arab or Arabic people. Levels of
patriotism were measured using Kosterman and Feshbachs (1989) 12-item Patriotism
scale. All o f the items made statements about patriotism in regards to feelings about the
flag, country pledge o f allegiance or countrymen. Anxiety was measured with the widely
used Impact o f Events Scale or IES (Sundin & Horowitz, 2002). This scale measures
levels of anxiety with respect to some traumatic event (e.g., rape). For this study, the
authors indicted terrorist attacks as the potentially distressing event. On the second
page, the questionnaire contained a picture o f a smiling Arabic Muslim man holding a
poster of George W. Bush. The purpose o f this image was two-fold: to help place
participants in the mindset o f Arab-American relations and to provide an independent
variable manipulation. Beneath this picture was a caption stating that the photo was
taken in Pakistan at either a rally in support of, or in protest against, U.S. involvement in
the region. As initially predicted, the relationships between each pair o f the three major
attitudinal variables (prejudice, patriotism, and anxiety) were significant positive
correlations. In general, the more people were anxious about terrorist attacks, the more
they were prejudiced toward Arabic people, and the more they reported stronger patriotic
attachment to the United States. As predicted, findings indicated that the anxiety
concerning the events o f 9/11 coincided with greater patriotic attachment toward the
37
United States and increased prejudicial attitudes toward the target group, Arabic people.
Further, there were no significant differences between round one and round four, just
after the beginning of offensive military operations in the second G ulf War. Also
correlated were participants expressed fear o f the reoccurrence o f terrorism, stronger
patriotic and nationalistic attachments, anger at the Islamic terrorists, fear o f and
prejudice toward foreigners, and a desire for revenge (Coryn et al., 2003).
Davidi (2004) also explored factors that predict attitudes toward Muslims post
9/11. The study investigated the relationship between stress-related symptoms and
attitudes toward Muslims and the relationship between vengefulness and attitudes
towards Muslims. Participants were a nationwide sample via internet questionnaire,
(n=l 14) 65 males and 49 females and all non-Muslim. The questionnaire consisted o f the
Vengeance Scale (Lerner, 2002), which measured the effects of fear and anger on
perceived risk of terrorism; the Impact o f Major Event Scale (Horowitz, 1979), which
measured current subjective distress as a result of any specific life event, and the
Attitudes Toward Muslims Scale (Altareb, 1997), which measured racist attitudes and
stereotypes towards Muslims. Findings indicated that the more stress-related symptoms a
person reported as a result o f September 11th, the more likely he or she would be to hold
negative attitudes towards Muslims. Findings also indicated that the more vengeful an
individual was, the more that individual held negative attitudes towards Muslims. The
above studies inform the current study in that the more one endorses negative attitudes
and beliefs about Muslim culture and Islamic religion, the more likely he or she will be to
endorse Islamophobia, racism and possibly violence such as war.
38
These results, combined with the empirical data on violence in the previous
section, indicate a relationship between Islamophobia and violence and possibly the
acceptance o f war attitudes.
Manifestations o f Islamophobia
Another possible outcome o f 9/11 is the oppression o f Muslims civil rights
(Hanley, 2002). For example, in a 2004 Cornell University poll, 44 percent of the 715
respondents said that Muslims civil rights should be curtailed (Ghazali, 2004). In
addition, 27 percent o f respondents said all Muslim-Americans should be forced to
register where they are with the federal government, and 26 percent believed police
should closely monitor mosques.
In addition, Twair and Twair (2002) presented a summary o f a Muslim-hosted
media panel regarding coverage o f the 9/11 aftermath. Comments were that the 9/11
attacks included perpetrators that were acting in the Muslim name and that, until this
attack, most Americans were uninformed about Islam. It was also noted that following
the attack, massive hysteria resulted, as the Justice Department attempted to round up
Arab-Americans and Muslims (Twair & Twair, 2002). Thus, Muslims appear to be the
target of systemic discrimination since 9/11.
Muslims have experienced direct and indirect, as well as overt and subtle, attacks
since the events o f 9/11. Some hostility has been overt: directly, Muslims have been
verbally and physically attacked in public places, and, indirectly, their mosques and
cemeteries have been desecrated (Stone, 2004), as described above. Likewise, more
39
subtly, Muslims have been victims o f anti-Muslim hostility and discrimination. For
example, they have experienced (a) problematic recruitment and employment practices
and workplace cultures and customs; (b) bureaucratic delays and inertia in response to
their requests for education and healthcare and in planning applications for mosques; (c)
lack o f attention to the fact that they are disproportionately affected by poverty and social
exclusion; (d) non-recognition by law for their religion; (e) anomalies in public order
legislation, such that they are less protected against incitement to hatred than are
members of certain other religions; and (f) laws curtailing civil liberties that
disproportionately affect them (Stone, 2004). Yet another illustration o f Islamophobia is
the reaction o f some conservatives to a plan by the University o f North Carolina to assign
a book on Islam to incoming freshmen (Tessler, 2003). The Family Policy Network, a
conservative Christian organization, filed suit against the university. Fox News Network
talk-show host, Bill O'Reilly, denounced the teaching o f "our enemy's religion" and
compared the assignment to teaching Mein K am pf in 1941 (Tessler, 2003).
Negative stereotypes and remarks have been heard in speeches by political
leaders, implying that Muslims are less committed than are others to democracy and the
rule of law (Stone, 2004). In November 2001, the Republican Congressman, Saxby
Chambliss (GA), told Georgia law officers to Just turn (the sheriff) loose and have him
arrest every Muslim that crosses the state line (Islamophobia Watch, 2002, ][ 6).
Additionally, Jean-Marie Le Pen, a French Presidential Candidate, has said, "These
elements [referring to Muslims] have a negative effect on all o f public security. They are
strengthened demographically both by natural reproduction and by immigration, which
reinforces their stubborn ethnic segregation, their domineering nature. This is the world
40
o f Islam in all its aberrations" (Islamophobia Watch, 2002, | 4, emphasis added). And
Ann Coulter, a conservative legal correspondent for Human Events and a writer o f a
popular syndicated column for Universal Press Syndicate, wrote, "We should invade their
countries, kill their leaders and convert them to Christianity" ( Islamophobia Watch,
2002, ^ 3). Similarly, Michael Savage, an American nationally syndicated conservative
talk show host of The Savage Nation, said, "I think these people [Arabs and Muslims]
need to be forcibly converted to Christianity ... It's the only thing that can probably turn
them into human beings" (Islamophobia Watch, 2003, f 4, emphasis added).
Furthermore, an American Baptist Minister, Jerry Vines, differentiated the Christian from
the Islam religion as such: "Christianity was founded by the virgin-born Jesus Christ.
Islam was founded by Mohammed, a demon-possessed pedophile who had 12 wives, and
his last one was a 9-year-old girl" (Islamophobia Watch, 2003, | 8, emphasis added).
Consistent with research on racism, Islamophobia, or negative attitudes and
beliefs about Muslim culture, appears to have increased post 9/11. However, we dont
know how such beliefs may be related to attitudes toward war. The next section will
discuss another possible factor related to the acceptance of war, Islamophobia and racism,
namely, religious dogmatism.
Religious Dogmatism
Defining Religious Dogmatism
Relationships between religious beliefs and doctrines and war and violence have
been the focus of many studies (Altemeyer 1998; 1996; 1988; Feather, 1996; Jost, Glaser,
Kruglanski, & Sullaway, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth,
41
1997; Rokeach, 1960; Sullaway, 2004). This section will examine religious dogmatism as
it relates to racism and to attitudes toward war. This is particularly relevant to the present
study, as Islam has a religious base and peoples prejudice may be related to their degree
o f dogmatism.
Dogmatism
Religious dogmatism rests on the foundation o f a particular dogma. A dogma is a
belief or doctrine held by a religion or any kind o f socio-political organization to be
authoritative or beyond question (Armstrong, 2000). Dogmata are found in religions
including Christianity and Islam, where they are considered to be core principles that
must be upheld by all followers of that particular religion (Mattil, 2004).
The definition for religious dogmatism in the present study relies on both
Rokeachs (1960) and Altemeyers (1998; 1996; 1988) descriptions o f the construct.
Rokeach (1960) argues that dogmatism is indicative o f closed-mindedness and describes
belief systems as being conflictual:
All belief systems serve two powerful and conflicting sets o f motives at the same
time: the need fo r a cognitive fram ework to know and to understand and the need
to ward o ff threatening aspects o f reality...as the need to ward off threat becomes
stronger, the cognitive need to know becomes weaker, resulting in more closed
belief systems, (p. 67, emphasis added)
Given that religious dogmatism is close-minded in style and based on a need to ward off
threats that outweigh a need to know and understand (particularly when in danger), it is
proposed that, in the context of the threatening events o f 9/11, religious dogmatism will
42
likely be related to racist and pro-war attitudes. Furthermore, it is proposed that, given
the closed belief systems, religious dogmatism is likely to be related to Islamophobia.
Altemeyers (1998) work is important in identifying the two primary directions in
which dogmatic attitudes may lead. First, dogmatic attitudes lock people into a
dominance-submissive authoritarian embrace (Altemeyer, p. 47), in which those who
espouse a particular dogma take on a submissive posture toward authorities who enforce
that dogma. Second, Altemeyer indicates dogmatic attitudes may lead to an actively
hostile approach in dealing with socially and culturally sanctioned out-groups, sometimes
resulting in war. Along these lines, it is proposed that the more religiously dogmatic
someone is, the more likely they are to be influenced by authorities who endorse war.
For instance, in terms of the United States, President Bush (2002) spoke of conflict
between good and evil, and refers to terrorists as evil doers. More religiously
dogmatic people may be more highly influenced by religious rhetoric, since it comes
from an authority that speaks to their religious dogma. Furthermore, the more religiously
dogmatic people are, the more likely they are to endorse a hostile approach toward those
who do not fit into their religious group in this case, war against Islam.
A more recent description o f religious dogmatism comes from the American
Psychological Association. In her address to the 110th Convention o f the American
Psychological Association in 2002, Dane described religious or ideological dogmatism as
(a) dualist, since the world is viewed as divided into "us" and "them," with no neutrals;
(b) Manichean, in that our party is Good, while their party is Evil; and (c) poised for
Armageddon, since there can be only one outcome, the final battle. Dane (2002) further
43
argues that dogmatism is permanent pre-polarization and describes that the harder
varieties of the three Abrahamitic religions namely, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
experience the CGT-syndrome (Choseness, Glory, Trauma). Choseness refers to a
chosen people under God and to a promised/sacred land; glory refers to a glorious past
and/or future; and trauma refers to a people under permanent PTSD. Therefore, people
who are more religiously dogmatic believe that they are more special in Gods eyes and
deserve to have the promised land and glory God has intended for them. The problem
is that each o f these groups Muslims, Jews, and Christians believe their group is
rightfully entitled to these benefits, at the exclusion o f the other groups. According to
Dane (2002), in the case o f 9/11, extremist Islamic fundamentalists executed terrorist acts
because they believed they were the chosen people, whose mission was to fight for the
preservation and glory of their God and people. The author of the present study argues
that, in response to the Islamic terrorists, more religiously dogmatic people in the U.S.
(and other nations) may have been more likely to resort to war as a way to preserve their
own sense o f chosenness and glory. Dane believes that in the standard U.S. discourse,
terrorism and dogmatism only apply to the "other"; yet she points out that exceptionalism,
the idea of being entitled to exceptional, violent-illegal action because o f an exceptional
status, is so much a part of the U.S. self-image that it becomes a truism and takes the
form o f dogmatic actions such as violence and war.
Nelson and Millbum (1999) proposed that militaristic attitudes are nested within
a value system and worldview that gives high priority to the achievement and
maintenance o f power, authority, and superiority for ones self and ones identity groups
(p. 161). Using Nelson and Millburns theory, Cohrs, Moschner, Maes and Kielmann
44
(2005) studied psychological determinants o f militaristic attitudes and attitudes toward
specific wars which they analyzed on the basis o f two waves o f a large German survey on
attitudes after September 11, 2001 (n= 1,548). Among the findings was a relationship
between more right-wing authoritarianism, more social dominance orientation and more
positive attitudes toward the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. This study demonstrates that
right wing authoritarianism and social dominance, two variables directly related to
religious dogmatism (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sullaway, 2003) were predictors toward
wars. In particular, wars which include the out-group under study, Muslims. Thus, a
possibility o f a relationship between dogmatism and acceptance o f war exists.
Fundamentalism and Dogmatism
Although, the term fundamentalism is often used in this study, including the
Religious Fundamentalism scale (Altemeyer, 1998), the author views this term inaccurate
as the scale actually captures more dogmatic characteristics. Below is a description of
how the two terms, fundamentalism and dogmatism, though related, are different.
Fundamentalism is characterized in terms o f a mind set (Conway & Siegelman,
1982), whereas dogmatism (Rokeach, 1960), is characterized as a closed belief system
and related to authoritarian principles (Altemeyer, 1981).
The term fundamentalist derives from a 1909 publication, "The Fundamentals: A
Testimony to the Truth, " which proposed five required Christian beliefs for those opposed
to the Modernist movement (Armstrong, 2000). Originally a technical theological term,
it became commonly used after the Scopes trial in Tennessee during the mid 1920s. By
the late 1930s, Christian fundamentalists had formed a dogmatic sub-culture and had
45
largely withdrawn from the rest of society. Following major revisions to Roman Catholic
beliefs and practices during the Vatican II conferences in the 1960s, the term
fundamentalist started to be used to refer to Catholics who rejected the changes and
wished to retain traditional beliefs and practices. Thus, it became a commonly used word
to describe the most conservative groups within Christianity both Protestant and
Catholic (Armstrong, 2000).
Armstrong (2000) argues that the term fundamentalist has been extensively
misused by the media to refer to terrorists who happen to be Muslim or who are anti-
American Muslims. In reality, fundamentalist Islam is simply the conservative wing o f
Islam, just as fundamentalist Christianity is the conservative wing o f Christianity. The
vast majority of Muslim fundamentalists are individuals who strictly follow the teachings
of Mohammed and who promote regular attendance at mosques and reading the Qur'an
(Armstrong, 2000), just as a predominant number o f Christian fundamentalists strictly
follow the teachings o f Jesus and promote regular attendance at churches and reading the
Bible. In other words, Islam fundamentalists are not synonymous with terrorists.
However, due to previous research connecting the two terms, dogmatism and
fundamentalism (Altemeyer, 1998; 1996; 1988; Feather, 1996; Jost et al. 2003;
Kirkpatrick, 1993; Peterson et al., 1997; Rokeach, 1960; Sullaway, 2004), they are often
used interchangeably. However, as stated earlier, the above authors measured more
dogmatic characteristics and used the term fundamentalism because it was being widely
used and accepted to describe dogmatic attitudes.
46
Studying the Construct Religious Dogmatism
Empirical data on religious dogmatism per se and its relationship to prejudice,
violence, and war is limited. Therefore, the author o f the present study has looked at
studies using constructs related to religious dogmatism, such as authoritarianism, right-
wing authoritarianism, dogmatism, fundamentalism, conservatism, intolerance of
ambiguity, uncertainty avoidance, and social dominance orientation. The authors search
was guided by the fact that many o f these terms were found by Jost et al. (2003) to be
included in studies about religious dogmatism. A meta-analysis (88 samples, 12
countries, 22,818 cases) was conducted to find psychological variables that predicted
religious dogmatism. Using all o f these related terms, findings overwhelmingly point out
that religious dogmatism is linked to violence. Some of these terms, as well as how they
relate to religious dogmatism, are discussed below.
Terms such as conservatism are connected to religious dogmatism in that they
suggest a preference for order, stability, and existing norms; a need for authority;
punishment of deviants; and the endorsement o f inequality (Jost et al., 2003). According
to Jost et al., political conservatism can manifest in terms of religious dogmatism,
resistance to scientific progress, and preference for convention. Conservatism and
authoritarianism lead to hostile and dominant approaches: scapegoats are sanctioned,
out-groups are devalued, and social dominance is coveted. Individuals espousing this
perspective are rigid, closed-minded, and intolerant o f ambiguity. Given this profile, the
dogmatic mind is resistant to change and is likely to react negatively to foreigners,
complexity, threats o f uncertainty, dissent, and social change (Jost et al., 2003).
47
The term right-wing authoritarianism is proposed to be related to religious
dogmatism because, like people who are religiously dogmatic, right-wing authoritarians
place a high value on conformity, security, and tradition, and a low value on liberalism,
open-mindedness, and hedonism (Feather, 1996). Furthermore, right-wing authoritarians
are likely to view the world as dangerous and, therefore, emphasize security and power
rather than self-direction or universalism. These attitudes are correlated with the belief
that punishment and retribution are necessary. In-group membership is a factor in
attitudes, with less punitive attitudes being evident toward an in-group member who has
committed the same crime as an out-group member (Feather, 1996).
Conservatism and right-wing authoritarianism relate to religious dogmatism,
which in turn is linked to superstition, ethnocentrism, punitiveness, militarism, rigid
morality, and outcomes such as war (Altemeyer, 1998; 1996; 1988; Feather, 1996; Jost et
al. 2003; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Peterson et al., 1997; Rokeach, 1960; Sullaway, 2004).
According to Dane (2002), religious dogmatism provides individuals with the ability to
transcend death, justify inequality, and defend their certainty. Furthermore, people who
are religiously dogmatic do not merely hold dogmatic beliefs, but to make sense o f the
world, they often hold attitudes that help maintain such dogmatic beliefs (Altemeyer
1998; Adorno et al., 1950). In the case o f the current study, it is proposed that these
attitudes may include racism and the acceptance o f violence and war.
Dogmatism and Prejudice
Several empirical studies have related dogmatism to prejudice. As one might
expect, religious dogmatism (the third predictor variable in this study) and prejudice
48
(which is closely related to racism, the first predictor variable in this study) have been
found to be related.
Kirkpatrick (1993) studied the correlation between fundamentalism, orthodoxy,
and prejudice. Kirkpatrick defined orthodoxy as the acceptance of well defined, central
tenets of religion (p.318), and orthodoxy was assessed using the Christian Orthodoxy
scale developed by Hunsberger (1989). Kirkpatrick defined fundamentalism in terms o f
something other than a belief content particularly, the boundary-maintenance function,
closed belief system and right-wing authoritarianism and used the Fundamentalism scale
by McFarland (1989). Five samples of college students, representing three universities in
the United States and Canada (n = 426), completed religion scales and measures of
discriminatory attitudes toward Blacks, women, homosexuals, and communists.
Findings indicated that fundamentalism was more positively correlated than was
orthodoxy with discriminatory attitudes toward all targets. In multiple regression
equations, fundamentalism was positively related to all measures of discriminatory
attitudes, whereas orthodoxy and intrinsic religious orientation were either unrelated or
negatively related to these variables.
Kirkpatricks findings indicate that the study of religion can be measured in
varying dimensions. For example, orthodoxy was operationalized in terms o f theological
beliefs common to virtually all Christian churches. In contrast, from a sociological
perspective, fundamentalism generally has been characterized as a boundary-maintenance
function, in which individuals form and maintain strict boundaries based on their
particular belief systems (Ethridge & Feagin, 1979; Flood, Morris, & Watson, 1986).
And again, the psychological perspective characterizes fundamentalism in terms of
49
having a closed belief-system or mindset that is likened to right-wing authoritarianism
and dogmatism (Conway & Siegelman, 1982; Rokeach, 1960; Altemeyer, 1981). In
short, fundamentalism predicted prejudice, while religiousness or orthodoxy did not.
Thus, espousing strict religious beliefs does not in-and-of-itself necessarily correlate with
being prejudiced. This finding is important because it distinguishes between people who
are orthodox (who strictly adhere to particular theological beliefs) and people who are
fundamentalist or dogmatic (who strive to maintain rigid boundaries between themselves
and others). It is important to note that these results indicate that it is not religion or
religiosity, but rather, religious dogmatism that is more related to prejudice.
Kirkpatricks study is consistent with the current dissertations hypothesis in that the
more religiously dogmatic people are, the more likely they will be to have racist attitudes.
Studies on Dogmatism and Violence
Religious dogmatism is proposed to not only be related to prejudice, but also to
violence and war attitudes. Again, constructs related to religious dogmatism are relied
upon in this discussion.
Feather (1996) conducted two studies, one with 220 and the other with 181
participants, all from a metropolitan area in South Australia. In the first study, variables
that are assumed to influence affective and cognitive reactions to penalties for domestic
violence, plagiarism, and shoplifting were studied, and in the second study, resistance of
a police order in a protest against logging was considered. In both studies, findings
showed that right-wing authoritarianism and related values influenced perceived
seriousness of crimes and were mediators in reactions to violence. Specifically, right-
50
wing authoritarians were more likely to perceive the crimes as serious and to react with
violence. Thus, the link between right-wing authoritarianism and violence was implied.
Since right-wing authoritarianism has been established to be related to religious
dogmatism (Altemeyer, 1998; 1996; 1988; Feather, 1996; Jost et al., 2003; Kirkpatrick,
1993; Peterson et al., 1997; Rokeach, 1960; Sullaway, 2004), the author of the present
study argues that religious dogmatism may also be related to violence.
Sullaway (2004) investigated studies o f psychological perspectives related to hate
crime laws by presenting statistics covering 42 states that have hate crime laws. Hate
crimes were defined as those in which a person is victimized due to group membership
such as religion, color, race, sexual orientation, or national origin. Examples o f hate
crimes include those that followed the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon; following these attacks, 1,450 hate crimes against perceived
Muslims were reported in the U.S. during a four-month period. O f these, eight resulted
in the death of the victim. Hate crime offenders perceive the outsider as a threat to their
community or way o f life. Sullaway (2004) concluded that biased violence takes place in
the context of environmental factors, such as legal and political. In addition, Sullaway
proposed that psychological factors affect hate crimes, as well as the laws against these
crimes. For example, hate crime laws are committed due to psychological factors such as
prejudiced motivations, attitudes, behaviors, emotions, and inter-group relations. While
many psychological factors may be related to this perception (e.g., an outsider being the
threat), Sullaway (2004) concluded that authoritarianism is the factor most related to
actual violence. Authoritarianism is defined as a rigid attitude with an exaggerated inter
group bias. Authoritarian people tend to be more obsessed with and against diversity,
51
race mixing, gender role changes, and immigration. Again, these attitudes are found to
be related to religious dogmatism, which includes qualities such as ethnocentrism, rigid
morality, and punitive attitudes (including retribution through war) (Conway &
Siegelman, 1982; Rokeach, 1960; Altemeyer, 1981). Thus one could expect religious
dogmatism to also be related to attitudes toward war as will be proposed in the present
study.
O'Neil, Patry, and Penrod (2004) explored the effects o f attitudes toward the death
penalty, which they focused on as a form o f violence, on capital sentencing verdicts.
These authors stated that, in accordance with previous research, authoritarianism and
dogmatism correlate with death penalty support: more authoritarian people tend to be
more punitive, with retributive motives. O Neil et al. (2004) used a 15-item, 5-factor
scale in 11 capital jury decision-making studies, designed with factors o f
authoritarianism, dogmatism, vengefulness, social desirability, belief in a just world, fear
o f crime, beliefs in due process, and attitudes toward crime and punishment.
Authoritarianism, dogmatism, vengeance, and punitive attitudes correlated with each
other. Findings showed that while case facts, such as future dangerousness of the
defendant, moderated ratings, these facts were more related to sentencing verdicts.
Qualities of authoritarianism, dogmatism, vengeance, punitiveness, and concern for due
process were related to death penalty support; belief in a just world and fear of crime
were related to beliefs that the death penalty would protect citizens. Thus,
authoritarianism, dogmatism, the perception of a dangerous world, as well as the need to
keep the world safe and just all concepts that have been linked to religious
dogmatism were related to violence.
52
Religious Dogmatism and the Iraq War
Unger (2005) looked at responses to the Iraq War in a nationwide sample of
college and university students (n=439) that looked at how individual characteristics and
group labels influenced their responses to the Iraq War. The study focused mainly on the
role of sex, religiosity, and the location of the school in a red or blue state. Support
for the war was measured by an instrument comprising two independent factors -
patriotic militancy and internationalism. As expected, support for the war in Iraq
was significantly higher among students who considered themselves religiously involved
than among students who rated themselves as more secular. Theoretical explanations for
this relationship include the view that ideological values motivate certain kinds of
cognitions consistent with a conservative stance; the idea that hierarchical religions tend
to foster authoritarian views as well as social dominance orientation consistent with
nationalism; and the theory that various forms o f ideologies foster them and us thinking
in religious fundamentalists independent o f their particular religious identity (Unger,
2002).
To demonstrate the above theory, Unger (2002) examined three instruments; the
Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale, the Social Dominance Orientation Scale, and the
Attitudes About Reality Scale were used. Findings indicated that the scales share similar
ideological components involving abdication o f moral responsibility to an outside agent,
a belief that one's own ideology represents the only form o f truth, and negative beliefs
about individuals who are not members o f one's own group. Unger postulated that radical
fundamentalists would probably score high on all three measures. These worldviews
share certain features, including abdication o f moral responsibility to a source outside
53
oneself, maintenance o f attitudes and behaviors that value ones own group at the
expense of other deviant groups, and closing oneself off from experiences and
viewpoints that might influence the worldview one possess. These ideology maintaining
mechanisms make it easy for people to believe that there is no true worldview other than
their own and to demonize others who do not recognize their truth as reality. These
beliefs make it easy for them to divide the world into "us" and "them" and exacerbate the
present conflict post-9/11.
In summary, the studies discussed above support the idea that religious
dogmatism is related to both prejudice and violence. The author o f the present study
hypothesizes that religious dogmatism and racism will be related, in that the more one
endorses religious dogmatism the more likely he or she will be to endorse racism. It is
also hypothesized that the more one endorses religious dogmatism the more likely he or
she will be to accept war. The next section will discuss the concept o f war.
War
Defining War
In the following section, studies dealing with attitudes toward war are examined.
This subject is of the greatest importance in the present study because a major objective
is to explore attitudes and beliefs that may perpetuate war. War is a part of a larger
scheme of how the world is understood and what we think it should be like (Holt, 1984;
Johnson et al., 1987). According to Johnson, et al., (1987), war is impartially viewed as
54
large-scale, organized conflict between groups. Many cultural values, such as
hierarchical, social dominance, devaluing of others (Rosenthal & Johnson, 1989) and
hegemonic attitudes (Schwartz, 1992), have been found to be related to accepting war.
Further, values that legitimate self-enhancement, power and achievement (Begue &
Apostolidis, 2000) along with social power, wealth, preserving public image, ambition,
hedonism (Mayton, Peters, & Owens, 1999) and nationalism (Kosterman & Fechback
1987) have also been found to be related to accepting war. Johnson, et al.(1987) found
that the value o f power, materialism, traditional male roles, lack o f interconnectedness,
beliefs in nationalism and low acceptance o f internationalism, just to name a few, are all
parts of the cultural value system that supports war.
According to Hinde and Pulkinnen (2000), war is a complex system. Perhaps the
most important characteristic o f international war is a marked degree o f role
differentiation. For example, it is in the interests of leaders to enhance the distinctive
identity, and thus the integrity and cohesiveness, o f their group. This is especially the
case within a fighting unit, where the need for in-group cooperation makes it essential for
social identity to be augmented and for the perceptions that individuals have of
themselves as unique and autonomous to be downplayed. According to Hinde and
Pulkinnen (2000), the image o f the in-group must be enhanced, the out-group denigrated,
and the difference between them emphasized. Previously, in this review, attitudes toward
group differences and how these attitudes may relate to violence and war were explored.
Racial, ethnic and religious conflicts were found to be potent psychological problems
confronting society today and related to violence and war. According to Davis (1992),
racial, cultural and religious groups remain at odds because o f the belief that real and
55
perceived differences between groups somehow mean that one group is superior to
another. Many authors have proposed that such attitudes and beliefs result in violence
and war (Adorno, 1950; Altemeyer, 1998; Correll et al., 2002; Coryn et al., 2003; Dane,
2002; Eberhardt et al., 2004; Feather, 1996; Fiske, 2000; Ghazali, 2005; Jost et al., 2003;
Kirkpatrick, 1993; Miller-Kustek, 1989; Modood, 2005; Poynting, 2004; Stone, 2004),
and several have found evidence o f empirical relationships (Altemeyer, 1998; Criss &
Johnson, 1993; Cohrs et al., 2005; Feshbach & White, 1986; Kiesel, 1990; Johnson &
Friedman, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Miller-Kustek, 1989; Unger, 2005)
As previously discussed, in a study that further explores the complexities of
attitudes regarding racism and in-group / out-group dynamics, Miller-Kustek (1989)
defined the components of we/they attitudes and showed the relationships between such
attitudes and the acceptance o f war and planned violence against groups. Milller-Kustek
defined we / they relationships as those characterized by (a) the tendency to separate
people into groups, some of which are perceived as different from ones own group, (b)
the tendency to perceive those groups defined as different as bad or less valuable, and (c)
the tendency to perceive those groups defined as different as dangerous or threatening
(p.73). Miller-Kustek found that the tendencies to perceive others as different, to devalue
those in other groups, and to perceive others as threatening were significantly related to
acceptance of planned violence, including war. Furthermore, racist attitudes were
significantly related to acceptance of war (Miller-Kustek). These finding support the
devastating effects of in-group / out-group relationships and racism as a predictor to
violence and war.
56
More specifically, Poynting (2004) attempted to portray concisely some of the
experiences o f racism amongst Arab and Muslim background since the attacks that took
place on September 11th 2001. Using a quantitative survey and face-to-face interviews,
this study examined the extent to which these groups have encountered increased or more
intense forms of racism, abuse and violence. The nature o f these experiences o f racism
varied widely, from the most egregious forms o f physical violence or threats o f violence,
to active discrimination in workplaces and other sites, to verbal abuse and general
feelings of discomfort. The perpetrators o f these various acts were typically identified by
respondents as of English-speaking background, and more often male than female.
Religion was cited as the most common reason for these acts, as perceived by the
interviewees, while some o f the abuse clearly indicated references to terrorism and other,
domestic events that have become ideologically linked to people o f Islamic faith. One o f
the most disturbing findings of the study was the frequency o f these incidents of racism -
these were often everyday experiences, and acceptance was commonplace by the
interviewees. The pervasive nature o f these incidents suggest that, for many citizens o f
Arab and Muslim background, racism, abuse and violence form part o f an everyday
landscape o f fear and incivility (Poynting, 2004). These findings inform the current
studys hypothesis in that the more one endorses negative attitudes toward Muslim
culture and Islamic religion, the more likely he or she will endorse pro-war attitudes.
Violence, abuse and racism toward Muslims has been called Islamophobia (Amin,
2002; Ghazali, 2005; Sajid, 2005; Stone, 2004 ) and have been linked to social
dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism, correlates o f religious dogmatism
and pro-war attitudes (Livengood & Stodolska, 2004; Modood, 2005; Rowatt et al., 2005;
57
Coryn et al., 2003) . Researchers have found that noncreedal religious dogmatism
correlated positively with self-report prejudices (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992;
Kirkpatrick, 1993; Laythe et al., 2002; Rowatt et al., 2005; Wylie & Forest, 1992). As
discussed previously, Rowatt et al. (2005) explored attitudes toward Muslims within a
predominantly Christian sample and found that as self reported anti-Arab racism, social
dominance orientation right-wing authoritarianism, and religious dogmatism increased,
self report attitudes toward Muslims became more negative. The above study supports the
current studys hypothesis that the more one endorses Islamophobia, the more likely he or
she will be to endorse religious dogmatic attitudes.
As discussed previously, religious dogmatism has been related to violence and
war (Altemeyer, 1998; 1996; 1988; Feather, 1996; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sullaway,
2003; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Peterson, Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997; Rokeach, 1960;
Sullaway, 2004). Another study mentioned previously by Cohrs et al. (2005) explored
personal values and attitudes toward war. These authors found that social dominance
orientation and right-wing authoritarianism (correlates o f religious dogmatism) were
related to positive attitudes toward the Afghanistan and Iraq wars. This study informs the
current studys hypothesis that the more one endorses religious dogmatism, the more
likely he or she will be to endorse more accepting attitudes toward war. Unger (2004)
also investigated religious dogmatism and attitudes toward war by looking at responses to
the Iraq war in a nationwide sample o f college students. One o f the studys foci was
religiosity and dogmatic attitudes. The Attitudes about Terrorism and War scale was used
to measure patriotic militancy, defined as ethnocentric justification for aggressive action
against putative enemies, the tendency to conflate different inimical out-groups, demands
58
for in-group unity, and a willingness to trade some freedoms for security. As expected,
support for the war in Iraq was significantly higher among students who considered
themselves religiously involved than among students who rated themselves as more
secular. The results are explained not in terms o f religious involvement or affiliation but
in terms of political rhetoric that focused on religious dogmatism as well as on the
reduced importance of feminism as an ideological stance. This study informs the current
studys hypothesis that the more one endorses religious dogmatic attitudes, the more
likely he or she will be to accept war.
The preceding review o f the literature has provided an overview of racism,
Islamophobia, religious dogmatism, and attitudes toward war. Research findings
consistently point out that these factors are interrelated. Following the 9/11 attacks, the
following happened: most of the American people supported military action and war
against terrorism in the Middle East (Coryn et al., 2004); most American Muslims and
Arabs experienced an increase in racism (Poynting, 2004); hate crimes increased (FBI,
2005); and Americans developed new views o f religion related to war attitudes (McClay,
2004).
Furthermore, empirical research demonstrates that religious dogmatism is related
to negative images and cognitions about nations (Hewstone et al., 1993). In addition,
enemy images (in this case, images of Muslims) are related to American attitudes and
cognitions regarding other nations (Silverstein, 1989), and cognitions are an important
determinant o f conflict resolution and war attitudes (Golec & Federico, 2004).
59
The need persists to directly and empirically study the constructs racism,
Islamophobia, religious dogmatism, and war attitudes, as well as the interrelationships
between these constructs. Below are the presented hypotheses.
Hypotheses
Following are the hypotheses for this study.
Hypothesis 1
Racism will be positively related to religious dogmatism. In specific, the more
one endorses racism the more likely he or she will be to endorse more religious dogmatic
attitudes.
Hypothesis 2
Islamophobia will be positively related to religious dogmatism. In specific, the
more one endorses negative attitudes and beliefs about the Muslim culture and Islamic
religion, the more likely he or she will be to endorse more religious dogmatic attitudes.
Hypothesis 3
Racism will be positively related to Islamophobia. In specific, the more one endorses
racism, the more likely he or she will be to endorse negative attitudes and beliefs about
Muslim culture.
60
Hypothesis 4
Racism will be positively related to war acceptance. In specific, the more one
endorses racism, the more likely he or she will be to accept pro-war attitudes.
Hypothesis 5
Islamophobia will be positively related to increased war acceptance. In specific,
the more one endorses Islamophobia, the more likely he or she will be to accept pro-war
attitudes.
Hypothesis 6
Religious dogmatism will be positively related to increased war acceptance. In
specific, the higher ones level o f religious dogmatism, the more likely one is to hold war
acceptance attitudes.
Hypothesis 7
Racism, Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism together will be positively related to
increased war acceptance.
61
CHAPTER III
METHODS
Introduction
The purpose o f this study is to explore the relationship between attitudes toward
racism, Islamophobia, religious dogmatism and war. This chapter describes the research
methods used in this study, including participant selection, research design,
instrumentation, and procedures.
Origins of the data
Archival data is being used for this dissertation. The original data resulted from a
collaborative effort in which data was collected by Dr. Paula Johnson, the current author
and five associates in the spring o f 2002. An original survey was constructed and
consisted o f an introductory letter; eight scales equaling 95 items; Racism Scale, Muslim
Cultural Beliefs Scale (Islamophobia), Religious Fundamentalism Scale, War Scale,
Internationalism Scale, Nationalism Scale, Sexism Scale and Environmentalism Scale;
and 15 demographic items (see Appendix B & C for the introductory letter and
demographic page). For this dissertation, the author used 53 o f the items which make up
four of the scales: Racism, Muslim Cultural Beliefs, Religious Fundamentalism and War
scales (see Appendix A for each).
Description of the Sample
Participants consisted of 200 adult volunteers, in the Southern California and the
New York area. Participants were recruited from Los Angeles, San Diego, and Orange
62
Counties, as well as the five borrows o f New York: Manhattan, Brooklyn, Staten Island,
Queens, and the Bronx. No differences were found between the New York sample. A
snowball methodology (Bailey, 1978) was used to gather the sample utilizing an
acquaintance network. The participants were above the age o f 18 and an effort was made
to include a wide range o f participants, both male and female who were ethnically and
culturally varied.
Design
The design o f the study is correlational. The hypotheses were tested using three
independent variables and one dependent variable. The independent variables are as
follows: (a) racism as measured by the Racism scale, (b) Islamophobia as measured by
Muslim Cultural Beliefs scale, and (c) religious dogmatism as measured by the Religious
Fundamentalism scale. The dependent variable is war, as measured by the WAR scale.
Instrumentation
This section will describe the scales used to measure racism, Islamophobia,
religious dogmatism and war. Reliability o f the measures will be provided where
available. The 95-item survey questionnaire was used to collect data in the correlational
study. The 53 items used in this study measure levels o f acceptance o f racism,
acceptance o f negative attitudes toward Muslims, acceptance o f religious fundamentalism
and acceptance o f war.
All measures were presented in a seven point likert format, ranging from strongly
agree (1) to strongly disagree (7). Agreement with a concept is a low number on an item.
63
Items were stated both positively and negatively and reversals were taken into
consideration during the data analysis (In appendix A, R signifies a reversed question).
The scales were presented in a questionnaire which also included the 15 demographics
described above (see appendix B for the demographics). Below is an explanation o f the
scales used in this study.
Racism Scale
The Racism Scale is a nine-item scale, which examines and measures a global
form of racism. Examples o f the questions on the racism scale include: People from my
own ethnic group are more important to me than people from different ethnic groups and
I prefer being with people o f my own racial background. It will be presented on a
seven-point likert scale format ranging from, strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (7).
The original scale was found reliable (alpha=.714). The Racism Scale was developed by
Sari F. Shepphird, (1996) under the direction of Paula B. Johnson, Ph.D. The racism scale
has been used in a dissertation and presentation ( Shepphird, 1996; Shepphird, et. al.,
1998).
Muslim Cultural B elief Scale
The Muslim Culture Belief scale is a thirteen item scale and was developed
specifically for this study by the author and is used in this dissertation to measure
Islamophobia. The questions were formulated from a variety of Internet sources such as,
Muslims.Net (http://www.muslims.net/), About Islam and Muslims
64
(http://www.unn.ac.uk./societies/islamic/) and Muslim Answers
(htpp://www.muslimsanswers.org/). Examples of the questions on the Muslim Cultural
Belief scale include, Arabs and Muslims are the same and I would like to understand
Muslim culture. Reliabilities will also be presented in the following chapter.
Religious Fundamentalism Scale
Religious Fundamentalist Scale is a 20-item scale that measures the belief that
there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contain inherent truth about humanity
and these beliefs must be fought for. The scale was developed by Altemeyer, and
Hunsberger (1992), to investigate the relationships among right-wing authoritarianism,
various indices of religious orientation, and prejudice. Examples of the questions on the
Religious Fundamentalism scale include, When you get right down to it, there are only
two kinds of people in the world: the righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the
rest, who will not and God will punish most severely those who abandon his true
religion. The scale was found reliable, (alpha = .92) (Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992).
WAR Scale
War Scale is an eleven-item scale, which examines attitudes in relation to the
acceptance of war, which focuses on the problem, whether one believes that war is
necessary or that it has positive or negative characteristics? This scale measures an
evaluative good/bad dimension o f beliefs about war. Examples o f the questions on the
war scale include: There are some situations in which we have no choice but to go to
war; War is useful; and War is a legitimate way to resolve conflict. The scale was
65
found reliable (alpha=.88) (Criss & Johnson 1989). The War scale was developed by
Paula B. Johnson, Ph.D. and her students. The war scale has been used in a several
dissertations and publications e.g., (Criss & Johnson, 1989; Johnson & Friedman, 1989;
Johnson, 1987; Johnson et al., 1987; Hilsberg, 1989).
Procedures
Approval to conduct the study first was obtained from the Human Subjects
Committee at the California School o f Professional Psychology at Alliant International
University, Los Angeles on January 28, 2002.
To recruit participants for this study a sample o f convenience was utilized. Five
associates and the principle researchers distributed questionnaires. An attempt was made
to sample diverse populations in a variety o f settings. Thus, the sample included people
in public locations, friends and neighbors, as well as people in the workplace, and
recreational settings such as parks and coffee shops. Guidelines concerning the
procedures, confidentiality, anonymity, and guidelines in the collection process were
thoroughly addressed with the associates. Associates were trained in regard to the
importance of avoiding coercion in the collection process. Each person collecting data
was informed of the importance o f maintaining confidentiality o f each participant. Those
collecting data informed participants that they were not obligated to participate, and that
they would not suffer negative consequences if they declined.
Those who agreed to proceed were asked to read a consent form which informed
them o f the purpose of the study, as well as make them aware o f their rights as
66
participants including their right to withdraw from the study, their right to confidentiality,
and their right to obtain information about the results. The examiner was available to
speak with the participants after completion o f the surveys, and participants were also
given information on how to contact the researchers in case o f any concerns or questions.
The surveys were self administered and did not take in excess o f twenty minutes to
complete. Upon completion o f the questionnaire participants gave them back to the
researchers or associates who then placed them in a large envelope with other completed
questionnaires. In this way, there was no way to personally identify any particular
participants questionnaire. If questionnaires could not be completed at the time of
distribution, a pre-addressed and stamped envelope was provided.
Methodology Assumptions and Limitations
The assumptions of the experimental methodology are that the instruments
have been planned to insure appropriate content coverage in each o f the areas defined
above. Limitations to survey research include the reactivity of the measures whereby the
respondent is directly involved in the assessment process. Reactive methods run several
risks in that they only tap respondents who are accessible, they arouse response sets such
as acquiescence or a proneness to agree with positive statements or questions, and
surveys are vulnerable to over-rate and under-rate bias whereby the respondents give
consistently high or low ratings. In order to counteract response sets that may have
developed, questions were worded in both positive and negative declarative statements so
that a Likert response o f (1) would sometimes reflect strongly agree while at other
times it would represent strongly disagree.
67
Another limitation in the present study is due to the haphazard sampling
procedure used to obtain a sample. A stratified random sample would have enabled the
results of this study to be more generalizable in all important respects to the population.
A problem with the survey items involves the inability to differentiate between a
participants value toward a particular item and their personal belief about it. For
example, given the item, War should be abolished, a participant may respond in two
different ways. On the one hand, they may strongly agree with this item because they
value non-violence, yet on the other, the participant may be pessimistic who wants world
peace but believes that there wall always be war. In this case, the subject may strongly
disagree with this item. Thus, the items potentially tap two different attitude sets; one
value and one belief. A related limitation may be found in the validity of the measures.
The scales used in this study were based on concepts found in the literature however the
extent to which these measures sample what they are supposed to measure is unclear.
Further the Muslim Belief Scale was developed for this study and does not have
reliability established. Additionally, the extent to which these explanatory concepts
account for an individuals answers is unknown.
CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
This chapter will present the results o f the study which examined peoples
attitudes toward racism, Islamophobia, religious dogmatism and war. For purposes o f the
description of the results, the chapter is organized as follows: a) the sample is described;
b) the means, standard deviations, and reliability o f the scales are examined; c) the seven
hypotheses are tested and d) the summary of the hypotheses is presented.
Demographic Characteristics of the Sample
The demographic characteristics of the sample are summarized in Table 1. There
were 200 participants in the original sample. Due to a large number o f missing answers
to the survey questions, one participant was eliminated from the sample, leaving 199
participants. This elimination did not statistically affect the analysis or the results o f the
study (.005 or < 1%). O f the 199 people that participated in the current study, one
hundred-fifteen were men and eighty-four were women. Participants' ages ranged from
19 to 84 years, with a median age o f 36 years. The racial composition o f the sample was
as follows: 42.7% were Caucasian; 19.8% were African American; 13.0% were
Latino/Latina; 12.5% were Asian/Pacific Islander; and 12% were Other.
Regarding grade completed, 39.5% reported a Bachelor Degree, 25.5% reported a
M asters Degree, 15.5% had a high school diploma, 12% had an Associates Degree, 3%
went to technical school and 3% had a doctorate degree. The median income for the
sample was $55,000.00, ranging from $19,000 to $1,000,000.
69
Table 1
Demographic Characteristics o f the Sample
Characteristics Median Range

Age 36 18-84
Income $55,000.00 $19,000-$1,000,000
Characteristics Percentage
Sex
Male 57.5%
Female 42.5%
Race
Caucasian 42.7%
African American 19.8%
Latino/Latina 13.0%
Asian/Pacific Islander 12.5%
Other 12.0%
Education
High School Diploma 15.5%
Associates Degree 12.0%
Technical School 3.0%
Bachelors Degree 39.5%
Masters Degree 25.5%
Doctorate Degree 3.0%
Religion
Christianity 80.6%
Judaism 13.4%
Buddhism 4.5%
Hinduism .7%
Muslim .7%
Religious Involvement
Strongly Involved 13.1%
Moderately Involved 26.3%
Slightly Involved 25.8%
Not Involved 15.6%
Not Applicable 18.6%
(table continues)
70
Table 1 (continued)
Characteristics Percentage
Political Party
Republican 39.8%
Democrat 38.5%
Independent 10.6%
Other 11.2%
Political Involvement
Very Conservative 4.0%
Conservative 11.6%
Slightly Conservative 15.1%
Neither Conservative or Liberal 24.5%
Slightly Liberal 9.5%
Liberal 17.1%
Very Liberal 5.5%
Not Applicable 11.1%
Ever fought in a war

No 95.5%
Yes 4%
Witnessed a war
No 88.4%
Yes 11.6%
Note. N=199
Marital status was as follows: 43.2% were married; 40.2% were single; 15.1% were
divorced; and 1.5% were widowed. Most reported that they had children (52.5%).
Number of children for the sample ranged from zero to six, with a median o f 2.
Religious Affiliation was as follows: 80.6% were Christian; 13.4% were Jewish; 4.5%
were Buddhist; and .7% were Hindu or Muslim. The highest percentage (26.3%)
reported being Moderately Involved for religious involvement, which was followed by
25.8% Slightly Involved.
Regarding political affiliation, 39.8% were Republican, 38.5% were Democrats,
11.2% were Other, and 10.6% were Independent. Regarding political involvement, the
highest rating was 24.5% representing Neitherconservative nor liberal. Most
participants reported never fighting in a war (95.5%). Most reported never living in a
country in which a war was witnessed (88%) and never having been in the military
(98.5%).
Means and Reliability o f Scales
The Racism Scale, the Religious Fundamentalism Scale, the WAR Scale and the
Muslim Cultural Beliefs Scale were deemed reliable using Cronbachs Alpha. The WAR
Scale was found to be reliable (alpha = .905), as was the Racism Scale (alpha = .815), as
was the Muslim Cultural Beliefs Scale (alpha = .849), and the Religious Fundamentalism
Scale (alpha = .914). The fact that scale means fell between 3.7 and 5.3 indicates that on
average peoples attitudes were slightly rejecting of racism, Islamophobia, religious
72
dogmatism and slightly accepting o f war, as measured by each scale (See Table 2). The
results of each specific hypothesis will be discussed in the next section.
Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1
The first hypothesis stated that a Pearson Correlation would reveal a significant
positive relationship between racism and religious dogmatism. In specific, the more
people endorse racism the more likely they will be to endorse more religious dogmatic
attitudes. Results showed there was a significant relationship between racism and
religious dogmatism, r=.304 (p<.0001). Thus, the hypothesis was supported. See Table
3.
Hypothesis 2
The second hypothesis stated that a Pearson Correlation would reveal a significant
positive relationship between Islamophobia and religious dogmatism. In specific, the
more people endorse negative attitudes and beliefs about Muslim culture and Islamic
religion the more likely they will be to endorse more religious dogmatic attitudes.
Results showed there was a significant relationship between Islamophobia and religious
dogmatism, r=.220 (p<.0001). Thus, the hypothesis is supported. See Table 3.
Hypothesis 3
The third hypothesis stated that a Pearson Correlation would reveal a significant
positive relationship between racism and Islamophobia. In specific, the more people
endorse racism the more likely they will be to endorse negative attitudes and beliefs
73
Table 2
Scale Means and Reliabilities
Scale Number of Means SD Chronbachs

Items Alpha
WAR Scale 11 3.7852 1.534 .905
Racism Scale 9 4.5605 1.217 .815
Muslim Belief Scale 12 4.2721 1.175 .849
Religious Dogma Scale 20 5.3792 1.185 .914
Note. All means based on a seven point scale, with a lower numbers indicating more
endorsement o f the constructs.
n=199
74
Table 3
Intercorrelations Between Scales
Scale 1 2 3 4
1. Racism Scale .304* .589* .630*
2. Religious Dogma Scale .220* .222*
3. Muslim Beliefs Scale .415*
4. War Scale
Note. * g_< .0001
n=199
75
about Muslim culture. Results showed there was a significant relationship between
Racism and Islamophobia, r=.589 (p<.0001). Thus, the hypothesis is supported. See
Table 3.
Hypothesis 4
The fourth hypothesis stated that a Pearson Correlation would reveal a significant
positive relationship between racism and war acceptance. In specific, the more people
endorse racism the more likely they will be to accept war attitudes. Results showed there
was a significant relationship between racism and war acceptance, r=.630 (p<.0001).
Thus, the hypothesis is supported. See Table 3.
Hypothesis 5
The fifth hypothesis stated that a Pearson Correlation would reveal a significant
positive relationship between Islamophobia and increased war acceptance. In specific,
the more people endorse Islamophobia, the more likely they will be to accept war
attitudes. Results showed there was a significant relationship between Islamophobia and
war acceptance, r=.415 (p<.0001). Thus, the hypothesis is supported. See Table 3.
Hypothesis 6
The sixth hypothesis stated that a Pearson Correlation would reveal a significant
positive relationship between religious dogmatism and increased war acceptance. In
specific, the more people endorse religious dogmatism, the more likely they are to hold
war acceptance attitudes. Results showed there was a significant relationship between
76
religious dogmatism and war acceptance, r=.222 (p<.0001). Thus, the hypothesis is
supported. See Table 3.
Hypothesis 7
Hypothesis seven stated that racism, Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism
together will be positively related to increased war acceptance. Racism, Islamophobia
and religious dogmatism as related to increased war acceptance was subjected to a step
wise regression analysis in addition to a Forced-entry analysis. While all independent
variables were related to the dependent variable, a step-wise regression analysis also was
used to determine the amount o f variance the independent variables accounted for war
acceptance. As presented in Table 4, findings o f the step-wise regression analysis
showed that racism accounted for 39.7% o f the variance in the acceptance o f war.
Forced-entry analysis was used to determine if there were any further relationships
between the variables in the present study by including the excluded variables,
Islamophobia and religious dogmatism. Results showed that Forced-entry analysis
changed very little from the previously analysis, indicating that while racism entered the
equation Islamophobia and religious dogmatism did not account for a significant amount
o f the variance in the acceptance o f war. Hypothesis seven was supported. See Table 4
and 5
77
Table 4
Stepwise Multiple Regression for Variables Predicting Acceptance of War
Model R Adjusted R Square F Change df2 Sig. F Change

1 .630* .397 129.583 197 .000
* Predictors: (Constant) racism, Racism Scale
78
Table 5
Model Summary: Forced Entry Analysis
Model R Adjusted R Square F Change df2 Sig. F Change

1 .630* .397 43.458 195 .000
* Predictors: (Constant) Racism Scale, Muslim Belief Scale, Religious
Dogmatism Scale
Coefficients: Forced Entry Analysis
Model Unstandardized Coefficents Standardized Sig.

Coefficients
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) -.144 .468 .759

racism Racism Scale .733 .089 .582 .000
Religious Dogmatism .041 .075 .031 .591
Muslim Belief Scale______ .086_______ .090_______________ .066_______.338
* Dependent Variable War Scale
79
Summary o f the Results
Hypotheses 1-7 were strongly supported by data analysis. All independent
variables were significantly related to each other and to the dependent variable. A
multiple regression showed that the three independent variables were predictive of
attitudes toward war. However, only racism was significant individually and a stepwise
multiple regression showed that racism predicted 39.7% of the variance in attitudes
towards war.
80
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The primary problem addressed in the present study is underlying beliefs and
attitudes that may have accounted for the acceptance o f war in the post 9/11 months. The
intent o f this study was to examine the relationships between racism, negative attitudes
toward Muslims (Islamophobia), religious dogmatism, and attitudes toward war. It was
believed that understanding the relationships between these factors might help us
decipher possible underlying reasons for the fallout o f the 9/11 attacks and the U.S.
initiation o f wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. As has been presented throughout, the events
of 9/11 appeared to influence attitudes and beliefs about Islam, race, and religion and also
appeared to be involved in shaping how the American culture views violence as a way to
resolve international and ethnic/religious group conflict. To this end, the following
section will expand upon the relationships found between racism, Islamophobia, religious
dogmatism, and war acceptance in the current study.
The most striking results were that all o f the variables were significantly related
and that attitudes toward war were predicted by racism, Islamophobia, and religious
dogmatism. Racism was the major predictor, accounting for the largest percentage o f the
variance (39.7%) in war acceptance. Although no causality can be inferred, the question
can be asked whether racism, Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism may have
something to do with the acceptance o f war in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq, beginning
in 2003. Speculating further, the concern over alleged presence o f weapons o f mass
destruction may not be the only (or real) reason for war; rather, largely non-conscious
81
ideologies and personality characteristics may come into play in such a compelling way
that people end up with pro-war attitudes.
In order to more fully understand how these concepts o f racism, Islamophobia,
and religious dogmatism are related to acceptance o f war, each hypothesis between these
independent variables and war acceptance will be examined next. It is important to note
that the hypotheses are presented in a manner that makes most conceptual sense;
therefore, results will not be presented in order of hypothesis number.
Hypotheses and Areas o f Analysis
Contribution o f Racism, Islamophobia, and Religious Dogmatism to War Attitudes
Hypothesis 7 stated that racism, Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism would be
positively related to increased war acceptance. This hypothesis was subjected to a step
wise regression analysis and forced-entry analysis. Attitudes toward war were found to
be significantly predicted by the three independent variables together. However, only
racism was significant individually.
Racism had the greatest correlation with war acceptance (r = .630) and that a
significant amount of the variance in war attitudes was accounted for by racism (39.7%).
In other words, peoples attitudes toward racism could be used to predict 39.7% o f their
war acceptance attitudes. This finding might be interpreted to mean that peoples war
acceptance attitudes might in part have their roots in racism, although it is important to
reiterate that causality is not established in a correlational study.
One of the most important outcomes is that the present study supports Miller-
Kusteks (1989) findings that racist attitudes were the most significant variable related to
82
war acceptance and that the tendency to perceive others as different, to devalue those in
other groups, and to perceive others as threatening is significantly related to acceptance
o f planned violence, including war.
Given that previous studies have found racism to be the most significant predictor
of war acceptance, the question remains, is it generally true that racism is positively
related to war acceptance? If the answer is yes, this finding implicates that interventions
targeting racism are needed if peaceful conflict resolution goals are to be attained.
In this overarching hypothesis, all three independent variables were examined
together to see how much each contributed to war acceptance. Next, the remaining
independent variable and its relation to war attitudes will be discussed separately.
Relationships between Independent Variables and Attitudes toward War
Racism and Attitudes toward War
Hypothesis 4 stated that racism would be positively related to war acceptance and
that the more one endorsed racism, the more likely he or she would be to hold pro-war
attitudes.
The findings o f the present study support the notion that racism and war
acceptance may evolve from the fertile ground o f in-group/out-group relationships, in
which the image of the in-group must be enhanced, the image o f the out-group must be
denigrated, and the difference between them must be emphasized (Hinde & Pulkinnen,
2000).
83
Many authors have proposed that attitudes and beliefs related to real and
perceived differences result in violence and war (Adorno, 1950; Altemeyer, 1998; Correll
et al., 2002; Coryn et al., 2003; Dane, 2002; Eberhardt et al., 2004; Feather, 1996; Fiske,
2000; Ghazali, 2005; Jost et al., 2003; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Miller-Kustek, 1989; Modood,
2005; Poynting, 2004; Stone, 2004). Furthermore, numerous researchers have found
empirical evidence that real and/or perceived differences are related to violence (such as
war) (Altemeyer, 1998; Criss & Johnson, 1993; Cohrs et al., 2005; Feshbach & White,
1986; Kiesel, 1990; Johnson & Friedman, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Miller-Kustek, 1989;
Unger, 2005). The findings o f the present study further support the devastating effects of
in-group/out-group relationships and racism as a predictor to violence and war.
Islamophobia and Attitudes toward War
Hypothesis 5 stated that Islamophobia would be positively related to war
acceptance, in that the more Islamophobic one was, the more likely he or she would be to
hold pro-war attitudes. Results o f the present study demonstrated a significant
relationship between Islamophobia and war acceptance (r = .415).
Even before 9/11, it was becoming evident that Muslims, not African-Americans,
were perceived as the other most threatening to Western society (Modood, 2005).
Since the events o f 9/11, Islamophobia has become even more widespread, with negative
stereotypes o f Muslims and Islam becoming prevalent in the U.S. (Ghazali, 2005). As
previously discussed, people fear and devalue groups that differ from their own feelings
and attitudes that lead to violence and even war (Miller-Kustek, 1989). Therefore it is no
84
surprise that anti-Muslim sentiment (since, again, Muslims are perceived as the other
most threatening to Western society) would be related to pro-war attitudes.
The present studys findings are consistent with those o f Miller-Kustek (1989)
namely that negative attitudes toward a group different from ones own (in this case,
Muslims or people o f the Islamic faith), as well as racism in general, are related to war
acceptance. Furthermore, the author of the present study speculates that, while the
relationship between Islamophobia and war acceptance was moderately significant in the
spring of 2002 (when data for this study was collected), this relationship might be even
stronger, had the data been collected today. This speculation is based on findings that
anti-Muslim views have increased (Stone, 2004; Shehata, 2006; Sajid, 2005, AP Wire,
2004) and that a pro-war stance against Muslim nations is an accepted point o f view (Pew
Surveys, 2006; CBS News, 2006).
Religious Dogmatism and Attitudes toward War
Hypothesis 6 stated that religious dogmatism would be positively related to war
acceptance, in that the more one endorsed religious dogmatism, the more likely he or she
would be to endorse pro-war attitudes. As reported above, results of the present study
showed a significant relationship between religious dogmatism and pro-war attitudes (r =
.222).
The present study supports previous findings that religious dogmatism is
positively correlated with violence and war (Altemeyer, 1998; 1996; 1988; Feather, 1996;
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sullaway, 2003; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Peterson, Smirles, &
Wentworth, 1997; Rokeach, 1960; Sullaway, 2004). Variables related to religious
85
dogmatism have also been found to positively correlate with pro-war attitudes. For
example, social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism have been found
to relate to positive attitudes toward the Afghanistan and Iraq wars (Cohrs et al., 2005;
Unger, 2004). Although the present study looked at religious dogmatism and attitudes
toward war in general, the results offer support to Cohrs et al.s and Ungers theory that
the idea that hierarchical religions tend to foster authoritarian views as well as social
dominance orientation consistent with nationalism; and the theory that various forms of
ideologies foster them and us thinking in religious fundamentalists independent of their
particular religious identity (Cohrs et al., 2005; Unger, 2002).
Interrelationships between Independent Variables
In the previous section, the significant findings regarding the relationships
between all of the independent variables and war acceptance were delineated. The author
of the present study further hypothesized that each o f the independent variables (racism,
Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism) would also be related to each other. Following
is a discussion o f the interrelationships found between (a) racism and Islamophobia, (b)
racism and religious dogmatism, and (c) Islamophobia and religious dogmatism.
Racism and Islamophobia
First, hypothesis 3 stated that racism would be positively related to Islamophobia,
in that the more one endorsed racist attitudes, the more likely he or she would be to
endorse negative attitudes and beliefs about the Muslim culture, was strongly supported.
86
This result could possibly indicate that followers o f the Islam religion were seen as
similar to a race that was different from ones own. According to Stone (2004) and
Ghazali (2005), Muslims are an ethno-religious group and although not a race, are
nevertheless constructed as a race. Following this line o f thinking, racism toward
Muslims, referred to as Islamophobia (Amin, 2002; Ghazali, 2005; Sajid, 2005; Stone,
2004), which can be described as a type o f cultural racism that justifies prejudice against
and stereotyping of outsiders (Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Cultural racism uses
cultural difference to disparage, marginalize, or demand cultural assimilation from
culturally different groups (Modood, 1994) even when those groups are ethno-religious
in composition (such as Muslims). Other examples o f cultural racism related to
Islamophobia include the oppression o f Muslims civil rights, such as those incidents
documented by numerous researchers (Ghazali, 2004; Tessler, 2003; Twair and Twair,
2002; Hanley, 2002).
Incidents reflecting the relationship between cultural racism and Islamophobia
have been widely reported (Ghazali, 2005; Poynting, 2004; Stone, 2004), and results
from this hypothesis confirm such findings.
Racism and Religious Dogmatism
Second, hypothesis 1 predicted that racism would be positively related to religious
dogmatism and that the more one endorsed racist attitudes, the more likely he or she
would be to endorse religiously dogmatic attitudes. Results of the present study showed
a significant moderate relationship between racism and religious dogmatism.
87
This data supports previous findings o f a positive correlation between religious
dogmatism and self-reported racial prejudices (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992;
Kirkpatrick, 1993; Laythe et al., 2002; Rowatt et al., 2005; Wylie & Forest, 1992).
Furthermore, this studys finding points to the devastating effects of in-group/out-
group relationships on both racism and religious dogmatism. As noted by Baird (2002)
and Craik (1993), an individuals pattern o f attitudes is considered to be one o f the most
characteristic expressions o f personality. Both racism and religious dogmatism are
related to we/they attitudes and, ultimately, to the acceptance o f war and planned
violence against out-groups (Miller-Kustek, 1989). Therefore, it is no surprise that the
more racist peoples attitudes are, the more religiously dogmatic they are.
Islamophobia and Religious Dogmatism
Third, hypothesis 2 stated that Islamophobia would be positively related to
religious dogmatism and that the more one endorsed negative attitudes and beliefs about
the Muslim culture and Islamic religion, the more likely he or she would be to endorse
religiously dogmatic attitudes. Results o f the present study showed a significant
moderate relationship between Islamophobia and religious dogmatism.
This study supports the work o f Pratto et al. (1994), who used the Anti-Arab
Racism Scale; results from that study showed that, as social dominance orientation and
right-wing authoritarianism increased, self-reported attitudes toward Muslims became
more negative. Although the current study measured religious dogmatism (as opposed to
social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism), it is important to keep in
mind that social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism, have been
88
theoretically and empirically strongly linked to both religious dogmatism and pro-war
attitudes (Livengood & Stodolska, 2004; Modood, 2005; Rowatt et ah, 2005; Coryn et
al 2003).
Although a significant positive correlation was found between religious
dogmatism and Islamophobia, this correlation (r = .220), along with the correlation
between religious dogmatism and war attitudes (r = .222), appeared to be weaker when
compared to the correlations from all other hypotheses. The pattern o f comparatively
weaker correlations for the hypotheses measuring religious dogmatism may be due to
limitations of the Religious Fundamentalism Scale. Specifically, the author o f the present
study argues that this scales questions are very overt and therefore, perhaps, do not
measure the kinds o f subtleties that this study aimed to capture. In other words, black-
and-white or outwardly overt questions (e.g., When you get right down to it, there are
only two kinds o f people in the world: the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and
the rest, who will not.) may elicit extreme answers (such as strongly agree or
strongly disagree). Extreme answers were, indeed, found when looking at the samples
responses on this scale. On a seven-point Likert scale, participants appeared to answer
with relatively little variability, clustering mainly around the strongly agree and
strongly disagree extremes of the scale.
Furthermore, because o f the scarcity of literature on religious dogmatism per se,
the author o f the present study, as explained in the literature review, looked at constructs
related to religious dogmatism, such as social dominance orientation, right wing
authoritarianism, and religious fundamentalism. While these related constructs have been
found to correlate with religious dogmatism, they are not necessarily interchangeable
89
with religious dogmatism. It is likely that at least some component of religious
dogmatism differs from these related constructs, and perhaps, this particular component
is not as strongly linked to either Islamophobia or pro-war attitudes, therefore evidencing
comparatively weaker significant relationships. Further research could include the
additional concepts above or other religious concepts.
Despite these explanations, it is important to keep in mind that the relationship
between religious dogmatism, Islamophobia and racism (as well as between religious
dogmatism and war acceptance) is significant and noteworthy.
Implications and Suggested Future Research
The present research study viewed war as part o f a system comprised o f how
people understand the world and what they think it should be like (Johnson, Handler, &
Criss, 1987). Using a social psychological approach, the dissertation investigated racism,
Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism in relation to the acceptance o f war as a solution
to international conflict, as seen in the months after the events of 9/11.
Based on Silverstein and Holt (1989), an underlying proposition of the current
research was that prejudice against Islam has led to a belief that Islam is an enemy o f the
United States; the more individuals have held on to such beliefs, the more war has
become acceptable. It was also proposed that, in the post-9/11 months, religious
dogmatism and racism (or prejudices against the other) have been positively related to
attitudes toward war. Thus, the findings from this study and previous studies, call to
question the Bush administrations reasoning behind war, i.e., could the wars with
90
Afghanistan and Iraq be related more to racism and anti-Arab/Islam feelings rather than
weapons of mass destruction?
Furthermore, the present study adopted the theoretical model o f Johnson, Handler,
and Criss (1987), which states that our social system is supported by widely held cultural
attitudes and beliefs that may serve to perpetuate war. The present research study sought
to reveal the mental heuristics that perpetuate an acceptance o f war, in the hopes of
enabling a critical examination o f what was previously covert or unconsciously held. It
was additionally hoped that the present research study would help in identifying and
understanding the detrimental and destructive attitudes and beliefs that may support war.
Based on the findings o f the present study, it appears that racist, Islamophobic,
and religiously dogmatic attitudes are significantly related to attitudes that promote
violence and the acceptance o f war as a means to address international conflict.
Furthermore, these attitudes may be understood in terms o f cultures and systems.
Specifically, the present study lends support to the notion that both direct (e.g. war) and
indirect violence (e.g. racist attitudes) may be complex systems made o f attitudes that
may be part o f a specific culture.
This study was designed to assist in understanding, and thereby allowing for
change in racist, Islamophobic, religiously dogmatic, and ultimately, pro-war attitudes. It
is hoped that the results o f this study will contribute to the growing body of psychological
literature that addresses attitudes leading to conflict behavior between individuals,
specific groups, and nations. Through the review o f relevant literature (including results
o f empirical studies) that explores this studys constructs, this dissertation has attempted
91
to inform the reader o f the relationships between attitudes that both promote war
acceptance and hinder nonviolent conflict resolution.
Attitudes toward war acceptance as a solution to international conflict based on
racism, Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism may be deeply ingrained in U.S. society.
However, findings such as these can illuminate psychologists and other mental health
professionals about the contribution o f complex attitudes to violence as a means o f
solving international conflict. The study also underlines the importance of developing
clinically psychological interventions designed to address international conflict and to
understand attitudes o f individuals on specific subjects, including racism, Islamophobia,
and religious dogmatism. Below is a discussion suggesting areas for future research and
underlining psychological interventions for non-violent conflict resolution.
Suggested Areas fo r Future Research
Future research can further address the links between the variables in this study
and help discover nonviolent options to international ethnic/religio-group conflict. A
number of important areas related to racism, Islamophobia, religious dogmatism, and war
acceptance could become the focus o f future research. For example, this studys
variables can be re-examined in follow-up studies designed to replicate findings. Follow-
up studies might seek a representative random sample, including participants from more
varied religious affiliations, as well as ethnic and cultural backgrounds; a more
representative random sample would render results more applicable to the general
population. Samples could be large enough to look at variation by sample characteristics.
92
In addition, the study should be expanded to sample more U.S. states, as well as
international groups for a more global understanding o f the relationships between this
studys constructs.
Implications
According to Rivers (2005), a psychological schism between Americans and the
Islamic world has manifested itself in the authorization o f the Bush administration to
conduct a massive violent campaign against a substantial section o f the Islamic Middle
East. While many justifications for the War on Terror have been presented at different
times by the U.S. government, one that continues to surface is the quest to find Osama
bin Laden. From the rubble o f the twin towers, very little energy was expended to
understand the roots o f the egregious attacks or to find a creative solution to the conflict.
Instead, the one and only plausible reaction for the United States was revenge (Rivers,
2005). Rivers (2005) believes with regard to terrorists, there has been no invitation to
negotiate, as no negotiation is seen as possible. The sole objective that can be pursued is
the destruction o f Islamic terrorists, to prevent them from destroying the West and its
values (Rivers, 2005). Psychologists are particularly well placed to explore the
subjective dimensions o f social resentments, and to highlight the fact that resentments felt
by individuals and group o f underprivileged communities must be somehow addressed on
the subjective plane. Research findings are beginning to emerge that identify restorative
psychological mechanisms at work.
Christie, Wagner and Winter (2001) suggest that many forms o f direct violence
can be traced to structure-based inequalities, exacerbated by ethnic tensions, religious
93
differences, environmental degradation, and economic desperation. In this way, forms of
direct violence are often exploited by powerful leaders (Renner, 1996). Winter et al.
(2000) believe because public policy is a psychological issue, psychologists should be
trained how to think about, research, lobby, and affect peace. Thus, psychologists cannot
abdicate the political dimension o f their work, since their position as scientists do not
require them to remain politically neutral. Science itself is value laden, and feigning
neutrality is intellectually dishonest and socially irresponsible (Winter et al., 2000).
According to Winters et. al. (2000), long term solutions require that: a)
psychologists illuminate the systemic connections between direct and indirect levels of
violence as well as between individuals and their communities; b) psychologists address
community structures which give meaning to individual identity. Thus, the individual
cannot be separated from the collective human need for security and respect. Violence
can be expected until those needs are satisfied, since conflict and war are human
behaviors that have human needs at their root, and c) psychologists pay attention to the
psychological needs that various groups carry.
Peace psychologists can provide important leadership, analysis, activism, and
support for the crucial task of building sustainable peace. Analyzing the causes of
violence, rebuilding war-torn communities, lobbying for social justice and arms control,
teaching and practicing nonviolent conflict resolution, sensitizing oneself to individual
ethnocentrism, consulting with peacekeeping operations, ensuring gender parity,
addressing ethnic identities and hostilities, empowering alternative voices, and building
environmental security are just a few of the myriad ways peace psychologists can
contribute to building a peaceful world (Winter et.al., 2000).
94
REFERENCES
Adler, L.L. & Geilen, U.P. (1994). Crosscultural topics in psychology. Westport,
CT: Praeger.
Adorno,T.W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D., Sanford, N., (1950). The

Authoritarian Personality. New York: Harper.
Aberson, C. L., Healy, M., & Romero, V. (2000). Ingroup bias and self-esteem: A meta
analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 157-173.
Abu-Nimer, M. (2003). Dialogue, Conflict Resolution and Change. New York: State
University o f New York Press.
Al Faruqi, I.R. (1979). Islam. Niles, IL: Argus Communication
Allport, G. (1954). The Nature o f Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison- Wesley.
Allport, G. (1966) Traits revisited. American Psychologist, 21, 1-10.
Altareb, Y.B. (1997). Attitudes Towards Muslims: Initial scale development.

Dissertation Abstract International (UMI No. 9738296).
Altemeyer, R., and Hunsberger, B. (1992). Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism,

quest and prejudice. International Journal fo r the Psychology o f Religion 2, 113-
33.
Altemeyer, R. (1988). Enemies o f freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism.

San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Altemeyer, R. (1998). The other authoritarian personality. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.),

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (vol. 30, pp. 47-92). New York:
Academic Press.
Altemeyer, R. (1996). The Authoritarian Specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University

Press.
American Psychological Association (APA) (2005) Racism and Psychology.

www.apa.org/
Amin, S. (2002). Understanding Islamic Politics and Culture. ASEM Watch 77: 118-123.
Annan, K. and Seyyed Hussein Nasr (2004). On Islamophobia. Retrieved [date] from
http://webcast.un.org/ramgen/specialevents/se041207.rm
Armstrong, K. (2000). The Battle fo r God. New York: Knopf.
Baird, V.A. (2002). Causes o f American domestic attitudes toward the use o f military
force. Retrieved from http://sobek.colorado.edu/bairdv/Attitudes_
T oward_W ar.pdf
Barker, M. (1981/1982). The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology o f the Tribe.
Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America.
Begue, L., & Apostolidis, T. (2000). The 1999Balkan war: Changes in ratings o f values
And prowar attitudes among French students. Psychological Reports, 86, 1127-
1133.
Belluck, P. (2001, Nov. 25). A nation challenged: The Arab-Americans; After Sept. 11,
complaints of job bias mount. The New York Times web site. Retrieved Oct. 6,
2002, from: http://query.nytimes.com/search/article-
printpage.html?res=9F02E3DF103AF936A15752ClA9679C8B63
Blackwell, M. (1993). Clinging to grandeur: British attitudes and foreign policy in the
aftermath o f the Second World War. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Blair, I.V., & Judd, C.M. (2002). The role of Afrocentric features in person perception:
Judging by features and categories. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology,
83, 5-25.
Blauner, R. (1972). Racial oppression in America. New York: Harper & Row
Bleiker, R. (2002). Jeju, island o f peace in cold-war Northeast Asia. Social Alternatives,
21(2), 65-68.
Bobocel, D. R., Hing, L. S., Davey, L. M., Stanley, D. J., & Zanna, M. P. (1998). Justice-
based opposition to social policies: Is it genuine? Journal o f Personality and
Social Psychology, 75 (3), 653-669.
Brewer, M.B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love or outgroup hate?
Journal o f Social Issues, 55, 429-444.
Brewer, M.B. & Brown, R.J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D.T. Gilbert & S.T. Fiske
(Eds.), In Handbook o f Social Psychology, Vol.2, 4th ed., pp.554-594. New York:
McGraw-Hill
Brunei, F. F., Tietje, B. C., & Greenwald, A. G. (2004). Is the Implicit Association Test a
valid and valuable measure o f implicit consumer social cognition. Journal o f
Consumer Psychology, 14: 385-404.
Bush, G.W. (2001, Nov. 10). Remarks to UN General Assembly. [Transcript of speech].
The Victoria Advocate web site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002 from:
http://www.thevictoriaadvocate.com/America_Under_Attack/Transcripts/story/167
946p-1610636c.html
Bush, G.W. (2002, Jan. 30). State o f the Union Address. 2002. The New York Times web
site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002, from: http://query.nytimes.com/search/article-
printpage.html?pagewantcd=2&res=9805E7D6103AF933A05752C0A9649C8B63
Bush, G. (2005). Address to Troops at Fort Bragg, www.nationalreview.com. Retrieved

July 13,2005.
Bush, G. (2005). Inaugural Address, www.washingtonpost.com. Retrieved July 13, 2005.
Chen, M., & Bargh, J.A. (1997). Unconscious behavioral confirmation processes: The
self-fulfilling consequences o f automatic stereotypes activation. Journal o f
Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 541-560
Cohrs, J. C., Moschner, B., Maes J., Kielmann, S. (2005). Personal values and attitudes
toward war. Peace and Conflict: Journal o f Peace Psychology, 11(3), 293-312.
Commission for Racial Equality (2005). Islamophobia. www.cre.gov.uk. Retrieved on

July 16, 2005.
Conway, F. and Siegelman, J. (1982). Holy Terror: The Fundamentalist War on

America's Freedoms in Religion, Politics, and Our Private Lives. Garden City,
NY: Doubleday.
Cornell University Poll. (2004). www.amperspective.com
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officers dilemma
using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, $3(6), 1314-1329.
Coryn, C. L., Beale, J. M., & Myers, K. M. (2004). Response to September 11: Anxiety,
patriotism, and prejudice in the aftermath of terror. Current Research in Social
Psychology, 9(12), 1-24.
Coryn, C., Beale, J., and Myers, K. (2003). Response to September 11: Anxiety,
Patriotism, and Prejudice in the Aftermath o f Terror. Current Research in Social
Psychology 9: 165-184.
97
Brewer, M.B. & Brown, R.J. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D.T. Gilbert & S.T. Fiske
(Eds.), In Handbook o f Social Psychology, Vol.2, 4th ed., pp.554-594. New York:
McGraw-Hill
Brunei, F. F., Tietje, B. C., & Greenwald, A. G. (2004). Is the Implicit Association Test a
valid and valuable measure of implicit consumer social cognition. Journal o f
Consumer Psychology, 14: 385-404.
Bush, G.W. (2001, Nov. 10). Remarks to UN General Assembly. [Transcript of speech].
The Victoria Advocate web site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002 from:
http ://www.thevictoriaadvocate.com/America_Under_Attack/Transcripts/story/167
946p-1610636c.html
Bush, G.W. (2002, Jan. 30). State o f the Union Address. 2002. The New York Times web
site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002, from: http://query.nytimes.com/search/article-
printpage.html?pagewanted=2&res=9805E7D6103AF933A05752C0A9649C8B63
Bush, G. (2005). Address to Troops at Fort Bragg, www.nationalreview.com. Retrieved

July 13, 2005.
Bush, G. (2005). Inaugural Address, www.washingtonpost.com. Retrieved July 13, 2005.
Chen, M., & Bargh, J.A. (1997). Unconscious behavioral confirmation processes: The
self-fulfilling consequences of automatic stereotypes activation. Journal o f
Experimental Social Psychology, 33, 541-560
Cohrs, J. C., Moschner, B., Maes J., Kielmann, S. (2005). Personal values and attitudes
toward war. Peace and Conflict: Journal o f Peace Psychology, 7/(3), 293-312.
Commission for Racial Equality (2005). Islamophobia. www.cre.gov.uk. Retrieved on

July 16, 2005.
Conway, F. and Siegelman, J. (1982). Holy Terror: The Fundamentalist War on

America's Freedoms in Religion, Politics, and Our Private Lives. Garden City,
NY: Doubleday.
Cornell University Poll. (2004). www.amperspective.com
Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., & Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The police officers dilemma
using ethnicity to disambiguate potentially threatening individuals. Journal o f
Personality and Social Psychology, 53(6), 1314-1329.
Coryn, C. L., Beale, J. M., & Myers, K. M. (2004). Response to September 11: Anxiety,
patriotism, and prejudice in the aftermath of terror. Current Research in Social
Psychology, 9(12), 1-24.
98
Coryn, C., Beale, J., and Myers, K. (2003). Response to September 11: Anxiety,
Patriotism, and Prejudice in the Aftermath of Terror. Current Research in Social
Psychology 9: 165-184.
Craik, K.H. (1993). Fifty years o f personality psychology. New York, Plenum Press
Criss, J.E. & Johnson, P.B. (1989). Patriarchal structures and acceptance o f war: The
values o f dominance, hierarchy, instrumentalism, and masculinity. Paper
presented at Western Psychological Association / Rocky Mountain Psychological
Association Convention, Reno NV.
Christie, D. J., Wagner, R. V., & Winter, D. D. (2001). Peace, Conflict, and Violence:
Peace Psychology fo r the 21st Century. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall.
Dane, L. (2002) Address to the 110th Convention o f the American Psychological

Association. Chicago: 25 August 2002.
Davidi, D. (2004). Factors that Predict Attitudes Toward Muslims Post September 11th
Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. California School of Professional
Psychology.
Los Angeles, CA.
Davis, K. (1992, August). Ethnic minorities: Now and in the future. Paper presented at
the 100th annual meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington
D.C.
Dixon, J., Durrheim, K., & Tredoux, C. (2005). Beyond the optimal contact strategy: A
reality check for the contact hypothesis. American Psychologist, 60(1), 69-711.
Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. (1996). Reducing prejudice: Combating intergroup biases.
Current Directions in Psychological Science, 8, 101-105.
Duncan, B.L. (1976). Differential social perception and attribution of intergroup

violence: Testing the lower limits of stereotyping Blacks. Journal o f Personality
and Social Psychology, 34, 590-598.
Eberhardt, J. L., Golf, P. A., Purdie, V. J., & Davies, P. G. (2004). Seeing Black race,
crime, and visual processing. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology,
87(6), 876-893.
El Fadl, K. (1994). Islamic Law and Muslim Minorities: The Juristic Discourse on
Muslim Minorities from the Second/Eighth to the Eleventh/Seventeenth Centuries.
Islamic Law and Society 1: 161- 178.
99
Harden, B. & Kilbom, P. (2002, Oct. 6). Nation's memory of 9/11 colors the debate on
Iraq. The New York Times web site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002, from:
http://www.nytimes.eom/2002/l 0/06/national/06VOIC.html?pagewanted=print&po
sition=top
Harris, B. (2001). Violence, Crime and Xenophobia. Violence and Transition 5: 34-41.
Hewstone, M., & Brown, R. (1986). Contact is not enough: An intergroup perspective on
the "Contact hypothesis". In M.
Hewstone & R. Brown (eds.), Contact and conflict in intergroup encounters. Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Hewstone, M., Islam, M. R., & Judd, C. M. (1993). Models o f crossed categorization and
intergroup relations. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 64(5), 779-
793.
Hilton & von Hippel (1993) Inhibitory effect o f schematic processing on perceptual
encoding. Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology, 64, 921-935
Hinde, R. and Pulkinnen, L. (2000). Human Aggressiveness and War. 50th Pugwash
Conference On Science and World Affairs: Eliminating the Causes o f War
Queens' College, Cambridge, UK, 3-8 August.
Hinde, R.A. (1997). Relationships: a Dialectical Perspective. Hove: Psychology Press.
Hinde, R. and Rotblat, J. (2003) War no more: eliminating conflict in the nuclear age.
London: Pluto Press.
Hoge, W. (2002, Oct. 1). Blair presses call for action on Iraq with Laborite delegates. The
New York Times web site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002,
from:http ://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/01 /intemational/01CND-
BRIT.html?pagewanted=print&position=top
Holt, R. (1987). Converting the War System to a Peace System: Some Contributions from
Psychology and Other Social Sciences. Paper presented at the Conference of
Exploratory Project on the Conditions o f Peace. Cohassat, MN.
Hood, R.W., Jr., R. J. Morris, & Watson, P., (1986). Maintenance o f religious
fundamentalism. Psychological Reports 59: 547-559
Horowitz, M., Wilner, M., and Alverez, W. (1997). Impact o f event scale: A measure of
subjective stress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 41, 209-218. Retrieved January 9,
2004, from http://www.swin.edu.au/victims/resources/assessment/ptsd/ies.html.
100
Hunsberger, B. (1996). Religious fundamentalism, right-wing authoritarianism, and
hostility toward homosexuals in non-Christian religious groups. International
Journal fo r the Psychology o f Religion 6:39-49.
Hunsberger, B. (1989). A short version o f the Christian Orthodoxy scale. Journal fo r the
Scientific Study o f Religion 28: 360-365.
Johnson, P., Friedman, D., (1989). Western Values and War. Paper presented at the
annual meeting o f the Western Psychological Association and the Rocky
Mountain Psychological Association, Reno, NV.
Johnson, P., Handler, A. and Criss, J. (1993). Beliefs Related to the Acceptance o f War:
A Social Systems Perspective. In K. Larsen (Ed.). Social Psychology and
Conflict. London: Sage.
Jones, J. M. (1997). Prejudice and racism (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism
as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339-375
Judd, C. M., Park, B., Wolsko, C. (2001). Measurement o f subtyping in stereotype

change. Journal o f Experimental Social Psychology , 3 7 , 325-332.
Judd, C. M., Ryan, C. S., and Parke, B. (1991) Accuracy in the judgment o f in-group and
out-group variability. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 366-401.
Kellman, L. (2002, Sept. 20). Bush outlines preemptive strike strategy. Newsday.com.
Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002, from:
http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/sns-iraq-
usstrategy ,0,5609024. story
Kerlinger, F.N. (1984). Liberalism and conservatism: The nature and structure o f social
attitudes. Hillside, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.
Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1993). Fundamentalism, Christian orthodoxy, and intrinsic religious

orientation as predictors of discriminatory attitudes. Journal fo r the Scientific
Study o f Religion 32:256-68.
Kosterman, R. & Feshbach, S (1987). A Measure o f Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes.

Unpublished manuscript, University o f California, Los Angeles.
Lerner, S., Gonzalez, R., Small, D., Fischoff, B., (2002). Effects o f fear and anger on
perceived risks of terrorism: A national field experiment. Journal o f
Psychological Science, 14, 144-150
10 1
LeShan, L. (2002). The Psychology o f War. New York: Helios Press.
Linville, P. W. (1998). The heterogeneity o f homogeneity. In J. M. Darley & J. Cooper

(Eds), Attribution and social interaction: The legacy o f Edward E. Jones (pp.
423-462). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Livengood, J. and Stodolska, M. (2004). Effects o f Discrimination and Constraints

Negotiation on Leisure Behavior o f American Muslims in the Post September 11
America. Journal o f Leisure Research 36: 183-208.
Mattil, J. (2004). Religious Fundamentalism, Fear and Terrorism.

www.flashpoints.info/FlashPoints home.html
Maykovich, M.K. (1975). Correlates o f racial prejudice. Journal o f Personality and

Social Psychology, 32 (6), 1014-1020
Mayton, D.M.., Peters, D.J., & Owens, R.W. (1999). Values, militarism, and nonviolent
predispositions. Peace and Conflict: Journal o f Peace Psychology, 5, 69-77
McAlister, A., Sandstrom, P., Puska, P., Veijo, A., Chereches, R., & Heidmets, L. (2001).
Attitudes towards war, killing, and punishment o f children among young people
in Estonia, Finland, Romania, the Russian Federation, and the USA. Bulletin
World Health Organization, 79(5), 1-11.
McClay, W. M. (2004). The soul o f a nation. Public Inter est,(\55), 4-19.
McConahay, J. (1986). Modem Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In
S. Gaertner and Dovidio, J. (Eds.). Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism. San
Diego: Academic Press.
McConahay, J. and Hough, J. (1976). Symbolic Racism. Journal o f Social Issues 32: 23-
45.
McFarland, S.G. (1989). Religious orientations and the targets of discrimination. Journal
fo r the Scientific Study or Religion, 28: 324-336.
Meertens, R. and Pettigrew, T. (1997). Is Subtle Prejudice Really Prejudice: Public

Opinion Quarterly 61: 54-71.
Miles, J. (2004). Religion and American foreign policy. Survival, 46( 1), 23-37.
Miller-Kustek, A. (1989). The Relationship Between We/They Attitudes and the

Acceptance o f War and Planned Violence Against Groups. Unpublished Doctoral
Dissertation. California School of Professional Psychology. Los Angeles, CA.
102
Modood, T. (2005). Multicultural Politics Racism, Ethnicity, and Muslims in Britain.
Edinburg: Edinburg University Press.
Modood, T. (1994) Political Blackness and British Asians, Sociology, vol. 28, no. 3: 117-
124.
Montada, L. and Lerner, M. (Eds.) (1998). Responses to Victimization and B elief in a Just
World. Critical Issues in Social Justice. New York: Springer.
Mosse, George L. (1990) Fallen Soldiers. Reshaping the Memory o f the World Wars.
New York and Oxford: Oxford University press.
Naff, A., (1993). Arabs in America: A historical overview. In S.Y. Abraham &
N. Abraham (Eds.), Arabs in the new world: Studies on Arab-American
Communities (pp.9-29). Detroit, MI; Wayne State University Center for
Urban Studies.
Neisser, U. (1976). Cognition and Reality. New York: W. El. Freeman and Company.
Nelson, L.I., & Milbum, T.W., (1999). Relationships between problem-solving

competencies and militaristic attitudes: Implications for peace education.
Peace and Conflict: Journal o f Peace Psychology, 5, 149-168.
O'Neil, K. M., Patry, M. W., & Penrod, S. D. (2004). Exploring the effects o f attitudes
toward the death penalty on capital sentencing verdicts. Psychology, Public
Policy, and Law, 70(4), 443-470.
Peterson, B. E., Smirles, K. A., & Wentworth, P. A. (1997). Generativity and

authoritarianism: Implications for personality, political involvement, and
parenting. Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology, 72(5), 1202-1216.
Pettigrew, T. F., & Tropp, L. R. (2000). Does intergroup contact reduce prejudice?
Recent meta-analytic findings. In S. Oskamp (Ed.), Reducing prejudice and
discrimination: Social psychological perspectives (pp. 93-114). Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Pettigrew, T. (1971). Racially Separate or Together? New York: McGraw-Flill.
Pettigrew, T. and Meertens, R. (1995). Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe.
European Journal o f Social Psychology 25: 57-75.
Pettigrew, T.F. (1997) The ultimate attribution error: Extending Allport's cognitive
analysis o f prejudice. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 5, 461-476.
1 03
Petty, R.E. & Cacioppo, J.T. (1996). Attitudes and persuasion: Classic and contemporary
approaches. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Philpott, D. (2002). The challenge o f September 11 to secularism in international

relations. World Politics, 55(1), 66-95.
Pinter, B., & Greenwald, A. G. (2005). Clarifying the role o f the "other" category in the
self-esteem IAT. Experimental Psychology, 52: 74-79.
Poynting, S. (2004). Living with racism: The experience and reporting by Arab and
Muslim Australians o f discrimination, abuse, and violence since 11 September
2001. A report to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, Center
fo r Cultural Research, University o Western Sydney. Found at:
www.uws.edu.au/ccr
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social dominance
orientation a personality variable predicting social and political attitudes. Journal
o f Personality and Social Psychology, 67(4), 741-763.
Reeves, F. (1983). British Racial Discourse: A Study o f British Political Discourse About
Race and Race-related Matters. Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy.
Ricks, T.E. & Loeb, V. (2002, June 10). Bush developing military policy o f striking first.
New doctrine addresses terrorism. Washington Post, p. A01. Washington Post web
site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002 from: http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-
dyn/A22374-2002Jun9?language=printer
Ridley, C.R. (1985). Imperatives for ethnic and cultural relevance in psychology
training programs. Professional Psychology: Research and Practice, 16(5), 611-
622.
Rivers, R. (2005). Reconciling the Divide: Understanding Islam from a Peace

Perspective. Center for Peace Studies, www.pcs.wavne.edu
Rokeach, M. (1968). Beliefs, Attitudes and Values: A Theory o f Organization and

Change. San Francisco: Josey-Bass Publishers.
Rokeach, M. (1973). The Nature o f Human Values. New York: The Free Press.
Rokeach, M. (1960). The Open and Closed Mind. New York: Basic Books.
Rosenberg, M. J., & Hovland, C. I. (1960). Cognitive, affective, and behavioral

components o f attitudes. In C. I. Floveland & M. J. Rosenberg (Eds.). Attitude
organization and change. New Haven: Yale University Press.
104
Rosenthal, K. (1990). Attitudes toward Structural Violence, War and Peace: A Systems
Perspective. Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation. California School o f Professional
Psychology, Los Angeles, CA.
Rosenthal, K. and Johnson, P. (1989). Attitudes Toward Structural Violence and War.
Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting o f the Western Psychological Association
and the Rock Mountain Psychological Association, Reno, NV.
Rowatt, W., Franklin, L. and Cotton, M. (2005). Patterns and Personality Correlates of
Implicit and Explicit Attitudes towards Christians and Muslims. Journal fo r the
Scientific Study o f Religion 44: 29-43.
Rudiger, I. (2003). Islamophobia. London: Institute for Public Policy Research.
Rummel, R. J. (1979). Understanding conflict and war, Volume 2. The conflict helix.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications. Found online at:
www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/NOTEl 1.htm
Runnymede Trust (2004). Islamophobia. www.runnymedetrust.org
Sagar, H.A., & Schofield, J.W. (1980) Racial and behavioral cues in Black and White
childrens perceptions o f ambiguously aggressive acts. Journal o f Personality
and Social Psychology, 39, 590-598.
Said, E. (1981). Covering Islam : how the media and the experts determine how we see
the rest o f the world. New York: Pantheon Books.
Sajid, A. (2005). Islamophobia: A New Word for an Old Fear. The American Muslim.
http://theamericanmuslim. Org/2005jan-comments. Retrieved July 15, 2005.
Saucier, G. (2000). Isms and the structure o f social attitudes. Journal o f Personality and
Social Psychology, 78(2), 366-385
Sears, D. and Kinder, D. (1971). Racial Tensions and Voting in Los Angeles. In Los
Angeles: Viability and Prospects fo r Metropolitan Leadership. New York:
Praeger.
Sears, D. (1988). Symbolic Racism. In P. Katz and D. Taylor (Eds.). Eliminating Racism:
Profiles in Controversy. New York: Plenum Press.
Sears, D., Laar, C., Carillo, M., and Kosterman, R. (1997). The Conceptualization and
Measurement o f Symbolic Racism. Journal o f Politics: 247-268.
Seidel, G. (1986) Culture, nation and race in the British and French New Right in R.
Levitas. The Ideology o f the New Right. Oxford: Polity Press.
1 05
Shenon, P. & Johnston, D. (2002, Oct. 6). Seeking terrorist plots, F.B.I. Is tracking
hundreds o f Muslims. The New York Times web site. Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002, from:
http://www.nytimes.eom/2002/l 0/06/national/06SLEE.html?pagewanted=print&po
sition=top
Shepphird, S. (1996). The Relationship Between Attitudes Toward Racism, Sexism, Rape,
Direct Violence and Nonviolent International Conflict Resolution. Unpublished
Doctoral Dissertation. The California School O f Professional Psychology. Los
Angeles, CA.
Sherif, M. & Cantril, H. (1947). The psychology o f ego-involvements: Social attitudes

and involvements. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Silverstein, B., & Holt, R. R. (1989). Research on enemy images: Present status and
future prospects. .Journal o f Social Issues, 45(2), 159-175.
Southern Poverty Law Center. (2005). Symbolic Racism, www.splcenter.org
Stone, R. (2004). Islamophobia: Issues, Challenges and Action. Stoke-on-Trent, UK:

Trentham Books.
Suleiman, M. (1988). America and the Arabs: Negative images and feasibility of
Dialogue. In B. Abu-Laden & M.W. Suleiman, Arab Americans; continuity
and change (pp.251-269). Belmont, MA Association of Arab American
university Graduates.
Sullaway, M. (2004). Psychological perspectives on hate crime laws. Psychology, Public

Policy, and Law, 10(3), 250-292.
Sundin, E.C. & Horowitz, M.J. (2002). Impact o f events scale: Psychometric properties.
British Journal o f Psychiatry, 180(3), 205-209.
Schwartz, S.H. (1992). Universals in the content structures o f values: Theoretical

advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M.P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances
in experimental social psychology (Vol. 25, pp. 1-65). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Tessler, M. (2003). Arab and Muslim Political Attitudes: Stereotypes and Evidence from
Survey Research. International Studies Perspectives 4: 175-180.
Tessler, M. (1998). Islam and Attitudes Toward International Conflict: Evidence from
Survey Research in the Arab World." Journal o f Conflict Resolution 42
(October): 619-636.
106
Twair, P., & Twair, S. (2002). Muslims host media panel on coverage o f 9/11
aftermath. The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, 21(8), 68.
Unger, R. (2002). Them and Us: Hidden Ideologies - Differences in Degree or Kind?
Analysis o f Social Issues and Public Policy 2: 43-62.
Unger, R. (2005). The Limits o f Demographic Categories and the Politics o f the 2004
Presidential Election. Analyses o f Social Issues and Public Policy 5: 153-160.
Wald, M.L. & Sack, K. (2001, Oct. 16). A nation challenged: The tapes; 'We have some
planes,' hijacker said on Sept. 11. [On-line], The New York Times web site.
Retrieved Oct. 6, 2002 from: http://query.nytimes.com/search/article-
printpage.html?pagewanted=2&rcs=9801 E3DF163EF935A25753C1A9679C8B63
Wagner, U. (2001). Threats on Cultural Identity and Hostility Towards

Migrants:Research Centered on Ethnic Majorities. The International Scope
Review 3: 31-35.
Winter, D. and Leighton, D. (1999). Structural Violence. Vancouver: University of

British Columbia.
Wittenbrink, B., Judd, C. M., Park, B. (1997). Evidence for racial prejudice at the implicit
level and its relationship with questionnaire measures. Journal o f Personality &
Social Psychology 72: 262-274.
107
Appendix A
War Scale
Racism Scale
Muslim Beliefs Scale
Note.
Numbers refer to item number on questionnaire and (R) refers to items which are
reversals.
108
War
1) There are some situations in which we have no choice but to go to war.

9) War is useful.
17) The United States should not go to war. R
25) War is one legitimate way to react to threats from some groups.
34) War solves nothing. R
42) War is exciting.
50) War is obsolete. R
65) Sometimes war benefits us.
76) War is a legitimate way to solve conflict.
95) War should be abolished. R
81) Human beings are biologically predisposed to wage war.
Racism
2) I prefer being with people o f my own racial background.

10) I would like to get to know people from other ethnic backgrounds other than my
own. R
18) Ethnic minorities do not have the same opportunities for success that white people
do. R
27) Minority groups should help themselves instead o f receiving special help from the
government.
35) Minority groups have too much say in the way things are run.
43) Its easy to understand the anger o f minorities in America. R
51) People from my own group are more important to me than people from different
ethnic groups.
90) Sometimes people take equality to far.
92) I dont care to learn about ethnic groups other than my own.
109
Muslim Beliefs Scale
4) Arabs and Muslims are the same.
12) Muslims are followers of Islam.
20) I would like to understand Muslim culture. R
29) Most Muslims are terrorists.
37) Islam is a religion of peace. R
45) Islam promotes terrorism
61) According to the teachings of Islam, life is sacred. R
71) Islam believes that the present life is a trial preparation for the next realm of
existence. R
83) Islam is totally against killing innocent people. R
75) Christianity and Judaism have nothing in common with Islam.
55) Muslims violate womens human rights.
88) Muslims cannot be trusted.
11 0
Demographic Questionnaire
Instructions: The following questions are designed to obtain information about your
background. Please read each question carefully and mark your response in the space
provided. Please try to answer asaccurately as you can.Mark only one answer per
question. However,if there are somequestions that you cannot or do not wish to answer,
leave them blank. Thank you for you time and effort.
What is your gender? Male

Female
What is your age? _____
What is your highest grade com pleted? High School

Bachelors
M asters
Doctorate
What is your ethnic/racial background?__________________
What is your approximate annual household income (not including other family
m em bers)?_______________
What is your current marital status? _______ Single

_______ Married
_______ Living together, but not married
_______ Divorced
_______ Widowed
Do you have children? Yes
No
Ill
If yes, how many
What is your religious affiliation?___________________
How involved are you in your religious affiliation?

Strongly involved
Moderately involved
Slightly involved
Not involved
Not applicable (no religion)
Political Party:________________________________
All in all, Id rate myself politically as:
_______________Very conservative
_______________Conservative
_______________Slightly conservative
_______________Neither conservative nor liberal
_______________Slightly liberal
_______________Very liberal
112
Not applicable
Have you ever fought in a w ar?________
Have you ever lived in a country where you witnessed a war going on?
Are you currently in the military?___________
Are you considering joining the m ilitary?_______
Do you have any comments about this questionnaire?
113
Appendix C
Informed Consent
114
Informed Consent
Study o f Social Issues
I have been informed that this study involves research, which will be conducted by Venus
Nicolino, M.A., a Ph.D. student of clinical psychology at the California School of
Professional Psychology, Los Angeles (CSPP-LA) at Alliant International University and
Paula Johnson, Ph.D. a professor at California School of Professional Psychology (CSPP-
LA) at Alliant International University. I understand that this project is designed to study
social issues including peoples attitudes and beliefs towards other groups and beliefs
about war. I have volunteered to participate in this study. I understand that my
participation in this study will involve the completion o f one questionnaire. I am aware
that my involvement in this study will take approximately twenty minutes o f my time.
I understand that I may refuse to participate or withdraw from this study at any time
without any penalty. I understand that my identity as a participant in this study will be
kept in strict confidence and that no information that identifies me in any way will be
released without my separate written approval. I am aware that the information that
identifies me will be protected. I am aware that the signed consent form will be kept
separate from the questionnaire and the two will not be able to be linked.
I have been informed that only Venus Nicolino, M.A., Paula Johnson, Ph.D. and Dr.
Johnsons research assistant will have access to my individual responses and that all my
responses will be combined with everyone elses so my individual responses will not be
identified. I have been informed that the examiner will hold all data collected for five
years for further research after which time it will be destroyed.
I am aware that although I may not directly benefit from this study, my participation in
this project will produce information concerning social issues that may be o f benefit to
others.
I understand that the only possible risks to me in this study are that some of the questions
may make me uncomfortable. There are no other possible risks to me in this proposed
study beyond those that I would not already experience by taking the time to fill out the
questionnaire.
115
I have been informed that if my participation in this study makes me feel uncomfortable,
phone numbers below will be available for someone that I will be able to discuss my
feelings with me. I have also been informed that if necessary, a referral will be made for
further psychological help.
I understand that if I have any questions about this project or my participation in this
study I may contact Dr. Paula Johnson, or Ms. Nicolino care o f Dr. Johnson, at 1000
South Fremont Ave., Unit 5 Alhambra, CA. 91803, (626) 284-2777 x3037,
pjohnson@alliant.edu. I understand that I may request a summary o f results or additional
information about the study from Venus Nicolino M.A. or Paula Johnson Ph.D..
Thank you for your participation!
Venus Nicolino, M.A.
Paula Johnson, Ph.D.
1 16

Out

Încărcat de

Informații document

Titlu original

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Out

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN RACISM, ISLAMOPHOBIA, RELIGIOUS

DOGMATISM AND ATTITUDES TOWARD WAR

A dissertation submitted to the faculty o f the

California School o f Professional Psychology

In partial fulfillment o f the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology at

Alliant International University, Los Angeles, California

ProQuest Information and Learning Company

The Dissertation o f Venus M. Nicolino, directed and approved

Paula B. Johnson, Ph.D., Chairperson

Vula Baliotis, Ph.D.

Kevin Francis Cleary

April 15, 1962 - September 11, 2001

on the morning o f September 11, 2001

List of Tables ................................................................................................................................v

CHAPTER II LITERATURE R EV IEW .................................................................... 13

CHAPTER IV RESULTS ............................................................................................. 69

APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................... 108

I would like to extend my sincere appreciation and gratitude to Paula B. Johnson,

I was also fortunate to have Vula Baliotis, Ph.D. on my committee. Her

development and refinement o f this project. My deepest gratitude to Judy Holloway,

I would like to acknowledge my husband Matthew, for all o f his patience,

become a psychologist would be meaningless. He has allowed me to express a lifetime

heart and soul.

1990-1994 B.A., New York University

1994 Phi Beta Kappa, New York University

1996-1998 M.A., Counseling Psychology New York University

1998 Summa Cum Laude, New York University

1995-1999 Intern: Mt. Sinai Hospital, Rape Domestic Violence and

Incest Department New York, New York

1 9 9 8-2000 North Queens Medical, Mental Health Department:

2001-2003 Youth, Family Accountability Model: psychotherapist

2002-2003 Pre-Doctoral Practicum: Aids Project Los Angeles

2003 M.A., Clinical Psychology California School of

Professional Psychology, Los Angeles

2003-2004 Intern, Center For Healthy Aging

2004-2005 Intern, Center For Healthy Aging Health Department

The Relationships Between Racism, Islamophobia, Religious Dogmatism

and Attitudes Toward War

Doctor o f Philosophy in Clinical Psychology

California School of Professional Psychology, Los Angeles

Paula B. Johnson, Ph.D., Chairperson

negative attitudes toward Muslims (Islamophobia), religious dogmatism and attitudes

endorsement of we/they relationships and in-group/out-group phenomenon may be

endorsement o f pro-war attitudes. Although war is a complex system, this dissertation

for the understanding o f peace making are discussed.

Statement of the Problem

On September 11, 2001, 19 members o f the international Islamic terrorist group,

launch a counterattack against Afghanistan, the country, according to U.S. President,

and the governments profiling o f Arab-Americans (Shenon & Johnston, 2001).

Iraq (Kellman 2002; Ricks & Loeb, 2002).

violence as a way to resolve conflict.

In her address to the 110th Convention o f the American Psychological

appropriate response are important to explore.

behavior between individuals, specific groups, and nations.

Background and Study Rationale

Islamophobia, and religious dogmatism in relation to the acceptance o f war as a solution

to international conflict, as seen in the months after the events of 9/11.

may be seen in racism and also related to attitudes toward war.

to enable a critical examination o f what was previously covert or nonconsciously held. It

beliefs that support war.

constructs will be explored.

A belief is a mental representation and one o f the building blocks o f conscious