Intestate Estate of Petra V. Rosales.
SANTIAGO,
Irenea C. Rosales v. Fortunato Rosales, et. al.
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987
FACTS:
On February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra Rosales died intestate. She was survived by her
husband Fortunato Rosales and their two children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio
Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosario, predeceased her, leaving behind a child,
Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased. The trial court ordered that Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox
and Antonio be entitled each to share in the estate of decedent. Irenea, on the
other hand, insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving
spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Irenea is entitled to inherit from her mother-in-law.
RULING:
No. Under the law, intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups,
namely, those who inherit by their own right, and those who inherit by the right of
representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The law has already
meticulously enumerated the intestate heirs of a decedent. The Court held that
Irenea misinterpreted the provision of Article 887 because the provision refers to the
estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse is a
compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Therefore, the
surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-
law.
MA. PILAR SANTIAGO and CLEMENTE SANTIAGO vs. ZOILO S.
FELICIDAD SANTIAGO-RIVERA, HEIRS OF RICARDO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF
CIPRIANO SANTIAGO, HEIRS OF TOMAS SANTIAGO
G.R. No. 179859 August 9, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Facts:
Basilio Santiago contracted three marriages the first to Bibiana Lopez, the second to
Irene Santiago, and the third to Cecilia Lomotan. Basilio and his first wife bore two
offsprings, Irene and Marta, the mother of herein oppositors Felimon, Leonila,
Consolacion, Ananias, Urbano, and Gertrudes, all surnamed Soco. Basilio and his
second wife had six offsprings, Tomas, Cipriano, Ricardo, respondents Zoilo and
Felicidad, and petitioner Ma. Pilar, all surnamed Santiago. Basilio and his third wife
bore three children, Eugenia herein petitioner Clemente, and Cleotilde, all surnamed
Santiago.
One of the provision of the will state that e) Ang lupat bahay sa Lunsod ng Maynila
na nasasaysay sa itaas na 2(c) ay ililipat at ilalagay sa pangalan nila Ma. Pilar at
Clemente hindi bilang pamana ko sa kanila kundi upang pamahalaan at pangalagaan
lamang nila at nang ang sinoman sa aking mga anak sampu ng apo at kaapuapuhan
ko sa habang panahon ay may tutuluyan kung magnanais na mag-aral sa Maynila o
kalapit na mga lunsod x x x.
After the executrix-petitioner Ma. Pilar filed a Final Accounting, Partition and
Distribution in Accordance with the Will, the probate court approved the will by Order
of August 14, 1978 and directed the registers of deeds of Bulacan and Manila to
register the certificates of title indicated therein. The oppositors-heirs of the first
marriage thereupon filed a complaint for completion of legitime against the heirs of
the second and third marriages.
Issue:
Whether or not the decree of distribution of the estate of Basilio should remain
undisturbed
Ruling:
The Court is not persuaded. It is clear from Basilios will that he intended the house
and lot in Manila to be transferred in petitioners names for administration purposes
only, and that the property be owned by the heirs in common. But the condition set
by the decedent on the propertys indivisibility is subject to a statutory limitation. On
this point, the Court agrees with the ruling of the appellate court: For this Court to
sustain without qualification, petitionerss contention, is to go against the provisions
of law, particularly Articles 494, 870, and 1083 of the Civil Code, which provide that
the prohibition to divide a property in a co-ownership can only last for twenty (20)
years. Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the indivision of a property
for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-
ownership beyond the period expressly mandated by the Civil Code
ARELLANO v. PASCUAL
G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010
Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his
siblings, namely: petitioner Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters
Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P. Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual
and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for Judicial Settlement of Intestate Estate and
Issuance of Letters of Administration filed by respondents on April 28, 2000,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in
Teresa Village, Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent
to petitioner the validity of which donation respondents assailed, may be considered
as an advance legitime of petitioner. Respecting the donated property, now covered
in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of the Register of
Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited
that it may be considered as an advance legitime to petitioner, the trial court,
acting as probate court, held that it was precluded from determining the validity of
the donation.
ISSUE: WON the property is subject of collation.
NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in
so far as is possible, and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so
that inofficious donations may be reduced. Collation takes place when there are
compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime and the free
portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded.
The records do not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring
compulsory heirs. He was only survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives
and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime that part of the testators property
which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for compulsory heirs.The
decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he was
at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral
relatives to inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed
as donation made to a stranger, chargeable against the free portion of the estate.
There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated property is not subject to
collation.
GR No. 185226 Gregorio vs Madarang
FACTS: Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr died intestate leaving real and personal properties.
He was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr.,
Corazon, Ramiro, and the petitioners Vicente and Jose. Dolores was appointed as the
administratrix and subsequently submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties
of the decedents estate but omitted six lots including Lot 829-B-4-B, the land in
question. She omitted the land in question for the reason that it was donated in favor
to Vicente during the lifetime of Casimiro.
ISSUE: Whether or not the exclusion of the property is proper.
HELD: No, the exclusion is not proper. In cases of collation or advancement Article
1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by
way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the
determination of the legitime of each heir and in the account of partition. in relation
to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides Questions as to
advancement to be determined. Questions as to advancement made, or alleged to
have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the
court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been donated by the decedent and his wife
to their son-respondent Vicente, should not be excluded from the inventory of the
properties of the decedent.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed of all her properties
appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60,
household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in the sum of P409.95 and
ten shares of Pampanga Sugar Development Company valued at P350.00) among her
above- named heirs. The lower court, after hearing, sustained and approved the
executrix' project of partition, ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil
Code specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or prejudiced, the same
shall be completed and satisfied. While it is true that this process has been followed
and adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed that the executrix and
the oppositors differ in respect to the source from which the portion or portions shall
be taken in order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The proposition of the

MARINA DIZON-RIVERA vs. ESTELA DIZON, TOMAS V. DIZON, oppositors, if upheld, will substantially result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in

BERNARDITA DIZON, JOSEFINA DIZON, ANGELINA DIZON and LILIA controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code" adding that "the testatrix has

DIZON chosen to favor certain heirs in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted.
This is legally permissible within the limitation of the law
June 30, 1970 G.R. No. L-24561
Issue: Whether use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment or distribution of her
Teehankee, J.: real properties to the respective heirs are in the nature of devises of real property

Facts: Ruling:

On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles,
Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate
children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon (herein
executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate
granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon
Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent. Six of these seven
compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February 2, 1960 and written in the
Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will were the above-named compulsory
heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr.,
Gilbert D. Garcia, Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly Jimenez
and Laureano Tiambon.
For the adjudications and assignments in the testatrix' will of specific properties to
specific heirs cannot be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the whole
context of the will and the disposition by the testatrix of her whole estate (save for
some small properties of little value already noted at the beginning of this opinion)
that her clear intention was to partition her whole estate through her will. The
repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions acquire no
legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from
the free one-half disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix' intent
that her testamentary dispositions were by way of adjudications to the beneficiaries
as heirs and not as mere devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on
account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs is expressly borne out in
the fourth paragraph of her will, immediately following her testamentary
adjudications in the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise command that
in case any of those I named as my heirs in this testament any of them shall die
before I do, his forced heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall
inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being dispositions in favor of
compulsory heirs, do not have to be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the Civil Code precisely
provides that "One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said
heirs." And even going by oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph
of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the executrix-appellee, who
admittedly was favored by the testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing
that "The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the entire property,
provided its value does not exceed that of the disposable portion and of the share
pertaining to him as legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual reason for
making a testament; otherwise, the decedent might as well die
intestate." Fundamentally, of course, the dispositions by the testatrix constituted a
partition by will, which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of the other
cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of the testator's last will and testament,
have to be respected insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.
Adjudication: ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed.
Buhay De Roma v. CA (July 23, 1987)
Facts: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died
intestate. When administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed
administratrix and filed an inventory of the estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the
ground that certain properties donated by their mother to Buhay and fruits thereof
had not been included. The Parcels of Land totaled P10,297.50 and the value is not
disputed. The TC issued an order in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated
the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of Donation sa pamamagitan ng
pagbibigay na din a mababawing muli which the TC interpreted as a prohibition to
collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. On appeal,
it was reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express
prohibition to collate.
Issue: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.
Held: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must
bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)
Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should
have so expressly provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless
the donation should be reduced as inofficious. (1036)
The SC affirmed the appellate courts decision and that it merely described the
donation as irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily
exempt the donated properties from collation as required under the provisions of the
NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of donation the decedent donor would
have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the donors intention.
Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemption should be
applied.-MJA
MARIANO B. LOCSIN, JULIAN J. LOCSIN, et al., petitioners, vs. The CA,
JOSE JAUCIAN, et al., respondents.
Facts: Don Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament instituting his wife,
Catalina Jaucian Locsin, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties. The
spouses being childless, had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall
have died should revert to their respective sides of the family, i.e., Mariano's
properties would go to his "Locsin relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews
and nieces), and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives."
 Don Mariano died of cancer on September 14, 1948 after a lingering illness.
In due time, his will was probated in Special Proceedings No. 138, CFI of Albay
without any opposition from both sides of the family. Don Mariano relied on Doa
Catalina to carry out the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his
death, as if in obedience to his voice from the grave, and fully cognizant that she was
also advancing in years, Doa Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or
assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews
and nieces. She made the following sales and donation of properties which she had
received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews and nieces:
Four years before her death, she had made a will on October 22, 1973 she
had made a will affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime
in favor of her husband's, and her own, relatives. After the reading of her will, all the
relatives agreed that there was no need to submit it to the court for probate because
the properties devised to them under the will had already been conveyed to them by
the deceased when she was still alive, except some legacies which the executor of
her will or estate, Attorney Salvador Lorayes, proceeded to distribute.
In 1989, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had already received
their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the RTC-Legaspi
to recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime,
alleging that the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration, and intended
solely to circumvent the laws on succession. Those who were closest to Doa Catalina
did not join the action.
After the trial, judgment was rendered in favor of Jaucian, and against the
Locsin. The CA affirmed the said decion,hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Doa Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin,
are entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more than ten
(10) years before her death.
Held: NO
They are not entitled since those properties did not form part of her hereditary
estate, i.e., "the property and transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time
of (the decedent's) death and those which have accrued thereto since the opening of
the succession."
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his
death, and do not vest in his heirs until such time.
Property which Doa Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to
which her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the property that
remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her legal heirs.
Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right
arising under certain circumstances to impugn and compel the reduction or
revocation of a decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the respondents since
neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs.
Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that
she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired
by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was
an expectancy that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire
estate subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it
were breached, the respondents may not invoke: Art. 750. The donation may
comprehend all the present property of the donor or part thereof, provided he
reserves, in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the support of himself,
and of all relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the donation shall
be reduced on petition of any person affected.
Petition for review is granted.